Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ld Dr. Stinson that he “didn’t remember very much at all about it.” Dr. Stinson ultimately diagnosed Turner as suffering from a “dissociative reaction,” which he described as a “type of amnesia.” Dr. 7 Florida Statute § 394.467, known as the Baker Act, allows a person to be placed involuntarily in a treatment facility if clear and convincing evidence indicates that the person is mentally ill, and, inter alia, there is a substantial likelihood that, based on recent behavior, the person will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another person. Fla. Stat. § 394.467(1)(a). 18 Stinson based his diagnosis in large part on Turner remembering that, during the stabbing, his wife had “no face.” Dr....

...Cottone’s Detention On March 9, 1999, Cottone was involved in a physical altercation with his father, Peter Cottone, Sr. As a result of this violent incident, Cottone involuntarily was transported to Memorial Hospital in Bro-ward County, Florida under Florida Statute § 394.467, for observation and evaluation....

...inimum medical care requirements, and availability of recreational activities. B. Charles’s Detention On March 1, 1999, Widnel Charles (“Charles”) was arrested. Prior to his arrest, Charles had been detained involuntarily under Florida Statute § 394.467 on numerous occasions due to his violent tendencies and a history of schizophrenia....

...Because we must accept the allegations of plaintiffs' amended complaint as true, what we set out in this opinion as "the facts” for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes may not be the actual facts. Cf. Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 992 (11th Cir.1995), . Florida Statute § 394.467, known as the "Baker Act,” allows a person to be placed involuntarily in a treatment facility if clear and convincing evidence indicates that the person is mentally ill, and, inter alia, there is a substantial likelihood that, based on recent behavior, the person will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another person. Fla. Stat. § 394.467 (l)(a)....

...Cottone’s Detention On March 9, 1999, Cottone was involved in a physical altercation with his father, Peter Cottone, Sr. As a result of this violent incident, Cottone involuntarily was transported to Memorial Hospital in Broward County, Florida under Florida Statute § 394.467, for observation and evaluation.2 On March 14, 1999, Cottone was moved to the Broward County Jail and was booked, assessed, and classified. As a result of the assessment and classification, Cottone was transferred from the Broward Count...

...Because we must accept the allegations of plaintiffs’ amended complaint as true, what we set out in this opinion as “the facts” for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes may not be the actual facts. Cf. Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 992 (11th Cir. 1995). 2 Florida Statute § 394.467, known as the “Baker Act,” allows a person to be placed involuntarily in a treatment facility if clear and convincing evidence indicates that the person is mentally ill, and, inter alia, there is a substantial likelihood that, based on recent behavior, the person will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another person. Fla. Stat. § 394.467(1)(a). 3 to a consent decree stemming from Carruthers v....

...l care requirements, and availability of recreational activities. B. Charles’s Detention On March 1, 1999, Widnel Charles (“Charles”) was arrested. Prior to his arrest, Charles had been detained involuntarily under Florida Statute § 394.467 on numerous occasions due to his violent tendencies and a history of schizophrenia. While in the booking area of the Broward County Jail on March 1, Charles struck another inmate....

...(2) If the court decides that the defendant is sane, it shall proceed to trial. (3) If the Court decides that the defendant is insane, it shall commit him or her to the Division of Mental Health for hospitalization under the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 394.467, F.S.A....

...T COMMITMENT PRIOR TO DISPOSITION OF THE APPEAL ON THE MERITS, WHAT SHOWING MUST SHE MAKE TO AVOID DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF MOOTNESS? We rephrase the question as follows: Does an appeal from a civil commitment order under The Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1989), become moot solely because the person subject to that order has already been released? We granted jurisdiction, pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, and answer the question in the negative....

...5), provides in pertinent part: "Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." [14] § 394.467, Fla....

...Hubbart, Public Defender, and Paul Morris, Asst. Public Defender, for Preer Beverly. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Margarita Esquiroz, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State of Florida. ADKINS, Justice. This is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Dade County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional. We have jurisdiction. Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. The pertinent portions of the statute under attack read as follows: "394.467 Involuntary hospitalization (1) Criteria....

...spitalization of respondent. A hearing on the involuntary hospitalization *484 petition was held on June 26, 1975, and resulted in an order requiring respondent to be hospitalized involuntarily. The judge specifically upheld the constitutionality of Section 394.467(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...Furthermore, once a finding of mental illness is made, it would be impossible not to find that the individual is in need of care." 339 A.2d 764 at 777-78. It is elementary that statutes may properly authorize the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill when the term "mentally ill" is given a satisfactory legal meaning. Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes, quoted above, imparts a sufficient legal meaning to the term "mental illness" by setting criteria....

...glect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his *486 well-being, and that he is incompetent to determine for himself whether treatment for his mental illness would be desirable." At 390-91. Standards analogous to those in Section 394.467, Florida Statutes, have been expressly sanctioned by federal and state courts and upheld when attacked on the ground of vagueness....

...that it is compatible with the best interests of the affected class and that its members are unable to act for themselves. Cf. Mormon Church v. United States, supra . " 422 U.S. 563 at 583, 95 S.Ct. 2486 at 2498, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (concurring opinion). Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), has withstood the attack of vagueness and overbreadth....

...nds should never be hospitalized involuntarily. The trial court denied appellant's motion to apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the court used the standard of clear and convincing evidence. Appellant says this was error. Section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes, merely provides that if "the court concludes that the patient meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization, the judge shall order the patient to be transferred to a treatment facility." The statute is silent regarding the burden of proof required....

...dmissible only on issues involving the patient's mental condition." Section 90.242(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1973). Prior to the examination appellant was advised that anything be said at that time could be used against him at the subsequent hearing. Section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), provides that in proceedings for involuntary hospitalization one of the physicians who executed the hospitalization certificate shall be a witness at the hearing on hospitalization....

...ikely" as "having a better chance of existing or occurring than not." [11] We turn next to the definitions in the case law. The Florida Supreme Court in In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla.1977) was confronted with determining the constitutionality of section 394.467, Florida Statute (1973) which provided that "[a] person may be involuntarily hospitalized if he is mentally ill and because of his illness is (a) likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or (b) in need of ca...

...tutionally vague. The court held that the statute was constitutional and stated: It is elementary that statutes may properly authorize the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill when the term `mentally ill' is given a satisfactory Legal meaning. Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes, quoted above, imparts a sufficient Legal meaning to the term `mental illness' by setting criteria....

...at 485 (emphasis supplied). In Hill v. State, 358 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the court addressed the appropriate standard that should be applied to the release of the criminally insane. The court held that the "likely-to-injure" standard under section 394.467(1)(a) as opposed to the "manifestly dangerous to others" standard under rule 3.460, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure, is the appropriate standard....

...isting or occurring than not" as argued by the appellant would add nothing to the plain and common meaning of the term and would be unnecessary. [12] In Thomas v. State, 443 So.2d 406 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), the court noted that the Legislature amended section 394.467 to embrace the "manifestly dangerous" test....

...We have for review M.W. v. Davis, 722 So.2d 966 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal that certified the following question to be one of great public importance: IS A HEARING WHICH COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 39.407(4) AND 394.467(1), FLORIDA STATUTES, NECESSARY WHEN A COURT ORDERS THAT A CHILD BE PLACED IN A RESIDENTIAL FACILITY FOR MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT, WHERE THE CHILD HAS BEEN COMMITTED TO THE LEGAL CUSTODY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, AND THE DEPARTMENT IS SEEKING RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT? M.W....

...V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we conclude that neither the statutory framework of Chapter 39 nor the Constitution requires an evidentiary hearing that complies with the substantive and procedural requirements of section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1997), part of the Baker Act, [1] prior to a court ordering that a dependent child in the temporary legal custody of the Department of Children and Families ("the Department") be placed in a residential mental health facility....

...argued that the dependency judge's order constituted an involuntary commitment to a mental health facility requiring an evidentiary hearing under section 39.407(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), and the Baker Act, specifically sections 394.463 and 394.467, Florida Statutes (1997). In its original opinion, the Fourth District granted the writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that section 39.407(4) requires the Department to comply with the procedures required by sections 394.463 and 394.467 of the Baker Act before placing a dependent child in psychiatric residential treatment....

...The judge may also order such child to receive mental health or retardation services from a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other appropriate service provider. If it is necessary to place the child in a residential facility for such services, then the procedures and criteria established in s. 394.467 [the Baker Act] or chapter 393 shall be used, whichever is applicable....

...r Act is an entirely new proceeding separate from the dependency proceeding, where the treatment facility brings the petition, the public defender represents the patient, and the state attorney represents the State as the real party in interest. See § 394.467(3)-(4), (6)(a)1....

...sychologist or psychiatrist, the court must hold a hearing and the treatment facility must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that the patient is mentally ill and either cannot care for himself or is likely to "inflict serous bodily harm." See § 394.467(1), (6)....

...County Legal Aid Society, proper procedures exercised by the dependency court before placing a dependent child into a residential psychiatric treatment facility will better assure the child's safety and mental health than the procedures required by section 394.467(1)....

...s to place M.W. in residential treatment were motivated by anything other than concern for M.W.'s best interests. [6] Although M.W. points out that the court's signed order made explicit reference to sections 39.407, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) and 394.467, Florida Statutes (1997), we do not deem that fact dispositive of the issue in this case....

...Petitioners were involuntarily committed to the Florida State Mental Hospital pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 394, Florida Statutes (1975), the Baker Act. When the hospital desired to continue petitioners' involuntary hospitalization beyond the initial six-month commitment authorized by Section 394.467(3), Florida Statutes (1975), each petitioner was granted a hearing before a hearing officer for the Department of Administration, as provided by Section 394.467(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). Petitioners were adjudged insolvent and, as provided by Section 394.467(4)(e), were represented by the public defender at their respective hearings....

...1428, 1435-1436, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). Commitment must be justified on the basis of a legitimate state interest, and the reasons for committing a particular individual must be established in an appropriate proceeding. A transcript of the hearing provided by Section 394.467(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), upon which an order requiring continued involuntary hospitalization is based, is necessary for meaningful appellate review....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...the appeal to be frivolous, it may affirm. If, however, it finds an arguable (i.e., nonfrivolous) issue, it orders briefing on that issue. See id. at 1074-76; see also Robbins, 528 U.S. at 265, 120 S.Ct. 746 (explaining the Wende procedure). [3] See § 394.467(4), Fla....

...l defendant is sent should not vary greatly from procedures common to the institution in the involuntary hospitalization or residential treatment of those not subject to criminal charges. The criteria for involuntary hospitalization are set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...tent to stand trial but does not meet the provisions for involuntary hospitalization. It is meant to provide as great a flexibility as possible for the trial judge in handling such defendant. *1267 As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...n. The law enforcement officer shall execute a written report detailing the circumstances under which the person was taken into custody. The report and certificate shall be made a part of the patient's clinical record. § 394.463, Fla. Stat. (1985). Section 394.467 specifies the procedures for involuntary commitment under similar circumstances....

...977). [2] When read together, appellant argues, the sections provide the requisite standards and safeguards with respect to involuntary commitment. We agree. In the case of In Re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977), we upheld the constitutionality of section 394.467(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...ent to stand trial or in the safeguard of Florida's insurers to those subjected to involuntary commitment." Id. 106 S.Ct. at 2606 n. 4. (citing Fla.Stat.Ann. § 916.11-916.12 (West 1985 and Supplement 1986) (competency to stand trial); Fla.Stat.Ann. § 394.467 (West Supplement 1986) (involuntary commitment proceedings))....

...§§ 916.11-916.12, an evidentiary hearing is required to determine the competency of a defendant to stand trial if reasonable grounds exist to believe a defendant is incompetent. See Walker v. State, 384 So.2d 730 (Fla.App.1980). Similarly, under Fla.Stat. § 394.467(3)(a), a hearing is required to determine whether an incapacitated person is involuntarily placed in a mental health facility....

...but separates it into manageable parts, which are: First, is the determinative standard whether Hill if released would be manifestly dangerous to others, or is it rather whether he would be likely to injure another? Compare Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.460 with Section 394.467(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), and Fla.R.Crim.P....

...es in accomplishing their difficult task in these cases. Standard for release Rule 3.460 authorizes commitment of one acquitted for insanity if his release would be "manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people." [2] But the Baker Act, Section 394.467(1)(a), authorizes commitment of one who, by reason of mental illness, is "[l]ikely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty." [3] The difference is more than semantic....

...such conduct and the degree of harm which may ensue"); Proctor v. Butler, 380 A.2d 673, 677 (N.H. 1977). The District of Columbia Code contains the same dichotomy — dangerousness versus likely-to-injure — that is created by criminal Rule 3.460 and Section 394.467(1)(a)....

...The Baker Act, as amended through 1975, did not simply provide a substantive standard for commitment and release different from the Rule 3.460 standard for insanity acquitees. The Act also provided independent administrative and civil court procedures for initial commitment and for commitment beyond six months. Section 394.467(2), (3)(a), (4), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...It purported to require that criminal commitment orders under Rule 3.460 "adequately document the nature and [the] extent of [the] patient's mental illness," and *197 the Act licensed hospital administrators to turn away insanity acquitees who are unaccompanied by "adequate orders and documentation." Section 394.467(3)(b), (c), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999, 97 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed.2d 609 (1976). Connors also reached beyond commitment questions to reassert paramount judicial authority over periodic evaluation and release of Rule 3.460 acquitees. Legislation in 1975 had added Section 394.467(5), [11] requiring an acquitee's release after six months unless statutory grounds for continued commitment were found by a hearing examiner, or by a court overruling the hearing examiner....

...trial, Rule 3.210(b)(1), and for those acquitted on account of insanity: When a person tried for an offense shall be acquitted for the cause of insanity, if the Court shall then determine that the defendant presently meets the criteria set forth in Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975) the Court shall commit the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for involuntary hospitalization, or shall order that he receive outpatient treatment at any other appropriate facility or service on an outpatient basis, or shall discharge the defendant....

...ction 2(a), power to repeal new Rule 3.210 almost before it became effective. [15] Chapter 77-312, Laws of Florida, extensively amended Chapter 394 and 921 to provide for trial court commitment of persons acquitted for insanity under the criteria of Section 394.467(1); for initial determination of release questions, under the same criteria, by Baker Act hearing examiners; for judicial review by the committing court of only those release orders which are contested administratively by the state attorney; and for de novo judge or jury trials, applying the same statutory criteria, in cases judicially reviewed. Sections 394.467(5), 921.131(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Rule 3.210, thereby insisting, as it were, that the Baker Act standard eclipsed that of its own Rule 3.460. Thus we conclude that the determinative test is whether Hill, if released, would be likely to injure himself or others. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.210, Section 394.467(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...aker Act proceedings, specifically that the state has the burden to justify his continued commitment by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court held, in In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977), that clear and convincing evidence satisfying Section 394.467(1) standards is necessary for involuntary hospitalization under the Baker Act....

...on shall be held in custody until released by order of the committing court, or may give him into the care of his friends, on their giving satisfactory security for the proper care and protection of such person; otherwise he shall be discharged. [3] Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1977): (1) Criteria....

...s if allowed to remain at liberty, or (b) In need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf. The Baker Act standards were purportedly applicable to insanity acquitees by the implication of Section 394.467(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1973). 1975 legislation made the implication explicit, Section 394.467(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...released "without danger to himself or to others." Model Penal Code § 4.08(2) (1962). [10] 306 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1974). [11] Chapter 75 305, Laws of Florida. The new statute was designated in the session law, and therefore in the Connors opinion, as § 394.467 (4)(h). 332 So.2d at 339, n. 2. It was renumbered § 394.467(5) in Florida Statutes (1975)....

...[12] Rule 3.460 was amended in 1974, before Powell was decided, to make explicit that "such person shall be held in custody until released by order of the committing court." In re Rule 3.460, Fla.Rules of Crim.P., 287 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1974). [13] Chapter 75 305, Section 1, Laws of Florida, added Section 394.467(4)(h)(1), codified as Section 394.467(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), providing: (a) In the case of any patient who has been committed to a mental hospital pursuant to Rule 3.460, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Acquittal for Cause of Insanity, the committing court shall retain jurisdiction in the case. [14] Section 394.467(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975): If ......

...ly and without warning. In reference to Hill's 1965 admission, the staff conference report indicates that Hill's hallucinations antedated his 1964 violence by "at least three or four years." [29] The likely-to-injure issue framed by paragraph (a) of Section 394.467(1) is inseparable from the paragraph (b) concern with whether the acquitee is "[i]n need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf," supra n....

...4th DCA 1974) (court must "fix a time" for competency hearing before defendant may be incarcerated under subsection). [29] If the defendant is found competent he proceeds to trial; if he is found incompetent, he is then committed "to the Division of Mental Health for hospitalization under the provisions of Fla.Stat. § 394.467, F.S.A.," subject to continuing review....

...dures which must be followed under a variety of circumstances and conditions, including emergency admission (Section 394.463(1)), court-ordered evaluation (Section 394.463(2)), voluntary admissions (Section 394.465), and involuntary hospitalization (Section 394.467)....

...as is required by the Act. [2] STEVENSON and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have selected five days because that is the period within which the legislature requires a probable cause hearing for civil commitment for treatment for mental illness. § 394.467(6)(a)1....

...1975), the court held that it was error for the trial court to enter a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity at a pretrial hearing and "short circui[t] [the] provision of [Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210] directing that he commit [the defendant] to the Division of Mental Health under said § 394.467." Brown, 307 So.2d at 897....

...Allen, Public Defender and Maria Ines Suber, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Jeffrey M. Dikman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. BARFIELD, Judge. Appellant seeks review of an order of involuntary placement under the Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...Having reviewed the record, we can find no clear and convincing evidence that appellant was a present danger to herself or to others or that she was unable to survive in the conditions she was residing in at the time she was ordered committed. Schexnayder v. State, 495 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); § 394.467(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1987). Even though the other criteria set out in section 394.467(1) might be met, a non-dangerous individual, capable of surviving safely in freedom by herself or with the help of others, should never be involuntarily committed....

...Metzger, Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville, Attorneys for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Amelia L. Beisner, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Attorneys for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant appeals an order of involuntary placement entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...lear and convincing evidence that the statutory criteria authorizing involuntary commitment have been met. In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla.1977); Salter v. State, 618 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Without question, Appellant meets the criteria of section 394.467(1)(a)1. She is mentally ill, she has refused voluntary placement, and she may not be able to determine for herself whether placement is necessary. At issue is whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the criteria contained in section 394.467(1)(a)2....

...ay that established any real and present threat of substantial harm to her well-being, could not support involuntary commitment). As in Smith v. State, 508 So.2d 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), we find a deficiency in the proof to meet the requirements of section 394.467(1)....

...ts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Ssection 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), and the case of In Re: Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977). As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see chapter 394, Florida Statutes, or, in the case of mental retardation, see chapter 393, Florida Statutes. Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979), prescribes criteria for involuntary hospitalization or placement....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...defendant is sent should not vary greatly from procedures common to the institution in the involuntary hospitalization or residential treatment of those not subject to criminal charges. The criteria for involuntary hospitalization isare set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ncompetent to stand trial but does not meet the provisions for involuntary hospitalization. It is meant to provide as great a flexibility as possible for the trial judge in handling such defendant. As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...d in the future. (c) Applicability. This sectionrule shall not apply to defendants determined to be incompetent to proceed with sentencing, which is provided in Rrule 3.214 below. Committee Notes 1980 Adoption. As to involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979); as to involuntary admission to residential services, see chapter 393, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...untarily hospitalized. It further provides that the administrator of the facility must notify the Sstate Aattorney prior to any release of a defendant committed pursuant to this sectionsubdivision. As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979); in case of retardation, see chapter 393, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...dments to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...ts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Ssection 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...ts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Ssection 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...s is to avoid trying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Ssection 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...nts is to avoid tying mentally ill or deficient defendants in the criminal justice system to civil commitment procedures in the "Baker Act." Reference to commitment of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity has been removed from Section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...need for medication. It was his opinion that appellant was a non-dangerous individual, even though she had trouble controlling her moods and behavior. He concluded that appellant would be able to function adequately if she would take her medication. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1985), sets forth criteria for involuntarily confining a mentally ill person for treatment....

...taking care of himself and surviving safely in freedom. The record here is devoid of evidence clearly and convincingly supporting the conclusion that "such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to [her] well-being." § 394.467(1)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Prior to trial, the court and the prosecutor were apprised of the facts that appellant had been adjudicated not guilty of receiving stolen property by reason of insanity in 1978 and had been involuntarily committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for treatment under the provisions of section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Sean F. Callaghan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. BROWNING, J. Appellant appeals an order of involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1999), on grounds that the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence that she met the required statutory criteria....

...Rather, there must also be clear and convincing evidence that without treatment, the patient would pose a real and present threat of substantial harm to herself, or a substantial likelihood that in the near future she will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or another, as evidenced by recent *410 behavior. See § 394.467(1)(a)2, Fla....

...On October 11, 1977, the administrator of the Tallahassee Psychiatric Centre, Inc., filed a petition for the involuntary hospitalization of Neff. A hearing on the matter was held October 13, 1977, and the trial court entered its order requiring Neff's involuntary hospitalization the following day pursuant to Section 394.467(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...e would get adequate treatment with the possibility that he might be able to come back into the world with his capabilities... ." This case is controlled by In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977). Beverly was involuntarily hospitalized pursuant to Section 394.467(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1973). Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1973) and Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975) are identical, and provide: "394.467 Involuntary hospitalization....

...ally ill and because of his illness is: "(a) Likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or "(b) In need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf." In holding that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973) was constitutional, the Supreme Court stated the following test to be used prior to the entering of an order requiring the involuntary hospitalization of an individual: First, the judge must conclude that the person is mentally ill....

...After appellant's third temporary hospitalization in a mental facility and his involvement in an altercation with the police, as a result of which he received several contusions requiring medical treatment, a petition for involuntary placement was filed pursuant to section 394.467(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...A hearing was held, and the trial court entered the order appealed committing appellant. The parties do not dispute that appellant, who believes he owns Amelia Island, is mentally ill. Instead, the question on appeal is whether the state proved at the hearing below that appellant is a danger to himself or others, section 394.467(1)(a)2.b., by clear and convincing evidence....

...In Shuman, petitioners were involuntarily committed to the Florida State Mental Hospital pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 394, Part I, Florida Statutes (1975), The Baker Act. When the hospital desired to continue the petitioners' involuntary hospitalization beyond the initial six-month commitment authorized by section 394.467(3), each petitioner was granted a hearing before a hearing officer for the Department of Administration, as provided by section 394.467(4)(a)....

...Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Kathleen E. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant was involuntarily committed to Florida State Hospital, pursuant to the provisions of section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ial proceedings and any other proceedings at which a decision could be made which might result in a detrimental change to the subject's liberty. In re Beverly, 342 So.2d at 489. The procedure for involuntary placement here applicable is set forth in section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...nidentified persons, which hearsay went unchallenged. Similar deficiencies occurred with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the order for involuntary placement. Involuntary placement of an individual for treatment, as set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1991), requires: a finding of the court by clear and convincing evidence that: (a) He is mentally ill and because of his mental illness: 1.a....

...ged to be inappropriate. (Emphasis supplied.) Application of the statutory criteria to the record in this case indicates an absence of the requisite "clear and convincing evidence" that due to mental illness, appellant meets the criteria outlined in section 394.467(1)....

...tary placement advanced by the psychiatrist. Even then he was hurried by the admonition that he be brief as they had "a lot of hearings". I, therefore, concur in the result reached. The appellant should be given a new hearing held in compliance with Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991).

...1968, does not require suppression of sovereign immunity to statewide hospital systems which extend services to both paying and non-paying patients, the status of the plaintiff was not that of a voluntary paying patient. He was the *534 subject of a court order of involuntary commitment under the Baker Act pursuant to F.S. 394.467....

...Ultimately, DCF might be responsible for Amaya's care if he is committed pursuant to the Baker Act, but the statutory procedures under that chapter must be followed and Amaya must be properly committed to DCF's custody before that agency should be burdened with providing for his treatment or care. See § 394.467, Fla....

...tters in the court. See State v. Reese, 773 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The trial court's dismissal order is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. THOMPSON, C.J., and PLEUS, J., concur. NOTES [1] See § 394.467, Fla.Stat....

...As reflected by the record in the first trial, appellant has had a history of mental problems. In 1976, Patten was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity of receiving stolen property, having been involuntarily committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for treatment under the provisions of section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...This opinion turns upon the administration of Rule 3.210(a)(3), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A. as follows: "(3) If the Court decides that the defendant is insane, it shall commit him or her to the Division of Mental Health for hospitalization under the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 394.467, F.S.A....

...e was three years old, after the court found that the Mother's mental health issues put the child at risk of harm. On December 1, 2008, after the Mother was committed pursuant to the Baker Act, she consented to her child being adjudicated dependent. § 394.467, Fla....

...into the facility within ten days. V.L., a 16-year-old child, was adjudicated dependent in 1975 at the age of nine months and was placed into the custody of her maternal grandmother. On March 23, 1988, the court ordered involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...days of the date of the opinion. See id. The court borrowed the five-day period from the Baker Act, where a probable cause hearing must be held within five days after a person is civilly confined for treatment of mental illness. Id. at n. 1 (citing § 394.467(6)(a)1., Fla....

...a petition. We further hold that if the judge finds probable cause, the judge must also appoint an attorney for the respondent, if he is not already represented by counsel. See Meadows, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D2577 n. 5, ___ So.2d at ___ n. 5, (citing section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes)....

ALTENBERND, Judge. Marsha Kay Drummond appeals the order of involuntary placement in her Baker Act proceeding. See § 394.467, Fla....

...State, 802 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 2001). This is a case in which a magistrate presided over a contested Baker Act proceeding. There are no special rules of civil procedure for Baker Act proceedings. Many of the procedures applicable to these proceedings are actually described in section 394.467....

...338 , 540 P.2d 818, 822 (1975), for the proposition that a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is constitutionally unacceptable in civil commitment cases because fundamental liberties are at stake). It is also reviewing a claim that the State is obligated to prove by clear and convincing evidence. See § 394.467(1)....

...nnecessary, especially since this is not a standard civil case. The Baker Act, which is similar to the Ryce Act, does not require service of a summons, but merely requires that the clerk provide the person with a copy of the commitment petition. See § 394.467, Fla....

...by the court. By way of analogy, the Baker Act requires that within one working day after the filing of a petition for involuntary commitment, the court must appoint the public defender, unless the respondent is otherwise represented by counsel. See § 394.467(4).

...Russell, State's Atty., and George E. Tragos, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee. ROBERTS, Justice. This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, which passes upon the constitutional validity of Section 394.467(3)(b), Florida Statutes....

...Stuart Cahoon as Director of the Division of Mental Health, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is willing and anxious to carry out and fulfill his official obligations as Director and that because of the language contained in Florida Statute 394.467(3)(b), as amended, he believes that, notwithstanding Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.460, the defendant, Christina I....

...in the Pasco County Detention Center where she has been a nuisance and danger *338 to herself and others and that continuation of the status quo cannot be further tolerated by the Court." proceeded to find: "1. That the provisions of Florida Statute 394.467(3)(b) relating to Part I, Chapter 394 are unconstitutional or otherwise ineffective as applied to this defendant and others who are committed to the Division of Mental Health of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by Court Or...

...the peace and safety of the people. "2. That under these circumstances, the above finding appears to be more appropriate at this time than a continuation of contempt proceedings against Dr. Stuart Cahoon." and ordered that: "1. That Florida Statute 394.467(3)(b) is unconstitutional or otherwise ineffective and inoperative as applied to the defendant, Christina I....

...y verdict or adjudication by the trial judge of not guilty of the crime charged by reason of insanity relates to his mental condition at the time of commission of the crime which could have occurred many months or even years before the adjudication. Section 394.467(3)(b), Florida Statutes, does not purport to veto or repeal Rule 3.460, F.Cr.R.P., as contemplated by Article *339 V, Section 2, Constitution of Florida....

...563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 decided June 26, 1975. We are not unmindful that these decisions hold that such patients are not subject to the same periodic re-examinations as are those committed who have not been charged with criminal offense. Cf. Section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), Ch....

...fety of the people. Accordingly, the trial court acted in accordance with Rule 3.460, F.Cr.R.P., in requiring that Connors be committed because she is manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people at the present time. To the extent that Section 394.467(3)(b), Florida Statutes, attempts to derogate the authority of the committing judge set out in Rule 3.460, F.Cr.R.P., such statutory provision is superseded thereby....

...Without doubting the importance of the question presented, I believe the Court oversteps jurisdictional boundaries in reaching the merits. While expressing the view that the legislature disregarded state constitutional limitations by enacting Fla. Stat. § 394.467(3)(b) (1974 Supp.), as amended, the Court fails to observe state constitutional restrictions on its own power, in my view....

...Stuart Cahoon, Director of the Division of Mental Health, why he should not be held in contempt of Court for failure to accept Mrs. Connors as an inmate in a mental institution. By motion to dismiss order to show cause, counsel for Dr. Cahoon brought to the trial court's attention Fla. Stat. § 394.467(3)(b) (1974 Supp.) which, as amended, had taken effect only a few months before. In response to Dr. Cahoon' motion to dismiss, the trial court entered a supplemental commitment order dated December 20, 1974, declaring that "Florida Statute 394.467(3)(b) is unconstitutional or otherwise ineffective and inoperative as applied to the defendant ... and all other defendants in like circumstances," and concluding that such a finding "appears to be more appropriate at this time than a continuation of contempt proceedings against Dr. Stuart Cahoon." In its zeal to vitiate portions of Fla. Stat. § 394.467(3)(b) (1974 Supp.), the majority loses sight of the particular case before us....

...Ironically, in the name of preserving the separation of powers, the Court has blurred the distinctions between the separate branches of government by passing on a statute as a general proposition, in much the same way the governor might, when exercising the power of the veto. NOTES [1] Section 394.467(3)(b) [Chapter 74-233], provides: "(b) In the event a person is ordered into a treatment facility under the provisions of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure or chapter 801 or chapter 917, the order shall adequately document the nature and extent of a patient's mental illness....

...If further hospitalization is necessary at the end of his authorized treatment period, the administrator shall apply to the hearing examiner for an order authorizing continued hospitalization." [2] In 1975, the Legislature of the State of Florida adopted Ch. 75-305 which added paragraph (h) to Section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes, to accord with Powell v....

...erson is a collateral legal consequence" rendering the issue not moot). [1] Turning to the merits of Lehrke's argument, in order to involuntarily commit an individual, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the criteria spelled out in section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2007). Pursuant to that section, the State must show that the individual has a mental illness and has either refused voluntary placement or is unable to determine whether placement is necessary. § 394.467(1)(a)(1). Here, it is undisputed that Lehrke was diagnosed with atypical psychosis and that he refused voluntary placement. However, pursuant to subsection 394.467(1)(a)(2), the State must also show that Lehrke either is likely to suffer neglect without treatment or that "[t]here *309 is a substantial likelihood that in the near future he ......

...examples of threats Lehrke had made to others, the doctor could only point to Lehrke's threat to sue for a violation of his civil rights. Our review of the evidence presented below leads us to conclude that the State failed to meet its burden under section 394.467....

...al institutions." Shuman v. State, 358 So.2d 1333, 1335 (Fla. 1978). The subject of an involuntary commitment has a right to the effective assistance of counsel at all judicial proceedings which could result in a limitation on the subject's liberty. § 394.467(4)(e), Fla....

...at 863, 95 S.Ct. at 2556, 45 L.Ed.2d at 601. Thus, a defendant has a right to a closing argument regardless of the length of the hearing or the apparent simplicity of the issues presented. Appellee also argues that the psychiatrist's testimony was required by section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982) and, therefore, inquiry into his qualifications would not be relevant. Section 394.467(3)(a) provides that one of the mental health professionals who signed the petition for involuntary commitment must testify at the hearing for involuntary commitment....

...ablish. Here the state does not contend that Mrs. Lyon posed a danger or threat to others, nor was there evidence of any recent behavior that would support a finding that in the near future she would inflict serious harm either on herself or others. Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1997), places on the state the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (a) He or she is mentally ill and because of his or her mental illness: 1.a....

...on this point. Our decision in Salter v. State, 618 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), controls the present case. In Salter, the state relied on the testimony of one Dr. DeMoya to prove self neglect posed "a real and present threat of substantial harm." § 394.467(1), Fla....

...staff. Petitioner seeks an order of this Court declaring null and void the trial court orders of May 24, 1973 and March 12, 1974, and authorizing his release pursuant to Chapter 394, F.S., known as the Baker *118 Act, and more particularly Sections 394.467 and 394.469 thereof....

...Nor do I agree with Respondents that the Baker Act is applicable only to civil proceedings. The Act by its express language shows the intent of the Legislature to apply it to civil and criminal proceedings alike, and we are bound to observe that intent. Section 394.467, generally, provides for admission criteria and procedures, hearing, and continued hospitalization of involuntary patients....

...The first point contends that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that appellant suffers from a mental illness as defined in section 394.455(3). The second point contends that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to support the required finding under section 394.467(1)(a) that, by reason of her present condition, she would in the near future inflict serious bodily harm upon herself or others, or would suffer neglect which poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to her well-being....

...d upon psychologist's admission that test was "somewhat experimental" and questioned by some in psychological science community). [4] The statute does not specify when in the future it must be "likely" that these possible crimes might occur. Compare § 394.467(1)(a)(2)(b), Fla....

...[5] It is useful to compare a Jimmy Ryce proceeding to a Baker Act proceeding. Under the Baker Act, involuntary admission to a treatment facility must be based on the opinion of a psychiatrist, supported by a second opinion of a psychologist or psychiatrist. See § 394.467(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). The common diagnostic issue is whether the patient "in the near future" "will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm." See § 394.467(1)(a)(2)(b)....

...ial detention). By way of comparison, the Florida Baker Act, also allowing for the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, requires the court to appoint counsel within one working day after the filing of a petition for involuntary placement. See § 394.467(4), Fla....

...Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Amelia L. Beisner, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. ALLEN, Judge. The appellant challenges a Baker Act order of involuntary placement for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...Rather, there must be clear and convincing evidence that without treatment the appellant would pose a real and present threat of substantial harm to his own well-being, or a substantial likelihood that in the near future he would inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another, as evidenced by recent behavior. § 394.467(1)(a)2....

...Prior to the commission of her murder, Rosales spent seventeen years in and out of mental hospitals. The last three hospitalizations took place, respectively, one year, nine months and six months prior to the murder of his wife. On at least two occasions, Rosales was adjudicated mentally ill under the Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1987), and involuntarily committed....

...d convincing evidence demonstrating that she met the criteria for involuntary placement. We reverse on the second ground. Ms. Archer was originally civilly committed by a court order that is not at issue here. On October 19, 1994, in accordance with section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1993), a hearing officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings conducted a hearing on the hospital administrator's request for an order of continued involuntary placement....

...st for continued involuntary placement or otherwise seek review in accordance with section 120.68, Florida Statutes (1993). Instead, on January 3, 1995, the hospital administrator filed a new petition for involuntary placement. The petition, quoting section 394.467(1)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1993), alleges that Ms....

...On January 26, 1995, the trial court filed the written order for involuntary placement appealed here. Appeal From Commitment Order Not Moot The order Ms. Archer is appealing committed her involuntarily for no more than six months, which have since elapsed. § 394.467(4), Fla....

...State, 478 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The supreme court's decision in Godwin overruled Taylor v. State, 536 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). For the reasons explicated in Godwin and Ozbourn, we turn to the substance of the appeal. Motion To Dismiss Denied Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1993), vests circuit courts with authority to grant petitions for initial involuntary placement. See Bentley v. State ex rel. Rogers, 398 So.2d 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Section 394.467(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1993), requires administrative hearing officers to authorize continued involuntary placement if a person committed by a court continues to meet the criteria. Liebman v. State, 555 So.2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). But "if it is shown at the hearing that the patient does not meet the criteria for involuntary placement, he is entitled to be released," § 394.467(4)(a), Fla....

...s ago would necessarily result in a final decision one way or the other. We have little to add to the learned circuit judge's analysis. Even though the criteria for continued involuntary placement are identical to the criteria for initial placement, § 394.467(4)(a), Fla....

...State, 575 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Welk v. State, 542 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Smith v. State, 508 So.2d 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Neff v. State, 356 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1993), specifies the criteria on which involuntary placement decisions must depend: (1) CRITERIA.—A person may be involuntarily placed for treatment upon a finding of the court by clear and convincing evidence that: (a) He is mentally ill and because of his mental illness: 1.a....

...The evidence presented below did not clearly and convincingly show that Ms. Archer was "incapable of surviving alone," or that she was "likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for h[er]self, and [that] such neglect or refusal pose[d] a real and present threat of substantial harm to h[er] well-being." § 394.467(1)(a)2.a., Fla....

...[3] The City Defendants have not alleged that mentally incompetent inmates receive inadequate treatment while housed at University Hospital. Consequently, no federal constitutional question arises from the fact that such inmates are housed there. [4] Florida Statutes § 394.467(1) (1980 Supp.) sets forth the criteria for involuntary hospitalization: (1) CRITERIA.— (a) A person who is acquitted of criminal charges because of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity may be involuntarily hospitalized pursuant...

...to ... [himself] or others." It is apparent from testimony given by representatives of HRS at the evidentiary hearing that HRS equates the second condition contained in Section 916.18(2) with the standard for involuntary hospitalization set forth in Section 394.467(1)(b)....

...t appears that HRS simply relies upon the finding made by the committing judge that the person meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization. This is reasonable in light of the fact that the first criterion for involuntary hospitalization under Section 394.467(1)(b) parallels the second condition found in Section 916.18(2), that is, that the person is likely to cause injury to himself or others....

...Allen, Public Defender, and Andrew Thomas, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellees. BARFIELD, Judge. Appellant is administrator of the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee. Appellees are persons involuntarily placed in that facility. Under Florida Statutes § 394.467 (1983), the administrator is required to request authorization to continue involuntarily placement six months after commitment and each six months thereafter....

...and their orders are final orders subject to appellate review in this court, id. § 394.457(6). The administrator is required to show by clear and convincing evidence that the patients meet the five statutory criteria for involuntary placement, id. § 394.467(1)(b)....

...The hearing officer held that the administrator failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing proof that appropriate and less restrictive treatment alternatives were not available and the patients therefore did not meet the criterion set forth in Fla. Stat. § 394.467(1)(b)5 (1983)....

...ement. In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977). We find nothing to suggest that the intent of the 1982 legislature in adding the fifth criterion to the statute differed from the construction given the requirement in Wilson. In fact, the language of § 394.467(1)(b)5 strongly suggests that the Wilson rationale should be applied here.

...The issue in this case is whether a court, having conducted a hearing on the merits and denied the State's Baker Act petition, may grant the State's motion for rehearing, take additional testimony, reverse its earlier denial and enter an order of involuntary placement under Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...We conclude that, in view of the authorities mentioned above, the trial court did not *761 abuse its discretion in granting rehearing. We also reject appellant's double jeopardy argument as well as her argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite criteria under Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes....

...Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Diane Leeds, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ. FERGUSON, Judge. The question presented is whether a court, after having determined in a Baker Act proceeding, pursuant to Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1981), that a subject meets a criteria for involuntary hospitalization, but also finds at the same time that under Section 394.453 the less restrictive means of outpatient care will suffice, may subsequently revoke...

...(1981)), has, consistent with legislative intent, ordered outpatient care by a private mental health professional as an alternative to involuntary hospitalization, that least restrictive intervention can be revoked and the patient deprived of her liberty only in proceedings which substantially meet the requirements of Section 394.467....

...hospitalized because she poses a danger to herself or others, the administrator of a designated receiving facility where the patient has been examined or evaluated shall make a recommendation to the court for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to Section 394.467(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...The notice must specify the date, time, and place of hearing; the basis for detention (if any); the names of examining mental health professionals and other persons who will testify in support of involuntary placement, and the substance of their proposed testimony. § 394.467(3), Fla....

...NOTES [1] The state candidly concedes at the outset that the court would have no jurisdiction to simply modify its original order for outpatient treatment without a second Baker Act hearing. The question is whether the hearing may properly proceed on a contempt motion. [2] Section 394.467(1), together with the other subsections of the statute, was amended in 1982....

...Hospital. She contends that the state failed to present clear and convincing evidence that she met the criteria for involuntary placement. We agree and reverse. The state has the burden to establish the criteria for involuntary placement set out in section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1999), by clear and convincing evidence....

...erience in the neighborhood and failed to take into account the changes Ms. White proposed. In light of Ms. White's testimony, the state did not present clear and convincing evidence that less restrictive treatment alternatives were unavailable. See § 394.467(1)(b), Fla....

...rd as presented at the time of involuntary placement). Nor was the testimony that she would likely have to be rehospitalized, if she did not take her medicine, sufficient to prove "a real and present threat of substantial harm to ... her wellbeing." § 394.467(1)(a)2 a, Fla....

...Indeed, a reading of the various statutes involved, although somewhat duplicative, indicates that it is the court's responsibility to determine if a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is "manifestly dangerous" and if not, to determine the appropriate alternative. See §§ 916.15, .16, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1980); § 394.467, Fla....

...es must be extended to appeals from involuntary civil commitments of sexually violent predators under the Jimmy Ryce Act. Our conclusion in Pullen that involuntary commitments under the Baker Act, which are limited by statute to only six months, see section 394.467(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), involve a sufficient curtailment of liberty to justify application of the Anders procedures dictates that those same procedures also be applied to commitment orders entered pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Ac...

...In a report dated October 16, 1984, the examining psychiatrists concluded that — With regard to the Court's specific questions it is our opinion this patient merits adjudication of competence for trial and no longer meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization under Florida Statute 394.467....

...Florida’s mental illness statute contains similar provisions, by which people involuntarily committed to either inpatient or outpatient services receive periodic review from either the committing court or a hearing officer with the authority to afford release. See id. § 394.467(7); id....

...Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. SHIVERS, Judge. Appeals were taken from the trial court's Orders for Involuntary Placement following separate hearings on the Petitions for Involuntary Placement of the appellants, Calvin Jordan and Frank Byrwa. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991), sets out the procedures for involuntary placement. At issue is whether the so-called Baker Hearings were conducted in accordance with the due process rights of Jordan and Byrwa and the requirements of section *353 394.467(3)(a)....

...The Florida Evidence Code authorizes the court to call witnesses, who may be cross-examined by all parties, and to interrogate witnesses called by a party or by the court itself "[w]hen required by the interests of justice." Section 90.615, Fla. Stat. The criteria for a finding of involuntary placement are enumerated in section 394.467(1). We find that the trial judge complied with the requirements of section 394.467 in all respects other than requiring the presence of an attorney from the Office of the State Attorney. The trial judge elicited evidence on the question of appellants' mental conditions and made sufficient findings to satisfy the legal criteria of section 394.467(1)....

...If any error resulted from the absence of an attorney to represent the state, the manner in which the hearings were conducted rendered it harmless error. Accordingly, on these particular facts we affirm the Orders for Involuntary Placement. The state concedes that the language of section 394.467(3) appears to mandate the presence of a state attorney to represent the state....

...Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and James H. Greason, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before HAVERFIELD, [*] C.J., and BARKDULL and KEHOE, JJ. KEHOE, Judge. This is an appeal of an order of involuntary hospitalization under the Baker Act, specifically Section 394.467, Florida Statutes [1977]....

...opting the rule. However, I write separately to express my concern that dependent children who are involuntarily placed in treatment facilities under section 39.407(5) are given less protection than a child civilly committed under the Baker Act. See § 394.467(4), Fla....

...The Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings, an executive officer appeals from an order entered by the Circuit Court of Broward County which found certain portions of Chapter 394, Florida Mental Health Act, unconstitutional. The specific portions of the Act found unconstitutional were Sections 394.459(3)(a) and 394.467(4)(h), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...A guardian advocate appointed pursuant to the provisions of this act shall meet the qualifications of a guardian contained in part IV of chapter 744, except that no mental health professional, department employee, or facility administrator shall be appointed. Section 394.467(4)(h), Florida Statutes (1979) provides: (4) PROCEDURE FOR CONTINUED INVOLUNTARY PLACEMENT....

...[5] See Amendment to Rules of Juv. Procedure, 804 So.2d 1206, 1215 (Fla.2001) (Harding, J., concurring). While the Baker Act requires appointment of a public defender to represent a person who is the subject of an involuntary commitment petition, see § 394.467(4), Fla....

...rida Statutes, for residential mental health treatment. Any reference to hospital is to a hospital licensed under chapter 395, Florida Statutes, for residential mental health treatment. This rule does not apply to placement under sections 394.463 or 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...e dangerous to others. See section 202.700 Mo. Rev. Stat. The act upon which appellant was committed to a mental institution in Missouri is more appropriately compared to Florida's Baker Act involuntary placement proceedings, as provided pursuant to section 394.467 Florida Statutes....

...appellant's post-war condition in light of sections 394.463(1)(b)2 and 394.463(2)(a)1 Florida Statutes (1985), with respect to appellant's eligibility for treatment with the Veterans *1170 Administration or other federal agency pursuant to sections 394.467 and 394.4672 Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Petitioner contends that it has not been shown that if released he would be likely to injure himself or others and therefore he is entitled to an order of release. Reliance on the likely-to-injure standard analyzed in Hill v. State, 358 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) is no longer justified. The test laid down by Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Hubbart, Public Defender, and Mark King Leban, Asst. Public Defender, for Edwin Smith. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Margarita Esquiroz, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State of Florida. ADKINS, Justice. This is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Dade County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional....

...thdrawn. In fact, a plain reading of section 394.469 would indicate that a petition could be withdrawn prior to a ruling. Also, the grant by a court of a petition for involuntary placement requires proof that a patient meets the criteria outlined in section 394.467(l)(a) and (b), 1 and the criteria must be established by clear and convincing evidence....

...1st DCA 1994), One of the findings that must be made to support an order of involuntary placement in a state mental hospital is that “all available less restrictive treatment alternatives which would offer an opportunity for improvement ... have been judged to be inappropriate.” § 394.467(l)(b) Fla....

...At the time of James Tuten’s commitment to Meridian, involuntary inpatient placement still required clear and convincing evidence that “all available less restrictive treatment alternatives which would offer an opportunity for improvement ... have been judged to be inappropriate.” § 394.467(l)(b), Fla....

...Stat. (2008). Given the professional opinion of Dr. Fariborzian, the treating physician, that Tuten was competent enough to give or withhold consent for treatment, involuntary placement *1067 in Meridian would have been inconsistent with the mandate of section 394.467(l)(b)....

...It paints a clear picture of Kimbrough's longstanding violent behavior toward others and his lack of rehabilitation. We conclude it was sufficient to sustain the lower court's order. We reject Kimbrough's analogy to Baker Act proceedings. He cites several cases dealing with proceedings under section 394.467 Florida Statutes, not section 393.11. These cases are not controlling because these statutes have different elements of proof. Section 394.467(1)(a)2.b....

...On December 5, 1988, D.M.L. was involuntarily placed at Anclote Manor Hospital for a period not to exceed six months. On May 12, 1989, a petition was filed requesting an order authorizing continued involuntary placement. The petition, filed pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1987), alleged that D.M.L....

...t of patients. We agree. Unless waived, before a person can be involuntarily placed for treatment, or have his involuntary placement continued, a hearing is held where that person can be represented by counsel. The scope of the hearing is limited by section 394.467 which provides: (1) CRITERIA....

...ovement of his condition have been judged to be inappropriate. The hearing is, therefore, for the limited purpose of determining if the patient is mentally ill and because of this illness needs to be involuntarily placed for the reasons set forth in section 394.467....

...al services... ." Id. At best we can assume only that the trial court is to utilize the criteria to be considered by the examining commission. Appellant relies on In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977), wherein the Florida Supreme Court found that Section 394.467, authorizing commitment of mentally ill persons, provided proper due process safeguards. In Beverly, the court found Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973) constitutional because subsection (1) defines specific criteria for involuntary hospitalization: "(a) Likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or (b) In need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf." [2] The attack upon the constitutionality of Section 394.467 in Beverly was based upon the holding in Commonwealth ex rel....

...In holding this statute unconstitutional, the court noted: "`In need of care' is so broad as to be virtually meaningless." Id. at 778. In Beverly the Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval this statement made by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The court in Beverly stated that the statutory standards in Section 394.467(1) are more precise than those discussed in Commonwealth ex rel....

...251, 257, 92 S.Ct. 885, 888, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1971). Id. at 485. The court also quoted Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.Ala. 1974): "Commitment on account of dangerousness to others serves the police power ..." Id. at 485. The court held that Section 394.467 is constitutional because it is a valid exercise of the state's parens patriae power and police power and the language of the statute itself limits involuntary commitment to those persons over whom the state may properly exercise thes...

...OTT and DANAHY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Amicus curiae briefs were filed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the Governor's Commission on Advocacy for Persons with Developmental Difficulties, which greatly helped to clarify the issues involved here. [2] Section 394.467 has subsequently been amended. Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979) provides: (1) CRITERIA....

...Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Kathleen E. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. ALLEN, Judge. The appellant challenges a Baker Act order of involuntary placement for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes. We reverse the order because the trial judge failed to comply with the requirements of the statute. Section 394.467 identifies the criteria and procedure to be used in determining whether an individual may be involuntarily placed in a treatment facility. If the individual does not waive the right to a hearing when a petition is filed for such placement, section 394.467(3)(a) directs that the "court shall serve notice on the state attorney ......

...tify at the hearing. And the order describes the factual basis of the ruling by quoting verbatim from the petition for involuntary placement. As in Jones, in light of the procedural irregularity and due process concerns here involved, as well as the section 394.467(1) requirement that the necessary criteria be shown by clear and convincing evidence, the appealed order is reversed....

...Harvey, Asst. Public Defenders, for Mabel Jones, appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Mary Jo Carpenter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State of Florida, appellee. ADKINS, Justice. This is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Leon County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional....

...Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. A petition was filed seeking involuntary hospitalization of appellant and a request was made on behalf of appellant for a jury determination of the factual issues involved in the proceeding. Appellant contends that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutional because of its failure to provide for a jury determination of the factual criteria involved in such proceedings....

...1974), came to the same conclusion. The federal decisions create no impediment to our conclusion that the statute is valid. Appellant also contends that the failure to provide a trial by jury deprives her of equal protection of the law. Appellant refers to Section 394.467(5), Florida Statutes, which grants a right to trial by jury in proceedings where patients, committed due to a court finding in a criminal case of acquittal by reason of insanity, seek release from the hospital....

...of involuntary hospitalization of a defendant acquitted for cause of insanity. The failure of the state to grant a right to a jury trial in original civil commitment proceedings does not violate either the Florida or the United States constitution. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes, is constitutional....

...Petitioners, Marilyn Liebman (Liebman) and Walter Jones (Jones), individually seek a writ of common law certiorari and a writ of prohibition. We consolidate their cases for opinion purposes to address the common issue. At separate times, pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1987), the circuit court placed each petitioner in custody for treatment....

...es the initial determination. Article V of the 1968 Florida Constitution did not mention "involuntary hospitalization" as being within the jurisdiction of any particular court, although the county courts had jurisdiction of guardianship proceedings. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1971), when originally enacted, provided for the county courts to assume jurisdiction for the original determination of involuntary hospitalization, but even then the legislature provided for a hearing officer to he...

...In 1972 the legislature passed section 26.012, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1972), which provided that the circuit court would have "exclusive original jurisdiction" of "proceedings relating to ... involuntary hospitalization [and] the determination of incompetency... ." At the same time, however, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1971), still provided for a hearing officer to hear petitions to determine continued involuntary hospitalization. The definition of "court" was amended to mean a circuit court instead of a county court to be consistent with the statutory changes. Then in 1978, the legislature again amended section 394.467, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...inuation of involuntary hospitalization. We would also point out that in two other cases, Coppol v. Muhtar, 444 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1984) and Williams v. Davis, 459 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) the courts considered the hearing procedure under section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Public Defender, Orlando, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Kelly Overstreet Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. COBB, Judge. This is an appeal by Howard Westlake from an involuntary commitment proceeding under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...program to restore her competency. She appeals from that order. Initially, she claims that the statute is facially unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection because it does not require a psychiatrist to recommend commitment, as provided under section 394.467(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), for adults for whom involuntary commitment is sought....

...ARIENTE, J. At the heart of this case is the right of an individual to have a judicial officer physically present at hearings held to determine whether the individual may be involuntarily committed to a mental health facility or hospital pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2016) (“the Baker Act”)....

...via videoconference equipment is within the discretion of the court. There is no ministerial, indisputable legal duty clearly established in the law which requires judicial officers presiding over involuntary inpatient placement hearings pursuant to section 394.467 to be physically present with the patients, witnesses, and attorneys....

...In my view, a judge’s physical presence is simply a constituent component of his or her ministerial duty to preside over a trial or evidentiary hearing. Id. at 168 . THE BAKER ACT This case involves proceedings used to involuntarily commit mentally ill individuals under section 394.467, Florida Statutes. Section 394.467, also known as the Baker Act, governs the involuntary inpatient placement of persons with mental illness....

...dividual will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or others, and that all available less-restrictive treatment alternatives that would offer an opportunity for improvement of the individual’s condition have been judged inappropriate. § 394.467(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). The Baker Act also requires an evidentiary hearing to be conducted for involuntary inpatient placement. See § 394.467(2), (6). Recognizing the need for immediate action, the statute specifies that “[t]he court shall hold the hearing on involuntary inpatient placement within 5 court working days, unless a continuance is granted.” § 394.467(6)(a)l....

...Additionally, *1025 “[w]ithin 1 court working day after the filing of a petition for involuntary inpatient placement, the court shall appoint the public defender to represent the person who is the subject of the petition, unless the person is otherwise represented by counsel.” § 394.467(4)....

...unty or the facility, as appropriate, where the patient is located, must be as convenient to the patient as is consistent with orderly procedure, and shall be conducted in physical settings not likely to be injurious to the patient’s condition.” § 394.467(6)(a)2....

...The independent expert’s report is confidential and not discoverable, unless the expert is to be called as a witness for the patient at the hearing. The testimony in the hearing must be given under oath, and the proceedings must be recorded. The patient may refuse to testify at the hearing. § 394.467(6)(a)3....

...ur society. The Baker Act has built-in safeguards, including the requirement that hearings be conducted at the institution where the patient is placed and in a manner not likely to be injurious to the patient’s condition. The State is correct that section 394.467 does not specifically require that Baker Act hearings be presided over by a judicial officer’who is physically present....

...on—on the patient. Moreover, it is no solution to the problem to allow a patient to be brought to the courthouse if he or she objects,' as the Fifteenth Circuit has proposed in its pilot program. The Legislature has expressed a clear preference in section 394.467 that hearings be conducted at the patient’s facility in a manner that would not likely be injurious to the patient’s condition....

...ent and have not waived their physical presence at their Baker Act proceedings, the judicial officers presiding over their hearings are required to appear in person, in “physical settings not likely to be injurious to the patient’s condition.” § 394.467(6)(a)2., Fla....

...among the State’s most vulnerable citizens. The language in the Baker Act reflects the Legislature’s acknowledgment that these individuals are entitled to heightened consideration regarding the manner in which the hearing will be conducted. See § 394.467(6)(a), Fla....

...CANADY, J., concurs in result with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. . In its decision, the Second District Court of Appeal certified the following question of great public importance: DOES A JUDICIAL OFFICER HAVE AN EXISTING INDISPUTABLE LEGAL DUTY TO PRESIDE OVER SECTION 394.467 HEARINGS IN PERSON? Doe, 210 So.3d at 159 ....

...However, after hearing oral argument, this Court vacated its earlier order and stayed the proceedings. . Circuit courts have jurisdiction over Baker Act hearings, however they are permitted by statute to either appoint a magistrate to preside over the hearings, see § 394.467(6)(a)3., Fla....

...We agree with Sierra and conclude that the school board did not, on its motion for summary judgment, establish that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employer's behavior satisfied the intentional tort exception. Reversed. WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2002) (the Baker Act), a court may order inpatient treatment on finding a substantial likelihood that the patient will inflict serious bodily harm on someone.

...ity that his competency will be restored in the future. He was adjudged incompetent to proceed in his criminal case in June 2011. The State thereafter moved to civilly commit Bronson to the Department of Children and Families [“DCF”] pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes, and the trial court ordered his involuntary commitment to DCF’s custody....

...DCF sought certiorari relief in this Court, asserting that the trial court failed to follow the required statutory procedures. This Court’s recently issued opinion quashed the trial court’s order, concluding that the trial court did not follow the procedural requirements set forth in Section 394.467 to determine if Bronson met the criteria for involuntary commitment....

be used to support his continued confinement. § 394.467(6)(a) 3., Fla. Stat. (2017) ("The patient may

LaROSE, Chief Judge. D.F., who is the subject of a Baker Act proceeding, appeals the trial court's order involuntarily committing him to an inpatient treatment facility for three months. See § 394.467, Fla....

...t alternatives would be inappropriate. The State must prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory criteria authorizing involuntary commitment have been met." Blue v. State , 764 So.2d 697 , 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (citations omitted). Section 394.467(1) sets forth the statutory criteria....

...real and present threat of substantial harm to his ... well-being ... b. ... ; and (b) All available less restrictive treatment alternatives which would offer an opportunity for improvement of his ... condition have been judged to be inappropriate. § 394.467(1)....

...refused to provide the last name of the roommate based on confidentiality. "In a Baker Act case, this law is primarily statutory, so the determination of the correct law is a relatively simple process." Id. (citing §§ 394.451-.4789). D.F. also argues that section 394.467(1)(a)(2)(b) is inapplicable. Because section 394.467(1)(a)(2)(b) is inapplicable, we focus on D.F.'s first two arguments....

...Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Douglas J. Glaid, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before SHEPHERD, ROTHENBERG, and SALTER, JJ. ROTHENBERG, J. Edwin Burley appeals from an Order of Commitment for Involuntary Placement ("Order of Commitment"), entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2009) ("Baker Act")....

...ns." Chalk, 443 So.2d at 422 (quoting Shuman v. State, 358 So.2d *135 1333, 1335 (Fla.1978)). Further, the court noted that the subject of an involuntary commitment petition has the right to the assistance of counsel. Chalk, 443 So.2d at 422 (citing § 394.467(4)(e), Fla....

...2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975) (internal footnotes omitted). However, I respectfully dissent from the remainder of the majority opinion. A court cannot logically reverse and affirm a trial court order at the same time. That is precisely what the majority does in this case. NOTES [1] Section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (2009), provides: (4) APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL.— Within 1 court working day after the filing of a petition for involuntary inpatient placement, the court shall appoint the public defender to represent the person wh...

...Any attorney representing the patient shall have access to the patient, witnesses, and records relevant to the presentation of the patient's case and shall represent the interests of the patient, regardless of the source of payment to the attorney. Whereas, section 394.467(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), provides in part: The patient and his guardian or representative shall be informed of the right to counsel by the hearing officer....

...mmitted for treatment for restoration of competency: 3) A defendant may be committed for treatment to restore a defendant’s competence to proceed if the court finds that: (A) the defendant meets the criteria for commitment as set forth by statute [section 394.467, Florida Statutes]; (B) there is a substantial probability that the mental illness or mental retardation causing the defendant's incompetence will respond to treatment and that the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the re...

...dependent, based upon her awareness of domestic violence between her Mother and Mr. Festa. A.P.'s safety and well-being is the penultimate goal, and we commend the lower court for its actions below, which were clearly aimed at furthering such. REVERSED and REMANDED. SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 394.467, Fla....

...(b) Mental Incompetency of Defendant Charged With a Felony. (1)If the Court decides that a defendant charged with a felony is not mentally competent to stand trial or be sentenced, and meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization set forth in Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975) (or, in the case of mental retardation, Section 393.11), Florida Statutes (1975), it shall order the defendant to be transferred to a treatment facility as defined in Chapter 394, Florida Statutes (1975) (o...

...sentenced, that there is no substantial probability that the defendant will become mentally competent to stand trial or be sentenced in the foreseeable future and that the defendant does meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization set forth in Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975), (or, in the case of retardation, Chapter 393, Florida Statutes (1975 and Supp.1976)), the Court shall commit the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for involuntary hospitaliz...

...finding of not guilty, shall state that it was given for such cause. (9) When a person tried for an offense shall be acquitted for the cause of insanity, if the Court shall then determine that the defendant presently meets the criteria set forth in Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975) the Court shall commit the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for involuntary hospitalization, or shall order that he receive outpatient treatment at any other appropriate facility or service on an outpatient basis, or shall discharge the defendant....

...er the defendant for the purpose of continued hospitalization or release. A later decision by the court to transfer the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services after five years of hospitalization, pursuant to the Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991), does not divest the court of jurisdiction over the person and it may amend the commitment order to require that the administrator of the H.R.S....

...to consider the matter in more depth. Ms. Jones’ parents responded by arguing that 2 their daughter filed the petition “as a result of a recent Baker Act proceeding” they initiated against her. See § 394.467(1), (1)(a)2.a., Fla....

ALLEN, Judge. The appellant challenges a Baker Act order of continued involuntary placement for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes....

...The doctor also asserted that the appellant had made inappropriate propositions, but the doctor could not clearly recall these incidents. There was no testimony as to prior incidents involving substantial harm, nor any testimony as to the manner in which future conduct might produce the necessary level of harm under section 394.467(l)(a)2, Florida Statutes....

...rights of the patient, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 [95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396] (1975), as well as the statutory procedures established by the Baker Act. If the patient does not meet the criteria for involuntary placement, as set forth in § 394.467(1) Fla....

...ition, and the burden remains on the State to show that there is a continued need for involuntary placement. Under the provisions of the Baker Act, these reviews are conducted by a hearing officer assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings. § 394.467(4) Fla. Stat. (1991). A patient who cannot afford to retain counsel has a right to be represented by an appointed lawyer in the hearing on the review. § 394.467(4)(e) Fla....

...One of the findings that must be made to support an order of involuntary placement in a state mental hospital is that "all available less restrictive treatment alternatives which would offer an opportunity for improvement ... have been judged to be inappropriate." § 394.467(1)(b) Fla....

...To do otherwise, would violate the constitutional rights of the patient as well as the plain requirements of the Baker Act. The Public Defender has a duty under the law to represent indigent mental patients in hearings to determine the need for continued involuntary placement. § 394.467(4)(e) and § 27.51(1)(d) Fla....

...a Baker Act hearing is superior to any conflicting right that could be asserted on behalf of the patient under the guardianship laws. Therefore, a state administrative hearing officer can order the release or transfer of a patient in a hearing under § 394.467(4) over the objection of the Public Guardian....

...The Amended Complaint does not state whether the dependency guardian ad litem was informed of this lawsuit and agreed that pursuing it is in the best interests of Plaintiffs. [4] Apparently, First Health is actually First Health Service Corporation, Inc. See Dkt. 48. [5] "Florida Statute § 394.467, known as the Baker Act, allows a person to be placed involuntarily in a treatment facility if clear and convincing evidence indicates that the person is mentally ill, and, inter alia, there is a substantial likelihood that, based on recen...

...dismissal shall be without prejudice to the state to refile the charges should the defendant be declared - 21 - competent to proceed in the future. If the defendant meets the criteria for commitment under section 394.467, Florida Statutes, the court shall commit the defendant to the Department of Children and Families for involuntary hospitalization solely under the provisions of law....

...l counsel. In addition, the trial court ordered that Watts be transferred and committed to CMHI. 3 The trial court found that Watts satisfied the criteria for involuntary hospitalization as set forth in section 916.12, Florida Statutes (1999), 4 and section 394.467(1), Florida *228 Statutes (1999), 5 also known as “The Baker Act.” The court instructed the administrator of CMHI to advise the court when Watts was restored to competency or no longer qualified for involuntary commitment....

...Part I of chapter 394, Florida Statutes (1999), entitled "Florida Mental Health Act,” authorizes courts to place individuals in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services for involuntary treatment for their mental illness when the mental illness causes a likelihood of harm if left untreated. Section 394.467, entitled "Involuntary placement,” provides in pertinent part: (1) Criteria....

...entered below. Although it is true that claimant was adjudicated incompetent to stand trial in an unrelated criminal proceeding just days before he signed the power of attorney, he was not simultaneously adjudicated incompetent for all purposes. See § 394.467(3)(d), Fla....

...Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Sean F. Callaghan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. This appeal seeks review of an order of involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), and Rule 3.213(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, finding that there was no substantial probability that the defendants would regain mental competency in the foreseeable future. The orders also stated that the defendants met the criteria for involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes....

...If charges are dismissed pursuant to this subdivision, the dismissal shall be without prejudice to the state to refile the charges should the defendant be declared competent to proceed in the future. Further, the Committee Notes to Rule 3.213 provide: "As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes; ..." Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1995), is the civil involuntary placement criteria of the Baker Act. *1168 Thus, in Florida, once a defendant's charges are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 3.213(b), the State is required to either release the defendant or commit the defendant for involuntarily hospitalization pursuant to section 394.467(1) of the Baker Act....

...On appeal, this Court affirmed finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to amend the order. In doing so, this Court held that a later decision by the court to transfer the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services after five years of hospitalization, pursuant to the Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991), does not divest the court of jurisdiction over the person and it may amend the commitment order to require that the administrator of the H.R.S....

...l precautions approximately two weeks prior to the hearing, and numerous attempts to place her in the community have failed. Based on these observations and findings, we conclude there is competent substantial evidence to satisfy the requirements of section 394.467(l)(a)l.b., Florida Statutes (2011), which is the sole criteria challenged on appeal....

...Appellant was involuntarily committed to Florida State Hospital in 1988 in accordance with a civil commitment and has remained there since the original commitment. The administrator of the hospital requested an order authorizing appellant's continued involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Larsen told the court that Husk is a danger to himself and to others and should be recommitted to Chattahoochee. Dr. Fjordbak told the court that Husk no longer met the criteria for involuntary hospitalization but refused to make a recommendation that he be released. Moreover, the alternative criteria in Section 394.467(1)(b)(4)(b) were met in this case....

...1 The order was entered after a hearing at which Ms. Mouliom was not present. Ms. Mouliom contends that conducting the hearing in her absence amounts to fundamental error. We agree and reverse. In June 2013, the administrator at the Northeast Florida State Hospital filed a petition pursuant to section 394.467(7), Florida Statutes, to continue Ms....

...Moul-iom’s involuntary inpatient placement at the facility. A hearing was held on the *981 petition by an administrative law judge (ALJ) on July 11, 2018. Ms. Mouliom was not present at hearing, but she was represented by an assistant public defender as required by section 394.467(7)(c)....

...[2] This court has held that “[a] patient has a fundamental [due process] right to be present at a commitment proceeding.” Brown v. State, 953 So.2d 688, 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citing Register, supra). This right was recognized in the context of an initial commitment hearing held by the circuit court under section 394.467(6), but the right is not limited to such hearings. The patient also has a fundamental right to be present at the periodic hearings held by an ALJ under section 394.467(7) to consider whether to continue the patient’s commitment....

...ed the right). Additionally, the ALJ did not make any inquiry into Ms. Mouliom’s mental state on the morning of the hearing and whether she had the ability to comprehend the right that she was waiving. This is significant because proceedings under section 394.467(7) necessarily involve patients with mental health issues, and without some indication that Ms. Mouliom had the ability to comprehend the right that she was waiving, the ALJ could not determine that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. 2 We are mindful that proceedings under section 394.467(7) are typically brief and do not involve all of the formalities of a criminal trial....

...nsistent with this opinion, if necessary. 3 REVERSED and REMANDED. CLARK and RAY, JJ., concur. . Ch. 394, pt. I, Fla. Stat. (2012). . We note that this would not necessarily preclude the ALJ from conducting the proceeding without the patient because section 394.467(7)(b) authorizes the ALJ to waive the patient's presence at the hearing if the patient’s attorney does not object and the ALJ "finds that attendance at the hearing is not consistent with the best interests of the patient.” However, no such finding was made in this case....

...Hubbart, Public Defender, and Paul Morris, Asst. Public Defender, for Pedro Alvarez. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Margarita Esquiroz, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. ADKINS, Justice. This is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Dade County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional....

...Appellant contends that the petition for involuntary hospitalization filed by the assistant administrator was fatally defective and did not confer jurisdiction upon the trial court because it did not contain two requisite medical opinions required by Section 394.467(2), Florida Statutes....

...Appellant was charged in five informations with various property offenses, including theft, burglary, and forgery. Initially, appellant pled not guilty to all of the charges. By order dated June 26, 1986, appellant was involuntarily hospitalized for 121 days at Florida State Hospital, pursuant to The Baker Act. § 394.467, Fla....

EVANDER, J. The Department of Children and Families (DCF) seeks certiorari review of an order involuntarily committing Steven Bronson, a criminal defendant, to the custody of DCF pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2011)....

...er 26, 2011, Bronson moved to dismiss his criminal charge (without prejudice) due to his incompetence. The State filed a written response arguing that dismissal would be improper and suggested that Bronson met the criteria for civil commitment under section 394.467(1). On October 6, 2011, DCF filed a written response to the State’s request to civilly commit Bronson in which it argued that Bronson did not meet the criteria for involuntary placement under section 394.467(1) because: (1) he was not “mentally ill”; and (2) there were less restrictive treatment alternatives to provide for his care, i.e., proper placement in a nursing home. More importantly, DCF observed the lack of compliance with the procedural requirements set forth in section 394.467....

...4th DCA 2009); Wehrwein . We conclude that the trial court’s order constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law. As DCF contends, and as the State and Bronson concede, the trial court did not follow the multi-step process established in section 394.467....

...Gauldin, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Alexandria Walters, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. The appellant, Ezekiel Register, appeals an order of involuntary inpatient placement under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...a Statutes § 394.451) and what has been called the "Jimmy Ryce Act," (Florida Statutes § 394.910). Each of these statutes deal with involuntary placement and each of the Acts require findings by clear and convincing evidence. See, Florida Statutes § 394.467(1) and Florida Statutes § 394.917(1)....

...ute nor the rule address the burden of proof. The trial court noted that in Florida's Baker Act proceedings, which involve the involuntary placement of persons for treatment for mental illness, the clear and convincing evidence standard applies. See § 394.467(1), Fla....

involuntarily committed pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 394.467 (the “Baker Act”) for psychiatric care in a “lock-down”

...ith medication. He definitely meets the criteria for involuntary commitment." The county court entered an order of commitment, finding that appellant "meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization set forth in [section] 916.15(1), and [section] 394.467(1)(a), Florida Statutes." The order committed appellant, pursuant to Fla.R....

...FACTS This case began when the hospital sought the involuntary placement of four individual patients under chapter 394 of the Florida Statutes, commonly known as the Baker Act. The four patients had been certified by the hospital for involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes, and were transported to the hospital's facility by private individuals....

...hosis. No lithium has been administered to Ms. Lefebvre since her admission, due to the likely harmful effects that it will have on the fetus. On July 10, 1990, the administrator of the Hospital filed a petition for involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1989) (the Baker Act), seeking to have Ms....

...Lefebvre's "guardian advocate" (her father) consented to termination of the pregnancy, and since the court found the termination to be in the best interests of Ms. Lefebvre and the fetus, termination could properly be ordered. We disagree. It is true that section 394.467(3)(c), which deals with involuntary placement, provides that "[t]he court may adjudicate a person incompetent pursuant to the provisions of chapter 744 at the hearing on involuntary placement." We find, however, that such adjudication...

...ve been met during the involuntary placement proceeding; for the procedures required in order to adjudicate a person incompetent are more stringent than those required to involuntarily place an individual in a mental treatment facility. For example, section 394.467(2), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that a patient may be involuntarily placed in a treatment facility, after notice and hearing, upon the recommendation (supported by the opinion of a psychiatrist and the second opinion of a clinic...

...r role or ability to function in the family, school, or community, which behaviors are not considered to be a temporary response to a stressful situation. The term includes a child or adolescent who meets the criteria for involuntary placement under s. 394.467(1). § 394.492(6), Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 394.467(1) provides that "[a] person may be placed in involuntary inpatient placement for treatment upon a finding of the court by clear and convincing evidence that” "[tjhere is substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she will inflict serious bodily harm on himself ... or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm[.]” § 394.467(l)(a)(2.)(b.), Fla....

...§ 39.407(6)(a)(3.), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis supplied). Section 394.492(5), unlike subsection (6)> provides that "[t]he term [‘emotional disturbance’] does not include ,a child or adolescent who meets the criteria for involuntary placement under s. 394.467(1),” § 394.492(5), Fla....

...394.875 or a hospital licensed under chapter 395 for residential mental health treatment only pursuant to this sec *1251 tion or may be placed by the court in accordance with an order of involuntary examination or involuntary placement entered pursuant to [the Baker Act] s. 394.463 or s. 394.467....

...ry inpatient placement, was not held within five calendar days. We affirm. When a petition for involuntary placement is filed under the Baker Act, either involuntary outpatient or involuntary inpatient placement may be sought. §§ 394.4655(6)(a)1., 394.467(6)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2008). If involuntary outpatient placement is sought, the trial court must hold a hearing "within 5 working days." § 394.4655(6)(a)1. If involuntary inpatient placement is sought, the trial court must hold a hearing "within 5 days." § 394.467(6)(a)1. D.M.H. seizes on the difference in language to argue that because section 394.4655(6)(a)1. uses "working" days, the omission of that word in section 394.467(6)(a)1....

...n provisions to the contrary." Canonico v. Callaway, 26 So.3d 53, 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). In relevant part, rule 1.090(a) provides that Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded when the prescribed time period is seven days or less. Because section 394.467 does not specifically indicate *802 how the five-day time period is to be calculated, rule 1.090 governs....

...criteria for continued involuntary placement; and (3) neither the defendant, his counsel, nor the prosecutor disputed the findings of the defendant's continued incompetency or asked for a hearing on the report. Using the authority of the Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991) (Involuntary Placement), the court ordered that where the report indicates no change in the defendant's competency status, a hearing officer shall conduct a hearing for continued involuntary placement since the circuit court has already made the initial placement determination....

...evidence that he is a danger to himself or others. The State properly concedes error and agrees that the writ of habeas corpus should be granted. Accordingly, we grant C.W.’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and order his immediate release. See § 394.467(1)(a), Fla....

...failed to meet the legal requirements necessary to be declared competent to stand trial, he was also not capable of caring for himself. For the most part, the mental health professionals also held the opinion that C.Z. was ineligible for involuntary civil commitment under the Baker Act. See § 394.467, Fla....

WENTWORTH, Judge. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in involuntarily committing appellant to Florida State Hospital as the section 394.467, Florida Statutes, criteria were not proven by clear and convincing evidence....

...Heidrick, 707 So.2d 1165, 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) review dismissed, 719 So.2d 288 (Fla.1998). Once a defendant’s charges are dismissed, the State is required to either release the defendant or commit him for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to section 394.467(1) of the Baker Act....

...reatment to the person where he or she is held. Id. 6 Finally, if the court grants the motion to dismiss and determines that the defendant meets the criteria for civil commitment, the defendant would be transferred to a civil treatment facility. See § 394.467(2), Fla....

working days following the filing of the petition. § 394.467(6)(a)(1); see In re Involuntary Placement of Linn

BARFIELD, Judge. We reverse the involuntary placement of appellant in the Northeast Florida State Hospital, because the criteria of section 394.467(l)(a)2.a. and 394.467(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), were not met....

...At an involuntary commitment proceeding, the state must demonstrate, among other things, either that the patient is incapable of surviving alone and is likely to suffer from neglect or that the patient will inflict serious bodily harm to himself or another person. See § 394.467(l)(a)2, Fla....

...Section 43.28 states: "The counties shall provide appropriate courtrooms, facilities, equipment, and, unless provided by the state, personnel necessary to operate the circuit and county courts." . Section 394.451, et seq., Florida Statutes (1987). . Section 394.467(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Jason Lee White, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. The appellant challenges an order of involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2007). Because the record is devoid of competent substantial evidence that the appellant is incapable of surviving alone or with the help of family and friends, we reverse. Under section 394.467(1), the state must demonstrate, among other things, either that the patient is incapable of surviving alone or with the help of family, friends or available services or that the appellant will inflict serious bodily harm to herself or another person. See § 394.467(1)(a)2, Fla....

involuntary placement for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes. As the appellant asserts

BARFIELD, Judge. The record before this court contains no evidence that will support the required criteria of section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...above, by some other person acting in a manner consistent with the Rule.”). However, we reverse the trial court’s appointment of a guardian advocate. The general master found that P.T. was competent to consent to treatment within the meaning of section 394.467(6)(d), Florida Statutes, and therefore determined that a guardian advocate should not be appointed....

...tal. For the reasons enunciated below we affirm the dismissals of the requests for continued involuntary placement of all the appellees except Walter Starnes. Appellant filed requests for continued involuntary placement of each appellee. Pursuant to § 394.467(4)(a), Fla.Stat....

...Accordingly, the request for continued involuntary placement of Starnes, filed November 17, 1981, was filed within six months of his admission to the treatment facility, but was not filed within six months of the date the court signed his involuntary placement order. Since § 394.467(2), Fla.Stat., relating to admission to a treatment facility on an involuntary basis, indicates that a patient may be retained by the facility for “a period not to exceed 6 months from the date of admission,” and since the order does n...

...rnes. However, we stay the issuance of the mandate for thirty days from the date that it would otherwise issue under Fla.R.App.P. 9.340 so that the appellant may have an opportunity to seek involuntary placement of the patients involved herein under § 394.467, Fla.Stat., if such action is felt to be necessary and advisable....

further involuntary hospitalization pursuant to Section 394.-467(l)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982). We affirm

...evaluation done pursuant to the Baker Act. [1] Based on the examination, Florida Hospital filed a petition for involuntary inpatient placement to request involuntary psychiatric care at Florida Hospital in Orlando. Under Florida's Mental Health Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2007), the circuit court is required to make the initial mental health determination and, in this case, the circuit court found that W.M....

...court determined six additional months of treatment were warranted. W.M. argues that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to order the continued treatment. Especially where it addresses hearings for continued involuntary inpatient treatment, section 394.467 is not a model of clarity....

...tment proceedings. *385 When the statute is read in its entirety, it is clear that the Legislature's intent was that the administrative hearing requirement applies after a patient is committed to a long-term treatment period at a treatment facility. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes, governs involuntary inpatient placement....

...it court relinquishes jurisdiction. In Liebman v. State, 555 So.2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), the Fourth District addressed the argument that it was unconstitutional for an administrative hearing officer to order continued involuntary placement under section 394.467....

...However, as the Fourth District recognized, "Such jurisdiction can be exercised concurrently with the original, nonexclusive jurisdiction given to circuit courts over the same matters." Id. at 1244 (emphasis added). Liebman addressed the confusion surrounding the administrative hearing requirement. In 1971, section 394.467 provided that a hearing officer should hear petitions for continued hospitalization....

...In 1972, the Legislature passed section 26.012, Florida Statutes, "which provided that the circuit court should have exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings relating to involuntary hospitalization and the determination of incompetency." Id. (internal quotations omitted) Finally, in 1978, section 394.467 was amended to provide that the mandates of section 120.57 must be followed in hearings for continued involuntary hospitalization—reaffirming that the Legislature "inten[ded] to have hearings on continuation of involuntary hospitalization handled under the APA." Id. However, most importantly for the instant matter, the Fourth District again recognized the continuing jurisdiction of the circuit court: "[H]earing officers assigned pursuant to section 394.467(7), Florida Statutes, (1987), have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court to conduct hearings on petitions for continuation *387 of involuntary hospitalization." Id....

...persons who have a mental illness, including facilities of the United States Government, and any private facility designated by the department when rendering such services to a person pursuant to the provisions of this part. As referenced above, subsection 394.467(7)(a) provides that hearings for continued involuntary treatment should be administrative, but does not itself distinguish between receiving and treatment facilities....

...The petition shall be filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings within 20 days prior to the expiration date of a person's authorized period of placement or, in the case of a minor, the date when the minor will reach the age of majority. (Emphasis added). This rule fully comports with the language in subsection 394.467(7)(b) which, in discussing petitions for continued involuntary inpatient treatment, references placement in "the treatment facility." The administrative rule, consistent with subsection (7)(b), requires an administrative petition only...

...Florida Hospital fits the statutory definition of a receiving facility. Thus, when the administrator of this receiving facility filed a petition for continued involuntary placement, the receiving facility administrator was not required to file with DOAH under Rule 65E-5.300— the rule, consistent with subsection 394.467(7)(b), only requires "treatment facility" administrators to do so....

...More importantly, because the treatment ordered was short-term, the circuit court properly *388 exercised jurisdiction to order further treatment. However, once long-term treatment is ordered, a petition for continued treatment must be addressed in an administrative hearing under section 394.467....

...facility for psychiatric evaluation where it is suspected that the person suffers mental illness and may need treatment. [2] The apparent intent of the Legislature is to give the circuit court jurisdiction for short-term treatment—up to six months. § 394.467(6)(b) ("If the court concludes that the patient meets the criteria for involuntary inpatient placement, it shall order that the patient ... be treated ... on an involuntary basis, for a period of up to 6 months."). However, the Legislature intended long-term treatment to be subject to administrative procedure. § 394.467(7), Fla....

...evaluation done pursuant to the Baker Act. 1 Based on the examination, Florida Hospital filed a petition for involuntary inpatient placement to request involuntary psychiatric care at Florida Hospital in Orlando. Under Florida’s Mental Health Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2007), the circuit court is required to make the initial mental health determination and, in this case, the circuit court found that W.M....

...court determined six additional months of treatment were warranted. W.M. argues that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to order the continued treatment. Especially where it addresses hearings for continued involuntary inpatient treatment, section 394.467 is not a model of clarity....

...ent proceedings. *385 When the statute is read in its entirety, it is clear that the Legislature’s intent was that the administrative hearing requirement applies after a patient is committed to a long-term treatment period at a treatment facility. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes, governs involuntary inpatient placement....

...it court relinquishes jurisdiction. In Liebman v. State, 555 So.2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), the Fourth District addressed the argument that it was unconstitutional for an administrative hearing officer to order continued involuntary placement under section 394.467....

...However, as the Fourth District recognized, “Such jurisdiction can be exercised concurrently with the original, nonexclusive jurisdiction given to circuit courts over the same matters.” Id. at 1244 (emphasis added). Liebman addressed the confusion surrounding the administrative hearing requirement. In 1971, section 394.467 provided that a hearing officer should hear petitions for continued hospitalization....

...In 1972, the Legislature passed section 26.012, Florida Statutes, “which provided that the circuit court should have exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings relating to involuntary hospitalization and the determination of incompetency.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) Finally, in 1978, section 394.467 was amended to provide that the mandates of section 120.57 must be followed in hearings for continued involuntary hospitalization — reaffirming that the Legislature “inten[ded] to have hearings on continuation of involuntary hospitalization handled under the APA.” Id. However, most importantly for the instant matter, the Fourth District again recognized the continuing jurisdiction of the circuit court: “[Hjearing officers assigned pursuant to section 394.467(7), Florida Statutes, (1987), have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court to conduct hearings on petitions for continuation *387 of involuntary hospitalization.” Id....

...persons who have a mental illness, including facilities of the United States Government, and any private facility designated by the department when rendering such services to a person pursuant to the provisions of this part. As referenced above, subsection 394.467(7)(a) provides that hearings for continued involuntary treatment should be administrative, but does not itself distinguish between receiving and treatment facilities....

...The petition shall be filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings within 20 days prior to the expiration date of a person’s authorized period of placement or, in the case of a minor, the date when the minor will reach the age of majority. (Emphasis added). This rule fully comports with the language in subsection 394.467(7)(b) which, in discussing petitions for continued involuntary inpatient treatment, references placement in “the treatment facility.” The administrative rule, consistent with subsection (7)(b), requires an administrative petition...

...Florida Hospital fits the statutory definition of a receiving facility. Thus, when the administrator of this receiving facility filed a petition for continued involuntary placement, the receiving facility administrator was not required to file with DOAH under Rule 65E-5.300— the rule, consistent with subsection 394.467(7)(b), only requires “treatment facility” administrators to do so....

...More importantly, because the treatment ordered was short-term, the circuit court properly *388 exercised jurisdiction to order further treatment. However, once long-term treatment is ordered, a petition for continued treatment must be addressed in an administrative hearing under section 394.467....

...acility for psychiatric evaluation where it is suspected that the person suffers mental illness and may need treatment. . The apparent intent of the Legislature is to give the circuit court jurisdiction for short-term treatment — up to six months. § 394.467(6)(b) ("If the court concludes that the patient meets the criteria for involuntary inpatient placement, it shall order that the patient ... be treated ... on an involuntary basis, for a period of up to 6 months.”). However, the Legislature intended long-term treatment to be subject to administrative procedure. § 394.467(7), Fla....

...reviewable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(2). See In re Commitment of Reilly, 970 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("As a general rule, certiorari is the proper vehicle for seeking this court's review for involuntary placement by clear and convincing evidence, as section 394.467 requires. We agree. Under subsection (1)(a)2 of section 394.467, the State had to prove one of two things: either that "without treatment, [C.D.] [wa]s likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for himself . . . , and such neglect or refusal pose[d] a real and present threat of substantial harm to his . . . well-being," § 394.467(1)(a)2.a; or that "[t]here [wa]s a substantial likelihood that in the near future he . . . w[ould] inflict serious bodily harm on self or others, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm," § 394.467(1)(a)2.b. The trial court found the latter—that C.D.'s behavior posed a substantial danger to others under section 394.467(1)(a)2.b—based on testimony from the State's testifying doctor....

...was "very argumentative" and "very paranoid," that he "gets agitated and is threatening to the staff," and that he "would be a possible risk" to himself and others without treatment. This evidence is not clear and convincing, and it is insufficient to support a finding that the State met the criteria in section 394.467(1)(a)2.b.2 See of orders committing an individual involuntarily.")....

...And we apply the standard of review this court first outlined in In re Drummond, 69 So. 3d 1054, 1056–58 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), and more recently reiterated in D.F. v. State, 251 So. 3d 276, 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). 2 The evidence was equally insufficient to establish the alternative criteria in section 394.467(1)(a)2.a because neither the doctor's testimony nor any other evidence the State presented specified the nature of self-neglect or substantial harm that would arise if C.D....

...patient's "potential for aggression" and the "possibility of substantial harm" was insufficient where "[t]here was no testimony as to prior incidents involving substantial harm, nor any testimony as to the manner in which future conduct might produce the necessary level of harm under section 394.467(1)(a)2"). Thus, we grant C.D.'s petition and quash the order for involuntary placement. Petition granted; order quashed. KELLY and LUCAS, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication....

...evaluation. For the following reasons, we reverse. Appellant entered a no contest plea to the charge of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. His plea agreement contains a handwritten notation that appellant had been “Baker-Acted several times.” See section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1997)(providing for involuntary placement of mentally ill persons)....

days? 2. Does the 5-day period contained in section 394.467(6), Florida Statutes (1996 Supplement), for

...to proceed in the future. *479 (c) Applicability. This rule shall not apply to defendants determined to be incompetent to proceed with sentencing, which is provided in rule 3.214. Committee Notes 1980 Adoption. As to involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979); as to involuntary admission to residential services, see chapter 393, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...be involuntarily hospitalized. It further provides that the administrator of the facility must notify the state attorney prior to any release of a defendant committed pursuant to this subdivision. As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979);....

evidence, as section 394.467 requires. We agree. Under subsection (1)(a)2 of section 394.467, the State

the trial court pursuant to Florida Statute Section 394.467. Upon consideration of the state’s commendable

...Allen, Public Defender; and Maria Ines Suber, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellees. WIGGINTON, Judge. Appellant is administrator of the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee. Appellees are persons involuntarily placed in that facility. Under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1987), appellant by separate petitions requested authorization to continue appellees' involuntary placements....

...er authorizing such continued hospitalization for a period of less than six months due to the fact that a plan for alternative placement was being pursued and would allegedly have been accomplished within the six-month period of time contemplated by section 394.467. The issue on appeal is whether the hearing officer's order allowing continued placement for periods less than the statutorily authorized period of six months was proper. We hold that it was not and reverse. Section 394.467(4)(f) provides that if a patient shows he or she "continues to meet the criteria for involuntary placement, the hearing officer shall sign the order for continued involuntary placement." See Williams v....

...the six-month period. That would be a result not intended by the legislature. Accordingly, the orders appealed are reversed and the cause is remanded to the hearing officer with directions to modify the authorized commitment periods to conform with section 394.467(4)(f), requiring that the continued hospitalizations be authorized for periods not to exceed six months....

others, and he continued to meet Florida Statute § 394.-467(l)’s enterias for involuntary hospitalization

...section 1396a(a)(3), an issue that a Medicaid beneficiary has the right to seek a fair hearing on. As such, DCF correctly dismissed J.W.’s hearing request, and we affirm the Final Order of Dismissal on appeal. AFFIRMED. WOLF and SWANSON, JJ., concur. . See § 394.467, Fla....

Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1983) (“the Baker Act”)

PER CURIAM. Gloria Pullen appeals an order authorizing her continued involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467(7), Florida Statutes....

...we conclude that this issue was not properly preserved for review and thus cannot be reached on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm. Proceedings to continue the involuntary placement of an individual under the Baker Act are administrative in nature. See § 394.467(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Pursuant to section 394.467(7)(e), a person who is the subject of a petition for continued involuntary placement is generally entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel, and Ms....

...petitions this court for habeas corpus relief to obtain her immediate release from her present confinement at the crisis stabilization unit at Stewart-Marchman Behavioral Healthcare. She argues that the order of involuntary commitment issued by the lower court pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2015), is improper because the evidence presented at the hearing did not establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner was a....

PER CURIAM. The appellant challenges an order of involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...Because the record is devoid of competent substantial evidence, either that the appellant is incapable of surviving alone or with the help of family, friends or available services or that the appellant will inflict serious bodily harm to herself or another person, we reverse. Under section 394.467(1), the state must demonstrate, among other things, either that the patient is incapable of surviving alone or with the help of family, friends or available services or that the appellant will inflict serious bodily harm to herself or another person. See § 394.467(l)(a)2, Fla....

...an appeal for Michael Gorchov who was involuntarily hospitalized by the circuit court pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 394.-467. There is no claim that appellant Gor-chov is not mentally ill. The claim is that the trial court proceeded illegally (1) because section 394.467 (2) is unconstitutionally vague and overly broad, and (2) because the judge erred in admitting into evidence over objection a psychiatrist’s evaluation of Gorchov’s mental condition when the evaluation was made in part from contro...

...The constitutional challenge to the statute was not made in the trial court. Nevertheless, we are called upon to consider the question under the rule laid down in Town of Monticello v. Finlayson, 156 Fla. 568 , 23 So.2d 843 (1945). Appellant urges that the criteria provided in § 394.467(1) is so vague as to be incapable of certain interpretation....

...diate release. See C.W. v. State , 214 So.3d 796 , 797 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (granting habeas corpus petition where trial court involuntarily committed petitioner without clear and convincing evidence that he was a danger to himself or others) (citing § 394.467(1)(a), Fla....

deemed to be inappropriate or unavailable. § 394.467(2)(b)1.–3., Fla. Stat.

...ate release. See C.W. v. State, 214 So. 3d 796, 797 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (granting habeas corpus petition where trial court involuntarily committed petitioner without clear and convincing evidence that he was a danger to himself or others) (citing § 394.467(1)(a), Fla....

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from an order of involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...Rather, there must also be clear and convincing evidence that without treatment, the patient would pose a real and present threat of substantial harm to himself, or a substantial likelihood that in the near future he will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another, as evidenced by recent behavior. See § 394.467(1)(a)2, Fla....

residential mental health sendees pursuant to section 394.467(2). Acting as a friend to Johnson, Wayne Basford

...petitions this court for habeas corpus relief to obtain her immediate release from her present confinement at the crisis stabilization unit at Stewart-Marchman Behavioral Healthcare. She argues that the order of involuntary commitment issued by the lower court pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2015), is improper because the evidence presented at the hearing did not establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner was a danger to herself or others....

PER CURIAM. Joshua Thigpen appeals his involuntary commitment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...well-being” or that “[tjhere is a substantial likelihood that in the near future [appellant] will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm.” Sec. 394.467(l)(a)2, Fla....

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from an order placing appellant involuntarily in Florida State Hospital pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991). We reverse and vacate the order of commitment. In order to involuntarily confine a mentally ill person for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, the court must find that: (1) the person is mentally ill; (2) because of mental illness, the person has refused placement or is unable to determine whether placement is necessary; (3) the person is manifestly incapable of surviving a...

PER CURIAM. The appellant appeals the trial court’s order of involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...ith the aid of others and that no less restrictive alternatives were available were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Because the trial court erred in finding that no less restrictive alternatives were available, we reverse. *225 Under section 394.467, Florida Statutes, the state must present clear and convincing evidence of the statutory criteria before a person may be involuntarily placed for treatment....

...substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings. See, e,g., Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982); Williams v. Davis, 459 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Under section 394.467(1), the state must show, among other criteria, that “[a]ll available less restrictive treatment alternatives which would offer an opportunity for improvement of his or her condition have been judged to bé inappropriate.” § 394.467(l)(b), Fla....

visited February 14, 2012). . See Fla. Stat. § 394.467 for discussion of involuntary inpatient placement

...The question raised by the motion is whether a *1312 circuit court has the authority to admit such a mental incompetent to supersedeas bail. We hold that the trial court lacks the authority to admit to supersedeas bail a person who appeals an order of involuntary hospitalization under the Baker Act. [Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1975)]. Accordingly, we deny the motion to review. It appears without dispute that on January 12, 1978, a petition to involuntarily hospitalize the appellant Tom Holland pursuant to Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1975), was filed in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida....

...In fact, the Baker Act contains detailed procedures for the admission and retention of patients pending emergency examination and court-ordered evaluation, Section 394.463(1), (2), Florida Statutes (1975), as well as pending proceedings for involuntary hospitalization. Section 394.467(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Post-commitment proceedings further mandate involuntary hospitalization up to a maximum of six months. Section 394.467(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...3.691; Fla.App. Rule 6.15 (1962). If a person is subject to commitment under the Baker Act as being likely to injure himself or others, or in need of care or treatment but lacking sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf, Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975), it would be a gross contradiction and distortion of the Baker Act to release such a person on bail pending appeal....

...l precautions approximately two weeks prior to the hearing, and numerous attempts to place her in the community have failed. Based on these observations and findings, we conclude there is competent substantial evidence to satisfy the requirements of section 394.467(1)(a)1.b., Florida Statutes (2011), which is the sole criteria challenged on appeal....

...ic, would neglect herself if she were not on medication, without specifying the nature of the 2In Boller, the First District Court of Appeal addressed an involuntary commitment pursuant to the 1999 version of the Baker Act; specifically, section 394.467(1)(a)2.a., the language and requirements of which are nearly identical to section 916.13(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2017)....

...Daniels, Public Defender, and David P. Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant. Charlie Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Sean F. Callaghan, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. The appellant challenges an order of involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...Because the record is devoid of competent substantial evidence, either that the appellant posed a real and present threat of substantial harm to her well-being or that her recent behavior evidenced a substantial likelihood that she would inflict serious bodily harm on herself or another in the near future, we reverse. Under section 394.467, Florida Statutes, the state must present clear and convincing evidence of the statutory criteria before a person may be involuntarily placed for treatment....

...etent substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings. See, e.g., Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla.1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982); Williams v. Davis, 459 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Under section 394.467(1), the state must show, among other criteria, either that the patient by neglect or refusal to care for himself or herself poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his or her well-being, or that there is a substantial likelihood that in the near future the patient will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm. See § 394.467(1)(a)2, Fla....

phrase “competence to consent to treatment” in Section 394.-467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), is not

PER CURIAM. We grant AB.’s amended petition seeking emergency habeas corpus relief to obtain her immediate release from her present confinement at Halifax Health. The order of involuntary commitment issued by the lower court pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2017), is improper because the evidence presented at the hearing did not establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that A.B....

...PER CURIAM. We grant A.B.'s amended petition seeking emergency habeas corpus relief to obtain her immediate release from her present confinement at Halifax Health. The order of involuntary commitment issued by the lower court pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2017), is improper because the evidence presented at the hearing did not establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that A.B....

defender shall be prescribed by general law. Section 394.467(4)(e), F. S., states that "[i]n the event a

PER CURIAM. Appellant appeals his involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2001). We reverse the order for involuntary placement and remand for further proceedings. The State failed to meet the clear and convincing standard by presenting only conclusory evidence that Appellant met the statutory requirements of section 394.467....

PER CURIAM. The appellant challenges a Baker Act order of involuntary placement for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes. However, the record does not clearly and convincingly establish the nature, extent, and likelihood of any future *765 harm which would comport with the requirements of section 394.467(l)(a)2....

...Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jacqueline I. Kurland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. KUNTZ, J. John Kogel appeals the circuit court’s order granting a petition for involuntary inpatient placement. Under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2020), also known as the Baker Act, the State must present clear and convincing evidence of the statutory criteria before a person may be involuntarily placed for treatment....

...evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm; and (b) All available less restrictive treatment alternatives that would offer an opportunity for improvement of his or her condition have been judged to be inappropriate. § 394.467(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2020). Kogel’s challenge in this appeal is limited to section 394.467(1)(a)2.a. He argues the State did not establish that without treatment he was likely to suffer from neglect or refusal to care for himself, threatening substantial harm to his well-being....

...threat of substantial harm to herself, or a substantial likelihood that in the near future she will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or another, as evidenced by recent behavior.” Boller v. State, 775 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (citing § 394.467(1)(a) 2., Fla....

...�s change of plea. Analysis “The procedure for determining a defendant’s competency is governed by Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.210 through 3.215. We review 1The “Baker-acted” reference is to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2013) (“the Baker Act”). 2 the court’s judgment and its compliance with these rules de novo.” Hawks v....

....459(8), Florida Statutes (2017), alleging that he was unlawfully detained as the State failed to present substantial, competent evidence to justify his detention at his Baker Act hearing.1 The State properly conceded error. Finding 1 § 394.467, Fla....

...inadequate to justify Petitioner’s continued involuntary commitment. Second, the Petitioner had no obligation to testify or even speak at the hearing, and his decision to remain silent cannot be used to support his continued confinement. § 394.467(6)(a)3., Fla....

confining appellant under the provisions of section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1979). It was alleged appellant

criteria for commitment under the Baker Act.2 Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2011), of the Baker Act

...oluntary placement in a mental hospital. We hold that affirmance is warranted in this case because the state met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that appellant meets the criteria for continued involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes....

PER CURIAM. L.B. appeals from an order of commitment pursuant to the Baker Act, section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...The evaluating physician, who did not speak Portuguese, formulated a diagnosis of appellant, who only spoke Portuguese, that included an apparently nonexistent disorder (“Black Diamond Parkinson’s”) and disorders that would have no bearing on the statutory factors enumerated in section 394.467 (“curvature of the spine”)....

LEHAN, Judge. Appellant appeals from an order denying her motion to vacate an order of involuntary placement for treatment of mental illness, entered under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), and to schedule a hearing on the need for involuntary placement....

...On March 23, 1983, without a hearing, the court ordered the involuntary placement of appellant. In April 1983, the public defender filed in the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County the motion to vacate the order for involuntary placement and to schedule a hearing on involuntary placement. Grounds alleged were that section 394.467(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982) (identical to the corresponding provision in the 1983 statutes), which allows a waiver of a hearing by a person subject to involuntary placement, is unconstitutional. Appellant argues that the criteria for involuntary placement under section 394.467(l)(b) are inconsistent with the ability to give a knowing and informed waiver of a hearing....

...We decline to address the constitutional argument presented by appellant because we find that there was available to appellant another remedy by which to get a hearing on her need for placement. See Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975). Section 394.467(2)(b) provides that a person who has waived a hearing, or his guardian or representative, may apply for a hearing on the need for involuntary placement at any time within six months of the date of the involuntary placement certificate. The petition is to be filed in the county in which the person is involuntarily placed. Thus, by filing a petition pursuant to section 394.467(2)(b) in the proper county, appellant could have had the hearing she requested....

terminate on or about June 13, 1982. Under section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1981), the administrator

...Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. LaROSE, Chief Judge. D.F., who is the subject of a Baker Act proceeding, appeals the trial court's order involuntarily committing him to an inpatient treatment facility for three months. See § 394.467, Fla....

...uld be inappropriate. The State must prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory criteria authorizing involuntary commitment have been met." Blue v. State, 764 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (citations omitted). Section 394.467(1) sets forth the statutory criteria. Specific to this case, the State must prove the following as to D.F.: (a) He ....

...; and -5-  (b) All available less restrictive treatment alternatives which would offer an opportunity for improvement of his . . . condition have been judged to be inappropriate. § 394.467(1)....

...Lyon would, if not on medication, neglect herself" where the doctor failed "to specify the nature of the self[-]neglect he anticipated in a way that established any real and present threat of substantial harm to her well-being"). 3D.F. also argues that section 394.467(1)(a)(2)(b) is inapplicable. Because section 394.467(1)(a)(2)(b) is inapplicable, we focus on D.F.'s first two arguments. -6-  D.F....

may be involuntarily committed pursuant to Section 394.467, Florida Statutes, because her behavior or

...dismissal shall be without prejudice to the state to refile the charges should the defendant be declared - 19 - competent to proceed in the future. If the defendant meets the criteria for commitment under section 394.467, Florida Statutes, the court shall commit the defendant to the Department of Children and Families for involuntary hospitalization solely under the provisions of law....

involuntary hospitalization is set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979). As to involuntary

proceedings for involuntary commitment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes, communication technology

...Butterworth, Attorney General, and Margaret A. Brenan, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before JORGENSON, COPE and RAMIREZ, JJ. COPE, J. Rodney Craig appeals an order committing him for involuntary mental health treatment under the Baker Act, §§ 394.451, 394.467, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Two important facts are undisputed. (1) Appellant was mentally ill at the times relevant here. (2) Appellant was incompetent to make a decision whether to consent to treatment. [1] Thus, those parts of the involuntary commitment criteria were satisfied. See § 394.467(1)(a)1.b., Fla. Stat. (1999). In order to obtain an involuntary commitment, the State must also establish that the patient meets one of the statutory standards for showing that the patient poses a potential for harm to himself or others. See id. § 394.467(1)(a)2....

...ory provision: b. There is substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or another person, as evidenced *534 by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm .... Id. § 394.467(1)(a)2.b....

...The appellant argues that under the current version of the Baker Act, proof of a purely emotional injury is insufficient. Appellant is correct. By its terms, the statute requires a finding of a substantial likelihood that the patient "will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or another person ...." § 394.467(1)(a)2.b....

...The master and the trial court relied on In re Beverly. However, that case involved the 1973 version of the Baker Act which provided, in part, that a patient could be committed if "[l]ikely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty ...." § 394.467(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1973) (quoted in In re Beverly, 342 So.2d at 483). The 1973 statute was broad enough to include emotional injury as well as physical injury. 342 So.2d at 487. The Baker Act was subsequently amended. It now specifies "serious bodily harm," § 394.467(1)(a)2.b., Fla....

...Under the statutory standard, there must be a showing of a "substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she [the patient] will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm ...." § 394.467(1)(a)2.b., Fla....

...luding available alternative services, and without treatment, is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself, and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his or her well-being.... Id. § 394.467(1)(a)2.a. The statute also requires that "[a]ll available less restrictive treatment alternatives which would offer an opportunity for improvement of his or her condition have been judged to be inappropriate." Id. § 394.467(1)(b)....

...contain clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to himself or others. The State properly concedes error and agrees that the writ of habeas corpus should be granted. Accordingly, we grant the petition and order his immediate release. See § 394.467(1)(a), Fla....

...Judge Mollica set bond at $500,000, noting that Plaintiff is the brother of Nicholas Cruz and that Stoneman Douglas students deserved to feel safe, especially following a grave tragedy. Id. ¶ 23. Unable to make bail, Plaintiff remained in custody until he was involuntarily committed, under the Baker Act, *1217 Fla. Stat. § 394.467 (2016), to the Broward Health Medical Center (the "Medical Center"), where Plaintiff spent five days undergoing repeated mental health evaluations and was placed on 24-hour suicide watch, with medical staff check-ups every 15 minutes....

...treatment on an outpatient basis. She had a business to attend to, and she was also responsible for her mother who has dementia. The trial court ruled in the State’s favor, ordering appellant’s commitment. Appellant then filed this appeal. Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2021), lays out specific criteria which the State must prove to order the involuntary inpatient placement of an individual as follows: (1) Criteria.--A person may be ordered for involuntary inpatient pl...

...reat of substantial harm to herself, or a substantial likelihood that in the near future she will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or another, as evidenced by recent behavior.” Boller v. State, 775 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (citing § 394.467(1)(a)2., Fla....

...v. State, 307 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (quoting Boller, 775 So. 2d at 410). In this case, the criteria for involuntary commitment were not met. The doctor testified that appellant was not in danger of self-neglect, negating the existence of section 394.467(1)(a)2.a., as a criteria for commitment....

...His testimony was conclusory, without any support of facts in evidence. This case is similar to Blue v. State, 764 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The issue in Blue, as here, was whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the criteria contained in section 394.467(1)(a)2....

...al harm to his … well-being[,]” or “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that in the near future he … will inflict serious bodily harm on [him]self or others, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm[.]” § 394.467(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2021).  The state concedes the circuit court lacked clear and convincing evidence to support its finding that the appellant met section 394.467(1)(a)2.’s requirements for involuntary patient placement. Based on our review of the record, we agree with the state’s concession of error....

Circuit Court of Dade County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional

Circuit Court of Dade County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional

PER CURIAM. Michael Gorchov appealed a judgment of the circuit court providing for his involuntary hospitalization upon the ground that he is mentally ill. Two points were presented on the appeal. The first point urged that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1975), was unconstitutional as vague and overbroad and in violation of the due process clause of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Florida....

...with HRS regulations, Fla.Admin.Code R. 10E-5.061; 2) reporting abuse pursuant to the Florida Adult Protective Services Act, Fla.Stat. § 415.101, et seq.; and 3) raising the deficiencies in the periodic Baker Act hearings held pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 394.467....

Health for hospitalization under the provisions of § 394.467, Florida Statutes. It further provides that, “The

...new statute [2] is stricter, making the judge's duty as to representation mandatory rather than permissive, and does not, therefore, affect the viability of In Re: Hnat, supra. We have jurisdiction, Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. Section 394.467(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), the statute under which petitioner was found incompetent provides: ......

...Given scenarios such as this, trial courts are understandably reluctant to release incompetent, reoffending defendants back into the community. Nevertheless, until the legislature provides a fix, the only recourse is for the State to institute civil commitment proceedings pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...Perkins under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.213(b)(1) due to his continued incompetence to proceed in the criminal matter. 1 The order states, in part, that “[tjhere is clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant continues to meet the criteria for involuntary placement pursuant to Florida Statute 394.467.” In addition, the order directs that Mr....

...On June 29, 2009, when involuntary commitment proceedings were initiated against Mr. Perkins in the probate court, the probate court ruled that the criminal court’s June 25 order operated to collaterally es-top it from readjudicating the issue of whether Mr. Perkins met the criteria for civil commitment under section 394.467(1)....

...2d DCA 2011), we conclude that — under the circumstances of this case — the probate court erred in- ruling that the doctrine of collateral estoppel *338 precluded it from determining whether Mr. Perkins .met the criteria for civil commitment under section 394.467(1)....

...This panel also considered whether an earlier hearing in the criminal court, during which it initially determined that Mr. Perkins was incompetent and committed him for treatment under rule 3.212(c)(3), may have satisfied the requirements of a Baker Act hearing under section 394.467(6)....

...State, 829 So.2d 901, 906 (Fla.2002))). For these reasons, the probate court erred in ruling that the criminal court’s June 25, 2009, order collaterally estopped it from readjudicating the issue of whether Mr. Perkins met the criteria for civil commitment under section 394.467(1)....

...to injure” and “manifestly dangerous.” . Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.210(e)(9): When a person tried for an offense shall be acquitted for the cause of insanity, if the Court shall then determine that the defendant presently meets the criteria set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1975), the Court shall commit the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for involuntary hospitalization, or shall order that he receive outpatient treatment at any other appropriate facility or service on an outpatient basis, or shall discharge the defendant....

he entered an order that in accordance with Section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1975), he was denying

...Pierce Wood Memorial Hospital on June 26, 1993. The order: (1) found that Akins remained incompetent to proceed to trial and was unlikely to regain competency in the foreseeable future; (2) dismissed the criminal charges; and (3) involuntarily placed Akins pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1993). The administrator filed a request, pursuant to section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1993), for an order continuing the involuntary placement....

...son, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm; and (b) All available less restrictive treatment alternatives which would offer an opportunity for improvement of his condition have been judged to be inappropriate. § 394.467(1), Fla.Stat....

...involuntary placement of appel-lee, a patient at the hospital. Appellee was involuntarily committed by order of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in 1978. Since that time appellee has remained a patient at the hospital. Pursuant to section 394.467(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), appellant has periodically obtained continuances of appellee’s involuntary placement....

...finement were denied. The orders indicate that the hearing officer did not restrict herself to consideration of the relevant criteria for involuntary confinement; we therefore reverse the orders appealed and remand the cause for further proceedings. Section 394.467(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), establishes the criteria for noncriminal involuntary confinement, and provides that Any other person may be involuntarily placed if he is mentally ill, and because of his illness, is: 1....

...ings: “At the heart of this case is the right of an individual to have a judicial officer physically present at hearings held to determine whether the individual may be involuntarily committed to a mental health facility or hospital pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2016) (“the Baker Act”).” Id....

PER CURIAM. The appellant was involuntarily committed pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2001). She concedes that certain of the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment apply to her, but she argues that the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence to satisfy the criteria of section 394.467(l)(a)2 that (i) she is manifestly incapable of surviving alone or with the help of others, and without treatment, is likely to suffer from neglect which poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to her well-being, or (ii) th...

...section 394.4625(l)(d) prohibited his admission as a voluntary patient. A few days later, the administrator of that facility filed a petition for involuntary placement. The matter was immediately referred to a general magistrate for a hearing under section 394.467....

...Although it was not argued by the State, this court has considered an alternative basis for affirming the probate court. We suspected that the 2004 hearing at which Mr. Linn was committed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212(c) might be the legal equivalent of a Baker Act hearing under section 394.467....

...A commitment under rule 3.212 results in a six-month review process to assure that the defendant is not involuntarily committed beyond the period in which such commitment is psychologically and legally justified. This safeguard procedure is very similar to the review process mandated by section 394.467(6)-(7)....

...It occurred to this court that the order entered at the conclusion of the criminal case was based on a proper competency determination in 2004 and that the effect of the transfer was simply to shift the safeguard procedures from those in rule 3.212 to the similar procedures in section 394.467....

...atutes § 394.451) and what has been called the “Jimmy Ryce Act,” (Florida Statutes § 394.910). Each of these statutes deal with involuntary placement and each of the Acts require findings by clear and convincing evidence. See, Florida Statutes § 394.467(1) and Florida Statutes § 394.917(1)....

...nor the rule address the burden of proof. The trial court noted that in Florida’s Baker Act proceedings, which involve the involuntary placement of persons for treatment for mental illness, the clear and' convincing evidence standard applies. See § 394.467(1), Fla....

...The Corrections Mental Health Act, sections 945.40-49, Florida Statutes, does not set forth the evidentiary standard for commitment, unlike civil commitments pursuant to Florida Statutes, Chapter 394, Florida’s Mental Health Act, also known as the Baker Act. Section 394.467(1) of the Baker Act sets forth the evidentiary standard for commitment of clear and convincing evidence....

...The Corrections Mental Health Act, sections 945.40-49, Florida Statutes, does not set forth the evidentiary standard for commitment, unlike civil commitments pursuant to Florida Statutes, Chapter 394, Florida's Mental Health Act, also known as the Baker Act. Section 394.467(1) of the Baker Act sets forth the evidentiary standard for commitment of clear and convincing evidence....

PER CURIAM. A.G. appeals the trial court’s order of involuntary commitment entered pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...safety of the public and his release from the hospital would endanger the peace and safety of whatever community he was released into.” The trial judge’s use of the term “manifestly dangerous” does not track the language of Florida Statutes § 394.467 (1979)....

...court’s order granting South County Mental Health Center’s (“the Center”) petition for involuntary inpatient placement at the Center. Ross contends that the State failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the criteria set forth in section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (2022) (part of “The Florida Mental Health Act,” a/k/a “The Baker Act” 1) to support her involuntary inpatient placement....

...Consequently, Ross was taken to the Center for “involuntary examination” pursuant to section 394.463, Florida Statutes (2022). There, a psychiatrist examined her. Based on this doctor’s examination of Ross and his communications with Ross’s family, the Center petitioned for section 394.467 involuntary 1 § 394.451, Fla....

...her well-being; or b. There is a substantial likelihood that in the near future . . . she will inflict serious bodily harm on self or others, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting or threatening such harm . . . . § 394.467(1)(a)2., Fla....

...including available alternative services, and, without treatment, [was] likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for . . . herself, and such neglect or refusal pose[d] a real and present threat of substantial harm to . . . her well-being.” § 394.467(1)(a)2.a., Fla....

...3d at 375 (alterations in original) (quoting Bess v. State, 336 So. 3d 36, 37–38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)). Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence of self-neglect posing a real and present threat of substantial harm to Ross’s well-being under section 394.467(1)(a)2.a. Conclusion Because the psychiatrist’s testimony was conclusory and unsubstantiated by the facts in evidence, the State has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the required involuntary inpatient placement criteria....

...We further direct that such proceedings be followed in all future cases in which court-appointed counsel seeks to withdraw from the appeal of a dependency order placing a child into residential treatment. RULING ON MOTION TO WITHDRAW DEFERRED; COUNSEL DIRECTED TO FILE ANDERS BRIEF. ORFINGER and MONACO, JJ., concur. . See § 394.467, Fla....

...of persons who are found to be mentally ill, and who, because of the illness, present a threat of substantial harm to their own well-being, or present a danger that the patient will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself or on others. See § 394.467(1), Fla....

...nter was untimely filed. Appellant also appeals the order for involuntary placement, claiming her detention is illegal and the State failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that she met the criteria for involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...We affirm the denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, we reverse the order for involuntary placement, and remand for further proceedings. At best, the State presented only conclusory evidence that Appellant met the requirements of section 394.467(l)(a)2 and (b), which was insufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard required for involuntary placement....

...He first asserts that the State failed to prove that he met the criteria for involuntary placement. We reject this argument without further discussion. Rice next argues that the trial court erred in failing to inform him of his right to an independent expert examination. We agree and reverse for further proceedings. Section 394.467(6)(a)2, Florida Statutes (2007), provides, in part: “The patient and the patient’s guardian or representative shall be informed by the court of the right to an independent expert examination....

failed to satisfy a similar requirement in section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1985)). Accord In re Beverly

...Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Shelly L. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. The appellant, Willie S. Brown, appeals an order of involuntary inpatient placement under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(A); Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c); Langsetmo v. Metza, 306 So. 3d 112, 114 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020); Murison v. Coral Park Props., Inc., 64 So. 3d 1288, 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). involuntary inpatient placement. See generally § 394.467(7), Fla....

PER CURIAM. Clarence Williams appeals an order involuntarily committing him under section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1995)....

and a timely hearing occurred the next day, Section 394.-467(3). There was no error. Abdullah was capable

civil commitment order under The Baker Act, section 394.-467, Florida Statutes (1989), become moot solely

...Butkis asserts that the hearing officer failed to make findings of fact required by section 120.59(l)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes (1991). The administrator of G. Pierce Wood Memorial Hospital concedes that the order denying the continued placement should be reversed or a new hearing is required pursuant to section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...After hearing evidence, with the guardian's consent, the patient was committed to a secure facility for thirty days. We grant this petition because the magistrate and the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in discharging the public defender's office. Section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes (2011), requires appointment of the public defender's office to represent the patient in involuntary civil commitment proceedings "unless the person is otherwise represented by counsel." The guardian's attorney represents the guardian, not the ward....

...th the First District's discussion of the role of the public defender in Baker Act proceedings: The Public Defender has a duty under the law to represent indigent mental patients in hearings to determine the need for continued involuntary placement. § 394.467(4)(e) and § 27.51(1)(d) Fla....

...At a hearing held on February 17, 2017, the circuit 1 § 394.463(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2016). court determined that C.W. met the criteria for involuntary commitment and issued an order for involuntary inpatient placement at the Medical Center under section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (2016). On March 28, 2017, Appellant petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus....

...not contain clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to himself or others. The State properly concedes error and agrees that the writ of habeas corpus should be granted. Accordingly, we grant C.W.'s petition for writ of habeas corpus and order his immediate release. See § 394.467(1)(a), Fla....