Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Although the version of the law that applies to this case does not incorporate the concept that a substantial term of incarceration is per se evidence of dependency or termination of parental rights, the Legislature has since enacted into law such a per se rule with regard to the termination of parental rights. See § 39.806(1)(d), Fla....

...2d DCA 1993) ("A determination of dependency may be based on prospective neglect where, as here, the parent cannot provide care of the child in the future."). [15] We decline to address the other issues raised by R.F. since they were not the basis for our discretionary review in this case. [16] Even before section 39.806(1)(d) went into effect, we held that "incarceration does not, as a matter of law, constitute abandonment," but that it is "a factor to be considered in determining whether abandonment has occurred." W.T.J....

...Hearn, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, FL; Dennis W. Moore, Guardian ad Litem Program, Kissimmee, FL, for Appellant. Felicia Shaman, Fort Lauderdale, FL; Ryan Truskoski, Orlando, FL; and Beverly A. Pohl of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2001), authorizes the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights "when the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily." In F.L. v. Department of Children & Families, 849 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the Fourth District Court of Appeal declared this statutory section unconstitutional. For the reason discussed herein, we determine that section 39.806(1)(i) is constitutional and reverse the decision of the Fourth District....

...signed a voluntary surrender of parental rights to her fifth child. At the same time, DCF gave F.L. a case plan for her sixth child. In December 2000, the court entered a final order terminating F.L.'s rights to her sixth child. The order was based on the court's finding under section 39.806(1)(c) Florida Statutes (2000), that F.L....

...This petition alleged two separate and distinct grounds for termination: (1) a substantial risk of imminent harm to C.N., Jr. based on F.L.'s history of domestic violence, neglect of her children, and failure to comply with her case plans, justifying termination under section 39.806(1)(c); [3] *606 and (2) the prior involuntary termination of F.L.'s rights to her sixth child, a justification for termination under section 39.806(1)(i)....

...missed some scheduled supervised visits with C.N., Jr., never paid child support, and did not have a stable residence or employment for six months after C.N., Jr.'s birth. In the trial court's conclusions of law, the court said that the grounds for termination had been met as set forth in both sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(i)....

...to parent her child." Based on the risk to C.N., Jr.'s safety and health, the court concluded that it was in the manifest best interest of the child to terminate F.L.'s parental rights. The Fourth District reversed, holding that DCF had failed to prove the requirements to terminate F.L.'s parental rights under either section 39.806(1)(c) or section 39.806(1)(i). F.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 849 So.2d 1114, 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Further, the Fourth District declared section 39.806(1)(i) facially unconstitutional, reasoning that the statute impermissibly shifts the burden to the parent to show that her past conduct does not predict that the current child is at risk. 849 So.2d at 1123. As the appellants, DCF and the guardian ad litem argue that section 39.806(1)(i) *607 is constitutional both facially and as applied in this case. Further, they argue that substantial competent evidence supports the termination of F.L.'s parental rights under either section 39.806(1)(c) or section 39.806(1)(i). CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 39.806(1)(i) Section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2002), provides: (1) The department, the guardian ad litem, or any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or who is informed of those facts and believes they are true may petition for the termination of parental rights under any of the following circumstances: .......

...Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 570 (Fla.1991); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (holding that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the "care, custody and management" of their children). Because section 39.806(1)(i) impinges on fundamental parental rights, the strict scrutiny standard applies....

...At 460 (giving Florida's polling place statute a narrowing construction); State v. Stalder, 630 So.2d 1072, 1076 (Fla.1994) (giving Florida's hate crimes statute a narrowing construction). Constitutional Requirements in the Termination of Parental Rights Section 39.806(1)(i) authorizes the termination of parental rights when the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily....

...See also M.F., 770 So.2d at 1194 (holding that a trial court may not base a final ruling of dependency solely on the fact that the parent committed a sex act on a different child, but must focus on all of the circumstances surrounding the current petition). Applications of Padgett to Section 39.806(1)(i) While we have not previously considered the application of Padgett to section 39.806(1)(i), several district courts have struggled to interpret the statute in light of Padgett's constitutional requirements. In A.B. v. Department of Children & Families, 816 So.2d 684 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), a mother challenged the constitutionality of section 39.806(1)(i)....

...2d DCA 2003). *609 However, the constitutionality of such a rebuttable presumption in this context has been disputed. In C.W. v. Department of Children & Families, 814 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), Judge Ervin wrote separately to express the view that section 39.806(1)(i) should not be used to terminate parental rights based solely on the parent's conduct with previous children....

...This relieves the state of the burden of proof, violating Padgett's requirement that to pass constitutional muster, the state must be required to prove that reunification with the current child would pose substantial risk to the child. F.L., 849 So.2d at 1123 (citing Padgett, 577 So.2d at 571). Constitutional Construction of Section 39.806(1)(i) We agree with the Fourth District that section 39.806(1)(i) may not constitutionally permit a termination of parental rights without proof of substantial risk to the child....

...would relieve the state of this burden of proof. This burden shifting would violate the constitutional requirements articulated in Padgett. We therefore disapprove the use of such a rebuttable presumption. However, we have an obligation to construe section 39.806(1)(i) in a way that preserves its constitutionality. See Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929, 934 n. 12 (Fla.1998). F.L. argues on appeal that under a constitutional interpretation, section 39.806(1)(i) merely gets DCF through the courthouse door, i.e., the statute allows DCF to file a petition for termination of parental rights without the prerequisite case plan, based on a prior involuntary termination....

...But to be constitutional under Padgett, the statute must be interpreted as requiring DCF to also prove that reunification would be a substantial risk to the child and that termination is the least restrictive way to protect the child. We agree with this interpretation. In enacting section 39.806(1)(i), the Legislature did not abrogate the constitutional requirements of Padgett....

...s presumed to have adopted prior judicial constructions of a law unless a contrary intention is expressed. See City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770 So.2d 1196, 1202 (Fla.2000). In 1998, the Legislature added subsection (i) to the grounds enumerated in section 39.806(1) for terminating parental rights....

...the constitutional mandate of Padgett. Padgett, therefore, represents a binding judicial construction of the statute governing the termination of parental rights. Padgett's requirements remain unchanged by the 1998 amendment adding subsection (i) to section 39.806(1). We, therefore, hold that parental rights may be terminated under section 39.806(1)(i) only if the state proves both a prior involuntary termination of rights to a sibling and a substantial risk of significant harm to the current child. Further, the state must prove that the termination of *610 parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. For a trial court applying section 39.806(1)(i), the circumstances leading to the prior involuntary termination will be highly relevant to the court's determination of whether the current child is at risk and whether termination is the least restrictive way to protect the child....

...While a parent's past conduct necessarily has some predictive value as to that parent's likely future conduct, positive life changes can overcome a negative history. We must emphasize that a parent is not required to show evidence of changed circumstances to avoid a termination of rights under section 39.806(1)(i)....

...The trial court may consider evidence introduced by any party when considering whether a current child is at substantial risk of significant harm and whether termination of rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. However, to support a termination order under section 39.806(1)(i), DCF must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's rights to a prior child were terminated involuntarily, that the current child is at substantial risk of significant harm, and that termination of rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. Interpreted in this light, section 39.806(1)(i) is constitutional. Application to this Case Having clarified the proof required for a termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(i), we now address the trial court's order of termination in this case. The trial court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports the termination of F.L.'s parental rights under section 39.806(1)(i). As we have explained above, to establish grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)(i), DCF must prove both a prior involuntary termination and a substantial risk of significant harm to the current child....

...rebuttable presumption because the burden must remain on DCF to prove the elements required for a termination of parental rights. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case for the trial court to apply the constitutional interpretation of section 39.806(1)(i) to the facts. [6] CONCLUSION We hold that parental rights may be terminated under section 39.806(1)(i) only *611 if the state proves both a prior involuntary termination of rights to a sibling and a substantial risk of significant harm to the current child....

...est best interests of the child. However, a manifest best interests determination is not the equivalent of requiring the State to prove substantial risk of significant harm to the child under one of the statutory grounds for termination contained in section 39.806....

...This time she did them on her own without assistance from DCF. Because there was evidence that F.L. had in fact improved her parenting skills with the provision of services, DCF failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that any efforts would be futile to terminate F.L.'s rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c). The court also found that DCF proved the termination of F.L.'s rights under section 39.806(1)(i), which ......

...further proceedings. But if there is a chance that the parent and child could be reunited without harm to the child, that is clearly the preferable alternative. ANSTEAD, J., concurs. CANTERO, J., specially concurring. I agree with the majority that section 39.806( l )(i), Florida Statutes, is constitutional, but I believe that section 39.810 greatly affects the constitutional analysis. I would adopt Judge Sawaya's specially concurring opinion in T.P. v. Department of Children & Families, 860 So.2d 1084, 1090-95 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), which recognizes the interplay between sections 39.806 and 39.810 and concludes that the statute does not shift the burden of proof and does not create a rebuttable presumption....

...the child when specified circumstances exist. These include when the parent has voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the child, when the parent is incarcerated (and other conditions are met), and when a parent has failed to comply with a case plan. § 39.806(1)(a)-(i), Fla. Stat. (2002). One of these circumstances is "[w]hen the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily." § 39.806( l )(i), Fla. Stat. (2002). None of these circumstances, however, in itself authorizes the termination of a parent's rights. Rather, as the majority notes, section 39.806( l )(i)—as with any other subsection—"merely gets DCF through the courthouse door." Majority op....

...Judge Sawaya has noted that a finding that termination is in the child's manifest best interests necessarily implies that no less restrictive alternatives exist. Therefore, section 39.810 renders the less restrictive means test unnecessary. See T.P., 860 So.2d at 1094-95 (Sawaya, C.J., specially concurring). Section 39.806 specifies the circumstances under which one may petition for the termination of parental rights....

...Under section 39.810, however, the burden remains on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the child require it. Therefore, I would hold that on that basis the statute does not create a rebuttable presumption and does not shift the burden. Section 39.806(1)(i) is constitutional....

...tution. [2] The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the father, C.N., Sr., who did not appeal. We commend the trial court's diligence in conducting an extensive evidentiary hearing and providing a thorough and well-analyzed order. [3] Section 39.806(1)(c) authorizes the filing of a petition for the termination of parental rights [w]hen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent...

...physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services. Provision of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. § 39.806(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2002). [4] Section 39.806(1)(i) authorizes the filing of a petition for the termination of parental rights "[w]hen the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily." § 39.806(1)(i), Fla....

...O'Rourke, Esquire of Three Rivers Legal Services, Inc., Gainesville, for Appellant. Phillippa G. Hitchins, Esquire, Lake City, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. N.L., the mother of S.W., appeals an order terminating her parental rights. The court below found that both subsections 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(f), Florida Statutes (2000), authorized termination of parental rights. Because the record contains no competent substantial evidence supporting termination under subsection (1)(f) of section 39.806 and contains no evidence of the provision of services (or the futility of providing services) necessary for termination under subsection (1)(c), we reverse and remand....

...Without preparing a case plan or offering to do so, DCFS filed a petition for termination of parental rights. As amended, the petition alleged that both parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and ability to prevent egregious conduct detrimental to S.W. and knowingly failed to do so, within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2000). The amended petition also alleged that both parents engaged in conduct that threatened S.W.'s life, safety, well-being, or health within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2000), irrespective of the provision of services....

...d to N.L. There is no record evidence that N.L. posed a risk to the child for "psychosocial" reasons that could not be ameliorated with the provision of services. The trial court entered the order under review, terminating parental rights under both section 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(f), Florida Statutes (2000), and concluding that N.L....

...D.J.S., 563 So.2d at 662; E.A.W., 658 So.2d at 967; see also In re A.R.S., 617 So.2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)("Competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings and decision that the evidence clearly showed neglect and abandonment...."). Subsection 39.806(1)(f) To establish a prima facie case under section 39.806(1)(f), DCFS was required to prove egregious conduct on N.L.'s part or her knowing failure to prevent such conduct by another when an opportunity existed to do so. As grounds for termination of parental rights, section 39.806(1)(f) specifies situations where the parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child.......

...or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child. § 39.806(1)(f), Fla....

...lish that N.L. harmed S.W.; that she knowingly failed to prevent the boyfriend's misconduct; or that she had any reason to suspect an injury, before S.W.'s arm became red and swollen, at which point she promptly sought medical care for the child. Subsection 39.806(1)(c) In order to establish a case under its alternative theory, DCFS was required to adduce clear and convincing evidence that N.L.'s continuing involvement in S.W.'s life threatens her life, safety, health, or well-being and that this threat exists "irrespective of the provision of services." § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

...Here, the trial court did not address whether, and the record is devoid of evidence that, services had been offered or provided to N.L. or that it would have been futile to have provided her such services. Thus, the requirements of subsection (1)(c) have not been met. See In re J.D.C., 819 So.2d 264, 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Section 39.806(1)(c) authorizes termination of parental rights when, despite the provision of all available social welfare services, the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continu...

...eatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child.... Provision of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. § 39.806(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2000). As the Second District has explained in In re C.W.W., 788 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) [I]n order to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court must find that the child's life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent regardless of any services provided to the parent....

...See In re D.W., 793 So.2d 39, 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). While she did not request services, DCFS never offered them. Conclusion Because the record does not contain the competent substantial evidence necessary to support termination of N.L.'s parental rights under either section 39.806(1)(c) or 39.806(1)(f), the trial court's order must be reversed....

...4, Fla. Stat. (2003) (providing that, subject to certain exceptions, "each parent of a child within the compulsory attendance age is responsible for the child's school attendance as required by law"); they cannot abuse or neglect their children, see § 39.806(1)(g), Fla....

...lish that termination of those rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991). In this case, the Department sought termination under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...based on record evidence, but rather is based on the trial court's speculation that the Mother would fail in any attempt to comply with a case plan with a goal of reunification. Such speculation is not a valid basis for terminating parental rights. Section 39.806(1)(c) allows for termination of parental rights [w]hen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child re...

...would threaten the child's life, safety, or health irrespective of the provision of services. "Irrespective of" means "independent or regardless of." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1196 (1986). Thus, in order to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court must find that the child's life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent regardless of any services provided to the parent....

...In the absence of such evidence, the trial court's order terminating the Mother's parental rights must be reversed to give the Mother the opportunity to comply with a case plan with a goal of reunification. The Department also sought termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f)....

...or the child's sibling. . . . . 2. As used in this subsection, the term "egregious conduct" means abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct of the parent or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. § 39.806(1)(f)2., Fla.Stat....

...Therefore, the Department failed to establish that termination was the least restrictive means available to prevent harm to the child. Because the Department failed to put forth sufficient evidence to support termination of the Mother's parental rights under either section 39.806(1)(c) or 39.806(1)(f), the trial court's order must be reversed....

...of Children and Families, Tallahassee, for Appellee. ON CLARIFICATION HAWKES, J. The opinion issued on October 28, 2003 is withdrawn and this opinion is substituted in its place. Appellant appeals from a final order terminating her parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...ictive means of protecting her children from serious harm. We find Appellant's arguments to be meritorious, and reverse. The Department of Children and Families (DCF) cross-appeals, arguing termination of Appellant's parental rights was proper under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, but that the trial court erred by not also terminating Appellant's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2001). Finding no competent, substantial evidence to support termination of parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and noting, moreover, that DCF failed to make any effort to reunify the family, we affirm the issue raised on cross-appeal without discussion....

...s no evidence child suffered harm or injury—physical, mental or emotional—as consequence of parent's alcohol and drug use, and no evidence parent failed to meet child's needs while child was in his care). Rather, to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), three sequential evidentiary requirements must be met....

...e case. Clearly, under these facts, termination of Appellant's parental rights was not the least restrictive means of protecting the children. Because the record is devoid of evidence to support termination of Appellant's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, the order is REVERSED and the case REMANDED, with immediate issuance of the mandate....

...had engaged in conduct that demonstrates that their continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of their children, irrespective of the provision of services, see § 39.806(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1999), and/or that they had engaged in egregious conduct or failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, *1002 safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the children or their sibling(s). See § 39.806(1)(f), Fla....

...Padgett v. Department of Health and Rehab. Servs., 577 So.2d 565 (Fla.1991). We agree with DCF that the cases relied on by the trial court are inapposite to this case, which involves termination of parental rights for "egregious abuse" pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes....

...hts' termination is met. § 39.810, Fla. Stat. See In re J.M.M., 795 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The trial judge's error on this point was understandable because Florida's courts have not yet fully examined the implications of legislation such as section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, or section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes, both of which authorize a parent's conduct toward one sibling to serve as a sufficient ground for termination as to a different child. Many Florida courts appear to continue to rely on Padgett exclusively in "prospective abuse" termination cases. It appears, however, that Padgett, which was decided under the 1987 statutes, must be applied in light of the subsequent enactment of section 39.806(1)(f) in 1990 and 39.806(1)(i), enacted in 1998. C.W. v. Department of Children and Families, 814 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), a recent decision out of the First District Court of Appeal examining a termination of parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f) and (i) based on conduct directed toward a sibling, exemplifies the current uncertainty in the law....

...Department of Children and Families, 816 So.2d at 685; see also Padgett, supra ; In re S.S., 723 So.2d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Lewis v. Department of Health and Rehab. Servs., 670 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). In A.B., the court had terminated the mother's parental rights, relying in part on section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes, which permits termination of parental rights "when the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily." On appeal, the mother urged that the statute was unconstitutional on its fa...

...ild must have the right to show the lack of a predictive relationship between the past abuse of one child and the prospective abuse of another. [4] 816 So.2d at 686. In one sense, this case offers an example that will help to illustrate the problem. Section 39.806(1)(f) would authorize termination of B.B.'s parental rights to his sons based on his egregious abuse of A.B....

...Ironically, the reverse of the situation presented in the case of the male children is present as to S.B., the remaining female child. Given the nature of the abuse perpetrated on A.B. and S.K. and the parents' deceit and concealment of their conduct toward these two girls, the salutary purpose of legislation like sections 39.806(1)(f) and (i) is manifest....

...hts, alleging the following statutory grounds: abandonment; continued involvement of the parent threatens the child irrespective of services; continued abuse; abandonment or neglect after filing a case plan; and material breach of the case plan. See § 39.806(1), Fla....

...ion. The statute provides for the contents of the petition as follows: (4) A petition for termination of parental rights filed under this chapter must contain facts supporting the following allegations: (a) That at least one of the grounds listed in s. 39.806 has been met....

...(b) That the parents of the child were informed of their right to counsel at all hearings that they attended and that a dispositional order adjudicating the child dependent was entered in any prior dependency proceeding relied upon in offering a parent a case plan as described in s. 39.806. (c) That the manifest best interests of the child, in accordance with s. 39.810, would be served by the granting of the petition. § 39.802(4) (emphasis added). Section 39.806(1), in turn, provides specific statutory grounds for termination....

...The surrender document must be executed before two witnesses and a notary public or other person authorized to take acknowledgments. 2. The surrender and consent may be withdrawn after acceptance by the department only after a finding by the court that the surrender and consent were obtained by fraud or under duress. § 39.806(1) (emphasis added). The other grounds for termination listed in the statute are involuntary in nature. See § 39.806(1)(b)-(i). In this case, for example, the Department alleged several involuntary grounds under the statute, such as abandonment and that continued parental involvement threatened the child irrespective of services. See id. § 39.806(1)(b)-(c)....

...consent for termination of parental rights. § 39.801(d) (emphasis added). In H.E., the Second District examined these statutes to determine whether they require the Department to present evidence of one of the grounds alleged in the petition under section 39.806 after a parent's consent to termination is entered under section 39.801(3)(d) for failure to appear. 3 So.3d at 342-43. The Second District reasoned that the statutorily required implied consent for failure to appear is a voluntary termination essentially equivalent to the voluntary surrender in section 39.806(1)(a) described above, which is one of the statutory grounds for termination....

...See S.S., 976 So.2d at 42; A.S., 927 So.2d at 208; R.H., 860 So.2d at 988. In sum, these district courts reason that (1) under section 39.802(4)(a), a petition for termination of parental rights must be based on at least one of the grounds for termination provided in section 39.806(1); (2) section 39.801(3)(d)'s implied consent is not listed as a section 39.806 ground; (3) neither section 39.801 nor section 39.806 refers to the other; and, therefore, (4) section 39.801(3)(d) is not a statutory ground for termination and evidence must be presented on the grounds in the petition. It is undeniable that consent to termination based on the parent's failure to appear is not among the grounds for termination listed in section 39.806(1). We therefore disagree with the Second District's analysis, which equates section 39.801(3)(d)'s constructive consent with the voluntary surrender under section 39.806(1)(a). See In re H.E., 3 So.3d at 343. A voluntary surrender under section 39.806(1)(a) is only accomplished by the parent's execution of "a written surrender of the child," with the "surrender document [being] executed before two witnesses and a notary public or other person authorized to take acknowledgments." A constructive consent for failure to appear *236 pursuant to section 39.801(3)(d) clearly is different in character from a "written surrender" under 39.806(1)(a)....

....3d at 343. [6] Once the trial court has deemed the parent to have consented to the termination, there is no basis for the parent to complain that the trial court did not consider evidence establishing the existence of a ground for termination under section 39.806(1). The constructive consent provision of section 39.801(3)(d) can only be reasonably understood as providing a basis for termination which precludes a defaulting parent's objection to the absence of proof of a ground for termination under section 39.806(1)....

...ute is unclear). The majority recognizes that the failure of a parent to appear for a hearing, along with the consequences of section 39.801(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), are not statutorily listed bases or grounds for the termination of rights in section 39.806....

...[6] We need not and do not consider any of the parties' arguments or the district courts' discussions regarding the impact of a termination predicated on a section 39.801(3)(d) consent on hypothetical future termination of parental rights proceedings concerning siblings under section 39.806(1)(i). Whether a termination based on constructive consent pursuant to section 39.801(3)(d) should be considered an involuntary termination for purposes of section 39.806(1)(i) is simply not at issue in this case....

...and B.C.B., challenges an order terminating her parental rights to her children. Appellant raises two arguments on appeal. Appellant argues that the trial court's finding that her continuing involvement with the children threatened their well-being or lives pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), was not supported by the evidence....

...ey engaged in conduct towards the children that demonstrated that the continuing involvement of the parents in the parent-child relationship threatened both the lives and well-being of the children regardless of the provision of services pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c)....

...children, in that she engaged in conduct towards the children, and more particularly their father, that demonstrated that the continuing involvement of the parent-child relationship would threaten the lives or well-being of the children pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c)....

...While the children were not present during this incident, the court found that such action, along with the continued domestic violence, was of such intensity, magnitude, and severity that the children's lives were endangered. The court also found, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2001), that appellant continued to neglect the children, and that she failed to substantially comply with her case plan by not participating in a psychological evaluation and by not following through with all r...

...of the father would be dangerous to the children's physical and emotional well-being. This appeal followed. Appellant contends that the court's finding that her continued involvement with the children threatened their well-being or lives pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c) is not supported by the evidence. We agree. Pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), when a parent engages in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, men...

...it may be said as a matter of law that no one could reasonably find such evidence to be clear and convincing. C.W. v. Dep't of Children and Families, 814 So.2d 488, 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Here, in its findings in support of termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court found that, due to appellant's medication management issues that leave her vulnerable to explosive and dangerous outbursts primarily directed at the father, her continued lack of control in perpetrating domestic violence on the father would threaten the well-being of the children....

...Furthermore, one of the tasks in the father's updated case plan involved securing a divorce from appellant. Thus, based upon the foregoing, we find that the record is devoid of clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination of appellant's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c). Although appellant struck the father with her automobile, the children were not present during this incident. In addition, the entire basis for the Department's termination petition and the court's termination order regarding section 39.806(1)(c) is refuted in the record....

...Moreover, based upon the father's updated case plan, the father is to secure a divorce from appellant. In addition, there is no evidence in the record that establishes that appellant harmed the children. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in terminating appellant's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), as the record evidence was neither clear nor convincing....

...gument with him, she would instead leave his presence. Thus, based upon this testimony, a reasonable basis did exist to find that appellant's problems could be improved. Although the trial court erred in terminating appellant's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court also based its termination order on section 39.806(1)(e), in finding that appellant failed to substantially comply with her case plan. Section 39.806(1)(e) provides for the termination of parental rights when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents....

...resume that the trial court correctly found that appellant failed to substantially comply with her case plan. See Peacock v. Melvin, 652 So.2d 951, 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Notwithstanding the trial court's presumptively correct findings pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), the Department also had the burden of demonstrating that the termination of parental rights was the least restrictive means of protecting the children from serious harm, as parental rights constitute a fundamental liberty interest....

...Kreidler, Lake Worth, FL, for Petitioner. Jeffrey Dana Gillen and Crystal Y. Yates-Hammond, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent. PER CURIAM. This case concerns termination of the parental rights of a person serving a prison sentence. We are called upon to construe section 39.806(1)(d)(1), Florida Statutes (2003), which provides, in pertinent part: (1) The department ......

...the time before the child, then four years old, will attain the age of eighteen years. The Fourth District reversed, concluding that the entire period of incarceration, rather than the period remaining to be served, was the correct measurement under section 39.806(1)(d)(1), and that the entire seven-year, seven-month sentence in this case constitutes a substantial portion of the child's eighteen-year minority. The Fourth District certified conflict with J.D.C., and A.W., in which the Second District held that under section 39.806(1)(d)(1) the trial court is to consider only future incarceration in determining whether incarceration constitutes a substantial portion of the time before the child turns eighteen. See B.C., 884 So.2d at 956. ANALYSIS To explain our resolution of the certified conflict, as well as the related issue of how to quantify the statutory term "substantial portion," we first briefly trace the history of section 39.806(1)(d)(1), then discuss the Second and Fourth District court opinions construing its terms. History of Section 39.806(1)(d)(1) When enacted in 1997, the provision now codified in section 39.806(1)(d)(1) set out one of the three criteria that had to be met for termination of the parental rights of an *1049 incarcerated parent....

...termination of the parental rights of the incarcerated parent is in the best interest of the child. § 39.464(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis supplied). Thus, the various sections were in the conjunctive. In 1998, section 39.464 was renumbered to section 39.806 during a reorganization of chapter 39....

...The federal act sets time limits for developing a timely permanency plan for children who are in the state's care, provides for expedited termination of parental rights under certain circumstances, and uses funding to encourage state compliance with federal requirements. In 1999, the Legislature revised section 39.806(1)(d) by making its three subsections independent alternatives rather than the previous conjunctive requirements....

...The court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child and, for this reason, that termination of the parental rights of the incarcerated parent is in the best interest of the child. § 39.806(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis supplied). For any termination of parental rights under chapter 39, the trial court must find, in addition to the specific grounds contained in section 39.806, that termination is in the best interests of the child. See § 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2003). Each ground for termination must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See § 39.811(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). Further, this Court has held — although not specifically as to section 39.806(1)(d)(1) — that termination of parental rights requires a showing by clear and convincing evidence that reunification of parent and child poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child, and that termination of rights be the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm....

...F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 608 (Fla.2004); Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991). District Court Decisions The Fourth District opinion in this case is one of several opinions in which the Second and Fourth districts have construed the language of section 39.806(1)(d)(1)....

...In B.C., the Fourth District clarified that it "considered the entire period, not merely the future portion," to be the correct measure of incarceration under the provision. 884 So.2d at 956, 2003 WL 22014737. In each of the certified conflict cases, the Second District concluded that section *1051 39.806(1)(d)(1) requires the trial court to measure the remaining incarceration at the time of the court's decision on termination against the time remaining before the child turns eighteen....

...In A.W., the court was faced with the question of whether the statutory language "limits the trial court to relying solely on the length of the parent's sentence or whether the trial court may also consider the `quality' of that time in the children's development." 816 So.2d at 1263. Concluding that the "plain language of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) speaks only to time," id....

...ial portion of the remaining fourteen- and seventeen-year minorities of the children, and therefore reversed the order terminating his parental rights. See id. Without citing A.W., a different Second District panel adopted the same interpretation of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) in J.D.C....

...and J.D.C., again reversed a termination order, holding that the remaining incarceration did not constitute a substantial portion of the time before the child turns eighteen. See In re E.I.F., 872 So.2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The Certified Conflict Issue The certified conflict issue of whether section 39.806(1)(d)(1) is solely forward-looking or instead encompasses the entire period of incarceration presents a question of statutory construction....

..."When a statute is clear, courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent." State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.2004); see also Lee County Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Jacobs, 820 So.2d 297, 303 (Fla.2002). The language of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) speaks only to the future regarding both the period of incarceration and the child's minority as the criteria to be used in determining whether this ground for termination has been established....

....2d at 571. In determining whether termination is necessary to protect the child from serious future harm, the trial court certainly may take into account evidence of past parent-child contact. Cf. F.L., 880 So.2d at 609 ("For a trial court applying section 39.806(1)(i), the circumstances leading to the prior involuntary termination will be highly relevant to the court's determination of whether the current child is at risk and whether termination is the least restrictive way to protect the child."). However, construing section 39.806(1)(d)(1) to require consideration of past incarceration in making the termination decision would be inconsistent with the constitutionally mandated narrow construction of the statutory language and the constitutionally required focus on future harm to the child. Justice Bell asserts in his dissenting opinion that a forward-looking construction of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) contravenes section 39.801(9), Florida Statutes, which provides that the provisions of chapter 39 are to be construed "liberally ......

...ny "intervention should intrude as little as *1053 possible into the life of the family ... and take the most parsimonious path to remedy a family's problems"). The purpose of protecting children is not necessarily better served by a construction of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) that requires courts to examine the entire period of incarceration during a child's minority than by a construction focusing on the remaining incarceration....

...correctional resource"). Further, we do not consider our construction to be either more or less "friendly" to incarcerated parents than the Fourth District's view. See dissenting op. at 1062 n. 11. If termination is gauged solely by the criteria of section 39.806(1)(d)(1), unwarranted termination can occur under either interpretation....

...Using a forward-looking construction, termination would not be authorized under those circumstances. In contrast, if termination is sought in the scenario of a fifteen-year-old child with a parent commencing a two-year prison sentence, the criteria of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) would be met under a forward-looking construction but not when taking into account the entire period of incarceration during a child's minority....

...In contrast, a construction that encompasses the entire sentence, regardless of when the termination petition is filed, creates no incentive to resolve the issue of parental rights of an incarcerated parent when the decision is of greatest significance to the child. Accordingly, we reject the construction of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) adopted by the Fourth District in B.C....

...as being consistent with the statutory language chosen by the Legislature, consistent with the constitutionally required emphasis on future harm, and consistent with the best interests of children of incarcerated parents. This Case The trial court, applying the forward-looking construction of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) that we endorse today, concluded that the approximately four years remaining in the father's sentence (from the filing of the petition in January 2002 to the January 2006 maximum release date) was not a substantial portion of the remaining fourteen-year minority of the child....

...nstituting twenty-six percent and thirty-two percent of the remaining minority of the children did not constitute a substantial portion). [4] Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that termination was not authorized under section 39.806(1)(d)(1). CONCLUSION For the reasons explained herein, we hold that before the parental rights of a parent incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution may be terminated under section 39.806(1)(d)(1), the trial *1055 court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the time remaining in the parent's incarceration constitutes a substantial portion of the time remaining before the child or children attain the age of eighteen years....

...to the extent that these decisions rely on a forward-looking construction of the provision. [6] In this case, we quash the decision of the Fourth District, which reversed the order in which the trial court denied termination of B.C.'s parental right under the construction of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) that we adopt today, and remand for reinstatement of the trial court's order....

...e, into consideration under section 39.810(2), Florida Statutes, [7] in determining whether the best interest of the child is served by termination of the parental rights of an incarcerated parent. Tension clearly exists between the 1999 revision to section 39.806(1)(d)(1), which bases termination of parental rights on incarceration alone, and section 944.8031, which recognizes the importance of parent-child relationships for incarcerated prisoners....

...even years old. The majority gives to the statute too cramped a reading. Furthermore, I would only decide the conflict issue in this case. CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur. BELL, J., dissenting. I agree with Justice Wells that the majority's reading of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) is "too cramped." The majority's "plain meaning" analysis completely ignores the statutory context and gives the section a strict construction in contravention of the Legislature's express mandate to interpret the statute liberally....

...Rather than interpreting the section acontextually and strictly, I would interpret it and apply its plain meaning in light of the statutory context and consistent with a liberal construction that respects the Legislature's expressly stated instructions and purposes. When section 39.806(1)(d)(1) is read in context of the entire statutory scheme and liberally interpreted to further its legislatively articulated purposes, it is clear that the section requires a court to consider *1058 whether the entire period of the in...

...This interpretation of the section's plain meaning, rather than the majority's, is most consistent with the unambiguous and expressly articulated legislative intent — the protection of this State's minor children. I would affirm the decision of the district court, and I therefore respectfully dissent. I. INTERPRETING SECTION 39.806(1)(d)(1) Section 39.806(1) provides several grounds on which the Department of Children and Families (DCF) may petition a court for the termination of a parent's parental rights. See § 39.806(1)(a)-(i), Fla. Stat. (2003). Pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)(1), DCF may petition a court for termination of parental rights [w]hen the parent of a child is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution and ... [t]he period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years. § 39.806(1)(d)(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). The question before us is how properly to define the relevant periods of time that the statute instructs a court to compare. The majority makes two mistakes in its interpretation of section 39.806(1)(d)(1)....

...hin the larger constitutional framework applicable to termination of parental rights *1059 cases that we recently clarified in Florida Department of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602 (Fla.2004). I will address each of these points below. A. Section 39.806(1)(d)(1)'s "plain meaning": Should context be considered? As I have said, the majority's statutory construction is fundamentally flawed because it attempts to interpret the words of the statute acontextually....

...Looking at the statutory words alone — isolating them from all context and interpreting them abstractly — the majority emphasizes the Legislature's use of "forward-looking" phrases such as " is expected to be incarcerated," " will constitute," and " will attain," and concludes that "[t]he language of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) speaks only to the future regarding both the period of incarceration and the child's minority." Majority op....

...d construct[ion] in conformity with [the chapter's] declared purposes." § 39.001(9), Fla. Stat. (2003). The paramount purpose of chapter 39 is to protect children. See § 39.001(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (listing the chapter's purposes). In this light, section 39.806(1)(d)(1) must be interpreted as liberally and broadly as the words naturally will allow so as to promote this purpose....

...rated in a state or federal correctional *1061 institution and ... [t]he period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years. § 39.806(1)(d)(1), Fla....

...(a)."). We refused to "ascribe an unusual meaning to `carry' ... in order to obtain a result beyond the statute's plain language." Burris, 875 So.2d at 414 n. 2 (emphasis added). [10] Unlike the statutory language at issue in Burris, the language of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) is not plain and unambiguous on its face....

...may petition for termination of parental rights) in the constitutional context of Florida Department of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602 (Fla.2004). In F.L., we provided the strict construction necessary to assure the constitutionality of section 39.806(1). Regardless of how broadly or narrowly we interpret section 39.806(1)(d)(1), the principles of F.L....

...child [and] that the termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm." 880 So.2d at 608. DCF will also have to satisfy the statutory burden of demonstrating that termination of parental rights is in the child's manifest best interests. Id. at 607-10 nn. 5 & 6. Like section 39.806(1)(i), which we construed in F.L., section 39.806(1)(d)(1) "gets DCF through the courthouse door." Id. at 609. But no matter how wide or narrow the door, the constitutional requirements of F.L. still remain. The majority's decision today simply narrows the door provided by section 39.806(1)(d)(1). It is not, however, constitutionally required, nor is it consistent with the Legislature's expressed purposes and instructions. II. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the majority has interpreted section 39.806(1)(d)(1) in an inappropriately and unnecessarily strict manner....

...Its acontextual, strict construction is contrary to this Court's historical application of the "plain meaning" rule and its "polestar" of statutory interpretation — an interpretation that is consistent with legislative intent. I would adopt the interpretation of the Fourth District Court of Appeal and hold that section 39.806(1)(d)(1) instructs a court to consider the entire period of incarceration — both the portion already served at the time the petition is filed and the portion yet to be served....

...NOTES [1] The certified conflict creates jurisdiction for this Court to review the Fourth District decision. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. [2] The requirement that incarceration constitute a "substantial portion" of the time before the child turns 18 is a basis for termination under section 39.806(1)(d)(1). Incarceration plus a finding that a continuing relationship would be harmful to the child are grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)(d)(3). This subsection is not before us in this case. The issue of abandonment as grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)(b) is also not before us because the trial court concluded that incarceration for a substantial portion of the child's remaining minority was the only viable basis for termination....

...ily, not the more random time that may elapse between the conclusion of legal proceedings for severance and the parent's release from prison." Id. at 206. Our conclusion that the filing of the petition is the starting point for a determination under section 39.806(1)(d)(1) avoids much of the randomness that caused the court concern in Jesus M....

...n. [6] Because the remaining incarceration at the time the petition was filed clearly does not constitute a substantial portion of the child's remaining minority, we decline to address what specific percentage constitutes a substantial portion under section 39.806(1)(d)(1), and whether the provision encompasses qualitative as well as quantitative considerations....

...These questions are beyond the scope of the certified conflict. Cf. Welsh v. State, 850 So.2d 467, 471 n. 6 (Fla.2003); Wood v. State, 750 So.2d 592, 595 n. 3 (Fla.1999) (declining to address issues beyond the scope of the certified conflict). Moreover, these questions implicate constitutional concerns over section 39.806(1)(d)(1), as amended in 1999, which have not been raised by the parties and need not be addressed to reach final adjudication in this case....

...as "reject[ing] a forward-looking construction." Majority op. at 1055, note 5. It would be more precise to say that the court rejected a construction that was solely forward-looking. That, essentially, is the dispute here. See Majority op. at 1051 (stating that the question before us is "whether section 39.806(1)(d)(1) is solely forward-looking or instead encompasses the entire period of incarceration.")....

...The question, however, is whether it only looks forward. On this point, the majority "agree[s] [with Jesus M. ] that the length of the parent's absence from the family is what matters to the child," majority op. at 1055, note6 — and presumably, then, that is what should matter to a court applying section 39.806(1)(d)(1)....

...cord. We affirm, concluding that the termination of parental rights was supported by competent substantial evidence. The Record Before the Trial Court The trial court found that termination of the father’s parental rights was supported by sections 39.806(l)(b), (c), (e)(1), and (e)(2), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...Standard of Review This court has previously set forth the “multi-step process inherent in the statutory scheme for termination of parental rights”: First, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2007), has been established....

...Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 930 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting N.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 843 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)). Moreover, so long as the trial court’s ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes, is supported by *428 the evidence, the court’s decision is affirm-able....

...rmination). In this opinion, we discuss two of those statutory bases. The Father abandoned the Child With reference to the findings set out above, there is clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned the child as contemplated by sections 39.806(l)(b) and 39.01(1), Florida Statutes....

...was testimony that this infrequent and irregular visitation caused the child to not see the father in a parental role, despite the child knowing that this individual was in fact his father. The Father did not substantially comply with his Case Plan. Section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes provides grounds for termination of parental rights when the “child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parent or parents.” § 39.806(l)(e), Fla....

...abuse, neglect, or abandonment unless the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due to the parent’s lack of financial resources or to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child. Id. at § 39.806(1)(e)1....

...The mother's appeal of the trial court’s order has been handled separately, and the court's order as to her parental rights was affirmed by this court without opinion. B.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 117 So.3d 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). . Section 39.806(l)(b) states that parental rights may be terminated upon establishment that the parent has abandoned the child as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes. § 39.806(l)(b), Fla....

...7 (Fla.2004) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (quoting In re Davey, 645 So.2d 398, 404 (Fla.1994)); see also J.R. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re J.B.), 923 So.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Here, the Department sought termination of the Father's parental rights on four grounds: abandonment under section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), continuing involvement *1079 threatening the welfare of the child under section 39.806(1)(c), continued abandonment after a case plan under section 39.806(1)(e)(1), and a material breach of the case plan under section 39.806(1)(e)(2). However, because the Department did not present clear and convincing evidence on any of the grounds it alleged, the termination of the Father's parental rights cannot stand. Abandonment under § 39.806(1)(b) The trial court first found that the Father had abandoned T.D.H. and thus that termination was proper under section 39.806(1)(b)....

...The trial court also found that the Father had failed to contact the Department to try to complete any of his case plan tasks. However, the evidence does not support these findings. Moreover, even if it did, the evidence does not support a finding of abandonment under section 39.806(1)(b). Section 39.806(1)(b) permits the trial court to terminate a parent's rights when the parent has "abandoned" the child, as that term is defined in section 39.01(1)....

...for several years, voluntarily abandoned those responsibilities upon his arrest and incarceration. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that the Department proved its case on this statutory ground. *1082 Threat Irrespective of Services under § 39.806(1)(c) The trial court also found that termination of the Father's parental rights was proper because the Father engaged in conduct toward T.D.H....

...threatens T.D.H.'s life, safety, well-being, or health irrespective of the provision of services. This finding is also not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. This court has set forth the specific standard to be applied when considering termination under section 39.806(1)(c): [I]n order to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court must find that the child's life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent regardless of any services provided to the parent....

...irrespective of the provision of services because the evidence showed that no services had ever been provided and nothing about the Father's interactions with the Department established that the provision of services would be futile. Therefore, the termination cannot be affirmed on this ground. Continued Abandonment under § 39.806(1)(e)(1) The trial court also found that termination was proper because the Father continued to abandon T.D.H. after having been given a case plan. This ground is likewise unsupported by the evidence in the record. Under section 39.806(1)(e)(1), termination of parental rights is proper when the child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, abandoned, or neglected....

...This court held that, in light of the Department's concession that it did not meaningfully attempt to assist C.C. in performing his case plan tasks, the evidence was "woefully inadequate" to support a finding that C.C.'s rights could be terminated under section 39.806(1)(e)(1)....

...incarcerated. Because the Department presented no evidence that it took any meaningful steps to assist the Father in complying with his case plan, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the Father's rights could be terminated under section 39.806(1)(e)(1), and the trial court erred in terminating the Father's parental rights on this basis. Material Breach under § 39.806(1)(e)(2) In addition, the trial court found that termination was proper because the Father had materially breached the case plan....

...On these facts, the Father's criminal record, which was well known to the Department long before any case plan was offered, cannot logically constitute a material breach of the case plan. The Department also contends that termination is proper under section 39.806(1)(e)(2) because the Father took no steps toward completing his case plan tasks while he was not incarcerated, citing T.C....

...rceration. In its order terminating J.T.'s parental rights, the trial court found that the Department had proved each ground for termination. The trial court also found that termination was in T.B.'s best interest. Failure to comply with a case plan Section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2000), provides for termination of parental rights when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents....

...Dep't of Children & Families, 814 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Further, because J.T. had no tasks to complete under the case plan he was given, there was no factual basis to find that he failed to substantially comply with the plan. Conduct threatening the life or well-being of the child Section 39.806(1)(c) provides for termination when a parent has engaged in conduct toward the child that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical,...

...It is also improper to terminate parental rights if a parent is unable to financially provide for the child or to assume parental obligations due to incarceration. E.L.H. v. State, 687 So.2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Incarceration The Department also sought termination based on section 39.806(1)(d). [2] J.T. correctly argues, and the Department concedes, *273 that the trial court erred in applying subsection 39.806(1)(d) to this case because J.T. began his incarceration before the statute became effective. [3] See D.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 791 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that section 39.806(1)(d) did not apply to a parent who had already started serving his prison sentence prior to the effective date prescribed by statute)....

...It was improper for the trial court to rely on these unsupported assumptions in making its finding. See R.W.W. v. Dept. of Children & Families, 788 So.2d 1020, 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We reverse the final order terminating J.T.'s parental rights and remand for further proceedings. On remand the court must determine under section 39.806(1) whether J.T.'s current situation warrants termination or whether the Department should provide him with a case plan with a goal of reunification....

...If the Department again petitions to terminate J.T.'s parental rights, the court should carefully consider the possibility of relative placement as the least restrictive means of protecting T.B. from harm. Reversed and remanded. BLUE, C.J., and WHATLEY, J., Concur. NOTES [1] See § 39.503(5),(6), Fla. Stat. (1997). [2] Section 39.806(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), states that parental rights may be terminated on the basis that a parent of the child is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution, and either (a) the period of time for which the paren...

...has been convicted of a substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction, or (c) the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child. [3] Subsection 39.806(1)(d) was originally numbered section 39.464(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), and took effect on October 1, 1997....

...involvement as A.C.'s mother threatened A.C.'s "life or well-being" in that C.C. "has not regained custody of the child's older siblings"; and the fact that C.C.'s parental rights had been involuntarily terminated as to one of A.C.'s siblings. See §§ 39.806(1)(c), (e), (f) & (i), Fla....

...did not, because she could not, as the order terminating parental rights erroneously found, have "neglected or abandoned [A.C.] for the past 12 months or more." C.C. argues for reversal of the order terminating parental rights because she was not afforded the full statutory twelve months to complete her case plan. See § 39.806(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2000). But DCFS did not proceed below only under section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Although DCFS filed its petition before then, on April 3, 2001, DCFS did not allege and the trial court failed to find or conclude that C.C. had "materially breached the provisions of the case plan." § 39.802(8), Fla. Stat. (2000). The trial court's conclusion that C.C.'s conduct was "egregious" under section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2000), as alleged in the petition, also lacks support in the record....

...had very limited opportunities to contribute to the child's health and well-being. Even so, C.C.'s counselor testified that C.C. visited A.C. "consistently," and brought as gifts several outfits she bought for the child. The order terminating parental rights made findings under and relied on sections 39.806(1)(c) and (i), as well as sections 39.806(1)(e) and (f), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 582 So.2d 113, 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). But see In re C.W.W., 788 So.2d 1020, 1023-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding the fact that a mother exposed a child to a controlled substance during pregnancy does not establish that her rights should be terminated under section 39.806(1)(c))....

...he record established that the mother was unwilling to seek treatment for her substance abuse problem). See also Atwell, 675 So.2d at 1031 (finding that the mother's failure to seek drug treatment was evidence of prospective neglect). Whether or not section 39.806(1)(c) applies, the evidence that C.C.'s parental rights to one of A.C.'s siblings had been involuntarily terminated was uncontroverted. See § 39.806(1)(i), Fla....

...In May 2004, Mother was involved in a domestic violence incident, involving the maternal grandmother. At this time, the Child was in DCF custody. Following the domestic violence incident, the Case Plan was amended, on June 24, 2004, with a goal to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e), of the Florida Statutes....

...June 10, 2004, and that Mother entered AGAPE rehab services. The Report notes that Mother was given plenty of time to complete Case Plan but failed to do so. [4] Mother was found intoxicated on the side of the road with the child in the vehicle. [5] Section 39.806(1)(e) provides: (e) A petition for termination of parental rights may also be filed when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents. In this case, the failure of the parents to substantially comply for a period of 12 months after an adjudication of the child as a dependent child ..., constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, neglect, or abandonment.... § 39.806(1)(e), Fla....

...appeal a judgment terminating their parental rights to three children. We affirm that portion of the judgment that terminates the parents' rights to the youngest child, an infant who suffered abuse as a result of egregious conduct when he was in the custody of one or both of the parents. See § 39.806(1)(f), Fla....

...ights to all three children based upon the abuse of the infant. The Department did not offer the parents a case plan. At the termination trial in November 2002, the Department sought to terminate the parents' rights to all three children pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), which permits termination when a parent engages in egregious conduct or has the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly fails to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child or the child's siblings....

...tinued abuse. See In re T.M., 641 So.2d 410, 413 (Fla.1994) (holding that in cases involving severe or continuing abuse or neglect, "the termination of parental rights without the use of plans or agreements is the least restrictive means"); see also § 39.806(2), Fla....

...occurred"). We thus affirm the trial court's termination of the parents' rights to this child. We reverse, however, the portion of the judgment that terminates the parental rights of the mother and father to the two older children. We recognize that section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2002), permits a court to terminate parental rights not only to a child who has suffered abuse by egregious conduct, but also to any siblings of such a child....

...ong as the parent is provided an opportunity to rebut the presumption. See also C.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re T.S.), 855 So.2d 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (reversing termination but noting that court agrees with conclusion in A.B. that section 39.806(1)(i) is facially constitutional)....

...of its burden to demonstrate that the reunification of parent and child poses a substantial risk of harm to that child. See F.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 849 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). We need not address the facial constitutionality of section 39.806(1)(f) because we conclude that, irrespective of who bore the burden of proof, the trial court's determination that the parents posed a substantial risk of significant harm to the two older children was clearly erroneous....

...We affirm, concluding that the termination of parental rights was supported by competent substantial evidence. There is a multi-step process inherent in the statutory scheme for termination of parental rights. First, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2007), has been established....

...are the child to be abandoned. A parent's incarceration can be a factor the court considers for terminating parental rights based on abandonment, but incarceration alone is insufficient. In re T.B., 819 So.2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Florida Statutes Section 39.806(1)(d), states that parental rights may be terminated on the basis that a parent of the child is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution, and either (a) the period of time for which the parent is expected to be incar...

...DCF must prove the allegations supporting the termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence and must establish that termination of those rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991). Section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, allows for parental rights to be terminated when: the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in...

...The trial court's conclusion to the contrary appears to be improperly based on speculation. As a result, terminating the mother's parental rights was not the least restrictive means of protecting the child and we reverse the order of the trial court so that a case plan, with a goal of reunification, can be established. III. Section 39.806(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, Best Interests of Child The mother also contends the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights under Florida Statute section 39.806(1)(d)3. Section 39.806(1)(d)3 permits the termination of an incarcerated parents rights when "[t]he court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child and, fo...

...Nor did DCF establish by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the mother would be harmful to the child. IV. Egregious conduct The mother also contends termination was improper based on alleged egregious conduct. Florida Statute section 39.806(1)(f) allows for parental rights to be terminated when: "the parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, saf...

...or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child. § 39.806(f)(2), Fla....

...A termination of parental rights proceeding involves a two-step process. See Rathburn v. Dep't of Children & Families, 826 So.2d 521, 523 (Fla. 4th DCA *780 2002). First, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2002), has been proven....

...719, 133 L.Ed.2d 672 (1996) (emphasis added). There is a two step process inherent in the statutory scheme for termination of parental rights, pursuant to chapter 39. First, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2001) has been established....

parental rights by completing a form. See, e.g., § 39.806(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (providing that grounds for

...under two years old. The Department of Children and Families ("DCF") asserted a number of grounds for terminating appellant's parental rights, including abandonment; however, the trial court found that the state proved only two grounds. The first is section 39.806(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes (2001), which provides in part: The department ......

...Fifty-four months, which is the total appellant will have served after the birth of the first child, is not a "substantial portion" of eighteen years. In addition, the language used in the statute speaks to the future, not the past. The trial court also concluded that appellant's parental rights could be terminated under section 39.806(1)(d)2 which provides as a ground for termination that the parent is incarcerated and has been determined to be a sexual predator as defined in section 775.21....

...That statute is inapplicable because it requires a current conviction of a capital, life or first degree felony. Appellant's conviction was of a felony of a lesser degree. A more basic problem with DCF's assertion that appellant is a sexual predator is that section 39.806(1)(d)2, Florida Statutes (2001), on which DCF relies, provides that parental rights may be terminated when *793 "[t]he incarcerated parent has been determined by the court to be ......

...Thus when DCF filed its TPR petition, the father's expected incarceration amounted to slightly less than 15 months. By the time the TPR was actually tried, only a few months of incarceration remained. DCF based its TPR case on a number of grounds founded on provisions contained in section 39.806(1). One of the grounds accepted by the trial judge, and which has been appealed by the father, is section 39.806(1)(d)1, which provides for a termination of parental rights when: "the parent of a child is incarcerated in a......

...Their use instead of the unadorned term "substantial" conveys a purpose to engage in a value-laden judgment of effect. One of the standard meanings of substantial is "considerable in importance, value, degree... or extent." [2] Thus applying that standard meaning of subsection 39.806(1)(d)1's operative term, the court would have to find that these months were considerably important in the lives of these children to constitute a "substantial" portion of their minority....

...Here such evidence was lacking. I also agree that the sexual predator provision—even though appropriate for the offense for which the father was convicted —does not support a termination here. This conclusion arises from the peculiar wording of subsection 39.806(1)(d)2, which allows a termination of parental rights when the incarcerated parent " has been determined by the court [e.s.] to be a......

...Llopis, 257 So.2d 17, 18 (Fla.1971) (same). It follows that the judge in the section 775.21 criminal proceeding is to determine whether the parent is a sexual predator. And so I agree that a termination of the father's parental rights cannot be sustained under subsections 39.806(1)(d)1 or (1)(d)2. That however does not end this attempt to terminate the father's rights. In the petition to terminate, DCF also alleged that: "The father ... is incarcerated in a state correctional institution[,] and pursuant to 39.806(1)(d)(3) [sic] continuance of the parental relationship with the father would be harmful to the children[,] and termination of the parental rights of the incarcerated parent is in the best interest of the children." The statutory provision referred to in this pleading is the same subsection 39.806(1)(d)3, discussed above, and which provides for termination when: "[t]he court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child and, for th...

...That means that his children will be severely restricted in having friends visit and stay the night. The state argued that this will also have an adverse effect on the development of these children. During closing argument, DCF specifically argued that the court should make a finding under subsection 39.806(1)(d)3....

...ure harm to the children if the parental ties were not terminated. In spite of this issue having been expressly alleged in the petition and argued in closing argument, the trial court failed to make any finding as to the claimed termination under subsection 39.806(1)(d)3....

...rgument as to this issue only. It follows that either party should have the right to seek review of the trial court's final determination as to this issue. NOTES [1] We cannot agree with Judge Farmer that the trial court could now grant relief under section 39.806(1)(d)3, which applies only to an "incarcerated parent." Appellant is no longer incarcerated....

...[2] AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1791 (3d ed.1992). [3] The majority brushes aside this issue by holding that the release of the father from incarceration during the pendency of this appeal renders impossible any termination now on the basis of subsection 39.806(1)(d)3....

...the failure to complete a case plan. The trial court also found that it was in the best interest of J.D.C. to terminate J.P.C.'s parental rights. On appeal, J.P.C. first contends that the Department failed to establish grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)(d)(1), Florida Statutes (2000). Section 39.806(1)(d)(1) provides that the Department may petition for the termination of parental rights when the parent of a child is incarcerated and the "period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substant...

...Because that period of time is not a substantial portion of the fifteen years before J.D.C. would reach eighteen, the trial court could not terminate J.P.C.'s rights under that provision of the statute. The Department argues that the trial court actually intended to find grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)(d)(3), which provides for termination if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child....

...However, the Department offered no evidence that continuing the parental relationship with J.P.C. would be harmful to the child. The Department's failure to offer evidence regarding the impact of continuing the relationship precludes termination on this basis. The Department also sought termination of J.P.C.'s rights under section 39.806(1)(c), which provides for termination when a parent has engaged in conduct toward the child that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or phy...

...would be harmed even if services were provided, and the Department offered no evidence that would have supported such a finding. In the absence of such evidence, we cannot sustain termination on this ground. Id. The Department also argued for termination under section 39.806(1)(f), which provides for termination when a parent has engaged in egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child. Specifically, the Department argued that J.P.C. had abandoned and neglected J.D.C. While abandonment and neglect constitute egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f), after reviewing the evidence in the record, we conclude that the Department failed to prove either abandonment or neglect by clear and convincing evidence....

...On March 19, 2003, the Department sought termination of J.R.'s parental rights to all three of his children. Later, it amended the petition to only seek termination of J.R.'s parental rights to J.B., and requested that J.B. be placed for adoption. The Department alleged the following statutory grounds for termination: (1) section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), abandonment of the child; (2) section 39.806(1)(c), conduct toward the child demonstrating that the continuing involvement of the parent in the parent-child relationship threatened the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child despite the provision of services; (3) section 39.806(1)(d)(3), the continuation of the parent-child relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child; and (4) section 39.806(1)(e), failure to comply with the case plan....

...Finally, he stated that he wishes to work on a case plan with a goal of reunification as soon as he is released from prison in March 2006. On April 8, 2004, the trial court entered a final judgment terminating J.R.'s parental rights to his son under sections 39.806(1)(b), 39.806(1)(c), 39.806(1)(d)(3) and 39.806(1)(e)....

...v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 614 n. 7 (Fla.2004) (Cantero, J., concurring) (quoting In re Davey, 645 So.2d 398, 404 (Fla.1994)). Based on these standards we review the statutory grounds the trial court assigned for termination of J.R.'s parental rights. Section 39.806(1)(b) Pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), the trial court found that J.R....

...y kind of bond with him. Considering J.R.'s demonstrated interest in his son and his near completion of his term of incarceration, the Department did not provide clear and convincing evidence that J.R. had abandoned his young son under this section. Section 39.806(1)(c) In support of its finding under section 39.806(1)(c) that J.R....

...ined to provide for his child's needs. He stated that he committed his most recent burglary by throwing a rock at his former employer's business and breaking a window out of frustration, and that he regretted doing so. It is error to terminate under section 39.806(1)(c) "when improvement was demonstrated and further improvement was possible." K.S. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re N.S.), 898 So.2d 1194, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); M.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 866 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that in order to terminate under section 39.806(1)(c), the State must show that the child's welfare would continue to be threatened by the parent regardless of the provision of services and that there is no reasonable basis to believe that the parent will improve). The Department failed to carry its burden to show that J.R. engaged in conduct toward his child which threatened his well-being under section 39.806(1)(c). Section 39.806(1)(d)(3) The trial court found that pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)(3) continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful and that termination of the parental relationship would be in the best interest of the child....

...ent lack of a relationship with their incarcerated father, and the detrimental effect that being reunited with the father would have on them. See N.S., 898 So.2d at 1198 (holding that a trial court is precluded from terminating parental rights under section 39.806(1)(d)(3) where no evidence regarding the impact of continuing the parent-child relationship is offered). [1] Based on the record before us, the Department failed to prove that termination was required under this section. Section 39.806(1)(e) Under section 39.806(1)(e), a petition for termination of parental rights may be filed when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with *1208 the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents....

...ons 39.810(1)-(11), Florida Statutes (2001), that termination of parental rights was in the manifest best interests of the child. Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. DAVIS and CANADY, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] We note that section 39.806(1)(d)(1) provides for termination if a parent is to be incarcerated for a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain age eighteen....

...It further "reject[ed]" the argument that the mother could parent the children because she safely parented J.F.-2 for one year and three months, stating that it is easy to parent a child J.F.-2's age. In this case, the Department has the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of the grounds under section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2002), for terminating parental rights and evidence that reunification poses a significant risk of harm to the child....

...A finding that evidence is clear and convincing enjoys a presumption of correctness and will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support. See id. In its amended petition, the Department moved to terminate the mother's parental rights on four grounds under section 39.806(1): subsection (c), the continuing involvement of the parent with the children threatens their life, safety and well-being, irrespective of the services offered; subsection (e), failure to substantially comply with the case plan for a...

...It was inappropriate to base termination on the testimony of a professional who recommended that the parents receive counseling and therapy and then, even though such counseling has not been provided, determines the parents still present a risk. 798 So.2d at 35-36. The other two grounds for termination, Florida Statutes section 39.806(1)(f) (egregious conduct towards another child) and (h) (committing manslaughter or felony assault against another child), raise questions of prospective abuse....

...Or, stated another way, whether it is "likely to happen" or "expected." In re J.L., 824 So.2d 1023, 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citations omitted). On appeal, the Department argues that, as to subsection (h), no nexus need be shown because the plain language of the statute itself requires none. Section 39.806(1)(h) allows parental rights to be terminated: When the parent or parents have committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child, or a felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child or another child, or aid...

...he statute constitutionally infirm. This conclusion is supported by the recent Florida Supreme Court case of Department of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602 (Fla.2004). There, the court considered the constitutionality of a similar statute, Section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2001), which authorizes the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights "when the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily." The court held that in order to render the statute constitutional in accordance with the previous dictates of Padgett: [P]arental rights may be terminated under section 39.806(1)(i) only if the state proves both a prior involuntary termination of rights to a sibling and a substantial risk of significant harm to the current child....

...e based not on any single act or omission with respect to a previous child, but rather on the totality of circumstances surrounding the current petition. (emphasis added) Id. at 610, 611. Thus, applying the rationale of our Supreme Court in F.L., to section 39.806(1)(h), we hold that in order for a termination of parental rights to be based solely on the single act of committing manslaughter or a felony assault against another child, the state must also prove that, based on the totality of the c...

...ill be referred to as J.F., the father as J.F., Sr., the son as J.F.-1, and the daughter as J.F.-2. [2] The court went on to note that a parent is not required to show evidence of changed circumstances to avoid a termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(i)....

...ON MOTION FOR REHEARING WARNER, J. We deny the motion for rehearing, withdraw our previously issued opinion and substitute the following in its place. A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to C.S. The trial court terminated his rights under section 39.806(1)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes....

...The petition for termination alleged two grounds: (1) the "child continues to be abused, abandoned or neglected as evidenced by the failure of the father to substantially comply with the terms and conditions of the Case Plan, constituting grounds for termination of parental rights pursuant to Section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes;" and (2) "[t]he father has engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent(s) in the parent-child relationship threatens the life or well-being of the child irrespective of the provision of services, constituting grounds for termination of parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes." Two weeks after the advisory hearing, the DCF case worker wrote the father a letter in prison advising him that DCF was pursuing termination of his rights due to his noncompliance with the case plan, the goal date of which had already expired....

...She had obtained a phone number for the father from the custodian and tried calling it several times, the last time receiving a message that the phone had been disconnected. The father had not attempted to contact the case worker. The court terminated the father's rights, finding under section 39.806(c) that the father had engaged in conduct that demonstrates his continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services....

...efforts, the father has not done anything on the case plan or even kept in contact with the Department or his attorney." The father appeals the order terminating his parental rights. Although this record provides ample evidence of abandonment under section 39.806(1)(b), [1] DCF concedes that the father's parental rights cannot be terminated on this ground because it was not alleged as a ground for termination in the petition....

...The trial court's finding that the father engaged in conduct that demonstrates his continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship would threaten the child's life, safety, and well-being is not supported by any evidence presented at trial. Section 39.806(1)(c) requires that the conduct of the father towards the child or other children demonstrate that his continuing involvement with the child threatens the child....

...The focus of DCF's case was the father's failure to comply with the case plan, not the father's danger to the child. In this respect this case is identical to In re H.F., 893 So.2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). There the trial court also terminated parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c) when the entire trial involved whether the mother substantially complied with the case plan....

...renting course. Although the Mother admitted that she did not complete the course, the Department did not prove, or even argue, that the Mother's failure to complete the course threatened the child in any way. In short, the Department's reference to section 39.806(1)(c) in its amended petition was little more than filler....

...Because the Department did not present clear and convincing evidence that the Mother's continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship threatened the life, safety, or well-being of the child, the trial court's finding that termination was warranted under section 39.806(1)(c) is unsupportable....

...Finally, as the trial court's order only contained the statutory language, it failed to specify why it felt the father was not amenable to services. See C.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 874 So.2d 1246, 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). As to termination pursuant to 39.806(1)(e), the petition alleges, in accordance with the statute, that the father's failure to complete the case plan demonstrates that the child continues to be abused, abandoned or neglected....

...nment, abuse or neglect, "unless the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due either to the lack of financial resources of the parents or to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child." § 39.806(1)(e) (emphasis added)....

...Furthermore, "[w]hen a parent and the department enter into a case plan, the department must make reasonable efforts to reunify the family." P.A. v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 685 So.2d 92, 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (citing § 39.464(1)(e), Fla. Stat., renumbered 39.806(1)(e))....

...ealth center). While the father, unlike the appellant in T.C.S., did not produce evidence that services were not available to him in prison, it is the Department that bears the "burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of the grounds under section 39.806(1) ....

...*1116 Felicia Shaman of Law Office of Felicia Shaman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant. No brief filed on behalf of appellee. WARNER, J. A mother, F.L., appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her seventh child. The trial court terminated her rights under sections 39.806(1)(c) and (i), Florida Statutes (2001). We hold that the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") failed to prove grounds for termination as authorized under section 39.806(1)(c). We further hold that section 39.806(1)(i), allowing for termination solely upon a showing that a parent's right to a prior child was terminated involuntarily, unconstitutionally shifts the burden to the parent to prove reunification would not be harmful to the child....

...he five prior children. After mediation, F.L. agreed to voluntarily surrender her rights to F.N., while DCF agreed to offer her a case plan for Cl.N. In December 2000, F.L.'s rights to Cl.N. were terminated based upon the court's determination under section 39.806(1)(c) that F.L....

...should keep the child, as she appeared to be loving and caring. Although DCF originally filed a petition for dependency, within a short period, and without offering a case plan, the agency filed a petition for termination of parental rights in June 2002. It alleged, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), that F.L....

...failed to comply with prior case plans leading to the termination of her rights to the other children. As a second ground for termination, DCF alleged that F.L.'s rights to Cl.N. were involuntarily terminated and constituted a ground for termination under section 39.806(1)(i)....

...t-time job, and she expressed a willingness to participate in any services in order to maintain this environment and be reunified with her child. The trial court concluded that DCF had proved its case for termination in accordance with both sections 39.806(1)(c) and (i)....

...Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); State ex rel. Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla.1957). In order to terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCF must present clear and convincing evidence that a ground for termination under section 39.806(1) exists and that reunification poses a significant risk of harm to the child....

...In Gaines, the court gave examples of such behavior as pedophilia, drug addiction, or mental illness. See 711 So.2d at 193. These types of behavior are the type that could constitute harm to the child and may not be amenable to treatment. In this case, DCF sought and obtained termination of F.L.'s rights under sections 39.806(1)(c) and (i). We conclude that it failed to prove the requirements to terminate under section 39.806(1)(c) and that section 39.806(1)(i) is facially unconstitutional. Section 39.806(1)(c) provides for termination, When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threate...

...Although the mother stated at the hearing that she was seeking drug treatment so that she could raise her child, the trial court doubted her sincerity and found that the child would be in danger. See id. The second district concluded the evidence was insufficient to terminate the mother's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c) where DCF failed to establish the mother's continual involvement with the child threatened her life, safety, or health regardless of the provision of services to the mother....

...However, while working on some of her tasks, she assaulted the father with her car. See id. at 1191. Based upon her failure to comply with all of the case plan as well as her continuing problems with anger management, the trial court terminated her parental rights, citing section 39.806(1)(c)....

...d they could never be cured of the affliction that constituted the danger to the child, such as pedophilia. See id. at 1195 (relying upon Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 547 So.2d 981, 984 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)). In order to terminate under section 39.806(1)(c), DCF must prove that there is no reasonable basis for improvement in the parent and that the continued involvement of the parent would be harmful to the child....

...This time she did them on her own without assistance from DCF. Because there was evidence that F.L. had in fact improved her parenting skills with the provision of services, DCF failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that any efforts would be futile to terminate F.L.'s rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c). The court also found that DCF proved the termination of F.L.'s rights under section 39.806(1)(i), which section allows for termination when the parent's rights to another child have been involuntarily terminated....

...Thus, DCF carries the burden not only to establish a ground for termination but the continuing substantial risk of harm to the current child. *1123 In A.B. v. Department of Children & Families, 816 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), where a mother challenged the constitutionality of the statute, the Department argued that section 39.806(1)(i) was simply a codification of the holding of Padgett....

...Jr.'s birth, yet the interpretation the court below and the Department placed on the statute appears not to make the passage of time a significant factor in deciding whether termination is appropriate. In my judgment, if the pertinent provisions of section 39.806 are permitted to survive constitutional muster, they must be given a far more restrictive construction than the majority places on them in the present case. Id. After reviewing Padgett and other pertinent authority, he concluded: *1124 If section 39.806 can be interpreted as permitting "the heavy hand of government paternalism," Padgett, 577 So.2d at 570, to be stretched out at any time to remove a child from its parent's custody, based solely on the parent's past conduct, without any...

...or that the provision of services to F.L. would be futile in permitting reunification. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the final judgment terminating parental rights and remand for further proceedings. We certify conflict with A.B. as we have held section 39.806(1)(i) is facially unconstitutional, thus, inviting supreme court review....

...he conditions of the home. In November of 2006, the Department filed a Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights as to both parents, alleging that grounds for termination of parental rights existed under paragraphs (b), (c), and (e) of section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...On remand, the trial court entered amended orders with the same dispositions as the previous orders, but with expanded factual findings. In the amended order terminating the mother's rights, the trial court found that the Department had established grounds for termination of parental rights under paragraphs (c) and (e) of section 39.806(1) and that, under section 39.810, it was in the child's manifest best interests to terminate the mother's parental rights....

...rough correspondence and phone calls, as regulated by the child's guardians. In the amended order denying the Department's petition for termination of parental rights as to the father, the trial court found that no grounds had been established under section 39.806(1). As to ground (e) of section 39.806(1), the trial court found that the Department had not established the father's failure to substantially *1174 comply with the case plan....

...ds for a single-parent termination under section 39.811(6), Florida Statutes (2006). Our review of the order reveals findings that the Department established only two grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights: paragraphs (c) and (e) of section 39.806(1)....

...being terminated became a parent through a single-parent adoption; (d) If the protection of the child demands termination of the rights of a single parent; or (e) If the parent whose rights are being terminated meets any of the criteria specified in s. 39.806(1)(d) and (f)-(i)....

...under section 39.811(6), beginning with the finding made pursuant to paragraph (e). Section 39.811(6)(e) allows for the termination of only one parent's rights "[i]f the parent whose rights are being terminated meets any of the criteria specified in s. 39.806(1)(d) and (f)-(i)." In finding that the mother's rights to another child had previously been involuntarily terminated, the trial court found that the criteria specified in section 39.806(1)(i) were met....

...ent." Section 39.811(6) does not allow for the termination of only one parent's rights in every case where the Department establishes grounds for termination as to only one parent. In fact, section 39.811(6)(e) isolates certain grounds enumerated in section 39.806(1) as the grounds that are sufficient to support a single-parent termination. Sections 39.806(1)(c) and (e) are not listed in this provision. See § 39.811(6)(e). Therefore, the trial court's findings that the Department established grounds to terminate the mother's rights under section 39.806(1)(c) and (e) are insufficient, in themselves, to establish that the protection of the child demanded termination of the mother's rights only....

...We agree with GAL and the Department as to these issues, and accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. First, we address the trial court's finding that the Department failed to establish grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e). Section 39.806 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) Grounds for the termination of parental rights may be established under any of the following circumstances: .......

...Because the trial court found that the home was still hazardous, and the undisputed evidence shows that the father continued to live in the home with the mother, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the Department did not establish grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e). Having determined that the trial court erred in declining to find grounds for termination of the father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e), we now consider whether the trial court erred in conducting its best interests analysis....

...The details regarding the prior dependency case are not pertinent to this appeal. [3] GAL and the Department filed separate briefs. They each purport to raise only one issue, and the nuances of their arguments are different. Essentially, however, both GAL and the Department challenge the trial court's findings under sections 39.806(1)(e) and 39.810 for lack of specificity and inconsistency....

...f parental rights. From this order both parents appeal. The adjudication of a case involving termination of parental rights involves a two-step process. First, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes, has been proven....

...appellate court has no choice but to affirm. Id. This standard of review dictates the result in this case. The trial court terminated both parents’ rights for failure to substantially comply with their case plans and material breaches of the plan. Section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2010), provides: Grounds for termination of parental rights may be established under any of the following circumstances: (e) When a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and: 1....

...He does not challenge the termination of his parental rights as to the twins. The father contends that the trial court's order terminating his parental rights as to Z.K.P. should be reversed because the trial court erroneously concluded that a finding of egregious abuse as to the twins under section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2005), was sufficient to support a finding of prospective abuse as to the unharmed child, Z.K.P....

...tional violence at the hands of his or her most trusted caretaker is more so. The state has a compelling interest in protecting all its citizens —especially its youth—against the clear threat of abuse, neglect and death. Padgett, 577 So.2d at 570. Section 39.806(1)(f) provides a mechanism for protecting children from the threat of abuse. Section 39.806(1)(f) permits the trial court to terminate parental rights to a child who has suffered egregious abuse, and to any siblings of such child. § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2005); K.A., 880 So.2d at 709. Section 39.806(1)(f) provides, in relevant part: (1) The department, the guardian ad litem, or any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or who is informed of those facts and believes that they are true may petition for the termination of parental rights under any of the following circumstances: ......

...(f) When the parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent *625 and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child's sibling. § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). Under section 39.806(1)(f), egregious abuse directed at one sibling is sufficient, without more, to support termination of parental rights to another sibling. Dep't of Children & Families v. B.B., 824 So.2d 1000, 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)(citing In the Interest of B.S., 697 So.2d 914 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). Section 39.806(1)(f) "represents a legislative expression that parents who have committed egregious acts of abuse against one child pose an unacceptable risk that they will abuse their remaining children." Id....

...Douglas B. Sherman, Department of Children and Family Services, Bartow, for Appellee. WALLACE, Judge. L.N., the natural mother (the Mother) of E.D., B.N., A.N., and R.N., appeals the final judgment terminating her parental rights. The trial court ruled that section 39.806(1)(b) and (1)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), authorized termination of her parental rights to all four children....

...because the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to allege or prove requisite grounds for severing one parent's rights without severing the parental rights of the other parent. Although the trial court erred in finding that the Mother abandoned B.N., A.N., and R.N. under section 39.806(1)(b), termination was otherwise warranted under section 39.806(1)(c) to protect the children from harm. We affirm the termination of her rights to B.N., A.N., and R.N. On January 9, 2002, the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights alleging two grounds: (1) that the Mother abandoned the children pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b) and (2) that the Mother engaged in conduct toward the children which demonstrated that the continuing involvement of the Mother in the parent-child relationship threatened the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the children irrespective of the provision of services, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c)....

...was not a permitted disposition under section 39.811(6), the final judgment is reversed as it pertains to the Mother's rights to E.D. The Children B.N., A.N., and R.N. After the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court entered final judgment accepting the grounds for termination asserted by the Department. First, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), the trial court found that the Mother abandoned the children because "she failed to contribute to the cost of their care upon her incarceration....

...Therefore, the trial court's finding that the Mother abandoned the children was clearly erroneous. However, the trial court found that the Department proved an alternative and independent ground for terminating the Mother's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c). To prove the grounds for terminating parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court must find that the children's lives, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent, regardless of the provision of services....

...being terminated became a parent through a single-parent adoption; (d) If the protection of the child demands termination of the rights of a single parent; or (e) If the parent whose rights are being terminated meets any of the criteria specified in s. 39.806(1)(d) and (f)-(i). Notably, the grounds cited in the final judgment for terminating the Mother's rights to E.D. — abandonment under section 39.806(1)(b) and conduct threatening the child's well-being under section 39.806(1)(c)—are not included in the criteria specified in section 39.811(6)(e). Because the Department did not allege, argue, or present evidence attempting to prove the requirements of section 39.811(6)(d), we express no opinion on the relationship between the ground for termination under section 39.806(1)(c) and the permitted disposition under section 39.811(6)(d). [3] In O.M., this court referenced a test of "three sequential requirements" that echoed the First District's test of "three sequential evidentiary requirements" that must be met before termination of parental rights can occur under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...Finally, [the Department] must show termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the children from serious harm. We do not read M.H. or O.M. as suggesting that proof of termination as the least restrictive means is required to prove a statutory ground for termination under section 39.806(1)(c). Rather, chapter 39 requires proof of a ground for termination under section 39.806 and proof that termination is in the manifest best interests of the child pursuant to section 39.810....

...he child from serious harm. V.W. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re L.B.W.), 863 So.2d 480, 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991)). [4] The Department did not assert section 39.806(1)(e) as a ground for termination....

...rights as to her three children, pursuant to section 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (2002). We find clear and convincing evidence that the mother's continuing involvement with the children threaten the children's lives or future well-being pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2002), and therefore affirm the trial court's findings and conclusions....

...eir problems and be reunited. See, e.g., § 39.001(1)(b)3. In some cases, the circumstances giving rise to a child's dependency are so egregious that the Department is not required to offer services before seeking termination of parental rights. See § 39.806(2), Fla....

...lan with a goal of reunification or adoption by September 30, 2001. On August 17, 2001, DCF filed its petition for termination of parental rights alleging that termination was in the best interests of L.B.W. As grounds for termination, DCF relied on section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2000)—"the parent ......

...engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent... in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services"—and section 39.806(1)(e)—"a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents." The petition alleged, among other things, that there was no suitable placement for the child with a relative....

...Section 39.802(4) sets forth the elements required for termination of parental rights, providing in pertinent part: A petition for termination of parental rights filed under this chapter must contain facts supporting the following allegations: (a) That at least one of the grounds listed in s. 39.806 has been met....

...Section 39.809(1) provides that "[e]ach of [the elements required for termination] must be established by clear and convincing evidence before the petition is granted." An order terminating parental rights therefore must be supported by clear and convincing evidence both that there is a ground for termination under *483 section 39.806 and that termination is in the manifest best interests of the child pursuant to section 39.810....

...erious harm." Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991). In the instant case, the trial court correctly determined there was clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the grounds for termination under section 39.806 existed....

...ld were informed of their right to counsel at all hearings that they attended and that a dispositional order adjudicating the child dependent was entered in any prior dependency proceeding relied upon in offering a parent a case plan as described in s. 39.806."

...In re Davey, 645 So.2d 398, 404 (Fla.1994). In reviewing termination orders, we must affirm unless the order is not supported by substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's finding of "clear and convincing" evidence. E.A.W, 658 So.2d at 967. Section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2001) provides the grounds for termination of parental rights....

...wingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child or the child's sibling. *1278 [or] (g) When the parent or parents have subjected the child to aggravated child abuse.... § 39.806(1)(f) and (g), Fla....

...rely on the notion of "abandonment" by the mother. Unfortunately, at the time of the filing of this petition, "abandonment" was not a statutory ground for termination of parental rights. "Abandonment" as defined in section 39.01(1) was not added to section 39.806(1)(b) until July 2000. The other legal ground for termination is contained in section 39.806(1)(i): "when the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily." On appeal, it is urged that this statutory provision is unconstitutional on its face....

...d their case plan tasks. "There is a two step process inherent in the statutory scheme for termination of parental rights, pursuant to chapter 39. First, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes has been established....

...4th DCA 2002); accord C.M. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 854 So.2d 777, 779-80 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The record reflects that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a valid statutory ground for terminating parental rights, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), as the parents failed to substantially comply with their case plans for a period longer than twelve months....

...ermitted pursuant to section 39.811(6), Florida Statutes (2014). In the final judgment, the trial court noted and accepted Father’s voluntary surrender of parental rights. Father’s surrender of his parental rights is grounds for termination. See § 39.806(l)(a), Fla....

...The Department has never pursued this allegation of abuse. G.E.M. testified that A.A. improperly touched the outside of her clothed buttocks with his hand. The Department's petition for termination of parental rights made a twofold allegation under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), based on neglect and abandonment....

...ing parental involvement with the youngest child, N.B.A., threatened her life, safety, or well-being irrespective of the provision of services. It did not base its ruling on the allegation of failure to substantially comply with the case plans under section 39.806(1)(e)....

...Concluding that there was no suitable custody arrangement with relatives and after evaluating the manifest best interest factors, the court deemed that it was in the children's best interest that the court terminate parental rights. The court erred in terminating parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c). As this court declared in In re C.W.W., 788 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001): [T]o terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court must find that the child's life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent regardless of any services provided to the parent....

...17, 2006). The motions for rehearing en banc and for certification are denied. C.M. (Appellant), the biological father of a 2-1/2-year-old daughter, A.A., appeals a final judgment terminating his parental rights over the child pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(b), 39.806(1)(d)1., 39.806(1)(d)3., 39.806(1)(f), and 39.810, Florida Statutes (2004), and permanently committing the child to the Department for subsequent adoption....

...at 1195; Interest of D.J.W., 764 So.2d 825, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The judicial decision whether to terminate parental rights involves two key determinations under section 39.802, Florida Statutes (2004): 1) whether the Department has proved at least one of the grounds for termination set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2004); and 2) whether the child's manifest best interests would be served by granting the petition to terminate parental rights....

...by Department's counsel at the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, supports the trial court's findings 1) that Appellant engaged in egregious conduct that endangered the child's life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2004); 2) that he abandoned the child pursuant to sections 39.01(1) & 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004); and 3) that Appellant is expected to be incarcerated for a period of time that will constitute a substantial portion of the time before the child will attain age 18, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2004)....

...BENTON, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. I concur in affirming the termination of C.M.'s parental rights with regard to his daughter, A.A. The Department carried its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination existed under sections 39.01(1) and 39.806(1)(b), (d) and (f), Florida Statutes (2004), and that termination, in order to commit the child to the Department for subsequent adoption, was in the best interests of A.A., within the meaning of section 39.810, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...We reverse because the Department of Children and Families failed to present clear and convincing evidence to support the three grounds for termination cited in the trial court's order. One of the grounds for termination of C.C.'s parental rights cited by the trial court is that set forth in section 39.806(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...Dep't of Children & Families, 811 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that fifty-four months is not a substantial portion of eighteen years). Accord In re A.W., 816 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Another ground for termination cited by the trial court is that set forth in section 39.806(1)(e)—a parent's failure to substantially comply with a case plan with the goal of reunification for a period of twelve months after the child has been adjudicated dependent....

...t C.C. while he has been incarcerated, the evidence in this case was woefully inadequate to support a finding that C.C. failed to substantially comply with his case plan. The final ground for termination cited by the trial court is that set forth in section 39.806(1)(i), which allows for termination when the parent's rights to another child have been terminated involuntarily....

...Kambour, Guardian Ad Litem. Before RAMIREZ and LAGOA, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 6, 2007. LAGOA, Judge. Appellant, L.D., the mother, appeals from a final order terminating her parental rights pursuant to sections 39.806 and 39.810, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...ng or physical, mental or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services." The record before us, however, contains no competent, substantial evidence to support such a conclusion. Prior to terminating a parent's rights under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), three evidentiary requirements must be met....

...The Court does not know if he is an untreatable sociopath or sexual deviant or is someone amenable to some kind of treatment. Despite finding that DCF had failed to prove that the Father could not benefit from services, the trial court elected to terminate the Father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...gations supporting termination by clear and convincing evidence. E.E.A. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re D.A.), 846 So.2d 1250, 1251-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The circuit court must first find grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806 and then must consider the manifest best interests of the child under *1271 section 39.810....

...DCF responds that absolute certainty concerning the identity of the perpetrator or perpetrators of the abuse is not required. On this point, we agree with DCF. The circuit court found that DCF had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Father's parental rights should be terminated as authorized by section 39.806(1)(f). Section 39.806(1)(f) provides that parental rights can be terminated "[w]hen the parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life...

...f the parent or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct" and "may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child." § 39.806(1)(f)(2)....

...propriate steps to obtain necessary medical care for the child. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in finding that DCF established by clear and convincing evidence grounds to terminate the Father's parental rights to D.L.H. under section 39.806(1)(f)....

...ibling had any impact on D.L.H. DCF responds that the severity of the injuries to D.L.H.'s sibling was sufficient to demonstrate the requisite nexus. On this point, we agree with the Father. Before a court terminates parental rights to a child under section 39.806(1)(f), DCF must demonstrate that there is a nexus or predictive relationship between the past abuse of the injured child and any prospective abuse of siblings....

...Kambour, Miami, for Appellee Guardian ad Litem Program. BROWNING, C.J. A.W. (Appellant) appeals a final order terminating her parental rights to B.W., her five-year-old daughter, in which the trial court found clear and convincing evidence that satisfied the requirements for termination under section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...(2006) (allowing 12 months for parents of a dependent child to complete their case plan sufficiently to have their child returned to parental custody and care, and mandating initiation of termination proceedings absent timely compliance by parents) & 39.806(1)(e)1., Fla. Stat. (2006), infra. As grounds for terminating Appellant's parental rights, the Department cited sections 39.806(1)(b), (c), or (e), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...case plan with a goal of reunification, but may instead file with the court a case plan with a goal of termination of parental rights to allow continuation of services until the termination is granted or until further orders of the court are issued. § 39.806(1)(b), (c), (e)1....

...Stat. (2006). Appellant misplaces her reliance on M.H. v. Department of Children & Families, 866 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (on clarification), in which we explained the three sequential evidentiary requirements for terminating parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...January 2007. Appellant's failure to substantially comply with the case plan in a meaningful manner, after being afforded far more time than the statutory timetable contemplates, constituted evidence of continuing abuse, neglect, or abandonment. See § 39.806(1)(e)1., Fla....

they cannot abuse or neglect their children, see § 39.806(l)(g), Fla. Stat. (2003) (providing for termination

...B.D.E. appeals an order leaving her dependent son, F.E., in the custody of T.M., who is F.E.'s paternal grandmother. After B.D.E. filed a motion for return of her son's custody, T.M. filed a petition for termination of B.D.E.'s parental rights. See § 39.806(1), Fla....

...While the mother was still in custody, the department filed a petition for termination of parental rights. Following a final hearing on the petition, the court entered an order terminating the mother's parental rights on the sole ground that the mother failed to substantially comply with her case plan under section 39.806(1)(e)....

...case plan. However, the court determined that the mother's failure to successfully complete the CRC residential drug treatment program constituted substantial noncompliance. The mother appealed the order terminating her parental rights. Pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes, a parent's failure to substantially comply with a case plan within twelve months of placement of the child in a shelter or an adjudication of dependency constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, neglect or abandonment and may serve as a ground for termination of parental rights....

...Instead [it] will uphold the trial court's finding "[i]f upon the pleadings and evidence before the trial court, there is any theory or principle of law which would support the trial court's judgment in favor of terminating . . . parental rights." 658 So.2d at 967. Section 39.806(1)(f)2 defines egregious conduct as "abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct of the parent or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct." The mother argues that the evidence does not prove such conduct....

...is foster home, finding that the child's best interests were served by this placement rather than by changing custody from the foster parent to J.R. and V.R. [5] We must reverse this case because the Department did not appreciate the requirements in section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1999), when it sought termination from the trial court. [6] Section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (1999), sets forth nine grounds upon which a parent's rights to his child can be terminated. [7] Section 39.806(1)(e) allows for termination of parental rights if, after a child has been adjudicated dependent, the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned....

...[2] Generally, the goal of a performance agreement is reunification. However, chapter 39 permits the Department to file an initial case plan with a goal of termination. See § 39.01(26), Fla. Stat. (1999) (defining "expedited termination" as one in which case plan with goal of reunification is not being offered); § 39.806(2), (3), Fla....

...benefits for Z.J.S. despite indications that these benefits were available to him as a dependent of J.R.S. [5] As the trial court noted, both the foster parent and the relatives offered loving and capable homes, making this a difficult decision. [6] Section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1999), provides: A petition for termination of parental rights may also be filed when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents....

...As to both of the parents, DCF alleged (1) that they had engaged in conduct toward the children which demonstrated that their continuing involvement in the parent/child relationship threatened the life or well-being of the children without regard to provision of services by DCF, pursuant to section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2008); (2) that they had engaged in egregious conduct which endangered the life, health, or safety of the child or child’s siblings or had the opportunity and capability to prevent egregious conduct that threatened the life, health, or safety of the child or child’s siblings and knowingly failed to do so, pursuant to section 39.806(l)(f); and (3) that they had committed murder or manslaughter of another child, aided or abetted such murder, or conspired or solicited to murder that child, pursuant to section 39.806(l)(h)....

...The trial court did not err in finding that DCF proved statutory grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights, but it did err in failing to find that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the children and in failing to conduct a manifest best interests analysis. 1. Statutory grounds Section 39.806(1)(f) provides that parental rights can be terminated when a *852 parent engages in egregious conduct or has the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly fails to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child’s sibling....

...“Egregious conduct” is defined as “abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct” and “may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child.” § 39.806(l)ffi(2). T.L., 990 So.2d at 1271 . Section 39.806(l)(h) provides for termination of parental rights where a parent has committed murder or manslaughter, aided and abetted the murder, or conspired or solicited the murder of another child....

...Here, the trial court found that “the [fjather committed the acts of abuse which lead [sic] to the child’s death.” As a result, the trial court determined that DCF adequately proved both egregious conduct and the father’s involvement in M.B.’s murder, pursuant to sections 39.806(l)(f) & (h)....

....H., it still found that DCF proved the father committed egregious conduct, and the trial court thereafter terminated his parental rights. Id. On appeal, this court agreed that DCF adequately proved the father committed egregious conduct pursuant to section 39.806(l)(f)....

...did not indicate the perpetrator lacked self-control; and (3) there was no evidence that the father had a drug addiction or a mental or emotional condition. Id. T.L. does not drive our decision here because the facts are significantly different. The petition in T.L. was founded solely on egregious conduct pursuant to section 39.806(l)(f), whereas in this case DCF proceeded on three statutory grounds including murder of a child under section 39.806(l)(h)....

...rospective harm to the murdered child’s siblings. We are cognizant of the Fourth District’s opinion in J.F. v. Department of Children & Families, 890 So.2d 434, 440-41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), wherein the court held that where DCF proceeds under section 39.806(1)(h), it must still prove a nexus between the murder or manslaughter of one child and the threat of prospective harm to other children. The Fourth District based its decision on the rationale espoused in Department of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602 (Fla.2004). In F.L., the Florida Supreme Court held that where DCF proceeds under section 39.806(l)(i), which provides for termination where DCF has already obtained termination of parental rights of another child, DCF must prove that there is a “substantial risk of significant harm to the current child.” 880 So.2d at 609 ....

...risk of harm to the current child could render the statute constitutionally infirm.” 890 So.2d at 440-41 . We simply cannot agree with the Fourth District’s application of F.L. to a case involving a petition based on the murder of a child under section 39.806(l)(h)....

...318, 320 (Fla.1974)). We therefore certify conflict with J.F., and we certify the following question as one of great public importance: WHERE THE STATE PROVES BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT A PARENT HAS COMMITTED ANY OF THE ACTS SET FORTH IN SECTION 39.806(1)(H), FLORIDA STATUTES (2008), MUST THE STATE ALSO PROVE THAT THE PARENT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF SIGNIFICANT HARM TO THE OTHER CHILDREN WHO ARE THE SUBJECT OF A PETITION FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS? *854 But irrespective of...

...2d DCA 2004); Dep’t of Children & Families v. B.B., 824 So.2d 1000, 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). If the provision of *855 services is not required where egregious conduct has been found, then obviously the same rationale applies in eases involving the murder of a child. Indeed, section 39.806(2) provides that “[reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in [section 39.806](l)(e)-(l) have occurred.” Of course, in this case, the egregious conduct and murder was perpetrated against M.B., rather than on E.R....

...Yet we again emphasize that this case involves the murder of a child. Just as we hold no nexus is required where a court determines that DCF proved a parent committed the murder or manslaughter of a child or was involved in such activity pursuant to section 39.806(l)(h), we likewise hold that in such cases, DCF is not required to prove that services would be futile in regard to the other children. Although sections 39.802(5) and 39.806(3) provide that in expedited termination cases, DCF “may ......

...a case plan having a goal of termination of parental rights to allow continuation of services until the termination is granted or until further orders of the court are issued,” there is no statutory mandate that DCF do so where it has proven grounds for termination pursuant to section 39.806(l)(h)....

...The futility of offering services to the parent who has already murdered one child is obvious to this court. Although we reject the argument that DCF is required to prove that the provision of services would be futile in prospective abuse cases proceeding under section 39.806(l)(h), we hold that under the facts of this case, the futility of providing services to the father was adequately proven by DCF....

...f one parent without terminating the rights of the other parent “[i]f the protection of the child demands [it].” Single-parent termination is also authorized if a trial court determines that DCF proved the statutory grounds set forth in sections 39.806(l)(d), (f)-(l)....

...6 However, we disagree with the trial court’s legal determination that DCF failed to prove the mother engaged in egregious conduct. As we previously explained, egregious conduct includes neglect and “any other conduct that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct.” § 39.806(l)(f)(2). Egregious conduct may be either an affirmative act or an omission, and it may occur only once yet be of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child or the child’s siblings. See § 39.806(l)(f)(2)....

...In our view, these facts were sufficient to prove that the mother engaged in conduct which is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous when compared to a normal standard of conduct and therefore, DCF sufficiently proved grounds for termination pursuant to section 39.806(l)(f). 2. The nexus requirement Because this case is a “prospective abuse case” and because the trial court found that DCF did not prove grounds for termination as to the mother pursuant to section 39.806(l)(h), we must consider whether DCF established a nexus between M.B.’s death and a risk of substantial harm to the other two children....

...This is a case involving the murder of a child and the threat of prospective harm to the murdered child’s siblings. We recognize that the trial court determined from the evidence that DCF failed to sufficiently prove that the mother engaged in the conduct described in section 39.806(1)(h), and we affirm that determination....

...�s death because E.R. and A.R. had not yet been born. And because E.R. and A.R. were sheltered shortly after birth and because DCF immediately moved for termination, there were no court-ordered services to continue pursuant to sections 39.802(5) and 39.806(3). Furthermore, sections 39.802(5) and 39.806(3) use the word may rather than shall when discussing the provision of a case plan in an up-front termination....

...n whose parents have engaged in such horrific conduct. We again acknowledge that parental rights are fundamental in nature, but we conclude that DCF not only established a statutory basis for termination of the mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(f), but it also proved that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting E.R....

...hreat of prospective harm to E.R. and A.R., and we certify conflict with J.F. As to the mother, we hold that the trial court erred by finding that DCF failed to prove a basis for termination of the mother’s parental rights pursuant to section *861 39.806(l)(f)....

...Alexander’s testimony by finding that his opinion that “the biggest predictor of serious injury or death of a child is prior injury to a child” was speculative and not a legal basis for termination. . We need not address whether DCF adequately proved grounds for termination pursuant to section 39.806(l)(c) based on our determination that DCF provided clear and convincing evidence of the other two statutory grounds. . We also note that the facts of this case exemplify situations where sections 39.802(5) and 39.806(3) might be inapplicable....

...We note that DCF provided some services to the mother through a voluntary case plan. However, at the time of the TPR trial, there was no court-ordered case plan in place. This formed the basis for the trial court's refusal to find this statutory ground. See § 39.806(l)(c)....

...Karla Perkins, for The Department of Children and Families; Hillary Kambour, for The Guardian ad Litem Program. Before RAMIREZ, SUAREZ, and CORTIÑAS, JJ. SUAREZ, J. The Mother, C.G., seeks to reverse a final order terminating her parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e)1, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...We thus agree with the trial court that termination of the Mother's parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting "the ultimate welfare of the child." Padgett, 577 So.2d at 570 (citing State ex rel. Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla.1957)). Affirmed. NOTES [1] Section 39.806(1)(e)1, Florida Statutes (2010), provides: (1) Grounds for the termination of parental rights may be established under any of the following circumstances: .......

...(Fla. 1995)("To terminate a parent's right in a natural child, the evidence must be clear and convincing."). The trial court found: 5. [C.W.'s] parental rights to three (3) siblings of the above-named minor child have been terminated involuntarily. 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...hts were terminated is proven by some of the testimony of Tory Wilson as well as the exhibits (prior Termination of Parental Rights Order and the Per Curiam Affirmed opinion of the First District Court of Appeal on the direct appeals of that order). 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...By virtue of her conduct, the natural mother had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of [T.G.], a *492 sibling to the above-named minor child. 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...C.W.'s statement that she "has never abused, neglected nor abandoned any child" completely ignores the record. The termination of parental rights to siblings because of abuse or neglect may serve as grounds for terminating the parent's rights in a different child. See §§ 39.806(1)(f) and (i), Fla....

...This is definitely not a situation where "there is simply no plausible way that this case could come out other than to terminate the mother's parental rights." L.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 770 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). But grounds for termination of parental rights were established under sections 39.806(1)(f) and (i), Florida Statutes (2000), *493 as even the dissenting opinion seems to concede, and the trial court has determined that it is in the child's manifest best interest that she be taken from her mother....

...cies. Two days following the birth of K.L.B., Jr., the Department removed the child from the mother's custody and initially placed him in the care of his aunt, with whom the mother was also permitted to stay. On August 11, 2000, pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(f), *494 Florida Statutes (2000), the Department filed a petition for termination of the mother's rights to K.L.B., Jr., alleging essentially that because of the mother's conduct involving her first four children, her continuing...

...in the petition, focusing almost exclusively upon the mother's prior conduct in regard to K.L.B. Jr.'s siblings, particularly the fact that the mother's rights to three of the prior children had been involuntarily terminated, a ground recognized by section 39.806(1)(i) as authorizing termination of a parent's rights to another child....

...Jr.'s birth, yet the interpretation the court below and the Department placed on the statute appears not to make the passage of time a significant factor in deciding whether termination is appropriate. In my judgment, if the pertinent provisions of section 39.806 are permitted to survive constitutional muster, they must be given a far more restrictive construction than the majority places on them in the present case....

...The Department argues that the above statements in Padgett are no longer applicable, because the statutes in effect at the time Padgett was decided have been amended to provide that if the mother's parental rights to a sibling have previously been terminated involuntarily, section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2000), or if the mother had the opportunity but failed to prevent egregious conduct that affected the safety of the child's sibling, as occurred here, section 39.806(2) does not require reasonable efforts be undertaken to preserve and reunify families, nor does section 39.806(3) require a case plan for the goal of reunification....

...least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. It seems to me that the only appropriate avenue by which the liberty interest of a parent can be balanced against the manifest best interests of the child is to interpret subsections 39.806(1)(f), (2) and (3), which authorize permanent commitment without offering the parents a case plan for the goal of reunification, as meaning that if a parent's rights to another child have been severed because of the parent's egregious conduct...

...nd any prospective, potentially injurious conduct to another child as yet unharmed. Compare the facts in In re C.W.W., 788 So.2d 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), with those in this appeal. In response to the Department's argument that it was not required by section 39.806(3), Florida Statutes (1999), to offer the mother a case plan with the goal of reunification, the court noted that the Department had failed to cite any case in which a parent's rights to a child were terminated, as the Department had sought in C.W.W., solely because a mother had given birth to a drug-dependent child. If section 39.806 can be interpreted as permitting "the heavy hand of government paternalism," Padgett, 577 So.2d at 570, to be stretched out at any time to remove a child from its parent's custody, based solely on the parent's past conduct, without any...

...declared dependent. Id. at 1193-94, n. 12. The court observed, "[T]he Fifth District has held that some additional proof of risk to the current child is required." Id. at 1193. There is no reason not to apply a similar restrictive interpretation to section 39.806(1)(f), permitting the filing of a petition seeking termination of parental rights in situations where a parent either engaged in egregious conduct, or failed to prevent egregious conduct threatening the safety of a child or the child's sibling, or to section 39.806(1)(f)(2), defining egregious conduct, among other things, as including "an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child." Compare these provisions with s...

...in the care of other persons who physically abused them, the children were adjudicated dependent, and a termination petition was thereafter filed due to the parents' failure to comply with the conditions contained in the case plan. [3] M.C refers to section 39.806(2), Florida Statutes (1999), as authority for the position that reasonable efforts to preserve and unify families need not be made where egregious conduct has occurred....

...the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. See A.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 798 So.2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). It appears from my examination of A.C. that the court took into consideration the amended statutes, including section 39.806(2).

...aning of the “least restrictive means” prong that the State must satisfy before a parent’s rights are terminated. S.M. concedes that DCF has proven one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights to all of her children under section 39.806 by clear and convincing evidence....

...(Rules 8.400, 8.401 and 8.410), and finally the Termination of Parental Rights Petition (Rule 8.500). Judicial reviews are provided for by statute, section 39.701, and embedded throughout the process (Rule 8.415). For termination to occur, section 39.806, Florida Statutes, requires that the trial court find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the grounds for termination under the section has been established....

...tional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services. Provision of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

...abandonment unless the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due to the parent’s lack of financial resources or to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child. § 39.806(e), Fla....

...child is important, but ultimately the health, welfare, and safety of the child must be paramount. Being a parent requires parental obligations to care for the child, specifically to ensure the child’s life, safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and emotional health. See § 39.806(c), Fla....

...At this point there is no reasonable basis to believe the mother will improve. - 25 -  The trial court found that DCF had established three grounds for termination of S.M.’s right to all three children pursuant to section 39.806, Florida Statutes, by clear and convincing evidence: (1) section 36.806(1)(c), continuing involvement of the parent in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services; (2) section 39.806(1)(e), parent’s failure to complete or substantially comply with the case plan for a period of 12 months, parent’s material breach of the case plan, and child has been in care for any 12 of the last 22 months and the parents have not substantially complied with the case plan; and (3) section 39.806(1)(j), parent has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of a controlled substance which renders her incapable of caring for the children, and has refused or failed to complete available treatment for such use during the t...

...correctly argues that, generally, it is error to terminate parental rights on grounds not alleged in the petition. See R.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 872 So.2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). We agree that the evidence at trial did not address "egregious conduct" under section 39.806(1)(f) or establish the "deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous" conduct contemplated by the section....

...Accordingly, we strike the portions of the termination order that cite to the issue of egregious conduct. See M.D. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 871 So.2d 311, 311 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Similarly, we strike the portions of the termination order that cite to section 39.806(1)(e) with respect to Da.L. The Guardian Ad Litem properly concedes that it was error to terminate parental rights as to him based on section 39.806(1)(e) because he was never adjudicated dependent. The mother also argues that the court erred in terminating her parental rights on the basis of section 39.806(1)(c), which was not cited in the petition. However, extensive evidence was introduced during the three-day hearing implicating section 39.806(1)(c), and the attorneys discussed this ground in closing....

...arranted in this case. As such, the court's ruling is affirmed." M.D., 871 So.2d at 311. *579 Accordingly, the trial court's termination order is affirmed, except those portions finding clear and convincing evidence of egregious conduct, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), or failure to comply with a case plan with respect to the younger Da. L., pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), which are stricken. Id. at 311-12. AFFIRMED, as modified. PALMER and LAWSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 39.806(1)(c), (e) & (f), Fla....

...See id.; In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.1995). With respect to the daughter, evidence was presented that the mother committed aggravated child abuse on the daughter by burning her hand. Therefore, a ground for termination was proved. See § 39.806(1)(g), Fla....

...had committed egregious abuse on W.T.J., and therefore, the Termination Order must be reversed. See, e.g., In re: K.C.C., 750 So.2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). We disagree. Here, the DCF sought termination of M.C.'s parental rights on the grounds she had engaged in "egregious conduct." Section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1999), permits a trial court to terminate a parent's rights when the parent engages in egregious conduct or has the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly fails to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child....

...rents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an *452 act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child." § 39.806(1)(f)(2), Fla....

...litate the parent and reunite the family). Our legislature has expressly provided that reasonable efforts to preserve and unify families need not be required where a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that egregious conduct has occurred. § 39.806(2), Fla....

...e case plan was the central issue at trial without objection." 961 So.2d at 1132. Likewise in K.S., the court found that the disputed issue was tried by implied consent when "extensive evidence was introduced during the three-day hearing implicating section 39.806(1)(c),......

...ights. All three children had been adjudicated dependent and placed in foster care, and the mother had agreed to complete the various tasks of a case plan. Approximately nine months after the case plan adoption, the Department filed a petition under section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes, [1] seeking to terminate the parental rights of both the mother and the two men *482 who had fathered the three children....

...We therefore reverse the order denying the Department's petition for termination of parental rights. On remand, we direct that judgment be rendered terminating A.D.'s parental rights to the three children. Reversed and remanded. ERVIN, PADOVANO and LEWIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2004), provides in part: A petition for termination of parental rights may also be filed when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents....

...T.M., the mother, appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her children, K.M. and A.M. We reverse the order terminating the mother's parental rights and remand for further proceedings. The mother concedes, for the sake of argument, that at least one of the grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806, Florida Statutes (1999), is present....

...The trial court denied the petition as to W.B. and gave W.B. custody of his two children, M.B. and D.B. The trial court placed the oldest child, D.W., with his father, A.W. The trial court terminated the mother's parental rights to all the children based upon subsections 39.806(1)(c) and (f), Florida Statutes (1999). Section 39.806(1)(c) provides for the termination of rights when the parent's conduct toward a child demonstrates that the parent's continuing involvement with the child would endanger the child's life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health. Section 39.806(1)(f) permits a trial court to terminate a parent's rights based on one incident when the parent engages in egregious conduct or fails to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child. The statute specifically states that "[e]gregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child." § 39.806(1)(f)2, Fla....

...ward the child which demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the Mother in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2000); (2) that the Mother failed to substantially comply with her case plan, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e); and (3) that the Mother engaged in egregious conduct that endangers the life, health, or safety of the child, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f)....

...or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child. § 39.806(1)(f)(2)....

...Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 812 So.2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (stating that a parent's substance abuse alone does not establish prospective neglect). The Mother also argues that the trial court's order failed to address the provision of services to the Mother. See § 39.806(1)(c)....

...Thus, in order to terminate parental rights, DCF must proceed in a narrowly tailored manner and must prove that, in addition to the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights, that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. Id.; § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

...me to comply with the plan so as to obtain reunification with the child."); B.C. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 887 So.2d 1046, 1050 (Fla. 2004) (requiring application of the least restrictive means test to termination proceedings pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)1., which applies in instances where a parent has been incarcerated); Fla....

...There is no cure for developmental delay. I can't fix it, she can't fix it.... Legally, we are called upon to resolve the conundrum in this case through application of the "least restrictive means" test, a judicially mandated appendage to Florida's termination of parental rights statute, § 39.806, Fla....

...used with the "manifest best interest" test. Id. (describing a two-step process inherent in statutory scheme for termination of parental rights in which the manifest best interest test is addressed only after one of the grounds for termination under section 39.806 has been proven); accord V.J....

...e years, M.M.'s three children desperately needed stability and that reuniting them with their mother under these circumstances would be detrimental to the children's manifest best interests. The guardian ad litem agreed. As grounds for termination, § 39.806(1)(e), Fla....

...The trial court's sole basis for terminating J.W.'s parental rights was its finding that the period of time for which J.W. was expected to be incarcerated constituted "a substantial portion of the period of time before the child[ren] will attain the age of 18 years" under section 39.806(1)(d)(1), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...In reaching this decision, the trial court stated that it was considering both the length of time J.W. would be incarcerated and the relative importance of that time to his children's development. On appeal, the parties do not dispute either the facts or the applicable law. They dispute only the interpretation of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) and its application to the facts of this case....

...Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918)). "If the legislature did not intend the results mandated by the statute's plain language, then the appropriate remedy is for it to amend the statute." Overstreet, 629 So.2d at 126. Here, the plain language of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) speaks only to time....

...10, § 7006-1.1 (2001) (requiring the court to consider both the duration of the parent's incarceration and its detrimental effect on the child in determining whether to terminate parental rights). The lack of such a reference to the "quality" of the time or the detriment to the child's development in section 39.806(1)(d)(1) indicates that no such considerations were contemplated by the legislature. If the legislature intended the trial courts to consider the "quality" of the time to the child, it should amend the statute to reflect this intent. Based on the plain language of section 39.806(1)(d)(1), we conclude that the trial court may consider only the length of time the parent will be incarcerated in determining whether that period constitutes a "substantial portion of the period of time" before the child reaches age eighteen. See W. W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 811 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (reversing termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(d)(1) and noting that the fifty-four months the father was to serve in prison was not a "substantial portion" of eighteen years). Any other interpretation of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) does not hold true to the plain language of the statute. Under the plain language of section 39.806(1)(d)(1), J.W.'s remaining sentence does not constitute a "substantial portion of the period of time" before A.W....

...was four years old and J.W. was one year old. The fifty-four months remaining in J.W.'s prison sentence do not constitute a "substantial portion" of the remaining minority of A.W. and J.W. Therefore, the trial court erred in terminating J.W.'s parental rights under section 39.806(1)(d)(1). Because J.W.'s parental rights may not be terminated under section 39.806(1)(d)(1) *1265 and because the Department failed to prove any other statutory basis for terminating J.W.'s parental rights, we reverse the final judgment....

...All of the medical experts testified that the injury was superficial, external, and not life-threatening. However, as stated above, it did constitute harm within the statutory definitions. [3] A termination of parental rights to other siblings is permitted when the parent murders another child. See § 39.806(1)(h), Fla....

...On remand, we instruct the trial court to grant the petition for termination of the father's parental rights and vacate the order compelling grandparent visitation. KLEIN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This section was amended effective October 1, 1998 and renumbered as § 39.806(1)(f). [2] Now section 39.806(1)(d)....

...he child's best interests; and (3) that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. See, e.g., C.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 953 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (on reh'g). The trial court relied upon sections 39.806(1)(c), 39.806(1)(e) and 39.802(8) as the statutory grounds warranting termination....

...he case plan for the performance of the case plan, then the petition must allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has materially breached the provisions of the case plan. The concept of "material[] breach[]" is addressed in section 39.806(1)(e)2., which allows for termination where the child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed and [t]he parent has materially breached the case plan by making it unlikely that he or she will be able to substantially comply with the case plan before the time for compliance expires....

...[1] Further, *1063 upon the mother's release from jail, there were only about two months remaining on a case plan that required the mother to obtain stable housing and employment. Accordingly, on this record, we find there was competent, substantial evidence to support termination pursuant to sections 39.802(8) and 39.806(1)(e)2....

...SHAHOOD, C.J., and WARNER, J., concur. NOTES [1] While the mother claimed to have gotten drug treatment while incarcerated, she failed to provide any documentation to substantiate her claims. [2] Our holding makes it unnecessary to consider whether termination was warranted under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...come from worker's compensation. The department filed a petition to terminate F.C.'s parental rights in April 1998, then filed an amended and substituted petition in October 1999. As the statutory grounds for termination, the petition cited sections 39.806(1)(a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (i), Florida Statutes (1999), but only one subsection applied to F.C., section 39.806(1)(e)....

...led purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). We first note that the evidence in this case did not prove that F.C. had failed to substantially comply with a case plan. See § 39.806(1)(e)....

...We reverse the judgment terminating F.C.'s parental rights to his four children. We remand for further proceedings. PATTERSON, C.J., and DAVIS, J., Concur. NOTES [1] The mother's parental rights were also terminated, but she has not challenged the judgment. [2] The petition also stated that termination was warranted under section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), because F.C....

...The mother failed to protect herself from abuse in this case. She exposed her children to known abusers and people with violent tendencies. 12. It is clear and convincing that the abuse to baby [J.P.] was egregious and life threatening as defined under Fla. Stat. 39.806(1)(f)....

...The court also prohibited any future contact between the father and any member of his family with the child. Mother's Appeal (07-2813) The mother appealed the order of termination of parental rights to J.P. DCF petitioned to terminate the mother's parental rights to J.P. pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...That section permits termination of parental rights: *17 (f) When the parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child's sibling. § 39.806(1)(f), Fla....

...abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct of the parent or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such an intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child. § 39.806(1)(f)(2), Fla....

...portion of the final judgment which denied their petition to terminate the mother's parental rights to D.O. They argue that the trial court erred by terminating the mother's parental rights to J.P. upon an express finding of egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f) but failing to terminate the mother's parental rights as to the older sibling, D.O....

...east restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. In K.A. the Second District reversed termination of the parents' rights to two older children where DCF had proven egregious conduct as a valid ground for termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(f) as to all the minor children, including those who were not shown to have been abused, but had failed to prove that termination of parental rights was the least restrictive means of protecting the two older children. Under § 39.806(1)(f), Fla....

...3d DCA 2006); Dep't of Children & Families v. B.B., 824 So.2d 1000, 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). In B.B., the Fifth District stated that "no additional proof is necessary to establish a likelihood that an abused child's sibling will also be abused," because section 39.806(1)(f) "represents a legislative expression that parents who have committed egregious acts of abuse against one child pose an unacceptable risk that they will abuse their remaining children." Id....

...serious harm. The "least restrictive means" test articulated in Padgett was reiterated by the supreme court in Florida Department of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602 (Fla.2004). In F.L., the Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of section 39.806(1)(i), which was enacted by the legislature after the court decided Padgett. Section 39.806(1)(i) provides for termination of parental rights where there has been a prior involuntary termination of rights to a sibling....

...protecting the current child from harm. In determining whether termination of a parent's rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances. F.L., 880 So.2d at 608. Because section 39.806(1)(f) similarly permits a court to terminate parental rights to a child based on prospective abuse, we believe the same constitutional analysis applies here. Thus, to comport with constitutional requirements, the state must establish that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the sibling of the abused child from serious harm under section 39.806(1)(f). See J.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 890 So.2d 434, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (applying the rationale of F.L. to a prospective abuse case under section 39.806(h) and holding that termination based on the single act of committing manslaughter or a felony assault against another child must be based on proof that the parent currently poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the current c...

...This by necessity requires proof that he knew or should have known of the mother's conduct [dropping their four-month-old child on his head and hitting him on the face with her hand] and resulting injury to [the child]. Id. at 1278. This statement is based on section 39.806(1)(f), which lists as a ground for termination the situation in which a parent "had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child . . . ." "Egregious conduct" includes abuse, abandonment, and *1262 neglect. § 39.806(1)(f)(2)....

...g to follow through on treatment for her special-needs children demonstrate that her continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, or well-being of the children irrespective of the provision of services. [1] See § 39.806(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2006). The evidence further supports the trial court's finding that the mother failed to substantially comply with the terms and conditions of her case plan as to J.R. See § 39.806(1)(e), Fla....

...The children's custodian, the paternal grandfather, also testified that the father made regular child support payments, helped with repairs on the custodian's home, and took the children shopping and to the movies. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2003), for failure of the father to substantially comply with the case plan....

...On appeal, the father and the GAL contend that there was not competent and substantial evidence supporting the trial court's order and that termination of the father's parental rights was not in the children's best interests. We agree and reverse. In order to terminate a parent's rights under section 39.806(1)(e), the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent failed to substantially comply with a case plan within twelve months of the court adjudicating the children dependent....

...emain drug free. Unfortunately, her good intentions for the future do not overcome her past neglect of her children, nor her past failure to complete treatment at four different drug treatment centers. The termination of parental rights is affirmed. § 39.806(1)(e), Fla.Stat....

...On behalf of the parents, several witnesses testified that they were not aware of any violence in the family's home and that the children all appeared to be well cared-for. The trial court granted the petition and terminated both parents' rights to all four girls under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...despite technical compliance with the plans. The court also found that the parents' testimony lacked any credibility and was unworthy of belief. In addition to the ground stated above, the trial court terminated the parents' rights to E.O. based on section 39.806(1)(f) and (g), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...Second, the parents argue that DCF did not show a nexus between the father's sexual abuse of E.O. and any future risk of harm to S.O., R.O., and M.O. We do not have to reach this issue because there is competent, substantial evidence to support termination of the parents' rights to all four children under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...and that the mother refused to end her relationship with the father despite this abuse. *179 We conclude that it is not necessary to reach the issue raised by the parents as to the other three children because DCF presented sufficient evidence to terminate the parents' rights to all four children under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), based on the continued threat of domestic violence in the home. Section 39.806(1)(c) allows a court to terminate parental rights under the following circumstances: When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the paren...

...She demonstrated that she cannot provide a safe environment for the children, and that termination of her parental rights is the least restrictive means to protecting the children from future harm. In sum, the trial court properly terminated the parents' rights to S.O., E.O., M.O., and R.O. under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...Sawyer, Jr., Senior Attorney, Department of Children and Families, Kissimmee, for Appellee. PLEUS, J. The father appeals a final judgment terminating his parental rights to his twin daughters. He argues that the trial court erred in basing the termination of his parental rights on section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2001), because the children were not adjudicated dependent "as to him." He also argues that the trial court should not have based the termination of his parental rights on section 39.806(1)(b) because there was insufficient evidence to prove that he willfully abandoned his children. We agree that the trial court could not terminate the father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes, because the children were not adjudicated dependent "as to him." [1] We nonetheless affirm the trial court's order of termination because parental rights may be terminated without a finding of dependency when abandonment is proven pursuant to the requisites of section 39.806(1)(b). In the instant case, the twins were adjudicated dependent as to the mother, but not the father. Section 39.806.(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2001) allows DCF to petition for TPR "when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents." Alth...

...for rev. denied, 475 So.2d 693 (Fla.1985). In addition, the signature page of the case plan that the father signed states, "Signing this document is NOT an admission you have abused or neglected your child." If the trial court had relied solely on section 39.806(1)(e) in terminating the father's parental rights, it would have been reversible error. The trial court, however, also found grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)(b). The father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his rights on this latter ground because he did not willfully reject his parental obligations. Section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), allows TPR based on abandonment, as defined in s....

...t evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned.... The incarceration of a parent, ... may support a finding of abandonment. (Emphasis added). The trial judge ruled as follows: Abandonment — Section 39.806(c) [2] The Father allowed his children to languish in foster care all their lives....

...efforts to maintain contact with them and by making no provisions for the welfare of the Children. Thus, the Father has, since the Children were sheltered, failed to evince a settled purpose to assume any parental responsibilities for the Children. § 39.806(1)(b) and 39.01(1), Fla....

...These findings and conclusions were supported by competent substantial evidence. See In the Interest of A.R.S., 617 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Thus, we affirm the order terminating the father's parental rights. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, C.J., and PETERSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.806(1)(e) does not allow for TPR solely because a child is declared dependent; it also requires that a case plan has been filed with the court and a finding that a child continues to be abused, neglected or abandoned by the parents. [2] This statutory reference is incorrect. There is no such section. The correct citation is 39.806(1)(b).

...*999 R.K., Oviedo, pro se. Charles D. Peters, Department of Children and Families, Orlando, for Appellee. THOMPSON, J. The mother of A.K. appeals the termination of her parental rights. [1] The trial court terminated the mother's parental rights pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes. To terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), the court must *1000 find by clear and convincing evidence that "the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in th...

...d that the condition was one which was likely to continue. Dept. of Children and Families v. B.B., 824 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (citing Padgett v. Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565 (Fla.1991)). The required showing under section 39.806(1)(i) is similar. Section 39.806(1)(i) provides that a petition for termination of parental rights may be filed "[w]hen the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily." Parental rights may be terminated under section 39.806(1)(i) only if the state proves by clear and convincing evidence both a prior involuntary termination of rights to a sibling and a substantial risk of significant harm to the current child and that the termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the current child from harm....

...A.B. was disapproved in F.L., 880 So.2d 602 (Fla.2004), which held that the A.B. unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the parent. A parent is not required to show evidence of changed circumstances to avoid a termination of rights under section 39.806(1)(i)....

...The trial court entered a final order terminating J.C.'s parental rights to her child, D.H. We affirm the final order terminating J.C.'s parental rights in all respects except one. DCF concedes that the trial court erred by terminating J.C.'s parental rights based on abandonment, as set forth in Florida Statutes section 39.806(1)(b), where this ground was not pleaded as a basis for termination in the petition and DCF failed to seek amendment of the petition to include this ground as to J.C....

...Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laurel R. Wiley, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. WARNER, J. An incarcerated father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children, claiming that the trial court erred in relying on section 39.806(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes (2001), as a ground for termination....

...Under these circumstances, Glugover properly counseled his client about the likely outcome of the trial. Glugover also admitted telling the mother it was in her best interest to surrender so that DCF could not use an involuntary termination as grounds to take away her unborn child. This advice was in line with section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes, which allows a TPR petition to be filed "when the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily." As DCF notes, "[I]t is not improper and therefore not duress to threaten what one has a legal right to do." City of Miami v....

...This petition alleged that the Mother had been offered services through a case plan but that she had failed to complete the case plan tasks related to parenting, anger management, domestic violence, and stable employment. For this reason, DCF requested that the Mother's parental rights be terminated under subsections 39.806(1)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...ions went well. Mr. Cribbs also indicated that the Mother had never been required to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. Nevertheless, he expressed his concerns about the domestic violence incidents and recommended termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...but that she was willing to delay her return. She also stated that she was willing to follow Dr. Johnson's recommendations, including any therapy and counseling. C. The Court's Order The circuit court ruled that termination was not appropriate under section 39.806(1)(c) because DCF had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parents' continuing involvement in the children's lives posed a risk to the children despite the provision of services. In particular, the court noted that it could not determine whether any provision of services would be futile. However, the circuit court terminated the parental rights of the Mother and Father for substantial noncompliance as authorized by section 39.806(1)(e) because it found by clear and convincing evidence "that neither parent ha[d] completed his or her case plan." The court explained that to determine whether the parents were in "substantial compliance," as defined in section 39.01...

...oved the allegations supporting termination by clear and convincing evidence. E.E.A. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 846 So.2d 1250, 1251-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The circuit court must first find grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806 and then must consider the manifest best interests of the child under section 39.810....

...pliance because "he had not forthrightly participated in the services required by the children's case plan." The circuit court found that DCF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that both parents' rights should be terminated as authorized by section 39.806(1)(e) because "neither parent has completed his or her case plan." Section 39.806(1)(e)(1) provides that parental rights can be terminated when "[t]he child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents." The statute presumes that the parent's failure to "substantially comply" with the case plan for...

...t this case into care have [not] been ameliorated" because "domestic violence continues in this relationship and ... the parents have not benefitted from remediation." This was error because "the `substantially comply' language contained in section [39.806] ......

...a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child"). Thus the circuit court erred in finding that DCF proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parents' rights should be terminated under section 39.806(1)(e). The Guardian ad Litem Program argues for affirmance based on A.W. ex rel. B.W. v. Department of Children Families, 969 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). In that case, DCF sought to terminate A.W.'s parental rights under subsections 39.806(1)(b), (c), or (e), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Unlike in A.W., here, the parents remedied the lack of housing, which was the original reason why the children were first sheltered and then adjudicated dependent. Moreover, this case is also distinguishable because the First District affirmed the termination of the mother's parental rights in A.W. based on section 39.806(1)(c). See id. at 503-04. For the reasons explained below, we cannot affirm the trial court's ruling based on section 39.806(1)(c)....

...had not been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the children would be endangered upon their return to the parents, the circuit court erred when it terminated the parental rights of the Mother and the Father under section 39.806(1)(e)....

...Continuing Involvement Because we must affirm the termination of parental rights if any principle or theory of law supports the circuit court's decision, G.W.B., 658 So.2d at 967, we consider whether DCF presented clear and convincing evidence for termination under section 39.806(1)(c). *651 Section 39.806(1)(c) authorizes the termination of parental rights "[w]hen the ......

...court must find that any provision of services would be futile or that the child would be threatened with harm despite any services provided to the parent." R.W.W. v. State, Dep't of Children & Families, 788 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Termination under section 39.806(1)(c) requires two specific findings: "first, that continued interaction with the parent threatens the life, safety, or health of the child, and second, that this threat cannot be remedied by the provision of services." T.H. v. Dep't of Children Family Servs., 979 So.2d 1075, 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). We cannot affirm under section 39.806(1)(c) for two reasons....

...ty for their children being placed in harm's way." Nevertheless, any abuse inflicted while in foster care is the direct result of DCF's placement of the children with the particular foster care providers and cannot be the basis for termination under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...harmed the children or threatened their lives, safety, or health. Although there was no showing of past harm, Dr. Ferrara and Dr. Johnson opined that the children could be detrimentally impacted if returned to the parents. Because termination under section 39.806(1)(c) in this case would be based on prospective harm, we must determine if there is a substantial risk of significant harm to the children....

...n. See L.D. v. Dep't of Children Family Servs., 957 So.2d 1203, 1205-06 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (explaining that there must be a nexus between the parent's past conduct and future harm to the child before the court can terminate the parent's rights under section 39.806(1)(c) based on prospective harm); S.S....

...ny potential threat presented by the alleged domestic violence or the Mother's self-reported mental health issues cannot be remedied by the provision of services. Thus we agree with the circuit court's decision not to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...A finding that evidence is clear and convincing enjoys a presumption of correctness and will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support.") (citations omitted). The petition for termination in the instant case cited two grounds for the termination, sections 39.806(1)(i) and 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes. Although the court cited both in its termination order, the mother's arguments generally focus on section 39.806(1)(i) to the exclusion of section 39.806(1)(f). Section 39.806(1)(i) states that parental rights to one child may be terminated when parental rights to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily....

...forward with evidence that the circumstances or pattern of conduct that led to termination of parental rights to the other child cannot serve as a predictor of his or her conduct with the child at issue. A.B., 816 So.2d at 686. Simply stated, under section 39.806(1)(i), the egregious abuse directed at one sibling is alone sufficient to support the termination of parental rights to another child, "without requiring additional proof to establish a likelihood that remaining children will be abused," B.B., 824 So.2d at 1007 (citing In the Interest of B.S., 697 So.2d 914 (Fla....

...We certify conflict with the Fourth District Court's decision in F.L. v. Department of Children & Families, 849 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), for the reasons discussed supra. We also certify the following questions to be matters of great public importance: 1. IS SECTION 39.806(1)(i), FLORIDA STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND IS APPLICATION OF THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION ESTABLISHED IN DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES v....

...SAWAYA, C.J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion. SAWAYA, C.J., concurring and concurring specially. Although I concur in the decision to affirm the order terminating parental rights in this case, I write to express my views regarding the constitutionality of section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2002), explain why I believe that application of a rebuttable presumption under this statute is wrong, and explain why I believe that the least restrictive means test *1091 is no longer applicable in termination proceedings. Section 39.806(1)(i) provides that parental rights to one child may be terminated when parental rights to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily. The Fourth District Court in F.L. v. Department of Children & Families, 849 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), has recently held section 39.806(1)(i) unconstitutional....

...that the statute is constitutional. F.L. may also conflict with the decision of the First District Court in C.W. v. Department of Children & Families, 814 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 823 So.2d 122 (Fla.2002). In A.B., this court held that section 39.806(1)(i) is constitutional in light of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Padgett v....

...J.H.K., 834 So.2d 298, 299 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (citing B.B. ). This court did not explain whether this presumption shifted the burden of going forward with the evidence or shifted the burden of proof. According to the Fourth District Court in F.L., section 39.806(1)(i) is unconstitutional because it improperly "shifts to the parent the burden of showing that current conditions are unlike those of the past and that reunification will not pose a substantial risk of harm to the child." 849 So.2d at 1124....

...The court in F.L. reasoned that "[t]o pass constitutional muster Padgett requires the state to prove that reunification with the current child would pose substantial risk to the child." Id. I fully concur in the result reached by this court in A.B. that section 39.806(1)(i) is constitutional, but respectfully disagree with the creation of a rebuttable presumption in order to make it so....

...for termination of parental rights, the court shall consider the manifest best interests of the child." (Emphasis added). Section 39.802(4), Florida Statutes, requires that a petition for termination allege the factual grounds for termination under section 39.806 and that termination is in the manifest best interests of the child under section 39.810....

...5th DCA 2003); K.M. v. Department of Children & Families, 795 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Hence, a termination proceeding is essentially a two-part process: 1) the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds in section 39.806 has been established; and 2) the Department must establish by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial court must specifically find in the order of termination, that the manifest best interests of the child requires termination of parental rights under section 39.810, Florida Statutes....

...§ 39.810(1)-(5), Fla. Stat. (2002). I find these factors particularly significant in light of the reasoning of the Fourth District Court in F.L. and the reasoning of this court in A.B., B.B., and J.H.K. In A.B., B.B., and J.H.K., this court held that section 39.806(1)(i) creates a presumption for termination which may be rebutted if *1094 the parent "comes forward with evidence that the circumstances or pattern of conduct that led to termination of parental rights to the other child cannot serve...

...Therefore, there is no need for the rebuttable presumption established by the decisions from this court. Accordingly, in my view, this court's reasoning in A.B., B.B. and J.H.K. is wrong and both the reasoning and result reached by the Fourth District Court in F.L. are wrong. For example, in termination proceedings under section 39.806(1)(i), the termination of parental rights to other children that were abused or neglected by the parents must be established by clear and convincing evidence....

...Therefore, the least restrictive means test is subsumed in the factors that must be found by clear and convincing evidence to exist under section 39.810. Hence, there is no reason to apply the least restrictive means test any longer and there is no need for a rebuttable presumption in termination cases under section 39.806(1)(i). Because under section 39.810 the Department carries the burden of establishing that termination is in the manifest best interests of the child, the concerns expressed in F.L. are virtually nonexistent and are not sufficient grounds to hold section 39.806(1)(i) unconstitutional....

...ts of the child require termination. There is substantial competent evidence in the record to support this conclusion. Because the Department met its burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, a sufficient ground for termination under section 39.806(1)(i), and that the manifest best interests of the child require termination, and because the statute is constitutional, we have no alternative but to affirm....

...Brinkley's parental rights are terminated remains to be determined. [2] Mr. Brinkley's own mother substantiated the testimony that her son has a drinking problem and is abusive. [3] The Fourth District Court in F.L. v. Department of Children & Families, 849 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), has recently held section 39.806(1)(i) unconstitutional....

...a stated ground for placing the child in a permanent guardianship; however, it may be relevant to the trial court's inquiry regarding the fitness of the parents to care for the child and whether reunification is possible. By comparison, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes, a parent's failure to substantially comply with a case plan may serve as a ground for termination of parental rights, unless the failure to comply is due to the parent's lack of financial resources or to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child. § 39.806(1)(e), Fla....

...y as required by the statute. We agree and reverse the final judgment. See C.C. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 854 So.2d 720, 2003 WL 21973599 (Fla. 2d DCA Aug.20, 2003). The trial court here based the termination of C.D.'s parental rights on section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2001), which allows termination "[w]hen the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily." In C.C., this court held that when the previous termination was the result of the pare...

...854 So.2d at 721-22 (citing § 39.801(3)(a)). Accordingly, we must reverse the termination of C.D.'s rights to T.S. and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, we also note that during the pendency of this appeal, the Fourth District found section 39.806(1)(i) to be unconstitutional....

...and the child as a result of her conviction for child abuse. The father argues that the court erred in determining that termination was the least restrictive means to protect the child where a relative placement was available. We reject all claims. Section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, provides grounds for termination of parental rights: (c) When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent o...

...orts the finding that DCF made reasonable and good faith efforts to rehabilitate the mother. The mother also complains that the court erred in terminating her parental rights on the ground that she had failed to substantially complete her case plan. Section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes, allows for termination of parental rights where a case plan has been filed for a parent, and the child continues to be abused by the parent....

...Powell, Legal Services of North Florida, Pensacola, for Appellee. HAWKES, J. T.S., Father of D.H., appeals the termination of his parental rights. As grounds, he alleges the Department of Children and Families (Department) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he abandoned his child pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...into custody in December of 2000, and, in March of 2002, the parental rights of C.A.H. and those of J.H.'s biological father were terminated. C.A.H. alone has appealed the termination, arguing that (1) her incarceration was insufficient to support termination under section 39.806(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2001), and (2) her rights should not have been terminated without DCF first offering her a case plan with a goal of reunification....

...her a case plan with a goal of reunification. Florida's governing statutes clearly state that when DCF seeks to terminate parental rights due to abandonment, it need not offer the parent a case plan with a goal of reunification. See §§ 39.802(5), 39.806(3), Fla. Stat. (2001). In cases of abandonment, the goal of the case plan can be termination of parental rights. See § 39.806(3)....

...The record adequately supports a conclusion that termination of C.A.H.'s parental rights was the least restrictive means of protecting J.H. from further harm. We affirm the order of termination. AFFIRMED. STEVENSON, SHAHOOD and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Under section 39.806(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2001), a parent's incarceration alone may serve as a basis for termination of parental rights but only where (1) the parent is expected to be incarcerated in the future for a substantial portion of the time before the child reaches eighteen, see In re J.D.C., 819 So.2d 264, 266 (Fla....

...The court therefore terminated the mother’s rights. The mother now appeals. The three-step process for terminating parental rights requires that the trial court make the following findings: 1) One or more of the grounds for termination under section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2014), has been established by clear and convincing evidence; 2) Termination is in the manifest best interest of the child under section 39.810, Florida Statutes (2014); and 3) Terminat...

...made more-than-reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with her children, and the mother was solely responsible for her failure to substantially comply with the case plan. The trial court found that DCF had established three grounds for termination under section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2014), by clear and convincing evidence, and that termination was in the manifest best interest of the children under section 39.810, Florida Statutes (2014)....

...with her case plan. We agree with Appellant that the settlement contract providing for her executed surrenders and consents to be delivered for use by the Department should Appellant default under her case plan contravenes the legislative intent of section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), and is void as *196 against public policy....

...609, 612 (1908) ( quoting Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Beazley, 54 Fla. 311, 45 So. 761, 762 (1907)); Gonzalez v. Trujillo, 179 So.2d 896, 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (same); Neiman v. Galloway, 704 So.2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (same). We interpret the legislative intent behind section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes, to permit a parent to seek termination of his or her *197 parental rights by voluntarily and unequivocally surrendering his or her children to the State....

...equirement that the grounds upon which termination of parental rights are based be proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find the use of the surrenders in the manner accepted and employed by the Department contravenes the legislative intent of section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and is injurious to the societal interest that recognizes natural parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children, "free from the heavy hand of government paternalism." Padgett v....

...(the Mother) appeal an order terminating their parental rights to their youngest child, E.C. Although several issues were raised on appeal, we write to address only the issue of whether it was fundamental error for the trial court to terminate the parental rights to E.C. under section 39.806(1)(e)(1), Florida Statutes (2006), when the case plan that was approved by the court and relied upon by the parties throughout the proceedings was not filed in the court file....

...best interests of those children. The trial court readjudicated those children dependent. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents as to E.C. on the basis of the parents' substantial noncompliance with the case plan pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e)(1)....

...mination by clear and convincing evidence. E.E.A. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 846 So.2d 1250, 1251-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The trial court must then find that the Department proved a statutory ground for termination of parental rights under section 39.806 and that termination is in the manifest best interests of the child under section 39.810....

...Rubin, 237 So.2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970). Fundamental error is error that "goes to the foundation of the case or goes to the merits of the cause of action." Id. An appellate court "should exercise its discretion under the doctrine of fundamental error very guardedly." Id. Section 39.806(1)(e)(1) provides that a ground for termination may be established "[w]hen [the] child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court," and "[t]he child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the...

...The Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to both parents *718 on February 20, 2007. This petition alleged that the parents had not substantially complied with their case plans. For this reason, the Department requested that the parents' rights be terminated under subsection 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...The court readjudicated these children dependent and ordered the Department to provide the parents with a new case plan with a goal of reunification. However, the court terminated the Father's and the Mother's parental rights as to E.C. for substantial noncompliance as authorized by section 39.806(1)(e)(1) because they "failed to complete their case plan, as necessary." The court also found that termination was in the manifest best interests of E.C....

...find that the Department presented clear and convincing evidence to support the termination. W.L. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 15 So.3d 866, 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). The court must first find grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806 and then consider the manifest best interests of the child under section 39.810....

...But some understanding of the statutory basis for terminating the parents' parental rights to E.C. for failure to substantially comply with a case plan is essential to an understanding of the parties' arguments. Thus I will briefly outline the elements of proof necessary for termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e)(1). B. Section 39.806(1)(e)(1) A three-part test governs the termination of parental rights for failure to substantially comply with a case plan. First, the circuit court must adjudicate the child dependent. § 39.806(1)(e); J.T. v. Dep't of Children Family Servs., 819 So.2d 270, 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Second, the Department must file a case plan with the circuit court. § 39.806(1)(e); Y.F. v. Dep't of Children Family Servs., 893 So.2d 641, 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Third, the Department must show that "[t]he child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents." § 39.806(1)(e)(1)....

...(71) (emphasis added); see also R.F. v. Dep't of Children Family Servs., 22 So.3d 650, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); E.R. v. Dep't of Children Family Servs., 937 So.2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The circuit court cannot terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e)(1) merely because a parent failed to comply with a case plan....

...l rights to E.C., and the parents are challenging the sufficiency of that evidence. Thus this court should address the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based on the Department's failure to file a case plan for E.C. [11] Termination under section 39.806(1)(e)(1) is improper where "no case plan ha[s] been filed with the court prior to the filing of the ......

...However, for three reasons, I am not persuaded that the late-filed paper that the Department refers to as the June 29, 2005, case plan applied to E.C. First, the paper was dated the day before E.C. was born and required compliance within only six months after her birth. But under section 39.806(1)(e)(1), the parents had twelve months to demonstrate substantial compliance with any case plan....

...For these reasons, the record on appeal does not reflect that a case plan for E.C. was filed in the circuit court before the parents' rights were terminated. Because the Department did not file a case plan for E.C., its "request for termination based on [section 39.806(1)(e)(1)] was fatally flawed from its inception." Y.F., 893 So.2d at 642....

...lid case plan applicable to E.C., the circuit court erred when it terminated his parental rights to E.C. because the Department failed to show that he had not remedied the circumstances that caused the creation of that "case plan." Termination under section 39.806(1)(e) is appropriate if "the circumstances which gave rise to creation of the case plan have not been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of [the child] will be endangered upon the child's return to the parents." B.L....

...concerning E.C. had not been significantly remedied to the extent that E.C.'s well-being and safety would be endangered upon her return to the Father, I could not concur in the affirmance of the trial court's termination of the Father's rights under section 39.806(1)(e)(1) even if the June 25, 2009, addendum applied to E.C....

...n appeal. "`Fundamental error,' which can be considered on appeal without objection in the lower court, is error which goes to the foundation of the case or goes to the merits of the cause of action." Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134, 137 (Fla.1970). Section 39.806(1)(e) applies only "[w]hen ......

...being terminated became a parent through a single-parent adoption; (d) If the protection of the child demands termination of the rights of a single parent; or (e) If the parent whose rights are being terminated meets any of the criteria specified in s. 39.806(1)(d) and (f)-(i).

...ings consistent with this opinion. Three days after S.R. was born, in December 2001, the Department filed a shelter petition and S.R. was sheltered on that same day. The Department later sought to terminate W.R.'s parental rights based upon sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes, [1] without offering W.R....

...was convicted of robbery without a weapon and there was no evidence that she used violence during the robbery. The Department is required to present clear and convincing evidence of the statutory bases upon which it filed its petition. See N.L. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 843 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Section 39.806 details the bases upon which one can petition to have a parent's rights terminated. In the instant case, the Department's petition was based upon sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(i)....

...Demonstrating the existence of one of these grounds merely gets the Department in the door, but does not satisfy the Department's burden when it seeks to terminate a parent's rights. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 609-10 (Fla.2004) (discussing how section 39.806(1)(i) "merely gets DCF through the courthouse door")....

...l rights be terminated and the child adopted by the custodians. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the court must determine by *917 clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds for termination of parental rights exist under section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...s to allow for the child's adoption by the child's custodians. In my view, the trial court correctly granted the petition for termination of the mother's rights. [3] I would therefore affirm but remand the case for correction of the order. NOTES [1] Section 39.806(1)(c) permits a petition to be filed where a parent has engaged in conduct toward a child that demonstrates that the continued involvement of the parent threatens the child at issue regardless of the provision of services. Section 39.806(1)(i) provides that the termination of parental rights as to a sibling is sufficient grounds to file a petition....

...his mother. The court suspended N.F.’s visitation and all contact with her daughter. On October 11, 2010, the Department filed a petition to terminate N.F.’s parental rights. The petition asserted that N.F. had materially breached her case plan, § 39.806(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (2010); that she had abandoned the child, § 39.806(l)(b); and that she had engaged in egregious conduct threatening the child’s life or well-being, § 39.806(l)(f)....

...The final hearing on the petition was begun in January 2011 and completed in March 2011. In the interim, N.F. was again arrested for domestic violence against her boyfriend. Ultimately, the circuit court entered an order terminating N.F.’s parental rights based solely on section 39.806(l)(e)....

...rted by the evidence or the law. Taking the court’s findings in order: *1192 Substantial Compliance with the Case Plan (Finding One) The circuit court’s first finding set forth above specifically addressed the ground for termination contained in section 39.806(l)(e). To support a termination on this ground, the Department must show that the child has been adjudicated dependent, that the parent has been offered a case plan, and that “the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned.” § 39.806(l)(e)....

...2d DCA 2006) (holding that parenting coordinator’s conclusory opinion unsupported by factual basis was not competent substantial evidence to support determination of child’s school placement). Deprivation of Food, Clothing, Shelter, or Medical Treatment (Finding Two) Parental rights may be terminated under section 39.806(l)(e) if, after a case plan has been offered, the parent continues to neglect the child....

...Absolutely no evidence supported a finding that the child’s “physical, mental, or emotional health” was significantly impaired by N.F.’s action. Substantial Risk of Prospective Neglect (Finding Three) “Prospective neglect” is generally a facet of termination sought pursuant to section 39.806(l)(c), i.é., “the parent ......

...that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent ... in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child.” See, e.g., R.F., 22 So.3d at 653 ; M.H., 866 So.2d at 222 . The Department’s petition against N.F. did not allege section 39.806(l)(c) as a ground for terminating her parental rights....

...Generally, a trial court errs when it bases a termination on grounds not asserted in the petition. Cf. *1196 C.J. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 9 So.3d 750, 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). Here, however, the circuit court’s third finding did not expressly rely on section 39.806(l)(c). Rather, the court’s assertion that N.F. posed a danger of prospective neglect was simply an extension of its finding that N.F. had not learned from her case plan and that her rights could be terminated under section 39.806(l)(e)....

...ome, did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the child faced “prospective neglect” in N.F.’s care. In conclusion, neither evidence nor law supported the ground for terminating N.F.’s parental rights set out in the court’s order, section 39.806(l)(e). The court made no findings that would justify termination on the other grounds alleged in the Department’s petition, abandonment, § 39.806(l)(b); or egregious conduct, § 39.806(l)(f); nor was any evidence offered to prove those grounds....

...J.H., the Father, seeks review of the trial court's order adjudicating E.I.F. dependent and terminating his parental rights to E.I.F. The Father does not challenge the adjudication of dependency but argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), (1)(d)(1), (1)(d)(3), and (1)(f), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...[1] The Father was incarcerated at the time of E.I.F.'s birth and was not identified as the Father of E.I.F. until February 2002. [2] In March 2002, the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to both parents. The petition alleged that termination was proper under section 39.806(1)(c), (1)(d)(1), (1)(d)(3), and (1)(f)....

...In fact, the record does not contain any evidence of any violent acts committed by the Father towards or in front of his two older children since that incident. Regardless, the trial court found that the Father's conduct towards his older children constituted clear and convincing evidence to support termination under section 39.806(1)(c), (1)(d)(3), and (1)(f). Section 39.806(1)(c) provides for termination of parental rights when the Department proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent "engaged in conduct toward ......

...iminal history absent evidence linking the criminal acts to the child's well-being); L.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So.2d 1189, 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that the trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c) based on her domestic violence against the father when she had received treatment for same, had been taking her medication, and the parties had separated)....

...eing, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child," it does not support the trial court's finding of clear and convincing evidence "that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child" under section 39.806(1)(d)(3), or of "egregious conduct ... that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child's sibling" under section 39.806(1)(f). Thus, the trial court erred in terminating the Father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), (1)(d)(3), and (1)(f). The trial court also based its termination on section 39.806(1)(d)(1), which provides for termination of parental rights if the Department proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is incarcerated and the time of incarceration will be a "substantial portion of the period of time be...

...(In re J.D.C.), 819 So.2d 264, 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). But see Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. B.C., 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2009, ___ So.2d ___, 2003 WL 22014737 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug.27, 2003) (holding that the time a parent has been incarcerated in the past should be considered under section 39.806(1)(d)(1) and certifying conflict with In re J.D.C....

...maining minority of a four-year-old or one-year-old child). The period of incarceration will not even constitute half of the time before E.I.F. reaches majority. Therefore, the trial court also erred in terminating the Father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(d)(1)....

...However, as noted above, the Fourth District considers the time a parent has been incarcerated in the past, while this court considers only the future period of incarceration. In B.C., the Fourth District held that a period of incarceration of seven years and nine months was sufficient to support termination under section 39.806(1)(d)(1), but it is not clear how much of this term was future incarceration....

...SILBERMAN, J., Concurs in part and dissents in part. SILBERMAN, Judge, Concurring in part and dissenting in part. For the reasons stated in the majority's opinion, I agree that the trial court erred in terminating the Father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), (1)(d)(3), and *929 (1)(f), Florida Statutes (2002). However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court erred in terminating the Father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(d)(1). Section 39.806(1)(d)(1) states that the Department of Children and Family Services may petition the court for termination of parental rights when the parent is incarcerated and "[t]he period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated...

...g until the child turns eighteen is slightly more than 44% of the child's life. [6] In my view, the Father's incarceration for 44% of the child's life to age eighteen constitutes a substantial portion of the relevant time frame within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(d)(1)....

...at D2009, ___ So.2d at ___(quoting The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1284 (1981)). It concluded that the seven-year, nine-month period of incarceration was a substantial portion of the time period before the child would turn eighteen and warranted termination of the father's rights under section 39.806(1)(d)(1)....

...The difference in the length of incarceration is one month less than the time involved in B.C., which I do not believe to be sufficient to change the outcome. The majority notes that the period of incarceration involved in this case does not constitute half of the time before the child reaches majority. However, in section 39.806(1)(d)(1) the legislature did not create a bright-line rule to fit every case....

...that continuity, and the placement has been for a significant portion of the child's life; and (8) the guardian ad litem recommends termination. Based on the record before us, I cannot agree with the majority's decision concerning termination under section 39.806(1)(d)(1)....

...Calianne P. Lantz; and Hillary S. Kambour, for appellee. Before GERSTEN, FLETCHER, and RAMIREZ, JJ. *585 RAMIREZ, J. I.R., the natural mother, appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights as to her minor child, C.R., pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). We reverse because the trial court's finding that the mother's continuing involvement with the child threatened the child's well-being or life pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), was not supported by clear and convincing evidence....

...A final judgment terminating the mother's parental rights was rendered in August 2004 by the trial court. The court found that the mother continued to engage in conduct that threatened the health and/or safety of the child despite the provision of services pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...vided to her and thus, posed a continuing risk to the child. The court thus found it was in the manifest best interests of the child that the mother's parental rights be terminated. The trial court terminated the mother's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), under which the court can terminate parental rights "[w]hen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the par...

...s petition without really giving the mother the opportunity to complete her case plan. The mother's case plan was approved on August 6, 2003, and the termination of parental rights petition was filed October 3, 2003. Although we are aware that under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, there is no twelve-month period requirement in order to complete a case plan as is provided in section 39.806(1)(e), we believe that termination here was still unwarranted. Section 39.806(1)(c) provides that termination is warranted when the parent continues to engage in conduct that is harmful to the child, despite the provision of services....

...He also opined that she potentially would be able to parent appropriately. The trial court made no reference in the final judgment to Dr. Rothe's psychological and psychiatric evaluation which the trial court itself had requested. The trial judge erred in terminating the mother's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c) when improvement was possible according to the mental health expert, if the mother was offered the proper treatment, which the Department could not have done because they did not have a proper diagnosis until after the termination of parental rights petition was filed....

...s." (emphasis added) A parent's consent to termination of his or her parental rights may only be withdrawn after acceptance by the department upon a finding by the court (at the adjudicatory hearing) that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress. § 39.806(1)(a)(2)....

...of Parental Rights of D.C. and M.C. We affirm the order as to both D.C. and M.C. We affirm termination of parental rights as to D.C. because S.J. failed to comply with the case plan presented by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF). § 39.806(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2001). We affirm termination of parental rights as to M.C. based on section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides as follows: When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent...

...THE MOTHER'S TERMINATIONS It is perhaps noteworthy that the Department did not file a petition against the Mother alleging that she had failed to comply with a case plan. Instead, the Department alleged that the Mother had engaged in egregious conduct as described in section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), and that she engaged in conduct toward the children that continued to threaten the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of each of the children irrespective of the provision of services, as described in section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). We conclude that the trial court properly terminated the Mother's parental rights as to the child, J.S., pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), but that termination of the Mother's rights as to each of her other four children was not established on either of the grounds alleged. Section 39.806(1)(f) permits termination when a parent "engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child's sibling." See § 39.806(1)(f)....

...ents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such an intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child. See § 39.806(1)(f)(2). Section 39.806(1)(f) permits a trial court to terminate parental rights not only to the child who has suffered egregious abuse but also to any siblings of such a child. See § 39.806(1)(f)....

...The Department failed to prove a predictive relationship between the past medical neglect of J.S. and any prospective abuse of the other four children. See A.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re G.D.), 870 So.2d 235, 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Similarly, as to termination under section 39.806(1)(c), the Department failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the children's lives, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the Mother....

...Especially in the absence of a case plan, there was no evidence that services had been offered or provided to the Mother or that it would have been futile to provide her with such services. We therefore conclude that termination of the Mother's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c) was improper....

...Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 843 So.2d 996, 1002 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). III. R.C. R.C. was convicted of child abuse concerning J.S., but he is the father only of the Mother's fifth child, R.S. The Department sought termination of R.C.'s parental rights to R.S. under section 39.806(1)(c), alleging that he engaged in conduct toward J.S....

...that demonstrated that his continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship with R.S. threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of this child irrespective of the provision of services. The Department also sought termination under section 39.806(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), claiming that R.C....

...The trial court terminated parental rights on both grounds. R.C. received only a five-year prison term in 2001. He apparently was released from prison during the pendency of this appeal. It is now clear that such a prison term, by itself, is not sufficient grounds to support a termination under section 39.806(1)(d)....

...Dep't of Children & Families, 887 So.2d 1046 (Fla.2004); see also In re A.D.C., 854 So.2d 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Thus, the trial court erred in terminating R.C.'s parental rights on this ground. *573 We agree with the trial court that the evidence supported a termination of R.C.'s parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...indings of fact required by section 39.811(6)(a)-(d) sufficient to affirm the judgment as a matter of law. In this case, the only ground for termination cited by the trial court that would have permitted termination of only R.C.'s parental rights is section 39.806(1)(d)....

...Similar to the Mother's circumstances, it is noteworthy that the Department did not seek to terminate J.T.'s rights by alleging that he had failed *574 to comply with a case plan. Instead, the Department sought termination of the Father's parental rights to both these children under section 39.806(1)(f), alleging that he "egregiously" abandoned them. As to J.S., the child with special medical needs, we affirm the termination of the Father's parental rights on this ground. However, we must reverse the termination as to the child, J.T. Egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f) can be abuse, abandonment, neglect or any other deplorable and outrageous conduct by the parent. § 39.806(1)(f)(2)....

...being terminated became a parent through a single-parent adoption; (d) If the protection of the child demands termination of the rights of a single parent; or (e) If the parent whose rights are being terminated meets any of the criteria specified in s. 39.806(1)(d) and (f)-(i). [4] § 39.806(1)(e), Fla....

...rted by the record. The Department of Children and Families (DCF) initially filed a petition for termination of parental rights against both the father and the child's mother, M.R. Apparently, the petition was filed on an expedited basis pursuant to section 39.806(3), Florida Statutes (2007), which permits a termination petition to be filed with an offer of a case plan with the goal of termination rather than reunification....

...lth issues, and domestic violence with various paramours. She is not a party to these proceedings. As to the first issue, the father contends that the definition of "abandonment" contained in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2007), which is cited in section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), as a ground for termination of parental rights, is unconstitutionally vague....

...Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). Hence, in order to terminate parental rights, DCF must proceed in a narrowly tailored manner and prove, in addition to the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2007), that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. B.C. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 887 So.2d 1046, 1050 (Fla.2004) (requiring application of the least restrictive means test to termination proceedings pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)1., which applies in instances where a parent has been incarcerated); Fla....

...The record further reveals that the father has not received DCF's services since his participation in the original case plan in 2002, and he was never offered a case plan with services as an alternative to losing his parental rights in the current proceedings. We are aware that pursuant to section 39.806(3), Florida Statutes (2007), DCF may expedite a termination petition without offering the parent a case plan for reunification....

...In September 2008, three months after being returned to Appellant, A.J. was removed a third time based on allegations of sexual abuse and substance abuse. After the third removal, the Guardian Ad Litem program ("GAL") filed a petition for termination of Appellant's parental rights pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(c) and ( l ), Florida Statutes (2008). Section 39.806(1)(c) provides for the termination of parental rights: When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship *89 threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services.... Section 39.806(1)( l ), which took effect on July 1, 2008, provides that parental rights may be terminated if "[o]n three or more occasions the child or another child of the parent or parents has been placed in out-of-home care pursuant to this chapt...

...had not been exposed to the substance abuse and asked the court to consider that the allegations of sexual abuse were unfounded because the alleged perpetrator, Appellant's former boyfriend, was acquitted in his criminal trial. Regarding termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)( l ), Appellant stated: As to the second issue relating to FL Statutes Chapter 39.806(1)( l ), we acknowledge that the law is and the Court may terminate parental rights on a finding that on three or more occasions the child has been placed in out-of-home care pursuant to this chapter, and the conditions that led to the child's out-of-home placement were caused by the parent....

...ved by termination of Appellant's parental rights. On appeal, Appellant does not challenge the trial court's findings on the least restrictive means of protection or the child's manifest best interest. Rather, Appellant argues that termination under section 39.806(1)(/) was an improper retroactive application of the statute because two of the three removals occurred prior to the statute's effective date and that the evidence did not support termination under section 39.806(1)(c). Neither issue was raised in the trial court and, therefore, the issues are not preserved for appellate review. As to termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)( l ), in light of Appellant's closing argument, we hold that not only is the claim unpreserved, but that the claim was effectively waived. As to section 39.806(1)(c), based upon our precedent, we hold that Appellant's claims were not preserved because no motion for judgment of dismissal was filed at the close of the GAL's case-in-chief....

...HAWKES, C.J., concurring. I fully concur with the decision to affirm the trial court's order terminating Appellant's parental rights. However, I would add that under no circumstances can Appellant's argument regarding the retroactive application of section 39.806(1)( l ) be valid....

...her way to meeting the statutory requirement for having her parental rights terminated when the Legislature placed harsher consequences on her future behavior. Like other statutory provisions recognizing the danger posed by repetitive bad behavior, section 39.806(1)( l ) was designed to protect children when parents continually engage in conduct warranting out-of-home placement....

...The mother, .....(name)....., freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and ..... with ..... without advice of legal counsel executed an Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender, Consent, and Waiver of Notice on .....(date)....., for termination of her parental rights to the minor child, .....(name)....., under section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...The father, .....(name)....., freely, knowingly, and voluntarily, and ..... with ..... without advice of legal counsel executed an Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender, Consent, and Waiver of Notice on .....(date)....., for termination of his parental rights to the minor child, .....(name)....., under section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...hey attended. 2. On or about .....(date(s))....., the following occurred: .....(acts which were basis for dependency or TPR, if filed directly)...... 3. The mother has .....(grounds for TPR)..... the minor child(ren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806, Florida Statutes, in that: .....(allegations which form the statutory basis for grounds)...... 4. The father has .....(grounds for TPR)..... the minor child(ren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806, Florida Statutes, in that: .....(allegations which form the statutory basis for grounds)...... 5. Under the provisions of sections 39.806(1)B(11)39.810(1)-(11), Florida Statutes, it is in the manifest best interests of the child(ren) for parental rights of .....(name(s))........

...d by counsel. 2. On or about .....(date(s))....., the following occurred: .....(acts which were basis for dependency or TPR, if filed directly)...... 3. The mother has .....(grounds for TPR)..... the minor child(ren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806, Florida Statutes, in that: .....(findings that form the statutory basis for grounds)...... 4. The father has .....(grounds for TPR)..... the minor child(ren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806, Florida Statutes, in that: .....(findings that form the statutory basis for grounds).........

...The minor child(ren) to whom ..... (parent's(s') name(s)) ...... parental rights are being terminated are at substantial risk of significant harm. Termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means to protect the child(ren) from harm. 6. Under the provisions of sections 39.80639.810(1)-(11), Florida Statutes, it is in the manifest best interests of the child(ren) for parental rights of .....(name(s))........

...The petition filed by ..... (name)..... is granted as to the parent(s), ..... (name(s)) ...... 2. The parental rights of the father, .....(name)....., and of the mother, .....(name)....., to the child, .....(name) ....., are hereby terminated under section 39.806(.....), Florida Statutes....

...urt of Appeal within the time and in the manner prescribed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, which is 30 days from the date this order is rendered (filed). NOTES [1] We correct a typographical error in the proposed form 8.981 by deleting "39.806(1)B(11)" and adding "39.810(1)-(11)." [2] Section 39.402 sets forth the factual circumstances which must exist and the procedures which the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) must follow in order to legally place a child into a protective shelter....

...o choice but to affirm." D.G. v. Dep't of Children & Families, ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 2462847 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing In re Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.1995)). Abandonment is a sufficient ground for terminating parental rights. See § 39.806(1)(b), Fla....

...4th DCA 2002) (finding termination of parental rights to be the least restrictive means of protecting the child from further harm in an abandonment case). And, because termination of parental rights can be the goal of a case plan, we find no error. See § 39.806(3), Fla....

...Because the evidence was insufficient to support the termination as to any of the children, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. On May 9, 2008, the Department filed a petition for the termination of parental rights to all three children, alleging the Mother and the Father failed to comply with section 39.806(1)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991); R.W.W., 788 So.2d at 1023. At the termination hearing, the trial court determined the Mother's and the Father's continued involvement with drugs threatened the well-being and safety of the children pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c)....

...Dep't of Children & Families, 866 So.2d 220, 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ("[I]t is well settled that a parent's drug addiction, standing alone, is an insufficient ground upon which to terminate *654 parental rights."). Therefore, we find the trial court erred by granting the petition under section 39.806(1)(c). [1] Next, the trial court's order determined the parents "failed to comply with the requirements of their case plans pursuant to [section] 39.806(1)(e)." However, the trial court failed to distinguish its findings among S.F....

...and P.F., who were parties to the original case plan, and C.F., who was adjudicated dependent only seven months before the termination. The trial court also failed to distinguish its findings between the Father and the Mother, the latter of whom had considerably more difficulties complying with her case plan. Section 39.806(1)(e)(1) provides that a twelve-month period for compliance with a case plan begins to run "only after the child's placement into shelter care or the entry of a disposition order placing the custody of the child with the department or...

...se plan." J.R.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 787 So.2d 875, 878 n. 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. M.H., 625 So.2d 909, 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Finally, the trial court determined that termination under section 39.806(1)(c) and (e) was the least restrictive means of protecting the children from serious harm....

...nnot treat the children as an amorphous group in which the best interests of one will meet the interests of all."). Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment terminating the Mother's and the Father's parental rights as to S.F., P.F., and C.F. under section 39.806(1)(c) and (e) and remand for further proceedings....

...The trial court granted the shelter petition and placed the children with their maternal aunt and uncle. DCF did not offer the parents a reunification case plan. Instead, on March 23, 1997, DCF filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights ("TPR") to the twins under Florida Statute sections 39.806(1)(f) and (i), alleging the parents' egregious conduct toward the children's older sibling, A2.H, and the involuntary termination of the parents' rights to A2.H....

...The court further found that the children have been in a stable pre-adoptive family home for a year since birth and, that if the twins were removed from their current placement, separation of the siblings would cause them harm. The mother appeals the final judgment terminating her parental rights. Section 39.806(1)(i) authorizes termination of parental rights to a child when parental rights to the child's sibling have been terminated involuntarily. Section 39.806(1)(f) authorizes termination of parental rights when evidence establishes that "the parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity or capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that t...

...least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. Florida Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 609 (Fla.2004). Similarly, where termination of parental rights is sought based on egregious abuse of a sibling child pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), DCF must prove that reunification with the parent poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the current child and that termination is the least restrictive way to protect the child....

...of harm to the current children. However, five years have passed since the prior involuntary termination. And although F.L. makes it clear that a parent is not required to show evidence of changed circumstances to avoid a termination of rights under section 39.806(1)(i), F.L., 880 So.2d at 610, the mother presented evidence of positive changes in her circumstances....

...In my view, however, the egregious nature of the harm suffered by their sibling, the unexplained 29 fractures of a three-month old child's arm, ribs, and skull, should be sufficient to establish the requisite basis for the termination of parental rights under 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2007)....

CONNER, J. D.B. (“the Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child Z.S. (“the Child”). 1 The Department of Children and Families (“the Department”) petitioned to terminate the Father’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2010), which allows termination of parental rights when a parent engages in conduct that demonstrates his continued involvement as a parent threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional safety of the Child....

...rove to the point of being able to appropriately care for the Child, termination of parental rights was the least restrictive alternative to protect the Child from harm. Legal Analysis Prospective Neglectful Conduct Will Harm the Child in the Future Section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2010), allows termination of parental rights: When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents i...

...4th DCA 2011). Similar to this case, the mother suffered from mental illness. The child was placed in a permanent placement with the grandparents. The grandparents then sought to terminate the mother’s parental rights on three grounds, one of which was section 39.806(1)(c)....

...ernal stimuli) at the time of his court-ordered evaluation. Because it is so factually distinguishable, I.R. is neither controlling nor helpful to our analysis. Our research reveals no cases in Florida in which a termination of parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c) was upheld and no case plan was offered to the parent. The Department cited no such cases. However, we found one case which discussed a situation where the Department *1285 sought termination under section 39.806(l)(c) and no case plan was offered to the parent....

...ture. Thus, the evidence that the Father was not amenable to services was not speculative. In R.W.W. v. Department of Children and Families, 788 So.2d 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), the Second District stated: [I]n order to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c), the trial court must find that the child’s life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent regardless of *1286 any services provided to the parent....

...Citing R.W.W., the First District reversed a termination in N.L. v. Department of Children and Family Services, 843 So.2d 996, 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), in part because there was “no evidence of the provision of services (or the futility of providing services) necessary for termination under subsection [39.806](l)(c) .......

...to conclude that the threat of harm to the child would continue despite the provision of services. We hold that under the facts of this case, the Department did not have to offer a case plan prior to terminating the Father’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c). We also note there is no statutory obligation to offer a parent a case plan prior to termination of parental rights. Section 39.806(3) states that if a petition for termination of parental rights is filed under subsection (1), “the department need not offer the parents a case plan having a goal of reunification, but instead may file with the court a case plan having a goal of termination of parental rights.......

...However, the evidence clearly showed that despite the provision of services, her men *1287 tal deficiencies prevented her from comprehending and implementing the parenting information provided to her. One of the grounds found by the trial court for terminating her parental rights was section 39.806(l)(c)....

...relative guardian, with whom the child has remained to date. On September 19, 2003, a Verified Petition for Termination of Parental Rights/Permanent Commitment was filed. The petition alleged that (1) termination was appropriate for the Father under section 39.806(1)(d), Florida Statutes, because of his incarceration for a substantial portion of the child's life; (2) termination was appropriate for both parents under section 39.806(1)(c) because they have "engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services"; and (3) termination was appropriate for the mother under section 39.806(1)(e) for the failure to comply with her case plan....

...DCF should have made such a good faith effort as part of its required reasonable efforts. See C.B., 874 So.2d at 1252-53. We also note that parental rights should not be terminated merely because of the Father's criminal history and incarceration history, without more. See § 39.806(1)(d), Fla....

...tody. Our reversal of the order terminating the Father's parental rights is without prejudice to DCF's right to file a new petition for termination if the circumstances warrant. Reversed and Remanded. WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Under section 39.806(2), "[r]easonable efforts to preserve and reunify families shall not be required if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in paragraphs (1)(e)-(i) have occurred." Here, as argued by the Father, none of the factors in (1)(e)-(i) apply....

...The mother, K.R.L., appeals from the trial court’s final judgment terminating her parental rights as to her child, A.M.L. We reverse the order terminating the mother’s parental rights as there is not clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the termination under section 39.806(l)(f) or (g), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...management of their children); L.D. v. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 957 So.2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). All parties, including the mother, accepted the court’s determination that the injuries to the infant constituted egregious abuse under section 39.806(l)(f)....

...in s.827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s.39.01, or chronic abuse. . Neither did the court find that the mother engaged in any conduct that was "deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct” as required by § 39.806(l)(f) to sustain termination under an "egregious” conduct standard....

..., C.R. We affirm. N.R.R. was alleged to have sexually abused C.R.'s half-sibling, who was twelve years old at the time of removal from his custody. An expedited petition to terminate the father's parental rights was filed on September 8, 2006, under section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2006), which provides for termination when the parent has committed "egregious abuse" of a child or the child's sibling. Termination of parental rights was also requested pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes (2006), which provides for termination when the parent is incarcerated for a substantial portion of the child's minority....

...es, Gainesville, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, M.S., the natural mother of D.W., seeks review of a final judgment terminating her parental rights as to D.W. In the judgment, the trial court concluded that termination was appropriate under (1) section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1999), because appellant's parental rights to a sibling had previously been involuntarily terminated, and (2) section 39.806(1)(e), based on appellant's failure to comply substantially with the case plan. Appellant challenges both bases for termination. We affirm as to the latter issue and, consequently, consider it unnecessary to address the former. It is undisputed that parental rights may be terminated pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e) if a parent fails to comply substantially with a case plan for a period of 12 months after a child is adjudicated dependent....

...II, a four-year-old boy, and R.E.D., a girl who turned three years old just before the order was entered. Although we disagree with the trial court's conclusions in some respects, we commend the trial court's thorough consideration of this troubling case and affirm the order terminating parental rights. SECTION 39.806(1)(f) Among the grounds for termination of parental rights alleged in the Department of Children and Family Services' petition was section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), which authorizes termination of parental rights when "the parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct...

...cident. At the adjudicatory hearing, the Father testified on his own behalf regarding his version of events on the night of the killing as well as his conduct toward his family. The trial court found that the Father committed egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f) in two circumstances....

...uct was deplorable and outrageous, the trial court's generalized finding of harm was not enough to establish a sufficient nexus between the conduct and the specific harm to the children to support a finding of egregious conduct within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(f). [1] Nevertheless, the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the Father's other conduct justified termination under section 39.806(1)(f). "Egregious conduct" means "abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct of the parent or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct." § 39.806(1)(f)(2)....

...However, taken as a whole, the Father's conduct comprised an unrelenting pattern of abuse, abandonment, and neglect. For this reason, the Father's conduct was "deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct" so as to be egregious conduct. See § 39.806(1)(f)(2); M.C. v. Dep't Children & Family Servs., 814 So.2d 449, 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (finding that "a pattern of physical abuse and ongoing neglect" of the child constituted egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f)). SECTION 39.806(1)(g) As a ground for terminating parental rights, the Department also alleged section 39.806(1)(g), which authorizes termination when the parent has "subjected the child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse." The trial court found that the Father committed chronic abuse under section 39.806(1)(g)....

...f the children. At the same time, the concepts of abandonment and neglect are subsumed within the meaning of "abuse" through the definition of "harm." See § 39.01(2), (30)(e), (f). Without question, the totality of the Father's conduct was "abuse." Section 39.806(1)(g) does not require that the abuse be "egregious"; rather, it must be "chronic." Undefined in chapter 39, "chronic" ordinarily means "marked by long duration or frequent occurrence." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary *1040 320 (Deluxe ed.1998)....

...II in October 1999 and continued through the time of the adjudicatory hearing in April 2004, interrupted only by the Father's incarcerations, which only contributed to his abandonment of the children. These facts support the trial court's finding that the abuse was "chronic" under section 39.806(1)(g)....

...limits the court's power to dispose of the case by termination when one parent's rights are to be severed without severing the rights of the other parent. Section 39.811(6)(e) permits termination only when the parent meets the criteria specified in section 39.806(1)(d) and (f)-(i). The trial court made no ruling with regard to section 39.811(6)(e). However, the trial court found that the Department proved grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)(f) and (g), which fall squarely within the scope of section 39.811(6)(e)....

...termination remains to be tried. We disagree. When the Department pursues termination of parental rights, it is not required to offer the parent a case plan with a goal of reunification. § 39.802(5). When any ground for termination is proved under section 39.806(1)(e)(i), reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required. § 39.806(2)....

...CONCLUSION Because we affirm for the reasons expressed above, we need not address other *1041 aspects of the order terminating parental rights. Affirmed. NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] As a matter of policy, should a parent who commits murder have his or her parental rights terminated? Yes, according to section 39.806(1)(d)(2), which provides that the parent's conviction of first-degree or second-degree murder is a ground for termination. However, section 39.806(1)(d)(2) requires a conviction. Section 39.806(1)(f) should not be used to excuse the conviction requirement of section 39.806(1)(d)(2) absent a sufficient nexus between the conduct and the specific harm to the children. [2] Section 39.806(1)(f)(2) continues: "Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child." [3] At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, the Mother was working on a case plan with the goal of reunification....

...pporting termination by clear and convincing evidence. E.E.A. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 846 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). First, the trial court found the Father failed to substantially comply with the terms of his case plan under section 39.806(1)(e)(1), Florida Statutes (2007). Section 39.806(1)(e)(1) provides that a parent's failure to complete a case plan within twelve months after an adjudication of the child as a dependent child is evidence of abandonment, abuse, or neglect. However, the evidence may be insufficient if "the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due ... to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child." § 39.806(1)(e)(1)....

...ermination of his parental rights on this basis. See C.C. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 854 So.2d 720, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Next, the trial court found that termination was proper because the Father materially breached his case plan under section 39.806(1)(e)(2), citing the Father's incarceration as its main explanation for the material breach....

...Kambour, for appellee, The Guardian Ad Litem Program. Before GERSTEN, SHEPHERD, and ROTHENBERG, JJ. ROTHENBERG, J. I.D. ("father") appeals from a final order terminating his parental rights as to G.D. Because there is clear and convincing evidence that the father engaged in egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2008); and sexual abuse, aggravated child abuse and/or chronic abuse under section 39.806(1)(g), we affirm the trial court's order terminating the father's parental rights on the basis of these findings. Because the trial court's order (perhaps confusing the father's case with that of G.D.'s mother) also finds abandonment under section 39.806(1)(b), and there is no evidence to support this finding, we reverse and remand with instructions to strike that portion of the trial court's order....

...Both DCF and GAL strongly recommended that the father's parental rights be terminated. After hearing all of the evidence and finding G.D.'s undisputed testimony credible, the lower court submitted a written order terminating the father's parental rights for engaging in egregious conduct, § 39.806(1)(f), sexual abuse pursuant to section 39.806(1)(g), as defined in section 39.01(67); aggravated child abuse, as defined in section 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse, as defined in section 39.01 or chronic abuse, § 39.806(1)(g); and for abandonment pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), as defined in section 39.01(1)....

...Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 826 So.2d 449, 450 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); M.R. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 783 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (citing In Re M.F.G. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 723 So.2d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)). *1120 EGREGIOUS CONDUCT/SEXUAL ABUSE Section 39.806(1)(f) provides for termination of parental rights where a parent engages in egregious conduct that "threatens the life safety, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child." Section 39.806(1)(f)(2) defines "egregious conduct" as: [A]buse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct....

...The Father appeals the final judgment terminating his parental rights to his minor child, A.R. On August 16, 2012, the Mother filed a private petition for involuntary termination of the Father’s parental rights, arguing that the Father’s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to— among other grounds — section 39.806(l)(d)(l), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...d’s manifest best interests. He also claims that the court erred by not allowing him to present evidence that the Mother thwarted his efforts to maintain a relationship with the child, finding that such evidence was irrelevant to an analysis under section 39.806(l)(d)(l). We agree that the court erred and therefore reverse for a full evidentiary hearing. The Florida Supreme Court has held that in addressing the termination of parental rights under section 39.806(l)(d)(l), *450 a court must not only consider the length of the parent’s incarceration but also whether termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm and in the manifest best interests of the child....

...case plan and that the manifest best interests of the children would not be achieved by terminating parental rights, especially without an alternative placement plan. The Department's petition alleged grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), claiming the parents engaged in conduct toward the children that continues to threaten the life, safety, well-being, or *597 physical, mental, or emotional health of the children irrespective of the provision of services and, under section 39.806(1)(e), claiming the parents failed to substantially comply with their case plans....

...He buttressed this evidence with testimony from the guardians ad litem and his counselors that he had demonstrated substantial improvement in his parenting skills and had the motivation to improve further. The trial court erred in terminating the Father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c) when improvement was demonstrated and further improvement was possible. See M.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 866 So.2d 220, 222-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that in order to terminate under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court must show that the children's welfare would continue to be threatened by the parent regardless of the provision of services and that there is no reasonable basis to believe the parent will improve). As to termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), the trial court found that the Father failed to substantially comply with his case plans, specifically articulating that he failed to attend domestic violence counseling and parenting classes....

...Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 930 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). Standard for Terminating Parental Rights There are three requirements to terminate parental rights. First, the Department must prove statutory grounds under section 39.806, Florida Statutes. See Rathburn v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 826 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Here the Department sought termination of the mother’s parental rights pursuant to subsection 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, which authorizes, When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the par...

...the provision of services. Provision of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. Prior to terminating a parent's rights under subsection 39.806(1)(c), two requirements must be met, First, the trial court must find the children's life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent, regardless of the provision of services....

...Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 843 So. 2d 996, 1002 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). 7 M.H. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 866 So. 2d 220, 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Second, to terminate parental rights under subsection 39.806(1)(c), the Department must show that there is no reasonable basis to believe a parent will improve....

...ive means test. See L.D. v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 957 So. 2d 1203, 1205 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991). First Requirement — Analysis of Termination under 39.806(1)(c) The Department’s statutory ground for termination in this case was section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes....

...circumstances that led to the need for the child’s removal.” Consequently, the trial court’s finding “that further efforts by the Department to rehabilitate the mother would be futile” is also based on record evidence. The trial court therefore had grounds under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, to terminate the mother’s parental rights....

...ts have been exhausted). 9 The least restrictive means test can be satisfied by other proof such as showing egregious conduct of a parent towards a child. See In re E.R., 49 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Egregious conduct is not alleged here. See §39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes. 11  Following Padgett, this Court and others have imposed additional requirements for termination of parental rights to pass the least restrictive means test....

...*369 Jodi Abramowitz of Department of Children and Family Services, Orlando, for Appellee. ORFINGER, J. K.B., the mother of R.A.D., a two-year-old child, appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights. While the mother concedes the existence of at least one ground for termination of parental rights under section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2002), she contends that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) failed to prove that termination was in the manifest best interest of the child and was the least restrictive means of preventing harm to the child because R.A.D....

...Additionally, he has never provided support of any kind to L.C. or communicated any desire to make child support payments. Thus, the very able trial judge, Seymour Gelber, was entirely correct in finding that the biological father had abandoned L.C. Section 39.806 establishes the grounds upon which a parent's rights can be terminated. See § 39.806, Fla....

...s listed in section 39.810. [1] See C.K. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 942 So.2d 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); see also § 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2004). In this case, the Department alleged, and the trial court found, termination warranted under sections 39.806(1)(b), 39.806(1)(c), and 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes. We affirm the trial court's ruling under section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes, provides for termination of parental rights in the case of abandonment, citing the definition of abandonment contained in section 39.01(1). See § 39.806(1)(b), Fla....

...trial court's termination of V.J.'s parental rights. Affirmed. FLETCHER, J., concurs. SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge (dissenting). As in In re J.B., 923 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), a termination based on the same grounds as those asserted in this case, §§ 39.806(1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(e), Fla....

...Because the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to present clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the Mother's parental rights, we reverse. In its order, the trial court terminated the Mother's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(e), Florida Statutes (2003). Termination under section 39.806(1)(e) was based on the Mother's alleged noncompliance with her case plan....

...The Department filed its amended petition for termination as to H.F. on December 17, 2002. The court-approved case plan concerning H.F. was not filed and approved until July 14, 2003. The Department concedes that it was error for the trial court to terminate the Mother's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e) because no case plan had been filed with the court prior to the filing of the amended petition for termination of parental rights. We agree. The trial court also based its termination decision on the alternative statutory ground of section 39.806(1)(c)....

...ices by the Department." The Department argues for affirmance based on this ruling. After a thorough review of the record, we are unable to affirm the order of the trial court on this basis. To prove the grounds for terminating parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court must find that the child's life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent, regardless of the provision of services....

...renting course. Although the Mother admitted that she did not complete the course, the Department did not prove, or even argue, that the Mother's failure to complete the course threatened the child in any way. In short, the Department's reference to section 39.806(1)(c) in its amended petition was little more than filler....

...Because the Department did not present clear and convincing evidence that the Mother's continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship threatened the life, safety, or well-being of the child, the trial court's finding that termination was warranted under section 39.806(1)(c) is unsupportable....

...The Justice Administrative Commission (JAC) seeks certiorari review of an order requiring it to pay the attorney's fees of a mother's court-appointed private counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding. Because the mother executed a voluntary written surrender of her parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), before the termination proceedings were initiated, she was not entitled to publicly-funded counsel....

...Before GERSTEN, FLETCHER, and SHEPHERD, JJ. PER CURIAM. P.S. ("mother") appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her four children. Because there was no competent substantial evidence supporting an expedited termination of the mother's parental rights under Section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2001), we reverse and remand....

...Subsequently, the mother pleaded guilty to conspiracy to import 500 grams of cocaine into the United States and was sentenced to a term of thirty months in federal prison. The trial court granted the petition for expedited termination of parental rights pursuant to Section 39.806(1)(f). To establish a prima facie case under Section 39.806(1)(f), the Department was required to prove egregious conduct on the part of the mother....

...parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child. See § 39.806(1)(f)(2), Fla....

...2d DCA 2003)(without connecting mother's drug use to specific harm to the child, egregious conduct was not a valid basis for termination of parental rights); In re C.W.W., 788 So.2d 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We also reject the argument advanced at oral argument that the termination of parental rights was proper under Section 39.806(1)(d)....

...(Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (incarceration alone is an insufficient ground to terminate parental rights). In sum, the evidence presented below does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support the expedited termination of the mother's rights under Section 39.806(1)(f)....

...tion. H.R., the father of P.R. proceeded to trial at the same time as the mother and the trial court also terminated his parental rights. Terrence Reed signed a surrender of his parental rights to C.R. The fathers are not parties to this appeal. [2] Section 39.806(1)(d) provides that the Department may file a petition for termination of parental rights when the parent is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution and the court finds either the period of time for which the parent...

...criminal, a sexual predator, or has been convicted of first degree or second degree murder; or the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child. See § 39.806(1)(d), Fla....

...unselor testified that the circumstances under which the parental rights to S.R., E.M., and Ed.M. had been terminated, remained unchanged. We conclude that the trial court acted reasonably in finding, due to the likelihood of prospective abuse under 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of J.M....

...A trial court has broad discretion regarding the termination of parental rights and an appellate court may not disturb an order so long as it is based on competent and substantial evidence. N.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 843 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Section 39.806, Florida Statutes, provides Department with numerous avenues by which to pursue a claim for termination of parental rights. Pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), parental rights may be terminated if the parent engaged in "egregious conduct" or "had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child's sibling." This court has interpreted section 39.806(1)(f) to also require Department to prove that reunification with the parent poses a substantial risk of harm to the child, regardless of past abuse to that child's siblings....

...2nd DCA 2001), where the court reversed a termination of parental rights after the child was born addicted to cocaine and the mother admitted to a serious substance abuse problem. There, the Second District concluded that the mother's conduct did not rise to the level of egregiousness intended in section 39.806(a)(f), Florida Statutes, because there was no evidence that the mother could not resolve the issues or that she had ever attempted any type of drug treatment program....

...DCF alleged the parents “engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent, and knowingly failed to prevent, egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the [c]hild.” § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2017). The parents purportedly “subjected the [c]hild to sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in Section 39.01, or chronic abuse.” § 39.806(1)(g), Fla....

...not in a sexual way. Moreover, no credible testimony was presented indicating that the Father touched the child in or on her vagina or under her clothes, or engaged in egregious conduct toward the child as defined in section 39.806(f) and/or (g)....

...the child. (g) The parent or parents have subjected the child or another child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse. § 39.806(1)(f)-(g), Fla....

...finding that “[a]t most . . . there was uncomfortable and/or inappropriate contact, touching or patting between the Father and Child, but not in a sexual way.” Whether the touching was done “in a sexual way” was, likewise, irrelevant, as neither section 39.806(1)(g) nor section 39.01(71) require such proof....

...avor of termination[] and the trial court's contrary decision was an abuse of discretion.”). C. The Trial Court’s Findings are Irreconcilable Finally, the trial court’s finding that DCF failed to prove sexual abuse under sections 39.806(1)(f)-(g) is irreconcilable with its finding of dependency under Chapter 39, including sections 39.01(2), 39.01(15)(a), and 39.01(15)(f)....

...is undisputedly uncomfortable and/or inappropriate is sexual abuse irrespective of whether the person doing the touching intended it to be in a sexual way. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that there was no egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f) or sexual abuse under section 39.806(1)(g), but that there was abuse under section 39.01, is irreconcilable....

...Dep't of Children & Families, 36 So. 3d 776, 778 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)). However, termination of parental rights without a case plan with a goal of 23 reunification is permitted when based on sections 39.806(1)(f)-(g). See § 39.802(5), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“When a petition for termination of parental rights is filed under s. 39.806(1), . . . the department need not offer the parents a case plan with a goal of reunification, but may instead file with the court a case plan with a goal of termination of parental rights . . . .”); § 39.806(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“Reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in . . . paragraphs (1)(f)-(m) have occurred.”); § 39.806(3), Fla....

...the department need not offer the parents a case plan having a goal of reunification, but may instead file with the court a case plan having a goal of termination of parental rights . . . .”). Here, because the trial court found that there was no egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f) or sexual abuse under section 39.806(1)(g), it necessarily made no factual findings as to whether termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. V. CONCLUSION Because the trial court incorrectly applied the statutes defining sexual abuse and because the trial court’s finding that DCF failed to prove sexual abuse under sections 39.806(1)(f)-(g) is irreconcilable with its finding of dependency within the 24 meaning of Chapter 39, including sections 39.01(2), 39.01(15)(a) and 39.01(15)(f), we reverse the adjudication of dependenc...

...te based on conduct by the Mother and Father that occurred while the Mother was pregnant or past conduct by both the Mother and Father that was unrelated to the birth of the twins. The Department's petition included four grounds for termination: (1) section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2003), alleging the Mother's parental rights had been terminated involuntarily as to another child; (2) section 39.806(1)(c), alleging the Mother and Father engaged in conduct toward the children that continued to threaten the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the children irrespective of the provision of services; (3) section 39.806(1)(b), alleging the Father abandoned the children; and (4) section 39.806(1)(d), alleging the Father was incarcerated and continued contact between him and the children would be harmful to the children....

...We conclude that the Department failed to prove any of these grounds. See R.W.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families (In re C.W.W.), 788 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991)). SECTION 39.806(1)(i) The Department sought termination of the Mother's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(i) because she previously had her parental rights involuntarily terminated as to other children in Oklahoma....

...However, in 2004, after the trial court entered the final order in this case, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the *1197 constitutionality of this statute. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602 (Fla.2004). The supreme court held that parental rights may be terminated under section 39.806(1)(i) only if the state proves both a prior involuntary termination of rights to a sibling and a substantial risk of significant harm to the current child....

...On remand, the Department can try to establish a connection, but if the trial court decides the circumstances under which these terminations occurred have changed, then these prior terminations would have limited applicability to the Mother's present ability to parent these children. SECTION 39.806(1)(c) The Department failed to present evidence that the children's lives, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the Mother and Father regardless of any services. Section 39.806(1)(c) provides in part that termination is permissible [w]hen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-c...

...Especially in light of the Mother's testimony concerning her own rehabilitation while in prison, the Department failed to prove this theory by clear and convincing evidence. The Department also alleged that termination of both the Mother's and Father's parental rights was proper under section 39.806(1)(c) because the Mother admittedly used drugs during the first few weeks of her pregnancy before she knew she was pregnant and because the Father continued to use drugs until two months prior to the twins' birth. However, the Department failed to present evidence that the *1198 children would be harmed by continued interaction with the parents as a result of this. The trial court erred in terminating the Mother's and Father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c) when improvement was demonstrated and further improvement was possible. See M.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 866 So.2d 220, 222-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that in order to terminate under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court must show that the children's welfare would continue to be threatened by the parent regardless of the provision of services and that there is no reasonable basis to believe that the parent will improve). SECTION 39.806(1)(b) AND (1)(d) The trial court erred in terminating the Father's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b) and section 39.806(1)(d). The Father's incarceration formed the Department's basis for termination on both of these grounds; however, the Department failed to establish how the Father's short-term incarceration justified termination. Section 39.806(1)(b) provides that termination of parental rights may be undertaken when a child is abandoned as defined by section 39.01....

...Dep't of Children & Families, 874 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Likewise, a trial court is precluded from terminating parental rights on the statutory ground that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child under section 39.806(1)(d)(3) where no evidence regarding the impact of continuing the parent-child relationship is offered. See J.P.C. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re J.D.C.), 819 So.2d 264, 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The Department sought termination under section 39.806(1)(d)(3), arguing that continuing the parental relationship between the Father and the twins would be harmful to the twins....

...In termination of parental rights proceedings, the Department of Children and Families (hereinafter "the Department") may petition for termination on the ground that "the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily." § 39.806(1)(i), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). The question here is whether parental rights are "involuntarily" terminated within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(i) when the parents fail to appear for the adjudicatory hearing and the trial court enters the termination order pursuant to section 39.801(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), which provides in pertinent part that "failure of [the] pare...

...der section 39.801(3)(d) when a parent fails to personally appear at the adjudicatory hearing does not transform that involuntary proceeding into a voluntary proceeding. Thus, in a subsequent termination proceeding the Department may properly allege section 39.806(1)(i) as grounds for termination....

...As a result of both parents' history of drug abuse, criminal charges, unstable housing, and prior involvement with the Department, the Department immediately removed the child from the parents' care and filed a petition for dependency and termination of parental rights based upon section 39.806(1)(i). [2] The trial court adjudicated R.S. dependent, but dismissed the petition to terminate the parents' rights, finding the previous order terminating their rights to A.P. was based on consent and thus could not form a basis for termination under section 39.806(1)(i)....

...both failed to appear at the adjudicatory hearing regarding the termination of their parental rights as to A.P., and neither parent contends otherwise. Hence we must resolve a legal issue that requires us to analyze the interplay between sections 39.801(3)(d) and 39.806(1)(i) to determine whether consent under the former statute renders the proceedings voluntary, thereby precluding termination under the latter....

...eria and construe them in harmony with one another. Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452 (Fla.1992); G.E.L. Corp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 875 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Our analysis begins with the provisions of section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2005), which establish the grounds for termination of parental rights....

...Specifically, it provides that "[t]he department, the guardian ad litem, or any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or who is informed of those facts and believes that they are true may petition for the termination of parental rights under any of the following circumstances. . . ." § 39.806(1), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). Nine grounds are specifically listed and because any one of them may be sufficient for termination, each is separate and distinct. See § 39.806(1)(a)-(i), Fla. Stat. (2005). Of these nine separate and distinct grounds, voluntary terminations are specifically provided for under section 39.806(1)(a); the remaining eight grounds, including terminations under section 39.806(1)(i), are involuntary. Hence, the Legislature certainly knows the difference between voluntary and involuntary termination and has provided specific provisions for each. Conspicuously absent from the provisions of section 39.806(1) as a ground for voluntary termination is consent under section 39.801(3)(d), and for good reason: the Legislature never intended for consent under section 39.801(3)(d) to be a ground for termination....

...5th DCA 2005). We believe that if the Legislature intended for consent under 39.801(3)(d) to transform an involuntary proceeding into a voluntary proceeding, it surely would have said so. It did not. Further analysis reveals that voluntary termination under section 39.806(1)(a) requires consent by the parents that is altogether different from consent under section 39.801(3)(d)....

...y because the voluntary surrender must be clear, expressed, unequivocal, and emanate directly from the parent. See T.C.B. v. Florida Dep't of Children & Families, 816 So.2d 194, 196-97 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ("We interpret the legislative intent behind section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes, to permit a parent to seek termination of his or her parental rights by voluntarily and unequivocally surrendering his or her children to the State.")....

...We believe that our construction gives full effect to all of the pertinent statutory provisions and construes them in harmony with one another. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the trial court's order dismissing the defendant's petition alleging grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)(i), and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings....

...Court in In re A.D.C., 854 So.2d 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and In re T.S., 855 So.2d 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), disagreed with on other grounds by Florida Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602 (Fla.2004) (addressing the constitutionality of section 39.806(1)(i))....

...AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED. PLEUS, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] The order also terminated A.S.'s parental rights to her first child, B.W. [2] The Department also alleged as an alternative ground that termination was proper based on section 39.806(1)(c)....

...This court has previously explained the standard of review in termination of parental rights appeals: The adjudication of a case involving termination of parental rights involves a two-step process. First, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in 39.806, Florida Statutes, has been proven....

...Further, DCF must show that the parent’s conduct poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the current child and that termination is the least restrictive means to protect the child. Id. Although the termination petition in F.L. was based on the involuntary termination of rights as to a sibling under section 39.806(l)(i), Florida Statutes, our courts have required the state to show a risk of harm to the current child where the petition is based on other grounds....

...See In re M.F., 770 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2000) (dependency petition based on sex offense against another child); J.J. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 994 So.2d 496, 501 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (termination petition based on egregious conduct toward a sibling under section 39.806(l)(f)); J.F. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 890 So.2d 434 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (termination petition based on manslaughter/felony assault of another child under section 39.806(l)(f) and (h))....

...ying conflict with Fourth DCA’s opinion in J.F.), cause dismissed, 61 So.3d 411 (Fla. 2011), and review denied, 60 So.3d 1054 (Fla.2011). We reject the father’s first argument that there was not sufficient evidence of sexual abuse. DCF relied on section 39.806(l)(g), Florida Statutes, which provides in relevant part: The parent or parents have subjected the child or another child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse. § 39.806(l)(g), Fla....

...ow him supervised visitation with his children; and (7) the children are in a stable and loving environment where they are thriving, and with a relative who wishes to adopt them. Abandonment is clearly grounds for termination of parental rights. See § 39.806(1)(b), Fla....

...Termination of parental rights is also appropriate where the children are adjudicated dependent, a case plan is filed with the court, and the parent fails to substantially comply with the case plan for a period of twelve months, thus evidencing continuing abuse, neglect, or abandonment. See § 39.806(1)(e), Fla....

regard to the termination of parental rights. See § 39.806(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (1999) (providing that the Department

...e two sisters to adoption, after termination of A.H.’s parental rights. The Department then filed a petition for termination of parental rights, initiating the present proceeding. As grounds for termination, an amended petition alleged that: under section 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2009), appellant had abandoned the children; under section 39.806(l)(c), appellant and S.S. had engaged in conduct toward the children demonstrating that their continuation as parents threatened the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the children; under section 39.806(l)(e), appellant had failed to substantially comply with his case plan; under section 39.806(l)(f), appellant and S.S. had engaged in egregious conduct or knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatened the life, safety or physical, mental, or emotional health of the children; under section 39.806(l)(g), appellant and S.S. had subjected a child and/or sibling to aggravated child abuse; and under section 39.806(l)(h), S.S....

...rt cannot say that no one could reasonably find such evidence to be clear and convincing, the finding will not be set aside on appellate review.” Id. at 1000 (footnote omitted). We consider each ground and the evidence adduced in support, in turn. Section 39.806(l)(f) First, appellant disputes the trial court’s ruling that he knowingly failed to protect his son from the traumatic brain injury the child’s mother, S.S., inflicted. Under section 39.806(l)(f), parental rights can be terminated if the “parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or ph...

...for a finding that N.L. ‘knowingly failed to prevent’ the abuse of’ the child). A parent’s knowing failure to prevent egregious conduct where he has *1217 an opportunity to prevent it is a sufficient basis to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(f), see In re B.S., 697 So.2d 914, 917 (Fla....

...had — was not able to determine how the child broke his leg and, for that reason, did not remove the children from S.S.’s care after their investigation. The Department did not prove that appellant knew anything the Department did not also know. Section 39.806(l)(g) Next, appellant disputes the trial court’s conclusion that he “subjected a child and/or sibling to aggravated child abuse as defined in s[ection] 827.03.” Aggravated child abuse occurs when a person: “(a) Commits aggravat...

...committed aggravated child abuse. But, for the same reasons the record does not support a finding that appellant knowingly failed to protect his son from S.S., the evidence did not establish that he “subjected [him] to aggravated child abuse.” Section 39.806(l)(e) Parental rights can be terminated when the record establishes that a parent did not comply with the essential tasks required by a case plan. See M.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 765 So.2d 152, 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Under section 39.806(l)(e), termination of parental rights is allowable: When a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and: 1....

...hat the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(73), Fla. Stat. (2009). “ ‘[T]he “substantially comply” language contained in section [39.806] ......

...The Department specifically concedes that the evidence did not establish that appellant’s continuing involvement in his children’s lives threatened their safety or well-being. The Department failed to prove that appellant failed to “substantially comply” with his case plan within the meaning of section 39.806(l)(e)....

...dren when she made no contact with them for four years and never supported them). Both the Department and the guardian ad litem have conceded that the trial court’s findings regarding abandonment are unsupported by competent, substantial evidence. Section 39.806(l)(c) Finally, appellant challenges the trial court’s finding that his continued involvement with his children would threaten their life, safety, or health....

...that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services.” § 39.806(l)(c), Fla....

...evidence that appellant had engaged in any conduct that posed any risk to the children. See, e.g., M.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 866 So.2d 220, 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (finding evidence insufficient to terminate mother’s rights under section 39.806(l)(c), as “there was no evidence that her children suffered harm as a result of her [drug] addiction, nor that [the mother] failed to meet their needs while they were in her care”)....

...ory grounds on which the trial court relied in terminating appellant’s parental rights. Accordingly, we reverse. VAN NORTWICK, J., concurs. WOLF, J., concurs in result only. . The mere fact that the mother’s parental rights were terminated under section 39.806(h), does not authorize or require automatic termination of appellant's parental rights....

...statute. See I.M. v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 668 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); In the Interest of C.K., 601 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). We further agree with the mother that the instant termination order improperly cites to section 39.806(1)(h) of the Florida Statutes (1999) as a legal basis to support the court's ruling. Section 39.806(1)(h) was not set forth in any of DCF's pleadings, was not discussed by the parties during the adjudicatory hearing, and was not yet enacted on the date that the instant termination petition was filed....

...contends that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) failed to adduce competent and substantial evidence, which a reasonable fact finder could find clear and convincing proof, that his continued relationship with his children would be harmful to them, within the meaning of section 39.806(l)(d)3., Fla....

...Since DCF removed the children, they (and their eight-year-old half-brother) have been placed in separate foster homes, and, during the sixteen months they spent in foster care before the trial, had been moved several times. On August 14, 2013, DCF petitioned for involuntary termination of parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(d)3., alleging that a continued parental relationship with the father would be harmful to the children because his “extensive criminal history resulting in his incarceration ......

...Although the children also remember their parents’ yelling at each other, and being spanked by their father, DCF does not contend that they suffered any harm as a result that would justify termination of parental rights. The sole ground on which DCF sought to terminate S.B.’s parental rights is section 39.806(l)(d)3., Florida Statutes (2013), which provides: (d) When the parent of a child is incarcerated and either: 3....

...Dep’t of Children & Families, 811 So.2d 791, 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that 54 months is not a substantial portion of eighteen years). With S.B. scheduled to be released some fifteen months hence, DCF could not have terminated parental rights under the prior version of section 39.806(l)(d)3....

...But DCF argues that the 2012 amendments justify termination of parental rights. “[A] trial court is precluded from terminating parental rights on the statutory ground that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child under section 39.806(l)(d)(3) where no evidence regarding the impact of continuing the parent-child relationship is offered.” In re N.S., 898 So.2d 1194, 1198 (Fla....

...Parental rights are a “fundamental liberty interest” that cannot be terminated based on incarceration alone. In re J.B., 923 So.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Finally, factor (e) allows the circuit court to consider “[a]ny other factor the court deems relevant.” § 39.806(l)(d)3.e., Fla....

...rent will be incarcerated in determining whether that period constitutes a ‘substantial portion of the period of time’ before the child reaches age eighteen”), to a more qualitative analysis. The Legislature changed the word "substantial” in section 39.806(l)(d)l....

...dent and ordered the Department to file a new case plan for reuniting the father with the child. This appeal follows. There is a two-step statutory process to terminate parental rights. First, the trial court must find a ground for termination under section 39.806....

...to substantially comply with the case plan for a period of 9 months after an adjudication of the child as a dependent child or the child’s placement into shelter care, whichever occurs first, constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, neglect, or abandonment ....” § 39.806(1)(e)1., Fla....

...l rights and raises two issues: 1) the trial court erred in admitting child hearsay evidence based on a failure to properly comply with section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes; and 2) the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)2, Florida Statutes, based on the court's determination that he is a sexual predator....

...so be terminated because Appellant qualified as a sexual predator under Oregon law, based on his Oregon sex crime related convictions. In its final judgment, the trial court found that Appellant was a sexual predator within the meaning and intent of section 39.806(1(d)(2), Florida Statutes, based on Appellant's abuse of the child and his Oregon sex-related crime convictions....

...We note that although DCF urged the trial court to find Appellant is a sexual predator and terminate his parental rights on that ground, it now properly concedes that the trial court's judgment on this issue was error. Analysis One of the statutory bases the trial court cited for terminating Appellant's parental rights was section 39.806(1)(d)2, Florida Statutes....

...a sexual predator as defined in s. 775.21." This statute is also known as the "Florida Sexual Predators Act," which is part of the Florida Criminal Code, and provides certain ramifications if a person is designated a sexual predator. Two phrases in section 39.806(1)(d)2....

...re." S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 851 So.2d 689, 691 (Fla. 2003). In our judgment, therefore, the answer to the two questions can be summarized as follows: the determination of an incarcerated parent's sexual predator status for purposes of section 39.806(1)(d)2....

...[1] We are not alone in this assessment. The Fourth District was confronted with a similar case in W.W. v. Department of Children & Families, 811 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). There, as here, "[t]he trial court ... concluded that appellant's parental rights could be terminated under section 39.806(1)(d)2" because the court found the appellant was a sexual predator....

...se it requires a current conviction of a capital, life or first degree felony. Appellant's conviction was of a felony of a lesser degree." Id. The court continued: A more basic problem with DCF's assertion that appellant is a sexual predator is that section 39.806(1)(d)2, Florida Statutes (2001), on which DCF relies, provides that parental rights may be terminated when "[t]he incarcerated parent has been determined by the court to be ......

...her procedures set forth in section 775.21 followed. Id. at 792-93 (emphasis added). The same scenario exists here. Similarly, we hold that the trial court erred by terminating Appellant's parental rights pursuant to the sexual predator provision in section 39.806(1)(d)2, because he had not been designated a sexual predator by the Oregon state court that sentenced him for his prior sex-related crimes....

...nate a parent as a sexual predator, or to terminate parental rights based on such an invalid determination. In so holding, we find persuasive Judge Farmer's special concurring opinion in W.W., in which he observed: [One] thing to consider about the [section 39.806](1)(d)2 text lies in the term, "the court." Under the definition in section 39.01(18) "the court," unless otherwise expressly stated, refers to the court exercising power in a chapter 39 proceeding....

...nstitute abandonment." W.T.J. v. E.W.R., 721 So.2d 723, 725 (Fla. 1998). Nevertheless, incarceration is a factor to be considered "together with other facts to determine whether clear and convincing evidence of abandonment exists." Id. Nevertheless, section 39.806(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2001), provides for termination of parental rights when the period of a parent's incarceration "will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years." The...

WALLIS, J. D.W.Q. (“Father”) appeals an order terminating his parental rights to M.E.Q. in which the trial court found Father’s conduct was egregious under sections 39.806(l)(f)2....

...least restrictive means to protect the child. First, we reverse because the trial court terminated D.W.Q.’s parental rights on a ground not alleged in the petition. The petition did not allege termination was warranted for egregious conduct under section 39.806(1)(f)2.; the petition only alleged termination was warranted under sections 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(g). We do not need to discuss the facts of this case other than to note that termination under section 39.806(1)(f)2....

...It further "reject[ed]" the argument that the mother could parent the children because she safely parented J.F.-2 for one year and three months, stating that it is easy to parent a child J.F.-2's age. In this case, the Department has the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of the grounds under section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2002), for terminating parental rights and evidence that reunification poses a significant risk of harm to the child....

...A finding that evidence is clear and convincing enjoys a presumption of correctness and will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support. See id. In its amended petition, the Department moved to terminate the mother's parental rights on four grounds under section 39.806(1): subsection (c), the continuing involvement of the parent with the children threatens their life, safety and well-being, irrespective of the services offered; subsection (e), failure to substantially comply with the case plan for a...

...It was inappropriate to base termination on the testimony of a professional who recommended that the parents receive counseling and therapy and then, even though such counseling has not been provided, determines the parents still present a risk. 798 So.2d at 35-36. The other two grounds for termination, Florida Statutes section 39.806(1)(f) (egregious conduct towards another child) and (h) (committing manslaughter or felony assault against another child), raise questions of prospective abuse....

...2d DCA 2002). Or, stated another way, *88 whether it is "likely to happen" or "expected." In re J.L., 824 So.2d 1023, 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citations omitted). On appeal, the Department argues that, as to subsection (h), no nexus need be shown. Section 39.806(1)(h) allows parental rights to be terminated: When the parent or parents have committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child, or a felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child or another child, or aid...

...Failure to give the statutory scheme a narrow construction requiring the State to prove a nexus between the past conduct and the continuing substantial risk of harm to the current child could render the statute constitutionally infirm. See id. (holding section 39.806(1)(i) unconstitutional where it permits termination of parental rights solely upon the involuntary termination of rights to another child and shifts "DCF's responsibility to prove the elements necessary to terminate a parent's fundamental right to parent to the parent")....

to X.W.'s life, safety, and well-being under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2016) ; (2) C.W. was

...additional evidence relevant to these issues. Reversed and remanded. LaROSE and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur. . As our en banc decision described, the reference to "grounds for termination” in section 39.811(1) does not refer to a statutory ground under section 39.806 but rather to all of the elements that must be proven to entitle the State to terminate parental rights under section 39.802(4), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...Competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF") proved a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the manifest best interest of S.D. See §§ 39.806(1)(i), 39.810, Fla....

...(2010); In re the Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.1995); C.L. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 943 So.2d 272, 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). We, therefore, affirm. *439 Because DCF was required to prove only one ground for termination, we do not need to decide whether the trial court correctly relied on section 39.806(1)( l ) as an alternative ground for termination. See § 39.802(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010); cf. A.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 63 So.3d 874, 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Section 39.806(1)( l ) has an effective date of July 1, 2008, which means it became effective after the filing of the dependency proceeding but before the filing of the termination proceeding in this case....

...had refused counseling, and that her parental rights as to her older son, E.L., were previously terminated. The Department's petition relied upon this prior termination to prove in this case that the mother refused to avail herself of services pursuant to section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...The Department suggests that her purchase of clothing for the child evidences mental health issues, since she does not have custody. The more salient and competent point is that she has clothing for the child. There is no evidence that she cannot meet the child's basic needs in this record. *851 The Department relies upon section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes....

...While the Department certainly has arguments about M.S.'s lack of stability, the record lacks evidence. For these reasons, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion, including the provision of a case plan to M.S. [4] Reversed and Remanded. WARNER and KLEIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] 39.806 Grounds for termination of parental rights (1) The department, the guardian ad litem, or any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or who is informed of those facts and believes that they are true may petition for the termination of parental rights under any of the following circumstances: ....

...preceding the August 15 hearing. After the hearing, the trial court entered an order finding that DCF established, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother continues to abuse, neglect, or abandon A.E. and L.E., serving as grounds for TPR under section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2016)....

...case plan” have not been significantly remedied, and the children may be endangered upon their return to Mother. As to Father, the trial court found that DCF established, by clear and convincing evidence, that his incarceration warranted TPR under section 39.806(l)(d)(l), Florida Statutes (2016)....

...19. . The trial court declined to terminate Father's parental rights despite its acknowledgement that it could do so without terminating the rights of Mother “[i]f the parent whose rights are being terminated meets any of the criteria specified in s. 39.806(l)(d) and (film).” § 39.811(6)(e), Fla....

...Appellee concedes that the trial court's order was in error on this point. In light of appellee's concession and request that the matter be remanded for further proceedings, we reverse and remand to the trial court. Appellee filed a Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights alleging that sections 39.806(1)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes, provided grounds for terminating the parental rights of both appellant and the father. With respect to the father, appellee also included an allegation that section 39.806(1)(g), Florida Statutes, provided an additional ground for termination. In terminating the parental rights of the father, the trial court's order relies upon section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes. Appellee concedes that section 39.806(1)(f), was not pled in the Department's original petition for termination or argued by the appellee at the termination hearing. Additionally, appellee concedes that the petition for termination was never amended to include this ground. Appellee asserts that, under the facts of this case, it was error for the trial court to terminate the father's parental rights based upon section 39.806(1)(f)....

...rmination of rights to occur. See § 39.811(6), Fla. Stat. Continuing down this line of reasoning, appellee notes that because section 39.811(6), Florida Statutes, does not permit a court to terminate parental rights as to only one parent based upon section 39.806(1)(c) or (e), Florida Statutes, the trial court could not have relied upon either of the Department's stated grounds for terminating appellant's parental rights in this case....

...Nevertheless, that issue was also tried by implied consent as the evidence of compliance with the case plan was the central issue at trial without objection. K.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 940 So.2d 577, 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (finding issue of termination based on section 39.806(1)(c) was tried by implied consent where extensive evidence was introduced during the hearing implicating section 39.806(1)(c), the attorneys discussed this ground in closing, and the mother's counsel did not object); compare T.M....

...f the ground is alleged in the pleading. See § 39.802(4)(a), Fla. Stat. ("A petition for termination of parental rights filed under this chapter must contain facts supporting the following allegations: (a) That at least one of the grounds listed in s. 39.806 has been met.")....

...State, 645 So.2d 987, 996 (Fla. 1994) (in the criminal context, an erroneous reference to a statute in a charging instrument is not fatal to the conviction if the necessary elements of the offense otherwise are properly alleged). In this case, while the petition did not cite section 39.806(1)(e)1., the DCF alleged that W.S....

...n was not appropriate because any breach of her case plan was occasioned by her incarceration and the DCF's failure to provide her services during such time. In T.C., we found that competent substantial evidence supported the termination pursuant to 39.806(1)(e)2., noting that the mother failed to avail herself of the DCF's referrals and services in the months leading up to her incarceration. Likewise, in this case, W.S. made no effort at all to comply with the case plan during the times when he was not incarcerated. Termination of W.S.'s parental rights was warranted under section 39.806(1)(e). For these reasons, we affirm the final judgment of termination of W.S.'s parental rights. [1] GUNTHER and GROSS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In light of this disposition, we decline to consider whether termination was also warranted under section 39.806(1)(c).

...had sustained significant injuries while in the custody of the mother, T.R., and C.W.'s stepfather. The trial court ruled that the parents' acts and omissions constituted egregious conduct that threatened the children's life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2007), and terminated parental rights with respect to S.R....

...BROWNING, C.J., and PADOVANO, J., concur. NOTES [1] DCF did not offer a case plan to the parents prior to petitioning for the termination of parental rights. Under the governing statutes, in some circumstances, a case plan is not required to be offered. Section 39.806(2) provides that: "[r]easonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in paragraphs (1)(e)-(i) have occurred." Here, the trial court found that the acts or omissions of the parents (i.e., causing three broken ribs and failing to get medical treatment) constituted "egregious conduct" as defined in section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...termination was warranted in this case. As such, the court's ruling is affirmed. Accordingly, the trial court's termination order is affirmed in all aspects, except that portion finding clear and convincing evidence of egregious conduct, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, which is stricken, in that such conduct was not alleged in the petition for termination....

...1st DCA 2004)(holding that portion of trial court's termination order finding clear and convincing *312 evidence of egregious must be stricken because such conduct was not alleged in the petition for termination). AFFIRMED, as modified. PLEUS, PALMER and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 39.806(1)(c) & (f), Fla....

...ing evidence, we reverse the order terminating *11 the Mother's parental rights and remand for further proceedings. The Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition seeking to terminate the Mother's rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes (2002). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating the Mother's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), which states that "[a] petition for termination of parental rights may also be filed when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents." The trial court also found, based on the eleven factors contained in section 39.810, that termination was in the manifest best interests of the children. The trial court did not address termination under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...The Mother contends that reversal of the termination order is required because the trial court failed to make the necessary findings to support termination and because several of the trial court's findings are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Although the trial court specifically referred to termination under section 39.806(1)(e), the Mother argues that the evidence and the trial court's findings are insufficient to support termination under either section 39.806(1)(c) or (e). The Department affirmatively elected not to file a brief in response. [1] To support the termination of parental rights, the Department must prove by clear and convincing evidence one of the grounds for termination contained in section 39.806 and that termination is in the manifest best interests of the child pursuant to section 39.810....

...Kelley Schaeffer, for the Guardian ad Litem Program, Tavares. MARSTILLER, J. L.J. appeals a final order terminating her parental rights to her two children, D.C., a girl aged five, and D.C., a boy aged three-and-a-half. [1] She asserts the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes, because the Department failed to prove her drug and alcohol addiction would not improve....

...On July 15, 2009, the Department filed a Verified Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and Permanent Commitment for *101 Purposes of Subsequent Adoption. Based upon evidence presented by the Department, the trial court terminated L.J.'s parental rights finding that, under section 39.806(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2009), [2] L.J....

...argues the trial court wrongly terminated her parental rights without clear and convincing evidence that there is no reasonable basis to believe she will improve in her efforts to beat alcohol and drug addiction. But in M.H. the Department proceeded under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, which allows a parent's rights to be terminated if her conduct "demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent......

...the Department sought to terminate the appellant's rights due solely to her drug addiction, we reiterated the principle that parental rights cannot be terminated based on drug addiction alone, and held the Department must, in order to justify termination under section 39.806(1)(c), prove both that continued interaction with the parent would threaten the child's life, safety, or health regardless of the provision of services and that "there is no reasonable basis to believe the parent will improve." Id....

...ting a "strong desire to overcome her addiction and parent her children." Id. at 223. Thus we found the record "demonstrate[d] a reasonable basis to believe Appellant's problems could be improved." Id. We have not extended M.H. to terminations under section 39.806(1)(e) and we decline to do so in this case....

...But there is no evidence in the record that L.J. has enrolled or is participating in after care. For similar reasons, we distinguish the two other cases cited by L.J. which she says apply the additional evidentiary requirement articulated in M.H. to terminations under section 39.806(1)(e)....

...While the Department alleged the mother failed to comply with her case plan by not reporting alcohol-related arrests, it also attempted to tie the mother's alcohol abuse to purported egregious conduct involving a domestic incident with her mother. Id. at 801. See section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes. The court cited M.H. not in relation to case plan noncompliance under section 39.806(1)(e), but to the "egregious conduct" ground for termination under section 39.806(1)(f) because it rested solely on the mother's alcohol abuse....

...The record in this case contains competent, substantial evidence supporting the order terminating L.J.'s parental rights. The order is therefore AFFIRMED. KAHN and ROWE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] At the termination hearing, the children's father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights under section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The termination of his rights is not at issue in this appeal. [2] Section 39.806(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2009), authorizes termination of parental rights when a case plan has been filed and "[t]he child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parent or parents." The statute provides further: The f...

...Paullin of Guardian ad Litem Program, Orlando, for Appellee Guardian ad Litem Program. NORTHCUTT, Chief Judge. J.R., the father of L.L-R., challenges the order terminating his parental rights. [1] The circuit court determined that he had abandoned the child. § 39.806(1)(b), Fla....

NOBTHCUTT, Chief Judge. J.R., the father of L.L-R., challenges the order terminating his parental rights. 1 The circuit court determined that he had abandoned the child. § 39.806(l)(b), Fla....

...was not living independently. Based on her chronic substance abuse and her history with the Department, the Department did not offer the mother a case plan, but instead filed an expedited petition to terminate her parental rights under sections 39.806(1)(c), (i), (j), and (l), Florida Statutes (2016)....

...This means that the Department ordinarily must show that it has made a good faith effort to rehabilitate the parent and to reunify the family, often through a case plan and related services. Id. However, a case plan is not a mandatory prerequisite to termination. Under section 39.806(2), Florida Statutes (2016), reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required when termination is proven under sections 39.806(1)(b) through (d) or (1)(f) through (m). Termination, here, was premised on sections 39.806(1)(c), (i), (j), and (l); therefore, the Department was not obligated to offer the mother a case plan before seeking to terminate her parental rights. The Florida Supreme Court has recognized in “extraordinary circumstances,” termination without a case plan is the least restrictive means....

...See R.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 228 So. 3d 730, 733 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (recognizing “extraordinary circumstances” for termination without a case plan include termination based on continuing abuse through continued involvement under section 39.806(1)(c))....

relationship with M.S., an incarcerated parent, under section 39.806(l)(d)(3), Florida Statutes (2014). I.

...hildren based solely on his incarceration. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.146. We agree with S.H. and reverse. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) filed an amended petition to terminate S.H.'s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)(1), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...In pertinent part, the statute provides for termination of parental rights when the parent is incarcerated and the period of expected incarceration constitutes a substantial portion of time before the child will attain the age of majority. Id. DCF alleged no other grounds for termination. DCF must satisfy section 39.806(1)(d)(1) with clear and convincing evidence....

...ld, then eight months old, reached the age of majority. J.H. v. Dep't *318 of Children & Family Servs. (In re E.I.F.), 872 So.2d 924, 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Similarly, S.H.'s remaining term of incarceration cannot be the basis for termination under section 39.806(1)(d)(1)....

...I agree this case in which the trial judge terminated the parental rights of K.S., the mother of A.S., a child, should be affirmed. The basis for the termination was K.S.'s failure to substantially comply with her case plan over a long period of time—in excess of the twelve months specified, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

before time to comply with the case plan expires. § 39.806(1)(e) 1.-2., Fla. Stat. (2017). The trial court

...Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 908 So.2d 568, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (one footnote omitted; emphasis added). Here, the order terminating the Mother’s parental rights reflects that her rights were terminated solely based on her failure to complete her case plan under section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...g terminated became a parent through a single-parent adoption; (d) If the protection of the child demands termination of the rights of a single parent; or *28 (e) If the parent whose rights are being terminated meets any of the criteria specified in s. 39.806(l)(d) and (f)-(i)....

...at her continued involvement with them would threaten their life or well-being without regard to the provision of services, and had refused to substantially comply with her case plan regarding the children after they had been declared dependent. See § 39.806(l)(b), (c), (e), Fla....

...tion 39.801(3)(d) (involving termination of parental rights). It does not apply to cases in which a parent voluntarily executes a written surrender of the child and consents to the entry of an order giving custody of the child to the Department. See § 39.806(l)(a), Fla....

...Because the evidence was insufficient to support the termination as to any of the children, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. On May 9, 2008, the Department filed a petition for the termination of parental rights to all three children, alleging the Mother and the Father failed to comply with section 39.806(l)(e) and (e), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991); R.W.W., 788 So.2d at 1023 . At the termination hearing, the trial court determined the Mother’s and the Father’s continued involvement with drugs threatened the well-being and safety of the children pursuant to section 39.806(l)(c)....

...Dep’t of Children & Families, 866 So.2d 220, 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“[I]t is well settled that a parent’s drug addiction, standing alone, is an insufficient ground upon which to terminate *654 parental rights.”). Therefore, we find the trial court erred by granting the petition under section 39.806(l)(c). 1 Next, the trial court’s order determined the parents “failed to comply with the requirements of their case plans pursuant to [section] 39.806(l)(e).” However, the trial court failed to distinguish its findings among S.F....

...and P.F., who were parties to the original case plan, and C.F., who was adjudicated dependent only seven months before the termination. The trial court also failed to distinguish its findings between the Father and the Mother, the latter of whom had considerably more difficulties complying with her case plan. Section 39.806(l)(e)(l) provides that a twelve-month period for compliance with a case plan begins to run “only after the child’s placement into shelter care or the entry of a disposition order placing the custody of the child with the department...

....S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 787 So.2d 875 , 878 n. 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. M.H., 625 So.2d 909, 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Finally, the trial court determined that termination under section 39.806(l)(c) and (e) was the least restrictive means of protecting the children from serious harm....

...reat the children as an amorphous group in which the best interests of one will meet the interests of all.”). Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment terminating the Mother’s and the Father’s parental rights as to S.F., P.F., and C.F. under section 39.806(l)(e) and (e) and remand for further proceedings....

...State, 687 So.2d 924, 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). G.M. argues that termination is inappropriate where "the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due . . . to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child." See § 39.806(1)(e)(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). G.M. is incarcerated and scheduled for release in early 2012. In W.L. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 15 So.3d 866, 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), the trial court terminated the father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e)(1), Florida Statutes (2007), finding that the father failed to comply with the terms of his case plan....

...did not have the ability to comply with his case because of his incarceration and the Department's failure to assist him. Abandonment The trial court also determined that G.M. abandoned the child because he *927 failed to support and communicate with the child. See § 39.806(1)(b). Section 39.806(1)(e)(1) provides that a parent's failure to complete a case plan within nine months after an adjudication of the child as dependent is evidence of abandonment, abuse, or neglect....

...Pickett, West Palm Beach, for appellant D.B., Sr. *1160 Frank A. Kreidler, Lake Worth, for appellant K.B. Anthony C. Musto, Hallandale Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We affirm the trial court's termination of the parental rights of both the mother and father pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes, for their failure to comply with their case plans imposed when the child was removed from their care....

...and N.K., the parents of twelve-year-old A.K., appeal the trial court's final judgment terminating their parental rights. We affirm, concluding that substantial competent evidence supported the trial court's finding that the statutory grounds for termination of their parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes, were established by clear and convincing evidence....

...en that demonstrates the[ir] continuing involvement ... in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the children irrespective of the provision of services, within the meaning of § 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003)." Additionally, the court found that, "notwithstanding that a Child Welfare Case Plan ... was entered on behalf of the [Appellants], [they have] continued to neglect, abuse and abandon the children for the past twelve months or more pursuant to § 39.806(1)(e) and § 39.01(1) and (45), Florida Statutes (2003)." Further, the court found that Appellants "abandoned [their] children within the meaning of § 39.806(1)(b) and § 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and [have] engaged in egregious conduct that endangered the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the children or the children's sibling, pursuant to § 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2003)." Because we find that the trial court erred in terminating Appellants' rights, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. Specifically, we find nothing in the record to support the trial court's decision to terminate Appellants' parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e), which provides for termination when the parents fail to substantially comply with their case plan for 12 months....

...One month later, however, the children were removed from the home, apparently based on a complaint from the day care provider. Three months after that, in November 2003, the Department initiated termination proceedings. The trial court erred in terminating Appellants' rights in March 2004 based on section 39.806(1)(e) because 12 months had not passed from August 2003, when the children were removed. See C.C. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 812 So.2d 520, 521 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (explaining that trial court erred in terminating parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e) where child "was some eight months old at the time, [appellant] did not, because she could not, as the order terminating parental rights erroneously found, have `neglected or abandoned' [the child] for the past 12 months or more")....

...parental rights itself is affirmed, because two other grounds supporting termination were established by DCF." 959 So.2d at 431. Accord A.B. ex rel. J.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 969 So.2d 422, 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (affirming order terminating A.B.'s parental rights where supported by adequate evidence on 39.806(1)(c) and (e) grounds, but reversing portion of order terminating parental rights under 39.806(b) on abandonment grounds for insufficient evidence)....

...1st DCA 2002) ("We nevertheless remand for reconsideration of A.C.'s best interests, in accordance with section 39.810, Florida Statutes (2000), because the fact findings in the order under review are erroneous and incomplete."). Therefore, "we affirm the termination of [K.W.'s] parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c) and (e), but reverse that portion of the order terminating her parental rights on the ground that she abandoned her children under section 39.806(1)(b) and remand for this finding to be stricken from the order." A.B....

...Bernadette Noe; Hillary S. Kambour, for appellee. Before GREEN, SHEPHERD, and LAGOA, JJ. PER CURIAM. Contrary to the arguments advanced by the appellant/mother, we find that the order terminating her parental rights to her minor children, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2007), was supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record before us....

...t were pleaded, viz., that her continued involvement “in the parent-child relationship[s]” would jeopardize “the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the childfren] irrespective of the provision of services.” § 39.806(l)(c), Fla....

...abused or neglected her children by “engaging] in conduct toward the children ... that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the mother in the parent-child relationship ... threatens the life or well-being of the children” within the meaning of section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2006). DCFS asserted no other ground but did allege under this heading that Z.M. had not completed certain tasks assigned in a case plan. DCFS did not allege abuse, neglect or abandonment evi *1269 denced. by case plan noncompliance in violation of section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2006), 1 as grounds for termination of Z.M.’s parental rights. From opening statement on, DCFS litigated the case as it had pleaded it in its petition, urging as grounds for termination of Z.M.’s parental rights section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2006), alone. Only after the close of DCFS’s case in chief and in response to Z.M.’s motion to dismiss did the trial judge suggest and DCFS’s counsel agree that section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2006), seemed to support termination of Z.M.’s parental rights....

...In its final judgment the trial court ruled, nevertheless, that DCFS had established grounds for termination of Z.M.’s parental rights, not only (on the grounds actually pleaded) under section (l)(c), but also under section (l)(e). This was error. DCFS never sought termination of Z.M.’s parental rights based on section 39.806(l)(e)....

...The 12-month period begins to run only after the child’s placement into shelter care or the entry of a disposition order placing the custody of the child with the department or a person other than the parent and the approval by the court of a case plan with a goal of reunification with the parent, whichever came first. § 39.806(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (2006). . The following exchange took place after DCFS rested and Z.M.'s counsel stated a motion to dismiss: THE COURT: It looks like the allegations in Paragraph 12 would be more under 39.806(l)(e)....

...The father's parental rights to the children have been terminated. . In contrast to the trial court’s ruling on the record, the court's written order does state (conclusorily) that DCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence grounds for termination of Z.M.’s parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...The child was adjudicated dependent in 2006 and placed in Department's custody for appropriate foster care placement. The trial court approved a child welfare case plan in 2006 with the goal of reunification. More than one year later, Department initiated proceedings against Appellant pursuant to section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2007), which states several grounds for terminating parental rights....

...physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services. Provision of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

...Department alleged that the evidence would prove that Appellant is incapable of meeting her child's daily needs. Specifically, Department contended that Appellant's intellectual deficits, mixed personality disorder, and parenting skills deficiencies created an unacceptable risk of abuse and/or neglect of her child. Section 39.806(1)(e)1, Florida Statutes (2007), sets out the following circumstances *268 as another proper ground for termination of parental rights: When a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and: The child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents....

...Wilkov, Guardian Ad Litem Program, Gainesville, for Appellee Guardian Ad Litem. PER CURIAM. The order of involuntary termination of parental rights is AFFIRMED in all aspects, except that portion finding clear and convincing evidence of egregious conduct, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, which is stricken, in that such conduct was not alleged in the petition for termination....

...2 That rule establishes the *18 grounds upon which a party may obtain relief from judgment in cases subject to the juvenile rules of procedure, including “[fjraud (intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of any other party.” Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.270(b)(4); see also § 39.806(l)(a)2., Fla....

...challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights after more than four years of efforts at reunification. [1] Ultimately, the trial court found that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the grounds for termination under sections 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(e), Florida Statutes (2007), and that termination was in the manifest best interests of the child....

...presumption of correctness and will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support. N.L. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 843 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Termination of parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c) requires three evidentiary proofs....

...Dep’t of Children & Families, 10 So.3d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), is instructive. In C.A.T., DCF initially filed a petition for termination of parental rights against both the father and the child’s mother. The petition was filed on an expedited basis pursuant to section 39.806(3), Florida Statutes....

...In short, it appears that the finding that termination of the father’s parental rights was the least restrictive means of protecting J.Y. from harm is not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. In addition, the lower court’s findings regarding the manifest best interest of J.Y. based on section 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), are likewise not supported by substantial competent evidence....

...The appeal with respect to K.N. was earlier dismissed by this court. . DCF concedes in its answer brief that they never claimed in their petition for termination that R.L., the mother, abandoned her two children. Rather it asserted only that grounds existed under section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes for parental termination....

...a goal of reunification. More than a year passed, and despite DCF's offer of services, B.B. failed to substantially comply with his case plan. Based on this failure, the trial court granted DCF's petition to terminate his parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes....

...rights. This appeal followed. In I.Z. v. B.H., it was noted by this court that: A termination of parental rights proceeding involves a two-step process. First, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2002), has been proven....

...The Department of Children and Family Services and the Guardian ad Litem Program concede that it was error to terminate the Father’s parental rights on the ground that he voluntarily surrendered his rights when he did not execute the necessary surrender forms. § 39.806(l)(a), Fla....

...The trial court ruled that the Department did not have to reveal the names or addresses of any foster parents. We agree with the trial court. A petition for termination of parental rights (TPR) must contain facts supporting the allegation that at least one of the grounds listed in section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2002) has been met and that "the manifest best interests of the child, in accordance with s....

...rsons providing a present or potential placement for the child." The focus in a termination case is on the deficiencies of a parent that may *321 justify the termination of parental rights. If a ground for termination of parental rights exists under section 39.806, the quoted language from section 39.810 indicates that an evaluation of a foster parent's qualities is not material to the termination decision....

...Rehearing Denied August 20, 2007. Michael Ufferman, Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant. Michael Lee, Department of Children and Families, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Father, appeals the termination of his parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), arguing the Department of Children and Families failed to prove that his continued involvement would harm his children irrespective of the provision of services and failed to provide him any services....

...The record is devoid of any evidence that his continued involvement would harm his children despite the provision of services, or that the Department provided him services. See N.L. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 843 So.2d 996, 1002 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (reversing termination of parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), because the record was devoid of evidence that services were offered or provided, or that it would have been futile to provide services); W.R. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 928 So.2d 414, 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (reversing termination of parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), because the record was devoid of evidence that the parent's continued involvement in the parent-child relationship would threaten or harm the child)....

...ce of prospective abuse. Alternatively, DCF contends the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing its petition for dependency because a preponderance of evidence demonstrated present and prospective abuse and neglect. The petition, relying on section 39.806(1)(c) and (i) [1] , alleged that on April 26, 2000, the father, Roy McCormack, assaulted the mother, Victoria Vaught, in the presence of the child, S.M., and that at the time of the domestic dispute, the parents and the child were livi...

...The mother said that the father had "shoved her and grabbed a hold of her hair." The father was arrested for child abuse and domestic violence. Because of the prior termination of parental rights in Mississippi, DCF filed a joint petition for dependency and a termination of parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes....

...found no competent evidence of the mother failing a drug screen in July 2000 and no evidence of current drug use. We agree with DCF that the trial court erred in refusing to recognize the termination of parental rights in Mississippi for purposes of section 39.806(1)(i)....

...hts, alleging the following statutory grounds: abandonment; continued involvement of the parent threatens the child irrespective of services; continued abuse; abandonment or neglect after filing a case plan; and material breach of the case plan. See § 39.806(1), Fla....

...ion. The statute provides for the contents of the petition as follows: (4) A petition for termination of parental rights filed under this chapter must contain facts supporting the following allegations: (a) That at least one of the grounds listed in s. 39.806 has been met....

...(b) That the parents of the child were informed of their right to counsel at all hearings that they attended and that a dispositional order adjudicating the child dependent was entered in any prior dependency proceeding relied upon in offering a parent a case plan as described in s. 39.806. (c) That the manifest best interests of the child, in accordance with s. 39.810, would be served by the granting of the petition. § 39.802(4) (emphasis added). Section 39.806(1), in turn, provides specific statutory grounds for termination....

...The surrender document must be executed before two witnesses and a notary public or other person authorized to take acknowledgments. 2. The surrender and consent may be withdrawn after acceptance by the department only after a finding by the court that the surrender and consent were obtained by fraud or under duress. § 39.806(1) (emphasis added). The other grounds for termination listed in the statute are involuntary in nature. See § 39.806(l)(b)-(i). In this case, for example, the Department alleged several involuntary grounds under the statute, such as abandonment and that continued parental involvement threatened the child irrespective of services. See id. § 39.806(l)(b)-(c)....

...consent for termination of parental rights. § 39.801(d) (emphasis added). In H.E., the Second District examined these statutes to determine whether they require the Department to present evidence of one of the grounds alleged in the petition under section 39.806 after a parent’s consent to termination is entered under section 39.801(3)(d) for failure to appear. 3 So.3d at 342-43. The Second District reasoned that the statutorily required implied consent for failure to appear is a voluntary termination essentially equivalent to the voluntary surrender in section 39.806(l)(a) described above, which is one of the statutory grounds for termination....

...See S.S., 976 So.2d at 42 ; A.S., 927 So.2d at 208 ; R.H., 860 So.2d at 988 . In sum, these district courts reason that (1) under section 39.802(4)(a), a petition for termination of parental lights must be based on at least one of the grounds for termination provided in section 39.806(1); (2) section 39.801(3)(d)’s implied consent is not listed as a section 39.806 ground; (3) neither section 39.801 nor section 39.806 refers to the other; and, therefore, (4) section 39.801 (3)(d) is not a statutory ground for termination and evidence must be presented on the grounds in the petition. It is undeniable that consent to termination based on the parent’s failure to appear is not among the grounds for termination listed in section 39.806(1). We therefore disagree with the Second District’s analysis, which equates section 39.801(3)(d)’s constructive consent with the voluntary surrender under section 39.806(1)(a). See In re H.E., 3 So.3d at 343. A voluntary surrender under section 39.806(1)(a) is only accomplished by the parent’s execution of “a written surrender of the child,” with the “surrender document [being] executed before two witnesses and a notary public or other person authorized to take acknowledgments.” A constructive consent for failure to appear *236 pursuant to section 39.801(3)(d) clearly is different in character from a “written surrender” under 39.806(l)(a)....

...So.3d at 343. 6 Once the trial court has deemed the parent to have consented to the termination, there is no basis for the parent to complain that the trial court did not consider evidence establishing the existence of a ground for termination under section 39.806(1). The constructive consent provision of section 39.801 (3)(d) can only be reasonably understood as providing a basis for termination which precludes a defaulting parent’s objection to the absence of proof of a ground for termination under section 39.806(1)....

...We need not and do not consider an)' of the parties' arguments or the district courts' discussions regarding the impact of a termination predicated on a section 39.801 (3)(d) consent on hypothetical future termination of parental rights proceedings concerning siblings under section 39.806(1 )(i). Whether a termination based on constructive consent pursuant to section 39.801 (3)(d) should be considered an involuntary termination for purposes of section 39.806(l)(i) is simply not at issue in this case....

...The Mother contends that the burden of proof set forth in this provision of federal law preempts the clear and convincing burden of proof that applies to the findings required under Florida law—1) at least one of the statutory grounds enumerated in section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes, has been met; 2) termination is in the child’s manifest best interests; and 3) termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm....

...imony, considered the probability high that S.S. would abuse drugs or alcohol in the future. Further, notwithstanding that S.S. had acknowledged guilt, the trial court considered that S.S. took no responsibility for his crimes. The court relied upon section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes, for its decision, recognizing that it applied when parents engage in conduct toward the child or other children that demonstrates that continued parental involvement threatens the life, safety, or well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child, irrespective of the provision of services or whether or not there had been services. The trial judge also listed as a factor section 39.806(l)(d)l., Florida Statutes, dealing with incarceration of a parent for a *557 substantial portion of a child’s minority....

...and noted that S.S. had been gone for the past seven formative years of his daughters’ lives. This case differs from the bulk of deci-sional law on termination of parental rights in that these proceedings were initiated by a parent, not the state. Section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes, allows a petition by any person with knowledge of the facts alleged....

...n testimony (inapplicable); (c) the parent whose rights are to be terminated became a parent through a single parent adoption (inapplicable); (d) the protection of the child demands termination of the single parent (possible); or (e) the criteria in section 39.806(l)(d) and (f)-(i) are met. Section 39.806(l)(d) deals with incarceration; (f) deals with egregious conduct (dismissed by the trial court); (g) deals with aggravated child abuse, sexual battery or sexual abuse on the particular child or children (dismissed by trial court); (h)...

...rious bodily injury to the child or another child (inapplicable); and (i) comes into play when parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been involuntarily terminated (inapplicable). The only possible applicable subsections are 39.811(6)(d) or 39.806(l)(d)....

...n incarcerated for a number of years. This testimony, taken alone, does not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence necessitating termination to protect the girls. It is simply evidence of the guardian ad litem’s understandable concern. Section 39.806(l)(d)l., dealing with incarceration, does not support terminating parental rights in this case....

...The record contains S.S.’s testimony that he was amenable to treatment and would do whatever the court deemed necessary to preserve and improve his relationships with his daughters. The record contains no evidence that S.S. would not respond to treatment. Furthermore, subsection 39.806(l)(c) provides: (c) When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life,...

...We reverse the termination of S.S.’s parental rights and remand with directions to consider less restrictive alternatives before any final decision is reached with respect to termination. We recognize, as noted by the trial court, that adjudication as a sexual predator, alone, is sufficient support for termination. Section 39.806(l)(d)(2) allows termination of parental rights where the parent is incarcerated and has been determined by a court to be a sexual predator as defined in section 775.21, Florida Statutes....

...imony, considered the probability high that S.S. would abuse drugs or alcohol in the future. Further, notwithstanding that S.S. had acknowledged guilt, the trial court considered that S.S. took no responsibility for his crimes. The court relied upon section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, for its decision, recognizing that it applied when parents engage in conduct toward the child or other children that demonstrates that continued parental involvement threatens the life, safety, or well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child, irrespective of the provision of services or whether or not there had been services. The trial judge also listed as a factor section 39.806(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes, dealing with incarceration of a parent for a *557 substantial portion of a child's minority....

...n, and noted that S.S. had been gone for the past seven formative years of his daughters' lives. This case differs from the bulk of decisional law on termination of parental rights in that these proceedings were initiated by a parent, not the state. Section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes, allows a petition by any person with knowledge of the facts alleged....

...n testimony (inapplicable); (c) the parent whose rights are to be terminated became a parent through a single parent adoption (inapplicable); (d) the protection of the child demands termination of the single parent (possible); or (e) the criteria in section 39.806(1)(d) and (f)-(i) are met. Section 39.806(1)(d) deals with incarceration; (f) deals with egregious conduct (dismissed by the trial court); (g) deals with aggravated child abuse, sexual battery or sexual abuse on the particular child or children (dismissed by trial court); (h)...

...rious bodily injury to the child or another child (inapplicable); and (i) comes into play when parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been involuntarily terminated (inapplicable). The only possible applicable subsections are 39.811(6)(d) or 39.806(1)(d)....

...een incarcerated for a number of years. This testimony, taken alone, does not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence necessitating termination to protect the girls. It is simply evidence of the guardian ad litem's understandable concern. Section 39.806(1)(d)1., dealing with incarceration, does not support terminating parental rights in this case....

...The record contains S.S.'s testimony that he was amenable to treatment and would do whatever the court deemed necessary to preserve and improve his relationships with his daughters. The record contains no evidence that S.S. would not respond to treatment. Furthermore, subsection 39.806(1)(c) provides: (c) When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life,...

...We reverse the termination of S.S.'s parental rights and remand with directions to consider less restrictive alternatives before any final decision is reached with respect to termination. We recognize, as noted by the trial court, that adjudication as a sexual predator, alone, is sufficient support for termination. Section 39.806(1)(d)(2) allows termination of parental rights where the parent is incarcerated and has been determined by a court to be a sexual predator as defined in section 775.21, Florida Statutes....

...This order states that the mother was in non-compliance with the tasks assigned to her in the case plan. On February 5, 2004, the Termination of Parental Rights Petition ("TPR Petition") was filed, and it was later amended on March 24, 2004. The Department sought termination based on the following grounds: 1) section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2004), which provides that irrespective of services, the parent's continuing involvement with the child threatens the child's safety, well-being, and health; 2) section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2004), which provides that the failure of a parent to substantially comply with a case plan, constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, abandonment, or neglect; and 3) section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), which provides that the parent has abandoned the child as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2004), if the parent, while being able, makes no provision for the support of the child and no effort to communicate with the child....

...Klein's testimony, the parties gave closing arguments. Thereafter, the trial court orally held that it was terminating the mother's parental rights on the following grounds, which the Department established by clear and convincing evidence: 1) pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), because the mother's conduct toward the child indicates that her continuing involvement with the child would threaten the child's life, safety, well-being or physical, mental or emotional health, irrespective of the provision of services; and 2) pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e) due to the mother's failure to comply with her case plan. Moreover, the trial court also found that termination was warranted pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b) because the mother had abandoned the child as defined in section 39.01(1)....

...erminating the mother's parental rights. The mother contends that the trial court's finding, that her continuing involvement with the child would threaten his life, safety, well-being or health, irrespective of the provision of services, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), is not supported by the evidence. We agree. In construing section 39.806(1)(c), the Second District explained that "[i]rrespective of" means "independent or regardless of." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1196 (1986). Thus, in order to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court must find that the child's life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent regardless of any services provided to the parent....

...State of Fla., Dep't of Children & Families, 788 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)(emphasis added); see In re J.B., 30 Fla. L. Weekly D2779, 2005 WL 3334379 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 9, 2005)(holding that trial court reversibly erred by terminating parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c) when parent has demonstrated improvement and further improvement is possible); I.R. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 904 So.2d 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)(holding that trial court erred by terminating parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), when the Department deprived the mother of a viable opportunity to complete her case plan and the record did not demonstrate that the mother failed to benefit from the services the Department did provide)....

...ard the child indicates that her continuing involvement with the child would threaten the child's life, safety, well-being or physical, mental or emotional health, irrespective of the provision of services, thereby warranting termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c). See J.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 890 So.2d 434, 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)(holding that parental rights could not be terminated pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c) where Department failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that long-term therapy would not improve mother's anger management problems). *644 The mother also contends that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e). We agree. Pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2004), parental rights may be terminated if the parent fails to substantially comply with a case plan....

...the parent and child." K.J. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 906 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); see T.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 905 So.2d 993, 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)(holding that parental rights cannot not be terminated pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e) where the "Department made no effort to assist the father in securing the type of services he would need to substantially comply with his case plan. . . ."); J.F., 890 So.2d at 439 (holding that evidence did not support termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e), for failing to substantially comply with case plan, where mother failed to complete intensive therapy, as required under case plan, "because of various problems, not attributable to her"); P.A....

...t. However, this does not excuse the Department's failure in making reasonable efforts to secure the type of services required under the case plan. Finally, the mother asserts that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b)....

...ough on the date that the order was entered, there was no referral in place for individual counseling. [3] The record does not indicate why there was an eight month lapse between the hearing and the filing of the trial court's order. [4] Subsections 39.806(1)(b), (c) and (e) provide as follows: (1) The department, the guardian ad litem, or any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or who is informed of those facts and believes that they are true may petition for the termination of parental rights under any of the following circumstances: ....

...was injured and virtually non-responsive as a result of head trauma, neglected to seek medical attention for over six hours, a decision that ensured a tragic end for the two and one-half year old child. The trial court found J.R.'s conduct to be egregious and made the required findings pursuant to section 39.806, Florida Statutes....

...The mother subsequently surrendered *591 her parental rights to the child, and W.N. proceeded to trial. The trial court issued the present Final Judgment Terminating Parental Rights. We affirm both grounds upon which the court terminated W.N.'s parental rights under Florida Statutes section 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(e). The trial court first found that W.N.'s drug use, with other factors, threatened the life and safety of the minor child. Section 39.806(1)(c) states that parental rights may be terminated: When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services.... § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

...4th DCA 1998) (affirming termination of mother's parental rights where she failed to substantially comply with the case plan and the child's best interests were served by the termination). The trial court also terminated W.N.'s parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e) by finding that W.N....

...failed to substantially comply with the reunification case plan for a period of over twelve months even though appropriate services were provided. Such failure of substantial compliance is evidence of abuse and neglect and is also grounds for termination. § 39.806(1)(e), Fla....

...and D.B., Foster Parents. Before EMAS, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.  PER CURIAM. A.B., the Father (“Father”), seeks to reverse the amended final judgment terminating his parental rights to the child (“C.B.”) on grounds of abandonment, pursuant to sections 39.01(1) and 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2023)....

...3d DCA 2024). ANALYSIS Before a trial court can terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child, there are three elements the Department must prove. First, the Department must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground in section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2023), exists. See § 39.806(1), Fla....

...Paullin, Tavares, for Appellee Guardian ad Litem Program. WALLACE, Judge. M.N. (the Father) appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his three children, C.N., M.N., and D.N., based on the material breach of a case plan under section 39.806(1)(e)(2), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...[1] The Father breached case plan tasks requiring him to commit no further law violations and to avoid further involvement in crimes of violence. Although the Father was imprisoned for four years, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) did not seek to terminate the Father's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(d) relating to parents who are incarcerated....

...'s parental rights when his imprisonment resulting from a new law violation made it impossible for him to complete his other case plan tasks within the allotted time. We conclude that the statutory scheme for the termination of parental rights makes section 39.806(1)(d) the exclusive method for *1226 the termination of parental rights based on the fact of a parent's incarceration. In addition, the Father did not commit any of the crimes for which the termination of parental rights is authorized under subsections 39.806(1)(g) and (1)(h)....

...The [F]ather is unable to complete his case plan in prison. Based on this finding, the trial court concluded that grounds existed for termination of the Father's parental rights based on noncompliance with his case plan tasks: Pursuant to Florida Statute 39.806(1)(e)(2) (2009), the child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the Court, and the [F]ather has materially breached the case plan by making it unlikely that he will be able to substantially comply with the case plan before the time for compliance expires....

...re of [DCF] to make reasonable efforts to reunify the [F]ather and child[ren]. Thus the trial court granted DCF's petition and terminated the Father's parental rights to his three children. This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION A. Incarceration Under Section 39.806(1)(d) Section 39.806(1)(d) establishes three separate grounds upon which a court may terminate the parental rights of a parent incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution: 1....

...nd-degree murder or sexual battery. Third, the trial court did not find that continuing the parental relationship with the Father would be harmful to the children. So the termination of the Father's parental rights because of his incarceration under section 39.806(1)(d) was not an option. Perhaps for this reason, DCF did not rely on section 39.806(1)(d) in its petition for the termination of the Father's parental rights. The trial court emphasized that the basis for its findings under section 39.806(1)(e)(2) was the Father's commission of a new violent crime, not the resulting incarceration....

...entirety of the younger two children's lives. Nevertheless, the trial court grounded its decision to grant the petition on a material breach of the case plan, not the length of the Father's incarceration. B. The Material Breach of a Case Plan Under Section 39.806(1)(e)(2) The inapplicability of section 39.806(1)(d) brings us to the issue of whether the Father's parental rights could properly be terminated for material breach of his case plan under section 39.806(1)(e)(2)....

...rt terminate the parent's parental rights based on a material breach of the case plan for this reason alone? We turn now to an examination of these questions. When a child has been adjudicated dependent and a case plan has been filed with the court, section 39.806(1)(e) permits a court to terminate a parent's parental rights in two separate circumstances. First, under section 39.806(1)(e)(1), a court may terminate a parent's parental rights if the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parent or parents....

...or abandonment unless the failure to substantially *1229 comply with the case plan was due to the parent's lack of financial resources or to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child. Id. Second, under section 39.806(1)(e)(2), a court may terminate a parent's parental rights for a material breach of the case plan....

...ng evidence that the parent or parents are unlikely or unable to substantially comply with the case plan before time to comply with the case plan expires." Id. C. The Father's Progress on His Case Plan In this case, DCF and the trial court relied on section 39.806(1)(e)(2) relating to a material breach of the case plan as the ground for the termination of the Father's parental rights....

...new crime or violates probation or community control, resulting in his or her incarceration. On the one hand, a parent's failure to comply with a case plan within the allotted time constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, neglect, and abandonment. § 39.806(1)(e)(1). On the other hand, incarceration alone is not a ground for the termination of parental rights. See § 39.806(1)(d); V.M....

...The only case plan task that the parent failed to complete was the requirement that he have no new law violations. Id. On a termination petition filed by DCF, the trial court terminated the parent's parental rights to his then three-year-old son on four grounds: (1) abandonment, § 39.806(1)(b); (2) continuing involvement of the parent in the parent-child relationship threatening the child irrespective of the provision of services, § 39.806(1)(c); (3) continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child, § 39.806(1)(d)(3); and (4) case plan noncompliance, § 39.806(1)(e). 923 So.2d at 1205. On appeal, this court disapproved the termination of parental rights on all four grounds. Id. at 1208. With regard to case plan noncompliance under section 39.806(1)(e), this court noted that the parent was in substantial compliance with his case plan until his arrest and incarceration....

...ns of probation or community control may not properly be included as a case plan task. The breach of such a task that results in the parent's incarceration is not—standing alone—a proper ground for the termination of parental rights. The design of section 39.806 compels this conclusion. Section 39.806 sets forth a comprehensive and detailed list of twelve separate grounds for the termination of parental rights....

...A parent's commission of some crimes, e.g., aggravated child abuse, obviously warrants intervention to protect the affected child or children. But the commission of many other crimes may have little to do with the offender's effectiveness as a parent or with the child's welfare. The scheme of section 39.806 controls and limits the crimes for which a circuit court may terminate the offender's parental rights. As we have seen, under section 39.806(1)(d)(2), a circuit court may terminate the parental rights of an incarcerated parent who qualifies as a violent career criminal, as a habitual violent felony offender, or as a sexual predator....

...at constitutes a capital, life, or first-degree felony. Id. A parent's commission of aggravated child abuse or sexual battery on a child constitutes grounds for the termination of parental rights without regard to whether the parent is incarcerated. § 39.806(1)(g). Finally, under section 39.806(1)(h), a circuit court may terminate parental rights without regard to incarceration when "[t]he parent or parents have *1233 committed the murder, manslaughter, aiding or abetting the murder, or conspiracy or solicitation to murder the other parent or another child, or a felony battery that resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to another child." This review of section 39.806 demonstrates that the statute establishes multiple grounds for the termination of parental rights based either on the parent's status as a recidivist or a sexual predator, or on the parent's commission of certain specifically designated crimes....

...1st DCA 1982)). It follows that a circuit court may not expand indefinitely the list of crimes for which the termination of parental rights is authorized in the statute by inserting a no-new-law-violation task into the case plan. To approve such a reading of section 39.806 would amount to judicial legislation that is contrary to the separation of powers that characterizes our system of government....

...ch of his case plan. But the Father's breach of the no-new-law-violation task was not sufficient to support the termination of his parental rights. With regard to the Father's alleged breach of the task that he show stable housing and stable income, section 39.806(1)(e)(1) requires at least a nine-month period for compliance....

...those duties while in prison."). Under these circumstances, we conclude that DCF failed to present clear and convincing evidence necessary to support the circuit court's finding that the Father had committed a material breach of his case plan under section 39.806(1)(e)(2)....

...erminate parental rights, except as specifically provided in the statute. See V.M., 922 So.2d at 1087. Here, the Father's criminal history and incarceration history did not constitute grounds for the termination of the Father's parental rights under section 39.806....

....C. v. Florida *1235 Department of Children & Families, 887 So.2d 1046 (Fla.2004). With all due respect to the supreme court, I believe the analysis in B.C. is unlikely to reflect the intent of the legislature and that the legislature should revisit section 39.806(1)(d)(1), Florida Statutes (2010), to determine whether it should clarify the statute. Section 39.806(1)(d)(1) allows a termination when a parent is "expected to be incarcerated" for "a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years." In B.C., the supreme court relied purely on a linear mathe...

...[2] DCF's reference to "the one-year period" is inaccurate, but it does not affect our analysis. The case plan was correctly established under the recently revised statute, which shortened the period for compliance from one year to nine months. See § 39.806(1)(e)(1); ch....

...Dep't of Children & Families, 826 So.2d 521, 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ("There is a two[-]step process inherent in the statutory scheme for termination of parental rights, pursuant to chapter 39. First, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2001)[,] has been established....

...tion of both parents’ parental rights. Regarding the father, the appellants argue the court erred in two respects: (1) finding that the father’s incarceration period does not constitute a significant portion of the child’s minority pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2015); and (2) finding that the father’s continued parental relationship with the child would not be contrary to the child’s best interests pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)3., Florida Statutes (2015)....

...In light of that disposition, we also reverse the denial of the termination of the mother’s parental rights. Our opinion begins by summarizing the case’s procedural history. We then present our reasoning as to why the father’s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(d)1. and 39.806(1)(d)3. Procedural History The child was born in March 2009....

...a willful violation of his other case plan tasks because his current prison facility “made it almost impossible for the case manager to have contact with him. So, likewise, it would be impossible for him to have contact with her.” Regarding section 39.806(1)(d)1., which concerns whether the parent’s incarceration constitutes a significant portion of the child’s minority, the court found: Based on the calculations that we can do from the evidence that was ascertained at...

...Although it is a very close call, the Court does not find clear and convincing evidence . . . that’s a significant portion of this child’s minority. He’ll still have seven-and-a- half more years or so until he reaches the age of majority after his father is released. Regarding section 39.806(1)(d)3., which concerns whether the child’s continued relationship with an incarcerated parent would be contrary to the child’s best interests, the court found: [T]he only contact that the child could have with his father...

...there has been no evidence presented that continued contact with the father would cause any harm to this child. Regarding the mother, the court found the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that she abandoned the child pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), and that she did not comply with her case plan within twelve months and materially breached her case plan pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(e)1. and 2., Florida Statutes (2015). However, the court denied the termination of the mother’s parental rights because the court found insufficient evidence existed to support a single- parent termination under sections 39.811(6)(e) and 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2015). The Department filed a motion for rehearing, which the guardian supported. The motion argued the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that the court should have terminated the father’s parental rights under sections 39.806(1)(d)1....

...The court denied the motion. This appeal followed. Regarding the father, the appellants argue that the circuit court erred in two respects: (1) finding that the father’s incarceration period does not constitute a significant portion of the child’s minority under section 39.806(1)(d)1.; and (2) finding that the father’s continued parental relationship with the child would not be contrary to the child’s best interests under section 39.806(1)(d)3....

...We agree with the appellants’ arguments, as explained in the two sections below. 1. The circuit court erred in finding that the father’s incarceration period does not constitute a significant portion of the child’s minority under section 39.806(1)(d)1. Section 39.806(1)(d)1....

...When determining whether the period of time is significant, the court shall consider the child’s age and the child’s need for a permanent and stable home. The period of time begins on the date that the parent enters into incarceration[.] § 39.806(1)(d)1., Fla....

...4th DCA 2015): 7  The prior version of this statute permitted termination of parental rights when a parent was incarcerated for a period constituting “a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years.” § 39.806(1)(d)1., Fla. Stat....

...relationship with his caregiver and his half-sister, whom his caregiver has already adopted, would prevent him from achieving a permanent and 10 stable home. Thus, the state proved grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)(d)1., and termination was both in the manifest best interest and the least restrictive means to prevent harm to the child. 2. The circuit court erred in finding that the incarcerated father’s continued parental relationship with the child would not be contrary to the child’s best interests under section 39.806(1)(d)3. Section 39.806(1)(d)3....

...physical needs. d. The parent’s history of criminal behavior, which may include the frequency of incarceration and the unavailability of the parent to the child due to incarceration. e. Any other factor the court deems relevant. § 39.806(1)(d)3., Fla....

...In light of that disposition, we also reverse the denial of the termination of the mother’s parental rights. We remand for the circuit court to enter a final judgment: (1) terminating the father’s parental rights as to the child pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(d)1. and 39.806(1)(d)3., Florida Statutes (2015); and (2) terminating the mother’s parental rights as to the child pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(b) and 39.806(1)(e)1....

...This petition alleged that the Mother had been offered services through a case plan but that she had failed to complete the case plan tasks related to parenting, anger management, domestic violence, and stable employment. For this reason, DCF requested that the Mother’s parental rights be terminated under subsections 39.806(l)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...ions went well. Mr. Cribbs also indicated that the Mother had never been required to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. Nevertheless, he expressed his concerns about the domestic violence incidents and recommended termination of parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c)....

...that she was willing to delay her return. She also stated that she was willing to follow Dr. Johnson’s recommendations, including any therapy and counseling. C. The Court’s Order The circuit court ruled that termination was not appropriate under section 39.806(1)(c) because DCF had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parents’ continuing involvement in the children’s lives posed a risk to the children despite the provision of services. In particular, the court noted that it could not determine whether any provision of services would be futile. However, the circuit court terminated the parental rights of the Mother and Father for substantial noncompliance as authorized by section 39.806(1)(e) because it found by clear and convincing evidence “that neither parent ha[d] completed his or her case plan.” The court explained that to determine whether the parents were in “substantial compliance,” as defined in secti...

...he allegations supporting termination by clear and convincing evidence. E.E.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 846 So.2d 1250, 1251-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The circuit court must first find grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806 and then must consider the manifest best interests of the child under section 39.810....

...because “he had not forthrightly participated in the services required by the children’s case plan.” The circuit court found that DCF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that both parents’ rights should be terminated as authorized by section 39.806(1)(e) because “neither parent has completed his or her case plan.” Section 39.806(1)(e)(1) provides that parental rights can be terminated when “[t]he child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents.” The statute presumes that the parent’s failure to “substantially comply” with the cas...

...to care have [not] been ameliorated” because “domestic violence, continues in this relationship and ... the parents have not ben-efitted from remediation.” This was error because “the ‘substantially comply’ language contained in section [39.806] ......

...nton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child”). Thus the circuit court erred in finding that DCF proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parents’ rights should be terminated under section 39.806(1)(e). The Guardian ad Litem Program argues for affirmance based on A.W. ex rel. B.W. v. Department of Children Families, 969 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). In that case, DCF sought to terminate A.W.’s parental rights under subsections 39.806(1)(b), (c), or (e), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Unlike in A.W., here, the parents remedied the lack of housing, which was the original reason why the children were first sheltered and then adjudicated dependent. Moreover, this case is also distinguishable because the First District affirmed the termination of the mother’s parental rights in A.W. based on section 39.806(1)(c). See id. at 503-04 . For the reasons explained below, we cannot affirm the trial court’s ruling based on section 39.806(1)(c)....

...had not been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the children would be endangered upon their return to the parents, the circuit court erred when it terminated the parental rights of the Mother and the Father under section 39.806(1)(e)....

...Continuing Involvement Because we must affirm the termination of parental rights if any principle or theory of law supports the circuit court’s decision, G.W.B., 658 So.2d at 967 , we consider whether DCF presented clear and convincing evidence for termination under section 39.806(1)(c). *651 Section 39.806(1)(c) authorizes the termination of parental rights “[w]hen the ......

...court must find that any provision of services would be futile or that the child would be threatened with harm despite any services provided to the parent.” R.W.W. v. State, Dep’t of Children & Families, 788 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Termination under section 39.806(1)(e) requires two specific findings: “first, that continued interaction with the parent threatens the life, safety, or health of the child, and second, that this threat cannot be remedied by the provision of services.” T.H. v. Dep’t of Children Family Servs., 979 So.2d 1075, 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). We cannot affirm under section 39.806(1)(c) for two reasons....

...their children being placed in harm’s way.” Nevertheless, any abuse inflicted while in foster care is the direct result of DCF’s placement of the children with the particular foster care providers and cannot be the basis for termination under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...harmed the children or threatened their lives, safety, or health. Although there was no showing of past harm, Dr. Ferrara and Dr. Johnson opined that the children could be detrimentally impacted if returned to the parents. Because termination under section 39.806(1)(c) in this case would be based on prospective harm, we must determine if there is a substantial risk of significant harm to the children....

...See L.D. v. Dep’t of Children Family Servs., 957 So.2d 1203, 1205-06 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (explaining that there must be a nexus between the parent’s past conduct and future harm to the child before the court can terminate the parent’s rights under section 39.806(l)(c) based on prospective harm); S.S....

...otential threat presented by the alleged domestic violence or the Mother’s self-reported mental health issues cannot be remedied by the provision of services. Thus we agree with the circuit court’s decision not to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c)....

parental rights should be terminated under section 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), for abandoning

...indicates, however, that the trial court did not advise him that he had a right to counsel, and denied counsel to him when he asked for representation even though he advised the trial court that he was indigent. The trial court subsequently entered an order terminating T.M.W.’s parental rights based on section 39.806(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2010), finding that T.M.W....

...and K.B.1 We reverse and remand for further proceedings. The children, ages six and two, were sheltered on September 21, 2024. The Department filed its expedited petition for termination of parental rights as to both the mother and the father on October 15, 2024. The petition alleged egregious conduct, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2024), and chronic abuse, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(g)....

...The petition also alleged grounds for single parent termination pursuant to section 39.811(6). A trial was held on June 9, 2025. Because our conclusion as to egregious conduct is dispositive, we address the evidence relevant to that ground for termination. We note that section 39.806(1)(f) permits termination of parental rights to siblings, even in the absence of proof of a nexus between the egregious conduct and the potential harm to the siblings, such that a discussion of the evidence of A.B.'s abuse is unnecessa...

...3d 149, 152 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021); and then quoting Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991)). However, if the Department establishes egregious conduct "[r]easonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required." § 39.806(2)....

...However, in cases involving egregious conduct by a parent, 'the termination of parental rights without the use of plans 7 or agreements is the least restrictive means.' " (citation omitted) (quoting In re T.M., 641 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. 1994))). Section 39.806(1)(f) provides that termination may be warranted when "[t]he parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, saf...

.... probably many months," the parents' failure to provide medical care before K.B. was in critical condition is egregious conduct. It is neglect that on the unrefuted evidence presented to the court endangered the life of the child as required under section 39.806(1)(f)....

...). The court's denial of the petition for termination is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The Department presented clear and convincing evidence of egregious conduct supporting termination of rights as to both K.B. and A.B. See § 39.806(1)(f) ("Proof of a nexus between egregious conduct to a child and the potential harm to the child's sibling is not required."). As a result, we do not address the second basis for termination, chronic abuse. See § 39.802(4)(a) (requiring that "at least one of the grounds listed in s. 39.806 has been met"); M.S....

...stody of DCF on March 4, 2004. The children were adjudicated dependent as to both the mother and father, and in April 2004, DCF filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of K.F., alleging that K.F. engaged in egregious conduct, as defined in Section 39.806(1)(f)(2), Florida Statutes, that threatened the life and well-being of her four children....

...Furthermore, all four children are currently attending weekly therapy as a result of their mother's conduct. None of this evidence was disputed. The trial court determined that DCF proved by clear and convincing evidence that K.F. engaged in egregious conduct towards her children pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(f) and 39.811(6)(e), Florida Statutes, and that K.F.'s conduct threatened their life, well-being, and physical, mental, and emotional health presently and for the foreseeable future....

...filed a motion to set aside the voluntary surrenders of parental rights. She alleged that her surrenders had been coerced, were not properly acknowledged, and that her mental condition was not properly addressed. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Two provisions of section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2007), are implicated in this appeal. The first involves the form required if a parent elects to execute a written surrender, thereby giving custody of the child to the Department for adoption. Section 39.806(1)(a)1....

...The legislature rightly intended there to be certainty in the identity of one who would give up this fundamental right. This was accomplished when the general master took the acknowledgment. The second involves the revocation of a written surrender and consent based on fraud or duress, as authorized by section 39.806(1)(a)2....

...ged in the petition for termination. Section 39.802(4), Florida Statutes (2007), requires that a petition for termination of parental rights contain facts supporting (a) That at least one of the grounds [for termination of parental rights] listed in s. 39.806 has been met....

...attended and that a dispositional order adjudicating the child dependent was entered.... (c) That the manifest best interests of the child, in accordance with s. 39.810, would be served by the granting of the petition. One of the grounds included in section 39.806 is a parent's voluntary surrender and "consent[ ] to the entry of an order giving custody of the child to the department for subsequent adoption." § 39.806(1)(a)....

...(In re A.D.C.), 854 So.2d 720, 721-22 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). We understand that this determination renders the consent imposed under section 39.801(3)(d) for failure to appear to be like the consent that results from the execution of a written surrender pursuant to section 39.806(1)(a)....

...However, the same section requires that "[a]djudicatory hearings for petitions for voluntary termination must be held within [twenty-one] days after the filing of the petition." Since section 39.802(4) designates that there are two further requirements that must be proven in addition to proving at least one of section 39.806's enumerated grounds, an adjudicatory hearing is required even after a consent has been entered—either by written surrender or resulting from a parent's failure to appear....

...es. Because of the unusual, nomadic lifestyle of the group with whom the children and their parents lived and traveled, the Department of Children and Family Services almost immediately filed a petition for termination of parental rights, relying on section 39.806(1)(c), which provides for termination [w]hen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship...

...es. Because of the unusual, nomadic lifestyle of the group with whom the children and their parents lived and traveled, the Department of Children and Family Services almost immediately filed a petition for termination of parental rights, relying on section 39.806(1)(c), which provides for termination [w]hen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship...

...She also found the termination of J.H.K.'s parental rights to his two other children in New Mexico was insufficient to sustain termination in this case. She relied on Department of Children and Families v. V.V ., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D2717 (Fla. 5th DCA Nov.16, 2001). Section 39.806(1)(i) provides that parental rights to one child may be terminated when parental rights to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily....

...hearing in V.V. We withdrew the prior opinion and issued a new one. Dept. of Children and Families v. V.V., 822 So.2d 555 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). We said the trial judge should recognize the termination of parental rights in Mississippi for purposes of section 39.806(1)(i)....

...This is an appeal of a final judgment terminating the parental rights of the mother, C.T. We affirm. The Department filed a petition for termination of the mother’s parental rights to her five children, C.T., D.G., T.T., B.W., and C.W. After a bench trial, the trial court found the petition to be proven under paragraphs 39.806(l)(c), (f), and (g), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...ourt had found the mother had committed egregious abuse of D.G. and C.T. In addressing this issue, the trial court said: k. The Court is governed by the Third District Court of Appeal’s ruling in T.P. v. DCF, 935 So.2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), that Section 39.806(l)(f), Florida Statutes, provides a mechanism for protecting children from the threat of abuse in that it permits the trial court to terminate parental rights to a child who has suffered egregious abuse, and to any siblings of such child....

...and D.G., termination must be auto *854 matic with regard to the siblings, T.T., B.W., and C.W. We believe the answer to that question is actually contained within the T.P. decision itself. Each termination case involves three questions: (1) Does a ground for termination of parental rights exist? See § 39.806, Fla....

...Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991); see also Fla. Dept. of Children and Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 609-11 (Fla.2004). This court’s opinion in T.P. primarily addressed the text and rationale for paragraph 39.806(l)(f), Florida Statutes, which provides that egregious abuse directed at one sibling is a ground for termination of parental rights as to another sibling....

...restrictive means. The T.P. panel relied on the Fifth District’s opinion in Dept, of Children and Families v. B.B., 824 So.2d 1000, 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). As pertinent here, the Fifth District has said, “In short, under the statute [paragraph 39.806(l)(f) ], the egregious sexual abuse of A.B....

...e termination judgment. In support of the trial court’s ruling, the Department also relies on Florida Department of Children and Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d at 610 . In that case the Court wrote about an analogous ground for termination, paragraph 39.806(l)(i), Florida Statutes, which states that it is a ground for termination that “[t]he parental rights of the parent to a sibling of the child have been terminated involuntarily.” In addressing least restrictive means, the Court said that prior history was highly relevant....

WHATLEY, Judge. The Mother appeals the order terminating her rights to her daughter, D.H., based on section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2008) (continuing involvement of parent threatens child irrespective of provision of services)....

...The case plan provided for numerous conditions, many of which were related to the Mother’s drug addiction issues. The Department of Children and Families (Department) ultimately filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to both children, based on abandonment, section 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), and continuing abuse, neglect or abandonment as evidenced by failure to substantially comply with the case plan, section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...It found that the Mother failed to comply with conditions related to the reasons the children were sheltered in the first place — the Mother’s addiction issues — and it found that because of the noncompliance, the children would not be safe if returned to the Mother. This was a sufficient basis for termination under section 39.806(l)(e)....

...2d DCA 2012) (“[Ejvidence of neglect or abuse can only be based on a failure to ‘substantially comply,’ i.e., fail in a case plan task that bears on the circumstances that caused the creation of the case plan.”). The Mother also argues that the court erred in basing termination on abandonment under section 39.806(l)(c)....

...Based on this evidence, it was error for the court to find the Mother abandoned her children. Contra T.G., 8 So.3d 1198 (affirming finding of abandonment where mother did not visit children for more than a year prior to the final hearing). We affirm the termination of parental rights based on section 39.806(l)(e), but reverse the portion of the order terminating the Mother’s parental rights based on a finding that she abandoned the children....

...rs of his parental rights. However, we reverse and remand for further proceedings as to the mother because the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that it had no statutory authority to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on section 39.806(1)0), Florida Statutes (2011). The Department’s petition sought termination of the mother’s parental rights based in part on section 39.806(1)0), which permits termination where “[o]n three or more occasions the child or another child of the parent or parents has been placed in out-of-home care pursuant to this chap-tern and the conditions that led to the child’s out-o...

...nd for termination, the Department relied in part upon a prior occasion of out-of-home placement that occurred in April 2007. The trial court concluded it had “no statutory authority to terminate *1051 based on this reason because the amendment to section 39.806(1)(Z) was subsequent (July 1, 2008) to this action and the statute is not applied retroactively.” We review de novo the trial court’s interpretation of section 39.806(1)(Z) 1 and we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that it was precluded from considering out-of-home placements that preceded the effective date of the statute. Here, the most recent out-of-home placement which triggered the Department’s termination petition occurred after the enactment of section 39.806(1)(Z). And because the pivotal removal occurred after the effective date of July 1, 2008, a consideration of out-of-home placements predating the statute does not constitute retroactive application of the statute. 2 The plain language of section 39.806(1)(Z) permits the trial court to consider the history of prior out-of-home placements, and it does not preclude a consideration of out-of-home placements predating the effective date of the statute. Like other statutory provisions recognizing the danger posed by repetitive bad behavior, section 39.806(1)0 was designed to protect children when parents continually engage in conduct warranting out-of-home placement_ [And] there is nothing improper, retroactive, or violative of [a parent’s] rights in the [legislature’s decision to a...

...rs when making termination of parental rights decisions. 3 Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the Department’s petition for termination of the mother’s parental rights, and we remand for the trial court to reevaluate the petition based on section 39.806(1)(Z)....

...Dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. DAVIS and MORRIS, JJ., Concur. . See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 194 (Fla.2007) (stating issues of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review). . We therefore do not reach the issue of whether section 39.806(1)(Z) may be applied retroactively....

...pled guilty to second degree murder and in April, 1995, was sentenced to 13.85 years in prison. Following a hearing on the Department's petition, the trial court entered its final judgment terminating D.B.'s parental *1226 rights to D.F. The sole basis for the trial court's order was section 39.806(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution" and "[t]he period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years." § 39.806(1)(d)1., Fla....

...incarceration which would qualify under the provisions of this act, as well as to any persons who are sentenced after that date." Ch. 97-226, § 6, Laws of Fla. [1] Because the record demonstrates that D.B. was incarcerated in 1995, it is clear that section 39.806(1)(d)1 does not apply and cannot serve as a basis to terminate his parental rights....

...There must be something more. M.S. at 1054. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment terminating D.B.'s parental's rights and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. SHARP, W., and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.806(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2000) was originally numbered section 39.464(1)(d)....

...THE MOTHER’S TERMINATIONS It is perhaps noteworthy that the Department did not file a petition against the Mother alleging that she had failed to comply with a case plan. Instead, the Department alleged that the Mother had engaged in egregious conduct as described in section 39.806(l)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), and that she engaged in conduct toward the children that continued to threaten the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of each of the children irrespective of the provision of services, as described in section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). We conclude that the trial court properly terminated the Mother’s parental rights as to the child, J.S., pursuant to section 39.806(l)(f), but that termination of the Mother’s rights as to each of her other four children was not established on either of the grounds alleged. Section 39.806(l)(f) permits termination when a parent “engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child’s sibling.” See § 39.806(l)(f)....

...ents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such an intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child. See § 39.806(1)00(2). Section 39.806(l)(f) permits a trial court to terminate parental rights not only to the child who has suffered egregious abuse but also to any siblings of such a child. See § 39.806(l)(f)....

...The Department failed to prove a predictive relationship between the past medical neglect of J.S. and any prospective abuse of the other four children. See A.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re G.D.), 870 So.2d 235, 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Similarly, as to termination under section 39.806(l)(c), the Department failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the children’s lives, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the Mother....

...Especially in the absence of a case plan, there was no evidence that services had been offered or provided to the Mother or that it would have been futile to provide her with such services. We therefore conclude that termination of the Mother’s parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c) was improper....

...Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 843 So.2d 996, 1002 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). III. R.C. R.C. was convicted of child abuse concerning J.S., but he is the father only of the Mother’s fifth child, R.S. The Department sought termination of R.C.’s parental rights to R.S. under section 39.806(l)(c), alleging that he engaged in conduct toward J.S....

...that demonstrated that his continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship with R.S. threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of this child irrespective of the provision of services. The Department also sought termination under section 39.806(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), claiming that R.C....

...The trial court terminated parental rights on both grounds. R.C. received only a five-year prison term in 2001. He apparently was released from prison during the pendency of this appeal. It is now clear that such a prison term, by itself, is not sufficient grounds to support a termination under section 39.806(1)(d)....

...Dep’t of Children & Families, 887 So.2d 1046 (Fla.2004); see also In re A.D.C., 854 So.2d 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Thus, the trial court erred in terminating R.C.’s parental rights on this ground. *573 We agree with the trial court that the evidence supported a termination of R.C.’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c)....

...dings of fact required by section 39.811(6)(a)-(d) sufficient to affirm the judgment as a matter of law. In this case, the only ground for termination cited by the trial court that would have permitted termination of only R.C.’s parental rights is section 39.806(l)(d)....

...Similar to the Mother’s circumstances, it is noteworthy that the Department did not seek to terminate J.T.’s rights by alleging that he had failed *574 to comply with a case plan. Instead, the Department sought termination of the Father’s parental rights to both these children under section 39.806(l)(f), alleging that he “egregiously” abandoned them. As to J.S., the child with special medical needs, we affirm the termination of the Father’s parental rights on this ground. However, we must reverse the termination as to the child, J.T. Egregious conduct under section 39.806(l)(f) can be abuse, abandonment, neglect or any other deplorable and outrageous conduct by the parent. § 39.806(l)(f)(2)....

...being terminated became a parent through a single-parent adoption; (d) If the protection of the child demands termination of the rights of a single parent; or (e) If the parent whose rights are being terminated meets any of the criteria specified in s. 39.806(l)(d) and (f)-(i). . § 39.806(l)(e), Fla....

...The Father returned to Florida permanently some time before the end of November. On December 28, 2009, the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to both children. The petition alleged the following grounds: abandon *577 ment of N.R.-G. under section 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2009); engaging in conduct demonstrating that the Father’s continuing involvement threatened N.R.-G.’s life, safety, well-being, or health under section 39.806(l)(c); and failing to substantially comply with the case plan under section 39.806(l)(e)....

...The adjudicatory hearing was held in May and June 2011, and the Mother and A.G.’s father, M.B.-V., were deemed to have consented to termination based on their failure to appear. The Department abandoned its allegations against the Father under sections 39.806(l)(b) and (c) and proceeded with termination under section 39.806(l)(e) based solely on his failure to substantially comply with his case plan....

...The court thereafter entered a final judgment terminating both parents’ rights to N.R.-G. and terminating the Mother and M.B.-V.’s parental rights to A.G. The court found that termination as to the Father was proper based on his failure to substantially comply with his case plan under section 39.806(l)(e). The court also concluded that the Father’s failure to comply with his case plan was not due to his lack of financial resources. Under section 39.806(l)(e), termination is proper when the court has adjudicated the child dependent, the Department has filed a case plan, and “[t]he child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parent.” A parent’s failure “to subs...

...failure to provide services, they are not sufficient to support a finding that the Father failed to substantially comply with his case plan. Thus, the Department failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination was proper under section 39.806(l)(e)....

...appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her son, T.L.O. The evidence presented during the trial, if believed by the trial court, was sufficient to support the court's decision to terminate K.O.'s parental rights based on section 39.806(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes (2001)....

...[1] The court based its judgment primarily on the mother's failure to complete her reunification case plan and her abandonment of the children while they were in foster care. We affirm on all issues raised in this appeal, but write to address the abandonment issue. Section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), authorizes termination of parental rights for abandonment....

...The court affirmed because there had been multiple periods of nearly six months without visitation. Id. In this case, where the lack of contact exceeded one year, the trial court properly found that the mother abandoned the minor children pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes....

...She raises three issues on appeal, only two of which warrant discussion. The Department of Children and Families ("Department") raises two additional issues on cross-appeal, neither of which warrants discussion. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to E.R. pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2004), because the Department failed to prove that her continuing interaction with E.R....

...to appellant's consent. On July 16, 2004, the Department filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and Permanent Commitment for Purposes of Subsequent Adoption as to all three children, alleging that termination was appropriate pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes, because appellant failed to substantially comply with her case plan, that termination was appropriate pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, because despite the services offered to appellant by the Department, she did not have the capacity to parent the children or to appreciate the circumstances that brought them into the Department's care to decre...

...It was not until after the Department's counsel advised the trial judge that his termination as to E.R. had to reflect a finding as to which statutory ground justified termination of appellant's rights as to E.R. that the trial court stated that the ground provided in section 39.806(1)(c) fit better than the case plan failure ground because appellant was incapable of taking care of E.R.'s needs....

...that it did not think that E.R. was stable or would become more stable in foster care. In its written order on the termination petition, the trial court again found that termination of appellant's parental rights as to E.R. was warranted pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c) and denied termination of appellant's rights as to R.R....

...Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 843 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (stating that a finding that evidence is clear and convincing enjoys a presumption of correctness and will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support). Section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that the Department, the GAL, or any person with knowledge of the facts may petition for the termination of parental rights under the following circumstances: When the parent or parents engaged...

...the child irrespective of the provision of services. Provision of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), three sequential evidentiary requirements must be met: (1) the trial court must find that the child's life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent regardless of the provision of services,...

...in a relationship with E.R. would threaten or harm him in any manner and, thus, conclude that no person could reasonably find that the evidence clearly and convincingly established that termination of appellant's parental rights to E.R. pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2004), was warranted....

...The Department's basis for termination was that, because Appellant married T.K. at a time that Appellant knew T.K. was not in compliance with her case plan, Appellant had engaged in conduct that threatened the well-being of the child irrespective of the provision of services. § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

abandonment and case plan non-compliance under section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2001), and noted that

...hildren. We affirm in all respects, save one. As the Department of Children and Families (DCF) concedes, the trial court *749 erred by terminating the mother's parental rights as to N.F. based on multiple out-of-home care placements, as set forth in section 39.806(1)( l ), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...Schurger, Assistant Circuit Legal Counsel of Department of Children and Families, Pensacola, and Annette Lizardo of Florida Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office, Orlando. PER CURIAM. Appellant M.D. seeks review of an order terminating her parental rights to C.D. and B.D. pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c) and (i), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...The termination order violates due process because it is based on grounds not asserted in DCF’s petition. DCF petitioned for termination of L.A.G.’s parental rights based on abandonment and her failure to comply with the case plan pursuant to Florida Statutes, sections 39.806(l)(b) and (e). The trial court terminated L.A.G.’s parental rights based on parental conduct that threatens the children’s life or safety, citing Florida Statutes section 39.806(l)(c). DCF did not cite section 39.806(l)(e) in the petition or at the hearing. Nor did DCF present any evidence that L.A.G.’s continued involvement with the children posed a threat to their health or safety. The first time section 39.806(l)(c) appears in this case is in the written termination order....

...Absent the due process violation, we would reverse the termination order on the merits because there is no competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the mother failed to substantially comply with the case plan. Florida Statutes section 39.806(l)(e) (2006), requires the trial court to find by *727 clear and convincing evidence “that the parent failed to substantially comply with a case plan within twelve months of the court adjudicating the children dependent.” E.R....

...always checked J.A.’s diapers during their visits. The trial court entered an order terminating A.S.’s parental rights, finding the evidence was clear and convincing that A.S. abandoned J.A. as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2014), and within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2014).3 The trial court further concluded that termination was the least restrictive means available, as reunification with A.S....

...would, in its opinion, pose a substantial risk of significant harm to J.A. Analysis Abandonment We first address the trial court’s finding that A.S. abandoned J.A. “Abandonment,” in the context of a termination of parental rights case, is 3 Section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), provides: (1) Grounds for the termination of parental rights may be established under any of the following circumstances: .... (b) Abandonment as defined in s....

...Seven months later, on November 6, 2007, DCF filed a termination petition, alleging that the father's rights should be terminated because he had engaged in conduct that continued to threaten the safety, well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and he had failed to substantially comply with his case plan pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes. The trial court rejected termination under section 39.806(1)(c), but found that DCF had proven its case as to the grounds alleged under section 39.806(1)(e) and that termination was in the child's manifest best interests and the least restrictive means of preventing harm to J.A....

...otional health would be endangered upon reunification with her father, then M.A. would have been considered at risk and removed from her father's care. The court also found that the father was making a determined effort in substance abuse treatment. Section 39.806(1)(e)1....

...ependent constitutes evidence of abuse and neglect and is also grounds for termination, unless the failure to "substantially comply" is due to the parent's lack of financial resources or DCF's failure to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. § 39.806(1)(e), Fla....

...ing with or being returned to the child's parent." § 39.01(71), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added); see E.R. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 937 So.2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). "[T]he `substantially comply' language contained in section [39.806] ......

...While substance abuse was part of the father's history, there was no indication, as the trial court specifically found, that the father's substance abuse caused harm to J.A. We conclude the trial court erred in finding that DCF proved by clear and convincing evidence that the father's rights should be terminated under section 39.806(1)(e)....

...determined effort to rehabilitate himself, and that J.A. would not be harmed by continued custody with her foster family while the father worked on his case plan. The trial court apparently concluded that proof of any of the statutory grounds under section 39.806 is enough to terminate parental rights....

...P.C., the father, and L.H., the mother, appeal an order terminating their parental rights as to their three children. We affirm the mother’s appeal without further comment. We also affirm termination of the father’s parental rights on two statutory grounds—section 39.806(1)(b) and 39.806(1)(d)(3)—but reverse termination based on section 39.806(1)(e)(1), failure to substantially comply with the case plan.  The Department concedes the record does not support a finding that the father failed to substantially comply with the case plan....

...The father completed the case plan tasks available to him while incarcerated. See T.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 905 So. 2d 993, 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Accordingly, we affirm termination of the father’s parental rights on the other two statutory grounds, but reverse and remand for the trial court to remove section 39.806(1)(e)(1) as a ground for termination....

PER CURIAM. C.B., mother of R.N., appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights as to R.N. We affirm the order of termination based on section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2016)....

...However, because the record reflects that, absent a period of one month, C.B. regularly visited with the child, provided some *529 toys and clothing items for the child, and the child appeared happy to see C.B. during the scheduled visits, we reverse as to the finding of abandonment under sections 39.01(1) and 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), and remand for modification of the order....

...Rosemarie Farrell, of Children's Legal Services, Orlando, for Appellee, Florida Department of Children and Families. PER CURIAM. C.B., mother of R.N., appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights as to R.N. We affirm the order of termination based on section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...However, because the record reflects that, absent a period of one month, C.B. regularly visited with the child, provided some toys and clothing items for the child, and the child appeared happy to see C.B. during the scheduled visits, we reverse as to the finding of abandonment under sections 39.01(1) and 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), and remand for modification of the order....

...As the trial court found, “substantial credible evidence and testimony” supported the finding that the mother “engaged in conduct toward the child ... that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent ... threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child.” See § 39.806(l)(c), Fla....

PER CURIAM. Because the record contains ample evidence to support the termination of appellant-father’s parental rights on grounds of failure to comply with his case plan, § 39.806(l)(e)l., Fla. Stat. (2008), and abandonment, § 39.806(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008), 1 the judgment under review is affirmed. Affirmed. . We do not reach the sufficiency of the evidence as to section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2008).

...The Department references two additional tasks within the case plan: obtain suitable housing and acquire stable employment. Yet the Department has not established A.D.’s ability to comply with those tasks, nor documented any services offered to assist A.D. in accomplishing those tasks. See § 39.806(l)(e), Fla....

harm to the child’s sibling is not required. See § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2020). The court added that

...This by necessity requires proof that he knew or should have known of the mother’s conduct [dropping their four-month-old child on his head and hitting him on the face with her hand] and resulting injury to [the child]. Id. at 1278 . This statement is based on section 39.806(l)(f), which lists as a ground for termination the situation in which a parent “had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child_” “Egregious conduct” includes abuse, abandonment, and *1262 neglect. § 39.806(l)(f)(2)....

Termination was found to be required under only section 39.806(c), Florida Stat. (Supp.1998): When the parent

...ldren based solely on his incarceration. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.146. We agree with S.H. and reverse. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) filed an amended petition to terminate S.H.’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(d)(l), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...In pertinent part, the statute provides for termination of parental rights when the parent is incarcerated and the period of expected incarceration constitutes a substantial portion of time before the child will attain the age of majority. Id. DCF alleged no other grounds for termination. DCF must satisfy section 39.806(l)(d)(l) with clear and convincing evidence....

...eight months old, reached the age of majority. J.H. v. Dep’t *318 of Children & Family Servs. (In re E.I.F.), 872 So.2d 924, 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Similarly, S.H.’s remaining term of incarceration cannot be the basis for termination under section 39.806(l)(d)(l)....

...ired by the statute. We agree and reverse the final judgment. See C.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 854 So.2d 720 , 2003 WL 21973599 (Fla. 2d DCA Aug.20, 2003). The trial court here based the termination of C.D.’s parental rights on section 39.806(l)(i), Florida Statutes (2001), which allows termination “[w]hen the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily.” In C.C., this court held that when the previous termination was the result of the...

...854 So.2d at 721-22 (citing § 39.801(3)(a)). Accordingly, we must reverse the termination of C.D.’s rights to T.S. and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, we also note that during the pendency of this appeal, the Fourth District found section 39.806(l)(i) to be unconstitutional....

of the twelve months specified, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). See M

...At the termination hearing the court heard testimony from the child’s therapist, a child psychologist, the child’s CHARLEE case manager, the guardian ad litem, and the mother, G.F., as well as arguments from counsel for the respective parties. Following the requirements of section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2004), the court determined that (1) there was no *61 suitable permanent custody arrangement with a relative; (2) despite her deep bond with the child, the mother was not able to provide the child with suitable cloth...

...stability. The court concluded that the parents engaged in conduct toward the child that demonstrated that the continuing involvement of the parent threatens the life, safety, well-being, and the physical, mental, and emotional health of the child. § 39.806(l)(c), Fla....

...and abusive members of A.P.’s family. DCF petitioned for termination of A.P.’s parental rights as to all four children in January 2020, eighteen months after the children were adjudicated dependent. See § 39.802, Fla. Stat. (2019). DCF alleged sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2019), as grounds for TPR. DCF also alleged that TPR was the least restrictive means to protect the children and was in the children’s manifest best interests under section 39.810. First Statutory Ground for TPR — § 39.806(1)(c) The trial court found the evidence clear and convincing that A.P....

...engaged in conduct towards all four children showing “that the continuing involvement of the mother in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health” of each of the four children “irrespective of the provision of services” as set out in section 39.806(1)(c)....

...the inability to safely reunify within a reasonable time. S.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 202 So. 3d 769, 782 (Fla. 2016). A.P. fails to demonstrate a deficiency in the evidence to support the trial court’s finding the ground for TPR under section 39.806(1)(c) for all four children, based on A.P.’s conduct towards each of them over the course of these proceedings. Second Statutory Ground for TPR — § 39.806(1)(e)1. The trial court also found the ground for TPR alleged by DCF under section 39.806(1)(e)1....

...nt after the reshelter. She attributes the expiration of time for compliance with her case plan to traumatic events in her life beyond her control and by DCF’s scheduling of her trauma counseling only after her drug abuse had been addressed. Section 39.806(1)(e)1....

...3d at 782 (holding that “there is a strong policy incentive in achieving permanency for children in care as quickly as possible” and that permanency should not be indefinitely delayed). A.P. fails to demonstrate the lack of clear and substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding section 39.806(1)(e)1. as a ground for TPR for all four children based on A.P.’s failure to substantially and timely comply with her case plan. 7  TPR as Least Restrictive Means The trial cou...

...interests of J.F. and F.S. Conclusion A.P. demonstrates no deficiency in the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding grounds for termination of A.P.’s parental rights as to all four children, under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(e)1....

...(“the father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights as to his daughter, R.A.T. (“the child”), who was eight years old when the final judgment for termination of parental rights was entered on February 2, 2015. Termination of R.T.’s parental rights was based on abandonment pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), Fla....

...eginning in August 2017 and concluding in May 2018. Nine months later, the court issued its final judgment terminating the parental rights of the mother and the father. 1 The court terminated the mother’s parental rights on two statutory grounds: section 39.806(1)(c) (parent’s past conduct demonstrates continuing involvement in parent-child relationship threatens to harm the child irrespective of services); and section 39.806(1)(e)3....

...the termination of parental rights hearing, at the time the trial court approved the case plan designating the goal of adoption, the grounds alleged in support of termination were stale.”). Termination of Parental Rights Under Florida Statutes Section 39.806(1)(c) Section 39.806(1)(c) provides that grounds for termination of parental rights may be established: When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent- child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services . . . . § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

...2d 553, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“non-expert speculation is not a sufficient basis for terminating parent rights.”). Because the Department failed to establish the first evidentiary requirement, termination of the mother’s parental rights under subpart 39.806(1)(c) was error. (2) The Department Failed To Establish That There Was No Reasonable Basis To Conclude That Past Behaviors Will Improve. We also find that the Department failed to establish the second evidentiary requirement—that...

...Her batterers intervention therapist testified that she was open and very active in group and was helpful toward others. When improvement is demonstrated and further improvement is possible, it is error to terminate parental rights under subpart 39.806(1)(c). In re J.B., 923 So....

...is no reasonable basis to believe the parents will improve.”). Here, improvement was demonstrated, and the mother’s progress established a reasonable basis to find that further improvement was possible. As such, it was error to terminate her parental rights under subpart 39.806(1)(c). Termination of Parental Rights Under Florida Statutes Section 39.806(1)(e)3. Section 39.806(1)(e)3....

...provides that grounds for termination may be established when the child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child “has been in care for any 12 of the last 22 months and the parents have not substantially complied with the case plan . . . .” § 39.806(1)(e)3., Fla....

...plan has been filed with the court, and: [t]he child[ren] ha[d] been in care for any 12 of the last 22 months and the parents ha[d] not substantially complied with the case plan . . . .” §§ 39.806(1)(c) and (e)(3), Fla....

...See R.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 872 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). • Conduct Demonstrating That Continuing Involvement Threatens the Children’s Well-Being. To terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, the trial court must find that the parent engaged in conduct toward the child that demonstrates the parents’ continuing involvement threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child....

...The mother,.(name)., freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and . with .without advice of legal counsel executed an Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender, Consent, and Waiver of Notice on . (date). , for termination of her parental rights to the minor child, . (name). , under section 39.806(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...ireely, knowingly, and voluntarily, and . with *352 .without advice of legal counsel executed an Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender, Consent, and Waiver of Notice on . (date). , for termination of his parental rights to the minor child. (name). under section 39.806(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...The parents have been advised of their right to legal counsel at all hearings that they attended. 2. On or about.(date(s)).. the following occurred: . (acts which were basis for dependency or TPR, if filed direct-!y). 3. The mother has . (grounds for TPR) .the minor child(ren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806 , Florida Statutes, in that:.(allegations which form the statutory basis for grounds). 4. The father has . (grounds for TPR). the minor children) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806 , Florida Statutes, in that:.(allegations which form the statutory basis for grounds). 5. Under the provisions of sections 39.806 (l)B(ll), Florida Statutes, it is in the mani *354 fest best interests of the child(ren) for parental rights of.(name(s)).to be terminated for the following reasons:.(allegations for each statutory factor in the manifest best interest test)....

.../were in fact represented by counsel. 2. On or about.(date(s))., the following occurred: . (acts which were basis for dependency or TPR, if filed directly). 3. The mother has . (grounds for TPR) .the minor child(ren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806, Florida Statutes, in that: . (findings that form the statutory basis for grounds). 4. The father has . (grounds for TPR). the minor child(ren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806, Florida Statutes, in that: . (findings that form the statutory basis for grounds). 5. Under the provisions of sections 39.806 (l)B(ll), Florida Statutes, it is in the manifest best interests of the child(ren) for parental rights of.(name(s)).to be terminated for the following reasons: ....

...ewed the file, heard argument of counsel, and considered recommendations and arguments of all parties. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents, .(names)., have surrendered their parental rights to the minor child(ren) under section 39.806(l)(a), Florida Statutes, and that termination of parental rights is in the manifest best interest of the child(ren)....

...The mother,.(name)., freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and . with .without advice of legal counsel executed an affidavit and acknowledgment of surrender, consent, and waiver of notice on . (date) , for termination of her parental rights to the minor children), under section 39.806(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...The father,.(name).. freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and.with. without advice of legal counsel executed an affidavit and acknowledgment of surrender, consent, and waiver of notice on . (date)., for termination of her parental rights to the minor child(ren), under section 39.806(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

..._____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Clay County. Steven B. Whittington, Judge. September 17, 2021 M.K. THOMAS, J. B.V. appeals from a final order terminating his parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes....

...the child from harm. Finding no error, we affirm the final order. However, given B.V. was deported and participated in a case plan following his deportation, we write to explain how the trial court’s finding that termination was appropriate under section 39.806(1)(c) is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Facts The child, born February 26, 2018, was taken into custody by the Department on July 18, 2018, and placed with a foster family. The Department became involved after it received reports of abuse....

...It was determined that the house was not adequate for the child due in part to the lack of medical care and the child suffering from asthma. On June 30, 2020, the Department filed a petition seeking to terminate B.V.’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), claiming the child was at risk of future harm irrespective of the provision of services....

...informed Immigration of his plan to separate. According to B.V., he is awaiting an appointment for an interview at the Embassy. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of B.V.’s parental rights was appropriate under section 39.806(1)(c), that termination was in the manifest best interest of the child, and that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. Analysis Section 39.806(1)(c) provides that termination of parental rights may be established under the following circumstance: When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrate that the cont...

...Dep’t of Children & Families, 866 So. 2d 220, 222–23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). In terminating B.V.’s parental rights, the trial court noted the unique circumstances presented by this case. In support of its decision, the trial court stated: Generally, under a subsection 39.806(1)(c) case, it is alleged that a parent has engaged in past behavior, such as drug or alcohol abuse or domestic violence, and that such behavior is likely to continue in the future despite the provision of services....

...5 consequence of an action, and in both cases, a parent is absent from the child’s daily life and is unable to provide support). Florida law specifically addresses termination of an incarcerated parent’s rights. Pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)3., Florida Statutes, an incarcerated parent’s parental rights may be terminated if, among other things, the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the parent would be ha...

...at 34–35. Adopting the reasoning of our colleagues in the Fourth District, we note that termination here is not based solely on B.V.’s deportation, but rather the effects of that deportation, such as the continued absence on the child and B.V’s inability to parent. Additionally, subsection 39.806(1)(d) allows for termination of an incarcerated parent’s rights where continuing a parental relationship would be harmful to the child....

...It is clear that B.V.’s deportation and subsequent inability to return to the United States or parent the child in any meaningful way “threatens the . . . mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services.” § 39.806(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in holding that the Department proved termination under section 39.806(1)(c) was appropriate....

...D.R.’s case plan required her to cooperate with DCF, provide executed releases, exhibit financial ability, provide safe and stable housing, and demonstrate appropriate parenting skills. In 2004, DCF petitioned the trial court to terminate D.R.’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2004), based on D.R.’s alleged noncompliance with her case plan for a period of time lasting at least twelve months....

...ces 2 , the Department acknowledges its amended petition did not allege such a statutory basis, but pleaded only abandonment. We therefore reverse the final judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 3 . See § 39.806(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). . See § 39.806(l)(c), Fla....

...The children’s custodian, the paternal grandfather, also testified that the father made regular child support payments, helped with repairs on the custodian’s home, and took the children shopping and to the movies. The trial court terminated the father’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2003), for failure of the father to substantially comply with the case plan....

...On appeal, the father and the GAL contend that there was not competent and substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s order and that termination of the father’s parental rights was not in the children’s best interests. We agree and reverse. In order to terminate a parent’s rights under section 39.806(l)(e), the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent failed to substantially comply with a case plan within twelve months of the court adjudicating the children dependent....

...for a no contact order for both mothers and both children in October 2018. Subsequently, DCF sought an expedited termination of parental rights of J.H. and B.D. as to both children on two grounds: egregious abuse 2 (violation of section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2018)) and aggravated child abuse (violation of section 39.806(g), Florida Statutes (2018))....

...qualifies as [] the child’s [J.W.H.] sibling, pursuant to statute. Following the statutory amendment in 2014, the Department is no longer required to present evidence of a nexus between egregious harm to one child, and prospective harm to the sibling. 4. Pursuant to Fla. Statute 39.806(1)(g), the mother, [J.H.] has subjected the minor child, [O.H....

...Department of Children and Families, 22 So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), we explained the multi-step process for termination of parental rights. First, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2007), has been established....

...The trial court’s rulings were supported by competent substantial evidence. J.H. argues that the abuse of J.W.H. should not serve as grounds to terminate her parental rights to O.H., because there was no evidence that she abused or allowed abuse of O.H. She concedes, however, that section 39.806(1)(f) states, as the trial court noted, “Proof of a nexus between egregious conduct to a child and the potential harm to the child’s sibling is not required.”. She argues, in part, that the same language is not included under section 39.806(1)(g), which the trial court found also as a 9 ground for termination....

...o support the trial court’s termination of parental rights. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)). As we affirm the trial court’s findings under section 39.806(1)(f), these are sufficient to terminate J.H.’s parental rights to O.H. In her final point, J.H. contends that termination was not the least restrictive means to protect the children. She argues that she should have been given a case plan to allow reunification with her children. Section 39.806(2), Florida Statutes (2018) states that reasonable efforts to reunify the family are not required where the court determines that events of egregious abuse pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f) or (g) have occurred. The trial court used section 39.806(1)(f) and (g) as grounds for termination, and thus no case plan was required....

...m harm. The record before us belies the mother’s arguments and we affirm. 1“Egregious conduct” is defined as “abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct.” § 39.806(1)(f)2., Florida Statutes (2020).  In 2018, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed a shelter petition, alleging that N....

...prevented by the Mother’s adherence to the court orders and any semblance of protective capacity.” The mother’s primary argument on appeal relates to the ground for termination: egregious conduct. DCF sought termination of parental rights based on section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2020), which permits termination when “[t]he parent ....

...hild and the potential harm to the child’s sibling is not required.” Id. 2 “Egregious conduct” is defined as “abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct.” § 39.806(1)(f)2., Fla. Stat. (2020). Further, 2 This court recently certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether the 2014 amendment to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional because it relieves the state of the burden of proving that the egregious conduct poses a substantial risk of harm to each sibling and is the least restrictive means protecting the siblings from serious harm....

...home resulted in any mental or psychological harm to N. or any of the children. However, the statute doesn’t require actual harm. Rather, it requires that the egregious conduct “threatens the . . . mental, or emotional health of the child or the child’s sibling.” § 39.806(1)(f), Fla....

...the legislature has abrogated the least restrictive means inquiry for 4 ‘egregious conduct’ cases, among others.” V.S. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 46 Fla. L. Weekly D1329, 2021 WL 2346077, at *8 (Fla. 4th DCA June 9, 2021) (citing § 39.806(2), Fla....

... In this appeal, S.H., the mother, challenges an amended final judgment terminating her parental rights to X.W., her three-year-old child, on the grounds of conduct threatening the life, safety, well-being, or health of the child irrespective of services, pursuant to 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2021), and failure to substantially comply with the case plan, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes....

...Notwithstanding that order, the following month, the Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, alleging three grounds: (1) conduct threatening the life, safety, well-being, or health of the child irrespective of services under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes; (2) failure to substantially comply with the case plan for a period of twelve months following the adjudication of dependency under section 39.806(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes; and (3) failure to substantially comply with the case plan while the child had been in care for any twelve of the last twenty-two months under section 39.806(1)(e)3., Florida Statutes. The court convened a lengthy trial, at the conclusion of which it rendered an amended final judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights....

...Finally, 6 the Department must also prove that termination is “the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm.” Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Program v. A.A., 171 So. 3d 174, 177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). Section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, imposes two requirements. First, the trial court must find that the parent’s continued involvement “threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child,” irrespective of services. § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

...continue to benefit from services.4 Indeed, the Department’s own expert, a clinical psychologist, testified the mother made strides and any opinion as to termination was inappropriate absent an updated evaluation. The alternative statutory ground cited below, section 39.806(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes, provides a basis for terminating parental rights if the parent fails “to substantially comply with the case plan for a period of 12 months after an adjudication of the child as a dependent.” See also § 39.806(1)(e)3., Fla....

...to the parent’s lack of financial resources or the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child.” K.J. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 906 So. 2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). In the instant case, citing section 39.806(1)(e)3., Florida Statutes, the trial court found, “due to the pandemic closures and issues in 2019 through 2021, [sic] [which] caused many services to be interrupted or halted, the [c]ourt will not be considering terminating paren...

substantially comply with the second case plan. § 39.806(1)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2017). His past history was

...2d 432, 451 (Fla. 2002))), abrogated in part on other grounds by Alahad v. State, 362 So. 3d 190, 198 (Fla. 2023); In Int. of X.W., 255 So. 3d 882, 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (recognizing that “a case plan with a goal of reunification is not required where, under section 39.806(1)(m)[, Florida Statutes], a child has been conceived as the result of an unlawful sexual battery” (citing D.A.D. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 903 So. 2d 1034, 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005))); § 39.806(1)(m), Fla....

...Additionally, while the mother accepted partial responsibility, there were some issues that brought the children into care that the mother would not acknowledge. The trial court entered an order terminating the mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2018), based on her failure to substantially comply with her case plan, despite being given three years to do so. The mother now appeals. She contends that because she obtained safe housing and completed parenting classes, she remedied the circumstances that caused the creation of the case plan, and consequently, there was not sufficient proof to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e)....

... abuse, neglect, or abandonment unless the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due to the parent’s lack of financial resources or to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child. . . . § 39.806(1)(e)1., Fla....

proposed judgment. The parents objected to the 2 § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2016).

...ns, the Department filed an expedited termination of parental rights petition instead of offering the parents another case plan. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Department proved grounds for termination against both parents under section 39.806(1)(c) (continuing involvement threatens, irrespective of services) and section 39.806(1)(l) (three or more removals caused by parent), and against the mother under section 39.806(1)(j) (chronic substance abuse), Florida Statutes (2017)....

...h-the Department and the GAL] that these children need stability as well, as permanency.” We reverse because, although the record contains competent, substantial evidence that the Department established grounds for termination pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2017) as to both parents, and section 39.806(1)(j) as to the mother, the trial court misconstrued the requirements of the least restrictive means test....

...Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991). However, the Legislature has specifically provided that no case plan is required where the trial court determines, as in this case, that termination is proper pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(b)-(d) or (f)-(m), Florida Statutes (2017). See § 39.806(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“Reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in paragraphs [39.806](l)(b)-(d) or paragraphs ' (1)(f)-(m) have occurred.”)....

...In re T.M. & F.M., 641 So.2d 410, 413 (Fla. 1994). Those extraordinary circumstances include severe or continuing abuse through continuing involvement and egregious abuse as found in then section 39.464, paragraphs (3) and (4), now renumbered as section 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(f)....

...he same behavior” after receiving services and “appears to not want to change or ácknowl-edge that there are any issues.” Moreover, requiring “an opportunity to rehabilitate” the parents is inconsistent with the Legislature’s mandate in section 39.806(2), given the statutory grounds proven for termination in this case....

...A.B., the mother of three children, appeals a final order terminating her parental rights. The finding of the trial court’s order terminating A.B.’s parental rights is supported by competent substantial evidence and termination is warranted under section 39.806(1)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes (2006), providing a basis for termination where the mother’s conduct threatens the well-being of her children irrespective of the provision of services by the Department of Children and Families and where she fails to comply with the case plan offered to her by the Department. The trial court erred, however, in terminating A.B.’s parental rights based on abandonment as the competent substantial evidence does not support termination based upon abandonment under section 39.806(1)(b). Accordingly, we affirm the termination of A.B.’s parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c) and (e), but reverse that portion of the order terminating her parental rights on the ground that she abandoned her children under section 39.806(1)(b) and remand for this finding to be stricken from the order....

...2 filed an expedited termination of parental rights petition instead of offering the parents another case plan. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Department proved grounds for termination against both parents under section 39.806(1)(c) (continuing involvement threatens, irrespective of services) and section 39.806(1)(l) (three or more removals caused by parent), and against the mother under section 39.806(1)(j) (chronic substance abuse), Florida Statutes (2017). In its order, the trial court made extensive findings detailing a history of domestic violence and substance abuse on the part of the father, and chronic substance abuse on the part of the mother....

...artment and the GAL] that these children need stability as well as permanency.” We reverse because, although the record contains competent, substantial evidence that the Department established grounds for termination pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(l), Florida Statutes (2017) as to both parents, and section 39.806(1)(j) as to the mother, the trial court misconstrued the requirements of the least restrictive means test....

...Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991). However, the Legislature has specifically provided that no case plan is required where the trial court determines, as in this case, that termination is proper pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(b)-(d) or (f)-(m), Florida Statutes (2017). See § 39.806(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“Reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in paragraphs [39.806](1)(b)-(d) or paragraphs (1)(f)-(m) have occurred.”)....

...In re T.M. & F.M., 641 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. 1994). Those extraordinary circumstances include severe or continuing abuse through continuing involvement and egregious abuse as found in then section 39.464, paragraphs (3) and (4), now renumbered as section 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(f). Id....

...e same behavior” after receiving services and “appears to not want to change or acknowledge that there are any issues.” Moreover, requiring “an opportunity to rehabilitate” the parents is inconsistent with the Legislature’s mandate in section 39.806(2), given the statutory grounds proven for termination in this case....

...The Court does not know if he is an untreatable sociopath or sexual deviant or is someone amenable to some kind of treatment. Despite finding that DCF had failed to prove that the Father could not benefit from services, the trial court elected to terminate the Father’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(f), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...s supporting termination by clear and convincing evidence. E.E.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re D.A.), 846 So.2d 1250, 1251-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The circuit court must first find grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806 and then must consider the manifest best interests of the child under *1271 section 39.810....

...DCF responds that absolute certainty concerning the identity of the perpetrator or perpetrators of the abuse is not required. On this point, we agree with DCF. The circuit court found that DCF had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Father’s parental rights should be terminated as authorized by section 39.806(l)(f). Section 39.806(l)(f) provides that parental rights can be terminated “[w]hen the parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the li...

...parent or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct” and “may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child.” § 39.806(l)(f)(2)....

...opriate steps to obtain necessary medical care for the child. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in finding that DCF established by clear and convincing evidence grounds to terminate the Father’s parental rights to D.L.H. under section 39.806(l)(f)....

...ling had any impact on D.L.H. DCF responds that the severity of the injuries to D.L.H.’s sibling was sufficient to demonstrate the requisite nexus. On this point, we agree with the Father. Before a court terminates parental rights to a child under section 39.806(l)(f), DCF must demonstrate that there is a nexus or predictive relationship between the past abuse of the injured child and any prospective abuse of siblings....

...ement set forth in Padgett . We therefore reverse the order terminating HJP.’s parental rights as to J.A. and A.A. and remand for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. NORTHCUTT and CANADY, JJ, concur. . The circuit court inadvertently cited section 39.806 as its basis for performing its manifest best interest analysis, but it is clear the court appropriately used the criteria found in section 39.810. A more troubling procedural irregularity is the fact that the court proceeded under the wrong statute in terminating H.P.’s rights. It cited section 39.806 as the statutory basis for termination....

irrespective of the provision of services.” See § 39.806(1)(c), Fla. Stat. C.W. was not offered any services

...L.E., the Mother, appeals two final judgments terminating her parental rights to her three children. The judgments were entered following a single trial addressing her rights to all three children. On appeal, L.E. argues that the evidence was insufficient to support termination under section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2010)....

PER CURIAM. We affirm the appeal and the cross-appeal. See § 39.806(l)(e)(l), Fla.' Stat....

...icipation in the abuse and/or failure to protect her stepdaughters. About a month later, DCF filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights (TPR), as to J.J. and J.L.J. against the mother and the father. As to the mother, the petition relied on section 39.806(l)(f), Florida Statutes (2010), which provides for termination of parental rights based on egregious conduct to a child or a child’s sibling. As to the father, the petition relied on section 39.806(l)(g), Florida Statutes (2010), and alleged that the father sexually abused two of his daughters. DCF also filed a TPR petition against the mother as to M.D. and G.D. This petition was also based on section 39.806(l)(f)....

...circumstances, the boys involved in the instant case were harmed or at risk of harm. Accordingly, we reverse. In termination of parental rights cases, the trial court “must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds set forth in 39.806, Florida Statutes, has been proven.” D.G....

...es. See § 39.802(5), Fla. Stat. (2010). Further, "[rjeasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in paragraphs (l)(e)-(Z) have occurred.” § 39.806(2), Fla....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See M.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 814 So.2d 1244, 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (finding “the trial court could not terminate the father’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes, because the children were not adjudicated dependent ‘as to him,’ ” but “nonetheless affirm [ing] the trial court’s order of termination because parental rights may be terminated without a finding of dependency when abandonment is proven pursuant to the requisites of section 39.806(l)(b)”)....

...rida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B). Saliva and his former wife, Cynthia L. Nolin, were divorced in 1994. In a separate action filed in 2003, Nolin petitioned to terminate Saliva’s parental rights as to the parties’ child pursuant to section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...State, 687 So.2d 924, 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). G.M. argues that termination is inappropriate where “the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due ... to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child.” See § 39.806(1)(e)(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). G.M. is incarcerated and scheduled for release in early 2012. In W.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 15 So.3d 866, 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(e)(l), Florida Statutes (2007), finding that the father failed to comply with the terms of his case plan....

...did not have the ability to comply with his case because of his incarceration and the Department’s failure to assist him. Abandonment The trial court also determined that G.M. abandoned the child because he *927 failed to support and communicate with the child. See § 39.806(l)(b). Section 39.806(l)(e)(l) provides that a parent’s failure to complete a case plan within nine months after an adjudication of the child as dependent is evidence of abandonment, abuse, or neglect....

...is the mother of the minor child, D.E.B., who was born on January 4, 2016. The Department of Children and Families removed D.E.B. from G.H.’s custody and, on May 10, 2017, the Department filed a petition for termination of G.H.’s parental rights as to D.E.B. under section 39.806(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, based on her purported abandonment of D.E.B....

...The mother, .(name) ., freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and . with.without advice of legal counsel executed an Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender, Consent, and Waiver of Notice on.(date)., for termination of her parental rights to the minor child, .(name) ., under section 39.806(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...The father, .(name) ., freely, knowingly, and voluntarily, and .with .without advice of legal counsel executed an Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender, Consent, and Waiver of Notice on.(date)., for termination of his parental rights to the minor child,.(name)., under section 39.806(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...had more than a year before his incarceration to comply with the case plan but made virtually no effort to do so. In evaluating whether termination of his parental rights was supported by the evidence, the trial court needed to determine whether W.D. was likely to substantially comply with the second case plan. § 39.806(1)(e)2., Fla....

...ed in a juvenile dependency proceeding. . We note that the mother also argued that the trial court erred by making findings of fact that were contrary to the evidence of record and were insufficient to justify termination of her parental rights. See § 39.806(l)(c), Fla....

...As such, the grandparents failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the mother engaged in conduct toward the child that demonstrates that her continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child. See § 39.806(l)(c), Fla....

...at the Department of Children and Families (the Department) had "failed to prove that the Mother was involved in egregious conduct or that the Child's life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the Mother." See also § 39.806(1)(c), (f), Fla....

...An order dismissing a petition for termination of parental rights is a mixed question of law and fact which will be sustained on review if the court applied the correct law, and its ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. See In re M.F., 770 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2000) (discussing dependency orders). Section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes, provides that a petition for termination of parental rights may be filed “unless the failure to substantially comply with the ease plan was due either to the lack of financial resources of the parents or to t...

...carry a presumption of correctness and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support). We remand, however, to correct the final judgment by removing the court’s conclusion of law that clear and convincing evidence supported termination based upon section 39.806(1)(g), Florida Statutes....

...parental rights based on a ground which was not noticed or tried by implied consent. See R.S. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 872 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). However, the trial court also found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes....

...termination alleged in the petition, but we need only focus on one. See § 39.802(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (“A petition for termination of parental rights filed under this chapter must contain facts supporting the following allegations: That at least one of the grounds listed in s. 39.806 has been met.”). The trial court determined that there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, which provides for termination when “the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent...

...eing, and they must be considered in the context of the historical mosaic for this family demonstrated by the entire record of this multi-year proceeding. We find no legal error in the trial court’s TPR based, at a minimum, on the ground stated in section 39.806(1)(c)....

...Finally, if the trial court intended her sua sponte comments on the record to be her reasons for ordering R.C. to have a pregnancy test, the comments fail as a 2 Nor is a new pregnancy among the statutorily established grounds enumerated in section 39.806 of the Florida Statutes (2014) to support a termination of parental rights. 6 matter of law....

...K.P., the mother, appeals a circuit court order terminating her parental rights as to her son, J.R. We affirm. In this case, the Department of Children and Family Services filed an expedited petition to terminate both parents' parental rights under section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2007), for egregious conduct....

...NOTES [1] The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the father. His appeal to this Court was dismissed for lack of prosecution. [2] There is no merit to the mother's assertion that she should have been offered a case plan prior to termination. Under section 39.806(2), "[r]easonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in paragraphs (1)(e)-(i) have occurred." This is precisely what the trial...

...Paullin, Appellate Counsel, Guardian ad Litem Program, Orlando. PER CURIAM. As to all four children we affirm the findings and conclusions that the Department of Children and Family Services established grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2007), although we agree with appellant that the presumption in section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2007), *1107 was unavailable to the Department as to Z.C....

...The record reflects that appellant was properly advised of the right to counsel at the dependency stage, and appellant’s failure over the course of five *342 years, to comply with her case plan, was an adequate basis to terminate her parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(e)....

...5th DCA 2021). However, the trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id. The Department and the GAL correctly assert that the trial court erred when it found the evidence insufficient to terminate mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(l), Florida Statutes (2022)....

...remained in out-of-home care. Despite these factual findings, the trial court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to terminate Mother’s parental rights because no single child was removed at least three times. But the requirements of section 39.806(1)(l) are satisfied if a parent with multiple children causes the removal of any number or combination of the parent’s children on at least three occasions. See K.A....

...3d 501, 504–06 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021); E.A. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 332 So. 3d 493, 496–99 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). The trial court misconstrued the clear and unambiguous statutory language when it found no basis to terminate the Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(l). The Department and the GAL are also correct that the trial court erred when, based on its own finding that Father abandoned W.C.L.C., it failed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2022)....

...Father abandoned Z.C., the trial court should consider the best interest of the children. See § 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2022); R.W. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 228 So. 3d 730, 734 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); In re E.R., 49 So. 3d 846, 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); see also § 39.806(2), Fla....

based on section 39.806(1)(b) was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Section 39.806(1)(b)

...AM. P.R., father of M.C., A.C., and A.C. (B.A.C.), 1 appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights. As to B.A.C., we affirm the final judgment terminating P.R.'s parental rights because the grounds for termination based on sections 39.806(1)(c), 39.806(1)(j), and 39.806(1)(k), Florida Statutes (2017), were supported by competent, substantial evidence. We also affirm the final judgment terminating P.R.'s parental rights as to M.C. and A.C. because the grounds for termination based on sections 39.806(1)(e) 1., 39.806(1)(e)3., and 39.806(1)(j) were supported by competent, substantial evidence. However, we conclude that the trial court's finding of abandonment as to M.C. and A.C. based on section 39.806(1)(b) was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Section 39.806(1)(b) permits termination of parental rights based on abandonment, which is *377 defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2017), as "a situation in which the parent ..., while being able, has made no significant contribution to t...

potential harm to the child’s sibling is not required. § 39,806(l)(f), Fla. Stah In this case, an infant child

...substantial risk of significant harm to a sibling can warrant the removal of both children, even though one child has yet to be abused." N.H., 192 So. 3d at 595; see also Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. K.D., 88 So. 3d 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), superseded on other grounds by § 39.806(1)(f), Fla....

...Litem, Appellate Division, Tallahassee, for Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office.  November 14, 2024 EDWARDS, C.J. Appellant, J.R., Mother of J.J., J.J., W.G. Jr., and K.B., appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her children, pursuant to section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2023), arguing inter alia, that there is no competent substantial evidence in the record that she knew or should have known that her paramour might inflict a severe head injury on W.G., nor is there any evidence that Mother injured the child....

...safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the children, based upon W.G.’s serious injuries. The trial court concluded that Mother knew or should have known of the paramour’s violent propensity, yet failed to protect W.G. from injury. Section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2023), permits termination of a parent’s rights if they “had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental,...

...e the proper care, we conclude that the conduct is “egregious” within the meaning of the statute and affirm the termination of parental rights. The Department petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights, alleging that pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2013), “the [father] engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental or emotional health of the minor child....

...Termination was in the child’s manifest best interest and the least restrictive means to protect the child from harm. The father appeals the court’s judgment. The father argues that his conduct in failing to medically care for his child could not be classified as “egregious” under the statute, and therefore using section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2013), was improper....

...t or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child . . . “Egregious conduct” is defined in 39.806(1)(f)2....

...ed by counsel. 2. On or about.....(date(s))....., the following occurred: .....(acts which were basis for dependency or TPR, if filed directly)...... 3. The mother has .....(grounds for TPR)..... the minor child(ren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806, Florida Statutes, in that: .....(findings that form the statutory basis for grounds)...... 4. The father has .....(grounds for TPR)..... the minor child(ren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806, Florida Statutes, in that: .....(findings that *56 form the statutory basis for grounds).........

...THAT: 1. The petition filed by.....(name)..... is granted as to the parent(s),.....(name(s))...... 2. The parental rights of the father,.....(name)....., and of the mother,.....(name)....., to the child,.....(name)....., are hereby terminated under section 39.806(.....), Florida Statutes....

...file, heard argument of counsel, and considered recommendations and arguments of all parties. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents, .....(names)....., have surrendered their parental rights to the minor child(ren) under section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and that termination of parental rights is in the manifest best interest of the child(ren)....

...The mother, .....(name)....., freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and ..... with ..... without advice of legal counsel executed an affidavit and acknowledgment of surrender, consent, and waiver of notice *59 on .....(date)....., for termination of her parental rights to the minor child(ren), under section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...The father, .....(name)....., freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and ..... with..... without advice of legal counsel executed an affidavit and acknowledgment of surrender, consent, and waiver of notice on.....(date)....., for termination of herhis parental rights to the minor child(ren), under section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...The parental rights of the parents,.....(name(s))....., to the child,.....(name)....., are terminated. The parental rights of the father,.....(name)....., and of the mother,.....(name)....., to the child,.....(name)....., are hereby terminated under section 39.806(.....), Florida Statutes....

statutory grounds for termination pursuant to § 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2023). Because competent

on egregious conduct' toward Z.C.(l) under section 39.806(l)(f), Florida Statutes (2009), and aggravated

...e plan was the central issue at trial without objection.” 961 So.2d at 1132 . Likewise in K.S., the court found that the disputed issue was tried by implied consent when “extensive evidence was introduced during the three-day hearing implicating section 39.806(l)(c), ......

terminating W.W.’s rights: (1) abandonment under section 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2016); (2) failure

...T.M., the mother, appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her children, K.M. and A.M. We reverse the order terminating the mother’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings. The mother concedes, for the sake of argument, that at least one of the grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806, Florida Statutes (1999), is present....

PER CURIAM. Contrary to the arguments advanced by the appellant/mother, we find that the order terminating her parental rights to her minor child pursuant to section 39.806(l)(c), and (e), Florida Statutes (2005); was supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record before us....

...Solomon , 166 So.2d 499 , 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). We cannot reweigh the evidence. Disston v. Hanson , 116 So.3d 612 , 613 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). AFFIRMED. COHEN, C.J., ORFINGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur. The trial court's order erroneously referred to section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2015), to interpret "abandonment" instead of section 63.089(4). However, the error was harmless, as there is no significant difference in the analysis under either statute. Compare § 63.089(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015), with § 39.806(1)(d), Fla....

...Child's dependency. His whereabouts remained unknown. In December 2016, DCF petitioned the court to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father. DCF alleged, among other grounds, that Father abandoned Child in violation of section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016)....

...e adoption *525 or to proceed with the termination proceeding under Chapter 39. The trial court continued with Father's termination proceeding. Following trial, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned Child pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b)....

...Child's dependency. His whereabouts remained unknown. In December 2016, DCF petitioned the court to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father. DCF alleged, among other grounds, that Father abandoned Child in violation of section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016)....

...e adoption *525 or to proceed with the termination proceeding under Chapter 39. The trial court continued with Father's termination proceeding. Following trial, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned Child pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b)....

...2d 499, 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). We cannot reweigh the evidence. Disston v. Hanson, 116 So. 3d 612, 612 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). AFFIRMED. COHEN, C.J., ORFINGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur. 1 The trial court’s order erroneously referred to section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2015), to interpret “abandonment” instead of section 63.089(4). However, the error was harmless, as there is no significant difference in the analysis under either statute. Compare § 63.089(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015), with § 39.806(1)(d), Fla....

...(“the mother”) appeals a final judgment terminating her parental rights. We conclude that neither of the two statutory grounds relied upon for termination of parental rights (“TPR”) was proven by competent, substantial evidence, and we reverse. The trial court’s determination that TPR was proper under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2019), was based on the mother’s history and findings related to (1) her “pattern of behavior” of completing services to obtain reunification with her children, (2) her reverting back to alcohol abuse and...

...Even though the mother was not offered a case plan, she became sober immediately upon the removal of the children and successfully completed a substance abuse treatment program. She is currently in an “aftercare” program for substance abuse. To terminate parental rights, one of the grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2019), must be established by clear and convincing evidence....

...Sufficient evidence is ‘such evidence, in character, weight, or amount, as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded.’” Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1285 (5th ed. 1979)). Section 39.806(1)(c) provides that grounds for termination may be established: When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the 2 ...

...physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services. Provision of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. § 39.806(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2019). “To terminate the mother’s rights under [section 39.806(1)(c)], the Department was required to prove that the children’s ‘life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent, regardless of the provision of services’ and that ‘there is no reasonable basis to believe the parent will improve.’” Q.L....

...parents were in an ongoing relationship. The evidence established just the opposite: the parents separated following removal, they no longer live together, and they are no longer romantically involved with one another. Accordingly, this court must evaluate whether termination under section 39.806(1)(c) is proper based on the evidence of one incident of domestic violence....

...whether or not the mother would improve with the assistance of services. Thus, any determination that domestic violence services would be futile was based on raw speculation with little if any evidentiary support. The second ground for termination in the order of TPR is based on section 39.806(1)(l), Florida Statutes (2019), under which termination is permissible where “[o]n three or more occasions the child or another child of the parent or parents has been placed in out-of-home care pursuant to this chapter ....

...The trial court denied the petition as to W.B. and gave W.B. custody of his two children, M.B. and D.B. The trial court placed the oldest child, D.W., with his father, A.W. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights to all the children based upon subsections 39.806(l)(c) and (f), Florida Statutes (1999). Section 39.806(l)(c) provides for the termination of rights when the parent’s conduct toward a child demonstrates that the parent’s continuing involvement with the child would endanger the child’s life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health. Section 39.806(1)© permits a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights based on one incident when the parent engages in egregious conduct or fails to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child. The statute specifically states that “[e]gregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child.” § 39.806(l)(f)2, Fla....

...fest best interests and the least restrictive means of protecting him from serious harm. 2 Analysis To terminate a parent’s rights, the State must: 1) prove a statutory ground for termination under section 39.806[, Florida Statutes (2018)]; 2) show that termination is in the child’s manifest best interests; and 3) prove that termination is the least restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm....

...unless it is clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support. Id. at 873. J.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 264 So. 3d 973, 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). Abandonment and felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury to a child are statutory grounds for termination. § 39.806(1)(b), (h), Fla. Stat. (2018). “[S]o long as the trial court’s ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes, is supported by the evidence, the court’s decision [to terminate parental rights] is affirmable.” M.D....

...hild] or ask about his well- being.” The finding of abandonment is supported by competent substantial evidence. We also agree with the trial court that termination is the least restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm. Under section 39.806(2), Florida Statutes (2018), reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required when termination is proven under sections 39.806(1)(b) through (d) or (1)(f) through (m). As discussed, termination here was premised and proven under section 39.806(1)(b); therefore, the Department is not required to offer additional services to allow the father an opportunity to keep his parental rights intact....

...Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s finding of abandonment and that termination is the least restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm. We remand, however, “for [the] court to strike all findings of termination” based on section 39.806(1)(h)....

...3d DCA 2011) (stating an appellate court reviews a trial court’s judgment in a termination of parental rights case for competent substantial evidence); T.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 935 So.2d 621, 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“Under section 39.806(l)(f) [, Florida Statutes (2013) ], egregious abuse directed at one sibling is sufficient, without more, to support termination of parental rights to another sibling.” (citation omitted)).

...unds that were pleaded, viz., that her continued involvement "in the parent-child relationship[s]" would jeopardize "the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child[ren] irrespective of the provision of services." § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

...abused or neglected her children by "engag[ing] in conduct toward the children . . . that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the mother in the parent-child relationship . . . threatens the life or well-being of the children" within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2006). DCFS asserted no other ground but did allege under this heading that Z.M. had not completed certain tasks assigned in a case plan. DCFS did not allege abuse, neglect or abandonment evidenced *1269 by case plan noncompliance in violation of section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2006), [1] as grounds for termination of Z.M.'s parental rights. From opening statement on, DCFS litigated the case as it had pleaded it in its petition, urging as grounds for termination of Z.M.'s parental rights section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2006), alone. Only after the close of DCFS's case in chief and in response to Z.M.'s motion to dismiss did the trial judge suggest and DCFS's counsel agree that section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2006), seemed to support termination of Z.M.'s parental rights....

...In its final judgment the trial court ruled, nevertheless, that DCFS had established grounds for termination of Z.M.'s parental rights, not only (on the grounds actually pleaded) under section (1)(c), but also under section (1)(e). This was error. DCFS never sought termination of Z.M.'s parental rights based on section 39.806(1)(e)....

...The 12-month period begins to run only after the child's placement into shelter care or the entry of a disposition order placing the custody of the child with the department or a person other than the parent and the approval by the court of a case plan with a goal of reunification with the parent, whichever came first. § 39.806(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2006). [2] The following exchange took place after DCFS rested and Z.M.'s counsel stated a motion to dismiss: THE COURT: It looks like the allegations in Paragraph 12 would be more under 39.806(1)(e)....

...(Emphasis supplied.) [3] The father's parental rights to the children have been terminated. [4] In contrast to the trial court's ruling on the record, the court's written order does state (conclusorily) that DCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence grounds for termination of Z.M.'s parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...-4- removal of both children, even though one child has yet to be abused. The case of Department of Children and Family Services v. K.D., 88 So. 3d 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), superseded on other grounds by § 39.806(1)(f), Fla....

...In K.D., one twin suffered fractures to the left leg, skull, and ribs during his first seventeen days of life. Id. at 980. We recognize that K.D. is a termination of parental rights case subject to a higher standard of proof and other factors not involved in a shelter hearing. Compare § 39.402 (shelter placement), with § 39.806 (termination of parental rights); see also Dep't of Children & Families v....

...ward the child which demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the Mother in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services, pursuant to section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2000); (2) that the Mother failed to substantially comply with her case plan, pursuant to section 39.806(l)(e); and (3) that the Mother engaged in egregious conduct that endangers the life, health, or safety of the child, pursuant to section 39.806(l)(f)....

...or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child. § 39.806(l)(f)(2)....

...Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 812 So.2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (stating that a parent’s substance abuse alone does not establish prospective neglect). The Mother also argues that the trial court’s order failed to address the provision of services to the Mother. See § 39.806(l)(c)....

...that his parental rights be terminated. We affirm. On January 28, 1998, the father was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences without parole as a sexual predator. Thereafter, the lower court terminated his parental rights upon application of section 39.806(1)(d), Florida Statutes *347 (Supp.1998)....

...The court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child and, for this reason, that termination of the parental rights of the incarcerated parent is in the best interest of the child. § 39.806(1)(d), Fla....

...Accordingly, the lower court did not err in finding that it is in the manifest best interests of the children that the court terminate the father's parental rights. The father maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contend that section 39.806(1)(d) could not be applied to his case, where he was in custody since March of 1997, before the effective date of material amendments to this section....

...any persons who are sentenced after that date." (Emphasis added). While the father was in custody pending trial prior to October 1, 1997, the record reflects that his sentence was entered in January 1998, after the effective date of the amendment to section 39.806(1)(d)....

...nd Laura J. Lee, Assistant Director of Appeals (Tallahassee), for appellee, Guardian ad Litem. Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LOGUE, and MILLER, JJ.  PER CURIAM. We affirm the final judgment terminating appellants’ parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2021)....

...The father appeals the final order terminating his parental rights that was entered without either a prior determination that the child was dependent as to the father or a case plan. We affirm. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of parental rights in accordance with section 39.806(l)(d) and (i), Florida Statutes (1999)....

JACOBUS, J. P.B., the Mother, and K.H., the Father, appeal the order terminating their parental rights to their daughter, K.M. The lower court found grounds for terminating both parents’ rights pursuant to sections 39.806(l)(c), (l)(e), (l)ffi, (1)CP, and (1 )(l), Florida Statutes. We have reviewed the record on appeal and affirm the order terminating the Father’s rights in its entirety. We also affirm without discussion the portion of the order terminating the Mother’s rights pursuant to sections 39.806(l)(c), (l)(f), and (l)(i). 1 We must remand, however, for correction of the order terminating the Mother’s rights because the record does not support termination under sections 39.806(l)(e) and (l)(j)....

PER CURIAM. Appellant challenges the order terminating her parental rights to S.K.B. Appellee properly and commendably concedes that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of egregiousness as required by section 39.806(l)(f), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...hat termination of those rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991). In this case, the Department sought termination under sections 39.806(l)(c) and 39.806(l)(f), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...ased on record evidence, but rather is based on the trial court’s speculation that the Mother would fail in any attempt to comply with a case plan with a goal of reunification. Such speculation is not a valid basis for terminating parental rights. Section 39.806(l)(c) allows for termination of parental rights [w]hen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child re...

...the child’s life, safety, or health irrespective of the provision of services. “Irrespective of’ means “independent or regardless of.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1196 (1986). Thus, in order to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c), the trial court must find that the child’s life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent regardless of any services provided to the parent....

...In the absence of such evidence, the trial court’s order terminating the Mother’s parental rights must be reversed to give the Mother the opportunity to comply with a case plan with a goal of reunification. The Department also sought termination pursuant to section 39.806(l)(f)....

...��s sibling. [[Image here]] 2. As used in this subsection, the term “egregious conduct” means abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct of the parent or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. § 39.806(l)(f)2., Fla.Stat....

...Therefore, the Department failed to establish that termination was the least restrictive means available to prevent harm to the child. Because the Department failed to put forth sufficient evidence to support termination of the Mother’s parental rights under either section 39.806(l)(c) or 39.806(l)(f), the trial court’s order must be reversed....

out-of-home care for 12 of the last 22 months. § 39.806(1)(b), (c), (j), (e)3., Fla. Stat. 8 case plan

...parental rights based on: (1) abandonment; (2) continuing involvement threatening L.A.’s life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health; (3) chronic substance abuse; and (4) L.A.’s placement in out-of-home care for 12 of the last 22 months. § 39.806(1)(b), (c), (j), (e)3., Fla....

...argued one issue: that the trial court erred in finding that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting L.A. In response, the Department and GAL argued: (1) there was competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s least restrictive means determination; (2) section 39.806(2), Florida Statutes, relieved the Department of having to make reasonable efforts where the trial court found statutory grounds under section 39.806(1)(b) (abandonment) and (1)(c) (continuing involvement); and (3) termination was the least restrictive means pursuant to this Court’s decision in In Interest of T.M., 641 So....

...ANALYSIS Before a trial court can terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child, there are three elements the Department must prove. First, the Department must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground in section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2021), exists. See § 39.806(1), Fla....

...ce. As a result, four months before the termination of parental rights trial, the case plan was modified to require random drug tests and substance abuse counseling. In its final order, the trial court terminated J.S.’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(e)l., Florida Statutes *1147 (2016), finding that J.S....

...As a result, four months before the termination of parental rights trial, the case plan was modified to require random drug tests and substance abuse counseling. In its final order, the trial court terminated J.S.’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2016), finding that J.S....

...As to P.O., the petition moved for termination on two grounds: (1) that she had engaged in conduct that threatened the life or well-being of the child irrespective of the provision of services, and (2) that she had materially breached the terms and conditions of her case plan. § 39.806(l)(e),(e), Fla....

...und there were clear and convincing grounds for termination, including P.O.’s failure to comply with her case plan, and that termination of P.O.’s parental rights was in S.S.’s best interests. §§ 39.809(1), 39.810, 39.811, Fla. Stat. (2001). Section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes, provides: A petition for termination of parental rights may also be filed when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents....

...part due to behavioral issues. P.O.’s failure to substantially comply with her case plan, especially those requirements relating to drug treatment, constitutes sufficient grounds for the termination of her parental rights as to her daughter, S.S. § 39.806(l)(e)....

...court’s final order terminating the father’s parental rights. As in V.S. v. Department of Children & Families, 322 So. 3d 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), we also certify the following question of great public importance to the supreme court: Does the 2014 amendment to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, which provides that no proof of nexus between egregious conduct toward one child is required to terminate the parental rights of the child’s siblings, unconstitutionally remove the sta...

...court’s final order terminating the mother’s parental rights. As in V.S. v. Department of Children & Families, 322 So. 3d 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), we also certify the following question of great public importance to the supreme court: Does the 2014 amendment to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, which provides that no proof of nexus between egregious conduct toward one child is required to terminate the parental rights of the child’s siblings, unconstitutionally remove the sta...

...The mother, A.N., appeals an order terminating the parental rights to her three children, A.C.N., D.S., and I.K.N. 1 We affirm the termination order in regard to A.C.N. and D.S. However, we are compelled to reverse the termination order as to I.K.N. The termination order at issue was based exclusively on section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1999)....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 39.806(l)(f), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998); Padgett v. Department of HRS, 577

...The parental rights of the parents of M.R., II, were terminated by the trial court after two years of efforts at reunification. In the end, the trial court found that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the grounds for termination pursuant to section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2005), and that termination was in the manifest best interests of the child....

...During the January 2008 case plan, the 2nd case plan for Reunification, the Mother went into non-compliance having stopped services. During the June 2008 case plan, the 3rd case plan for Reunification, the Mother still had not attained substantial compliance. Pursuant to Florida Statute Section 39.806(1)(e)1, the Mother was required to comply with twelve (12) months of services with her case plan tasks....

...lity through adequate housing, child support, and stable employment by the expiration of her 3rd case plan resulting in her non-compliance and material breach of her case plan. Therefore, for these aforementioned reasons, pursuant to Florida Statute Section 39.806(1)(e)1[,] the Mother's parental rights must be terminated based upon her non-compliance with her case plan tasks after being given well over twelve (12) [months] to comply....

...We affirm the final judgment of termination of parental rights entered by the trial court. Affirmed. COPE, J. (specially concurring). I concur in affirming the judgment on the basis of "[a]bandonment as defined in s. 39.01(1), [Fla. Stat. (2007)] ...." § 39.806(1)(b), Fla....

...rpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned." Id. § 39.01(1). I am skeptical that the record adequately supports the ground cited in the majority opinion, an alleged material breach of the case plan. See id. § 39.806(1)(e)2....

...(the Mother) appeal an order terminating their parental rights to their youngest child, E.C. Although several issues were raised on appeal, we write to address only the issue of whether it was fundamental error for the trial court to terminate the parental rights to E.C. under section 39.806(l)(e)(l), Florida Statutes (2006), when the case plan that was approved by the court and relied upon by the parties throughout the proceedings was not filed in the court file....

...st interests of those children. The trial court readjudicated those children dependent. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents as to E.C. on the basis of the parents’ substantial noncompliance with the case plan pursuant to section 39.806(l)(e)(l)....

...on by clear and convincing evidence. E.E.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 846 So.2d 1250, 1251-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The trial court must then find that the Department proved a statutory ground for termination of parental rights under section 39.806 and that termination is in the manifest best interests of the child under section 39.810....

...Rubin, 237 So.2d 134, 137 (Fla.1970). Fundamental error is error that “goes to the foundation of the case or goes to the merits of the cause of action.” Id. An appellate court “should exercise its discretion under the doctrine of fundamental error very guardedly.” Id. Section 39.806(l)(e)(l) provides that a ground for termination may be established “[w]hen [the] child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court,” and “[t]he child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned b...

childfren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806, Florida Statutes, in that:.TT^ffindings that

...The parental rights of the children’s father were terminated following his failure to appear after a diligent search and publication and are not the subject of this appeal. T.H. asserts that her agreement to voluntarily surrender her parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2010) 1 was conditioned upon A.H. and *152 B.T. being adopted by her sister who lived in Tennessee, which did not occur. Additionally, T.H. contends that the surrender documents required by section 39.806(l)(a)(l), were never identified in open court, never filed as required by the statute, and have never been located....

...“voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to the children, A.H. and B.T., on 5/18/2009, with the assistance of counsel.” The second order was titled “Order of Termination of Parental Rights and Permanent Commitment.” The order states: a. On 5/18/2009, in accordance with Section 39.806(l)(a) Florida Statutes 2007, the mother, T.H., executed in proper form an Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender, Consent, and Waiver of Notice as to the minor children A.H....

...The court then issued an order denying T.H.’s motion to set aside her consent to the termination of her parental rights. The court explained that T.H.’s surrenders “may be withdrawn only after a finding by the court that the surrender and consent were obtained by fraud or under duress.” § 39.806(l)(a)(l), Fla....

...he least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm.” A.B.E. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 47 So.3d 347, 352-53 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing J.J. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 886 So.2d 1046, 1048-49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)). Section 39.806(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that grounds for termination of parental rights are established “[w]hen the parent or parents have voluntarily executed a written surrender of the child and consented to the entry of an order giving custody of the child to the department for subsequent adoption.” § 39.806(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). “The surrender document must be executed before two witnesses and a notary public or other person authorized to take acknowledgments.” § 39.806(l)(a)(l). In the instant case, the trial court erred in terminating T.H.’s parental rights under § 39.806(l)(a)(l), because the written surrenders were neither filed, nor examined, to determine if they comported with the statutory requirements....

...rs on the children ... however we are going to hold them in abeyance.” The record confirms that the surrender documents were never filed and the attorneys present at *155 the hearing did not receive them. Accordingly, the statutory requirements of section 39.806(l)(a)(l), Florida Statutes, were not met. Without the surrender documents, there is no evidence as to what was contained within them or whether they were properly executed as required by section 39.806(l)(a)(l). It is error to terminate parental rights when the parent has not executed the necessary surrender forms when DCF seeks to terminate parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(a)(l)....

...2d DCA 2009). While DCF cites Department of Children & Families v. A.S., 927 So.2d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), for the proposition that Florida law permits an oral surrender, it is not on point; the case did not involve a termination of parental rights under section 39.806(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...In A.S., the court explicitly recognized the important distinction between termination of parental rights by implied consent and statutory termination of parental rights by written consent: Further analysis reveals that voluntary termination under section 39.806(l)(a) requires consent by the parents that is altogether different from consent under section 39.801(3)(d)....

...Conversely, in the instant case, the surrender documents were not executed in open court, were never filed, and it is unknown as to whether the docu: ments were witnessed and notarized. Thus, the trial court erred in refusing to vacate its order terminating T.H.’s parental rights because the statutory requirements of section 39.806(l)(a)(l), Florida Statutes, were not met. We, therefore, reverse the orders terminating T.H.’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and Remanded With Directions. MAY and CIKLIN, JJ., concur. . Section 39.806(l)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2010), states as follows: *152 (1) Grounds for the termination of parental rights may be established under any of the following circumstances: (a) When the parent or parents have voluntarily executed a writt...

...behavioral issues that led to the termination of her parental rights of two other children in 2007 and 2018. We conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating Appellant’s parental rights as to Y under the expedited process established in section 39.806(2) of the Florida Statutes, which permitted appellee Florida Department of Children and Families to proceed without first offering Appellant a reunification plan and services. We further conclude that the trial court’s findings regarding the alleged grounds for the termination of parental rights, set forth in sections 39.806(1)(c), (i) and (l), are supported by competent, substantial evidence and represent the least restrictive means to protect Y....

...3d DCA 2019) (“To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that the Department established by clear and convincing evidence the following: (1) the existence of at least one statutory ground for terminating parental rights set forth in section 39.806(1); (2) termination is in the manifest best interest of the child; and (3) termination is the least restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm.”). Affirmed. 3 

was adjudicated dependent, in violation of section 39.806(1)(e)(1), Florida

...5th DCA 2005). We conclude that the court did not err in denying the motion. A review of the record shows that competent substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence proved that the father had failed to substantially comply with his case plan in violation of section 39.806(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2019)....

...ts to all three of his children. Later, it amended the petition to only seek termination of J.R.’s parental rights to J.B., and requested that J.B. be placed for adoption. The Department alleged the following statutory grounds for termination: (1) section 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), abandonment of the child; (2) section 39.806(l)(e), conduct toward the child demonstrating that the continuing involvement of the parent in the parent-child relationship threatened the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child despite the provision of services; (3) section 39.806(l)(d)(3), the continuation of the parent-child relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child; and (4) section 39.806(l)(e), failure to comply with the case plan....

...Finally, he stated that he wishes to work on a case plan with a goal of reunification as soon as he is released from prison in March 2006. On April 8, 2004, the trial court entered a final judgment terminating J.R.’s parental rights to his son under sections 39.806(l)(b), 39.806(l)(c), 39.806(l)(d)(3) and 39.806(l)(e)....

...F.L., 880 So.2d 602 , 614 n. 7 (Fla.2004) (Cantero, J., concurring) (quoting In re Davey, 645 So.2d 398, 404 (Fla.1994)). Based on these standards we review the statutory grounds the trial court assigned for termination of J.R.’s parental rights. Section 39.806(l)(b) Pursuant to section 39.806(l)(b), the trial court found that J.R....

...kind of bond with him. Considering J.R.’s demonstrated interest in his son and his near completion of his term of incarceration, the Department did not provide clear and convincing evidence that J.R. had abandoned his young son under this section. Section 39.806(l)(c) In support of its finding under section 39.806(l)(c) that J.R....

...to provide for his child’s needs. He stated that he committed his most recent burglary by throwing a rock at his former employer’s business and breaking a window out of frustration, and that he regretted doing so. It is error to terminate under section 39.806(l)(c) “when improvement was demonstrated and further improvement was possible.” K.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re N.S.), 898 So.2d 1194, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); M.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 866 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that in order to terminate under section 39.806(l)(e), the State must show that the child’s welfare would continue to be threatened by the parent regardless of the provision of services and that there is no reasonable basis to believe that the parent will improve). The Department failed to carry its burden to show that J.R. engaged in conduct toward his child which threatened his well-being under section 39.806(l)(c). Section 39.806(l)(d)(3) The trial court found that pursuant to section 39.806(l)(d)(3) continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful and that termination of the parental relationship would'be in the best interest of the child....

...ent lack of a relationship with their incarcerated father, and the detrimental effect that being reunited with the father would have on them. See N.S., 898 So.2d at 1198 (holding that a trial court is precluded from terminating parental rights under section 39.806(l)(d)(3) where no evidence regarding the impact of continuing the parent-child relationship is offered). 1 Based on the record before us, the Department failed to prove that termination was required under this section. Section 39.806(l)(e) Under section 39.806(l)(e), a petition for termination of parental rights may be filed when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with *1208 the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents....

...Therefore, we find it unnecessary to discuss the trial court’s reasons under sections 39.810(1)-(11), Florida Statutes (2001), that termination of parental rights was in the manifest best interests of the child. Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. DAVIS and CANADY, JJ., Concur. . We note that section 39.806(l)(d)(l) provides for termination if a parent is to be incarcerated for a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain age eighteen....

...Underwood and Robin Bresky of Schwartz Sladkus Reich Greenberg Atlas LLP, Boca Raton, for appellee. DAMOORGIAN, J. K.M. (“the mother”) appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her private petition for termination of parental rights against K.B. (“the father”). The mother’s petition was based on section 39.806(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2023), which allows termination of parental rights under certain conditions when the parent is incarcerated....

...from federal prison and placed on federal home confinement for the remainder of his sentence. The mother thereafter filed a motion asking the trial court to determine whether the father’s placement on home confinement qualified as “incarceration” for purposes of section 39.806(1)(d). At the ensuing hearing, the father testified as to his home confinement terms....

...The father also testified that he was permitted to take the child to the hospital in an emergency without first seeking prior approval. Based on this testimony, the father argued he was completely available to parent the child and therefore was not “incarcerated” within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(d). Following the hearing, the trial court concluded the father was not “incarcerated” as it relates to section 39.806(1)(d) and dismissed the mother’s petition....

...and concluded the home confinement terms permitted the father to “act as a parent for the child.” On appeal, the mother argues the father’s placement on home confinement as part of his federal prison sentence constitutes incarceration for purposes of section 39.806(1)(d)....

...BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Based on this definition, the mother argues the father is “incarcerated” as he is confined to his home. The father counters that, in looking at the plain and ordinary meaning of “incarceration” and section 39.806(1)(d)’s legislative intent, his placement on home confinement does not constitute “incarceration.” The father further argues that several district courts, including this court, have clearly held that house arrest or home confinement is not equivalent to incarceration. Sections 39.806(1)(d)1....

...The parent’s history of criminal behavior, which may include the frequency of incarceration and the unavailability of the parent to the child due to incarceration. e. Any other factor the court deems relevant. § 39.806(1)(d)1., 3., Fla. Stat. (2023). Although section 39.806 does not define “incarceration,” we have previously defined “incarceration” as being confined in a “governmental institution” and held that house arrest is not equivalent to “incarceration”: [I]ncarceration has b...

...case applies equally to a home confinement sentence. We further hold that when a parent is placed on home confinement with terms which enable the parent to be involved in the child’s care and well-being, the parent is not “incarcerated” under section 39.806(1)(d). Such a holding is consistent with section 39.806(1)(d)’s purpose of protecting the child’s need for a permanent and stable home. Accordingly, as the trial court in this case expressly found that the terms of the father’s home confinement permitted the father to act as a par...

...J.H., the Father, seeks review of the trial court’s order adjudicating E.I.F. dependent and terminating his parental rights to E.I.F. The Father does not challenge the adjudication of dependency but argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(c), (l)(d)(l), (l)(d)(3), and (l)(f), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...1 The Father was incarcerated at the time of E.I.F.’s birth and was not identified as the Father of E.I.F. until February 2002. 2 In March 2002, the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to both parents. The petition alleged that termination was proper under section 39.806(l)(c), (l)(d)(l), (l)(d)(3), and (l)(f)....

...In fact, the record does not contain any evidence of any violent acts committed by the Father towards or in front of his two older children since that incident. Regardless, the trial court found that the Father’s conduct towards his older children constituted clear and convincing evidence to support termination under section 39.806(l)(e), (l)(d)(3), and (l)(f). Section 39.806(l)(c) provides for termination of parental rights when the Department proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in conduct toward ......

...tory absent evidence linking the criminal acts to the child’s well-being); L.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 835 So.2d 1189, 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that the trial court erred in terminating the mother’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c) based on her domestic violence against the father when she had received treatment for same, had been taking her medication, and the parties had separated)....

...physical, mental, or emotional health of the child,” it does not support the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence “that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child” under section 39.806(l)(d)(3), or of “egregious conduct ... that threatens the. life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child’s sibling” under section 39.806(l)(f). Thus, the trial court erred in terminating the Father’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c), (l)(d)(3), and (l)(f). The trial court also based its termination on section 39.806(l)(d)(l), which provides for termination of parental rights if the Department proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is incarcerated and the time of incarceration will be a “substantial portion of the period of time...

...2d DCA 2002). But see Dep’t of Children & Family Servs, v. B.C., 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2009 , — So.2d -, 2003 WL 22014737 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug.27, 2003) (holding that the time a parent has been incarcerated in the past should be considered under section 39.806(l)(d)(l) and certifying conflict with In re J.D.C....

...ining minority of a four-year-old or one-year-old child). The period of incarceration will not even constitute half of the time before E.I.F. reaches majority. Therefore, the trial court also erred in terminating the Father’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(d)(l)....

...However, as noted above, the Fourth District considers the time a parent has been incarcerated in the past, while this court considers only the future period of incarceration. In B.C., the Fourth District held that a period of incarceration of seven years and nine months was sufficient to support termination under section 39.806(l)(d)(l), but it is not clear how much of this term was future incarceration....

...and the potential harm to the Three Siblings and (4) the court failed to make an individualized analysis of the statutory manifest best interest factors as applied to each of the Three Siblings. We address each argument in turn. 1. Unpled Statutory Ground (§ 39.806(1)(g)) “[B]efore terminating parental rights, ‘the trial court must find that the Department established by clear and convincing evidence the following: (1) the existence of at least one statutory ground for terminating parental rights set forth in section 39.806(1); (2) termination is in the manifest best interest 1 A.A....

...We review the trial court’s findings under the highly deferential competent substantial evidence standard of review. See, e.g., C.G. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 67 So. 3d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). The trial court relied on two statutory grounds for terminating the Mother’s rights: § 39.806(1)(f) and § 39.806(1)(g)....

...Relevant here is subsection (g), which provides as follows: (g) The parent or parents have subjected the child or another child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse. § 39.806(1)(g), Fla....

...because it is based on grounds not asserted in DCF’s petition.”). But because the existence of only one statutory ground is necessary, this does not amount to reversible error unless the trial court’s reliance on subsection (f) was also erroneous. See § 39.806(1) (“Grounds for the termination of parental rights may be established under any of the following circumstances ....

...Weekly D1633 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 3, 2022), reh’g denied (Oct. 7, 2022) (“[W]e conclude that terminating parental rights solely on a statutory ground not pled in the petition constitutes a denial of due process.” (emphasis added)). 2. Egregious Conduct (§ 39.806(1)(f)) The only statutory ground the Department relied on against the Mother was § 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2022), which provides as follows: (f) The parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious 3 The Department asserted subsection (g) against A.A....

...conduct that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child.” § 39.806(1)(f)(2). The Mother contends that competent substantial evidence does not support termination pursuant to subsection (f)....

...C. is supported 8 by at least one statutory ground, we affirm the termination order as to D.G.C. We turn now to the remaining two issues involving the Three Siblings. 3. Proof of a Nexus of Harm (§ 39.806(1)(f)) Section 39.806(1)(f) permits termination of parental rights to siblings, even if there is no nexus between the egregious conduct and the potential harm to the siblings: “Proof of a nexus between egregious conduct to a child and the potential harm to the child’s sibling is not required.” This language was added in 2014. Even before the 2014 amendment, this Court held that “[s]ection 39.806(1)(f) provides a mechanism for protecting children from the threat of abuse [and] permits the trial court to terminate parental rights to a child who has suffered egregious abuse, and to any siblings of such child.” T.P....

...ights to the Three Siblings without proof of a nexus between her knowing failure to prevent egregious harm to D.G.C. and the potential harm to the Three Siblings violates her constitutional rights as a parent. Consequently, the Mother claims that § 39.806(1)(f) is unconstitutional....

...2d at 624 (“Although parental rights are fundamental, we emphasize that they are not absolute, as they are subject to the overriding principle that the best interests of the children must prevail.”). Because a fundamental liberty interest is involved, we subject § 39.806(1)(f) to strict scrutiny. “To withstand strict scrutiny, a law must be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” N.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & 5 Below, the Mother only argued § 39.806(1)(f) was facially unconstitutional. Her as-applied challenge on appeal is therefore not preserved....

...Fams., 183 So. 3d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (quoting State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1109 (Fla. 2004)). It is undisputed that the statute serves a compelling government interest by protecting children. As for being narrowly tailored, we note that § 39.806(1) lists several grounds for termination of parental rights....

...unharmed siblings. 6 Importantly, subsection (f) narrowly applies in situations where there is “egregious conduct,” which is clearly defined in the statute as “conduct that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct.” § 39.806(f)(2). As this Court explained in T.P., “[s]ection 39.806(1)(f) ‘represents a legislative expression that parents who have committed egregious acts of abuse against one child pose an unacceptable risk that they will abuse their remaining children.’” 935 So. 2d at 625 (quoting B.B., 824 So. 2d at 1007). The Mother heavily relies on two Florida Supreme Court cases that do not involve egregious conduct under § 39.806(1)(f): Padgett and F.L. We 6 Section 39.806(1)(h), which has to do with “murder, manslaughter, aiding or abetting the murder, or conspiracy or solicitation to murder the other parent or another child, or a felony battery that resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to another child” similarly does not require proof of a nexus between the conduct and potential harm to another child. 11 agree with the Fourth District that these cases do not undermine the constitutionality of § 39.806(1)(f): Neither opinion dealt with section 39.806(1)(f) as amended in 2014, nor with a “no nexus required” provision inserted by the legislature....

...Thus, the “no nexus required” amendment is not incompatible with Padgett and F.L. or with the “narrowly tailored” prerequisite. V.S. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 322 So. 3d 1153, 1161–62 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).7 We therefore conclude that § 39.806(1)(f) survives strict scrutiny because it promotes the compelling government interest of protecting 7 The Fourth District has certified the constitutionality of § 39.806(1)(f) as a question of great public importance at least four times....

...children and it narrowly applies in situations where there is egregious conduct. 4. Manifest Best Interests of the Three Siblings (§ 39.810) Although proof of a nexus between egregious conduct and potential harm to a sibling is not required for termination under section 39.806(1)(f), the trial court must still engage in a manifest best interests inquiry pursuant to § 39.810....

...n which the trial court has determined that the parent ‘[e]ngaged in egregious conduct . . . that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child's sibling.’” V.S., 322 So. 3d at 1160 (quoting § 39.806(1)(f), Fla....

...we must apply.” J.P. v. Fla. Dept. of Child. & Fams., 183 So. 3d 1198, 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). III. CONCLUSION 14  Although the trial court erred when it terminated the Mother’s parental rights based on § 39.806(1)(g), a statutory ground that was never pled, we nevertheless affirm the termination order because there is competent substantial evidence supporting termination of the Mother’s parental rights to D.G.C. under § 39.806(1)(f). We also conclude that § 39.806(1)(f) is constitutional and that the trial court did not err in terminating the Mother’s parental rights to the Three Siblings. Affirmed. 15 

...Office, Tallahassee, for appellee Guardian ad Litem. PER CURIAM. The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her four children based upon egregious conduct toward her thirteen-month-old child, egregious conduct being a ground for termination in section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2020)....

...ded in 2014, and concludes that (1) the mother engaged in “egregious conduct . . . that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of . . . the child’s sibling[s,]” a ground for termination of parental rights found in section 39.806(1)(f), and (2) that termination of the mother’s parental rights of the siblings is the least restrictive means of protecting them from serious harm. Finally, all three panel members agree that the case is to be remanded to have t...

...s not married to the mother, and the mother was given supervised visitation. Subsequently, the Department filed an expedited termination of parental rights petition against the mother, pursuant to section 2 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2020), on the grounds that she engaged in egregious conduct threatening the life, safety, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child or his siblings....

... Given the mother’s caretaker role, the court determined she had engaged in “egregious conduct” threatening the child’s life, safety, physical, mental, or emotional health. While no evidence was presented of abuse to the other children, the court noted section 39.806(1)(f) does not require proof of any nexus between egregious conduct toward K.M.4 and harm to his siblings. The trial court further found that because the Department had proved termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), it was not required to use reasonable efforts to reunify the siblings with the mother....

...See M.C. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 186 So. 3d 74, 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). The termination of parental rights involves a three-step process. First, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground under section 39.806 has been established....

...t the child from serious harm. Id. at 777. A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Prove Egregious Conduct with respect to K.M.4 In this case, the Department alleged one ground for terminating the mother’s parental rights to her children based on section 39.806(1)(f). That section provides: (1) Grounds for the termination of parental rights may be established under any of the following circumstances: 6  .... (f) The parent o...

...Therefore, even if we may have viewed the evidence differently had we been the trier of fact, we must defer to the trial court’s findings and conclusions that the mother had engaged in egregious abuse of K.M.4. Thus, we affirm the termination of parental rights as to K.M.4. B. Constitutionality of the 2014 amendment to Section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2020), as applied to the termination of parental rights with respect to K.M.4’s siblings. As grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights to her other children, the statute provides that “[p]roof of a nexus between egregious conduct to a child and the potential harm to the child’s sibling is not required.” § 39.806(1)(f), Fla....

...circumstances with respect to sibling terminations, even in circumstances in which the trial court has determined that the parent “[e]ngaged in egregious conduct . . . that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child’s sibling.” § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2020); see also S.M. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 202 So. 3d 769, 776– 77 (Fla. 2016) (a termination of parental rights petition must contain facts supporting three basic elements: (a) at least one of the grounds listed in section 39.806 has been met; (b) the manifest best interests of the child would be served by the granting of the petition; and (c) “termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm”). Thus, once the petitioner establishes a statutory ground for termination (section 39.806(1)(f) here), it still must address the manifest best interests inquiry. The mother has not established that section 39.806(1)(f), post-2014 amendment, is unconstitutional....

...3d 529, 538 (Fla. 2014) (“Generally, when we review the constitutionality of a statute, we accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and construe the challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome when possible.”). Here, the challenged legislation serves a compelling state interest. Section 39.806(1)(f)2., Florida Statutes (2020), defines egregious conduct as “abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct. Egregious conduct may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child.” § 39.806(1)(f)2., Fla....

...The 2014 amendment eliminating the nexus requirement embodies a legislative recognition that egregious conduct toward one child not only threatens the life and safety of the child’s siblings, but also threatens their “physical, mental, or emotional health[.]” § 39.806(1)(f), Fla....

...Judge Warner’s dissenting opinion relies heavily on pre-2014 opinions of the Florida Supreme Court: Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991), and Dep’t of Child. and Fams. v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004). Neither opinion dealt with section 39.806(1)(f) as amended in 2014, nor with a “no nexus required” provision inserted by the legislature....

...or with the “narrowly tailored” prerequisite. The Second District, in In Interest of C.M.H., 288 So. 3d 722 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018), noted having earlier held that Padgett’s “risk-of-harm requirement did not apply to the ground for termination under section 39.806(1)(h), which allows for termination when a parent has caused the death of a child, because ‘[t]he risk in [that] kind of case is clear.’” 288 So. 3d at 724 (alterations in original) (citing and quoting In re E.R., 49 So. 3d 846, 853 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)). C.M.H. applied In re E.R.’s logic to section 39.806(1)(d)(2), which terminates parental rights for a parent who is incarcerated and has been designated a sexual predator. See 288 So. 3d at 724–25. The court rejected the parent’s argument that this subchapter of section 39.806(1) should be declared unconstitutional “because it does not require such proof of a substantial risk of significant harm to the child.” Id....

...injuries to K.M.4, we see no reason to not apply the “risk is clear” rationale to the inherent risk of harm associated with such parental behavior as applied to parental rights of the siblings. See D.O. v. S.M., 981 So. 2d 11, 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that section 39.806(1)(f) “represents a legislative expression that parents who have committed egregious acts of abuse against one child pose an unacceptable risk that they will abuse their remaining children”). C. Manifest Best Interests 10  The trial court also relied on the language eliminating the proof of a nexus in section 39.806(1)(f) in its manifest best interests analysis. Section 39.810(1)–(11), Florida Statutes (2020), requires the court to consider all relevant factors before making a manifest best interests decision....

...but made no statement confirming that it made the determinations for each child individually, despite use of the group descriptor “the children.” 11 Thus, due to the court’s improper reliance on the elimination of the nexus requirement in section 39.806(1)(f), the court erred in failing to conduct a complete manifest best interests analysis with respect to the siblings. D....

...the least restrictive means.’” Interest of C.E., 263 So. 3d at 213 (quoting In re. T.M., 641 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. 1994)). As to the siblings, the legislature has abrogated the least restrictive means inquiry for “egregious conduct” cases, among others. See § 39.806(2), Fla....

...termination was based upon egregious conduct. We find no error. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we affirm the termination of parental rights with respect to K.M.4. Moreover, the panel majority does not determine that the amendment to section 39.806(1)(f), which provides that “[p]roof of a nexus between egregious conduct to a child and the potential harm to the child’s sibling is not required,” is unconstitutional or in conflict with pre-amendment precedent....

...t. 12 CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur. WARNER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. WARNER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I conclude that the 2014 legislative amendment of section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional, as it violates a parent’s fundamental right to parent by relieving the State of its burden to show that the parent poses a substantial risk of harm to a child, simply by proving an act of egregious conduct towards a sibling....

...Thus, I dissent in part from the majority opinion. Facial Constitutionality of Section 36.806(1)(f) In Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991), our supreme court considered the constitutionality of an earlier version of section 39.806(1)(f), which provided that where a parent engages in severe abuse or neglect of one child, termination of the parent’s rights to other children was authorized....

...2) termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. 14  In Florida Department of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004), the court addressed another similar statute, section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2002), that established a ground for termination “when the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily.” Id....

...In all cases, we emphasized that to pass constitutional muster, the termination of parental rights to the current child must be the least restrictive means of protecting that child from harm. Id. at 608. Based on Padgett, the court agreed that “section 39.806(1)(i) may not constitutionally permit a termination of parental rights without proof of substantial risk to the child.” Id. at 609. However, the statute could be deemed constitutional by applying the Padgett factors to its operation. Thus, the court held: We, therefore, hold that parental rights may be terminated under section 39.806(1)(i) only if the state proves both a prior involuntary termination of rights to a sibling and a substantial risk of significant harm to the current child....

...also required proof of substantial risk of significant harm to the child where the ground for termination is based upon the termination of parental rights to a sibling. The court further explained that such a finding must be based upon the specific circumstances of each case: For a trial court applying section 39.806(1)(i), the circumstances leading to the prior involuntary termination will be highly relevant to the court’s determination of whether the current child is at risk and whether termination is the least restrictive way to protect the child....

...insufficient evidence of substantial risk of significant harm to sons based upon sexual abuse of daughters and the totality of the circumstances); J.J. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 994 So. 2d 496, 502 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding that termination based upon section 39.806(1)(i) was error where there was no showing of substantial risk of significant harm to later born siblings). In contrast, the Second District held that in cases of sibling murder, there was no requirement to show a nexus between the murder and substantial risk of significant harm to the remaining children....

...in such conduct had a high rate of recidivism, as testified to by a child abuse expert. Thus, the court considered the totality of the circumstances in determining that there was a substantial risk. Id. at 854. With the amendment eliminating the nexus requirement in section 39.806(1)(f), the legislature removed the very factor that Padgett and F.L. required to make similar statutes constitutional when seeking to terminate parental rights to a child based upon the parent’s conduct toward a 16 sibling....

...e same abuse suffered by the daughters. See id. at 1008–09. The majority cites both In Interest of C.M.H., 288 So. 3d 722 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) and In re E.R., 49 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) in support of its holding. E.R. concluded that under section 39.806(1)(h), where a parent murdered one child, the Department did not have to prove a substantial risk of harm to other children, because the risk was apparent. Id. at 853. In C.M.H., however, the court applied the Padgett substantial harm analysis to section 39.806(1)(d)(2)....

...It concluded that the legislature had not intended to abrogate the substantial harm requirement of Padgett, but the harm to all the children of the father being a sexual predator and having been convicted of sexual abuse of a minor was sufficient. Neither opinion analyzed the constitutionality of section 39.806(1)(f), but C.M.H. included a footnote important to explain its conclusion that the substantial harm requirement of Padgett was not abrogated: Rather, the 2014 amendments to the grounds for termination provided in section 39.806(1)(f) (egregious conduct) and section 39.806(1)(h) (causing the death or serious bodily injury of a child) indicate a desire to retain Padgett’s risk-of- harm requirement for section 39.806(1)(d)(2)....

...See ch.14-224, § 19, at 41, Laws of Fla. Under the doctrine of expressiounius est exclusion alterius, the inclusion of such language in only those two grounds indicates an intention to exclude that language from all of the other grounds, including section 39.806(1)(d)(2)....

...caveat in one subsection of the statute, but not in another, 18  indicated that it intended to exclude the caveat in the other subsection). Thus, the amendments indicate that Padgett’s risk-of-harm requirement applies to section 39.806(1)(d)(2). We note that in commenting on these amendments we do not express any opinion regarding their constitutionality, which we have previously called into question. See J.F. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 198 So. 3d 706, 707 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Id. at 724 n.4 (emphasis supplied). Because the legislative amendment to section 39.806(1)(f) conflicts with the constitutional analysis of Padgett and F.L., I would hold that it is unconstitutional, as we are bound to follow supreme court precedent....

...ot the least restrictive means of protecting the other children. See, e.g., A.J., 97 So. 3d at 988; J.J., 994 So. 2d at 503. Just as with the manifest best interest analysis, the court improperly relied on the elimination of the nexus requirement in section 39.806(1)(f) to find that termination was the least restrictive means to protect the siblings....

...In this case, the trial court did not conduct a least restrictive means inquiry, only making a conclusory finding that termination was the least restrictive means, based on E.A. v. Department of Children and Families, 332 So. 3d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), and section 39.806(2), Florida Statutes (2022). * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 2 

...ment. *335 We find the trial court erred in failing to address two of the grounds for termination alleged by the Department: (1) that continuing the parental relationship with appellee, who was incarcerated, would be harmful to C.A., as set forth in section 39.806(1)(d)(3), Florida Statutes (2011); and (2) abandonment, as set forth in section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...these grounds. Because the trial court specifically denied the petition for termination based on the Department’s failure to assist appellee with his case plan and to find a relative placement, without addressing the grounds related to subsections 39.806(1)(d)(3) and (l)(b), it is unclear that the trial court actually considered these grounds....

12 months of the child’s shelter pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e)(1) and (1)(e)(2), Florida Statutes (2024)

...The trial court’s sole basis for terminating J.W.’s parental rights was its finding that the period of time for which J.W. was expected to be incarcerated constituted “a substantial portion of the period of time before the child[ren] will attain the age of 18 years” under section 39.806(l)(d)(l), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...In reaching this decision, the trial court stated that it was considering both the length of time J.W. would be incarcerated and the relative importance of that time to his children’s development. On appeal, the parties do not dispute either the facts or the applicable law. They dispute only the interpretation of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) and its application to the facts of this case....

...Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792 , 78 So. 693 (1918)). “If the legislature did not intend the results mandated by the statute’s plain language, then the appropriate remedy is for it to amend the statute.” Overstreet, 629 So.2d at 126 . Here, the plain language of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) speaks only to time....

...10, § 7006-1.1 (2001) (requiring the court to consider both the duration of the parent’s incarceration and its detrimental effect on the child in determining whether to terminate parental rights). The lack of such a reference to the “quality” of the time or the detriment to the child’s development in section 39.806(l)(d)(l) indicates that no such considerations were contemplated by the legislature. If the legislature intended the trial courts to consider the “quality” of the time to the child, it should amend the statute to reflect this intent. Based on the plain language of section 39.806(l)(d)(l), we conclude that the trial court may consider only the length of time the parent will be incarcerated in determining whether that period constitutes a “substantial portion of the period of time” before the child reaches age eighteen. See W.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 811 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (reversing termination of parental rights under section 39.806(l)(d)(l) and noting that the fifty-four months the father was to serve in prison was not a “substantial portion” of eighteen years). Any other interpretation of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) does not hold true to the plain language of the statute. Under the plain language of section 39.806(l)(d)(l), J.W.’s remaining sentence does not constitute a “substantial portion of the period of time” before A.W....

...was four years old and J.W. was one year old. The fifty-four months remaining in J.W.’s prison sentence do not constitute a “substantial portion” of the remaining minority of A.W. and J.W. Therefore, the trial court erred in terminating J.W.’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(d)(l). Because J.W.’s parental rights may not be terminated under section 39.806(l)(d)(l) *1265 and because the Department failed to prove any other statutory basis for terminating J.W.’s parental rights, we reverse the final judgment....

...ing or physical, mental, or emotional health of the children, irrespective of services. By entering his consent to this allegation, the Father agreed that his continued involvement would pose a threat to the children with or without a case plan. See § 39.806(l)(c), Fla....

...ing or physical, mental, or emotional health of the children, irrespective of services. By entering his consent to this allegation, the Father agreed that his continued involvement would pose a threat to the children with or without a case plan. See § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

...Appellant/Mother, C.B., appeals from the lower court’s Final Judgment termi *1186 nating parental rights. We reverse on the ground that the Department of Children and Family Services (“Department”) failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence any basis for termination as required by section 39.806, Florida Statute....

...To support the termination of parental rights, the Department has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has abused, neglected, or abandoned a child and that permanent termination of parental rights is the least restrictive alternative. See § 39.806(1), Fla....

...ld that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well being [sic] or physical, mental or emotional health of the child.... ” The statutory authority for this ground is section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2013)....

...ation. In its order terminating J.T.’s parental rights, the trial court found that the Department had proved each ground for termination. The trial court also found that termination was in T.B.’s best interest. Failure to comply with a case plan Section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2000), provides for termination of parental rights when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents....

...Dep’t of Children & Families, 814 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Further, because J.T. had no tasks to complete under the case plan he was given, there was no factual basis to find that he failed to substantially comply with the plan. Conduct threatening the life or well-being of the child Section 39.806(1)(c) provides for termination when a parent has engaged in conduct toward the child that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical,...

...It is also improper to terminate parental rights if a parent is unable to financially provide for the child or to assume parental obligations due to incarceration. E.L.H. v. State, 687 So.2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Incarceration The Department also sought termination based on section 39.806(l)(d). 2 J.T. correctly argues, and the Department con *273 cedes, that the trial court erred in applying subsection 39.806(l)(d) to this case because J.T. began his incarceration before the statute became effective. 3 See D.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 791 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that section 39.806(1)(d) did not apply to a parent who had already started serving his prison sentence prior to the effective date prescribed by statute)....

...making its finding. See R.W.W. v. Dept. of Children & Families, 788 So.2d 1020, 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We reverse the final order terminating J.T.’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings. On remand the court must determine under section 39.806(1) whether J.T.’s current situation warrants termination or whether the Department should provide him with a case plan with a goal of reunification....

...If the Department again petitions to terminate J.T.’s parental rights, the court should carefully consider the possibility of relative placement as the least restrictive means of protecting T.B. from harm. Reversed and remanded. BLUE, C.J., and WHATLEY, J., Concur. . See § 39.503(5),(6), Fla. Stat. (1997). . Section 39.806(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), states that parental rights may be terminated on the basis that a parent of the child is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution, and either (a) the period of time for which the paren...

...s been convicted of a *273 substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction, or (c) the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child. . Subsection 39.806(l)(d) was originally numbered section 39.464(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), and took effect on October 1, 1997....

...ictive means to protect the children, are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. She also argues the trial court erred in basing the termination on her failure to comply with the case plan. We disagree with all three arguments and affirm. Section 39.806(l)(e)2, Florida Statutes (2010), provides for the termination of parental rights when the children have been adjudicated dependent and “[t]he parent *992 or parents have materially breached the case plan .... ” § 39.806(l)(e)2, Fla. Stat. (2010). Under section 39.806(l)(e)l, failure to “substantially comply with the case plan ... constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, neglect, or abandonment.” § 39.806(l)(e)l, Fla....

...89.806(1). The constructive consent provision of section 39.801(3)(d) can only be reasonably understood as providing a basis for termination which precludes a defaulting parent’s objection to the absence of proof of a ground for termination under section 39.806(1)....

...he termination, and (3) that the termination of Father’s parental rights would be the least restrictive means of protecting Child from serious harm. See Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. S.S.L., 352 So. 3d 521, 523–24 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing §§ 39.806(1), 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2021); Padgett v. Dep’t of HRS, 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991)). The statutory grounds asserted by DCF for termination of Father’s parental rights to 2 Child were: (1) section 39.806(1)(c) (parent engaged in conduct toward the child demonstrating that the continuing involvement of the parent in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services); (2) section 39.806(1)(d)3. (continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child and, for this reason, the termination of the rights of the incarcerated parent is in the best interest of the child); and (3) section 39.806(1)(l) (on three or more occasions the child or another child of the parent or parents had been placed in out-of-home care pursuant to this chapter or to a substantially similar law of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the Uni...

...They also argue that based on the grounds for termination alleged by DCF, there was no requirement under the plain language of the applicable statute that DCF make efforts to reunify Father and Child prior to seeking to terminate his parental rights. We agree with both arguments. Substantively, section 39.806(2), Florida Statutes, provides that “[r]easonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in paragraphs (1)(b)–(d) or paragraphs (1)(f)–(m) have occurred.” Here, each of the grounds upon which DCF sought to terminate Father’s parental rights fell within these subparagraphs of section 39.806(1), meaning that under section 39.806(2), DCF was not required to take steps to reunify Father with Child as a predicate to termination of Father’s parental rights....

...’s five surviving siblings. 4 Despite this, the trial court, inexplicably, determined that DCF had failed to establish probable cause, denied the petition, and ordered that E.R. be released from shelter care and returned to Mother. 5 . Pursuant to section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2014), the evidence of Mother’s egregious conduct (or failure to prevent egregious conduct) as to E.R.’s sibling, J.L., as well as the evidence of Mother’s involuntary manslaughter conviction in relation to the death of E.R.’s sibling, J.L., would actually subject Mother to expedited termination of parental rights proceedings. See § 39.806(1)(f), (h), Fla. Stat. (2014); see also In re E.R., 49 So.3d 846, 853 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (addressing section 39.806(1)(h), explaining that “DCF proceeded on three statutory grounds including murder of a child under section 39.806(l)(h),” and providing that “[it] believe[d] that where DCF proves by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has murdered a child, there is no requirement for DCF to then prove a nexus between that child’s murder and a threat of prospective harm to the murdered child’s siblings,” that....

...o circumstances that could result in a similar fate is unacceptable,” and that “[f]urthermore, there is no nexus requirement within the statute”); Dep’t of Children & Families v. B.B., 824 So.2d 1000, 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (addressing section 39.806(1)(f) and providing that “[u]nder this statute, egregious abuse directed at one sibling is sufficient, standing alone, to support termination of parental rights to another child, without requiring additional proof to establish a likelihood that remaining children will be abused”)....

...he contends that the order must be reversed because the Department of Children and Family Services did not present competent substantial evidence that it took meaningful steps to assist her in completing the tasks set out in her case plan. We agree. Section 39.806(1)(e)1, Florida Statutes, states that failure substantially to comply with one's case plan may not be treated as evidence of continuing abuse, neglect or abandonment for purposes of termination of parental rights if such failure is attributable to the Department not making a reasonable effort to reunify the parent and children. § 39.806(1)(e)1, Fla....

...The father, K.C., appeals the final judgment terminating his parental rights as to his five-year-old child, C.D. We only find merit in K.C.'s argument that the Department of Children and Families (the "Department") failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that K.C.'s parental rights should be terminated under section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), for abandoning the minor child, and section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, for engaging in conduct toward the child that demonstrates that his continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, physical, mental and emotional health of the child irrespective of services....

...2016) (reiterating that trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more grounds for termination have been established). Even so, we affirm the final judgment because the trial court's termination of K.C.'s parental rights based on section 39.806(1)(e) 1., Florida Statutes (2016), is supported by clear and convincing evidence. See D.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 211 So.3d 351 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (citing M.D. v. State , 187 So.3d 1275 , 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("[S]o long as the trial court's ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes, is supported by the evidence, the court's decision [to terminate parental rights] is affirmable.") )....

...ng the child from serious harm. Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment terminating K.C.'s parental rights to C.D., but we remand with directions for the entry of an amended final judgment striking any language from the judgment regarding sections 39.806(1)(b) and (1)(c) as grounds for the termination of the parental rights....

...appeals the final judgment that terminated her parental rights to S.P., raising five arguments, including challenges to each of the three separate grounds found to justify termination. As E.P. argues and Appellee concedes, the trial court erred in finding grounds for termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)( l ), Florida Statutes, because children were only removed from E.P.'s care on two occasions, whereas the statute requires removal on at least three occasions. E.P. has not shown any further reversible error, and the trial court properly terminated her rights under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f). Therefore, we affirm the termination of E.P.'s parental rights under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f), but reverse the portion of the order finding grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)( l ) and remand for this ground to be stricken from the order....

...appeals the final judgment that terminated her parental rights to S.P., raising five arguments, including challenges to each of the three separate grounds found to justify termination. As E.P. argues and Appellee concedes, the trial court erred in finding grounds for termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)( l ), Florida Statutes, because children were only removed from E.P.'s care on two occasions, whereas the statute requires removal on at least three occasions. E.P. has not shown any further reversible error, and the trial court properly terminated her rights under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f). Therefore, we affirm the termination of E.P.'s parental rights under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f), but reverse the portion of the order finding grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)( l ) and remand for this ground to be stricken from the order....

...appeals the final judgment that terminated her parental rights to S.P., raising five arguments, including challenges to each of the three separate grounds found to justify termination. As E.P. argues and Appellee concedes, the trial court erred in finding grounds for termination pursuant to section 39.806(1)(l), Florida Statutes, because children were only removed from E.P.’s care on two occasions, whereas the statute requires removal on at least three occasions. E.P. has not shown any further reversible error, and the trial court properly terminated her rights under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f). Therefore, we affirm the termination of E.P.’s parental rights under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f), but reverse the portion of the order finding grounds for termination under section 39.806(1)(l) and remand for this ground to be stricken from the order....

October 1, 1998 and renumbered as § 39.806(1)(0- . Now section 39.806(l)(d). This subsection took effect

...as to his five-year-old child, C.D. We only find merit in K.C.'s argument that the Department of Children and Families (the "Department") failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that K.C.'s parental rights should be terminated under section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), for abandoning the minor child, and section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, for engaging in conduct toward the child that demonstrates that his continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, physical, mental and emotional health of the child irrespective of services....

...2016) (reiterating that trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more grounds for termination have been established). Even so, we affirm the final judgment because the trial court's termination of K.C.'s parental rights based on section 39.806(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2016), is supported by clear and convincing evidence. See D.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 211 So. 3d 351 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (citing M.D. v. State, 187 So. 3d 1275, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("[S]o long as the trial court's ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes, is supported by the evidence, the court's decision [to terminate parental rights] is affirmable."))....

...d from serious harm. Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment terminating K.C.'s parental rights to C.D., but we remand with directions for the entry of an amended final judgment striking any language from the judgment regarding sections 39.806(1)(b) and (1)(c) as grounds for the termination of the parental rights. AFFIRMED; REMANDED with directions. SAWAYA, PALMER and BERGER, JJ., concur. 2 

...had attempted suicide several times, did not take prescribed medications, and felt she did not need them. She did not follow up on referrals for services. The Department of Children and Family Services ["DCF"] sought to terminate the mother's parental rights as to both children. DCF asserted that under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), there was no way of establishing a safe parent-child relationship. It alleged that P.I. had failed to protect the child from abuse by the step-father and had no ability to protect the children. DCF further alleged egregious conduct by P.I. and T.M., Sr., as to each child pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 572 (Fla.1991). The simple fact of waiting a month after A.N.'s brain injury, to take the child to the hospital — and then only after he had been vomiting and not speaking for days — supports the court's finding. § 39.806(2), Fla....

...Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 880 So.2d 705, 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The mother witnessed the father's treatment of the child but was never able to stop it. Here, DCF met its burden of presenting evidence to support the court's finding that sections 39.01 and 39.806 were satisfied....

...II, a four-year-old boy, and R.E.D., a girl who turned three years old just before the order was entered. Although we disagree with the trial court’s conclusions in some respects, we commend the trial court’s thorough consideration of this troubling case and affirm the order terminating parental rights. SECTION 39.806(l)(f) Among the grounds for termination of parental rights alleged in the Department of Children and Family Services’ petition was section S9.806(l)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), which authorizes termination of parental rights when �...

...cident. At the adjudicatory hearing, the Father testified on his own behalf regarding his version of events on the night of the killing as well as his conduct toward his family. The trial court found that the Father committed egregious conduct under section 39.806(l)(f) in two circumstances....

...t was deplorable and outrageous, the trial court’s generalized finding of harm was not enough to establish a sufficient nexus between the conduct and the specific harm to the children to support a finding of egregious conduct within the meaning of section 39.806(l)(f). 1 Nevertheless, the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the Father’s other conduct justified termination under section 39.806(l)(f). “Egregious conduct” means “abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct of the parent or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct.” § 39.806(l)(f)(2)....

...However, taken as a whole, the Father’s conduct comprised an unrelenting pattern of abuse, abandonment, and neglect. For this reason, the Father’s conduct was “deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct” so as to be egregious conduct. See § 39.806(l)(f)(2); M.C. v. Dep’t Children & Family Servs., 814 So.2d 449, 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (finding that “a pattern of physical abuse and ongoing neglect” of the child constituted egregious conduct under section 39.806(l)(f)). SECTION 39.806(l)(g) As a ground for terminating parental rights, the Department also alleged section 39.806(l)(g), which authorizes termination when the parent has “subjected the child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse.” The trial court found that the Father committed chronic abuse under section 39.806(l)(g)....

...At the same time, the concepts of abandonment and neglect are subsumed within the meaning of “abuse” through the definition of “harm.” See § 39.01(2), (30)(e), (f). Without question, the totality of the Father’s conduct was “abuse.” Section 39.806(l)(g) does not require that the abuse be “egregious”; rather, it must be “chronic.” Undefined in chapter 39, “chronic” ordinarily means “marked by long duration or frequent occurrence.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary *1040 320 (Deluxe ed.1998)....

...II in October 1999 and continued through the time of the adjudicatory hearing in April 2004, interrupted only by the Father’s incarcerations, which only contributed to his abandonment of the children. These facts support the trial court’s finding that the abuse was “chronic” under section 39.806(l)(g)....

...its the court’s power to dispose of the case by termination when one parent’s rights are to be severed without severing the rights of the other parent. Section 39.811(6)(e) permits termination only when the parent meets the criteria specified in section 39.806(l)(d) and (f)-(i). The trial court made no ruling with regard to section 39.811(6)(e). However, the trial court found that the Department proved grounds for termination under section 39.806(l)(f) and (g), which fall squarely within the scope of section 39.811(6)(e)....

...termination remains to be tried. We disagree. When the Department pursues termination of parental rights, it is not required to offer the parent a case plan with a goal of reunification. § 39.802(5). When any ground for termination is proved under section 39.806(l)(e)-(i), reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required. § 39.806(2)....

...CONCLUSION Because we affirm for the reasons expressed above, we need not address other *1041 aspects of the order terminating parental rights. Affirmed. NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ., Concur. . As a matter of policy, should a parent who commits murder have his or her parental rights terminated? Yes, according to section 39.806(l)(d)(2), which provides that the parent’s conviction of first-degree or second-degree murder is a ground for termination. However, section 39.806(l)(d)(2) requires a conviction. Section 39.806(l)(f) should not be used to excuse the conviction requirement of section 39.806(l)(d)(2) absent a sufficient nexus between the conduct and the specific harm to the children. . Section 39.806(l)(f)(2) continues: "Egregious conduct may include an act or omission *1038 that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child.” ....

...he evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.” N.L, v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 843 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (quoting In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995)). Section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2017), provides that a trial court may terminate parental rights where “[t]he parental rights of the parent to a sibling of the child have been involuntarily terminated.” In Florida Department of Children & Families v....

...& Fams., 898 So.2d 998, 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (citing Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. B.B., 824 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)). We find that, although the evidence presented at the hearing supports termination of Father’s parental rights under section 39.806(1)(i), the trial court failed to include the required finding that “reunification would be a substantial risk to the child.” See F.L., 880 So.2d at 609 ....

658 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995)). Section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2017), provides that

...Additionally, the Department must establish that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. Id. In its first amended petition for termination of parental rights, the Department alleged grounds for termination pursuant to subsections (b), (c), (e), and (g) of section 39.806(1), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...Although the trial court was correct to find that the Department established that the mother would not be able to be the custodial parent of these children, that is not the ground for termination that the court found the Department had shown pursuant to section 39.806(l)(c)....

...mply with the case plan. The trial court issued a final order terminating D.W.’s parental rights. D.W. now appeals. Termination of parental rights requires the Department to prove by clear and convincing evidence one of the grounds listed in section 39.806, Florida Statutes....

...The court found that the Department made reasonable efforts to assist D.W. with complying with the case plan. Still, at every hearing, the court found D.W. had not reached substantial compliance. This Court affirms a termination order if the evidence supports at least one of the grounds listed in section 39.806, Florida Statutes....

...The Department of Children and Family Services and the Guardian ad Litem Program concede that it was error to terminate the Father's parental rights on the ground that he voluntarily surrendered his rights when he did not execute the necessary surrender forms. § 39.806(1)(a), Fla....

...arent and the time period for which the father is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a significant portion of the child’s minority,” and “continuing the parental relationship with the father would be harmful to the minor child.” See § 39.806(1)(d)1., 3., Fla. Stat. (2014). On appeal, the father makes numerous arguments pertaining to section 39.806(1)(d)1....

...The judgment contains language indicating that termination was based on all the grounds alleged in the petition. Because the ground of abandonment was withdrawn and it is apparent that termination was not based on abandonment, the judgment should clarify that termination is based only on subsections 39.806(1)(d)1....

...mental, or emotional health of the . . . child’s sibling” and the termination was in the best interest of the child, we affirm and write only to commend the trial judge on her lucid, carefully crafted order and dispassionate handling of this troubling case. § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2022); see also § 39.806(2), Fla. Stat....

...(“Reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are not required if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that any of the events described in [paragraph (1)(f)] have occurred.”); S.M.O. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 357 So. 3d 773, 778 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“Section 39.806(1)(f) permits termination of parental rights to siblings, even if there is no nexus between the egregious conduct and the potential harm to the siblings ....

...5th DCA 2022) (reversing and remanding with instructions to terminate parents’ parental rights as to both children even though only one sibling had signs of abuse); 2 E.A. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 332 So. 3d 493, 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (upholding constitutionality of section 39.806(1)(f)). Affirmed. 3 

...ng termination by clear and convincing evidence. E.E.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 846 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). First, the trial court found the Father failed to substantially comply with the terms of his case plan under section 39.806(l)(e)(l), Florida Statutes (2007). Section 39.806(l)(e)(l) provides that a parent’s failure to complete a case plan within twelve months after an adjudication of the child as a dependent child is evidence of abandonment, abuse, or neglect. However", the evidence may be insufficient if “the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due ... to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child.” § 39.806(l)(e)(l)....

...tion of his parental rights on this basis. See C.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 854 So.2d 720, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Next, the trial court found that termination was proper because the Father materially breached his case plan under section 39.806(l)(e)(2), citing the Fathex*’s incarceration as its main explanation for the material breach....

...Final Judgment”).1 On appeal, he argues that the Department of Children and Families (“the Department”) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship would be harmful to his children pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)3., Florida Statutes (2021)....

...2  In March 2022, the Department filed an amended verified petition for termination of parental rights. As grounds for termination, the Department alleged that the Father failed to comply with the case plan although able to do so under section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes; engaged in a course of conduct that demonstrated the children’s continued involvement in the parent-child relationship threatened their wellbeing under section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes; and that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated father would be harmful to the children under section 39.806(1)(d)3., Florida Statutes. At the trial, it was established that the Father has been continuously incarcerated since the children were eleven months old....

...the phone. The custodian confirmed that the Father called at least five times, but she did not answer. In its Final Judgment, the trial court found that the Department failed to prove that the Father did not comply with the case plan under section 39.806(1)(e) or that he “engaged in a course of conduct toward the children that demonstrated their continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship threatened the wellbeing of the children irrespective of the provision of services” under section 39.806(1)(c). However, the court found clear and convincing evidence to support termination under section 39.806(1)(d)3....

...sm.” Finally, the court found that reunification “would harm the children, destabilizing their environment and severing strong emotional attachments.” Accordingly, the trial court terminated the Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)3., Florida Statutes....

...presumption of correctness and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous and lacking evidentiary support.” L.F. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 888 So. 2d 147, 148 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing C.C. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 886 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). Section 39.806(1)(d)3....

...The parent’s history of criminal behavior, which may include the frequency of incarceration and the unavailability of the parent to the child due to incarceration. e. Any other factor the court deems relevant. § 39.806(1)(d)3., Fla....

...& Fams., 847 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). However, “a trial court is precluded from terminating parental rights on the statutory ground that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child under section 39.806(1)(d)(3) where no evidence regarding the impact of continuing the parent-child relationship is offered.” In re N.S., 898 So....

...ad set up or what his living situation would look like. Based on the record before us, we are unable to find evidentiary support to dispute the Father’s claims. 10 evidence to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(d)3., where the children’s therapists testified regarding the children’s mental state, their need for permanency, and “stressed that the possibility of the father reclaiming his children after his incarceration would be ext...

...Conclusion Because the Department failed to present any evidence that continuing the parental relationship would be harmful to the children, the trial court was precluded from terminating parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)3., Florida Statutes....

...Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LOGUE and BOKOR, JJ. PER CURIAM.  Affirmed. See P.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 337 So. 3d 456, 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (explaining that once the trial court determines that termination is warranted under section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, the court need not make a determination as to the least restrictive means); K.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 332 So. 3d 501, 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (upholding the constitutionality of section 39.806(1)(f)); J.H....

evidence standard of review” and noting that section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, “permits termination

...matter of law. J.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 908 So.2d 568, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Here, the order terminating the Mother’s parental rights reflects that the termination was primarily based on section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes, due to the failure to complete her case plan....

...Police arrested the Father on criminal charges stemming from the reported abuse. In June 2018, the Department filed a petition for termination of the Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the surviving children, D.A.N. and S.N. The Department alleged grounds for termination of each parent’s rights under sections 39.806(1)(f) and 39.806(1)(h), Florida Statutes. At the termination of parental rights hearing, the Department called several witnesses, including the Mother and Father....

...strictive means to protect them. The Mother now appeals the termination of her rights and argues that the Department failed to present clear and convincing evidence that she had: (1) engaged in or failed to prevent egregious conduct, contrary to section 39.806(1)(f), and (2) committed, aided, abetted, conspired, or solicited the murder or manslaughter of A.N., contrary to section 39.806(1)(h)....

...4th DCA May 23, 2019). 4 evidence to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.” Id. The first step in the decision to terminate parental rights requires a court to find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground under section 39.806, Florida Statutes, has been established....

...rest of the child. Id. Once the court finds termination appropriate, the court must determine whether the Department established that termination is the least restrictive means to protect the child from harm. Id. Termination Under Section 39.806(1)(f) “A parent’s knowing failure to prevent egregious conduct where he has an opportunity to prevent it is a sufficient basis to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(f).” A.H....

...Egregious conduct is defined as “abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct” and “may include an act or omission that occurred only once but was of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child.” § 39.806(1)(f)2., Fla....

...them, or knowingly failed to prevent A.N.’s injuries. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrated that the Department, the court, and the medical professionals were uncertain of the Mother’s role in the abuse. Termination Under Section 39.806(1)(h) “Section 39.806(1)(h) provides for termination of parental rights where a parent has committed murder or manslaughter, aided and abetted the murder, or conspired or solicited the murder of another child.” In re E.R., 49 So....

...usly concluded that termination of parental rights is not barred by application of the least restrictive means test. See, e.g., F.L.C. v. G.C., 24 So.3d 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); A.J., 951 So.2d at 30 . AFFIRMED. LAWSON and BERGER, JJ., concur. . See § 39.806(l)(d)l....

...he mother but that he said nothing about it being accidental or in self-defense. As of the date of the termination hearing, the Father had not been convicted. In its petition for termination, DCF alleged that termination was appropriate under either section 39.806(1)(b), (c), or (f), Florida Statutes (2005). The trial court found that DCF presented sufficient evidence to support termination pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(c) and (f). Section 39.806(l)(c) provides for termination of parental rights [w]hen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child...

...ve of the provision of services. Provision of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. “To prove the grounds for terminating parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c), the trial court must find that the children’s lives, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent, regardless of the provision of services.” L.N....

...e is incarcerated or not, there was no testimony that his continued involvement with A.W., Jr., threatens the child irrespective of the provision of those services. Consequently, the trial court erred in terminating the Father’s rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(c). Section 39.806(l)(f) provides for termination of parental rights [w]hen the parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, saf...

...deprived the child of the mother’s love, care, and services. While the Father’s killing of the child’s mother by firing a gun that he placed against her head meets the statutory definition of egregious, that is not the end of the inquiry under section 39.806(l)(f)....

...Indeed, the only testimony regarding the impact of the shooting on the child was that he had exhibited no effects from being in the house at the time of the shooting. Thus the trial court also erred in terminating the Father’s rights pursuant to section 39.806(l)(f)....

...We note that the child has been placed with the maternal grandmother. The Father’s counsel stated at the hearing that this case could go to long-term relative custody. However, counsel conceded that if the Father is convicted of the murder, DCF may have grounds for termination. See 39.806(d)....

...he mother but that he said nothing about it being accidental or in self-defense. As of the date of the termination hearing, the Father had not been convicted. In its petition for termination, DCF alleged that termination was appropriate under either section 39.806(1)(b), (c), or (f), Florida Statutes (2005). The trial court found that DCF presented sufficient evidence to support termination pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(c) and (f). Section 39.806(1)(c) provides for termination of parental rights [w]hen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child...

...tive of the provision of services. Provision of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. "To prove the grounds for terminating parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court must find that the children's lives, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent, regardless of the provision of services." L.N....

...he is incarcerated or not, there was no testimony that his continued involvement with A.W., Jr., threatens the child irrespective of the provision of those services. Consequently, the trial court erred in terminating the Father's rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c). Section 39.806(1)(f) provides for termination of parental rights [w]hen the parent or parents engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, saf...

...se it deprived the child of the mother's love, care, and services. While the Father's killing of the child's mother by firing a gun that he placed against her head meets the statutory definition of egregious, that is not the end of the inquiry under section 39.806(1)(f)....

...Jr. Indeed, the only testimony regarding the impact of the shooting on the child was that he had exhibited no effects from being in the house at the time of the shooting. Thus the trial court also erred in terminating the Father's rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f)....

...We note that the child has been placed with the maternal grandmother. The Father's counsel stated at the hearing that this case could go to long-term relative custody. However, counsel conceded that if the Father is convicted of the murder, DCF may have grounds for termination. See 39.806(d)....

PER CURIAM. The Department did not meet its statutory duties in this case because it did not make “reasonable efforts” to reunite the mother and her children, as required by section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...tition was filed too soon. As the father did not make this argument in the trial court, we reject his argument for lack of preservation. We reject the mother's argument on this point on the merits. The petition was filed in this case under paragraph 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes, which allows termination of parental rights "[w]hen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services." § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

...(Supp.1998). This particular statutory provision does not contain a requirement for any particular period of time under a case plan. The twelve-month provision *1030 which the mother refers to is contained in a different statutory alternative, paragraph 39.806(1)(e)....

...y breached the provisions of the case plan. Id. § 39.802(8) (emphasis added). Thus, the petition in this case was timely, not premature, because it was filed after the case plan had expired. The mother bases her argument on a different provision of section 39.806, Florida States, which states, "A petition for termination of parental rights may also be filed when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents." Id. § 39.806(1)(e)....

...he entry of a disposition order placing the custody of the child with the department or a person other than the parent and the approval by the court of a case plan with a goal of reunification with the parent." Id. The mother's reliance on paragraph 39.806(1)(e) is misplaced, because the petition for termination of parental rights in this case was filed under a different paragraph, 39.806(1)(c). We therefore need not conduct any further analysis under paragraph 39.806(1)(e)....

...ights to his minor child, A.R. On August 16, 2012, the Mother filed a private petition for involuntary termination of the Father's parental rights, arguing that the Father's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to—among other grounds—section 39.806(1)(d)(1), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...'s manifest best interests. He also claims that the court erred by not allowing him to present evidence that the Mother thwarted his efforts to maintain a relationship with the child, finding that such evidence was irrelevant to an analysis under section 39.806(1)(d)(1). We agree that the court erred and therefore reverse for a full evidentiary hearing. The Florida Supreme Court has held that in addressing the termination of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(d)(1), a court must not only consider the length of the parent's incarceration but also whether termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm and in the manifest best interests of the child....

...The father claims he takes over twenty-five pills per day, including cocaine, for “medicine reasons.” Based upon this history, the trial court stated she “assume[d] we’re going straight to TPR [termination of parental rights]” for the mother, an assertion not forcefully disputed by counsel to the Department. See § 39.806(2)-(4), Fla....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 39.806(l)(f), Fla....

...3d DCA 2000)(court may terminate parental rights upon proof that “continuing involvement of the parent ... threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services”)(quoting § 39.806(l)(c), Fla....

...KLINGENSMITH, J. C.P. (“the father”) appeals the trial court’s final judgment terminating his parental rights to his two minor children. 1 The trial court found grounds to terminate the father’s parental rights to one child, C.F.P., under sections 39.806(1)(b) (abandonment); 39.806(1)(c) (continuing involvement threatens child’s well-being irrespective of services); and 39.806(1)(e)1....

...hts under section 1 The mother’s appeal of the final judgment terminating her parental rights to these two minor children was affirmed per curiam by this court. See A.W. v. Guardian Ad Litem, 4D21-38, 2021 WL 2105428 (Fla. 4th DCA May 25, 2021). 39.806(1)(b). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment terminating the father’s parental rights as to both children on the grounds of abandonment under section 39.806(1)(b), but reverse the findings as to C.F.P. based on sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(e)1. “While a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence, [appellate] review is limited to whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.” M.D....

...“A trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence is reversible only if clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support.” S.S. v. D.L., 944 So. 2d 553, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). The State may terminate parental rights if a parent “abandon[s]” their child. See § 39.806(1)(b), Fla....

...or otherwise, was when the children’s foster parents brought them to visit him in prison a year after his incarceration. Accordingly, competent, substantial evidence supports the termination of the father’s parental rights to both children under section 39.806(1)(b) for abandonment. The father argues that the lack of relationship between him and the children was due to his incarceration, the children’s age, and DCF’s lack of efforts to assist him in maintaining contact with the children....

...4th DCA 2019) (“[W]hile the father 3 had completed his case plan goals to the extent he was able to do so in prison, he had sent only the one letter to J.L.”). Although DCF successfully proved abandonment under section 39.806(1)(b), it did not prove that termination of the father’s parental rights as to C.F.P. was warranted under section 39.806(1)(c)....

...3d at 1282 (stating that to terminate parental rights under this ground “there must be no reasonable basis to conclude that past behaviors will improve”). Additionally, DCF did not prove termination of the father’s rights to C.F.P. was warranted under section 39.806(1)(e)1., because the record did not show that the father failed to substantially comply with the case plan. “‘Substantial compliance’ means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly...

...It is also unclear whether the father had the ability to provide the child support envisioned under his case plan due to his “limited opportunities” to earn money while in jail. See B.F., 237 So. 3d at 393. We reverse the portion of the order terminating the father’s parental rights as to C.F.P. under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(e)1. We remand for those grounds and findings that are inconsistent with this opinion to be stricken from the final judgment. However, we affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights as to both children under section 39.806(1)(b)....

...to assess whether the competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion; so long as the competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling on one of the statutory grounds alleged as a basis for termination under section 39.806, Florida Statutes, a reviewing court will affirm that ruling)....

...We review this order to determine if the trial court's findings were based on competent, substantial evidence. C.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 953 So.2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). M.E. argues that he did not abandon the child within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (reversing termination where father sought custody of the child, attempted to maintain contact after imprisonment and had nearly completed his sentence). We agree that M.E. has not abandoned the child within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(d)....

...In 2018, the Department filed a TPR petition as to the mother and the two fathers. 1 At the TPR hearing, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding there was “no way to dispute” the overwhelming evidence for terminating the mother’s parental rights under section 39.806(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2018)....

...The appellants argue that the trial court incorrectly applied the law regarding manifest best interests and its denial must be reversed because it was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. We agree. There are three requirements to TPR. First, the Department must prove one of the statutory grounds under section 39.806, Florida Statutes....

...2 So. 2d 948, 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (citing Dep’t of Children & Families v. A.D., 904 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)). We agree with the trial court that clear and convincing evidence supported TPR of the mother’s rights under section 39.806(1)(e)1....

...If the Father is voluntarily continuing any relationship with the Mother despite the provision of services to him and he has reason to know the Mother continues to be a danger to the Children, then his rights should be terminated pursuant to § 39.806(l)(c) because he has shown he cannot change his behaviors that helped cause the Children’s shelter despite the provision of services....

...If the Father is continuing a relationship with the Mother and the 2nd Case Plan requires him to discontinue that relationship because Mother continues to be a danger to the Children, then his rights should be terminated -3-  pursuant to § 39.806(1)(e)2 because he failed to achieve the 2nd Case Plan’s outcome and is voluntarily engaging in conduct - maintaining a relationship with the Mother - which endangers the Children in the home. The Court finds the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence the parental rights of [Appellant] to the Children should be terminated pursuant to Sections 39.806(l)(c) and (e)2, Florida Statutes. On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(e)2....

...4th DCA 2011). “While a trial court’s discretion in child welfare proceedings is very broad, reversal is required where the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain the findings of the trial court.” R.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 881 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Termination under § 39.806(1)(c) As noted above, the trial court based the termination on two statutory grounds. The first is section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2019), which provides that “[g]rounds for termination of parental rights may be established” [w]hen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demon...

... continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent- child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services. . . . § 39.806(1)(c), Fla....

...believe the parent will improve; and (3) that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. T.O. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 21 So. 3d 173, 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). We have held that termination under subpart 39.806(1)(c) is termination “based on prospective abuse or neglect.” Q.L....

...the children in the future, and that it is highly unlikely that he will ever improve”). “When improvement is demonstrated and further improvement is possible, it is error to terminate parental rights under subpart -7- 39.806(1)(c).” Q.L., 280 So....

...The trial court erred in finding that DCF established Appellant’s past conduct made future harm to the children likely to happen, and it similarly failed to establish there was no reasonable basis to conclude that past behaviors will improve. Thus, the termination under § 39.806(1)(c) cannot stand. Termination under § 39.806(1)(e)2. The trial court’s second statutory basis for termination was section 39.806(1)(e)2., Florida Statutes (2019), which states that grounds for termination of parental rights may be established: (e) When a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and: .... 2....

...In order to prove the parent or parents have materially breached the case plan, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent or parents are unlikely or unable to substantially comply with the case plan before time to comply with the case plan expires. § 39.806(1)(e)2. -8-  The trial court found that Appellant had completed all tasks set forth in the case plan....

...On or about .....(date(s))....., the following occurred: .....(acts which were basis for dependency or TPR, if filed directly)...... 3. The mother has .....(grounds for TPR)..... the minor child(ren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806, Florida Statutes, in that: .....(findings that form the statutory basis for grounds)...... 4. The father has .....(grounds for TPR)..... the minor child(ren) within the meaning and intent of section 39.806, Florida Statutes, in that: .....(findings that form the statutory basis for grounds)...... 5....

...The petition filed by .....(name)..... is granted as to the parent(s), .....(name(s))...... 2. The parental rights of the father, .....(name)....., and of the mother, .....(name)....., to the child, .....(name)....., are hereby terminated under section 39.806(..........), Florida Statutes. - 57 -  COMMENT: Repeat the above for each child and parent, as necessary. 3....

...reviewed the file, heard argument of counsel, and considered recommendations and arguments of all parties. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents, .....(names)....., have surrendered their parental rights to the minor child(ren) under section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and that termination of parental rights is in the manifest best interests of the child(ren). The specific facts and findings supporting this decision are as follows: 1....

...The mother, .....(name)....., freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and ..... with ..... without advice of legal counsel executed an affidavit and acknowledgment of surrender, consent, and waiver of notice on .....(date)....., for termination of her parental rights to the minor child(ren), under section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes. 5....

...The father, .....(name)....., freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and .....with ..... without advice of legal counsel executed an affidavit and acknowledgment of surrender, consent, and waiver of notice on .....(date)....., for termination of his parental rights to the minor child(ren), under section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes. 6....

...1. The petition for termination of parental rights is GRANTED. 2. The parental rights of the father, .....(name)....., and of the mother, .....(name)....., to the child(ren), .....(name(s))....., are hereby terminated under section 39.806(..........), Florida Statutes. COMMENT: Repeat the above for each child and parent on petition. 3....

...This is an appeal by a stepfather from an order denying his petition for termination of the parental rights of a biological father to a little girl. The stepfather brought the petition so he could adopt the child. The biological father is in prison. Although the trial judge made a legal error in focusing on section 39.806(l)(d)l, Florida Statutes (2008), to interpret section 63.089(4), Florida Statutes (2008), we find the error to be harmless....

...We deny Appellant’s motion for rehearing. We grant the motion to certify questions of great public importance. As we noted in V.S. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 322 So. 3d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), “[t]he constitutionality of the 2014 amendment to section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, affects fundamental parental interests.” Id. at 1230. We once again certify the following question to the supreme court:  DOES THE 2014 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 39.806(1)(f), FLORIDA STATUTES, WHICH PROVIDES THAT NO PROOF OF NEXUS BETWEEN EGREGIOUS CONDUCT TOWARDS ONE CHILD IS REQUIRED TO TERMINATE THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE CHILD’S SIBLINGS, UNCONSTITUTIONALLY REMOVE...

...EGREGIOUS CONDUCT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF HARM TO EACH SIBLING AND IS THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS OF PROTECTING THE SIBLING(S) FROM SERIOUS HARM? Moreover, we certify the following question concerning the constitutionality of section 39.806(1)(l), Florida Statutes: DOES THE 2008 ADDITION OF SUBPARAGRAPH (l) TO SECTION 39.806(1), FLORIDA STATUTES, WHICH PROVIDES FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WHEN “ON THREE OR MORE OCCASIONS THE CHILD OR ANOTHER CHILD OF THE PARENT OR PARENTS HAS BEEN PLACED IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE ....

...se plan and that the manifest best interests of the children would not be achieved by terminating parental rights, especially without an alternative placement plan. The Department’s petition alleged grounds for termination of parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), claiming the parents engaged in conduct toward the children that continues to threaten the life, safety, well-being, or *597 physical, mental, or emotional health of the children irrespective of the provision of services and, under section 39.806(l)(e), claiming the parents failed to substantially comply with their case plans....

...He buttressed this evidence with testimony from the guardians ad litem and his counselors that he had demonstrated substantial improvement in his parenting skills and had the motivation to improve further. The trial court erred in terminating the Father’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c) when improvement was demonstrated and further improvement was possible. See M.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 866 So.2d 220, 222-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that in order to terminate under section 39.806(l)(c), the trial court must show that the children’s welfare would continue to be threatened by the parent regardless of the provision of services and that there is no reasonable basis to believe the parent will improve). As to termination pursuant to section 39.806(l)(e), the trial court found that the Father failed to substantially comply with his case plans, specifically articulating that he failed to attend domestic violence counseling and parenting 'classes....

...Guardian Ad Litem Office, Tallahassee, for Appellee Guardian Ad Litem Program. PER CURIAM. K.E. (the Mother) appeals from the trial court's final judgment terminating her parental rights to her child, C.E. (the Child), under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2017)....

...An amended expedited petition was filed on December 22, 2017, alleging that the Mother engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatened the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the Child under section 39.806(1)(f) and that the Mother's continued involvement with the Child 1TheFather was never involved with the Child and voluntarily executed written surrenders for the Child....

...The Father's parental rights were also terminated. He has not appealed from the final judgment. -2- threatened the Child's life, safety, well-being, or health, irrespective of the provision of services under section 39.806(1)(c). Because the Department sought termination under subsections 39.806(1)(c) and (f), the Department did not, and was not required to, make "[r]easonable efforts to preserve and reunify" the family. See § 39.806(2), Fla....

...a fall or by someone mishandling the baby. The Final Judgment Terminating the Mother's Parental Rights The trial court entered its final judgment terminating the Mother's parental rights to the Child pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(c) and (f)....

...or knows who did, and is covering for that person." - 11 -  The trial court also found that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the Mother's parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), finding that the Mother's continued involvement with the Child threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the Child, irrespective of the provision of services....

...Further, because parental rights constitute a fundamental liberty interest, the Department must establish that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. Id. at 571. Termination under Section 39.806(1)(f) Section 39.806(1)(f) provides for the termination of parental rights when a parent has "engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child." § 39.806(1)(f). Egregious conduct is defined as "abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any other conduct that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of conduct." § 39.806(1)(f)(2)....

...Child on three separate occasions and never noticed any bruising or adhesions on the Child. For a single occurrence to constitute "egregious conduct," it must have been of such intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger the life of the child. § 39.806(1)(f)2....

...ore this court, the trial court's finding that the Department established by clear and convincing evidence that the Mother engaged in egregious conduct is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Termination under Section 39.806(1)(c) In order to terminate parental rights under section 39.806(1)(c), the trial court must find that the child's life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent regardless of any services provided to the parent. § 39.806(1)(c)....

...The father did not provide financial support or supplies for the child, with the exception of an outfit and a pair of shoes, and possibly fast food when he visited the child. Following trial, the court entered an order finding that grounds for termination existed pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes, because the father had abandoned the child, and pursuant to section 39.806(1)(e), Florida Statutes, because the father failed to substantially comply with the case plan for a period of time after the child was adjudicated dependent and the case plan had been filed. 1 1 With respect to this ground, the order provides: 39.806(1)(e) The child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and: (1) The child continue[s] to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the father....

...The father also asserts that the evidence demonstrates he maintained a relationship despite his incarceration by communicating with the child on the phone. We agree. Termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination set forth in section 39.806, Florida Statutes....

...review is limited to whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.” J.E. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 126 So. 3d 424, 427 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citation omitted). Abandonment is a ground for termination of parental rights. § 39.806(1)(b), Fla....

...ess the failure to substantially comply with the case plan was due to the father’s lack of financial resources or to the failure of the Department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the father and children, as defined in §39.806(1)(e)[1.], Florida Statutes, or (2) The child has been in care for any 12 of the last 22 months and the parents have not substantially complied with the case plan so as to permit reunification under §39.522(2) Florida Sta...

ALTENBERND, Judge. S.B. (the mother) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to four children. We reverse because the Department of Children and Family Services did not prove the grounds for termination pur *382 suant to section 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...There was no order adjudicating this child dependent, however, until after the Department first proceeded to trial to seek termination of the mother’s parental rights for these four children in June 2001. In the first trial, the Department sought to terminate the mother’s parental rights pursuant to sections 39.806(l)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes (2001) (allowing termination when continued involvement of parent with children would threaten life, safety, and well-being of children or when children have been adjudicated dependent and continue to be abandon...

...The Department filed a second petition for termination of parental rights on February 15, 2002, which was granted on May 24, 2002, less than a year after the entry of Judge Haworth’s order denying termination and requiring a new case plan. Although the petition sought termination pursuant to sections 39.806(l)(c) and (e), at trial the Department indicated it was proceeding solely based on section 39.806(l)(e). In the order granting the termination of parental rights, Judge Robert W. McDonald concluded that the Department had established the grounds for termination under section 39.806(l)(e) and detailed the facts supporting his finding that the mother had failed to comply with her case plan thus justifying a termination of her parental rights. Section 39.806(l)(e) provides: A petition for termination of parental rights may also be filed when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents....

...due either to the lack of financial resources of the parents or to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child. The trial court erred in failing to require the Department to prove the elements required by section 39.806(l)(e) before terminating the mother’s parental rights....

PER CURIAM. N.W., the mother, appeals the final order of the circuit court terminating her parental rights to two children, A.S. and C.S., pursuant to section 39.806(l)(c), (f), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 202.6, at 59-60 (2008 ed.). We have reviewed the other issues raised on appeal and find no error. Accordingly, the order of termination of parental rights is AFFIRMED. WARNER, POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. . Section 39.806(l)(c) allows for termination of parental rights where the parent has engaged in conduct that demonstrates that the parent’s continuing involvement in the parent-child relationship would threaten the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services; section 39.806(l)(f) allows for termination where the parent has engaged in egregious conduct or acts as defined in the statute.

...than, as in this case, mental illness, the facts of the recent case of In re S.F., 22 So.3d 650 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), are almost identical. Most importantly, as in S.F., there was no showing, as required by the only even arguably applicable provision, section 39.806(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), that "`continued interaction with the parent threatens the life, safety, or health of the child, and ....

...defense to the petition alleging that the father abandoned his children and that he was an incarcerated parent with a lengthy criminal history who had not provided for his children's care, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health. See § 39.806(1)(b), (d)(3), Fla....

...defense to the petition alleging that the father abandoned his children and that he was an incarcerated parent with a lengthy criminal history who had not provided for his children's care, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health. See § 39.806(1)(b), (d)(3), Fla....

...lan with a goal of reunification or adoption by September 30, 2001. On August 17, 2001, DCF filed its petition for termination of parental rights alleging that termination was in the best interests of L.B.W. As grounds for termination, DCF relied on section 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2000) — “the parent ......

...engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent ... in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services” — and section 39.806(l)(e) — “a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents.” The petition alleged, among other things, that there was no suitable placement for the child with a relative....

...Section 39.802(4) sets forth the elements required for termination of parental rights, providing in pertinent part: A petition for termination of parental rights filed under this chapter must contain facts supporting the following allegations: (a) That at least one of the grounds listed in s. 39.806 has been met....

...Section 39.809(1) provides that “[ejach of [the elements required for termination] must be established by clear and convincing evidence before the petition is granted.” An order terminating parental rights therefore must be supported by clear and convincing evidence both that there is a ground for termination under *483 section 39.806 and that termination is in the manifest best interests of the child pursuant to section 39.810....

...arm.” Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991). In the instant case, the trial court correctly determined there was clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the grounds for termination under section 39.806 existed....

...d were informed of their right to counsel at all hearings that they attended and that a dispositional order adjudi-eating the child dependent was entered in any prior dependency proceeding relied upon in offering a parent a case plan as described in s. 39.806.”

...The Department has never pursued this allegation of abuse. G.E.M. testified that A.A. improperly touched the outside of her clothed buttocks with his hand. The Department’s petition for termination of parental rights made a twofold allegation under sections 39.806(l)(c) and 39.806(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), based on neglect and abandonment....

...ing parental involvement with the youngest child, N.B.A., threatened her life, safety, or well-being irrespective of the provision of services. It did not base its ruling on the allegation of failure to substantially comply with the case plans under section 39.806(l)(e)....

...Concluding that there was no suitable custody arrangement with relatives and after evaluating the manifest best interest factors, the court deemed that it was in the children’s best interest that the court terminate parental rights. The court erred in terminating parental rights under section 39.806(l)(c). As this court declared in In re C.W.W., 788 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001): [T]o terminate parental rights under section 39.806(l)(e), the trial court must find that the child’s life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the parent regardless of any services provided to the parent....

...We affirm the requirement of a new adjudicatory hearing, but reverse the portion of the order mandating the filing of a new petition with service upon the father. The Department filed a petition for termination against the mother and father of R.A., alleging grounds under section 39.806(1)®, Florida Statutes (2002)....

The mother argues that termination under section 39.806(1)(e)1., (e)3., and (j), Florida Statutes was

...v. Department of Children & Families, 322 So. 3d 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). I write, however, to address the motion for rehearing’s reference to me and my dissenting opinion. In the motion for rehearing, the movant states, “Warner, J. opined he would hold that § 39.806(1)(f) is unconstitutional . ....

...filing of the petition for termination of parental rights. However, the trial court indicated it was required to focus on the “best interests” of the child. The court granted the petition for termination of parental rights “based on [section] 39.806(l)(d), [Florida Statutes (2002) ] and further on the fact that the father’s conduct has been egregious.” Unlike the lengthy final judgment typically entered in a termination of parental rights proceeding in which the Department of Children and Families is involved, this judgment is 2$ pages in length....

...in B.C. v. Florida, Department of Children & Families, 887 So.2d 1046 (Fla.2004), calls into question the trial court’s conclusion that T.V.R.’s parental rights could be terminated because of the length of the term of his incarceration under section 39.806(1)(d)(1). 2 In B.C., the supreme court held that section 39.806(1)(d)(1) requires the court to evaluate whether the time for which a parent is expected to be incarcerated in the future constitutes a substantial portion of the time before the child reaches eighteen, measured from the date of the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights....

...The trial court did not assess whether T.V.R.’s five to six years of incarceration was a “substantial” portion of the ten years remaining of A.L.R.’s minority. Although the trial court did not specifically cite the statute, the court apparently concluded that T.V.R.’s parental rights could be terminated pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), permitting termination when a parent engages in egregious conduct threatening the mental and emotional health of a child or the child’s sibling....

...protect the State's interests and to assure that the petition is not misused as a substitute for more appropriate family law remedies. . C.R. did not argue, nor did the trial court assess, whether T.V.R.’s parental rights could be terminated under section 39.806(1)(d)(2) (permitting termination if the incarcerated parent has been convicted of an offense in another jurisdiction that is substantially similar to a sexual battery that constitutes a capital, life, or first-degree felony violation of section 794.11, Florida Statutes (2002))....

...The mother subsequently surren *591 dered her parental rights to the child, and W.N. proceeded to trial. The trial court issued the present Final Judgment Terminating Parental Rights. We affirm both grounds upon which the court terminated W.N.’s parental rights under Florida Statutes section 39.806(l)(e) and (l)(e). The trial court first found that W.N.’s drug use, with other factors, threatened the life and safety of the minor child. Section 39.806(l)(c) states that parental rights may be terminated: When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services.... § 39.806(l)(c), Fla....

...4th DCA 1998) (affirming termination of mother’s parental rights where she failed to substantially comply with the case plan and the child’s best interests were served by the termination). The trial court also terminated W.N.’s parental rights under section 39.806(l)(e) by finding that W.N....

...failed to substantially comply with the reunification case plan for a period of over twelve months even though appropriate services were provided. Such failure of substantial compliance is evidence of abuse and neglect and is also grounds for termination. § 39.806(l)(e), Fla....

...ALTENBERND, Judge. J.F., the mother, appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her four children. Because there was competent, substantial evidence supporting termination as to each child on at least one of the grounds enumerated in section 39.806, Florida Statutes (2014), we affirm....

...See § 39.802(4)(a) (requiring the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination exists). We write to reiterate our concern that, with the elimination of the "nexus" requirement in 39.806(1)(f), trial courts may wish to take extra care in the application of this statute until any questions concerning its constitutionality have been resolved....

...The father voluntarily surrendered his rights to all four children. The children now range in age from thirteen to sixteen. The Department elected not to offer the mother a case plan. It filed a petition for expedited termination, alleging three grounds: (1) pursuant to section 39.806(1)(c), that the continuing involvement of the mother in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of each child; (2) pursuant to section 39.806(1)(f), that the mother engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of a child, warranting the termination of her rights to all children; and -2- (3) pursuant to section 39.806(1)(g), that the mother subjected the victimized child to sexual battery or abuse by the father, warranting the termination of her rights only as to that child. The Department presented extensive testimony at the final hearing, which we will not detail in this opinion....

...grounds and that termination was in the manifest best interests of this child. As to the other three children, we have carefully reviewed the evidence and conclude that it supports the termination of parental rights as to each child under section 39.806(1)(c) because the continuing involvement of the mother in the parent- child relationship threatens the well-being and the mental health of each child. The evidence also established that termination is in the manifest best interest of each child. As a result of our conclusion as to this ground, we do not need to determine whether termination was authorized under section 39.806(1)(f). Unlike the circumstances in N.W., the amendment to section 39.806(1)(f), which became effective on July 1, 2014, is applicable to this termination proceeding. The proceeding was commenced in January 2015 due to the father's misconduct in November 2014....