Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Indeed, in such circumstances, the quest for truth might elude even the wisest court." Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 36 (Fla.1976) (quoting Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745, 752 (1968)). Time limitations on legal actions in Florida are governed by the provisions of chapter 95, Florida Statutes (1991). Section 95.11 sets forth the limitations period for an action based on an intentional tort: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property.—Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: . . . . (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.— . . . . ( o ) An action for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort.... § 95.11, Fla....

...an, or guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor or incapacitated person, or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue; except with respect to the statute of limitations for a claim for medical malpractice as provided in s. 95.11....

...Graham, 767 So.2d 1179 (Fla.2000). [4] See, e.g., Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice 148 (2nd ed. 1997) ("Summary judgments present a classic example of the type of decisions that are subject to the de novo standard of review."). [5] See generally § 95.11, Fla....

...h the standard of care used by similar professionals in the community under similar circumstances. 552 So.2d at 232. That Florida recognizes an action for professional malpractice is also evidenced by the statutory scheme for limitations of actions. Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1997), reads in pertinent part: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ....

...(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.— (a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort.... However, the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional. § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). A profession, within the meaning of section 95.11, is "any vocation requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing is possible in Florida." See Garden v....

...City of Gainesville, 734 So.2d 1068, 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we answer this certified question in the negative. We hold that the general four-year statute of limitations for statutory violations, section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1995), applies to actions filed pursuant to chapter 760, Florida Statutes, if the Commission on Human Relations does not make a reasonable cause determination on a complaint within the 180 days contemplated by section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...not require her to file a civil action within one year after the 180-day period; the permissive "may" only gave her the option of doing so. Instead, Joshua contended, the general four-year statute of limitations for statutory causes of action under section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1995), should govern....

...r to court action. It would appear contrary to that scheme to require a person to proceed to court without any indication from the Commission of the progress, or lack thereof, in investigating the complaint filed with that body. Joshua's reliance on section 95.11(3)(f), which provides a four-year statute of limitations for actions based on statutory liability, finds support in our decision in Hullinger, and the Legislature's failure to clarify this area subsequent to Hullinger....

...nd requesting compensation for lost wages. The Commission still had not responded to his complaint by the time Hullinger filed his action. The trial court dismissed Hullinger's claim as time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), [6] which governs actions to recover lost wages....

...See Hullinger v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 516 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). This Court agreed with Hullinger's argument that his claim was premised on the violation of a statute. Accordingly, we applied the four-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(3)(f)....

...e notice. A claimant should not be penalized for attempting to allow a government agency to do its job. Since the legislative intent is to uproot discrimination, we now seek to preserve that intent by finding Joshua's civil action timely filed under section 95.11(3)(f)....

...The Commission should take that step by providing some type of notice to claimants within 180 days of filing regarding the status of their claims. For the reasons stated above, we answer the certified question in the negative. We hold that the statute of limitations for causes of action based on statutory liability, section 95.11(3)(f), applies to situations where the Commission has not made a reasonable cause determination within 180 days....

...time, according to the complaint, Graham allegedly murdered Hearndon's mother). The complaint was dismissed with prejudice on the sole ground that the alleged cause of action was barred, as a matter of law, by the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)( o ), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...claims is fair given the nature of the alleged tortious conduct and its effect on victims, and is consistent with our application of the doctrine to tort cases generally; thus, we hold that the doctrine is applicable to childhood sexual abuse cases. SECTION 95.11(7), FLORIDA STATUTES The 1992 enactment of the delayed discovery doctrine to be employed in cases of childhood sexual abuse does not apply in the instant case. Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1999), provides that: For intentional torts based on abuse.—An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s....

...r within 4 years after the injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse, whichever occurs later. § 95.11(7), Fla....

...I conclude that the Legislature recognized that Florida law barred this type of cause of action, as stated by the majority in the Third District's case of Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), and for that reason adopted the amendment to the statute of limitations of section 95.11(7), Florida Statutes, in 1992....

...Throughout the litigation which followed, the plaintiff and her counsel have consistently maintained that her action against the clinic was, properly viewed, not a "malpractice" case, and that it was therefore governed by the general four year statute of limitations. Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...This was so, because only her son was a patient of the clinic when the accident occurred and the injury did not therefore arise out of the defendant's "medical ... treatment ..." of Mrs. Salcedo so as to require the application of the two year limitations period provided by Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...ssed below, the final order under review is reversed and the cause remanded for *1340 further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. HENDRY, J., dissents. NOTES [1] The 1973 statute is applicable since the 1975 revisions of § 95.11 are not retroactive. Brooks v. Cerrato, 355 So.2d 119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 361 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1978); but see Carpenter v. Florida Central Credit Union, 369 So.2d 935 (Fla. 1979). The same results would follow, however, under the 1975 law. §§ 95.11(3); 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...Caruso, West Palm Beach, for petitioner-appellant. Richard L. Martens of Cone, Owen, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson & McKeown, and Larry Klein, West Palm Beach, for respondents-appellees. ENGLAND, Chief Justice. In this proceeding we are called upon to review the constitutionality of section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), insofar as it absolutely bars the right to bring suit for certain injuries incurred on real property unless the lawsuit is commenced within twelve years after the completion of the improvements which produced the injury....

...y Sirmons was injured in the building in the course of his employment. He sued both the owner of the building and its builders. When Overland *573 moved for a summary judgment based on the statutory twelve year ban on lawsuits, the quoted portion of section 95.11(3)(c) was declared unconstitutional by the trial court, thereby allowing Sirmons and the other respondents to proceed with the lawsuit not withstanding the seeming bar of the statute....

...[6] When the "access to courts" provision *574 of the constitution was re-adopted in 1968, there existed a right of redress against contractors for the type of injury Sirmons suffered, provided, of course, that suit was commenced within four years [7] after the cause of action accrued by the occurrence of the injury. Section 95.11(3)(c), insofar as is relevant to this proceeding, creates absolute immunity from suit for certain professionals and contractors connected with the construction of improvements to real property after the expiration of twelve years from the completion of the building....

...ishes an injured person's cause of action. The legislation impermissibly benefits only one class of defendants, at the expense of an injured party's right to sue, and in violation of our constitutional guarantee of access to courts. This analysis of section 95.11(3)(c) naturally calls for an explanation of our recent decision in Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978), where we sustained this very provision in the face of a constitutional challenge by one whose cause of action was curtailed, rather than wholly barred, by the effect of section 95.11(3)(c). In Bauld, unlike the present case, the injury occurred prior to the enactment of section 95.11(3)(c), at a time when the applicable statute of limitations provided only that suit must be commenced within four years. [9] When section 95.11(3)(c) took effect in 1975, two and one-half years of that period had elapsed, during which time an action could have been filed....

...our declaring the same statute invalid vis-a-vis Jerry Sirmons. Some mention should be made of decisions from other jurisdictions concerning similar statutes. In several cases relied on by Overland the courts reviewed statutory provisions similar to section 95.11(3)(c) under a much less exacting standard than our own constitution and decisional law require....

...[13] We similarly conclude that in Florida, as in Kentucky, the unique restriction imposed by our constitutional guarantee of a right of access to courts makes it irrelevant that this "statute of repose" may be valid under state or federal due process or equal protection clauses. We hold that, insofar as section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), provides an absolute bar to lawsuits brought more than twelve years after events connected with the construction of improvements to real property, it violates article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. The order of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed. It is so ordered. ADKINS, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. ALDERMAN, J., dissents with an opinion, with which BOYD and OVERTON, JJ., concur. ALDERMAN, Justice, dissenting. Section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), prevents a cause of action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property from arising against professional engineers, registered architects, and licensed contractors...

...1973), holds this section to be in violation of article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution, because the legislature failed to show an overpowering public necessity or *576 that there was no less onerous alternative method. Although the legislature, in section 95.11(3)(c) did not make an express finding that this statute was enacted to meet an overpowering public necessity and that there is no less onerous alternative, it is apparent to me that the limitation on causes of actions imposed by this section was created to meet such a necessity. Some insight into the purpose of section 95.11(3)(c) may be found in Grissom v. North American Aviation, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 465 (M.D.Fla. 1971). In that case, the court was considering section 95.11(10), Florida Statutes (1969), the predecessor to section 95.11(3)(c), which provided a time limitation of twelve years within which actions may be brought against professional engineers and registered architects....

...The report explained the basis for limiting to some definite period the time in which an action could be brought against the engineers, architects, or designers of improvements to realty. The reasons set out in the report are equally applicable to Florida and make clear the overpowering public necessity for section 95.11(3)(c)....

...Nor can they prevent the owner of a building from making alterations or changes which may, years afterward, be determined unsafe or defective and appear to be a part of the original improvement." 326 F. Supp. at 467-8. The federal district court determined that this same general intent was a major reason for passage of section 95.11(10) and similar statutes in other jurisdictions. If the legislature, in enacting section 95.11(3)(c), had made findings similar to those quoted above, there could be little doubt that it would have shown an overpowering public necessity and the absence of a less onerous alternative. Even without such express recital, however, I believe the need for section 95.11(3)(c) is clear. In the present case, the time lapse was sixteen years, but it could just have well been thirty-two or sixty-four years. Without section 95.11(3)(c), there is no limitation on the number of years after which a suit could be brought against an engineer, architect, or contractor....

...confined as of 1776, but have been held to be "designed for application to new conditions and circumstances." State ex rel. Burr v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 90 Fla. 721, 744, 106 So. 576, 584 (1925). [5] Ch. 74-382, § 7, Laws of Fla., codified as § 95.11(3)(c), Fla....

...expansive view was developed by our courts over the years as exceptions to the general rule. For a discussion of the evolution of contractor liability in Florida, see Slavin, and see generally, W. Prosser, Torts § 104, at 680-82 (4th ed. 1971). [7] § 95.11(4), Fla. Stat. (1967). [8] See, for example, Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901, 91 S.Ct. 868, 27 L.Ed.2d 800 (1971); Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971). [9] § 95.11(4), Fla....

...of final judgment," the cause of action did not mature until the trial court entered final judgment. Zakak, 545 So.2d at 381. The law is not clear as to when the limitations period for legal malpractice in a litigation-related context begins to run. Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), provides in pertinent part: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.— (a) An action for professional malpractice......

...e presiding judge resolved these matters and recorded final judgment and this final judgment became final. We therefore hold, in those cases that proceed to final judgment, the two-year statute of limitations for litigation-related malpractice under section 95.11(4)(a), Florida *1176 Statutes (1997), begins to run when final judgment becomes final....

...2d DCA 1992), in which the court certified the following as a question of great public importance: WHETHER, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE STILLBIRTH OF A CHILD IS SUCH AN OBVIOUS INJURY AS TO PLACE A PLAINTIFF ON NOTICE OF THE POSSIBLE INVASION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL RIGHTS TO COMMENCE THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER SECTION 95.11(4)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)....

...66.106, Florida Statutes (1987), was filed on February 12, 1990. The malpractice suit was filed on August 1, 1990. Upon motion of the health-care providers, the trial court dismissed the complaint as barred under the two-year statute of limitations. Section 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...dical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence... . *179 Section 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...re and treatment in the eyes of a lay person is in fact legal notice of possible malpractice. In my view, the legislature recognized such circumstances when it included the "should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence" language in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The Tanners did not seek an extension under this statute. The other provision is section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1991), which reads as follows: (4) The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11....

...Ignorance of the wrong does not delay the commencement of a statute of limitation. It may, however, affect what statute of limitation applies. This is the situation in reference to a medical malpractice claim. Some meaning must be afforded that part of section 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...Thus, the cause of action should not have been dismissed. BARKETT, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] The certified question was inadvertently omitted from the Southern Reporter. [2] We note that the 1992 legislature declined to enact proposed legislation which would have amended section 95.11(4)(b) to provide that knowledge of the injury without knowledge that the injury resulted from malpractice does not constitute discovery of the incident....

(11th Cir.1988) (stating that Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3) provides for a four-year limitations period

...t, “decades ago” at the time the Developer transferred control of the condominium to the Condominium Association. Because the applicable statute of limitations require claims founded on a written instrument to be commenced within five years, see § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...either as provided in the declaration itself, or if the amendment is approved by the owners of not less than two-thirds of the units. IV. ANALYSIS A. Dismissal Based on Statute of Limitations The limitations periods applicable here are set forth in section 95.11, Florida Statutes, and discussed below....

...ght an injunction prohibiting unauthorized members of the public from using the club’s amenities. The limitations period for “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument” is five years. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...s of Section 12.9 of the Declaration (governing club membership and fees) are void and unenforceable. The limitations period for “a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument” is five years. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...In Count VI, the Condominium Association demanded the value of its annual membership fees and dues allegedly paid in violation of Section 12.9(f) of the Declaration. The limitations period for an unjust enrichment action is four years. Swafford v. Schweitzer, 906 So.2d 1194, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); see also § 95.11(3)(p), Fla....

...of Section 12.9(f) of the Declaration (limiting club assessments to an “initial membership fee”). The limitations period for “a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument” is five years. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...The trustee alleged in detail that Lazard failed to honor its duty of care and good faith and failed to adhere to its duty to perform its services with reasonable care and industry standards. The district court dismissed the complaint as being barred by section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes, the five-year breach of contract statute of limitations....

...Southeast's Board of Directors approved the purchase, and the acquisition was completed on December 30, 1988. This action for breach of contract was not filed until over eight years later on December 18, 1996. Thus, the suit is barred by the five-year statute of limitations, section 95.11(2)(b), unless the last fact necessary to the cause of action has occurred within five years preceding the date the suit was filed, or the statute is tolled from some reason. The limitations period begins to run when "the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." § 95.031(1), Fla....

...A case from the Supreme Court of Florida, decided after the district court's decision in this case, makes it unnecessary to consider these alleged exceptions to the discovery rule, argued on this appeal. The Florida Supreme Court held that there is no discovery rule in section 95.11(2)(b) and that actions for breach of contract are barred five years after the cause of action accrued regardless of whether the plaintiff knew that it had a claim: 2  Using the principle of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, we conclude that the absence of such express language in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes(1981), is clear evidence that the legislature did not intend to provide a discovery rule in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). To conclude otherwise would require us to write into section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), a discovery rule when the Legislature has not. Federal Ins....

...Abbott Laboratories, Inc. ("Abbott") appeals a summary final judgment granted to General Electric Capital Corporation ("GECC"). Abbott contends that the contractual obligations enforced by the summary judgment are barred by the statute of limitations of section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ve year statute of limitation on contracts [1] barred GECC's causes of actions against Abbott. The trial court did not agree with Abbott, finding that GECC's causes of action against Abbott were not barred by the statute of limitations prescribed by section 95.11(2)(b), because the discovery rule was applicable....

...Goodgame informed it of the separate agreement with Abbott in June, 1996. In Federal Insurance Co. v. Southwest Florida Retirement Center, Inc., 707 *740 So.2d 1119, 1122 (Fla.1998), the supreme court specifically held that the limitation period in section 95.11(2)(b) is not tolled by the lack of discovery of a breach within the limitation period and that actions for breach of contract are barred five years after the cause of action accrued regardless of whether the plaintiff knew that it had a claim. The supreme court stated: Using the principle of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, we conclude that the absence of such express language in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), is clear evidence that the legislature did not intend to provide a discovery rule in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). To conclude otherwise would require us to write into section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), a discovery rule when the legislature has not. Id. at 1122; see also Beck v. Lazard Freres & Co., LLC, 175 F.3d 913, 914 (11th Cir. 1999). Under section 95.11(2)(b), the limitations period begins to run when "the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." § 95.031(1), Fla....

...See Muroff v. Dill, 386 So.2d 1281, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Because GECC filed its action in 1998, more than five years after Abbott materially breached the VPA, and thereby caused injury to GECC, GECC's breach of contract claim against Abbott is barred by section 95.11(2)(b)....

...ailed in its claim against GECC. It is only when and if Goodgame prevails that the amount of damages can be liquidated and demand can be made by GECC upon Abbott for indemnification. REVERSED AND REMANDED. THOMPSON and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...ff either knows or should know that the last element of the cause of action occurred. [1] The Legislature has also imposed a delayed discovery rule in cases of professional *710 malpractice, medical malpractice, and intentional torts based on abuse. Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...idering the unique and sinister nature of childhood sexual abuse, as well as the fact that the doctrine is applicable to similar cases where the tortious acts cause the delay in discovery. We also considered the Legislature's endorsement in amending section 95.11(7), Florida Statutes (1999), to include intentional torts based on abuse and the fact that the application of the doctrine among the states is both the majority rule and modern trend....

...95.051 and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues. (1) A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. ... (2)(a) An action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered within the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered. (b) An action for products liability under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered within the exercise of due diligence, rather than running from any other date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), except as provided within this subsection....

...rendering the agent a professional. *86 The professional malpractice statute of limitations states that an action for professional malpractice other than medical malpractice shall be commenced within two years from the discovery of the malpractice. § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...To determine the precise definition of the term "professional" as employed in the statute of limitations, we must first look to the statute itself since the plain language of the legislation must control. However, the legislature has chosen not to include a specific definition of the term professional in either section 95.11 or in any other part of chapter 95. An examination of the different limitations provisions uncovers a separate provision for medical malpractice and another separate provision for malpractice or negligence in connection with the construction of an improvement to real property. Section 95.11(4)(a), specifically addressing professional malpractice, simply does not provide any definition for its terms. A review of the legislative history also does not assist us in determining the definition the legislature intended to apply to "professional" under section 95.11. The tape recordings of the House Judiciary Committee, Law Revision Subcommittee hearings discussing section 95.11 reveal that one subcommittee member expressed his belief that the committee would not categorize the vocations and professions in the statute to avoid "hurt[ing] some people's feelings......

...(1987); (3) veterinary medicine, § 474.207(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987); (4) architecture, § 481.209(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). While architecture is a profession under our definition, the statute of limitations for the design and construction of improvements to real property is four years, § 95.11(3)(c), Fla....

...Indus., Inc., 850 F.2d 1480, 1481 (11th Cir.1988) (statute of limitations for § 1981 claims); (3) Florida Civil Rights Act claims-four-year statute of limitations, see Seale v. EMSA Corr. Care, Inc., 767 So.2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2000); and (4) assault and negligence claims-four-year statute of limitations, see Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)....

...American Hospital *1186 Supply Corp., 375 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1980). [1] The issue to be decided in both cases is whether blood banks are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice suits under section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), or the four-year negligence statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(a)....

...Southwest notified the Smiths in April 1986 that the donor had tested positive for HIV. The baby then tested positive for HIV. The Smiths filed suit in January 1990 against Southwest alleging negligence. The trial court ruled the suit timebarred under section 95.11(4)(b), finding that Southwest "clearly meets at least the privity requirement of that Statute of Limitations." The Second District did not address the privity argument, but rather affirmed on the authority of Silva. Analysis Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence......

...c plaintiffs in this case, Southwest was merely the supplier of a product. Southwest concedes that a plaintiff would have four years to sue a supplier of *1188 drugs or other medical products under the ordinary negligence statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...Even if we accept for the sake of argument that blood banks do not "manufacture" blood as other suppliers manufacture drugs or equipment, this fact does not answer the question of whether blood banks are included within the medical malpractice statute of limitations. Once again, a plain reading of section 95.11(4)(b) reveals no indication that the distinction between blood and other medical products has any legal significance. Thus, Southwest's argument merely begs the question. [2] Southwest nonetheless argues that a legislative intent to include blood banks under section 95.11(4)(b) can be discerned when the statutory provisions are read in pari materia with a policy statement in the preamble to chapter 69-157, Laws of Florida....

...ended this legal fiction (that selling blood is a "service" rather than a "sale") to apply in any other context. Moreover, even if the legislature was making a broad policy statement that blood banks provide a "medical service," the plain wording of section 95.11(4)(b) indicates that the legislature intended for the shorter limitations period to apply only to a narrow class of medical services....

...are" by a health care provider. Had the legislature intended a broader coverage, it would have used the "medical services" language from the chapter 69-157 preamble. Consequently, the very paragraph on which Southwest relies to prove it comes within section 95.11(4)(b) more accurately suggests that it is not providing the type of care covered by the limitations statute....

...*1189 Finally, even if the terms "diagnosis," "treatment," and "care" were ambiguous, we would be constrained under the rule requiring ambiguity to be construed in favor of the longer limitations period. Accordingly, we conclude that the medical malpractice statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(b), is inapplicable in this case because the allegations of negligence against Southwest do not "aris[e] out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care." Although our determination of the first issue is disposi...

...eged supported the conclusion that the blood bank did not merely supply blood, but actually provided diagnosis, treatment, or care. In those cases, the statute's applicability would depend on whether the blood bank also met the second requirement of section 95.11(4)(b): that the diagnosis, treatment, or care be rendered by a "provider of health care." The Second District concluded that blood banks are health care providers, relying on a statutory definition formerly found in section 768.50(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1985) (repealed 1986)....

...The current collateral source statute does not contain the definition on which Southwest now relies. See § 768.77, Fla. Stat. (1989). Perhaps more important, not only does the provision upon which Southwest relies not exist today, it did not exist when the medical malpractice statute of limitations was enacted. Section 95.11(4)(b) was enacted by the legislature in 1975, see chapter 75-9, section 7, Laws of Florida, two years prior to the enactment of the definition found in section 768.50(2)(b)....

...GRIMES, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur that the medical malpractice statute of limitations is inapplicable in this *1190 case because the allegations of negligence against Southwest do not "aris[e] out of any medical, dental or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care." § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). However, I do believe that Southwest is a "provider of health care" as contemplated by the statute of limitations for medical malpractice. Id. The medical malpractice limitations statute, section 95.11(4)(b), does not define "any provider of health care." However, section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (1991), which sets the standards for recovery in medical malpractice actions, refers to the "negligence of a health care provider as def...

...l B. Anderson of Billing, Cochran, Heath, Lyles & Mauro, P.A., *203 Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Florida Defense Lawyers Association, Amicus Curiae. CANTERO, J. In this case, we must interpret a statute of repose applicable to medical malpractice cases. Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), extends the normal four-year statute of repose for such actions to seven years when "fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact" prevents discovery of the injury. The Fifth District Court of Appeal has certified the following question of great public importance: DOES THE TERM CONCEALMENT AS USED IN SECTION 95.11(4)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES, ENCOMPASS NEGLIGENT DIAGNOSIS BY A MEDICAL PROVIDER? Nehme v....

...The petitioner sought damages on behalf of the estate, himself, and the Nehmes' six minor children. The respondents Smithkline, Premier, and Dr. Shutze moved for summary judgment, arguing that the case was barred by the four-year statute of repose as set forth in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, which requires that any medical malpractice action be commenced no later than four years from the date of the incident or occurrence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the petitioner argued that the statute of repose should be extended to the full seven years allowed by section 95.11(4)(b) in cases of fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact....

...Therefore, because the "language in Nardone can be read to support a conclusion either *204 way, as evidenced by Myklejord," the Fifth District certified the question of great public importance. Nehme, 822 So.2d at 522. II. At issue is whether the term "concealment" as used in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, encompasses negligent diagnosis by a medical provider. As an initial matter, however, the parties disagree as to whether the pre-1996 or post-1996 version of section 95.11(4)(b) applies in this case. The petitioner relies on the post-1996 version of the statute, while the respondents argue the pre-1996 version should apply. The Fifth District relied on the post-1996 version. See Nehme, 822 So.2d at 521 (citing § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...f limitations is extended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993) (emphasis added). The post-1996 version does not contain the above-underlined phrase. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...ace before that date." Ch. 96-167, § 2, Laws of Fla. The "act, event, or occurrence" which the cause of action arose out of in this case was the alleged negligent diagnosis of Mrs. Nehme's pap smear slide in 1994. Therefore, the pre-1996 version of section 95.11(4)(b) applies. As quoted above, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), extends the normal four-year statute of repose in a medical malpractice action to seven years in cases of "fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact." The statute does not define "concealment," and the parties disagree about its meaning....

...o toll the statute, there is no concomitant duty imposed on the physician to relate all merely possible or likely causes of the injury. Id. at 39-40 (emphasis added). We note two points about Nardone. First, Nardone did not interpret the language in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...On appeal, the Third District reversed: *208 Notwithstanding the hospital's assertion to the contrary, there was no need for Hernandez to prove that the Hospital or its employees had actual knowledge that a pad had been left inside Hernandez' abdomen, in order for Hernandez' claim to succeed. There is no indication in section 95.11(4)(b) that the term "concealment" includes a scienter element....

...The Third District concluded that "[b]ecause [the plaintiff] produced sufficient evidence to show that the Hospital concealed evidence or intentionally misrepresented facts, [the plaintiff] was brought within the extended seven-year statutory period of repose in section 95.11(4)(b)." Hernandez, 714 So.2d at 542....

...s abdomen, in order for Hernandez's claim to succeed." Hernandez, 714 So.2d at 541. We find that Hernandez read the definition of the term "concealment" too broadly and thus erred in reasoning that no knowledge is required to prove concealment under section 95.11(4)(b)....

...See Kush, 616 So.2d at 421-22 ("In creating a statute of repose which was longer than the two-year statute of limitation, the legislature attempted to balance the rights of injured persons against the exposure of health care providers to liability for endless periods of time."). We have upheld section 95.11(4)(b) as constitutional, finding that the statutory repose period for medical malpractice actions does not violate the constitutional requirement of access to courts, [3] even when applied to a cause of action which did not accrue until after the period had expired....

...ction in order to achieve certain public interests), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114, 106 S.Ct. 1626, 90 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986). VI. For the reasons stated, we answer the certified question in the negative and hold that the term "concealment" as used in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, does not encompass negligent diagnosis by a medical provider....

...r. Kilgore performed additional surgery allegedly made necessary by the negligence involved in the first operation. Respondents sought dismissal on basis that petitioner's cause of action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(6) (1973), effective July 1, 1972, rather than the four-year statute of limitations, Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes, in effect when the cause of action accrued....

...The questions posited for our determination are (1) whether petitioner's cause of action accrued on September 11, 1971, when the drain was discovered or on November 13, 1972, at which time petitioner underwent additional surgery and (2) whether petitioner's cause of action is governed by the four-year statute of limitations, Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes, or by the new two-year statute of limitations, Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes, which became effective July 1, 1972....

...ively shortens a period of limitation, providing a reasonable time is allowed by the statute within which to file suit, where there is manifest legislative intent to retrospectively shorten the period, we must look to the language of Chapter 71-254, Section 95.11(6), which provides: "Section 1. Subsection (6) of Section 95.11, Florida Statutes, is amended to read: "95.11 Limitations upon actions other than real actions....

...intention by the Legislature to do otherwise than prospectively apply the new two-year statute of limitations. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Maltempo v. Cuthbert, supra , which involved the question of retroactive application of Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes, opined: "Our conclusion is that where there is reasonable doubt concerning legislative intention to provide for retroactive application of a shortened limitation period, the benefit of this doubt should be given to the person with the existing cause of action." Confronted with the question of whether Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 71-254, Laws of Florida, applied to an alleged act of malpractice that occurred prior to the effective date of that act, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in DeLuca v. Mathews, supra , responded in the negative and declared that where "There is reasonable doubt concerning the legislative intention to provide retroactive effect to the newly added statute of limitations, § 95.11(6), and the benefit of this doubt should here be given to the appellant-plaintiff, whose cause of action was dismissed." Generally referring to the conceded authority of the Legislature to pass a statute of limitations or to change a period...

...not be affected by it, but will be governed by the original statute unless a contrary intention is expressed by the legislature in the new law." 51 Am.Jur.2d § 57, Limitation of Actions. Since the legislative intent to provide retroactive effect to Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes, is not express, clear, or manifest, we conclude that it does not apply to causes of action occurring prior to its effective date....

...s of protecting a tortfeasor from defending a stale claim when the tortfeasor *552 is responsible for the delay. Id. at 708-09. As well, the district court concluded that even though fraudulent concealment was included as a tolling provision only in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995) (medical malpractice statute of limitations), the doctrine could broadly apply to other causes of action....

...In Robinson, we answered a certified question and held that the "significant relationship" test for use in applying section 95.10, Florida Statutes (1997) (borrowing statute), also applies to the determination of whether to apply Florida's statute of limitations, section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1997), or the limitations period of another jurisdiction....

...Thus, we agree with the trial court that this action has a significant relationship to the State of Georgia. In Florida, a cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the date of death, see St. Francis Hosp. v. Thompson, 159 Fla. 453, 31 So.2d 710 (1947), and has a two-year statute of limitations period. See § 95.11(4)(d), Fla....

...hus was subject to the longer statute of limitations for an action on a contract founded on a written instrument. See Florida Keys Cmty. Coll. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 456 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); 7 Fla. Jur.2d Bonds § 9 (2004); see also, § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...[10] In this case, Plaza Materials admittedly did not file its claim within the one-year period, and the question of whether the bond's failure to refer to the subsection (2) deadlines eliminated the limitations period was argued both below and in this appeal. [11] In 1988 the Legislature added paragraph (e) to subsection 95.11(5) to make all claims against payment bonds for both private and public works subject to a one-year statute of limitation. Ch. 88-397, § 1, Laws of Fla. Then in 2001 the Legislature amended section 95.11(2)(b), which provides a five-year statute of limitation for legal and equitable claims on a written instrument, to specify that claims against payment bonds "shall be governed by the applicable provisions of ss....

...The Supreme Court extended Wilson’s rationale to Section 1981 actions in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2617 , 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987). The parties agree that actions for personal injury in Florida fall within the subsections enumerated in Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(3), which provides for a four-year statute of limitations period. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(3)....

...itable results if applied retroactively, injustice or hardship should be avoided by a holding of nonretroactivity. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). The district court applied Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(4)(c), which provides for a two-year limitation on “an action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime.” Defendants cite as controlling our prior cases which applied a two-year statute of limitations to employment cases....

...across-the-board to civil rights actions. The choice of the appropriate statute of limitations has turned on the nature of the claim asserted in the civil rights action. See, e.g., Campbell v. Weatherford, 427 F.2d 131 (5th Cir.1970) (Fla.Stat. Ann. § 95.11(5)(a) (1967) applied to Section 1983 action for declaration of invalidity of prior convictions); White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861 , 94 S.Ct. 78 , 38 L.Ed.2d 112 (1973) (Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(5)(a) (1972) applied to Section 1983 action challenging procedures used in adjudicating finding of incompetency and subsequent committal to state hospital); Williams v. Rhoden, 629 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir.1980) (Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(3) (1980) applied to Section 1983 action alleging civil conspiracy); Schaefer v. Stack, 641 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(3)(f) (Supp. 1980) applied to Section 1983 action by prisoner to recover items seized pursuant to search warrant); McGhee v. Ogbum, 707 *1483 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir.1983) (Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(4)(c) (Supp.1982) applied to Section 1981 and Section 1983 claims alleging unlawful termination of employment)....

...The record simply does not support such speculative assertions. Since the Goodman decision properly applies retroactively in this case, the district court erred in dismissing count I as time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations embodied in Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(4)(c)....

...The appellant, Marie Wood, challenges the entry of final summary judgment in a medical malpractice action instituted against the appellee, Dr. John Fraser. She argues that the trial court erred in determining that her cause of action was barred by the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), in that the time limitations of the statute were tolled when she served a notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...te. In making his argument, the appellee acknowledged the opinion of this court in Moore v. Winter Haven Hospital, 579 So.2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 589 So.2d 294 (Fla.1991), in which we clearly held that the four-year statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), was tolled by the service of a notice of intent to *17 initiate medical malpractice litigation as provided for in section 768.57(4), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...e noted that "a statute of repose is a form of a statute of limitations and the terms are often used interchangeably." Id. at 190. [2] We concluded, therefore, that the "`statute of repose' is subsumed in the general term `statute of limitations' of section 95.11(4) and is tolled by the service of the notice of intent to litigate." Id....

...Moore. In Kush, the supreme court, after undertaking an extensive analysis of the purpose of a statute of repose and how it differs from a statute of limitations, simply answered a certified question regarding when the four-year statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b) begins to run in a medical malpractice case involving wrongful birth....

...It interpreted the statutory language to mean that the statute runs from the date negligent advice is given rather than from the date of birth. Id. at 418. In Tanner, the court responded to another certified question directed at the pivotal issue of when the two-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(b) commences in a medical malpractice case based on stillbirth....

...State, 642 So.2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (en banc) (decision to hear case en banc based in part on determination of whether to continue to adhere to prior opinions). Finally, we find it significant that since our judicial interpretation of the interplay between section 95.11(4)(b) and former section 768.57(4), now section 766.106(4), the legislature has continually reenacted these statutory provisions without any change in language....

...warn the plaintiff brother of the patient's infectious disease, failure to properly instruct the plaintiff regarding transportation of the patient, and negligently using the non-patient brother as a transporter for the patient fall within Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(b), the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions? 2....

...On appeal, the federal circuit court declined to rule on J.B.'s claim, concluding that the issues are appropriate for resolution by the Florida Supreme Court. II. CHAPTER 95 Chapter 95, Florida Statutes (1989), sets a two-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property....

...(b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence... . § 95.11, Fla....

...The statute goes on to define a medical malpractice action: An "action for medical malpractice" is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...ions barred the claimant's suit against a blood bank for releasing units of AIDS-contaminated blood to the treating hospital. The district court affirmed. In determining that the district court erred, we defined "diagnosis, treatment, or care" under section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1991): First, there is no ambiguity to clarify in the words "diagnosis," "treatment," or "care," and we find that these words should be accorded their plain and unambiguous meaning....

...must accept these allegations as true, and may not speculate as to what the true facts may be or what facts may ultimately be proved in the trial of the cause. See Emile v. Florida Power and Light Co., 426 So.2d 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). According to Section 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations for a fraud action is four years. In computing that four year time frame, Section 95.031(2)(a), Florida Statutes, explains: An action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence ......

...Co., 94 A.D.2d 835, 463 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111-12 (N.Y.App.Div. 1983). After careful consideration, we adopt the Third and Fourth Districts' position on this issue. Using the date the insurance contract is breached is the most logical event to begin the running of the statute of limitations. Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that a "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument" should be commenced within five years. The intent of section 95.11(2)(b) is to limit the commencement of actions from the time of their accrual....

...[3] In Levy, the insured, Howard Levy, sought PIP benefits from his insurer, Travelers Insurance Company. Travelers refused to pay the benefits and Levy brought suit against Travelers. The trial court dismissed Levy's complaint based on the five-year statute of limitations found in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Perse of Horton, Perse & Ginsberg and Carroll, Halberg & Meyerson, Miami, for appellees. PER CURIAM. This appeal is from a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, Perez v. Universal Engineering Corp., 413 So.2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), which held section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), unconstitutional as applied to appellees' causes of action....

...They do so regardless of the time of the accrual of the cause of action or of notice of the invasion of a legal right. Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 357 So.2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1978). The statute of repose in issue was contained in the statute of limitations in effect when the actions were filed, section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), which provided: (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS....

...es effective and that would not have been barred under prior law may be commenced before January 1, 1976, and if it is not commenced by that date, the action shall be barred. *466 The issue presented to this Court is whether the statute of repose in section 95.11(3)(c) may be constitutionally applied to bar actions which arose after the expiration of the twelve-year repose provision but before the effective date of the statute, so as to invoke the savings clause....

...[3] This case must be analyzed in terms of our reasoning in Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979), and its clarification of Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978). In Overland we held that, insofar as section 95.11(3)(c) operates as an absolute bar to actions commenced more than twelve years after events connected with the construction of improvements to real property, it violates article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. [4] This section provides: The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay. Thus, for section 95.11(3)(c) to be unconstitutional as applied, it must operate as an *467 absolute bar to bringing an action. If section 95.11(3)(c) only shortens the time period in which the action may be brought to a reasonable amount of time, then the Florida Constitution is not violated. Bauld. In Overland the plaintiff's cause of action accrued after January 1, 1975, the effective date of the statutory revision and after the running of the twelve-year cap provision of section 95.11(3)(c)....

...Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981) (interpreting section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1977)). In Bauld the plaintiff's cause of action accrued prior to January 1, 1975, the effective date of the revision, and prior to the running of the twelve-year cap provision of section 95.11(3)(c)....

...Federal Press Co., 387 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1980) (interpreting section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975)). It is undisputed that the cause of action accrued after the twelve-year repose provision had run in 1970, but this alone is not sufficient to determine the constitutionality of section 95.11(3)(c)....

...tate the summary judgment of the trial court entered in favor of Universal Engineering Corporation on the basis that the cause of action against Universal was barred by the twelve-year statute of repose. The district court erroneously concluded that section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutional as applied to appellees' causes of action. The causes of action arose after the expiration of the twelve-year repose period and prior to the effective date of section 95.11(3)(c), thereby invoking the savings clause which provides: [B]ut any action that will be barred when this act becomes effective and that would not have been barred under prior law may be commenced before January 1, 1976, and if it is not commenced by that date, the action shall be barred....

...nsideration, but Universal in its motions to that court argued that the applicable statute of repose barring Perez's and Rodriguez's claims was § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. (1975). That statute provides: Actions for products liability and fraud under subsection 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in subsection 95.11(3) but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser or the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have been discovered. Perez's and Rodriguez's brief to the circuit court mentioned §§ 95.031(2) and 95.11(3)(c). It is unclear from the record before this Court whether the parties presented their arguments to the district court based on § 95.11(3)(c), § 95.031(2), or both. The district court based its decision solely on § 95.11(3)(c) after finding that the "machinery which is alleged to have been the cause of appellants' injuries was purchased and installed as fixtures between 1952 and 1958." Perez, 413 So.2d at 76. This Court questions the applicability of § 95.11(3)(c) to the facts of this particular case, but as to the issue in this case the result would be the same under either § 95.11(3)(c) or § 95.031(2). In different factual situations, however, the result may vary as to actions under § 95.11(3)(c), because of ch....

...g public necessity for the prohibitory provision, and an absence of less onerous alternatives. This Court notes that the legislature in response to Overland set forth the following preamble to the provision increasing the statute of repose period of § 95.11(3)(c) in ch....

specifically includes the State within its operation. See § 95.011, Fla. Stat. (2006) (providing that limitations

...Baskerville-Donovan Engineers, Inc., 566 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), to resolve express and direct conflict with Cristich v. Allen Engineering Inc., 458 So.2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). [1] The issue is whether the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), [2] applies only to malpractice actions where *1302 direct privity of contract exists between the plaintiff and the professional....

...he report, causing damage to the Association and its members. The trial court granted Baskerville-Donovan's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the lawsuit was barred under the two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice, section 95.11(4)(a). The First District Court of Appeal found no direct privity between the parties and reversed, concluding that section 95.11(4)(a) was applicable only where "direct contractual privity" exists. Section 95.11(4)(a) creates a two-year limitations period for suits brought for professional malpractice where the parties are in privity. In the absence of this statute, suits grounded in contract would be subject to the limitations period of five years as set forth in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983). Likewise, suits brought in tort would be governed by the four-year statute of limitations pertaining to general negligence actions. See id. § 95.11(3)(a). In this case, the Association is suing in tort for negligence. Accordingly, if section 95.11(4)(a) does not apply, the Association's cause of action falls under the four-year limitation and would not be time-barred....

...an would the original seller. Thus the court concluded that the action was governed by the two-year, rather than the four-year, statute of limitations. The court below disagreed with Cristich and held that "privity" must be construed for purposes of section 95.11(4)(a) to mean direct contractual privity....

...nt, the preference is to allow the longer period of time. See Haney v. Holmes, 364 So.2d 81 (Fla.2d DCA 1978), appeal dismissed, 367 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 1979). Applying these rules of construction leads us to conclude that the term "privity" as used in section 95.11(4)(b) means direct contractual privity....

...Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1990); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (attorney preparing will has duty to client's intended beneficiaries). Thus, the two terms are not interchangeable. As the First District noted below: Section 95.11(4)(a) is specifically limited in application "to persons in privity with a professional." The decision by the supreme court in First American Title Ins....

...To the extent our recent cases may have applied a different gloss to the concept of *1304 privity for these limited circumstances, the legislature would have been unaware of it when enacting the law in 1974. Thus, we conclude that the legislature intended privity in section 95.11(4)(a) to apply only to malpractice suits where direct privity is found to exist....

...We remand this case for further proceedings consistent herewith. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. [2] Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), provides: (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS....

...and inextricably intertwined medical care and diagnosis which was provided both to Shams Bell and her fetus." Thus, the Hospital maintained that appellants' claims fell squarely within the definition of a claim for medical malpractice as defined by section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes....

...e in conjunction with rendering medical diagnosis and services by a healthcare provider. Since Plaintiffs admit they have not complied with the presuit requirements of Section 766.101, Fla. Stat., and have filed this action beyond the limitations of Section 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...The appellants did not allege in their complaint that the hospital was negligent in the delivery of their child, in the performance of the autopsy on the deceased child, or that the hospital or physicians rendered improper medical diagnosis, treatment or care to the mother or the deceased child. [2] Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that an "`action for medical malpractice' is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental,...

...so as to fall within the scope of section 96.11(4)(b). In resolving this issue, the court reaffirmed that in construing a statute, words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. See id. at 1186. The court, in considering the applicability of section 95.11(4)(b), explained: First, there is no ambiguity to clarify in the words "diagnosis," "treatment," or "care," and we find that these words should be accorded their plain and unambiguous meaning....

...the child's remains. They were only expected to perform the ministerial act of transporting the child's remains back to the parents following the conclusion of the autopsy. Given the rationale in Lynn and the Florida Supreme Court's construction of section 95.11(4)(b) in Silva, the wrongful disposal of the deceased patient did not fall within the plain ordinary meaning of diagnosis, treatment or care....

...endants-appellees, Drs. Fox, Key, and Harari and Diskin, Porter, Blumenthal & Brown, a partnership formerly known as Emergency Medical Specialists of South Florida, Inc. On June 11, 1987, with eight days remaining in the two-year limitations period, § 95.11(4)(d), Fla....

...vil action for ninety days after the notice of intent is served and, pursuant to section 768.57(4), Florida Statutes (1985), tolls the statute of limitations for at least ninety days if the notice is timely served within the time limits set forth in section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...A key aspect of this statutory scheme is the promotion of settlement options and negotiations between the parties out of court. The provisions for tolling and extending the limitations period are part of this scheme. LIMITATIONS SCHEME Pursuant to section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), an action for medical malpractice must be commenced within two years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within two years from the time the incident is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence....

...First, a claimant must conduct a reasonable investigation to determine if there are grounds for a good faith belief that there was negligence in his care or treatment. See § 766.104(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). After the completion of this presuit investigation, and during the two-year period provided for in section 95.11(4)(b), the claimant must serve a notice of intent to initiate litigation to each prospective defendant....

...an, or guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor or incapacitated person, or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue; except with respect to the statute of limitations for a claim for medical malpractice as provided in s. 95.11....

...We also agree with the Hankeys that to construe the statute otherwise would effectively reduce the two-year limitations period since a claimant cannot lawfully file an action during the period of suspension and, hence, is deprived of that time to file suit. Accordingly, we hold the two-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(b) is suspended ("tolled") for ninety days under section 766.106(4) and any extended time agreed to by the parties under that same section....

...us why IBEX’s unjust enrichment counterclaim would be barred. 4 The district court did not rule, as Mr. Pioch had argued, that IBEX’s unjust enrichment counterclaim was barred by Florida’s two-year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(c). 19  Case: 15-10845 Date Filed: 06/14/2016 Page: 20 of 24 We recognize that some courts, including our own, have been hesitant to allow employers to assert state-law counterclaims against employees in FLSA cases....

...for Disease Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that we can affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, including grounds on which the district court did not rely). Mr. Pioch argues that, under Florida law, IBEX’s counterclaim was time-barred under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(c) (imposing a two-year statute of limitations for actions “to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime”)....

...opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 5 Mr. Pioch contends that “any claim for wages—no matter the legal theory under which it is brought—is subject to the [two-year] statute of limitations under what is now [§] 95.11(4)(c).” Appellee’s Reply Br....

...e statute of limitations as to each. Counts I and II are actions for breach of fiduciary duty which is an intentional tort. See Allerton v. State Dep't of Ins., 635 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). As such, the four-year statute of limitations applies. § 95.11(3)( o ), Fla....

...ich it gives the same or similar relief as that granted in cases of real fraud," etc. Pomeroy's Eq.Jur. (4th Ed.) § 992. Douglas v. Ogle, 80 Fla. 42, 85 So. 243, 244 (Fla. 1920). As a recognized species of fraud, constructive fraud is controlled by section 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1991), a four-year limitations period, and the discovery rule of section 95.031(2) applies....

...ave occurred within four years preceding the filing of the complaint. Reversed and remanded. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: (2) Actions for products liability and fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.

...ery, and (3) relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The federal district court granted the motion in full. The court concluded that because a garnishment proceeding was an "action on a judgment" within the meaning of section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), the Florida five year statute of limitations barred the 1999 garnishment, begun over 11 years after the issuance of the 1987 judgment. Relying on Balfour Beatty Bahamas, Ltd. v. Bush, 170 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir.1999), the district court held that under section 95.11(2)(a), National Union was "required to commence an action on the New York federal judgment within five years" after the 1987 entry of that judgment....

...The federal judge observed that National Union had "waited more than five years and eight months to register the federal New York judgment on July 29, 1993." This language suggests that the district court found that the act of registration was an "action on a judgment" under section 95.11(2)(a)....

...h the district court is held...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a). Garnishments and executions in a Florida federal court are thus subject to the practices and procedures of chapters 56 and 77, Florida Statutes (2000), respectively. The statute of limitations at section 95.11, Florida Statutes (2000), is also a matter of "practice and procedure" that the federal court must apply. See Balfour Beatty Bahamas, 170 F.3d at 1050. II. The term "action on a judgment" as used in the statute of limitations denotes a specific common law cause of action. Crucial to this case is the wording of subsections 95.11(1) and (2), which provide: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (1) WITHIN TWENTY YEARS.— An action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state....

...in early versions of the statute of limitations. Under a correct reading of the statute, neither the garnishment proceeding, nor the registration of the New York judgment under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 was an "action on a judgment" within the meaning of section 95.11(2)....

...Finlayson, 41 Fla. 169, 26 So. 704, 707 (1899). A later version of the statute of limitations, section 2939, Revised General Statutes of Florida, similarly employed the term "action upon a judgment." See Van Deren v. Lory, 87 Fla. 422, 424, 100 So. 794, 795 (1924). Section 95.11(2)(a) now uses the term "action on a judgment." Nothing in any subsequent revision of the statute of limitations indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the phrase by referring to an action " on a judgment" instead of " upon a judgment." The Florida Supreme Court has interchanged both terms....

...170, 171 (1924), the court used the statutory formulation, containing the preposition "upon." Every judgment gives rise to a common law cause of action to enforce it, *841 called an action upon a judgment. In Crane v. Nuta, 157 Fla. 613, 615, 26 So.2d 670, 671 (1946), the supreme court held that section 95.11(1) did not bar a plaintiff in 1945 from bringing an action on a 1926 judgment....

...interest in the property. The defendant in partition argued that the scire facias proceeding, which the creditor did not initiate until eight and a half years after the 1933 judgment, was barred by the seven year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(2), Florida Statutes (1941). [3] Id. at 669. The wording of the 1941 statute is similar in material respects to section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Petty, 5 Fla. 326 (1853)). In Young v. McKenzie , the supreme court considered whether proceedings supplementary under sections 55.51-55.61, Florida Statutes (1941) [4] were an "action upon a judgment" under the statute of limitations contained at section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1941). The supreme court agreed with the trial judge "that the `proceedings supplementary' [did] not constitute `an action upon the judgment'" within the meaning of section 95.11....

...rcement of, the final judgment rendered in the original cause"). We, therefore, hold that neither the 1999 garnishment proceeding nor the 1993 registration of the judgment under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 was an "action on a judgment" within the meaning of section 95.11(2)(a)....

...Over five years later, the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandamus in Leon County to compel payment. The first district held that the mandamus proceeding was barred by the five year statute of limitations applicable to "an action on a judgment or decree of... any court of the United States." Id. at 595 (quoting section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1974))....

...h as scire facias, garnishment, proceedings supplementary, or discovery in aid of execution. While mandamus in Kiesel may have been objectionable as a collection device on some other ground, it was not an "action on a judgment" within the meaning of section 95.11(2)(a)....

...nd independent action subject to the statute of limitations. However, the use of mandamus proceedings in Kiesel was more analogous to the proceedings supplementary at issue in Young. Also, mandamus is not the common law action on a judgment to which section 95.11(2)(a) refers. For similar reasons, we disagree with the eleventh circuit's conclusion that post judgment discovery in aid of execution was an action on a judgment under section 95.11(2)(a)....

...e execution of a judgment already obtained." B.A. Lott, 14 So.2d at 669; Massey, 100 So. at 171-72. Finally, we disagree with In re Kilby, 196 B.R. 627 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1996), which held that a garnishment proceeding was an action on a judgment under section 95.11(2)(a)....

...In this case such a showing nullifies the necessary element of malice, since it establishes probable cause to initiate the garnishment as a matter of law. More than just a reasonable interpretation of Florida law justified National Union's use of garnishment in February 1999. As we have held above, section 95.11(2) does not bar the garnishment proceeding in federal court, based on B.A. Lott and Young. The writ of garnishment was issued over one month before Balfour Beatty Bahamas was decided on March 25, 1999. In 1996, the eleventh circuit certified a question, concerning application of section 95.11 arising out of the United States District for the Northern District of Florida; the question asked "what is the appropriate statute of limitations for an action brought in a federal court in Florida involving a judgment entered by that same court?" Leasco Response, Inc....

...two additional seven year periods by rerecording, subject to the limitation that no lien created by section 55.10 could extend "beyond the period provided for in s. 55.081." § 55.10(4), Fla. Stat. (1999); see § 55.10(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). [3] Section 95.11(2), Florida Statutes (1941), provided: 95.11 Limitations upon actions other than real actions.—Actions other than those for the recovery of real property can only be commenced as follows: ....

...4th DCA 2000), we held that an attempt to register a dormant and unrevived judgment of another state under the Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, §§ 55.501-55.509, Fla. Stat. (1999), was an "action on a judgment" subject to the bar of the statute of limitations of section 95.11(2)(a)....

...We analogized such a situation to "bringing an entirely separate action on a judgment." Muka, 766 So.2d at 241. We did not decide in Muka, and do not reach in this case, whether an attempt to register a valid judgment under the Act would be an "action on a judgment" within the meaning of section 95.11(2)(a)....

...courts unless there is some persuasive indication that the Supreme Court would decide the case differently. See McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 2002). The Florida statute of limitations for a wrongful death action is two years. See FLA. STAT. ch. 95.11(4)(d)....

...The delayed discovery rule was codified by the Florida legislature in 1999. See FLA. STAT. ch. 95.031 (2002). Appellants concede § 95.031 does not specifically extend the delayed discovery doctrine to wrongful death actions. That statute provides as follows: An action for products liability under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence ....

...postponing accrual where there is delayed discovery. Davis v. Monahan, 832 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla. 2002). It is plain from the statutory text that the delayed discovery rule of § 95.031(2)(b) applies only to products liability actions under § 95.11(3), not wrongful death actions which are governed by § 95.11(4)(d)....

...childhood sexual abuse.” Id. at 712; see also Hearndon, 767 So. 2d at 1186. In addition, the Hearndon court noted that the Florida Legislature had statutorily extended the delayed discovery rule to cases of childhood abuse with a 1992 amendment to FLA. STAT. ch. 95.11(7), though that amendment did not apply to the plaintiff in Hearndon....

...mportance: DOES THE SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST ADOPTED IN BATES V. COOK, 509 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 1987), FOR USE IN APPLYING FLORIDA'S BORROWING STATUTE, SECTION 95.10, FLORIDA STATUTES, ALSO APPLY TO CASES INVOLVING FLORIDA'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SECTION 95.11, FLORIDA STATUTES? Robinson v....

...We rephrase the question to read as follows: DOES THE SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST ADOPTED IN BATES V. COOK, 509 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 1987), FOR USE IN APPLYING FLORIDA'S BORROWING STATUTE, SECTION 95.10, FLORIDA STATUTES, ALSO APPLY TO CASES WHERE THE CLAIM IS TIME-BARRED UNDER FLORIDA'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SECTION 95.11, FLORIDA STATUTES? We answer the rephrased question in the affirmative....

...which tolls the statute of limitations on infants' claims while they are minors, makes her claim viable under West Virginia law. Robinson further argues that this limitations provision governs the action rather than the limitations period imposed by section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1993).[ [4] ] Thus, the question to be settled here is whether Florida's statute of limitations was properly applied to a tort action which arose in West Virginia and which is not barred by that state's statute of limitations....

...have been suffered for which relief is provided by law. We see no reason to refrain from employing the "significant relationship" test to conflict of law issues concerning limitation periods generally, thereby treating conflicts of law pertaining to section 95.11 consistently with conflicts concerning substantive law and with conflicting limitations periods affected by the borrowing statute. We therefore agree with the opinion below and likewise "read the language in Bates to be applicable to any conflict of law question concerning a statute of limitation, including section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1993)." Robinson, 700 So.2d at 725....

...The obvious meaning of this provision of the Restatement is that if the action is barred by the statute of limitations of the state in which the action is filed, that ends the inquiry. The action cannot proceed in that forum. Since the present action was barred by the Florida statute, section 95.11, that should end the inquiry in this case because the action cannot proceed in Florida according to this provision of the Restatement, which this Court cited and held to be pertinent in Bates....

...Hargis also filed a complaint on October 25, 1994, for medical negligence against the estate in Pinellas County, Florida. The estate moved to dismiss, arguing that the claim was time-barred under Florida's seven-year medical malpractice statute of repose, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...those statutory provisions have been upheld by that state in a proceeding involving these same parties. It is clear to me that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. NOTES [1] The trial court dismissed appellant's complaint as barred by section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...full age or sane that is allowed to a person having no such impediment to bring the same after the right accrues... except that it shall in no case be brought after twenty years from the time when the right accrues. W. Va.Code § 55-2-15 (1995). [4] Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1993), provides in part: ....

...es, or in a foreign country, and its laws forbid the maintenance of the action because of lapse of time, no action shall be maintained in this state." [6] In answering this conflict of law question, it is immaterial for purposes of our analysis that section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), is characterized as a statute of repose versus a statute of limitation....

...Broward County, 505 So.2d 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). The Fourth District found Carr's medical malpractice action, filed more than nine years after the alleged incident causing brain damage to her newborn child, was barred by the statute of repose provisions contained in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...t and that the Carrs, despite their due diligence, were unable to discover the facts and circumstances surrounding prenatal and obstetrical care and the care rendered during birth. The trial court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss, applying section 95.11(4)(b). Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), reads in pertinent part: (b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident...

...On appeal, the Fourth District determined that the brain damage injury to the Carr infant was a completed fact at the time of birth and the cause of action was permanently barred after September, 1982, by the seven-year statute of repose provision contained in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...Dreis and Krump Mfg. Co., 515 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1987). We find that the Fourth District Court recognized the principles of Kluger and properly applied them in determining that the legislature had found an overriding public necessity in its enactment of section 95.11(4)(b)....

...ale fraud claim in determining a reasonable period for the statute of repose, and further find seven years is an objectively reasonable period within which the legislature may require fraud claims be discovered. We agree with the district court that section 95.11(4)(b) was properly grounded on an announced public necessity and no less stringent measure would obviate the problems the legislature sought to address, and thus the statute does not violate the access-to-courts provision....

...LILES, WOODIE A., Associate Judge (Retired). This is an appeal from an order holding that an action on a judgment of the United States District Court, even though that court is located within the State of Florida, is controlled by the five-year period of limitation as set forth in Section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...t Appellees make payment. An Alternative Writ of Mandamus commanding Appellees to make payment or show cause why they have not done so was then issued. Appellees filed their return claiming, among other things, that the cause of action was barred by Section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes, in that the suit was filed more than five years after the accrual of the cause of action on July 19, 1973, and more than one year after the effective date of Chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida....

...The issue presented by this appeal is whether an action on the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida is governed by a five-year statute of limitation or a twenty-year statute of limitation. The applicable sections of the Florida Statutes are: Section 95.11(1), which provides that "an action upon a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state" shall commence within twenty years of said judgment or decree; and Section 95.11(2)(a), which provides that "an action on a judgment or decree of ....

...In this situation, the phrase "of any court of the United States" is more specific than "of a court of record in this state." The former clearly limits its scope to courts of the United States, while the latter could include both federal and state courts, as long as they are in Florida. Hence, it must be concluded that Section 95.11(2)(a) will operate as an *596 exception to, or a qualification of, the more general terms of Section 95.11(1)....

...atter covering "[judgments of] any court of the United States," are in direct conflict. Application of the principle set forth in State v. Hialeah, supra , and DeConingh v. Daytona Beach, supra , dictates that the latter provision, now enumerated in Section 95.11(2)(a), must govern. We, therefore, conclude that Section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes, is controlling in this cause....

...States Code provision relevant to this determination. The order appealed from is AFFIRMED. ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., J., concurs. BOOTH, J., dissenting. NOTES [1] Prior to January 1, 1975, the time period for the running of the statute of limitation in Section 95.11(2)(a), F.S., was seven years....

...she alleged that all of the named defendants conspired to prevent her from reporting the alleged abuse. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint because the statute of limitations barred Roof's cause of action pursuant to sections 95.011 and 95.11(3)( o ), Florida Statutes (1991). [1] While the case was pending before the Second District Court of Appeal, the Florida Legislature, in chapter 92-102, Laws of Florida, amended section 95.11 to read: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ......

...r within 4 years after the injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse, whichever occurs later. § 95.11, Fla....

...gency or officer of any of them, or any other governmental authority, shall be barred unless begun within the time prescribed in this chapter or, if a different time is prescribed elsewhere in these statutes, within the time prescribed elsewhere. Subsection 95.11(3)( o ), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ......

...We held that the order should be reversed because the facts alleged in the complaint revealed that the defendant doctor had fraudulently concealed his negligent treatment of the minor child and fraudulently concealed the cause of death. In so holding, the court determined that Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), effective May 20, 1975 (Laws of Florida, 75-9), was controlling. The cause was then remanded to the trial court for further consistent proceedings; appellee affirmatively defended by alleging that the claim was barred by the applicable provisions of Section 95.11 because the cause of action had accrued, and was known or should have been known to plaintiff more than two years before the filing of the action....

...igence. Appellant filed his complaint on July 13, 1976, and at trial proved that his daughter, *484 Brenda Alford, died on September 27, 1972, nearly four years before the filing of the complaint. The statute in effect at the time of Brenda's death, Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1971), amended the general four-year limitation period formerly provided in Section 95.11(4) and (6), Florida Statutes (1969), by reducing the time within which to bring such actions to two years, and provided also that "an action to recover damages for injuries to the person arising from any medical, ......

...[shall] not be deemed to have accrued until the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable care should have discovered, the injury." The accrual provisions of the amended statute pertaining to personal injury actions did not also encompass wrongful death actions. Neither did the 1974 amendment (Section 95.11(4)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Kennedy Memorial Hospital, 384 So.2d 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), affirmed in part, reversed in part, on other grounds, sub nom. Dober v. Worrell, 401 So.2d 1322 (Fla. 1981). It was not until the legislative amendments of 1975, see Chapter 75-9, Laws of Florida, effective May 20, 1975, passed as Section 95.11(4)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes (1975), that wrongful death actions were so covered....

...The amended statute defined "[a]n action for medical malpractice [as including] a claim in tort ... for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, ..., or surgical diagnosis [or] treatment... ." Section 95.11(4)(b) also required the action be filed "within two years from the time the incident ......

...Unless, then, the 1975 amended statute could be retroactively applied to the time plaintiff allegedly discovered the defendant's negligent acts (November 6, 1974), appellant's cause of action would normally have been required to be filed, by operation of Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1971), within two years from the date of Brenda's death. In 1974, at the same time the legislature enacted Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...applied unless the legislative intent to provide retroactive effect is expressed, clearly and manifestly. Id. In so ruling, the court held the plaintiff's malpractice action was barred because it was not filed within the two-year period required by Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973) (the action was deemed to have accrued on April 3, 1973), and because the provisions of Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), could not be retroactively applied. Thus, were it not for our prior opinion in this cause applying the provisions of Section 95.11(4)(b), effective May 20, 1975, to plaintiff's cause of action, appellant's wrongful death action would necessarily have been barred two years following the death of Brenda Alford....

...rual provisions of the statute were considered to apply to a death which occurred before the effective date of the amendment. [1] Yet, even though we consider that we are bound by our former opinion, it was incumbent, under the accrual provisions of Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), for appellant to prove that his action was "commenced within two years from the time the incident occurred giving rise to the action, or within two years from the time the accident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence......

...arge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law. The district court reversed, finding the action barred by section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), which provides that an "[a]ction to recover wages or overtime or *643 damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime" must be brought within two years. The court relied on Goehring, in which we found section 95.11(7)(b), the predecessor to section 95.11(4)(c), applicable to "all suits for wages or overtime, however accruing, as well as to suits for damages and penalties accruing under the laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime." Goehring, 231 So.2d at 515. The instant action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 is not a "suit for wages" for the purposes of section 95.11(4)(c). We recognize that in the absence of a controlling federal statute of limitations, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, relying on Goehring, have applied the two-year wage statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(4)(c) to federal statutory causes of actions for discriminatory employment termination....

...The legislature, however, enacted section 440.205 subsequent to Goehring, creating distinct limited statutory cause of action a for retaliatory discharge in the area of workers compensation. Claims under section 440.205 must be brought within the four-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(3)(f) for statutory causes of action....

...[*] Accordingly, we quash the district court's decision, and remand for consideration of the remaining issues not previously considered by the district court. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [*] Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1987), provides: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property....

...Our construction of these statutes requires that we modify Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650 to conform to this statutory interpretation. In order to understand the facts in this case, it is necessary to first examine the statutory provisions involved. The statutes at issue are sections 95.11(4)(b) and 766.106(2)-(4), Florida Statutes (1989). These sections set forth certain statutory prerequisites to the filing of a medical malpractice action, prerequisites that directly affect how the statute of limitations period for a malpractice action is computed. The pertinent part of section 95.11(4)(b) reads as follows: (b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence... . § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...Failure of the prospective defendant or insurer or self-insurer to reply to the notice within 90 days after receipt shall be deemed a final rejection of the claim for purposes of this section. ... . (4) The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11....

...ion contract. [3] Southwest's claim against Federal alleged a breach of the performance bond for failure to cure the general contractor's warranty violation. The trial court granted Federal's motion for a judgment on the pleadings, ruling that under section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), any claim arising under the performance bond was time-barred. [4] On appeal, the Second District reversed. The district court first noted that all parties agreed that section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), pertaining to causes of action based on written contracts, was the applicable statute of limitations....

...warranty." Id. The district court found that the trial court relied on School Board of Volusia County v. Fidelity Co. of Maryland, 468 So.2d 431 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), and that the Fifth District apparently relied upon the lack of tolling language in section 95.11(2)(b), to hold that the five-year limitation specified therein is an absolute bar in an action against a surety on a payment bond for latent defects that the owner discovers beyond the five-year period beginning with the acceptance of completion of the construction....

...It does this by explaining that the cause of action does not accrue until the latent defect is discovered and only then does the five-year statute of limitations begin to run. This analysis purely and simply attaches a tolling period to the statute of limitations applicable to the bond. It is the tolling provision in section 95.11(3)(c) which permits a cause of action beyond the four-year limitations period in this section. To make the latent defects actionable against the bonding company requires imposing a tolling period within section 95.11(2)(b), which School Board of Volusia County and this court have held is a legislative determination....

...y is relieved of any further responsibility. As to the statute of limitations for latent defects, we agree with the stipulation of the parties and with the district court that the applicable statute of limitations is the five-year period provided in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...However, we do not agree with the district court's majority that the five-year period would begin to accrue at a time other than acceptance of the construction. On this issue we agree with Judge Blue's dissent and quash the majority's decision. We expressly hold that section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), as it applies to an action on a performance bond, accrues on the date of acceptance of the project as having been completed according to terms and conditions set out in the construction contract. [5] We approve the decision of the Fifth District in Volusia County, in which the court stated: *1122 There is no comparable deferral of accrual of a cause of action for latent undiscovered defects in section 95.11(2)(b), unlike the four year statute of limitations found in section 95.11(3)(c).......

...atutory changes. We cannot reach any other conclusion unless we depart from the clear wording of the statutes and the substantial precedent interpreting them. Volusia County, 468 So.2d at 432-33 (footnote omitted). As the Fifth District pointed out, section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), makes no reference to a discovery rule for latent defects. Using the principle of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, we conclude that the absence of such express language in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), is clear evidence that the legislature did not intend to provide a discovery rule in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). To conclude otherwise would require us to write into section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), a discovery rule when the legislature has not....

...by TSE to initiate and prosecute the patent infringement suit and for the sums it paid *39 for Franklynn's attorney fees and expenses. [2] Larson moved for summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice in section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...g the cause of action occurs," § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2002), and that a legal malpractice action must be brought within two years "from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence," § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...mages are speculative until the underlying action is concluded with an adverse outcome to the client. .... We therefore hold, in those cases that proceed to final judgment, the two-year statute of limitations for litigation-related malpractice under section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), begins to run when final judgment becomes final....

...tion and one for the claims based on the post-trial sanctions. The statute of limitations requires that a legal malpractice action on a litigation-related claim be brought within two years after the cause of action is or should have been discovered, § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...ement constituting the [malpractice] cause of action occurs," § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2002)— that is, the element of "loss to the client," Law Office of David J. Stern, P.A., 969 So.2d at 966—and the cause of action is or should be "discovered," § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...ssential to our Silvestrone holding, is effectively removed from the analysis and the accrual of the cause of action occurs only when there is no further ongoing litigation related to the underlying action. This is inconsistent with the provision in section 95.11(4)(a) that "the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." When the underlying action was finally determined adversely to TSE, TSE...

...igation in which the client might assert a position inconsistent with the malpractice claim. Such a rule could not be reconciled with the commencement point—"the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered"—established in section 95.11(4)(a)....

...In sum, the position urged by TSE and the analysis employed by the Second District are wholly detached from the governing statute, which ties the running of the limitations period for lawyer malpractice claims to "the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered." § 95.11(4)(a)....

...Only with the entry of the settlement agreement was the existence of any harm to TSE arising from the sanctions claim determined with sufficient certainty to justify commencement of the limitations period. Accordingly, we conclude that the Fourth District's bifurcated approach is most consistent with section 95.11(4)(a) and our reasoning in Silvestrone....

...The district court reversed, holding that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until entry of the parties' joint stipulation on October 10, 2002. B. The Applicable Law Statute of limitations issues in litigation-related legal malpractice claims in Florida are governed by two main authorities. First, section 95.11, Florida Statutes (2002), sets forth a two-year limitations period for the filing of such claims. See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...n from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. However, the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional. § 95.11, Fla....

...t's judgment in the patent case became final for purposes of appeal. At that point, all the alleged acts of malpractice had occurred, [9] the malpractice cause of action had accrued, [10] and the malpractice cause of action had been "discovered" for section 95.11(4)(a) purposes, as explained below. Under Silvestrone, the section 95.11(4)(a) discovery requirement is satisfied when a court issues its final judgment on the merits in the underlying case and that judgment (a) is adverse to the client, and (b) results in damage to the client, and (c) is final for purposes of appeal. Silvestrone, 721 So.2d at 1175-76. At that point, the client suffers redressable harm in the form of the final judgment and, based on that harm, the client is imputed with "discovery" of the malpractice cause of action under section 95.11(4)(a)....

...ge to TSE, and became final for purposes of appeal on September 16, 2002. At that point, TSE suffered redressable harm in the form of the final judgment and, based on that harm, TSE was imputed with discovery of the malpractice cause of action under section 95.11(4)(a)....

...This general rule, which is termed the discovery rule, was adopted by the Court in Brooks and has been operative in Florida ever since, for over half a century. See Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 2000). In 1974, the Legislature codified the rule specifically for professional malpractice claims in section 95.11(4)(a), see ch....

...74-382, § 7, at 1211, Laws of Fla., and the language of this statute could not be clearer in this respect: "[T]he period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...illary to, and . . . is incidental to the main adjudication."). Further, the fact that the attorney fees award was not final and was subject to reversal on appeal is immaterial for purposes of the "discovery" of the malpractice cause of action under section 95.11(4)(a), for the bright-line rule of Silvestrone is based not on the finality of a post-judgment *52 ruling on an ancillary matter, but on the finality of the final judgment on the merits....

...ater discovered its additional malpractice damages (i.e., when Franklynn's attorney fees and expenses were agreed upon), those two opinions, to my mind, abrogate the discovery rule and violate legislative intent as evidenced in the plain language of section 95.11(4)(a)....

...efinitively concludes the underlying litigation, there remains an unremitting risk that the client will be forced to seek new counsel and to prematurely initiate malpractice litigation for fear of triggering the two-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes....

...ons of the contract requiring Janis to obtain liability insurance and to keep the construction area clean and follow safety precautions. In Abbott Lab., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital, 765 So.2d 737, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), the court held that "[u]nder section 95.11(2)(b), the limitations period begins to run when `the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.' § 95.031(1), Fla....

...Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the two causes of action for breach of contract. We reverse the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action and remand for further proceedings. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. STEVENSON and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. MAY, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1994), provides: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (2) Within five years.— (b) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a writ...

...liable for actions taken in the scope of her employment. She is correct on all three grounds. First, Mr. Navarro’s claim for false imprisonment against ASA Miller— and otherwise—is barred by the relevant statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(o)....

...This is so for the length of the statute of limitations: It is that which the State . provides for personal-injury torts.”). In Florida, the statute of limita *1365 tions for false arrest/false imprisonment 4 claims is four years. See Harris v. Goderich, 608 Fed.Appx. 760, 763-64 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(o))....

...on November 23, 2010, and the search of Plaintiffs home on June 3, 2010, and any allegedly unlawful seizure of his property connected with same, would also be barred by Florida’s four year statute of limitations. Compl. ¶¶ 49, 56; see Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)....

...See, e.g., Christman v. Walsh, 416 Fed.Appx. 841, 844 (11th Cir. 2011). H. City of Riviera Beach, ECF No. [13] All seven counts in the Complaint are asserted against the City of Riviera Beach—and all seven fail as either time-barred, see Fla. Stat. § 95.11 , or precluded by absolute and/or qualified immunity....

...Recognizing the implications of Nardone, the major thrust of Mrs. Shapiro's argument in this Court is that the case no longer applies because of later amendments to the applicable statute of limitations. The applicable statute of limitations in Nardone was section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1965), which provided: Actions other than those for the recovery of real property can only be commenced as follows: ......

...— Any action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter. Thereafter, the legislature created a specific statute of limitations for medical malpractice, and that statute has been amended several times. The statute applicable to the instant case was section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), [2] which reads in pertinent part: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the inc...

...The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions states that a claim must be brought "within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action ... is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...the phrase "cause of action" substituted in its place. [3] By changing the terminology, the legislature clearly intended to change the commencement of the running of the statute to the time when the negligence or malpractice was discovered: "[U]nder 95.11(4) the plaintiff would have two years from the date of discovery of the malpractice....

...According to her, she simply had no reason to suspect malpractice until she visited a second doctor. The present ruling also renders the statute's period of repose dubious. The statute provides that "in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident." § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...The complaint was not amended to claim wrongful death. [2] This statute remains unchanged to date. [1] I note that the statute contains a four year period of repose, which provides that "in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident." § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence"). [6] Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 181 was incorporated with "[n]o substantial changes" into House Bill 1267 and was enacted as section 7 of chapter 75-9, Laws of Florida. The section was codified as section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...f limitations is extended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...l itself of such relief, a suit for declaratory decree may not be sought to alter or reverse the prior decision). The action was also untimely as to the 1981 judgment because the complaint was not filed within the four-year timeframe provided for by section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1995). The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief in connection with prior judgments entered in the 1972 case. As no specific statute of limitation governs such an action, it is controlled by the four-year provision of section 95.11(3)(p)....

...The only counts remaining in Patten's third and final amended complaint were for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting. Winderman filed a second amended motion for summary judgment raising one ground. He argued that Patten's actions were barred by section 95.11, Florida Statutes (2006), claiming that accounting and breach of fiduciary duty are intentional torts governed by the four-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)( o ), Fla....

...other considerations."). Although Patten's claim for an accounting is an equitable action, it concerns the same subject matter as his claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, his claim that laches applies to his accounting claim fails because section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (2006), provides in pertinent part: Laches shall bar any action unless it is commenced within the time period provided for legal actions concerning the same subject matter regardless of lack of knowledge by the pers...

...oth counts of Patten's complaint. Affirmed. GUNTHER, J., and METZGER, ELIZABETH A., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Patten and Winderman agree that breach of fiduciary duty is an intentional tort subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)( o ), Fla....

...orceable where rendered can be registered in Florida beyond the time periods expressed in Florida's statute of limitations. We also hold, regarding the second certified question, that the twenty-year statute of limitations found in subsection (1) of section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1995), is applicable to actions to enforce foreign country money judgments in Florida....

...eign jurisdictions. In order to promote this policy, the court stated that judgments still cognizable in a foreign jurisdiction should be recognized in Florida courts. Additionally, the Fifth District found that the twenty-year limitations period in section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes (1995), should apply to foreign judgments....

...reign Money Judgment Recognition Act (UFMJRA). First, we must decide whether there is a time limitation imposed on the registration of foreign judgments in Florida. Second, we must determine which general provision concerning statutes of limitation, section 95.11(1) or 95.11(2), applies to either the registration or enforcement of a foreign judgment....

...We turn then, as the Fifth District did, to Florida's general statutory provisions to determine a limitations period. In so doing, we seek to reconcile the policy underlying the UFMJRA of adequately affording reciprocal treatment of foreign judgments with our express limitations periods. Florida's Statute of Limitations Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1995), provides, in pertinent part: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (1) WITHIN TWENTY YEARS—An action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state....

...gment sought to be enforced is enforceable in the originating jurisdiction. The Fifth District further determined that once a foreign judgment is registered the twenty-year statute of limitations for enforcement of domestic judgments provided for in section 95.11(1) is applicable. On the other hand, Nadd asserts section 95.11(2)(a) should apply to registration of foreign judgments measured from the time the judgments were rendered in the originating jurisdiction; the trial court agreed with this argument and barred registration....

...everal had arisen under a similar uniform law, the UEFJA. [7] While this examination gives us an understanding of the scope of each of these uniform acts and an appreciation of the purposes for each, we find that the *1230 language of the UFMJRA and section 95.11, when read in pari materia, demonstrates the correctness of the district court's decision. Application of UFMJRA and Section 95.11 to This Case The UFMJRA provides in pertinent parts as follows: 55.601 Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act; short title....

...[9] The UFMJRA specifically requires the recognized judgment be "enforced in the same manner as the judgment of a court of this state." One of the requirements for enforcement of judgments of this state is that the judgment be enforced with the time constraints of section 95.11. Section 95.11(1) provides that an action to enforce a judgment of a court of record of this state must be commenced within twenty years....

...This interpretation gives full effect to the legislative intent to ensure reciprocal favorable treatment of Florida judgments in foreign countries. We do not believe the Legislature wished to subject foreign judgments under the UFMJRA to the enforcement limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(a), since to do so would severely impede similar recognition of Florida judgments....

...ey judgment is that the judgment be enforceable where rendered; Florida's statute of limitations does not affect the recognition portion of a UFMJRA action. In answer to the second certified question, we hold that the twenty-year period contained in section 95.11(1) should be applied to actions brought to enforce a foreign judgment once it has become domesticated through the registration and recognition phase of the UFMJRA....

...4th DCA 1997) (when decedent's daughter and her children sought to have a settlement agreement with decedent's widow declared void, widow counterclaimed seeking enforcement of a 1991 Canadian cost judgment; the appeals court affirmed trial court's decision that beneficiaries' suit was time barred under section 95.11).

...The trial court agreed with Nissan, entering summary judgment in its favor. On appeal the district court reversed, holding section 95.031(2) inapplicable in wrongful death actions. In reaching this conclusion the court looked first to the various limitations set forth in sections 95.11 and 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983). Section 95.11 provides in pertinent part: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ........

........ (j) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud. ..... (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS. — ..... (d) An action for wrongful death. Section 95.031(2) dealing with computation of time under chapter 95 provides: Actions for products liability and fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser or within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have been discovered....

...The district court reasoned that since this action was a wrongful death action pursuant to section 768.19 [1] rather than a products liability action, "by its very language, section 95.031(2) does not apply and, rather, the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions found in section 95.11(4)(d) applies." 487 So.2d at 1097. Nissan concedes that it is section 95.11(4)(d) rather than section 95.11(3) which is the applicable statute of limitations in this action but argues that the twelve-year statute of repose set forth in section 95.031(2) applies to bar what Nissan characterizes as the underlying products liability cause of action....

...e of the statute of limitations," 457 So.2d at 1378-79, that issue was never actually reached by this Court. In Ash we held that wrongful death actions based on medical malpractice would be governed by the medical malpractice statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...This conclusion was based solely on the fact that the statute of limitations at issue specifically defined an action for medical malpractice as including "a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of ... death" and thus, clearly expressed the legislature's intent that section 95.11(4)(b) apply to wrongful death actions based on medical malpractice. 457 So.2d at 1379, quoting § 95.11(4)(b)....

...ongful death action. We agree with the district court that "by its very language section 95.031(2) does not apply [to wrongful death actions]." 487 So.2d at 1097. Section 95.031(2) specifically refers to "the actions for products liability ... under s. 95.11(3)." Section 965.031(2) makes no reference to wrongful death actions under section 95.11(4)(d); nor does either section 95.11(3) or section 95.031(2) refer to actions for damages because of death....

...While wrongful death actions are authorized to be filed within two years of the death of the decedent, this does not have the effect of tacking additional time on the statute of repose. The absence of any reference in section 95.031(2) to the provisions of section 95.11(4)(d) is of no moment because the statute of repose is only directed to limiting fraud and product liability actions, both of which are delineated under section 95.11(3)....

...When her husband died, she had more than six months to bring suit even under the statute of repose. However, because the statute of repose had been declared invalid in Battilla, she had no reason to believe that she did not have the full two years provided by section 95.11(4)(d)....

...D. The clinics’ final contention on the merits is that Allstate’s fraud claims are barred by Florida’s statute of limitations. Under Florida law, an action for fraud must be brought within four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j)....

...Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint because Freundlich had failed to serve the requisite notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation, § 768.57(2), Fla. Stat. (1985), [1] on petitioners University of Miami and Dr. Scheinberg within the applicable statute of limitations period, § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...ety-day screening period. § 768.57(4). In order to toll the statute of limitations, however, a plaintiff must adhere to the mandate of section 768.57(2), and serve a notice of intent to initiate litigation within the limitations period set forth in section 95.11....

...tration; review. — ... . (2) Prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, a claimant shall serve upon each prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, a notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice. [2] Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property....

...rred by the two year statute of limitations. Appellant's basic contention on appeal is that her wrongful death claim brought pursuant to § 768.01, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., is not barred by the two year statute of limitations on such actions set forth in § 95.11(6), Fla....

...s claims brought in her capacity as the widow of Charles M. Walker, deceased, because her claim in that capacity was barred by the two year statute of limitations on wrongful death actions. It is from this judgment that appellant brings this appeal. Section 95.11(6), Fla....

...o run from the date of death, or whether, as appellant contends, from the time the person entitled to sue discovers or should have discovered the particular cause of death, even though the date of death is known. It is our opinion that the intent of § 95.11(6), Fla....

...We accepted jurisdiction to answer the following question certified to be of great public importance: DO THE EXTENSIONS OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ALLOWED BY SECTIONS 766.104(2) AND 766.106(4), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), ALSO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF REPOSE CONTAINED IN SECTION 95.11(4)( [b]), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? Id. at 625. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We rephrase the certified question as follows: WHETHER A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION IS "COMMENCED" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN SECTION 95.11(4)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), WHEN THE PLAINTIFF PETITIONS FOR AN AUTOMATIC 90-DAY EXTENSION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 766.104(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), IN ORDER TO *947 CONDUCT THE "REASONABLE INVESTIGATION" REQU...

...MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW In the case below, the Second District considered whether the extensions of the medical malpractice statute of limitations provided for in sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1989), likewise extend the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose residing in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...2d DCA 1991), wherein it held that the four-year statute of repose was tolled by the service of a notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation because "[t]he `statute of repose' is subsumed in the general term `statute of limitations' of section 95.11(4)." Parham, 704 So.2d at 625....

...and repose, and her reading of this Court's caselaw for the proposition that the time periods of each operate in isolation and independent of the other. Id. LAW AND ANALYSIS Resolution of this case will be determined by the interplay among sections 95.11(4)(b); [1] 766.104(2); [2] and 766.106(2), [3] Florida Statutes (1989), and the application of our prior caselaw construing various provisions of chapter 766....

...1996) (detailing the numerous procedural requirements of chapter 766). Stringent presuit investigatory requirements are the hallmarks of this framework. Appended to this statutory scheme are the two-year statute of limitations and four-year statute of repose found in section 95.11(4)(b), [5] which at least one commentator has argued "protect health care providers in a way no other class of defendants is protected." Scott R....

...766.106, and the accompanying tolling of the statute of the limitations so the prospective defendants may investigate the basis of the claim against them. Juxtaposed against the investigation requirements of chapter 766 is the limitations period of section 95.11(4)(b), which includes the two-year statute of limitations and four-year statute of repose....

...tive determination that there must be an outer limit beyond which medical malpractice suits may not be instituted," id. at 421, and, indeed, we have upheld its constitutionality. See Carr v. Broward County, 541 So.2d 92, 95 (Fla. 1989) (holding that section 95.11(4)(b) "was properly grounded on an announced public necessity and no less stringent measure would obviate the problems the legislature sought to address")....

...The present issue arises because subsections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4) provide, respectively, an extension to and tolling of the statute of limitations within the statutory presuit and investigation framework, but are silent as to the statute of repose. This results in an inconsistency because section 95.11(4)(b) mandates that the statute of repose runs four years "from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued," but section 766.106 does not allow an action to be filed in court until a notice of intent...

...Otherwise, the presuit screening and investigation requirements would be in conflict with article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, [7] and thus be unconstitutional. We reach this conclusion because on the one hand, the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b) cannot, in this context, be viewed in isolation; and, more importantly, we simply cannot ignore the unique presuit screening requirements embodied in the medical malpractice statutory framework....

...to the clerk of the court filed pursuant to section 766.104(2) and that the tolling provisions of these statutes and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(d) applicable to the statute of limitations are equally applicable to the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...Department of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1087-90 (Fla. 1987) (invalidating portion of statute capping all noneconomic damages as violative of article I, section 21, while upholding remaining portions of act). We are also mindful of our obligation to construe section 95.11(4)(b) and sections 766.104(2) and 106(4) in such a manner to give effect to each statute....

...As a final note, we hasten to add that prospective plaintiffs still must pursue their claims in a timely manner if no presuit settlement is reached. Our decision today in no way shields potential plaintiffs from the running of the two-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(b), if they sit on their rights after the tolling and extension provisions of chapter 766 have expired....

...s access to the courts, while at the same time carrying out the legislative policy of screening out frivolous lawsuits and defenses"). Accordingly, we hold that a medical malpractice action is "commenced" for the purposes of the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b) when the prospective claimant files for the automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations under section 766.104(2) in order to comply with the requirement to conduct a "reasonable investigation" of possible medical...

...nitiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106(4). We further hold that the tolling provisions of these statutes and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(d) applicable to the statute of limitations are equally applicable to the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...easoning contained herein, and amend Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(d) as detailed above. It is so ordered. HARDING, C.J., SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., and KOGAN, Senior Justice, concur. OVERTON, Senior Justice, dissents. NOTES [1] Section 95.11(4)(b) provides in part: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been di...

...The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run. [3] Section 766.106(4) provides, in pertinent part: The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11....

...Perry, 718 So.2d 859 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), and the statutory notice requirements in defamation actions under section 770.01, Florida Statutes (1997). See Mancini v. Personalized Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 702 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). [5] Of course, section 95.11(4)(b) also contains a seven-year statute of repose which is implicated when "it can be shown that fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented the discovery of the injury within the 4-year period." However, for...

...Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)). [9] We similarly reject Parham's argument that the statute of repose is "subsumed" within the statute of limitation because the word "repose" is never mentioned. See Carr, 541 So.2d at 94 (noting that section 95.11(4)(b) prescribes a two-year statute of limitations, a four-year statute of repose, and a seven-year statute of repose where fraud is alleged)....

...he same language: "In any event, the action must be begun within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action." § 95.051(1)(d),(h), Fla. Stat. (1997). Although using slightly different language, the legal effect of section 95.11(4)(b)'s statute of repose is the same: "however, in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued." In both instances, the mandatory language "must" or "shall" is used and a date certain for when the cause of action must be brought or forever extinguished is also made plain on the face of the statute. Moreover, within section 95.11 itself, the four-year statute of limitations for actions related to the design, planning, or construction of real property improvements carries with it a fifteen-year statute of repose, so indicated by the words, "In any event, the action must be commenced within 15 years. ..." § 95.11(3)(c), Fla....

...ined in chapter 95, titled "Limitations of Actions; Adverse Possession." Georgia's medical malpractice statute of repose is likewise contained in a chapter titled "Limitations of Actions." Ga.Code Ann. § 9-3-71 (1998). Section 9-3-71 also resembles section 95.11 in that both the statute of limitation and statute of repose are found there....

...Jacksonville General Hospital, Inc., et al., 365 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The First District Court of Appeal's decision directly conflicts with a decision of the Fourth District on the same point of law, i.e., the effect of subsequent amendments upon the application of section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...Appellees, Homemakers and MPP, thereafter sought certiorari review in this Court. Whether or not Mrs. Gonzales' claim is barred by the statute of limitations depends on our construction and application of the statute, as it stood when her cause of action accrued, and the subsequent amendments thereto. § 95.11(6), Fla. Stat. (1973); §§ 95.022, 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1974); § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1975). The cause of action here accrued on April 2, 1973. On that date, when Mrs. Gonzales experienced pain from the injection, she discovered or should have discovered the injury. The statute of limitations in force on April 2, 1973, was section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973), which provided in part: Limitations upon actions other than for the recovery of real property....

...[A]n action to recover damages for injuries to the person arising from any medical ... treatment ..., the cause of action in such cases not to be deemed to have accrued until the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable care should have discovered, the injury. Clearly, had section 95.11(6) remained unamended until April 3, 1975, Mrs. Gonzales' cause of action would be barred by the statute, since no action of any kind was begun until November 12, 1975. However, section 95.11(6) was amended by section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...n from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. However, the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional. § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...om the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued... . The limitation of actions within this subsection shall be limited to the health-care provider and persons in privity with the provider of health care. ..... *967 § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1975) (effective date May 20, 1975). In finding that Mrs. Gonzales' action was not barred by the statute of limitations, the First District Court of Appeal held that upon January 1, 1975, the amended section 95.11(4)(a) became applicable to then-existing causes of action, superseding section 95.11(6). The Court then found section 95.11(4)(a), applying to actions for professional malpractice, inapplicable due to a perceived lack of the required privity between appellee Gonzales and appellants Homemakers and MPP. Instead the Court classified the action as one founded on negligence or alternatively as one not specifically provided for in the statute. Either classification carries a four-year period of limitation. §§ 95.11(3)(a), (p), Fla....

...In that case, the plaintiff lost the use of an arm after surgery to remove a tumor from her neck. The action accrued February 8, 1973, and suit was filed on June 27, 1975. The Court found the action to be barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Acknowledging the intervening amendment to section 95.11, the Court stated: [I]n the absence of any express, clear or manifest legislative intent to apply Section 95.11(4) [Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974)] retroactively, we conclude that it does not apply to causes of action occurring prior to its effective date. We hold that the applicable statute of limitations in this case is Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...The rule was correctly stated in Brooks that a statute of limitations will be prospectively applied unless the legislative intent to provide retroactive effect is express, clear and manifest. See also Foley v. Morris, 339 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1976) (disallowing retroactive application of § 95.11(6), Fla. Stat. (1973)). Reviewing chapter 95 in its entirety we find no express, clear or manifest intent that section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...t for those sections of chapter 95 which either lengthened or retained periods of limitations previously defined. The impact of our holding in the instant case is that the statute of limitations applicable to Mrs. Gonzales' claim for all purposes is section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973), which provides a two-year period of limitation. Neither of the subsequent amendments to chapter 95 disrupted the application of section 95.11(6) since there is no evidence of legislative intent of retroactivity. In the final analysis, Mrs. Gonzales' claim accrued on April 3, 1973, but no action was taken thereon within two years, so her action is barred by section 95.11(6). *968 Having so decided, there is no need to determine whether privity exists between petitioners and respondents as required by section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974) and section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...ndominium and must be removed by the Association under its duty to maintain the common elements." In addition to ordering the Association to remove two of the enclosures, the court also awarded Daugherty's attorney's fees. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1998), provides, in relevant part: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: * * * (2) Within five years.— * * * (b) A legal or equitable action on a contract.......

...4th DCA 1998), the Association argues that Daugherty's claim for injunctive relief was substantively a claim for specific performance of the declaration of condominium, and, as a result, the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations period for specific performance. [2] See § 95.11(5)(a), Fla....

...See 48 Fla. Jur.2d Specific Performance § 3 (2000). Daugherty argues that it can equally be said that enforcement of the rights and duties set forth in the declaration of condominium is "a legal or equitable action on a contract" within the scope of section 95.11(2)(b)....

...Banyon moved to dismiss the amended counterclaim as to all counts, asserting that they were permissive and not compulsory counterclaims. As such, they were subject to the applicable statute of limitations, which Banyon asserts is two years as to all Callaway claims under section 95.11(4)(g), Florida Statutes....

...ct agreement). In light of the fact that a permissive counterclaim is subject to the applicable statute of limitations, the trial court correctly held that the action for disparagement of title was barred by the two year statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(g), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...4th DCA 1975). The various injuries resulting from it are merely items of damage arising from the same wrong. Id. We recognize that abuse of process and interference with contract are torts normally governed by the four year statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(p)....

...The opinion holds that the disparagement of title claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule Industries, Inc., 68 So.2d 180, 182 (Fla.1953) held that the two-year statute of limitation for libel and slander applied to disparagement or slander of title claims. [2] The wording of section 95.11(4)(g) is the same as section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1953), in force at the time of Old Plantation....

...h opinion. GROSS, J., concurring specially. I concur in the denial of appellants' motion for rehearing. I write only to clarify a portion of my concurring opinion issued October 2, 2002. The concurring opinion imprecisely states that "the wording of section 95.11(4)(g) is the same as section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1953)." Appellants have pointed out that "the statutes are not the same." Appellants are correct....

...I intended the quoted sentence from the concurring opinion to refer to the use of the terms "libel" and "slander" and not to the entire sections. NOTES [1] We have considered, and reject, the argument that Old Plantation was overruled by statutory modifications to section 95.11 by its 1974 revision....

...v. Flanagan, 629 So.2d 113 (Fla.1993), Excavation contends that the court erred in refusing to apply the delayed discovery doctrine to its tortious interference with business relationship, and unfair and deceptive trade practice claims. We disagree. Section 95.11(3) of the Florida Statutes (1989) provides a four year statute of limitations for tortious interference, and for unfair and deceptive trade practice claims. See § 95.11(3)(f); ( o ), Fla....

...did not apply to the plaintiff's cause of action based on an alleged breach of a construction contract since the applicable statute of limitations contained no deferral in the accrual of a cause of action based upon latent undiscovered defects. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...of contract claims). Applying this same reasoning, we hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the delayed discovery doctrine is not applicable to causes of action for tortious interference and unfair and deceptive trade practices because section 95.11(3) is silent on the issue....

...e parties agree that the trial court dismissed the action upon finding that the factual allegations in the complaint sound in medical malpractice, and that appellant's action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice, section 95.11(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1989). Section 95.11(4)(b) provides in pertinent part: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time of the incident giving rise to the action occurred......

...An "action for medical malpractice" is defined as: ... a claim in tort or contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment or care by any provider of health care. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...Rankin v. Colman, 476 So.2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) rev. denied, 484 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1986); Price v. Morgan, 436 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) rev. denied, 447 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1984). We hold that the above counts, as alleged, do not fall within the ambit of section 95.11(4)(b)....

...On May 10, 1989, Buyer filed a counterclaim for specific performance, breach of contract, and tortious interference with business relationships. The counterclaim asked for $65 million in damages. Sellers responded that the claim for specific performance was time-barred because it was not filed within one year, as required by section 95.11(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...fic performance. The mere fact of entering into a contract for purchase and sale thus could become a risky venture, giving buyers great pause. All of these results are contrary to the public policy of Florida, as expressed in legal authority such as section 95.11(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), which seek to encourage the alienability of real property....

...than a one-time $150,000 “referral fee,” which it did in December 2004. On summary judgment, the district court concluded that Merle Wood’s claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment were time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations, Fla. Stat. § 95.11, because they accrued prior to ∗ Honorable Eugene E....

...Merle Wood argues that its claims relating to 3 It is undisputed that four years is the applicable limitations period as Merle Wood’s claims involve a “legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument,” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(k), or in the alternative an “action not specifically provided for in these statutes,” id. § 95.11(3)(p). 3  Case: 12-11680 Date Filed: 04/15/2013 Page: 4 of 11 the second yacht did not accrue until the client made each installment payment on the yacht and “each part...

...oreclose Merle Wood’s effort to circumvent Florida’s statute of limitations. III. CONCLUSION Merle Wood’s quantum meruit and unjust enrichment causes of action are time-barred under Fla. Stat. § 95.11....

...Morris, 339 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1976), the language of which appears to me to be controlling. The facts are not in dispute. Appellant's cause of action accrued on August 16, 1973, the date of its loss. At that time the applicable statute of limitations was F.S. 95.11(5)(c), *109 Florida Statutes 1973....

...Appellant's complaint was filed on October 26, 1976, more than three years after its cause of action accrued. Upon appropriate proceedings, the learned trial judge ruled that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant contends that enactment by the legislature of Chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida (F.S. 95.11(3)(h) Florida Statutes 1975), which became effective January 1, 1975, the period of limitation on its claim was extended to four years and that therefore its complaint was timely. The issue, therefore, is whether the enactment of Chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida, brought forward into the official Florida statutes as Section 95.11(3)(h), Florida Statutes 1975, which became effective January 1, 1975, operated to extend the period of limitation for the filing of appellant's claim....

...It seems obvious that a statute which sets a time limit for the trial of an action is a "when" question, not a "how" question. Like statutes of limitation, which define when an action must be commenced, section 39.048 defines when a lawsuit must be commenced and tried. See, e.g., § 95.11, Fla....

...This Court has previously held that statutes of limitations create substantive rights that cannot be abrogated by rules of procedure. See Lundstrom v. Lyon, 86 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla. 1956). Section 39.048(7) operates exactly like a statute of limitations. For example, under section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), an action for negligence "shall be barred" unless it is filed within four years from the date of the last element constituting the tort. Id.; § 95.11 (emphasis added)....

...The conversion of the petition from mandamus to certiorari was therefore unnecessary. This error had no bearing on these proceedings, however, as both remedies are subject to a 30 day jurisdictional time limit. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.100(c)(1) and Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.630(c) (certiorari); § 95.11(8), Fla....

...Therefore, under the statute, if notice of the incident is given on the last day, then suit could be delayed by the state's inaction until three-and-a-half years after the incident (three years for notice plus six months for denial), thus falling within the four-year statute of limitations for negligence. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...ctively. This was within the statutory three-year period, and when an additional six months had passed with no state action, the conditions precedent to the *235 filing of the complaint were met. Here, that would have occurred on May 17, 1982. Under section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), the plaintiff had until April 13, 1983, to file suit....

...There was no dispute that all matters pertaining to the construction of the building were completed in 1960. The summary judgments were predicated upon the failure to file suit within the applicable statutes of repose. The statute pertinent to the claims against the contractor and the architect is section 95.11, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...American Liberty contends that this statute is unconstitutional as applied in this case because the fifteen-year period expired before the fire occurred. It relies on Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979), in which the supreme court held unconstitutional section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), which was a twelve-year statute of repose concerning actions based on the design, planning, or construction of improvements to real property....

...can be shown." Id. at 4. The court pointed out that the legislature had not expressed any perceived public necessity for abolishing causes of action for injuries occurring more than twelve years after the completion of improvements to real property. Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1985), is essentially the same as the statute stricken by the supreme court in Overland Construction Co., except that the outer time limit for bringing suit was extended from twelve to fifteen years. However, this statute, which was passed in 1980, contained a comprehensive preamble which stated: An act relating to limitation on actions other than for recovery of real property; amending s. 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes; providing limitation on actions founded on the design, planning, or construction of improvements to real property; providing an effective date....

...It is not unusual for a subsequent legislative determination of the legality of purpose to be served by an undertaking to be deemed sufficient to overcome a prior judicial decision to the contrary. State v. Ocean Highway & Port Authority, 217 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1968). In enacting the preamble to the new section 95.11(3)(c), we believe the legislature has met the requirements of Overland Construction Co., thereby sustaining the validity of the statute....

...the cause of action for alienation of affection). With respect to the product liability claim against Arvinil, the pertinent statute is section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1979), which reads in part: (2) Actions for products liability and fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser or within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have been discovered....

...Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980), which was followed in Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981). In these cases, the supreme court held section 95.031(2) to be unconstitutional for the same reasons that section 95.11(3)(c) was declared invalid in Overland Construction Co....

...See § 766.203(4) ("The medical expert opinions required by this [presuit investigation] section are subject to discovery."). [2] The alleged medical malpractice of the appellees occurred in June 2005. The appellants had two years from that date to file a medical malpractice action. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...of priests. [1] We agree with the trial court that plaintiff's action resulting from injuries caused by abuse inflicted on him while he was a minor and based on the negligent retention policies of the church is barred by the statute of limitations. Section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes, limits an action for negligence to four years. This period is tolled until a minor plaintiff reaches majority. Section 95.051(1)(h). Although plaintiff urges that section 95.11(7) is the appropriate statute of limitations to apply in this case, we find that such section applies only to causes of action for "intentional torts based on abuse." Even though the priest's abusive conduct prompted this action against...

...op, the alleged cause of action against them is a negligence action based on the alleged improper selection or retention policies and practices of the church in relation to its priests, not any active abuse by the appellees. We, therefore, find that section 95.11(3)(a), and not 95.11(7), is the applicable statute of limitations in this case, and that it started running when plaintiff turned eighteen. Even if section 95.11(3)(a) is the applicable statute, urges appellant, since the improper conduct of the priest continued until plaintiff was twenty-six, the statute should not start running until that time....

...Plaintiff appeals from a final summary judgment for the defendant physician. The trial court held that plaintiff's action for the wrongful death of her husband, allegedly the result of inadequate medical diagnosis of his cancer, was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes....

...In the interim plaintiff lost the benefit of tolling the running of the statute by medical mediation proceedings, because the action was not filed within 60 days after termination of the mediation panel's jurisdiction. Section 768.44(4), Florida Statutes (1977); Perkins v. Pare, 352 So.2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Construing Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973), this court held that the two-year limitation period on a wrongful death action for medical malpractice runs from the date of death although in case of injury only the period does not begin until plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the injury. Fletcher v. Dozier, 314 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Fletcher's construction of Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973), was hinged to that statute's clear distinction between actions for wrongful death and actions for "injuries to the person." An amendment to Section 95.11(4) in 1974 partially removed the language on which Fletcher was based. No longer did Section 95.11(4)(a) confine the benefit of a postponed limitation period, in case of excusable ignorance, to claims for "injuries to the person" by malpractice. The 1974 amendment of Section 95.11(4)(a) seemingly extended that benefit to all persons having an undiscovered cause of action for professional malpractice, although Section 95.11(4)(d) continued to provide separately, without qualification, for a two-year limitation on "[a]n action for wrongful death." Whatever would be the proper construction of the *627 1974 legislation, comprehensive 1975 amendments to Section 95.11(4) [1] made clear that the two-year statute does not begin to run on any action for medical malpractice, whether resulting in injury or in death, until "the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise...

...dical mediation on May 26, 1976, within two years of her husband's death. If plaintiff had been privileged to maintain this action without first demanding mediation, the filing of this action on May 26, 1976, would have been timely by any reading of Section 95.11(4)....

...In this case the pleadings are silent. Defendant affirmatively pleaded the bar of the statute of limitation in language even more conclusory and imprecise than that countenanced by Fla.R.Civ.P. form 1.965 [2] ; defendant simply invoked the asserted bar of Section 95.11 and did not aver either that the action was filed more than two years after the cause of action accrued or that the action was filed more than two years after plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the asserted cause of action....

...But the summary judgment was improper if proof of plaintiff's knowledge of the cause of action, or her means of knowledge, was essential to defendant's establishment of the affirmative defense. We hold that a defendant invoking the two-year limitation period prescribed by Section 95.11(4)(b) for medical malpractice actions must demonstrate that the action was commenced beyond two years after "the time the cause of action [was] discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." Section 95.11(4)(a)....

...Our decision is supported by Cowan v. Turchin, 270 So.2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), Petroleum Products Corp. v. Clark, 248 So.2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), and Green v. Adams, 343 So.2d 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. den., 353 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1977), construing statutes which like Section 95.11(4) postpone the running of the statute until plaintiff has notice of the legal injury....

...We concede the difficulty of rationalizing our classification of this case with decisions associating accrual of a cause of action with plaintiff's knowledge of it, instead of with those that require a reply of waiver or tolling to avoid a limitation statute running upon accrual of the cause in a strict sense. Section 95.11(10), Florida Statutes (1973), which formerly governed the limitation period for medical malpractice actions, leaped the doctrinal chasm by declaring that "the cause of action in such case [is] not to be deemed to have accrued until the...

...een expected to sue, given plaintiff's knowledge or means of acquiring knowledge. In recognizing that element as a part of defendant's affirmative defense, we do not intimate that the burden of proof is likewise on the defendant when, under the same Section 95.11(4)(b), the issue is whether the plaintiff's ignorance due to defendant's fraud or misrepresentation prevented the running of the statute pleaded as an affirmative defense....

...1976) ("[P]laintiff must show both successful concealment of the cause of action and fraudulent means to achieve that concealment."); MacMurray v. Board of Regents, 362 So.2d 969, 970 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). REVERSED. McCORD, C.J., and MELVIN, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.11(4)(a) and (b) now provides a two-year limitation period for: (a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the tim...

...overed with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed seven years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred. [2] Defendant's third affirmative defense was: This action is barred by the Statutes of Limitation F.S.A. Section 95.11 and F.S.A....

...Zeder and Jerold I. Budney of Paul & Thomson, Miami, for appellees. CAMPBELL, Judge. Appellant brought this appeal from a summary judgment for appellees which *704 held that appellant's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1979). [1] The applicable portions of section 95.11(3)(c) provide as follows: (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS....

...ause of action did not accrue until it had knowledge or could reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the specific nature of the defects causing the leak. Appellant filed its complaint on August 26, 1976. We affirm the trial court's holding that section 95.11(3)(c) bars appellant's action....

...a defect." Id. at 1080. We consider this sound reasoning applicable to the circumstances of this case. AFFIRMED. BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and RYDER, J., concur. NOTES [1] The court below held, and the parties never disputed, that the applicable statute was section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...After a full trial, the court entered a mandatory injunction requiring the Foxes to remove that portion of their driveway which extends into an easement on the property line. The Foxes appeal, claiming that the action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations for specific performance of a contract. See § 95.11(5)(a), Fla. Stat. Madsen contends, on the other hand, that the action is one for injunction and is governed by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...stantial question or reasonable dispute as to which two or more statutes of limitation ... should be applied, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the application of the statute containing the longest limitation period."). Id. at 582. We applied section 95.11(2)(b), to enforce a restrictive covenant in Pond Apple Place III Condominium Ass'n v....

...biting dogs. The trial court held that the complaint was one for specific performance and was therefore time-barred. This court reversed, finding that the applicable statute of limitations for injunction proceedings of this type was five years under section 95.11(2)(b)....

...of plaintiff's complaint alleges a violation of § 517.301, Florida Statutes. Defendant moves to dismiss based on the argument that Count I is barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations applicable to Chapter 517 is set forth in § 95.11(4)(e), Florida Statutes, which provides: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ......

...ing rise to the cause of action were known by the plaintiff. In Wilder v. Meyer, 779 F.Supp. 164, 167-68 (S.D.Fla.1991), the court held that fraudulent concealment would not serve to extend the five-year bar provided by the statute of limitations in § 95.11(4)(e) in a § 517.301 action....

...In Cook, the court was interpreting language in the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act ("the Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq. The pre-1979 § 1711 of the Act, providing the limitations period, contains a similar bifurcated limitations scheme as is found in § 95.11(4)(e)....

...estion depends on when the violation is deemed to have occurred. If the violation is deemed to have occurred when the securities were actually purchased, then the complaint was filed beyond the five year limitations period and the claim is barred by § 95.11(4)(e)....

...In this case, plaintiffs argue, the defendant's ongoing fraudulent misrepresentations and violations of fiduciary duties would extend the limitations period beyond the date of the original purchase and place it within the five year limitations period of § 95.11(4)(e)....

...the time the securities were purchased. See Byrne v. Gulfstream First Bank & Trust Co. of Boca Raton, 528 F.Supp. 692, 695 (S.D.Fla.1981) (determining for purposes of a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 action applying the limitations period in Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e) that the cause of action arose when the transaction transferring the securities at issue to the defendant was completed, and the action was therefore barred, even though the fraud was allegedly discovered within 2 years of the filing o...

...see also Armbrister v. Roland Int'l Corp., 667 F.Supp. 802, 823 (M.D.Fla.1987) ("The right of action provided arises when a sale is made in violation of the Chapter's [517] provisions. The `violation,' then, that triggers the limitations period [of § 95.11(4)(e)] occurs when the purchaser contracts to buy the security."); Wilder, supra ....

...Accordingly, because the allegedly fraudulent conduct was discovered more than two years after the complaint was filed and because the securities were purchased more than 11 years before the complaint was filed, Count I is barred by the statute of limitations in § 95.11(4)(e) and is therefore dismissed....

...The Moransais court did engage in an inquiry to determine what sort of occupation would be defined as "profession," and it concluded that a "profession" is "any vocation requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing is possible in Florida." Id. at 976 (citing § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...See Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 739 n. 15 (11th Cir.1995). [2] Plaintiffs' cited authorities are inapposite because they do not specifically address the bifurcated limitations period and absolute bar contained in § 95.11(4)(e)....

..."A cause of action for the negligence of another accrues at the time the injury is first inflicted." Dep't of Transp. v. Soldovere, 519 So.2d 616, 617 (Fla. 1988). The cause of action in a medical malpractice case accrues at the time the malpractice incident occurs. [5] See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...[5] The fact that Mr. Raphael's personal injury action was converted into a wrongful death action when he died does not change the date on which the cause of action in this case accrued, because both causes of action accrued when the malpractice occurred. Section 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...An "action for medical malpractice" is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care.... Under section 95.11(4)(b), whether the malpractice results in injury or in death, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the occurrence of the malpractice....

...ERIOD Initially, Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint because the complaint was not *1520 filed within five years of the decedent's death. Defendant alleges that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations specified under Florida Statutes, § 95.11 (1985), which requires that a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument shall be commenced within five years, or be barred by the statute of limitations....

...f the insured's death, and is thus barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The statute of limitations applicable to a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument is five years. FLA.STAT. § 95.11(2)(b) (1985)....

...Fortune Insurance Company, 530 So.2d 388 (Fla.2d DCA 1988). In that case, the court held that when applied to an automobile passenger's action against the insurer for breach of contract for failure to pay personal injury benefits, the five-year statute of limitations under Florida Statutes § 95.11(2)(b) commenced to run on the date of the accident....

...e Florida Statutes. See FLA.STAT. § 627.736(4)(b) and FLA.STAT. § 733.808 (1985). The Florida Legislature did not explicitly set out its intent regarding when the limitations period should begin to run under the statute of limitations listed under § 95.11 of the Florida Statutes. However, there has been some judicial interpretation of this issue. Specifically, in Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 320 So.2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), the court held that the intent of § 95.11(6) (a similar statute of limitations provision applying to wrongful death actions) was to limit the commencement of actions to two years from the time of their accrual (emphasis added)....

...nd for proceedings consistent therewith. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions is two years. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...However, the 90-day presuit period triggered by the filing of the notice of intent required under section 766.102(6) tolls the limitations period. Section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1999), provides: (4) The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11....

...Accordingly, in the instant case the petitioner's filing of a notice of intent on February 7, 1997, tolled the statute of limitations period so that it would have expired on or about January 5, 1998. See Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So.2d 93, 97 (Fla.2000) ("[W]e hold the two-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(b) is suspended ("tolled") for ninety days under section 766.104(4)....")....

...of limitations. Sarasota Home also seeks review of the denial of its motion for leave to amend the complaint. We affirm the trial court's ruling that the applicable statute of limitations for an inverse condemnation action is four years pursuant to section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...g buildings and improvements it had intended to build on the property lying above the encroaching sewer line. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the action was barred by a four-year statute of limitations pursuant to either section 95.11(3)(c) or 95.11(3)(p). [1] The trial court ruled that section 95.11(3)(p) barred Sarasota Home's cause of action and granted the City's motion for summary judgment....

...However, we observe that the legislature has not prescribed a specific statute of limitation for inverse condemnation actions. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that this action must be controlled by the four-year provision applicable to "[a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes." § 95.11(3)(p)....

...ll carpet and did not commence this action until November 9, 1982, more than two years later. The trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment, finding that the two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice applied here. Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1981), provides in relevant part that: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS (a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, w...

...nappliable to them under the express language of the statute. If this limitation period is inapplicable here, then appellants would have four years within which to bring suit under the statute of limitations governing general negligence actions. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1981). [2] We believe that a "professional act" is involved here and that section 95.11(4)(a) applies to the alleged malpractice of appellee, a surveyor, just as it applies to attorney malpractice....

...a land surveyor. See § 472.013, Fla. Stat. We conclude that the preparation of a survey, involving as it does such intricate knowledge of mathematics, geography and the physical sciences, is a "professional act." Therefore, it is encompassed within section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes. We recognize that the Fourth District, in Toledo Park Homes v. Grant, 447 So.2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) has concluded otherwise. The second and more difficult issue involves the last sentence in section 95.11(4)(a) which reads, "However, the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional." Appellants position is that since the sellers of the property contracted with appe...

...SHARP, J., dissents with opinion. SHARP, Judge, dissenting. I disagree that these purchasers (Frank J. Cristich, et al.) of real estate are in "privity" with the surveyor (Allen Engineering, Inc.), for purposes of applying the two year statute of limitations of section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...(2) fees incurred in preparing new condominium documents to reflect a corrected survey, and (3) loss in the re-sale value of each unit because of their irregular dimensions and in some cases, lower than indicated ceilings. [2] Appellants claim that section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes, which contains a four year statute of limitations, is the appropriate statute of limitations here....

...The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Lynn did not pursue the required pre-trial notice and screening procedures established under the Medical Malpractice Act, and filed her complaint after the expiration of the two year medical malpractice statute of limitations. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla.Stat....

...nt, or discovery, and applies to any: claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla.Stat....

...2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987). Following the Supreme Court's lead, the Eleventh Circuit has determined that Section 1981 claims are most analogous to personal injury claims, and therefore, are governed by Florida's four year statute of limitations set out at Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The only issue is whether Bay Tank is liable for the judgment previously entered against Gulf Tank. In the alternative, Bay Tank suggests that, at the very least, Preyer's claim is subject to Florida's five year statute of limitations applicable to "actions on a judgment". See § 95.11(2), Fla.Stat. (1991). Again, I disagree. Bay Tank cites to no authority in support of its contention that Section 95.11(2) applies to this case. However, I note that Rule 69(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seems to make the state's practice and procedure applicable to actions on a federal judgment, in the absence of federal statutes to the contrary. Assuming, without deciding, that Section 95.11(2) is applicable to Preyer's claim, defendant's argument still must fail....

...That same statute also controls the wrongful death claim. Ash v. Stella, 457 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1984). Thus, for either the personal injury claim or the wrongful death claim asserted against the doctor, the relevant statute of limitations is the two-year medical malpractice statute. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...he words it chooses. Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1992); Sheffield v. Davis, 562 So.2d 384, 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In choosing the words "from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered" in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), we conclude that the legislature anticipated and intended an ability of conscious awareness on the part of a victim of alleged malpractice to trigger the statute running....

...I agree that the statute of limitations did not run as to Counts I and III of the Fifth Amended Complaint, the wrongful death and medical malpractice claims against Greenbrook Nursing Center and Malcolm Fraser, M.D. In so concluding, I adopt the majority's reasoning that in construing section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), the legislature intended an ability of conscious awareness on the part of a victim [6] of alleged malpractice to trigger the running of the statute of limitation....

...Statutes (1987). See Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So.2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). [2] Renumbered as sections 766.104 and 766.106, Florida Statutes (1991). [3] The discovery rule is also found in sections: 95.031(2) (products liability and fraud); 95.11(3)(c) (latent defects in improvements to real property); 95.11(4)(a) (professional malpractice other than medical malpractice); 95.11(4)(e) (an action founded upon a violation of chapter 517); and 95.11(4)(f) (an action for personal injury caused by contact or exposure to phenoxy herbicides), Florida Statutes (1987), and is not limited or controlled by section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1987) (when limitations tolled)....

...osp. Dist. No appearance for appellees Renfroe, Florida Patient's Compensation Fund and Guin. ORFINGER, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from a final summary judgment in a medical malpractice action. The trial court found that the action was barred by section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1977) (the two-year limitation on medical malpractice actions), and that plaintiffs had failed to comply with section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1977), the notice provision under the waiver of sovereign immunity act....

...a decision in favor of the Hospital. Following extensive pleadings, the trial court entered the summary judgment appealed from. The Hospital's motion for summary judgment was essentially based on two grounds: (1) the two-year statute of limitations [section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1977)], had expired prior to the filing of the suit; and (2) because defendant Hospital was a subdivision of the State of Florida, created by chapter 65-1905, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1965, the notice re...

...s based on negligence or on any other "wrongful act or omission" brought against a state agency, is four years from the date the claim accrues. § 768.28(11), Florida Statutes (1977). The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action under section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), is two years from the date the incident occurred or was discovered, but no more than four years from the date of the incident....

..., or licensed contractor and his employer, whichever date is latest; except that, when the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. . . . § 95.11(3)(c), Fla....

...r the completion of work, regardless of the time of the accrual of the cause of action or the notice of the invasion of a legal right. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Acosta, 612 So.2d 1361, 1363 (Fla.1992). In this case, the applicable language from section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), [1] provides: In any event, the action must be commenced within 15 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment o...

...trial, and 3) the lack of an adequate remedy on appeal. Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla.1987). We find it unnecessary to address the second and third elements because we find no error in the trial court's interpretation of section 95.11(3)(c)....

...of limitations defense. For these reasons and those expressed in the majority opinion, I agree that the Petition for Writ of Prohibition should be dismissed. NOTES [1] This statute was amended in 2006 to provide for a ten-year statute of repose. See § 95.11(3)(c), Fla....

...Before PEARSON, HUBBART and SCHWARTZ, JJ. HUBBART, Judge. The sole issue presented for review by this appeal is centered on when a cause of action for personal injury sounding in negligence and arising from an automobile accident accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations under Section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...(1973)] by ascertaining that her injury was permanent. The action was brought in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. The trial court dismissed the action upon the defendants' motion as barred by the applicable four year statute of limitations [§ 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...negligent act of the defendant Justine Cross. On May 18, 1978, or more than four years subsequent to this accident, the instant lawsuit was filed. As such, the action was barred by the applicable four year statute of limitations in negligence cases. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...Davis of Bond & Woitesek, Miami, for defendant/appellant. Barry J. Clyman of Frishman & Clyman, Coral Gables, for plaintiff/appellee. ADKINS, Justice. This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the Dade County Court which held Sections 95.022 and 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), unconstitutional as applied to promissory notes under seal....

...ntral Credit Union (Credit Union). The Defendant defaulted on the payment due June 26, 1969, and on each installment due thereafter. At the time of the execution, delivery, and default, the limitations period for instruments under seal was 20 years. Section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes (1969). Effective January 1, 1975, the legislature reduced the time for bringing suit to 5 years by deleting all references to sealed instruments. Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1975). On April 28, 1977, the Credit Union filed suit on the note. The Defendant moved to dismiss the action as barred by Sections 95.11(2)(b) and 95.022, Florida Statutes (1975). The motion was denied and final judgment entered for the Credit Union. The trial court held Sections 95.11(2)(b) and 95.022, Florida Statutes (1975), unconstitutional insofar as they operated to violate the prohibitions against impairing contractual obligations....

...We hold that the presence of a seal on the promissory note did not create a substantive right in a 20-year limitations period, but merely designated the applicable statute of limitations, i.e. that affecting sealed instruments. The applicable limitations period when this action arose in 1969 was 20 years. Section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes (1969)....

...Section 95.022, Florida Statutes (1975). The very nature of a savings clause imparts retroactivity upon the statutes within its ambit. Nash v. Asher, 342 So.2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) ("[Section 95.022] clearly demonstrates the legislative intent to make [Section 95.11(4)(a)] retroactive, since it is a saving clause ...") (emphasis supplied); see Brooks v....

...The prior law stated: "Actions other than those for the recovery of real property can only be commenced as follows: (1) WITHIN TWENTY YEARS. — An action upon a judgment or decree of a court of record in the state, and an action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument of writing under seal." § 95.11, Fla....

...It may be assumed the parties contracted with knowledge of the legislature's authority to alter or amend the time to pursue legal remedies invoked by the seal. When the legislature exercised its power to reduce the limitations period a reasonable time was allowed for suit on *938 existing actions. Sections 95.11(2)(b) and 95.022 Florida Statutes (1975), are retrospective in nature and constitutional as applied to promissory notes under seal....

...ellants. III. Analysis A. The Inverse Condemnation Claim The parties agree that the inverse condemnation claim is subject to the residual four-year statute of limitations applicable to actions that are "not specifically provided for" in the statute. § 95.11(3)(p), Fla....

...hat the permanent nature of the taking is evident and the extent of the damage is reasonably foreseeable." (citations omitted)). B. The Continuing Trespass Claim "An action for trespass on real property" is subject to a four-year limitations period. § 95.11(3)(g)....

...Clark Fowhand, II appeals from a final judgment of paternity. At issue is whether the trial court erred in awarding retroactive child support from the date of birth. Fowhand contends that the award (1) was barred by laches; (2) should be limited by the statute of limitation found in section 95.11(3)(k); and (3) should not have been awarded since actual support was provided by third persons and there is no evidence of the amount of support provided by the mother or evidence of the past needs of the child....

...Mr. Fowhand is a manager and part owner of his family's furniture business. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rejection of the laches defense. Mr. Fowhand next argues that, irrespective of the application of the doctrine of laches, section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1991), bars a claim which accrued more than four years prior to the institution of this action for child support....

...Deutsch, 80 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1955), in which the supreme court referred to a child support obligation as quasi-contractual in nature. In Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. West, 378 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 1979), the supreme court held unconstitutional section 95.11(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), which acted to bar claims of all support, past and prospective, unless the paternity action was filed within four years of birth....

...In dicta the court indicated that a statute of limitations might be applied to "child support claims ... that have accrued in the past but which are not adjudicated." 378 So.2d at 1228. We decline to hold that the four year statute of limitations provided by section 95.11(3)(k), specifically addressing an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares and merchandise, applies to limit the claim of a minor child for support from her unwed father....

...action is filed in Florida to enforce a foreign judgment against an alleged alter ego of a judgment debtor. We conclude that such an "action [is one] on a judgment or decree of any court ... of ... any other state or territory in the United States," § 95.11(2)(a), Fla....

...the United States, any other state or territory in the United States, or a foreign country. ... . (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS. — ... . (j) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud. ... . (p) Any action not specifically provided for in these statutes. § 95.11, Fla....

...and the common corporate parent depended, in addition, on evidence that Carrousel Concessions, Inc. was an alter ego of the other two corporate entities. For statute of limitations purposes, however, the entire proceeding can only be viewed as an "action founded on negligence." § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...phy's recovery is limited by what the South Carolina court has adjudged. Like the proceedings on Count I, proceedings on Count II comprise an "action on a judgment or decree of any court ... of ... any other state or territory in the United States." § 95.11(2)(a), Fla....

...ing: (3) Within four years.— . . . . (k) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument, including an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store accounts. § 95.11(3)(k), Fla....

...Thus, Acosta's own account of his discussion with Neal Brooks demonstrates he could not prevail on his fraud in the inducement and fraud claims. The fraud in the inducement, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims are also barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (2006) (providing for a four year limitation period for "[a] legal or equitable action founded on fraud"); § 95.11(3)(o), (p), Fla....

...The other packing house doesn't even have a lime machine, and their cooler space is very limited, so I also was scared to fly away and have no place to go. [5] Section 95.031(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, provides: (2)(a) An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11(3), including constructive fraud, must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered....

...hence was barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions. We disagree with the trial court and find that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to when Adams' cause of action for legal malpractice arose. Section 95.11(4)(a) provides that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence....

...Here Adams would not have a legal malpractice claim if in fact the satisfaction of mortgage had been upheld. Thus she did not suffer any damage until 1981 when the appeal was finally resolved. REVERSED and REMANDED. COBB, C.J., and LEE, R.E., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] § 95.11(4)(a), Fla.Stats....

...LLP (the firm) and attorney William E. Curphey (Curphey). The trial court dismissed Brooke's complaint with prejudice on the ground that it showed on its face that the cause of action was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...Brooke's complaint was not filed until June 8, 2001. The statute of limitations for a suit for legal malpractice begins to *1080 run from "the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). The firm and Curphey argued that the statute began to run on December 10, 1998, and any cause of action was barred by the two-year limitations period in section 95.11(4)(a)....

...Edell, 721 So.2d 1173 (Fla.1998). In Silvestrone, which involved litigation malpractice, the Florida Supreme Court held that "in those cases that proceed to final judgment, the two-year statute of limitations for litigation-related malpractice under section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), begins to run when final judgment becomes final." Id....

...In the same complaint, plaintiff also sued the pharmacy, claiming that it negligently provided plaintiff's decedent with numerous refills of the prescription drug Voltaren without authorization from a treating physician. Both parties agree that the medical malpractice statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), does not apply, but disagree as to whether the applicable statute of limitations for the action against the pharmacy is the professional malpractice statute of limitations or the wrongful death statute of limitations. Plaintiff contends that the professional malpractice statute of limitations, which provides a two-year period running from the "time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered," governs. See § 95.11(4)(a); Sheils v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 560 So.2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). The pharmacy contends that the two-year wrongful death statute applies so that this cause of action would run from the date of death. See § 95.11(4)(d); Arthur v....

...We acknowledge that there is no specific reference to fraudulent concealment in any subsection of the provisions concerning statutes of limitations other than the reference in the subsection relating to medical malpractice actions. [1] See generally § 95.11....

...ine as an "equitable principle" which tolls the statute of limitations. 333 So.2d at 37. It was not until after Proctor and Nardone, in 1975, that our legislature included fraudulent concealment as a statutory tolling provision in malpractice cases. Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...5th DCA 1992), decision approved, 620 So.2d 993 (Fla.1993); Almengor v. Dade County, 359 So.2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Accordingly, we reverse the entry of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Subsection 95.11(4)(b) provides, in pertinent part: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should h...

...e funds resulted from defendants' actual fraud, fraud in fiduciary capacity, embezzlement and larceny. Defendants raise the statute of limitation as an affirmative defense to these allegations. They argue that the action is barred by Florida Statute § 95.11(3)(j) because the loan was received and the certificate pledged five and one-half years prior to the adversary proceeding being filed....

...Lombardi, 461 So.2d 1350 (Fla.1984); Carr v. Broward County, 505 So.2d 568 (Fla 4th DCA 1987). Thus the Court must consider each element required to establish misrepresentation or actual fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) to determine whether the action is timely filed or is barred by § 95.11(3)(j) of the Florida statutes. Section 95.11(3)(j) states in relevant part: Limitations other than for the recovery of real property. — Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS. — *979 (j) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud. § 95.11 FLA.STAT....

...This adversary proceeding was filed September 10, 1991, was dismissed, and an amended complaint was filed February 21, 1992. The last element of the cause of action accrued, at the earliest, April 21, 1988, thus the four-year limitation period had not run and the adversary proceeding is not barred by Florida statute § 95.11(3)(j)....

...E.-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.2006)). The starting point of our analysis thus begins with the actual language of the statute. In this case, the statute of limitations that applies to the investors’ causes of action is contained within section 95.11. Specifically, subsections 95.11(3)(a) and (4)(e) state as follows: 95.11....

...on of chapter 517, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but not more than 5 years from the date such violation occurred. § 95.11, Fla....

...ice but more than four years after the allegedly negligent treatment occurred. The Hospital moved for a judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, a summary judgment, based on the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), which requires that an action for medical malpractice be brought within four years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred. The trial court held that section 95.11(4)(b) (effective May 20, 1975) applied to the facts in this case but denied Hospital's motions on the ground that the statute unconstitutionally violates respondent's right of access to the courts for redress of any injury as guaranteed by article I, section 21, Florida Constitution....

...ion would be directly appealable to this Court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. There are two issues presented by this petition for certiorari. First, whether the four-year absolute bar contained in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), is applicable to the facts of this case as found by the trial judge. Second, if applicable to this case, whether the four-year absolute bar to medical malpractice claims contained in section 95.11(4)(b) unconstitutionally denies a claimant access to the courts under article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution....

...To assist in resolution of the question presented it is beneficial to review the history of chapter 95, Florida Statutes, as it pertains to the facts in this case. On the inclusive dates during which the alleged malpractice occurred, the applicable statute of limitations was section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes, which established a four-year limitation period for actions not otherwise specifically provided for in chapter 95....

...The limitation period in medical malpractice actions, however, was measured from the date of discovery of or opportunity to discover the injury, through use of reasonable care. See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1976). By chapter 71-254, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1972, section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes, was amended to impose a two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims....

...existing case law respecting the date upon which medical malpractice claims accrued. City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1954); Vilord v. Jenkins, 226 So.2d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). See Nardone v. Reynolds, supra . Effective January 1, 1975, section 95.11(6) was amended and redesignated section 95.11(4), *1285 Florida Statutes, by chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida....

...mitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." See Brooks v. Cerrato, 355 So.2d 119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 361 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1978). The version of section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes, with which we are here concerned was the result of an amendment enacted by chapter 75-9, Laws of Florida, which became effective May 20, 1975. The pertinent portion of subsection (b) of section 95.11(4) provides: (b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within two years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within two years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been disco...

...to the injury. The only relevant date in the case of the latter type statute of limitations is the date of occurrence or incident. Consequently, while the reasoning of the district court in Johnson is applicable to the two-year limitation period of section 95.11(4)(b), that reasoning may not be extended to the four-year limitation period of the statute....

...Where a statute of limitations is measured by occurrence rather than accrual of a cause of action it must be assumed that some claim arose upon the occurrence of the event causing injury. Second, the penultimate paragraph of the opinion in Foley states: Since the legislative intent to provide retroactive effect to Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes, is not express, clear, or manifest, we conclude that it does not *1287 apply to causes of action occurring prior to its effective date....

...ired at the very time the act first became effective. We hold that this result should not obtain and, therefore, answer the certified question in the negative. 288 So.2d at 520. Maltempo was discussed and approved in Foley. Accordingly, we hold that section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), evinces no express, clear or manifest intent that it be applied retroactively and, therefore, the four-year limitation period contained therein may not be applied to a medical malpractice claim where the...

...airs in 1979; count IV, negligence in attempting further repairs in 1982; and count V, breach of implied warranty. Almand filed a motion for summary judgment claiming, among other things, that all counts of the fifth amended complaint were barred by section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), [1] because the suit was filed more than four years after the Evans discovered and became aware of the defects....

...Almand maintains that actual knowledge of the specific cause of a defective condition is not necessary under this Court's decision in Kelley and argues that the Evans' knowledge of the settling and resultant damage to the house was sufficient to trigger the running of section 95.11(3)(c)....

...e complaint that the Evans had knowledge of the unsuitability of the lot at least as early as 1978. We agree that even if knowledge of the specific cause of a defective condition were required before the running of four-year limitations period under section 95.11(3)(c) is triggered, all claims are barred....

...Corp. v. McElvy, Jennewein, Stefany & Howard, Architects/Planners, Inc., 417 So.2d 703, 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), that the plaintiff in that case could not rely on a lack of knowledge of the specific cause of a defect to protect it from the running of section 95.11(3)(c)....

...The Evans' knowledge of the settling of the house and resultant structural damage, which they concede they had as early as 1978, was sufficient to put them on notice that they had, or might have had, a cause of action. This knowledge meets the discovery component of section 95.11(3)(c)....

...at 807. Accordingly, that portion of the decision below reversing the entry of summary judgment on counts I, II, and V of the fifth amended complaint is quashed. It is so ordered. OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), provides a four-year statute of limitations for [a]n action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property, with the time running from the date of actual possession by...

...Therefore, we reverse the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of Chrestensen's amended complaint and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is five years. See § 95.11; Barnes v....

...prison and ultimate invalidation of his convictions and sentences were delayed." [1] Id. at 3-4. Schreiber and Jorandby filed identical motions to dismiss on the ground that the actions were barred by the two year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1997). The trial court granted the motions. We hold that the limitations period under section 95.11(4)(a), began to run when the trial court granted Rowe's motion for post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel....

...Stat. (1997). For professional malpractice actions, the statute of limitations is two years, with the period of limitations running "from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...stablished and the injured party knows or should know of either the injury or the negligent act." Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323, 1325 (Fla.1990) (citations omitted). Cases cited with approval in Peat, Marwick have interpreted section 95.11(4)(a) to mean that the event which triggers the running of the statute of limitations is notice to or knowledge by the injured party that a cause of action has accrued in his favor, and not the date on which the negligent act which caused the damages was actually committed....

...The first district's decision was rendered in December, 1986 and rehearing was denied in February, 1987. Martin filed a legal malpractice suit against her trial attorney in June, 1987. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that the suit was barred by the two year statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(a)....

...e commission of malpractice.... Conversely, in cases where the claim has been filed timely, courts often conclude that no claim can exist until the defendant has been exonerated. Id. at D775, 724 So.2d at 1199. We believe that the correct rule under section 95.11(4)(a), is that a defendant must successfully obtain post-conviction relief for the cause of action to accrue in a case involving the legal malpractice of a criminal defense attorney....

...eral estoppel to this area, so that the post-conviction relief proceeding effectively eliminates frivolous malpractice claims. See Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1361. When a criminal defendant discovers or should have discovered his attorney's malpractice under section 95.11(4)(a) is a question of fact....

...accrual of the malpractice action until July 15, 1994, the date when the trial court granted his motion for post-conviction relief. The December 26, 1995 filing against Schreiber was within two years of July 15, 1994, and was therefore timely under section 95.11(4)(a)....

...4th DCA 1987) (“The period of time established by a statute of repose commences to run from the date of an event specified in the statute . . . . At the end of the time period the cause of action ceases to exist.”), approved, 541 So. 2d 10. The statute of limitations for claims of fraud is four years, § 95.11(3)(j), Fla....

...2003). In Kush, we clearly expressed that statutes of repose “run[] from the date of a discrete act on the part of the defendant without regard to when the cause of action accrued.” 616 So. 2d at 418 (emphasis added);11 see also Nehme, 863 So. 11. In Kush, this Court interpreted section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), the statute of repose governing medical malpractice claims, containing a four-year statute of repose from the date of the “incident” or “occurrence.” Id....

...statute of repose governing fraud claims, has essentially remained unchanged. See ch. 74-382, §§ 3, 36, Laws of Fla. (1974). The twelve-year statute of repose for fraud claims provides as follows: [I]n any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered. § 95.031(2), Fla....

...The appellee refused to return it and appellants brought this suit on December 23, 1965, to recover their deposit. The lower court, in entering final summary judgment for appellee, ruled that appellants' action, which was filed on December 23, 1965, was barred by the statute of limitations, Section 95.11(5) (e), Florida Statutes F.S.A., since the May 31, 1961, sales agreement did not require the appellee to return the deposit to the appellants and therefore did not constitute a written contract. The question which is determinative of this appeal is whether § 95.11(5) (e), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. (the 3-year statute), or § 95.11(3), Florida Statutes F.S.A. (the 5-year statute), applies to the instrument sued upon. The two sections in question are: "§ 95.11 Limitations upon actions other than real actions....

...of an agreement to the contrary) unless there was an express contract to return it to him. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the instrument in question is a written contract and comes within the purview of the 5-year statute of limitations, § 95.11(3), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court held that (1) the student application form attached to plaintiffs' third amended complaint does not constitute an enforceable written contract, therefore the five-year statute of limitations in Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983) is inapplicable, and (2) the claims in both oral contract and tort are subject to, and barred by the four-year statute of limitations in Section 95.11(3), since the cause of action accrued prior to the end of the school year in June 1977....

...For the same reasons, the defendant-church's reliance on Velazquez v. Metropolitan Dade County, 442 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) is misplaced. [2] *1145 The complaint must be reinstated because, even applying the four-year period of limitation in Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1983), from the face of the complaint (which alleges that the parent had no knowledge of the cause of action until July 1981) the suit is not time-barred....

...founded on a written instrument within the meaning of Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Carr, 297 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Therefore, I would find that the trial court correctly dismissed this count and that the five year statute of limitations found in Section 95.11(2)(b) Florida Statutes (1981) is not applicable. The remaining tort counts are governed by the four year statute of limitations found in Section 95.11(3)(a) Florida Statutes (1981). The complaint shows on its face that the action was commenced more than four years from the occurrence of the events giving rise to the instant case and are thus barred by Section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) unless some action on the part of the defendant has tolled the running of the statute....

...Therefore, I would find that the plaintiffs failed to allege any facts in their third amended complaint necessary to toll the running of the statute of limitation as to the defendant church and would affirm the trial court's holding dismissing the cause with prejudice on the basis that it was barred by Section 95.11(3)(a) Florida Statutes (1981)....

...DOC therefore structured Canete's sentence accordingly, applying 400 days of credit only to Count I. In response to the request for mandamus relief, DOC argued that because Canete acknowledged that he became aware of the change in his TRD in January 2004, his claim was untimely under section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes....

...ad applied jail credit in accordance with *415 the express directions of the sentencing judge. Following the filing of Canete's reply, the circuit court denied the amended petition for writ of mandamus, agreeing with DOC that the claim was barred by section 95.11(5)(f), and that in any event, Canete had failed to demonstrate the existence of a ministerial duty on the part of DOC to apply the disputed 800 days of jail credit....

...w, and the sentencing judge's letter constituted a clear directive that was consistent with Florida law governing the application of jail credit to consecutive sentences. With regard to the statute of limitations issue, both parties acknowledge that section 95.11(5)(f) is applicable to this case....

...[3] In short, Canete's claim for mandamus relief did not become ripe for judicial review until the administrative grievance process was exhausted, and because he invoked the circuit court's jurisdiction well within one year of that date, his claim was not barred by section 95.11(5)(f)....

...ll be entitled to proceed with judicial remedies as he would have exhausted his administrative remedies." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(3) and (4). DOC acknowledged in the circuit court that Canete had exhausted his administrative remedies. [2] Section 95.11(5)(f) provides that except for actions challenging prison disciplinary proceedings, "a petition for extraordinary writ, other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction, filed by or on behalf of a prisoner" must be brought within one year....

...Marlow, Shofi, Ortmayer, Smith, Connell & Valerius and Joseph H. Lowe, Miami, for appellee. Before HENDRY, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ. HENDRY, Judge. The plaintiffs appeal the adverse final summary judgment wherein their complaint was dismissed on statute of limitation grounds. § 95.11(3), Fla....

...ately December, 1977 that Szabo was informed of any causal connection between exposure to the defendants' chemicals and his illness. Therefore summary judgment was precluded on the issue of whether the complaint filed in June, 1981 was timely filed. § 95.11(3), Fla....

...f Florida. Professional Medical Specialties, Inc. v. Renfroe, 362 So.2d 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Since 1955, an action is commenced in Florida by the filing of a complaint. W.W. Friday v. Newman, 183 So.2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA (1966); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.050. Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced within four years (from the time the cause of action accrues, § 95.031, Fla....

...ns, including defendant's use of a false name or concealment in Florida to avoid service of process. See § 95.051(1)(b)-(c), Fla. Stat. (1975). Notably absent from this list was fraudulent concealment of the identity of the actual tortfeasor. While section 95.11(4)(b) provided a tolling provision for fraudulent concealment of the discovery of the plaintiff's injury in medical malpractice actions, there was no similar tolling provision for wrongful death causes of action. Compare § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1975), with § 95.11(4)(d), Fla....

...rovided only a few exceptions from this broad rule. For example, subsection (2) of section 95.031 expressly begins the limitations period in product liability and fraud cases from the time of discovery rather than the accrual of the cause of action. Section 95.11(4) begins the running of the statute for professional malpractice from the time of discovery....

...blication, we conclude that plaintiffs' statutory claim under section 540.08 was time-barred. What we have said for the statutory claim applies, of course, with equal force as to the common law invasion of privacy claim against the photographer. See § 95.11(3)(p) ("any action not specifically provided for in these statutes") and § 770.07 (action for invasion of privacy based on publication accrues upon first publication), Fla....

...40.08 and the other based on invasion of privacy. The verdict was in favor of the publisher on the invasion of privacy claim but in favor of plaintiffs on the statutory violation against the publisher and on both claims against the photographer. [3] § 95.11(3)(f) and (p), Fla....

...on accrues."). Section 95.051 provides when a limitations period may be tolled, but none of the allowable tolling provisions apply to this action. See fn. 9, below. [5] § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. (1997) ("Actions for products liability and fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.")....

...an, or guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor or incapacitated person, or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue; except with respect to the statute of limitations for a claim for medical malpractice as provided in s. 95.11....

...2015) (applying La Grasta and finding that, where the dates included in the complaint made the time-bar apparent, plaintiff was required to allege facts that supported tolling the statute of limitations)). The statute of limitations for Plaintiffs' claim under FDUTPA is four years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(f) ; Speier-Roche v....

...2014. As such, the statute of limitations on Shames's FDUTPA claim ran in July 2018-four months before this action commenced in November 2018. Therefore, it is " 'apparent from the face of the complaint' that the [FDUTPA] claim is time-barred" under Section 95.11(3)(f)....

...Jan. 26, 2010) (citing Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States , 312 F.2d 545 , 548 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1963) ). Thus, the limitations period for a declaratory relief claim premised on rights protected by FDUTPA is also four years under Florida Statute Section 95.11(3)(f)....

...Both suits were filed on January 18, 1971 in state court but were subsequently removed to federal court on January 27, 1971. The defendants have filed various motions, including a motion to dismiss alleging that the Statute of Limitations for wrongful death actions in Florida, Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes, F.S. A., has run. F.S. Section 95.11(6), F.S.A., provides for a two (2) year statute of limitations in wrongful death actions in Florida; the time beginning to run at decedent's death, St....

...Grissom's wrongful death would be barred if not filed within two (2) years thereof, and because the present suit was filed almost four (4) years after date of death it should be dismissed. Plaintiff, however, argues that the Court should apply F.S. Section 95.11(10), F.S. A., a special statute of limitations for actions against professional engineers, rather than F.S. § 95.11(6), F.S.A., the general two (2) year statute. Florida Statutes, § 95.11(10), F.S.A., provides a time limitation of twelve (12) years within which actions, including wrongful death actions, may be brought against professional engineers: "* * * arising out of any deficiency in design or planning or for any deficiency in the design or planning of an improvement to real property....

...Plaintiff argues that she had twelve (12) years, rather than two (2) years, in which to bring this action; therefore, the suit is within the applicable statute of limitations and the motion to dismiss should be denied. Basically, defendants argue that § 95.11(10) is inapplicable to the instant case in that it is intended only to cover suits against professional engineers who have worked professionally in some way with the design or planning to real property or improvements thereto, and that it should not be applied to the instant situation involving the design and manufacture of a space craft. Plaintiff contends that if defendants' interpretation of § 95.11(10) is correct, it creates a redundancy of language: if the first "design or planning" phrase in the statute is limited to real property then—says the plaintiff—the second phrase "design or planning of an improvement to real property" would be merely repetitious. On March 12, 1971, at the hearing in this case, the parties were granted ten (10) days within which to submit any available relevant legislative history bearing on the intent of the legislature in passing this addition to F.S. § 95.11, F.S.A....

...e or defective and appear to be a part of the original improvement." This same general intent appears to be one major reason for the passage of similar provisions in a number of other jurisdictions. [2] Even though it is apparent that the purpose of § 95.11(10) was to limit the period of potential liability of professional engineers and architects, the question still remains whether it was the intention of the legislature that § 95.11(10) be applied as a separate, independent statute of limitation complete in itself—that is, whether § 95.11(10) superceded all previously applicable general statutes of limitation and is to be used in isolation to govern the period for bringing of wrongful death actions against professional engineers and architects. This Court believes the more reasonable application of § 95.11(10) and the only correct interpretation is that a professional engineer or architect is susceptible to suit for a period of only twelve (12) years, and that a plaintiff, once death occurs, has not more than two (2) years in which to bring suit or have the action barred. If death occurs or the defect is found more than twelve (12) years after completion of the work, no wrongful death suit could be maintained. In light of this Court's interpretation of F.S. § 95.11(10), F.S.A., it is unnecessary to decide whether that statute applies to a space capsule or whether the instant defendants are "professional engineers" within the coverage of § 95.11(10) because even were it applicable, under this Court's interpretation, the widow would have had only two years after her husband's death in which to initiate suit for wrongful death. Therefore, in the present circumstances, whether § 95.11(10) is specifically applicable or not, the wrongful death action is barred by § 95.11(6)....

...The district court found that a cause of action accrues for purposes of awarding attorney's fees under section 768.56 when a party discovers or should have discovered the existence of malpractice, which is the time the statute of limitations begins to run under section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Altenhaus, 472 So.2d 1152 (Fla. 1985), a cause of action accrues under section 768.56, Florida Statutes, when the negligent act causing injury occurred rather than when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the malpractice injury as provided in section 95.11....

...awarding attorney's fees under section 768.56, Florida Statutes (1981), at the time a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the malpractice, which is the time a malpractice action accrues for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...In Spring Lake I, this court held: Thus, because the affected landowners waited so long to seek relief, we conclude that the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches bar them from recovering those taxes assessed for maintenance beyond the four-year period contained in section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...In entering judgment, the trial court rejected this argument, as we do. In Crane v. Nuta, 157 Fla. 613, 26 So.2d 670 (1946), the court held that a judgment, whether domestic or foreign, constitutes a cause of action upon which a new and independent action may be based, citing to section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes, on limitations of actions on judgments....

...ering an extensive revision of many statutes relating to medical malpractice.) The statute of limitations applicable to an action arising upon account of an act causing a wrongful death, including such deaths resulting from medical malpractice, is F.S. 95.11(6), which provides for a period of two years....

...rom medical malpractice. However, in injury cases (which are not cases arising on account of wrongful death ) the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers, or through use of reasonable care should have discovered, the injury. (F.S. 95.11(6)) The affirmative defense of the expiration of a statute of limitations is not waived, nor is a defendant estopped from asserting same, merely by an accused or his attorney knowing that a claimant is anticipating suit nor by mere negotiations between the parties....

...ated to the accident, named Mary Jane Brown, personal representative of Simmons' estate, as a co-defendant. It is undisputed that this cause of action was not barred by the general four-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence cases. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...ng that no cause of action shall survive unless a claim is timely filed or the claim comes within one of the exceptions set forth in subsection 702(4). The language limiting liability in section 733.710 should also be contrasted with the language in section 95.11 governing general limitations on bringing causes of action, providing that a cause of action shall be barred unless brought within a specified period of time....

...Accordingly, we reverse the final summary judgment. GUNTHER, C.J., and BAKER, MOSES, Jr., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] No party contends that the cause of action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for wrongful death. See § 95.11(4)(d), Fla....

...Phelan, at which time she learned that the intrauterine device had not been expelled, but instead was lodged in and projecting through the wall of her uterus. Within two years of this discovery, on August 1, 1983, the plaintiff sued Dr. Hanft. [2] Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), provides in pertinent part: "An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within two years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within two years from the time the incid...

...Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982). This rule, although first arising in the context of products liability and construction defects cases and their attendant statutes of limitations and repose, is equally applicable to medical malpractice cases and Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes....

...Therefore, if the fact-finder in this case shall ultimately determine that Ms. Phelan discovered or should have discovered her cause of action within two years of August 14, 1976, then, of course, her action would be barred by the two-year limitations period of Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes....

...he courts and cannot be used against her to bar her claim. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. NOTES [1] The defendant first moved to dismiss the complaint asserting that on its face it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...rred, a plaintiff who discovers the cause of action after the statute of repose has expired would have two years from discovery within which to sue. [3] See Universal Engineering Corp. v. Perez, 451 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1984) (in action filed pursuant to Section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes, by employees against employers-manufacturers for manganese poisoning discovered post-repose, court stated that with knowledge of when employees knew or should have known that their disease was occupational in origin, date of accrual of cause of action determinable); Meehan v....

...We find Issues I and IV dispositive, as discussed below. Accordingly, we need not address the other issues raised by the Developer. Beach Property The Developer argues that the Association’s claims concerning the Beach Property are barred by the five-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes, which applies to “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument.” The Association responds that its claim challenging the validity of the amendment to...

...Hinson, 67 So.3d 1107, 1111-12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); see also Holland v. Hattaway, 438 So.2d 456, 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Accordingly, we agree with the developer that the Association’s claims related to the Beach Property are subject to the five-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(b)....

...at 367 . The trial court found that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed more than five years after the challenged provision was recorded. Id. The Fourth District agreed that the five-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(b) applied, id., and affirmed the summary judgment on the plaintiffs challenge to the validity of the amendment....

...es, medical expenses, and damages for pain, suffering and other intangible injury ...” Newber-ger Complaint, Final Paragraph. Five provisions in the Florida statute of limitations arguably are analogous to appellant’s cause of action. Fla. Stat. 95.11(3)(f), which provides a four-year limitation period, covers actions founded on statutory liability — arguably analogous, since appellant’s cause of action arises from a federal statute. Fla.Stat. 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year statute of limitations for intentional torts. Fla.Stat. 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year statute for “any action not specifically provided for in these statutes.” A two-year statute is provided by Fla.Stat. 95.11(4)(c) for “[a]n action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages or overtime.” Finally, Fla.Stat. 95.11(5)(a) provides a one-year statute of limitation for actions for specific performance of contracts....

...Ross, 165 So.2d 780 (Fla.App.1964) (statute does not cover engineering firm’s claim for a fee). In Bro-ward, the Florida Supreme Court squarely held that “an action seeking recovery of a salary allegedly withheld does not fall within the terms ‘suit for wages’ within the intent of F.S. § 95.11(7)(b) [the predecessor to Fla.Stat. 95.11(4)(c) ].” The court went on to note that there are special problems in preserving evidence with respect to hourly wage claims, problems which do not generally exist in salary actions, making the distinction a logical one....

...The trial court also held that appellant's causes of action for breach of contract and *1321 fraud are barred by the statute of limitations. [2] We conclude that the contract action is not barred, but the quantum meruit and fraud actions are. The contract action is controlled by Section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1981), which prescribes a four-year period for any "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument." [3] As to whether the four-year period had expired by A...

...e alleged breach occurred in July 1985. [4] Concerning the issue of the application of the statute of limitations to the *1322 quantum meruit claim under Count II, the parties agree that the action is governed by the four-year provision under either section 95.11(3)(p), relating to "[a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes," or section 95.11(3)(k), applying to an equitable action on an obligation not founded on a written instrument....

...Matthews, 222 So.2d at 286; Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Borbiro, 201 So.2d 571, 572 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 207 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1967). In regard to Count III, alleging fraud, the parties also agree that fraud is governed by the four-year limitations provision of section 95.11(3)(j)....

...Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1979) (appellate court may affirm a decision if it is supported by a theory different from that relied upon by the trial court). [3] There are no facts in the record before us that would support the application of the two-year provision of section 95.11(4)(c), pertaining to "[a]n action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime." The supreme court has stated that the term "wages" typically refers to "`compensation for services by the day or week.'" Broward Builders Exch., Inc....

...llee occasioned by the undisclosed easement. In response to the complaint initiating the present litigation appellee interposed a motion to dismiss. One basis for the motion was that the statute of limitations applicable to professional malpractice, Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1981), barred the action....

...The trial court granted the motion and subsequently entered a final judgment finding that it was the intent of the legislature to remove claims involving professional malpractice arising out of contractual relationships based on a written instrument from the five (5) year statute of limitations set forth in Section 95.11(2), Florida Statutes, such causes of action being governed instead by the two (2) year statute of limitations provided for in Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes....

...1978). We agree with this proposition and reject appellee's hypothesis that every activity subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Professional Regulation constitutes a "profession" within the scope of the malpractice statute of limitations, Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...To hold otherwise would bring activities such as embalming and cosmetology within the professional malpractice statute of limitations. We are confident the legislature had no such intention. Accordingly, we hold that the four year statute of limitations in Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1981) (actually its predecessor) applies here....

...raud [1] and the 12-year statute of repose [2] ; the claim for reformation was barred by the five-year statute of limitations [3] ; and their other legal and equitable claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations or laches contained in section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...e plaintiff either knows or should know that the last element of the cause of action occurred. The Legislature has also imposed a delayed discovery rule in cases of professional malpractice, medical malpractice, and intentional torts based on abuse. Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.2000), provides: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ....

...efit from the delayed discovery doctrine under Davis. It is unlikely that the supreme court narrowed the delayed discovery doctrine in Davis on November 7, 2002, only to have it subsumed by equitable estoppel on November 27, 2002 in S.A.P. NOTES [1] § 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (1997). [2] § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). [3] § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...idance which was not pleaded ... the issue of the [appellant's] estoppel to assert the applicable statute of limitations was not an issue properly before the trial court based on the pleadings at the time." Id. at 848. [10] Section 95.031(2)(a)-(b); section 95.11(4), (7), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...y Trucking was required to file an action to domesticate the judgment in Florida in order to create a valid lien and execute on the judgment in Florida. Michael argues that Valley Trucking is now barred from doing so by the statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), which provides that "an action on a judgment or decree of any court, not of record, of this state or any court of the United States, any other state or territory in the United States, or a foreign country" must be brought within five years....

...Since 1994, creditors with federal judgments can simply record a copy of the judgment in the circuit court of any county in Florida and it will be given the same effect as a judgment obtained in Florida. They no longer have to file a separate action to domesticate the judgment. § 55.503, Fla. Stat. (2000). Section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes, applies to "actions on a judgment." *216 Actions to domesticate a foreign judgment fall within this statute. Valley Trucking would be barred by section 95.11(2)(a) if it attempted to enforce its judgment based on the 1992 recording of its judgment. However, when Valley Trucking re-recorded its judgment in 2000, the FEFJA applied and Valley Trucking was not required to bring an action to domesticate the judgment. The re-recording in 2000 was not prohibited by the statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(a), because that section applies only to independent actions on a judgment and not to the recording of a foreign judgment and proceedings to enforce that judgment under the FEFJA....

...Creditor re-registered the judgment in 1998. In 1999, creditor was issued a writ of garnishment. [2] Id. at 838. The Federal District Court granted debtor's motion seeking dissolution of the writ and concluded that a garnishment proceeding was an action on a judgment within the meaning of section 95.11(2)(a)....

...Debtor then filed a complaint in state court seeking damages arising from the federal court garnishment. The circuit court concluded that the federal district court had erred in its dismissal of the garnishment proceeding. The determinative issue was whether section 95.11(2)(a) applied to a writ of garnishment. This court stated that neither the garnishment proceeding, nor the registration of the New York judgment under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963, was an "action on a judgment" within the meaning of section 95.11(2)(a)....

...ten years of the date of the judgment. More than ten years after the judgment was issued, creditor tried to register the judgment in Florida pursuant to the FEFJA. Debtor argued that registration was barred by the five-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(a)....

...This Court in Muka reasoned that since the judgment no longer had any effect in the state where the judgment was originally entered, allowing the judgment to be registered in Florida under the FEFJA would be similar to bringing an entirely separate action on a judgment. Although the court went on to state that the bar of section 95.11(2)(a) "also encompasses a proceeding to register a dormant and unrevived judgment of a foreign state," this was not essential to the holding in the case and, therefore, is dicta....

...Valley Trucking may have a lien only for twenty years after the date that the judgment was entered, regardless of when it was actually recorded. Therefore, simply recording the judgment pursuant to the FEFJA should not be viewed as an independent action on a judgment that would fall under the statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(a)....

...See Muka, 766 So.2d at 241; see also Burshan, 805 So.2d at 838 (1987 judgment registered in 1993 and re-registered in 1998). *218 In the instant case, the judgment against Michael was still valid under Texas law in 2000 when Valley Trucking re-recorded it in Palm Beach County under the FEFJA and therefore was not barred by section 95.11(2)(a)....

...Hamilton's appeal concerns the trial court's award of damages to Mr. Tanner for unpaid rents and taxes that accrued during the term of the lease agreement. Mrs. Hamilton argues that the statute of limitations as to an action on the lease agreement is five years, § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...-fifth of the month. Hence, the last payment due during the lease term was that of September 25, 1994. Mr. Tanner could have sued against this installment, assuming that it had not been paid by the Hamiltons, at the latest on September 25, 1999. See § 95.11(2)(b) (providing that an action on an obligation founded on a written instrument has a statute of limitations of five years); Holiday Furniture, 852 So.2d 926....

...es of action against Kelley, and that the record showed, as a matter of law, that the School Board discovered or should have discovered the design defects in the roofs more than four years before it filed its lawsuits, in July of 1977. We agree that section 95.11(3)(c) applies to these cases rather than the two-year statute....

...[3] However, we disagree that the record established conclusively, in these cases, that the four-year statute had run against the School Board by July of 1977. Accordingly, we reverse. [4] In order to sustain a summary judgment holding that a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations, such as section 95.11(3)(c), the record must conclusively demonstrate that the appellant discovered or should have discovered the injury or the negligent act of the appellee giving rise to the injury....

...Whether or not a construction deficiency is covered by a bond does not affect the accrual of a cause of action against a negligent party. Likewise, such accrual is not deferred until the party with the cause of action is told about it by the negligent party or the negligence confessed. A leaky roof is not a "latent defect." § 95.11(3)(c), Fla....

...to prevent the material from cracking due to expansion." This is a clear reference to the architect's failure to design proper expansion joints in the roof and is, in my opinion, sufficient to sustain the summary judgment. I would affirm. NOTES [1] Section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...In any event the action must be commenced within 12 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his employer. [2] Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides a two year period in which to file: An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run...

...is court: "Is the cause of action ordered to be reinstated by the Court's decision in Barfield v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, 197 So.2d 545 (Fla. DCA 2d, 1967) governed by the three year statute of limitations set forth in Florida Statutes § 95.11(5) (e), or by the four year statute of limitations set forth in Florida Statutes § 95.11(4)." The trial court stated that the point of law involved "may be determinative of the cause and is without direct controlling precedent in the state and instructions from the District Court of Appeal will facilitate the proper disposition of this cause * * *." The facts in Barfield v....

...Only the cause of action alleging breach of warranty was before the court below and is now before this court. Defendant had raised the defense that the statute of limitations governing causes of action arising from breach of unwritten contracts bars this suit. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (5) (e), 1967. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, urge that the four year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4), 1967, controlling any relief not specifically provided for in Fla. Stat. Ch. 95, Limitations of Actions; Adverse Possession, is applicable. This latter section has traditionally been applied to tort actions. See Manning v. Serrano, Fla. 1957, 97 So.2d 688. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5) (e), 1967, reads as follows: "Actions other than those for the recovery of real property can only be commenced as follows: * * * * * * "(5) Within three years....

...Ware, 1938, 136 Fla. 466, 182 So. 605; Schenkel v. Atlantic National Bank, Fla. App. 1962, 141 So.2d 327. However, this court, in Creviston v. General Motors Corp., Fla.App. 1968, 210 So.2d 755, 757, indicated that the three year statute of limitations of Section 95.11(5) (e) was applicable to actions *376 on implied warranty, stating that such actions are founded on a contract not in writing. Thus we held that the period of limitation on such actions commences to run when the "agreement" is breached, rather than the time the actual damages are sustained. It should be noted, however, that the question of the applicability of Section 95.11(5) (e), rather than Section 95.11 (4), to actions based on implied warranty against a manufacturer was not before the court....

...The Supreme Court of Florida quashed our judgment in that cause in Creviston v. General Motors Corp., Fla. 1969, 225 So.2d 331. The court accepted, for the purposes of resolving the question of the time the three year statute of limitations begins to run, that implied warranty is governed by Section 95.11(5) (e)....

...1969, 225 So.2d 553, is subject to the same analysis. However, we wish to make clear that we express no opinion as to the issue of whether a suit based on implied warranty by an ultimate consumer against one other than a manufacturer is within the ambit of Section 95.11(5) (e) or Section 95.11(4)....

...Yet when examining decisions that may shed some light on the problem, it must be remembered that the question is not whether a cause based on implied warranty by a consumer against a manufacturer *377 is ex contractu or ex delicto. It is whether such an action is specifically provided for by Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5) (e), 1967, F.S.A. See Section 95.11(4)....

...on to be contractual in nature. See Prosser, Torts, 3d ed. § 97, pp. 678-681. For the foregoing reasons we are unable to see how consumer actions against a manufacturer based on implied warranty come within the specific [3] provisions of Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5) (e), 1967, F.S.A....

...Therefore, in answer to the question certified to this court, we hold that the cause of action ordered to be reinstated by our decision in Barfield v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla.App. 1967, 197 So.2d 545, is governed by the four year statute of limitations set forth in Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (4), 1967, F.S.A....

...ble and Insurable Laws," 1960, 69 Yale L.J. 794. See Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., Fla.App. 1967, 205 So.2d 307, 308-309, for a historical treatment of implied warranty. [2] 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability, 1968, § 1. [3] See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4), 1967, F.S.A.

...in failing to monitor the tumor for future treatment needs. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that even if the allegations in the complaint were true, the cause of action was barred by the four year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla.Stat....

...Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25 (Fla.1976), modified on other grounds, sub nom. Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177 (Fla.1993), for their contention that failure of a physician to advise a patient of a significant medical condition could be considered "concealment" in accordance with section 95.11(4)(b)....

...If true, such non-disclosure resulting in successful concealment would also toll the running of the statute of limitations. Id. at 895. We recognize that in Nardone and Almengor, the alleged negligence and the action which tolled the statute were separate. Nevertheless, the plain language of section 95.11(4)(b) does not suggest that the negligence and the concealment which extends the statute must be separate....

...o so would violate the principles of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.150(c) which requires that the moving party "state with particularity" the grounds upon which the motion is based). REVERSED and REMANDED. STONE and GROSS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.11(4)(b) provides in part that: In those actions covered by this paragraph in which it can be shown that fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented the discovery of the injury within the four year period, the pe...

...of a foreign judgment pursuant to the UFMJRA, and that the applicable statute of limitations are the ones pertinent to Florida's domestic judgments. *1173 REVERSED and REMANDED; Questions CERTIFIED. ANTOON, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 95.11, Fla.Stat. (1995). [2] §§ 55.XXX-XX-XXX, Fla.Stat. [3] § 95.11(1), Fla.Stat. [4] § 95.11(2), Fla.Stat....

...law" bond. It contained additional language in a number of areas that made the bond's coverage more expansive than a statutory bond. See Martin Paving Co. v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 646 So.2d 268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Therefore, as provided in section 95.11(2)(b) Florida Statutes (1995) the proper limitations period for bringing this action was five years....

...conclusive applicability of such defense to bar the action. McLeod v. Barber, 764 So.2d 790, 792 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Relying on Nadd v. Le Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 804 So.2d 1226 (Fla.2001), NYS argues that the twenty year limitation period found in section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes (1995), applies to its action....

...ch courts, judgment creditors or debtors may rely when a judgment creditor seeks to enforce a foreign judgment in Florida, we turn to Florida's general statutory provisions to determine the applicable limitations period. See Nadd, 804 So.2d at 1229. Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1995), provides, in relevant part: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (1) Within twenty years.—An action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state....

...(2) Within five years.— (a) An action on a judgment or decree of any court, not of record, of this state or any court of the United States, any other state or territory in the United States, or a foreign country. The twenty year limitation period set forth in section 95.11(1) applies to actions seeking to enforce a foreign judgment only after such judgment had been domesticated in Florida pursuant to the applicable statutes. Because that is not the case here, we conclude, as did the trial court, that the five-year limitation period set forth in section 95.11(2)(a) applies....

...("This act applies to any foreign judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered...."). [3] See N.Y. CPLR Law § 211(b) (McKinney 2001) (an action to enforce a money judgment is governed by a twenty year statute of limitations). [4] § 95.11(1), Fla....

...date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered." Because Puchner filed suit in August of 1982, any fraud committed before August of 1971 is barred by the statute of repose. Similarly, section 95.11(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), bars Puchner's cause of action for violations of Florida's Investor Protection Act....

...There is evidence that Prudential-Bache was on notice that Goodstein was mailing Puchner's statements to a post office box. [2] The limitations periods for Puchner's claims are: securities law violations, two years from discovery, but not more than five years from violation § 95.11(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1987); fraud, four years from discovery, but not more than twelve years from violation §§ 95.031, 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (1987); breach of fiduciary duty, four years § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (1987); negligence, four years § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...Homeowners answered the complaint and asserted as their first affirmative defense that the complaint was time barred and must be dismissed with prejudice because the suit was not commenced within five years of the default date alleged in the complaint, as required under section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2013)- (establishing a five-year statute of limitations on actions to foreclose a mortgage)....

...recluded from filing a new foreclosure action based on different acts or dates of default not previously alleged, provided that the subsequent foreclosure action on the subsequent defaults is brought within the statute of limitations period found in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes....

...supplemental to or in aid of a judgment or execution shall be governed by the procedure of the state in which the district court sits, at the time that the remedy is sought. 1 Fed.R.Civ.P. 69. The relevant section of the Florida Code, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11, provides: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (1) Within twenty years....

...To apply the state procedures would render a judgment of the Connecticut court foreign *383 to itself and would thwart the federal statute, which was designed to simplify the enforceability of judgments in district court. The district court in this case applied the reasoning of Anderson to conclude that if § 95.11(2)(a) is applied, then a judgment of the federal district court for the Southern District of Florida would be “foreign” when enforced in that court....

...l district court, not when a federal district court is enforcing its own order. Wright contends that this case is distinguishable from Anderson because the Connecticut statute in that ease specifically mentioned “foreign judgments.” In contrast, § 95.11 does not use that language....

...had to provide greater proof of the judgment’s validity than normally required, thus impinging on the federal statutory goal of simplifying the process for transferring a judgment between district courts. Wright states that in this case, applying § 95.11 would not alter any federal law or practice and, thus, the reasoning of the Anderson court is inapplicable here....

...refiling them in state court. Less than a month after the dismissal, she filed her claims in the circuit court below. Defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued that her state law claims were barred by the Florida statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)( o ), Fla Stat....

..., Inc., in which he alleged a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. See § 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993) (prohibiting employers from discharging employees based upon handicap). We affirm because the statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1993), bars this action. See Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432 (Fla.2000) (holding four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(f) applies to claims under Florida Civil Rights Act when Commission on Human Relations fails to make reasonable cause determination within 180 days)....

...workers' compensation claim. See § 440.205, Fla. Stat. (1993). The trial court dismissed this count because it was filed more than four years after Mr. Ross's termination and was barred by the statute of limitations provided for statutory claims in section 95.11(3)(f)....

...Because we conclude that the statute of limitations bars this claim, we do not determine whether Mr. Ross's broken leg constituted a disability under federal or state law. Both parties agree that the four-year statute of limitations for statutory causes of action controls this case. See § 95.11(3)(f); Joshua, 768 So.2d 432....

...one year in which to file a lawsuit. See § 760.11(5). Unfortunately, there are many complaints that are not processed within 180 days by the Commission. As to those complaints, the supreme court has held that the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(f) applies....

...Nevertheless, the four-year *316 statute of limitations runs from the accrual of the cause of action, not from the conclusion of the condition precedent. See § 768.28(6)(b), (14). Admittedly, section 768.28 contains its own separate statute of limitations and is not controlled by section 95.11(3)(f), but the length and operation of the two statutes are identical and the same policies should apply to both absent clear legislative intent otherwise. Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Ross's claim for a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act accrued on the date of his alleged wrongful termination and that the running of the four-year statute of limitation in section 95.11(3) was not tolled while Mr....

...nder answers this question on remand. First, if the fact-finder determines that Phelan discovered or should have discovered her cause of action within two years of August 14, 1976, the district court ruled that the two-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), would bar her claim....

...t declared a state statute invalid as article V, section 3(b)(1) contemplates. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. This dismissal of jurisdiction is without prejudice as to any future appeal in this matter should the district court eventually find section 95.11(4)(b) unconstitutional....

...the limitations period in section 112.3231, Florida Statutes (2001), would not bar the Trust's administrative forfeiture determination in any event. Arguing in the alternative, Hames contends that the four-year limitations period found in paragraph 95.11(3)(n), Florida Statutes (2001), barred the Trust from proceeding forward with the forfeiture determination....

...Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla.1995). We, therefore, must resolve whether the Trust's administrative forfeiture determination was a "proceeding" requiring the application of the four-year limitations period provided by paragraph 95.11(3)(n)....

...periods found within chapter 95. Thus, although the Trust initiated the forfeiture determination proceedings more than four years after Hames' guilty plea, it did so in a timely fashion because the four-year limitations period provided by paragraph 95.11(3)(n), Florida Statutes (2001), was inapplicable....

...Superior Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 776 F.2d 265, 267 (11th Cir.1985). 10 The four-year statute does not appear to encompass contracts for mere repairs. The statute is directed only to "[a]n action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement...." Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1979) (emphasis added)....

...5 12 We note that the four-year statute of limitations applicable to improvements might still apply if the contract for repairs arose directly from the construction of the condominiums. The contract action might then be characterized as "an action founded on ... an improvement...." Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1979); see Dubin v....

...School Bd., 435 So.2d 804 (Fla.1983) (action against architects, contractors and manufacturers for damages for roof leakage in newly constructed buildings). 13 Because the contracted repairs do not qualify as "improvements," and arise primarily from a contract unrelated to the construction of the condominiums, we find that Section 95.11(2)(b), 6 which places a limit of five years on contract actions, is applicable....

...damage award. * See Rule 34-2(b), Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ** Honorable Edward S. Smith, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation 1 NAMI settled with the Association 2 Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1979). The court incorrectly applied the amended § 95.11(3)(c) effective July 3, 1980, instead of the prior version....

...ndows. See Brief for Appellant NAMI at 46, incorporated by reference in Brief for Appellant Orenstein 6 "(2) Within five years.-- (b) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument." Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(2)(b) (West 1979)....

...ntracts in place of a more specifically applicable statute of limitations. See Dubin v. Dow Corning Corp., 478 So.2d at 72-73 (breach of warranty claim for leaky roof against builder and roof manufacturer properly barred by the specifically relevant § 95.11(3)(c) rather than the general § 95.11(2)(b)) 8 Orenstein also complains that some of the damage is attributable to the fact that the Association failed to perform regular maintenance after the repairs were completed....

...He once again contended, based on the minutes, that plaintiffs knew or should have known by July 1987 of any discrepancies in the accounts and that the action was therefore barred by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to "[a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes." § 95.11(3)(p), Fla....

...The statute provided: This chapter shall not apply ... with respect to any money or property held or collected by any officer or trustee or his sureties. § 95.02, Fla. Stat. (1973). This statutory bar was eliminated in 1974, when the legislature made sweeping revisions to section 95.11. See Ch. 74-382, § 7, Laws of Florida. No specific provisions regarding an accounting or breach of fiduciary duty were added to the limitations statute; however, at the same time it amended section 95.11, the legislature also added section 737.307 to the chapter on trusts....

...REVERSED and REMANDED. W. SHARP, J., concurs. DAUKSCH, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] The elder Mr. Nayee apparently died in 1977. [2] Plaintiffs had apparently produced the minutes at defendant's deposition and used them to question defendant. [3] § 95.11(3)(p), Fla....

...Patients Compensation Fund. CAMPBELL, Judge. This is an appeal of the trial court's dismissal of a medical malpractice action against appellees Mease Hospital and Clinic (Mease), James David Emerson, M.D. (Emerson), and the Florida Patients Compensation Fund, pursuant to section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...action based on the negligent administration of the same drugs Mrs. Phillips received. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was barred on the face of the complaint by the two year statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...Upon receipt of the Motion for Rehearing with the attached Amended Complaint the Court, on its own Motion, will make a ruling as to whether or not the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint avoid the Statute of Limitations requirement set forth in Florida Statute 95.11(4)(b). Appellants filed a timely motion for rehearing, accompanied by an amended complaint. *1061 The trial court denied the motion for rehearing and entered a final judgment of dismissal. We find this to have been error. The first portion (part one) of section 95.11(4)(b), provides that a medical malpractice action must be brought within two years from the occurrence of the "incident" giving rise to the action, or within two years from discovery of the "incident," or when the "incident" should have been discovered, but in no event, more than four years from the "date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued." In the last portion (part two) of section 95.11(4)(b), the four year maximum limitations of part one is extended where, [I]t can be shown that fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented the discovery of the injury within the 4-year period, the period of li...

...(Emphasis supplied.) We find that the trial court mistakenly restricted the word "injury" in part two of the statute to physical injury. A cause of action in a medical malpractice case necessarily includes a negligent act, omission, or breach of contract, and a resulting injury. Section 95.11(4)(b) defines an "action for medical malpractice" as a claim in tort or in contract for death, injury or monetary loss "arising out of ......

...Reading the statute as a whole therefore requires, in our opinion, that both "incident" (or act) and "injury" must be known and that fraud, concealment or intentional misrepresentation of fact that conceals either will extend the limitations period as provided in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...and to intentionally misrepresent to her ... that her problems were ... normal ... and not due to negligent care." Appellants then allege they first became aware of the alleged negligence and fraud on May 17, 1982. These allegations were sufficient to invoke part two of section 95.11(4)(b) so that appellants' cause of action was no longer, on the face of the complaint, barred by the limitations of part one of section 95.11(4)(b)....

...As to Counts II and III, the Defendants urge dismissal based upon a statute of limitations argument. The parties agree that this Court must look to the most analogous state statute of limitations for guidance, and offer as alternatives Fla.Stat. § 760.10(10) (1983) (180 days for handicap discrimination); § 95.11(4)(c) (two years for action to recover lost wages); § 95.11(3)(f) (four years for action on statutory liability); and § 95.11(2)(b) (five years for contract action based upon written instrument)....

...] Goehring [231 So.2d 513 (Fla.1970)] suggests that no matter how an employment termination suit is characterized, Florida law dictates that the two-year statute applies. McWilliams [ v. Escambia County School Board, 658 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)] holds that even though § 95.11(4)(c) may appear on its face to be limited to actions for the recovery of back-pay, it applies to § 1983 employment suits in which the plaintiff requests legal and equitable relief....

...This Court consequently finds that the essential federal nature of this ERISA claim is most strongly analogous to a state employment termination suit, and consequently the applicable state statute of limitations is the two year period contained in Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(c)....

...of assignment contract against Lynch and Suncoast; and Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices against Lynch. The defendants moved to dismiss the homeowners' amended complaint arguing that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 95.11(3)(c) provides, in pertinent part: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ......

...1st DCA 1990)); see also Black's Law Dictionary 794-95 (5th ed.1979). In the instant case, the defects involved were not latent. First, the homeowners were aware of the defects. Second, the defects were discovered during a reasonable and customary inspection. Therefore, because the "latent defect" portion of section 95.11(3)(c) is inapplicable, the statute of limitations does not start to run from the "time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence." Rather, pursuant to section 95.11(3)(c), when a latent defect is not involved, the limitation period begins to run from the latest of the following events: the date of actual possession by the owner; the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy; the date of ab...

...s made in an attempt to remedy defects in construction work do not toll the statute of limitations. Defendants' reliance on K/F Development is misplaced. K/F is factually distinguishable because it travels under the "catchall" four-year provision in section 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (1975). Although not relied on by the parties, Kelley is also distinguishable. Kelley involves a situation in which there had been "completion of construction." Further, the Kelley opinion does not state which portion of section 95.11(3)(c) was applied....

...ess of the school board's lack of knowledge of a specific defect, the school board knew more than four years prior to [filing the action] that something was wrong with the roofs of these three schools. This knowledge meets the discovery aspect of subsection 95.11(3)(c)." Kelley, 435 So.2d at 806-07....

...Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law on Count I of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Counts II and III The applicable statute of limitations for the Plaintiff's Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Florida's Blue Sky Law claims is § 95.11(4)(e). Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e). Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e) requires a two prong test to be met....

...First, the lawsuit must be commenced within two years "from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." Second, actions of this type must be instituted "not more than 5 years from the date such violation occurred." Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e)....

...Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Count IV of the Amended Complaint as a matter of law. Count V Plaintiff's common law fraud claim in Count V of the Amended Complaint is governed by a four-year statute of limitations. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(j)....

...Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V is DENIED. Counts VI and VII The Plaintiff's negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations applicable to professional malpractice claims. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(a)....

...more than two years from the time that [Joseph] knew or should have known of the injury or knowledge that there was a reasonable possibility that the injury was caused by medical negligence, and there *917 fore is barred pursuant to Florida Statutes § 95.11.” UBC also alleged: “[UBC] asserts that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action by [Joseph’s] failure to comply with the conditions precedent prior to the filing of this action pursuant to Florida Statutes § 766....

...whether a suit raises an issue of ordinary negligence or medical malpractice. Southern Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v. Ashe, 948 So.2d 889, 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Similarly, the statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice contained in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), provides: (b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered,...

...ANALYSIS Among other arguments made in the appeal, the defendants contend that the action for false light invasion of privacy was barred by the statute of limitations. They assert that Anderson merely recast *4 his unsuccessful libel claim as a false light invasion of privacy claim to circumvent the effect of section 95.11(4)(g), Florida Statutes, which places a two-year limitation on defamation actions....

...In response, Anderson contends that the false light invasion of privacy claim is a distinct tort, which differs from a claim of libel in the respect that it can be asserted even if the statement at issue is true. Thus, he argues that the claim is governed by section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes, which sets a four-year limitation period for any action not governed by a more specific statute....

...We therefore decline to address that issue, as well. Reversed. BENTON, J., concurs. LEWIS, J., concurs in result with written opinion. LEWIS, J., concurring in result only. I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in applying the four-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes, which applies to "[a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes," including invasion of privacy actions, under the circumstances of this case....

...Generally, false light actions fall under the invasion of privacy *12 umbrella, see Agency for Health Care Administration v. Associated Industries of Florida, Inc., 678 So.2d 1239, 1252 n. 20 (Fla.1996), and are, therefore, subject to the four-year limitations period contained in section 95.11(3)(p)....

...Pursues Political Clout." Because some of the articles in the series were published more than two years before the action was filed, they could not be used to support the libel claim, which was subject to the two-year limitations period contained in section 95.11(4)(g), Florida Statutes....

...action and categorized false light as a subcategory of invasion of privacy, I agree with the Second District's approval of false light invasion of privacy as a valid action and its determination that the four-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(3)(p) applies to all invasion of privacy actions, including those based on the false light theory. See Heekin, 789 So.2d. at 358; see also Haskins v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 898 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (stating that in Florida, the statute of limitations for invasion of privacy claims is four years, citing section 95.11(3)); Putnam Berkley Group, Inc. v. Dinin, 734 So.2d 532, 536 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (finding that a common law invasion of privacy claim was barred by the four-year limitations period in section 95.11(3)(p)); Houston v....

...In October of 1983, the trial court granted Ware and Dow's motions for summary judgment on the ground that Dubin's cause of action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations for actions founded on the design, planning or construction of an improvement to real property. § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1981). On appeal, Dubin argues that the trial court should have applied the five-year statute of limitations on contracts to his breach of warranty claim. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...ased upon breach of warranty. Additionally, because none of these cases suggest that the plaintiffs argued that the five-year statute applied to a breach of warranty count, we must rely upon the plain meaning of the statute to resolve this issue. Subsection 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), provides for a four-year statute of limitations for: (c) An action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property, with the time running from the date of actual posses...

...exercise of due diligence... . (emphasis added) We read this language to mean "any" action arising out of improvements to real property, whether founded on contract or on negligence. To read the statute otherwise would render it meaningless, because section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), already provided for a four-year statute of limitations for actions founded on negligence. *73 Further, section 95.11(3)(c) is a specific statute relating to real property improvements....

...mitations in the summer of 1982, we must affirm. Affirmed. DANAHY, J., concurs. GRIMES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. GRIMES, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I fully agree that the four-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), is applicable to this case....

...That action was dismissed for failure to prosecute in July, 2003. Medical Jet filed the complaint here at issue on August 27, 2003. The circuit court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that the five-year statute of limitations of section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), barred the cause of action. The statute of limitations for a contract founded on a written instrument is five years. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...While acknowledging that language found in treatises and cases support this view, I wonder whether the treatises and cases have ever really addressed the issue or rather have simply fallen back on repeating language found in prior decisions where the issue has never been squarely met. Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2003) provides that "[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument" must be commenced within five years....

...ections to foreclose and collect the moneys owed under the lien, and to remit to Collections money that the City collected from property owners. [1] The City moved for summary judgment on the basis that suit was barred by the statute of limitations, section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...NOTES [1] In connection with this allegation, Collections claims that in 1998, it discovered that the City had collected on liens or lien rights previously sold to Collections. The City asserts, however, that Collections was aware of this since 1992. [2] Under section 95.11(2)(b), a "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation or liability founded on a written instrument" shall be commenced within five years....

...a wrongful death action against her husband's doctor. Chasin continued to represent her until sometime in March 1985. During the period that the firm represented Kaufman, case law in this district held that the wrongful death statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), applied to claims such as Kaufman's, namely, claims for a patient's wrongful death which allegedly results from medical malpractice....

...Under this law, Kaufman's claim could have been filed as late as November 16, 1985, some time after the firm and Chasin were discharged. The Supreme Court of Florida subsequently reversed this district's holding, deciding that claims such as Kaufman's must comply with the medical malpractice statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), and *1153 must be filed within two years of discovery of the negligent act, but no later than four years after the negligent act. Wagshul v. Lipshaw, 464 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1985); Ash v. Stella, 457 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1984). By the time these decisions were released, the statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(b) had already run on Kaufman's claim. Kaufman alleges that the firm and Chasin were negligent in failing to anticipate the change in the law and, as a result, negligently failed to file suit before the statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(b) had run on her claim....

...Plaintiff submits the trial court erred when it concluded her claims were time barred by Florida's statute of limitations. We disagree with her contention. In Florida, the statute of limitations period for an invasion of privacy claim and for an action founded on negligence is four years. § 95.11(3), Fla....

...Parrish, Stephens, Lynn, Klein & McNicholas, P.A., Miami, for appellee Jonathan L. Shepard. MOE, LEROY H., Associate Judge. This is an appeal from an order dismissing a legal malpractice action on the ground that the action was barred by the two year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...mmence when the underlying cause of action against Dr. Glaser is complete, or, (2) that the statute of limitations did not commence until June of 1990 when Dr. Glaser "breached" the employment agreement. We agree with Dr. Zitrin's second contention. Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1991) provides in part: (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS....

...[4] Stephen Rotell's claim for loss of consortium derives from Adam Rotell's negligence claim and only survives if Adam Rotell proves his claim. See Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40, 45 (Fla. 1971) (recognizing a claim for loss of consortium as being derivative to a claim for negligence). [5] "A profession, within the meaning of section 95.11, is `any vocation requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing is possible in Florida.'" Moransais, 744 So.2d at 976 (citing § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...k review of the EEOC's findings. It did not clarify whether the Dismissal and Notice of Rights constituted a "determination" which would trigger the thirty-five-day restriction. [4] In this case, the applicable statute of limitations was four years. § 95.11(3)(f), Fla....

...the nonmoving party. See Caretta Trucking, Inc. v. Cheoy Lee Shipyards, Ltd., 647 So.2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The statute of limitations on a legal or equitable contract or obligation not founded on a written instrument is four years. See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (1990). When an action is based upon an obligation founded on a written instrument, the statute of limitations is five years. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...he defense. Aberdeen POA filed a cross-motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. The court entered a final summary judgment in favor of Aberdeen POA, in which the court found that the five-year limitations period applied under section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), that the cause of action accrued in 2004 when Aberdeen POA’s mandatory membership amendment was recorded, and that Harris’s claim was brought outside of the limitations period....

...Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla.2001); see also Briggs v. Jupiter Hills Lighthouse Marina, 9 So.3d 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (reviewing de novo a trial court’s entry of summary judgment based on statute of limitations). The parties agreed below to the applicability of section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), which provides for a limitations period of five years for “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instru-menté]” We agree this section applies to Harris’s complaint....

...to the world” that a property is subject to any properly recorded provisions and regulations). Accordingly, any challenge to the validity/enactment of the amendment itself is barred by the applicable statute of limitations which, in this case, is section 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...— Except as provided in subsection 95.051(2) and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues. Thus, under the statute, Mrs. Small's cause of action, unless otherwise barred, accrued on June 26, 1981. Under section 95.11 entitled "Limitations other than for the recovery of real property," the following provisions applied to the suit: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ... . (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS. — (a) An action founded on negligence. ... . § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...Since the remainder of the complaint did not deal with specific causes of actions listed under subsection 3, Mrs. Small's remaining counts were governed by subsection 3(p) which allowed four years for "[a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes." § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (1979). At the core of our analysis is section 95.031(2), a statute of repose, which provided: Actions for products liability and fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser ......

...On May 7, 1986, the Smalls filed their notice of appeal, and soon thereafter, on July 1, 1986, the Florida Legislature amended chapter 95 by deleting the twelve-year statute of repose. See Ch. 86-272, Laws of Fla. Chapter 86-272 is entitled: An act relating to limitations of actions; amending s. 95.11, F.S.; reducing the time within which actions for libel and slander must be commenced; amending s....

...— Except as provided in subsection (2) and in s. 95.051 and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues. (2) Actions for products liability and fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered....

...e unless a contrary intention is expressed by the legislature in the new law. Id., citing 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 57 (1970) (emphasis supplied). The supreme court concluded: Since the legislative intent to provide retroactive effect to section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes, is not express, clear, or manifest, we conclude that it does not apply to causes of action occurring prior to its effective date....

...Houck Corporation seeks review of the final summary judgment in favor of defendant New River, Ltd., Pasco, in Houck's action to foreclose a mortgage. Houck argues that the trial court erred in determining that its foreclosure action was barred by a five-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...We conclude that section 95.281 is a statute of repose that prescribes the enforceable life of a mortgage lien, but does not operate to preclude an action to foreclose the mortgage. Therefore, the trial court did not err in applying the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(c) for mortgage foreclosure actions....

...New River answered Houck's complaint, freely admitting that it failed to make the required principal payments due under the notes and mortgage on October 30, 1991. New River asserted as an affirmative defense that Houck's action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(c). Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. New River contended that it was entitled to summary judgment based on the five-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(c), and Houck contended that the applicable statute of limitations was twenty years, based on section 95.281(1)(b). The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of New River and dismissed Houck's complaint. Section 95.11(2)(c), entitled "Limitations other than for the recovery of real property," provides that actions to foreclose a mortgage must be commenced within five years....

...Many courts have referred to both sections as "statutes of limitation." However, the statutes conflict under this interpretation because section 95.281(1)(b) would extend the amount of time to bring a foreclosure action from the five years articulated without exception in section 95.11(2)(c) to twenty years if the maturation of the note secured by the mortgage is not ascertainable from the record....

...Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 863 So.2d 201, 208 (Fla.2003). The purpose of a statute of repose is to set a definitive time limitation on a valid cause of action even if there are circumstances that would make it difficult to discover. Id. The limitations period provided in section 95.11(2)(c) does not affect the life of the lien or extinguish the debt; it merely precludes an action to collect the debt after five years. Section 95.281(1)(b), conversely, establishes an ultimate date when the lien of the mortgage terminates and is no longer enforceable. Section 95.051, Florida Statutes (2002), sets forth the times when the limitations period under section 95.11 is tolled, but expressly excludes section 95.281. Thus it is clear that section 95.11(2)(c) operates as a statute of limitation while section 95.281(1)(b) operates as a statute of repose. While the duration of a lien is determined by section 95.281(1)(b), section 95.281(1)(b) does not constitute a bar to the filing of an action to foreclose the mortgage unless it causes the lien to terminate before the statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(c) has expired. Our determination of this issue is supported by the legislative history of sections 95.11 and 95.281....

...(Emphasis supplied.) In 1974, section 95.28 was amended and replaced by section 95.281. At that time, the legislature eliminated the language in section 95.28(1) providing that "no action or proceeding of any kind shall begin to enforce or foreclose the mortgage," and amended section 95.11 to provide a five-year statute of limitations for "[a]n action to foreclose a mortgage." Ch....

...he mortgage lien. Our determination on this issue is also supported by our earlier decision in USX Corp. v. Schilbe, 535 So.2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). There, the court held that "[t]he timeliness of an action to foreclose a mortgage is controlled by section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), and the duration of the lien created by such mortgage is governed by section 95.281, Florida Statutes (1987), a statute of repose." Schilbe, 535 So.2d at 719....

...The question before the court in Schilbe was whether a bankruptcy stay tolled the statutory period for an action to recover on a promissory note and to foreclose a mortgage. The court answered the question in the negative and determined that the mortgage foreclosure action was time-barred by section 95.11(2)(c) and that the life of the lien had also expired under section 95.281....

...*605 This court's reference in Layton to section 95.281 as a "statute of limitations" is unfortunate because, as we have already explained, section 95.281 is not a true statute of limitations, but a statute of repose. Regardless, this court did not address the issue of whether the statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(c) barred the foreclosure action....

...The only issue decided by the Layton court was that section 95.281(1)(a) did not bar a foreclosure action on the mortgage. This decision is not based on a determination that the statute of limitations for filing a mortgage foreclosure action under section 95.11(2)(c) had not expired, but on a determination that the mortgage lien had not terminated because it was governed by the twenty-year period in section 95.281(1)(b). We cannot speculate as to why the defendant in Layton failed to raise as an affirmative defense the expiration of the statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(c), but that issue was not considered on appeal....

...2d DCA 1980), in which this court determined that the twenty-year "statute of limitations" under section 95.281 precluded dismissal of the foreclosure actions. Again, to the extent that it has caused confusion in the interpretation of the relation between sections 95.11(2)(c) and 95.281, the reference to section 95.281 as a "statute of limitations" is unfortunate. However, in those cases, the causes of action had not yet begun to accrue; therefore, the five-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(c) had not expired. In fact, in Smith, this court set forth an analysis consistent with that articulated by the trial court in this case. There, the court read sections 95.281 and 95.11 together to conclude that neither provision barred the foreclosure action because "[t]he twenty-year lien of the mortgage has not yet terminated, and appellants' cause of action did not accrue until the filing of the complaint herein." Smith, 391 So.2d at 798....

...ainable from the recorded mortgage, and the notes were not recorded. New River failed to make any payments and defaulted in 1991. The mortgage was assigned to Houck in January 2003; shortly thereafter, Houck filed its foreclosure action. Pursuant to section 95.11(2)(c), the statute of limitations to file the foreclosure action expired on October 30, 1996; however, under section 95.281(1)(b), the mortgage lien was enforceable until November 1, 2004....

...en in the event New River attempted to sell the property before November 1, 2004. In summary, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that Houck's foreclosure action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(c). At the time Houck filed suit, the five-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(c) had expired, but the twenty-year statute of repose under section 95.281(1)(b) had not....

...The trial court granted CBS's motion to dismiss on the first two grounds and its motion for summary judgment on the third. This appeal followed. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS The parties do not dispute that the tort of invasion of privacy is not specifically named in any subsection of section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1999). Therefore, the statute of limitations for this cause of action is four years. See § 95.11(3)(p), Fla....

...(1999) (applying a four-year statute of limitations to all actions "not specifically provided for in these statutes"). Despite this, the trial court dismissed Heekin's complaint with prejudice based on the two-year statute of limitations for libel and slander actions contained in section 95.11(4)(g), Florida Statutes (1999), because it found that the gravamen of Heekin's claim for false light invasion of privacy was the same as a claim for libel or slander....

...ed in Chapter 95, Florida Statutes, the four-year "catch-all" statute of limitations applied to the cause of action. See Putnam, 734 So.2d at 536; Houston, 192 So.2d at 542. We agree and hold that the four-year statute of limitations provided for in section 95.11(3)(p) applies to all causes of action for invasion of privacy....

...supporting affidavits, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; if the slightest doubt exists, summary judgment must be reversed. Delta Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 937 So.2d 695, 698 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). *910 Pursuant to section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, an action for medical malpractice must be commenced “within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence....

...Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 516 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), based on conflict with Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1988). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. This case presents the issue of whether the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), or the four-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1983), governs claims brought under section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...[1] In addition to wage-related damages, Hullinger requested recovery for humiliation, embarrassment, mental distress, and mental anguish as well as punitive damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint as time barred by the statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(4)(c) which provides: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property....

...— ... . (c) An action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime. The Fifth District Court affirmed the trial court's decision, 516 So.2d 1148. Asserting conflict with Scott, Hullinger argues that section 95.11(3)(f) should control because he states a statutory cause of action. Section 95.11(3)(f) provides: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property....

...to claim workers' compensation. In rejecting the contention that the suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, we stated: The instant action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 is not a "suit for wages" for the purposes of section 95.11(4)(c)....

...We recognize that in the absence of a controlling federal statute of limitations, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, relying on [ Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. ] Goehring [231 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1970)], have applied the two-year wage statute *233 of limitations set forth in section 95.11(4)(c) to federal statutory causes of actions for discriminatory employment termination....

...5th DCA 1987) (relying on McGhee and McWilliams ).[ [2] ] We did not intend this result. Id. at 643. Reasoning that the legislature had created a limited statutory cause of action for retaliatory discharge which was not recognized at common law, we held that the claim was controlled by section 95.11(3)(f)....

...to discharge an employee because of his age. Like Scott, Hullinger's cause of action is grounded upon the violation of a statute. We know of no common law cause of action for wrongful discharge because of age. The two-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(c) pertains to "[a]n action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime." This statute and its predecessor were intended to cover claims for wages or overtime earned for services rendered, see Azaroglu v....

...The fact that his damages may include or even be limited to recovery for such quantifiable injuries as the wages he lost had he not been discharged does not mean that his claim is one "to recover wages." Because the basis for Hullinger's cause of action is section 760.10, the applicable statute of limitations is section 95.11(3)(f) pertaining to "an action founded on a statutory liability." We quash the decision below and remand for further proceedings....

...Menendezes filed a complaint against the Public Health Trust of Dade County (PHT), which operates Jackson, together with other defendants. The defendants moved for a dismissal of the cause on grounds that the four-year statute of repose contained in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...he incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...be forever barred unless the civil action is commenced by filing a complaint in the court of appropriate jurisdiction within 4 years after such claim accrues. § 768.28(11), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1980). This statute contains no period of repose, unlike section 95.11....

...We begin by noting the somewhat unusual nature of the conflict between the opinion under review and Carr. In Carr, this Court did not address the question of whether the period of limitation in section 768.28(11) should prevail over that contained in section 95.11(4)(b) for medical malpractice actions against governmental hospitals....

...Rather, our opinion in Carr dealt solely with the constitutionality of the latter statute. Thus, the opinion under review and Carr are factually distinguishable. Jurisdiction exists, however, because our opinion in Carr reasonably may be read as a broad statement that section 95.11(4)(b) should apply to malpractice actions against governmental hospitals....

...Section 768.28(11), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), provides its own period of time. Thus, section 768.28(11) is the statute applicable to this case. We are aware of PHT's argument that section 768.28(11) contains no statute of repose and that the repose period contained in section 95.11 thus should apply....

...w at the time it amended these same statutes in 1988. A staff summary attached to these amendments endorsed the view that, under the then-existing law, section 768.28(11) applies to medical malpractice actions against governmental *570 hospitals and section 95.11(4) does not....

...er 1, 1988]. Staff of Fla.H.R.Comm. on Judiciary, CS/HB 0750, at 4 (1988) (May 5, 1988) (on file with Committee). In light of the foregoing statutes and legislative history, we find that our opinion in Carr must be limited solely to its holding that section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), is constitutional. We recede from Carr to the extent it suggests that section 95.11(4)(b) provides the applicable statute of limitation in medical malpractice actions brought against governmental hospitals before October 1, 1988....

...It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] However, the statute does provide for the limitations to be extended somewhat in cases involving fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentations of fact. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...terial." Ultimately, the repeated water intrusions into the home's structure led to the presence of "high and dangerous levels" of toxic mold. The Builder moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the four-year limitations period provided by section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), commenced to run in 1988 when the Homeowner experienced "numerous problems with the roof" and thus knew or should have known of the construction defects on which his complaint was founded....

...The circuit court agreed that the Homeowner discovered "the latent defect" in 1988, and it dismissed the complaint with prejudice on the authority of Kelley v. School Board of Seminole County, 435 So.2d 804 (Fla. 1983). Law and Analysis In pertinent part, section 95.11(3)(c) provides a four-year statute of limitations applicable to an action founded on the construction of an improvement to real property....

...NOTES [1] The Homeowner also asserted two counts against the company that designed the home and the design company's owner individually. These counts are not at issue in this appeal and, insofar as the record reveals, remain pending below. [2] Relevant portions of section 95.11(3)(c) have remained substantially unchanged at all times relevant to this appeal. [3] For reasons unnecessary to detail here, the complaint on its face does not conclusively establish the expiration of the statute of repose contained within section 95.11(3)(c)....

...summary judgment was properly entered for appellee because appellants' suit was barred by the statute of limitations, one of the matters also argued below in support of the motion. The statute of limitations on ordinary negligence is four years. See § 95.11, Fla....

...Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 863 So.2d 201, 208 (Fla.2003). The purpose of a statute of repose is to set a definitive time limitation on a valid cause of action even if there are circumstances that would make it difficult to discover. Id. The limitations period provided in section 95.11(2)(c) does not affect the life of the lien or extinguish the debt; it merely precludes an action to collect the debt after five years....

...nsent of her mother Jean between 1968 and 1971 while Appellant was between the ages of twelve and sixteen. A first amended complaint was filed on October 31, 1994, which was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds that the statute of limitations section 95.11(3)( o ), Florida Statutes (1975), barred Appellant's claim....

...Thereafter on January 26, 1995, Boyce filed a second amended complaint adding an additional count denominated as the tort of "continuing corruption of a child." Appellant now appeals the lower court's dismissal with prejudice of the second amended complaint again based upon the limitations bar of section 95.11(3)( o ). The threshold issue for resolution is which statute of limitation controls, that is, Florida Statute section 95.11(7), enacted in 1992 (chapter 92-102, Laws of Florida) as asserted by Boyce, or section 95.11(3)( o ), which the Cluetts argue was in effect as of January 1, 1975 (see section 95.022), and at the time the alleged abuse occurred. Section 95.11(3)( o ) provides in relevant part that a cause of action for an assault or any other intentional tort except as provided in subsection (7) of section 95.11 must be commenced within four years from the time the cause of action accrues....

...Section 95.031(1) provides that a cause of action accrues "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." Thus, as the Cluetts contend, because the last act of sexual abuse occurred in 1971, Boyce would have had to file her complaint in 1975 when she was nineteen years of age. Section 95.11(7), on the other hand, provides that intentional torts based on abuse may be commenced: ......

...Cluetts as of the filing of the complaint, and therefore, her cause of action would not be time barred. Alternatively, Appellant argues that because she did not learn until 1990 through psychological counseling that she was abused, then pursuant to section 95.11(7) she could bring this action in 1994....

...In 1985, approximately twenty years after the last alleged abuse occurred, she filed her complaint after psychological counseling uncovered her purportedly repressed memories of these incidences. Id. at 1118. The third district unequivocally declared that section 95.11(3)( o ) barred her complaint. Id. Lindabury underscores a legitimate underlying concern, that is, a judicial condoning of such delayed filing of lawsuits that would erode the protection that statutes of limitations were intended to repose. Section 95.11(7), however, was not enacted as of the date of that decision and, therefore, unaddressed by that decision. In Wiley v. Roof, 641 So.2d 66 (Fla.1994), our highest court specifically addressed the issue of what effect section 95.11(7), enacted in 1992, might have in reviving a cause of action previously barred under section 95.11(3)( o )....

...Because Appellant's cause of action was barred in 1975, the Cluetts possessed a legally protected expectation to be free from any claim that may have accrued but became barred due to Appellant's failure to initiate a lawsuit within the four year period allowed by section 95.11(3)( o )....

...As Quigley observes, the nonsupport aspect of a foreign judgment can be enforced like any other foreign money judgment. In this case, however, the statute of limitations for a legal action concerning a foreign judgment, as compared to an equitable proceeding on a foreign support order, appears to have elapsed. See § 95.11(2), Fla....

...In light of the purpose and intent of URESA, we see no reason to apply a legal statute of limitations to either a part III or a part IV URESA proceeding to collect delinquent periodic alimony. Wood v. Hunter, 504 So.2d 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Although section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1991), allows laches to bar any equitable action that is not commenced within the time provided for "legal actions concerning the same subject," the courts have not applied this statute to bar claims for periodic alimony or child support. Implicitly, the courts have decided that periodic alimony and child support do not have a legal counterpart for purposes of statutory laches. See Popper. In Winland v. Winland, 416 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), this court applied section 95.11(2)(a) to bar a claim for support on an old Ohio order....

...The complaint alleged that all defendants were negligent and the doctors involved committed medical malpractice in handling the decedent. Appellees Roberts and Phillips filed a motion to dismiss asserting (1) the cause of action was barred by the applicable statute of limitation, Section 95.11, Florida Statutes; (2) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and (3) the complaint failed to comply with Section 768.45, Florida Statutes....

...f his motion to vacate pending since June 18, 1982. Appellees Richards and Seminole Hospital filed respective motions for summary judgment which alleged that appellant's action for wrongful death was barred by the statute of limitation delineated in Section 95.11(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1979). Roberts and Phillips also filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that both the actions for wrongful death and for medical malpractice are barred by Sections 95.11(4)(b) and (4)(d), Florida Statutes....

...on for Reconsideration are hereby affirmed. We now address the trial court's order granting summary judgments in favor of appellees Richards and Seminole Hospital which were granted on the basis of the expiration of a two year statute of limitation. Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, provides: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within two years from the time the incident occurred giving rise to the action, or within two years from the time the incident is discovered, or sho...

...shall the action be commenced later than four years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued. (emphasis added). Also included within the two year statute of limitation is an action for wrongful death. See § 95.11(4)(d), Fla....

...Appellees responded to the complaint by filing a motion for summary judgment asserting that the alleged breaches occurred before March 11, 2001, four years before the complaint was filed. As a result, the action on the oral agreement was barred by the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Banks, P.A., filed suit when appellees failed to split the fee as provided by their contract. Appellees' motion for summary judgment asserted that the majority of the alleged breaches occurred more than four years before the complaint was filed and as a result any action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(3)(k), Fla....

...In Abbott, during the term of the parties' contract, Abbott breached one provision of that contract by entering into a separate agreement with a customer. GECC did not file suit until more than five years later when Abbott breached the indemnification provision of the same contract. The district court held: Under section 95.11(2)(b), the limitations period begins to run when "the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." § 95.031(1), Fla....

...e purchasers of its product.”). Furthermore, Florida law provides a five-year statute of limitations on claims arising under “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument....” Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (2)(b)....

...red by the statute of limitations. See McKissic v. Country Coach, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-1488-T-17EAJ, 2009 WL 500502 , at *12 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 27, 2009) ("This Court holds that the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Florida Statute[s] [section] 95.11(2)(b) begins to run for a claim of breach of express warranty when the breach giving rise to the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered, or when such warranty expires, whichever occurs first.” (emphasis in original))....

...One defendant, not either of Appellees, challenged the medical expert opinion submitted in connection with the notice; in response, Appellant mailed all Defendants a second set of statutory notice letters, with a new expert opinion, on February 4, 1993. She filed suit on June 3, 1993. Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), provides in part that "[a]n action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is d...

...determination as to when the cause of action accrued, and, therefore, whether or not the statute of limitations had run prior to the date Appellant filed suit. In Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177, 181 (Fla. 1993), the Florida Supreme Court construed section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, to mean that more than mere notice of injury is required to start the statute of limitations running; knowledge of a reasonable possibility that the injury was caused by medical malpractice is also necessary....

...of his estate. See Arthur v. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc., 602 So.2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 613 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1992). The Arthur court held that one lacking conscious awareness could not have notice sufficient to trigger the start of the section 95.11(4)(b) limitations period and declined to impute to the victim the notice of the holder of his power of attorney....

...l mediation panel August 31, 1977 — suit filed. Our decision requires tracing the development of the statute of limitations as applicable to medical malpractice claims and to wrongful death claims. In the early 1940's the limitations in effect were Section 95.11(4) and (6), Florida Statutes (1943)....

...The accrual of a wrongful death cause of action occurred at time of death, rather than notice of the defendants' negligence. This general scheme of a four-year limit and two-year limit was maintained and continued substantially unchanged for a number of years through the late 1960's last appearing as Section 95.11(4) and (6), Florida Statutes (1969). A change occurred in the 1971 legislative session via Laws of Florida 71-254. Section 95.11(6) was amended as follows: (6) Within two years — An action by another than the state upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture; an action for libel, slander, assault, battery or false imprisonment; an action arising upon account of a...

...optometric, [podiatric] or chiropractic treatment or surgical operation, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the plaintiff discovers, or through use of reasonable care should have discovered, the injury. This Act, Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1971), took effect July 1, 1972, and removed medical malpractice from the prior four-year limitation and placed it within the two-year limitation....

...As stated in Fletcher v. Dozier at 241 and 242, "The cause of action accrues and the statute commences to run on the date of such death." This is the statute which was in effect on January 14, 1973, the date of death involved in the instant case. An amendment to Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1971), occurred in Laws of Florida 73-333, effective August 5, 1973, when the word "podiatric" was removed, and the word "chiropodial" substituted. The next substantive amendment applicable to medical malpractice occurred in the 1974 legislative session as Laws of Florida 74-382, effective January 1, 1975. This change appeared as Section 95.11(4)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), and accomplished a substantial re-wording of the general statute of limitations section. The subsections in question were 95.11(4)(a) and (c), providing: (4) Within two years....

...This statute containing the words "cause of action" was in existence for only four months and 20 days. In the 1975 legislative session, Laws of Florida 75-9, effective May 20, 1975, was passed and again substantially revised the statute of limitations on medical malpractice. In accordance with this amendment Section 95.11(4)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes (1975), provided as follows: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property....

...There had been no such four-year or seven-year limitations in the prior statutes. With this statutory history, when did plaintiffs' claim for death resulting from medical malpractice accrue? The statutes, as indicated above, have continually redefined the starting point. In summary, Section 95.11(4) and (6), Florida Statutes (1969), did not specifically mention medical malpractice and it was thus within the four-year limitation of subsection (4)....

...The words, "injury", "cause of action", and "incident", have been used at various times. With the above evolution in mind, did the Legislature mean to include "death" within the notice accrual provisions of the medical malpractice statutes of limitations before the clear rewording of Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), which specifically included death? We answer this question in the negative. We conclude that death due to medical malpractice was not included within the notice accrual provision of Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973), nor within the notice accrual provision of Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...It is thus unimportant whether the 1973 or the 1974 statutes are applied as they do not extend the limitation period and the claim was not filed within two years of death. Appellants urge we adopt the reasoning of Glass v. Camara, 369 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), and apply Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), in a retroactive fashion. [3] We decline to do so. Glass involved a death on May 29, 1974, and two years from this date was May 29, 1976 — well after the effective date of Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Here the two years ran before the effective date of the 1975 amendment. The case of Brooks v. Cerrato, 355 So.2d 119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), involved a medical malpractice injury claim where the act of malpractice occurred on February 8, 1973. In an opinion written by Judge Alderman, this court applied Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973). We believe that the same statute is applicable here. In Brooks one question was whether Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), should be applied retroactively. Brooks held Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...tion 95.022) was no indication of a retroactive intent regarding medical malpractice. We adhere to this ruling *902 and recede from the holding of Nash v. Asher, 342 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), to the extent it is contrary. [4] We thus hold that Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973), applies to this case and that the cause of action for death due to medical malpractice herein accrued at the time of the death. In doing so we point out we would prefer the different result reached in Glass v. Camara, supra , under Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), wherein death was expressly included within the definition of medical malpractice....

...There is no sworn support in the record for either date despite the fact that much argument is made about it in the motions and memoranda filed in the trial court. We accept the date of January 13, 1977, because this is the date all parties have argued in the briefs before this court. [2] Both sides engage in arguments that Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), effective May 20, 1975, extended the statute of limitations on medical malpractice death cases to four years and question whether this statute should be given retroactive effect....

...igence. There is simply no four-year extension within this statute. Instead the statute limits the period for discovery of the incident to four years. [3] It is not completely clear whether Glass v. Camara, 369 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), applied Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), effective January 1, 1975, or Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), effective May 20, 1975....

...Although the opinion states that the later statute is being applied, the opinion quotes from the earlier 1974 statute and relies specifically on the language "that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action [was] discovered or should have been discovered" which is contained in the 1974 statute [Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...We find that the doctrine of equitable estoppel survives Sullivan and conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' action in the instant case. We also conclude that there is a disputed issue of material fact. In this case, the plaintiffs had a four-year limitation under section 95.11(3)( o ), Florida Statutes (1993), to file their claim of tortious interference with contractual rights and advantageous business relationships....

...an, or guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor or incapacitated person, or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue; except with respect to the statute of limitations for a claim for medical malpractice as provided in § 95.11....

...lie). The action was filed in 1980, four years and several months after execution of the contracts. Ionata sought rescission and restitution based on fraud and breach of a fiduciary relationship. Allie asserted the applicable statute of limitations (§ 95.11(3), Fla....

...Based on the jury findings, the trial court then entered judgment granting Ionata rescission of the contracts and damages based on the jury verdicts, and denied Allie's counterclaim. On appeal, we held that Ionata's action for rescission was barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations, section 95.11(3)( l ), Florida Statutes, since it had not been extended by fraudulent concealment by Allie under section 95.031(2), as established by the jury finding that there was no (actual) fraud by Allie....

...face of the complaint when considered in the light of the principles just mentioned. It is agreed that the cause of action is for negligent misrepresentation and that the applicable Statute of Limitations is three years, the statute being Fla. Stat. 95.11(5) (d) (1973). [1] "95.11 Limitations upon actions other than for the recovery of real property....

...was aware that coverage was $10,000.00 on the face of the policy and now be entitled to vary the express terms of the insurance contract by pleading parol evidence contradicting the express provisions of the insuring agreement. NOTES [1] Fla. Stat. 95.11 was amended effective January 1, 1975.

...ides that: "Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to alter, modify, or extend the limitation period applicable for the enforcement of foreign judgments." The judgment debtor in this case argues that registration in Florida is barred under section 95.11(2)(a) which requires that an action "on a judgment or decree of ... any court of ... any other state" be brought within 5 years. Section 95.11(2)(a) is, of course, associated with section 95.10, which bars causes of action arising in another state if they are time-barred in the state in which they arose....

...see § 95.011 ("A civil action or proceeding [e.s.], called `action' in this chapter...."); Credit Lyonnais, 741 So.2d at 1171, and registration under FEFJA is surely such a proceeding. Therefore we have little trouble in concluding that the bar of section 95.11(2)(a) against an "action on a judgment or decree of any court of any other state" also encompasses a proceeding to register a dormant and unrevived judgment of a foreign state....

...See Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 561 So.2d 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). [1] We conclude that the notice to Dr. Steckler was untimely because the plaintiff had discovered the "incident" or, with due diligence, should have discovered that incident prior to August 10, 1987. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...Goodlet apparently did not receive that information in the doctor's telephone call, and this record does not establish when she first learned or should have learned the story of her daughter's death. We would suggest that the difficulty in interpreting section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), stems from the problem of relating the concept of "incident" to the elements of a cause of action for medical negligence....

...The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to file *659 the complaint within four years. [2] The standard of review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is de novo. Apostolico v. Orlando Regional Health Care Systems, Inc., 871 So.2d 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes, requires an action for negligence to be filed within four years....

...The complaint states a cause of action for mortgage foreclosure. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT I. Statute of Limitations In Florida, the Statute of Limitations on mortgage foreclosures with an ascertainable date of maturity is five (5) years. § 95.111 and § 95.281, Fla.Stat....

..."Questions of law may be determined on a motion for summary judgment." Id. THEREFORE, this Court finds that this cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. II. Laches Florida Statute § 95.11(6) provides that laches automatically bar any action that would be barred by the statute of limitations. § 95.11(6), Fla.Stat. (1982 & Supp.1996). THEREFORE, this Court finds that this cause of action is additionally barred by laches and pursuant to Florida Statute § 95.11(6), Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, thus mooting Plaintiff's cross motion....

...vations, or was prevented from performing, by March 1, 1995; accordingly, it was required to bring its action for breach of contract by February 29, *928 2000, based upon the five-year limitations period for actions alleging breach of contract under section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff based upon the unjust enrichment and/or quantum meruit claims for goods and services provided between June 2004 and June 2006. The relevant statute of limitations for quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claims is four years. See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla....

...Woodruff, filed a petition for administration of Dombrowsky's estate on his own behalf. The probate court denied this petition, and Woodruff appeals the court's denial of his petition. [2] *533 These cases have been consolidated for purposes of our consideration. We reverse both orders. Under section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), a suit founded on negligence must be commenced within four years of the accrual of the cause of action. Notar commenced her negligence action on September 14, 1981, when she filed her complaint against Dombrowsky, even though she was unable to effect service of process upon the decedent. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.050. Thus, Notar complied with section 95.11(3)(a)....

...Dombrowsky's insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contends that Notar should be precluded from bringing an action against its insured's estate because she took no action to substitute the estate as a party in her original suit until after section 95.11's four-year limitations' period had expired....

...urt ruling that a four-year statute applied to all of Technical's claims, making the lawsuit untimely. The four-year period applied to the breach-of-contract claim because, the court ruled, the Technical-UCB sales agreements were oral contracts. See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla....

...om UCB to Technical were oral contracts, thus entailing four-year limitations periods. Hanchett/Trenam contend (as Technical did in the underlying lawsuit) that the sales agreements were written contracts entailing five-year limitations periods, see § 95.11(2)(b), and that Technical should have prosecuted an appeal based on that legal theory....

...Given that causes of action for breach accrued during the December 1996—May 1998 period, when the defective cellophane was delivered, the limitations period corresponding to the respective deliveries expired between December 2001 and May 2003. See § 95.11(2)(b)....

...ing lawsuit: The [four] purchase orders placed during the five years preceding filing of this lawsuit were issued on April 7, 1998 . . ., May 5, 1998 . . ., and June 5, 1998. The statute of limitations for breach of a written contract is five years. Section 95.11(2)(b), Fla[.] Stat....

...The issue, as framed by Hanchett/Trenam in one of its subarguments, is whether the statutory implied warranty of merchantability ("a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale . . .," § 672.314(1)) enjoys the same five-year limitations period as the written contract itself, see § 95.11(2)(b), or entails a four-year period as a statutory liability, see § 95.11(3)(f), as Technical now urges....

...ersonally encountered at EPCOT Center in 1997. B. Statute of Limitations Next, Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff's EPCOT Center claims are time-barred under Florida's personal injury statute of limitations. See F.S.A. § 95.11(3)....

...Plaintiff was informed of the alleged EPCOT violations sometime "around 1997," (Doc. 38 at 26), and filed suit in November 1998. Applying Florida's four-year statute of limitations, as Defendant urges, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims were timely filed. See F.S.A. § 95.11(3)....

...orate opportunities. The back commissions were assessed against Barnes but not against Barnes Surgical because the court found that as to Barnes Surgical, the commissions owed to Bradshaw were wages and barred by the two year statute of limitations. § 95.11(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (1987). The court found, however, that the claim for commissions was not time-barred as against Barnes individually, assumably since Bradshaw's claim was based on the oral contract and the four year statute applied. § 95.11(3)(k), Fla....

...This court addressed this issue in Iamaio v. Kite, 531 So.2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), where based on distinctions the supreme court has made between wages and commissions, we held that compensation in the form of commissions does not fall within the category of wages in the context of section 95.11(4)(c)....

...The trial began on October 26, 1981, at which time Mrs. Byer expressed her intention to proceed only upon the wrongful death action, withdrawing the survival action. Dr. Bruce then requested the court to rule that given a sufficient evidentiary predicate, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), the statute of limitations for malpractice actions, would apply to bar the wrongful death action....

...An `action for medical malpractice' is defined as a claim in tort ... for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care... (Emphasis added.) The trial court construed section 95.11(4)(b) as barring wrongful death claims grounded in medical malpractice brought more than two years after the discovery of the medical negligence. As applied to the facts in this case, this construction of the statute would operate to bar the wrongful death action prior to the death itself. Perceiving this dilemma, the trial court concluded that section 95.11(4)(b) as so applied in a wrongful death action is unconstitutional, hence he applied section 95.11(4)(d), the subsection pertaining to wrongful death actions in general, not just those arising from medical malpractice....

...The *415 general rule is that a cause of action for wrongful death accrues upon the date of the decedent's death. Moorey v. Eytchison & Hoppes, Inc., 338 So.2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). In Perkins v. Variety Childrens Hospital, 413 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), the Third District construed section 95.11(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1979) (the general limitations provision for wrongful death actions), as follows: Since the right does not exist until death occurs, the only reasonable interpretation is that wrongful death actions must be brou...

...In Perkins, the defendant hospital claimed that plaintiff's father had no right of action for wrongful death because the statute of limitations for a personal injury action had expired prior to the time of his son's death. The effect of prior court decisions is to construe section 95.11(4)(b) as commencing the two-year period on the date of the death upon which the wrongful death action is based. In Hickox v. University Community Hospital, Inc., 384 So.2d 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), the lower court had dismissed a wrongful death action on the statute of limitations ground, applying section 95.11(4)(d). Appellant argued section 95.11(4)(b) should govern his action....

...iod would apply because under either section appellant's wrongful death claim was timely, as it was filed within two years after appellant's decedent's death. Similarly, in Eland v. Aylward, 373 So.2d 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), the court interpreted the section 95.11(4)(b) language "within two years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred ..." as meaning the date of plaintiff's decedent's death in a wrongful death action....

...The lower court rendered a final summary judgment in favor of the physician, holding that the action was barred by the two-year limitation. Recognizing that the statute of limitations had not run on the wrongful death action when the 1975 amendments to section 95.11(4) became effective, which amendments operated, inter alia, to postpone the running of the period on undiscovered causes of action for wrongful death by medical malpractice, the court found that the legislative lengthening of the statute of limitations period enured to the benefit of the plaintiff....

...d the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the physician. Based on the foregoing, it appears that the two-year period for wrongful death actions based on medical malpractice commences upon death, and that the 1975 legislation which included in section 95.11(4)(b) actions based on death from medical malpractice postpones the running of the period on undiscovered causes of action for wrongful death by medical malpractice. In the instant case, Mr. Byer died on March 28, 1981, and the wrongful death action was filed on May 21, 1981, clearly within the two-year period of section 95.11(4)(b) as we interpret it....

...Bleck, Miami, for appellees. Before BARKDULL, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. The trial court entered final summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the action, commenced July 31, 1979, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...f law the plaintiff should have discovered with the exercise of due diligence his injury some 4 years prior to the commencement of the action. The Florida Statute of Limitations governing this cause of action for negligence and products liability is Section 95.11(3)(a), (e), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Mouradian, 100 So.2d 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); Morre, By and Through Moore v. Morris, 429 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Roberts v. Casey, 413 So.2d 1226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Steiner v. *1101 Ciba-Geigy Corporation, 364 So.2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). NOTES [1] Section 95.11 provides in pertinent part: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS....

...(a) An action founded on negligence. * * * * * * (e) An action for injury to a person founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property that is not permanently incorporated in an improvement to real property, including fixtures. Section 95.11(3) must be read in conjunction with Section 95.031(2), which provides in pertinent part: (2) Actions for products liability ... under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3)....

...On May 14, 1999, PACA filed a complaint alleging breach of contract arising from an underlying claim of negligent design and construction against Clark and Wentworth. Ultimately, the trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the four-year period of limitations had expired in February 1999. § 95.11(3)(c), Fla....

...This summary judgment was entered at the inception of this lawsuit before the Hospital Authority had even filed an answer. The trial court determined that because John Doe had constructive notice of the content of his medical records, the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), *263 applied and barred the action. As a result, the trial court did not consider whether the seven-year statute of repose contained in section 95.11(4)(b) applied....

...The Board of Regents answered the complaint and raised affirmative defenses, including a defense that the claim was barred by "the applicable statute of limitations." The Hillsborough County Hospital Authority filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing in part that the statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(4)(b) barred the complaint because John Doe was deemed to have knowledge of his medical records, which contained the positive test results in 1993....

...Based upon these pleadings and the defendants' answers to John Doe's first set of requests for admissions, the defendants immediately moved for summary judgment, claiming that the action was barred either by the two-year statute of limitations or by the four-year statute of repose, both contained in section 95.11(4)(b). The trial court concluded that the two-year statute of limitations barred the action and entered final summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Section 95.11(4)(b) contains the relevant statute of limitations and statute of repose....

...ations to seven years under the statute of repose. For the latter proposition, John Doe relies primarily upon Hernandez v. Amisub, Inc., 714 So.2d 539, 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), which states that the "concealment" exception to the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b) does not include a "scienter element" and that a careless misrepresentation may be sufficient to extend the period of repose....

...on. If John Doe cannot allege fraud or intentional misrepresentation, the issue will apparently hinge upon whether any "concealment" must be intentional or whether negligent or careless concealment is sufficient to extend the statute of repose under section 95.11(a)(4)....

...See, e.g., § 95.031(2)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (directing that the time periods for bringing actions for fraud and products liability run “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered”); accord § 95.11(4)(a) (indicating that the time period for action for professional malpractice runs “from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence”), (4)(e) (stating that the time perio...

...It is significant that the text and structure of section 726.110(1) contrasts markedly with the text of statutory sections in which the legislature has created separate provisions governing both limitations and repose. For example, the statute applicable to securities violations under chapter 517, contained in section 95.11 titled “Limitations other than for the recovery of real property,” provides that all “actions ......

...shall be commenced” within two years “with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but not more than 5 years from the date such violation occurred.” § 95.11(4)(e)....

...ure of repose (“but not more than five years”). See, e.g., Puchner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 553 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding that the appellant’s claim was barred because it was commenced after the time periods prescribed by section 95.11(4)(e))....

...est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.”). This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that when the legislature wants to extend a time period based on fraud or concealment, it knows how to do so. See, e.g., § 95.11(4)(b) (providing that two- and four-year periods for commencement of medical malpractice suit are extended when “fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation” prevent discovery of the injury)....

...Damiano when she was not in a life-threatening situation even though he knew of the risk of HIV contamination of donated blood. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Dr. McDaniel on the ground that the suit was barred by the statute of repose for medical malpractice. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla.Stat....

...[1] The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment but certified the foregoing question to this Court. We find that the certified question has been resolved adversely to the Damianos by this Court's prior decisions. [2] In Carr v. Broward County, 541 So.2d 92 (Fla.1989), we explained that section 95.11(4)(b) "prescribes (1) a statute of limitations of two years; (2) a statute of repose of four years absent fraud or intentional misconduct; and (3) a statute of repose of seven years where there is an allegation that fraud, concealment,...

...n to run with the alleged incident of malpractice. We answer the certified question in the negative and approve the decision below. [4] It is so ordered. OVERTON, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. KOGAN, C.J., and SHAW, J., dissent. NOTES [1] Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), states in relevant part: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is d...

...in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred. (Emphasis added.) The validity of the claim against the blood center is not before us. See Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, 601 So.2d 1184 (Fla.1992) (section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), inapplicable to claim against blood bank for delivery of tainted blood)....

...Thus, the Court dissolved the Writ of Garnishment against the radio station. The Court conducted a hearing on the Writ of Garnishment against Barnett Bank. Ms. Ilgen contends that the Writ of Garnishment is improper because it was issued more than five years after the entry of the judgment and Fla.Stat. § 95.11 requires an action on a judgment to be commenced within five years....

...District Court depends upon the practice applicable to a judgment of the court of the state in which the District Court is located." In accordance with these principles, the Court must apply Florida state law to the judgment in this case. Fla.Stat. § 95.11 provides, "Actions other than for the recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (1) Within twenty years — An action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state....

...A trial is held and judgment is issued on the cause of action, that is the original judgment, which has become the cause of action. Therefore, the act of seeking a writ of garnishment is an "action on a judgment." The only reported case dealing with Fla. Stat. § 95.11 in the context of judgments entered by a federal court is Kiesel v....

...factually similar enough to be pertinent case law. In this case, the First District Court of Appeal held that the federal judgment could not be enforced because it had been entered more than five years previously. The court expressly found Fla.Stat. § 95.11(2)(a) controlling, which limited actions on judgments of courts of the United States to five years, and therefore, refused to grant the writ of mandamus. Applying the above cited law to the case at bar, the Court finds that more than five years have elapsed since the entry of the judgment against Ms. Ilgen. Accordingly, pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 95.11(2)(a), an "action on the judgment" cannot be commenced....

...cution after the underlying judgment has expired. We grant the petition. I. Plaintiff-respondent Linda Patchett obtained a judgment against defendant-petitioner Marsh effective December 2, 1980. The statute of limitations for a judgment is 20 years. § 95.11(1), Fla....

...o appear before the court to be sanctioned by fine or imprisonment should he fail to produce the documents. Defendant has petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition. We grant the petition. II. The life of the original judgment was twenty years. § 95.11(1), Fla....

...805 So.2d at 843 , this court contrasted proceedings supplementary and scire facias with an action on a judgment: "Unlike an action upon a judgment, neither proceeding renews or extends *1289 the twenty year life of a judgment." 805 So.2d at 843 . . § 95.11(1), Fla....

...cient to avoid Mr. Barber's statute of repose defense. See Ambrose v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 736 So.2d 146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). The next question is whether the McLeods' claim of fraud is barred under Florida's four-year statute of limitations, section 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED. COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur. SAWAYA, J., concurs, without participation in oral argument. NOTES [1] 95.031. Computation of time * * * (2)(a) An action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered. § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] 95.11. Limitations other than for the recovery of real property Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: * * * (3) Within four years.— * * * (j) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud. § 95.11(3)(j), Fla....

...statute of limitations. FRAUD CLAIMS We first address the trial court's conclusion that Florida's statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1997), bars Ms. Ambrose's claims of fraud. The statute provides that "an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered." Id....

...[3] Based upon this averment, Ms. Ambrose had until October 1998 to file suit alleging fraud. Her July 1998 complaint was thus timely filed. The next question is whether Ms. Ambrose's claims of fraud are barred under Florida's four-year statute of limitations relating to fraud, section 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...These allegations are sufficient to raise the issue of whether Ms. Ambrose's cause of action for fraud accrued in April 1998. Thus, dismissal of this claim as time-barred by Florida's four-year statute of limitations was also improper. NEGLIGENCE CLAIM The statute of limitations for negligence is four years. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...Ambrose's complaint because the facts alleged in the complaint do not establish, as a matter of law, that the applicable statute of repose and statute of limitations period expired prior to the filing of the complaint. REVERSED and REMANDED. COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 95.031(2); 95.11, Fla....

...as entitled to participate in the City's pension plan. The City filed a motion for summary judgment on its statute of limitations defense, which the trial court denied. Both parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is five years. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...Because these five elements existed at the time Petrosino was hired and was informed he could not participate in the City's pension plan, Petrosino's cause of action accrued in 1987. See id.; Margolis, 732 So.2d at 509. This places Petrosino's claim well outside of the five-year statute of limitation. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...orty-five units.for which Pathfinder had never received the release fee. In response, six of those unit owners filed motions to dismiss, asserting that Pathfinder’s foreclosure action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2013), and by the five-year statute of *7 repose set forth in section 95.281(1). The trial court held a hearing on these motions and dismissed the foreclosure complaint as to those unit owners under both statutes. Pathfinder now appeals this ruling. We dispose first of the statute of limitations issue. Section 95.11(2)(c) provides that an action to foreclose a mortgage must be commenced within five years from when the right to foreclose accrues....

...s to any of the claims, because Carlton's property has been continuously flooding since 1989. Carlton's counsel asserted that every wet season since 1989 the land floods, creating a lake. The trial court found the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1997) was applicable to the nuisance action (count I) and implied easement action (count III); the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(g), Florida Statutes (1997) was applicable to the trespass action (count II); and the five-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997) was applicable to the express easement action (count IV)....

...Lawrence, 102 So.2d 143, 146 (Fla.1958); Petroleum Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 248 So.2d 196, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). Both an action for nuisance and an action for trespass on real property shall be commenced within four years from the time the cause of action accrues. See §§ 95.031, 95.11(3)(g),(p), Fla....

...The causes of action accrued in 1989 when the culvert was crushed, thereby preventing drainage of Carlton's land and denying his use of the easement. This case was filed on January 9, 1998, beyond the time prescribed by the applicable statutes of limitations. See §§ 95.11(3)(p) and (2)(b), Fla....

...ndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179 (Fla.2000). In Hearndon, the supreme court applied the doctrine to intentional torts arising from childhood sexual abuse of the plaintiff. Id. at 1182. The statute of limitations for such intentional torts was found at section 95.11(3)( o )....

...med that the doctrine still applied to delay the accrual of causes of action. Under Hearndon, the proper reading of section 95.031(2) is that it limits the application of the delayed discovery doctrine in cases of fraud and products liability "under s. 95.11(3)." Nothing limits the application of the doctrine to the causes of action at issue in this case....

...0 and April 18, 2000. REVERSED AND REMANDED. STEVENSON and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The complaint in Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179 (Fla.2000), was filed in 1991. In Chapter 92-102, Laws of Florida, sections 1 & 2, the legislature created section 95.11(7), which applies to actions "founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s....

...Plaintiffs claim that DR. GRAHAM negligently failed to remove a piece of glass from the foot of Plaintiff ROBERT B. CATES. Defendants denied Plaintiffs' allegations and, as an affirmative defense, asserted that Plaintiffs' action was time barred by F.S. 95.11(4)(b) which provides that in medical malpractice actions, in no event shall the action be commenced later than four (4) years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued....

...Notwithstanding having had a period of approximately five (5) months within which to file an action, Plaintiffs waited until over eleven (11) months before filing a medical malpractice mediation claim on January 9, 1980. The Court finds that when applied to the facts in this case, F.S. 95.11(4)(b) is constitutional and that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be and is hereby granted....

...Therefore, for the reasons above stated the final judgment hereunder review be and the same is hereby affirmed. Affirmed. JORGENSON, Judge, concurring specially. I concur with the result reached for the reasons advanced in the majority opinion. Were I free to write upon a clean slate, I would hold that section 95.11(4)(b) is unconstitutionally applied to this minor plaintiff....

...When the mediation proceeding was terminated by operation of law pursuant to the supreme court's decision in Aldana v. Holub, 381 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1980), Cates instituted an action in the circuit court, filing a complaint on April 9, 1980. Ruling that the action was time barred under section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of appellees....

...81-1193 (Fla. 3d DCA April 20, 1982) [7 FLW 907], but, upon rehearing, now affirms the final judgment. It is a decision with which I cannot agree. In my opinion, appellant has been deprived of his right of access to the courts by the application of section 95.11(4)(b). I would therefore reverse upon a holding that, under the circumstances of this case, section 95.11(4)(b) is unconstitutional. The issue involved is whether the five months between discovery of appellant's injury and the absolute four-year bar to bringing suit under section 95.11(4)(b) constituted a reasonable time under the Florida Constitution for commencement of a medical malpractice claim. Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), in relevant part, provides: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident i...

...According to the facts presented, "the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued" was July 4, 1975, the last date of the allegedly negligent medical treatment. According to the four-year final repose provision contained in section 95.11(4)(b), Cates' action became barred on July 4, 1979....

...on after he discovered his right to bring suit. Whether a five-month period constitutes a reasonable time within which to file suit is an issue the Florida Supreme Court has not yet addressed in its decisions construing the final repose provision of section 95.11(4)(b). In Dade County v. Ferro, 384 So.2d 1283 (Fla. 1980), the court exercised judicial restraint and did not reach the constitutional question of access to courts under section 95.11(4)(b)....

...ical malpractice claim "where the occurrence or incident out of which the claim arose predates the effective date of the statute." Id. at 1287. Left open was the question "whether the four-year absolute bar to medical malpractice claims contained in section 95.11(4)(b) unconstitutionally denies a claimant access to the courts under article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution." Id....

...ternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown. *293 There are two distinct lines of case law in Florida involving the application of the constitutional right-of-access principles enunciated in Kluger to statutes of repose similar to section 95.11(4)(b)....

...ngful opportunity to pursue his claim within the context of Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. In Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978), the court found that the twelve-year limitation provisions of sections 95.11(3)(c) and 95.031(2) were not unconstitutional where the injury occurred prior to the enactment of the twelve-year repose provisions....

...and construction defect cases, measured from the "date of delivery of completed product to its original purchaser," section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975), or from the date of possession by the owner or termination or completion of the contract, section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), without regard to the date of discovery of the injury or right of action....

...Bauld was aware of her right of action for three and one-half years before the running of the revised statute of limitations, extended pursuant to the savings clause. Cates, however, learned that a right of action existed only five months prior to the running of the four-year repose provision contained in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...Statutes of repose may not completely bar access to courts. Accordingly, in Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979), the court held that where injuries were not sustained until after the running of the twelve-year limitation period, the final repose provision of section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975) barring the claim operated unconstitutionally....

...e injury was discovered. The difference is that in Diamond, the injury became apparent after the twelve-year limitation period had run, whereas Cates' injury was discovered five months before the expiration of the four-year final repose provision of section 95.11(4)(b)....

...In my opinion, the date of discovery is significant in determining whether reasonable time remains for the commencement of an action. For these reasons, I would hold that the five-month period between the date of discovery and the expiration of the final four-year repose provision of section 95.11(4)(b) was insufficient to afford appellant his constitutionally guaranteed right of access to court....

...[6] The term "inverse condemnation" refers to the process by which a landowner recovers damages from a governmental taking of his property, even though no formal takings or condemnation proceedings have been instituted. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 63 L.Ed.2d 373 (1980). [7] § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (2007). The catch-all four-year statute of limitations found within section 95.11(3)(p) has been held to govern inverse condemnation actions....

...2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106, (1980); Galaxy Fireworks, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 842 So.2d 160, 164 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Lost Tree Village Corporation v. City of Vero Beach, 838 So.2d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Tinnerman v. Palm Beach County, 641 So.2d 523, 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). [15] § 95.11(3)(p), Fla....

...n Co. MAGER, Judge. Plaintiffs appeal a summary final judgment entered in behalf of defendants. The *450 summary final judgment was premised primarily upon the trial court's determination that the statute of limitations as set forth in F.S. Sections 95.11(3) [1] and 95.11(4) [2] , F.S.A., bars any relief to the plaintiffs....

...It was the view of the trial court that the statute of limitations began to run in late 1964 when the pipe was installed at which time plaintiff was put on notice of such installation so that the four or five year limitations set forth in Sections 95.11(3) and 95.11(4) barred the suit (the suit was brought over six years after the date of installation). It is our view that this appeal is controlled by the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Creviston v. General Motors Corporation, Fla. 1969, 225 So.2d 331, 333, which, in applying Section 95.11(5)(e) [3] to an action based upon an implied warranty, stated: "... [W]e conclude in an action on implied warranty for personal injury under the facts of this case, the three-year statute of limitations, F.S. Section 95.11(5)(e), F.S.A., begins to run from the time Petitioner first discovered, or reasonably should have discovered the defect constituting the breach of warranty. ..." (Emphasis added.) The trial court's reference to "F.S. § 95.11(3)" or "§ 95.11(4)" would have application only to Counts I and III relating to negligent installation and breach of contract. The statute of limitations applicable to Count II based upon a breach of implied warranty would be governed by Section 95.11(5)(e). Creviston v. General Motors Corporation, supra. See also Hendon v. Stanley Home Products, Fla.App. 1969, 225 So.2d 553. With respect to Counts I and III, the limitations of time set forth in Sections 95.11(3) and 95.11(4) would stand as a bar to such claims. See 2765 South Bayshore Drive Corp. v. Fred Howland, Inc., Fla. App. 1968, 212 So.2d 911 [4] ; with respect to Count II founded upon breach of implied warranty, Section 95.11(5)(e) would also stand as a bar if the 3-year limitation contained therein began to run in 1964....

...Summary proceedings "may be used only as a vehicle for establishing whether there is a genuine issue of material fact to be determined, and the trial court may not try or determine factual issues in such proceedings". Humphrys v. Jarrell, Fla.App. 1958, 104 So.2d 404. In order to apply the three-year limitation set forth in Section 95.11(5)(e) it would be necessary to adjudicate factual issues with respect to the time when plaintiff first discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged defect constituting a breach of warranty....

...Accordingly, the final summary judgment with respect to Count II is reversed and affirmed as to Counts I and III and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. Reversed, in part; affirmed, in part. WALDEN and OWEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] "95.11 Limitations upon actions other than for the recovery of real property....

...— Any action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter." [3] "(5) Within three years. — "... "(e) And an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing, including an action for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered, and on store accounts." [4] Sections 95.11(3) and 95.11(4) provide respectively for a 5- and a 4-year limitation; as it appears that claims I and III were instituted six years after the time of the alleged defective installation or breach such claims would be barred.

..., but before any evidence was presented by the defendant a mistrial was declared. Later, the trial court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the lessors finding (1) that "plaintiffs' defense of statute of limitations under Florida Statute 95.11 is *848 tolled by the continuing negotiations regarding settlement between the parties" and (2) that the lessee was liable to the lessors based on "the testimony at the trial on December 9, 1981, documents and correspondence admitted into evide...

...le of Civil Procedure 1.510(c) in entering the partial summary judgment. The partial summary judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. COBB, FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that "a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a instrument in writing" must be commenced within five years from the accrual of the cause of action....

amended petitions? It is no answer to say that section 95.11(p) provides a four-year statute of limitations

...ure to proceed "promptly." Consequently, I believe the sanction of dismissal we opted for in Honda Prelude is unwarranted. Further, our conclusion in Honda Prelude also renders the four-year statute of limitations for forfeiture proceedings found in section 95.11(3)(n), Florida Statutes (2002), meaningless. See Mosley v. State ex rel. Broward County, 363 So.2d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (holding section 95.11(3)(n) was applicable to proceedings under section 943.44 (which was later renumbered 932.701-.704, the statutes at issue))....

...Specifically, in his amended complaint, Doktorczyk alleged, as the sole basis for his FDUTPA claim, that on December 21, 1996, South Motors misrepresented that the factory warranty on the used vehicle had expired and that he was persuaded to purchase a power train warranty. Section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1996), covers "[a]n action founded on a statutory liability," which would apply to *1217 Doktorczyk's FDUTPA claim....

...Based on certain misrepresentations and deceiving practices during the execution of a "written instrument," i.e. the RSIC, [Doktorczyk] purchased an unnecessary warranty which was never refunded. If, as [South Motors] correctly points out, the general statute of limitations in § 95.11(3)(f), Fla....

...n a written instrument simply because the alleged deception resulted in the execution of a written instrument. In Yusuf Mohamad Excavation, Inc. v. Ringhaver Equipment, Co., 793 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), the court stated that, "[s]ection 95.11(3) of the Florida Statutes (1989) provides a four year statute of limitations for tortious interference, and for unfair and deceptive trade practice claims. See § 95.11(3)(f); (o), Fla....

...[12] A record that is silent on a determinative issue of fact forecloses summary judgment, for the movant's burden is to `show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Glass v. Camara, 369 So.2d 625, 627-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). NOTES [1] Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), which was in effect in 1977, provides: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence... . [1] Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1977) provides: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered within the exercise of due diligence; ......

...[5] See also State ex rel. Love v. Jacobson, 343 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [6] Adams v. Wright, 403 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1981); Art. V, § 2(a) and Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const.; S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1977); Lane v. State, 337 So.2d 976 (Fla. 1976). [7] § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...time, according to the complaint, Graham allegedly murdered Hearndon's mother). The complaint was dismissed with prejudice on the sole ground that the alleged cause of action was barred, as a matter of law, by the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)( o ), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...sion in Lindabury *88 v. Lindabury, 552 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Neither party brought to the court's attention the then newly enacted amendment to the statute of limitations contained in chapter 92-102, section 1, Laws of Florida, codified in section 95.11(7), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...[1] For the following reasons, we affirm and certify a question of great public importance. Lindabury v. Lindabury An action for damages from child abuse is governed by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to civil actions for injury or damages caused by an intentional tort. See § 95.11(3)( o ), Fla....

...exual batteries perpetrated by her father beginning in 1955 and continuing through 1965, the memories of which she allegedly had repressed but had "rediscovered" when she sought psychological counseling just prior to filing the complaint. Reading subsection 95.11(3)( o ), Florida Statutes (1987), in conjunction with subsection 95.031(1), the Lindabury court found that "[i]t is beyond contradiction that the alleged incestuous acts, if taken as true, damaged the appellant at the time they occurred...

...endorsing the application of the delayed discovery rule to permit the action to proceed. Id. at 1118-21 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting). Chapter 92-102, Laws of Florida As noted above, by chapter 92-102, Laws of Florida, the Florida Legislature amended section 95.11 to add subsection (7) specifically dealing with intentional torts based on acts of abuse....

...2d DCA 1993), the Second District ruled that with the passage of chapter 92-102, the Legislature removed the statute of limitations bar to the right of victims of certain forms of past intentional abuse to commence an action, even though the cause of action had been time-barred prior to the 1992 amendment of section 95.11....

...ns based upon the application of the doctrine of delayed discovery to actions to recover damages for child abuse where the victim-plaintiff suffers from traumatic amnesia resulting from the abuse. Further, even though the Legislature has provided in section 95.11(7) that an action founded on alleged abuse may be commenced "within four years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse," Wiley precludes the application of that statute here. Wiley, 641 So.2d at 68. Because we recognize that there may be more than one way to read Sullivan and because the instant case raises issues of first impression involving the interrelated application of Wiley, Sullivan, and section 95.11(7), pursuant to Article V, section 3(b)(5) of the Florida Constitution, we certify the following question as one of great public importance: WHERE A PLAINTIFF IN A TORT ACTION BASED UPON CHILD ABUSE ALLEGES THAT SHE SUFFERED FROM TRAUMATIC AMNESIA CAUSED BY THE ABUSE, DOES FULTON COUNTY ADMIN....

...� was disclosed, in July 2010, when she first discovered concealment' of a L & H commission, or in September 2010, when Wardell repudiated the agreement, Gee’s causes of action for breach of an oral agreement accrued within the 4-year Statute. 95.11(3)(k), Fla....

...Co., 798 So.2d 811 , 812--(Fla. 4th-DCA 2001)). Here, the application of the .statute of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact. “A legal or equitable action on a contract ... not founded on a written instrument” is governed by a four-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(3)(k), Fla....

...The court appears to have concluded that the cause of action did not accrue until Gee became aware that something was “amiss.” For specified causes of action, the Legislature has established exceptions that would toll the statute of limitations. See §§ 95.031(2)(a) & (b), 95.11(4)(a) & (b), 95.11(7), Fla....

...Johnson's motion to dismiss the complaint on grounds the complaint was time barred, because it failed "to allege facts constituting fraud, concealment or intentional misrepresentation which prevented the Plaintiff[s] from discovering injury which would extend the statute of limitations [sic] beyond four years." See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...ose"). Whether the filing was timely turns on whether "it can be shown [or, at this stage *259 of the proceedings, has been adequately pleaded] that fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented the discovery of the injury." § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). The Todds alleged concealment, but the trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute "concealment," within the meaning of section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...The petitioner sought damages on behalf of the estate, himself, and the Nehmes' six minor children. The respondents Smithkline, Premier, and Dr. Shutze moved for summary judgment, arguing that the case was barred by the four-year statute of repose as set forth in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, which requires that any medical malpractice action be commenced no later than four years from the date of the incident or occurrence....

...Johnson's file about the call from the radiologist implied that people in Dr. Johnson's office, if not Dr. Johnson himself, viewed Mr. Todd as a patient. The complaint does not fail to plead a physician-patient *262 relationship. [8] Reversed and remanded. PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), provides: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or s...

...the injury occurred, except that this 7-year period shall not bar an action brought on behalf of a minor on or before the child's eighth birthday. This paragraph shall not apply to actions for which ss. 766.301-766.316 provide the exclusive remedy. Section 95.11(4)(b) is both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose....

...acts, events, or occurrences that take place before that date."). In Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., 863 So.2d 201, 204 (Fla.2003), the court described the pertinent difference between the superseded version and the post-1996 version of section 95.11(4)(b) that governs here: The pre-1996 version of the statute provides: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the...

...f limitations is extended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...Like the superseded statute which they interpret, Nehme, Carlton and Glass do not control here. The Todds' discovery of the nondisclosure within the initial four-year period of repose does not preclude extension of the period for a total of up to seven years. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...Before HENDRY, HAVERFIELD and NATHAN, JJ. *879 PER CURIAM. Hazel Smith seeks reversal of an order dismissing her medical malpractice action against Dade County d/b/a Jackson Memorial Hospital on the grounds she is barred by the statute of limitations [Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1975)]....

...s relating to the time in which an action must be filed. Cf. Galuppi v. Viele, 232 So.2d 408 (Fla.4th DCA 1970). Accordingly, the order of dismissal is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. So ordered. NOTES [1] § 95.11(6), Florida Statute (1975).

bars only the right to enforce a cause of action. § 95.11, Fla. Stat. (2005). A remedy, on the other hand

...Kendall of Gobleman, Love, Gavin, Wasilenko & Broughan, L.L.C., Jacksonville, for Appellees. HAWKES, J. Appellants challenge the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Michelle Macksey, M.D. and Marie McLanahan, M.D. Appellants make two arguments. First, the 1996 Amendment to section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), applies to the statute's two-year period of limitations as well as its four-year period of repose....

...Macksey and McLanahan with additional notices of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation. Drs. Macksey and McLanahan subsequently filed motions for summary judgment, arguing the claims against them were filed outside the statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...edge of injury and knowledge of the possibility that such injury was caused by medical negligence." Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Drs. Macksey and McLanahan, holding the two-year period of limitations contained in section 95.11(4)(b) barred Appellants' action. The 1996 Amendment Appellants argue that pursuant to section 95.11(4)(b), a medical malpractice action arising from an injury to a minor is never barred by the statute of limitations until the minor is at least eight years old. Specifically, they argue the Florida Legislature clearly intended that the 1996 amendment to section 95.11(4)(b) refer to both the statute's two-year period of limitations and the statute's four-year period of repose....

...See Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.2006). Courts should give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, and may not add words that were not included by the legislature. Id.; see Exposito v. State, 891 So.2d 525 (Fla.2004). Section 95.11(4)(b) sets up three time periods....

...This period applies only to cases involving children under eight years of age and enjoins the statute of repose until at least the child's eighth birthday, so long as the malpractice was not and could not have been reasonably discovered previously. Section 95.11(4)(b), as amended, reads: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been...

...ars from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued, except that this 4 year period shall not bar an action brought on behalf of a minor on or before the child's eighth birthday. (Emphasis added). The language of section 95.11(4)(b) is clear and unambiguous....

...child's eighth birthday. Appellants' proposed interpretation of the 1996 Amendment is inconsistent with the statute's plain language. The trial court correctly held that the 1996 Amendment refers only to the four-year period of repose enumerated in section 95.11(4)(b), not the statute's period of limitations. The Summary Judgment Appellants further argue that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in finding section 95.11(4)(b) barred their malpractice action. We disagree. The two-year period of limitations for medical malpractice actions set forth in section 95.11(4)(b) expired before Appellants initiated their action against Appellees....

...Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126 (Fla.2000). Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the *580 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The period of limitations in section 95.11(4)(b) expires at least two years from the date an injured party first has knowledge of a reasonable possibility that medical malpractice caused an injury....

...knowledge that there is a reasonable possibility that the injury was caused by medical malpractice"). Here, Appellants failed to initiate litigation against Drs. Macksey and McLanahan prior to the expiration of the period of limitations set forth in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...existed to commence a medical malpractice action. To the extent Appellants had their potential claim investigated, the means to discover any alleged negligence on the part of Drs. Macksey and McLanahan were readily available. Therefore, pursuant to section 95.11(4)(b), Appellants were barred from bringing a claim against any new defendants at least two years from October 29, 2001, the date on which, after having requested, received and studied the medical records, they served their notices of i...

...at 344; see also § 725.01, Fla. Stat. Next, we conclude that the trial judge erred in finding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court found that the claim was barred by the two-year limitations period under Florida Statutes section 95.11(4)(c)(action to recover wages) and the one-year limitations period under section 95.11(5)(a)(action for specific performance of a contract). *1123 This point requires little discussion as it is evident from the allegations in the complaint that sections 95.11(4)(c) and (5)(a) are not applicable to the instant case. As Lundstrom correctly points out, he neither seeks payment of wages nor specific performance of the oral agreement. Instead, either section 95.11(3)(k)(breach of contract) or section 95.11(3)( o )(intentional tort) is applicable here as the action is for breach of fiduciary duty stemming from a partnership agreement....

...aulted on the loan; and 5) that the loan was assigned to the United States Department of Education [hereinafter "Department"] in 1983. Defendant argues that the Florida statute of limitations on actions for the recovery of defaulted loans, Fla.Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), had expired before the assignment of his loan to the Department....

...ignment of the loan, and extending at least six years from that date. By its terms, this new federal rule applies "notwithstanding any provision of state law that would set an earlier deadline for filing suit." Section 484A of the HEA. Florida Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), which would have required that suit be brought well before the date of assignment, is clearly such a state law, and therefore, by virtue of Section 484A of the HEA, its limitations now have no effect on the United State's ability to enforce an assigned loan obligation previously affected by that law....

...hartered, d/b/a Florida Orthopaedic Institute. PER CURIAM. James S. Parham, plaintiff in a medical malpractice action, appeals the dismissal of *624 his amended complaint which the trial court found to be barred by the statute of repose contained in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation as provided for in section 768.57(4), Florida Statutes (1987) [now transferred to 766.106(4)] because "[t]he `statute of repose' is subsumed in the general term `statute of limitations' of section 95.11(4)." Applying the same reasoning that we applied in Moore, we conclude that the 90-day extension allowed by section 766.104(2) extends both the statute of limitation and the statute of repose....

...Because our holding in this case will potentially impact many medical malpractice claims, we certify the following question as one of great public importance: DO THE EXTENSIONS OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ALLOWED BY SECTIONS 766.104(2) AND 766.106(4), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), ALSO EXTEND THE STATUTE OFREPOSE CONTAINED IN SECTION 95.11(4)(B), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? THREADGILL, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur....

...e by a subsequent statutory enactment, trial courts in this district are firmly bound by its holding." However, I disagree with this court's holding in Moore that "[t]he `statute of repose' is subsumed in the general term `statute of limitations' of section 95.11(4) and is tolled by the service of the notice of intent to litigate." 579 So.2d at 190....

...lative intent of section 768.57 in its entirety." I also disagree with this conclusion. Therefore, I would have taken this opportunity to recede from Moore and would have affirmed the trial court's ruling. It is my view that the statute of repose in 95.11(4)(b) is neither extended nor tolled by the provisions of sections 766.104 and 766.106....

...When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Courts are *626 without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would modify its express terms. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984). Section 95.11(4)(b) was originally enacted as part of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975....

...Therefore, at the time the legislature drafted the language in sections 766.104 and 766.106, respectively granting "an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations" and providing that "the statute of limitations is tolled" during the 90-day period following service of the notice of intent, section 95.11 had been in existence for ten years and provided for both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. A plain reading of these statutes requires the conclusion that the legislature intended to "extend" and "toll" only the statute of limitations. This conclusion is also consistent with the language in the repose provisions of section 95.11(4)(b) which provides: "however, in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years" and "but in no event to exceed 7 years." I believe the words "in no event" preclude a statutory interpretation that allows an extension or a tolling of the four or seven year period....

...The supreme court affirmed the dismissal of the action on the grounds that the claim was barred by the statute of repose before it accrued. In doing so, the court held that, because the legislature had found an overriding public necessity in its enactment of section 95.11(4)(b), the plaintiffs were not unconstitutionally denied their access to the court as guaranteed by Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution....

...me that underlying the court's analyses was the assumption that the repose period ran without interruption from the day of the malpractice incident until the expiration of the statutory period without regard to the statute of limitations. NOTES [1] Section 95.11 (4)(b) provides in part: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been d...

...The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run. [3] Section 766.106(4) provides in part: The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11. However, during the 90-day period, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants. [4] In 1996, the legislature amended section 95.11(4)(b) to provide that no action brought on behalf of a minor before the child's eighth birthday would be barred by the statute of repose....

...An order was entered by the state court judge on stipulation by the parties, Attache and Kaplan, that the matters of discovery in the federal case would be adopted in the state case. Attache filed two motions to dismiss the counterclaim alleging, inter alia, a statute of limitations defense under section 95.11(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...peal. Attache contends that the trial court "lacked subject matter jurisdiction" over count I of Kaplan's counterclaim, which alleged a violation under the state securities statute, chapter 517, because the statute of limitations period set forth in section 95.11(4)(e), had expired....

...ntimely state counterclaim as would prevent a triggering of the limiting statute. We therefore agree with Attache that because Kaplan's counterclaim in the state court was filed more than two years after the cause of action accrued, it was barred by section 95.11(4)(e) and should have been dismissed....

...rs, in inducing Kaplan to enter into the employment contract on March 8, 1979, concealed or failed to furnish Kaplan with the partnership agreement which, if disclosed, would have revealed pertinent facts regarding the partnership's liabilities. [2] Section 95.11(4)(e) provides: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: * * * * * * (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS....

...section 718.203, Florida Statutes [1987]." The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice without giving a rationale. The district court reversed, reasoning thusly: Section 718.203(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), provides a cause of action for breach of implied warranty; section 95.11(3)(c) provides a four-year limitations period for bringing implied warranty actions; and section 718.124 tolls the running of the limitations period until control of the condominium association passes from the developer to the unit owners....

...A lawsuit based on such a defect must be filed within the general time limits set out in chapter 95, Florida Statutes (1987). See, e.g., Naranja Lakes Condominium No. 2, Inc. v. Rizzo, 463 So.2d 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (suit for construction defects in condominium barred by section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1981)); Biscayne Roofing Co. v. Palmetto Fairway Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 418 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (suit for breach of warranty in condominium construction timely filed under section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975)). *925 The chapter 95 limitations period for bringing an "action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property" is four years: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property....

...een discovered with the exercise of due diligence. In any event, the action must be commenced within 15 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, [or] the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy ... whichever date is latest. § 95.11, Fla....

...The plaintiff, in opposition to the entry of a judgment on the pleadings, argues: (1) the Fund acts as an insurer and therefore the cause of action against it does not arise until a judgment is entered; (2) the two-year statute of limitations provided by section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1977) is not applicable to the Fund; and (3) she has been denied access to court because she was unaware of her claim until after the statute of limitations had run....

...We conclude therefore that for purposes of the statute of limitations the Fund does not act as an insurer. The question that remains then is what is the applicable statute of limitations. The Fund, of course, argues that the two-year limitation provision for those in privity with health care providers is applicable, see § 95.11(4)(b), while the plaintiff argues that the claim falls under the four-year limitation period as an action for negligence, § 95.11(3)(a), or for statutory liability, § 95.11(3)(f), or an action not provided for elsewhere, § 95.11(3)(p)....

...Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981), but that is not the situation presented here. This plaintiff has alleged that she was aware of her cause of action for medical malpractice in October, 1978, and thus, at the latest, her cause of action accrued on that date. § 95.11(4)(b)....

...e: Whether a claim against the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund arises at the time of the alleged medical malpractice, rather than when judgment is entered against the tortfeasor, and is governed by the two year statute of limitations provided by Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), so that the Fund must be made or joined as a party defendant within two years after the malpractice action accrues? NOTES [*] Chief Judge Schwartz did not hear oral argument. [1] Insofar as an action for medical malpractice must be commenced within two years from the time the incident is discovered, § 95.11(4)(b), the date on which the plaintiff discovered the existence of the Fund is irrelevant....

...LORIDA KEYS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL following an operation on June 26, 1978. 4. Plaintiffs' cause of action, not having been commenced as against the FLORIDA PATIENT'S COMPENSATION FUND within two (2) years from June 28, 1978, is barred by Florida Statute § 95.11(4)(b)......

...TIENT'S COMPENSATION FUND. Appellants contend (1) that the trial court erred in failing to recognize that a claim against a non-tortfeasor insurance fund whose liability is solely derived from the negligent conduct of the tortfeasor is not barred by section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to recognize that section 95.11(4)(b) begins to run only upon discovery that the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund extended coverage to Florida Keys Memorial Hospital....

...Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 449 So.2d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Burr v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 447 So.2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); and Owens v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 428 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for review denied, 436 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1983). See §§ 95.11(4)(b) and 768.54(3)(e)1, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...The insurer's right to notice and an opportunity to defend a claim is a common feature in a contract of insurance, from which does not necessarily follow a right to be insulated from judgment by virtue of a statute of limitations. Third, plaintiffs correctly argue that Section 95.11(4)(b) does not apply to the Fund because it is not a person in privity with the health care provider....

...health care provider — whether the Fund be joined in the action early or late. Whether a plaintiff should be permitted to join the Fund as a defendant long after the action is commenced is answered by equitable principles, e.g., laches, and not by Section 95.11(4)(b)....

...[10] The procedure is the same as in the collection of a judgment against an insurance company. For the foregoing reasons, the holding here should be that where a medical malpractice action against a health care provider is timely commenced, the statute of limitations in Section 95.11(4)(b) is no bar to the subsequent joinder of the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, subject only to the statutory requirement that the Fund be joined as a defendant in sufficient time so as to permit it, if warranted, to interpose a defense to the plaintiff's claim....

...2d DCA 1984), and an opinion of this court released prior to this one. Taddiken v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 449 So.2d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Another case presenting the question is currently pending in this court. Lugo v. Glasser (Case No. 83-932, oral argument set for June 4, 1984). [3] Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1981) provides in part: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence......

...of the statute of limitations. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 , 127 S.Ct. 1091 , 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). Florida has a four-year statute of limitations for personal-injury torts. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir.2003); Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(o)-(p)....

...da.... We agree the New York Transcript meets the requirements of section 55.503, Florida Statutes (2002). [3] We disagree, however, with the court's application of the five-year statute of limitations to the "domestication" of the foreign judgment. Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (2002), provides a twenty-year limitation period when a party files an "action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state," and a five-year period when the action concerns a judgment or decree "not of record, of this state or any court of the United States...." § 95.11(1) & (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added). If the act of "domestication" is an "action on a judgment," this section applies. However, this court has previously held that section 95.11, Florida Statutes does not apply....

...In Muka and Michael, this court determined the act of domesticating a foreign judgment was not equivalent to bringing an action on the foreign judgment. "[S]imply recording the judgment pursuant to the FEFJA should not be viewed as an independent action on a judgment that would fall under the statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(a)." Michael, 832 So.2d at 217....

...In fact, our legislature has made this very distinction. The FEFJA "shall not be construed to impair the right of a judgment creditor to bring an action to enforce his or her judgment instead of proceeding under [FEFJA]." § 55.502(2), Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added). Section 95.11 simply does not apply when a judgment creditor opts to domesticate its foreign judgment under FEFJA rather than immediately enforce it under another subsection....

...Once domesticated, a foreign judgment will be effective for a period no longer than the original forum's statute of limitations or twenty years, whichever comes first. See N.Y. Dep't of Taxation v. Patafio, Jr., 829 So.2d 314 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); see also § 95.11(1), Fla....

...CPLR LAW § 211 (McKinney 2004) (emphasis added). Since the time period to enforce the tax warrant under New York law had not expired, NYS should have been permitted to domesticate the judgment in this state. See id.; cf. Patafio, Jr., 829 So.2d 314 (section 95.11 applied where plaintiff filed an action under section 72.401(2), Florida Statutes, to enforce a foreign judgment not of record in this state); N.Y....

...mother, who died allegedly from a misdiagnosed ovarian cancer. At the outset, we find that William's individual claim is barred by Ash v. Stella, 457 So.2d 1377 (Fla.1984). As to Jason's claim, the issue on appeal is whether the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, for cases "brought on behalf of a minor," applies only to cases brought on behalf of a child injured by medical malpractice or also extends to cases brought on behalf of a child for the wrongful death of a parent....

...It further alleged that appellants did not learn of the 1997 misdiagnoses until June of 2002. Appellees filed motions to dismiss the suit based on the ground that it was barred by the statutes of limitations/repose. The trial court found that the suit was barred by the statute of repose found in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes. Section 95.11(4)(b) now provides: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discov...

...Appellees counter that the legislature intended to extend the statute of repose only in those instances where the minor suffers injury as the result of medical negligence. A careful review of the legislative history leading to the 1996 amendment to section 95.11(4)(b) indicates that the appellees are correct. Section 95.11(4)(b) was amended as a result of Senate Bill 454 (SB 454)....

...tions for medical malpractice claims brought "by a minor" and an Ohio statute that tolls the statute of limitations "for minors to bring a medical malpractice action." [3] Collectively, these citations indicate that the legislature intended to amend section 95.11(4)(b) to provide children under the age of eight that are injured as a result of medical malpractice with additional time to file a claim....

...[6] Subsection B compares the differences between the then-current law and the amendment proposed in HB 43. and explains that the time extension applies to those situations where "medical malpractice is committed on a child." (Emphasis added). These facts provide further evidence that the 1996 amendment to section 95.11(4)(b) was directed to claims brought on behalf of a minor who suffered personal injury as the result of medical negligence....

...d simple negligence in Count II. Appellee moved to dismiss appellant's complaint asserting that both counts of the complaint sought relief for medical negligence and were, therefore, barred by the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...s arising from the medical care he contracted to be provided by ARA. In the performance of his custodial duties, appellee was not necessarily providing "diagnosis, treatment or care" as contemplated by the medical malpractice statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(b)....

...Burr, seeks reversal of the trial court's order dismissing his cause of action against the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund (Fund). The trial court ruled that appellant's cause of action appeared, on the face of his amended complaint, to be barred by the limitations period provided in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...On December 22, 1979, appellant allegedly suffered injuries as a result of medical malpractice while a patient at Bayfront Medical Center (Bayfront). Apparently, appellant filed his complaint against Bayfront within the two-year limitations period of section 95.11(4)(b), although this information is not provided in the parties' briefs, nor in the record on appeal....

...Joinder of the Fund, as a party defendant, was required by section 768.53(3)(e)1, Florida Statutes (1981), if appellant sought to recover his claimed damages from the Fund. In Owens v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 428 So.2d 708, 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the court expressly held that for the purposes of complying with section 95.11(4)(b), when a complaint against a health care provider is amended to add the Fund as a new party defendant, such amendment does not relate back to the filing date of the original complaint....

...Appellant urges, however, that Owens is not applicable, so that it matters not that the amended complaint does not relate back to the filing date of the original complaint. Appellant argues instead that the amendment was filed within the limitations provisions of section 95.11(3)(f) or (p), Florida Statutes (1981), which he claims are the sections applicable to the joinder of the Fund, rather than section 95.11(4)(b). Appellant's assertion that section 95.11(3) applies, rather than section 95.11(4), is based on the argument that the Fund is not a health care provider as contemplated by section 95.11(4), relying on Durden v. American Hospital Supply Corporation, 375 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1980). Durden is not applicable here. The Durden court ruled section 95.11(4)(b) inapplicable because there, Durden's claim for damages against American Hospital Supply Corporation, who operated a blood donor center, arose from an injury allegedly received as a result of a vendor-vendee relationship from sales of blood. Section 95.11(4)(b), in contrast, requires an injury resulting from a relationship arising out of medical, dental or surgical diagnosis, treatment or care....

...rgoing medical, dental or surgical diagnosis, treatment or care at Bayfront. Appellant also argues that because the Fund is not a health care provider rendering such services, and because the Fund was not in privity with appellant, the provisions of section 95.11(4)(b) are still inapplicable....

...Jacksonville General Hospital, *351 Inc., 365 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), quashed on other grounds, 400 So.2d 965 (Fla. 1981). We agree that the Fund is not a health care provider, and that the Fund was not in privity with appellant. However, we do not agree that section 95.11(4)(b) is inapplicable, and in doing so, reject the reasoning and holding of the district court in Gonzales on the question of privity. The Florida Supreme Court, in quashing the decision of the district court in Gonzales, expressly refrained from reaching the privity issue. Section 95.11(4)(b) provides that the limitation of actions in that subsection is "limited to the health care provider and persons in privity with the provider of health care." In Gonzales, the district court construed that language to require privity between the claimant and the health care provider, as well as privity between the claimant and any other persons the claimant alleges to be liable. We reject that construction. It is clear to us that section 95.11(4)(b) applies when there is privity not only between the claimant and the health care provider, but also when anyone connected with the incident against whom the claimant alleges damages is in a privity relationship with the health care provider. We note that while both cases are from the same court, the Owens opinion does not address Gonzales. An argument could be made that any action against the Fund is founded on a statutory liability, and that section 95.11(3)(f) should be applicable. However, it is clear to us from the overall legislative intent, as we perceive it, that section 95.11(4)(b) is applicable. [1] In construing legislative intent to make section 95.11(4)(b) applicable, we observe several facts....

...Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in its dismissal of the action against the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund. GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Analogously, a wrongful death action, an action created by statute, is governed by the more specific limitations provision of section 95.11(4)(d), and not 95.11(3)(f).

...eas relief. See Knowles v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 846 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Heard v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 811 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The parole commission suggests that the trial court nonetheless reached the correct result in light of section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes (2006), which provides that a petition for extraordinary writ other than one challenging a criminal conviction, filed on or on behalf of a prisoner, must be brought within one year....

...erly denied relief on procedural grounds. See Cooper v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 924 So.2d 966 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), review pending, No. SC06-1236 (Fla. June 21, 2006). We find this reasoning to be flawed for two reasons. First, the legitimacy of applying section 95.11(5)(f) in this situation is questionable in light of Allen v....

...Accordingly, the order treating Martin's petition for writ of habeas corpus as seeking non-habeas relief and denying that petition as untimely is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings. To the extent Cooper holds that rule 9.100(2)(c) and section 95.11(5)(f) may operate to bar a habeas corpus proceeding challenging a prisoner's continued confinement pursuant to the revocation of post-release supervision by the parole commission, we certify conflict with that decision. BROWNING, C.J., KAHN, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Although it did not directly address section 95.11(5)(f), this court noted in Johnson v....

...The complaint also alleged that the Hospital and its employees "misrepresented material facts" concerning the pad count. Thereafter, the trial court granted the Hospital's motion to dismiss, finding that the action was barred by the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...This Court reversed, finding that the allegations of the amended complaint were sufficient to create a fact issue as to whether the seven-year repose rather than the four-year repose period was applicable. See Hernandez v. Amisub (Am.Hosp.), Inc., 659 So.2d 1316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), states in relevant part: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is d...

...itation is extended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred. Thus, section 95.11(4)(b) extends the normal four-year statute of repose in a medical malpractice action to seven years in cases of fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact....

...Notwithstanding the hospital's assertion to the contrary, there was no need for Hernandez to prove that the Hospital or its employees had actual knowledge that a pad had been left inside Hernandez' abdomen, in order for Hernandez' claim to succeed. There is no indication in section 95.11(4)(b) that the term "concealment" includes a scienter element....

...Because the presence of the pad was concealed due to the employees' disregard of Hospital policy and their false report, there was no way for Hernandez to know or discover that the pad was still in his body. The Hospital employees' actions also support application of the "intentional misrepresentation of fact" exception in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...s based upon the statute of repose. Because Hernandez produced sufficient evidence to show that the Hospital concealed evidence or intentionally misrepresented facts, Hernandez was brought within the extended seven-year statutory period of repose in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...In the case at bar, the dismissal of Delgado's cause ended the judicial labor as to her case and required her to file a new action to re-initiate proceedings. However, Delgado would have been unable to do so because the four-year statute of limitations for negligence had run. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

..., and "had no opportunity before that to learn" thereof. Motions to dismiss the third amended complaint were filed by each of the appellees-defendants on the ground that plaintiff's allegations show that the statute of limitations had expired, under § 95.11(6) of Florida Statutes....

...The trial court granted each of the motions to dismiss, with prejudice, on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired. It is conceded by the parties that malpractice actions were governed by the four-year limitation provision of Florida Statutes, § 95.11(4), until the legislature, by the enactment of Chapter 71-254, Laws of Florida, which became Florida Statute § 95.11(6), specifically limited the filing of malpractice actions to two years. Florida Statute 95.11(6) was enacted June 23, 1971, and became effective July 1, 1972. The real question here presented is: Does § 95.11(6), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 71-254, Laws of Florida, providing a statute of limitations of two years on actions arising out of medical malpractice, apply to an alleged act of malpractice that occurred prior to the effective d...

...Cuthbert, 288 So.2d 517, Opinion filed January 18, 1974. There is a distinction between the facts of *856 the Maltempo v. Cuthbert case and the case sub judice. Maltempo's cause of action accrued February 5, 1970 and thus, with the passage of Florida Statutes § 95.11(6) on June 23, 1971, his cause of action expired on July 1, 1972, at which date the new act became effective. In the case sub judice, the plaintiff's cause of action accrued on December 24, 1970, and with the enactment of Florida Statute 95.11(6) on June 23, 1971, the plaintiff, DeLuca, had approximately six months after the effective date July 1, 1972, within which time to file his action....

...on are to be affected by the new law shall have a definite period within which to file or prosecute their claims. There is reasonable doubt concerning the legislative intention to provide retroactive effect to the newly added statute of limitations, § 95.11(6), and the benefit of this doubt should here be given to the appellant-plaintiff, whose cause of action was dismissed. This action is reversed, with direction to the trial court to reinstate plaintiff's cause. The appellant raises an additional question concerning the applicability of Florida Statute, § 95.11(6), to malpractice of osteopaths....

...Florida Statute § 459.07(2) provided that standards of professional education and the rights of osteopathic physicians are equal to those of the other three schools of medicine designated as allopathic, homeopathic and eclectic. We hold that the word "medical" as used in F.S. 95.11(6), connotes the healing art of medicine and includes the practice of osteopathy and osteopathic medicine....

...Defendants moved for summary judgment, and after conducting a hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The trial court decided that plaintiffs' claims were barred *281 by the four-year statute of repose contained in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980). The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for rehearing. Plaintiffs instituted this appeal. Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...f limitations is extended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...r, when they consulted an attorney, two days before the expiration of the statute; however, they did not file an action for an additional two months. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in applying the statute of repose contained in section 95.11(4)(b) to bar plaintiffs' action. Cates v. Graham, 427 So.2d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), decision approved, 451 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1984); Pisut. *282 As to Jackson, however, we hold that the trial court erred in applying the provisions of section 95.11(4)(b)....

...I have also answered that I became aware that the surgery should not have been performed when the infection began. In answering this question by "when the infection began" I meant the day I found out the rods were infected which was sometime in late spring of 1993. FURTHER AFFIANT SAY NOT Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995) provides that An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with due diligence.... In Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177, 181-82 (Fla.1993), the Florida Supreme Court construed section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), to mean that .......

...SMITH, Judge. Martin, who sued Pafford for legal malpractice arising out of her criminal conviction for first degree murder, appeals the final summary judgment entered in favor of Pafford based upon the trial court's determination that suit was time-barred by section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes....

...On June 12, 1987, Martin filed suit against Pafford for legal malpractice. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In his motion for summary judgment, Pafford alleged that the statute of limitations had run before suit was instituted. The governing statute, section 95.11(4)(a) provides for a two-year limitations period "which shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." Thereafter, the trial court entered an amended order a...

...erred without paying for them. We find that the Swaffords' counterclaim for unjust enrichment states a claim for unjust enrichment and the trial court erred in dismissing it. The statute of limitations on a claim for unjust enrichment is four years. § 95.11(3)(k), Fla....

...or misrepresentation when the contracts or statements were provided. Plaintiffs failed to respond to Desimone's argument. No Florida case addresses how the statute of limitations applies in a churning case. Desimone is correct that Florida Statutes section 95.11(3) provides a statute limitation period of four years for actions founded on fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or breach of fiduciary duty. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)....

...own that the actions and inactions of the Defendants fell below the standard of care recognized in the community. In response, the appellees separately filed motions to dismiss the appellants' amended complaint. They argued, among other points, that section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), the two year statute of limitations governing medical malpractice actions, barred the appellants' suit....

...The dispositive issue on appeal is whether, as a matter of law, based upon the pleadings before the trial court, the two year statute of limitations as extended by the tolling period in section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1987), had expired prior to the filing of the appellants' complaint. Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action *251 occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered,...

...the incident or occurrence giving rise to their cause of action, the trial court may properly grant the appellees' motion to dismiss. Abston v. Bryan, 519 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). We now briefly examine the relevant decisional law construing section 95.11(4)(b)....

...re and treatment in the eyes of a lay person is in fact legal notice of possible malpractice. In my view, the legislature recognized such circumstances when it included the "should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence" language in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Costello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2294, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). Alternatively, the Plan argues that if this Court decides to adopt the most analogous state law limitations period, it should adopt Florida Statute § 95.11(4)(c), which allows for a two-year limitations period on actions to "recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime." Mr....

...Gray's behalf submitted by his attorney which was denied on February 23, 1988, acted to forestall the running of the limitations period. Additionally, Mr. Gray argues that the most closely analogous state statute of limitations is contained in Florida Statute § 95.11(2)(b), which provides for a five-year limitation period for an action based on a "contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument," and is the statute this Court should adopt in determining the timeliness of this action....

...U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. In Corkery, the district court applied the rationale of McGhee in adopting Florida's two-year statute for a termination of employment case brought pursuant to ERISA § 510. This Court concludes as well that Florida Statute § 95.11(4)(c) should be applied to the facts of this case as the most closely analogous state statute of limitations. In rejecting Mr. Gray's argument that Florida Statute § 95.11(2)(b) should apply, it is important to note that there is no dispute here over an interpretation of a contractual provision....

...Additionally, as the Court in McGhee ruled, the Florida two-year statute has been construed to be much broader than the wording of that statute might indicate. See e.g., Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So.2d 513 (Fla.1970). Accordingly, it is this Court's ruling that Florida Statute § 95.11(4)(c) prescribes the appropriate limitations period to be applied in this case as it is much more narrowly focused for the relief sought than the more general statute governing contract actions....

...Before the Court is the question of which statute of limitations provision governs plaintiff's pendant state law claim brought pursuant to the Florida Equal Pay Act, § 725.07, Florida Statutes (1981). Defendant contends that the applicable statute is § 95.11(4)(c), Fla.Stat., which prescribes a two-year limitations period for *10 any "action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime." Because the Florida Equal Pay Act, § 725.07, Fla. Stat., is concerned with "payment ... for services performed", defendant argues that the two-year limitations period under § 95.11(4)(c), pertaining to "wages" actions, should be applied, rather than the four year limitations period generally applicable under § 95.11(3)(f), Fla.Stat., to actions "founded on a statutory liability." Although apparently no Florida case has considered which limitations period is applicable to actions brought under § 725.07, Fla. Stat., defendant emphasizes the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla.1970), that § 95.11(7)(b), Fla. Stat. — the predecessor to the present § 95.11(4)(c) — applies "to all suits for wages and overtime, however accruing, as well as to suits for damages and penalties accruing under the laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime." Defendant further points to a line of Eleventh and former Fifth Circuit cases applying the two-year limitations period in § 95.11(4)(c) to employment discrimination suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C....

...The chief difficulty with defendant's position is that defendant has cited to only one of the pertinent holdings of the Florida Supreme Court in Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, supra . Although that court, in the language quoted above, seemed to call for broad application of § 95.11(4)(c) to suits concerning "wages or overtime", it also adopted a very narrow definition of the term "wages." Indeed, the principal holding of Broward Builders was that an action seeking recovery of a "salary" is not a "suit for wages" within the intent of § 95.11(4)(c)....

...Jordan, 270 So.2d 422 (Fla.3d DCA 1972). In the instant case, plaintiff Forehand claims the defendant IBM discriminated against her in its payment of her "salary". *11 Under the reasoning of the Broward Builders decision, the two-year "suit for wages" statute of limitations, § 95.11(4)(c), would govern plaintiff's claim only if her "salary," properly viewed, constituted "wages". It is clear to this Court from consideration of the above-quoted discussion, however, that the term "wages" in § 95.11(4)(c) would not include plaintiff's "salary." The record reveals that the salaries of sales personnel at IBM are not based on hourly compensation, or other considerations of the sort normally associated with wages, but are paid in fixed mont...

...d calculated according to performance quotas and other criteria. Thus, under Florida law, plaintiff's "salary" is just that, and to the extent her equal pay claim is based on the level of her "salary", the claim is not a "suit for wages" governed by § 95.11(4)(c). Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, supra . Of the Eleventh Circuit cases applying § 95.11(4)(c) in federal employment discrimination suits, only the most recent case McGhee v....

...e/employer cases are governed by the two-year period", 707 F.2d at 1314, the Eleventh Circuit — like the defendant in this case—appears to have overlooked the restrictive interpretation the Broward Builders decision ascribed to the term "wages" in § 95.11(4)(c). As noted above, Broward Builders itself was an employee/employer case which for purposes of a motion to dismiss was held not to be governed by § 95.11(4)(c)....

...ation suits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, et seq. and therefore are not binding upon this Court in determining which statute of limitations is applicable to plaintiff's pendant state law claim. Having concluded that plaintiff's claim is not governed by § 95.11(4)(c), it remains to determine which statute of limitations is properly applicable....

...Because the basis for plaintiff's claim, as well as the measure of damages plaintiff can recover, derive expressly and exclusively from the Florida Equal Pay Act, § 725.07, Fla.Stat., the Court finds that the applicable limitations provision is the four-year statute governing actions "founded on a statutory liability", § 95.11(3)(f)....

...Broward Builders Exch., Inc. v. Goehring, supra . Although the Court speaks of McGhee as seeking, inter alia, "lost wages", 707 F.2d at 1312, as indicated above, the decision makes no acknowledgement of the "wages"/"salary" distinction. [2] See also § 95.11(3)(n), Fla.Stat. (four year limitation on "[a]n action for a statutory penalty or forfeiture"), and § 95.11(3)(p), Fla.Stat., (four year limitation on "[a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes.")

...efamation as the independent tortious wrong committed by Defendant. Third, if Plaintiffs are pleading defamation, then the two-year statute of limitations may apply to the claim even though it is characterized as tortious interference. See Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(g)....

...rence counts are defamation counts in disguise, [3] the Court recognizes that the two causes of action are governed by different limitations periods. The applicable statute of limitations for a claim of tortious interference is four years, Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)( o ); see also Farish v. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co., 425 So.2d 12, 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), while defamation is covered by a two-year statute of limitations. See Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(g)....

...] on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations had expired, [2] and *524 these appeals ensued. [3] As to all but one of the counts now in issue, we affirm. Count I involves a written agreement governed by a five-year limitations statute. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1975). [4] The other counts are quantum meruit claims based on oral contracts which, as specifically held infra, are subject to the four-year period which became effective on January 1, 1975. § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1974), replacing § 95.11(5)(e), Fla....

...As to count 3, we reach a different conclusion. There is evidence that those services were concluded on April 8, 1972, [7] less than four years before suit was filed. The appellees argue, however, that the three-year statute in effect at that time, Section 95.11(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1971), applies and that Section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1975) effective January 1, 1975, is not retroactive....

...ted an independent action, the summary judgments as to less than all of the counts are presently appealable under Mendez v. West Flagler Family Ass'n., Inc., 303 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1974). [4] The prior statute, which also provided a five-year period, was § 95.11(3), Fla....

...Deneace Joshua ("Appellant") appeals the trial court's order finding her claim to be time-barred pursuant to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1995), and dismissing her complaint with prejudice. [1] Appellant contends *1069 that her claim should be governed instead by the general four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes....

...Citing Milano [3] and subsection (5) of the Act, Appellee argued that, as a matter of law, Appellant's civil action filed after January 17, 1997, was time-barred by the statute of limitations. In her response to the motion to dismiss, Appellant contended that her action was timely under section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes, which sets out a four-year statute of limitations for "[a]n action founded on a statutory liability." Finding that chapter 760 rather than chapter 95, Florida Statutes, controls the instant case, the trial court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss with prejudice....

...Likewise, we conclude that the trial court carried out the provisions of the Act in dismissing Appellant's claim as time-barred. Relying upon Hullinger v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 548 So.2d 231 (Fla.1989), and the statute of limitations provision in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes, Appellant contends that she had four years to file from the date of the discriminatory or retaliatory act, i.e., four years from May 1995, and that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim with prejudice....

...ys of filing. After three years the Commission had not resolved his claim, so Hullinger filed suit in the trial court alleging wrongful discharge. The trial court dismissed his claim as time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1983) (governing "[a]ctions other than for recovery of real property" and including "[a]n action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime"), and the district court affirmed the order. Id. at 232. The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with Hullinger's argument that his cause of action under the Act was based on the violation of a statute, so that the four-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1983) (pertaining to "[a]n action founded on a statutory liability"), applied....

...2d DCA 1990); Dubin v. Dow Corning Corp., 478 So.2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Therefore, as subsection (5) of the current Act specifically addresses the applicable time period for bringing a cause of action pursuant to the Act, the more general provisions of section 95.11(3)(f) do not apply....

...That the negligence of the Defendant, DRAGE INDUSTRIES, was a direct cause of the above described fire and was a direct and proximate cause of the damages suffered by the Plaintiff. In granting the motion on the pleadings the trial court found that the statute of limitations, Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes, [1] barred appellant's cause of action and implied that the clock started running in 1969 when appellee performed the work....

...lty was damaged that appellant was made aware of his right to bring this action and that his cause of action arose. The complaint was filed within the time period applicable to any action for injury to personal property under the applicable statute, Section 95.11(3)(h), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...NOTES [1] It appears that the trial judge was relying on the 1975 statute which became effective January 1, 1975. Application of that statute is not consistent with the implication that the cause of action arose in 1969. The statute of limitations applicable to an action for injury to personal property in effect in 1969 was § 95.11(5)(c), Fla....

...r the revision effective in 1975 that statute would have barred this action after December 18, 1976. However, the 1975 statute relevant to actions for injury to personal property increased the time period from three to four years on January 1, 1975. § 95.11(3)(h), Fla....

...Id. at 1181-82, 1186 . The court reasoned that such an application is fair, given the nature of the alleged tortious conduct, its effect on victims, and the general application of the doctrine to tort cases. Id. The court did rely on Florida Statute section 95.11(7), since the plaintiffs action was based on abuse that occurred from 1968 to 1975, preceding the effective date of that statute....

...v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 560 So.2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (statute of limitations for actions for professional malpractice was applicable to claims against employer predicated solely on the negligence of the employee)). Moreover, it is persuasive that section 95.11(7), on which both Heamdon and Cisko partly rely, contains no limitation that the claim be one against the perpetrator in order for it to apply....

...Defendant Caridad argues that the entire Complaint should be dismissed as untimely. His additional arguments will be further addressed separately. . In general, the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs claims against the Church Defendants is four years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(a) (negligence claims), § 95.11(3)(p) (“catch-all'’provision). . Section 95.11(7) provides that: FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE....

...years after the injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse, whichever occurs later. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (7)....

...Liroff, P.A., and Nancy Little Hoffmann of Nancy Little Hoffmann, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants. Joan Fowler and Michael B. Davis of Walton Lantaff Schroeder & Carson, West Palm Beach, for appellee. DELL, Judge. This appeal arises out of an action for dental malpractice. Appellants claim that application of section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1985) to their cause of action violates Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution....

...Shields underwent exploratory and corrective surgery. Appellants claim that the corrective surgery revealed that appellee had negligently performed the treatment rendered on August 4, 1978. Appellants filed their complaint on June 9, 1983. The trial court held that section 95.11(4)(b) barred appellants' action and entered judgment on the pleadings. Appellants contend that: Where a party injured by dental malpractice suffers no symptoms of injury until sixteen days prior to expiration of the four-year final repose provisions of section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, and discovers only four days prior to expiration of the repose period that his symptoms were caused by defendant's malpractice, *1381 application of that statute as a bar to his claim violates Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution. We affirm on the authority of Carr v. Broward County, 505 So.2d 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), and hold that the application of section 95.11(4)(b) to appellants' claim did not violate Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution....

...y the fund for a participating hospital or ambulatory surgical center shall apply to the officers, trustees, volunteer workers, trainees, committee members (including physicians, osteopaths, podiatrists, and dentists ).... [Emphasis added.] Finally, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1985) provides: An "action for medical malpractice" is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care....

...Since we find that the medical liability mediation procedures are not applicable to dentists, the provision of Section 768.44(4), tolling the statute of limitations during pendency of the claim, offers no relief to appellants. The summary final judgment finding that appellants' claim was barred by Section 95.11(4)(b) is accordingly AFFIRMED....

...We find no support for appellants' argument in Young since even though the court concluded that the legislature's failure to include dentists in section 768.44, Florida Statutes (1977) did not occur as the result of an oversight, the court affirmed a summary final judgment against the claimant based on section 95.11(4)(b). We also note that the First District Court of Appeal held that a dental hygienist, when cleaning teeth, is a provider of health care within the meaning of section 95.11(4)(b)....

...Therefore, if the fact-finder in this case shall ultimately determine that Ms. Phelan discovered or should have discovered her cause of action within two years of August 14, 1976, then, of course, her action would be barred by the two-year limitations period of Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes....

...her actual or constructive notice of the claim and that the injured party should have a reasonable time after discovery of the claim to file suit. In Carr we held that the legislature found an overwhelming public necessity that required enactment of 95.11(4) and satisfied the test in Kluger v....

...However we believe this appeal presents questions of great public importance and we certify the following questions to the Supreme Court: HAS THERE BEEN A SUFFICIENT SHOWING THAT THE KLUGER TEST HAS BEEN SATISFIED TO SUPPORT THE STRICT APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF REPOSE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 95.11(4)(b) TO CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF DENTAL MALPRACTICE? WHERE AN INCIDENT OF DENTAL MALPRACTICE OCCURS AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM ACT, DOES APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF REPOSE FROM THE DATE OF THE INCIDENT OF MALP...

...entified Dr. Sayyed Hussain as the psychiatrist who authorized her son's release. The Hillsborough County Mental Health Center and Dr. Hussain moved for summary judgment. They argued the two-year statute of limitations against health care providers, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), began to run on either October 6 or 7, 1986, the dates Mrs....

...HARR was aware of the "physical injury" which was the consequence of the alleged negligence of defendants, to-wit: the death of MICHAEL L. HARR, on October 7, 1986. More than two years elapsed between that time and the date of service of notices of intent to initiate litigation. As a result, the statute of limitations, being § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985) bars this action. The issue now presented to us is whether, as a matter of law, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), as amended by the 1986 supplement, governing actions against health care providers, commenced on October 7, 1986....

...Shapiro, 565 So.2d 1319, 1322 (Fla. 1990). Notice may be actual or constructive. There is no evidence that Mrs. Harr actually discovered or should have discovered the basis of her cause of action against the appellees within two years of the "incident giving rise to the action." § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...We are concerned that the supreme court may intend the statute to commence as soon as the plaintiff has notice of Goodlet 's factors 2 and 7. Accordingly, we certify the following question to the supreme court as a matter of great public importance: DOES THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN SECTION 95.11(4)(b) COMMENCE: (A) WHEN THE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFF HAS NOTICE OF AN INJURY IN FACT; OR (B) WHEN THE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFF HAS ADDITIONAL NOTICE THAT THE INJURY IN FACT RESULTED FROM AN INCIDENT INVOLVING A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER? LEHAN and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur....

...xtent counts I and III are predicated upon acts and/or omissions that occurred after October 11, 1998. The claims for breach of fiduciary duty and violation of section 617.303, Florida Statutes, are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)( o ), (p), Fla. Stat. (limitations periods for intentional torts and actions not specifically addressed); Halkey-Roberts Corp. v. Mackal, 641 So.2d 445, 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (stating breach of fiduciary duty is an intentional tort governed by section 95.11(3)( o ))....

...Holcomb, of Huey, Guilday, Kuersteiner & Tucker, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellee. WIGGINTON, Judge. Appellant, a condominium homeowners' association and plaintiff below, brings this appeal from a final summary judgment entered on the basis that appellant's cause of action was barred by Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes, the two-year professional malpractice statute of limitations....

...Appellant did not then file its civil complaint in circuit court against appellee until April 30, 1986. Appellee ultimately moved for summary judgment asserting the claim was barred by Florida's two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice as set forth in section 95.11(4)(a)....

...applicable to appellant's cause of action, citing Cristich v. Allen Engineering, Inc., 458 So.2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Three points are now raised on appeal challenging the final summary judgment. The first point questions the constitutionality of section 95.11(4)(a); however, that question was not raised before the trial court and is not one that may be raised for the first time on appeal within the exception discussed in Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association v....

...We conclude that an engineer is a professional as that term was recently defined by the supreme court in Pierce v. AALL Insurance, Inc., 531 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1988). The final point questions whether appellant and all condominium unit owners for whom it brought this action are in privity with appellee for purposes of applying section 95.11(4)(a). On this point we must reverse. Section 95.11(4)(a) provides in relevant part that: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS....

...The appellants claimed that they relied on the survey in deciding to buy the property and subsequently discovered the dimensions, size and volume of the apartment units were not in accord with the survey. The trial court granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment finding that section 95.11(4)(a) applied....

...ersons in privity with the profession" for purposes of the statute of limitations. Concluding that a "professional act" was indeed involved in that cause, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, in a two-member majority (Sharp, J., dissenting) held that section 95.11(4)(a) was correctly applied insofar as it would be ......

...perty, citing First American Title Insurance Company, Inc. v. First Title Service Company of the Florida Keys, Inc., 457 So.2d 467 (Fla. 1984). For the following reasons, we are compelled to disagree with the Fifth District's conclusion in Cristich. Section 95.11(4)(a) is specifically limited in application "to persons in privity with a professional." The decision by the supreme court in First American Title Ins....

...Based on the foregoing, it is clear that "privity" has not been redefined by the supreme court. Rather, by way of these opinions the court has simply identified parties not in direct contractual privity, or even in "near privity," who may sue the professional. Notwithstanding, the legislature in enacting section 95.11(4)(a) chose to limit its application only to those "in privity" with the professional....

...e trial court. However, it is abundantly clear in the record that appellant was not in direct contractual privity with appellee for purposes of the preparation of the report. Consequently the two-year professional malpractice statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(a), did not apply to bar appellant's cause of action and we must reverse the final summary judgment in favor of appellee and remand the cause for further proceedings....

...im for breach of an implied warranty of habitability of a new residence, where the buyer was raped in the residence. The trial court granted the defendant developer's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which asserted that the action was barred by section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1984), because the personal injury occurred more than four years before the suit was brought....

...e criminal activity and to warn them in regard to previous criminal activity." The trial court found that actions alleging a breach of the implied warranty of habitability are governed by the four-year "catch all" statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(3)(p), citing K/F Development and Investment Corp....

...Williamson Crane & Dozer Corp., 367 So.2d 1078 (Fla.3d DCA), cert. den., Williamson Crane & Dozier Corp. v. K/F Development & Investment Corp., 378 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1979). [1] Appellant argues that the proper limitations statute to be applied in this case is section 95.11(2)(b), which provides a five-year limitations period for a "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation or liability founded on a written instrument," and that this specific statutory language precludes the possibility that the...

...a v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 369 So.2d 418 (Fla.3d DCA), cert. den., Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Heredia, 378 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1979). [2] *378 Appellee argues that the trial court properly relied on K/F Development and Investment Corporation in ruling that section 95.11(3)(p) governs actions based upon a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, and argues that cases dealing with products liability implied warranty actions also support the conclusion that this statute should govern implied warranty cases, citing Creviston v....

...re based on negligence rather than breach of contract or warranty. The question at issue similarly seems to turn, not on whether the action is characterized as sounding in tort or in contract, but rather on whether the specific statutory language of section 95.11(2)(b) includes the action involved in this case....

...g upon the type of contract involved in the sale, since the type of contract or its specific terms have no effect on the implied warranty of habitability, which arises as a matter of law from the relationship of the parties to the sales transaction. Section 95.11(2)(b) is therefore logically construed to apply only to actions which arise from or *382 relate to the specific language of the written instrument....

...Paul Revere appeals from this judgment. Discussion Under Florida law, a "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument" must be commenced within five years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b) (1995). The Florida Supreme Court has held that, under § 95.11(2)(b), a breach of contract action on an insurance contract accrues 2 on the date the contract is breached....

...Diocese’s supervision. The complaint alleges the events produced traumatic amnesia that blocked their memory of the abuse until May 2005. The Diocese moved for summary judgment, claiming the four-year statute of limitations barred the action. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...to causes of action 1 arising out of childhood sexual abuse and repressed memory in Heamdon, we did so only after considering the unique and sinister nature of childhood sexual abuse.... We also considered the Legislature’s endorsement in amending section 95.11(7), Florida Statutes (1999), to include intentional torts based on abuse.... Davis, 832 So.2d at 712 . Here, as in Davis , there is no statutory endorsement. In fact, in more than ten years since enacting section 95.11(7), the legislature has not extended the limitations period to causes of action other than intentional torts. Our holding today also accords with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s interpretation of section 95.11(7) and Heamdon. See Doe v. Sinrod, 90 So.3d 852, 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (declining to apply tolling provisions under section 95.11(7), Fla....

...Thus, on remand, Willoughby's claim in recoupment cannot be utilized defensively against Fields individually. Willoughby's recoupment claim, in this case, should be limited to Dowda and Fields, P.A., on remand. In all other respects, the motion is denied. GOSHORN and PETERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 95.11, Fla....

...at 1019 (emphases added). Additionally, after, noting that “a dismissal without prejudice would allow a mortgagee to bring another foreclosure action premised on the same default as long as the action was brought within five years of the, default per section 95.11(2)(c)[, Fla....

...sixty-day extension period under section 766.106(4). This case involves Florida's medical malpractice statutory scheme. We explained the general statutory time-line requirements of the scheme in Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So.2d 93 (Fla.2000): Pursuant to section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), an action for medical malpractice must be commenced within two years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within two years from the time the incident is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence....

...First, a claimant must conduct a reasonable investigation to determine if there are grounds for a good faith belief that there was negligence in his care or treatment. See § 766.104(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). After the completion of this presuit investigation, and during the two-year period provided for in section 95.11(4)(b), the claimant must serve a notice of intent to initiate litigation to each prospective defendant....

...The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run. (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, section 766.106(4) provides: The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11....

...at 953 (citation and footnote omitted). This construction is in accord with this Court's analysis in Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So.2d 93, 97 (Fla.2000), in which we cited Rothschild with approval. The normal statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims is two years. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...sixty or more days remain in the limitations period for that defendant. [8] To do this calculation: 1. Determine the date the statute of limitations expires without regard to tolling provisions: A. Two years from accrual of the cause of action. See § 95.11(4)(b)....

...le pleadings in this same action. Nothing in the October 30 order requires counsel to file a new action. Moreover, the statutes of limitation applicable to Al-Hakim’s claims have not yet expired so as to make the effect of the dismissal final. See § 95.11(3), Fla....

...t failed to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(d). We find the first issue to *455 be dispositive of this appeal and do not reach the merits of the other arguments. The limitations period for a medical malpractice claim is governed by section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes....

...See Collins v. Monroe County, 999 So.2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 641 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In such cases, the inverse condemnation claim must be filed within four years of the taking date. § 95.11(3)(p), Fla....

...and granted appellant twenty days within which to amend the count. The trial court dismissed count II with prejudice, however, finding the allegations sounded in medical negligence and appellant failed to comply with the statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, and the pre-suit notice requirements in chapter 766, Florida Statutes....

...mation to her boyfriend. (Emphasis added.) Under the trial court’s first reason for dismissing count II, appellant was required to file her claim within the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, as dictated by sections 95.11(4)(b) and 766.106(4), Florida Statutes....

...2002), wherein it emphasized that the provisions of chapter 766 “should be construed in a manner that favors access to courts.’” Id. (quoting Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9, 13 (Fla. 1994)). As regards the application of the statute of limitations in sections 95.11(4)(b) and 766.106(4), the supreme court in J.B....

...Sacred Heart Hospital of Pensacola, 635 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1994), ruled the key inquiry is whether the action “‘aris[es] out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care.’” Id. at 947 10 (quoting § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...He sued the hospital for negligence in arranging the transportation, “in that it knew of L.B.’s condition, the level of care that would be required in transporting him, and the risk involved[.]” Id. The questions presented to the the supreme court were whether section 95.11(4)(b) applied to bar the action, and whether chapter 766 applied to the cause of action. In deciding whether the statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(b) applied to defeat J.B.’s claim against the hospital, the supreme court concluded that Silva v....

...ional torts unrelated to, or independent of, medical diagnosis, care or treatment). Thus, appellant’s complaint, likewise, does not state a cause of action for medical malpractice, and neither the two-year statute of limitations period in section 95.11(4)(b), nor the pre-suit notice requirement in chapter 766 apply to defeat appellant’s claim. We further conclude that our recent en banc decision in Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc....

...se were clearly adequate to avoid a dismissal with prejudice. REVERSED. LAWSON, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Because Appellant's action was founded upon negligence, she had four years from the date of the accident to file her complaint. § 95.11(3), Fla....

...on that accident. By written order dated October 15, 1997, based on Brown's oral motion, the county court voluntarily dismissed the complaint without prejudice. On December 11, 1998, prior to expiration of the four-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1998), Brown filed another complaint....

...His final appeal to the Secretary of the Department of Corrections (DOC) was denied and filed with the agency clerk on March 5, 2010. Malara filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court which had a service date of April 5, 2010. This would have been within the 30-day time limit of section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes; however, the date stamp on the face of the petition indicated that it was provided to prison officials on April 6, 2010, which would have been one day late....

...The date stamp contains Malara’s initials and the initials of a second person, presumably a DOC employee. DOC filed a motion to dismiss in the circuit court arguing that Malara’s petition for writ of mandamus was filed outside the 30-day time limit of section 95.11(8)....

...based on the certificate of service. Ultimately, the circuit court granted Malara’s petition for writ of mandamus. DOC now argues that Malara’s petition for writ of mandamus was untimely filed in the circuit court and subject to dismissal under section 95.11(8), because the official date stamp showing when the petition was provided to prison officials for mailing was dated and initialed by Malara on April 6, 2010, beyond the 30-day statute of limitations of section 95.11(8). We agree. Section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that “[a]ny court action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Department ......

...�� This time period is jurisdictional and, thus, a mandamus petition filed more than 30 days after the final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding must be dismissed. See, e.g., Hale v. McDonough, 970 So.2d 362, 364-65 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); see also § 95.11(8), Fla....

...*147 Malara has presented no evidence to show the DOC’s procedures under the rule did not operate as intended. The date stamp affixed to the face of Malara’s petition as required by rule 33-210.102(8)(g) clearly states that the petition was turned over to prison officials outside the 30-day time limit of section 95.11(8)....

...Malara himself initialed the daté stamp as required by rule 33-210.102(8)(g), so the presumption must be that the date stamp properly reflects the date on which the prisoner turned his petition over for mailing. Because the petition was untimely under section 95.11(8), the petition should have been dismissed by the circuit court....

...t liability claims. In Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1976), our supreme court addressed that statute in response to certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Nardone court said that, in applying section 95.11(4), an action would be barred four years after either "the plaintiff has notice of the negligent act giving rise to the cause of action or......

...or when the plaintiff has notice of the physical injury... ." Moore v. Morris, 475 So.2d 666, 667 (Fla. 1985). See also Barron v. Shapiro, 565 So.2d 1319 (Fla. 1990). The statute of limitations applicable to this products liability case is four years. § 95.11(3)(e)....

...The medical malpractice statute provides that the limitations period commences to run from "the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence... ." § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...3d DCA 2008); Thrasher v. First Nat’l Bank of Miami, 288 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.130(b) (“Any exhibit attached to a pleading shall be considered a part thereof for all purposes.”). The statute of limitations for fraud is four years. § 95.11(3)(j), Fla....

...ction 95.051(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2006), at all times prior to April 13, 2007, when the Grandparents were appointed as the Twins' permanent guardians. The statute of limitations applicable to the Twins' claims provides a four-year filing window. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...868 , 869 (1915) (holding that when a court learned a party appearing before it was a minor, "[i]t thereupon became the duty of the court to see that the interests of the minor were protected in the suit before it" by appointing a guardian ad litem). The statute currently in effect provides the same limitations period. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...circumstances. . . . That Florida recognizes an action for professional malpractice is . . . evidenced by the statutory scheme for limitations of actions.” Id. at 975-76. This “statutory scheme for limitations of actions” is Florida Statute § 95.11, which states that an action for professional malpractice must be brought within two years. The Florida Supreme Court has previously held that a profession within the meaning of § 95.11 is “any vocation requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing is possible in Florida.” Garden v....

...“standard of care used by similar professionals in the community under similar circumstances.” Moransais, 744 So.2d at 975-76. The Florida Supreme Court has, however, expressly limited this college-degree definition of “professional” to application of Florida Statute § 95.11, a statute of limitations not at issue in this case: We limit the definition of “professional” set forth above to the context of the professional malpractice statute....

...*188 GRIMES, Justice. We review Harr v. Hillsborough Community Mental Health Center, 591 So.2d 1051, 1055 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), in which the court certified the following question as a matter of great public importance: DOES THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN SECTION 95.11(4)(b) COMMENCE: (A) WHEN THE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFF HAS NOTICE OF AN INJURY IN FACT; OR (B) WHEN THE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFF HAS ADDITIONAL NOTICE THAT THE INJURY IN FACT RESULTED FROM AN INCIDENT INVOLVING A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER? We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution....

...Harr served a notice of intent to commence litigation against the Mental Health Center and Dr. Hussain on October 20, 1988, and thereafter filed a malpractice action against them. The trial court held that Mrs. Harr's suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations on suits against health-care providers. Section 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...The circuit court applied a statute of limitations to bar a code enforcement proceeding commenced pursuant to part I of chapter 162, Florida Statutes (2001), which is entitled the "Local Government Code Enforcement Boards Act." See § 162.01-.13, Fla. Stat. (2001). We grant relief, holding that section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), has no application to such administrative enforcement proceedings....

...A special master conducted the administrative hearing pursuant to the Code. [1] The special master entered an order containing the preceding findings of fact. The special master concluded that the County had established the two violations and that the statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(3)(c) did not bar the County's enforcement action. Section 95.11(3)(c) provides that "[a]n action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property" must be commenced within four years, "with the time running from the date of actual possession by the owner." The special master based this conclusion on the fact that Ms....

...ssession by the owner." The circuit court reviewed this final administrative order of a local government code enforcement board, [2] and reversed the special master. The circuit court agreed with the special master that the statute of limitations in section 95.11 applied to the case but concluded that the period of limitations began in the early 1990s when the County knew about the violations....

...Chapter 95 applies to civil actions or proceedings. § 95.011, Fla. Stat. (2001). We have previously held that the statutes of limitation in chapter 95 do not apply to administrative license revocation proceedings. See Landes v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 441 So.2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Nothing in section 95.11(3)(c) suggests that the legislature intended it to apply to quasi-judicial proceedings initiated pursuant to any administrative law, and we are inclined to conclude the same as to all of chapter 95. Enforcement proceedings *235 brought under part I of chapter 162 are administrative actions that simply are not subject to the statute of limitations provided in section 95.11(3)(c)....

...s of the filing of the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed ... as if the commission determined that there was reasonable cause." § 760.11(8), Fla. Stat. (1997). A claimant would have four years to bring a civil action under this section. See § 95.11(3)(f), Fla....

...ntemplates administrative hearings and not state court action, there seems to be only two possible conclusions: either White was barred from filing his complaint in state court under section 760.11(7), or he timely filed under sections 760.11(8) and 95.11(3)(f)....

...Without such a finding, Cisko is not bound by the thirty-five-day restriction in section 760.11(7). The only restriction on Cisko's civil action was that she file her civil action after the FCHR's 180-day determination period expired, but before the applicable statute of limitations [section 95.11(3)(f) ] expired....

...nder this section. As such, section 760.11(8) applies. Under this section, the only restriction on White's action was that he file suit after the EEOC's 180-day determination period expired and before the four-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 95.11(3)(f) expired....

...We should reverse the trial court's determination that the statute of limitations on Appellants' causes of action was not tolled by section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes, and reinstate the action for consideration on the merits. NOTES [1] The statute of limitations for a FDUTPA claim is four years pursuant to section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes, as it is based on a statutory liability. Appellants' claim for unjust enrichment is also subject to a four-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 95.11(3)(k). The breach of the duties of good faith and fair dealing is a claim arising from the parties' contractual relationship and, therefore, subject to a five-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(b)....

...ed decedent and his family as to the nature of his condition so as to convince them no health care provider was responsible for his injuries and ultimate death. The hospital filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the 2 year statute of limitations of § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...Pursuant to § 768.57, Fla. Stat. (1986), any medical malpractice claimant, prior to filing suit, must serve on each prospective defendant a notice of intent to initiate litigation. This notice must be filed within the 2 year statute of limitations of § 95.11....

...n which to file suit. See Abston v. Bryan, 519 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). The primary problem presented to the trial court in the instant case was the determination of when the statute of limitations should be regarded as having been triggered. Section 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...Commenos v. Family Practice Medical Group, 516 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Because this is a medical malpractice action for injuries and death pursuant to § 768.57, Fla. Stat. and not a wrongful death action brought under § 768.16, Fla. Stat., § 95.11(4)(d) is not applicable and the 90 day tolling period of § 768.57 is applicable....

...Here, the circuit court posited that the limitations period for Garden Street's trespass action began in 1990, when Tanner retrieved some of the tires but left others behind. If so, Garden Street's suit would have been barred by the four-year limitations statute applicable to trespass actions. § 95.11(3)(g), Fla....

...The complaint does not contain an express allegation that the defendant is a limited partnership, however. The plaintiff should correct this technical defect by filing an amended complaint. Thirdly, the defendant claims this action is barred by Florida's statute of limitations, Fla.Stat. 95.11(3)(a), which provides that an action founded on negligence must be commenced within four years of when the cause of action accrues....

...Petition granted; order quashed. KELLY and KHOUZAM, JJ„ Concur. . Many of the facts in this case are disputed by the parties. The parties’ contentions remain to be resolved at trial. . Zirkelbach relied on the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11 (3)(c), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Section 159.17 establishes liens for unpaid water, sewer, or gas service charges. Both statutes instruct that the respective liens are *170 enforceable in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. See §§ 158.67, 159.17, Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), establishes a five-year limitations period for an action to foreclose a mortgage....

...ns. See, e.g., Houck Corp. v. New River, Ltd., Pasco, 900 So.2d 601, 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that the twenty-year statute of repose was not a statute of limitations and did not alter the unequivocal five-year limitations period enunciated in section 95.11, Florida Statutes).

...Frazier of Huey, Guilday, Kuersteiner & Tucker, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellee Civitan Regional Blood Center, Inc., and amicus curiae Florida Ass'n of Blood Banks, Inc. BOOTH, Judge. This cause is before us on appeal from a judgment entered on an order dismissing appellants' suit as barred by section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Appellants contend that: (1) the trial court erred in interpreting the statute to bar appellants' action and that, as interpreted, the statute is unconstitutional; (2) Civitan Regional Blood Center (Civitan) is not a "health care provider" covered under Section 95.11(4)(b); and (3) the trial court erred in denying discovery of the unidentified blood donor....

...Whigham was completely asymptomatic until several months after July 1987. He died on October 18, 1988, as a result of the infection. The trial court dismissed the action against both Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. (Shands) and Civitan, holding that it was barred by section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), which states in pertinent part: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incide...

...1992) (statute of repose runs from the date of a discrete action on the part of a defendant without regard to when the cause of action accrued). Thus, the four-year statute of repose, as distinguished from the two-year statute of limitation provided in section 95.11(4)(b), commences with the date of the actual incident of malpractice without regard to knowledge of injury or negligence. [4] The question presented, then, is whether section 95.11(4)(b), when construed as a true statute of repose, restricts access to courts in violation of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, because appellants were unaware of any injury or negligence resulting from the transfusion until after the four-year statutory period had run. The Florida Supreme Court in University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000, 1003-1004 (Fla. 1991), ruled that section 95.11(4)(b), the statute here in question, did not violate article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution, holding: [A] statute of repose precludes a right of action after a specified time which is measured from the incident of malpractic...

...cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4 (1987). [5] The precise issue decided in Menendez was whether the period of limitation in Section 768.28(11) should prevail over that contained in Section 95.11(4)(b), for a medical malpractice action against governmental hospitals....

...arose more than twelve years from the delivery of the equipment. Causes of action which accrued before the twelve-year period were treated differently. In Universal Engineering Corp. v. Perez, 451 So.2d 463, 466-67 (Fla. 1984), we stated: "Thus, for section 95.11(3)(c) to be unconstitutional as applied, it must operate as an absolute bar to bringing an action. If section 95.11(3)(c) only shortens the time period in which the action may be brought to a reasonable amount of time, then the Florida Constitution is not violated....

...EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, J., concur. NOTES [1] Our jurisdiction is discretionary. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. [2] We do not pass on the alternative claim made by Baker for summary judgment. [3] That section provides: Actions for products liability ... under subsection 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in subsection 95.11(3) but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser ... regardless of the date the defect in the product ... was or should have been discovered. (Emphasis added.) Section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), in turn, establishes a statute of limitations which bars negligence actions that are not commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues....

...She argued that the children's cause of action accrued when Robert breached the divorce agreement by executing the nonconforming will in 1992. Because this occurred more than five years before the filing of the adversary proceeding, she claimed the action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11 (2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1992)....

...In the alternative, she argued that the contract had actually merged into the 1974 Wisconsin judgment. Thus, any action under the contract was barred by the judgment, and any action on the twenty-six-year-old judgment was barred by the statute of limitations. See § 95.11(2), Fla....

...ismissed. This count perfunctorily sought "enforcement" of the Wisconsin judgment. Because the Wisconsin decree is a foreign decree, never domesticated in Florida, the statute of limitations barred any action to enforce the decree in this state. See § 95.11(2), Fla....

...Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (stating that state statutes of limitations for personal injuries govern § 1983); Baker v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 850 F.2d 1480, 1482 (11th Cir.1988) (stating that Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3) provides for a four-year limitations period for personal injuries)....

...s extinguishing their constitutional responsibility for him. They also contend that none of the alleged torts were intentional, which precludes Plaintiff from invoking the expansive statute of limitations *1347 for abuse victims under Fla. Stat. Ann § 95.11(7)....

...Taylor simply stands for the proposition that foster children have a fourteenth amendment liberty interest in safe and secure foster care. The question of qualified immunity is adjudicated under an entirely different line of cases. [4] Defendants assert that Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(7), which establishes a generous statute of limitations for the victims of childhood abuse, does not apply because Plaintiff's complaint does not allege any intentional torts....

...endant's malpractice before October 1973. In the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict the defendant alleged that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant argued that the two-year limitation period of § 95.11(6), Fla. Stat. (1973) expired in October 1975, thereby barring the plaintiff's suit filed in December 1975. The plaintiff countered that the four-year limitation period of § 95.11(4), Fla....

...The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and denied the defendant's motion. This appeal ensued. There is no dispute that the defendant's malpractice occurred before July 1, 1972, the effective date of the two-year limitation period for medical malpractice contained in § 95.11(6). Nor is it disputed that the plaintiff could not have reasonably discovered the defendant's malpractice before October 1973, after the effective date of § 95.11(6). Before July 1, 1972, medical malpractice actions sounding in tort fell under § 95.11(4), Fla. Stat. (1971), which provided a four-year limitation period for any action "not specifically provided for in this chapter." Manning v. Serrano, 97 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1957). In 1971 the legislature passed Ch. 71-254, Laws of Florida, which amended § 95.11 [1] to read in pertinent part as follows: Limitations upon actions other than the recovery of real property — Actions other than those for the recovery of real property can only be commenced as follows: ........

...Stoner's body during an operation in March 1971. A two-year limitation *372 period was in effect when the operation was performed; however, by the time the needle was discovered in 1973 a one-year limitation period was in effect. The one-year statute provided, as does § 95.11(6), that a cause of action does not accrue until the malpractice is discovered or should have been discovered....

...Florida, like Idaho, follows the "discovery rule," i.e., the limitation period does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers the defendant's malpractice, or should have discovered it through the exercise of due diligence. This concept is statutorily embodied in § 95.11(6), which is expository of the prior decisional law of this state....

...en the act of malpractice occurs, and that the discovery rule does nothing more than toll the running of the limitation period until the plaintiff discovers the malpractice. We cannot agree. Plaintiff's argument is refuted by the express language of § 95.11(6), which says that a cause of action shall not "be deemed to have accrued" until the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, the act of malpractice....

...of limitations attaches. See also Von Villas v. Williams, 117 R.I. 309, 366 A.2d 545, 549 (1976); Dirksen v. Hynes & Howes Insurance Counselors, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1290, 1294-95 (S.D.Iowa 1976). In the instant case the two-year limitation period of § 95.11(6) was in effect when the plaintiff should reasonably have discovered the defendant's malpractice (October 1973); therefore, we think that statute was controlling....

...Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's final judgment entered on the jury's verdict and its order denying the defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and remand for entry of a final judgment in favor of the defendant and his insurer. GRIMES, C.J., and HOBSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 95.11 has been substantially altered by the legislature since 1971....

...77-174, § 1, Laws of Fla. (effective August 2, 1977); Ch. 75-9, § 7, Laws of Fla. (effective May 20, 1975). However, none of these changes apply to the instant case. [2] In Foley v. Morris , Maltempo v. Cuthbert , and the other cases dealing with § 95.11(6) the act of malpractice and the date by which the malpractice could have been reasonably discovered both occurred before the effective date of the statute....

...ese arguments. [3] Two Florida cases appear to be factually on point. In both Hill v. Virgin, 359 So.2d 918 (Fla.3d DCA 1978) and Salvaggio v. Austin, 336 So.2d 1282 (Fla.2d DCA 1976) the defendant's malpractice occurred before the effective date of § 95.11(6), but was not discovered by the plaintiff until afterwards. In each case the court found § 95.11(6) applicable.

...After preliminary pleading skirmishes were resolved, the Owners responded with several defenses, including the statute of limitations. The Owners argued and the court below held the complaint filed by the Association was one for specific performance and was, therefore, time-barred by section 95.11(5)(a), Florida Statutes....

...junctive relief is the proper vehicle for judicial enforcement. Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 1304, 128 So. 821 (1930). The applicable statute of limitations for injunction proceedings of the type here under consideration is five years. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). The Association delivered its first official notice of violation by letter dated May 16, 1996. The Association's Complaint for Injunctive Relief was filed on March 8, 2000, well *528 within the time allowed by section 95.11(2)(b)....

...Kalway was charged with manufacturing an unauthorized beverage and, following a hearing, was disciplined. His administrative appeals were denied on May 25 and August 2, 1995. He filed a petition for writ of mandamus in circuit court on September 7, 1995, which was denied as time-barred under section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes (1995). The district court affirmed, certifying conflict with Van Meter, wherein the First District Court of Appeal found section 95.11(8) unconstitutional. Kalway claims that section 95.11(8) constitutes a violation of the separation of powers doctrine....

...within 30 days of rendition of the matter sought to be reviewed. Id. (emphasis added). The specific "time provided by law" for prisoners seeking relief from disciplinary action taken by the Department of Corrections (the Department) is set forth in section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes (1995): 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property.—Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: .......

...through the administrative grievance process under chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code. Any action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings shall be barred by the court unless it is commenced within the time period provided by this section. § 95.11, Fla. Stat. (1995). [1] This interplay between rule 1.630 and section 95.11(8) is not anomalous and does not constitute a separation of powers violation....

...Further, we find that a thirty-day time limit provides a reasonable window of opportunity for challenging the Department's disciplinary action. First, this period commences from the time administrative remedies are exhausted, not from the time the original disciplinary infraction was committed. See § 95.11(8), Fla....

...threaten to discharge, intimidate or cause any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law. Appellant contends that the applicable statute of limitations is Section 95.11(4)(c) Florida Statutes (1979), which provides that "An action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages or overtime", must be brought within two years. Appellee contends that section 95.11(3)(f) is applicable which applies to an "action founded on statutory liability" or in the alternative section 95.11(3)(o) governing intentional torts, both of which require an action to be brought within four years....

...ges and benefits. In our opinion, the present case is governed by Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So.2d 513, (Fla. 1970), decided prior to the enactment of Section 440.205, in which the Florida Supreme Court stated that Section *943 95.11(7)(b), [1] the predecessor of 95.11(4)(c) was the applicable statute of limitations for recovery of wages under a contract: As to the argument concerning the Fair Labor Standards Act and other social legislation, it may well be that the spate of actions spawned by such legislatio...

...The fact that a federal statute of limitations has preempted the field as to cases arising under specific federal legislation does not, of course, invalidate the Florida Statute which remains in full force and effect as to cases arising under the common law or Florida legislation. Thus we hold that § 95.11(7)(b) was intended to apply to all suits for wages or overtime, however accruing, as well as to suits for damages and penalties accruing under the laws respecting payment of wages and overtime....

...e actions for wrongful discharge brought pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), governed by Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1970). ANSTEAD, J., and KLEIN, HERBERT M., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.11(7)(b) Florida Statutes (1969), governed: (b) Suits for the recovery of wages, overtime, or damages and penalties accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime.

...present controversy as to an ascertainable state of facts and a present and adverse interest in the subject matter) (citations omitted). Accordingly, any action predicated on this contract had to commence within five (5) years from May 1, 2000. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...as its attorney in the sale of land by Genway to plaintiffs, and also acted as the escrow agent in the transaction. Plaintiffs filed an action against the defendants for fraud and breach of their fiduciary duty as escrow agent. The trial court improperly found the action barred under Florida Statutes Section 95.11(4)....

...We find no error in the circuit court's denial of the petition for writ of mandamus as untimely. A claimant's failure to challenge an order of the Department of Corrections within thirty days of its rendition produces a jurisdictional defect and precludes the court from exercising jurisdiction. See § 95.11(8), Fla....

...007, when the City of Marathon rejected with finality the Special Master's BUD recommendation and denied the Shands' BUD application, [22] and thus the *727 Shands' state claim was timely filed within the four-year statute of limitations provided by section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...l," however, following the usage made by the parties, but point out that in this context the term refers to a categorical, per se, taking, as used in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). [9] § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (2007). The catch-all four-year statute of limitations found within section 95.11(3)(p) has been held to govern inverse condemnation actions....

...Wieland of Kelaher & Wieland, P.A., Orlando, for appellant. Anne C. Conway of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith, Cutler & Kent, P.A., Orlando, for appellee. UPCHURCH, Chief Judge. Roy Hullinger appeals an order dismissing his complaint as barred by the statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes....

...aint with prejudice. Hullinger contends the four year statute of limitations for violations based upon a statutory liability [1] applies because he sought more than just the recovery of wages. Ryder argues that the two year statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(c) governs claims under section 760.10 because this is the most analogous statute of limitations....

...Polk County Community College, 728 F.2d 1374, 1383 (11th Cir.1984) and in Fowler v. Taco Viva, 646 F. Supp. 152, 155 (S.D.Fla. 1986). We agree and accordingly the order dismissing Hullinger's complaint is AFFIRMED. COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 95.11(3)(f), Fla....

...[6] In State of Florida, Department of Health And Rehabilitative Services v. West, 378 So.2d 1220 (Fla.1979), the court reviewed a holding that the 4-year statute of limitations barred an action for retroactive child support against the father of a child born outside marriage. Section 95.11(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), provided that actions relating to paternity must be commenced within 3 years....

...In light of more recent constitutional interpretation, our understanding of the common law has correspondingly metamorphosed into an understanding that both parents have a duty to support their child, whether born in or out of marriage. [5] See Ch. 97-170, § 81, Laws of Fla. [6] See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla....

...of Howell, Howell, Liles & Braddock, Jacksonville, John I. Todd, Jr., Jacksonville, for appellees. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from a summary final judgment by which the trial judge held plaintiff's action to be barred by the statute of limitations, F.S. 95.11(6), Florida Statutes 1973....

...n would pay the nurse, generally at a rate less than that paid by the user. All defendants filed motions for summary judgment, urging applicability of a two year statute of limitations. The trial judge granted those motions, reciting as depositive F.S. 95.11(6), Florida Statutes 1973....

...There is no issue but that plaintiff's alleged injury was sustained and discovered more than two years prior to the commencement of any action against appellees. Nor is there any question but that the *802 action was commenced within less than four years. The issue, therefore, is which statute is applicable. F.S. 95.11(6), Florida Statutes 1973, provided for the commencement of actions within two years "* * * to recover damages for injuries to the person arising from any medical, dental, optometric, chiropodial, or chiropractic treatment or surgical operation, * * *". Subsection (4) of F.S. 95.11 provided for the commencement within four years of "[a]ny action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter." Chapter 95, Florida Statutes, was substantially revised by Chapter 74-382 which became effective January 1, 1975....

...law may be commenced before January 1, 1976, and if it is not commenced by that date, the action shall be barred." Chapter 95, Florida Statutes, was further amended by Chapter 75-9, Laws of Florida, which became effective May 20, 1975. By that act F.S. 95.11 was amended to read as follows: "95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property....

...giving rise to the injury occurred." Appellant first contends that since she has couched her second amended complaint in terms of carelessness and negligence and that since appellees did not themselves provide medical or other such treatment then F.S. 95.11(6) is not applicable and that therefore the four year statute of limitations is applicable....

...Clearly, unless the nurse furnished by appellees (or one of them) was careless or negligent and thereby caused injury to appellant then no liability can be visited upon appellees. The act of administering the shot by the nurse, we hold, was a medical act. Accordingly, F.S. 95.11(6), Florida Statutes 1973, was applicable to appellees as well as the hospital. That statute would have, unless rendered ineffective by subsequent amendment, barred the action which was commenced by the plaintiff more than two years after her alleged injury. However, F.S. 95.11(6), as it existed on April 2, 1973, the date of the alleged negligent act, ceased to exist on January 1, 1975, the effective date of Chapter 74-382....

...sons in privity with the professional it necessarily follows that that limitation was and is inapplicable. Having determined that statute to be inapplicable the only remaining statute of limitations which could have been applied is section (3)(a) of § 95.11 "an action founded on negligence" or section (3)(b) "any action not specifically provided for in these statutes"....

...effective May 20, 1975, prior to the filing of the subject cause of action. That amendment separated actions for medical malpractice from actions for other professional malpractice, adding a paragraph which became paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of section 95.11, Florida Statutes 1977....

...ive date. We construe the express language of the act that it became effective on January 1, 1975 to mean just that and that all pending actions be subject to the provisions of the act on that date. It is for that reason that we recited supra that F.S. 95.11(6) as it existed on April 2, 1973 "ceased to exist on January 1, 1975, the effective date of Chapter 74-382"....

...f the longer period." Such was also essentially the holding of the majority in Mazda Motors of America, Inc. v. S.C. Henderson & Sons, 364 So.2d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). As already mentioned, the learned trial judge held applicable and relied upon F.S. 95.11, Florida Statutes 1973. That section was specifically amended by section 7 of Chapter 74-382. Since there was no provision in the act preserving F.S. 95.11(6), Florida Statutes 1973, and there was no corollary in the new act, then on the effective date of the act (January 1, 1975) it (Chapter 74-382) became applicable to causes of actions then existing....

...easons already herein recited, (absence of privity) the two year limitation period provided for in that Chapter has no application here. Having determined, as we do, that by virtue of the language of Chapter 74-382, which contained no corollary to F.S. 95.11(6) Florida Statutes 1973, the later statute was superseded and ceased to exist as of January 1, 1975 and that for the reasons stated Chapter 75-9 had no effect on the plaintiff's cause of action, we conclude that plaintiff had four years within which to commence the action against appellees....

...However, it is unclear if the trial court was aware that even without good cause, it was still permitted to grant an extension of time for service if it was warranted under the circumstances. REVERSED and REMANDED for reconsideration in light of this opinion. WOLF, C.J. and WEBSTER, J., Concur. NOTES [1] See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...�s fees provision of § 1415(e)(4)(B) was renumbered and is now § 1415(i)(3)(B). John T. ex rel. Robert T. v. Iowa Dep’t of Educ., 258 F.3d 860, 864 n.2 (8th Cir. 2001). 9 liability under Florida Statute § 95.11(3)(f) applied instead. Id. at 848, 851-52. In doing so, we used the familiar two-step borrowing analysis. First, we first determined in Zipperer that the attorney’s fees claim was most analogous to a claim based on statutory liability under Florida Statute § 95.11(3)(f)....

...ot the administrative agency, is to decide, Florida’s statutory liability claim is the most analogous state statute for an IDEA attorney’s fees action. Id. at 851. Second, in Zipperer we compared the policies underlying Florida Statute § 95.11(3)(f), the statutory liability provision, and the IDEA to see whether they were inconsistent....

...statute of limitations to claims for attorneys’ fees under the IDEA is consistent with the policies of the federal statute.” Id. at 851-52. It was for those reasons that we held in Zipperer that the four-year statute of limitations in Florida Statute § 95.11(3)(f) was applicable to the appellant’s claim....

...`Action for medical malpractice' is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care. (Emphasis added.) § 95.11(4)(b) Fla....

...red to do. We therefore agree with the first district that the plaintiff has no such burden. In Glass v. Camara, 369 So.2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), that court said: "We hold that a defendant invoking the two-year limitation period prescribed by Section 95.11(4)(b) for medical malpractice actions must demonstrate that the action was commenced beyond two years after `the time the cause of action [was] discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.'" The complain...

...dings consistent with this opinion. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c)(4), a petition challenging an order of DOC entered in a prisoner disciplinary proceeding must be filed within 30 days of rendition of that order. Similarly, section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes, requires that a court action challenging a prisoner disciplinary proceeding must be commenced within 30 days after final disposition of the proceeding through the administrative grievance process under chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code....

...Once a judgment has been domesticated pursuant to FEFJA it has the same effect and is subject to the same legal and equitable defenses and rules of procedure as a Florida judgment. See Michael v. Valley Truck *948 ing Co., Inc., 832 So.2d 213, 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Under section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations applicable to an action on a judgment in Florida is twenty years....

...f-Country Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act (UFMJRA). 2 There, the court held that once an out-of-country judgment is domesticated in a Florida court, it becomes enforceable for a period of twenty years from the date of the judgment pursuant to section 95.11(1)....

...The Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Nadd has been extended to claims under FEFJA by other Florida courts. In Goodwin, a Florida bankruptcy court held that a bankruptcy claimant’s judgment which had been domesticated under FEFJA was subject to the twenty-year limitations’ period of section 95.11(1), and the judgment would be enforced in the same manner as any judgment entered in a Florida state court....

...n the October 17,1991, judgment, the trial court erred by granting Wiley’s motion to dismiss. We, therefore, REVERSE and REMAND for the trial court to reinstate Desert Palace’s amended complaint. WOLF and ROBERTS, JJ., concur. .Wiley argues that section 95.11 (2)(a), Florida Statutes, which subjects a foreign judgment to a five-year statute of limitations, applies to this case. We disagree. Section 95.11(2)(a) does not apply to a judgment domesticated under FEFJA....

the applicable four-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat. (2005). Thereafter, Sony Pictures

...Henderson of Henderson Keasler Law Firm, Jacksonville, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Albert Jones Richey appeals an order granting the motion of Modular Designs, Inc., for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the appellant's cause of action was barred by two-year statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2000); that the cause of action was barred by the Statute of Frauds, section 725.01, Florida Statutes (2000); and that the jury's award of damages was not sustained by the evidence....

...After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Modular Designs had breached its oral agreement with Richey. The jury awarded Richey damages of $3,000 for unpaid commissions and $475 in unpaid wages, but determined that Modular Designs was not liable for any unpaid bonuses. The two-year provision of section 95.11(4)(c) applies to "[a]n action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime." In Broward Builders Exchange, Inc....

...me, while wages are compensation for services by the day or week." Appellant's action for his last week of unpaid wages was instituted within two years of the date the wages allegedly became payable in late December 2000 and, thus, was not barred by section 95.11(4)(c). Turning to Richey's claim for unpaid commissions, we agree with him that, as a salaried employee suing for unpaid commissions, the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (2000) is applicable to his claim for commissions....

...dering of medical care or services. *234 To the extent that there may be some significance to the deletion of the phrase "monetary loss" from the statute outlining the medical malpractice screening requirements, we note that it is still contained in section 95.11, Florida Statutes, the general statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes states, "An `action for medical malpractice' is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care." When section 95.11 and 766.106 are read together, the definition of medical malpractice is broader, not narrower, than the definition in the former statute, section 768.44(1)(a)....

...Although the trial court incorrectly converted appellant's habeas petition into a mandamus petition, see Knowles v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 846 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Heard v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 811 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), the court properly denied the petition as untimely. § 95.11(5)(f), Fla....

...He should have had borings, done soil evaluations and made sure the demucking process was more tha[n] just a surface preparation. Snyder contends that the Werneckes' claims should be barred by either the fifteen-year statute of repose or the four-year statute of limitations found in section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2000), which governs actions founded on the "design, planning, or construction" of an improvement to real property. On the other hand, the Werneckes argue that the applicable statute of limitations is that found in section 95.11(3)(j) for actions founded on fraud, and which contains no repose period. Section 95.11(3) provides in part that: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ....

...2d DCA 1995)(holding that seller who knew or should have known of structural defects in house had a duty to disclose them to purchaser)(citing Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d 625 (Fla.1985)). Thus, even if the improper construction claim against Snyder, as builder, would have been barred by section 95.11(3)(c)'s repose period, the fraud claim against Snyder, as owner and seller, was still viable. The limitations set forth in section 95.11(3)(c) was a clear attempt by the legislature to protect engineers, architects and contractors from stale claims....

...timely fraud claim filed against him in his separate and distinct capacity as owner/seller. Snyder, however, presents no authority for this position. We find that the applicable statute of limitations for the Werneckes' fraud claim is that found in section 95.11(3)(j), which, as previously noted, contains no limiting repose period. We next turn to Snyder's argument that an applicable four-year statute of limitations bars the Werneckes' claims, whether under section 95.11(3)(c) or (j)....

...vasion of legal rights or a person has been put on notice of his right to a cause of action. See City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So.2d 306 (Fla.1954). The Werneckes filed suit on December 22, 1997, and, therefore, the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(j), once triggered, would have extended back to no later than December 1993....

...ctive conditions, it was timely filed. We have considered the other issues raised in this appeal and find no error. The judgment on review is, accordingly, AFFIRMED. STONE, J., and CLARK, NIKKI ANN, Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] The preamble to section 95.11(3) provides in part: WHEREAS, architects, engineers, and contractors of an improvement to real property may find themselves named as defendants in a damage suit many years after the improvement was completed and occupied, and WHEREAS, t...

...each of contract and other tort claims. We affirm. First, the various tort claims pled in the complaint, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, are, as a matter of law, barred by the four-year statute of limitations for tort claims. Section 95.11(3)(p), Fla....

...In this appeal, appellants, plaintiffs below, Tracy Sheils and Wanda Owens Sheils, challenge the final summary judgment for appellee, defendant below, Jack Eckerd Corporation. The summary judgment held that appellants' cause of action was barred by section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), the two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice. Appellants argued below and again on appeal that because they brought their cause of action as a products liability cause of action, section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1987), the four-year statute of limitations applicable generally to products liability cases, should apply. We agree with the trial judge that the professional malpractice statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(a), is the applicable statute and, therefore, affirm this summary judgment....

...Appellants filed their four-count complaint seeking compensatory damages for the alleged resulting injury to Timothy Sheils based on strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty. They also requested punitive damages. It is not disputed that appellee's pharmacist is a "professional" within the meaning of section 95.11(4)(a), and that if appellants *363 had sued the pharmacist, the two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice under section 95.11(4)(a) would apply....

...Appellants forcefully and ably argue, however, that because they chose to sue the corporate appellee, rather than its pharmacist, and to structure their complaint around a cause of action based on strict liability arising out of a sale of a defectively labeled product, rather than an action for professional malpractice, then section 95.11(3), the four-year statute of limitations for products liability applies. Regardless of the forcefulness of appellants' argument, the two most applicable, reasonable and persuasive of the rules of statutory construction force us to conclude that section 95.11(4)(a) relating to limitations on professional malpractice actions is the proper statute to be applied to the particular circumstances of this case....

...y and the dilatory litigant is caught by whichever runs first." We need not rely, however, only on a strict versus liberal construction argument in order to agree with the trial judge that the specific professional malpractice two-year limitation of section 95.11(4)(a) applies and that the more general products liability limitation of section 95.11(3) does not apply....

...Moreover, this court has specifically held that a specific statute of limitations addressing itself to a specific matter takes precedence over a more general statute of limitations even though the specific statute provides for a shorter period of limitations. Dubin v. Dow Corning Corp., 478 So.2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Section 95.11(4)(a), providing a two-year statute of limitations for actions for professional malpractice was, therefore, applicable, as the trial judge ruled, to bar appellants' action....

...Mr. Navaretta, his law firm, and Commonwealth pleaded an affirmative defense that the statutes of limitations barred WBI's claims. Absent tolling of the statute of limitations, WBI had two years from the October 2004 closing to sue Mr. Navaretta. See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004) (two- year limitation for professional malpractice, whether based on contract or tort). For the constructive fraud and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims against the law firm and Commonwealth, WBI should have sued by 2008. See §§ 95.11(3)(j),(o) (four-year limitations). For the breach-of-contract claim against Commonwealth, WBI should have sued by 2009. See § 95.11(2)(b) (five-year limitation)....

...He now seeks review in this court upon a final summary judgment entered in favor only of defendant William L. Phillips. The sole point raised by the parties is whether or not the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant Phillips on the ground that the statute of limitations, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(d), F.S.A., pertaining to causes of action alleging fraud, had run....

...The complaint charged Phillips, as Career's president and chief executive officer, with the same material misrepresentations which induced the plaintiff to purchase one of these franchises for $25,000. Defendant's position is that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff's action was barred by Section 95.11(5)(d) because any fraud perpetrated occurred, if at all, prior to the time of the franchise agreement and that once the agreement was established, the plaintiff was on notice of the falsity of any representations made to him....

...t : We have read and understand clearly the contents of this agreement. For our mutual protection we agree that this is the entire understanding between us and that no other agreement or promises were made to us other than those herein given." Under Section 95.11(5)(d) "discovery" of facts constituting fraud is measured by an objective standard, meaning those facts which would be discovered through the exercise of due diligence....

...Adams of Adams, Hill, Reis, Adams & Hall, Orlando, for appellee Winter Haven Hosp. PATTERSON, Judge. Patricia Boss Moore appeals from a final summary judgment in which the trial court held that her action for medical negligence was time barred by the four-year statute of repose contained in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida *189 Statutes (1983)....

...a statute of repose is a form of a statute of limitations and the terms are often used interchangeably. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2230 (1986). The "statute of repose" is subsumed in the general term "statute of limitations" of section 95.11(4) and is tolled by the service of the notice of intent to litigate....

...of limitations based on the facts of the case. The issue not being properly before the court, we decline to comment on it. Reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate Moore's amended complaint. FRANK, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur. NOTES [1] 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property....

...[3] 768.57 Notice before filing action for medical malpractice; presuit screening period; offers for admission of liability and for arbitration; review. — ... . (4) The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11....

...n April of 1993. The trial court stayed the proceedings against Dr. Leon after he filed a suggestion of bankruptcy. [1] A.M.I. then filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it based upon the four-year statute of repose found in Florida Statutes, Section 95.11(4)(b)....

...period, he nevertheless found that the statute and caselaw time-barred Hernandez's complaint against A.M.I. Hernandez now appeals. II. THE CLAIMS AGAINST A.M.I. The first issue before us is whether the trial court properly applied Florida Statutes, Section 95.11(4)(b) in dismissing Hernandez's medical malpractice complaint against A.M.I.A.M.I....

...dismissing his claims against A.M.I.; it is undisputed that the complaint was filed within the seven-year repose period. For the ensuing reasons, we find that the trial court erred in dismissing Hernandez's complaint against A.M.I. Florida Statutes, Section 95.11(4)(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered,...

...f limitations is extended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...sentation of fact, a seven-year statute of repose. Carr v. Broward County, 541 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1989); Arango v. Orr, 656 So.2d 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). With respect to Hernandez's claims against A.M.I., we are only concerned with the repose periods in Section 95.11(4)(b)....

...It is therefore altogether possible that a cause of action may be barred by the statute of repose before the statute of limitations has even commenced. Kush, 616 So.2d at 421; accord Melendez, 515 So.2d at 736. Keeping this analysis in mind, we now turn to the specific repose periods in Section 95.11(4)(b)....

...LaTorre should, in any event, survive a motion to dismiss predicated upon either the statute of repose or the statute of limitations. With respect to the statute of repose, Dr. LaTorre incorrectly asserts that the repose period, as against him, should commence from the date of Hernandez's 1988 operation. Section 95.11(4)(b) states that the statute of repose commences on the "date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued." § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...These appeals ensued. Finding that the bonds in question were common law bonds which were not subject to the one year limitation, we hold that the claims against the sureties were filed within the four year limitation period applicable to common law bonds. § 95.11, Fla....

...The court concluded, in effect, that failure to mention section 255.05 did not automatically render the bond a common law bond. For these reasons, we conclude that the expanded liability in the bonds under review renders them common law bonds subject to the general limitations period of section 95.11 and that the claims against the sureties were timely....

...Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remain Here the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CCF, Dr. Canque, Mr. Smith, Smith Business Services, and Mr. Pialoux on grounds that there were no genuine issues of fact material to the running of the applicable four-year statute of limitations period. § 95.11(3), Fla.Stat....

...as no basis on which to toll the running of the statute of limitations period. The trial court found "as a matter of law," that Messrs. Brugiere and Vallin did not exercise due diligence in investigating the matters alleged in the amended complaint. Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1995) specifies the applicable period in which a cause of action founded on fraud must be commenced. It provides: (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.— . . . . (j) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud. When the four years begins to run, however, is controlled by section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1995) which provides: Actions for ... fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3).......

...& Loan explained, while the law of fraud does not endorse a “hear no evil, see no evil approach,” neither does it require that an aggrieved party to have presumed wrongdoing from the outset. 403 So.2d at 1100 (citing Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996,1002 (5th Cir.1974)). Section 95.11(3)(j) provides that a legal or equitable action founded on fraud must be brought within four years; however, pursuant to section 95.031(2)(a), the period for filing a cause of action founded on fraud does not commence to run until the t...

...governed by a four-year or five-year limitation period. Plaintiffs take the position that a suit for equitable contribution is properly viewed as a "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument." § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...he five-year statute of limitations is controlling. Defendant asserts that the case is governed by the four-year limitation period for a "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument...." Id.; § 95.11(3)(k), Fla....

...Since in the circumstances of the present case, the right of contribution is created by law, and does not arise from any promise contained in the written guaranties themselves, the question is whether the cause of action is "founded on a written instrument," § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...Here the guaranties do not contain any promise relating to contribution by one guarantor toward another. We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs' cause of action for equitable contribution is governed by the four-year limitation period of paragraph 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...At the time of the MRI, Athany was not quite four years old. Issues on Appeal Ms. Barcenas presents three issues for our review. First, she claims that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because Athany had not yet reached his eighth birthday, citing section 95.11(4)(b), *589 Florida Statutes (2011)....

...Because the issues raised by Dr. Roush’s motions to dismiss were not fully and factually addressed, another hearing on her motions will be in order. Reversed and remanded. NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs. ALTENBERND, J., Concurs with opinion. .The relevant portion of section 95.11(4)(b) provides: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered...

...n of construction was asserted approximately two full months subsequent to expiration of the time allotted for the bringing of such actions). On appeal, the parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is the five-year period provided in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...ct, which would likely be precluded by the statute of limitations, i.e., five years from the date of the accident. See Woodall v. Travelers Indem. Co., 699 So.2d 1361 (Fla.1997); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kilbreath, 419 So.2d 632 (Fla.1982); § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...ay be subject to the statute of limitations, each payment default that is less than five years old, i.e., since October, 2008, created a basis for a subsequent foreclosure and/or acceleration action. Singleton, 882 So.2d at 1008 . See also Fl. Stat. § 95.11(2)(c) (setting a five year statute of limitation for actions to foreclose on a mortgage)....

...Considering Florida’s statute of limitations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, Wells Fargo has anywhere from October 1, 2013 until November 1, 2018 to file a second foreclosure action based on the default of any payment owed since October 1, 2008. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (2)(e); Singleton, 882 So.2d at 1007-08 ....

...bert and Heather Sunderman (“Sunderman”) and the subsequent order denying its motion for rehearing. In dismissing the action, the trial court found that the action was barred by the statute of limitations for a foreclosure action set forth in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2014)....

...filed on October 30, 2009, and dismissed for failure to prosecute in 2011. On March 17, 2014, Sunderman filed a motion to dismiss, which argued that Nationstar’s complaint was time-barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes, because it was filed more than five years after the filing of the first foreclosure....

...The federal district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that Florida’s five-year statute of limitations on a Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act claim and the four-year statute of limitations on all other claims had run. See § 772.17, Fla. Stat. (2013) (Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act); § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013) (negligence); § 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (fraud); § 95.11(3)(p), Fla....

...ctions 55.501-509, Florida Statutes, it "should have filed this cause of action as an Affidavit for domestication of foreign judgment." The motion also addressed Haigh's statute of limitations defense, noting that the five year limitations period in section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes, "applies only to independent actions on a judgment and not to the recording of a foreign judgment and proceedings to enforce that judgment under FEFJA," citing Michael v....

...The clerk of court sent Haigh a "Notice of Recording Foreign Judgment," presumably pursuant to section 55.505(2), Florida Statutes (2005). Haigh then filed a motion for summary judgment, which alleged that the action was barred by the five year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Thus, Haigh was denied a fair opportunity to be heard on these defenses, similar to the debtor in Walters. Haigh also argues that the Planning Board's suit was an action on a foreign judgment and therefore was barred by the five year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005). The Planning Board argues that section 95.11(2)(a) does not apply because its action was only a proceeding to enforce its judgment under the FEFJA. Actions on foreign judgments are subject to the five year statute of limitation in section 95.11(2)(a). Caiazza v. Tuff Realty Corp., 805 So.2d 29, 31 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). However, simply recording a foreign judgment or proceeding to enforce a foreign judgment under the FEFJA is not subject to section 95.11(2)(a)....

...Specifically, registration of and proceedings to enforce a foreign judgment are derivative of the original judgment and are therefore subject to the limitations period in the jurisdiction where the judgment was originally rendered. They are not subject to the five year limitations period in section 95.11(2)(a)....

...In contrast, the effect of an "action upon a judgment" is to extend the statute of limitations on the prior judgment. Thus, once a creditor holding a foreign judgment successfully obtains a new Florida judgment, the creditor obtains a new 20 year limitations period under section 95.11(1) to enforce that judgment....

...in Florida within five years of the date the foreign judgment was rendered. In the instant case, the Planning Board filed an action upon a foreign judgment. Haigh filed an answer and affirmative defenses, including the five year limitation period in section 95.11(2)(a)....

...It is not clear from the order being appealed whether the order is a Florida final judgment or a final order enforcing a foreign final judgment. In either case, the court erred. If it is a Florida final judgment, the court erred because the action was barred by the five year limitations period in section 95.11(2)(a)....

...Statute of Limitations CCIP argues that the Trustee's claims for professional negligence and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty both fall under the two year statute of limitations for professional malpractice claims provided by Florida Statutes § 95.11(4)(a)....

...07, prior to the filing of this bankruptcy case. In response, the Trustee argues that the claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty is subject to the four year statute of limitations provided for intentional torts under Florida Statutes § 95.11(3)(o)....

...to the professional negligence or aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claims, such two year period is subject to tolling as a result of the delayed discovery doctrine made applicable to professional malpractice claims under Florida Statutes § 95.11(4)(a)....

...main bankruptcy case. So long as the applicable non-bankruptcy statutes of limitation had not run as of the petition date, May 8, 2008, this adversary proceeding is timely filed. To the extent the four year limitations period under Florida Statutes § 95.11(3)(o) applies to the Trustee's aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary claim, there is no dispute that such claim was timely filed here....

...financial statement giving rise to the Trustee's claims. The four year period would have expired more than a year after the petition date here, making the claim timely under 11 U.S.C. § 108(a). The two year limitation period under Florida Statutes § 95.11(4)(a) applies to the Trustee's professional negligence claim....

...CCIP argues that it also applies to the Trustee's claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary on the ground that, in their view, such claim is tantamount to a professional malpractice claim. If the Court were to look no further than the provisions of Florida Statutes § 95.11(4)(a) and 11 U.S.C....

...A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. Fla. Stat. § 95.031(1). A statutory exception known as the "delayed discovery doctrine" applies to certain causes of action, including professional malpractice claims. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a); Davis v....

...Monahan, 832 So.2d 708, 710 (Fla.2002). The period of limitations for an action for professional malpractice commences when the plaintiff either discovers the cause of action or should have discovered the cause of action with the exercise of due diligence. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a)....

...On appeal, the husband argues that the Final Decree did not convey an interest in the property. Thus, no tenancy in common was created, and the wife only possessed a judgment which was susceptible to the twenty-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...The decree did confer upon the wife the right to seek — by judicial proceedings if necessary — a sale of the property and division of proceeds. Having delayed taking legal action to enforce her claim for more than the 20-year limitation period prescribed by section 95.11, Florida Statutes, for an "action on a judgment or decree of a court of record ...," her claim is barred and should have been dismissed.

...tute of limitations. Appellees cross appeal arguing that the court erred in failing to grant them summary judgment on the basis of judgmental immunity, and in admitting certain evidence. We agree with the trial court that the statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...practice action against Cross in November, 1977. Cross moved for summary judgment alleging that Appellants' cause of action *401 had expired in late 1976, two years after they had learned of Cross's negligence and one year before the suit was filed. § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...e suit against Cross in March, 1985. Appellants then sued Appellees for legal malpractice based on Shaw's opinion. The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Appellees, finding the four-year statute of limitations applied because amended section 95.11(4)(a), which shortened the limitations period to two years effective January 1, 1975, was not retroactive. See § 95.11(4), Fla. Stat. (1973). Noting that the action against Cross was filed within the four-year limitations period, the court concluded that Appellees could not be held liable for malpractice. At the time the legislature revised section 95.11(4)(a), it also enacted a savings clause, section 95.022, providing that "[t]his act shall become effective on January 1, 1975, but any action that will be barred when this act becomes effective and that would not have been barred under prior law may be commenced before January 1, 1976, and if it is not commenced by that date, the action shall be barred." Ch. 74-382, § 36, Laws of Fla. The issue thus presented by Appellants' appeal is whether the two-year limitations period of section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...tatutes within its ambit." Id. at 937. Both parties cite the supreme court decision in Homemakers, Inc. v. Gonzales, 400 So.2d 965 (Fla. 1981), in support of their positions. As argued by Appellees, Homemakers stands for the proposition that amended section 95.11(4), contains no "express, clear, or manifest intent that it apply retroactively" and that the savings clause "offers no evidence of such intent." Homemakers, 400 So.2d at 967....

..., despite the savings clause, any express, clear or manifest statement of legislative intent that the statute be applied retroactively. See also Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla. 1977) (finding no intent in the language of section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1975) to support retroactive application)....

...given to the party with the existing cause of action. Maltempo v. Cuthbert, 288 So.2d 517 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. den., 297 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1974). This has been the result where other Florida courts have addressed similar situations and refused to find section 95.11 retroactive despite the existence of the section 95.022 savings clause....

...“A legal issue surrounding a statute of limitations question is an issue of law subject to de novo review.” Fox v. Madsen, 12 So.3d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citation omitted). Under the statute of limitations, a negligence action must be commenced within four years of when the cause of action accrued. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...une 24, 1975. Latent defects in the roof of the school appeared no earlier than 1979. This suit was filed on July 11, 1983. Although the lawsuit may have been timely as to the roofing contractor, roofing supplier, the architect and other defendants, § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1983), [1] it is well established that a suit on a common law performance bond [2] is an action on a "contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument." § 95.11(2)(b)....

...denied, 342 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 1976); but see Florida Keys Community College v. Insurance Company of North America, 456 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984). There is no comparable deferral of accrual of a cause of action for latent undiscovered defects in section 95.11(2)(b), unlike the four year statute of limitations found in section 95.11(3)(c)....

...court, not of record, of this state or any court of the United States, any other state or territory in the United States, or a 2 foreign country ” must b e broug ht within five years . Fla. Stat. § 95.11( 2)(a). Since B use regis tered his ju dgmen t and ob tained a w rit of exec ution fo r it more than seven years after he had obtained the judgment, his action is time-barred if section 9 5.11(2 )(a) app lies. Wh ether it app lies is the dis puted q uestion o f state law upon w hich this case turns. Concluding that section 95.11(2 )(a) does apply, the district court granted Kuechenberg’s motion to dismiss or quash the writ of execution. Of course, Buse disagrees. He takes the position that section 95.11( 2)(a) do es not ap ply becau se he w as not pu rsuing “a n action o n a judg ment.” Wheth er Buse ’s collection efforts am ounted to an “an a ction on a judgm ent” under Florida law is not clear....

...1st DCA 1980). The appellant in that case had obtained a judgment in federal court and attempted to use a writ of mandamus from the state courts to collect on the judgm ent mor e than fiv e years later . Id. at 595. The Florida appellate court concluded that section 95.11(2)(a) applied, and as a result the five-year statute of limitations barred th e appellan t’s collection efforts....

...attempted in a federal district court in Florida to collect on a federal judgment that was m ore than five years old. Id. at 1049. Relying upon Kiesel, we concluded that the “post-judgment collection efforts–which exceeded the five-year period–[were] barred by § 95.11(2)(a) as untimely.” Id....

...the opposite conclusion. In Burshan v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 805 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), the Fourth District Court of Appeal said that “[s]ince the ninete enth cen tury, the p hrase ‘actio n on a ju dgmen t’ in the statu te [§ 95.11(2)(a)] has had a precise meaning as a common law cause of action,” and explained that an action on a judgment provides the opportunity for a new judgm ent that w ill ultimately a llow satis faction o n the orig inal one....

...Tom’s Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1451 (11th Cir. 1991). Only the Florida Supreme Court can authoritatively decide whether it is. 5  Does the statute of limitations contained in Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(a) apply to bar the registration of a judgment and issuance of a writ of executio n more than five years after the judg ment w as initially entered? Our phrasing of the question is not int...

...JONES, Senior Circuit Judge : This appeal raises a question of first impression: Is an action brought in a Florida federal district court, to enforce a district court judgment entered earlier in the same court, governed by the five-year limitations period of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(2)(a) (West Supp.1999), or the twenty-year limitations period of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(1) (West Supp.1999)? The district court below found the twenty-year limitations period controlled, and therefore denied a motion by defendant-appellant, Fred Bush ("Bush"), for a Protective Order....

...Boca Raton Millwork, Inc., 217 B.R. 339, 341 (S.D.Fla.1998). Bush, arguing that BBB waited too long to enforce its $151,815.50 judgment, now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we reverse, and find BBB's post-judgment recovery efforts barred by § 95.11(2)(a). I. * Honorable Nathaniel R....

...Instead, BBB waited until November 1997 before serving the instant discovery requests upon Bush. Bush declined to provide the requested discovery, and filed the subject motion for a Protective Order. In the motion, Bush, relying upon Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(2)(a), argued that BBB could no longer collect judgment monies from him, as more than five years had passed since the issuance of the default judgment in January 1991. The district court disagreed with Bush; found this dispute controlled instead by the twenty-year limitations period of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(1); and denied Bush's motion....

...This appeal—of the district court's Discovery Order—timely followed. We are thus now asked to decide whether the district court erred in (1) denying Bush's motion for a Protective Order, and (2) finding that BBB's post-judgment collection efforts are controlled by Fla. Stat. § 95.11(1) instead of § 95.11(2)(a)....

...the state in which the district court is held...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a). See also Leasco Response, Inc. v. Wright, 99 F.3d 381, 382 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam). In this case, that state is Florida. Florida's statute of limitations, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11, provides in relevant part: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (1) Within twenty years.—An action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this...

...(a) An action on a judgment or decree of any court, not of record, of this state or any court of the United States, any other state or territory in the United States, or a foreign country. The applicability, in cases such as this, of § 95.11(1) versus § 95.11(2)(a) is a question the Florida Supreme Court has yet to address....

...817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). III. Our analysis of the scant cases from the lower Florida courts leads us to the conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court would apply here the five-year limitations period of § 95.11(2)(a), not the twenty-year 3 limitations period of § 95.11(1). Although the lower Florida courts have had rare occasion to visit the issue, we note that the issue was fully addressed by the Florida Court of Appeals in Kiesel v. Graham, 388 So.2d 594 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980). In adopting § 95.11(2)(a) as controlling, the Kiesel court reasoned as follows: Both [§§ 95.11(1) and 95.11(2)(a) ] appear to govern the instant situation, for the subject judgment is that "of a court of record in this state" as well as that "of any court of the United States." This apparent conflict, however, can be readily resolved...

...of record in this state." The former clearly limits its scope to courts of the United States, while the latter could include both federal and state courts, as long as they are in Florida. Hence, it must be concluded that [§ ]95.11(2)(a) will operate as an exception to, or a qualification of, the more general terms of [§ ]95.11(1)....

...latter covering "judgments of any court of the United States," are in direct conflict. Application of the principle set forth in [ ]Hialeah, supra, and DeConingh [ ], supra, dictates that the latter provision, now enumerated in [§ ]95.11(2)(a), must govern. Id....

...d here, i.e., an attempt to enforce a district court judgment, entered in the Southern District of Florida, in the same district court. We therefore hold that, under such circumstances, the five-year limitations period set forth in Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(2)(a) controls. In view of the fact that BBB's post-judgment collection efforts—which exceeded the five-year period—are thus barred by § 95.11(2)(a) as untimely, we find, after a de novo review of the record, that the district court erred in denying Bush's motion for a Protective Order....

...We have for review a decision on the following question certified to be of great public importance: WHERE REVIEW OF A DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN AN ACTION UNDERLYING A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM IS SOUGHT IN THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, DOES THE TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD OF SECTION 95.11(4)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES, BEGIN TO RUN FROM THE DATE THE DECISION BECOMES FINAL BY THE SUPREME COURT'S RESOLUTION OF THAT REVIEW, OR DOES THE PERIOD RUN FROM THE DATE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S MANDATE? Watkins v....

...The City of Quincy appeals from an order by which the trial court awarded damages to the appellee, upon the City’s breach of contract. In challenging that award the City contends that the appel-lee’s lawsuit was not filed within the limitations time allowed under section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...But the City is calculating that time from its initial breach of a continuing obligation under the contract, and the City’s continuing subsequent breaches provided subsequent dates from which the limitations time may be calculated, with the appellee’s lawsuit having been filed within the limitations period under section 95.11(2)(b) for the continuing breach of the parties’ contract....

...The appellee filed his lawsuit against the City in June 2008, and indicated that he had not realized that the City was no longer maintaining the dam until problems arose after heavy rains earlier in 2008. The City interposed a statute of limitations defense, asserting that the five-year limitations period in section 95.11(2)(b) commenced in February 2003 when the City ceased performing its obligations under the contract, and that the appellee’s lawsuit was thus barred as it was not filed within that limitations time....

...inuing nature of its obligations under the contract, and that its ongoing nonperformance constituted a continuing breach while the contract remained in effect. The ap-pellee’s cause of action was not limited to the City’s initial breach, and the section 95.11(2)(b) statute of limitations had not expired when the appellee filed his lawsuit which encompassed the City’s continuing breach....

...Furthermore, under similar procedural circumstances relating to an action by a union to compel an employer to submit to arbitration, the Eleventh Circuit specifically adopted Florida's one-year limitations period governing judicial suits to compel arbitration pursuant to Fla. Stat. 95.11(5)(a), in lieu of borrowing the sixmonth statute of limitations from § 10 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)....

...early the very moment of birth, thereby charging plaintiffs with knowledge of their claim against the pediatrician and the hospital. The trial judge agreed with them; hence this appeal. We start of course with the text of the statute of limitations. Section 95.11(4)(b) provides: "An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovere...

outside the four-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993). Eventually, Hernandez

...by James and Elizabeth Irwin. In May of 2004, Appellant timely filed suit only against Quest Air Soaring Center, Inc. The deadline for pursuing a cause of action sounding in tort under Florida's four-year statute of limitations was August 18, 2005. § 95.11(3)(e), Fla....

...Defendants' motion to dismiss principally argues that plaintiff's case is time-barred by the one or three year statute of limitations contained in section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77m, and the two year limitations period contained in section 95.11(4)(e) of the Florida Investor Protection Act....

...ations. Federal courts borrow the relevant state statute of limitations when addressing the timeliness of actions under section 10(b) because the 1934 Act does not have its own statute of limitations. The relevant provision in this case is Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e), which provides: (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS (e) An action founded upon a violation of any provision of part I of Chapter 517, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have b...

...Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.1974); Azalea Meats v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.1967). The court has carefully considered the allegations of count 2 and finds that plaintiff also has alleged sufficient facts to toll the limitations period of Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e)....

...MILLS, Judge. The issue in this workers' compensation appeal is whether proceedings to contest denial of reimbursement requests made pursuant to section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1985), must be commenced within the four-year limitations period of section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Following the hearing, the deputy entered the order appealed. In it, he concluded in material part that any claim for reimbursement based on benefits paid more than four years prior to 3 January 1986 was barred by the four-year limitations period of section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes. The e/c contend the deputy erred in applying section 95.11(3)(f) to bar the proceeding to contest the Fund's denial of the 1985 reimbursement request....

...In those cases where the Fund has an obligation to reimburse an e/c, that obligation is strictly a creature of section 440.49, Florida Statutes. Thus, an e/c's request for a hearing before a deputy commissioner to contest a denial of reimbursement from the Fund is an action founded on a statutory liability. And section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that an action founded on a statutory liability shall be commenced within four years. Section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1985), provides generally that the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues. It therefore follows that section 95.11(3)(f) bars a proceeding to contest the denial of a reimbursement request if the request for that proceeding is made more than four years after the cause of action accrued. [2] *1307 The question then becomes when do requests for specific reimbursements mature into accrued causes of action for purposes of section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes? The deputy, by concluding that any request for reimbursement for benefits paid by the e/c more than four years prior to the date the e/c requested a hearing on the denial of their reimbursement request was time...

...We reject this interpretation, however, because, at the time an e/c pay allegedly reimbursible benefits to the injured employee, the e/c have no way of knowing whether their subsequent reimbursement request for those benefits will be granted or denied by the Fund. The e/c contend that even if section 95.11(3)(f) applies to their right to reimbursement from the Fund, the four-year period does not begin to run until the Fund has actually denied a reimbursement request....

...We therefore modify the order appealed to state that any proceeding to contest denial of a reimbursement request, based on benefits paid by the e/c during any six-month intervals designated in section 440.49(2)(g), that ended more than four years prior to the date the e/c requested the proceeding, is barred by section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes....

...See 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 322 (1962); cf. Rebich v. Burdine's, 417 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 424 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1982) (treating physician's claims for payment for services rendered to workers' compensation claimant governed by section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes).

...Petitioners filed their civil action on 7 October 1994, more than two years after the crime occurred. Petitioners argue that, if they are forced to refile their civil suit after complying with the presuit requirements for a medical malpractice claim, the action will fall outside the two-year statute of limitations of section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), as opposed to the four-year statute of limitations for ordinary tort and negligence actions found in section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...compliance with applicable code. In January 2010, Florida Peninsula refused and Donovan filed the underlying lawsuit in July of 2011.1 Florida Peninsula moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that it was brought more than five years after the 2005 loss and was time-barred by section 95.11(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2011), and that Donovan provided late notice of loss....

...imitations period for Donovan’s contract action is five years. Instead, they dispute whether the limitations period began running when the cause of action accrued (when Florida Peninsula denied coverage) or on the date of loss (October, 2005). Section 95.11(2)(e) became effective on May 17, 2011 after Donovan’s cause of action accrued. This statutory enactment provided that the limitations period in an action for breach of property insurance contract began running from the date of loss. Prior to the effective date of section 95.11(2)(e), a suit for breach of a property insurance contract began running from the date the cause of action accrued—that is, when coverage was alleged to have been erroneously denied. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla....

...4th DCA 2003) (“In regard to insurance contracts, a specific refusal to pay a claim is the breach which triggers the cause of action and begins the statute of limitations running.”) (citation omitted). The parties are in agreement that the application of section 95.11(2)(e) to Donovan’s action would be retroactive. To the extent section 95.11(2)(e) is properly regarded as a statute of limitations, as the parties 1 The record is unclear as to the exact date coverage was denied, but it appears the denial occurred sometime on or after January 5, 2010, when Donovan’s claims a...

...Broward, 382 So. 2d 722, 724 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (“We start with the basic proposition that a shortening of any statute of limitations will be given retroactive application only upon the showing of clear intent by the Legislature.”) (citations omitted). Section 95.11(2)(e) does not contain evidence of the legislature’s intent for retroactive application, on its face or in its legislative history....

...Nor does it contain a savings clause, which would allow for a period of time to file suit for those with existing causes of action—such clauses indicate the legislature’s intent for retroactive application. Carpenter v. Fla. Cent. Credit Union, 369 So. 2d 935, 937 (Fla. 1979). In sum, the court erred in applying section 95.11(2)(e) retroactively in the absence of evidence of the legislature’s intent for such application. The court also dismissed Donovan’s suit based on her alleged failure to comply with a notice of loss provision in the contract....

...4th DCA 2000) (citations omitted). However, “[a] trial court is not bound by the four corners of the complaint where the facts are undisputed and the motion to dismiss raises only a pure 2 Although the parties do not raise the possibility, it appears that section 95.11(2)(e) is actually a statute of repose, as it provides for a particular event that starts the limitations period running....

...In those cases, the issues involved application of section 705.105, Florida Statutes, providing for transfer of seized property to law enforcement agencies. Here, however, ten years passed between the transfer of the funds following conviction and Poux's motion. We can discern no reason not to apply section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes, mandating a four year civil statute of limitations for actions to recover personal property....

...pt from levy. Jonassen then became potentially liable for his role in transferring the stock. Ramsey's malpractice claim, brought within two years of this court's affirmance, was within the statute of limitations period for professional malpractice. § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...10 (11th Cir.1996); accord, Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir.1974). C. Statute of Limitations In Florida, the statute of limitations bars a fraud claim after four years from the accrual of the cause of action. Fla. Stat. 95.11(j)....

...solely on the ground that the statute did not start running on such payments until the time of the termination of the contract, that is, the date when the minor child attained his majority." The statute of limitations to which the court referred was section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1953) which provided that an action upon a written contract not under seal must be commenced within five years....

...ons from the nonpaying parent discharged by a third party should run from the time the support was actually provided during the child's minority. The applicable statute of limitations for an equitable action on an implied contract is four years. See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (1989). The concept of laches may shorten this period. See § 95.11(6), Fla....

...f limitations barred recovery and notified her that they would seek sanctions if she did not withdraw the complaint. On December 28, 2007, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, based on the two-year limit set for wage claims in section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...nd costs. They filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts in the amended complaint. The trial court granted the motion, ruling as follows: The primary issue before the Court is whether the two year statute of limitations under Florida Statute § 95.11(4)(c) applies to the claims asserted by the Plaintiff....

...While the cases establish a distinction between "wages" and "salary," the facts here support the conclusion that the Plaintiff is seeking wages and not a salary or bonus. See, e.g. Nealon v. Right Human Resource Consultants, Inc., 669 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (a bonus is not wages under Section 95.11(4)(c))....

...Because section 448.08 has typically been used to award attorney's fees to prevailing unpaid workers, scant case law exists on awarding attorney's fees to prevailing employers. Case law does support, however, awarding an employer attorney's fees under section 448.08 when the employer prevails under a section 95.11(4)(c) statute of limitations defense....

...Dade County, 472 So.2d 795, 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) ("Although [the employee's] complaint purported to seek a declaratory statement of his rights, his claim actually constituted an action for back wages filed beyond the applicable limitations period. § 95.11(4)(c), Fla....

...their respective work on the project. The trial judge dismissed the complaint as to those defendants and, in the orders now under review, the cross-claims *792 with prejudice on the ground that they were barred by the statute of repose contained in section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...r, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy ... or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest. § 95.11(3)(c), Fla....

...Appellee moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the two- year statute of limitations under the single publication rule barred his claim. The trial court agreed and granted Appellee's motion to dismiss. Florida law establishes a two-year statute of limitations for actions for "libel and slander." § 95.11(4)(g), Fla....

...Such an acceleration is self-executing, requiring neither notice of default nor some further action to accelerate the debt. Baader v. Walker, 153 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). By contrast, where the acceleration 1 The relevant statute of limitations is provided in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2008). 5 clause is optional (as it is in this case), it is not automatic or self-executing, but requires the lender to exercise this option and to give notice to the borrower that it has done so....

...The issue in this case is whether the 15 year statute of repose for actions involving property construction applies to bar the appellants homeowners' associations' and insurer's complaint. We affirm finding the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the appellees because the statute of repose in Section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), barred the cause of action....

...KM East, Inc. and IBBID Investments of Florida. These defendants were responsible for the manufacture, design, and installation of trusses at Sabal Chase. Thereafter, the appellees moved for summary judgment under the fifteen-year statute of repose, Section 95.11(3)(c), which was reenacted in 1980....

...of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest. The original section 95.11(3)(c), in effect in 1978, was "invalidated" in 1979 by the Florida Supreme Court because the legislature had not expressed an overwhelming public necessity for the provision....

...to the owner in possession of the property. The trial court granted the appellees' motions for summary judgment and the Associations and insurer/subrogee now appeal. The appellants first argue that of the four elements required to be established in Section 95.11(3)(c), the appellees failed to establish the "date of possession" by the owners....

...Thus the commencement period for the statute of repose was established in 1978. The appellants next argue that the turnover provision of the statute of limitations contained in the Condominium Act, Section 718.124, Florida Statutes (1995), extends to the statute of repose provisions contained in Section 95.11(3)(c)....

...Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)(quoting American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of Florida v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)). We decline the appellants' invitation to abrogate legislative power and therefore conclude that section 718.124 is necessarily limited to its terms and does not otherwise alter section 95.11(3)(c). Finally, the appellants argue the statute of repose is inapplicable, because it was enacted after the events occurred which the appellees claim triggered the repose period. The original section 95.11(3)(c), in effect in 1978, was "invalidated" in 1979 by the Florida Supreme Court based upon the Court's conclusion that the legislature had not expressed an overwhelming public necessity for the provision....

...t in this case, the intervening period of invalidity based upon the court decision does not bar the statute's applicability. See American Liberty Ins. Co. v. West and Conyers, Architects and Engineers, 491 So.2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). The fact that Section 95.11(3)(c) was repealed because of missing public necessity language and then later reenacted, does not affect the operational application of the statute of repose in this case....

...Mitchell, 42 So.2d 53 (Fla.1949); State v. Bowman, 116 Ohio App. 285, 187 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio Ct.App. 2 Dist.1962); Lander County v. Board of Trustees of the Elko General Hospital, 81 Nev. 354, 403 P.2d 659 (Nev.1965). Once the legislature cured the statutory defect in Section 95.11(3)(c) by supplying the requisite language, all parts of the original statute which were reenacted are deemed to have been in continuous effect....

...ers. *800 I. The plaintiff-appellant condominium associations brought suit against the defendant-appellee developers for construction defects. The developers argued that the associations' claims were barred by the fifteen-year statute of repose. See § 95.11(3)(c), Fla....

...her than the shorter possible statutory period." Angrand v. Fox, 552 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (citations omitted). Under that rule of interpretation, section 718.124 applies to all limitation periods, including statutes of repose. Second, section 95.11(3)(c) itself uses four alternatives to begin the 15-year repose period....

...is latest. Id. To these four possibilities section 718.124 adds a fifth: the date of turnover of control of the condominium association. Turnover of control is analogous to the date on which a property owner assumes actual possession for purposes of section 95.11(3)(c). There is nothing conceptually wrong or inconsistent in saying that section 718.124 extends all of the time periods contained in section 95.11(3)(c)....

...nit owners. Without that information, it is impossible to determine whether the fifteen-year repose period has run. It follows that the summary judgment must be reversed. II. I concur with the majority opinion that the statute of repose contained in section 95.11(3)(c) was effectively reenacted and extended in 1980, and that the fifteen-year repose period is applicable to this case....

...Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla.1992); University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1991), as well as to bar a stale product liability claim, see Melendez v. Dreis and Krump Mfg. Co., 515 So.2d 735 (Fla.1987). [3] As re-enacted in 1980, the provision applicable here states: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property.—Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ....

...occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his employer, whichever date is latest. § 95.11(3)(c), Fla....

...Rizo, appeals an adverse final summary judgment in a circuit court suit against her insurer, State Farm. The summary judgment was predicated on State Farm’s affirmative defense that Ms. Rizo’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...Measuring the five-year limitations period from the alleged 2010 breach regarding her supplemental claim, Ms. Rizo’s lawsuit was timely and was not barred. The final summary judgment below is thus reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. . In 2011, section 95.11(2) was amended to shorten the limitations period for property insurance claims....

...this action was a wrongful death action pursuant to section 768.19 rather than a products liability action, "by its very language, section 95.031(2) does not apply and, rather, the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions found in section 95.11(4)(d) applies." 487 So.2d at 1097. Nissan concedes that it is section 95.11(4)(d) rather than section 95.11(3) which is the applicable statute of limitations in this action but argues that the twelve-year statute of repose set forth in section 95.031(2) applies to bar what Nissan characterizes as the underlying products liability cause of action....

...2012). Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed, with prejudice, count 21 against Romay and ACV. III. DISCUSSION a. The Delayed Discovery Doctrine While fraud claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations (see section 95.11(3), Fla....

...(2009)), when that four-year limitations period begins to run depends upon the application of the delayed discovery doctrine. The Florida Legislature enacted section 95.031(2)(a), which codified the delayed discovery doctrine, and provides: An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11(3), including constructive fraud, must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date 5  of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered. (Emphasis added)....

...Further, appellees’ argument avoids the central issue here: regardless of what period of limitations applies to a civil conspiracy claim, the discrete question presented is whether count 21 is an “action founded upon fraud,” 5 For this assertion, Romay and ACV rely upon section 95.11(o), Florida Statutes (2009) which provides a four-year limitations period for an “action for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort ....

...atute of limitations applies to this claim; Tejera concedes this very point, because whether count 21 is characterized for limitations purposes as a claim for conspiracy or one for fraud, each is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)(o) (establishing four-year statute of limitations for intentional torts not otherwise covered by this section); § 95.11(3)(j) (establishing four-year statute of limitations for fraud)....

...We disagree with the trial court and hold that the statute of limitations on Persol North America v. Lott commenced on June 1, 1995, when Persol North America suffered "redressable harm" at the conclusion of the Persol North America v. Persol Italy dispute. The statute of limitations governing legal malpractice actions is section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323, 1325 (Fla.1990). Section 95.11(4)(a), provides in pertinent part: (4) Within two years.— (a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time...

...se until that time, "the Lanes knew only that Peat Marwick might have been negligent." Id. at 1325. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the third district's decision. Id. The court recognized that the applicable statute of limitations is set forth in section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and that "[g]enerally, a cause of action for negligence does not accrue until the existence of a redressable harm or injury has been established and the injured party knows or should know of either the injury or the negligent act." Id....

...The suit against Lott ( Persol North America v. *127 Lott ) was filed on May 8, 1997, within two years of the date the cause of action accrued. Accordingly, the suit was timely filed within the time prescribed by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...rosecute the claims asserted in her complaint, Chase also moved the court to dismiss her complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the statutes of limitations of New York, N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 213-14 (McKinney 2012), and Florida, Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (2012), barred her claims....

...of limitations. Restatement (Second) of the Conflicts of Laws § 142 (1988). Nguyen made her demand on Chase on March 2, 2006. Florida’s statute of limitations for breach of contract (for contracts in writing) is five years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2). The statute bars that claim because more than five years elapsed between March 2, 2006, and March 22, 2011, the day she filed suit. Nguyen’s other claims are subject to Florida’s four-year statute of limitations, Id. § 95.11(3), and are also barred. The next question thus becomes whether the court would have reached a different result had it adjudicated the case in the exercise of its diversity jurisdiction and applied New York’s statutes of limitations....

...Rehearing Denied March 31, 1993. Loren E. Levy, Tallahassee, Carol Falvey of Cone, Green & Kaster, Ocala, for appellant. Francis E. Pierce, III, of Gurney & Handley, Orlando, for appellee. KAHN, Judge. In this medical malpractice action we must reject appellant's contention that section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), the medical malpractice statute of repose, is an unconstitutional denial of access to courts because appellants neither knew nor could have reasonably known of an injury before the expiration of the repose period....

...1980), the supreme court decided that the statute of repose was unconstitutional as applied to an injury which occurred within twelve years after delivery of a product. See Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979) (holding unconstitutional as applied in section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975))....

...riod had ended, and based upon a complaint which essentially alleges that plaintiffs did not know or with reason could not have known of the fact of injury until after the expiration of such period, is barred by the provisions of the repose statute, Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...e doctor's representations. Upon motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, the trial court ruled that Doe's parents had stated a cause of action for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, but that the four-year repose period provided in section 95.11(4)(b) barred their action against Shands, in that it was filed more than four years from the date of the incident in question, i.e., the September 1983 blood transfusion....

...denied, 104 So.2d 592 (Fla. 1958). Moreover, there existed at such time a general right of redress in the form of a negligence action against health care providers and other defendants if the action was commenced within four years after the accrual of the cause of action. § 95.11(4), Fla....

...In approving the Fourth District's decision, the supreme court stated: We find that the Fourth District Court recognized the principles of Kluger and properly applied them in determining that the legislature had found an overriding public necessity in its enactment *1178 of section 95.11(4)(b)....

...solve any lingering questions as to its intent by the discretionary exercise of its conflict jurisdiction. In my judgment, *1180 the issue could be simply decided by answering the following question: DOES THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE, PROVIDED IN SECTION 95.11(4)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES, VIOLATE ARTICLE I, SECTION 21 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, IF IT IS APPLIED TO BAR A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WHEN THE ALLEGED ACT OF MALPRACTICE OCCURRED MORE THAN FOUR YEARS BEFORE THE ACTION WAS FILED, BUT...

...Co., 515 So.2d 735, 736 (Fla. 1987). A statute of limitation, in contrast, sets a time limitation within which an action must be brought, which begins to run at the time an injury occurs or is discovered. Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So.2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1978). [3] Section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), effective January 1, 1975....

...further bonus payments to him. Cabanas filed a lawsuit in February 1995 to recover damages for breach of the agreement. Womack & Bass filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), and the statute of frauds....

...The trial court granted the motion. In Nealon v. Right Human Resource Consultants, Inc., 669 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), this court clearly held that an action by an executive, a salaried employee, for an unpaid bonus was not a suit for wages for purposes of section 95.11(4)(c). Rather, the correct statute of limitations governing these actions is the four-year provision of section 95.11(3)(k). Following the holding in Nealon, Cabanas' action was timely brought under section 95.11(3)(k) and is not barred....

...Stat. (1997). For professional malpractice actions, the statute of limitations is two years, with the period of limitations running "from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." § 95.11(4)(a), Fla....

...eld that, absent legislative intent to the contrary, "the basic principles for all professional malpractice actions should be the same." Id. at 1325. The Court recognized that the applicable statute of limitations was the two-year period provided in section 95.11(4)(a) and that "[g]enerally, a cause of action for negligence does not accrue until the existence of a redressable harm or injury has been established and the injured party knows or should know of either the injury or the negligent act." Id....

...Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 515 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1987). Wallis also argues that his allegation of breach of a duty to warn of a known defect did not give rise to a cause of action "founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property" as set forth in section 95.11(3)(e), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 635 F. Supp. 45 (N.D.Fla. 1986); Dague v. Piper Aircraft *1278 Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207 (1981); Davidson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 78 N.C. App. 193, 336 S.E.2d 714 (1985), review denied, 316 N.C. 375, 342 S.E.2d 892 (1986). Section 95.11(3)(e) applied to all theories of product liability, including the duty to warn....

...nium to the Association. See § 718.124, Fla. Stat. (1995) [2] ; Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc. v. Seawatch at Marathon Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 658 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla.1994). The parties agree that the applicable limitation period would be four years. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...The engineering report attached to the amended complaint in this case does not conclusively establish, at this stage, that the defects are patent. Where the defect is latent, the limitation period "runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." § 95.11(3)(c), Fla....

...Appellant's motion for rehearing is denied. The court's opinion filed February 3, 2006, is withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted for clarification. Phynerrian Q. Manning appeals a final order dismissing with prejudice, pursuant to the statute of limitations, section 95.11, Florida Statutes (2003), his complaint against appellees, Guy Tunnell, as sheriff of Bay County, Florida, Bay County, and the Corrections Corporation of America, in which he sought to state claims based upon alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights and false imprisonment....

...was required to be commenced within twenty years. [1] By the enactment of Chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida, the Legislature extensively revised Chapter 95, relating to limitations of actions. Section 7 of Chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida, codified as Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), in pertinent part, provides: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ........

...ual of his cause of action, he could, at any time through July 19, 1980, commence the action. The complaint, which was commenced on June 19, 1978, was well within that time. For the foregoing reason, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. NOTES [1] § 95.11(1), Fla....

...Her complaint alleges that, on January 6, 1991, she gave birth at Jackson Memorial Hospital to Immacula LaFortune and that, due to medical malpractice, Immacula now suffers from cerebral palsy. The statute of limitations applicable to this case is set forth in section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes: (b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have be...

...mitations is extended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred .... § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...that state's three-year statute of repose); Chaney v. State, 432 So.2d 256 (La.1983) (same). The doctrine is inapplicable here because Florida law provides for a statute of repose that specifies the time limit for filing a medical malpractice suit. Section 95.11(4)(b) provides litigants with a maximum period of seven years from the date of the injury to commence a medical malpractice case....

...5th DCA 2006), for instance, a judgment debtor allegedly transferred funds and assets 8 to his family and purchased homestead property against which the judgment creditor sought execution under § 56.29. The debtor argued the UFTA and § 95.11(3)’s limitations periods barred proceedings supplementary....

...The court in Labbe went on to hold that dismissal is only appropriate if a plaintiff “can prove no set of facts that toll the statute.” Labbe, 319 Fed.Appx. at 764 (quoting Tello, 410 F.3d at 1288 n. 13). The applicable statute of limitations for an action founded on statutory liability is four years. Fla. Stat. 95.11(3)(f) (2011)....

...which must be commenced within four years from when the last element constituting the cause of actions occurs. Servicios De Almacen Fiscal Zona Franca Y Mandatos S.A v. Ryder Int’l Inc., 264 Fed.Appx. 878, 881 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11 (3)(k) (2011))....

...as been brought.” Sneed v. Pan Am. Hosp., 370 Fed.Appx. 47, 49 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir.2008)). The applicable statute of limitations in Florida provides for a four-year limitations period. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(p) (2011); see also Sneed, 370 Fed.Appx....

...Sharp of Bullock, Sharp, Childs, Mickler & Cohen, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellee. MILLS, Judge. Betty and William H. Carlton, plaintiffs below, appeal the entry of summary judgment for Ridings on the ground that their claim for medical malpractice is barred by Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Ridings negligently administered radiation therapy to Mrs. Carlton on 10 July 1975, and further alleging that they did not become aware of this alleged malpractice until 18 September 1978 due to fraud, concealment, and intentional misrepresentation of fact by Dr. Ridings. Section 95.11(4)(b) sets out two periods of limitation which are applicable to medical malpractice claims. The first sentence of Section 95.11(4)(b) provides that such claims must be filed within two years of the date of injury or discovery of the injury, but in any event not later than four years after the injury. The Carltons' claim is clearly barred under this first sentence because it was not filed within four years of the injury. The last sentence of Section 95.11(4)(b) applies in those cases where it can be shown that fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented discovery of the injury within the four-year period....

...Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1976); Nolen v. Sarasohn, 379 So.2d 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Almengor v. Dade County, 359 So.2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Tetstone v. Adams, 373 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). All of these cases involved earlier versions of Section 95.11(4)(b), none of which contained any special provisions for cases of fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation. Therefore, we will not follow the reasoning of those cases. Alford v. Summerlin, 362 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), does deal with Section 95.11(4)(b) as it is presently enacted....

...for an additional two years beyond the usual two-year period. We hold, therefore, that because the Carltons discovered the alleged injury before 10 July 1979 and failed to file suit before that date, their claim for medical malpractice is barred by Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Generally, the courts in these cases hold that the statute of limitations for such claims begins to run when a judgment has been entered and becomes final in the underlying litigation. In Silvestrone, for example, the Supreme Court of Florida looked to § 95.11(a)(4)(a) for guidance. Generally, in Florida a statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action "accrues," defined as "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." Fla.Stat. § 95.031. Section 95.11(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes, however, as cited in Silvestrone, provides that an action for professional malpractice shall be commenced within *233 two years "provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." Fla.Stat. 95.11(4)(a)....

...Citing the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Balfour Beatty Bahamas, Ltd. v. Bush, 170 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir.1999), Hillard characterizes Simonetti's adversary proceeding as an action to enforce a federal judgment, subject to Florida's five-year statute of limitations for federal judgments. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(2)(a). Hillard also suggests the five-year period applicable to actions on a written instrument ( id. § 95.11(2)(b)), the one-year period applicable to specific performance of a contract ( id. § 95.11(5)(a)), or the four-year period applicable to equitable or other actions ( id. 95.11(3)(k) & (3)(p)). Simonetti, in contrast, suggests the five-year period applicable to the foreclosure of certain mortgage liens ( id. § 95.281(1)(a)), or the five year period applicable to actions on a written instrument ( id. § 95.11((2)(b))—as tolled by id....

...sum payment, such action would indeed resemble an action to enforce a federal money judgment (as in the Balfour Beatty Bahamas case), which must be commenced within five years, presumably measured from the entry of judgment, [28] under Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(2)(a)....

...It may be rational to apply a different limitation period to an action to compel transfer of real property, even though the right to recover the real property is set forth in a confirmed reorganization plan. Florida, at least, has prescribed different limitation periods for these different rights. Compare Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(2)(b) (action on a federal judgment) with id....

...ir full application would defeat the goals of the federal statute at issue."). [26] As to whether laches might apply, in Florida that equitable doctrine may only be used to shorten a prescribed limitation period, not to enlarge it. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(6)....

...al to rule for Simonetti, nor has Simonetti requested such relief by appropriate motion. [31] See Hollywood Lakes Section Civic Ass'n v. City of Hollywood, 676 So.2d 500 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1996) (applying four year "catch-all" period of Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(3)(p) to action seeking declaratory relief regarding effect of prior judgment). [32] See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.11(2)(b)....

...r failure to pay supplemental claims. The circuit courts in both cases granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers on statute of limitations grounds. On appeal, this Court and the Fourth District reversed, finding that under a prior version of § 95.11(2)(e), the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the allegations of breach for failure to pay supplemental claims. See Rizo, 133 So. 3d at 1114 n.1 (citing § 95.11(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2011)) (noting that the 2011 amendment to § 95.11(2) shortened the limitations period for property insurance claims and that subsection (e) was added to specify that in “an action for breach of a property insurance contract,” the limitations period runs from the date of loss); Luciano, 156 So. 3d at 1110 n.1 (citing § 95.11(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2011)) (§ 95.11(2)(e) was amended in 2011 to provide that the limitations period for an action for breach of property insurance contract runs from the date of loss)....

...Both parties have argued rather broad issues concerning the applicable statute of limitations and the nature of estoppel in a typical inverse condemnation case. The county primarily argues that this action should be controlled by a four-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...488, 331 N.W.2d 438 (1982) (adverse possession statute of limitations did not apply where plaintiffs lost all interest and title to property for nonpayment of taxes). We do not need to decide whether this action is governed by a four-year limitations period under section 95.11(3), as urged by the county....

...To the extent the City is trying to argue that it can maintain a contract-based malpractice action against Dickens, it is correct. The term "malpractice" has been used in Florida law to describe both tortious and contractual causes of action. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. 95.11(4)(a) ("An action *1382 for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.")....

...estoppel because he came to the court with unclean hands); Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So.2d 1016, 1018 (Fla.1979). Under Florida law, the statutes of limitations for actions at law also will apply to the same subject matters at equity. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(6) (2007). The statute of limitations for a legal or equitable action founded upon fraud is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j)....

...s humiliated her, intimidated her, or laughed at her because of her disability or permitted others to do so. DLES moved for summary judgment, alleging, inter alia, that Maggio's claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...dgment was entered. Id.; see also Brugiere v. Credit Commerciale Fr., 679 So.2d 875, 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). At the outset, we note that the trial court was correct in its determination that the general four-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(3)(f) applied to Maggio's claim....

...We consider all the grounds raised in the hospital's motion for summary judgment, because the trial court did not specify the basis for its ruling. See Johnson v. Davis, 449 So.2d 344, 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). First, the hospital argued that the statute of limitations on medical malpractice against the hospital had run. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...ment against the nursing home on November 9, 2007. At that time the nursing home was within the three year period to file its section 768.28(6)(a) notice and the four year statute of limitations for filing its equitable *1172 subrogation action. See § 95.11(3)(p), Fla....

...t them. See, e.g., Bankers Mut. Capital Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 784 So.2d 485, 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The trial court held that Walters's claim for specific performance was barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided by section 95.11(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...As such, this court has jurisdiction to reach the merits of the dismissal of these permissive counterclaims. On the merits, we hold the trial court properly dismissed the Borrowers’ FUITPA counterclaims because they were not timely filed. The statute of limitations to bring an action under the FUITPA is four years. § 95.11(3)(f), Fla....

...In December 1989, the Silvas filed an action for damages against Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., the supplier of the blood from which the cryoprecipitate provided Mrs. Silva was derived. In response, Southwest filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that it is entitled to rely on section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), the medical malpractice statute of limitations, because it is a health care provider or, in the alternative, it is in privity with the health care provider hospital at which Mrs....

...Silvas did not institute their action until December 1989, their action is barred. We agree with the trial court's findings and affirm the order of dismissal. By this appeal, Silva contends that Southwest is not a health care provider and nothing in section 95.11(4)(b) remotely suggests the legislature intended it to be considered as one....

...The two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations defines an action for medical malpractice "as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care." § 95.11(4)(b)....

...finding that the complaint states a cause of action for medical malpractice against Southwest and that it was filed after the applicable two-year statute of limitations had run. Affirmed. SCHOONOVER, C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur. NOTES [1] Although section 95.11(4)(b) was already in effect, ch....

...4th DCA 1985), because of direct and express conflict with Taddiken v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 478 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 1985). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The district court below held, inter alia, that the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), was not applicable to complaints against the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund. Respondent concedes this was error. We disapprove this portion of the decision below on the authority of Taddiken. As an alternative ground, the district court also held, assuming section 95.11(4)(b) was applicable, that there was a genuine, material issue of fact as to when respondent discovered his cause of action and thus, whether the cause of action was filed within the two-year limitation....

...Thomas argues that the statute of limitations on Tammy's medical malpractice claim against the Health Care Providers began to run no earlier than when she was appointed Tammy's plenary guardian. If she is correct, the complaint was timely filed due to the various tolling provisions found in chapter 766, Florida Statutes. [2] Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, establishing a two-year *67 limitations period for medical malpractice actions, provides: An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action...

...ident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued. . . . § 95.11(4)(b), Fla....

...Put another way, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the reasonable possibility that an injury was caused by medical malpractice. Tanner, 618 So.2d at 181; Keller v. Reed, 603 So.2d 717, 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Section 95.11(4)(b), codifying the discovery rule in Florida, establishes both a subjective component, what the plaintiff actually knew, and an objective component, what an objectively reasonable plaintiff should have discovered with the exercise of due diligence....

...Thus, § 672.725’s four year limitation period would be applied instead of the five year period for written contracts found in § 95.-11(2)(b). Section 672.725, however, was repealed as superfluous by 1974 Fla.Laws c. 74-382, § 26, effective January 1, 1975, when Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(k) (1975) made a four year limitation period applicable to all contracts....

...ntiff's cause of action accrued. The court simply stated that § 672.-725(1) was repealed effective January 1, *989 1975, so the plaintiffs action on a written warranty not under seal was governed by the five year statute of limitations set forth in § 95.11(3) (1973)....

...Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir.1982) (dismissal of an earlier suit without prejudice does not authorize a subsequent suit brought outside of the otherwise binding statute of limitations). At the time of its filing, June 25, 1980, Dade County’s second complaint was time-barred by Fla.Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), a five year statute of limitations....

...early had notice of a putative cause of action against them since the original complaint and the case never really lost its continuity. . During oral argument before the Eleventh Circuit, counsel for Grumman Allied and Grumman Flxible only discussed § 95.11(2)(b), the five year statute of limitations....

...ract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Chapter 678) and things in action. The comment to UCC § 2-105 states that the definition of goods is based upon the concept of their movability. . Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(k) currently states that a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument, including an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store account should...

...more than 12 years after May 27, 1965, the date the aircraft in question was delivered as a completed product to the original purchaser and the date the § 95.031(2) statute of limitations began to run. MacRae appeals this summary judgment. Sections 95.11(3) and 95.031(2) provide that products liability actions must be commenced within four years of the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but that in...

...statute of limitations ran in May of 1977, 12 years after the aircraft was delivered as a completed product to its original purchaser. In the recent case of Universal Engineering Corp. v. Perez, 451 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1984), the court, in interpreting § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (which for purposes of this opinion is identical in effect to § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat.), held as follows: [F]or § 95.11(3)(c) to be unconstitutional as applied, it must operate as an absolute bar to bringing an action. If § 95.11(3)(c) only shortens the time period in which the action may be brought to a *1095 reasonable amount of time, then the Florida Constitution is not violated....

...Borland of Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A., Tampa, for appellee. QUINCE, Judge. Carrie Hargis Robinson, by and through her mother and next friend, Shirley Hargis, *724 challenges a final judgment entered in her medical malpractice action. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding the action was barred by section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...which tolls the statute of limitations on infants' claims while they are minors, makes her claim viable under West Virginia law. Robinson further argues that this limitations provision governs the action rather than the limitations period imposed by section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...procedural, rather than substantive. Although Bates involved the application of Florida's borrowing statute, section 95.10, we read the language in Bates to be applicable to any conflict of law question concerning a statute of limitation, including section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Pacific Scientific Co ., we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: DOES THE SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST ADOPTED IN BATES V. COOK, 509 So.2d 1112 (Fla.1987), FOR USE IN APPLYING FLORIDA'S BORROWING STATUTE, SECTION 95.10, FLORIDA STATUTES, ALSO APPLY TO CASES INVOLVING FLORIDA'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SECTION 95.11, FLORIDA STATUTES? We reverse the trial court's order dismissing the cause of action and certify the question stated above. FRANK, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property — Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.— (b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the...

...Neal E. Nicarry appeals the dismissal of his second amended complaint against Donald Eslinger, Sheriff of Seminole County, Florida, for negligence. The order of dismissal concluded that his complaint was barred by the statute of limitations found in section 95.11(5)(g), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...bodily injury. Nicarry filed his original complaint twenty-one months after the incident, and later amended that complaint. Sheriff Eslinger filed motions to dismiss both the original and amended complaints [1] on the ground that they were barred by section 95.11(5)(g)....

...int, Sheriff Eslinger filed another motion to dismiss. The trial court granted Sheriff Eslinger's motion and dismissed Nicarry's second amended complaint with prejudice on the ground that it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations found in section 95.11(5)(g)....

...e of limitations bars the action as a matter of law. Wishnatzki v. Coffman Constr., Inc., 884 So.2d 282, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). This Court takes the allegations of the complaint as true and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. Section 95.11, Florida Statutes, outlines the statute of limitations for all causes of action except for recovery of real property. In relevant part, section 95.11 provides that an action founded on negligence must be commenced within four years of when the action accrued. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla....

...The statute also specifies that except for actions relating to disciplinary proceedings, a complaint brought by or on behalf of a prisoner relating to the "conditions of the prisoner's confinement" must be commenced within one year of when the action accrued. § 95.11(5)(g), Fla....

...lied because he was challenging a single instance of negligence. This is a case of first impression in Florida. The integral component of the issue on appeal is the definition of the phrase "conditions of the prisoner's confinement," as contained in section 95.11(5)(g)....

...2d DCA 2005). We find that there is no reasonable interpretation for the phrase "conditions of a prisoner's confinement" that would encompass only "ongoing conditions," as urged by Nicarry, especially in light of the statute's clear framework. Sections 95.11(5)(f) and (g) specifically enumerate two exceptions to the one-year statute of limitations for prisoner complaints: extraordinary writs challenging a criminal conviction and actions involving correctional disciplinary proceedings. It is not logical to find that another exception would exist when these specific circumstances were highlighted for exception in the statute. We find that section 95.11(5) encompasses the complaint filed by Nicarry, and limited the time for filing his lawsuit to one year. [3] As section 95.11(5) is clear and unambiguous, we do not find the need to explore other aids to statutory construction. However, we note that cases issued by the United States Supreme Court interpreting the meaning of "conditions of confinement," albeit not in a statute of limitations context, strongly support this Court's interpretation of section 95.11(5)(g)....

...The Court, however, found that the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a suit challenging prison conditions "applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes." Id. at 532, 122 S.Ct. 983. In light of the clear and unambiguous language of section 95.11(5), Florida Statutes (2004), and mindful of the United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting similar statutory language, we conclude that the one-year statute of limitations applies to both ongoing and isolated conditions of a prisoner's confinement....

...NOTES [1] Sheriff Eslinger also raised Nicarry's failure to obtain leave of court or written consent to file his amended complaint. The trial court only addressed the statute of limitations as the basis for its Order of Dismissal. [2] The relevant text reads: 95.11....

...through the administrative grievance process under chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code. Any action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings shall be barred by the court unless it is commenced within the time period provided by this section. § 95.11(3)(a), (5)(f)-(g), (8), Fla. Stat. (2004). [3] By allowing prisoners to bring a complaint relating to conditions of confinement, section 95.11(g), Florida Statutes (2004), implicitly waives sovereign immunity on these issues....

...The recent decision of our supreme court in Cates v. Graham, 451 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1984), gives us excellent guidance in deciding the case sub judice. Yet, this matter presents facts which make difficult our decision regarding the constitutionality of section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...While appellants asserted two other counts against Dr. Sichelman, Dr. Wallace was named in only Count IX. The trial court entered a final judgment on the pleadings as to Counts I, II and IX in favor of the physicians because the actions were barred by the limitations period in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...istinct causes of action which are independent from the other counts of the complaint. Therefore, the final judgment as to Counts I and II is appealable. Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, Inc., 303 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1974). Appellants argue that section 95.11(4)(b) is unconstitutional as applied to this case in that the statute did not provide appellants a reasonable time in which to file suit before their actions were barred....

...Therefore, they argue that they had only one day to file Count I and approximately three months to file Counts II and IX before the limitations period ran. Our supreme court in Cates held that a five to six-month period remaining after the discovery of an injury is not so short as to make section 95.11(4)(b) unconstitutional as applied....

...njury. If, as in Cates, the failure to file an action within five to six months precludes relief, the appellants' inaction for nearly two years must surely be fatal. We hold, following Cates, that the time periods involved in this case do not render section 95.11(4)(b) unconstitutional as applied to appellants....

...A statute of repose is constitutional when it merely curtails the time in which to file a suit. Cates; Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978). Appellants also contend that because Dr. Sichelman misrepresented and *623 concealed his negligence, the seven-year limitations period in the last sentence of section 95.11(4)(b) should apply....