Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...before the disposition hearing. Id. § 39.521(1)(a). The case plan is a document that “follows the child from the provision of voluntary services through any dependency, foster care, or termination of parental rights proceeding or related activity or process.” Id. § 39.01(11)....

...ather may sign a valid consent for adoption at any time after the birth of the child." § 63.085(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). "Parent" is defined in pertinent part as "a man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under s. 63.062(1)." § 39.01(49), Fla....

...Florida Statutes (2005), because "the mother executed a waiver of venue . . . and the adoption entity is located in Hillsborough County." [4] Section 63.032(12), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that "`[p]arent' has the same meaning as ascribed in s. 39.01." [5] Section 63.087(5), Florida Statutes (2005), requires that the petitioner serve the petition and summons "upon any person whose consent is required but who has not provided that consent." [6] We do not discuss in this case the requireme...

...court err in its final Order by holding that the maternal grandparents of the child should not be awarded custody? We answer both of these questions in the affirmative. As to the first issue, Chapter 73-231, Section 2, Laws of Florida, which amends § 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, defines a "dependent child", inter alia, as a child who "is surrendered to the division of family services or a licensed child placing agency for purposes of adoption." (§ 39.01(10)(g))....

...A parent who surrenders his or her child for adoption is obviously unable, for one reason or another, to maintain the child. Also, it is our interpretation of the statute's intent that the Home Society should be considered a temporary foster home or, at the very least, an "agency of the state". See § 39.01(14)....

...ion on page 164. Instead, a note should replace the instruction on that page as follows: Note to Judge: Prepare the definition of "delinquency" or of "dependency" based on the statutory definitions in effect at the time of the alleged offense. See F.S. 39.01....

...(g) Is surrendered to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services or a licensed child-placing agency for purpose of adoption. (h) Has persistently run away from his parents or legal guardian. (i) Being subject to compulsory school attendance, is habitually truant from school. Fla.Stat. § 39.01(8) (1977)....

...court err in its final Order by holding that the maternal grandparents of the child should not be awarded custody? We answer both of these questions in the affirmative. As to the first issue, Chapter 73-231, Section 2, Laws of Florida, which amends § 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, defines a “dependent child”, inter alia, as a child who “is surrendered to the division of family services or a licensed child placing agency for purposes of adoption.” (§ 39.01(10) (g))....

...sequently, the well-being of the child requires severing the parent's legal custody or relationship with the child. Id. at 744 (emphasis added). When this Court decided Doe, chapter 63 did not include a definition of abandonment. The Court looked to section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1985), which defined abandonment *966 in juvenile proceedings....

...onetheless decided that such conduct is relevant because it "does tend to prove or disprove material facts bearing on abandonment." Id. at 746. After Doe, the Legislature amended section 63.032 to define abandonment. The definition tracks the one in section 39.01(1) (juvenile proceedings), but adds a sentence that is critical to the instant case: "In making this decision [of abandonment], the court may consider the conduct of a father toward the child's mother during her pregnancy." § 63.032(14), Fla....

...To make matters worse, we are applying it in an undisciplined fashion to a relationship between a father and an unborn child during an extremely brief period of time immediately before the child is born. [23] As set out in an unbroken line of cases, and, indeed, made explicit in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1993), abandonment means a "willful rejection of parental obligations." To be guilty of abandonment, a parent, while able, must be found to have made "no provision for the child's support" and made "no effort to communicate with the child." Id....

...o assume all parental responsibilities and the Court, therefore, declares that the child was abandoned." 647 So.2d 918, 922-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). [24] In *981 approving this as a proper test for abandonment, this Court focuses on loose language in section 39.01(1) that was not intended to supplant and is at odds with the long-established stringent test of abandonment....

...tal duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned." Matter of Adoption of Doe, 543 So.2d 741, 745 (Fla. 1989). The trial court found that to be the situation here. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So.2d 918, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). [25] Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: "Abandoned" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person responsible for the child's welfare, while being able,...

...y person under the age of eighteen F.S. years. 827.01(1) Note to Prepare the definition of "delinquency," or of Judge "dependency," or "child in need of services" based on the statutory definitions in effect at the time of the alleged offense. See F.S. 39.01....

...The Act defines a dependent child as one who inter alia is at risk of imminent abuse or neglect: (11) "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: . . . . (f) To be at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect by the parent or parents or the custodian. § 39.01, Fla....

...shelter, or medical treatment or permits a child to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired. § 39.01, Fla....

...uage of the Act. A simple showing by DCF that a parent committed a sex act on one child does not by itself constitute proof that the parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to the child's sibling, as required by the statute. See § 39.01(11), Fla....

...[17] A court may find that a child who has not actually "been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parents" is nonetheless dependent if that child is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodian." § 39.01(11)(a), (f), Fla....

the child and the best interests of the state." § 39.001(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1991).[9] Id. (emphasis added)

statutory definition of abuse. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.01.

...ordinance] with disorderly conduct and with possessing and showing obscene motion picture films." 189 So.2d at 847. See also Moffett v. State, 340 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 1976). [4] A delinquent child is defined as "a child who commits a violation of law." Section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...In relevant part, the title of the session law states: [r]evis[ed], reorganize[ed], and combin[ed] chapters 39 and 959, F.S.; amend[ed] s. 39.001, F.S.; provid[ed] purpose; amend[ed] s. 39.002, F.S.; provid[ed] legislative purpose for the juvenile justice system; amend[ed] s. 39.01, F.S.; revising definitions ...; provid[ed] for medical, psychiatric, psychological, substance abuse, and educational examination and treatment; provid[ed] for intake and case management procedures and criteria, including a case management s...

...ment procedures ...; authorize[ed] departure from department-recommended restrictiveness levels based upon preponderance of the evidence ... [ [27] ]; provid[ed] powers of disposition.... Ch. 90-208, title, at 1083, Laws of Fla. The 1990 Act revised section 39.01(21), Florida Statutes, the precursor to section 985.03(21), Florida Statutes (2007), to state: "Disposition hearing" means a hearing in which the court determines the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting provided for under s. 39.052(3) 39.09(3), in delinquency cases.... Ch. 90-208, § 3, at 1090-91, Laws of Fla.; [28] see also § 39.01(21), Fla....

...Section 985.433(7)(a)-(b), Florida Statutes (2007), which governs disposition hearings in delinquency cases, contains very similar language but does not require that the juvenile court state its departure reasons in writing; instead, these reasons must simply be presented on the record. Relatedly, the 1990 Act created section 39.01(61), Florida Statutes, which defined "restrictiveness level" as: [T]he identification of broad custody categories for committed children, including nonresidential, residential, and secure residential....

...Specific placement in restrictiveness levels within these categories depends on the risk and needs of the individual child. Restrictiveness levels must be established by the department by rule, provided however that there shall be no more than 8 levels. Ch. 90-208, § 3, at 1094, Laws of Fla. (emphasis supplied); § 39.01(61), Fla....

...juvenile court's overarching duty to determine "the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting" and the requirement that the juvenile court exercise " appropriate discretion " when doing so. §§ 39.001(2)(f), 39.01(21), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990) (emphasis supplied); §§ 985.01(1)(e)1., 985.03(21), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis supplied). These are the specific decisions that a juvenile court is required to make during a disposition hearing. The definitions provided in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), and section 985.03, Florida Statutes (2007), do not define the "reasons" that the juvenile court must provide when departing from a DJJ-recommended disposition....

...— and further — its ultimate responsibility and obligation to exercise " appropriate discretion " in providing the juvenile offender with "the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting." §§ 39.001(2)(f), 39.01(21), Fla....

...rovides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless."). [33] § 985.03(21), Fla. Stat. (2007); formerly § 985.03(22), Fla. Stat. (2005); formerly § 39.01(28), Fla. Stat. (1995); formerly § 39.01(21), Fla....

total of $500,000 per incident); N.D. Cent. Code § 39-01-08 (1980) (immunity waived to extent of governmental

...urt's findings unless it may be said as a matter of law that no one could reasonably find such evidence to be clear and convincing. In re D.J.S., 563 So.2d 655, 662 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). See also Florida Bar v. Hooper, 509 So.2d 289, 290 (Fla. 1987). Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Specific placement in restrictiveness levels within these categories depends upon the risk and needs of the individual child. Restrictiveness levels must be established by [HRS] *990 by rule, provided however that there shall be no more than eight levels. § 39.01(61), Fla....

...9.061, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). HRS, meanwhile, is given purported authority to define the "restrictiveness levels" in terms of broad custody categories based on "the risk and needs of the individual child," of which there can be no more than eight. § 39.01(61), Fla....

...a "`hiatus' in the law that would be intolerable to society." Majority op. at 995. Certainly this case does not present a situation where the loss of the invalid portion of the statute creates an "intolerable hiatus in the law." Id. at 995. Sections 39.01(61) and 39.061 were amended by the legislature in 1992, and as amended appear to cure the delegation problems....

...n is a means of detaining a juvenile in state custody pending a delinquency hearing. Commitment to a juvenile facility is one option the juvenile judge has after the child is adjudicated delinquent. Compare § 39.002(4), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990) with § 39.01(18), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990) and with § 39.01(45), Fla....

...efore placing M.W. in a residential psychiatric treatment facility. See M.W., 722 So.2d at 968-69. As the temporary legal custodian of the dependent child, the Department has the statutory authority to obtain "ordinary" medical treatment pursuant to section 39.01(70), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), but that authority may be enlarged by a court order....

...At the adjudicatory hearing, the dependency court must determine whether the Department has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is dependent-for example, abandoned, abused, or neglected, or is at substantial risk of imminent harm from abandonment, abuse, or neglect. See §§ 39.01(14); 39.507(1)(b), Fla....

...Chapter 39 defines "temporary legal custody" as "the relationship that a juvenile court creates between a child and an adult relative of the child, legal custodian, or caregiver approved by the court, or other person until a more permanent arrangement is ordered." § 39.01(70)....

...ce provider." A construction that section 39.407(4) applies to children who have been adjudicated dependent and placed in the temporary *103 legal custody of the Department would expressly conflict with the Department's specific authority granted by section 39.01(70) to obtain ordinary psychological or psychiatric care for dependent children in its temporary legal custody....

...m used by section 39.407(4). However, the term "taken into custody" is defined as "the status of a child immediately when temporary physical control over the child is attained by a person authorized by law, pending the child's release or placement." § 39.01(69) (emphasis supplied)....

...itted to the department." This subsection clearly applies to those children who have been placed in emergency shelter, but not to those children who have been adjudicated dependent and placed in the Department's temporary legal custody. *104 Because section 39.01(70) provides that the Department has the authority to consent to ordinary medical treatment for those children who have been adjudicated dependent and placed in its custody, it is logical that the procedure spelled out in section 39.407...

...the child by a "licensed health care professional," or an evaluation by a psychiatrist or psychologist. Once again, interpreting this subsection as applicable to children in the Department's legal custody would conflict with the authority granted by section 39.01(70) to obtain "ordinary" medical and psychological care....

...red by section 394.467(1). These positions appears to be consistent with the statutory framework of Chapter 39 and the overall legislative intent in enacting this chapter. Accordingly, reading the entire text of section 39.407 together with sections 39.01(69) and (70), 39.508, 39.601 and 39.701, we find that the Legislature did not intend for the Baker Act to apply to those children who have been adjudicated dependent and placed in the *106 temporary legal custody of the Department....

...es. [25] A dependent child is also defined as including one who was voluntarily placed with a child-placing agency, adult relative, or the Department, as well as a child with no parent or legal custodian capable of providing supervision or care. See § 39.01(14), Fla....

well-being of all children under the state's care." § 39.001(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). The department's role

...as not applicable to speech. See id. at 891. Turning to the vagueness challenge, the district court, relying on Fuchs, held that the term "mental injury," as used in section 827.03(1)(b), is not unconstitutionally vague since the term is defined in section 39.01(44), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...That definition provides: "Mental injury" means an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior. § 39.01(44), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998); see also ch. 98-403, § 20, Laws of Fla. The definition for "mental injury" is currently located in section 39.01(43). See § 39.01(43), Fla....

...ry to a child. "Abuse," as defined in chapter 39, includes any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's mental health to be significantly impaired. See § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). [6] Relatedly, "harm," as defined in section 39.01(30), can occur to a child's health or welfare when any person "[i]nflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury." The term "harm" was similarly defined in section 415.503....

...In this case the trial court determined the evidence established neglect. Appellant contends neglect cannot be prospective, and because she never had custody of the child, she could not have legally neglected him. We disagree. We also think abuse under section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1980), provides: When any child is adjudicated by a court to be dependent, the court having jurisdiction of the child shall have the power, by order, to: ... . [p]ermanently commit the child ... [i]f the court finds that the parent has abandoned, abused, or neglected the child. Section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The Legislature clearly did not intend to have a child suffer such an experience before a trial court could act. Because of the clear and convincing evidence that neglect and abuse will occur if the child is placed in the care of his mother, we affirm. ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by clear and convincing evidence. [3] In contrast, the third ground for commitment, i.e., abandonment may not be considered prospectively in view of the language of section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

their constitutional and other legal rights." § 39.001, Fla. Stat. (1995). Pursuant to chapter 39, parental

is rehabilitation rather than retribution. See § 39.001(2), Fla. Stat. (1985). The Act's procedures expedite

...equences to the community at large. Parents have responsibilities. The State already demands a certain threshold level of care under its child neglect statutes. See, e.g., § 39.001(3), Fla. Stat. (2002) (outlining general protections for children); § 39.01, Fla....

...quired by law"); they cannot abuse or neglect their children, see § 39.806(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2003) (providing for termination of parental rights when parent abuses child); and they must give their children a certain level of financial support, see § 39.01(30)(f), Fla....

...Provision of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. In this case, the Department established that the Mother had harmed the child as a matter of law. § 39.01(30)(g), Fla.Stat....

...LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Under various provisions of section 39.303(1), Florida Statutes (2007), child protection teams are charged with interviewing child victims of sexual abuse and with providing expert testimony in court. Further, section 39.01(13), Florida Statutes (2007), created CPTs for the express purpose of processing child abuse cases, and section 39.306, Florida Statutes (2007), requires CPTs to enter into agreements with local law enforcement agencies to be part of the local investigation and prosecution of child sexual abuse cases....

...In relevant part, the title of the session law states: [r]evis[ed], reorganize[ed], and com-bin[ed] chapters 39 and 959, F.S.; amend[ed] s. 39.001, F.S.; provid[ed] purpose; amend[ed] s. 39.002, F.S.; pro-vid[ed] legislative purpose for the juvenile justice system; amend[ed] s. 39.01, F.S.; revising definitions ...; provided] for medical, psychiatric, psychological, substance abuse, and educational examination and treatment; provid[ed] for intake and case management procedures and criteria, including a case management sy...

...acement procedures ...; authorize[ed] departure from department-recommended restrictiveness levels based upon preponderance of the evidence ... [ 27 ]; provided] powers of disposition.... Ch. 90-208, title, at 1083, Laws of Fla. The 1990 Act revised section 39.01(21), Florida Statutes, the precursor to section 985.03(21), Florida Statutes (2007), to state: “Disposition hearing” means a hearing in which the court determines the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting provided for under s. 39.052(3) 39.09(3), in delinquency cases.... Ch. 90-208, § 3, at 1090-91, Laws of Fla.; 28 see also § 39.01(21), Fla....

...Section 985.433(7)(a)-(b), Florida Statutes (2007), which governs disposition hearings in delinquency cases, contains very similar language but does not require that the juvenile court state its departure reasons in writing; instead, these reasons must simply be presented on the record. Relat-edly, the 1990 Act created section 39.01(61), Florida Statutes, which defined “restrictiveness level” as: [T]he identification of broad custody categories for committed children, including nonresidential, residential, and secure residential....

...Specific placement in restrictiveness levels within these categories depends on the risk and needs of the individual child. Restrictiveness levels must be established by the department by rule, provided however that there shall be no more than 8 levels. Ch. 90-208, § 3, at 1094, Laws of Fla. (emphasis supplied); § 39.01(61), Fla....

...court’s overarching duty to determine “the most appropriate dispositional sendees in the least restrictive available setting” and the requirement that the juvenile court exercise “appropriate discretion ” when doing so. §§ 39.001(2)(f), 39.01(21), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990) (emphasis supplied); §§ 985.01(l)(e)l., 985.03(21), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis supplied). These are the specific decisions that a juvenile court is required to make during a disposition hearing. The definitions provided in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), and section 985.03, Florida Statutes (2007), do not define the “reasons” that the juvenile court must provide when departing from a DJJ-recommended disposition....

...further — its ultimate responsibility and obligation to exercise “appropriate discretion” in providing the juvenile offender with “the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting.” §§ 39.001(2)(f), 39.01(21), Fla....

...provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.”). . § 985.03(21), Fla. Stat. (2007); formerly § 985.03(22), Fla. Stat. (2005); formerly § 39.01(28), Fla. Stat. (1995); formerly § 39.01(21), Fla....

...ld to be abandoned. The failure by any such person to appear in response to actual or constructive service in a dependency proceeding shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption of such person's ability to provide for and communicate with the child. § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. The natural father here filed an acknowledgment of paternity in accordance with section 63.062(1) on 19 September 1986. Thus, his consent was required unless he had previously abandoned the child. Relying on the definition of "abandoned" in section 39.01(1), the district court concluded that the reference to communicating with the child meant, as a matter of law, there could be no abandonment of an unborn child because there could be no communication with an unborn child....

...Nevertheless, where the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain the findings of the trial court, reversal is required. Under chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes, a child may be found to be "dependent" if the child has been "abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents, legal custodians, or caregivers." § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). A child may also be found to be dependent where the court finds the child "to be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parents ...." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). Section 39.01(2) defines "abuse" as: any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired....

...; and the type of trauma inflicted. Such injury includes, but is not limited to: 4. Inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical injury, mental injury as defined in this section, or emotional injury.... § 39.01(30), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). Harm also occurs when a person "[e]ngages in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child." § 39.01(30)(i), Fla....

...(Supp.1998). Under these definitions the trial court could properly conclude that kicking a child in the head is likely to cause significant injury and is "[i]nappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical injury." § 39.01(30), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). It also shows that appellant was not adverse to "engag[ing] in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child." *427 § 39.01(30)(i), Fla....

...er, are unsupported by the law or the evidence. The statutory definition of "harm" includes "engag[ing] in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child." § 39.01(30)(i), Fla....

...In the instant case, there was no evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing that the domestic violence occurred in the presence of any of the children. Further, while the statutory definition of abandonment would include leaving the child unattended while incarcerated, see section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), there was no evidence that appellant was ever arrested and incarcerated, leaving M.H....

...Department of Children and Families, 711 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), rev. dismissed by, 728 So.2d 747 (Fla.1999). The statute permits a finding of dependency if the child is found to be at "substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent ..." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

...Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 661 So.2d 934 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). To be found dependent on this basis, the statute requires the child to be "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

habitual felony offenders’ law. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-1-801 (1982). Under the Tennessee statute, like the

...s and denying appellants motion to quash and dismiss counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Count 2 was dismissed because in charging violation of Section 828.21, count 2 alleged that the minor involved was seventeen. Since delinquent child is described by Section 39.01 to be one under seventeen years of age, the trial judge dismissed count 2....

...Discussion While dependency proceedings are civil in nature, parents must be informed of their right to counsel at all stages of a dependency proceeding, and if a parent is indigent and wishes to have representation, counsel must be appointed. See § 39.013(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). Subsection (9)(a) of section 39.013 provides: At each stage of the proceedings under this chapter, the court shall advise the parents of the right to counsel....

...When right to counsel is waived, the court shall determine whether the waiver is knowing and intelligent. The court shall enter its findings in writing with respect to the appointment or waiver of counsel for indigent parents or the waiver of counsel by nonindigent parents. § 39.013(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). Thus, section 39.013 gives indigent parents the right to court-appointed counsel in these civil proceedings....

...he parent-child separation, the degree of parental restrictions on visitation, the presence or absence of parental consent, the presence or absence of disputed facts, and the complexity of the proceeding. Of course, the Legislature has since enacted section 39.013 which gives indigent parents the right to counsel in dependency proceedings....

...Permanently commit the child to the department or a licensed child-placing agency willing to receive the child for subsequent adoption if the court finds that it is manifestly in the best interests of the child to do so, and: a. If the court finds that the parent has abandoned, abused, or neglected the child. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1983) defines abandonment as a situation in which a parent who, while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child for a period of 6 months or longer....

...If a parent's efforts to support and communicate with the child during such a 6-month period are, in the opinion of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. (Emphasis added.) Section 39.01(1), thus, does not provide for the termination of parental rights when abandonment is involuntary, i.e., where a parent is unable to communicate with or financially support a child....

...Further, since as a practical matter, an incarcerated parent is unable to assume all parental duties, his failure to "evince a settled purpose" to assume all duties cannot support a finding of abandonment. This is not to say that an incarcerated parent is incapable of voluntarily abandoning his children under section 39.01....

...The Domestic Violence Chapter 39 defines a "dependent" child as one who is found by the court to have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his or her parents or one who is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents." § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla....

...Stat. (2002). "Abuse" is defined as "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2) (emphasis added)....

...The Substance Abuse A parent's alcohol and drug addictions can also provide grounds for an adjudication of dependency. Chapter 39's definition of "harm" includes a parent's "[c]ontinued chronic and severe use of a controlled substance or alcohol" if "the child is demonstrably adversely affected by such usage." § 39.01(30)(a), (g)2....

...ctness under the law of, the trial court's order on those issues. We hold that the trial court's determination that the evidence is clear and convincing is supported by the record and cannot be held to be unreasonable as a matter of law. CHILD ABUSE Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes, [14] defines child abuse as "any willful act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired."...

...He failed and refused to attend the classes or participate in the services offered to help him deal with his problems. The bottom line was that he was not willing to modify his behavior so that a court could reasonably find that the child would not be "at risk" with him. CHILD NEGLECT Section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...There is no evidence, however, indicating she ever attempted to have these relatives undertake the care of the child or provide a decent environment for the child to live in. Thus, she has neglected her child by permitting the child to live in an environment condemned by the Florida Juvenile Justice Act. See § 39.01(26) and § 39.41(1)(f)1.a....

...The court in In the Interest of J.L.P., 416 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), held: Appellant contends neglect cannot be prospective, and because she never had custody of the child, she could not have legally neglected him. We disagree. We also think abuse under section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...(Answer Brief, pp. 6-7). The brief then refers to the allegations that appellant neglected his son "by allowing *683 him to remain in the custody of his mother when the Appellant knew that leaving the boy with the mother was detrimental (R. 358)," and states that section 39.01(37), Florida Statutes (1987), defining neglect means "while being able, the parent having primary responsibility of the child deprives or allows the child to be deprived of food, clothing and shelter to the point that the child is substantially impaired." (Answer Brief, p....

...(R. 358). The applicable statute defines *687 "abuse" to mean "any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2), Fla....

...helter, or medical treatment or permits a child to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(37) (emphasis added)....

...[10] Section 39.41(1)(f)3, Fla. Stat.; In the Interest of C.M.H., 413 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). [11] McCormick, Evidence § 340 at 961 (3d ed. 1984). [12] Ibid. [13] 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1656(9), at 519. [14] The present definitions of abuse and neglect found in Section 39.01(2) and (3), respectively, are today as they were at the time the proceedings below were commenced....

...rals from the protective investigators and protective supervision staff of the [Department of Children and Family Services] and to provide specialized and supportive services to the program in processing child abuse, abandonment, or neglect cases. " § 39.01(13), Fla....

...In In the Interest of W.D.N., 443 So.2d 493 (Fla.2d DCA 1984), the court held that abuse of other siblings by a parent could be considered as evidence of abuse in a permanent commitment case involving three children, one of whom had suffered no abuse. The court relied upon the definition of "abuse" in section 39.01(2), Fla....

...The psychologist who evaluated the parent testified that a child in this mother's care would be "at considerable risk of abuse because of her inability to think in terms of the child's welfare." Although there had been *984 no evidence of past neglect, the court said abuse under section 39.01(2) could be established prospectively....

...They show, insofar as is relevant here, that appellants voluntarily delivered their daughter Sharon into the temporary custody of the State for her protection and welfare, and that three days after delivery a hearing was conducted to determine whether Sharon should be adjudicated a "dependent child" within the meaning of section 39.01(10), Fla....

...State, 690 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla.1997), held that child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome "has not been proven by a preponderance of scientific evidence to be generally accepted by a majority of experts in psychology." No issue about such testimony has been raised in this case. [3] Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (1993), defines "Child who is found to be dependent" to include one found by the court: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents or other custodians....

primary purpose of chapter 39, as expressed in section 39.001(1), the provision also reflects the Legislature's

...Any intimation that appellant's age at the time of sentencing would preclude the application to him of Section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), can be quickly disposed of. Section 39.111 deals with children prosecuted as adults. Within the meaning of Chapter 39, a "child" is defined in Section 39.01(4), Florida Statutes (1977), as "any married or unmarried person under the age of 18 years or any person who is charged with a violation of law occurring prior to the time that person reached the age of 18 years....

...ained or placed in shelter care, he shall immediately notify the parents or legal custodians of the child... . The district court disagreed with Doerr's contention and affirmed the trial court. We agree with the district court's following rationale: Section 39.01(3) defines "taken into custody" to mean "the status of temporary physical control of a child by a person authorized by this chapter, pending his release, detention, or placement." The language of Section 39.03(3)(c) differentiates between taking a child into custody and placing him in detention or shelter care....

...(b) If a minor proves not to be amenable to treatment under the provisions of subsection (4)(b), the court shall have the power to revoke the adjudication of delinquency, impose the withheld adjudication of guilt, and impose any sentence which it may lawfully impose, giving credit for all time in the department. [6] F.S.A., Section 39.01(6). [7] F.S.A., Section 39.01(12)....

...does not necessarily preclude the court from placing other conditions on the exercise of the Department's discretion to place the child. For instance, earlier in F.B. v. State, 319 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), this court addressed the intent behind section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...would be negatively exposed at the commitment facility to other juveniles who have been in the juvenile system for a long period of time; and (3) the child's mother was still very much in control of A.S. and had indeed imposed certain restrictions on A.S.'s activities in the aftermath of this incident. [2] Subsection 39.01(61), Florida Statutes (1993) (amended and renumbered 1994, see § 39.01(59), Fla.Stat....

...(1995)) defines "restrictiveness level" as "the level of custody provided by programs that service the custody and care needs of committed children." Prior to the effective date of 1994 amendments, there were four levels commonly referred to as level 2, 4, 6 or 8. A "level six" placement was defined in section 39.01(61)(c), Fla.Stat. (1993) (now as amended at § 39.01(59)(c), Fla.Stat....

...(1995)) as a "moderate risk residential." These programs are for children assessed as being a "moderate risk to public safety," who require close "24-hour awake supervision" but who "do not need placement in facilities which are staff or physically secure." Chapter 94-209, § 11, at 1243, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 39.01(59)(e), Fla.Stat....

..."Abuse" is defined in chapter 39 as "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2). "Child" is defined as "any unmarried person under the age of 18 years who has not been emancipated by order of the court." § 39.01(12)....

...Chapter 39 provides further: "`Harm' to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person ... [c]ommits, or allows to be committed, sexual battery as defined in chapter 794, or lewd or lascivious acts, as defined in chapter 800, against the child." § 39.01(30)(b)....

...In this opinion, we discuss two of those statutory bases. The Father abandoned the Child With reference to the findings set out above, there is clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned the child as contemplated by sections 39.806(l)(b) and 39.01(1), Florida Statutes. 2 “Marginal efforts and incidental or token visits or communications are not sufficient to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with a child.” § 39.01(1), Fla....

...y this court without opinion. B.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 117 So.3d 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). . Section 39.806(l)(b) states that parental rights may be terminated upon establishment that the parent has abandoned the child as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes. § 39.806(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012). Section 39.01(1) defines abandonment as "a situation in which the parent ... has made no significant contribution to the child’s care and maintenance or has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child, or both.” § 39.01(1), Fla....

...Moreover, even if it did, the evidence does not support a finding of abandonment under section 39.806(1)(b). Section 39.806(1)(b) permits the trial court to terminate a parent's rights when the parent has "abandoned" the child, as that term is defined in section 39.01(1). Section 39.01(1) defines "abandoned" as a situation in which the parent, ....

...a child, a first-degree misdemeanor. This amendment was followed in 1998 by an amendment to chapter 39 that designates certain types of excessive corporal punishment as civil child abuse. Ch. 98-403, § 20, Laws of Fla. The definition of "abuse" in section 39.01(2) was amended to read: "Abuse" means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired....

...Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child. Ch. 98-403, § 20, Laws of Fla.[ [8] ] See also § 984.03(2), Fla. Stat. (1999) (providing a similar, though not exact, definition). At the same time, section 39.01(30) was added to define harm, in pertinent part, as: "Harm" to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person: (a) Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury....

...fare." § 415.503(3), Fla. Stat. (1985). "Harm," as defined, included "injury sustained as a result of excessive corporal punishment." § 415.503(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (1985) (emphasis supplied). [8] The Second District appears to have mistakenly quoted section 39.01(2) as it now reads as a result of amendments in 1999, see ch....

...onstitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child as defined in s. 415.503. Ch. 98-403, § 20, at 3107, Laws of Fla. (additions are underlined; deletions are struck-through). [9] The language concerning "corporal discipline of a child" in section 39.01(2) was first added in 1996 and cross-referenced "harm" as defined in section 415.503....

...nce of the evidence demonstrates a substantial risk of "prospective mental neglect" or "prospective abuse" of the children based on Appellant's mental-health condition. Appellant contends that the lower court misconstrued the findings required under section 39.01(14)(f), Florida Statutes (1999), and that the evidence does not support a finding of dependency. The pertinent statute defines a "[c]hild who is found to be dependent" as, inter alia, one who is found by the court "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

...Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 661 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Richmond v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 658 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The statutory definitions of "abuse" and "neglect" do not expressly include this requirement of imminence. § 39.01(2) & (46), Florida Statutes (1999). [2] However, when these definitions are read in pari materia with the related language in section 39.01(14)(f), a risk of imminent abuse or imminent neglect seems to be required to establish that a child is "dependent" as a matter of law....

...bility of future abuse, neglect, or abandonment will not support a finding of dependency. Rather, where the slate is clean, Florida law requires a substantial risk of imminent abuse or imminent neglect to support a finding that a child is dependent. § 39.01(14)(f)....

...rt's conclusion that the evidence supports a finding of dependency. The trial court withheld an adjudication of dependency but initially ordered out-of-home placement of the children, i.e., "placement outside of the home of the parents or a parent." § 39.01(49), Fla....

...alth to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes acts or omissions. Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child. § 39.01(2), Fla....

...hysician, or other qualified health care provider; or (b) Treatment by a duly accredited practitioner who relies solely on spiritual means for healing in accordance with the tenets and practices of a well-recognized church or religious organization. § 39.01(46), Fla....

...Hodges [254 Or. 21] 457 P.2d 491 (Oregon 1969), State v. Whitted [254 Or. 31] 457 P.2d 495 (Oregon 1969)." The aforestated statute provides that the definition for delinquent child should be derived from the general laws of Florida. Florida Statutes (1972), Section 39.01(11), [1] defines delinquent child, as follows: "(11) `Delinquent Child' means a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurred, except a child who commits a juvenile traffic offense and whose case has not been transferred to the juvenile court by the court having jurisdiction." Section 39.01(13)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1972), F.S.A., defines violation of the law, as follows: "(13)(a) `Violation of law' means violation of any law of the United States, the state, or another state within the United States or a city or town ordinance of a city or town within the United states." "(b) `Federal law' means a law of the United States." *379 "Child" is defined by Section 39.01 to mean: "......

...Barone, 124 So.2d 490, wherein this Court held that this statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Section 828.19 (1959) and Section 828.19 (1972) vary only as to the severity of the penalty to be imposed upon conviction; otherwise, the language is the same. Examination of the statutory change in Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes (1959), F.S.A....

...However, under that construction of the statute as applied in this case, it is apparent the statute is unconstitutionally vague and uncertain. Also, I agree with the trial judge the statute is without constitutional standards prescribing with certainty the prohibited acts. NOTES [1] Chapter 72-179, Laws of Florida, amended Section 39.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. to provide an exception to the definition of delinquent child. Chapter 72-404, Laws of Florida, which became effective on the effective date of Senate Joint Resolution 52-D, January 1, 1973, repealed Subsections (2) and (3) of Section 39.01. Therefore, Subsection (11) of Section 39.01 defining delinquent child has now been renumbered as Subsection (9); Subsection (13) has become Subsection (11); and Subsection (6) is now Subsection (4)....

...The court did not find that H.C. complained to her mother about the father's abuse or that the mother failed to protect H.C. from sexual abuse. However, the court did find that the mother's conduct after the alleged abuse justified a finding that the mother mentally abused H.C. Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1997), defines abuse, in pertinent part, as: ......

...to detain juveniles, such as DeBolt, who have been accused of committing delinquent acts. See, § 39.03, Fla. Stat. (1981). Such detention may be in a "detention home or nonsecure detention program, including home detention and attention homes. ..." § 39.01(14), Fla....

...view of evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court." In re D.J.W., 764 So.2d 825, 826 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2000). An adjudication must be upheld if the trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent substantial evidence. Id. Section 39.01(46) of the Florida Statutes (1999) defines neglect for purposes of dependency proceedings as follows: 39.01 Definitions.—When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires: * * * (46) "Neglect" occurs when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or a child is perm...

...ourts the authority to adjudicate a child to be dependent based upon a finding of substantial risk that the child is in danger of imminent neglect. See Richmond v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 658 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Section 39.01(30) explains that "harm" is caused to a child when a parent inflicts physical, mental, or emotional injury upon the child, including when the parent engages in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child: 39.01 Definitions.—When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires: * * * (30) "Harm" to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person: (a) Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury ... * * * (i) Engages in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child. § 39.01(30), Fla....

...nment has not been shown does not determine the matter of custody. Custody traditionally has been taken from natural parents and placed in others whenever the parents' neglect or abuse makes that action necessary for the best interests of the child. Section 39.01(9) and Sections 39.40, et seq., Florida Statutes (Supp....

...One ground for commitment is a finding that the parent has abandoned the child. In 1978 the legislature also added to Chapter 39 a definition of abandonment for purposes of that chapter which appears more narrow than the definition of abandonment for adoption purposes established by case law in Florida. § 39.01(1), Fla....

...th her own. On appeal, the mother argues that a finding of prospective abuse is not a basis for an adjudication of dependency without evidence of past abuse or neglect. We disagree. A child may be found to be dependent under several circumstances. §§ 39.01(10) (a)-(e), Fla....

...Two of these circumstances include a child who is found: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by [the] parents or other custodians. .... (e) To be at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect by the parent or parents or the custodian. § 39.01(10), Fla....

...ative Services for adoption pursuant to section 39.41(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1981). [1] The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in severing the rights of the mother based on a finding of "abandonment" as that term is defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1981). That statute provides: *366 39.01 Definitions....

...tory definition. There also was ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding that the order of permanent commitment was in the best interest of the child. [2] We note that the appellant has not raised any challenge to the constitutionality of section 39.01(1), either at trial or on appeal; therefore, we decline to determine that issue in this case....

...ORFINGER, C.J., and DAUKSCH and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. SHARP and COWART, JJ., dissent with opinions. SHARP, Judge, dissenting. I dissent in this case because I do not think the record sustains the trial court's conclusion that Faatz abandoned her child as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Faatz testified the social workers did not tell her about her visitation rights. She did attend all of the court hearings concerning the child, in December of 1980 and September 1981. Under these circumstances, I do not think HRS showed by clear and convincing evidence that Faatz was "able to communicate," section 39.01(1), with her child, and the finding of abandonment should not therefore be based on her failure to do so. Nor was it shown that Faatz was "able" to support the child at any time, section 39.01(1), so abandonment should not be based on that aspect of the definition....

...t of parental rights as relating not only to the neglect of parental duties but also as requiring an intentional and voluntary, total and permanent relinquishment of all parental rights. The panel majority noted that the definition of abandonment in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1981), related only to neglect of parental duties, and, agreed that while neglect of parental duties as described in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes, was a sufficient basis to adjudicate dependency and to deprive natural parents of custody of children under chapter 39, Florida Statutes, the panel majority were of the opinion, consistent with Hinkle, that "abando...

...Therefore, in no way did the proposed panel majority opinion in this case conflict with Hinkle. The substance of the proposed panel dissent was that the principles applied in Hinkle should not be applied in this case because of the restrictive definition of abandonment contained in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes....

...[2] The public policy of Florida favors a permanent family life for children rather than merely an indefinite protective custody. See § 63.022, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1982). [3] Several courts, however, including this one, previously have applied the "abandonment" test set out in section 39.01(1)....

...The real substance of the en banc majority opinion is that in Florida, constitutionally, all parental rights can be permanently forfeited if, in the opinion of one judge, a parent's efforts during any six month period "do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties." (§ 39.01(1), Fla....

...On the other hand if parental rights can only be voluntarily and intentionally relinquished by consent to adoption by others or by true abandonment and cannot be constitutionally forfeited then the application of section 39.41(1)(f)1.a., Fla. Stat., read in combination with section 39.01(1), Fla....

...six month period" were considered to be "only marginal" by HRS and the trial judge. As a lexical definition of the meaning of "abandonment" as that word connotes the legal consequence of a voluntary and intentional relinquishment, the definition in section 39.01(1), Fla....

...The language of the Florida Juvenile Justice Act makes clear that corporal discipline, by itself, does not constitute abuse: Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child. § 39.01(2), Fla....

...er corporal discipline to their children; provided, however, that the discipline is reasonable."). To constitute abuse, corporal discipline must be "[i]nappropriate or excessively harsh" and likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury. § 39.01(30)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (2005). Although corporal discipline may be considered excessive when it results in "[s]ignificant bruises or welts," see section 39.01(30)(a)4.k., the courts of this state have consistently found that bruises are not necessarily indicative of excessive corporal discipline....

...use the bruise, exceeded proper corporal discipline and entered the realm of abuse. The circuit court next cited the father's past drug use. Harm to a child's health can occur when any person "[e]xposes a child to a controlled substance or alcohol." § 39.01(30)(g), Fla. Stat. (2005). A parent's *107 use of controlled substances is harmful to a child if it is "chronic and severe" and the child is "demonstrably adversely affected" by the use. § 39.01(30)(g)2., Fla. Stat. (2005); see P.C. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 898 So.2d 195, 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (finding evidence of cocaine use did not rise to the level required by section 39.01(30)(g)2., to justify a finding of dependency); B.C....

...The Department investigated the alcohol exposure. Apparently, the father left a juice and alcohol drink unattended for a moment and the child drank from it. The Department does not allege, nor is there any reason to believe, the father gave the young child the alcohol purposely. See § 39.01(30)(a)2., Fla....

adults responsible for them. As set out in section 39.001(1)(a), Florida Statutes *800 (1999), the expressed

...During this time, she became pregnant with T.N.B. She returned to jail and was continuously incarcerated from August 3, 2000. She was released on December 23, 2003. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that DCF established abandonment, as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....

..."`Clear and convincing' is an intermediate level of proof; the evidence must be credible; the memories of the witnesses must be clear and without confusion; and the sum total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy." In re Davey, 645 So.2d 398, 404 (Fla.1994). Section 39.01, Florida Statutes, defines "abandoned" as follows: a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the caregiver responsible for the child's welfare, while being able, mak...

...It contends that the mother never contacted the child's custodian, only her sister. This distinction is unpersuasive. The T.C.S. opinion does not emphasize whom the father was trying to contact regarding his son, only that he had made efforts to contact his son. Section 39.01, Florida Statutes, defines abandonment....

...A week prior to the disposition hearing, the trial court entered a written order from the earlier arraignment hearing. The written order stated that "[b]ased on the mother's consent, the Court finds the child(ren) to be dependent within the intent and meaning of Chapter 39.01(14)(a), Florida Statutes." Thus, the written order did not withhold adjudication of dependency, as had been agreed at the arraignment hearing....

...arties and the court's oral pronouncement. To the extent that the order needs clarification, we remand the matter to the trial court. See Y.G. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 830 So.2d 212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Of more significance, B.C. argues that section 39.01(14)(a) was not intended to allow children to be found dependent when the allegations are against only one parent and there exists another fit nonoffending parent willing to assume custody. Section 39.01(14), Florida Statutes (2003), provides the following definition: (14) "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians; * * * (f) To be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians. (Emphasis added). Based on the inclusion of "parent or parents" in section 39.01(14), the Legislature's intent to permit a finding of dependency based on allegations against only one parent is clear and unambiguous....

...If the court places the child with such parent, it may do either of the following: 1. Order that the parent assume sole custodial responsibilities for the child. 2. Order that the parent assume custody subject to the jurisdiction of the circuit court hearing dependency matters. (Emphasis added). When read together, sections 39.01(14)(a) and 39.521, Florida Statutes (2003), provide a comprehensive framework supporting the Department's position for finding children dependent as to one parent only....

...child," the mandatory terms of section 39.41(1), [3] Florida Statutes (1995), required that the father be given custody; statute does not permit an independent *491 judicial consideration of the "best interests" of the child). B.C. also argues that section 39.01(14)(a) is unconstitutional in that permitting an adjudication of dependency, when there is a non-offending parent willing and able to take immediate custody, violates Florida and federal due process and privacy rights....

...Nonetheless, it should be noted that, having in mind the foregoing overriding principle, under the facts of this case we believe a parent's abuse of some of her children may constitute grounds for the permanent commitment of her other children who also live with the parent. Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981), defines "abuse" as "any willful act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." To...

placement may be achieved as soon as possible. See § 39.001(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2002). At all stages of the

*356only one man and one woman”).10 For example, section 39.01(49), Florida Statutes, defines “[pjarent” as

...At one point petitioner states that she "believes that the minor child has been abandoned by his parents due to their deaths." This statement is part of the general background. Later in the petition, petitioner alleges that "the minor child is dependent within the intent and meaning of [section] 39.01, Florida Statutes." The trial court held a final hearing on the petition on November 13, 2003....

...although the child was then living with a family they did not have any legal obligation to support him. Essentially the Department argues that an orphaned alien child living in Florida without any legal custodian is not dependent under our statute. Section 39.01(14)(e) states that: a ("`[c]hild who is found to be dependent' means a child who... is found by the court ... [t]o have no parent or legal custodians capable of providing supervision and care."). § 39.01(14)(e), Fla....

...Strictly speaking, the term abandoned is not appropriate when the parents or guardian have died because, in that event, they are no longer able to do anything. The real question was whether an orphaned child without a legal custodian is dependent. Section 39.01(14)(e) provides the answer....

...In contrast, here the child has no parents, no legal custodian, and no caregiver legally responsible for his welfare. His caregiver at the time of trial was a mere volunteer without legal appointment. Under these circumstances the child met the statutory requirements for dependency under section 39.01(14)(e)....

...under the laws of Florida. While no specific mention is made of it in Sections 828.19 or 828.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., there is but one place in the statutes of this State where the words "delinquent child" are delimited. That is to be found in Section 39.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.: "(6) `Child' means any married or unmarried person under the age of seventeen years, or any person who is charged with a violation of law occurring prior to the time that person reached the age of seventeen years....

...DAUKSCH, Judge. This opinion revisits the matter we had before us In re Adoption of Wendy Dee Peterson, 344 So.2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The grandparents mentioned in that *99 opinion have now suggested the child is a dependent child within the meaning of Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1977) and seek to have the juvenile division of the circuit court declare her to be such a dependent child....

such as the revision of Chapter 39. In Part I, Section 39.001(4), it is stated: It is the intent of the legislature

...not for the TPR court to determine sexual predator status; that fact should have been already determined when the TPR case begins. The second thing to consider about the subsection (1)(d)2 text lies in the term, "the court." Under the definition in section 39.01(18) "the court," unless otherwise expressly stated, refers to the court exercising power in a chapter 39 proceeding....

Florida is to better the lot of our children. See § 39.001(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). If a commitment to helping

...Our decisions indicate that parental rights ordinarily should not be terminated solely on the basis of a temporary deficiency which results from conditions beyond the parent's control. See Harden v. Thomas, 329 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (incarceration does not, as a matter of law, constitute abandonment under section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes); In the Interest of P.S., 384 So.2d 656 (Fla....

...se, abandonment or neglect of the child by the mother, with a dissent on grounds that the mother's mental condition was beyond her control, the mother had never had custody of the child, and had never abused, neglected or abandoned the child.) Under section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985), neglect occurs when: the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person primarily responsible for the child's welfare deprives a child of, or allows a chi...

...roceeding. [6] Because a permanent loss of parental rights "can result" or "might result" ( In the Interest of D.B., supra ), from admitting acts of child neglect, child abuse or acts of non-support and non-communication (statutory abandonment under § 39.01(1), Fla....

...Brown would likely neglect her child's needs for medication, professional counseling, and effective parental attention, that finding is absent. To the extent that meeting those needs requires financial resources, Mrs. Brown must be found "financially able," § 39.01(26), through public assistance or otherwise, if her neglect of the child is to be predicated on her likely failure to meet those needs....

...If the court finds that it is manifestly to the best interest of the child to do so. [3] "Neglect" is depriving a child of necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment, or permitting a child to live in "an environment" causing or threatening significant impairment to health broadly conceived. § 39.01(26)....

...nly if the parent is "financially able." "Abandoned" is similarly conditioned, again not entirely in financial terms: the statute speaks of abandonment as a parent's failure, "being able," to make provision for the child's support or to communicate. § 39.01(1). "Abuse" contains another reference to volition: "abuse" is a "willful" act having a specified detrimental result. § 39.01(2)....

...At the father's request, they were placed with their aunt because the mother was unable to manage on her own. The mother has, among other problems, bipolar disorder and did not testify. The trial court found, based on the spankings with the belt, that the children were being abused by the father under section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1999) which provides: "Abuse" means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health be significantly impaired....

...not result in harm to the child. The court also found that the mother had neglected the children by allowing the excessive discipline to continue. Harm occurs when a child suffers "physical, mental, or emotional injury" as the result of discipline. § 39.01(30)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). Mental injury requires proof of "a discernible and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior." § 39.01(44), Fla. Stat. (1999). There was no evidence in this case that either child was not functioning within his normal range. Accordingly, the question boils down to whether the children suffered physical injury. Section 39.01(30)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1999), provides that corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in a physical injury, including "temporary disfigurement" or "[s]ignificant bruises or welts." In this case, ther...

...The psychologist called by DCF, who had not interviewed the parents, said only that it was possible that the children could be harmed. That does not rise to the level of injury or harm " likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2)(emphasis added)....

...we hold that the State may not intrude upon the parents' fundamental right to raise their children except in cases where the child is threatened with harm. (emphasis added). Id. at 1276. That standard is consistent with the standard we quoted, from section 39.01(2), in the preceding paragraph....

...SHIVERS, Judge. Appellant, the mother, appeals the trial court's finding that her two children, G.D.H. and A.J.S., were legally dependent. We hold that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of abuse and neglect under sections 39.01(2) and 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985), and reverse the trial court's determination of dependency....

...e state of dependency." See also In the Interest of L.T., 464 So.2d 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (standard of proof in an initial adjudication of dependency requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence). The statutory definition of abuse is found in section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1985): "Abuse" means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired....

...The mother cited as an example of this the fact that she sometimes punished G.D.H. for stealing money from her purse. Nothing in G.D.H.'s testimony suggests that these spankings "significantly impaired" her physical, mental or emotional health, and this is the statutory standard which section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes prescribes. The state's allegations of neglect are similarly without merit. Under section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985), neglect: occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person primarily responsible for the child's welfare deprives a child of, or allows a chi...

...The mother's financial situation may have also contributed to her electricity being turned off on one occasion. The record portrays a familial situation which, primarily because of the mother's low income, was less than optimal. Yet even if the record more convincingly demonstrated that the mother had neglected her children, section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985), forbids a finding of neglect if the family's circumstances were "caused primarily by financial inability......

...76-26-CJA, Clay County, Florida, under Section 90.202(6), F.S. Such records reflect: (a) A sworn petition of dependency filed on 2/23/76, alleging "said child's parents are unable to provide a stable home environment at this time" (Exhibit 3 in evidence). Section 39.01(10), F.S., 1975, defines a "dependent child" under subsection (c) as one who "has not proper parental support, maintenance, care or guardianship" and under subsection (e) as one who "is living in a condition or environment such as to injure him or endanger his welfare"....

...On 1/5/77, HRS petitioned the Court for temporary custody which was granted by order entered 1/14/77, based upon a waiver, consent and joinder executed by the mother. The opinion states "the findings of the trial court that abandonment occurred under Section 39.41(1)(d) and 39.01(1) or 39.11(1)(d) are supported by clear and convincing evidence." Citing Estate of C.K.G., 365 So.2d 424 (Fla....

...and Rehabilitative Services to formulate a plan that would evince a settled purpose toward return of her child to her, nor has she provided support for said child in a repetitive, customary manner." ... . However, the definition of "abandonment" in Section 39.01 is the same in the 1979 and the 1980 statute....

...The statute did not define restrictiveness levels but, rather, left that task to the discretion of HRS to establish by rule. The only guidance given by the Legislature to HRS was that "there shall be no more than eight levels." Id. at 989-90 (quoting § 39.01(61), Fla....

...39.061, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990). HRS, meanwhile, is given purported authority to define the "restrictiveness levels" in terms of broad custody categories based on "the risk and needs of the individual child," of which there can be no more than eight. § 39.01(61), Fla....

...Chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1985), provides the exclusive means whereby a trial court can declare a child to be dependent. State v. M.T.S., 408 So.2d 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 419 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1982). An adjudication of dependency must be based upon a showing of abuse, abandonment, or neglect. Id. Section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985), defines neglect as occurring when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person primarily responsible for the child's welfare deprives a child of, or...

...Section 415.512 cannot be read so narrowly as to apply only to privileged communications occurring after the birth of a child who is later made the subject of a dependency hearing. We find, however, that section 415.512 must be read in pari materia with section 39.01(27)....

...In our determination that the two statutes must be read together, we are guided by the well-reasoned decisions of the New York courts *1089 in neglect proceedings where a parent's psychiatric history is at issue. Section 1012(f)(i)(A) of the New York Family Court Act mirrors section 39.01(27) and provides in pertinent part: (f) "Neglected child" means a child less than eighteen years of age (i) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the...

...While we acknowledge the trial court's sincere concern, the reality of inadequate state funding cannot justify removing I.T. from his parent's custody and effectively holding him hostage. [3] Because the state has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that I.T. is at risk of prospective neglect as defined by section 39.01(27), we reverse the order adjudicating I.T....

...ng shall be deemed to be guilty of the offense provided for in this section. [3] Ch. 1637, subc. 8, § 8, Laws of Florida (1868). [4] See State v. Lash, 16 N.J.L. 380 (N.J. 1838). [5] The terms "dependent child" and "delinquent child" are defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1977), as follows: (8) "Dependent child" means a child who: (a) Has been abandoned by his parents or other custodians....

protect the child, not to punish the caregiver. § 39.001, Fla. Stat. (2003); S.B., 851 So.2d at 693. Hence

...Based on these standards we review the statutory grounds the trial court assigned for termination of J.R.'s parental rights. Section 39.806(1)(b) Pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), the trial court found that J.R. had abandoned his son as defined in section 39.01(1), which states: "The incarceration of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver responsible for the child's welfare may support a finding of abandonment." Although a court may consider a parent's criminal history and incarceration as fa...

...Viewing the testimony in a light most favorable to the state, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that appellant failed to effectively waive his rights under Miranda or that his confession was not freely and voluntarily made. Affirmed. McNULTY, C.J., and HOBSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] "Detention care" is defined in Fla. Stat. § 39.01(17) (1973) as "the temporary care of children in a detention home pending court disposition or execution of a court order." [2] In Francois , both juveniles signed confessions before consulting with parents or attorneys.

...does not involve the vacating of the adjudication and imposing a new adjudication, as is contemplated by section 924.34 in a criminal appeal. In a delinquency appeal, the original adjudication of delinquency is affirmed on an alternative ground. See § 39.01(9), Fla....

...nment has not been shown does not determine the matter of custody. Custody traditionally has been taken from natural parents and placed in others whenever the parents' neglect or abuse makes that action necessary for the best interests of the child. Section 39.01(9) and Sections 39.40, et seq., Florida Statutes (Supp....

...helter, or medical treatment or permits a child to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(36), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...hild, a first-degree misdemeanor. [4] This amendment was followed in 1998 by an amendment to chapter 39 that designates certain types of excessive corporal punishment as civil child abuse. Ch. 98-403, § 20, Laws of Fla. The definition of "abuse" in section 39.01(2) was amended to read: *646 "Abuse" means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired....

...Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child. Ch. 98-403, § 20, Laws of Fla. See also § 984.03(2), Fla.Stat. (1999) (providing a similar, though not exact, definition). At the same time, section 39.01(30) was added to define harm, in pertinent part, as: "Harm" to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person: (a) Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury....

...efusing to enter into performance agreements; that she had failed to substantially perform the performance agreements and that the mother's small number of visits with the child in the foster home was sufficient evidence of abandonment as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes....

...ild (§ 39.41(1)(f)1.a); the mother failed to substantially comply with a performance agreement (§ 39.41(1)(f)1.d.); and the mother abandoned the child (§ 39.41(1)(f)1.a.). It is obvious from the facts that the mother has never neglected her baby. Section 39.01(27) defines neglect as intentionally depriving a child of necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical treatment or significantly impairing the child's physical, mental or emotional health....

...urse of action was not followed by HRS in this case. The final order found that the mother's failure to visit the baby in the foster home for a period in excess of six months after August 4, 1983, was sufficient evidence of abandonment as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes....

...he kind of home that her foster parents has given her, but I'll try to do the best that I can with her and her problems. The order permanently terminating the mother's parental rights is REVERSED. COBB, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur. NOTES [1] Under section 39.01(9)(a), Florida Statutes, this constituted a legal adjudication that T.S....

purposes of Chapter 39, which are stated in Section 39.001 are, in summary, to protect society by substituting

...she was significantly impaired mentally or emotionally by the incident involving her older sister. A finding of dependency may be found upon evidence that the child is at a "substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment or neglect by the parent." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

...has held, A simple showing by DCF that a parent committed a sex act on one child does not by itself constitute proof that the *1149 parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to the child's sibling, as required by the statute. See § 39.01(11), Fla....

...(5) Due to lack of more appropriate facilities. (Emphasis added). "Secure detention facility" was defined by the legislature as "a physically restricting facility for the temporary care of children, pending delinquency adjudication or court disposition." § 39.01(45), Fla....

...(2) A child alleged to be dependent or in need of services shall not, under any circumstances, be placed into secure detention care solely for these reasons. § 39.043, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). "Secure detention" was specifically defined in section 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...es and specifically to assure legal counsel to all children, including indigents, who are charged with contempt of court and are thereby facing any restriction on their liberty. Section 39.044(10) only refers to "detention" — which by definition in section 39.01(16), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...facility designed to hold those who are an imminent threat to public safety. Dependent children and children in need of services are not criminals; it has been determined that they have been neglected or physically, emotionally, or sexually abused. § 39.01(10), Fla....

...The acts of contempt committed by the dependent children in this case constituted running away from home and refusing to go to school. These acts are ones that the legislature deems a sign of children in need of services, not children in need of punishment. See § 39.01(8)(a), Fla....

...I suggest that the legislature immediately *821 address the problem and return to the judiciary in juvenile proceedings this important and necessary power. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. [2] Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...[3] "Indirect" contempt occurs when the contemptuous act is committed outside the presence of the court. See Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So.2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1977); Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.150(b) (setting forth the procedural rules for prosecuting indirect contempt). [4] Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...chapter. [5] "Direct" contempt occurs when the act constituting the contempt is committed in the immediate presence of the court. See Pugliese, 347 So.2d at 425; Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.150(a) (setting forth the procedures for punishing direct contempt). [6] Section 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. For purposes of clarification as to those individuals who are to be considered juveniles for purposes of this case, the parties need only refer to the definition of a "child" as set forth in the state statute itself. Section 39.01(6) of the Florida Statutes provides that a "child" is "any married or unmarried person under the age of eighteen years or any person who is charged with a violation of law occurring prior to the time that person reached the age of eighteen years"....

...The question now here for disposition is whether the common law rebuttable presumption that a child between the ages of 7 and 14 is incapable of committing a crime applies to delinquency proceedings. The answer depends upon a construction of the term "delinquent child" as defined by Section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes: "`Delinquent child' means a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurs, except a child *1165 who commits a juvenile traffic offense and whose case has not been transferred to th...

...y. Following the people's directive the Legislature provided for judicial treatment of juveniles in Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, wherein procedures are provided, inter alia, for determining whether a given child is dependent or delinquent. Sections 39.01(10) and (12), Florida Statutes....

...It is readily apparent that in its definition of "delinquent child" the legislature avoided use of the word "crime" and utilized instead the term "violation of law." This is perfectly consistent with the constitutional authority to treat violations of law as "an act of delinquency" as opposed to a "crime." In construing Section 39.01(12), therefore, we find that the Legislature did not intend for the common law presumption with respect to "crimes" to operate in delinquency proceedings....

...Where the presumption of incapacity is successfully maintained the child who may most need the care provided by the Act so as to be taught the capacity to refrain from anti-social behavior is deprived of that care. We cannot accept the argument of counsel for the juveniles that Section 39.01(10), [3] *1166 Florida Statutes, solves the problem....

...Although "a child who commits a violation of law" may in some instances qualify under the definition of a "dependent child," it must be obvious that innumerable cases occur where a child who violates the law meets none of the criteria enumerated in Section 39.01(10)....

...by the receiving court within the circuit of such court, and thereafter the court in which the petition is filed shall control the child and the case in accordance with this chapter." (Underlining added) Appellant seeks to rely on that portion of F.S. 39.01(9) which provides that: "An agency granted legal custody shall have the right to determine where and with whom the child shall live, but an individual granted legal custody shall exercise all rights and duties personally unless otherwise ord...

...and responsibilities of the Division of Family Services: But no such broad grant as is here contended is vested by that chapter. Indeed, appellant sub judice bases its statutory claim to exclusive authority on F.S. 39.11(2)(c), which incorporates F.S. 39.01(9), already above discussed. However, even were we to construe F.S. 39.01(9) as contended by appellant, rather than as above treated, it could have no application by virtue of F.S....

...As to the order relative to custody and requiring that the five subject children be placed in the same foster home, we affirm. As to the order finding appellants in contempt we reverse and remand. It is so ordered. McCORD and MILLS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Please see F.S. 39.01(17) and F.S. 39.01 (25). [2] Please see F.S. 39.01(25). [3] See F.S. 39.01(27). [4] See F.S. 39.01(25)....

...2d DCA 1988). Chapter 39 defines a "dependent" child as one who is found by the court to have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his or her parents or one who is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents." § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2004). "Abuse" is defined as "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury or harm." § 39.01(2). "Harm" is defined to include "engag[ing] in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child." § 39.01(30)(i)....

...Instead, there must be some evidence that the child sees or is aware of the violence occurring. Id. at 618. Further, for "harm" resulting from witnessing domestic violence to constitute "abuse," the domestic violence witnessed by the child must result in some physical, mental, or sexual injury to the child. § 39.01(2); W.T....

...er the provisions of Chapter 39, F.S., is not a criminal but a civil proceeding in which appellee is neither charged nor convicted of having committed a crime against the laws of this state but merely with being a delinquent child as defined in F.S. Section 39.01(11), F.S.A., as follows: "`Delinquent child' means a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurs." Appellant points to Article I, Section 15, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A....

...4th DCA, 2003). A "[c]hild who is found to be dependent" includes, inter alia, one who has been "abandoned, abused, or neglected" by the parents, or a child who is found "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect" by the parents. See § 39.01(14)(a) & (f), Fla....

...An abandoned child is one whose parent or caregiver, "while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child." P.D. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 866 So.2d 100, 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (quoting § 39.01(1), Fla....

...An abused child is one who is subjected to "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." Id. (quoting § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2002)). "Harm" is defined by statute to include a parent's "[c]ontinued chronic and severe use of a controlled substance or alcohol" if "the child is demonstrably adversely affected by such usage." § 39.01(30)(a), (g) 2., (Fla....

...permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." P.D., 866 So.2d at 101-102 (quoting § 39.01(45), Fla....

...The child's placement in permanent guardianship is also relevant to a consideration of the mother's lack of understanding of her role in the relationship. Because of the permanent guardianship, neither parent will be acting in a parental role. See § 39.01(54) (defining permanent guardianship as "a legal relationship that a court creates ......

..."Substantial compliance" is statutorily defined as "mean[ing] that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the *1177 extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child's remaining with or being returned to the child's parent." § 39.01(71), Fla....

...When the consent decree was signed, there were only two "training schools" in Florida. They were the Arthur C. Dozier School in Marianna, and the Eckerd Youth Development Center in Okeechobee. Those two facilities continue to be the only "training schools" in Florida. § 39.01(74), Fla.Stat....

entitled to procedures to insure a fair hearing, § 39.001(2)(d).

...There was no evidence of any injuries to the father's biological children. In order to adjudicate a child dependent, the trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the child has been abused, abandoned, or neglected or is at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect. § 39.01(14), Fla....

...eatment or rehabilitation of children found to have committed delinquent acts or violations of law constitutes *954 escape within the intent and meaning of s. 944.40 and is a felony of the third degree. The term "restrictiveness level" is defined in Section 39.01(61), as follows: "Restrictiveness level" means the identification of broad custody categories for committed children, including nonresidential, residential, and secure residential....

...Specific placement in restrictiveness levels within these categories depends upon the risk and needs of the individual child. Restrictiveness levels must be established by the department by rule, provided, however that there shall be no more than eight levels. § 39.01(61), Fla....

...1962) (quoting 1 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 116); see also Department of Business *955 Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. Jones, 474 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Florida Waterworks Assoc. v. Florida Public Service Comm'n, 473 So.2d 237, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Reading secs. 39.061 and 39.01(61) in pari materia, as we must, we find that insofar as they pertain to residential commitment facilities, they do not contain standards sufficiently explicit to inform the discretion of the agency charged with administering them thereby rendering them vulnerable to challenge under the nondelegation doctrine....

...legislature specifically outlined what shall constitute contraband). To paraphrase the standard articulated by the Florida Supreme Court in Chiles, et al. v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F, 589 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1991), we hold that Sections 39.061 and 39.01(61), Florida Statutes (Supp....

consistent with public policy as articulated in Section 39.001(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987).[3] He was given

foster care longer than 1 year. (emphasis added) § 39.001(1)(h), Fla. Stat. Here the child remained with

...was still a party to the proceeding even though she agreed to the dependency order. "`Party' means the parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian ad *557 litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child." § 39.01(50), Fla....

...C.A. testified he could take care of E.A. on his own if necessary. After considering all the testimony, the trial court ruled in favor of DCF. The trial court stated: I find for the Department that [C.A.] has abused and/or neglected the child under 39.01 or that the child is in imminent risk thereof....

...The trial court determined DCF had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence *559 that C.A. neglected E.A. and placed him at imminent risk of harm. We find the trial court's finding of dependency is not supported by the evidence. Finding of Neglect Section 39.01(45), Florida Statutes, states in relevant part: "`Neglect'" "occurs when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired . . . Neglect of a child includes acts or omissions." § 39.01(43), Fla. Stat. "`Harm' to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person: Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury." § 39.01(31)(a), Fla....

...In relation to harm from a substance abuse problem: Exposes a child to a controlled substance or alcohol. Exposure to a controlled substance or alcohol is established by: Continued chronic and severe use of a controlled substance or alcohol by a parent when the child is demonstrably adversely affected by such usage. § 39.01(31)(g)(2), Fla. Stat. "Harm to a child's health can occur when any person `[e]xposes a child to a controlled substance or alcohol.'" T.G. v. Dep't of Children and Families, 927 So.2d 104, 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)( quoting § 39.01(30)(g), Fla....

...e lower court made the difficult decision to terminate Williams' parental rights. The lower court concluded the evidence clearly and convincingly showed a likelihood that the children would suffer neglect if they were reunited with their father. See § 39.01(37), Fla....

...dian and that she regularly sent the children cards while she was incarcerated. Although the trial court was of the opinion that the Mother's efforts were only marginal efforts that did not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, see § 39.01(1), its finding of abandonment does not reflect that it was based on any factor other than the Mother's incarceration....

...ort a judgment of permanent commitment. The trial court recognized this requirement in the final judgment. He found the children to be abandoned and neglected "... as those terms are defined by F.S. section 39.11(1)(d) [(2)(d)] [sic] (1977) and F.S. section 39.01(1) and (2) [(27)] [sic] (1978)......

...arent or parents have voluntarily executed a written surrender of the child for subsequent adoption in the form required by paragraph (c) of subsection (7); and if the court finds that it is manifestly to the best interest of the child to do so. [2] § 39.01(1) and (27), Fla....

is habitually truant from school. Fla.Stats. § 39.01(8) (1977). In 1978, the Florida State Legislature

...t. The petition for writs of prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari is denied. [4] STEVENSON and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. NOTE: SHAHOOD, J., did not participate in oral argument, but has had the opportunity to review the entire proceeding. NOTES [1] Section 39.01(64), Florida Statutes (Supp....

psychological counseling. The department points to section 39.001(3), which states that chapter 39 should be

...Hillary S. Kambour; and Calianne P. Lantz, Miami, for appellee. Before LEVY, C.J., and RAMIREZ, and ROTHENBERG, JJ. RAMIREZ, J. T.V., the natural mother, appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights as to her three children, pursuant to section 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (2002)....

protect the health and safety of children. See § 39.001(1)(b)1, Fla. Stat. (2006). When setting up procedures

...After reviewing the testimony presented to the trial judge, especially the expert testimony, we affirm the final judgment terminating Tolley's parental rights. *481 Initially, we note that a child may be found dependent because of prospective abuse. Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (1993) reads in pertinent part: (10) "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: ........

...Dep't of Children & Families (In re M.F.), 770 So.2d 1189, 1192 (Fla. 2000) (footnotes omitted). Generally, a dependent child is one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents, or who is at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by his parents. See § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla....

...There are a number of cases where a child has been adjudicated dependent because of the parent's health situation. These cases, generally speaking, have involved psychological or emotional health impairments. Nevertheless, a review of the rationale applied in those circumstances is of value here. Courts, pursuant to section 39.01(14)(f), require that the prospect of neglect be imminent....

...To interpret the provision otherwise would appear to this Court to be inconsistent with the legislative intent of Chapter 39. The intent of the Legislature in enactment of the provisions of Chapter 39, particularly with respect to dispositional alternatives, is expressed at various points in the Chapter. In Section 39.01(21) "Disposition hearing" is defined as "a hearing in which the Court determines the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting provided for under s. 39.052(3)... ." (emphasis added). Prior to this 1990 revision section 39.01(21) had read simply "disposition hearing means a hearing provided for under s....

...Millers of Orlando, 294 So.2d 704 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). However, under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, any child under the age of eighteen can be charged with a violation of the law. State v. D.H., 340 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 1976); McCray v. State, 424 So.2d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); § 39.01(7), Fla....

...As appellant points out, the second ground for termination of parental rights in the appealed order appears to rely on the notion of "abandonment" by the mother. Unfortunately, at the time of the filing of this petition, "abandonment" was not a statutory ground for termination of parental rights. "Abandonment" as defined in section 39.01(1) was not added to section 39.806(1)(b) until July 2000....

...ord v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). We begin by noting that a statute has established the CPT as part of the Department of Children and Families for the express purpose of "process[ing] child abuse cases. " [e.s.] § 39.01(13), Fla....

..., we should understand that the trial was not held until 4 years later, when she was 13. It is the age of the witness at trial that matters. After Crawford, the trial court had no discretion to waive the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. [3] Section 39.01(13), Florida Statutes (2001), defines the child protection team as "a team of professionals established by the Department of Health to receive referrals from the protective investigators and protective supervision staff of the departmen...

...gust 24. Both the deputy and the investigator testified that the grandmother had told them that K.V. was present during the incident. The trial court found the Father and the grandmother's testimony to not be credible and adjudicated K.V. dependent. Section 39.01(14), Florida Statutes (2005), in pertinent part, provides: "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who ....

...(f) To be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent. . . . "`Abuse' means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2). "Harm" is defined to occur when any person "[i]nflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury." § 39.01(30)(a)....

...nd settlement agreement. The mother likewise, without any explanation, contends that she "completed all tasks of her case." However, although the parents completed many of their tasks, such completion *1049 does not equate to substantial compliance. Section 39.01(68) states that, "`[s]ubstantial compliance' means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon...

...the Interest of Y.F.W., 494 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). As to paragraph 6 in the amended petition, an allegation that the mother allegedly failed to visit and support the child who was in foster care cannot support a finding of statutory neglect, section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1986). Additionally, the alleged grounds of abandonment in paragraph 6 of the amended *1171 petition cannot be maintained since the petition for termination fails to allege that the mother was able to do that which it was alleged she failed to do. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes, defines abandonment as: a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of the parent or legal custodian, the person responsible for the child's welfare, while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations. (emphasis supplied) Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes, thus does not provide for the termination of parental rights when abandonment is involuntary....

...S. would be exposed to the same type of unfortunate experience that she had suffered. None of this evidence is sufficient to support an adjudication of dependency. The testimony falls short of establishing neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. § 39.01(27), Fla....

well-being of all children under the state's care. § 39.001(2)(a) & (b), Fla. Stat. Further, the act provides

the child and the best interests of the state." § 39.001(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Another purpose is to preserve

...The juvenile delinquency statute allows a child to appeal his restrictiveness level—a statutory security classification—where, as here, the trial court selects a restrictiveness level other than one recommended by the Department. Id. §§ 39.052(3)(e)3, 39.01(61)....

...The trial court agreed with the State and ruled that a more severe sanction was required, given the seriousness of the offense. The court committed J.M. to the Department and ordered a level 4 restrictiveness level, which is a "low-risk residential" classification. Id. § 39.01(61)(b)....

...In 1990 the legislature made a significant change in the law to increase the powers of the juvenile court judge over placement of children committed to the Department. To do this, the legislature created "restrictiveness levels." Ch. 90-208, §§ 3, 5, Laws of Fla.; present version §§ 39.01(61), 39.052(3)(e), Fla....

...§ 39.052(3)(e)3. [13] For present purposes, the important point is that this is a very specific, very narrowly targeted right of appeal. It must be remembered that a restrictiveness level is assigned only to a child who has been committed to the Department. See §§ 39.01(61), 39.052(3)(e) 2-3, Fla....

...int. Obviously, the trial court thought the offense was serious enough to warrant placement in a residential program. However, the court's pronouncements do not specifically address the statutory criteria for the relevant restrictiveness levels. See § 39.01(61), Fla....

...same. [4] Effective October 1, 1994, the juvenile delinquency programs of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services were transferred to the newly-created Department of Juvenile Justice. Ch. 94-209, §§ 1-2, Laws of Fla.; see §§ 20.316, 39.01(15), Fla....

...The decision to adjudicate the child delinquent (as opposed to withholding adjudication) is made as part of the disposition hearing. Id. § 39.052(3)(d). [7] There are four restrictiveness levels: (a) minimum risk nonresidential; (b) low risk residential; (c) moderate risk residential; (d) high risk residential. Id. § 39.01(61)....

...restrictiveness levels. See B.H. v. State, 645 So.2d 987, 989-90, 994 (Fla.1994), cert denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2559, 132 L.Ed.2d 812 (1995). The restrictiveness levels were subsequently enacted into statute without the original numbers. See § 39.01(61), Fla....

by section 775.089 Florida Statutes (1995). See § 39.001(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995) (identifying as a purpose

achieved as soon as possible for every child. See § 39.001(l)(h), Fla. Stat.' (2014). Section 39.621(1) also

returned to the child's parent or guardian." Section 39.001(50), Fla. Stat. (1989). Appellant maintains

...Appellants, each of whom is a minor child subject to the compulsory school attendance law of Florida, [1] have appealed a final order rendered by the Juvenile Court of Duval County adjudging them to be children in need of supervision as defined by F.S. Section 39.01(12)(a), F.S.A., and placing them under the supervision of a juvenile counselor of the court....

...ted States in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder. [7] The judgment appealed is affirmed. RAWLS, Acting C.J., WIGGINTON, J., and POWELL, GILLIS E., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] F.S. Chapter 232, F.S.A. [2] F.S. § 232.01(1)(a), (b), F.S.A. [3] F.S. § 39.01(12) (a), F.S.A....

...We affirm the appellant's conviction for the knifepoint robbery of a convenience store. Of Hubbard's seven points on appeal, two require comment. Hubbard was seventeen years old and subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system when the crime occurred on July 18, 1977. Section 39.01(4), 39.02, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...appeals from a disposition order which adjudicated his children, J.R. and F.R., Jr., dependent and placed them in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services. [1] He argues there was insufficient evidence of "abuse" as defined by section 39.01(2) to support the trial court's finding that F.R....

...bandonment or neglect. W.T. v. Department of Children and Families, 787 So.2d 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). "Abuse" includes any willful act that results in injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's health to be significantly impaired. § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. "Harm" includes engaging in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of the child. § 39.01(30)(i)....

...5th DCA 2003); M.N. "Abuse" is defined as "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2), Fla....

...into Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, which provides, in pertinent part, that "[c]orporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child." § 39.01(2), Fla....

...We must, therefore, determine whether there is substantial competent evidence that C.M. was harmed by the corporal discipline administered to him. A child's health or welfare may be harmed when any person "[i]nflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury." § 39.01(30)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). The injury contemplated by this statute may include "[i]nappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action ...." § 39.01(30)(a)(4), Fla....

...Injury resulting from the use of a deadly weapon. g. Burns or scalding. h. Cuts, lacerations, punctures, or bites. i. Permanent or temporary disfigurement. j. Permanent or temporary loss or impairment of a body part or function. k. Significant bruises or welts. § 39.01(30)(a)4., Fla....

...ncrimination and that any confession given by him before either (1) he is granted the right to make such call, or (2) the officer makes a good faith effort to so advise his parents, is inadmissible in evidence." 336 So.2d at 376 (citations omitted). Section 39.01(3) defines "taken into custody" to mean "the status of temporary physical control of a child by a person authorized by this chapter, pending his release, detention, or placement." The language of Section 39.03(3)(c) differentiates between taking a child into custody and placing him in detention or shelter care....

which should have been given by [their] parents." § 39.001(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (1991). The Florida Legislature

(Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In K.H., the court quoted section 39.001(2)(b) and (c), to illustrate legislative intent

...This follows the conventional rule in Florida that the Legislature uses the word “including” in a statute as a word of expansion, not one of limitation. See, e.g., In Re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d 749, 752 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), quashed on other grounds, 215 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2017) (interpreting “includes” in section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2015), expansively); Childers v....

...was removed from his parents' home, he gained 24 ounces and grew two inches over the next seven months. At the time L.H. was removed, he was 22 months old and weighed 18 pounds. *1316 A dependent child is one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents or custodians. § 39.01(10)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). The trial court found no evidence of abandonment or abuse. Neglect is defined in section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes, which provides in part that a child is considered neglected "when a parent ......

...substantial compliance with her case plan was merely technical, at most, and in no way demonstrated her ability to comprehend and implement the basic parenting skills and practices necessary to assure her child's health, safety, and well-being. See § 39.01(71), Fla....

..., B.W. The child's father, who was convicted of the sexual offense and was incarcerated accordingly, is not a party in this appeal. The child was adjudicated dependent as to Appellant in December 2003 and as to the child's father in August 2004. See § 39.01(14), Fla....

...As grounds for terminating Appellant's parental rights, the Department cited sections 39.806(1)(b), (c), or (e), Florida Statutes (2006). Specifically, the Department alleged that Appellant had abandoned and neglected the child, as the terms "abandoned" and "neglect," respectively, are defined in section 39.01(1) & (43), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...In its termination petition, the Department expressly cited the following statutory language or presented allegations substantially related to these specific provisions: *499 (1) Grounds for the termination of parental rights may be established under any of the following circumstances: . . . . (b) Abandonment as defined in s. 39.01(1)....

...n with a goal of termination of parental rights to allow continuation of services until the termination is granted or until further orders of the court are issued. § 39.806(1)(b), (c), (e)1. & (3), Fla. Stat. (2006). As defined in pertinent part in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2006): "Abandoned" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child[,] ....

...s. If the efforts of the parent . . . are, in the opinion of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. According to the pertinent language in section 39.01(43), Florida Statutes (2006): "Neglect" occurs when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation...

...or necessary to ensure B.W.'s health, safety, and well-being irrespective of the Department's provision of more services. Appellant's acts and omissions simply did not square with the Florida Legislature's definition of "substantial compliance." See § 39.01(71), Fla....

...vidence clearly demonstrated that the provision of yet more counseling and services to Appellant would be futile. Further, achieving a safe and permanent home expeditiously for children is a primary purpose of Chapter 39. See *505 §§ 39.001(1)(h), 39.013(5), 39.402(14)(e) & 39.621(1), Fla....

See, e.g., § 39.001(3), Fla. Stat. (2002) (outlining general protections for children); § 39.01, Fla. Stat

...r placement. In support thereof, we would show: 1. That the child, who was not less than 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the current offense and who was adjudicated and has been committed in this proceeding, meets the criteria in subsection 39.01(46), Florida Statutes, for serious or habitual juvenile offender placement in that said child was: ____ Adjudicated or had adjudication withheld on the current offense for a capital, life, or first-degree felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm to another person....

...(b) A disposition order was entered pursuant to section 39.41, Florida Statutes. (c) The parents were informed of their right to counsel in the dependency proceeding pursuant to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. (d) A ____ performance agreement/permanent placement plan ____ as defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes, has been offered to the parents....

...ted counsel for the parents/the parents were informed of their right to counsel including the right of an indigent person to be represented by court appointed counsel ____; 5. A ____ performance agreement/permanent placement plan ____, as defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes, was offered to the parents; 6....

...that day. There, is however, nothing in the statute that authorizes continued detention based on the pendency of the State's request to have the child bound over for trial as an adult. [7] Non-secure custody may be provided in a detention home, see Section 39.01(16), Florida Statutes (1979), or in the child's own home, see Section 39.01(14), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...inor child to the Department for the purpose of adoption. The Guardian ad Litem Program, joined by the Department, moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of standing. Because we agree that the appellants were not parties to the proceedings below, see § 39.01(50), Florida Statutes (2007), they lack standing to bring this appeal, see § 39.815(1), Florida Statutes (2007), and we must grant the motion and dismiss the appeal....

...prior to the hearing). We agree with appellant, however, that the lower court's order permanently committing the child on the ground of neglect lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary predicate. The state has in fact confessed error in this regard. Section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985), defines neglect in part as occurring when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person primarily responsible for the child's welfare deprives a chil...

...urces to care for her child in the manner that HRS deemed desirable. Such circumstances cannot serve as clear and convincing evidence justifying termination of a parent's rights. See In the Interest of J.R.C., 480 So.2d 198, 199 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Section 39.01(27), moreover, forbids a finding of neglect if the cause of a parent's allowing a child to live in an environment resulting in the child's physical health to be significantly impaired is due "primarily ......

...law and fact, which will be upheld on appeal if the trial court applied the correct law and its ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence. Id.; A.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family *1139 Servs., 901 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Section 39.01(15)(a),(f), Florida Statutes (2011), defines a dependent child as one who "is found by the court: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians; ......

specific rehabilitation needs of the child ....". § 39.001(1)(c), Fla. Stat.(1995). The act further provides

...as not been completed is sufficient to find permanency at this time for this child." The parents argue that the term "substantial compliance," is statutorily defined as something different than merely whether the parents "completed" their case plan. Section 39.01(68), Florida Statutes, contains the applicable definition: "Substantial compliance" means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of...

...en. Although this provision states a need for secure placement for "certain children alleged to have committed a delinquent act," the second sentence makes no distinction between children awaiting adjudication and those whose disposition is pending. Section 39.01(16), Florida Statutes (1993), also defines detention care as "the temporary care of a child in secure, nonsecure, or home detention, pending a court adjudication or disposition or execution of a court order"....

...[2] A "guardian" is defined as "a person who has been appointed by the court to act on behalf of a ward's person or property, or both." § 744.102(8), Fla. Stat. (2003). We have not found a definition of the term "legal guardian." We have found a definition of the term "legal guardianship" in section 39.01(34), Florida Statutes (2003), which provides that the term "means a judicially created relationship between the child and caregiver which is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining and is provided pursuant to the procedures in chap...

...If a parent's efforts to support and communicate with the child during such a 6-month period are, in the opinion of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. § 39.01(1), Fla....

...ORFINGER and SHARP, JJ., concur. AFTER REMAND COBB, Judge. By opinion filed April 23, 1980, this Court relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court with directions to make a specific finding of whether there was abandonment, abuse, or neglect within the contemplation of section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...tiveness level VI or above maintained for the treatment or rehabilitation of children found to have committed delinquent acts or violations of law constitutes escape within the intent and meaning of s. 944.40 and is a felony of the third degree. [2] Section 39.01(61) defines "restrictiveness level" as: the identification of broad custody categories for committed children including nonresidential, residential, and secure residential....

...categorized for the length of rehabilitation that is necessary." At trial, the state presented no evidence as to any HRS rule defining "any secure detention or any residential commitment facility of restrictiveness level VI or above" as specified in section 39.01(61), or that Duval House is that type of facility....

...Chapter 39 does not purport to govern all relationships between police and juveniles. Its principal concern, as its title indicates, is orderly and sensitive "judicial treatment" of juveniles. That phrase implies a concern for adjudicatory standards and for appropriate ancillary processes. Section 39.01(30) defines "taken into custody," the linchpin phrase of appellant's argument, as "the status of a temporary physical control of a child by a person authorized by this chapter, pending his release, detention, or placement." The statute...

...However, the failure to comply with a case plan may not be used as a ground for termination of parental rights if the failure is due to the parent's lack of financial resources or the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child. Substantial compliance is defined in section 39.01(68), which states: Substantial compliance means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child's remaining with or being returned to the child's parent....

discarded entirely.” Prosser, id. at § 39. 1 The Federal Tort Claims Act requires

...to relatives has two significant ramifications. First, it is important to note that if J.R.S. had been able to tend his child, his resumption of parenting responsibilities beginning in 1998 might well have precluded a finding of abandonment notwithstanding his earlier lapses. See § 39.01(1), Fla....

...NOTES [1] The trial court terminated the natural mother's rights in a prior order that the mother did not appeal. [2] Generally, the goal of a performance agreement is reunification. However, chapter 39 permits the Department to file an initial case plan with a goal of termination. See § 39.01(26), Fla....

...5th DCA 1994). This remains true under the current statutory scheme. [8] The Department argued that J.R. and V.R. lacked standing to appeal the order denying placement of the child with them after the termination because they were merely "participants." See § 39.01(37), (38), Fla....

...In order to establish dependency based on prospective abuse or neglect in cases where another child was previously harmed, DCF has the burden of establishing that the current child is at "substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents...." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

...law relating to prospective abuse or neglect. The Law Relating To Prospective Abuse Or Neglect The law defines a dependent child as one who, inter alia, is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect by the parent or parents or the custodian." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

...states that she "has never abused, neglected nor abandoned any child." Regarding her first three children, the trial court explicitly found that C.W. and the father had "abandoned or neglected and have continued to abandon or neglect their children pursuant to Section 39.01(1) and (36), and Section 39.464(1)(f) and (c), Florida Statutes (1997)." Subsequently, C.W....

...section 39.806(1)(f)(2), defining egregious conduct, among other things, as including "an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child." Compare these provisions with section 39.01(14)(f), Florida Statutes (2000), defining as a dependent child one who is found "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." The analysis provided in D.H....

...d under the laws of Florida. While no specific mention is made of it in section 828.19 or 828.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., there is but one place in the statutes of this State where the words `delinquent child' are delimited. That is to be found in section 39.01, Florida Statutes ......

...inable source to determine the meaning of those words. AFFIRMED. PETERSON and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 26.012(1), Fla.Stat. (1997). [2] State v. Shamrani, 370 So.2d 1 (Fla.1979); State v. Barone, 124 So.2d 490 (Fla.1960). [3] Sections 39.01(11) and 984.03(12), Florida Statutes (1997) refer to the term "dependent" child. Section 39.01(11) provides: (11) "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parents or other custodians....

...In addition, the children receive $350.00 a month social security payments until they reach the age of 22 or cease being full time students. They do not become dependent in the eyes of the law because they are in college. See, Carmody v. Carmody, Fla.App. 1970, 230 So.2d 40; Perla v. Perla, Fla. 1952, 58 So.2d 689; and Section 39.01(10), F.S....

his or her most trusted caretaker is more so); § 39.001(1)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). We conclude, the

...The several appellate points have been considered and none have merit or require discussion except that common point which challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The Florida Statutes define a delinquent child as one who "commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurred". Section 39.01(11), F.S. 1971, F.S.A. A violation of law is a violation of any law of the United States, Florida, another state, or a city or town ordinance. Section 39.01(13)(a), F.S....

...Dep't of Children & Families (In re M.F.), 770 So.2d 1189, 1192 (Fla.2000)). In this case, the question for the trial court was whether D.J. was "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(f) (defining what constitutes a dependent child). "`Neglect' occurs when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment...." § 39.01(43). "`Necessary medical treatment' means care which is necessary within a reasonable degree of medical certainty to prevent the deterioration of a child's condition or to alleviate immediate pain of a child." § 39.01(42)....

..."intrude as little as possible into the life of the family," § 39.001(1)(b)(3). We are also concerned by the Department's apparent disregard of the requirement that dependency actions be expedited in all but the most exceptional circumstances. See § 39.0136....

legislative policies regarding dependency cases in section 39.001(1), Florida Statutes (2000); delinquency cases

...The statute on which A.A. relies must be read in context with the other detention-related provisions of chapter 39. Detention care in the juvenile system is ordinarily employed for temporary custody of a child pending adjudication of the petition for delinquency. See § 39.01(16), Fla....

...or necessary to ensure B.W.'s health, safety, and well-being irrespective of the Department's provision of more services. Appellant's acts and omissions simply did not square with the Florida Legislature's definition of "substantial compliance." See § 39.01(71), Fla....

...donment or neglect to the minor children [C.M.] and [I.M.]. A child is deemed dependent if the court finds him or her, inter alia, "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(15)(f), Fla....

..."Abuse," as defined in the statute, is any willful act or threatened act resulting in "physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes acts or omissions." § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). A child suffers "abandonment" when his or her parent, "while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child." § 39.01(1), Fla....

...(2011). "Neglect" means depriving a child of "necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical *621 treatment ... caus[ing] the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(44), Fla....

...Abuse of Alcohol and Illegal Substances For purposes of finding dependency, harm to a child includes "extensive, abusive, and chronic use of a controlled substance or alcohol by a parent when the child is demonstrably adversely affected by such usage." § 39.01(32)(g)2, Fla....

...violence could not be sustained where there was no evidence that parents committed violent acts in front of the children). Neglect of Children's Dental Health Neglect occurs when a parent deprives a child of, inter alia, necessary medical treatment. § 39.01(44), Fla. Stat. (2011). The term "necessary medical treatment" is defined as care necessary "to prevent the deterioration of a child's condition or to alleviate immediate pain of a child." § 39.01(43), Fla....

...red and received cleanings, sealants, and restorative fillings. But there had been no dental emergencies, and the children were not in pain. Assuming, without deciding, that routine dental care constitutes "necessary medical treatment" as defined in section 39.01(43), the counselor's testimony does not show that lack of such care significantly impaired the children's physical health. Moreover, the evidence shows that the Mother has been providing her children necessary health care. We therefore conclude the counselor's testimony was not sufficient to establish imminent neglect under section 39.01(44) as a basis for finding the children dependent....

...1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; Annot., 25 L.Ed.2d 950 (1970). See also, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). Especially is this true where the statutory definition of "delinquent child" is limited to "a child who commits a violation of law." See, F.S. § 39.01(11) (1971), F.S.A....

...; State v. ex rel . Lewis v. Lutheran So. Ser., 68 Wis.2d 36, 227 N.W.2d 643 (1975) (upheld termination of natural father's parental rights because of pre-birth abandonment). The only statutory definition of "abandonment" in Florida is that found in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1985): (1) "Abandoned" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person responsible for the child's welfare, while being able, makes...

...The father's argument that DCF failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain its burden of proof is also rejected. If found credible by the trial court, the evidence which was presented at the hearing would be sufficient to support a finding of dependency. The father's argument that section 39.01(1) of the Florida Statutes which defines "abandonment" is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad is also rejected....

...It is particularly abhorrent in a situation like this one, where both children had been abandoned and neglected by their fathers until the inception of this case. Moreover, it nullifies those statutes in Chapter 39 which otherwise provide for reunification with the mother. [5] Section 39.01(17) defines comprehensive assessment: "Comprehensive assessment" or "assessment" means the gathering of information for the evaluation of a child's and caregiver's physical, psychiatric, psychological or mental health, educational, voca...

...at least 6 months, the child is adopted, or the child attains the age of 18. (emphasis added) [7] See § 39.601(9)(f). [8] See § 39.601(9)(f). [9] See 5th Amend. U.S. Const.; Art. I, section 9, Fla. Const. [10] Substantial compliance is defined in section 39.01(68) as: [t]he circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child's remaining with or being returned to the child's parent....

...The petition further alleged that the husband had failed to contact the children since that date, and that he had provided only marginal support for them since they had been in Lee County. Thus, the petition alleged, the husband had abandoned and psychologically abused the children within the meaning of section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1983), and it would be in the best interests of the children if the wife were awarded custody of them....

...ement; and (3) appellant had neglected T.S. However, the trial court did not specifically find that appellant had abandoned or neglected T.S., nor did it set forth findings of fact which would constitute abandonment or neglect as defined in Sections 39.01(1) and 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...ination of the record of the final hearing, shall enter a final judgment containing the appropriate factual findings. Motion for rehearing is granted to the extent indicated, but is otherwise denied. BOOTH, SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1983), defines "abandoned" as follows: "Abandoned" means a situation in which a parent who, while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child for a period of 6 months or longer....

...If a parent's efforts to support and communicate with the child during such a 6-month period are, in the opinion of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. Section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1933), defines "neglect" as follows: "Neglect" occurs when a parent or other legal custodian, though financially able, deprives a child of, or allows a child to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, o...

...t cause bruising. Bruising could occur by any object pushed against the anus. A rape examination was completed, and DNA analysis was done. They revealed nothing. Nevertheless, the injury to the anus itself would constitute harm within the meaning of section 39.01(30)(b), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...I also would reverse the decision finding the other two minor boys dependent as to both parents. In order to find them dependent, evidence must show that the dependent child is found "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

...which held: A simple showing by DCF that a parent committed a sex act on one child does *986 not by itself constitute proof that the parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to the child's sibling, as required by the statute. See § 39.01(11), Fla....

...The central point for review is whether the circuit court followed and employed the correct statute(s) governing a commitment proceeding. The mother contends that the court should have applied Section 39.41(1)(d) Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) and the definition of "abandoned" contained in Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ither the procedure applicable and governing before October 1, 1978 or that which went into effect after that date. A comparison of the criteria delineated in Section 39.11(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1977) and that set forth in Section 39.41(1)(d) and Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...to the child's support or demonstrated any degree of parental fitness, stability or emotional maturity so as to develop any type of relationship with her child. The findings of the trial court that abandonment occurred under Section 39.41(1)(d) and 39.01(1) or 39.11(1)(d) are supported by clear and convincing evidence....

...Commitment proceedings, pursuant to Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, have as their object the termination of rights of nominal parents to afford a child a temporary place of refuge. There is significant legislative intent in the adoption of Sections 39.41(1)(d) and 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ppeal unless, under the Constitution, such appeal may be taken direct to the Supreme Court or to a circuit court. The question then arises whether a juvenile court is a trial court. Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides for juvenile courts. Section 39.01 provides that a juvenile court means any court, the name of which includes the word "juvenile", heretofore or hereafter established, and means the county judge's court in every county in which no separate juvenile court is established....

...was incarcerated thereby rendering him unable to provide said children with shelter, support, care, and maintenance. 7) That [the other cocaine-exposed child] was examined and evaluated at Jackson Memorial Hospital by Dr. Montana who diagnosed said child as being malnourished and developmentally delayed. Section 39.01(37), Florida Statutes (1989), specifically defines neglect as "[occurring] when the parent ......

...deprives a child of necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or permits a child to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(37), Fla....

dependent children such as K.H. and M.C. In Section 39.001(2)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1981), two

...This is an appeal from a final order adjudicating a child dependent and awarding temporary custody of the child to the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The natural mother prosecutes this appeal raising three alleged errors. We affirm. *1084 First, the natural mother contends that Section 39.01(26), Florida Statutes (1981), under which her child was adjudicated dependent, is unconstitutional because it provides a facially vague standard as a basis for removing a child from a parent's custody....

...The above statute provides, in pertinent part, that a child is considered neglected "when a parent ... permits a child to live in an environment when such... environment causes the child's ... mental or emotional health ... to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(26), Fla....

...aling with this act that although section 2 thereof confers jurisdiction upon the court established thereby to deal with dependent children "as defined in Chapter 415, Laws of Florida," section 3, Chapter 26880, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1951, F.S.A. § 39.01 note, specifically repealed that section of Chapter 415, namely section 415.01(1), Florida Statutes 1949, that defined the term "dependent children." Under these circumstances we have the view that in making an adjudication of dependency under that portion of *305 Chapter 27318 that confers upon the respondent the jurisdiction "to hear, determine, and adjudicate, all complaints affecting children * * * who may be dependents * * *", resort may be had to section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., which has to do with the establishment of juvenile courts generally, to determine what constitutes a "dependent child." When so viewed it is plain that the purpose of Chapter 27318 is to confer upon t...

...rt of minor children, where the circuit court having jurisdiction of the minor children so directs; and (2) "to hear, determine, and adjudicate, all complaints affecting children * * * who may be dependents" — a dependent child being, as defined by section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., "* * * a child who, for any reason, is destitute, homeless, dependent upon the public for support, or has not the proper parental support, maintenance, care, or guardianship; or who is neglected as to...

...to the child by virtue of Mr. Eddy's admissions regarding his prior sexual prosecution...." A child may be found dependent if the court finds the child is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect by the parent or parents or the custodian." § 39.01(11)(f), Fla....

...1-39.402, Fla. Stat. (1997). Homelessness, derived solely from a custodian's financial inability, does not constitute abuse, neglect, or abandonment unless the Department offers services to the homeless custodian and those services are rejected. See § 39.01, Fla. Stat. (1997); K.H. v. State, Department of HRS, 527 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). When services are offered and rejected by a homeless custodian, the child is deemed "neglected" and foster care is warranted. See § 39.01(36), Fla....

...or her child where there is no abuse, neglect, or abandonment, see §§ 39.401(1)(b)1, 39.402(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997), and since there is no abuse, neglect, or abandonment where a homeless parent accepts the services offered by the Department, see § 39.01, Fla....

...If the efforts of such parent ... to support and communicate with the child are, in the opinion of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. § 39.01(1), Fla....

...Indeed, the trial court specifically found the children's mother had failed to substantially comply, but made no such finding concerning the father. The issue then becomes whether the department proved by clear and convincing evidence that F.C. abandoned the children, as that term is defined in section 39.01(1)....

...This court has held that when children witness incidents of domestic violence, both verbal and physical abuse between parents, that the children are at risk of being "harmed"—impaired mentally and emotionally—if they remain in the custody of the abusive parents, within the meaning of section 39.01(30)(i), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...See D.D., 773 So.2d at 618. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and MONACO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See Vandergriff v. Vandergriff, 456 So.2d 464 (Fla.1984); Boylan v. Boylan, 571 So.2d 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Wright v. Wright, 431 So.2d 177 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). [2] Subsection 39.01(30), Florida Statutes (2002), defines harm and provides: (30)(i) "Harm" to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person: (i) Engages in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child....

...WELTS MAY CONSTITUTE FELONY CHILD ABUSE UNDER SECTION 827.03(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2001). *956 The extent of the student's injuries in this case was nothing more than "significant bruises or welts," and there was no corresponding mental injury under section 39.01(43), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...We therefore reverse and remand for his discharge. Reversed and remanded. FULMER and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The State did not charge King with a violation of section 827.04, Florida Statutes (2001). [2] The definition of "mental injury" under section 39.01(43), Florida Statutes (2001), applies to section 827.03, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...ne the Florida Juvenile Justice Act. Because all the violations occurred during August 1983 to August 1985, we conclude that chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1983), supplies the governing statutory provisions. We begin with the definition of "child" in section 39.01(7): "(7) `Child' means any unmarried person under the age of 18 alleged to be dependent or any married or unmarried *939 person who is charged with a violation of law occurring prior to the time that person reached the age of 18 years." [ e.s....

...In Johnson v. State, 371 So.2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), the defendant was an adult when sentenced for a juvenile crime. The court held: "Section 39.111 deals with children prosecuted as adults. Within the meaning of Chapter 39, a `child' is defined in Section 39.01(4), Florida Statutes (1977), as `any married or unmarried person under the age of 18 years or any person who is charged with a violation of law occurring prior to the time that person reached the age of 18 years....

...Florida law, "a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurs, except a child who commits a juvenile traffic offense and whose case had not been transferred to the circuit court by the court having jurisdiction." (F.S. 39.01(12)) It has been held that "a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurred", is a violation of any law of the United States, of Florida, of another state, or of a city or town ordinance....

...HRS is required to establish the status of dependency, as alleged in its petition, by the preponderance of the evidence. § 39.408(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). We have examined the record and find insufficient evidence to establish that W.P.'s parents "abused" her, as that term is defined in section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...and Family Skills) to assist the family. On July 27, 1984, after appellant had allegedly failed to fulfill the terms of the agreement, HRS filed three separate petitions for dependency, alleging that appellant had neglected the children pursuant to section 39.01(26), Florida Statutes (1983) [1] ....

...nce nor sufficient to establish neglect. Although there was ample evidence that Hall's rented home was in need of the repairs, there was no evidence that the home was "unsafe" or that it in any manner constituted "neglect" as that term is defined in section 39.01(26), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...State, 383 So.2d 934 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) and In the Interest of S.J.T. and T.N.T., 475 So.2d 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The order of adjudication dated November 13, 1984 and the subsequent disposition order are REVERSED. MILLS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.01(26) defines neglect as follows: "Neglect" occurs when a parent or other legal custodian, though financially able, deprives a child of, or allows a child to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or permi...

...The court stated: "[S]ince as a practical matter, an incarcerated person is unable to assume all parental duties, his failure to `evince a settled purpose' to assume all duties cannot support a finding of abandonment. This is not to say that an incarcerated person is incapable of voluntarily abandoning his children under section 39.01....

...(2002). The term "mental injury" is defined as "an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernable and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior." § 39.01(43), Fla....

...hen the instructor entered or simply saw her granddaughter exit the dressing area with the instructor behind her. [2] The Information merely tracked the language of the child abuse statute and did not include the facts giving rise to the charge. See § 39.01(43), Fla....

...ghts, the only true meaning of the word "abandonment." See Hinkle v. Lindsey, 424 So.2d 983 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) and the dissent in In the Interest of K.A.F., 442 So.2d 365 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). HRS relies on the statutory definition of abandonment in section 39.01(1), Fla....

...cerated and thereby prevented from meeting parental duties and that by merely committing the crime the parent evinced such a lack of interest in the welfare of his children as to indicate an intent to abdicate (abandon) his parental rights. (Compare § 39.01(1), Fla....

...egard to his children can constitute abandonment authorizing adoption. Subsequent to the Turner opinion, the Florida legislature enacted the following definition of abandonment, effective October 1, 1978, a definition applicable to the instant case: 39.01 Definitions....

...e ability to do so. There is a further finding that the communications to the children from the imprisoned father were only "lip service" — i.e., marginal. [5] These findings are presumed correct, and are encompassed by the emphasized provisions of section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1983), set forth above. The trial court and a majority of this court have faithfully followed our constitutional obligation to apply the applicable statutory law of Florida. The dissent, on the other hand, is philosophically committed to the proposition that section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1983), incorrectly defines "abandonment," and to the proposition that the State of Florida lacks the moral and legal authority to implement the adoption of neglected and abused children pursuant to section 39.41(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Obviously HRS carefully selected the six month period between April, 1983, and the filing of the petition for permanent commitment on November 7, 1983, within which to allege and attempt to prove a six month period of parental non-support and non-communication (statutory abandonment as defined in section 39.01(1), Fla....

...(Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (incarceration is an involuntary circumstance even though criminal acts are voluntary); In the Interest of P.S., R.S., and R.S., 384 So.2d 656 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (phrase "while being able" in statutory definition of abandonment, 39.01(1), Fla....

...the basic question here, to wit: whether a fondling or kissing of a female breast is sexual contact. There are relevant statutes which do include the breasts as "intimate parts" and thus are of importance to the law governing behavior. For instance section 39.01(63)(d), Florida Statutes (1997) governs child welfare proceedings and defines "sexual abuse of a child," in relevant part, as follows: "The intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts, including the breasts, genital area, gro...

...In this type of case it may truly be said that actions often speak louder than words. Although we are not called upon to decide whether the definition of abandonment in a Chapter 39 dependency proceeding applies in adoption proceedings as well, and consequently we do not do so, it is interesting to note that section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1983) looks to the parent's conduct in determining whether there has been an abandonment when it says: ......

...judicial consideration in this instance. Further, I agree that "under one concept" [1] of abandonment some fact-finders could find that Dee has been abandoned by her mother; but that concept is the legislative definition of abandonment contained in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes, and that statute, if constitutional, is inapplicable to this case....

...a circuit court order summarily denying their amended petition for an adjudication of dependency as to T.J. We review the summary denial of the amended petition under a de novo standard. We reverse and remand the case on the basis of our analysis of section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2010), and persuasive decisions of the Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal....

...ied the amended dependency petition. The trial court also denied the amended petition on the ground that T.J.'s father had not been served, but did not address the two affidavits of diligent search for him. This appeal followed. Analysis—Dependency Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2010), provides the following definitions (inapplicable excerpts omitted) that apply to the issue before us: (1) "Abandoned" or "abandonment" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in...

...The Fifth District concluded that, at the time of the dependency hearing, "K.S.L. was an orphan with no legal custodian and, therefore, he was dependent." Id. at 930. In the case at hand, T.J.'s aunt is not a "parent or legal custodian capable of providing supervision and care" under section 39.01(15)(e)....

...e a party or give notice to a participant shall not affect the validity of an order of adjudication or disposition if the court finds that the petitioner has completed a diligent search for that party." The statutory definition of "diligent search," section 39.01(24) (set forth in full above), contemplates the "efforts of a social service agency to locate a parent or prospective parent whose identity or location is unknown." In the present case, the Department has not made any such efforts or ex...

...t Chapter currently is written may be interpreted to provide an avenue for such use. See § 39.001(1), Fla. Stat. (2010) (stating generally the purpose of Chapter 39 as being to provide for the care, safety and protection of children). Specifically, section 39.01(15), as pertinent here, defines a dependent child as a child who has been abused, abandoned, or neglected or who has no parent or legal guardian capable of caring for her or him: (15) "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child w...

...pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians; . . . . (e) To have no parent or legal custodians capable of providing supervision and care. ... § 39.01(15), Fla....

...focuses primarily on subsection (15)(e) to support her dependency claim. This is so because she does not fall within the definition of an abandoned child. Under Chapter 39 an abandoned child is one whose parent, legal custodian, or " caregiver, while being able, makes no provision for the child's support. ..." § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added); § 39.01(10), Fla. Stat. (2010) (defining the term caregiver as "the parent, legal custodian, permanent guardian, adult household member, or other person responsible for a child's welfare as defined in subsection (47) ) (emphasis added); § 39.01(47), Fla....

...Since it is conceded here that T.J.'s aunt has provided for T.J.'s support since 2004 and intends to continue to do so, T.J. cannot be deemed dependent as an abandoned child. The question to be resolved is, therefore, whether T.J. has no parent or legal custodian "capable of providing supervision or care." § 39.01(15)(e), Fla. Stat. (2010). As to whether T.J. has a legal custodian, the record is clear: she has none. See § 39.01(35), Fla....

...has a parent, the record is equally clear: while T.J.'s mother died in 2004, her father is alive and living somewhere. Thus on remand, it must be determined whether T.J.'s father is "capable" of providing supervision and care to her. Anything less contravenes the express language of section 39.01(15)(e) and opens wide the door to parents wishing to secure either a back door immigration route into the United States or funds and services from the State of Florida by simply leaving an otherwise fully supported and properly cared fo...

...was issued November 23, 2010, several months after the trial court's hearing and decision on the amended petition. [3] The trial court order refers to a single affidavit, but there were two (July 9, 2009, and March 23, 2010), as detailed below. [4] T.J. may also qualify as an "abandoned" child under sections 39.01(1) and 39.01(15)(a). We do not reach that question because of our determination that section 39.01(15)(e) is applicable. Abandonment is a more fact-intensive question, turning in this case on the definition of "caregiver" (§ 39.01(10)) and whether T.J.'s aunt is an "adult household member, or other person responsible for a child's welfare as defined in [section 39.01(47)]," raising in turn the question of whether T.J.'s aunt was ever "entrusted with" or "responsible for" T.J.'s care. As detailed in F.L.M. and L.T., an analysis under section 39.015(e) is independently sufficient....

...If such a search takes three or four months for completion by the Department, T.J. will turn 18. The imposition of that requirement is thus likely to "deprive the child of a legal basis for regularizing the child's immigration status." L.T., 48 So.3d at 931. [9] In pertinent part section 39.01(24) and (70) provide: (24) "Diligent search" means the efforts of a social service agency to locate a parent or prospective parent whose identity or location is unknown. ... . . . . (70) "Social service agency" means the department, a licensed child-caring agency, or a licensed child-placing agency. § 39.01(24), (70), Fla....

reasonable doubt. Definitions, give as applicable. § 39.01(2), Florida Statutes? “Abuse” means any willful-acb

...Mother failed to protect Jo.A. or the other children from the Father's abuse. A "[c]hild who is found to be dependent" is one found by the court "[t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians[.]" § 39.01(14)(a)....

..."`Abuse' means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes acts or omissions." § 39.01(2). In turn, "`[h]arm' to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person ... [n]egligently fails to protect a child in his or her care from inflicted physical, mental, or sexual injury caused by the acts of another." § 39.01(30)(j) (emphasis added)....

..., mental, or emotional health of the child . . . ." "Egregious conduct" includes abuse, abandonment, and *1262 neglect. § 39.806(1)(f)(2). Although the definition of failure to protect applicable to dependency proceedings is worded differently, see § 39.01(30)(j), we believe that it is logical in the dependency context as well to require proof that the parent who is alleged to have failed to protect the child knew or should have known that the offender would engage in the abusive conduct....

...e Mother, the relevant statutory provision is that a "[c]hild who is found to be dependent" includes one who is found by the court "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(f) (emphasis added)....

...NOTES [1] Over objection, the probation officer testified that the offense underlying the Father's probation was driving while license suspended. [2] Jo.A. and Je.A. could not be found dependent as to the Father because of the way in which dependency is defined in the statute. See § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2003) (defining dependency in terms of abuse, imminent abuse, etc., by a child's parents or legal custodians) and § 39.01(33), (49) (defining "legal custody" and "parent")....

...In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d at 967; In re D.J.W., 764 So.2d at 826. An adjudication will be upheld if the trial court's findings as to abuse, abandonment or neglect are supported by competent substantial evidence. D.D. v. Department of Children and Families, 773 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Under section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1998), the definition of a dependent child includes one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his or her parents, custodians or caregivers, or is at substantial risk of imminent harm from abandonment, abuse or neglect. § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla....

...dependent on the basis of abuse and neglect. Abuse consists of "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. Neglect occurs "when the parent ... permits a child to live in an environment when such ... environment causes the child's physical ... health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(46), Fla. Stat. For the purpose of protective investigations, abuse and neglect of a child include the acts or omissions of the parent. *1048 § 39.01(2), (46), Fla....

..."Substantial compliance" means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the children will not be endangered upon the children remaining with or being returned to the children's parent. § 39.01(68), Fla....

...We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting proof of a prior 1993 DUI incident and in declaring this child dependent. Because the record does not demonstrate that the child was at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect as a result of the father's actions, we reverse. See § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

...was born, was not, by itself, relevant to any material fact in issue. See Foburg v. State, 744 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). *531 Next, although the trial court did not specify the grounds on which it found the child dependent, only two of the six possible statutory grounds could apply factually. See § 39.01(14)(a), (f). Having determined that the child was not abandoned, abused, or neglected pursuant to section 39.01(14)(a), as those terms have been statutorily defined, we conclude that the only basis for the court's adjudication of dependency must be section 39.01(14)(f). See §§ 39.01(14)(a); 39.01(1); 39.01(2); 39.01(30); 39.01(46). Under section 39.01(14)(f), a child may be found dependent if the court finds the child to be "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." The facts contained in the record on appeal do not support such a finding here....

...Appellant argues the order is reversible because a delinquency petition was never filed and because a finding of delinquency in this case, rather than dependency, frustrates the plain legislative intent of chapter 39, designating truant and runaway behavior as dependency. § 39.01(9), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1978). [1] The state responds that a delinquency petition in substantial compliance with the pertinent statutes and rules was filed and that the contempt was properly based upon J.M.J.'s willful violation of a court order. § 39.01(8)....

...of delinquency and that, in any event, under the circumstances of this case, appellant cannot be adjudicated a delinquent for committing the contempt alleged here. An adjudication of delinquency must be made pursuant to the provisions of chapter 39. § 39.01(8), supra....

...rect contempts and was not intended to conform with the requirements of a proper delinquency petition. Thus, the adjudication of delinquency is void because there is no petition of delinquency to support it. § 39.05(1), supra. Furthermore, although section 39.01(8), supra, generally permits contempts to be treated as delinquent acts, the scheme of section 39.01(9), supra, indicates the specific acts committed here should be treated as acts of dependency....

...interests of the state. [Emphasis supplied.] § 39.001(2)(b). The Act is to be liberally interpreted and construed in conformity with its declared purposes. § 39.001(3). Notably, delinquent children are those who have usually committed crimes. See § 39.01(8) and (34). In contrast, dependent children include those neglected and those formerly known as ungovernable. Compare § 39.01(9), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1978) with 39.01(9), Fla....

...Thus, we hold the delinquency adjudication under chapter 39 is invalid under the facts presented in this case. [4] The order of commitment, adjudicating J.M.J. delinquent and ordering disposition, is vacated. ERVIN and SHAW, JJ., concur. WOODROW M. MELVIN (Ret.), Associate Judge, dissents without opinion. NOTES [1] § 39.01(9) reads in part: "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: ..... (c) To have persistently run away from his parents or legal guardian. (d) To be habitually truant from school while being subject to compulsory school attendance. [Emphasis supplied.] [2] § 39.01(8) reads: "Child who has committed a delinquent act" means a child who, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, is found by a court to have committed a felony, a misdemeanor, contempt of court, or a violation of a local penal ordinance,...

...Bassett, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. STONE, J. We reverse an order adjudicating C.J. dependent and remand for a new final hearing. Appellant is the child's father. The department alleges that C.J. is at substantial risk of imminent threat of harm, as defined in section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes, or imminent neglect, as defined in section 39.01(43), Florida Statutes, arising out of Appellant's history of domestic violence against the mother....

...At the conclusion of all testimony, the court found that Appellant placed C.J. at risk because she "was exposed to some kind of violence." The court ruled that C.J. was subject to imminent neglect and that Appellant had neglected C.J., pursuant to sections 39.01(43) and 39.01(14), Florida Statutes. See also §§ 39.01(2), 39.01(30), Fla. Stat. (2006). Dependency analysis begins with section 39.01(14), Florida Statutes, which states, in relevant part, that a child may be found "dependent" if the child (1) has "been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent," or (2) is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent." § 39.01(14)(a),(f), Fla. Stat. (2006). "Abuse" means "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). "Harm," in turn, includes "engage[ing] in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child." § 39.01(30)(i), Fla....

...er, or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired. § 39.01(43), Fla....

...and that Appellant's conduct caused her, under the totality of the circumstances, to be at significant risk. Unlike the D.H. dependency order, which was based on prospective abuse, neglect or imminent neglect do not require that the child personally observe the acts. Compare § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (defining "abuse" to include an act that results in harm that causes or may cause significant impairment to a child's health), and § 39.01(31)(i), Fla. Stat. (defining "harm" to "occur when any person . . . [e]ngages in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child"), with § 39.01(43), Fla....

...The father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his rights on this latter ground because he did not willfully reject his parental obligations. Section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), allows TPR based on abandonment, as defined in s. 39.01(1). Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2001), states: "Abandoned" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the caregiver responsible for the child's welfare, while being able,...

...contact with them and by making no provisions for the welfare of the Children. Thus, the Father has, since the Children were sheltered, failed to evince a settled purpose to assume any parental responsibilities for the Children. § 39.806(1)(b) and 39.01(1), Fla....

...use of unlawful force. § 776.012, Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added). The State reads this statute in conjunction with case law and dependency statutes acknowledging that corporal punishment by parents is lawful unless it crosses the line to abuse. § 39.01(2), Fla....

...Under the State's theory, S.J.C.'s mother's use of corporal punishment was lawful because it was not abuse, and it was not abuse because S.J.C. was not harmed; therefore, S.J.C. cannot assert self-defense because the force his mother used against him was lawful. See § 39.01(2) ("Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child.")....

...e way or the other whether the mother's act was abuse for the same reason the trial court stated: because the mother was not on trial. We are likewise unpersuaded that the lack of resulting harm to S.J.C. necessarily equals a lack of abuse. Although section 39.01(2) specifically states that corporal punishment that does not result in harm is excluded from the definition of abuse, it should be noted that this exclusion is within the context of dependency and termination of parental rights....

So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); see also § 39.001(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989) (purposes of chapter

...When as here, the agency has already declined that request, it is wholly improper for the court to intervene. [8] More to the point, a valid dependency determination rests on a finding by the *1143 court of one or more of the conditions enumerated in section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...nd Rehabilitative Services will attempt to rehabilitate juveniles."); Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. I.C, 742 So.2d 401, 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ("[T]he court has no general jurisdiction over DCF to monitor and evaluate its functioning."). [9] Section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes provides: (15) "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal cus...

...The court shall include the dates of the adjudicatory hearing, if any, in the order. [14] While we need not address the reasons for the dependency determination, the only two conceivable subsections which might support a determination of dependency, sections 39.01(15)(a), or (f), indisputably do not apply. Y.C. conceded that the children had not been "abandoned, abused, or neglected," § 39.01(15)(a), and it is clear that Y.C. and her three children have now moved away from O.D. Thus, there is no factual basis for concluding the children "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians" as required by section 39.01(15)(f)....

...mother to complete the case plan to which she had previously objected. ANALYSIS For purposes of this case, a dependent child is one who has been abused by *138 either or both parents, or who is at "substantial risk of imminent abuse" by the parents. § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla....

...An "abused" child is one who is subjected to "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). Harm includes "violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child." § 39.01(31)(i), Fla....

...ance at Osceola High School." She argues that the charge of "excessive absences" from school is not grounds for dependency under chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1981), and therefore the dependency petition filed against her was insufficient. We agree. Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes, (1981), provides in relevant part that: "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: * * * * * * (d) To be habitually truant from school while being subject to compulsory school attendance....

...*235 Kayo E. Morgan, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants. Patricia B. Wright, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. PER CURIAM. A mother appeals an order adjudicating her three children dependent, the dependency order having been based on a finding of abuse pursuant to section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...1st DCA 1988); In the Interest of T.S., 511 So.2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Under the statute "abuse means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired". § 39.01(2), Fla....

...hat appellant might commit further criminal acts. The only remaining question is whether the trial court's finding that a high-risk placement was the more appropriate means of ensuring such protection is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 39.01(59)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), states that moderate-risk residential facilities are intended for children who "do not need placement in facilities that are physically secure"; whereas section 39.01(59)(d) states that high-risk residential facilities are designed to "provide[ ] 24-hour-per-day secure custody, care, and supervision." It is apparent that the trial court had this distinction in mind when it opted for high-risk placement rather than moderate-risk....

...REREQUISITE TO PERMANENT COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION 39.41(1)(f)1.a. The order severing the appellant's parent rights is AFFIRMED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr. and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.08(1), Florida Statutes (1983). [2] Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1983), provides: "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents or other custodians....

...is the mother of two children who were adjudicated dependent both as to her and as to their father, J.C. [1] We reverse. The petition for dependency [2] alleged that the children were at "substantial risk or imminent threat of harm o[r] abuse or neglect" from L.R. on four bases: violence, § 39.01(30)(i), Fla. Stat. (2005); failure to protect the children, § 39.01(30)(j); substance or alcohol abuse, § 39.01(30)(g); *1243 and abandonment, § 39.010(1). See § 39.01(14)(f)....

...We review a dependency adjudication for abuse of discretion. An adjudication of dependency will be upheld if the court applied the correct law and its factual rulings are supported by competent substantial evidence. See R.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families (In re M.F.), 770 So.2d 1189, 1192 (Fla.2000). Section 39.01(14)(f) permits an adjudication of dependency if the court finds the children to be "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians," even if no actual abuse is proved....

...Moreover, courts have required a nexus between the parent's alleged conduct and the potential for future abuse of the child. See N.D., 939 So.2d at 1194. VIOLENCE Domestic violence may constitute either harm to a child's health or welfare as defined in section 39.01(30), or abuse of a child as defined in section 39.01(2). Harm can occur when a person "[e]ngages in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child." § 39.01(30)(i)....

...M.B., 937 So.2d at 711; W.T. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 787 So.2d 184, 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). In this case, the circuit court's dependency order found that "the mother and the father engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the children." See § 39.01(14)(f)....

...had ever acted violently in front of the children. Without any competent evidence of such acts, there was insufficient evidence to predict that L.R.'s behavior put the children at risk of abuse or neglect as required for an adjudication of dependency under section 39.01(14)(f)....

...FAILURE TO PROTECT The petition for dependency alleged that L.R. failed to protect the children "from inflicted physical, mental, or sexual injury" because she frequently allowed them to be alone with their father, J.C., when she knew of his violent tendencies. See § 39.01(30)(j)....

...DCF must prove that the nonabused child is at risk from the abuser and that the parent will also fail to protect that child. See G.R., 937 So.2d at 1262-63; C.M. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re C.M.), 844 So.2d 765, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). But section 39.01(14)(f) requires a nexus between the parent's behavior and the prospective abuse....

...Consequently, there was no competent evidence to support a finding that L.R. would fail to protect them in the future. SUBSTANCE ABUSE The circuit court found that "the mother's chronic and severe use of illegal drugs has demonstrably affected the children." See § 39.01(30)(g)....

...substantive evidence. See Smith, 880 So.2d at 741; Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. M.B., 701 So.2d 1155, 1157, 1160. They did not provide competent evidence that L.R.'s drug use demonstrably affected the children, as required in section 39.01(3)(g)....

...She testified that she had tried to stop using drugs and had voluntarily attended drug abuse rehabilitation programs, but she admitted that she had suffered a relapse several years before the trial. Still, DCF presented no evidence, other than J.C.'s 2004 request for a domestic violence injunction, to substantiate the section 39.01(30)(g) requirement that L.R.'s drug use "demonstrably affected" the children. As such, there was no competent evidence to prove that the children were at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect because of L.R.'s drug problem. See § 39.01(14)(f), N.D., 939 So.2d at 1194; F.S.G., 825 So.2d at 531; J.L., 824 So.2d at 1025, see also P.C., 898 So.2d at 198; J.S., 892 So.2d at 1157-58....

...The foster parents’ motion alleged that they had “direct and immediate interests” in the dependency cases relating to J.K. and D.D., and that they had a right to intervene and become parties rather than remain mere “participants” as defined by section 39.01(50), Florida Statutes (2013)....

...t the order violates the privacy rights of the petitioning mother, the father, and three half-siblings, thus departing from the essential requirements of law, causing irreparable injury, and leaving no adequate remedy on appeal. 3 We agree. Analysis Section 39.01(50) expressly includes foster parents as “participants” in a dependency proceeding such as this, affording them rights to receive notice of hearings involving children in their care and allowing the court to permit them “to be hea...

...tural parents, or to siblings that are in other *1082 placements and are not in the care of the foster parents. The order in this case did not exclude any such records, thus jeopardizing the constitutional (Art. I, § 23, Fla. Const.) and statutory (§ 39.0132(3), Fla....

...On appeal, J.C.'s natural parents argue, among other things, that the record does not support the trial court's finding of dependency and that the petition for dependency should therefore have been dismissed. We agree. A dependent child is one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents or custodians. Sec. 39.01(10)(a), Fla....

...Department of H.R.S., 568 So.2d 1314, 1316 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Based upon the conclusions in support of the order of dependency, the trial court obviously deemed Clock's planned relocation to Colorado with J.C. to be an act of abuse. The statutory definition of abuse is set out in section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1993): "Abuse" means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired....

...ate steps are not taken (e.g. counseling) to assist them in adjusting or coping with their new environment. However, we do not believe that the Florida legislature *315 intended to subject an otherwise fit custodial parent to a charge of abuse under section 39.01(2) simply because the parent seeks to relocate his child against the child's wishes. Accordingly, we hold that the mere act of relocating or separating a child from familiar surroundings by an otherwise fit and proper custodial parent against the child's wishes does not constitute abuse under section 39.01(2) and therefore does not render the child dependent under section 39.01(10)(a)....

...status, as is contemplated in the statutory scheme. See § 39.436, Fla. Stat. (1995). DJJ contended that the child did not constitute a CINS because she had a pending juvenile delinquency proceeding, which would disqualify her from CINS status. See § 39.01(1), Fla....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District. February 7, 2003. Carol Ann Volini, Ocala, for Appellant. Ralph J. McMurphy, Department of Children & Families, Wildwood, for Appellee. *1079 THOMPSON, C.J. A.D., the father, appeals an order adjudicating his child dependent. We affirm. Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes, defines "abuse" as: [A]ny willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes acts or omissions.... "Harm" includes engaging in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child, section 39.01(30)(i), and includes domestic violence committed in the presence of a child, F.R. v. Department of Children and Families, 826 So.2d 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Section 39.01(45) defines "neglect" as: [W]hen a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment cau...

..."Within the context of the definition of `harm,' the term `neglects the child' means that the parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare fails to supply the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or health care, although financially able to do so or although offered financial or other means to do so." § 39.01(30)(f), Fla....

...uthorized by section 39.806(1)(e) because it found by clear and convincing evidence "that neither parent ha[d] completed his or her case plan." The court explained that to determine whether the parents were in "substantial compliance," as defined in section 39.01(71), it had to determine whether the problems which caused the case to be filed had been ameliorated....

..."`Substantial compliance' means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child's remaining with or being returned to the child's parent." 39.01(71) (emphasis added); E.R....

...The parents finished a parenting class and visited as often as possible with the children. Above all, there was no indication that domestic violence caused any harm to the children because the children were not present when the alleged incidents occurred. See § 39.01(31)(i) (defining "harm" to a child as "violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child")....

...Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Ann P. Corcoran, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The appellant, D.F., Jr., challenges an order adjudicating him delinquent and sentencing him as a serious or habitual juvenile offender pursuant to section 39.01(46)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...5th DCA 1987); In re K.J.M., 495 So.2d 241 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); In re L.B., 493 So.2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); T.A.W. v. State, 455 So.2d 582 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). CONDITION STRICKEN and CAUSE REMANDED. DANIEL, C.J., and SHARP, W., J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes, defines community control as: "Community control" means the legal status of probation created by law and court order in cases involving a child who has been found to have committed a delinquent act....

...Thus, other valid reasons for departure are supported by the record. It was not solely the unavailability of the recommended program that led to the higher placement, but the child's need for a secure facility as evidenced by her prior history in the juvenile system. Section 39.01(59)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), provides that: "High-Risk Residential—Youth assessed and classified for this level of placement require close supervision in a structured residential setting that provides 24-hour-per-day secure cu...

...ing on the petition to terminate parental rights. § 39.466, Fla. Stat. (1995). Thereafter, at an adjudicatory hearing, the court "determine[s] whether or not the facts support the allegations stated in the petition" for terminating parental rights. § 39.01(4), Fla....

...to be a dependent child, but did not state on what basis, and ordered the authorization of blood transfusions that were medically necessary to "sustain life and restore said child to good health." We find no abuse of discretion in the court's authorization of blood transfusions *1134 to the child. Section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...f his life, is judicially well-recognized. In the Interest of Ivey, 319 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Annot., 30 A.L.R. 2d 1138 (1953). We therefore affirm as to this issue. We do find error, however, in the trial court's adjudication of dependency. Section 39.01(9)(a) defines a dependent "child [as one] who is found ......

...d to support a finding that J.V. had been abandoned, [1] nor is there any relating to J.V.'s neglect. Although "neglect" occurs "when the parent or legal custodian ... deprives a child of, or allows a child to be deprived of, ... medical treatment," section 39.01(30), the same statute further specifically excludes from the definition of neglect a parent or guardian who so acts because of his or her legitimate religious beliefs....

...igious beliefs, there is no evidentiary basis for a finding of neglect. Neither can they be deemed to have abused him due to their refusal to provide medical treatment for his condition. Admittedly there is no similar exclusion, as is provided under section 39.01(30), defining neglect, from the definition of abuse as to conduct that is based upon the legitimate religious beliefs of the child's parents, and the broad definition of abuse, provided by section 39.01(2), [2] could on its face arguably include the parent's willful deprivation of such treatment....

...Applying a strict construction to the statutory definition of a "child who is found to be dependent," as discussed supra, requires that, as applied to the facts at bar, the court explicitly determine that the child was abandoned, abused, or neglected. See Section 39.01(9)(a)....

...dence would not be supportive of any such determination, the adjudication of dependency is reversed. The lower court apparently decided that, absent an adjudication of dependency, it was without jurisdiction to order the necessary medical treatment. Section 39.01(30), however, expressly empowers the court to order medical services if the child's health so requires, regardless of the parents' lack of authorization, from a qualified health care provider or from a duly accredited practitioner who relies solely on spiritual means for healing....

...I concur in the affirmance of the court's authorization of blood transfusions but dissent from the reversal of the adjudication of dependency. In my view, a child who has been deprived of necessary medical treatment is a neglected child within the definition of "neglect" under Section 39.01(30). [1] The fact that the child is deprived of such necessary medical treatment because of the parent's religious beliefs renders the child no less neglected. The provision in the second part of 39.01(30) which says that such a parent shall not "be considered a negligent parent" should not be read to preclude an adjudication of dependency on the basis of neglect....

...efs," from being proceeded against criminally such as via Section 827.05, Florida Statutes. I would affirm the adjudication of dependency. I would also certify the above question as one of great public importance. NOTES [1] "Abandoned" is defined by section 39.01(1) as "a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child ... while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations." [2] Section 39.01(2) defines abuse as "any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." [1] Section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), provides: "Neglect" occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person primarily responsible for the child's welfare deprives a child of...

...would not have been allowed to leave the premises had he attempted to do so. After the questioning was completed, G.A. was released to a family member. Appellant contends that G.A. was taken into custody for purposes of activating the running of various rule and statutory time limits. On the facts of this case, we agree. Section 39.01(33), Fla....

under the Alabama Public Works Statute, Ala.Code § 39-1-1 (1975). The district court entered judgment for

...AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. MILLS and SHAW, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Krathy v. State, 406 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Rozier v. State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); and Waters v. State, 401 So.2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). [2] Section 39.01(8).

...her parental right to administer `reasonable' or `nonexcessive' corporal punishment, i.e., a typical spanking, in a prosecution for simple child abuse." Id. at 1020. Corporal punishment or corporal discipline is not defined in chapter 827. However, section 39.01(30)(a)4, Florida Statutes (2004), provides: 4....

...child protection system in Florida and which establishes the bases of and procedures for the removal of children from parental custody. [1] The courts in Raford and McDonald have found guidance in the definition of "corporal discipline" contained in section 39.01(30)(a)4, when reviewing a conviction, under chapter 827, for child abuse by a parent who has claimed to have engaged in corporal discipline. Raford, 828 So.2d at 1018-1019, and McDonald, 785 So.2d at 646. We find the first sentence of section 39.01(30)(a)4 to be useful as well in determining the bounds of "reasonable" or "nonexcessive" corporal discipline. The sentence provides that harm can occur from: "Inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical injury, mental injury as defined in this section, or emotional injury." Further, we conclude that section 39.01(30)(a)4 should be read in pari materia with the definition of child abuse given in section 827.03(1), which provides in part that child abuse includes an "intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child....

...The case at bar differs from the typical case where the defense of reasonable corporal discipline is raised, however, because here Czapla did not administer a spanking *680 or other typical form of parental corporal punishment to his son. As noted, the injuries listed in section 39.01(30)(a)4a-k include injuries, such as burns and drowning, which clearly cannot result from spanking....

...Czapla's act in kicking his son while the son was laying on the ground was an "intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury" to the son, see section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes, and was an act that was "likely to result in physical injury" to the son. See § 39.01(30)(a)4....

...Accordingly, we AFFIRM Czapla's conviction for child abuse. BROWNING, C.J., WOLF and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, was substantially revised by chapter 98-403, Laws of Florida. The revisions included the definition of "harm" found in section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...e child. The term does not include an individual whose parental relationship to the child has been legally terminated, or an alleged or prospective parent, unless the parental status falls within the terms of either § 39.4051(7) or § 63.062(1)(b). § 39.01(48), Fla....

...j. The Mother has not remedied the circumstances that caused this Court to place the Child in DC & F custody to the extent that the Child's well-being and safety would not be endangered if the Court were to place the Child in the Mother's custody. Section 39.01(68), Fla....

...shelter, or medical treatment or permits a child to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired. § 39.01(26), Fla....

...There is no evidence, however, indicating she ever attempted to have these relatives undertake the care of the child or provide a decent environment for the child to live in. Thus, she has neglected her child by permitting the child to live in an environment condemned by the Florida Juvenile Justice Act. See § 39.01(26) and § 39.41(1)(f)1.a....

...powers, privileges, and responsibilities authorized in section 61.403, Florida Statutes, and states: 1.The following minor child(ren) is (are) subject to this proceeding: [[Image here]] 2. Verified allegations of child abuse or neglect as defined in section 39.01(2) or (5), Florida Statutes, ( ) HAVE ( ) HAVE NOT been made in this case....

...PPOINTING GUARDIAN AD LITEM Upon ( ) Petitioner’s ( ) Respondent’s ( ) Court’s own motion to appoint guardian ad litem for the minor child(ren) herein and the Court finding that _ a. verified allegations of child abuse or neglect as defined in section 39.01(2) or (5), Florida Statutes, have been made and are determined to be well-founded, OR _ b....

...required and the grounds for terminating parental rights listed in section 63.089(3) do not apply to him. Additionally, J.C.J. is not a "parent" under the Florida Adoption Act. Chapter 63 does not include a definition of parent but rather refers to section 39.01(49), Florida Statutes (2004), which defines a parent as a "man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under s....

...ts. Additionally, men of common understanding would certainly agree that homosexual activity among young boys in their formative years would easily cause them to become delinquent children. The term "delinquent child" is clearly defined in Fla.Stat. § 39.01(12) (1973) as "....

...after the second removal, the disposition of her criminal charges prevented her from contacting the child. The trial court found abandonment, because the mother had not even inquired into the welfare of the child after the second removal. We agree. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2009), defines "abandonment" as: [A] situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child ......

...Appellant contends that the appellee, Department of Children & Families (Department), failed to show a sufficient nexus between Appellant's mental-health problems and the danger of significant impairment of the child's physical, mental, or emotional health. § 39.01(2),(14)(a), (14)(f), & (46), Fla....

...Under Florida law, a "[c]hild who is found to be dependent" includes, inter alia, one who has been "abandoned, abused, or neglected" by the parent(s) or legal custodian(s), or a child who is found "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect" by the parent(s) or legal custodian(s). § 39.01(14)(a) & (f), Fla....

...Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 661 So.2d 934 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Richmond, 658 So.2d at 176. Department based its case primarily on the proposition that Appellant's mental illness places the child at risk of prospective "neglect." § 39.01(46), Fla....

...ted" to her child-rearing capacities. Absent a sufficient nexus between a psychiatric disorder and the likelihood that a parent will substantially impair the child(ren)'s physical, mental, or emotional health, neither of the pertinent subsections of section 39.01(14), Florida Statutes (1999), has been satisfied, and an adjudication of dependency cannot stand....

...*1266 Ray Dvorak of Dvorak & Cohen, P.A., Orlando, for appellant. Thomas R. Mooney and Howard G. Butler of Meyers and Mooney, P.A., Orlando, for appellee. DAUKSCH, Judge. This is an appeal from the natural mother from an order finding her child dependent, as defined by section 39.01(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), and permanently committing the child to a licensed child-placing agency for the purpose of subsequent adoption....

...for adoption of the child. In an agency adoption, a child must first be permanently committed to the custody of the agency. § 39.41, Fla. Stat. (1985). To permanently commit a child the court must first adjudicate the child dependent as defined by section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...hild. It is the opinion of this court that prior to the child being adjudicated dependent the natural parents have the unfettered right to withdraw their "consent" or surrender. Without a valid surrender a child cannot be adjudicated dependent under section 39.01(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...rights over a child that was born by her same-sex partner, was based on facts “completely different from cases involving nonparents seeking to establish legal rights to a child” *61 (citing Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla.1996))); see also § 39.01(49), Fla....

S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967);[2] § 39.001, Fla. Stat. (1977). For the most part, the differences

...Because the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in dismissing L.T.'s dependency petition, we reverse. L.T. filed a petition for dependency regarding his nephew, K.S.L. The petition stated that K.S.L.'s parents were both deceased, K.S.L. was dependent within the meaning and intent of section 39.01(1), (2), (14)(e), (45) or (63) of the Florida Statutes (2009), and the only relative who was able to care for K.S.L....

...The Court treats the Petition for Dependency as a Petition for Legal Custody. The child, who will be 18 years of age in 3 days is not a dependent child. The child's uncle, the Petitioner, has been his caregiver for the past nine months and will continue to do so. The child's uncle qualifies as a caregiver under F.S. 39.01(10), and therefore the child is not abandoned....

...was an orphan from Guatemala. At the time of the petition for dependency, F.L.M. was living with a family that was voluntarily furnishing him with a place to stay. The petition for dependency alleged that F.L.M. was abandoned and that he was dependent within the meaning of section 39.01 of the Florida Statutes....

...m. After concluding that the trial court possessed jurisdiction over the dependency proceeding, the Fourth District proceeded through its dependency analysis. The court addressed whether an orphaned child without a legal custodian is dependent under section 39.01(14)(e) of the Florida Statutes (now section 39.01(15)(e) of the Florida Statutes (2009))....

...Strictly speaking, the term *930 abandoned is not appropriate when the parents or guardian have died because, in that event, they are no longer able to do anything. The real question was whether an orphaned child without a legal custodian is dependent. Section 39.01(14)(e) provides the answer....

...In contrast, here the child has no parents, no legal custodian, and no caregiver legally responsible for his welfare. His caregiver at the time of trial was a mere volunteer without legal appointment. Under these circumstances the child met the statutory requirements for dependency under section 39.01(14)(e)....

...to support and communicate with the child are, in the opinion of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. . . . [I]ncarceration . . . may support a finding of abandonment." § 39.01(1), Fla....

...terests of the boy, the vital and determinative question in matters of this kind. The record contains sufficient substantial, competent evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court that the boy was a "dependent" child within the meaning of Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and that the best interests of the boy were served by awarding his custody to the appellee Conwell....

...he mother went to the emergency room of a hospital where a police officer noted that she had a swollen lip. Under chapter 39, a dependent child is one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians. § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). A dependent *331 child is also one who is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla. Stat. (2002). "`Abuse' means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). "Harm" to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury. Such injury includes willful acts that produce cuts and lacerations. § 39.01(30)(a)1.h., Fla. Stat. (2002). The term "willful" refers to the intent to perform an action, not to the intent to achieve a result or to cause an injury. § 39.01(30)(a), Fla....

...Fla. Stat. (2006). While there is no precise definition of legal guardian, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Cason ex rel. Saferight v. Hammock, 908 So.2d 512, 517 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), "found a definition of the term `legal guardianship' in section 39.01(34), Florida Statutes (2003), which provides that the term `means a judicially created relationship between the child and caregiver which is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining and is provided pursuant to the procedures in chap...

...cal Examiner's records. *35 II The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it denied the mother's motion to set the case for trial. Apparent throughout Chapter 39 is the legislative intent that dependency cases be expedited. Section 39.013(5), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), provides that the circuit court "shall expedite the judicial handling of all cases when the child has been removed from the family and placed in a shelter." [5] Section 39.506(1), Florida Statutes (Sup...

...er, the petitioner shall continue regular efforts to provide notice to the parents during such periods of delay. (d) Reasonable periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the parent or legal custodian of a subject child. § 39.013(9), Fla....

...8.315(a) (if parent denies allegations of petition, court shall set adjudicatory hearing within period provided by law or grant continuance as provided by law). We reject the Department's argument that this case presents an "exceptional circumstance" under sections 39.013(9)(b)2 and 39.402(14)(b)2....

...The reports sought by the mother and the Department are in existence. The failure of one arm of the government to cooperate with another by providing information is not an exceptional circumstance which can justify delay under the statute. This case is properly analyzed under sections 39.013(9)(b)1 and 39.402(14)(b)1, which provide for a continuance where evidence is unavailable, the attorney for the Department has exercised due diligence to obtain it, and "there are substantial grounds to believe that such evidence will be availa...

...In any event, the mother's demand for a trial filed on June 5, 1998, resurrected the time requirements of Chapter 39. At best, the waiver at the arraignment amounted to a parent's acquiescence in a continuance, which suspends the running of Chapter 39 time limitations under sections 39.013(9) and 39.402(14)....

...accused person, who was himself implicated and had all sorts of worries to distract him. Franz Kafka, The Trial 146 (The Modern Library 1964) (1937). [3] As a result of the 1998 amendments to Chapter 39, this provision of the law is now contained in section 39.013(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...ence in the section to dependency proceedings. [5] "Shelter" is defined by the statute as "a place for the temporary care of a child who is alleged to be or who has been found to be dependent, pending court disposition before or after adjudication." § 39.01(64), Fla....

...or firefighters. That statute, section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1989), states in part: Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an intake officer as defined in § 39.01, or a parking enforcement specialist as defined in § 316.640, while the officer, firefighter, intake officer, or parking enforcement specialist is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties, the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: (Emphasis added)....

...r, does not include "legal custodian": "Party" means the parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian ad litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child. § 39.01(50). Rather, a legal custodian is included under the rubric of "participant," which is a status separate from that of "party." See § 39.01(49) (defining "participant")....

..." as an entity that may appeal and provides for appeals only by "any party." Furthermore, the phrase "any other party" in rule 9.146(b) implies that legal custodians are a specific category of party, but this contradicts the definition of "party" in section 39.01(50), which does not include legal custodians....

...may appeal" to "Any party to the proceeding who is affected by an order of the court . . . may appeal"; effective July 1, 1999); see also ch. 99-193, § 4, Laws of Fla. (deleting "legal custodian" from the definition of "party" and adding "the legal custodian of the child" to the definition of "participant" in section 39.01)....

...n adult relative or other adult approved by the court who is willing to care for the child, under the protective supervision of the department. We note that, although both "legal custody" and "temporary legal custody" are defined in the statute, see § 39.01(34), (73), there appears to be no provision in chapter 39 that delineates the circumstances under which "legal custody" is actually granted. Only "temporary legal custody" is granted. See, e.g., § 39.521(3)(c), (d). Furthermore, although the term "legal custodian" is used throughout chapter 39, usually in conjunction with "parent," see, e.g., §§ 39.01(1) (definition of "abandoned"), 39.201(1)(a) (requirement for reporting child abuse, etc.), 39.402(1) (criteria for placing a child in shelter), the term is not defined in chapter 39. It appears to cover wider ground than persons granted "legal custody." Cf. § 39.01(9), Fla....

constitutional standard of fundamental fairness." § 39.001(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (1979). The requirement unquestionably

..."`Substantial compliance' means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child's remaining with or *720 being returned to the child's parent." § 39.01(71) (emphasis added); see also R.F....

...At this time, counsel was appointed by the court to represent her, and he promptly filed motions attacking the statute and the validity of the first adjudication of ungovernability. The statute in question, Chapter 75-48, Section 15(11), now appears as Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes, and provides: "`Ungovernable child' means a child who persistently disobeys the reasonable and lawful demands of his parents or other legal custodians and is beyond their control....

...all the provisions of this act relating to delinquency shall be applicable. If necessary the court may order placement of the child in secure shelter care pending disposition." In his order granting the motion to dismiss, the trial judge found that Section 39.01(11) is vague and indefinite in its entirety *705 and that the failure of the statute to include provisions for counsel in the adjudicatory hearings on ungovernability constituted a failure to accord procedural due process as required. The order held the statute to be unconstitutional and invalidated the earlier ungovernability adjudication. The first question for our determination is the constitutionality vel non of Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes....

...That right accrues to the child regardless of the fact that it may not be written into the statute, and therefore, absence of a statutory provision requiring counsel in such proceedings does not negate the validity of the questioned statute. Since we conclude that Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes, is constitutional, we have for disposition the question of whether a juvenile alleged to be an ungovernable child is entitled to counsel at every hearing delineated in Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes....

...the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child." *706 Section 39.01(12) defines a delinquent child as "a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurs, except the child who commits a juvenile traffic offense and whose case has not been transferred to the circuit court by...

...of the child beyond a reasonable doubt. [7] Any child alleged to be a delinquent child under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, is entitled to the due process protection specified in In re Gault, supra. Cf. State v. Steinhauer, 216 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1968). Section 39.01(11) provides that, for the second and subsequent adjudications for ungovernability, the child may be defined and treated as a delinquent child and all provisions of the act relating to delinquency shall be applicable....

...Such a procedure would not provide adequate safeguards. The fact of the first adjudication would remain an essential element, and it would have been settled without the required protection and by a simple preponderance of the evidence. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes, is constitutional and that the adjudication of Linda Faye Hutchins as an ungovernable child on August 11, 1975, was a valid proceeding for the purpose of placing her in the status of a dependent child....

...SUNDBERG, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, with which ENGLAND and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. SUNDBERG, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur in the result reached by the majority with respect to the constitutionality of Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...I am absolutely convinced that initial proceedings for adjudication of ungovernability should be carried on in an informal atmosphere calculated to rehabilitate the juvenile without all the trappings of adversary judicial proceedings. I submit that the correct and more practical construction of Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes (1975), is readily discernible from a plain reading of the statute. After a definition of "dependent child" [1] and before a definition of "delinquent child" [2] is set forth, Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes (1975), defines an "ungovernable child." In addition to defining the conduct which constitutes ungovernability, this section outlines certain consequences which may flow from an adjudication of ungovernability....

...I suggest that it means simply that after such definition by the court, the child becomes a potential candidate for proceedings which can result in an adjudication of dependency or delinquency pursuant to Sections 39.05-39.11, Florida Statutes (1975). This construction is reinforced by the phrases in Section 39.01(11) "and all the provisions of this act [§§ 39.05-39.11, Fla. Stat.] relating to [dependency] [delinquency] shall be applicable." In short, an adjudication of ungovernability may form the basis for a petition under Section 39.05, Florida Statutes (1975), for dependency absent any of the elements recited in Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...dication of ungovernability. Expressed another way, the adjudication of ungovernability will be open to collateral attack at any hearing upon a petition filed pursuant to Section 39.05, Florida Statutes. I submit that the foregoing interpretation of Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes, obviates the critical first step assertion of the appellee and fully comports with the dictates of In Re Gault, 387 U.S....

...[4] Section 39.10, Florida Statutes. [5] Section 39.11(2), Florida Statutes. [6] Section 39.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes. [7] Section 39.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes. [8] Section 39.09(1), Florida Statutes. [9] Section 39.11, Florida Statutes. [10] Ibid. [1] § 39.01(10), Fla. Stat. (1975). [2] § 39.01(12), Fla....

...“‘Substantial compliance’ means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(73); see also R.F....

...ghts may be terminated under section 39.806(l)(e) if, after a case plan has been offered, the parent continues to neglect the child. But the circuit court’s second finding quoted above was merely a restatement of the definition of neglect found in section 39.01(44)....

...pts to regulate the jurisdiction, duties and practice of Courts and is a special or local law and any such law must be of general and uniform operation in the several counties of the State. Under the provisions of Chapter 26880, Acts of 1951, F.S.A. § 39.01 et seq., which was the general law applicable to every county in the state where a Juvenile Court was established, jurisdiction was only granted over minor children in cases of dependency or delinquency or a threat thereof....

...The court's order required the parents to enter into a performance agreement, have a mental health assessment, and follow the recommendations of H.R.S. *176 Under Florida law, a dependent child is one who has been abandoned, abused or neglected by his parents or other custodians. § 39.01(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (1985). Here, there is no contention of abuse or abandonment. "Neglect" is defined by section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes, which states in pertinent part: "Neglect" occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person primarily responsible for the child's welfare deprives a...

...4th DCA 1991), the Fourth District followed a different procedure and reversed an adjudication of delinquency for grand theft auto and discharged the juvenile defendant based on Gould. We conclude that the supreme court did not intend to overrule G.C. in Gould, which is properly limited to adult criminal cases. See § 39.01(9), Fla....

...Under this rule, appellee was not entitled to discharge at the time he made his motion. In view whereof, the order appealed from should be, and it is hereby, reversed; and the cause is remanded for further proceedings under the outstanding indictment herein. GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Rule 8.120, R.J.P. [2] Section 39.01(6), F.S. 1973. [3] Section 39.01(6), F.S....

...*415 Appellee also points out that the judgment of permanent commitment includes a finding of neglect. Although appellant does not argue neglect in her brief and did so only summarily before the court, we will address the matter in order to provide a complete analysis of this situation. Section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985) defines neglect as follows: "Neglect" occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person primarily responsible for the child's welfare deprives...

...If the efforts of such parent or legal custodian, or parent primarily responsible for the child's welfare to support and communicate with the child are, in the opinion of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned... . § 39.01(1), Fla....

remains in foster care for longer than 1 year," § 39.001(1)(a), (1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003), and say that

...pellee. KAHN, J. P.D., the mother of C.W., appeals a dependency order entered by the trial court based solely upon a finding that the mother and child tested positive for cocaine at the child's birth. Because we conclude that a finding of harm under section 39.01(30)(g)1., Florida Statutes (2002), requires some showing of an adverse effect resulting from the mother's use of controlled substances or alcohol, we must reverse....

...Under the statutory provisions pertinent to C.W.'s situation, an adjudication of dependency requires the Department to show that C.W. has been "abandoned, abused, or neglected" by P.D. or that C.W. was at "substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect." § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2002). The Amended Petition for Dependency in this cause alleged "acts constituting abandonment, abuse and/or neglect as defined in Section 39.01(01), (02) and/or (46)." In support, the Department alleged that: 1) P.D....

...continues to abuse drugs; and 4) of P.D.'s two other children, one has been placed with the father and the other has been placed with the mother. An abandoned child is one whose parent or caregiver, "while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child." § 39.01(1), Fla....

...An abused child is one who is subjected to "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2), Fla....

...necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or ... permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being *102 significantly impaired." § 39.01(45), Fla....

...Despite the variety of allegations, the trial court made no pertinent factual finding other than "at the child's birth the mother and child tested positive for cocaine." As a result, we must examine whether the Department made a showing of harm as required to meet the definition of abuse in section 39.01(2). Under section 39.01(30)(g)1., exposure of an unborn child to controlled substances or alcohol by the mother may constitute harm. That provision, however, does not contemplate an adjudication of dependency any time a newborn tests positive for the presence of a controlled substance or alcohol. In pertinent part, section 39.01(30) provides: "Harm" to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person: * * * (g) Exposes a child to a controlled substance or alcohol....

...Such a rule, however, would allow a finding of dependency based on the presence in a newborn of any non-prescribed controlled substance or alcohol regardless of whether the child showed any adverse effects at birth. If the Legislature had intended such a result it could have omitted the second sentence of section 39.01(30)(g) and subparagraphs 1....

within one year of her placement into foster care. § 39.001(1)(h). The Florida Legislature *1219 has also

...rly provide child support to the maternal grandmother with whom the child stayed for two months. We reverse. A child may be found dependent if the child has been "abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(a), Fla....

...substantial evidence of record. Furthermore, while the trial court's finding that the mother and child had changed residences seven times in eight months was supported by record evidence, such finding does not rise to the level of statutory neglect. Section 39.01(45) defines neglect as "when a child is deprived of, or allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or a child is permitted *417 to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment cause...

...ent. Similarly, the trial court's finding that the mother did not financially support the child during the two months he stayed with his maternal grandmother, while supported by record evidence, does not meet the statutory definition of abandonment. Section 39.01(1) defines "abandoned" as "a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child ......

...ed "deliberate indifference" by Defendants to his grave predicament (without "deliberate indifference" there would be no constitutional violation). This "deliberate indifference" satisfies the state statutory definition of abuse. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.01

...DISCUSSION Although it is quite apparent DCF believes the father is no more capable of parenting E.K. than the mother, the record of this case reflects continual change by DCF in its legal and factual theories to achieve that result. Apparently concerned about the viability of its petition as filed, see section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes (2004) ("`[c]hild' or `youth' means any *56 unmarried person under the age of 18 years who has not been emancipated by order of the court"), DCF amended it on the day of trial to add a charge that the father was possessed of a mental illness that rendered him incapable of caring for the child....

...ondition that will continue, such as mental illness . . ."), but approved the original charge, holding that the father knowingly failed to prevent the mother's drug use during pregnancy, constituting actual abuse of E.K. by him within the meaning of section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...unless asked. By the time the case arrived here, DCF abandoned the actual harm theory it had promoted from the outset, and sought to convert that charge into an affirmance based upon an alternate theory of "prospective neglect and abandonment" under section 39.01(14)(f), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...First, there being no finding of domestic violence, we are unable to affirm on the ground that such domestic violence as may have occurred had an adverse effect on the child. See M.B. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 937 So.2d 709, 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing 39.01(2), Fla....

...by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent "while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations." § 39.01(1), Fla....

...ices. The court further found that S.J. had failed to maintain regular employment, could not provide a stable home, and lacked the capacity to care for her children, all of which threaten the children's safety and well-being and may constitute harm. § 39.01(30), Fla....

safety of the child or children involved. See § 39.001(1)(b)1, Fla. Stat. (1999). Because of this overriding

...e maximum term of imprisonment which an adult may serve for the same offense ... (emphasis added.) But it appears that a "placement" into community control is in "lieu of" (therefore distinguished from) "commitment to the custody of the department." Section 39.01(12), Fla....

permanency for every child in the dependency system. § 39.001(1)(h). When it is determined that reunification

...cal dependency proceeding initiated by a social agency. We find it unnecessary to address these procedural concerns. *312 The core issue is whether the evidence produced justified a finding of dependency based on abandonment of M.K.S. by her father. Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1995), defines abandonment as: [A] situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child, ......

...needed prompt chemotherapy and radiation treatment. Despite the apparent haste with which the trial court proceeded, we see no departure from the essential requirements of law, much less fundamental error. According to DCF, D.G. suffered from medical neglect. Section 39.01(31), Florida Statutes (2006), provides: "Harm" to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person: ....

...Within the context of the definition of "harm," the term "neglects the child" means that the parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare fails to supply the child with adequate . . . health care, although financially able to do so or although offered financial or other means to do so. See also § 39.01(43). "`Necessary medical treatment' means care which is necessary within a reasonable degree of medical certainty to prevent the deterioration of a child's condition or to alleviate immediate pain of a child." § 39.01(42)....

expressed by the Florida *480 Legislature in F.S. 39.001. The four purposes listed are: "(1) To protect

...owing an adjudicatory hearing. Our reasoning in Division of Family Services v. State of Florida, supra, is equally applicable here. In that case the appellant based its statutory claim to exclusive authority on F.S. 39.11(2)(c), which incorporated F.S. 39.01(9)....

...the agency be permitted to flaunt nor ignore specific provisions contained in the custodial order. Sub judice appellant makes the same contention. In addition to our holding in the last above mentioned case, we here observe that the true thrust of F.S. 39.01(9) is the personal exercise of custody....

...It did not order the Division to place the subject children in any particular foster care facility. The Division remained free to place the children anywhere so long as they were placed in the sibling composition as required by the court order. It will be noted that F.S. 39.01(9) refers to a "child" and not to "children"....

...5th DCA 2000), the court held that kissing and fondling of a child's breast constitutes sexual contact for the purpose of scoring victim injury. In determining what sexual contact encompasses, the court looked at other legislative pronouncements: [f]or instance section 39.01(63)(d), Florida Statutes (1997) governs child welfare proceedings and defines "sexual abuse of a child," in relevant part, as follows: "The intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts, including the breasts, genital area, gro...

...r an extended period of time due to drug abuse, mental health issues, and domestic violence with various paramours. She is not a party to these proceedings. As to the first issue, the father contends that the definition of "abandonment" contained in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2007), which is cited in section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), as a ground for termination of parental rights, is unconstitutionally vague. Because we have specifically rejected a similar vagueness challenge to the same statute in J.C.G. v. Department of Children & Families, 780 So.2d 965, 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ("The father's argument that section 39.01(1) of the Florida Statutes which defines `abandonment' is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad is also rejected."), we will address this issue no further....

...Accordingly, the finding of delinquency is affirmed as modified. See B.D. v. State . [1] Affirmed. NOTES [1] We need not question the propriety of reducing a charge to an offense which is not necessarily a lesser included offense of the crime charged as the basis for a finding of delinquency. Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (Supp....

..."Neglect" occurs when a child is deprived of or is allowed to be deprived of necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment which causes a child's physical, mental or emotional health to be significantly impaired or endangered. § 39.01(45), Fla....

...egree. "Mental injury" under the statute is "an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernable and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior." § 39.01(43), Fla....

...ad litem, or any other party to the proceeding affected by an order of the lower tribunal, or the appropriate state agency as provided by law.” The foster parents were not parties to the proceedings below, but rather were simply participants. See § 39.01(51), (52), Fla....

...department and the court finds that the grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall, by order, ■place the child in the custody of the department for the purpose of adoption. . Section 39.01(51), Florida Statutes (2012), defines a "party” as: *496 [T]he parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian ad litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child.... See also Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(a). . Section 39.01(50), Florida Statutes (2012), provides: “Participant,” for purposes of a shelter proceeding, dependency proceeding, or termination of parental rights proceeding, means any person who is not a party but who should receive notice of h...

...ing that A.O. was "A Delinquent Child within the intent and meaning of the Laws of the State of Florida, F.S. Chapter 39," because he had violated the November 1981 court order, and was therefore "in contempt of Court pursuant to sections 39.412 and 39.01(8), Florida Statutes." A.O....

...pled nolo contendere and specifically reserved the right to appeal the question whether the continued truancy shown could support an adjudication of delinquency. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the adjudication of delinquency. Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1981), defines a dependent child as, among other *1174 things, one who is found to be "habitually truant from school." Section 39.01(8), on the other hand, defines a delinquent child as one who has been found to have committed "a felony, a misdemeanor, contempt of court, [etc.]." (Emphasis added.) When A.O....

...The question here is: did this contempt, grounded in the continuing or "status" offense of habitual truancy, support a finding of delinquency? Petitioner relies on the decision in J.M.J. v. State, 389 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). There, the juvenile had been adjudicated dependent for "runaway" and truant behavior under section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...d by section 39.05, and that under chapter 39, the legislative intent was to treat truancy and running away from home as acts of dependency. The court reasoned as follows: Notably, delinquent children are those who have usually committed crimes. See § 39.01(8) and (34). In contrast, dependent children include those neglected and those formerly known as ungovernable. Compare § 39.01(9), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1978) with 39.01(9), Fla....

...The certified question, set out above, is framed more broadly than the facts of the case require. We therefore rewrite it as follows: May a juvenile be adjudicated delinquent for contempt of court under chapter 39, based upon a finding of the dependency trait, "being habitually truant from school," section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1981), where the juvenile was previously found to be a dependent child on the same basis and was ordered to attend school? We answer the revised certified question in the negative and hold that a juvenile may not b...

...served shall be of paramount concern." § 39.001(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2002). Under the statute, a dependent child includes one who is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." Id. § 39.01(14)(f)....

...The court found that a prima facie case of present neglect had been proved as to the mother, but not as to the fathers. Concluding that an adjudication of dependency required proof of current or prospective abuse, neglect or abandonment as to each parent, the court reluctantly dismissed the petition for dependency. Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (1993), defining "dependent child," states in part: (1) "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: (a) to have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents or other custodians....

...oviding a home for the children. That is, the record indicates that the court was prepared to receive evidence concerning the fathers' ability to care for their children, if they had indicated a desire to present such evidence. Neglect is defined in section 39.01(37), Florida Statutes (1993), as occurring "when the parent ......

...at of the trial court. The trial court's findings of fact should not be disturbed absent a total lack of substantial evidence in its support. In Interest of R.D.D., 518 So.2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); see Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1971). Section 39.01(37), Florida Statutes (1989) states: (37) "Neglect" occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child ......

...Dep't of Children & Families, ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 2462847 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing In re Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.1995)). Abandonment is a sufficient ground for terminating parental rights. See § 39.806(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011). Section 39.01(1) defines abandonment as: "a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child . . . while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child." § 39.01(1), Fla....

...Accordingly, we affirm *1122 the trial court's order of dependency as to Y.P., the father. Affirmed. NOTES [1] R.V.'s separate appeal was affirmed by this Court. R.V. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 932 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (table). [2] Pursuant to section 39.01(30)(i), Florida Statutes (2005), "harm" can occur when a parent "[e]ngages in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child." [3] Pursuant to section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (2005), "abuse" is defined as including "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." [4] Pursuant to section 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (2005), "`[n]eglect' occurs when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment when such deprivat...

the care, safety, and protection of children. § 39.001(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). While pursuing this

...o committed the forcible entry, while plausible, also does not satisfy the State's burden under the circumstantial evidence rule. The adjudication of delinquency against the defendant is reversed with directions to discharge him. Reversed. NOTES [1] § 39.01(10), Fla. Stat. (1977). "`Delinquent child' means a child who commits a violation of law... ." [2] § 39.01(27), Fla....

...Under Section 39.408(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), dependency must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. See In the Interest of G.D.H., 498 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); and In the Interest of L.T., 464 So.2d 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). The statutory definition of abuse is found in section 39.01(2) and means "any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." The Department based its allegations of abuse against C.C....

...and L.T.R., appeals from an order adjudicating her two children dependent. Because the record contains insufficient evidence to support the dependency finding, we reverse. The trial court did not find that K.A.R. or L.T.R. had been abused, abandoned or neglected. See § 39.01(14)(a), Fla.Stat....

...knew or should have known that Freddie Moore constituted a danger to baby Franklin and that A.R. failed to protect Franklin. The Department was relegated to showing that K.A.R. and L.T.R. were at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment or neglect by the mother. See § 39.01(14)(f), Fla.Stat....

...he children; (2) the children are presently at risk of imminent neglect based upon the father's failure to protect the children from the mother; and (3) the children are presently at risk of imminent neglect based upon the father's own drug use. See § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2007); § 39.01(43), Fla....

...f imminent neglect. Reversed. STONE, STEVENSON and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The mother consented to dependency as to her four children, three of whom are M.F.'s children, and settled with the department. [2] "Neglect" is statutorily defined in section 39.01(43), Florida Statutes (2007), as: when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environme...

...or to be in danger of being significantly impaired. . . . Neglect of a child includes acts or omissions. (Emphasis added). [3] Pursuant to the dependency statute, "harm" to a child exists where a parent "[e]xposes a child to a controlled substance." § 39.01(31)(g), Fla....

...(2007). In the present context, "[e]xposure to a controlled substance or alcohol is established by . . . [c]ontinued chronic and severe use of a controlled substance or alcohol by a parent when the child is demonstrably adversely affected by such usage." § 39.01(31)(g)2., Fla....

possible, to maintain sibling groups. See also § 39.001(k), Fla. Stat. (1997) (providing that the Department

...e prior history of injuries to the child, the location of the injury on the child, the multiplicity of the injury, and the type of trauma inflicted. It also must result in the types of injuries set forth by law, such as significant bruises or welts. § 39.01(30)(a)(4), Fla....

...Increasing the restrictiveness level in a juvenile commitment proceeding is not the equivalent of resentencing an adult on the same charge. The level of restrictiveness refers to "the level of custody provided by programs that service the custody and care needs of committed children." § 39.01(59), Fla.Stat....

...She also stated that, shortly after the removal of her children from her home, she found appropriate government subsidized housing for her father and that at the time of the hearing he was no longer in her home. A child may be adjudicated dependent if the court finds that the child was "abandoned, abused, or neglected," § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003), or that the child is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect," § 39.01(14)(f)....

...hild welfare"). On appeal, A.R. contends that the adjudication of dependency as to D.G.S. was improper because there was no evidence that D.G.S. was "abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents, legal custodians, or caregivers." § 39.01(14)(a)....

...dency with respect to J.A.H. In this case, competent, substantial evidence was presented that the mother knew of the grandfather's propensity to abuse the child but nonetheless permitted them to be together without direct and continuous supervision. Section 39.01(2) defines abuse, in pertinent part, as "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." Section 39.01(3) also provides that abuse "includes acts or omissions." Section 39.01(30) defines "`[h]arm' to a child's health or welfare" to include situations where a person "[n]egligently fails to protect a child in his or her care from inflicted physical, mental, or sexual injury caused by the acts of another." The...

...2d DCA 2003). Here, there was no demonstration of any nexus between the abuse of D.G.S. and any prospective abuse of J.A.H. The apparent basis for the adjudication was that J.A.H. might have been harmed by witnessing the abuse suffered by her older brother. Section 39.01(30)(i) provides that "harm" to a child can occur when any person "[e]ngages in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child." But this type...

...dren's only provider, the Father abandoned [4] and neglected [5] the children. In *1039 addition, the Father's acts of domestic violence—both directed at the children and at the Mother in the presence of the children—was abuse of the children. See § 39.01(2); [6] see also § 39.01(30)(a), (i); [7] D.D....

...SECTION 39.806(1)(g) As a ground for terminating parental rights, the Department also alleged section 39.806(1)(g), which authorizes termination when the parent has "subjected the child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse." The trial court found that the Father committed chronic abuse under section 39.806(1)(g)....

...As noted above, the Father's egregious conduct was comprised of acts of abuse, abandonment, and neglect of the children. At the same time, the concepts of abandonment and neglect are subsumed within the meaning of "abuse" through the definition of "harm." See § 39.01(2), (30)(e), (f)....

...[4] "`Abandoned' means a situation in which the parent ... while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations." § 39.01(1)....

...r, or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(45)....

...[6] "`Abuse' means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes acts or omissions." § 39.01(2) (emphasis added)....

...[7] "Harm" occurs when the parent "[i]nflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury," including engaging "in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child." § 39.01(30)(a), (i).

...trictiveness level VI or above maintained for the treatment or rehabilitation of children found to have committed delinquent acts or violations of law constitutes escape within the intent and meaning of s. 944.40 and is a felony of the third degree. Section 39.01(61) of the Florida Statutes defined restrictiveness level as: The identification of broad custody categories for committed children, including nonresidential, residential, and secure residential....

...We will *918 uphold the ruling if the circuit court applied the correct law and its findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. C.J. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 9 So.3d 750, 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). The instant dependency determination was based on prospective neglect, § 39.01(15)(f), Fla....

..., her pervasive marijuana smoking, and her frequent drug-induced apathy concerning her son's well being. When adjudicating a child dependent based on prospective neglect, the court must find that the child is at substantial risk of imminent neglect. § 39.01(15)(f)....

...Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 939 So.2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Neglect can occur when a child is permitted to live in an environment that "causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(44)....

...Harm to a child's health and welfare can be caused by exposure to a controlled substance if evidence shows "extensive, abusive, and chronic use of a controlled substance . . . by a parent when the child is demonstrably adversely affected by such usage." § 39.01(32)(g)(2)....

best interests and overall well-being. See, e.g., § 39.001(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005) (stating the purposes

rights and interests of dependent children, section 39.001, Fla. Stat. (2003), and it does so through

...After hearing all of the evidence and finding G.D.'s undisputed testimony credible, the lower court submitted a written order terminating the father's parental rights for engaging in egregious conduct, § 39.806(1)(f), sexual abuse pursuant to section 39.806(1)(g), as defined in section 39.01(67); aggravated child abuse, as defined in section 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse, as defined in section 39.01 or chronic abuse, § 39.806(1)(g); and for abandonment pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), as defined in section 39.01(1)....

...cy. The legislature's intent is implemented in part by defining who is a "parent." Chapter 63 has no definition of "mother" or "father." Rather, section 63.032(12) states that the word "parent" as used in chapter 63 "has the same meaning ascribed in s. 39.01." Section 39.01(49), Florida Statutes (2004), defines parent as follows: "Parent" means a woman who gives birth to a child and a man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under s....

...aving legal custody of a child, while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes little or no effort to communicate with the child"). [16] We note that in chapter 39 proceedings, A.S. would also not be considered a parent under section 39.01(49), but he would be a "prospective parent" pursuant to section 39.01(56) (defining prospective parent as "a person who claims to be, or has been identified as, a person who may be a mother or a father of a child")....

...In our view, section 409.145(4), Florida Statutes, does not permit an interpretation argued by appellants whereby we would extend juvenile jurisdiction to L.Y. by reading it in para materia with section 39.40(2), Florida Statutes. Nor do sections 39.41(2)(a)10 and 39.45, Florida Statutes, change our view. Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, defines children as individuals under the age of 18....

...PER CURIAM. We affirm the trial court's adjudication of dependency as to the mother. Her inconsistent testimony and the testimony of Dr. Kessler about the nature of the injuries to the child were sufficient to meet the statutory definition of abuse. *183 See § 39.01(2), Fla....

...An adjudication of dependency must be based upon a finding of abuse, abandonment or neglect. W.T. v. Department of Children and Families, 787 So.2d 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Gelrod v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 648 So.2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); § 39.01(14)(a), Fla....

...with the plan and her neglect of the child. See M.B., 739 So.2d at 717. While denial of termination may be appropriate where the parent evinces a settled purpose to assume parental duties, the record before us does not support such a conclusion. See § 39.01(1), Fla....

...at the child named in the petition may be incompetent to proceed... the court ... may or on the motion of the child's attorney or state attorney must, stay all proceedings and order an evaluation of the child's mental condition. (Emphasis added). Subsection 39.01(75), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996) gives the terms *368 "violation of law" and "delinquent act" the same meaning, at least for the purposes of Chapter 39, Florida Statutes: "Violation of law" or "delinquent act" means a violation of any...

...which is a misdemeanor or a felony or a violation of a county or municipal ordinance which would be punishable by incarceration if the violation were committed by an adult. Given the common definition of "violation of law" and "delinquent act" in subsection 39.01(75), the only logical way to read the operative sentence of subsection 39.0517(1) is to attach the dependent clause "that would be a felony if committed by an adult" to both "delinquent act" and "violation of law"; i.e., the clause modi...

...ent has committed a delinquent act, the juvenile incompetent may be involuntarily committed only if the act would constitute a felony had it been committed by an adult. Any other conclusion would require us to disregard the definition provided in subsection 39.01(75)....

...§ 827.07(i), Fla.Stat. (1977). The above definition was removed from Chapter 827 in 1983, along with other provisions involving reporting, investigating, and preventing child abuse, and moved to Chapter 415. The definition was moved from section 415.503(8) to section 39.01(44) in 1998....

...erms were followed by the phrase "as defined under the laws of Florida." That language was removed by a 1996 amendment. We are unable to distinguish the present case from Fuchs. In the present case, as we noted earlier, "mental injury" is defined in section 39.01(44), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), as follows: "Mental injury" means an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment in his ability to function within his normal range of performance and behavior....

...going acts, has the same effect as a finding of guilt, regardless of adjudication or disposition. Such standards for screening shall also ensure that the person has not been judicially determined to have committed abuse against a child as defined in s. 39.01(2) and (7) or to have a substantiated indicated report of abuse as defined in s....

...nt. On the other hand, persons who are not disqualified by reason of having pled to or been convicted of a specified felony, but who have committed a specific misdemeanor or have been judicially determined to have committed child abuse as defined in section 39.01, or to have a substantiated indicated report of abuse as defined in section 415.503, [2] or to have committed an act which constitutes domestic violence as defined in section 741.30, are presumed unqualified as child care personnel and...

...In fact, the statutes of this State indicate that an illegitimate father shall not have any rights to an illegitimate child, in that his consent is not necessary to an adoption, [see: § 72.14, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.], and for the purpose of determining matters within the juvenile court he is not considered as a parent. See: § 39.01(8), Fla....

...was at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect and therefore I respectfully dissent. "Abuse" is defined as "any willful act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental or emotional health to be impaired." § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). A child may be found to be dependent because of "abuse" under several circumstances. §§ 39.01(10)(a)-(e), Fla....

...Stat. (1993). They include when a child is found: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by [the] parents or other custodians. * * * * * * (e) To be at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect by the parent or parents or the custodian. § 39.01(10)....

...nthood. Matter of Aaron S., 163 Misc.2d 967, 625 N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993), affirmed, ___ A.D.2d ___, 626 N.Y.S.2d 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); DSS on Behalf of Moria I. v. Manuel S., 148 Misc.2d 988, 563 N.Y.S.2d 592 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990). [2] § 39.01(2), Fla....

...and TORPY, J., concur. NOTES [1] In fairness to the trial judge, the statute became effective only six days prior to the July 7, 2008 evidentiary hearing. [2] Section 39.811, Florida Statutes (2008) pertains to termination of parental rights proceedings. [3] § 39.01(15)(f), Fla....

...tutes. We affirm the trial court's ruling under section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes, provides for termination of parental rights in the case of abandonment, citing the definition of abandonment contained in section 39.01(1)....

...383.50, a "child in need of services" as defined in chapter 984, or a "family in need of services" as defined in chapter 984. The incarceration of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver responsible for a child's welfare may support a finding of abandonment. § 39.01(1), Fla....

construction" of the statute allowed under section 39.001(9), Florida Statues (2001) does not allow us

liberally construed based on Florida Statutes section 39.001(9). The provision at issue in the present case

...In response, HRS offered testimony which will be summarized hereafter. HRS contends that the Legislature has provided for secure detention facilities only for the temporary care of children pending delinquency adjudication or court disposition (Senate Bill 409, effective July 1, 1980, amending § 39.01(31), F.S.)....

...a crisis center and was ordered by the *305 court to stay there. He left the day he arrived. Thereupon, a petition was filed alleging a violation of the code. I have not researched the California code, but I assume such petition alleged a contempt similar to the contempt mentioned in § 39.01(8), F.S., based upon a portion of the opinion identified as Bootstrapping, page 390....

...of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). Appellant had a history of chronic substance abuse and neglect of D.C., a special needs child. After the determination of dependency, appellant entered into a performance agreement with HRS, as defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes....

...SHARP, Chief Judge, concurring specially. I write to explain my reasons for joining in a PCA (without opinion) in this case. Whether "prospective neglect" or even "prospective abandonment" are valid grounds for termination of parental rights pursuant to section 39.01, Florida Statutes, are important legal issues which should be addressed by this court in a proper case....

...(W2) They were attempted, monthly contacts at least. But, I did not in fact see Tonya monthly because she wasn't there and I left messages with the grandmother that I would be back two or three days later, for Tonya to please be there, and she was not there. [3] § 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...This litigation began when a visiting teacher for the School Board of Broward County filed in the Family Division of Broward County Circuit Court, pursuant to Section 39.404, Florida Statutes (1981), petitions representing that each of the minors was "a dependent child [within the purview of Section 39.01(9)(d)] for reason of ......

...djudicated. § 39.409(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). Once the court has adjudicated a child dependent, the court retains jurisdiction to order appropriate supervision, treatment and services as necessary. § 39.41, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). Furthermore, section 39.01(21) defines a disposition hearing as one in which "the court determines the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting." § 39.01(20), Fla....

...s (Supp.1994). Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied. WARNER, POLEN and KLEIN, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING PER CURIAM. We deny petitioner A.G.'s motion for rehearing of our June 24, 1998 decision and his motion to declare section 39.01(21), Florida Statutes (1993) unconstitutional....

...t, egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the [c]hild.” § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2017). The parents purportedly “subjected the [c]hild to sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in Section 39.01, or chronic abuse.” § 39.806(1)(g), Fla....

...that “[g]rounds for dependency [] have been established by a preponderance of the evidence as to the Father only.” As such, the trial court found that “[t]he Child is dependent within the meaning and intent of Chapter 39, including sections 39.01(2), 39.01(15)(a), and/or 39.01(15)(f), such that the Child and Father are in need of services to address their interactions, communications and any resulting trauma, which left untreated would place the Child at risk of harm.” Lastly, the trial court determined th...

...er the life of the child. (g) The parent or parents have subjected the child or another child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse. § 39.806(1)(f)-(g), Fla. Stat. (2017). In Florida, the definition of “sexual abuse” for purposes of establishing a basis for termination of parental rights is drawn from the definitions found in section 39.01. More specifically, the definition of “abuse” found therein encompasses “sexual abuse.” § 39.01(2), Fla....

...(2017) (“‘Abuse’ means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual abuse, injury, or harm that causes or it is likely to cause the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired.”). Similarly, under section 39.01(71), “‘[s]exual abuse of a child’ for purposes 11 of finding a child to be dependent” includes “[t]he intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts, including the breasts, genital area, groin, inner thighs, and buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of either the child or the perpetrator . . . .” § 39.01(71)(d), Fla....

...or engaged in egregious conduct.” These findings demonstrate the trial court’s misapplication of the law. The definition of sexual abuse expressly includes the touching of clothing covering the child’s genitals, genital area, or groin. See § 39.01(71)(d)....

...there was uncomfortable and/or inappropriate contact, touching or patting between the Father and Child, but not in a sexual way.” Whether the touching was done “in a sexual way” was, likewise, irrelevant, as neither section 39.806(1)(g) nor section 39.01(71) require such proof....

...er she meant there was touching of her “butt” when she said “vagina” were similarly irrelevant and, again, demonstrate the trial court’s misapplication of the law, as the definition of sexual abuse includes touching of the buttocks. See § 39.01(71)(d)....

...pubic hair was, were irrelevant given the statutory definition of sexual abuse. The touching of the child’s pubic hair, above the actual opening of the vagina, falls within the definition of sexual abuse that includes touching the genitals, genital area, or groin. See § 39.01(71)(d)....

...The Trial Court’s Findings are Irreconcilable Finally, the trial court’s finding that DCF failed to prove sexual abuse under sections 39.806(1)(f)-(g) is irreconcilable with its finding of dependency under Chapter 39, including sections 39.01(2), 39.01(15)(a), and 39.01(15)(f)....

...Any act which may reasonably be construed to be a normal caregiver responsibility, any interaction with, or affection for a child; or 2. Any act intended for a valid medical purpose. § 39.01(71)(d). Further, section 39.01(15) states that a “‘[c]hild who is found to be dependent’ means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: (a) [t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child’s parent or parents or legal custodians; . . . [or] (f) [t]o be a substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or legal custodians; . . . .” § 39.01(15)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2017). 17  Here, the trial court found the child was dependent as to the father under section 39.01 “such that the [c]hild and [the] [f]ather are in need of services to address their interactions, communications and any resulting trauma, which left untreated would place the [c]hild at risk of harm.” As such, the trial court orde...

...person doing the touching intended it to be in a sexual way. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that there was no egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f) or sexual abuse under section 39.806(1)(g), but that there was abuse under section 39.01, is irreconcilable....

...and because the trial court’s finding that DCF failed to prove sexual abuse under sections 39.806(1)(f)-(g) is irreconcilable with its finding of dependency within the 24 meaning of Chapter 39, including sections 39.01(2), 39.01(15)(a) and 39.01(15)(f), we reverse the adjudication of dependency as to the father and remand for entry of an order finding that the father sexually abused the child....

...sts of the child to do so, and: a. If the court finds that the parent has abandoned, abused, or neglected the child; or ... . In the order denying the petition for commitment, the court acknowledged that according to the definition of "abandoned" in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1981), the father had abandoned R.V.F., Jr....

...plete abandonment. The problem with this analysis is that the opinion in Interest of D.A.H. specifically noted that it was relying on a case law definition of abandonment which predated the 1978 enactment of the statutory definition which now reads: 39.01 Definitions....

...was then removed from the custody of her parents and placed in a foster home. After appellants' motions for rehearing and for relief from judgment were denied, this appeal ensued. Appellants raise three points on appeal: first, that the evidence was insufficient to establish child abuse as defined by section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1985); second, that the order of adjudication of dependency on the grounds of abuse was in violation of section 39.409, subsections (2) and (3), Florida Statutes (1985), and Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.780...

...Appellants do not challenge the trial court's order granting their petition for dependency on the basis of ungovernability. We have examined the record and find that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that T.S. was abused by her parents as defined by section 39.01(2), which defines abuse as "any willful act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental or emotional health to be significantly impaired." (Emphasis added)....

...This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of a mother to her child. [1] The child was born in 1984. Before parental rights can be permanently terminated, the state must show abandonment, abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence. In the Interest of R.W., 495 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1986). Section 39.01, Florida Statutes, defines these terms as follows: (1) "Abandoned" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person responsible for the child's welfare, wh...

...Subsequently, the state filed a petition for serious habitual juvenile offender placement to which appellant objected, contesting the constitutionality of the serious juvenile habitual offender statute because its criteria were based merely on arrests. Finding that appellant met the criteria of section 39.01(46), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), the trial court committed him under the terms of the program. This appeal followed. The dispositive question is whether sections 39.09(5) and 39.01(46), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), violate substantive due process as found in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. We conclude that they do. The criteria contained in section 39.01(46) include the juvenile's prior arrest record....

...Chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1989) provides methods for dealing with juveniles, supposedly for their "moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare... ." and is intended to shield them from being catapulted into the adult criminal justice system. Section 39.01(46) in particular, seeks to identify serious habitual juvenile offenders in order to provide for their appropriate handling as a juvenile....

...f these grounds; however, the Department failed to establish how the Father's short-term incarceration justified termination. Section 39.806(1)(b) provides that termination of parental rights may be undertaken when a child is abandoned as defined by section 39.01....

...For a dependency adjudication to be affirmed, there must be competent, substantial evidence that a child was either: (1) abused, abandoned, or neglected by the parents; or (2) at imminent risk of being abused, abandoned, or neglected by the parents. See id. ; § 39.01(14)(a) & (f), Fla....

...Abuse An abused child is one who is subjected to "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, *395 or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2), Fla....

...tions: (1) when a mother's use of a controlled substance during her pregnancy demonstrably adversely affects the child; or (2) when a parent's "continued chronic and severe use of a controlled substance" demonstrably adversely affects the child. See § 39.01(30)(g), Fla....

...Specifically, DCF did not offer any testimony, medical reports, or expert opinion indicating J.B. suffered any physical, emotional, or mental impairment as a result of the search and arrest. Because the record lacks competent, substantial evidence that J.B. suffered harm pursuant to section 39.01(30), the trial court's adjudication of dependency based on a finding of abuse must be reversed....

...necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or . . . permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(45), Fla....

...or medical treatment. Further, there was no evidence J.B. was ever in danger of becoming significantly physically, mentally, or emotionally impaired. Because the record is devoid of competent, substantial evidence that J.B. was neglected pursuant to section 39.01(45), the trial court's adjudication of dependency based on a finding of neglect must be reversed....

...The term "abandoned" does not include a "child in need of services" as defined in chapter 984 or a "family in need of services" as defined in chapter 984. The incarceration of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver responsible for a child's welfare may support a finding of abandonment. § 39.01(1), Fla....

the child and the best interests of the state." § 39.001(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1991). B.J.M. has alleged that

...boys, based on allegations that he and his second wife, the children’s stepmother, abused two of the daughters by digitally penetrating the daughters to check for sexual activity. Because there was sufficient evidence of sexual abuse as defined by section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2010), and evidence that, under the totality of the circumstances, all the girls were at substantial risk of significant harm, we affirm the termination as to the daughters....

...e. DCF relied on section 39.806(l)(g), Florida Statutes, which provides in relevant part: The parent or parents have subjected the child or another child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse. § 39.806(l)(g), Fla. Stat. (2010). After reviewing the record, we find that competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence of sexual abuse as defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...t, legal custodian, caregiver, or other person responsible for the child's welfare." § 39.201(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added). The judge surveyed the definitions of these classes of perpetrators, contained in a different statutory provision, section 39.01, and ruled them out one by one as potentially encompassing a public school teacher....

...For the purpose of departmental investigative jurisdiction, this definition does not include law enforcement officers, or employees of municipal or county detention facilities or the Department of Corrections, while acting in an official capacity. Id. § 39.01(47) (emphasis added)....

...2d DCA 1992) (rejecting argument that predecessor statutory section was overbroad on the basis that it required reporting of an incident of child abuse even if the incident had already been reported). [16] A public school teacher is obviously not a "parent," and the statutory definition confirmed this. See § 39.01(49), Fla. Stat. (2003). "Legal custodian" was defined as "the person or entity in whom the legal right to custody is vested." Id. § 39.01(33). "Caregiver" was defined as "the parent, legal custodian, adult household member, or other person responsible for the child's welfare as defined in subsection (47)." Id. § 39.01(10)....

...hool"; that is, the 2006 version provides in pertinent part that the term "includes the child's legal guardian or foster parent; an employee of any school, public or private child day care center, residential home, institution, facility, or agency." § 39.01(46), Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). This change was approved and filed on June 12, 2006. See ch. 06-194, Laws of Fla. The 2007 version reads the same way. § 39.01(46), Fla....

...ision of the First District Court of Appeal in In re Y.V., 160 So.3d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), and the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in In re T.J., 59 So.3d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), regarding the definition of a dependent child under section 39.01 (15)(e), Florida Statutes....

...1 However, because the individual in the case under review is now an adult who cannot be adjudicated a dependent child under Florida law, we dismiss this case as moot. I. BACKGROUND A private petition for an adjudication of dependency under sections 39.01 (15)(a) and (e), Florida Statutes, was filed in the trial eourt on behalf of O.I.C.L....

...ng the United States and that ORR later released him to his uncle in Palm Beach County. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition for child dependency. The trial court ruled that O.I.C.L. did “not qualify as dependent under section 39.01 because he left his Mother in Guatemala and he now resides with and is cared for by his Uncle, against whom there are no allegations of abandonment, abuse, or neglect.” On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed. Id. The Fourth District ruled that the uncle qualified as a “caregiver” under section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, because ORR (a government agency that is considered a caregiver) released O.I.C.L....

...Judge Forst dissented in the Fourth District. Although he ■ generally agreed with the majority’s analysis and conclusion, Judge Forst believed that the trial court failed to adequately address whether O.I.C.L. presented a prima facie ease of child dependency under section *578 39.01(15)(e). Id. at 1251 (Forst, J., dissenting). II. ANALYSIS O.I.C.L. argues that the Fourth District failed to acknowledge section 39.01(15)(e) as a separate basis for a finding of child dependency. However, we dismiss this ease because the issue of whether O.I.C.L. is a dependent child pursuant to section 39.01(15)(e) is moot....

...he State. Section 39.001(l)(a), Florida Statutes, explains that the purpose of chapter 39 is “[t]o provide for the care, safety, and protection of children” and “to promote the health and well-being of all children under the state’s care.” Section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes, further provides that “ ‘[cjhild’ or ‘youth’ means any unmarried person under the age of 18 years who has not been emancipated by order of the court.” Moreover, section 39.01(15) clearly specifies that a “ ‘[cjhild who is found to be dependent’ means a child.” Therefore, an individual over the age of 18 fails to satisfy Florida’s statutory definition of a “child” who can be adjudicated a dependent child under any of the grounds listed in section 39.01(15)....

...Therefore, the legal questions raised are not likely to evade appellate review, and we cannot ignore the mootness of this particular case. III. CONCLUSION Because O.I.C.L. is no longer a child as defined in chapter 39 and cannot be adjudicated a dependent child of the State of Florida pursuant to section 39.01(15), we dismiss this case as moot....

...� Raford v. State, 828 So.2d 1012, 1015, n. 5 (Fla.2002). In both civil and criminal child abuse proceedings, a parent’s right to administer reasonable and non-excessive corporal punishment to discipline their children is legislatively recognized. § 39.01(2), Fla....

...It is undisputed that the father disappeared for many years without providing any financial support for the children or contacting the children's custodians or anyone else during his absence to inquire about the children. This was clearly a willful rejection of his parental responsibilities and constitutes abandonment under section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2005)....

State of Florida is the property of the state... ." § 39-1.002, Fla. Admin. Code. While that is a correct

...ld abuse. The disposition of any criminal action against the Mother was not disclosed in the record on appeal. The Department filed a Petition for Adjudication of Dependency alleging two counts against the Mother: (1) abuse against D.Y., pursuant to section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes; and (2) prospective abuse as to the other three children, pursuant to section 39.01(14)(f)....

...We examine first the trial court's adjudication of D.Y. as dependent. A "`[c]hild who is found to be dependent' means a child who, pursuant to [chapter 39], is found by the court . . . [t]o have been . . . abused . . . by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(a)....

...The statutory definition of "abuse" can be parsed into two elements: abuse refers to "[1] any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm [2] that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2)....

...Within the first element of the definition of abuse, only the "physical injury" and "harm" prongs are relevant in light of the evidence presented in this case. "`Physical injury' means death, permanent or temporary disfigurement, or impairment of any bodily part." § 39.01(52)....

...the child; the multiplicity of the injury; and the type of trauma inflicted. Corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in any of [the injuries listed in paragraph (1)(a)-(j) or]: k. Significant bruises or welts. *574 § 39.01(30). [2] As for the "physical injury" prong of the first element of "abuse," the only potentially applicable type of injury under section 39.01(52) in light of the evidence is "temporary disfigurement." However, the courts have indicated that bruising alone does not constitute the temporary disfigurement contemplated by the statute....

...There was no evidence that these conditions lasted beyond the day of the incident. As such, the evidence was not sufficient to prove "temporary disfigurement." The other pertinent prong within the first element of the definition of abuse is "harm," § 39.01(30). The only potentially applicable injuries under the definition of "harm" are "temporary disfigurement" and "significant bruises or welts." § 39.01(30)(a)(1)(i), (4)(i), (k)....

..."disciplinary action" provisions of the definition of "harm": "the age of the child; any prior history of injuries to the child; the location of the injury on the body of the child; the multiplicity of the injury; and the type of trauma inflicted." § 39.01(30)(a), (a)(4)....

...Y.'s three siblings were dependent. The Department's second count alleged that "[a]s a result of the abuse to [D.Y.], the other . . . children are at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the [M]other." The petition cites to section 39.01(14)(f), which provides that a "[c]hild who is found to be dependent" includes one who is found by the court "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." Dependenc...

...The sections constituting Part IV (sections 415.502.514) have since been either repealed or renumbered as sections of chapter 39. Ch. 98-403, Laws of Fla. The definition of "physical injury" in section 415.502(13), Florida Statutes (1993), is identical to the definition of "physical injury" in section 39.01(52), which was created by chapter 98-403.

...Dep't of Children & Families, 813 So.2d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). The Department presented evidence of neglect as the child was permitted to live in an environment that could significantly impair or endanger the child's mental, physical or emotional health. § 39.01(45), Fla....

...abuse or neglect: (11) “Child who is found to be dependent” means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: [[Image here]] (f) To be at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect by the parent or parents or the custodian. § 39.01, Fla....

...elter, or medical treatment or permits a child to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired. § 39.01, Fla....

...ge of the Act. A simple showing by DCF that a parent committed a sex act on one child does not by itself constitute proof that the parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to the child’s sibling, as required by the statute. See § 39.01(11), Fla....

...chapter 63, the chapter dealing with private and agency adoptions. It was only defined in chapter 39, entitled "Proceedings related to juveniles," dealing with termination of parental rights. The problem with the statutory definition set forth in subsection 39.01(1), and subsequently engrafted by the legislature into subsection 63.032(14), is that the primary definition clearly envisions circumstances where the parent has abandoned the child post-birth....

...ime since oral argument on this one case. [12] See In the Matter of the Adoption of Doe, 524 So.2d 1037, 1041 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). [13] The 1992 change added the above entire paragraph to chapter 63, but the first two sentences had long been part of section 39.01(1), as indeed the court in Doe itself observed....

...r 39 and waiver of parental rights proceedings under chapter 63. As to both proceedings, the underlying focus of the applicable statutory provision is conduct that already has, or is likely to have, an adverse effect on the child involved. Compare §§ 39.01(1) and (2), with § 63.032(14). Section 39.01(2) defines "abuse" as intentional acts "that result in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." There is absolutely no evidence in this record showing any impairment to baby E.A.W.'s health....

...The trial court adjudicated the children dependent. The mother appealed the order. On appeal, the mother argues that the DCF failed to present witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the allegations to support a finding of dependency based upon abandonment under section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes, or neglect under section 39.01(43), Florida Statutes....

...t interest of the child to permanently commit her to the appellant agency for subsequent adoption. Although evidence was adduced in overwhelming quantities from disinterested persons showing that the child was a dependent child within the meaning of Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the trial court erroneously held that the allegations of the petition for permanent commitment were not sustained. Section 39.01(10), *52 Florida Statutes, F.S.A., defines a "dependent child" to mean in material part as follows: "(10) `Dependent child' means a child who ......

...gence — supervision, retention, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The causes of action against Sinrod, who is not a party to this appeal, were intentional torts. Doe argues that because she was abused under the definition provided by section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes, 2 section 95.11(7) governs her claims....

...Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, governs negligent torts and, specifically, the waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions, recovery limits, limitation on attorney fees, statute of limitations, exclusions, indemnification, and risk management programs. § 768.28, Fla. Stat. (2011). . Under section 39.01, Florida Statutes, "Abuse” means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes acts or omissions. Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child. § 39.01(2), Fla....

...5th DCA 2005). As part of the statutory definition of abuse, the legislature noted, "Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child." § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. Under the definition of harm, the legislature explained that corporal discipline is "excessively *665 harsh" if it "is likely to result in physical injury, mental injury . . ., or emotional injury." § 39.01(31)(a)4., Fla....

...cy statutes. We noted that "[h]arm occurs when a child suffers `physical, mental, or emotional injury' as a result of the discipline." 773 So.2d at 1221. There was no evidence of mental or emotional injury. As to physical injury, the court relied on section 39.01(30)(a)4., Florida Statutes (1999), which provided "that corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in a physical injury, including `temporary disfigurement,' or `[s]ignificant bruises or welts.'" Id....

...ng other things: “1. A child caring institution which is subect to licensing as defined by law must not accept children for care until a license is secured from the State Department of Public Welfare.” In the chapter treating of juvenile courts, Section 39.01(10), Fla.Stat.1955, F.S.A....

...r and the spiritual”, and thereby sharply restricted the meaning of “exclusive jurisdiction” as used in Section 39.02. However, as pointed out in an article by Roger J. Waybright, Florida’s Juvenile Court Law (Revised January 1, 1958, F.S.A. § 39.01 et seq.) which may be found in the 1957 cumulative pocket supplement to Fla.Stat....

...(Emphasis supplied.) Substantial compliance means “the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have *1218 been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(73), Fla....

...aning of section 39.806(l)(e). Section 39;806(l)(b) Abandonment is “a situation in which the parent ... makes no provision for the child’s support and has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child.” § 39.01(1), Fla....

...properly restricted; while, at the same time, protecting children from harm. In this case, the charges made in the petitions were based exclusively upon allegations that certain actions of appellant had resulted in emotional abuse to S.B. and S.M.B. Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...at these contempt proceedings are post-dispositional hearings within the meaning of subsection (12). Resolution of this issue demands a close examination of several related statutory provisions under Chapter 39 governing juvenile proceedings. First, section 39.01(28), Florida Statutes (1995), defines disposition hearing as a hearing in which the court determines the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting provided for under section 39.052(4). It is not clear from this definition whether contempt proceedings, conducted following a violation of community control, are considered to be pre-dispositional or post-dispositional. As such, we turn to the following statutory provisions. Section 39.01(13) defines a child who has committed a delinquent act as a child who has been found by a court to have committed a violation of law or to be in direct or indirect criminal contempt of court....

...Since Section 50, Article V of the Constitution applies only to "criminal cases" where "minors under any age specified by the Legislature" are involved, the legislature would have the power to classify them (minors) as dependent or delinquent. F.S. § 39.01(10), F.S.A., defines dependent child as one "who, for any reason, is destitute, homeless, dependent upon the public for support, or has not proper parental support, maintenance, care * * * or who is neglected." The same act defines a delinqu...

...the parents' control, is a reputed criminal or associates with criminals, etc. It follows that when the provisions of Section 50, Article V of the Constitution are read with other provisions of the Constitution referred to therein including Sections 39.01(10, 11) and F.S....

...he Constitution that there was a purpose to remove the power to adjudicate "estates and interests of minors" from the circuit courts. In the case at bar it is contended that the children in question are not delinquent or dependent as contemplated by Section 39.01(10) and (11) because the Juvenile Court found: "After the divorce and the father's (Clem Harris Watson) remarriage, his manner of life appears to have entirely changed....

...ice has been to certify it to that court for disposition. Orderly procedure would require this in any case where the Circuit Court finds that a minor child or children have become delinquent or otherwise in the criminal class as contemplated by F.S. § 39.01, F.S.A....

...Based on these findings, the court granted the dependency petition. A dependent child is one who is found "[t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent" or "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect." § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla....

...child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations" and it includes only marginal efforts "to support and communicate with the child . . . that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties[.]" § 39.01(1)....

...cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. . . . Corporal discipline of a child by a parent . . . for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child. § 39.01(2). Relevant to this case, harm to a child's health or welfare occurs when any person inflicts physical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a), or uses inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury, § 39.01(30)(a)(4)....

...4th DCA 2000) (holding that bruises inflicted with belt did not constitute excessive or abusive corporal discipline to support dependency). Harm to a child also occurs when a parent engages in "[c]ontinued chronic and severe use of a controlled substance . . . when the child is demonstrably affected by such usage[.]" § 39.01(30)(g)(2)....

...esponsible executive personnel of the Division of Youth Services. The events leading up to this unusual appeal are the following. On 2 February 1972 the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating J.N. to be a delinquent child within the meaning of § 39.01(11) and (12)(b), F.S....

...Subsection 39.048(1), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that, "All proceedings seeking a finding that a child has committed a delinquent act or violation of law shall be initiated by the state by the filing of a petition for delinquency by the state attorney" (emphasis added). Section 39.01(9) states: "`Child who has been found to have committed a delinquent act' means a child who, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, is found by a court to have committed a violation of law or to be in direct or indirect contempt of court......

...1st DCA 1995); see generally Padgett v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 577 So.2d 565 (Fla.1991); In the Interest of M.T.T., 613 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Under Chapter 39, a child may be found dependent in a number of circumstances. There are two provisions of Section 39.01 that apply to this case: "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: *480 (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians; * * * (f) To be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians. § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla.Stat....

...lication of the language in 1415(e)(2) is that the court's function is confined, in the usual case, to that of reviewing administrative proceedings, "not determining in the first instance the appropriateness of a handicapped child's education"). [5] Section 39.01(9)....

...n invalid determination. In so holding, we find persuasive Judge Farmer's special concurring opinion in W.W., in which he observed: [One] thing to consider about the [section 39.806](1)(d)2 text lies in the term, "the court." Under the definition in section 39.01(18) "the court," unless otherwise expressly stated, refers to the court exercising power in a chapter 39 proceeding....

...ate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations. In addition, the father, has been incarcerated since October of 1998 for armed cocaine trafficking." This order was signed on September 7, 2001. Section 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (1999), explains that "neglect" occurs when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired. Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2001), defines "abandoned" as a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the caregiver responsible for the child's welfare, while being able, makes...

...could reasonably be expected to result in an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of the child, as evidenced by a discernable and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior." § 39.01, Fla....

...(1993) (emphasis added). However, the words "or parent" were deleted by the amendment which became effective on October 1, 1994. Ch. 94-209, §§ 43, 150, at 1294, 1384, Laws of Fla. Moreover, the definition of the word "parent" did not include a legal guardian. See § 39.01(39), Fla....

remains in foster care for longer than 1 year,” § 39.001(l)(a), (l)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003), and say that

...He had also recently given her gifts. The guardian ad litem reported that the father's visits with the children were "sporadic." Sometime before the hearing he began paying $24 per week to the paternal grandfather for child support arrearages he owed. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2003) defines abandonment as: [A] situation in which the parent ..., while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations....

...The circuit court found that the father's efforts were only marginal. We agree that his efforts were weak, but the department did not establish that his conduct "evince[d] a willful rejection of parental obligations" or failed to "evince a settled purpose to assume parental duties." See § 39.01(1); S.C....

...n harmed when a parent "exposes a child to a controlled substance[,]" which may be established by proof of a parent's "[c]ontinued chronic and severe use of a controlled substance ... when the child is demonstrably adversely affected by such usage." § 39.01(30)(g)2....

...th the grandfather, pushed his son who tried to intervene. The son suffered minor injury. The department's petition did not allege abuse as a ground for the dependency. Even if it had, the evidence did not prove abuse based on this one incident. See § 39.01(2).

...We note that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is not a party to these proceedings. The trial court recognized that the mother remained free to seek a modification of the custody terms. The court's order was, at least in part, founded on the court's interpretation of section 39.01(10), concluding that the statute's use of the plural, "parents," required abuse allegations against both parents....

...rections to dismiss the escape charge. REVERSED AND REMANDED. BARFIELD and MINER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] A "halfway house" is defined as "a community-based residential program for 12 or more committed delinquents that is operated by the department." § 39.01(25), Fla....

...be waived. — The court may excuse the consent of the following individuals to an adoption: (1) A parent who has deserted a child without affording means of identification or who has abandoned a child... ." [2] Chapter 39 provides in relevant part: 39.01 Definitions....

...ld to be abandoned. The failure by any such person to appear in response to actual or constructive service in a dependency proceeding shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption of such person's ability to provide for and communicate with the child. § 39.01, Fla....

...And as a result of what has happened to [J.P.], what is occurring with [A.P.]. And I don't believe that you can really separate the two." The court subsequently entered an order finding A.P. was at substantial risk of imminent abuse and neglect and adjudicated A.P. dependent. See § 39.01(14), Fla....

...We find this was error. Although the lower court did not find A.P. had been personally abused in the past, it did find she was "at substantial risk of imminent abuse and neglect" based upon the abuse inflicted upon J.P. and therefore was dependent. *1110 See § 39.01(14)....

...We are extremely concerned regarding the pattern of behavior between the Mother and Mr. Festa. [5] We note domestic violence that occurs in the presence of the child may serve as the basis that a child has been "harmed," and may serve as grounds for adjudicating that child dependent. See § 39.01(30)(I), Fla....

...nd the father was entitled to custody of T.F., his daughter. [2] That the older child, N.R., is not the natural son of the father, further complicates this case. Under the dependency statutes, a stepfather is neither a "parent" nor a "relative." See § 39.01(49), (60), Fla....

...Gen., Bruce Barkett, Asst. Atty. Gen., F. Robert Santos, Certified Legal Intern, Tallahassee, for appellee. *1184 HERSEY, Judge. The natural mother appeals an order of the circuit court finding her minor child to be a dependent of the state pursuant to Section 39.01(9)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...nt was "financially able" as required by the applicable statute. We find the petition adequate for due process purposes and therefore discuss only the second prong of appellant's attack. The pertinent sections of the statute in question are Sections 39.01(1), 39.01(9) and 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (Supp....

child remains in foster care longer than 1 year.” § 39.001(h), Fla. Stat. (2016). Allowing Mother more time

...This appeal by the father followed. A child who is "dependent" is one who has been abused, abandoned, or neglected, or who is found by a court "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

...tes (1986 Supp.). With respect to dependency proceedings, section 39.41 was amended to require the circuit court to order parents to pay "child support" to the adult relative caring for the child, the licensed child/caring agency, or the Department. Section 39.01 was amended by adding the definition of "child support" which is defined as "a court ordered obligation enforced pursuant to ss. 409.2551-409.2597, for monetary support for the care, maintenance, training and education of a child." Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.)....

...ase. See Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905 (Fla.1980). Appellant was found to have committed a misdemeanor, violating § 806.13, Florida Statutes, and the action taken by the trial judge was within her power pursuant to Chapter 39, Florida Statutes. See § 39.01(8) and 39.10(2)....

...The Department of Children and Families ("DCF") argues that the court's ruling was supported by competent substantial evidence that the mother suffered from mental illness that adversely affected the children's care, exposed the children to illegal drugs in the home, and kept her home in a deplorable condition. Under section 39.01, Florida Statutes, the definition of a dependent child includes one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his or her parents, custodians, or caregivers or is at substantial risk of imminent harm from abandonment, abuse or neglect. § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2006). For the purpose of protective investigations, abuse and neglect of a child include the acts or omissions of the parent. § 39.01(2),(43), Fla....

...Contrary to the argument on behalf of the parents, we find no basis to disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the requirements of Florida Statute section 39.41(1)(f)(1)(a) for permanent commitment were met because abuse was proven as defined in section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Less than a year after making these findings, however, the court agreed to reopen the case without applying the statutory safeguards. Permanency is an integral element of a “permanent guardianship of a dependent child,” unless and until a valid basis for changing the child’s placement is established in the record. See § 39.01(55), Fla....

...He was almost four years old when he was adjudicated dependent. He is described as a three-year-old for purposes of this opinion because that is the birthday nearest the date he left the custody of his parents. [2] The definition of a "child who is found to be dependent" in section 39.01(14)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), includes children found "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." [3] Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.260(a) requires all...

the care, safety, and protection of children. § 39.001, Fla. Stat. (1991). While it seems absurd to terminate

...ed violation of law. Happily, however, if there is a danger to the community or to the juvenile, appropriate proceedings to declare a child "dependent" or "in need of supervision" are available in Florida's Juvenile Justice System. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 39.01 (10) and (11)....

...iggers their being taken into custody in the first instance is the alleged commission of a criminal offense. Indeed, the very nature of a delinquency proceeding is to determine whether the accused has committed a violation of law. See Fla. Stat.Ann. § 39.01(6), (12). "`Violation of law' means a violation of any law of the United States or of the state, or of a local ordinance, which would be a misdemeanor or a felony if committed by an adult." Fla.Stat.Ann. § 39.01(31)....

...Domestic violence may constitute harm sufficient for an adjudication of dependency if it "demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child," or if the violence actually results in "physical, mental or sexual injury" to the child. § 39.01(32)(i), (j), Fla....

...entitled “Proceedings Relating to Children” as: “injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior.” Fla. Stat. § 39.01(43) (2002); see also DuFresne v....

...abused." M.F., 770 So.2d at 1193. Under this chapter, a "child who is found to be dependent" includes a child who is found by the trial court "[t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians" under § 39.01(14)(a), Florida Statutes (2005); or "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

..."Abuse" means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes acts or omissions. § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 39.01(30)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), states in pertinent part: "Harm" to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person: (a) Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury....

...t to achieve a result or to cause an injury." Id. Furthermore, "`harm' to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person . . . [c]ommits, or allows to be committed, . . . lewd or lascivious acts, as defined in chapter 800, against the child." § 39.01(30)(b), Fla....

...sexual abuse in the immediate past. "Sexual abuse of a child" can include "[t]he intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts, including the breasts, . . . or the clothing covering them," subject to exceptions not pertinent to this record. § 39.01(63)(d), Fla....

...on so confined. This negative inference would exist in the minds of a lay jury regardless of the fact that said person may also be a "dependent child", § 39.02 Fla. Stat. F.S.A., which includes children who are destitute, homeless, neglected, etc., § 39.01 Fla....

...BACKGROUND Appellee, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF), commenced the instant proceeding by sheltering the three children and later filing a petition seeking dependency, alleging that they have been abused, abandoned, or neglected by the Mother, constituting dependency pursuant to section 39.01(14)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), and that each child was at risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect, constituting dependency pursuant to section 39.01(14)(f)....

...rely subjective standard of conduct. We find appellants' constitutional attack to be without merit. In E.H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 443 So.2d 1083 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), the court rejected the natural mother's argument that section 39.01(26), Florida Statutes (1981), under which her child was adjudicated dependent, was unconstitutional because it provided "a facially vague standard." The statute (renumbered as section 39.01(37), Fla....

...The trial court concluded that any one of the “factors” shown in this case would not be sufficient to order the child dependent, but taken 4 together, show that the child “has been harmed,” as defined in §39.01(30)(k) and (l)3, and that the child is at “prospective risk of neglect,” pursuant to §39.01(44)4 as a result of the mother continuing to co-sleep with the child A.G., who is now almost three years old. To support an adjudication of dependency, the parent's harmful behavior must be a present threat to the child....

...A “[c]hild who is found to be dependent” includes, among other things, one who has been “abandoned, abused, or neglected” by the parents, or a child who is found “[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect” by the parents. See § 39.01(14)(a) & (f), Fla. Stat. (2002). Therefore, before we can affirm a trial court's adjudication of dependency, 3 § 39.01(30), Fla....

...(l) Makes the child unavailable for the purpose of impeding or avoiding a protective investigation unless the court determines that the parent, legal custodian, or caregiver was fleeing from a situation involving domestic violence. 4 § 39.01(44), Fla....

...An abused child is one who is subjected to “any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired.” § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). “Harm” is defined by statute to include a parent's “continued chronic and severe use of a controlled substance or alcohol” if “the child is demonstrably adversely affected by such usage.” §39.01(30)(g), Fla. Stat....

...To the extent that DCF implies the adjudication in this case was appropriate based upon a “danger” that the physical, mental, or emotional health of A.G. would be significantly impaired in the future, the evidence still must meet the imminency requirement of section 39.01(14)(f)....

...2d at 185 (“The statutory definitions of ‘abuse’ and ‘neglect’ do not expressly include [a] requirement of imminence. However, when [absent actual 7 abuse, abandonment or neglect] these definitions are read in pari materia with the related language in section 39.01(14)(f), a risk of imminent neglect seems to be required to establish that a child is ‘dependent’ as a matter of law.”) (internal citations omitted); J.C....

...PROCEEDINGS SIBLING’S DEATH: There is no competent substantial evidence in the record that A.G.’s sibling died as a result of abuse, abandonment or neglect so as to be deemed “harm” to A.G. pursuant to the language of §39.01(30)(k).6 The expert medical examiner testified that there was no explanation for the death (that is, it was not caused by abuse, neglect, etc.), and concluded that SIDS with co-sleeping as a potential factor was the cause of death....

...possession of marijuana, in which case adjudication was withheld. His prior two criminal charges were also adjudication withholds. The petition goes on to state: These activities and/or environments harmed the Child as defined in Section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes (2014) and /or caused or are likely to cause the Child’s physical, mental or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired....

...Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 640 So.2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Although corporal discipline, alone, does not constitute abuse, a finding of dependency may be based upon evidence that the child is at a substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or legal custodian. § 39.01(14)(f), Fla. Stat. (2002). "Abuse" means any willful act or threatened act that results in physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. § 39.01(2), Fla....

...stified that it was possible that the child could be harmed again. We concluded that the "possibility" did not rise to the level of injury or harm "likely" to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired under 39.01(2)....

...At that point, J.R. stated that he didn’t know what to do. The *709 judge wisely determined that J.R. had not voluntarily consented to the termination and proceeded to conduct a trial on the department’s allegation of abandonment. The 2006 version of section 39.01(1) defines abandonment as: a situation in which the parent ..., while being able, makes no provision for the child’s support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations....

...At that point, J.R. stated that he didn't know what to do. The *709 judge wisely determined that J.R. had not voluntarily consented to the termination and proceeded to conduct a trial on the department's allegation of abandonment. The 2006 version of section 39.01(1) defines abandonment as: a situation in which the parent ..., while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations....

...the Shelter Order. The Shelter Order did not alter the Father’s status as the noncustodial parent under the prior Domestic Relations order. By definition, shelter custody is temporary, “pending court disposition before' or after adjudication.” § 39.01(70), Fla....

followed if the commitment resource is available. Section 39.001(3), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that

....'" Raford v. State, 828 So.2d 1012, 1015, n. 5 (Fla.2002). In both civil and criminal child abuse proceedings, a parent's right to administer reasonable and non-excessive corporal punishment to discipline their children is legislatively recognized. § 39.01(2), Fla....

...Evidence was also presented that was favorable to Appellees presented as to their relationship with the children. The department asserts that the trial court's recognition that the children were at risk of emotional harm is equivalent to a dependency finding under section 39.01(36), Florida Statutes, which defines neglect, as a basis for dependency, as "Neglect" occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person primarily responsible for the child...

...There, we said: We reverse because the evidence is simply insufficient to support a finding of abuse.... Under the statute "abuse means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. " § 39.01(2), Fla....

...Stat.(1997); § 39.0471, Fla. Stat. (1995). [4] See § 985.03(29), Fla. Stat.(1997); § 39.001(33), Fla. Stat. (1995). [5] See § 985.211(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997); § 39.038(2)(a), Fla. Stat.(1995). [6] See § 39.049(7), Fla. Stat.(1995). [7] § 985.03(53), Fla. Stat. (1997); § 39.01(70), Fla....

...in custody of the child and that the previously-accepted case plan would remain in effect. This appeal followed. The mother argues no competent, substantial evidence existed to show that the child was “at substantial risk of imminent abuse.” § 39.01(15)(f), Fla....

...Abuse means “any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual abuse, injury, or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes acts or omissions.” § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). Harm, in turn, occurs “when any person . . . [i]nflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury.” § 39.01(32)(a), Fla....

...Programs or program models in this restrictiveness level include: community counselor supervision programs, special intensive group programs, nonresidential marine programs, nonresidential training and rehabilitation centers, and other local community nonresidential programs. § 39.01(59)(a), Fla....

...However, under the definition section of chapter 39, community control is defined as "an individualized program in which the freedom of the child is limited and the child is restricted to noninstitutional quarters or restricted to the child's home in lieu of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice." § 39.01(16), Fla....

...Hence, community control is defined as something entirely different than a commitment to DJJ at any restrictiveness level. "Restrictiveness Level" is defined as "the level of custody provided by programs that service the custody and care needs of committed children." Id. § 39.01(59) (emphasis added)....

...because it is designed to recommend a sanction other than adjudication and commitment. Because the report only concerns a sanction other than commitment, it would obviously not treat or recommend an appropriate restrictiveness level. KOGAN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.01(59)(b) defines "low-risk residential" as: Youth assessed and classified for placement in programs at this level represent a low risk to themselves and public safety and do require placement and services in residential settings. Programs or program models in this restrictiveness level include: Short Term Offender Programs (STOP), group treatment homes, family group homes, proctor homes, and Short Term Environmental Programs (STEP). § 39.01(59)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996)(current version at § 985.03(45)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997)). [2] "`Restrictiveness level' means the level of custody provided by programs that service the custody and care needs of committed children." Id. § 39.01(59)(current version at § 985.03(45), Fla....

...Community control is an individualized program in which the freedom of the child is limited and the child is restricted to noninstitutional quarters or restricted to the child's home in lieu of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice. § 39.01(16), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996) (emphasis added) (current version at § 985.03(12), Fla. Stat. (1997)). [4] Section 39.01(59) lists and defines five restrictiveness levels: (a) minimum-risk nonresidential; (b) low-risk residential; (c) moderate-risk residential; (d) high-risk residential; and (e) maximum-risk residential. § 39.01(59)(a)-(e), Fla....

...3d DCA 1996), wherein Judge Cope explained: The 2-4-6-8 numbering terminology is a holdover from the original 1990 rule which first promulgated restrictiveness levels. See B.H. v. State .... The restrictiveness levels were subsequently enacted into statute without the original numbers. See § 39.01(61), Fla....

...es not shed any additional light on the definition of community control within the meaning of section 39.052. This ambiguity is not resolved by the majority opinion's reference to "minimum-risk nonresidential," the lowest restrictiveness level under section 39.01(59), which includes within its definition programs such as "community counselor supervision programs." Unfortunately, the statute does not define "community counselor supervision programs" and there is scant case law on this issue....

...5 child subject to his authority, if he remains within the legal limits of the exercise of that authority.”) (partly superseded by statute on other grounds, as acknowledged in Raford v. State, 828 So. 2d 1012, 1020 (Fla. 2002)). See also § 39.01(2), Fla....

necessity of filing a motion'to intervene. § 39.01(50), Fla. Stat. (2013). The trial court granted

...Under chapter 39, neglect occurs only when “a child is deprived of ... necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment [that] causes the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired.” § 39.01(44), Fla....

...Here, the circumstances cited by the trial court are legally insufficient to support a finding that Ms. Seilkop neglected her son. First, the finding that Ms. Seilkop’s apartment is dangerous and likely to harm the child is purely speculative and does not rise to the level of neglect under section 39.01(44)....

...seeking the Department's assistance, the trial court found the children were at risk of being harmed if they were released to M.C. This finding of dependency could only be based upon a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect as provided for in section 39.01(14)(f), Florida Statutes (2007), because there was no evidence that M.C....

...EVANDER, J., concurring specially. I write only to emphasize that expert testimony is not necessarily required to support a finding that a caregiver's mental condition places a child "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

...Judging from the stricken text itself and the discussion among the court and counsel at the disposition concerning how the original written order should be altered, it appears that the intention was to delete any findings as to existing neglect, see § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004), and retain findings as to prospective- neglect, see § 39.01(14)(f)....

...“A court’s final ruling of dependency is a mixed question of law and fact and will be sustained on review if the court applied the correct law and its ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record.” In re M.F., 770 So.2d 1189, 1192 (Fla.2000). Section 39.01(14) provides that a “[e]hild who is found to be dependent” means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: *1194 [[Image here]] (a) [t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child’s parent or parent...

..., or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired. § 39.01(45)....

...or T.B. The Mother moved to her paternal grandmother’s home in Virginia, where her father also lived. We agree with the Mother’s argument that these several moves, in and of themselves, do not satisfy the statutory definition of neglect found in section 39.01(45)....

...2d DCA 2003), in which we held that the mother and child’s seven moves in eight months did not rise to the level of statutory neglect. As such, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support an adjudication of dependency based on existing neglect pursuant to section 39.01(14)(a)....

...We also conclude that this record does not support the adjudication of dependency based on prospective neglect. “While prospective neglect or abuse can be a basis for an adjudication of dependency, the Department must meet the statute’s imminency requirement.” In re J.L., 824 So.2d 1023, 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); see § 39.01(14)(f)....

...problems and her potential to harm her daughter). Here, the Department failed to adduce evidence demonstrating that the Mother’s several changes of residence should compel a finding that T.B. was at “substantial risk of imminent ... neglect,” § 39.01(14)(f), i.e., that T.B....

...would likely “be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment” or be living in an environment that would cause her “physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired,” § 39.01(45)....

...abandoned the child because he *927 failed to support and communicate with the child. See § 39.806(1)(b). Section 39.806(1)(e)(1) provides that a parent's failure to complete a case plan within nine months after an adjudication of the child as dependent is evidence of abandonment, abuse, or neglect. Section 39.01(1) provides that "[t]he incarceration of a parent....

rehabilitation needs of the child[.]’” Id. (quoting § 39.001(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995)). The court also explained:

...ubstantial evidence. Id. See also A.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 901 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). In the case before us, the trial court applied the correct law using the statutory definition of a dependent child as defined in section 39.01(14), Florida Statutes (2004), which provides, in pertinent part: "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians; ....

...(emphasis added). The Department too acknowledges the lack of any evidence of illegal activity by J.O. after September 14, 2005. The Department nevertheless argues that J.O.'s contention that the children therefore cannot be declared dependent as to him under Section 39.01(14)(f) of the Florida Statutes (2004), requiring dependent children "to be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect" to justify an adjudication, "is fallacious based upon his ability to move from his sister's home,...

...Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes defines a "dependent" child as one who is found by the court to have been abandoned, abused or neglected by his or her parents or one who is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents. . . ." § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla....

...abandonment, abuse or neglect is imminent." J.B.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 870 So.2d 946, 949 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The adjudication in this case is not sustainable on the basis of actual abuse, abandonment, or neglect within the meaning of Section 39.01(14)(a). If it is sustainable at all, the adjudication must rest upon the existence of a present or "imminent risk" to the children within the meaning of Section 39.01(14)(f) of Florida's dependency statute....

...Dep't of Children & Families, 881 So.2d 1130, 1135 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). This legal truth is derivable from the language of the relevant sections of Chapter 39. Dependency adjudications based upon actual abuse, abandonment, or neglect by a parent or legal custodian are governed by Section 39.01(14)(a). A dependency adjudication lies under this section of the Florida statutes whenever a child is found "[t]o have been abused, abandoned, or neglected. . . ." § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). In these circumstances, the Department need not inquire into or offer proof of present household circumstances. The statutory misfeasance is alone sufficient. See id. By contrast, Section 39.01(14)(f) allows an adjudication of dependency where a child is found "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect. . . ." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

....the court;appointed counsel for the parents/the parents were informed of their right to counsel including the right of an indigent person to be represented by court appointed counsel...; 5. A .. .performance agreement/permanent placement plan..., as defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes, was offered to the parents; 6....

...tice Act, and thus held that a simple showing by DCF that a parent committed a sex act on one child does not, by itself, constitute proof that the parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to the child's sibling, as is required by section 39.01(11) of the Florida Statutes to establish dependency....

that there shall be no more than eight levels. § 39.01(61), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1990). In D.P., the First

...s welfare." Christie filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. She asserted that as a public school teacher, she was not a section 827.03(3) "caregiver" or "other person responsible for a child's welfare" if that section was read in pari materia with section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...ool hours and was therefore an "other person responsible for a child's welfare." § 827.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). The trial court granted Christie's motion to dismiss. The State appealed. We agree with the State that there is no need to refer to the section 39.01(47) definition of "other person responsible for a child's welfare" in considering a neglect charge under section 827.03....

...nsible for a child's welfare." Contrary to Christie's argument, because the phrase "other person responsible for a child's welfare" has a plain and obvious meaning in everyday parlance, there is no need to resort to the statutory definition given in section 39.01(47) as in DuFresne....

...We find no logic to Christie's argument, which counters the plain dictate of section 827.03(3). Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the dismissal of the State's information and remand this cause for is reinstatement. Reversed. NOTES [1] Section 39.01(47), in pertinent part, defines "[o]ther person responsible for a child's welfare" as "the child's legal guardian, legal custodian, or foster parent; an employee of a private school, public or private child day care center[.]"

...the court found that, "notwithstanding that a Child Welfare Case Plan ... was entered on behalf of the [Appellants], [they have] continued to neglect, abuse and abandon the children for the past twelve months or more pursuant to § 39.806(1)(e) and § 39.01(1) and (45), Florida Statutes (2003)." Further, the court found that Appellants "abandoned [their] children within the meaning of § 39.806(1)(b) and § 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and [have] engaged in egregious conduct that endangered the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the children or the children's sibling, pursuant to § 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2003)."...

...Appellant also challenges the use of an electronic monitoring device as a special condition of community control. By statutory definition, community control contemplates that the freedom of a delinquent child will be limited by the restriction of the child to noninstitutional quarters or to the child's home. § 39.01(16), Fla.Stat....

...aw. In dependency proceedings, a party is defined as the parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian ad litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child. 39.01(50), Fla....

...687 So.2d at 977-78. Accordingly, we grant the Father's petition for writ of certiorari and quash the circuit court's order. On remand, the circuit court may consider whether the Maternal Grandmother should be allowed to intervene as a participant in accordance with section 39.01(49) and Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.210(b)....

entitled to procedures to insure a fair hearing, § 39.001(2)(d).

...Reversed and remanded with directions to discharge the appellant. NOTES [1] The new text of Article V, § 5, F.S.A., was adopted by the special election of March 14, 1972, and became effective January 1, 1973. See Fla. Stat. § 26.012 (2)(c), F.S.A., and Fla. Stat. § 39.01(1), F.S.A., which implement the new language of Article V.

...The instant case is similar to In the Interest of C.W., 490 So.2d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) where the child suffered a temporary set-back as a result of the mother's lack of education and experience, rather than through the neglect and mistreatment prohibited by section 39.01(14)(a), Florida Statutes....

...not perform the surgery without a court order. However, the trial court ruled that a court order is not needed because, under the relevant statutes, DCF, as the legal custodian, is already authorized to consent to the surgery on L.B.'s behalf. Under section 39.01(70), Florida Statutes (2001), DCF has "the right ......

...care ...." (emphasis added.) Further, section 39.407(13) states, "Nothing in this section alters the authority of the department to consent to medical treatment for a dependent child...." The dispositive issue in the instant case is whether the "ordinary medical ... care" referenced in section 39.01(70), and the "medical treatment" referenced in section 39.407(13), include surgery....

...other extraordinary procedures for which a separate court order, power of attorney, or informed consent as provided by law is required. Section 743.0645(1)(b) specifically excludes surgery from the definition of "medical *832 care and treatment." As section 39.01(33) and section 39.01(70) both concern "ordinary medical ......

...Since DJJ cannot be considered either the parent or the legal custodian for purposes of adjudicating a child dependent under Chapter 39, I agree with the lower court's conclusion that the petition for adjudication of dependency had to be dismissed. See § 39.01, Fla....

...The family court judge was concerned that the Department did not take appropriate steps to protect the child by initiating a dependency proceeding, so she decided sua sponte to initiate such a proceeding by issuing an order to take the child into custody. Section 39.01(68), Florida Statutes (2011), defines "shelter" as " placement with a relative or a nonrelative, or in a licensed home or facility ..." (Emphasis added.) Section 39.402(1), Florida Statutes (2011) states: Unless ordered by the court und...

...The trial judge supplemented the standard jury instruction, which does not provide a definition of physical injury, with an instruction that "[p]hysical injury means asphyxiation, suffocation, or drowning." Ms. Garrett argues that it was fundamental error for the court to use that definition borrowed from section 39.01(30)(a)(4)e., Florida Statutes (2004). [1] We reject this contention. Section *216 39.01(30)(a)(4) should be read in pari materia with section 827.03(1) and is appropriately used by the courts to define excessive or abusive corporal discipline....

...result of Ms. Garrett's actions to reach their verdict. If anything, this definition inured to her benefit by narrowing the conduct that potentially subjected her to prosecution. We find no error. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.01(30)(4)e., Florida Statutes (2004), defines "harm" and specifies that "corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in any of the following or other similar injuries: . . . e. Asphyxiation, suffocation, or drowning." This section was renumbered effective July 1, 2006, to section 39.01(31)(4)e....

...B.P., 588 So.2d 39. Prior to the 1990 revisions to the Florida Juvenile Justice Act, the statute contemplates *127 a juvenile might be placed in detention based either on an allegation, or a finding, of contempt. § 39.032(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (1989). Compare § 39.01(9), Fla. Stat. (1989). The new contempt provision, section 39.044(10), Florida Statutes (1991) expressly provides that detention is appropriate for contempt, but the prior reference to "allegation" has been deleted. See also § 39.01(9), Fla....

...scretionary jurisdiction to interfere with the already impossible task of juvenile judges in cases where the juveniles themselves have not complained. WRITS DENIED. DAUKSCH and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 39.042(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] §§ 39.01(16)(b), (c), Fla....

...Before COPE, C.J., and GREEN, J., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. PER CURIAM. We affirm the final order terminating the mother's parental rights because there is substantial competent evidence in the record to show that she abandoned her minor child as defined by section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or . . . permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes [her] physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(43), Fla....

...e trial court entered a Dependency Proceedings Order of Disposition. This order, however, largely mirrored the prior order of adjudication and included the following findings: The father, [S.K.], has abandoned the child as defined in Florida Statute 39.01(1) in that the father, while being able, has made no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations....

...dated March 18, 2006 which was accepted into evidence without opposition. He concluded that [S.K.] was not competent and posed a risk of harm to himself and others. These activities and/or environments harmed the child as defined in Florida Statutes 39.01(30) and/or caused the child's physical, mental or emotional health to be significantly impaired....

...well-being of the child. Also while incarcerated, L.K. was in work release and attending intensive rehabilitation. On April 30, 2010, the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The Department alleged abandonment, pursuant to section 39.01(1) of the Florida Statutes, as its only ground for termination as to L.K....

...st be considered. [1] J.G. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 22 So.3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). "In addition, the Department must establish that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm." Id. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes, provides: "Abandoned" or "abandonment" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the caregiver, while being able, makes no provision for...

...requent and regular communication to or with the child, and the exercise of parental rights and responsibilities.... The incarceration of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver responsible for a child's welfare may support a finding of abandonment. § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). "To reverse a trial court's determination that" a child was abandoned, the appellate court must find that the determination was not "supported by clear and convincing evidence." In re E.D., 884 So.2d 291, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Section 39.01(1) is a two-prong test. First, the parent must have been able to support the child and, second, the parent failed to establish a relationship *1243 with the child. See § 39.01(1), Fla....

...Instead, the petition alleged that A.B. should be found dependent as to her mother because A.B. was prospectively at significant risk of harm based on the mother's physical abuse of D.O. and the previous dependency adjudication of D.O. for that harm. See § 39.01(15)(f), (32), Fla....

...We, therefore, affirm the order and remand to the trial court for correction of the order. Affirmed and remanded with directions. NOTES [1] The record shows that D.O. was adjudicated dependent as to J.O., her father, for neglect and prospective risk of harm. See § 39.01(15)(f), (32), (44), Fla....

...State, 826 So.2d 272, 278-79 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court held that the statute "is not unconstitutionally vague because the term `mental injury' is adequately defined in another related statute"—Chapter 39, which is titled "Proceedings Relating to Children." Section 39.01(42), Florida Statutes (2008), defines "mental injury" as "an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of...

...dependency order. While the dependent acknowledges that he may be held in contempt for violation of the conditions of his dependency, R.M.P. v. Jones, 419 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1982), he contends that he may not be adjudicated delinquent. It is true that Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1981) provides that truancy is a basis for a finding of dependency and Section 39.01(8), Florida Statutes (1981) does not describe it as a basis for an adjudication of delinquency. However, Section 39.01(8) expressly authorizes a petition for delinquency upon a finding of contempt of court....

...The alternative to the proceeding suggested by the majority is for the state to commence another dependency proceeding with the probable outcome being that the court will impose the same conditions as those which have already been violated. We are of the view that the legislature intentionally designed Section 39.01 to avoid such a cumbersome procedure and to allow remedial action to be taken before it is too late to be of assistance to the juvenile and society....

...argues, and the Department of Children and Family Services and the Guardian Ad Litem Program concede, that there was not competent, substantial evidence that the abuse of the half-sister placed J.A. at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by B.A. See § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

provide for abuse by an institution. Rather, section 39.01 outlines separate subsections for definitions

settled purpose to assume parental duties, see section 39.01, and that the efforts he did make were marginal

...f witnesses to the incident. Appellee also alleged prejudice in that the parents *960 of two of his witnesses were reluctant to bring their children to testify because of the delay. Since appellee was never "taken into custody" within the meaning of section 39.01(51), Florida Statutes (1993), and the delinquency petition was filed approximately seven months after the incident, well within the two-year statute of limitations for battery, we decline to hold that appellee was so prejudiced by a seven-month delay in filing to justify dismissal....

...Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Anthony C. Musto, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. KARL, Justice. This cause is before us on direct appeal to review an order of the Circuit Court, in and for Orange County, upholding the constitutional validity of Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes, thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution....

...several occasions without permission, has disobeyed the staff and has been profane, defiant, disrespectful and argumentative. The public defender appointed to represent him filed a motion to dismiss the petition wherein he alleged, inter alia, that Section 39.01(11) is unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and overbroad, that the petition was filed and initiated by Mr....

...This motion was denied and order of commitment to the Division of Youth Services was entered by the trial court. The trial court found D.T.H. to be dependent by reason of ungovernability for the second time within the intent and meaning of Section 39.10, Florida Statutes. On appeal, appellant first contends that Section 39.01(11) is unconstitutionally vague. We have recently resolved that point against appellant in In Interest of Hutchins, 345 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1977), wherein this Court determined that Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes, is not unconstitutionally vague....

...ition seek an adjudication of delinquency. There was no adjudication of delinquency sub judice. There was an attempt to define and treat the child as a delinquent after a second hearing based on allegations of ungovernability under the provisions of Section 39.01(11). [1] There is no reference to ungovernability in Chapter 39, except in Section 39.01(11)....

...delinquency are applicable. In the case before us, the trial judge attempted to define and treat D.T.H. as a delinquent by committing him to the Division of Youth Services. [2] We hold that he could not do so on the record before him. The portion of Section 39.01(11) that permits the court to define and treat the child as a delinquent effectually establishes a basis additional to that contained in Section 39.01(12) to attain the status of delinquency....

...While it is not material to the disposition of this appeal, we observe that, if the requirements of Hutchins, supra, were not met in the first ungovernability hearing, then in the second ungovernability proceeding, the child may not be defined or treated as a delinquent child pursuant to Section 39.01(11)....

...Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. SUNDBERG, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] Section 39.01(11), F.S., provides: "`Ungovernable child' means a child who persistently disobeys the reasonable and lawful demands of his parents or other legal custodians and is beyond their control....

...c charge. We reject this contention. In a shelter proceeding, the court determines whether probable cause exists to believe the child is dependent, i.e., "has been abandoned, abused or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(a), Fla....

...Families ("DCF"). § 390.01114(4)(d) (emphasis added). The Act defines "sexual abuse of a child" to mean, among other things, "[a]ny penetration, however slight of the vagina . . . of one person by the penis of another person." §§ 390.0114(2)(e), 39.01(63). A "child" is "any unmarried person under the age of 18 years who has not been emancipated by order of the court." § 39.01(12)....

...Dep’t of Children & Families, 795 So.2d 183, 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); F.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 763 So.2d 478, 479 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). The Mother argues, and the Department concedes, that the Department failed to prove abuse, abandonment or neglect, or imminent risk thereof. See § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2007). The record supports the Department’s concession and that, it failed to prove the Mother’s “[cjontinued chronic and severe use of a controlled substance or alcohol” that “demonstrably adversely affected” her children. § 39.01(31)(g)(2); see also J.B.M....

...Dep’t of Children & Families, 870 So.2d 946, 950 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). We note that the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) does not concede error. With respect to the GAL’s argument concerning prospective abuse or neglect, the substantial risk of abuse or neglect to the child must be imminent. See § 39.01(14)(f); N.D....

...the Department, that commitment "invests in the department all rights and responsibilities of a legal custodian." § 39.508(9)(a)7, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The rights and responsibilities of the Department as custodian are explained in section *969 39.01(70), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which provides: "Temporary legal custody" means the relationship that a juvenile court creates between a child and an adult relative of the child, legal custodian, or caregiver approved by the court, or other person until a more permanent arrangement is ordered....

...y legal custody relationship. [emphasis added]. The Department, as custodian of a dependent child, thus has the authority and duty to provide many of the same things that a parent or guardian provides, without court approval, including medical care. Section 39.01(70) limits that care, though, to "ordinary medical, dental, psychiatric, and psychological care," unless that authorization is enlarged by court order....

...bstantially complied with the terms of the case plan to the extent that the safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and emotional health of the child is not endangered by the return of the child to the home." *1009 § 39.522(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 39.01(68) defines "substantial compliance" as: [T]he circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child's remaining with or being returned to the child's parent....

...Christopher Chopin of Law Office of Christopher Chopin, West Palm Beach, for respondent. GROSS, C.J. In this petition for writ of certiorari, the wife in a pending dissolution of marriage proceeding seeks review of a non-final order denying her motion for a hearing under section 39.0139, Florida Statutes (2008), in which she sought to prohibit the husband's visitation pending the hearing....

...On the same day, the husband filed an emergency motion for civil contempt based on the missed visitation. The trial court set both motions for hearing for October 31. On October 21, the wife filed within the dissolution proceeding her motion for a hearing under section 39.0139, which sought (1) the appointment of a guardian ad litem, (2) the prohibition of visitation until the section 39.0139 hearing, and (3) cancellation of the scheduled October 31 hearing....

...The detective who prepared the report reclassified the incident with the 17 year old as being unfounded, because the child reported that his father did not touch him and the earlier touching was without criminal intent. The wife noticed her motion for a section 39.0139 hearing on October 31, at the same time as the previously scheduled emergency motions. The circuit judge refused to entertain the motion for a section 39.0139 hearing due to inadequate notice....

...The husband's two cousins also denied the allegations against them. With regard to visitation, the detective thought that the teenage boys were capable of defending themselves, having taken Tae Kwan-Do. At this point in the hearing, the wife moved the court to consider her section 39.0139 motion....

...She wanted the trial court to appoint a guardian and suspend visitation. As to the Chapter 61 motions, the court found that the wife did not do all she could have done to carry out the trial court's visitation provisions. The court decided that the section 39.0139 hearing was unnecessary, since it had already conducted hearings under Chapter 61....

...erially injure the petitioner throughout the remainder of the proceedings, which cannot be remedied adequately on appeal. See Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097 (Fla.1987); Bared & Co., Inc. v. McGuire, 670 So.2d 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Section 39.0139 is designed to protect children. A court's failure to apply the statute to protect a child from abuse is reviewable by certiorari, since the situation presents the possibility of irreparable harm to the child. Section 39.0139, the "Keeping Children Safe Act," is designed to protect children "who have been sexually abused or exploited by a parent or other caregiver." § 39.0139(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). The Act creates a "presumption of detriment" to a child under enumerated circumstances, § 39.0139(3), Fla. Stat. (2008), and places "additional requirements on judicial determinations related to visitation and other contact." § 39.0130(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). One of the circumstances creating a presumption of detriment is that a parent "[h]as been the subject of a report to the child abuse hotline alleging sexual abuse of any child as defined in s. 39.01." § 39.0139(3)(a)1, Fla....

...In this case, the wife contends that her report to a *4 hotline [1] triggered the presumption under this section, so that the husband may be allowed visitation with the teenagers "only after a hearing and an order by the court that allows the visitation or other contact." § 39.0139(4), Fla....

...been appointed" and may allow visitation only if the accused parent "proves by clear and convincing evidence that the safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and emotional health of the child is not endangered by such visitation or other contact." § 39.0139(4)(b) & (c), Fla. Stat. (2008). Certiorari does not lie in this case because section 39.0139 did not apply in this Chapter 61 dissolution of marriage proceeding. The focus of section 39.0139 is to protect children "who are abused, abandoned, or neglected." § 39.0139(2)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (2008). These are defined terms in section 39.01 which have a meaning specific to Chapter 39 proceedings. See § 39.01(1), (2), & (44), Fla. Stat. (2008). Chapter 39 thus provides an entry mechanism into the court system for children who need protection. Section 39.0139(4) requires an order by "the court" that allows visitation. When "used in" Chapter 39, "[c]ourt" "means the circuit court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter," "unless otherwise expressly stated." § 39.01(20), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis supplied). Chapter 39 primarily involves dependency and termination of parental rights proceedings. Thus, a "court" within the meaning of section 39.0139 is a court "assigned" to hear dependency and parental termination cases, not the circuit court in general or a family division of the circuit court primarily assigned to hear Chapter 61 dissolution of marriage cases. The court in this case was a family division of the circuit court, not the division in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit established to hear a docket of dependency and parental termination cases. This reading of section 39.0139 makes sense in light of the broad powers given to a court under Chapter 61 to protect children embroiled in a dissolution proceeding....

...Under Family Law Rule 12.610, a court may enter an ex parte temporary injunction to protect children from the fallout from domestic, repeat, or sexual violence. Given these broad powers to protect children under Chapter 61 and the Family Law Rules, section 39.0139 should not be read to supplant a due process oriented, comprehensive, balanced approach with provisions that change case dynamics based on a phone call to an abuse hotline....

...There is no requirement that the report be found to have been true, or even that it be subject to a finding of probable cause before the rebuttable presumption arises. A report that was made in the distant past and closed following an investigation with no indicators of abuse nevertheless triggers the application of [section 39.0139]. Sue Robbins, Florida Statute § 39.0139: Limiting the Risk of Serious Harm to Children, 82 Fla....

...petition and subsequently filed a private dependency petition. But the Department argues that although the grandparents are “essentially” parties they would need some kind of “additional standing” to challenge this order regarding placement. Section 39.01(51), Florida Statutes (2010), defines “party” to include “the petitioner.” Because the grandparents are petitioners in the trial court, they are not “essentially” parties, they are parties....

...w by showing ‘that the trial court made an error so serious that it amounts to a miscarriage of justice.’ ” K.G., 66 So.3d at 368 (quoting State v. Smith, 951 So.2d 954, 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)). At issue here is the Keeping Children Safe Act, section 39.0139, Florida Statutes (2010) (the Act). There has been no suggestion that S.C., a two-year-old boy, has ever been sexually abused. Our review of the Act leads us to conclude that it applies only to sexually abused or exploited children. Section 39.0139(2) provides as follows: (2) Legislative findings and intent.— (a) The Legislature finds that: 1....

...(b) It is the intent of the Legislature to protect children and reduce the risk of further harm to children who have been sexually abused or exploited by a parent or other caregiver by placing additional requirements on judicial determinations related to visitation and other contact. (Emphasis added.) Section 39.0139(3) provides for a rebuttal presumption of detriment to a child when a parent or caregiver has been found guilty of certain crimes that include the child molestation conviction at issue here. Section 39.0139(4) provides that “[a] person who meets any of the criteria set forth in paragraph (3)(a) may visit or have other contact with a child only after a hearing and an order by the court that allows the visitation or other contact.” Aft...

...vidence that the safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and emotional health of the child is not endangered by such visitation or other contact, the presumption in subsection (3) is rebutted and the court may allow visitation or other contact.” § 39.0139(4)(e). Reading subsection (2) on legislative intent as a whole with the remainder of section 39.0139 supports the conclusion that the Act is intended to apply to children who have been sexually abused or exploited....

...vidence could rebut the presumption of harm to the child. This is an error so serious that it amounts to a manifest injustice. Thus, even if the Act applies to S.C., the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in not applying section 39.0139(3) which provides for a re-buttable presumption....

...LaROSE and CRENSHAW, JJ„ Concur. . At the end of the hearing, one of the attorneys noted that she tried to get records from New York relating to the case and was also told that they did not exist. . We recognize that under another provision of chapter 39, section 39.0138, the trial court may consider the criminal history of a person seeking placement of a child. Section 39.0138(7)(b) provides that a person with such a criminal history may present evidence of rehabilitation to show that the person would not pose a danger to the child if placement were allowed and outlining factors that would be relevant to es...

...ilure of a parent to substantially comply with a case plan, constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, abandonment, or neglect; and 3) section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), which provides that the parent has abandoned the child as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2004), if the parent, while being able, makes no provision for the support of the child and no effort to communicate with the child....

...pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e) due to the mother's failure to comply with her case plan. Moreover, the trial court also found that termination was warranted pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b) because the mother had abandoned the child as defined in section 39.01(1)....

...not warrant a finding of abandonment as the record indicates that the mother lacked the ability to do so. Therefore, we do not find that the Department established by clear and convincing evidence that the mother "abandoned" the child as defined in section 39.01(1)....

...or any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or who is informed of those facts and believes that they are true may petition for the termination of parental rights under any of the following circumstances: . . . (b) Abandonment as defined in s. 39.01(1)....

...donment unless the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due either to the lack of financial resources of the parents or to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child. . . . In addition, section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2004), provides: "Abandoned" means a situation in which the parent ....

...2004). “When the court obtains jurisdiction of any child who has been found to be dependent, the court shall retain jurisdiction, unless relinquished by its order, until the child reaches [twenty-one] years of age,” subject to a few exceptions. § 39.013(2), Fla....

...the part of the parent which will be likely to result in future abuse, neglect or abandonment. In the Interest of T.D., 537 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In this case we do not think the state sufficiently proved Veronica was neglected by Hroncich. Section 39.01(37) provides a description of neglect....

...[2] At the time of the hearing it appeared that the Nobel prize in mathematics was going to be awarded to a person who was an acute paranoid schizophrenic whose disease had gone into remission. [3] U.S. Const, Amend. XIV; In the Interest of T.M., 641 So.2d 410 (Fla.1994). Section 39.01(21), Florida Statutes (1993), states: `Disposition hearing' means a hearing in which the court determines the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting provided for under s....

....” § 39.603(l)(f). Later, the court’s determination whether there has been “substantial compliance” with the case plan will turn on whether “the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied.” § 39.01(73); cf....

...Under the statutory definition, abandonment occurs when a parent, “while being able, makes no provision for the child’s support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations.” § 39.01(1)....

...d by section 39.806(1)(e) because it found by clear and convincing evidence “that neither parent ha[d] completed his or her case plan.” The court explained that to determine whether the parents were in “substantial compliance,” as defined in section 39.01(71), it had to determine whether the problems which caused the case to be filed had been ameliorated....

...“ ‘Substantial compliance’ means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” 39.01(71) (emphasis added); E.R....

...The parents finished a parenting class and visited as often as possible with the children. Above all, there was no indication that domestic violence caused any harm to the children because the children were not present when the alleged incidents occurred. See § 39.01(31)(i) (defining “harm” to a child as “violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child”)....

SCHOONOVER, Judge. The appellants, parents of R.H. and G.K., appeal an order finding that R.H. and G.K. were dependent children. We find that the evidence presented to the trial court was insufficient to support a finding of neglect under section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985), and, accordi:..g;y, reverse the order of dependency. Section 39.01(27) provides in part: “Neglect” occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person primarily responsible for the child’s welfare deprives a child of, or allows a chil...

...court to declare the child a dependent, pursuant to Sections 39.408 — 39.41, Florida Statutes (1979), alleging as a basis for the dependency adjudication that the child was: (a) abandoned; (b) abused; or (c) neglected as those terms are defined by Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...After a third hearing, the court entered the present order denying the petition for a determination of dependency on a finding that the evidence did not activate Chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1979). The trial court found that the child was not abandoned for a period of six months or longer as required by Section 39.01(1), supra. There was no conduct on the part of the mother that would constitute abuse as defined by Section 39.01(2), supra. The mother cannot be said to have neglected her child as defined by Section 39.01(27), supra, *663 because the court found she was not financially able....

...lect would warrant a change of child custody. 14 Ruling Case Law § 46, Infants (1916). Misconduct or unfitness would likewise warrant a change of custody from parent to some third party. 20 Ruling Case Law § 14 Parent and Child (1918). Clearly, by Section 39.01, supra, the Legislature sought to restrict the cases in which a child could be taken away from its parents....

...The question now here for disposition is whether the common law rebuttable presumption that a child between the ages of 7 and 14 is incapable of committing a crime applies to delinquency proceedings. The answer depends upon a construction of the term “delinquent child” as defined by Section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes: “ ‘Delinquent child’ means a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurs, except a child *1165 who commits a juvenile traffic offense and whose case has not been transferre...

...Following the people’s directive the Legislature provided for judicial treatment of juveniles in Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, wherein procedures are provided, inter alia, for determining whether a given child is dependent or delinquent. Sections 39.01(10) and (12), Florida Statutes....

...ded use of the word “crime” and utilized instead the term “violation of law.” This is perfectly consistent with the constitutional authority to treat violations of law as “an act of delinquency” as opposed to a “crime.” In construing Section 39.01(12), therefore, we find that the Legislature did not intend for the common law presumption with respect to “crimes” to operate in delinquency proceedings....

...Where the presumption of incapacity is successfully maintained the child who may most need the care provided by the Act so as to be taught the capacity to refrain from anti-social behavior is deprived of that care. We cannot accept the argument of counsel for the juveniles that Section 39.01(10), 3 *1166 Florida Statutes, solves the problem....

...Although “a child who commits a violation of law” may in some instances qualify under the definition of a “dependent child,” it must be obvious that innumerable cases occur where a child who violates the law meets none of the criteria enumerated in Section 39.01(10)....

...He even acknowledged the child was in the house during their altercations and that on at least one occasion, the child became upset by their arguments and the police were called. P.M. also admitted the facts which formed the basis for the allegations of sexual abuse. Under section 39.01(63), "sexual abuse of a child" includes the following: (b) Any sexual contact between the genitals or anal opening of one person and the mouth or tongue of another person....

...“other person responsible for a child’s welfare” portion of the definition of “caregiver” in section 827.01(1) “does not encompass the seventeen (17) year old Defendant in this case.” Without articulating a reason, the court looked to section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2009), which for purposes of chapter 39 defines *82 “other person responsible for a child’s welfare” to include “an adult sitter ... entrusted with a child’s care.” The trial court concluded “[t]he clear language of [section 39.01(47) ] requires that a babysitter be an adult in order to be responsible under [section 827.03(3) ] to the victim in this case.” The court further found that although the facts showed Nowlin knew her dog had previously bitten a small c...

...with mentally incompetent criminal defendants, expressly imports definitions from chapter 393 governing treatment and support services for persons with developmental disabilities in non-criminal settings). Indeed, “there is no need to refer to the section 39.01(47) definition of ‘other person responsible for a child’s welfare’ in considering a neglect charge under section 827.03.” State v. Christie, 939 So.2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). In Christie , a public school teacher was charged under section 827.03(3)(a) with child neglect with no bodily harm, and the trial court dismissed the charge, relying on the definition in section 39.01(47), which the appellee argued did not cover public school teachers. The Third District found the trial court’s application of section 39.01(47) to the criminal child neglect statute in error: Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, there is nothing vague or ambiguous about the phrase “other person responsible for a child’s welfare.” Thus, because the statute’s l...

...Durand v. State, 820 So.2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Id. “[B]ecause the phrase ‘other person responsible for a child’s welfare’ has a plain and obvious meaning in everyday parlance, there is no need to resort to the statutory definition given in section 39.01(47)....” Id....

denial of this order, particularly in view of section 39.001(1)(k), Florida Statutes (2005), instructing

...George, Jr., Criminal Conflict & Civil Regional Counsel, Third Region and Kevin Coyle Colbert, for appellant, A.V.C.; and Kevin G. Thomas, for appellant, V.C. Karla A. Perkins, Children Legal Services Appellate Counsel, for appellee. Before GERSTEN, CORTIÑAS and ROTHENBERG, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 39.01(15)(f), Fla....

...Chapter 39 defines a “dependent” child as one who is found by the court to have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his or her parents or one who is “at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents.” § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2004). “Abuse” is defined as “any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury or harm.” § 39.01(2). “Harm” is defined to include “engaging] in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child.” § 39.01(30)®....

...Instead, there must be some evidence that the child sees or is aware of the violence occurring. Id. at 618 . Further, for “harm” resulting from witnessing domestic violence to constitute “abuse,” the domestic violence witnessed by the child must result in some physical, mental, or sexual injury to the child. § 39.01(2); W.T....

...er the provisions of Chapter 39, F.S., is not a criminal but a civil proceeding in which appellee is neither charged nor convicted of having committed a crime against the laws of this state but merely with being a delinquent child as defined in F.S. Section 39.01(11), F.S.A., as follows: “‘Delinquent child’ means' a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurs.” Appellant points to Article I, Section 15, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A....

constitutional and other legal rights”) (quoting § 39.001(l)(i), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998)), that an evidentiary

...The child was just short of her fifth birthday at the time of the hearing. At the adjudicatory hearing held on February 10, 2009, Father was the only witness who testified. He admitted that he is currently serving a ninety-six month prison sentence, with a release date of July 4, 2011. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2008) defines abandonment as follows: (1) "Abandoned" or "abandonment" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the caregiver, while bei...

...Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The sole issue on appeal in this case is appellant's challenge to the constitutionality of section 39.061, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990). We reverse. We recently held sections 39.061 and 39.01(61), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...has given some guidance in that "restrictiveness level," defined as "broad custody categories for committed children," is limited to eight levels and is further defined by way of example, i.e., "nonresidential, residential, and secure residential." Section 39.01(61) Fla....

...he law forbidding escape from certain enumerated classes of facilities, I see no reason why the legislature could not lawfully delegate to an agency of the executive branch the power to classify the levels of restrictiveness based upon, as stated in section 39.01(61), "the risk and needs of the individual child." If unlawful delegation involves simply the power to make a law rather than the authority to execute it, Jones, 523 So.2d at 1214, it appears to me that by enacting sections 39.01(61) and 39.061, the legislature has made the fundamental and primary policy decision to forbid escape from specified classes of facilities, but has delegated to HRS the power to determine the explicit levels, pursuant to certain minimal standards and guidelines established by the legislature....

...rminated by a judgment entered pursuant to chapter 39 shall be governed by s. 39.812 and this chapter” (emphasis added). Chapter 39 sets out requirements for dependency proceedings, which again, are governed by the Rules of Juvenile Procedure. See § 39.013(1), Fla. Stat....

...and in dependency proceedings. Second, the fact that Chapter 63 governs adoptions does not alter this conclusion. The procedures and substantive rights 4 governing TPR proceedings are codified in Chapter 39. Moreover, section 39.013(1) clearly states that “all procedures” in chapter 39 are governed by the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Section 39.813 provides that “[t]he court which terminates the parental rights of a child who is the subject of termination proceedings ....

...hey were in foster care. We affirm on all issues raised in this appeal, but write to address the abandonment issue. Section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), authorizes termination of parental rights for abandonment. "Abandonment" is defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...HAZOURI and MAY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The mother's three younger children were returned to her in 2005. Protective supervision over these younger children was thereafter terminated by court order. [2] The definition of abandonment was amended in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 2008....

...d the exercise of parental rights and responsibilities." It goes on to state that "[m]arginal efforts and incidental or token visits or communications are not sufficient to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with a child." § 39.01(1), Fla....

...Appellants seek review of an order granting appellee’s unsworn Motion to Dismiss appellants’ Petition for Dependency. We reverse because the factual allegations contained within the four corners of the pleading, when construed in favor of appellants, are legally sufficient to prove dependency pursuant to section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...“Substantial compliance” means that “the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(71), Fla....

...at the child was either “(1) abused, abandoned, or neglected by the parents; or (2) at imminent risk of being abused, abandoned or neglected by the parents.” J.B. III v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 928 So.2d 392, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

...disputed the foster mother’s testimony, asserting that he always checked J.A.’s diapers during their visits. The trial court entered an order terminating A.S.’s parental rights, finding the evidence was clear and convincing that A.S. abandoned J.A. as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2014), and within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2014).3 The trial court further concluded that termination was the least restrictive means available, as reunification with A.S....

...is 3 Section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), provides: (1) Grounds for the termination of parental rights may be established under any of the following circumstances: .... (b) Abandonment as defined in s. 39.01(1) or when the identity or location of the parent or parents is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent search within 60 days. 3 defined as: [A] situation in which t...

...d, and the exercise of parental rights and responsibilities. Marginal efforts and incidental or token visits or communications are not sufficient to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with a child. § 39.01(1), Fla....

...If a child has been legally adopted, the term “parent” means the adoptive mother or father of the child. The term does not include . . . an alleged or prospective parent, unless the parental status falls within the terms of s. 39.503(1) or s. 63.062(1). § 39.01(49), Fla....

...Section 63.062(1), Florida Statutes (2014), lists persons who are required to consent to an adoption. 4  In making this determination, we have considered the legislature’s finding “that time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system.” § 39.0136(1), Fla....

...in the termination of parental rights proceeding for the child shall be considered a parent for all purposes under this section. 5 This established pace constitutes “frequent and regular contact with the child.” § 39.01(1), Fla....

..."`Substantial compliance' means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child's remaining with or being returned to the child's parent." § 39.01(71), Fla....

...However, because the record reflects that, absent a period of one month, C.B. regularly visited with the child, provided some *529 toys and clothing items for the child, and the child appeared happy to see C.B. during the scheduled visits, we reverse as to the finding of abandonment under sections 39.01(1) and 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), and remand for modification of the order....

...Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 143 So.3d 1158, 1158 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). (citing S.L. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 120 So.3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)); see also A.S. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 162 So.3d 335, 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citing § 39.01(1), Fla....

followed if the commitment resource is available. Section 39.001(3), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that

...However, because the record reflects that, absent a period of one month, C.B. regularly visited with the child, provided some toys and clothing items for the child, and the child appeared happy to see C.B. during the scheduled visits, we reverse as to the finding of abandonment under sections 39.01(1) and 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), and remand for modification of the order....

...See J.L. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 143 So. 3d 1158, 1158 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (citing S.L. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 120 So. 3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)); see also A.S. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 162 So. 3d 335, 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citing § 39.01(1), Fla....

By that enactment, the Legislature amended Section 39.01 by adding subsection (36) defining “training

COHEN, J. A.D. appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, M.D. 1 The Department of Children and Families (“the Department”) concedes that the record does not support a finding that A.D. abandoned the child. Abandonment, under section 39.01, Florida Statutes, is defined in pertinent part as follows: (1) “Abandoned” or “abandonment” means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the caregiver, while being able, has made no significant contribution to the child’s care and maintenance or has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child, or both. § 39.01(1), Fla....

...to protect Jo.A. or the other children from the Father’s abuse. A “[c]hild who is found to be dependent” is one found by the court “[t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the. child’s parent or parents or legal custodians[.]” § 39.01(14)(a)....

...“ ‘Abuse’ means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes acts or omissions.” § 39.01(2). In turn, “ ‘[h]arm’ to a child’s health or welfare can occur when any person ... [njegligently fails to protect a child in his or her care from inflicted physical, mental, or sexual injury caused by the acts of another.” § 39.01(30)(j) (emphasis added)....

...l, mental, or emotional health of the child_” “Egregious conduct” includes abuse, abandonment, and *1262 neglect. § 39.806(l)(f)(2). Although the definition of failure to protect applicable to dependency proceedings is worded differently, see § 39.01(30)®, we believe that it is logical in the dependency context as well to require proof that the parent who is alleged to have failed to protect the child knew or should have known that the offender would engage in the abusive conduct....

..., the relevant statutory provision is that a “[c]hild who is found to be dependent” includes one who is found by the court “[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians.” § 39.01(14)(f) (emphasis added)....

...Over objection, the probation officer testified that the offense underlying the Father's probation was driving while license suspended. .Jo.A. and Je.A. could not be found dependent as to the Father because of the way in which dependency is defined in the statute. See § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2003) (defining dependency in terms of abuse, imminent abuse, etc., by a child's parents or legal custodians) and § 39.01(33), (49) (defining "legal custody” and "parent”)....

expedited timeframe in other contexts. See, e.g., § 39.001(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2023) (stating that one of

the child and the best interests of the state.” § 39.-001(2)(d), Fla.Stat. (1991). B.J.M. has alleged that

...t A.O. was “A Delinquent Child within the intent and meaning of the Laws of the State of Flori-da, F.S. Chapter 39,” because he had violated the November 1981 court order, and was therefore “in contempt of Court pursuant to sections 39.412 and 39.01(8), Florida Statutes.” A.O....

...pled nolo contendere and specifically reserved the right to appeal the question whether the continued truancy shown could support an adjudication of delinquency. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the adjudication of delinquency. Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1981), defines a dependent child as, among other *1174 things, one who is found to be “habitually truant from school.” Section 39.01(8), on the other hand, defines a delinquent child as one who has been found to have committed “a felony, a misdemeanor, contempt of court, [etc.].” (Emphasis added.) When A.O....

...� offense of habitual truancy, support a finding of delinquency? Petitioner relies on the decision in J.M.J. v. State, 389 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). There, the juvenile had been adjudicated dependent for “runaway” and truant behavior under section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978)....

...d by section 39.05, and that under chapter 39, the legislative intent was to treat truancy and running away from home as acts of dependency. The court reasoned as follows: Notably, delinquent children are those who have usually committed crimes. See § 39.01(8) and (34). In contrast, dependent children include those neglected and those formerly known as ungovernable. Compare § 39.01(9), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1978) with 39.01(9), Fla.Stat....

...The certified question, set out above, is framed more broadly than the facts of the case require. We therefore rewrite it as follows: May a juvenile be adjudicated delinquent for contempt of court under chapter 39, based upon a finding of the dependency trait, “being habitually truant from school,” section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1981), where the juvenile was previously found to be a dependent child on the same basis and was ordered to attend school? We answer the revised certified question in the negative and hold that a juvenile may not b...

...In the Interest of N.W., 506 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). We reject the parents’ claim that the court was authorized by Section 39.42, Florida Statutes (1989), which appears in part IV of Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, relating to families and children in need of services. Section 39.01(8), Florida Statutes (1989), defines a “child in need of services” as “a child for whom there is no allegation *487 or suspicion of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.” As stated above, HRS specifically alleged that J.P.’s parents...

...Further, the court rejected the trial court's ruling that the term "mental injury" used in the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it was not defined in chapter 827. The court found that "mental injury" was defined in a closely related statute, section 39.01(44), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which under State v. Fuchs, 769 So.2d 1006, 1009 (Fla.2000), should be read in pari materia with chapter 827. Section 39.01(44) defines mental injury as follows: "Mental injury" means an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment in his ability to function within his normal range of performance and behavior....

...was unconstitutionally vague. On review by the Florida Supreme Court, the court agreed with the Fourth District that, even though section 827.03(1) did not define the term "mental injury," the court could resort to the definition of mental injury in section 39.01(44) contained *1229 within chapter 39....

...The court noted that the child protection provisions in chapter 39 and the criminal provisions of section 827.03 have similar underlying purposes. Id. at 278. Thus, for purposes of understanding the meaning of "child abuse" in section 827.03, the court relied upon the definition of "[a]buse" in section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides: "`[a]buse' means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes acts or omissions. . . ." (emphasis added). In addition, the court noted that "harm" is defined in section 39.01(30) and includes infliction of injury on a child physically, emotionally, or mentally....

...were not constitutionally overbroad because infirmity could be cured by narrowing construction). Thus, speech will constitute proscribed "child abuse" under section 827.03(1)(a) only if it meets the definitions of "[a]buse" and "[m]ental injury" in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...The state will be required to demonstrate that, in pertinent part, the defendant's comments intentionally caused a "discernible and substantial impairment in [the child's] ability to function within [his or her] normal range of performance and behavior." § 39.01(43), Fla....

dependent but did not specify grounds contained in section 39.-01(9), Florida Statutes (Supp.1984), and (2) reserved

...fore the court at 10 a.m. on July 23. This summons also notified her that Brinkhoff had filed in the court a petition alleging her said child is a delinquent child within the intent and meaning of Chapter 26880, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1951, F.S.A. § 39.01 et seq....

...Chapter 39 applies to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Dade County, but protects any expanded jurisdiction and certain other matters not relevant to the case at bar conferred on that court by other statutes. See Secs. 39.-02(7); 39.181; and Chapter 26880, Sec. 3, Laws of Florida 1951, F.S.A. § 39.01 note....

...evidence demonstrates a substantial risk of “prospective mental neglect” or “prospective abuse” of the children based on Appellant’s mental-health condition. Appellant contends that the lower court misconstrued the findings required under section 39.01(14)(f), Florida Statutes (1999), and that the evidence does not support a finding of dependency. The pertinent statute defines a “[c]hild who is found to be dependent” as, inter alia, one who is found by the court “[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians.” § 39.01(14)(f), Fla....

...Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 661 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Richmond v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 658 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The statutory definitions of “abuse” and “neglect” do not expressly include this requirement of imminence. § 39.01(2) & (46), Florida Statutes (1999). 2 However, when these definitions are read in pari materia with the related language in section 39.01(14)©, a risk of imminent abuse or imminent neglect seems to be required to establish that a child is “dependent” as a matter of law....

...bility of future abuse, neglect, or abandonment will not support a finding of dependency. Rather, where the slate is clean, Florida law requires a substantial risk of imminent abuse or imminent neglect to support a finding that a child is dependent. § 39.01(14)(f)....