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Florida Statute 39.806 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 39.806 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title V
JUDICIAL BRANCH
Chapter 39
PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO CHILDREN
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 39.806
39.806 Grounds for termination of parental rights.
(1) Grounds for the termination of parental rights may be established under any of the following circumstances:
(a) When the parent or parents have voluntarily executed a written surrender of the child and consented to the entry of an order giving custody of the child to the department for subsequent adoption and the department is willing to accept custody of the child.
1. The surrender document must be executed before two witnesses and a notary public or other person authorized to take acknowledgments.
2. The surrender and consent may be withdrawn after acceptance by the department only after a finding by the court that the surrender and consent were obtained by fraud or under duress.
(b) Abandonment as defined in s. 39.01(1) or when the identity or location of the parent or parents is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent search within 60 days.
(c) When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services. Provision of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency.
(d) When the parent of a child is incarcerated and either:
1. The period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a significant portion of the child’s minority. When determining whether the period of time is significant, the court shall consider the child’s age and the child’s need for a permanent and stable home. The period of time begins on the date that the parent enters into incarceration;
2. The incarcerated parent has been determined by the court to be a violent career criminal as defined in s. 775.084, a habitual violent felony offender as defined in s. 775.084, or a sexual predator as defined in s. 775.21; has been convicted of first degree or second degree murder in violation of s. 782.04 or a sexual battery that constitutes a capital, life, or first degree felony violation of s. 794.011; or has been convicted of an offense in another jurisdiction which is substantially similar to one of the offenses listed in this paragraph. As used in this section, the term “substantially similar offense” means any offense that is substantially similar in elements and penalties to one of those listed in this subparagraph, and that is in violation of a law of any other jurisdiction, whether that of another state, the District of Columbia, the United States or any possession or territory thereof, or any foreign jurisdiction; or
3. The court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child and, for this reason, that termination of the parental rights of the incarcerated parent is in the best interest of the child. When determining harm, the court shall consider the following factors:
a. The age of the child.
b. The relationship between the child and the parent.
c. The nature of the parent’s current and past provision for the child’s developmental, cognitive, psychological, and physical needs.
d. The parent’s history of criminal behavior, which may include the frequency of incarceration and the unavailability of the parent to the child due to incarceration.
e. Any other factor the court deems relevant.
(e) When a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and:
1. The child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parent or parents. The failure of the parent or parents to substantially comply with the case plan for a period of 12 months after an adjudication of the child as a dependent child or the child’s placement into shelter care, whichever occurs first, constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, neglect, or abandonment unless the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due to the parent’s lack of financial resources or to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child. The 12-month period begins to run only after the child’s placement into shelter care or the entry of a disposition order placing the custody of the child with the department or a person other than the parent and the court’s approval of a case plan having the goal of reunification with the parent, whichever occurs first; or
2. The parent or parents have materially breached the case plan by their action or inaction. Time is of the essence for permanency of children in the dependency system. In order to prove the parent or parents have materially breached the case plan, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent or parents are unlikely or unable to substantially comply with the case plan before time to comply with the case plan expires.
3. The child has been in care for any 12 of the last 22 months and the parents have not substantially complied with the case plan so as to permit reunification under s. 39.522(4) unless the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due to the parent’s lack of financial resources or to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child.
(f) The parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child’s sibling. Proof of a nexus between egregious conduct to a child and the potential harm to the child’s sibling is not required.
1. As used in this subsection, the term “sibling” means another child who resides with or is cared for by the parent or parents regardless of whether the child is related legally or by consanguinity.
2. As used in this subsection, the term “egregious conduct” means abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child.
(g) The parent or parents have subjected the child or another child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse.
(h) The parent or parents have committed the murder, manslaughter, aiding or abetting the murder, or conspiracy or solicitation to murder the other parent or another child, or a felony battery that resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to another child. Proof of a nexus between the murder, manslaughter, aiding or abetting the murder, or conspiracy or solicitation to murder the other parent or another child, or a felony battery to a child and the potential harm to a child or another child is not required.
(i) The parental rights of the parent to a sibling of the child have been terminated involuntarily.
(j) The parent or parents have a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of alcohol or a controlled substance which renders them incapable of caring for the child, and have refused or failed to complete available treatment for such use during the 3-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights.
(k) A test administered at birth that indicated that the child’s blood, urine, or meconium contained any amount of alcohol or a controlled substance or metabolites of such substances, the presence of which was not the result of medical treatment administered to the mother or the newborn infant, and the biological mother of the child is the biological mother of at least one other child who was adjudicated dependent after a finding of harm to the child’s health or welfare due to exposure to a controlled substance or alcohol as defined in s. 39.01, after which the biological mother had the opportunity to participate in substance abuse treatment.
(l) On three or more occasions the child or another child of the parent or parents has been placed in out-of-home care pursuant to this chapter or the law of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States which is substantially similar to this chapter, and the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement were caused by the parent or parents.
(m) The court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the child was conceived as a result of an act of sexual battery made unlawful pursuant to s. 794.011, or pursuant to a similar law of another state, territory, possession, or Native American tribe where the offense occurred. It is presumed that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child if the child was conceived as a result of the unlawful sexual battery. A petition for termination of parental rights under this paragraph may be filed at any time. The court must accept a guilty plea or conviction of unlawful sexual battery pursuant to s. 794.011 as conclusive proof that the child was conceived by a violation of criminal law as set forth in this subsection.
(n) The parent is convicted of an offense that requires the parent to register as a sexual predator under s. 775.21.
(2) Reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in paragraphs (1)(b)-(d) or paragraphs (1)(f)-(m) have occurred.
(3) If a petition for termination of parental rights is filed under subsection (1), a separate petition for dependency need not be filed and the department need not offer the parents a case plan having a goal of reunification, but may instead file with the court a case plan having a goal of termination of parental rights to allow continuation of services until the termination is granted or until further orders of the court are issued.
(4) If an expedited termination of parental rights petition is filed, reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child.
History.s. 9, ch. 87-289; s. 16, ch. 90-306; s. 4, ch. 90-309; s. 7, ch. 92-158; s. 35, ch. 94-164; s. 1, ch. 97-226; s. 12, ch. 97-276; s. 88, ch. 98-403; s. 2, ch. 98-417; s. 45, ch. 99-193; s. 35, ch. 2000-139; s. 3, ch. 2001-3; s. 12, ch. 2004-371; s. 25, ch. 2006-86; s. 16, ch. 2008-245; s. 2, ch. 2009-21; s. 15, ch. 2012-178; s. 1, ch. 2013-132; s. 19, ch. 2014-224; s. 16, ch. 2016-24; s. 16, ch. 2017-37; s. 8, ch. 2017-107; s. 23, ch. 2017-151; s. 11, ch. 2019-128; s. 14, ch. 2021-169.
Note.Former s. 39.464.

F.S. 39.806 on Google Scholar

F.S. 39.806 on Casetext

Amendments to 39.806


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 39.806
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 39.806.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

E. P. S. P. a v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 274 So. 3d 555 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . and Appellee concedes, the trial court erred in finding grounds for termination pursuant to section 39.806 . . . shown any further reversible error, and the trial court properly terminated her rights under sections 39.806 . . . (1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f). . . . s parental rights under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f), but reverse the portion of the order . . . finding grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)(l ) and remand for this ground to be stricken . . .

A. D. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN FAMILIES Ad, 273 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . listed two grounds: 1) the mother's failure to substantially comply with her case plan under section 39.806 . . . or physical, mental, or emotional health, irrespective of the provision of services, under section 39.806 . . .

R. L. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES Ad, 273 So. 3d 1012 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury to a child are statutory grounds for termination. § 39.806 . . . "[S]o long as the trial court's ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida . . . Under section 39.806(2), Florida Statutes (2018), reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families . . . are not required when termination is proven under sections 39.806(1)(b) through (d) or (1)(f) through . . . We remand, however, "for [the] court to strike all findings of termination" based on section 39.806(1 . . .

J. G. N. S. G. B. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 270 So. 3d 523 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . DCF alleged, among other grounds, that Father abandoned Child in violation of section 39.806(1)(b), Florida . . . trial, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned Child pursuant to section 39.806 . . .

S. H. M. B. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 264 So. 3d 1094 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . As to M.B., the Department alleged, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2018), that Mother's . . . It did not allege chronic abuse of a controlled substance pursuant to section 39.806(1)(j). . . . conjunction with a prior finding of harm to a sibling because of exposure to drugs, pursuant to section 39.806 . . . allege that the parental rights of a sibling had been involuntarily terminated pursuant to section 39.806 . . . The Department could not allege section 39.806(1)(i) as a ground for termination because at the time . . .

J. C. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES Ad, 264 So. 3d 973 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . We agree with appellant that the trial court erred in terminating her rights based on section 39.806( . . . Thus, we affirm the final order of termination under section 39.806(1)(d) 1., but we remand for the trial . . . court to strike all findings of termination under section 39.806(1)(b). . . . First, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2017), it alleged abandonment as defined in . . . based on section 39.806(1)(b). . . .

In INTEREST OF C. E. a K. E. v. Ad, 263 So. 3d 202 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . (the Child), under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2017). . . . Because the Department sought termination under subsections 39.806(1)(c) and (f), the Department did . . . See § 39.806(2), Fla. Stat. (2017). . . . Termination under Section 39.806(1)(f) Section 39.806(1)(f) provides for the termination of parental . . . Termination under Section 39.806(1)(c) In order to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)( . . .

E. T. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 261 So. 3d 593 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . The mother argues that termination under section 39.806(1)(e)1., (e)3., and (j), Florida Statutes was . . . "[S]o long as the trial court's ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida . . . found the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence five statutory grounds for a TPR: section 39.806 . . . was put on notice by the answer briefs that she had waived the issue of termination based on section 39.806 . . .

R. D. S. T. D. S. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 263 So. 3d 183 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Such conduct is one of the fourteen enumerated grounds for TPR, paragraphs 39.806(1)(a) through (m), . . . "Egregious conduct," paragraph (f) of section 39.806(1), includes conduct that "threatens the life, safety . . . The term is further defined in subparagraph 39.806(1)(f)2 to mean "abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any . . . See https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/001555.htm (site last visited October 22, 2018). § 39.806(1) . . .

G. M. R. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 262 So. 3d 840 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . rights to another child pursuant to section 39.806(1)(i). . . . s parental rights as to K.M. under section 39.806(1)(c) and section 39.806(1)(e)(1). . . . See § 39.806(1)(e). . . . s parental rights on section 39.806(1)(e)(1). See T.H. v. . . . judgment removing all references to section 39.806(1)(e)(1). . . .

A. P. Sr. A. P. Jr. A. F. P. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 260 So. 3d 544 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Appellant, A.P., Sr., appeals an order terminating his parental rights pursuant to sections 39.806(1) . . . Appellant argues that the trial court erred in basing the termination in part upon section 39.806(1)( . . . c), that section 39.806(1)(f) is unconstitutional because the Legislature eliminated the proof-of-nexus . . . We find no merit in Appellant's challenge to the trial court's application of section 39.806(1)(c) in . . . Given such, we decline to address Appellant's constitutional challenge to section 39.806(1)(f). . . .

K. C. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES Ad, 259 So. 3d 880 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . court's conclusion of law that clear and convincing evidence supported termination based upon section 39.806 . . . trial court also found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination pursuant to sections 39.806 . . . (1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes. . . .

P. R. M. C. A. C. A. C. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 260 So. 3d 376 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . s parental rights because the grounds for termination based on sections 39.806(1)(c), 39.806(1)(j), and . . . 39.806(1)(k), Florida Statutes (2017), were supported by competent, substantial evidence. . . . s parental rights as to M.C. and A.C. because the grounds for termination based on sections 39.806(1) . . . (e) 1., 39.806(1)(e)3., and 39.806(1)(j) were supported by competent, substantial evidence. . . . Section 39.806(1)(b) permits termination of parental rights based on abandonment, which is defined in . . .

C. B. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 257 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . The trial court entered an order terminating the mother's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806( . . . case plan, and consequently, there was not sufficient proof to terminate parental rights under section 39.806 . . . or to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child.... § 39.806 . . .

W. D. N. D. S. D. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 257 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 39.806(1)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2017). His past history was relevant to that determination. . . .

G. F. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 256 So. 3d 224 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . department petitioned to terminate the father's parental rights based on Florida Statutes sections 39.806 . . . (1)(e) 1. and 39.806(1)(e)2. . . . unable to substantially comply with the case plan before time to comply with the case plan expires. § 39.806 . . . did not rule on the alternative circumstance for termination in the department's petition, section 39.806 . . . the department did not meet the legal criteria for termination of his parental rights under section 39.806 . . .

D. G. D. L. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 250 So. 3d 871 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Families ("DCF") proved, by clear and convincing evidence, a ground for termination pursuant to section 39.806 . . . Section 39.806(1)(d)(3) provides that grounds for termination of parental rights may be established where . . .

C. R. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 253 So. 3d 97 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . filed a petition to terminate the Mother's parental rights based on two statutory grounds, sections 39.806 . . . Section 39.806(1)(e) 1. . . . Section 39.806(1)(e) 1. permits the termination of parental rights when a child is adjudicated dependent . . . s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e) 1. . . . Section 39.806(1)(e) 3. . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES Ad o b o P. R. v. A. R. R. L., 253 So. 3d 1158 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ." § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2017). . . . ." § 39.806(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2017). . . . Whether the touching was done "in a sexual way" was, likewise, irrelevant, as neither section 39.806( . . . Accordingly, the trial court's finding that there was no egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f) . . . Here, because the trial court found that there was no egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f) or . . .

A. BUSCHOR n k a A. v. BUSCHOR,, 252 So. 3d 833 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . history of substance abuse or domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28 or which meets the criteria of s. 39.806 . . .

K. C. C. D. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 246 So. 3d 1289 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . s parental rights should be terminated under section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), for abandoning . . . the minor child, and section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, for engaging in conduct toward the child . . . s parental rights based on section 39.806(1)(e) 1., Florida Statutes (2016), is supported by clear and . . . 2016) ("[S]o long as the trial court's ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806 . . . for the entry of an amended final judgment striking any language from the judgment regarding sections 39.806 . . .

D. M. J. C. D. A. W. D. v. M. D., 247 So. 3d 713 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . The trial court's order erroneously referred to section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2015), to interpret . . . Stat. (2015), with § 39.806(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

H. R. G. JR. H. G. III, a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 241 So. 3d 275 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . two statutory grounds pleaded, but we remand to the trial court to strike its reference to section 39.806 . . . inadvertent clerical error by the court, as the Department of Children and Families did not plead section 39.806 . . .

K. D. C. D. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 242 So. 3d 522 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . case plan, but instead filed an expedited petition to terminate her parental rights under sections 39.806 . . . Under section 39.806(2), Florida Statutes (2016), reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families . . . are not required when termination is proven under sections 39.806(1)(b) through (d) or (1)(f) through . . . Termination, here, was premised on sections 39.806(1)(c), (i), (j), and (l) ; therefore, the Department . . . case plan include termination based on continuing abuse through continued involvement under section 39.806 . . .

IN INTEREST OF X. W. a Ad v. C. W., 255 So. 3d 882 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . s minority under section 39.806(1)(d) ; (3) C.W. had engaged in egregious conduct that threatened the . . . life, safety, or health of X.W. under section 39.806(1)(f) ; (4) C.W. had subjected the child or another . . . child to a sexual battery under section 39.806(1)(g) ; and (5) X.W. had been conceived as the result . . . of a sexual battery made unlawful by section 794.011, Florida Statutes, under section 39.806(1)(m). . . . See § 39.806(1)(m). . . .

B. F. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 237 So. 3d 390 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . trial, the court entered an order finding that grounds for termination existed pursuant to section 39.806 . . . (1)(b), Florida Statutes, because the father had abandoned the child, and pursuant to section 39.806( . . . rights requires clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination set forth in section 39.806 . . . Abandonment is a ground for termination of parental rights. § 39.806(1)(b), Fla. Stat. . . . With respect to this ground, the order provides: 39.806(1)(e) The child has been adjudicated dependent . . .

J. K. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 231 So. 3d 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . termination in part on a finding that the petitioner had established grounds for termination under section 39.806 . . . We remand for the trial court to amend the termination judgment’ to exclude section 39.806(1)0) as a . . .

R. W. K. W. V. W. A. W. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Ad o b o K. W. V. W. A. W. v. R. A. D. R. W., 228 So. 3d 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . court concluded that the Department proved grounds for termination against both parents under section 39.806 . . . (1)(c) (continuing involvement threatens, irrespective of services) and section 39.806(1)(l) (three or . . . more removals caused by parent), and against the mother under section 39.806(1)(j) (chronic substance . . . (1)(c) and 39.806(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2017) as to both parents, and section 39.806(1)(j) as to the . . . See § 39.806(2), Fla. . . .

C. W. R. G. T. W. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 228 So. 3d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 39.806(1)(c), Fla. Stat. . . . In discussing termination of parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c), we have required proof either . . . Although there are ,other subsections in section 39.806(1) that do not require proof of either the provision . . .

M. P. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 230 So. 3d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . judgment, which the trial court denied because M.P. failed to prove a meritorious defense to section 39.806 . . . See § 39.806(l)(e)(3), Fla. Stat. (2016). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motion. . . .

G. H. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 227 So. 3d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . the Department filed a petition for termination of G.H.’s parental rights as to D.E.B. under section 39.806 . . .

W. K. M. K. Ad v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 230 So. 3d 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Whether a petition for termination of parental rights has been filed pursuant to s. 39.806(l)(f), (g) . . .

T. H. S. D. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 226 So. 3d 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . With respect to the Father, the Department alleged only one ground, abandonment under section 39.806( . . . As to T.D.H., the Department based its request for termination of parental rights on section 39.806(l . . . Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 915 So.2d 761, 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that section 39.806 . . . Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 819 So.2d 270, 271-72 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (finding section 39.806(1 . . . We have no trouble finding that the Department established abandonment under section 39.806(1)(b). . . .

A. M. B. N. R. B. C. M. N. R. B. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 222 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . terminating the Mother’s parental rights reflects that the termination was primarily based on section 39.806 . . .

L. J. a k a M. L. A. J. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 220 So. 3d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2017), provides that a trial court may terminate parental rights . . . the evidence presented at the hearing supports termination of Father’s parental rights under section 39.806 . . .

W. W. V. H. V. H. J. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 218 So. 3d 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . petition alleged three statutory grounds for terminating W.W.’s rights: (1) abandonment under section 39.806 . . . (l)(b), Florida Statutes (2016); (2) failure to comply with the case plan under section 39.806(l)(e)l . . . Statutes (2016); and (3) harm from a continuing relationship with the incarcerated parent under section 39.806 . . . ground: that WW. would be incarcerated for a significant portion of the twins’ minority, under section 39.806 . . .

D. N. K. a k a D. N. P. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 217 So. 3d 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 39.806(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016); S.M. v. Fla. . . .

IN RE AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE AND FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 213 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 2017)

. . . The mother has Tr^grounds for TPR)-^ the minor childfren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806 . . . , .T77T7-(n;une)-7rr7T.. to the child,.Trr7r-(name)-rrrrr,...., are hereby terminated under section 39.806 . . . rmr (names)-rTTrr...... have surrendered their parental rights to the minor children) under section 39.806 . . . on.rr7rr-(date)-rr^r..for termination of her parental rights to the minor child(ren), under section 39.806 . . . TTTTr-fnamefs)Wttt , are hereby terminated under - section 39.806(-.-), Florida Statutes. . . .

J. S. M. S. E. D. J. D. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 211 So. 3d 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . In its final order, the trial court terminated J.S.’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(e . . .

D. H. S. R. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 211 So. 3d 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . proved by clear and convincing evidence that D.H.’s parental rights should be terminated under section 39.806 . . . trial court’s termination of D.H.’s parental rights on the other statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806 . . . 2016) (“[S]o long as the trial court’s ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806 . . . be supported by clear and convincing evidence that there is a ground for termination under section 39.806 . . . for the entry of an amended final judgment striking any language from the judgment regarding section 39.806 . . .

GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM O B O A. E. L. E. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, B. B. J. E., 207 So.3d 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Mother continues to abuse, neglect, or abandon A.E. and L.E., serving as grounds for TPR under section 39.806 . . . DCF established, by clear and convincing evidence, that his incarceration warranted TPR under section 39.806 . . . Mother “[i]f the parent whose rights are being terminated meets any of the criteria specified in s. 39.806 . . .

NAIME, v. T. CORZO, III,, 208 So. 3d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . history of substance abuse or domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28 or which meets the criteria of s. 39.806 . . .

In J. H. Le. H. La. H. Ad v. C. H. N. H., 204 So.3d 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . K.D., 88 So.3d 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), superseded on other grounds by § 39.806(1)©, Fla. . . .

In J. W. a M. S. v. Ad, 210 So. 3d 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . harmful to the child to continue the relationship with M.S., an incarcerated parent, under section 39.806 . . . (l)(b), 39.806(l)(e)(l), and 39.806(l)(e)(3) are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. . . . However, DCF argues that competent, substantial evidence supports termination under section 39.806(l) . . . Continued Involvement Under Section 39.806(l)(c) Section 39.806(l)(c) provides that grounds for termination . . . Any other factor the court deems relevant. § 39.806(1)(d)(3)(a)-(e). . . .

C. B. R. N. A v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 199 So. 3d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . We affirm the order of termination based on section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2016). . . . during the scheduled visits, we reverse as to the finding of abandonment under sections 39.01(1) and 39.806 . . .

S. M. v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 202 So. 3d 769 (Fla. 2016)

. . . one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights to all of her children under section 39.806 . . . services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. § 39.806 . . . See § 39.806(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . established three grounds for termination of S.M.’s right to all three children pursuant to section 39.806 . . . last 22 months and the parents have not substantially complied with the case plan; and (3) section 39.806 . . .

E. M. B. O. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 199 So. 3d 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 39.806(l)(d)l., 8., Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . On appeal, the father makes numerous arguments pertaining to section 39.806(l)(d)l. . . . not based on abandonment, the judgment should clarify that termination is based only on subsections 39.806 . . .

In L. E. H. a N. H. C. H. v. Ad In J. H. La. H. Le. H. Ad v. C. H. N. H., 192 So. 3d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . K.D., 88 So.3d 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), superseded on other grounds by § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. . . . Compare § 39.402 (shelter placement), 'ivith § 39.806 (termination of parental rights); see also Dep’ . . .

S. M. T. H. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, T. H. a, 188 So. 3d 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . with the exception of the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806 . . . ) “the parents have not substantially complied with the case plan so as to permit reunification.” § 39.806 . . . amended final judgment striking the reference to termination of Father’s parental rights under section 39.806 . . .

M. D. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 187 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . “[S]o long as the trial court’s ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida . . . Parental rights may be terminated when a child is abandoned. § 39.806(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . . .

M. C. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 186 So. 3d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . (collectively, “the Children”) under .section 39.806(1)©, Florida Statutes (2015). . . . and E.C., asserting that the Department was proceeding directly to termination pursuant to section 39.806 . . . Because the Department sought termination under section 39.806(l)(f), the Department did not, and was . . . not required to, make “reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify” the family¡ § 39.806(2), Fla. . . . Reversed and'remanded. , Section 39.806(l)(f) provides as follows: (1) Grounds for the termination of . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES Ad v. B. C. C. S., 185 So. 3d 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . parental rights may be terminated: the existence of a statutory ground for termination under section 39.806 . . .

GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, v. M. H. W. S., 184 So. 3d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . or conviction in a criminal proceeding is required for termination of parental rights under section 39.806 . . . Section 39.806(1)(m) allows for termination of parental rights of an offending parent when a child is . . . We agree, Section 39.806(1)(m) provides: 39.806 Grounds for termination of parental rights.— (l) Grounds . . . We perceive nothing in section 39.806(1)(m), Fla. . . . See § 39.806(1)(d)2., Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . .

In S. M. M. M. R. W. M. v. Ad, 184 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 39.806(1)(b), (d)(3), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

In B. F. E. F. B. F. W. F. J. F. v., 198 So. 3d 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . evidence supporting termination as to each child on at least one of the grounds enumerated in section 39.806 . . . We write to reiterate our concern that, with the elimination of the “nexus” requirement in 39.806(l)( . . . It filed a petition for expedited termination, alleging. three grounds: (1) pursuant to section 39.806 . . . safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of each child; (2) pursuant to section 39.806 . . . Unlike the circumstances in N.W., the amendment to section 39.806(l)(f), which became effective on July . . .

J. P. T. P. a v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 183 So. 3d 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . First, the Department must prove statutory grounds under section 39.806, Florida Statutes. . . . Here the Department sought termination of the ..mother’s parental rights pursuant to subsection 39.806 . . . Prior to terminating a parent’s rights under subsection 39.806(l)(c), two requirements must be met, . . . . in this case was section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes. . . . See § 39.806(l)(f), Florida Statutes. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES Ad v. J. S. S. I., 183 So. 3d 1177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . incarceration period does not constitute a significant portion of the child’s minority pursuant to section 39.806 . . . relationship with the child would not be contrary to the child’s best interests pursuant to section 39.806 . . . (l)(d)l.- and 39.806(l)(d)3. . . . Any other factor the court deems relevant. § 39.806(l)(d)3., Fla. Stat. (2015) (emphasis added). . . . as to the child pursuant to sections 39.806(l)(b) and 39.806(l)(e)l. and 2., Florida Statutes (2015) . . .

N. B. v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 183 So. 3d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for termination exist, specif-, ically sections. 39.806 . . . (l)(e)(l) and 39.806(l)(i), Florida Statutes (2014); termination is in the manifest best interest of . . . Nonetheless, we briefly address the facial constitutionality of section 39.806(l)(i). . . . In addressing section 39.806(1)©, Chief Judge Hawkes recognized in K.J. ex rel. A.J. v. . . . Thus, we reject N.B.’s facial constitutional challenge to section 39.806(1)(Z). Affirmed. . . .

In A. W. S. W. N. W. v. Ad, 184 So. 3d 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . s parental rights to S.W. and A.W. under a 2014 amendment to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, . . . Deeming T.K.H. a “sibling” of S.W. and A.W. under section 39.806(1)(f)(1), the dependency court applied . . . The amended text of section 39.806(1)(f) is silent on the subject of retro-activity. . . . In applying section 39.806(1)(f)’s amendment retroactively, the dependency court believed the removal . . . However, the 2014 amendment' to section 39.806(1)(f) did not affect the Department’s burden of proof . . .

S. M. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 190 So. 3d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . trial court make the following findings: 1) One"or more of the grounds for termination under section 39.806 . . . The trial court found that DCF had established three grounds , for termination under section 39.806, . . .

C. S. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 178 So. 3d 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . for his child could not be classified as “egregious” under the statute, and therefore using section 39.806 . . . “Egregious conduct” is defined in 39.806(l)(f)2. to mean: [A]buse, abandonment, neglect, -or any other . . .

A. D. Jr. M. D. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 200 So. 3d 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 39.806(l)(e), Fla. . . .

R. T. v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN FAMILIES,, 174 So. 3d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Termination of R.T.’s parental rights was based on abandonment pursuant to section 39.806(l)(b), Fla. . . .

W. L. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 172 So. 3d 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . The petition alleged three grounds for termination: 1) abandonment, pursuant to subsection 39.806(l)( . . . Florida Statutes (2013); 2) threat of harm to the child irrespective of services, pursuant to subsection 39.806 . . . comply with the case plan within twelve months of an adjudication of dependency, pursuant to subsection 39.806 . . . Based upon the above findings and after considering all relevant grounds listed in Florida Statute 39.806 . . .

J. C. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN,, 172 So. 3d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . conduct, support a finding that (i) J.C. materially breached her case plan, as provided in section 39.806 . . . We agree with the Department of Children & Families that citation to section 39.806(l)(e)l. in the conclusion . . .

STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, v. A. A. A. S. A., 171 So. 3d 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 39.806(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

D. W. Q. M. E. Q. a v. A. B. M. E. Q. a, 200 So. 3d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . parental rights to M.E.Q. in which the trial court found Father’s conduct was egregious under sections 39.806 . . . The petition did not allege termination was warranted for egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f . . . )2.; the petition only alleged termination was warranted under sections 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(g). . . . We do not need to discuss the facts of this case other than to note that termination under section 39.806 . . .

B. K. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 166 So. 3d 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Regarding B.K., the only ground alleged for termination of parental rights was under section 39.806(l . . . See §§ 39.806, 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . Before July 1, 2012, when the foregoing section became law, section 39.806(l)(d)l., Florida Statutes . . . The court in B.C. emphasized that section 39.806(l)(d)l., “must be read in light of Padgett’s requirement . . . Both parties have proceeded upon the assumption that the 2012 amendments to section 39.806(l)(d) apply . . .

C. D. T. R. T. R. v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 164 So. 3d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . She challenges the court’s order which determined that termination was warranted under sections 39.806 . . . (l)(c) and 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes, that it was the least restrictive means of protecting the . . . the trial court’s order to the extent it found that termination was warranted pursuant to sections 39.806 . . . (l)(c) and 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes, and because it was in the children’s manifest best interests . . .

D. S. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 164 So. 3d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . requires clear and convincing evidence of: (1) a statutory ground for termination set forth in section 39.806 . . . Section 39.806(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2013), provides: (1)Grounds for the termination of parental rights . . . constituting “a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years.” § 39.806 . . .

A. S. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN FAMILIES, J. A. Ad, 162 So. 3d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . abandoned J.A. as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2014), and within the meaning of section 39.806 . . . Section 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), provides: (1) Grounds for the termination of parental . . .

R. W. J. L. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 164 So. 3d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . P. 8.270(b)(4); see also § 39.806(l)(a)2., Fla. Stat. . . .

P. C. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES Ad, 155 So. 3d 1279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . substantial evidence of the grounds alleged by the Department of Children and Families under sections 39.806 . . . (l)(c), 39.806(l)(e)l., and 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2012); (2) without making statutorily-required . . . we conclude that competent, substantial evidence did not support the grounds alleged under section 39.806 . . . (l)(c) and 39.806(l)(e)l., and that such evidence was sufficient to support the termination of parental . . . (l)(c) and 39.806(l)(e)l., and not on the grounds alleged under section 39.806(l)(b). . . .

R. C. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES Ad, 150 So. 3d 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Nor is a new pregnancy among the statutorily established grounds enumerated in section 39.806 of the . . .

In J. E. C. E. M. K. v. Ad, 149 So. 3d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 39.806(l)(e)(l), Fla.' Stat. (2013). ALTENBERND, NORTHCUTT, and KELLY, JJ., Concur. . . .

A. F. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 178 So. 3d 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . parental rights based on the Mother’s abuse, neglect, and abandonment of the Child pursuant to sections 39.806 . . . (l)(b) and 39.806(l)(e)(l) of the Florida Statutes (2012). . . .

L. P. L. P. K. P. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 148 So. 3d 832 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . DCA 2002) (finding “the trial court could not terminate the father’s parental rights under section 39.806 . . . terminated without a finding of dependency when abandonment is proven pursuant to the requisites of section 39.806 . . .

R. W. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 147 So. 3d 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 39.806(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). . See § 39.806(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . .

J. L. J. L. JR. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 143 So. 3d 1158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . We affirm the order of termination based on section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes. . . . and that the child is bonded with Father, we reverse as to the finding of abandonment under section 39.806 . . .

J. H. A. H. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 161 So. 3d 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 39.806(l)(d)l. & 2„ Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

In A. R. a R. R. v. M. M., 143 So. 3d 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . arguing that the Father’s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to— among other grounds — section 39.806 . . . relationship with the child, finding that such evidence was irrelevant to an analysis under section 39.806 . . . Florida Supreme Court has held that in addressing the termination of parental rights under section 39.806 . . .

G. H. Sr. P. G. H. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 145 So. 3d 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . physical, mental or emotional health of the child.... ” The statutory authority for this ground is section 39.806 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, v. H. M. R. E. R. a, 161 So. 3d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Pursuant to section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2014), the evidence of Mother’s egregious conduct (or failure . . . See § 39.806(1)(f), (h), Fla. . . . Stat. (2014); see also In re E.R., 49 So.3d 846, 853 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (addressing section 39.806(1) . . . explaining that “DCF proceeded on three statutory grounds including murder of a child under section 39.806 . . . B.B., 824 So.2d 1000, 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (addressing section 39.806(1)(f) and providing that “[ . . .

V. L. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,, 201 So. 3d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 935 So.2d 621, 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“Under section 39.806(l)(f) . . .

R. B. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 137 So. 3d 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 39.806(l)(d)l, Fla. Stat. (2013). Affirmed. . . .

ALBANESE, v. ALBANESE,, 135 So. 3d 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . history of substance abuse or domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28 or which meets the criteria of s. 39.806 . . .

S. B. A. R. B. H. M. B. A. N. B. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 132 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . his continued relationship with his children would be harmful to them, within the meaning of section 39.806 . . . August 14, 2013, DCF petitioned for involuntary termination of parental rights pursuant to section 39.806 . . . The sole ground on which DCF sought to terminate S.B.’s parental rights is section 39.806(l)(d)3., Florida . . . the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child under section 39.806 . . . The Legislature changed the word "substantial” in section 39.806(l)(d)l. to “significant” in describing . . .

In Z. C. Z. C. K. D. v. Ad Z. H. v. Ad, 132 So. 3d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . to "grounds for termination” in section 39.811(1) does not refer to a statutory ground under section 39.806 . . .

J. E. Sr. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 126 So. 3d 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Court The trial court found that termination of the father’s parental rights was supported by sections 39.806 . . . Section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes provides grounds for termination of parental rights when the “ . . . child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parent or parents.” § 39.806(l)(e), Fla. . . . Id. at § 39.806(1)(e)1. . . . has abandoned the child as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes. § 39.806(l)(b), Fla. . . .

D. M. T. v. T. M. H., 129 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2013)

. . . See, e.g., § 39.806(l)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

S. L. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 120 So. 3d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to both children, based on abandonment, section 39.806 . . . neglect or abandonment as evidenced by failure to substantially comply with the case plan, section 39.806 . . . This was a sufficient basis for termination under section 39.806(l)(e). See N.F. v. . . . The Mother also argues that the court erred in basing termination on abandonment under section 39.806 . . . We affirm the termination of parental rights based on section 39.806(l)(e), but reverse the portion of . . .

T. H. S. K. B. A v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 111 So. 3d 980 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . concedes that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of egregiousness as required by section 39.806 . . .

J. B. V. B. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, N. B. V. B. v., 107 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . The Department sought termination based upon three grounds: First, pursuant to section 39.806(l)(i), . . . (l)(i) and 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes. . . . Section B9.806(l)(i), Florida Statutes Section 39.806(l)(i) authorizes termination of parental rights . . . 39.806(3) does not require a case plan with the goal of reunification. . . . Section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes The Department and the trial court also relied on section 39.806 . . .

A. H. M. F. A v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 111 So. 3d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Program concede that two of the statutory grounds for termination found by the trial court — subsections 39.806 . . . As to the three remaining grounds — subsections 39.806(l)(e)1„ (1)(i), and (1)ffi, Florida Statutes ( . . . reverse the order, in part, and remand to the trial court to enter an amended order excluding subsections 39.806 . . .

N. M. M. M. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 103 So. 3d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . . § 39.806(l)(f), (g), Fla. Stat. (2012). See N.R.R. v. . . . as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39,01, or chronic abuse. § 39.806 . . .

M. J. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES Ad, 101 So. 3d 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . court’s conclusions that the Department proved statutory grounds for termination under both section 39.806 . . . (l)(e) and 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2011), that termination was in the manifest best interest . . .

In D. E. J. E. K. E. L. E. v. Ad, 101 So. 3d 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . On appeal, L.E. argues that the evidence was insufficient to support termination under section 39.806 . . .

A. J. L. J. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES Ad, 126 So. 3d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . As to the mother, the petition relied on section 39.806(l)(f), Florida Statutes (2010), which provides . . . As to the father, the petition relied on section 39.806(l)(g), Florida Statutes (2010), and alleged that . . . This petition was also based on section 39.806(l)(f). . . . cases, the trial court “must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in 39.806 . . . jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in paragraphs (l)(e)-(Z) have occurred.” § 39.806 . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE, 101 So. 3d 368 (Fla. 2012)

. . . (name) ., under section 39.806(l)(a), Florida Statutes. COMMENT: Repeat above as necessary. 34. . . . (name)., under section 39.806(l)(a), Florida Statutes. COMMENT: Repeat above as necessary. 45. . . .

A. J. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES Ad, 97 So. 3d 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . First, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in 39.806 . . . (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (termination petition based on egregious conduct toward a sibling under section 39.806 . . . DCA 2004) (termination petition based on manslaughter/felony assault of another child under section 39.806 . . . DCF relied on section 39.806(l)(g), Florida Statutes, which provides in relevant part: The parent or . . . as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse. § 39.806 . . .