Cases from cite.case.law:

WEAKLEY, v. STATE, 273 So. 3d 283 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Popple , 626 So. 2d at 186 ; see also § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

DAVIS, v. STATE, 253 So. 3d 1234 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2014) ; see also Terry v. . . . shall not extend beyond the place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof." § 901.151 . . . See § 901.151(3), Fla. Stat. (2014). To make an arrest, law enforcement needs probable cause. . . .

TRIPP, v. STATE, 251 So. 3d 982 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. . . . search the person only to the extent necessary to determine whether the person in fact has a weapon. § 901.151 . . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. . . .

STATE v. MAXWELL,, 245 So. 3d 994 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . State, 124 So.3d 176, 183 (Fla. 2013) ; see also § 901.151(2), Fla. . . . State, 121 So.3d 76, 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting § 901.151(5) ). . . . If such a search discloses such a weapon or any evidence of a criminal offense it may be seized. § 901.151 . . . disclose, and for the purpose of disclosing" the presence of a dangerous weapon, as authorized by section 901.151 . . .

SLYDELL, v. STATE, 240 So. 3d 134 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993) ; see also § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2016) ; United States v. . . .

STATE v. HARRIS,, 230 So. 3d 1285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993) (citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)). . . .

KUMAR, v. C. PATEL,, 227 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2017). . . .

BROWN, Jr. v. STATE, 224 So. 3d 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Brown, that suspicion, in and of itself, would not have justified a pat-down search pursuant to section 901.151 . . .

L. MARSHALL, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 828 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . Section 901.151, Fla. . . . Stat. § 901.151(3). . . . as a fruit of the violation of § 901.151(3). . . . Stat. § 901.151. . . . Stat. § 901.151. . . . . . § 901.151, and that McKinley’s failure to challenge the Pizza Hut identification on this ground constituted . . .

COLE, v. STATE, 190 So. 3d 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Section 901.151(5), Florida Statutes (2012). . . . A patdown search is conducted for the purpose of discovering "a dangerous weapon.” § 901.151(5), Fla. . . .

MOCEK, v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE F. De La, 813 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2015)

. . . . §§ 856.021(2), 901.151(2); Ga.Code Ann. § 16-ll-36(b); Ind.Code § 34-28-5-3.5 (a stopped suspect must . . .

VAUGHN, v. STATE, 176 So. 3d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. . . .

G. M. a v. STATE, 172 So. 3d 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . of the officer or any other person” prior to searching them for the presence of a weapon) (quoting § 901.151 . . .

MAXWELL, v. STATE, 170 So. 3d 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. . . .

REZA, v. STATE, 163 So. 3d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . . § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (2014); Gray v. State, 981 So.2d 562, 564-65 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); State v. . . .

DOMINGUES, v. STATE, 159 So. 3d 1019 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . The standard of reasonable suspicion to support a stop is also codified in section 901.151, Florida Statutes . . . to believe that -the person had committed, was committing, or about to commit a criminal offense. § 901.151 . . . that he had committed, was committing or about to commit a crime, as required by Popple and section 901.151 . . .

SCOTT, v. STATE, 150 So. 3d 1273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

GRIFFIN, Jr. v. STATE, 150 So. 3d 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 901.151(2)-(4), Fla. Stat.; June, 131 So.3d at 6. . . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat.; State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 825 (Fla.1981). . . .

A. TOBIN, v. STATE, 146 So. 3d 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2012), Terry v. . . .

STATE v. TEAMER,, 151 So. 3d 421 (Fla. 2014)

. . . (citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991))). . . .

P. HOLL, III, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 140 So. 3d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . -25 (“In determining legislative intent, we must give due weight and effect to the title of section 901.151 . . .

GAY, v. STATE, 138 So. 3d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . “ ‘a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.’ ” Smith, 95 So.3d at 968 (quoting § 901.151 . . .

W. McCLAMMA, v. STATE, 138 So. 3d 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Under section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2011), an officer can conduct a stop and frisk, i.e., a Terry . . . , was committing, or was about to commit an offense that would authorize a Terry stop under section 901.151 . . .

MUSALLAM, v. STATE, 133 So. 3d 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2012). The detention must be based on more than an “inarticulate hunch.” . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 127 So. 3d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . State, 384 So.2d 272, 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

STATE v. K. CRUSE,, 121 So. 3d 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . In addition, section 901.151(5) of the Florida Statutes (2011), known as the “Florida Stop and Frisk . . . The Florida Supreme Court has clarified that when the term “probable cause” is used in section 901.151 . . . resulting from the search is admissible. § 901.151(6), Fla. . . . Accordingly, if the defendant was legally detained pursuant to section 901.151(2), and the firearm at . . .

D. H. a v. STATE, 121 So. 3d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and was codified by the Florida legislature in section 901.151 . . . committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime before the stop can constitutionally occur. § 901.151 . . . believe that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.” § 901.151 . . . Absent such exacerbating evidence though, the investigatory stop must terminate. § 901.151(4). . . . . § 901.151(5). . . .

PRICE, v. STATE, 120 So. 3d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2010); Arvizu; United States v. . . .

STINSON, v. STATE, 117 So. 3d 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . State, 384 So.2d 272, 273-74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

G. PAMPHILE, v. STATE, 110 So. 3d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993); § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

J. H. a v. STATE, 106 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also United States v. . . .

PARTLOW, v. STATE, 134 So. 3d 1027 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)); see § 901.151, Fla. . . .

PATRICK, v. STATE, 104 So. 3d 1046 (Fla. 2012)

. . . . § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

STATE v. HANNAH,, 98 So. 3d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . The trial court granted Hannah’s motion to suppress, explaining that pursuant to section 901.151, Florida . . . Section 901.151(3), Florida Statutes, commonly known as the “Stop and Frisk Law,” codifies the principles . . . that some movement of the detainee from the place where he is initially detained is permissible. § 901.151 . . . Citing section 901.151(3), Florida Statutes, as well as federal cases involving movement of a detainee . . .

SMITH, Jr. v. STATE, 95 So. 3d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .; see § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. . . .

BERRY, v. STATE, 86 So. 3d 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2009); Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). . . .

K. S. a v. STATE, 85 So. 3d 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 698 So.2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (quoting § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1993)). . . . Section 901.151(5) speaks in terms of "probable cause,” however, courts have suggested that "probable . . .

SANTIAGO, v. STATE, 84 So. 3d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . are permissible where an officer has a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity); § 901.151 . . . State, 771 So.2d 1238, 1243 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see also § 901.151(5), Fla. . . . WARNER and CONNER, JJ., concur. . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . . The Florida Supreme Court has indicated that the meaning of "probable cause” in section 901.151(5), is . . .

MACKEY, v. STATE, 83 So. 3d 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . . § 901.151(2)(1997) (“Florida Stop and Frisk Law”). 3. . . .

D. O. a v. STATE, 77 So. 3d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); § 901.151, Fla. Stat. mon) . . . .

FRIAS, v. L. DEMINGS, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . He contends that the basis of this legal duty was § 901.151 of the Florida Statutes. . . . . § 901.151 is Florida’s “Stop and Frisk” law. . . .

FANT, v. STATE, 72 So. 3d 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 901.151(5), Fla. . . .

STATE v. HERRON,, 68 So. 3d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2009); Richardson, 599 So.2d at 705. . . .

DAVIS, v. STATE, 67 So. 3d 1125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . .; see also § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

STATE v. TRIPLETT,, 82 So. 3d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Florida’s “Stop and Frisk Law,” codified in Section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2008), permits "a law . . .

STATE v. NICHOLS,, 52 So. 3d 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . State, 905 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); see also § 901.151(5) Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

E. J. a v. STATE, 40 So. 3d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and section 901.151, Florida Statutes, permit . . .

T. T. N. v. STATE, 40 So. 3d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . State, 929 So.2d 1169, 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); see also § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

STATE v. M. DeLUCA,, 40 So. 3d 120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. . . .

CALDWELL, v. STATE, 41 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 2010)

. . . (citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)). . . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

HILL, v. STATE, 39 So. 3d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2006). See also Carroll v. . . .

STATE v. AMEQRANE,, 39 So. 3d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . The officer was entitled under section 901.151 to conduct a reasonable inquiry to confirm or deny that . . .

P. SKINNER, v. STATE, 31 So. 3d 940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2007); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1995). . . . See § 901.151(4); Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). . . .

STATE v. ZALDIVAR,, 34 So. 3d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2006). IV. . . .

L. HANKERSON, v. STATE, 32 So. 3d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

D. B. P. A v. STATE, 31 So. 3d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . See § 901.151(6), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES- REPORT NO. In No. In No. In No. In No. s In No. In No. In No. In No., 35 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 2010)

. . . Various statutes justify restraint under stated circumstances, e.g., F.S. 812.015, 901.15, 901.151 (2006 . . .

STATE v. LOPEZ,, 29 So. 3d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Arango, 9 So.3d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); § 901.151(2), Fla. . . . Applying these principles, the stop was justified, Terry; § 901.151(2), and the order under review cannot . . .

COOKS, v. STATE, 28 So. 3d 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993)); see also § 901.151(2), Fla. . . .

REGALADO, v. STATE, 25 So. 3d 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . .; § 901.151, Fla. Stat. . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. STATE, 29 So. 3d 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . under these circumstances the officer did have authority to conduct a Terry stop pursuant to section 901.151 . . . Section 901.151(2) provides: (2) Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person . . .

POVIONES, v. STATE, 15 So. 3d 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2004); Terry v. . . .

PANTER, v. STATE, 8 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2007) (“Stop and Frisk Law”); United States v. . . .

STATE v. ARANGO,, 9 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Section 901.151, Florida Statutes provides, in pertinent part: (2) Whenever any law enforcement officer . . . believe that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense. § 901.151 . . . Section 901.151(2) merely requires that Vila had encountered the defendant “under circumstances which . . .

STATE v. REYES,, 4 So. 3d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . While we agree that the pat-down search exceeded the scope authorized by section 901.151 of the Florida . . . To the contrary, section 901.151 of the Florida Statutes limits the scope of searches conducted during . . . extent necessary to disclose, and for the purpose of disclosiny, the presence of such weapon .... § 901.151 . . .

STATE v. ALLEN,, 994 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). See also State v. . . .

A. GRIGGS, v. STATE, 994 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 901.151(3), Florida Statutes (2007), entitled “Stop and Frisk Law,” is of importance in connection . . .

JOHNSON, v. STATE, 989 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also Gray v. . . .

C. E. L. v. STATE, 995 So. 2d 558 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see also § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

L. RACHEL, v. STATE, 987 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see also § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .

STATE v. WALKER,, 991 So. 2d 928 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1999); see also Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. . . .

LEROY, v. STATE, 982 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

McNEIL, v. STATE, 995 So. 2d 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . State, 610 So.2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); see also § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .

G. M. a v. STATE, 981 So. 2d 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . . See § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

C. B. v. STATE, 979 So. 2d 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . . § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

GREIDER, v. STATE, 977 So. 2d 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. . . .

R. ROBINSON a k a R. v. STATE, 976 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . .; see § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2005) (“Florida Stop and Frisk Law”). . . . circumstances surrounding the person’s presence at the location which led to the officer’s suspicions. § 901.151 . . . investigatory stop is permissible if supported by probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed. § 901.151 . . . individual is armed with a dangerous weapon and poses a threat to the officer or any other person. § 901.151 . . .

E. YADIMSKY, v. CITY OF MELBOURNE, a T., 270 F. App'x 924 (11th Cir. 2008)

. . . . § 901.151; see Tillman v. . . .

KOLLMER, v. STATE, 977 So. 2d 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla Stat. (2006). In U.S. v. . . . Regarding investigatory stops, Florida Statutes, section 901.151, provides, “[n]o person shall be temporarily . . . See § 901.151(3), Fla Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). . . .

STATE v. TRIANA,, 979 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . . § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

COX, v. STATE, 975 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2006), states: Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state . . .

STATE v. BALLINGER,, 977 So. 2d 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2004); Terry v. . . .

BERRY, v. STATE, 973 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2006), provides as follows: Whenever any law enforcement officer . . .

S. McKNIGHT, v. STATE, 972 So. 2d 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . .; § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . . § 901.151(4); Golphin, 945 So.2d at 1180. . . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2006); Lanier v. State, 936 So.2d 1158, 1161 (Fla. 2d DCA2006). . . . Thus, Officer Shea was justified under section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2006), in detaining Mr. . . .

STATE v. PRUITT,, 967 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . See §§ 901.151(6) (“Stop and Frisk Law”); 934.06 (illegally intercepted wire or oral communications), . . .

BREVICK, v. STATE, 965 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . State, 792 So.2d 667, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2006) (“Florida Stop and Frisk Law”) provides: Whenever any law . . .

E. A. B. v. STATE, 964 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The question presented on appeal is whether Morales was authorized, pursuant to section 901.151, to stop . . . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); § 901.151, Fla. . . .

NEWKIRK, v. STATE, 964 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993); see also § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

D. B. A. v. STATE, 962 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The Florida Stop and Frisk Law, § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. . . .

D. WALLACE, III, a k a a k a D. v. STATE, 964 So. 2d 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . . § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

ANDREWS, v. STATE, 962 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); Terry v. . . .

J. M. C. a v. STATE, 962 So. 2d 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

RIOS, v. STATE, 975 So. 2d 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime”); § 901.151 . . .

STATE v. R. LENNON,, 963 So. 2d 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Section 901.151(2), Fla. . . .

STATE v. E. D. R. a, 959 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Further, the seizure was not pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2005), Florida’s Stop and . . .

LEACH, v. STATE, 957 So. 2d 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . suppress because Officer Junnier did not have probable cause to conduct a pat-down search under section 901.151 . . . Section 901.151(5), Florida Statutes (2005), states: Whenever any law enforcement officer authorized . . .

STATE v. A. L., 956 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993) (citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)). . . .

P. B. P. v. STATE, 955 So. 2d 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2004), which governs detentions, provides: Whenever any law enforcement . . .

FALLS, v. STATE, 953 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . . § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

MIAMI- DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, v. In FORFEITURE U. S. CURRENCY,, 946 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . . § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). . . .