Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 854 So.2d 822, 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (quoting Henry & Rilla White Found., Inc. v. Migdal, 720 So.2d 568, 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). The courts' continuing jurisdiction is supported by the various statutory provisions of chapters 39 and 63. For example, section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes, states that "[t]he court shall retain jurisdiction over any child placed in the custody of the department until the child is adopted," and section 39.813 provides that "[t]he court which terminates the parental ri...

...tute. The statutes that provide for the department's consent to adoptions of children in its custody are permissive, not mandatory. The department " may provide consent to the adoption." § 63.062(7), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added); see also id. § 39.812(1) ("The department may thereafter ... consent to the adoption....") (emphasis added). If the department does consent, then "that consent alone shall in all cases be sufficient," id. § 39.812(1), and "no other consent is required," id....

...urt to finalize the adoptions of children for whom parental rights have been terminated. Despite this permissive phrasing, the department contends that the Legislature intended to give the department a veto power over adoptions. The department cites section 39.812(5), Florida Statutes (2003), which states that a "copy of the consent executed by the department as required under section 63.062(7) must be attached to the [adoption] petition." Id. (emphasis added). According to the department, the mandatory language of section 39.812(5) supersedes the permissive language of sections 63.062(7) and 39.812(1)....

...t harmonizes two related, if conflicting, statutes while giving effect to both.'") (quoting Palm Harbor Special Fire Control District v. Kelly, 516 So.2d 249, 250 (Fla.1987)). The provisions addressing the department's consent are easily harmonized. Section 39.812(5) states that a "copy of the consent executed by the department as required under section 63.062(7)" must be attached to the adoption petition....

...aived upon a determination by the court that such consent is being unreasonably withheld, provided that the petitioner has filed with the court a favorable preliminary adoptive home study performed by [one of various licensed agencies]. See also id. § 39.812(5) (containing a new waiver provision with similar wording)....

...Thus, the trial court's decision to finalize the adoptions in this case, despite the department's unreasonable withholding of consent, was justified. PARIENTE, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] Two of the three children are actually B.Y.'s grandchildren. [2] Our holding is consistent with the 2004 legislative amendment to section 39.812 which, in discussing the court's continuing jurisdiction in adoption matters, clarifies that a copy of the department's consent must be attached to the adoption petition "unless the court determines that such consent is being unreasona...

...that the petitioner has filed with the court a favorable preliminary adoptive home study performed by a licensed child-placing agency, a child-caring agency registered under s. 409.176, or a licensed professional or agency described in s. 61.20(2)." § 39.812(5), Fla....

...hout the necessity of filing a motion to intervene. See N.S. v. Department of Children and Families, 857 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Turning to the substantive issues, the foster parents contend the trial court erred in failing to determine that section 39.812 is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied in this case. We are unable to find the foster parents presented this issue to the trial court. Thus they may only challenge the facial constitutionality of the statute. Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93 (Fla.2002). Section 39.812 provides in part: 39.812....

...est interest of the child should govern and be of foremost concern in the court's determination. The court shall make a specific finding as to the best interest of the child in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. The foster parents argue section 39.812 violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Florida and federal constitutions by providing children *586 adopted through the Department with less rights than children adopted through other means. According to the foster parents, section 39.812 gives the Department "unfettered" discretion to determine adoptive placements whereas adoptions under chapter 63 must be in the "best interests" of the child. We find section 39.812 is facially constitutional. Section 39.812(5) specifically provides that an adoption proceeding under this subsection is governed by chapter 63....

...However, we do conclude the trial court erred in this case by refusing to consider the child's best interests before changing placement from the foster parents to the relatives. The trial court clearly has the authority, as well as the duty, under sections 39.812(4) and(5) and section 63.022(2) to consider the child's best interests in these circumstances....

...At a hearing a few days later, the Department contended it had exclusive jurisdiction to take the child away from Scott in order to select the adoptive parents. The guardian ad litem moved the court to conduct a good cause hearing to review the appropriateness of the placement under section 39.812(4)....

...er 63 (Adoption), regarding the adoption of children placed in DCF's care. As discussed, supra, section 63.0425 provides the court shall give first priority to petitions filed by grandparents who qualify under that statute. However, Florida Statutes section 39.812(1) provides, where a child is placed in DCF's custody for subsequent adoption, DCF may become a party to any proceeding for the legal adoption of that child and consent to the adoption, and that consent alone shall be sufficient in all cases. § 39.812(1), Fla....

...d in its control. Thus, where DCF consents to an adoption petition, the trial court lacks authority under chapter 39 to determine another adoptive placement is more appropriate. Id. at 266-67 (citing section 39.47(1994), which has been renumbered as section 39.812(2001)). Further compounding the tension between Chapter 39, Part IX and Chapter 63, recent amendments to *532 the governing statutory scheme provide adoption proceedings of children placed in the Department's care shall be "governed by chapter 63." See § 39.812(5), Fla....

...S.H., 671 So.2d 260 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 680 So.2d 424 (Fla.1996), this court held that it is within the discretion of the DCF to decide where to place a child who is in its custody pursuant to termination of parental rights proceedings under chapter 39. Section 39.812(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provides in part that: If the department is given custody of a child for subsequent adoption in accordance with this chapter, the department may place the child ......

...where the adoption proceeding is pending and consent to the adoption, and that consent alone shall in all cases be sufficient. It is only when an inappropriate placement has been made that the trial court can reject the DCF's adoptive placement. See § 39.812(4), Fla....

...djudication for termination of parental rights. .... (3) The court shall enter an order of adjudication briefly stating the facts upon which its finding is made. Id. [2] We note that the legislature recently amended this section by renumbering it as section 39.812 and deleting the language in subsection (5)....

...tending it had exclusive jurisdiction to take J.C. away from Geraldine in order to choose adoptive parents. The Guardian Ad Litem then moved ore tenus for the court to conduct a good cause hearing to review the appropriateness of the placement under Section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...Scott with whom he has lived for virtually his entire life and *490 prohibits the Department of Children and Families from changing the child's placement, pending the outcome of the hearing to "review the appropriateness of the adoptive placement of the Child" scheduled for October 1, 2001, pursuant to F.S. 39.812(4)....

...3d DCA), review denied, 649 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1994). [3] As part of its legislatively mandated review authority, the judiciary is specifically authorized to exercise its review powers in analyzing the appropriateness of a DCF proposed adoptive placement. See § 39.812(4), Fla. Stat. (2001). See also, §§ 39.013(2), 39.812, 39.813, Fla. Stat. (2001). This is evidenced by the plain language of Section 39.812(4), which states that the court "shall retain jurisdiction over any child placed in the custody of the department until the child is adopted" and provides for continuing jurisdiction so that "the court may review the appropriateness of the adoptive placement of the child." § 39.812(4), Fla. Stat. (2001). The language of Section 39.812(4) is clear and must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See Canida v. Canida, 751 So.2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), review denied, 767 So.2d 455 (Fla.2000). The plain and ordinary meaning of Section 39.812(4) provides express statutory authority for the trial court to exercise judicial review of the appropriateness of adoptive placement. § 39.812(4), Fla....

...Nourse, 437 So.2d 221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)("The court had no jurisdiction to direct a specific placement and treatment of an individual committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services."). The lower court and the majority base their conclusions on section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes (2000), which reads as follows: The court shall retain jurisdiction over any child placed in the custody of the department until the child is adopted....

...Contrary to the Guardian's position, in Florida Dep't of Children and Families v. Adoption of B.G.J., 819 So.2d 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), the Fourth District Court of Appeal reiterated its belief that the language of the statute presently in question, section 39.812(4), does not give the trial court the power to nullify the Department's selection of adoptive parents....

...liams v. Glass, 245 A.D.2d 66, 664 N.Y.S.2d 792, 793 (1997). We note that although the Florida DCF did authorize J.C.'s move to Virginia, it apparently did so without receiving prior approval from the state of Virginia, in violation of the ICPC. [2] Section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes (2001) provides: The court shall retain jurisdiction over any child placed in the custody of the department until the child is adopted....

...homes to a child for at least six months have, when they seek to adopt the child, the right — a right also formerly recognized by agency rule — to initiate a "formal challenge" to any DCFS decision authorizing the child's adoption by (an)other(s). Section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes (2004), provides: When a licensed foster parent or court-ordered custodian has applied to adopt a child who has resided with the foster parent or custodian for at least 6 months and who has previously been permanen...

...(b) Thirty days have expired following written notice to the foster parent or custodian of the denial of the application to adopt, within which period no formal challenge of the department's decision has been filed; (c) The foster parent or custodian agrees to the child's removal. § 39.812(4), Fla....

...The Florida Legislature *1219 has also decreed that "[i]f a child will not be reunited with a parent, adoption, under chapter 63, is the primary permanency option." § 39.621(6) (emphasis added). Ultimately, if the adoption does not proceed pursuant to chapter 63, section 39.812(5) specifically provides that the "petition for adoption must be filed in the division of the circuit court which entered the judgment terminating parental rights." In that instance, neither the birth mother nor the unmarried biological father will have standing concerning the choice of adoptive parents....

...That motion was granted by the trial court on June 13, 2013. The Roberts are the maternal great uncle and great aunt of B.E. and also wish to adopt him. In February 2013, the Roberts filed a separate action seeking to adopt B.E. The Roberts’ filing would appear to be contrary to the dictates of section 39.812(5), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...e new counsel retained or appointed for the remainder of the proceedings. (b) [No Change] RULE 8.535. POSTDISPOSITION HEARINGS (a) — (c) [No Change] (d) Withholding Consent to Adopt. (1) When a petition for adoption and a favorable home study under section 39.812(5), Florida Statutes, have been filed and the department's consent has not been filed, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine if the department has unreasonably withheld consent....

...Subsequently, the three children's parents signed voluntary surrenders, and their parental rights were terminated. See § 39.811, Fla. Stat. (2003). On June 7, 2004, the children were committed by court order to the Department's permanent custody for purposes of adoption. See §§ 39.622 & 39.812, Fla....

...resulting from a termination of parental rights under chapter 39. A case in which a minor becomes available for adoption after the parental rights of each parent have been terminated by a judgment entered pursuant to chapter 39 shall be governed by s. 39.812 and this chapter....

...63.088; and procedures for terminating parental rights pending adoption provided in s. 63.089. The children's parental rights were terminated by judgment entered pursuant to chapter 39, Florida Statutes. Thus, by the *1199 express terms of section 63.037, Florida Statutes, this case "shall be governed by s. 39.812 and this chapter [63]." Another provision in chapter 63, Florida Statutes, addresses persons required to consent to adoption....

...61.20(2)." The Department correctly contends that neither one of the two requirements for a waiver of Department's consent was satisfied in this case. The express language in section 63.037 directs us not only to the other governing provisions in chapter 63, but also to section 39.812, Florida Statutes, which specifically addresses the petition for adoption. One of its subsections states: 39.812 Postdisposition relief; petition for adoption....

...obtainable. The person seeking to adopt the child may not file a petition for adoption until the judgment terminating parental rights becomes final. An adoption proceeding under this subsection is governed by chapter 63, as limited under s. 63.037. § 39.812(5), Fla....

...less the court determines that such consent is being unreasonably withheld and provided that the petitioner has filed with the court a favorable preliminary adoptive home study performed" by a qualified entity. In other words, sections 63.062(7) and 39.812(5) include virtually identical requirements addressing the Department's consent or, if it is not given, the court's finding that the withholding of consent is unreasonable....

...e), and for the petitioner to file with the court a favorable preliminary adoptive home study (which was not done). The trial court reasoned that, notwithstanding the express requirements of section 63.037, Florida Statutes, supra, the provisions of section 39.812 do not apply in this case because the Department was not given custody of these children for subsequent adoption and the Department's consent is not required....

...Where the Department refuses to give consent, such consent can be waived upon the court's finding of unreasonable withholding of consent, but only if the petitioner has filed with the court a favorable preliminary adoptive home study performed by a qualified entity. See §§ 39.812(5) & 63.062(7), Fla....

...ntrols. "[I]t also is well settled that when two statutes are in conflict, the more recently enacted statute controls the older statute." Id. Section 63.112(2) & (3) was last amended in 2003, see Laws of Florida 2003-58, section 23; whereas sections 39.812(5) and 63.062(7) were amended in 2004, see Laws of Florida 2004-389, section 2, to provide the trial court with statutory authority to waive the Department's consent upon a finding of unreasonably withheld consent, provided that a favorable preliminary adoptive home study is filed too....

...has been in foster care for longer than one year, contrary to the intent of the statute. The Buckners further point out that Chapter 39 provides the court with the authority *1291 to assure that progress is being made toward a permanent adoptive placement. See §§ 39.811, 39.812, Fla....

...rogress being made toward permanent adoptive placement. As part of this continuing jurisdiction, for good cause shown by the guardian ad litem for the child, the court may review the appropriateness of the adoptive placement of the child. Similarly, section 39.812(4) provides for continued review after custody of a child for subsequent adoption has been given to DCF....

...o this chapter shall retain exclusive jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to the child's adoption pursuant to chapter 63. Section 63.037, Florida Statutes (2003), provides that adoptions where parental rights have been terminated are "governed by s. 39.812 and this chapter." [3] Although we conclude that the Buckners' lack of standing is a procedural bar to this action, we acknowledge the need for S.H....

...63 to determine how they are intended to work in tandem. Chapter 39 governs proceedings related to children, and its provisions are to be liberally construed based on Florida Statutes section 39.001(9). The provision at issue in the present case is section 39.812(1): If the department is given custody of a child for subsequent adoption in accordance with this chapter, the department many place the child with an agency as defined in s....

...The department may thereafter become a party to any proceeding for the legal adoption of the child and appear in any court where the adoption proceeding is pending and consent to the adoption, and that consent alone shall in all cases be sufficient. (Emphasis added). Additionally, section 39.812(5) states that "[a] copy of the consent executed by the department as required under s....

...63.062(7) must be attached to the petition." DCF maintains that the language of Chapter 39 clearly indicates that DCF consent is the sine qua non of adoption finalization and that such consent must be executed in writing before an adoption can become final. B.Y. places emphasis on the italicized words of section 39.812(1) above, stressing that DCF may give its consent for an adoption, indicating that it does not have to and that other parties must be able to consent....

...a child for at least six months have, when they seek to adopt the child, the right — a right also formerly recognized by agency rule — to initiate a “formal challenge” to any DCFS decision authorizing the child’s adoption by (an)other(s). Section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes (2004), provides: When a licensed foster parent or court-ordered custodian has applied to adopt a child who has resided with the foster parent or custodian for at least 6 months and who has previously been permanen...

...ng written notice to the foster parent or custodian of the denial of the application to adopt, within which period no formal challenge of the department’s decision has been filed; (c) The foster parent or custodian agrees to the child’s removal. § 39.812(4), Fla....

...Stat. Adoptions are governed by Chapter 63 of the Florida Statutes. However, section 63.037, Florida Statutes, provides that “[a] case in which a minor becomes available for adoption after the parental rights of each parent have been terminated by a judgment entered pursuant to chapter 39 shall be governed by s. 39.812 and this chapter” (emphasis added)....

...argues that, because adoptions are governed by Chapter 63, the Family Law Rules of Procedure apply. Post-TPR adoption proceedings, however, are governed by the Rules of Juvenile Procedure. First, as noted above, section 63.037 specifically references section 39.812. Subsection (5) of this statute establishes the procedures for adoption following TPR, requiring that a post-TPR adoption petition be filed in the court that terminated parental rights. § 39.812(5), Fla....

...Chapter 63”). Consequently, the juvenile division of Santa Rosa County retains sole jurisdiction of B.S.’s adoption petition. Because the juvenile court retains jurisdiction, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure apply. B.S. correctly notes that section 39.812(5), while directing parties to file a petition for adoption following TPR in the dependency division of the circuit court, requires that an adoption proceeding under that subsection “is governed by Chapter 63.” This does not mean,...

...apter 63, and by extension the Family Law Rules of Procedure, control these proceedings. Because the proceeding remains in dependency court, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure must apply. More importantly, we have previously found that this sentence in section 39.812(5) means only that the standards of Chapter 63 govern the adoption, even if the procedure is controlled by Rules of Juvenile Procedure....

...st-TPR adoptions fall within the ambit of Chapter 39. If not, there would have been no need for the Legislature to codify section 63.037 differentiating post-TPR adoptions from other forms of adoption. Section 5 39.812(5) would be equally superfluous....

...ption. See §§ 63.087(4), .089. Heart of Adoptions could also file a petition for adoption on behalf of the prospective adoptive parents who retained its services after resolution of the Department's petition for termination of parental rights. See § 39.812(5), Fla....

...tending it had exclusive jurisdiction to take J.C. away from Geraldine in order to choose adoptive parents. The Guardian Ad Litem then moved ore terms for the court to conduct a good cause hearing to review the appropriateness of the placement under Section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...Scott with whom he has lived for virtually his entire life and *490 prohibits the Department of Children and Families from changing the child’s placement, pending the outcome of the hearing to “review the appropriateness of the adoptive placement of the Child” scheduled for October 1, 2001, pursuant to F.S. 39.812(4)....

...3d DCA), review denied, 649 So.2d 870 (Fla.1994). 3 As part of its legislatively mandat ed review authority, the judiciary is specifically authorized to exercise its review powers in analyzing the appropriateness of a DCF proposed adoptive placement. See § 39.812(4), Fla. Stat. (2001). See also, §§ 39.013(2), 39.812, 39.813, Fla. Stat. (2001). This is evidenced by the plain language of Section 39.812(4), which states that the court “shall retain jurisdiction over any child placed in the custody of the department until the child is adopted” and provides for continuing jurisdiction so that “the court may review the appropriateness of the adoptive placement of the child.” § 39.812(4), Fla. Stat. (2001). The language of Section 39.812(4) is clear and must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See Canida v. Canida, 751 So.2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), review denied, 767 So.2d 455 (Fla.2000). The plain and ordinary meaning of Section 39.812(4) provides express statutory authority for the trial court to exercise judicial review of the appropriateness of adoptive placement. § 39.812(4), Fla....

...lliams v. Glass, 245 A.D.2d 66 , 664 N.Y.S.2d 792, 793 (1997). We note that although the Florida DCF did authorize J.C.'s move to Virginia, it apparently did so without receiving prior approval from the state of Virginia, in violation of the ICPC. . Section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes (2001) provides: The court shall retain jurisdiction over any child placed in the custody of the department until the child is adopted....

amend rule 8.535 in response to changes to section 39.812, Florida Statutes (2023), by chapter 2024-177

...The Department of Children and Families (DCF) appeals an order that disapproved its prospective adoptive placement for C.R. and M.R., arguing that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by conducting a broader review of the appropriateness of the placement of the children than is permitted under section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...ild shall live.” It argues that the court, by balancing the risk of harm of removing the children from their current placement, against the status quo, and by considering the children’s best interests, went far beyond the inquiry permitted under section 39.812(4)....

...1 And by disapproving the prospective adoptive placement, the court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the agency in determining where and with whom the children should live. In our judgment, if we were to adopt DCF’s argument, the review power granted to the courts by section 39.812(4) would be rendered meaningless. We agree with the majority’s observation in J.C., 847 So.2d at 490 , that “[t]he language of Section 39.812(4) is clear and must be given its plain and ordinary meaning!,]” and “provides express statutory authority for the trial court to exercise judicial review of the appropriateness of adoptive placement.” DCF’s argument also fails...

...On the merits, because there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the prospective *690 adoptive placement was not appropriate or in the best interests of the children, we AFFIRM. ERVIN, ALLEN and LEWIS, JJ., CONCUR. . Section 39.812(4) provides: The court shall retain jurisdiction over any child placed in the custody of the department until the child is adopted....

...Even if this court reached the merits of the arguments on appeal and found the trial court erred, the mother’s consent cannot now be given effect, as the termination judgment placed the child in the custody of the Department of Children and Families for adoption. See § 39.812(1), Fla....

...(“Denied Applicants”), the adoptive parents of the Child’s half-sisters, asked the trial court to review DCF’s denial of their application and to allow them to adopt the Child. A newly enacted statute constrained the trial court’s scope of review. See § 39.812(4), Fla. Stat. (2024). It confined the trial court’s evaluation of DCF’s adoption decision to “whether [its] denial of the application is consistent with its policies and if [it] made the decision in an expeditious manner.” Id. § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...It concluded in early November 2024, when DCF denied the application. DCF regulations governed this process. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-16.001–.009 (2024). Because the operative statute requires DCF to act in an “expeditious manner,” we focus on the process’s timing in addition to its content. § 39.812(4)(b)4. The trial court ordered sibling visitation supervised by DCF, but it did not allow Denied Applicants to interact with the Child....

...contact.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-16.002(5)(b), (e). It noted that the AARC’s denial recommendation was unanimous. II. Denied Applicants timely moved to review DCF’s denial with the trial court. See § 39.812(4)(b)2....

...(“A denied applicant may file a motion to have the court review [DCF’s] denial within 30 business days after the issuance of [DCF’s] written notification of its decision to deny the application to adopt a child.”). And the trial court promptly set a hearing. See id. § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...r anyone who could explain its drafting process. Two AARC members and Denied Applicants testified. Following the hearing, the trial court ordered written closing arguments, and it belatedly issued a decision at the beginning of February 2025. See § 39.812(4)(b)6....

...The parties dispute our standard of review. Denied Applicants argue that we should apply an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court’s decision. DCF and GAL advocate for de novo review because we evaluate whether the trial court properly interpreted section 39.812(4)....

...2004)); Orosco v. Rodriguez, 376 So. 3d 92, 94 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (citing McGovern v. Clark, 298 So. 3d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)). But the statute contemplates that denied applicants will present evidence for the trial court’s consideration. See § 39.812(4)(b)3. To the extent that the trial court made findings based on relevant and admissible evidence, we will afford these determinations deference by applying a competent, substantial evidence standard....

...& Fams. v. A.R., 253 So. 3d 1158, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). IV. The operative statute strictly limits a trial court’s evaluation of a denied applicant’s motion for review to two questions. See § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...2022) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 16  A. The operative statute’s reference to DCF’s “policies” relates, in context, to DCF’s policies surrounding the denial of an adoption petition. See § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...a statutory term is ‘obviously transplanted from another legal source,’ it ‘brings the old soil with it.’” (quoting Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59, 73 (2018))). Some statutory history contextualizes this unpersuasive argument. In 2024, the Florida Legislature amended section 39.812(4) to clarify a trial court’s “continuing jurisdiction” over children placed in DCF’s custody pending adoption....

...Meanwhile, the record shows DCF followed its policies after the adoption process commenced. Although Denied Applicants had the burden to show DCF “unreasonably denied [their] application to adopt,” they did not elicit testimony from the denial letter’s author. See § 39.812(4)(b)2....

...ntrary conclusion. B. The trial court also erred when it misapplied the operative statute’s plain language to determine that DCF did not make “such decision in an expeditious manner.” See § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...logical relation of its many parts.’” (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012))). The operative statute discusses adoptions that follow the disposition of a dependency case. See generally § 39.812. The operative section addresses the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction “for the purpose of reviewing the status of the child and the progress being made toward permanent adoptive placement.” § 39.812(4). The operative subsection concerns review of DCF’s decision on 20 the adoption. § 39.812(4)(b). And the operative sub-subsection references both DCF’s decision to deny an adoption application and whether DCF made “such decision” expeditiously. § 39.812(4)(b)4. No plausible reading of section 39.812 supports the trial court’s decision to assess and criticize DCF’s actions at any time before Denied Applicants finalized their adoption application. The trial court alternatively reasoned that DCF failed to act expeditious...

...We see no way in which a quicker decision would have affected this case, especially when DCF followed its post-adoption policies. C. Finally, the trial court disregarded the statute’s unambiguous directive to review DCF’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...DCF of relying on an attachment that only existed because of its error to justify its decision. 24  The operative statute did not allow the trial court to reweigh evidence in this fashion. Under section 39.812(4)(b)3., Denied Applicants only had standing “to file a motion to review the department’s denial and to present evidence in support of such motion.” The trial court’s task was not to reweigh the evidence or right any wrongs. Its job was to apply the factors contained in section 39.812(4)(b)4., giving deference to DCF’s decision, and its failure to do so was error. V. For the reasons outlined in this opinion, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Denied...

...not have the authority to determine the adoptive placement of B.G.J. The statutory scheme presumes that DCF is in the best position to determine which family is appropriate for adoption placement, but allows the trial court to review the appropriateness of that selection. See § 39.812(4), Fla....

...The equivocal statements made by the DCF adoption supervisor at the August 8th hearing did not amount to an oral affirmation of DCF’s consent that J.M. and G.M. would be the adoptive parents, and in any event, DCF’s consent must be in writing. See §§ 39.812(5), 63.052(5), 63.082(3)(b), Fla....

...Karla Perkins, for Department; Hillary Kambour, for The Guardian Ad Litem Program; Alan I. Mishael, Miami Beach, for G.O., appellees. Before GREEN, SHEPHERD, and LAGOA, JJ. SHEPHERD, J. Appellants, R.H. and B.H., seek to appeal an order modifying placement—pursuant to section 39.812, Florida Statutes (2007), and Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.345(a)—of G.O., their granddaughter, who thus far has resided with R.H....

...This court recognized that “[t]he statutory scheme presumes that DCF is in the best position to determine which family is appropriate for adoption placement, but allows the trial court to review the appropriateness of that selection.” Id. at 986 (citing § 39.812(4), Fla....

...etitions to adopt. Rather, this court has consistently held that where DCF’s consent is appropriate, a trial court does not have the authority to place a child with another family. B.G.J.; L.R.; C.S. We also reject the H’s position that sections 39.812(5) and 63.062(7), Florida Statutes (effective July 1, 2004), effectuated a change in the law permitting the trial court to choose them as the adoptive placement. Nothing in those statutes enables a trial court to do that. To begin with, section 39.812(1) provides: If the department is given custody of a child for subsequent adoption in accordance with this chapter, the department may place the child with an agency as defined in s....

...tion, and that consent alone shall in all cases be sufficient. (emphasis supplied). The statute further requires the trial court to review the status of the child until the child is adopted and to review the appropriateness of an adoptive placement. § 39.812(4), Fla. Stat. While sections 39.812(5) and 63.062(7) permit a court to deem that DCF’s consent may be waived if unreasonably withheld, nothing in these statutes provides that where DCF has consented to adoption by one family, it must also consent to the adoption by any other family....

...atutory time requirements. Subdivision (f)(6) of rule 8.415, Judicial Review of Dependency Cases, is amended to remove a provision that allows commitment of a child to a licensed child-placing agency for adoption. This amendment conforms the rule to section 39.812(1), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...3(1) and (4), Florida Statutes (2004). We further amend subdivision (d), Waiver of Service, of rule 8.505 to remove the reference to commitment of a child to a licensed child placing agency. This amendment conforms the rule to sections 39.811(2) and 39.812(1), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...Subdivision (c), Continuing Jurisdiction, of rule 8.535, Post-Disposition Hearings, is amended to add a sentence stating that the petition for adoption must be filed in the court that entered the judgment terminating parental rights unless a motion for a change of venue is granted. The amendment conforms the rule to section 39.812(5), Florida Statutes (2004)....

was not the case here. The court found that section 39.812(5) applied. The court stated it was aware a

...The Florida Legisla *1219 ture has also decreed that “[i]f a child will not be reunited with a parent, adoption, under chapter 63, is the primary permanency option.” § 39.621(6) (emphasis added). Ultimately, if the adoption does not proceed pursuant to chapter 63, section 39.812(5) specifically provides that the “petition for adoption must be filed in the division of the circuit court which entered the judgment terminating parental rights.” In that instance, neither the birth mother nor the unmarried biological father will have standing concerning the choice of adoptive parents....

...he court’s determination.” § 63.022(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). “A case in which a minor becomes available for adoption after the parental rights of each parent have been terminated by a judgment entered pursuant to chapter 39 shall be governed by s. 39.812 and this chapter.” § 63.037, Fla....

...e and that no child remains in foster care longer than 1 year.” § 39.001(l)(h), Fla. Stat. (2015). “An agency granted legal custody shall have the right to determine where and-with whom the child shall live.”' § 39.521(4), Fla. Stat. (2015). Section 39.812, Florida Statutes (2015), the main statute at issue in this case, is titled “Postdisposition relief; petition for adoption” and provides in part: (4) The court shall retain jurisdiction over any child placed in the custody of the department until the child is adopted....

...As such, it is clear that “[u]nder Chapter' 39, the judicial and executive branches exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the welfare of foster children who have been placed in DCF’s . custody.” Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. Interest of J.C., 847 So.2d 487, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (explaining that section 39.812(4) expressly authorizes the judiciary to exercise its review powers over the appropriateness of a Department-proposed adoptive- placement); • see also State, Dep’t of Children & Families v....

...In fact, ⅛ circuit court has “inherent and continuing jurisdiction to entertain matters pertaining to child custody and to enter any order appropriate to a child’s welfare.’”” B.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 854 So.2d 822, 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing sections 39.812(4) and 39.813 and quoting Henry & Rilla White Found., Inc....

...end to the selection of adoptive parents). Cf. Guardian Ad Litem of C.R., 855 So.2d at 689 (affirming an order that disapproved the Department’s prospective adoptive placement; holding that “the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction [under section 39.812(4)] by considering the children’s best interests and balancing the risk of harm when it reviewed the appropriateness of the prospective adoptive placement”; and distinguishing Adoption ofB.G.J....

...As a result, the trial court could have compelled the Department to make an expeditious selection of an adoptive family. See C.S., 671 So.2d at 269 (explaining that “[w]hile the trial court may have authority in its continuing supervisory jurisdiction under subsection 39.47(4) [now section 39.812(4)] to compel HRS [the Department’s predecessor] to make a selection of an adoptive parent if HRS has not acted expeditiously or to disapprove an inappropriate selection,” a trial court does not have the authority to waive HRS’s consent and thereby override Chapter 39)....

...Denied Applicants, the adoptive parents of the Child’s half-sisters, asked the trial court to review DCF’s denial of their application and to allow them to adopt the Child. A newly enacted statute constrained the trial court’s scope of review. See § 39.812(4), Fla. Stat. (2024). It confined the trial court’s evaluation of DCF’s adoption decision to “whether [its] denial of the application is consistent with its policies and if [it] made the decision in an expeditious manner.” Id. § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...It concluded in early November 2024, when DCF denied the application. DCF regulations governed this process. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-16.001–.009 (2024). Because the operative statute requires DCF to act in an “expeditious manner,” we focus on the process’s timing in addition to its content. § 39.812(4)(b)4. The trial court ordered sibling visitation supervised by DCF, but it did not allow Denied Applicants to interact with the Child....

...contact.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-16.002(5)(b), (e). It noted that the AARC’s denial recommendation was unanimous. II. Denied Applicants timely moved to review DCF’s denial with the trial court. See § 39.812(4)(b)2....

...(“A denied applicant may file a motion to have the court review [DCF’s] denial within 30 business days after the issuance of [DCF’s] written notification of its decision to deny the application to adopt a child.”). And the trial court promptly set a hearing. See id. § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...r anyone who could explain its drafting process. Two AARC members and Denied Applicants testified. Following the hearing, the trial court ordered written closing arguments, and it belatedly issued a decision at the beginning of February 2025. See § 39.812(4)(b)6....

...The parties dispute our standard of review. Denied Applicants argue that we should apply an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court’s decision. DCF and GAL advocate for de novo review because we evaluate whether the trial court properly interpreted section 39.812(4)....

...2004)); Orosco v. Rodriguez, 376 So. 3d 92, 94 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (citing McGovern v. Clark, 298 So. 3d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)). But the statute contemplates that denied applicants will present evidence for the trial court’s consideration. See § 39.812(4)(b)3. To the extent that the trial court made findings based on relevant and admissible evidence, we will afford these determinations deference by applying a competent, substantial evidence standard....

...3d DCA 2018). 15  IV. The operative statute strictly limits a trial court’s evaluation of a denied applicant’s motion for review to two questions. See § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...2022) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A. The operative statute’s reference to DCF’s “policies” relates, in context, to DCF’s policies surrounding the denial of an adoption petition. See § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...a statutory term is ‘obviously transplanted from another legal source,’ it ‘brings the old soil with it.’” (quoting Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59, 73 (2018))). Some statutory history contextualizes this unpersuasive argument. In 2024, the Florida Legislature amended section 39.812(4) to clarify a trial court’s “continuing jurisdiction” over children placed in DCF’s custody pending adoption....

...But that canon does not apply here because those cases did not interpret a statutory provision containing those terms. 18 denied [their] application to adopt,” they did not elicit testimony from the denial letter’s author. See § 39.812(4)(b)2....

...contrary conclusion. B. The trial court also erred when it misapplied the operative statute’s plain language to determine that DCF did not make “such decision in an expeditious manner.” See § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...logical relation of its many parts.’” (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012))). The operative statute discusses adoptions that follow the disposition of a dependency case. See generally § 39.812. The operative section addresses the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction “for the purpose of reviewing the status of the child and the progress being made toward permanent adoptive placement.” § 39.812(4). The operative subsection concerns review of DCF’s decision on the adoption. § 39.812(4)(b). And the operative sub-subsection references both DCF’s decision to deny an adoption application and whether DCF made “such decision” expeditiously. § 39.812(4)(b)4. No plausible reading of section 39.812 supports the trial court’s decision to assess and criticize DCF’s actions at any time before Denied Applicants finalized their adoption application. The trial court alternatively reasoned that DCF failed to act expeditious...

...licies. 23  C. Finally, the trial court disregarded the statute’s unambiguous directive to review DCF’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See § 39.812(4)(b)4....

...Relying on multiple actions and perceived delays that occurred before the adoption process began, the trial court accused DCF of relying on an attachment that only existed because of its error to justify its decision. The operative statute did not allow the trial court to reweigh evidence in this fashion. Under section 39.812(4)(b)3., Denied Applicants only had standing “to file a motion to review the department’s denial and to present evidence in support of such motion.” The trial court’s task was not to reweigh the evidence or right any wrongs. Its job was to apply the factors contained in section 39.812(4)(b)4., giving deference to DCF’s decision, and its failure to do so was error. V. For the reasons outlined in this opinion, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Denie...

...the dependency case but only a participant, and only parties may take depositions. Id. The trial court granted the GAL’s motion for a protective order because the grandmother was only a participant and not a party entitled to discovery, relying on section 39.812(5), Florida Statutes (2021)....