Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 827.03
S827.03 1 - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7492 - F: T
S827.03 2 - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: F
S827.03 1a - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: T
S827.03 1b - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - REPEALED 1996 AGGRAVATED ABUSE WILLFUL TORTURE - F: S
S827.03 1b - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7492 - F: T
S827.03 1c - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - REPLD 1996 AGGRAV ABUSE MALICIOUS PUNISHMENT - F: S
S827.03 1c - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: T
S827.03 1d - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - REPEALED 1996 AGGRAVATED ABUSE WILLFUL CAGING - F: S
S827.03 2a - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: F
S827.03 2b - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: F
S827.03 2c - CRUELTY TOWARD CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7324 - F: F
S827.03 3b - NEGLECT CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7493 - F: S
S827.03 3c - NEGLECT CHILD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7494 - F: T
CopyCited 148 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 31833870
...N FOR *368 AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR WHEN THE INSTRUCTION INACCURATELY DEFINES THE DISPUTED ELEMENT OF MALICE? We answer this rephrased question in the affirmative. Petitioner Loretta Reed was convicted of aggravated child abuse under section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1997)....
...Court in State v. Gaylord,
356 So.2d 313, 314 (Fla.1978). In Young v. State,
753 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), the First District Court of Appeal explained this conflict by stating: In State v. Gaylord,
356 So.2d 313 (Fla.1978), the court held that section
827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1975), which treated "maliciously punish[ing] a child" as aggravated child abuse, was not unconstitutionally vague....
...State,
387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980); see also Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293,
87 S.Ct. 1967,
18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). It is so ordered. ANSTEAD, C.J., SHAW, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur. QUINCE, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] Section
827.03(2) states: "Aggravated child abuse" occurs when a person: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child; or (c) Knowingly or willfully abuses a child...
CopyCited 88 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1998 WL 207909
...theless determined what evidence was credible, and chose to convict Donaldson. Thus, we are unable to disturb the jury's verdict on this basis. [5] The jury verdict form indicates only that the jury found Donaldson guilty of first-degree murder. [6] Section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1993) provides as follows: (1) "Aggravated child abuse" is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures a child; (c) Maliciously punishes a child; or (d) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child. (2) A person who commits aggravated child abuse is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. §
827.03, Fla....
CopyCited 85 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 8723, 2003 WL 21027214
...ecause, like the alien in Fernandez-Bernal, Garcia has had an opportunity to contest her inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(2). The record indicates that Garcia is an alien who was convicted of the crime of aggravated child abuse, in violation of §§
827.03(1), (3) and
784.045(1) of the Florida Statutes....
...at 1215-16 . Under Florida law, aggravated child abuse occurs when a person (a) commits an aggravated battery on a child; (b) willfully tortures a child; (c) maliciously punishes a child; or (d) willfully and unlawfully cages a child. Florida Stat. § 827.03(1) (1990)....
CopyCited 68 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2005 WL 1475401
...o the homicide. Likewise, had Brooks been charged with aggravated child abuse, he could not have been convicted of that crime. That is because aggravated child abuse is an aggravated battery, the only difference being that the victim is a child. See 827.03(2), Fla....
...[26] The statute in effect in 1984 provided: "Aggravated child abuse" is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures a child; (c) Maliciously punishes a child; or (d) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child. §827.03(1)(a)-(d), Fla....
...n a child; (b) Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child; or (c) Knowingly or willfully abuses a child and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child. § 827.03(2)(a)-(c), Fla....
CopyCited 67 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 1044912
...ndant is required to show not that the indictment is technically defective but that it is so fundamentally defective that it cannot support a judgment of conviction. [15] In the present case, the caption of the indictment charged Ford with violating section 827.03, Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), and the text of the indictment stated specific grounds. [16] Although section 827.03 embraces three separate child abuse-related offenses (i.e., simple child abuse, aggravated child abuse, and neglect of a child) and the grounds set forth in the indictment could have supported charges of either simple child abuse under section 827.03(1) or neglect of a child under section 827.03(3), this is not a sufficient basis for invalidating the conviction at this point....
...Any inquiry concerning the technical propriety of the indictment should have been raised prior to trial at which time any deficiency could have been cured. The indictment as worded adequately placed Ford on notice that he was charged with a violation of the child abuse proscriptions of section 827.03....
...k in an isolated wooded area of the sod farm. When she was found the next day, she was dehydrated, flushed with heat, and covered with insect bites. This is a sufficient evidentiary basis to support a third-degree felony child abuse conviction under section 827.03....
...port a judgment of conviction when the indictment references a specific section of the criminal code which sufficiently details all the elements of the offense."). [16] Count IX of the indictment charged Ford with the following crime: "CHILD ABUSE F.S. 827.03 THIRD DEGREE FELONY." The relevant text of the indictment read as follows: "The Grand Jurors of the County of Charlotte, State of Florida, impaneled and sworn to inquire and true presentment make in and for the County of Charlotte upon thei...
CopyCited 61 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Charles Corcees, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. OVERTON, Justice. This is a direct appeal from a circuit court judgment expressly upholding the *1159 constitutionality of sections
782.04 (third-degree felony murder) and
827.03(3) (aggravated child abuse), Florida Statutes (1975). We have jurisdiction. [1] Appellants Robert Mahaun and Patricia Mahaun, husband and wife, were charged in Count One with third-degree felony murder and in Count Two with aggravated child abuse under sections
782.04(4) and
827.03(3), respectively....
...COUNT TWO ROBERT MAHAUN and PATRICIA MAHAUN ... did commit the crime of aggravated child abuse by torturing one Gregory Travis Moore, a child under the age of eighteen years, by causing great bodily harm, or permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; contrary to Chapter 827.03, Florida Statutes......
...offense of culpable negligence by exposing the infant to injury, a lesser included offense of aggravated child abuse. Appellants contend that the statutes under which they were convicted are vague and overbroad. Appellants' due process attacks upon section 827.03 concerning aggravated child abuse have been rejected by this Court on several occasions....
...urder are illfounded. In any felony murder conviction the element of causation must be established. Adams v. State,
310 So.2d 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Phillips v. State,
289 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). We find the language of sections
782.04(4) and
827.03 sufficiently defines the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice....
CopyCited 59 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2011 WL 294272
...1199 (allowing plaintiffs challenging state’s
anti-sodomy laws as unconstitutional to proceed anonymously).
As for Plaintiff V, there is no real dispute that her conduct was not “casual
and voluntary.” Francis was convicted under a Plea Agreement of one count of
child abuse under Florida Statutes §
827.03(1)(c) and two counts of prostitution
under Florida Statutes §
796.07(2)(f) for his actions with Plaintiff V....
CopyCited 54 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 6234529
...child.” Under Florida law, when
an offender “knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily
harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child,” the offender
commits third-degree felony child abuse. Id. § 827.03(2)(c). “Child abuse” under
Florida law includes “[a]n intentional act that could reasonably be expected to
result in physical or mental injury to a child.” Id. § 827.03(1)(b)(2).
In Spencer’s direct appeal, we rejected his argument that the district court
erroneously sentenced him as a career offender, and we affirmed his sentence.
Spencer v....
...§ 2255? If so, whether the district court, in light of
Begay . . . erroneously determined that the movant was properly
classified as a career offender where he had a prior state conviction
for felony child abuse under Fla. Stat. §
827.03(1)?
6
Case: 10-10676 Date Filed: 11/14/2014 Page: 7 of 107
After a panel of this Court answered both questions in the affirmative, Spencer v.
United States,
727 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir....
...Spencer’s first brush with
the law. His earlier legal problems included another conviction for selling cocaine,
from when he was 17 years old. Also, at the age of 18, Mr. Spencer pleaded guilty
in state court to felony child abuse, under Florida Statute § 827.03.
Because the federal sentencing scheme is set up to cause those who have a
violent past to serve longer sentences, the nature of Mr....
...This clause
provides that the crime must “otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (emphasis
added). The district court reasoned that “any conviction of Florida Statute 827.03,
a third-degree felony, has the underlying elements of a crime of violence.”
But, under Florida law, the state may prove third-degree felony child abuse
in two different ways....
...84
Case: 10-10676 Date Filed: 11/14/2014 Page: 85 of 107
injury to a child”] without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or
permanent disfigurement to the child.” Fla. Stat. §§ 827.03(2)(c), 827.03(a)(b)(2)
(emphasis added)....
...13, 26,
125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005) (plurality opinion);
Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575, 602,
110 S. Ct. 2143 (1990)).
This the district court never did. Instead, the court apparently did not
recognize that more than one version of §
827.03 exists, so it did not ascertain to
which version of third-degree felony child abuse Spencer had pled guilty. The
judge simply concluded, “I think [Spencer’s prior conviction] comes within [Fla.
Stat. §]
827.03(b), an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in
physical or mental injury to a child.” (Emphasis added).
It is nonetheless clear in looking at the sentencing record before the district
court that no sufficient...
...7
The record contains no charging document for the predicate crime to which
Spencer pled guilty, and the only Shepard document referred to during the
sentencing proceeding was the transcript of Spencer’s hearing where he pled guilty
to Section 827.03(2)(c)....
...s factual basis for the conviction. In
its entirety, it reads, “As to [Spencer], . . . he did engage in sexual activity with a
minor and that action could reasonably cause physical or mental injury to that
child, contrary to the provisions of 827.03.” 7 (Emphasis added).
This statement sheds no light on to which version of the statute Spencer pled
guilty—the version where the act could reasonably cause physical injury, or the
version where the act could reasonably cause only mental injury....
...11/14/2014 Page: 91 of 107
that many types of sexual activity could reasonably cause physical injury to a
child, not all sexual activity necessarily could reasonably cause physical injury to a
child, particularly because, for purposes of Section 827.03, Fla....
...In
fact, during the sentencing hearing, Spencer argued that he had not pled guilty to
the physical-injury version of the statute before the state court. Based on the
record, it cannot be said that when Spencer pled guilty to violating Fla. Stat. §
827.03, Spencer knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently gave up his Sixth
8
In support of his § 2255 petition, Spencer filed an affidavit from the person with whom
he engaged in sexual activity, written by her after she attained the age of majority....
CopyCited 50 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 4380919
...propriety of the indictment should have been raised prior to trial at which time any deficiency could have been cured. The indictment as worded adequately placed Ford on notice that he was charged with a violation of the child abuse proscriptions of section 827.03." Id....
CopyCited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 1362911
...rve the issue for appeal.
575 So.2d at 644-45 (citations omitted). We reiterated this principle in Reed, where the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on a lower threshold of malice than required under the aggravated child abuse statute. See §
827.03(2), Fla....
CopyCited 37 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 2020158
...West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent. ANSTEAD, C.J. We have for review State v. DuFresne,
782 So.2d 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), wherein the district court certified the following question to be of great public importance: IS THE TERM "MENTAL INJURY" IN SECTION
827.03(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1996) UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS VAGUE? Id....
...For the reasons expressed below, we answer the certified question in the negative. PROCEDURE TO DATE On August 25, 1997, the State filed an information charging petitioner, a public school teacher who works with autistic children, with five counts of child abuse involving different children, contrary to section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Section 827.03 provides: (1) "Child abuse" means: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; or (c) Active encourag...
...*274 A person who knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. §
827.03(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). Prior to trial, the State filed an amended information, wherein it changed the dates of the alleged incidents of abuse in order to bring the case within the effective date of the 1996 revisions to section
827.03(1). Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the amended information, arguing in part that section
827.03(1) was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Following a hearing on petitioner's motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order finding the statute to be unconstitutional as being both overbroad and vague. On appeal, in an initial opinion, the Fourth District held section
827.03(1)(b) was unconstitutionally vague because the term "mental injury" was not defined therein....
...As a result, the district court withdrew its initial opinion and requested the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Fuchs. Thereafter, based upon its interpretation of Fuchs, the district court issued the opinion currently before this Court, and reversed the trial court's order finding section
827.03(1)(b) unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See State v. DuFresne,
782 So.2d 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The district court first concluded that section
827.03(1)(b) is not overbroad since it can be narrowly construed as not applicable to speech. See id. at 891. Turning to the vagueness challenge, the district court, relying on Fuchs, held that the term "mental injury," as used in section
827.03(1)(b), is not unconstitutionally vague since the term is defined in section
39.01(44), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). See id. at 894. The Fourth District, however, certified the above question as one of great public importance. [1] Id. at 894. ANALYSIS Petitioner maintains that section
827.03(1) is unconstitutionally vague since its language does not adequately inform persons of common intelligence of the proscribed conduct. Specifically, petitioner argues that section
827.03(1) is unconstitutionally vague because the term "mental injury" is not defined within the statute....
...ory provision, the Legislature clearly intended that the terms be defined by chapters 39, 984 and 985." Id. Mental Injury In essence, the issue to be decided here is the applicability and effect of our decision in Fuchs to the vagueness challenge to section 827.03(1)(b)....
...See §
39.201-.206, Fla. Stat. (2001). Additionally, section
39.301, which provides for the initiation of protective investigations by the Department of Children and Families, requires the department to immediately forward allegations of child abuse as defined in section
827.03 to the appropriate local law enforcement agency....
...415.503. See § 415.503(9), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). As we believe the above discussion demonstrates, the child protective provisions previously located in sections 415.502-.514 and now located in chapter 39, and the criminal provisions enumerated in section 827.03 are plainly interrelated....
...fined in another related statute. Chapter 39, as well as the provisions previously located in chapter 415, part IV, is sufficiently related to child abuse to put a citizen on notice that its provisions may be related to the child abuse provisions of section 827.03....
...While it may obviously be preferable for the Legislature to place the appropriate definition in the same statute, citizens should be on notice that controlling definitions may be contained in other related statutes. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the term "mental injury" in section
827.03 is not unconstitutionally vague. Although section
827.03(1) "may not be `a paradigm of legislative drafting,' well settled principles of statutory construction adequately respond to the alleged vagueness challenge." Fuchs,
769 So.2d at 1011....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 1424534
...ld and that the child was under eighteen years of age. In addition to returning a general verdict of first-degree murder, based on either premeditated or felony murder, the jury convicted Lukehart on a separate charge of aggravated child abuse under section 827.03(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....
...[7] Section
782.04, Florida Statutes (1995), defines first-degree felony murder in relevant part: (1)(a) The unlawful killing of a human being: . . . . 2. When committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate,.... . . . . (h) Aggravated child abuse, . . . . [8] Section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in relevant part: "(1) Aggravated child abuse is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) commits aggravated battery on a child." [9] Section
784.045, Florida Statutes (1995), provid...
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 703, 2012 WL 5514368, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 2357
causing great bodily harm, as set forth in section
827.03(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1997): A person who
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 5194454
...s, adult household members, neighbors, health care providers, and employees and volunteers of facilities. As applied to a Child. Caregiver means a parent, adult household member, or other person responsible for a child's welfare. §
825.102(3)(a) or §
827.03(3)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 233894
...o the jury. At trial, the defense took the position that behavior constituting omissions, such as the withholding of food and the refusal to seek medical attention, is not willful torture, which is a necessary element of aggravated child abuse under section 827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....
...State,
600 So.2d 1101, 1104 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
113 S.Ct. 625,
121 L.Ed.2d 557 (1992). In Nicholson, we held that "a willful `omission, or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused' constitutes aggravated child abuse under section
827.03(1)." (Footnote omitted)....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17990
...Cir.
1933) (observing that assault with a dangerous weapon “plainly involve[s] moral
turpitude”); see also Matter of Medina, 15 I & N Dec. 611, 613-14 (concluding that
4
In Garcia, this Court held that the inherent nature of aggravated child abuse, in violation
of Fla. Stat. Ann. §§
827.03 and
784.045, constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. Garcia,
329
F.3d at 1222. Under Florida law, aggravated child abuse occurs in several ways, including when
a person commits aggravated battery on a child. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §
827.03(2)(a) (Fla. Stat.
Ann. §
827.03(2)(a) provides that “‘Aggravated child abuse’ occurs when a person....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 1288872
...*1012 WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See Ch. 96-322, § 10, at 1774, Laws of Fla. [2] See Ch. 90-53, § 8, at 139, Laws of Fla. [3] This amendment also removed the subsections within section
827.04 which dealt with child abuse and incorporated them into section
827.03, currently entitled "Abuse, aggravated abuse, and neglect of a child." As a result, section
827.04 solely contained provisions relating to "Contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a child," as its title suggests....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 615, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 2572, 2011 WL 5082614
Stat. (2008), and aggravated child abuse, see §
827.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). In statements made initially
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1195
...Appellant was charged with aggravated child abuse upon his ten-year-old stepson, Christopher, on June 11, 1985, in that he "did maliciously punish said child by hitting child across back several times and hitting said child in face with his fist, in violation of section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes." [1] Appellant's wife testified that she called the police because appellant was beating her child, "whopping him with a belt and slapping him in the face and just a little bit out of hand with him." She testified...
...ing that the child abuse in the instant case "was relatively minor compared to the majority of cases of this nature." The schedule of lesser included offenses contained in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases [3] does not include section
827.03, although it does include
827.04....
...[9] The trial judge therefore did not abuse his discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on misdemeanor child abuse. Because we can find no indication why the schedule of lesser included offenses in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases does not include section 827.03, we certify, as a matter of great public importance, the following question: WHAT, IF ANY, ARE THE CATEGORY 1 AND 2 LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE UNDER SECTION 827.03, FLORIDA STATUTES (1985)? The conviction is AFFIRMED....
...ble or moderate corporal punishment, what then is the penalty that may be inflicted upon a parent who oversteps the bounds of proper parental correction? The majority, relying upon statutory authority, primarily aggravated child abuse, proscribed by Section 827.03, Florida Statutes, is of the view that the legislature has manifested its intent that a parent or one standing in place thereof cannot be guilty of the lesser requested offenses....
...roneous in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 3 Fla.Jur. Appellate Review § 325 (1978). In the case below, the trial judge, without the benefit of a standard instruction, correctly explained to the jury that the word "maliciously", as used in section 827.03(1)(c), means "wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification or excuse." Evidence of a malicious act by the parent is not, however, required by the majority rule, because, as stated, a parent or other person standing in such au...
...If the rule approved by the majority's opinion is correct, a parent who exceeds the bounds of moderation in disciplining his child would be considered to have exercised a legal right, and therefore be exempt from prosecution, unless the punishment were maliciously inflicted or otherwise fell within the parameters of section 827.03....
...he bounds of moderation, they could properly conclude the punishment inflicted was consensual. If, on the other hand, the force was considered by them in excess of the bounds of moderation, but not so excessive as to fall within the proscriptions of section 827.03, the defendant could be found guilty of the lesser offense of battery....
...as a category one offense, the lesser offense of simple *162 battery. While the precise conduct that the state's information below charged appellant with committing did not relate to aggravated battery, but rather malicious punishment, proscribed by section 827.03(1)(c), all of the elements of simple battery are necessarily included in the offense of aggravated battery, accomplished by malicious punishment, since the information alleged that the abuse occurred by maliciously punishing the child...
...1979) (defendant appropriately convicted of lesser included misdemeanor of culpable negligence to the charged offense of aggravated child abuse). For the above reasons, appellant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for new trial. NOTES [1] Section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1983), charges aggravated child abuse by maliciously punishing a child. Chapter 84-238, Laws of Florida, which took effect on October 1, 1984, renumbered the statute so that aggravated battery by maliciously punishing a child is now section 827.03(1)(c)....
...[4] "Battery" is defined by section
784.03, Florida Statutes (1985): (1) A person commits battery if he: (a) Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or (b) Intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual. [5] See the authorities cited in footnote 2. [6] Section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1985) defines "aggravated child abuse": (1) "Aggravated child abuse" is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures a child; (c) Maliciously punishes a child; or (d) Wilfully and unlawfully cages a child....
...egilgence (section
784.05). Chapter 828 was renumbered and amended to define as a child anyone under 18 years of age, to define "torture" (see footnote 6), and to proscribe various forms of mistreatment of children, including aggravated child abuse, section
827.03: Whoever: (1) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (2) Willfully tortures a child; (3) Maliciously punishes a child; or (4) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in chapter 775....
...emeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in chapter 775. Chapter 83-75, Laws of Florida, created section
827.071, defining offenses involving "sexual performances" by a child. Chapter 84-238, Laws of Florida renumbered the subsections in section
827.03, but did not substantively change the statute (see footnote 1)....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 25073, 2004 WL 2796550
...lly and unlawfully cages a
child; or
(c) Knowingly or willfully abuses a child and in so doing causes great bodily
harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child.
Fla. Stat. § 827.03(2).
3
plea had been for “beat[ing] his girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter” and that this
was a “crime of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G....
...is a “crime of violence” if it meets
2
We apply the 2002 edition of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines
Manual. See United States v. Bailey,
123 F.3d 1381, 1403 (11th Cir. 1997).
3
See Fla. Stat.. §
827.03(2).
5
the requirements of either subpart I or II.
In Fuentes-Rivera, we considered whether a California conviction for first-
degree burglary was a “crime of violence” under section 2L1.1....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 534733
...Given this evidence, the trial court properly denied this motion as well as the renewed motion made at the end of all evidence. [5] Alternatively, under a felony murder theory, the focus is upon the underlying offense, which, in the case at bar, is aggravated child abuse. According to section 827.03(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), aggravated child abuse, a second-degree felony, happens when a person "[c]ommits aggravated battery on a child." A battery is "aggravated" when the perpetrator "[i]ntentionally or knowingly causes great...
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1999 WL 742296
...825.102(3) commits aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. (3) A person who causes the death of any person under the age of 18 by culpable negligence under s.
827.03(3) commits aggravated manslaughter of a child, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s....
...(c) A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775,082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. §
827.03, Fla.Stat....
...§
827.04(1)-(2), Fla.Stat. (1995). See generally Nicholson v. State,
600 So.2d 1101, 1104 (Fla.1992) ("Thus, a willful `omission, or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused' constitutes aggravated child abuse under section
827.03(1).") (footnote omitted); Leet v....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 118005
...fidential child abuse information in a story on a related child abuse trial. We conclude that under the facts here it cannot. On December 8, 1980, respondents Hitchners were charged with aggravated child abuse by maliciously punishing a child, under section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 435064
...Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Sherri Tolar Rollison, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee. WOLF, J. Loretta Reed (appellant) appeals her conviction of aggravated child abuse of her minor daughter, a second-degree felony under section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1997)....
...n a child; (b) Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child; or (c) Knowingly or willfully abuses a child and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child. § 827.03(2), Fla....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 31119112
...rental privilege and immunity as to the abuse charged and tried. PROCEEDINGS TO DATE Petitioner, Willie Raford, was charged with committing aggravated child abuse on his girlfriend's eight-year-old child by repeatedly striking the child with a belt. Section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (1997), provides: (2) "Aggravated child abuse" occurs when a person: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child; or (c) Knowin...
...in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child. A person who commits aggravated child abuse commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. §
827.03(2), Fla....
...ion, to instruct the jury on *1014 the lesser included offense of child abuse, a third-degree felony. [2] During jury deliberations, the trial court realized that it had mistakenly instructed the jury on second-degree aggravated child abuse found in section 827.03(2)(c), rather than the lesser included felony child abuse the court intended to address....
...ed. The court certified conflict with Wilson. [4] Id. ANALYSIS Under the conflict of decisions certified, at issue is whether a parent or person standing in loco parentis may be convicted *1015 of the lesser offense of felony child abuse pursuant to section
827.03(1), Florida Statutes. [5] Kama In Kama v. State,
507 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), Kama was convicted of aggravated child abuse in violation of section
827.03(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1985), for his conduct in disciplining his ten-year-old son....
...Thus, as amended, and unlike the situation in Kama, a person who "inflicted" the physical or mental injury to a child could be found guilty of misdemeanor child abuse under section
827.04(2). More recently, in 1996, the Legislature again amended chapter 827, and section
827.03 was rewritten to include three subsections pertaining to child abuse, aggravated child abuse, and neglect of a child, respectively. See ch. 96-322, § 8, at 1770-71, Laws of Fla. As amended, section
827.03 provided in pertinent part: (1) "Child abuse" means: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; or (...
...A person who knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree, *1017 punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. §
827.03(1), Fla....
...tanding in loco parentis may be convicted of felony child abuse. Rather, petitioner argues that the First District correctly held in Wilson that the parental privilege and immunity discussed and recognized in Kama extends to felony child abuse under section 827.03(1). Wilson In Wilson, the appellant was charged with aggravated child abuse by malicious punishment under section 827.03(2)(b)....
...The court reasoned: This new crime of felony child abuse was enacted well after our Kama decision as part of the legislature's 1996 revision and amendment of the criminal child abuse statutes. See Ch. 96-322, Laws of Florida;
827.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). [Section
827.03(1)] does not define or refer to the parental privilege of corporal discipline, and we have found no cases that address this felony child abuse offense in interaction with it....
...McDonald,
785 So.2d 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), announced its agreement with the Fourth District's conclusion in Raford that the holding in Kama has been overruled by subsequent statutory changes. In McDonald, the defendant was charged with felony child abuse in violation of section
827.03(1) for allegedly spanking his six-year-old daughter in a manner that resulted in bruising to the child's buttocks, upper thigh, and upper back....
...ourt could glean from the statutory scheme in 1985 had since been substantially altered by subsequent legislation. See id. at 645. Analyzing the subsequent statutory changes, the Second District stated: In chapter 96-322, section 8, Laws of Florida, section 827.03 was rewritten to include three subsections: the first addressed child abuse, the second addressed aggravated child abuse, and the third addressed neglect of a child. The definition of child abuse, which previously discussed a person "permitting" injury, was substantially rewritten in the amended section 827.03(1)....
...the misdemeanor offense under section
827.04 when a spanking results in significant welts, the legislature intended more serious beatings that do not result in permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to be treated as simple child abuse under section
827.03(1)....
...ry scheme. Pursuant to that scheme, a parent can be charged with simple child abuse for excessive corporal punishment that falls between the level of abuse required to establish the offense in section
827.04 and that required to prove a violation of section
827.03(2). Id. at 647. [10] Parental Privilege We agree with the Fourth and Second Districts that under the current statutory *1020 scheme there is no parental privilege barring prosecution for felony child abuse under section
827.03(1)....
...contradict the Kama court's finding that the Legislature has not provided for an offense less serious than a second-degree felony for a battery which exceeds the legal limits of a parent's disciplinary authority. See Kama,
507 So.2d at 158. Indeed, section
827.03(1), defining felony child abuse, makes no exception for parents or the equivalent....
...Accordingly, we approve the Fourth District's decision in Raford and the Second District's decision in McDonald, concluding that a parent or one standing in loco parentis has no absolute immunity and may be convicted of the lesser offense of felony child abuse under section 827.03(1)....
...ANSTEAD, C.J., SHAW, WELLS, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur. LEWIS, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] In 1999, aggravated child abuse was enhanced to a first-degree felony. See ch. 99-168, § 16, at 951-52, Laws of Fla. [2] Section 827.03(1) provides: (1) "Child abuse" means: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; or (c) Active encou...
...A person who knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084 §
827.03(1), Fla....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2005 WL 2095664
...The witness should not be discredited by talking to a lawyer about [his][her] testimony. 8. Your verdict should not be influenced by feelings of prejudice, bias or sympathy. Your verdict must be based on the evidence, and on the law contained in these instructions. 16.1 AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE § 827.03(2), Fla....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 94292
...A NON-SCOREABLE JUVENILE RECORD IN AGGRAVATING A SENTENCE ABOVE THE GUIDELINES RANGE? Id. at 189-90. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Carl Puffinberger was charged with aggravated child abuse on his stepdaughter in violation of section 827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 117281
...An autopsy revealed that the child had severe bruises on her back, legs, abdomen, and arms, and that her liver had been partially consumed by her body. The medical examiner testified that Kimberly had died in extreme pain. Nicholson was charged with and convicted of first-degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse under section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1987)....
...The motion was denied. On appeal, Nicholson challenged the trial court's refusal to enter a judgment of acquittal and further maintained that the trial court committed fundamental error by instructing the jury that aggravated child abuse by willful torture under section
827.03(1)(b) includes acts of omission or neglect. Both of Nicholson's claims are based on the contention that only acts of commission done with specific intent are actionable under section
827.03. [1] See Jakubczak v. State,
425 So.2d at 189 ("legislature intended to punish under section
827.03 only acts of commission done with specific intent"); State v....
...mmission or omission.
579 So.2d at 819. The district court acknowledged Jakubczak and Harris in which the Third and Second District Courts of Appeal held that the legislature intended to punish only acts of commission done with specific intent under section
827.03, and that the failure to take a child for medical treatment was not an act of "commission." Id. However, it rejected that interpretation of the statute, instead, holding that section
827.03 "contemplates acts of commission or omission." Id....
...the statute unless a contrary intent clearly appears. Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co.,
118 So.2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). There is no contrary intent apparent in chapter 827. The word "torture" is used only once in chapter 827, that being in section
827.03(1)(b). Therefore, if the definition contained in section
827.01(3), Florida Statutes (1987), is to be given effect, it must be read into the phrase "willful torture" as used in section
827.03(1)(b)....
...Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n,
396 So.2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 1980) (where possible, court must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related provisions in harmony with one another). Applying the definition of torture supplied by the legislature results in a reading of section
827.03(1)(b) that includes not only willful acts of commission, but also willful acts of omission and neglect that cause unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering to a child....
...ustifiable pain and suffering just as one can willfully commit an act that produces the same result. Thus, a willful "omission, or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused" [3] constitutes aggravated child abuse under section 827.03(1). The fact that section 827.03(1) expressly refers to "one or more acts committed" in defining aggravated child abuse does not preclude this construction because it is clear that in the criminal context an omission or failure to act may constitute an act....
...od deprivation carried out systematically [accompanied with a regimen of forced exercise and beatings] with intent to willfully torture and maliciously punish the child. Under these aggravated circumstances, the State was entitled to prosecute under Section 827.03, Florida Statutes....
...However, we note that those cases are factually distinguishable. Both Jakubczak and Harris involved the negligent failure to seek prompt and timely medical attention for an injured child. We agree that such negligent omissions are not encompassed by section 827.03 not because they are omissions, but because they are committed without the requisite specific intent. Accordingly, the Jakubczak and Harris decisions are disapproved insofar as they hold that only acts of commission constitute aggravated child abuse under section 827.03....
...to Nicholson's attention. These facts alone support a finding of willful intent. Accordingly, we approve the decision below. It is so ordered. OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur. SHAW, C.J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1987), provides in pertinent part: (1) "Aggravated child abuse" is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures a child; (c) Maliciously punishes a child; or (d) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Gen., Tallahassee, and Paul H. Zacks, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellant. Charles Holcomb, Cocoa, for appellee. KARL, Justice. We have for review by direct appeal an order of the trial judge finding Section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1975), unconstitutionally vague and overly broad and dismissing the information against appellee....
...n. Appellee was charged by information with aggravated child abuse in that he maliciously punished Harold Wilmore, a child thirteen years of age, by beating the child with a hose. Appellee moved to dismiss the amended information on the grounds that Section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and overbroad and that the undisputed facts do not, and cannot, constitute a crime under the laws of the State of Florida....
...ult of Harold's repeated disobedience, insolence and intentional disregard of appellee's instructions, appellee administered corporal punishment to Harold using a length of garden hose. The trial judge granted the motion to dismiss on the basis that Section
827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. This Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of Section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), in Faust v. State,
354 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1978), against the attack of vagueness and overbreadth. Therein, this Court held that Section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), conveys a sufficiently definite warning to those subject to its provisions as to what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 377272
...Connor, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jenny S. Sieg, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. CASANUEVA, Judge. David Arnold appeals his conviction for child neglect, a third degree felony in violation of section 827.03(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1997)....
...Because the State did not prove a prima facie violation of the statute, the trial court erred in failing to grant Mr. Arnold's motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief. Accordingly, the conviction must be vacated. Section 827.03(3)(a)1 defines "neglect of a child," as applied to this case, as "a caregiver's failure or omission to provide a child with the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain a child's physical and mental health, including, but...
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ild abuse a standard of what is "necessary" for a child's welfare is too vague to apprise the public of unlawful conduct. I concur in all aspects of the majority opinion. NOTES [1] As distinguished from aggravated child abuse, which is proscribed by § 827.03, Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 467985
...The trial court, bound by the First District's decision in Wilson v. State,
744 So.2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), held that Mr. McDonald's common law parental privilege to use corporal punishment on his child prohibited a charge of "simple" or third-degree felony child abuse. See §
827.03(1), Fla.Stat....
...McDonald. The defense argued that the punishment was in response to the child getting into a medicine cabinet, into the father's girlfriend's cigarettes, and pushing her brother. II. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW The State charged Mr. McDonald with a violation of section 827.03(1)....
...orporal punishment on his child he was exempt from prosecution for this crime. See Wilson,
744 So.2d 1237. At a hearing on the motion, the State conceded that the evidence did not justify charging Mr. McDonald with aggravated child abuse pursuant to section
827.03(2), which provides: (2) "Aggravated child abuse" occurs when a person: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child; or (c) Knowingly or willfully ab...
...KAMA AND ITS PROGENY The legal analysis of this case begins with a consideration of the First District's opinion of Kama,
507 So.2d 154. In Kama, the appellant was charged and convicted of aggravated child abuse by way of malicious punishment in violation of section
827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1985), for his conduct in disciplining his stepson....
...in "great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement."
507 So.2d at 155 (emphasis added). The Kama court then examined the legislative history involving child abuse. It concluded that the statutory scheme then existing in sections
827.03 and
827.04, Florida Statutes (1985), which separated the crime of aggravated child abuse from "simple" child abuse and defined "simple" child abuse in terms of "permitting" injury to a child, indicated a legislative intent to draw a clear line between acceptable discipline and criminal conduct....
...The statutory amendments allow some forms of "excessive" or "cruel" punishment, which might have constituted major felonies under Kama, to be classified as misdemeanors or minor felonies. IV. STATUTORY CHANGES AFTER KAMA When Kama was decided, three statutory sections addressed the crimes for abuse or neglect of children: section
827.03 addressed the second-degree felony of aggravated child abuse; section
827.04 addressed three levels of child abuse constituting either a third-degree felony or a first-degree misdemeanor; and section 827.05 addressed negligent treatment of children, a second-degree misdemeanor....
...After Kama, both chapter 827 and chapter 39 were extensively amended. See chs. 96-322, 98-403, Laws of Fla. Whatever legislative intent Kama could glean from the statutory scheme in 1985 has been substantially altered by these revisions. In chapter 96-322, section 8, Laws of Florida, section 827.03 was rewritten to include three subsections: the first addressed child abuse, the second addressed aggravated child abuse, and the third addressed neglect of a child. The definition of child abuse, which previously discussed a person "permitting" injury, was substantially rewritten in the amended section 827.03(1)....
...We conclude that if a parent can be charged with the misdemeanor offense under section
827.04 when a spanking results in significant welts, the legislature intended more serious beatings that do not result in permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to be treated as simple child abuse under section
827.03(1)....
...ry scheme. Pursuant to that scheme, a parent can be charged with simple child abuse for excessive corporal punishment that falls between the level of abuse required to establish the offense in section
827.04 and that required to prove a violation of section
827.03(2)....
...Adams,
683 So.2d 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), section
775.01, Florida Statutes (1999), this difficult task is principally a legislative function. We confess, however, that the present statutory scheme gives us pause in two respects. First, the offense in section
827.03(1) prohibits an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child....
...However, it is the better practice to file such evidence or copies of such evidence in the trial court record for inclusion in the appellate record. [4] Section 827.05, Florida Statutes (1985), was repealed. Ch. 96-322, § 11, Laws of Fla. [5] We do not decide today whether the relationship among sections 827.03(2), .03(1), and.04, Florida Statutes (1999), creates lesser-included offenses.
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 3741064
...adult household members, neighbors, health care providers, and employees and volunteers of facilities. As applied to a Child. "Caregiver" means a parent, adult household member, or other person responsible for a child s welfare. §
825.102(3)(a) or §
827.03(3)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...adult household members, neighbors, health care providers, and employees and volunteers of facilities. As applied to a Child. "Caregiver" means a parent, adult household member, or other person responsible for a child's welfare. §
825.102(3)(a) or §
827.03(3)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 57806
...Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Gypsy Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. ZEHMER, Judge. Trevor Mohammed appeals his conviction and sentence on a charge of aggravated child abuse in violation of section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1987)....
...d on child abuse under section
827.04(1) and culpable negligence under section
784.03, Florida Statutes. The trial court correctly ruled that neither of these offenses is a lesser included offense of the crime of aggravated child abuse as defined in section
827.03....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 561717
...; 2) willfully tortured, maliciously punished, or willfully and unlawfully caged a child; or 3) knowingly and willfully abused a child and in so doing caused great bodily *1252 harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child. See § 827.03(2), Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 85715
...This is an appeal from a judgment in an aggravated child abuse case. The jury determined that appellant committed this offense by malicious punishment of his eight-year-old daughter after the trial court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. See § 827.03(1)(c), Fla....
...This can be called such a borderline case and it is our considered judgment that the state has failed to establish that appellant crossed the line. The conviction must be reversed. See Eddy v. State,
510 So.2d 969 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). REVERSED. COBB and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1]
827.03 Aggravated child abuse....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Because of the unique circumstances presented, we determine that there was an undue separation of the jury and quash the trial court's order which denied the defendant's motion for discharge. On November 1, 1979, the defendant was charged, by information, with aggravated child abuse as denounced by Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1979)....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 151442
...State,
425 So.2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Thus, the state was required to present a prima facie case that Ms. Freeze had, with specific intent, "willfully tortured" or "maliciously punished" the child, or that the shaking constituted aggravated battery. §
827.03, Fla....
...State,
354 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1978) ("malicious punishment" not unconstitutionally vague). A defendant "maliciously" punishes a child if the punishment is imposed "wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification or excuse." Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) §
827.03....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 603211
...on. Count I alleged that defendant "did intentionally touch or strike [the child] ... and intentionally or knowingly caused great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement or in the course of said battery did use a deadly weapon." § 827.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). Count II alleged defendant "maliciously punish[ed]" the child. § 827.03(1)(c), Fla....
...tment, or who knowingly or by culpable negligence, inflicts or permits the infliction of physical or mental injury to the child.... §
827.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). In count I, defendant was charged with aggravated child abuse by aggravated battery:
827.03 Aggravated child abuse.- (1) `Aggravated child abuse' is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; §
827.03(1)(a), Fla....
...Therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for an instruction on misdemeanor child abuse with regard to count I. See Amado,
585 So.2d at 283; see also Wimberly,
498 So.2d at 932. [4] In count II, the defendant was charged with aggravated child abuse by malicious punishment:
827.03 Aggravated child abuse.- (1) "Aggravated child abuse" is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: * * * * * * (c) Maliciously punishes a child. §
827.03(1)(c), Fla....
...ions to correct defendant's written sentencing order to state that defendant is to have "no unsupervised contact with any child under the age of 16." AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED. GRIFFIN, C.J., and GOSHORN, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 827.03, Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 1036487
...Marvin, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; L. Michael Billmeier, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. MINER, J. In pleading no contest below to the reduced charge of simple or felony child abuse under section 827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), appellant reserved the right to appeal the issues raised in her motion below filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4)....
...Having heard oral argument and considered the briefs, including the supplemental briefs, we grant appellant's request for a belated appeal and hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying appellant's (c)(4) motion. Appellant initially was charged with aggravated child abuse by malicious punishment under section 827.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes....
...Noting that the state had stipulated that appellant's single open handed slap caused a bruise and redness, the court found as a matter of law that this act did not rise to the level of aggravated child abuse and reduced the charge to simple or felony child abuse under section 827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes....
...her, whether the facts could be sufficient for a jury to convict a defendant. State v. Knight,
622 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Id. at 1195-96. Appellant was originally charged with maliciously [2] punishing her child, a second degree felony under section
827.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997).In Kama v....
...Our analysis in Kama, however, also serves as the basis for our determination that the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying appellant's (c)(4) motion in part as to the lesser charge of felony child abuse. In granting appellant's (c)(4) motion, the court reduced the charge to simple or felony child abuse under section 827.03(1)(b) and denied the (c)(4) motion as to this charge. Appellant pled no contest to this third degree felony under section *1240 827.03(1) [5] (emphasis added), which provides as follows: (1) "Child abuse" means: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury...
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Mary Jo M. Gallay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. KARL, Justice. This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final judgment of the trial court inherently passing on the constitutional validity of Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution....
...Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority,
111 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1959); Demko's Gold Coast Trailer Park, Inc. v. Palm Beach County,
218 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1969). Appellant was charged by information with two counts of aggravated child abuse contrary to Section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1975)....
...endere and reserved his right to appeal the constitutionality of the statute. [1] He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the information since Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), provides: "827.03 Aggravated child abuse....
...Willfully and unlawfully cages a child shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084." Appellant concedes that the language in subsection (1) is sufficiently definite. We find that Section
827.03, Florida Statutes, is not unconstitutionally vague and indefinite since it conveys a sufficiently definite warning to those subject to its provisions what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 127, 2012 WL 572977, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 407
disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child. §
827.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). The statute defines “maliciously”
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 22900994
...We briefly address some of these issues here, as they are likely to be raised upon re-trial. Tate first asserts that the legislature did not intend to prosecute children, who are not caretakers, for the crime of "aggravated child abuse," and that Tate did not have notice that section 827.03, Florida Statutes, could be applied to noncaretaker children, rendering the statute void for vagueness. Aggravated child abuse is the predicate for charging Tate with felony murder. *52 This court must be guided by the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. Section 827.03 clearly specifies that child abuse occurs when a "person" abuses a child....
...Bouters v. State,
659 So.2d 235, 238 (Fla.1995); State v. Hagan,
387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980). This issue has been resolved adversely to Tate in K.B.S. v. State,
725 So.2d 448 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). There, K.B.S., a fourteen-year-old juvenile, violated section
827.03(1) by knowingly or willfully abusing a child by intentionally burning the nine-year-old victim with a cigarette....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2011 WL 2060061
...We note that if Delgado had left the child in the vehicle unattended after transporting her away from her parents and harm to the child could reasonably have been expected to ensue, the State could have charged Delgado with child abuse pursuant to section 827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), [8] and the evidence may have been sufficient to sustain a conviction under that charge....
...n pickup truck in an isolated, wooded area for over 18 hours after murdering the child's parents, thereby exposing the child to dehydration, heat, and numerous insect bites was sufficient to support a third-degree felony child abuse conviction under section 827.03)....
...ody of another, with intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." §
812.133(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). [8] Section
827.03(1)(b) defines "[c]hild abuse" as "[a]n intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child." [9] We similarly reject the State's alternative argument that Delgado's unsupported kidnapping...
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 44382
...iled to prove the degree of punishment which constitutes the crime of aggravated child abuse; and (2) the state failed to prove that appellant acted with malice in disciplining her son. As has been noted, Rose Herbert was charged with a violation of section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes aggravated child abuse for malicious punishment. Section 827.03(1) provides: "Aggravated child abuse" is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures a child; (c) Maliciously punishes a child; or (d) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child....
...(Victim) was under the age of eighteen years. Definitions: "Maliciously" means wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification or excuse. In Faust v. State,
354 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1978) the supreme court affirmed the constitutional validity of section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), noting that "it conveys a sufficient warning to those subject to its provisions what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties." Nonetheless, the case law demonstrates that the courts have...
...e propriety of their conduct under the criminal standard. Kama, at 156. See also Schraffa v. State,
508 So.2d 755 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), in which it was stated that malicious punishment may not necessarily involve physical injury. The cases construing section
827.03 reflect that the classification of a parent's disciplinary conduct as either permissible or not permissible (i.e., aggravated child abuse) has largely been done on a case-by-case basis....
...State,
355 So.2d 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). While it is probably true that a parent's use of a belt to spank a child, not unlike the corporal punishment approved for school children, is legally permissible and is not by itself the kind of punishment addressed in section
827.03, [3] we believe a jury question is raised by the evidence adduced in this case which indicated that appellant struck the child severely a number of times and on various parts of his body other than the buttocks....
...574, 264 S.E.2d 348 (Ct.App. 1980). I would affirm. NOTES [1] Rose Herbert was not charged in the October incident. She entered into an agreement with HRS to get counseling and to terminate her relationship with her current boyfriend. [2] Citing the language of section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), and its predecessor, section
784.045. [3] The other portions of section
827.03 prohibit the "willful torturing" and "willful and unlawful caging" of children....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 289741
...In this direct criminal appeal, appellant challenges her conviction, following a jury trial, of aggravated child abuse. Because we conclude that the standard jury instruction on aggravated child abuse given by the trial court included a prejudicially erroneous definition of the word "maliciously" as used in section 827.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), we reverse and remand for a new trial. Appellant was charged by amended information with aggravated child abuse of her seven-year-old son. The information alleged that appellant "did maliciously punish the said child, by striking said child with a cord, in violation of Section 827.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes." To the extent pertinent, section 827.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), provides that "`[a]ggravated child abuse' occurs when a person......
...e Department of Children and Families about the incident. After the state rested, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence failed to establish that the punishment inflicted had been maliciously motivated, as required by section 827.03(2)(b)....
...thout legal justification or excuse. The jury found appellant guilty as charged. Appellant moved for a new trial, arguing (among other things) that the trial court had incorrectly instructed the jury regarding the meaning of "maliciously" as used in section 827.03(2)(b)....
...There was no dispute about the fact that the child had been punished. The only contested issue was whether that punishment *728 had been "maliciously" inflicted. "Maliciously" is not defined in chapter 827. In State v. Gaylord,
356 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1978), the court held that section
827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1975), which treated "maliciously punish[ing] a child" as aggravated child abuse, was not unconstitutionally vague....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 667636
...s noticeably inactive in the following two days, and to refrain from seeking medical counsel during this subsequent period, could constitute culpably negligent conduct which caused great bodily harm. AFFIRMED. COBB and PALMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
827.03(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). [2] §
782.07(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). [3] §
827.03(3)(C), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...*188 Samek & Besser and Lawrence Besser, Miami, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and William P. Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ. FERGUSON, Judge. Appellant and her husband were charged with aggravated child abuse in violation of Section 827.03(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1979)....
...by act, ommission [sic] or neglect did cause unnecessary and unjustifiable pain or suffering upon David Allen Jakubczak III, an infant under the age of eighteen (18) years, to-wit: contusions about the face and head and bleeding in the left eye, in violation of Florida Statute 827.03(2)....
...by act, ommission [sic] or neglect did cause unnecessary and unjustifiable pain or suffering upon David Allen Jakubczak III, an infant under the age of eighteen (18) years, to wit: three (3) fractures of the skull and internal bleeding, in violation of Florida Statute 827.03(2)....
...ng great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to said David Allen Jakubczak III, an infant under the age of eighteen (18) years, to wit: three (3) fractures of the skull and internal bleeding, in violation of Florida Statute 827.03(1)....
...xpressly because the state failed to produce sufficient evidence that the appellant, rather than her husband, had actually inflicted the injuries which led to this prosecution. Our review of the record supports that determination. A plain reading of section
827.03(2) as compared to section
827.04, as well as the history of the statutes, leads us to conclude that the legislature intended to punish under section
827.03 only acts of commission done with specific intent. [3] Sections
827.04 (child abuse) [4] and 827.05 (negligent treatment of children) [5] expressly provide that there can be a conviction for failure to do something which is required to be done; section
827.03 does not. What is now section
827.03 was amended in 1965 to substitute "willfully with malice, wantonly, or unlawfully" in the place of "willfully, unlawfully or negligently " as a description of the offenses. [e.s.] At the same time the penalty was increased. See Historical Note, West's F.S.A. §
827.03 (1976). Because the record is devoid of sufficient evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, to establish willful acts of commission by appellant, as the court found in entering judgment of acquittal on count III, and because section
827.03 is not violated by acts of negligence, judgment of acquittal should have been entered on Count II as well....
...Affirmed in part; reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to enter an acquittal on the charge of aggravated child abuse. BASKIN, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part). I disagree with the majority holding that only acts of negligence, insufficient to establish malice under section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979), were proved with regard to Mrs....
...physical or mental injury to the child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree... . [3] The words "omission" and "neglect", as used in counts I and II of the information to describe the offenses which allegedly constitute violations of Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1979), do not appear in the statute. The statute provides, in pertinent parts: 827.03 Aggravated child abuse....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 397349
...ble as comparative negligence, whereas no such evidence is admissible with regard to a younger child in a child passenger restraint. I would affirm. NOTES [1] The trial court granted summary judgment as to Counts IV and V. Count V alleges that under section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes, which defines criminal child neglect, Mrs....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...s. Perdomo v. State,
439 So.2d 314, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). It remains to be seen, however, whether the error, given the facts of the case, can be deemed harmless. In our view it was. The offense charged, i.e., aggravated child abuse in violation of Section
827.03, Florida Statutes, was clearly established by the evidence....
...beyond that which would have occurred accidentally by falling from a bed or chair, or while playing and striking the head on an object. A fall from eight or ten feet onto her head could have resulted in the injury. One means by which a violation of section 827.03 may occur is by the commission of an aggravated battery....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 1144594
...If they were, the state shall have the option of taking Parker to trial on all of the original charges, or resentencing him under the guidelines. See Rickman v. State,
713 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Jolly v. State,
392 So.2d 54 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). REVERSED and REMANDED. COBB and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
827.03(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] §
827.03(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). [3] Art. III, § 6, Fla. Const. [4] §
827.03(2), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 817186
...Gibson, Public Defender, and Noel A. Pelella, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellee. GRIFFIN, J. The State of Florida seeks review of an order granting Gwendolyn Fuchs' motion to dismiss the information charging her with three misdemeanor violations of section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1997)....
...se. Greene told Forehand that he and Fuchs were at a bar, Calico Jacks, in Kissimmee where Fuchs was arrested on another charge. Greene returned to the house to watch the children. Based on these facts, Fuchs was arrested for child abuse pursuant to section 827.03, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 574917
...Tracy Sheehan of Law Office of Tracy Sheehan, Tampa, for Appellee. WHATLEY, Judge. The State of Florida appeals an order dismissing a child neglect charge against Randall Rogers Wynne. We conclude that there was a factual basis supporting a prima facie case of child neglect and reverse. Section 827.03(3)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (1999), defines neglect of a child as a "caregiver's failure or omission to provide a child with the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain the child's physical and mental health, including, bu...
...vices that a prudent person would consider essential for the well-being of the child." Neglect may be based on a single incident or omission that results in, or could reasonably be expected to result in, serious physical or mental injury to a child. § 827.03(3)(a)(2)....
...We conclude that Wynne's actions constituted a prima facie case of child neglect. He failed to provide his six-year-old child with the supervision necessary to maintain the child's physical and mental health when he abandoned him on the side of Hillsborough Avenue. See § 827.03(3)(a)(1)....
...Neither the legislature nor the courts have ever created a privilege that would allow parents to discipline a child by failing to provide the child with "food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, and medical services that a prudent person would consider essential for the well-being of the child." § 827.03(3)(a)(1)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 7325, 2010 WL 2076918
...ble jeopardy. Consequently, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction solely on the aggravated child abuse conviction of count I. Of note, aggravated child abuse is a first degree felony and aggravated battery is a second degree felony. See §§
827.03(3)(b),
784.045(2), Fla....
...[w]illfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child"; or (c) "when a person . . . [k]nowingly or willfully abuses a child and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child." § 827.03(2)....
...ingly caus[ing] great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement" or by "us[ing] a deadly weapon." §
784.045(1)(a). The first manner of committing aggravated battery (i.e., causing great bodily harm) is specifically referenced in section
827.03(2)(c) of the aggravated child abuse statute. In the instant case, count I of the information read as follows: [On] July 31, 2007 Gardner Lee Browne [1] did willfully torture, maliciously punish or willfully and unlawfully cage [K.O.] [tracking section
827.03(2)(b)], a child under the age of 18 years, or did knowingly or willfully abuse said child and in so doing caused great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to said child [tracking section
827.03(2)(c)], in violation of Florida Statute
827.03(2). Count I did not track the language of, or otherwise reference, section
827.03(2)(a), which provides that the crime of aggravated child abuse is committed when a person commits an aggravated battery on a child....
...It is possible that the jury found that the defendant "intentionally or knowingly caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement," a theory that was instructed upon and which could fall within the indisputably charged violation of section 827.03(2)(c)....
...me to be valid.'" Brown v. State,
21 So.3d 108, 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting State v. Dye,
346 So.2d 538, 541 (Fla.1977)). Here, count I did not allege the use of a deadly weapon *263 and it did not track the language of, or otherwise reference, section
827.03(2)(a) the only portion of section
827.03 that could have supported a charge of aggravated child abuse as the consequence of an aggravated battery on the child with a deadly weapon....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21501907
...orturing, maliciously punishing, or willfully and unlawfully caging her; or knowingly or willfully abusing the child and in so doing causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to a child under age 18, in violation of section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (1999) (Count Two)....
...probation and imposed the same sentence in the absence of the conviction. Thomas v. State,
453 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Bates v. State,
424 So.2d 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The provision under which the State charged the Count Two offense reads:
827.03 Abuse, aggravated abuse, and neglect of a child; penalties. * * * (2) "Aggravated child abuse" occurs when a person: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a...
...to convict him of child abuse. Because the jury used a general verdict, the specific findings underlying the factual basis of the guilty verdict are not in the record. Culpable negligence is an element of "neglect of a child," which was not charged. § 827.03(3)(b), Fla....
...This additional emphasis on culpable negligence, albeit with defense counsel's apparent blessings, could have confused the jury further. Second, the instruction given is erroneous because it includes causing "great bodily harm" to the victim as an element of child abuse, whereas it is not an element. § 827.03(1), Fla....
...State,
682 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (finding fundamental error where jury instruction was not simply misleading, but permitted defendant to be convicted of non-existent crime); Ward v. State,
655 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Child abuse under section
827.03(1)(a) requires intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child and is a third-degree felony, whereas neglect of a child under section
827.03(3)(b) is a crime of omission constituting a seconddegree felony....
...ly harm. The elements of neglect of a child include willfully or by culpable negligence causing great bodily harm. The erroneous instructions blended the elements of these two offenses. Great bodily harm is an element of aggravated child abuse under section 827.03(2)(c) and child neglect under section 827.03(3)(b), but not of child abuse. § 827.03(1)....
...Because the court instructed on each of these elements, the instructions conformed to neither the child abuse nor the child neglect statute, and it is unclear of which offense the jury found Appellant guilty. The information did not allege either neglect or culpable negligence, and section 827.03(3) is not a proper lesser offense....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 34822
...The primary issue *229 is whether it was fundamental error to instruct the jury on a theory of child abuse that was not charged in the information. We affirm. On the child abuse counts, [1] the state charged that Beasley "did intentionally inflict physical or mental injury upon a child . . . in violation of Florida Statute 827.03(1)(a)." Regarding the child abuse allegations, "S" said that her father, Beasley, used a wooden paddle to spank her and her siblings....
...There are three ways to commit child abuse: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; or (c) Active encouragement. . . . § 827.03(1), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 263898
...Although her mother testified that the student had become withdrawn after the paddling, there was no evidence that she suffered any discernible impairment in her ability to function within her normal range of performance and behavior. The State charged King with child abuse under section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2001), which makes it a third-degree felony to "knowingly or willfully abuse[ ] a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child." Child abuse is defined as...
...Instead, this type of corporal punishment may constitute contributing to the dependency of a child, which is a first-degree misdemeanor under section
827.04, Florida Statutes (2001). [1] McDonald,
785 So.2d at 646. We recognize that our holding on this issue seemingly contradicts the plain language of section
827.03(1). However, as we explained in McDonald, this construction is the only way to reconcile section
827.03(1) with section
827.04....
...Because of the difficulty in distinguishing between the two statutes, we certify the following question as one of great public importance: WHETHER A SPANKING ADMINISTERED AS CORPORAL PUNISHMENT THAT RESULTS IN SIGNIFICANT BRUISES OR WELTS MAY CONSTITUTE FELONY CHILD ABUSE UNDER SECTION 827.03(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2001)....
...Reversed and remanded. FULMER and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The State did not charge King with a violation of section
827.04, Florida Statutes (2001). [2] The definition of "mental injury" under section
39.01(43), Florida Statutes (2001), applies to section
827.03, Florida Statutes (2001)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 379816
...The defendant must be resentenced within the guidelines. Fifth, there is a dispute between the parties as to the applicable guidelines scoresheet. The parties agree that the defendant's primary offense at conviction was aggravated child abuse pursuant to section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1989)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 3733842
...We review court rulings on motions for judgment of acquittal de novo. Johnston,
863 So.2d at 283. The legislature defined child abuse, in part, as "[a]n intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in . . . mental injury to a child." §
827.03(1)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 617, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 1893, 2013 WL 4734579
and amended in 2013. 16.1 AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE §
827.03(2)(a), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Aggravated
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...[1] One of the enumerated violent felonies is aggravated child abuse. Id. §
782.04(1)(a)2.h. Insofar as pertinent here, aggravated child abuse includes committing an aggravated battery on a child, or willfully torturing a child, or maliciously punishing a child. Id. §
827.03(1)(a)-(c)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 16768
“maliciously punished” within the meaning of section
827.03(l)(a)2. Case law establishes that “torture”
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2442
...Such would be a simple battery under Section
784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes. If the 18-year old used a deadly weapon, he would have been deemed to have committed an aggravated battery under Section
784.045(1)(b) which would in turn apparently qualify as an aggravated child abuse under Section
827.03(1)(a) in view of the victim's age being less than 18 years....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 658, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 1936, 2010 WL 4483514
also charged with child abuse in violation of section
827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2004), in relation to
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 6327, 2011 WL 1660937
...iously punishing J.M., a human being less than 18 years of age, and/or by knowingly or willfully committing Aggravated Battery or Child Abuse causing great bodily harm, to-wit: by causing him to sustain burns over a large portion of his body. . . ." Section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (2005), defines "aggravated child abuse" as occurring when a person: (a) commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child; or (c) knowingly or willfully abuses a child and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child. § 827.03(2)....
...ry to return a guilty verdict based upon a finding of only legal or "technical" malice. Reed,
837 So.2d at 368-69. Reed involved an early version of the aggravated abuse statute which did not define "maliciously." After Reed, the legislature amended section
827.03 and defined the term "maliciously" as it now appears in the current standard jury instruction. See §
827.03(4), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 567626
...oad and can be upheld against an overbreadth argument by narrowly construing it as not applicable to speech. The Fourth District declined to construe a statute outlawing the "[i]ntentional infliction *1037 of physical or mental injury upon a child," § 827.03(1)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 1162934
...t in harm is excluded from the definition of abuse, it should be noted that this exclusion is within the context of dependency and termination of parental rights. [1] In contrast, the definition of child *1117 abuse for criminal purposes is found in section 827.03, Florida Statutes (2003), and it includes "[a]n intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child." § 827.03(1)(b)....
...for judgment of dismissal. We therefore reverse with directions that S.J.C.'s withhold of adjudication be vacated. Reversed. NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] We are mindful of the supreme court's reading of chapter 39 in para materia with section 827.03, Florida Statutes (2003), to define "mental injury." DuFresne v....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 235169
...new trial. Accordingly, we vacate Mr. Hubbard's judgment and sentence and remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial. JUDGMENT and SENTENCE VACATED, and CAUSE REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL. ANTOON, C.J., DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 827.03(2), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 40265
...The photographs show textured bruises on the boy's buttocks, leg, and back, approximately two inches wide, which were consistent with being struck three times with a belt. There was no indication of bleeding. The information charged appellant with committing the second degree felony of aggravated child abuse under section 827.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), for maliciously punishing the child by striking *478 him with a belt. Section 827.03(2)(b) provides that a person is guilty of aggravated child abuse when that person (b) Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child; ... At the jury instruction conference the court, over the defendant's objection, decided to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of child abuse, a third degree felony, which is defined in section 827.03(1) as: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; ......
...t had improperly instructed the jury. Instead of instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of third degree child abuse, it had instructed the jury concerning an alternative ground of second degree (aggravated) child abuse which is found in section 827.03(2)(c) and which was not charged....
...the error in the instructions, was second degree child abuse. Appellant's counsel responded that he would "have a hard time saying I was prejudiced by that one," and the discussion ended. The jury found appellant guilty of child abuse as defined in section 827.03(2)(c), the second degree felony on which the jury was erroneously instructed, but which was not charged....
...ffenses of aggravated child abuse. At the time Kama was decided, the legislature had, so far as parents were concerned, only criminalized aggravated child abuse by prohibiting corporal punishment that was malicious or amounted to aggravated battery. § 827.03, Fla....
...entirely on his argument that third degree child abuse is not a lesser included offense of aggravated child abuse. His only authority to support that proposition is Kama, which we have found distinguishable, and Wilson, with which we disagree. Under section 827.03(1)(a), the intentional infliction of physical injury on a child is third degree child abuse....
...We therefore affirm appellant's conviction and remand to conform his sentence to the court's oral pronouncement. STONE, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] In 1996, the legislature eliminated misdemeanor child abuse by moving it from section
827.04(2), Florida Statutes (1995) to section
827.03(1), Florida Statutes (1997), and making that crime a third degree felony. The legislature also made abuse where great bodily harm is inflicted, section
827.04(1), Florida Statutes (1995), previously a third degree felony, a second degree felony. §
827.03(2)(c)....
...n-handed slap across the face which left a red mark. Although we may not think that this should be criminalized, we cannot agree with the first district that, under the statutory scheme, Wilson could not have been guilty of third degree child abuse. Section 827.03(1)(a) makes the "intentional infliction of physical or mental injury" a third degree felony, and the legislature has not made an exception for the parental privilege.
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 779, 2009 WL 277442
...His brother, C.C., suffered from mental and physical health issues and was screeching loudly during the incident, as he often did when agitated. Neither of the boys sustained any physical injury, nor did the State present evidence of resulting mental injury. *1222 Cox was charged with aggravated child abuse in violation of section 827.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), which provides that aggravated child abuse occurs when a person "[w]illfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child." Section 827.03(4) defines maliciously as wrongfully, intentionally, and without legal justification or excuse....
...or C.C. Rather, it appears the children were drawn into Cox's angry outburst aimed at Bonnie and Patrick Patterson. The evidence shows Cox's actions were not a form of punishment and thus malicious punishment cannot serve as a basis for conviction. See § 827.03....
..."A conviction is fundamentally erroneous when the facts affirmatively proven by the State simply do not constitute the charged offense as a matter of law." Griffin v. State,
705 So.2d 572, 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also F.B. v. State,
852 So.2d 226 (Fla.2003). Section
827.03(2) does not define torture, so we look to case law and the greater statutory scheme for guidance as to what constitutes torture for purposes of aggravated child abuse....
...1223 relevant to a particular case. It is clear, however, that "the first-degree felony of aggravated child abuse [is] preserved for truly aggravated circumstances." McDonald,
785 So.2d at 642; see also Herbert,
526 So.2d at 712 n. 3 ("[P]ortions of section
827.03 prohibit the `willful torturing' and `willful and unlawful caging' of children....
...ild abuse as "every act, omission, or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused." See Nicholson v. State,
600 So.2d 1101 (Fla.1992) (discussing what acts constitute torture under previous version of sections
827.01 and
827.03)....
...body or mind for purposes of punishment, or to extract a confession or information, or for sadistic pleasure." [2] Black's Law Dictionary 1490 (6th ed. 1990). While we agree that such conduct would certainly constitute "willful torture" pursuant to section 827.03, we decline to apply this common definition of torture as the baseline for conduct constituting torture of a child pursuant to section 827.03(2)(b)....
...not challenge those convictions in this appeal. [2] This definition was considered in State v. Harris,
537 So.2d 1128, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), which held that acts of omission and neglect were not included in the meaning of "willful torture" under section
827.03. Nicholson v. State,
600 So.2d 1101 (Fla.1992), disapproved Harris in part, holding that willful acts of omission and neglect can constitute torture under section
827.03.
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 7526
...LEHAN, Judge. This is an appeal by the state from the dismissal of count I of the information against defendants. Under count I it is alleged that defendants were guilty of aggravated child abuse through willful torture, a second degree felony under section
827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987). The state's theory is that defendants violated section
827.03(1)(b) by having failed to seek prompt and timely medical attention for a burned child. We affirm. See Jakubczak v. State,
425 So.2d 187, 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) ("the legislature intended to punish under section
827.03 only acts of commission done with specific intent."). That the legislature did not intend that negligent omissions be encompassed within section
827.03(1)(b) was shown, Jakubczak reasoned, by the facts that an earlier version of the statute had been amended to omit from its provisions offenses resulting from negligence and that other portions of chapter 827, i.e., sections
827.04 and 827.05, which define particular types of child abuse offenses, do, in contrast to section
827.03, specifically encompass within their descriptions of offenses failures to do that which is required to be done....
...Id. at 188-89. The alleged conduct of defendants appears to be squarely encompassed within the type of offense described in either section
827.04(1) or
827.04(2), each of which refers to "culpable negligence." Under these circumstances and even if section
827.03(1)(b) could, contrary to Jakubczak, be considered to encompass negligent omissions, section
827.04(1) or
827.04(2) should apply to the exclusion of
827.03(1)(b)....
...42, 47 (1916), quoting in turn State ex rel. Loftin v. McMillan,
55 Fla. 246, 250,
45 So. 882, 884 (1908)). It also appears of particular significance that in 1984, after the Third District Court of Appeal's 1983 decision in Jakubczak, the legislature clarified section
827.03 to provide specifically that each kind of aggravated child abuse defined therein must consist of "acts." There was no change to the provisions of section
827.03(1)(b) concerning aggravated child abuse through willful torture, nor was there any change to the definition of "torture" in section
827.01(3). Ch. 84-238, § 1, Laws of Fla. Jakubczak had specifically concluded that "the legislature intended to punish under section
827.03 only acts of commission......
...1973,
95 L.Ed.2d 814 (1987) ("when the use of a statutory definition results in a manifest incongruity ... that definition should not be employed."). Accordingly, consistent in effect with Jakubczak, we do not conclude that the legislature meant to encompass within section
827.03(1)(b) a meaning of the word "torture," much less the words "willful torture," so different from that understood in common parlance....
...ntion for an injured person. "Torture" may be commonly defined as "to inflict intense pain to body or mind for purposes of punishment ... or for sadistic pleasure." Black's Law Dictionary 1335 (5th ed. 1979). Also, while, technically, the facts that section
827.03(1)(b) addresses willful torture and section
827.01(3) only defines "torture" would not logically justify ignoring the section
827.01(3) definition, the inclusion of the word "willfully" in section
827.03(1)(b) may be taken to indicate that the legislature meant to criminalize in that section something worse than what was defined in section
827.01(3). And, of course, penal statutes are to be strictly construed. See Graham v. State,
472 So.2d 464, 465 (Fla. 1985). In addition, even if, contrary to Jakubczak, section
827.03(1)(b) was intended to encompass omissions and neglects and to not be limited to acts of commission, that section, by requiring willfulness, requires specific intent....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 10190
...degree felony murder. See §
782.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1985). It is committed by an accused who: (a) commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) willfully tortures a child; (c) maliciously punishes a child; or (d) willfully and unlawfully cages a child. §
827.03(1), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 1819445
...Steven Nixon appeals a judgment of conviction for child abuse. We affirm all issues raised on appeal. We write to address appellant's argument that reversal is required because child abuse by a parent in the course of discipline is privileged under section 827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1997)....
...cient to convict the defendant on the greater charge. See Espinosa,
686 So.2d at 1348-9. The evidence provided in the victim's testimony as well as that of the doctor's testimony are sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated child abuse. See §
827.03(2), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 536955
...The State contends the trial court erred in setting aside a jury verdict and granting the appellee, Douglas Coffman, a new trial in this aggravated child abuse case. We agree and reverse. Coffman was charged with aggravated child abuse based on malicious punishment in violation of section 827.03(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), after his girlfriend's six-month-old child, for whom Coffman had been babysitting, was rushed to the emergency room of Manatee Hospital, because he had stopped breathing and was essentially having some kind of seizure....
...ld abuse based on malicious punishment. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) p. 365. In fact, there are no necessarily or permissible lesser-included offenses indicated in the standard jury instructions for aggravated child abuse under any provision of section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1995)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 1238588
...on in the side. Later that day, the son met with his mother, who is estranged from Czapla. His mother contacted the police. At the time of the incident, the son was 15 years old and weighed at least 160 pounds. Czapla was charged with a violation of section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2004), child abuse without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement....
...However, a judgment of acquittal is proper if the State fails to prove a prima facie case of guilt when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. We review court rulings on motions for judgment of acquittal de novo. Johnston,
863 So.2d at 283; Reynolds,
934 So.2d at 1145. Section
827.03(1) provides that "a person who knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree....
...ional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; or (c) Active encouragement of any person to commit an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child. § 827.03(1), Fla....
...principally a legislative function, better left to the Legislature." Id. at 1020-1. The Raford court held that "a parent or one standing in loco parentis has no absolute immunity and may be convicted of the lesser offense of felony child abuse under section 827.03(1)." Id....
...sciplinary action that is likely to result in physical injury, mental injury as defined in this section, or emotional injury." Further, we conclude that section
39.01(30)(a)4 should be read in pari materia with the definition of child abuse given in section
827.03(1), which provides in part that child abuse includes an "intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child. . . ." As we read Raford, if a parent establishes the affirmative defense of reasonable parental corporate punishment, the considerations under section
827.03(1) are modified and the offense that may be sustained depends directly upon the type of injury sustained by the child....
...the misdemeanor offense under section
827.04 when a spanking results in significant welts, the legislature intended more serious beatings that do not result in permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to be treated as simple child abuse under section
827.03(1)....
...hich requires more serious beatings that do not result in permanent disability or permanent disfigurement"), rev. denied,
837 So.2d 410 (Fla. 2003). If the parent fails to establish the affirmative defense of reasonable parental corporal punishment, section
827.03(1) is applied to the parent as to any other defendant. Czapla argues on appeal that, under Raford, the parental corporal punishment must be sufficiently serious to cause injury greater than "significant bruises or welts" to constitute simple felony child abuse under section
827.03(1)....
...Czapla did not show that he employed reasonable corporal discipline under the circumstances. Czapla's act in kicking his son while the son was laying on the ground was an "intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury" to the son, see section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes, and was an act that was "likely to result in physical injury" to the son....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 148666
...orrect classification of the severity ranking level of her primary offense. The appellant claimed in her motion that she was sentenced in April of 1996 to eighty-four months in prison followed by five years of probation for the offense of "Fla.Stat. 827.03AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE." She further alleged that this crime was incorrectly classified as a level 8 primary offense under the severity ranking chart of "section 921.0012," resulting in the assessment of 74 points....
...appellant "was assessed the proper number of points on her scoresheet." It supported this determination by referring to the information which charged the appellant "with aggravated child abuse a second degree felony in violation of Florida Statutes Section 827.03" and by reviewing "section 921.0012 of the Florida Statutes" which showed "that a violation of Florida Statutes 827.03 is listed as a level 8 offense." The trial court, however, did not affix any record attachments to its order in support of its ultimate conclusion that the appellant was properly assessed sentencing points based on a correct classification of her primary offense as a level 8 offense....
...As we will demonstrate, these record-based facts are critical to any assessment involving the correctness of the appellant's claim that her sentence is illegal because this information directly governs which version of section 921.0012 applies to her offense. In 1984, the Florida legislature amended section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1983), to provide as follows: (1) "Aggravated child abuse" is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures a child; (c) Maliciously punishes a child; or (d) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child. (2) A person who commits aggravated child abuse is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. See Ch. 84-238, § 1, at 1054, Laws of Fla. (codified at §
827.03, Fla.Stat....
...Based on the interplay of these statutes, a person who committed aggravated child abuse could only be assigned a level 8 severity ranking, calling for the assessment of 74 points for this offense as the primary offense, if the abuse involved aggravated battery on a child in violation of section 827.03(1)(a)....
...(codified at § 921.0012, Fla.Stat. (1995)). This amendment may have altered the manner in which the offense of aggravated child abuse committed on or after October 1, 1995, is to be ranked in terms of its severity level. Section 921.0012(3)(h) provided that a violation of section 827.03(2), which is the catchall section punishing all species of such abuse as a second-degree felony, must be ranked at a severity level of 8 even though it continued to describe the offense to be ranked at this level as one involving the commission of aggravated battery on a child....
...FRANK, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., Concur. NOTES [1] This statute remained unchanged until 1996, when the legislature substantially revised it with an effective date of October 1, 1996. See Ch. 96-322, § 8, at 1770-1771, § 30, at 1798, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 827.03, Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2011 WL 4835655
responsible for a child’s welfare. §
825.102(3)(a) or §
827.03(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Give 1 or 2 as applicable.
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 2726023
...Her speech was not slurred. She was "concerned" and complied with his instructions. The motion contended that the charge was based solely on these facts. The State had charged defendant with one count of criminal child neglect, a third degree felony. § 827.03(3)(c), Fla....
...As Judge Gross succinctly added in Kalogeropolous, "[t]he rule requires a prosecutor to place material facts before the court if she wants the court to consider them in ruling on the motion." State v. Kalogeropoulos,
735 So.2d 507, 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Here the State charged a violation of section
827.03(3)(c). That statute defines criminal child neglect as "willfully or by culpable negligence neglect [ing] a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement...." §
827.03(3)(c), Fla....
...Neglect is further defined as: "a caregiver's failure or omission to provide a child with the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain the child's physical and mental health, including ... supervision... that a prudent person would consider essential for the well being of the child." § 827.03(3)(a)(1). The statute makes clear that: "[n]eglect of a child may be based on ... a single incident or omission that results in, or could reasonably be expected to result in, serious physical or mental injury, or a substantial risk of death, to a child." § 827.03(3)(a)(2)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 75561
...ittal because the evidence failed to establish that the victim died from either malicious torture or willful punishment; and (2) the trial court committed fundamental error in instructing the jury that aggravated child abuse by willful torture under Section 827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes, includes acts of negligence or omission....
...liver had been partially consumed by her body. The medical examiner testified that Kimberly had died in extreme pain. Appellant was convicted of first-degree felony murder with the underlying felony being aggravated child abuse pursuant to Sections 827.03(1)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes....
...Therefore, we affirm appellant's conviction. We are aware of Jakubczak v. State,
425 So.2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and State v. Harris,
537 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), wherein those courts concluded that the Legislature intended to punish only acts of commission in Section
827.03, Florida Statutes, and that failure to take a child for medical treatment was not an act of "commission." However, Florida's child abuse statute, [2] clearly defines "torture" as an act of omission. Therefore, we decline to follow the rationale of Jakubczak and Harris and hold that Section
827.03 contemplates acts of commission or omission....
...However, the case sub judice involved an aggravated form of food deprivation carried out systematically with intent to willfully torture and maliciously punish the child. Under these aggravated circumstances, the State was entitled to prosecute under Section 827.03, Florida Statutes....
...The error was not fundamental, and the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. Murray v. State,
491 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 1986). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed thereon. [3] ZEHMER and WOLF, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section
827.03, Florida Statutes: (1) "Aggravated child abuse" is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures a child; (c) Maliciously punishes a child; or (d) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1084
...ed battery on a child; (2) Willfully tortures a child; (3) Maliciously punishes a child; or (4) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. §
827.03, Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 5444, 34 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1010
...an. We find no merit to Defendant's other arguments and affirm his convictions on the following charges: (1) luring or enticing a child under the age of twelve in violation of section
787.025, Florida Statutes (2006); (2) child abuse in violation of section
827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006); and (3) lewd or lascivious molestationoffender eighteen or older, victim twelve or younger in violation of section
800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2006)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 111330
...Because we reverse appellant's conviction and sentence based on appellant's claim that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, the other issues need not be addressed. Appellant was charged with the aggravated child abuse of his infant daughter in violation of section 827.03, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21294021
...[1] During its investigation, the state agreed the marital privilege barred access to Mary's confidential communications with her husband. However, after approximately 21 months, the state amended the charges to add a felony count of child neglect, pursuant to section
827.03(3)(b) for the injured child, and two additional counts of manslaughter pursuant to section
782.07....
...rge. The trial court noted that the child neglect charge was "tenuous" at best since it was based on Mary Hill's driving at an excessive speed with a child in the car. However, the court concluded that because of the broad definition of "neglect" in section
827.03, section
39.204 abrogated both the psychotherapist and marital communications privileges....
...and shall not constitute grounds for ... failure to give evidence *1214 in any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse, abandonment, or neglect. (emphasis added) In this case, the State has charged Mary Hill with felony child neglect pursuant to section 827.03(b)(3), which constitutes a judicial proceeding....
...iving of a vehicle which resulted in the injury of a child, if the defendant's reckless driving is shown to be sufficiently gross, there is no reason the charge could not be proven. Because of the clear statutory language in both section
39.204, and section
827.03(b)(3), we agree with the trial court that the psychotherapist-patient privilege does not exist in this case as to any communications relevant to the child neglect felony count....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 428808
...1994, [R.F.], RICARDO ELLIS, and DEBRA ELLIS, did willfully torture, maliciously punish, or willfully and unlawfully cage, a child, to wit: [C.F., C.J., or W.F.] by willfully failing to feed or seek medical treatment for the child, in violation of F.S.
827.03/777.011. (Emphasis supplied.) While these counts cite the aggravated child abuse statute, section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1995), [3] the alleged illegal conduct is squarely encompassed within the conduct proscribed by section
827.04(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....
...[2] Three children were the listed victims in all of these charges. Count VIII alleged that the abuse was directed toward C.F.; Count IX alleged that the abuse was directed toward C.J.; and Count X alleged that the abuse was directed toward W.F. [3] Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1995), provides: Aggravated child abuse. (1) "Aggravated child abuse" is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures a child; (c) Maliciously punishes a child; or (d) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 212
...y for the original crimes for which they had been placed on probation. Nothing in those opinions indicates that the defendants *1271 were being sentenced for additional crimes at the same time. AFFIRMED. COBB, C.J., and COWART, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 827.03(3), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
a child's welfare. §
825.102(3)(a) or §
827.03(3)(e), Fla. Stat. "Neglect of [a child"]
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 162717
...We find no merit in the appellant's contention that the trial court erred by revoking her community control, but because of a guidelines scoresheet error, we must remand for resentencing. The appellant originally pled guilty to the crime of aggravated child abuse in violation of section 827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...(1993). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.702(c) provides that felony offenses not listed in section 921.0012 are assigned a severity level as described in section 921.0013. Appellant was charged with aggravated battery on a child in violation of section 827.03(1)(b) and not pursuant to section 827.03(1)(a). Aggravated battery on a child as defined in section 827.03(1)(a) is the only form of aggravated child abuse specifically listed in the 1993 version of section 921.0012. The legislature amended section 921.0012 in 1995 but that version of the statute does not apply in this case. Because a violation of section 827.03(1)(b) was not specifically listed in section 921.0012 the severity level for this crime should have been assigned pursuant to section 921.0013....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 1733666
...did knowingly or willfully abuse a child by committing an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to S.Y., a child, by stomping on the foot of S.Y. with her foot without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to S.Y., contrary to F.S. 827.03(1)....
...suffered from an attention deficit disorder and developmental delays, and was experiencing behavioral difficulties, and/or did cause the chair in which S.C. was seated to fall down steps, without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to S.C., contrary to F.S. 827.03(1)....
...to S.C., to wit: by causing S.C. to be seated in a chair in very close proximity to descending steps knowing that S.C. suffered from an attention deficit disorder and developmental delays, and was experiencing behavioral difficulties, contrary to F.S. 827.03(3)(c)....
...Such circumstantial evidence "must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Wilson v. State,
824 So.2d 335, 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ( quoting Bowen v. State,
791 So.2d 44, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)); accord State v. Law,
559 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989). Section
827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2006), defines the crime of "child abuse" as: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury t...
...rmal range of performance and behavior." §
39.01(43), Fla. Stat. (2002); see DuFresne v. State,
826 So.2d 272, 277-78 (Fla.2002); Zerbe v. State,
944 So.2d 1189, 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). As to both S.Y and S.C., the state charged child abuse under section
827.03(1)(b)that Lanier committed an "intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child." The circuit court correctly relied upon King to dismiss the charges based on section
827.03(1)(b). King involved a teacher who spanked a student with a wooden paddle; the student "suffered significant welts and bruises on her buttocks."
903 So.2d at 955. The state charged the teacher with violating section
827.03(1). Reversing the teacher's conviction, the second district held that "spankings that result in `significant bruises or welts' do not rise to the level of felony child abuse" under section
827.03(1), which requires "more serious beatings that do not result in permanent disability or permanent disfigurement." King,
903 So.2d at 955 (quoting State v. McDonald,
785 So.2d 640, 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)). Also, the court noted that there was "no corresponding mental injury." Id. at 956. We applied King in Zerbe, a case involving the conduct of a karate instructor; we reversed a conviction under section
827.03(1)(b) and held that as a matter of law the teacher's "repetitive requests for" an eleven year old child "to go to the bathroom" could not "reasonably be expected to cause mental injury."
944 So.2d at 1193. Lanier's conduct in this case is less egregious than that of the defendant in King. There was no intentional act that could "reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child" under section
827.03(1)(b)....
...Sitting near steps, even for a child with ADHD, is not an activity that could reasonably be expected to result in physical injury to the child. We reject the state's contention that Lanier's violation of a school board *369 policy against corporal punishment is significant in deciding whether there has been a section 827.03(1) violation....
...At common law, one standing in loco parentis had the right "to moderately chastise for correction a child under his or her control and authority." Raford v. State,
828 So.2d 1012, 1015 n. 5 (Fla.2002) (quoting Marshall v. Reams,
32 Fla. 499,
14 So. 95 (1893)). Nothing in section
827.03, or any related statute, abolishes that right....
...punishment for crime." If the application of a criminal statute hinges on the existence of a local policy, then the statute fails to "give fair warning . . . of the nature of the conduct proscribed" contrary to section
775.012(2), Florida Statutes (2007). Count III of the information charged a violation of section
827.03(3)(c). We agree with the trial court's determination that the undisputed material facts did not establish a prima facie case of guilt on the charge of child neglect. The pertinent portion of the statute, section
827.03(3) provides: (3)(a) "Neglect of a child" means: 1....
...ect (Count III). However, I disagree with the majority's holding that, as a matter of law, the undisputed facts fail to establish a prima facie case of child abuse. Counts I and II of the information allege that Defendant committed child abuse under section 827.03(1)(b) by engaging in "an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to the child." The majority concludes that the trial court properly relied upon King v....
...As the majority correctly notes, Raford recognized that, at common law, a parent or one standing in loco parentis (such as a teacher) had the right to reasonably discipline a child under his or her control and authority. Citing this language, the majority in the instant case concludes that "[n]othing in section 827.03, or any related statute, abolishes that right....
...By the plain language of the statute, the Legislature has granted individual school districts the authority to limit the manner and circumstances by which a teacher may impose corporal punishment. Consistent with this statutory scheme, and pursuant to Raford, a defendant charged with child abuse under 827.03(1) may raise as an affirmative defense the parental privilege of corporal punishment by establishing that: 1....
...1st DCA 2007). That is, Defendant's conduct is to be measured not in terms of whether her actions were "reasonable" (as the majority asserts) but whether those actions "could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child." § 827.03(1)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 633748
...n
794.011(2) (capital sexual battery) instead of section
782.04(2)(second degree murder). We remand to the trial court to correct this error in the judgment. Affirmed but remanded to correct scrivener's error. POLEN and GROSS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section
827.03, Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 250710
...First, felony murder, with aggravated child abuse as the underlying felony. Second, the state argued that Appellant was guilty as a principal under section
777.011, Florida Statutes. At the time of Appellant's trial, Florida's aggravated child abuse statute §
827.03 (1995), since amended, provided as follows: (1) "Aggravated child abuse" is defined as one or more acts committed by a person who: (a) commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) willfully tortures a child; (c) maliciously punishes a child; or (d) willfully and unlawfully cages a child....
...NOTES [1] The child abuse statute was substantially amended in 1996 after the trial. The amended version's definition of child abuse includes intentional acts and/or "active encouragement of any person to commit an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child." Fla. Stat. § 827.03(1)(c).
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 1203349
...We affirm the convictions without comment, but vacate the sentence for Count II, child abuse, and remand for resentencing. Charged with aggravated child abuse in Count II of the Information, the jury found appellant guilty of the lesser offense, child abuse, a third degree felony. § 827.03(1), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 869395
...LaFleur of his status as "parent" under section
787.01(1)(b). There is no question that Mr. Muniz's behavior was inappropriate. We are inclined to believe that the State could have charged Mr. Muniz with assault on the child, see §
784.011, Fla. Stat. (1997); child abuse, see §
827.03(1)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 339101
...The record clearly shows that Newberry pled guilty to a Level four offense only, and the state agreed under those circumstances to drop the other criminal charge against him. A deal is a deal, even though it is a bad one for the state. REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing. PETERSON, C.J., and GOSHORN, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 827.03(b) and (c), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 9995, 2009 WL 2168753
...lower court submitted a written order terminating the father's parental rights for engaging in egregious conduct, §
39.806(1)(f), sexual abuse pursuant to section
39.806(1)(g), as defined in section
39.01(67); aggravated child abuse, as defined in section
827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse, as defined in section
39.01 or chronic abuse, §
39.806(1)(g); and for abandonment pursuant to section
39.806(1)(b), as defined in section
39.01(1)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 103315
...Gen., Tampa, for appellee. LEHAN, Judge. This is an appeal from defendant's convictions for first-degree felony murder under section
782.04(1)(a)(2)(h), Florida Statutes (1985), and the underlying second-degree felony of aggravated child abuse under section
827.03....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 55921
...Although we originally agreed with the trial court that the statute was vague, Fuchs requires a different result. Appellee, a public school teacher who works with autistic children, was charged with five counts of child abuse involving different children, contrary to section 827.03, Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), which provides: Abuse, aggravated abuse, and neglect of a child; penalties. (1)"Child abuse" means: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that coul...
...osecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,
472 U.S. 491, 503,
105 S.Ct. 2794,
86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985). [footnote omitted.] In this case some of the counts are based solely on oral statements. Section
827.03(1)(b) is, accordingly, being used to prosecute conduct protected by the First Amendment....
...We conclude, as our supreme court did with the election laws involved in Doe, that this statute is not substantially overbroad and can be upheld against an overbreadth argument by narrowly construing it as not applicable to speech. Vagueness Our limitation of section 827.03 so that it is not applicable to speech does not resolve all of the issues in this case, because two of the counts in this case charged appellee with "force feeding," and two other counts charged appellee with "slapping" or "striking."...
...and preventing child abuse, and moved to Chapter 415. The definition was moved from section 415.503(8) to section
39.01(44) in 1998. See ch. 98-403, § 19, Laws of Fla. [2] Fuchs In our original opinion, we concluded that "mental injury" as used in section
827.03 was unconstitutionally vague; however Fuchs appears to require a contrary result....
...jury" means an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment in his ability to function within his normal range of performance and behavior. The trial court's conclusion that section 827.03 is vague because the term "mental injury" is undefined is contrary to Fuchs....
...rt or in this court, suggest that the vagueness of section 627.03 could be cured by using a definition contained in a different statute. We reverse, but certify the following question as one of great public importance: IS THE TERM "MENTAL INJURY" IN SECTION 827.03(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1996) UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS VAGUE? GROSS, J., and FINE, EDWARD H., Associate Judge, concur....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 111037
...Parents are legally responsible for their minor children's health insofar as it is in their power to foster it. They have a duty to stay alert to their minor children's medical needs, and to secure appropriate medical assistance if they are able to do so. See § 827.03(3)(a)1., Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 1969195
...Hanna, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We agree with appellant that the evidence presented did not support her conviction of aggravated child abuse. We reverse the conviction and direct the trial court on remand to enter judgment for child abuse under section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...iss an information and an affidavit of violation of probation and in revoking his probation for an alleged violation of a term of his probation requiring him to live honorably. Appellant was charged with maliciously punishing a child in violation of Section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1977)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 653601
...Accordingly, we affirm the judgment but quash the sentence and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of slight versus moderate injury prior to sentencing. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED. THOMPSON, J., concurs. COBB, J., dissents without opinion. NOTES [1] § 827.03, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 14629
absolute immunity to charges of child abuse under section
827.03, however, it may be asserted as an affirmative
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 608506
...In accordance with rule 3.702, "[f]elony offenses not listed in section 921.0012 are to be assigned a severity level as described in section 921.0013." Id. See also § 921.0013, Fla. Stat. (1993); § 921.0012, Fla.Stat. (Supp. *412 1994). Defendant was charged with aggravated battery on a child pursuant to subsections 827.03(1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) and not pursuant to subsection (1)(a). Aggravated battery on a child, as set forth in subsection 827.03(1)(a), is the only subsection relating to the crime of aggravated child abuse specifically listed in section 921.0012. Because defendant's crime was not specifically listed in section 921.0012, the severity level for his crime should have been scored pursuant to section 921.0013. Further, because aggravated child abuse is a second degree felony, see section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes, his primary offense should have been scored within offense level 4, pursuant to section 921.0013(2), and not within offense level 8....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2013 WL 6124277
or disabled adult; penalties), as it did in section
827.03, Florida Statutes (2012) défining Aggravated
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 3355120
...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Tiffany Gatesh Fearing, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. WHATLEY, Judge. William Blow appeals his judgment and sentence for child abuse. Blow was originally charged by information with aggravated child abuse pursuant to section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (2005). The information alleged that Blow "did willfully and unlawfully cage a child...." Blow filed a motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 827.03(2) proscribes the caging of a child and that his act of chaining his sixteen-year-old stepson at Blow's *541 place of work and in the stepson's bedroom did not constitute caging....
...The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and Blow entered a plea to the lesser offense of third-degree child abuse, [1] attempting to reserve his right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. We conclude that the denial of Blow's motion to dismiss was not dispositive of the offense of child abuse as defined by section 827.03(1)(b), [2] and therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed....
...propriately clothed. Finally, Blow alleged that the handcuff never caused injury to the child. The State filed a demurrer accepting as true the facts as alleged in the motion, but arguing that such chaining did constitute unlawful caging pursuant to section 827.03(2)(b). Section 827.03(2)(b) provides that a person commits aggravated child abuse when the person "willfully and unlawfully cages a child...." The statute does not define the term "caging" and we have been unable to find a case addressing this issue....
...The plain meaning of the term "cage" does not include the act of chaining or handcuffing. Therefore, based on the facts presented in the motion to dismiss and demurrer, the State did not present a prima facie case of aggravated child abuse by caging as provided for in section 827.03(2)(b). However, Blow entered a plea to the offense of child abuse as provided for in section 827.03(1)(b), which does not include the element of caging....
...State,
892 So.2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Griffin v. State,
753 So.2d 676, 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Here, even if this court were to reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss, the State could proceed with prosecuting Blow for child abuse under section
827.03(1)(b)....
...tive. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal without prejudice to Blow's right to file a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion. See Ashley v. State,
611 So.2d 617, 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Dismissed. SILBERMAN and KELLY, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] §
827.03(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). [2] Section
827.03(1)(b) defines child abuse as "An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child...." [3] This opinion is not intended to limit what type of structure could be considered a "cage." We conclude only that the proscription against caging in section
827.03(2) does not encompass Blow's act of chaining his stepson in the present case.
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 798709
...that misdemeanor child abuse is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated child abuse and reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to grant A.J.'s motion for judgment of acquittal. A.J. was charged with aggravated child abuse, a second-degree felony, pursuant to section 827.03(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....
...to the law. In State v. Coffman, ___ So.2d ____,
1998 WL 536955, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1998 (Fla. 2d DCA Aug. 26, 1998), this court, in holding that battery is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated child abuse based on malicious punishment under section
827.03(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), noted that "there are no necessarily or permissible lesser-included offenses indicated in the standard jury instructions for aggravated child abuse under any provision of section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1995)." (Emphasis added.) See also Mohammed v. State,
561 So.2d 384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (child abuse by culpable negligence under section
827.04(1) not a lesser-included offense of aggravated child abuse under
827.03, Florida Statutes (1987))....
...In the present case, the petition alleged only intentional *763 touching or striking and did not allege injury through culpable negligence. Reversed and remanded with instructions. PARKER, C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., concur. NOTES [1] We note that on October 1, 1996, section 827.03 was amended by chapter 96-322, section 8, Laws of Florida (1996).
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 467557
...Clegg, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. ORFINGER, R. B., J. Robert Corsen appeals his conviction for felony child abuse in violation of section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (1998)....
...was interviewed, and his injuries photographed, by a child protective investigator with the Department of Children and Families and a St. Johns County sheriff's office detective. After the authorities concluded their investigation, Corsen was charged with felony child abuse in violation of section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (1998)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 1226054
...in prohibiting appellant from obtaining the victim's medical and mental health records, which contained evidence highly relevant to appellant's defense. We remand for a new trial. However, appellant can be retried for no more than child abuse under section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (1999), because, as we ruled in the co-defendant's appeal, the evidence was insufficient for the greater charge of aggravated child abuse....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida
maximum sentence of up to fifteen years in prison. §
827.03(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2015) (defining child neglect);
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 2524, 2010 WL 711790
...and the degree of the crime, if any, involved in the mother's care of the child, particularly, whether she may have been guilty of a lesser offense such as neglect of a child by culpable negligence with great bodily harm, a second degree felony. See § 827.03(3)(b) (2007)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 865806
...Helm, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anne Sheer Weiner, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. ALTENBERND, Judge. Jolanda W. Julius appeals a final judgment convicting her of two counts of child abuse pursuant to section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2004)....
...There was evidence that the choking occurred within the time frame alleged in the information. The older boy had similar, albeit somewhat more severe, injuries. As a result of these events, the State filed an information charging Ms. Julius with aggravated child abuse, a first-degree felony, see § 827.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2004), for the injuries to her son, and child abuse, a third-degree felony, see § 827.03(1), for the injuries to her daughter....
...Nothing in this record suggests that the choking was thought by Ms. Julius to be an act of discipline. Indeed, contrary to Ms. Julius's argument, the State might have been able to proceed on a charge of aggravated child abuse for the injuries to both the son and daughter. Under section 827.03(2), aggravated child abuse occurs when a person "maliciously punishes" a child....
...Maliciousness may be established by circumstances from which one could conclude that a reasonable parent would not have engaged in the damaging acts toward the child for any valid reason and that the primary purpose of the acts was to cause the victim unjustifiable pain or injury. § 827.03(4)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21412362
...Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. SAWAYA, J. Leah Gryphon appeals his judgment and the subsequent sentence rendered for aggravated child abuse in violation of section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....
...de the Gaylord definition of malice to the jury in its instructions. We agree with Gryphon that this failure constitutes fundamental error and reverse. On October 19, 2001, Gryphon was convicted of one count of aggravated child abuse in violation of section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (1997), a second-degree felony, for incidents that allegedly occurred with his daughter between August 1 and December 13, 1998....
...d concerning the use of the standard jury instruction for aggravated child abuse, specifically as it defined "malice." Because the latter issue determines the resolution of this appeal, we will not address the issue regarding the alleged misconduct. Section 827.03(2), as it read at the time of the alleged offense in the instant case, defined aggravated abuse of a child as when a person (a) [c]ommits aggravated battery on a child; (b) [w]illfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child; or (c) [k]nowingly or willfully abuses a child and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child. § 827.03(2), Fla....
...as in the instant case), must be a disputed element of the crime. In the instant case, the State had the burden of proving that Gryphon had "willfully tortured or maliciously punished the child" to make a prima facie case of aggravated child abuse. § 827.03(2)(b), Fla....
...Furthermore, the trial court used these as yet unamended jury *593 instructions and defined maliciously as meaning "wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification or excuse." Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.). Because the specific definition of malice is critical in determining whether the State has met all elements of section 827.03(2), it is evident that the meaning of malice is, in fact, in dispute....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1426
...Schraffa unsuccessfully moved for new trial and to dismiss, and he was subsequently sentenced to a term of 41/2 years in prison, with credit for time served. Appellant argues that because victim injury is not a necessary element of the felony of aggravated child abuse by maliciously punishing a child, under section 827.03(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1985), with which appellant was charged, there are eight points both in the prosecutor's point count and in the defense counsel's calculation that are incorrect....
...1st DCA 1985); Motyka v. State,
457 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The charge against appellant was that he maliciously punished the child by repeatedly striking him with his hand, causing massive bruises on his buttocks and genital area, contrary to section
827.03(1)(c) Florida Statutes....
...nflicted, but that it be a necessary element of the crime with which the accused is charged and of which the accused is convicted. Here Schraffa was charged in the information with causing physical trauma, but the crime charged is that identified at section 827.03(1)(c) aggravated child abuse by maliciously punishing a child....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 746647
...The State of Florida appeals the trial court's dismissal of child abuse charges against appellee Carlos M. Figarola. We affirm because Figarola's behavior constituted reasonable parental discipline, and thus did not form a basis to convict him of child abuse under section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....
...utes (1999). [3] The second level of excessive corporal punishment would be simple child abuse, the charge against Figarola, and constitutes a third-degree felony. The most severe violation would be aggravated child abuse, a first-degree felony. See Section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (1999). In McDonald, supra, McDonald spanked his six-year old daughter which caused dark bruises on the child's buttocks, upper thigh, and upper back that required medical attention. The State charged McDonald with child abuse under section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (1999) characterizing the act as an unjustifiable beating....
...Furthermore, unlike the parent's act of discipline in Raford, Figarola did not intend to inflict injury upon his son and did so accidentally. We therefore find that, under the record before us, the circumstances of this case do not rise to the level of child abuse. Affirmed. NOTES [1] Section 827.03(1) provides, in pertinent part: "Child abuse" means: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; or (...
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...The appellant was charged with two counts of aggravated manslaughter of a
child by culpable negligence under section
782.07(3), Florida Statutes (2010),
which provides,
A person who causes the death of any person under the age of 18 by
culpable negligence under s.
827.03(3) commits aggravated
manslaughter of a child, a felony of the first degree. . . .
Section
827.03(3) defines “neglect of a child” to include a “caregiver’s
failure or omission to provide a child with the care, supervision, and services
necessary to maintain the child’s physical and mental health. . . .” “Neglect may
be based upon repeated conduct or on a single isolated incident or omission. . . .” §
827.03(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). Child neglect is criminalized when a person
“willfully or by culpable negligence neglects a child.” §
827.03(3)(b), Fla....
...ours, and a
witness observed the children playing on a ladder in the back yard, which
Appellant knew or should have known was occurring. Such conduct, in my view,
can support a conviction for aggravated manslaughter based on child neglect.
Under section 827.03(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2010), Appellant failed to “provide
a child with the ....
.... supervision . . . necessary to maintain the child’s physical . . .
8
health . . . .” Such child neglect was the result of Appellant “willfully or by
culpable negligence neglect[ing] a child.” § 827.03(2)(b), Fla....
...2d 3 (Fla. 1977)).
To withstand the motion for JOA, the State’s evidence was required to
support a prima facie case for each element of the charged offense, aggravated
manslaughter of a child (§
782.07(3), Fla. Stat.) by culpable negligence (§
827.03(3), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 11565, 2011 WL 3055393
...In addition, the floor of the child's room was covered with clothes, trash, and dirt, and smelled like urine and mold. The couch where the girl was supposedly sleeping was covered with clothes and cobwebs, and there was no room for her to lie down. Section 827.03(3)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2010), defines child neglect as: A caregiver's failure or omission to provide a child with the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain the child's physical and mental health, including, but not...
...ng of the child. Such failure or omission may be based on repeated conduct or, as in the present case, on a "single incident or omission that results in, or could reasonably be expected to result in, serious physical or mental injury [] to a child." § 827.03, Fla. Stat. To prove child neglect, the State is required to show the defendant acted willfully or with culpable negligence in creating the situation or in allowing the questionable conditions to occur. See § 827.03(3)(c), Fla....
...by a discernable and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior." §
39.01, Fla. Stat (2010); see DuFresne v. State,
826 So.2d 272, 278-79 (Fla.2002) (reading chapter 39 in pari materia with section
827.03 to supply a definition for "mental injury")....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2009 WL 2031722
...tated "This is my fucking class and I'll run it the way I see fit." ( Id. 15:14-25). Rodriguez and Mort reported the incident to Alexis Agosto, the Assistant Principal at South Seminole. Garrett was convicted of third-degree felony child abuse under section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes, for this incident....
...( See State Court Trial Verdict, Ex. A to Doc. 54). The court entered judgments of acquittal on the count of aggravated child abuse and one count of child abuse. ( Id. ). The jury returned a guilty verdict on the charge of child abusespecifically for abuse directed at M.S.under section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes, and acquitted her of the remaining count. ( Id. ). Section 827.03(1) defines "child abuse" as the "[i]ntentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child," "[a]n intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child," or "[a]ctive encouragement of any person to commit an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child." § 827.03(1)(a)-(c), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Duhig, Miami, for appellant Hearns. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael J. Kotler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Carol Denise Miller and Eugene Hearns appeal from their convictions of aggravated child abuse in violation of Section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1977), and third-degree felony murder in violation of Section
782.04(4), Florida Statutes (1977)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 288963
...There were no weapons involved in this case, so the jury must have *537 rejected the State's assertion that Key caused great bodily harm. Similarly, the jury's acquittal of aggravated child abuse and conviction for child abuse necessarily precludes a finding of great bodily harm. § 827.03(1), (2), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 4576394
...This court redesignated the case as a petition *206 for writ of habeas corpus, treated her initial brief as the petition, and issued an order to show cause. We now grant the petition. Defendant was charged, along with co-defendant Ronald Festa (Festa), with one count of aggravated child abuse in violation of section 827.03(2)(b), alleged to have occurred on June 18, 2000....
...This court reversed Defendant's direct appeal, finding the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support her conviction for aggravated child abuse. It directed the trial court on remand to enter judgment for child abuse under section 827.03(1)....
...actively encouraged another person to commit an act that resulted in or could reasonably have been expected to result in physical or mental injury to (victim). 2. (Victim) was under the age of 18 years. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 16.3. [2] The jury instruction for aggravated child abuse under section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (1999), is as follows: To prove the crime of aggravated child abuse, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 906558
...Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Maximillian J. Changus, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. This appeal challenges appellant's sentence for aggravated child abuse where the verdict form failed to specify that he had violated subsection (1)(a) of section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1995)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 1576529
...ild abuse or child abuse. Moreover, prior to the change in the standard jury instructions, there were no necessarily or permissible lesser-included offenses listed in the standard jury instructions *436 for offenses committed under the provisions of section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1997). See State v. Coffman,
746 So.2d 471 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied,
728 So.2d 201 (Fla.1998). In Coffman, the appellant was charged with aggravated child abuse based on malicious punishment in violation of section
827.03(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995)....
...e of lesser-included offenses, the court held that a simple battery instruction was unwarranted.
746 So.2d at 473. In the present case, the jury found appellant guilty of committing felony child abuse on April 3, 1998. Although she was charged under section
827.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) ("Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child"), and not malicious punishment, at that time there were no necessarily or permissible lesser-included offenses listed under that section....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2013 WL 4106367, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16895
...career offender sentence is cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
2. If so, whether the district court, in light of Begay, erroneously
determined that Spencer was a career offender based upon a predicate state
conviction for felony child abuse under Fla. Stat. § 827.03(1).3
1
Begay involved the Armed Career Criminal Act, not the career offender statute and
Guideline, but courts treat them the same in defining what is a crime of violence....
...United
States,
553 U.S. 137,
128 S. Ct. 1581,
170 L. Ed. 2d 490 (2008), erroneously determined
that the movant was properly classified as a career offender where he had a prior state
conviction for felony child abuse under Fla. Stat. §
827.03(1)?
4
Case: 10-10676 Date Filed: 08/15/2013 Page: 5 of 45
On appeal from a district court’s denial of a section 2255 motion, “we
review legal issues de novo and factual findings under a clear error standard.”
Thomas v....
...degree
felony child abuse provided: “A person who knowingly or willfully abuses a child
without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent
disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree . . . .” Fla. Stat.
§ 827.03(1) (2003) (emphasis added).6 It defined child abuse as:
(a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury 7 upon a
child;
(b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to...
...Chitwood,
676 F.3d 971, 975-76 (11th Cir. 2012) (second
emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In identifying the elements of the offense, the language of the Florida statute
refers to “physical or mental injury to a child.” Fla. Stat. §
827.03(1) (2003)
(emphasis added)....
...r stage:
35
The DuFresne court actually cited section
827.01, which defined only the terms
“caregiver,” “child,” and “placement.” Fla. Stat. §
827.01 (1996). Elsewhere throughout the
opinion, the DuFresne court cited section
827.03, which did define child abuse, not section
827.01. Thus, we assume that DuFresne’s quoted reference to
827.01 here, rather than
827.03,
was inadvertent.
27
Case: 10-10676 Date Filed: 08/15/2013 Page: 28 of 45
The second way that a crime can come within the residual
clause is the modified...
...Although it is a lesser offense (third
rather than second degree), it is not a lesser included offense.
30
Case: 10-10676 Date Filed: 08/15/2013 Page: 31 of 45
mental injury to that child, contrary to the provisions of 827.03.” Change of Plea
Hr’g Tr., Appellant’s Br., App....
...2001) (citation omitted). 44
“Substantially certain to result,” however, is not the standard for felony child
abuse, by either the plain language of the Florida statute (an “act that could
reasonably be expected to result in . . .,” Fla. Stat. § 827.03(1) (2003) (emphasis
added)) or the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 496962
...At trial, a large body of evidence was presented that young Brennan had been horridly abused. The State prosecuted Mr. Dougherty on a charge of first-degree felony murder, a capital felony, based on an underlying felony of aggravated child abuse, a second-degree felony defined in section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (1997). At the jury charge conference, defense counsel requested an instruction on child abuse, a third-degree felony violation of section 827.03(1), as a lesser-included offense of aggravated child abuse....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 WL 4104731
...Stat. (2011) (containing a virtually identical exception to the definition of "abuse"). In Raford, the Florida Supreme Court held that the parental privilege to use corporal discipline does not provide absolute immunity to charges of child abuse under section 827.03, however, it may be asserted as an affirmative defense to criminal child abuse charges....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida
in a physical or mental injury to a child.” See §
827.03(1)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. And having committed no act
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 15870
condition worsened before he returned. Section
827.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), provides that
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 16898, 2011 WL 5061349
...years of probation. We reverse Wilson's conviction because of the improper admission of extrinsic evidence, introduced solely for impeachment on an irrelevant and collateral matter. Wilson was charged by information with child abuse in violation of section 827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 2861101
...Blumberg, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. Before LEVY, GREEN, and WELLS, JJ. GREEN, J. The State of Florida appeals the trial court's dismissal of its information against Vonda Denise Christie for child neglect with no bodily harm pursuant to sections 827.03(3)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (2003)....
...r, stood by and did nothing while her teacher's aide bound certain students to their desks and/or to the blackboard with adhesive tape, in the classroom. The State charged Christie with five counts of child neglect with no bodily harm under sections 827.03(3)(a) and (c)....
...Section
827.01(1), in turn, defines "caregiver" as "a parent, adult household member, or other person responsible for a child's welfare." Christie filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. She asserted that as a public school teacher, she was not a section
827.03(3) "caregiver" or "other person responsible for a child's welfare" if that section was read in pari materia with section
39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2003). [1] The State responded that the Chapter 39 definition of "other person responsible for a child's welfare" did not need to be superimposed on section
827.03. Moreover, the state argued that Christie was a section
827.03 "caregiver" because, as a school teacher, she stood in loco parentis to the students during school hours and was therefore an "other person responsible for a child's welfare." §
827.01(1), Fla....
...The trial court granted Christie's motion to dismiss. The State appealed. We agree with the State that there is no need to refer to the section
39.01(47) definition of "other person responsible for a child's welfare" in considering a neglect charge under section
827.03. That is because we conclude that a teacher falls within the plain meaning of "caregiver" during school hours as that word is defined in section
827.01(1). Section
827.03(3) criminalizes child neglect by a "caregiver." A "caregiver" in turn is statutorily defined as "a parent, adult household member, or other person responsible for a child's welfare." §
827.01(1), Fla....
...s language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be given its "plain and obvious meaning." Holly v. Auld,
450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). The plain and obvious meaning of "caregiver," in
827.01(1), has been applied to neglect prosecutions under
827.03(3)....
...in pari materia, the absence of such a directive does not bar construing two statutes in that manner." Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court opted to read the statutory definition of "mental injury" found in Chapter 39 in pari materia with section
827.03, Florida Statutes (2003). DuFresne, however, does not mandate that chapter 39 always be read in pari materia with section
827.03. See S.J.C. v. State,
906 So.2d 1115, 1117 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("We are mindful of the supreme court's reading of chapter 39 in pari materia with section
827.03, Florida Statutes (2003), to define "mental injury." ....
..."[T]he public interest is in education, upon which society places a high value. It requires an orderly atmosphere which is free from danger and disruption." *1081 D.T.W.,
425 So.2d at 1386 (citations omitted). We find no logic to Christie's argument, which counters the plain dictate of section
827.03(3)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 5499990
charge of aggravated child abuse with torture. See §
827.03(2) Fla. Stat. (2002). He apparently cooperated
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida
alleged or proven here. See §
784.085, Fla. Stat.; §
827.03(1)(a)&(b), Fla. Stat. If it had received
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 1235740
...In so doing, we find prohibition a proper remedy to assert a right against double jeopardy and conclude that we are not bound by the direction in the former appeal to the effect that any retrial would be limited to the charge of child abuse. Defendant and a co-defendant were charged with aggravated child abuse. § 827.03(2)(b), Fla....
...defendant could be tried for no offense other than simple child abuse. Festa v. State,
901 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). On remand the State filed a new information based on the same incident, this time charging defendant with simple child abuse. §
827.03(1)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 817911
...State,
830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction. Id. Section
827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2004), provides in pertinent part: "Child abuse" means: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child;....
..." Ms. Garrett argues that it was fundamental error for the court to use that definition borrowed from section
39.01(30)(a)(4)e., Florida Statutes (2004). [1] We reject this contention. Section *216
39.01(30)(a)(4) should be read in pari materia with section
827.03(1) and is appropriately used by the courts to define excessive or abusive corporal discipline....
...struction on carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon allowed jury to find defendant guilty without deciding whether a paring knife was a "concealed weapon"). [4] Whether this instruction, which effectively precluded a finding of guilt under section 827.03(1)(b), was appropriate is not before us for determination....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 8954, 2011 WL 2498113
...We reverse the defendant's conviction for attempted second-degree murder, but affirm his conviction and sentence for child abuse. The defendant was charged with the attempted first-degree murder of Bynum (Count 1), and the child abuse of J.E. in violation of section 827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2008) (Count 2)....
...suffered an actual mental injury as a result of witnessing his mother being brutally attacked by the defendant, and (2) J.E.'s older sister's testimony reflecting that J.E. is a "normal boy" who is doing well in school. We reject the defendant's contention. The defendant was charged with child abuse pursuant to section 827.03(1)(b), which provides in relevant part: "(1) `Child abuse' means: ... (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a *1260 child...." (Emphasis added). Although section 827.03 does not define the term "mental injury," in DuFresne v....
...y had excluded. During trial, defense counsel objected when the State asked J.E.'s mother whether J.E. had gone to counseling, and the trial court sustained the objection. Second, the defendant's argument is erroneous as a matter of law. Pursuant to section
827.03(1)(b), the State was not required to prove actual mental injury to J.E., but only that the defendant's intentional act " could reasonably be expected to result in ... mental injury" to J.E. (emphasis added); see Zerbe v. State,
944 So.2d 1189, 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("The offense of child abuse under subsection (b) [of section
827.03(1)] does not require proof of actual injury; rather, the offense includes any act that is done intentionally that could reasonably be expected to cause mental injury."); Clines v....
...Based on this evidence, there is no doubt that the State proved that the defendant's intentional act "could reasonably be expected to result in mental injury" to J.E. Cf. Baker v. State,
980 So.2d 616, 616-19 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (reversing denial of judgment of acquittal on charge of child abuse filed under section
827.03(1)(b), where evidence showed that Baker rubbed child's stomach; kissed child on cheeks, jaw, and forehead; and during incident, the child was crying and upset because he did not know Baker)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 10124
delinquent, dependent, or in need of services. See §
827.03(1). Therefore, the former is not a necessarily
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 361847
...A jury found him guilty of lewd act, and the trial court sentenced him to three years of imprisonment followed by two years' probation. He was acquitted of a separate charge of aggravated child abuse, which related to alleged physical abuse of the couple's child. See § 827.03, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 49363
...a third degree felony. We affirm the order of the trial court and write only to express our concern that the legislature did not place an age-based restriction on these types of prosecutions. The petition for delinquency alleged that K.B.S. violated section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), in that she knowingly or willfully abused a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child....
...The evidence at trial showed that K.B.S., a fourteen-year-old juvenile, intentionally burned the victim, who was nine years old at the time, with a lighted cigarette. Intentional infliction of a physical or mental injury upon a child is included in the definition of child abuse under section 827.03(1)(a)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida
charged with child neglect in violation of section
827.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2016). “Neglect of
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 465576
...ut permission, we reverse. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Background In October 2004, Mr. Thompson pleaded no contest to the charges of aggravated battery, section
784.045, Florida Statutes (2003), a second-degree felony; and felony child abuse, section
827.03, Florida Statutes (2003), a third-degree felony....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 2894, 2009 WL 928582
...We hold that double jeopardy does not prevent a court from granting the state's timely motion to rehear an order granting a rule 3.800(a) motion that was based on false or incomplete information. Appellant pleaded no contest to one count of neglect to a child, a second degree felony. See § 827.03(3), Fla....
...In September 2005, appellant filed a motion to vacate an illegal sentence, apparently under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). He argued that the 10 year sentence was illegal because he had entered a plea to a reduced charge, a third degree felony under section 827.03(3)(c), to which a maximum sentence of five years applied. To support his argument, appellant pointed to the judgment of conviction, which identified the crime involved as section "827.03(3)" and indicated that the degree of crime was "3F." On October 18, 2005, a new circuit judge, not the one who had accepted the plea, granted appellant's motion and issued a written order which vacated the "illegal sentence" and sentenced appellant to five years in prison....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 889163
...The third issue raised by Acres is that the sentences of 66 months incarceration exceed the statutory maximum penalty of 60 months and are illegal. Child abuse and neglect of a child are both third degree felonies, for which the maximum sentence is 60 months. See § 827.03(1) and (3)(c), Fla....
...ory maximum penalty for a third degree felony. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(25). If so, attachment of the scoresheet and a ruling denying relief would suffice. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED. GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 827.03(1) and (3)(c), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
of aggravated child abuse, in violation of section
827.03(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes (2015), following
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 13420, 2015 WL 5559767
...We begin by comparing the statutory offenses and the elements of the
crimes at issue. Mr. Pethtel was charged with first-degree felony murder predicated on
an act of aggravated child abuse. As the court instructed the jury in this case,
aggravated child abuse under section 827.03(1)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (2010), occurs
when a person:
Knowingly and willfully abuses a child and in so doing
causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or
permanent disfigurement to the child.
Child abuse is then defined under section 827.03(1)(b) as:
1....
...Finally, the offense that the trial court entered its judgment and conviction
on, aggravated manslaughter of a child, is defined under section
782.07(3) as: "A
person who causes the death of any person under the age of 18 by culpable negligence
under s.
827.03(2)(b) commits aggravated manslaughter of a child, a felony in the first-
degree ....
..."[a]n intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental
injury," or "[a]ctive encouragement of any person to commit an act that results or could
reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury" to a child. § 827.03(1)(b),
Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 1006295
...da Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) and 3.850. Mr. Ellis raises numerous issues in his motion. Only one issue has merit. We affirm as to all other issues without comment. Mr. Ellis was convicted of multiple counts of aggravated child abuse under section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1993)....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 2714277
...*1227 Mark E. Walker of Pelham, Andrews & Walker, Tallahassee, for Appellee. VAN NORTWICK, J. The state appeals an order granting Eric Coleman's motion to dismiss the information filed against him which charged him with three counts of felony child abuse under section
827.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). The attempted prosecution of Coleman under section
827.03(1)(a) was based upon his graphic comments to three minor girls, which the trial court characterized as "offensive and disturbing." Relying upon State v. DuFresne,
782 So.2d 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ( DuFresne I ), the trial court ruled that appellant's verbal conduct was not actionable under section
827.03(1)(a) based upon the holding in DuFresne I that section
827.03(1)(b) could withstand a constitutional overbreadth challenged only if it was narrowly construed to avoid its application to speech. Id. Although the trial court correctly followed DuFresne I, [1] we do not agree that we are required to interpret section
827.03(1) in such a manner that speech can never constitute the basis for a child abuse prosecution....
...We also certify conflict with DuFresne I and Munao v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D2268, ___ So.2d ___,
2006 WL 2519865 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 1, 2006). Background On April 15, 2005, the state filed an information charging Coleman with three counts of felony child abuse under section
827.03(1)(a)....
...friend's house. When he was contacted by law enforcement, Coleman stated that he licked his lips after making the statements. Coleman filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190 [2] arguing that the application of section 827.03(1)(a) to his conduct would be unconstitutional because it amounted to mere speech and, pursuant to DuFresne I, section 827.03(1)(a) must be narrowly construed as not being applicable to speech....
...charges three counts of child abuse, all based on essentially verbal conduct. This Court finds that it is bound by the holding in State v. DuFresne,
782 So.2d 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), appealed on other grounds,
826 So.2d 272 (Fla.2002). This case held section
827.03(1)(b) was *1228 not overbroad, and therefore not unconstitutional, because the court narrowed the construction of the statute as not being applicable to speech. This precedent is equally applicable to section
827.03(1)(a). Therefore, while the kind of speech alleged here may not be constitutionally protected speech, the appellate court has previously held this statute does not apply to any kind of speech. This appeal ensued. DuFresne and Section
827.03(1) Section
827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2004) provides: (1) "Child abuse" means: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical and mental injury to a...
...(emphasis added). In DuFresne I, the defendant was charged with five counts of child abuse involving different children. Some of the counts were based solely on oral statements. The trial court granted DuFresne's motion to dismiss on the grounds that section 827.03(1)(b) was both overbroad and vague. [3] On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal determined that section 827.03(1)(b) could withstand an overbreadth challenge if it was narrowly construed so as to avoid its application to speech....
...chological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment in his ability to function within his normal range of performance and behavior. The Fourth District certified the question of whether the term "mental injury" in section
827.03(1)(b) was unconstitutionally vague. On review by the Florida Supreme Court, the court agreed with the Fourth District that, even though section
827.03(1) did not define the term "mental injury," the court could resort to the definition of mental injury in section
39.01(44) contained *1229 within chapter 39. See DuFresne v. State,
826 So.2d 272, 275 (Fla.2002) ( DuFresne II ). The court noted that the child protection provisions in chapter 39 and the criminal provisions of section
827.03 have similar underlying purposes. Id. at 278. Thus, for purposes of understanding the meaning of "child abuse" in section
827.03, the court relied upon the definition of "[a]buse" in section
39.01(2), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides: "`[a]buse' means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that cau...
...utionally vague because the term "mental injury" is adequately defined in another related statute. Chapter 39 . . . is sufficiently related to child abuse to put a citizen on notice that its provisions may be related to the child abuse provisions of section
827.03. . . . (emphasis added). Id.
826 So.2d at 278-79. In Munao v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D2268, ___ So.2d ___,
2006 WL 2519865 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 1, 2006), the Fourth District recently reiterated its holding in DuFresne I that "section
827.03(1)(b) cannot be applied to speech of any kind ....
...enged statute." Sult v. State,
906 So.2d 1013, 1022 (Fla.2005)(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 615,
93 S.Ct. 2908,
37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). We do not agree with DuFresne I and Munao, however, that, to withstand an overbreadth challenge to section
827.03(1), we must construe the statute to avoid its application to all speech. If section
827.03(1) can be construed to be applicable only to specifically described unprotected speech, it can withstand an overbreadth challenge....
...Weekly at D2270, ___ So.2d at ___; compare U.S. v. Hornaday,
392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir.2004) (speech attempting to arrange sexual abuse of children not constitutionally protected). The rationale employed by the Florida Supreme Court in DuFresne II in analyzing the vagueness challenge to section
827.03(1) may be equally employed in determining the narrow class of speech to which section
827.03(1) can be applied and still withstand an overbreadth constitutional challenge. If in applying section
827.03(1) to speech, courts define the proscribed speech by construing the statute in pari materia with the definitions in chapter 39, constitutional speech will not be implicated....
...Mortham,
708 So.2d 929, 931 (Fla.1998)(concluding that statutes governing campaign advertising and financing were not constitutionally overbroad because infirmity could be cured by narrowing construction). Thus, speech will constitute proscribed "child abuse" under section
827.03(1)(a) only if it meets the definitions of "[a]buse" and "[m]ental injury" in section
39.01, Florida Statutes (2004)....
...decisions in Morris v. State,
789 So.2d 1032, 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)(en banc), and Smith v. State,
632 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). We find the state's reliance on Morris and Smith to be misplaced. These cases did not involve prosecutions under section
827.03....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
of aggravated child abuse, in violation of section
827.03(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2019). He contends
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child. §
827.03, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). At the charge conference
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 2014 WL 4458879
...Sanders v. State,
905 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA
2005).
This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1985 [
477 So. 2d
985], and 1998 [
723 So. 2d 123], and 2014.
16.1 AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE
§
827.03(2)(a), Fla._Stat.
To prove the crime of Aggravated Child Abuse, the State must prove
the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1....
...d or threatened to be used in a
way likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
Give if element 1b, 1d, or 1e is alleged.
“Willfully” means knowingly, intentionally, and purposely.
Give if element 1c is alleged. Fla. Stat. § 827.03(c).
“Maliciously” means wrongfully, intentionally, and without legal
justification or excuse....
...from which one could conclude that a reasonable parent would not have
engaged in the damaging acts toward the child for any valid reason and that
the primary purpose of the acts was to cause the victim unjustifiable pain or
injury.
Give if element 1e is alleged. Fla. Stat. § 827.03(1)(b).
“Child Abuse” means [the intentional infliction of physical or mental
injury upon a child] [an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to
result in physical or mental injury to a child] [active encouragement of any
person to commit an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result
in physical or mental injury to a child].
Give if applicable. Fla. Stat. § 827.03(1)(d)
“Mental injury” means injury to the intellectual or psychological
capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment
in the ability of the child to function within the normal range of performance
an...
...- 10 -
Parental affirmative defense. Give if applicable. See Raford v. State,
828
So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 2002). See §
39.01(49), Florida Statutes, if the defendant’s
status as a parent is at issue.
§
827.03 Fla....
...find [him]
- 11 -
[her] guilty, if all of the elements of the charge have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Lesser Included Offenses
AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE — 827.03(2)(a)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
...8.5
element 1a is charged
Battery; if element 1a
784.03 8.3
is charged and only
under certain
circumstances. See
Kama v. State,
507 So.
2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA
1987)
Child Abuse; if
827.03(2)(c) 16.3
element 1e is charged
Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1
Comment
This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 2002 [824 So....
...ctions
shall be determined beyond a reasonable doubt in a bifurcated proceeding. State v.
Harbaugh,
754 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2000).
This instruction was adopted in 2014.
16.3 CHILD ABUSE
§
827.03(2)(c), Fla....
...(Victim) was under the age of 18 years.
- 14 -
Parental affirmative defense. Give if applicable. See Raford v. State,
828
So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 2002). See §
39.01(49), Florida Statutes, if the defendant’s
status as a parent is at issue.
§
827.03 Fla....
...reasonable for misbehavior under the circumstances, you should find [him]
- 15 -
[her] guilty, if all of the elements of the charge have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Definitions, give as applicable.
§ 827.03(1)(d), Florida Statutes.
“Mental injury” means an injury to the intellectual or psychological
capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial
impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of
performance and behavior as supported by expert testimony.
Note to Judge....
...and duty to protect, nurture, guide, and discipline the child and to
provide [him] [her] with food, shelter, education, and ordinary medical,
dental, psychiatric, and psychological care.
Lesser Included Offenses
CHILD ABUSE — 827.03(2)(c)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Argued: Apr 19, 2024
in neglecting the child, in violation of section
827.03(2)(b) or (d), or to engage in mentally
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 1295382
...d he never wanted her anyway." The telephones in the house had been unplugged. Adams asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by improperly defining the element of malice to the jury in respect to the charge of aggravated child abuse. Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1998) provides in relevant part: (2) "Aggravated child abuse" occurs when a person: (a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; (b) Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child;...
...In Young the defendant, charged with maliciously punishing her son, objected to the standard instruction and the appellate court reversed her conviction for aggravated child abuse, finding the standard jury instruction on malice to be inadequate. The court explained: In State v. Gaylord , the court held that section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1975), which treated "maliciously punish[ing] a child" as aggravated child abuse, was not unconstitutionally vague....
...However, the court went on to state that any error would have been harmless given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt and the fact that the prosecutor did not make the inaccurate instruction a feature of his closing argument. The state here points out that Gaylord involved an attack on a prior version of section 827.03 against a vagueness challenge and that the definition of "maliciously" adopted therein has never been adopted by the supreme court in the jury instructions....
...r the age of eighteen (18) years, date of birth: January 13, 1992, by striking, kicking and stomping upon Kayla Victoria McKean, thereby causing her great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement, in violation of Florida Statute 827.03(2)(b).......
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
(2013); aggravated child abuse, in violation of section
827.03(2), Florida Statutes (2013); and sexual battery
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 2008).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
8. Section
826.04, relating to incest. 9. Section
827.03, relating to child abuse, aggravated child
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 18184, 2014 WL 5783805
...on an uncharged theory of guilt. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse Ms. Wunsch's
judgment and sentence for child neglect with great bodily harm and remand for a new
trial on that charge.1
I. THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (2007), defines "neglect of a child" and
sets forth the offenses arising out of such conduct as follows:
(3)(a) "Neglect of a child" means:
1....
...-2-
disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a
felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084.
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, section
827.03(3) provides two alternative theories
under which a caregiver may commit child neglect: (1) by failing to provide for a child's
needs to maintain the child's physical and mental health or (2) by failing to reasonably
protect a child from abuse, neglect, or exploitation by another person....
...or mental injury to said child, to wit: J.C. DOB: 6-21-2004
and in so doing caused great bodily harm, permanent
disability, or permanent disfigurement to said child, contrary
to Florida Statute[s][, section] 827.03(3).
(Emphasis added.) Thus the State only charged Ms. Wunsch with the failure to protect
J.C. from abuse by another person under section 827.03(3)(a)(2), which resulted in
great bodily harm. It did not charge her with failure to provide services necessary for
J.C.'s physical or mental health under section 827.03(3)(a)(1).
However, the trial court instructed the jury only that it could find Ms.
Wunsch guilty of child neglect owing to her failure to provide for J.C.'s needs, an
uncharged theory of the offense....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...child.” Under Florida law, when
an offender “knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily
harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child,” the offender
commits third-degree felony child abuse. Id. § 827.03(2)(c). “Child abuse” under
Florida law includes “[a]n intentional act that could reasonably be expected to
result in physical or mental injury to a child.” Id. § 827.03(1)(b)(2).
In Spencer’s direct appeal, we rejected his argument that the district court
erroneously sentenced him as a career offender, and we affirmed his sentence.
Spencer v....
...§ 2255? If so, whether the district court, in light of
Begay . . . erroneously determined that the movant was properly
classified as a career offender where he had a prior state conviction
for felony child abuse under Fla. Stat. §
827.03(1)?
6
Case: 10-10676 Date Filed: 11/14/2014 Page: 7 of 107
After a panel of this Court answered both questions in the affirmative, Spencer v.
United States,
727 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir....
...Spencer’s first brush with
the law. His earlier legal problems included another conviction for selling cocaine,
from when he was 17 years old. Also, at the age of 18, Mr. Spencer pleaded guilty
in state court to felony child abuse, under Florida Statute § 827.03.
Because the federal sentencing scheme is set up to cause those who have a
violent past to serve longer sentences, the nature of Mr....
...This clause
provides that the crime must “otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (emphasis
added). The district court reasoned that “any conviction of Florida Statute 827.03,
a third-degree felony, has the underlying elements of a crime of violence.”
But, under Florida law, the state may prove third-degree felony child abuse
in two different ways....
...84
Case: 10-10676 Date Filed: 11/14/2014 Page: 85 of 107
injury to a child”] without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or
permanent disfigurement to the child.” Fla. Stat. §§ 827.03(2)(c), 827.03(a)(b)(2)
(emphasis added)....
...13, 26,
125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005) (plurality opinion);
Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575, 602,
110 S. Ct. 2143 (1990)).
This the district court never did. Instead, the court apparently did not
recognize that more than one version of §
827.03 exists, so it did not ascertain to
which version of third-degree felony child abuse Spencer had pled guilty. The
judge simply concluded, “I think [Spencer’s prior conviction] comes within [Fla.
Stat. §]
827.03(b), an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in
physical or mental injury to a child.” (Emphasis added).
It is nonetheless clear in looking at the sentencing record before the district
court that no sufficient...
...7
The record contains no charging document for the predicate crime to which
Spencer pled guilty, and the only Shepard document referred to during the
sentencing proceeding was the transcript of Spencer’s hearing where he pled guilty
to Section 827.03(2)(c)....
...s factual basis for the conviction. In
its entirety, it reads, “As to [Spencer], . . . he did engage in sexual activity with a
minor and that action could reasonably cause physical or mental injury to that
child, contrary to the provisions of 827.03.” 7 (Emphasis added).
This statement sheds no light on to which version of the statute Spencer pled
guilty—the version where the act could reasonably cause physical injury, or the
version where the act could reasonably cause only mental injury....
...11/14/2014 Page: 91 of 107
that many types of sexual activity could reasonably cause physical injury to a
child, not all sexual activity necessarily could reasonably cause physical injury to a
child, particularly because, for purposes of Section 827.03, Fla....
...In
fact, during the sentencing hearing, Spencer argued that he had not pled guilty to
the physical-injury version of the statute before the state court. Based on the
record, it cannot be said that when Spencer pled guilty to violating Fla. Stat. §
827.03, Spencer knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently gave up his Sixth
8
In support of his § 2255 petition, Spencer filed an affidavit from the person with whom
he engaged in sexual activity, written by her after she attained the age of majority....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 14333
abuse, a second-degree felony, pursuant to section
827.03(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). The petition
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 27 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 451, 2002 Fla. LEXIS 880, 2002 WL 926073
(TOR-T-URED)(-MALICIOUSL¥-PUN-ISHED) (CAGED)F.S. Fla. Stat.
827.03(2) Before you can find the -defendant guiltyTo
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...had an opportunity to contest her inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(2).
6
The record indicates that Garcia is an alien who was convicted of the crime
of aggravated child abuse, in violation of §§
827.03(1)(3) and
784.045(1) of the
Florida Statutes....
...at 1215-16.
Under Florida law, aggravated child abuse occurs when a person (a) commits an
aggravated battery on a child; (b) willfully tortures a child; (c) maliciously
punishes a child; or (d) willfully and unlawfully cages a child. Florida Stat.
§ 827.03(1) (1990)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
judgment. Grant was charged with violating section
827.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2019). The judgment
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
Stat. (2008), and aggravated child abuse, see §
827.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). In statements made initially
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 7220
*1117abuse for criminal purposes is found in section
827.03, Florida Statutes (2003), and it includes “[a]n
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 7069, 2015 WL 2214148
...The only issue
we address is that regarding the state’s cross-examination of one of
appellant’s expert witnesses. Because we find the cross-examination did
not constitute reversible error, we affirm.
The state charged appellant with aggravated child abuse under section
827.03(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
for a child’s welfare. §
825.102(3)(a) or §
827.03(3)(e). Fla. Stat. “Neglect of hi child”
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
child abuse, so three third-degree felonies. See §
827.03(2)(c), Fla. Stat. For those convictions, he received
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 685, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 12006
including beatings and burnings, contrary to Section
827.03, Florida Statutes. The second count charged
CopyPublished | District Court, N.D. Florida | 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31527, 2011 WL 1103888
...ion of lesser included offenses, if any were available ( id. at 285). The information charged Petitioner with aggravated child abuse by maliciously punishing a child, Taylor Ballard, by choking her until she blacked out, contrary to Florida Statutes Section 827.03(2) (Ex....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 3400, 2015 WL 1044221
...Our opinion should not be construed to expand the meaning of
“kidnapping” or to dislocate the coordinated parts of chapter 787.
14
Pertinent to these two counts, the jury was instructed that aggravated child
abuse occurs when a person “maliciously punishes” a child. See § 827.03(2)(b),
Fla....
...Maliciousness
may be established by circumstances from which one could conclude
that a reasonable parent would not have engaged in the damaging acts
toward the child for any valid reason and that the primary purpose of
the acts was to cause the victim unjustifiable pain or injury.
§ 827.03(4), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
with two counts of child abuse, pursuant to section
827.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2015). She entered
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
with two counts of child abuse, pursuant to section
827.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2015). She entered
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
sentences for five counts of child abuse under section
827.03(1)(b)2., Florida Statutes. He argues that the
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
State charged Kelley with neglect of a child. See §
827.03(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2019). Following the State’s
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
abuse was not alleged in the indictment. Section
827.03(1)(a)1.-3., Florida Statutes, states aggravated
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 10059
bar, is aggravated child abuse. According to section
827.03(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), aggravated
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2009 WL 2194513
...ming a delinquent or dependent child or a child in need of services." §
827.04, Fla. Stat. (2006). However, the statute for felony child abuse does not require one to contribute to a child becoming delinquent, dependent, or in need of services. See §
827.03(1)....
...Conclusion Because contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a minor is not a category one or category two lesser-included offense of felony child abuse, as charged, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. SILBERMAN and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] See § 827.03, Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59082
convicted of third-degree felony child abuse under section
827.03(1), Florida Statutes, for this incident. (State
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 20456
...However, the final judgment for aggravated child abuse by great bodily harm in lower tribunal case number 1999CF003600A is remanded to the trial court to correct a scrivener's error. The judgment reflects that the offense is a second degree felony. However, such offense is a first degree felony. See § 827.03(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 275296
2000). In turn, to prove child neglect under section
827.03(3), Florida Statutes (2009), the State is required
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15289
Appellant committed aggravated child abuse, Section
827.03(2), Florida Statutes (1975), upon her five
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 1217
medical assistance if they are able to do so. See §
827.03(3)(a)l., Fla.Stat. (1999) (defining neglect as
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 952
for delinquency alleged that K.B.S. violated section
827.03(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), in that she
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 215049
...Petersen, Shalimar, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Alan R. Dakan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Gary Russell Wright appeals a judgment of conviction for child abuse, a third degree felony under section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2000), based upon a spanking he administered to his then one year old daughter....
...While this appeal was pending, the supreme court released Raford v. State,
828 So.2d 1012, 1021 (Fla.2002), in which the supreme court held that there is no absolute immunity enjoyed by a parent or one standing in loco parentis, and thus, such a person may be convicted of felony child abuse under section
827.03(1)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
lesser charge of aggravated child abuse under section
827.03(2), Florida Statutes (2007), in exchange for
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 2914, 2009 WL 347774
...Mr. Lain was charged and convicted of aggravated child abuse after his three-year-old son suffered a spiral fracture of his femur. We affirm. The details of the offense are not critical to the one issue that merits discussion. Lain was charged under section 827.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), which provides that aggravated child abuse occurs when a person knowingly or willfully abuses a child and, in so doing, causes great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement. Child abuse is defined under section 827.03(1)(b) as an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...1199 (allowing plaintiffs challenging state’s
anti-sodomy laws as unconstitutional to proceed anonymously).
As for Plaintiff V, there is no real dispute that her conduct was not “casual
and voluntary.” Francis was convicted under a Plea Agreement of one count of
child abuse under Florida Statutes §
827.03(1)(c) and two counts of prostitution
under Florida Statutes §
796.07(2)(f) for his actions with Plaintiff V....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1992).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
aggravated battery is an element of the offense. Section
827.03, F.S., defines "aggravated child abuse" as
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
or abused the child causing great bodily harm. §
827.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). Hicks insists that the
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
or abused the child causing great bodily harm. §
827.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). Hicks insists that the
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
or abused the child causing great bodily harm. §
827.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). Hicks insists that the
CopyPublished | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133793, 2010 WL 5298902
...icate offenses requiring a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). [1] The listed convictions were for battery on a law enforcement officer, §
784.07(2)(b), Fla. Stat., child abuse, §
827.03(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
rejecting a vagueness and overbreadth challenge to section
827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), which criminalized
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
was convicted of an of- fense under Fla. Stat. §
827.03(2), which is titled “Abuse, aggravated abuse,
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
was convicted of an of- fense under Fla. Stat. §
827.03(2), which is titled “Abuse, aggravated abuse,
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
in Physical or Mental Injury in violation of section
827.03, Florida Statutes. Appellant signed a Sentence
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 11397, 2009 WL 2475016
...Rogers, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. ORFINGER, J. Christopher Pena appeals his conviction of child abuse in violation of section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2007)....
...fell to the ground, slightly injuring his shoulder. Pena then got on top of T.D. in a threatening manner. When T.D. told Pena that he was only fourteen years old, Pena got off of him, threw the bicycle into the street, and left in the car. Subsequently, Pena was charged with child abuse. Section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides in pertinent part: (1) "Child abuse" means: (a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child; (b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; ......
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
neglect by culpable negligence in violation of section
827.03(2), Florida Statutes; and (3) culpable negligence
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
absolute immunity to charges of child abuse under section
827.03, however, it may be asserted as an affirmative
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
of aggravated child abuse, in violation of section
827.03(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes (2015), following
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
by life, instead of a first-degree felony. See §
827.03(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). AFFIRMED and REMANDED
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
by life, instead of a first-degree felony. See §
827.03(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). *904AFFIRMED and REMANDED
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
disfigurement.” While this finding is necessary under section
827.03(1)(a)3., Florida Statutes, aggravated child
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 2016 WL 1460587
and 2016. 16.1 AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE §
827.03(2)(a), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Aggravated
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
2019 . 16.5 NEGLECT OF A CHILD §
827.03(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (Great Bodily Harm, Permanent
