Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ndent. SUNDBERG, Chief Justice. This suit raises questions concerning a prisoner's eligibility for parole under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979), when he or she has been incarcerated as a special condition of probation pursuant to sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...1976), in which we treated the subject of incarceration as a condition of probation, also known as the split sentence probation alternative. First, however, it will be helpful to note the statutory provisions authorizing incarceration as a condition of probation. Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1979), authorizes the trial court to withhold imposition of sentence on a criminal defendant and instead place him on probation when it appears to the court that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a cours...

...Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979), states that the enumeration of the terms and conditions in subsection (1) does not prevent the imposition of other conditions the court may consider proper. One of these other possible conditions includes incarceration as provided in section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979): (4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, direct the defendant to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence....

...Rule 3.790(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the pronouncement and imposition of a sentence of imprisonment shall not be made upon a defendant who is placed on probation regardless of whether he is adjudicated guilty. This rule is consistent with section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1979), which requires the court to stay and withhold the imposition of a sentence in placing a defendant on probation....

...Under section 947.16(1) a prisoner does not become eligible for parole consideration unless he has been sentenced to at least one year in prison. We construe this provision as expressing a legislative intent to limit the period of incarceration which may be imposed as a condition of probation under section 948.01(4) to a period of less than one year....

...Where possible we must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another. State ex rel. School Board v. Department of Education, 317 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1975). Our construction of section 947.16(1) in conjunction with section 948.01(4) achieves these objectives. For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we hold that incarceration, pursuant to the split sentence alternatives found in sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), which equals or exceeds one year is invalid....

...If the time exceeds one year it is not a valid probation order but becomes a sentence. There are times when a trial judge finds that a defendant should be sentenced to prison but also needs some form of supervision longer than the prison sentence. I construe sec. 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, to give a trial judge authority to do just that....

...However, the question before us is not whether they are the same punishment. Rather, it is whether they are similar forms of release. Florida considers both probation and community control to be discretionary alternatives to imprisonment. See Fla. Stat. § 948.011 (“when the defendant's offense is punishable by both fine and imprisonment, the trial court may, in its discretion, impose a fine upon him or her and place him or her on probation or into community control as an alternative to imprisonment.”)....

...Likewise, Florida’s community control “contains rules, requirements, conditions, and programs that are designed to encourage noncriminal functional behavior and promote the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the community.” See Fla. Stat. § 948.01(3)(b). We have held that the primary purpose of probation is “rehabilitation, the accomplishment of which will serve to protect the public.” United States v. Gaskell, 134 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir....

...d presupposes the fact that probationer is not in prison confinement, Roy v. State, 207 So.2d 52 (Fla.App. 1967), cert. dismissed, Fla., 211 So.2d 554. The purpose of the granting of probation as was allowed by the trial court sub judice pursuant to Section 948.01(1) without an actual adjudication of guilt, is rehabilitation of one who has committed the crime charged without formally and judicially branding the individual as a convicted criminal and without consequent loss of civil rights and other damning consequences....

Community control and probation are defined in section 948.001, Florida Statutes (1985): (1) "Community control"

...Gen., and Melvina Racey Flaherty, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent. GRIMES, Chief Justice. We review State v. McKendry, 614 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), in which the court certified the following question as one of great public importance: DO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 948.01, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), AUTHORIZE THE IMPOSITION OF A SENTENCE OTHER THAN AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 790.221(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? Id....

...However, because of the facts of the case [2] and McKendry's prior record, the judge suspended the five-year prison term and placed McKendry on community control for one year to be followed by three years of probation. The State appealed and the district court of appeal reversed McKendry's sentence. The court held that section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1989), the statute which gives a trial court authority to suspend a sentence and implement community control, could not operate to avoid the enforcement of the mandatory minimum term in section 790.221(2). However, because of the conflicting provisions of section 790.221(2) and section 948.01, the court certified the question quoted above....

...ossession, or control a short-barreled shotgun. Section 790.221(2) provides that any person convicted under this statute "shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 5 years." § 790.221(2), Fla. Stat. (1989). At the same time, section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1989), states: (3) If it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do n...

...he offense, it appears to the court in the case of a felony disposition that probation is an unsuitable dispositional alternative to imprisonment, the court may place the offender in a community control program. The issue presented is whether or not section 948.01 authorizes a trial judge to depart from the minimum mandatory sentence set forth in section 790.221(2)....

...tute. Floyd v. Bentley, 496 So.2d 862, 864 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1987). Under this rule, section 790.221(2), which specifically addresses the criminal penalty for possession of a short-barreled shotgun, prevails over section 948.01, which generally gives a trial judge discretion to suspend criminal sentences....

...Further, when two statutes are in conflict, the later promulgated statute should prevail as the last expression of legislative intent. Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 144 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1962); State v. Ross, 447 So.2d 1380, 1382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), review denied, 456 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1984). Section 948.01 was originally enacted in 1941 long before mandatory minimum sentences were known except in capital cases and at a time when trial courts still had virtually unlimited discretion in sentencing. While section 790.221 was originally enacted in 1969, it was not until 1989 that the statute was amended to include the mandatory sentencing language. *47 Although section 948.01 was also amended in 1989, the amendment concerned an unrelated issue, and there was no mention of section 790.221. Therefore, section 790.221(2) should prevail over section 948.01 as the last expression of legislative intent on the subject of sentencing for possession of a short-barreled shotgun....

...3. In contrast, the statutes in the case at bar were not created to work together toward a specific legislative goal. Section 790.221 was enacted in part specifically to address the crime of possession of a short-barreled shotgun. On the other hand, section 948.01 was created to generally address the trial court's authority to grant leniency in any criminal sentencing....

...Interestingly, the legislature has now eliminated the mandatory sentence for McKendry's offense. The legislature should be extremely careful in directing the imposition of mandatory sentences and should possibly seek a means to reinstate, at least to some extent, the discretion allowed trial judges under section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1993)....

control is the nonprison custodial alternative. § 948.001. A person under community control is in supervised

accordance with individualized treatment plans." § 948.001(4), Fla. Stat. (2005). This is mirrored in section

...This is a petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal reported at 296 So.2d 519 (Fla.App.3d 1974), upon its certified question. The question involves probation which is preceded by a specified period of jail time and requires a construction of Sections 948.01(4), 948.03, and 948.06, Florida Statutes (1973)....

...UNTY JAIL (FOR A PERIOD AS PERMITTED BY § 922.051 FLA. STAT., F.S.A.), WITH DIRECTION THAT HE BE PLACED ON PROBATION UPON COMPLETION OF A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF SUCH SENTENCE WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE JAIL SENTENCE STAYED AND WITHHELD (AS PERMITTED BY § 948.01(4), FLA....

...NDANT, A NEW SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE STATE PENITENTIARY FOR A PERIOD OF YEARS, SUCH AS THE COURT COULD HAVE ORIGINALLY IMPOSED (AS PERMITTED BY § 948.06 FLA. STAT., F.S.A. WHEN SENTENCE HAS BEEN WITHHELD AND PROBATION HAS BEEN GRANTED UNDER § 948.01(1)-(3), FLA. STAT., F.S.A.), OR IS THE TIME TO BE SERVED, FOLLOWING REVOCATION OF PROBATION WHICH HAS BEEN GRANTED PURSUANT TO § 948.01(4), FLA....

...STAT., F.S.A., LIMITED TO THE UNSERVED PORTION OF THE PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED JAIL SENTENCE WHICH WAS STAYED AND WITHHELD UPON PLACING THE DEFENDANT ON PROBATION?" For the reasons stated herein, we answer the question by holding that a defendant placed on probation pursuant to Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973), who subsequently violates that probation may be sentenced to imprisonment by the trial judge for the same period of years as the court could have originally imposed in accordance with Section 948.06, Florid...

...se. The sole purpose of Chapter 948 is to authorize probation. The manner of imprisonment is considered elsewhere [2] and its consideration in Chapter 948 is only as an incident to probation or violation thereof. The chapter must be read as a whole. Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1973), principally in issue in these proceedings, reads in its entirety as follows: "948.01....

..."(5) In no case shall the imposition of sentence be suspended and the defendant thereupon placed on probation unless such defendant be placed under the custody of said commission." The Legislature in 1974 attempted to correct the confusion arising from varying District Court decisions by amending Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1974), effective July 1, 1974, as follows: " Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentenc...

...The Third District held that there was no power in the trial judge to impose probation upon this defendant subsequent to the completion of serving his term in the county jail, and found the probationary portion of the sentence a nullity. It construed Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, to mean that the trial court must withhold a portion of the county jail sentence in order to impose any punishment for a violation of the probation....

...App.3d 1973), and Mylks v. State, 285 So.2d 434 (Fla.App.3d 1973). See also Green v. State, 310 So.2d 373 (Fla.App.3d 1975), and Durham v. State, 304 So.2d 146 (Fla. App.3d 1974). In Hutchins v. State, supra , the Third District further interpreted Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973), by saying: "......

...offenses pursuant to the general condition provisions of Section 948.03, Florida Statutes, and the reasoning and authorities contained in Washington v. State, supra , and Lewis v. State, supra . We hold that prior to July 1, 1974, the provisions of Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973), granted specific authority to the trial judge to prescribe a period in the county jail followed by probation for those offenses punishable only by imprisonment in the county jail (misdemeanor offenses). It is our opinion that the term "whenever punishment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed" is descriptive of the offenses to which the subparagraph was applicable. The new amendment to Section 948.01(4), effective July 1, 1974, expands the trial judge's specific statutory authority to include felonies as well as misdemeanors in the use of the split sentence probation alternative. *25 We reject the District Court's interpretation of Section 948.01(4) which requires the trial judge at the initial sentencing proceeding to impose a total sentence immediately followed by the withholding of a part thereof for use in the event probation is violated. This interpretation is inconsistent with the procedure for straight probation as authorized by Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes, and in conflict with Section 948.06, Florida Statutes. The latter authorizes the trial judge, upon a finding that probation has been violated, to impose any sentence he might have originally imposed. Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes, pertaining to placing a defendant on straight probation, requires the court to stay and withhold the imposition of sentence. The only difference in the wording of Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, is the addition of the qualifying word "remainder" in the phrase "withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence." We read this provision of the statute to mean that the time spent in jail must be within any maximum jail sentence which could be imposed....

...We find no legislative intent to require an initial imposition of the total sentence. [3] We further hold that a defendant must be given credit for the time spent in jail pursuant to the split sentence probation order whether it is imposed pursuant to Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, or as a condition of probation under Section 948.03, Florida Statutes....

...BOYD, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion and would adopt the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal reported at 296 So.2d 519 which is being quashed herein. To reach the result attained by the majority it is necessary to give Section 948.01, Florida Statutes, 1973, a strained interpretation never contemplated by the Legislature in its consideration of the matter of probation. Section 948.01(1), (2) and (3), Florida Statutes, 1973, regulates procedures for release of defendants on probation prior to being sentenced....

...I believe the District Court of Appeal, Third District, correctly held that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by imposing two-year penitentiary sentences on defendant after previously fixing definite one-year sentences in county jail for the very same offenses. The language of Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes....

...The deprivation of personal liberty by courts for violating criminal statutes must never exceed the punishment authorized by the Legislature. If more harsh sentences are needed the Legislature, not the courts, should change the law. Here, the courts admittedly have disagreed upon the construction of Section 948.01, Florida Statutes, 1973....

...Regardless of the trial court's high motives to deter crimes, I respectfully submit that the methods used were never approved by the Florida Statutes *27 and should not be approved by this Court. Respondent should serve one year in jail less eighty-five days and no more. I do not find that the 1974 amendment to Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, alters my view....

...Public Defender, and Marc R. Goldstein, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for respondents. HATCHETT, Justice. We have for review a decision holding that the combined period of incarceration and probation imposed under Florida's split sentencing statute, Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1975), must be within the maximum period of incarceration allowed by statute for the offense for which sentence is being imposed....

...1976), we have jurisdiction. [2] The decision of the district court is approved. Respondents, Ricky W. Holmes, Edgar Allen Holmes, and Helen Ann Holmes, were convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor and were sentenced under Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1975), to combined terms of imprisonment and probation in excess of the five year period of incarceration permitted by Section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The Fourth District Court affirmed the judgments and convictions but modified the sentences, holding that the combined time spent incarcerated and on probation must not total more than the maximum period of incarceration allowed by statute for the offense. *382 Section 948.01(4) authorizes the imposition of a sentence popularly known as a "split sentence," that is, a sentence imposing a specified period of incarceration followed by a specified period of probation....

...In that case this court held that upon revocation of probation, a trial judge may impose any sentence which he might have originally imposed minus the time spent in jail as part of the same sentence. The court stated: We read this provision of the statute [Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973)] to mean that the time spent in jail must be within any maximum jail sentence which could be imposed....

...the maximum period of incarceration allowed by statute for the particular offense. In Jones, the court was called upon to answer a certified question regarding the permissible length of incarceration following a revocation of probation imposed under Section 948.01(4)....

...First, a penal statute must be strictly construed in favor of those against whom it would operate; and second, to infer that a court could extend probation beyond such a maximum permitted punishment would lead to unacceptable results. At 223. (footnotes omitted) We hold: (1) that a trial judge is authorized by Section 948.01(4) to sentence a defendant to a period of incarceration followed by a period of probation; (2) that the combined periods at the time of the original sentence cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by statute for the...

terms and conditions as provided in s. 948.03." § 948.001(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). See generally Larson v

...pay the fine to serve a term at hard labor in the Seminole County jail for a period of six months from the date thereof. Additionally the court imposed probation upon the appellant in accordance with an order of probation entered the same date. F.S. Section 948.01(1), F.S.A....

...d not commence until he was released from the Seminole County jail. The argument is ingenious and somewhat intriguing. Nonetheless, we are satisfied that the court's action in revoking probation and imposing sentence on appellant was not error. F.S. section 948.01(3), F.S.A....

...Credit for time in an institution We affirm the district court's decision that the trial judge was not required to credit Dorfman with the time he was hospitalized as a mentally disordered sex offender. It is clear that the trial court had no authority to impose a split sentence since, at the time of the crime, Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1971), did not allow the split sentence alternative for felonies....

...confinement period suspended," some courts have concluded that some of the period, but not all, can be suspended. We conclude that the supreme court in Poore was merely summarizing the complex statutory sentencing options available at that time. In section 948.01(6),[ [1] ] the legislature empowers trial courts to impose a split sentence "whereby the defendant is to be placed on probation ......

...Given the different purposes of incarceration and probation, it is not obvious why the length of probation in a true split sentence must always equal the suspended portion of the sentence of incarceration. In analyzing the legality of this conditional suspended sentence, we have found it useful to consider section 948.01(11),[ [2] ] *446 Florida Statutes (1995)....

...tence. Disbrow v. State, 642 So.2d 740 (Fla.1994). There is no requirement that the conditional period of incarceration be equal in length to the preceding term of probation. .... Because the conditional suspended sentence does not appear to violate section 948.01(6) and is compatible with the sentencing policy announced in 948.01(11), we conclude that it is an authorized sentence....

...Accordingly, we answer both certified questions in the affirmative, approve the decision of the district court, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. [3] It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.01(6), Florida Statutes (1995), states in pertinent part: (6) Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, imp...

...lit sentence whereby the defendant is to be placed on probation or, with respect to any such felony, into community control upon completion of any specified period of such sentence which may include a term of years or less. Id. (emphasis added). [2] Section 948.01(11), Florida Statutes (1995), states: (11) The court may also impose a split sentence whereby the defendant is sentenced to a term of probation which may be followed by a period of incarceration or, with respect to a felony, into commu...

sanctions are imposed and enforced." Fla. Stat. § 948.001. The Supreme Court of Florida has characterized

...In some respects, the Venice ordinance sets a greater penalty than that prescribed by the law of Florida. Except in serious cases involving minimum mandatory *86 sentences, state law grants a trial judge the discretion to withhold adjudication and order probation. § 948.01, Fla....

...thout a hearing. In Florida, the trial judge does not pronounce and impose a sentence of imprisonment upon a defendant who is to be placed on probation [RCrP Rule 3.790(a)], except in the special county jail split-sentence situation provided in F.S. Section 948.01(4), F.S.A., and in Florida the trial judge granting probation holds the revocation hearing....

...[2] Usually the affidavit is that of the probation supervisor and is presented to the judge granting the probation. [3] See F.S. Section 933.06, F.S.A. [4] RCrP Rule 3.121(a)(7). Whether or not he was originally adjudged guilty or adjudication was withheld (F.S. Sec. 948.01(3), F.S.A.), persons on probation are beyond the trial or guilt determining stage of the criminal process and are not bailable "as of right"....

...defendant to be guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt; and in either case, it shall stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon such defendant and place the defendant upon probation. Fla Stat. ch. 948.01(2). We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Johnson, 399 F.3d 1297, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005). Under Florida Statute 948.01(2), the district court has the discretionary authority to withhold the adjudication of guilt....

...expired, and that his nolo contendre plea was not a criminal conviction. However, 4 these arguments are meritless. Anton’s restoration of rights argument was based upon his erroneous interpretation of Florida Statute 948.01(2) as having restored his civil rights upon his completion of the probationary period....

...In responding to this appeal, the state alleges that the new sentencing guidelines are not applicable, because the sentence here was a "resentencing" after probation. We reject the state's position. When the defendant was originally placed on probation, the trial court withheld imposing sentence. § 948.01(3), Fla....

...Instead of adjudging the appellant guilty and imposing sentence on him the trial judge entered an order which withheld adjudication of guilt and placed appellant *580 on probation for a period of five years. In doing so the judge acted pursuant to F.S. Section 948.01, F.S.A....

...It is true, as the State points out, that if any one of a number of circumstances occurs the trial court may thereupon resume jurisdiction over the defendant-appellant and enter other orders, including a judgment adjudicating guilt and passing sentence. Prior to the passage, by the 1959 Legislature, of the present Section 948.01 an accused could be placed on probation, but only after a formal adjudication of guilt by the court....

...However, because of the quoted provision of the State Constitution, unless the order of probation has finality and directness in respect to passing upon the validity of a state statute upon which a defendant's guilt is predicated, it is an insufficient predicate for an appellate review of the case by us. F.S. Section 948.01(3), F.S.A., authorizes the trial court to either adjudge the defendant to be guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt and in either event place him upon probation....

...[1] , F.S.A., which provides for a maximum sentence of one year. Dade County v. Baker, Fla. 1972, 265 So.2d 700; see also J. Carroll's dissent in Dade County v. Baker, Fla.App. 1972, 258 So.2d 511, 512. Thereupon, the trial court placed the appellant on probation pursuant to the authority of § 948.01(4), Fla....

...In such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence imposed upon the defendant, and direct that the defendant be placed upon probation after serving such period as may be imposed by the court." [emphasis added] The probation portion is a nullity and is void. The language of § 948.01(4), Fla....

...FACTS On July 28, 1981, Reinaldo Orellanes, the appellant, entered a negotiated plea of guilty of two felonies, possession of marijuana and carrying a concealed firearm, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. The Florida court entered an order withholding adjudication pursuant to Florida Statute § 948.01....

...hearing of the matter that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law... ." § 948.01(3), Fla....

...d adjudication of guilt, and impose any sentence which it may lawfully impose, giving credit for all time in the department. "[*]Note-Ch. 73-21, Laws of Florida, removed the disability of nonage for persons 18 years of age and older." [4] Fla. Stat. § 948.01.

...It has long been the law in this State: That "in all cases the court shall award the sentence and shall fix the punishment or penalty prescribed by law." [12] In 1941, the legislature, by enactment of F.S. Chapter 948, F.S.A., limited the authority by which imposition of a sentence may be deferred. F.S. § 948.01(3), F.S.A., provides that "* * * if it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require...

...e court, in its discretion may thereupon stay and suspend the imposition of sentence upon such defendant, and shall place him upon probation under the supervision and control of the parole commission for the duration of such probation * *;" and F.S. § 948.01(4), F.S.A., provides: "In no case shall the imposition of sentence be suspended and the defendant thereupon placed on probation unless such defendant be placed under the custody of said parole commission except as provided in § 949.03." Th...

...sition of sentence upon a convicted criminal, but accompanied such sanction with a mandate that the court "shall place [the defendant] upon probation under the supervision and control of the parole commission for the duration of such probation * *", § 948.01(3), Fla. Stat. 1957, F.S.A. So that there could be no doubt of its intention to limit the suspension power theretofore exercised by trial judges, it was expressly provided in § 948.01(4) that "In no case shall the imposition of sentence be suspended and the defendant thereupon placed on probation unless such defendant be placed under the custody of said parole commission * * *." Thus, regardless of whether the practice a...

...ent that probation is violated, since such a requirement would conflict with section 948.06, Florida Statutes, authorizing a trial judge to impose any sentence he might have originally imposed after revoking probation. Instead, the court interpreted section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, [7] which states that in a split sentence, the court shall "withhold the imposition of the remainder of the sentence" to mean merely that the time spent in jail must be within the maximum jail sentence which could be imposed....

...ncreased sentence after a defendant violated probation does not offend either the Federal Probation Act or the Fifth Amendment safeguard against double punishment. [6] See In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 408 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1981). [7] Now section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...and who had in his possession a "firearm" as defined in subsection 790.001(6), or "destructive device," as defined in subsection 790.001(4), shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 calendar years. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall the defendant be eligible for parole, prior to serving such minimum sentence....

...Williams argues that it is inconsistent to permit a departure based on reasons which existed at the time he was placed on probation, because in placing him on probation the court necessarily had to find that he was not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct. See § 948.01(3), Fla....

...d judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."). More specifically, the defendants asserted that because a trial court may, pursuant to section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1995), withhold an adjudication of guilt with regard to a DWLCSR offense, the trial court therefore has the authority to determine whether a third or subsequent DWLCSR offense constitutes a misdemeanor or a felony....

...4th DCA 1998), wherein the circuit court held section 322.34(1) to be unconstitutional. See Gloster, 703 So.2d at 1175. In Santiago, the circuit court reasoned: Because [section 322.34(1)(c)] requires an adjudication of guilt for the conduct to be punishable as a felony, and because § 948.01, Fla....

...ication in a case where a defendant is charged with a violation of section 322.34(1)(c), the result will be that the defendant's conduct will be treated as a misdemeanor, rather than a felony." Gloster, 703 So.2d at 1175. The First District analyzed section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes a court to withhold an adjudication of guilt, and noted that a withhold of adjudication is permitted only if the defendant is placed on probation....

...Outside of section 318.14, a judge is authorized to withhold adjudication in criminal cases if he or she places a defendant on probation. See Waite v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 681 So.2d 901 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); State v. Gloster, 703 So.2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); §§ 948.01(2); 921.187(1)(a)3; Fla....

...A defendant is placed on probation if "it appears to the court ... that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law." § 948.01(2), Fla....

...The "penalty" is generally a fine or a sentence of imprisonment or both. Villery, 396 So.2d at 1110. When a defendant is placed on probation, the court must stay and withhold the imposition of sentence regardless of whether adjudication of guilt is withheld. § 948.01(2), Fla....

...The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provide, "Pronouncement and imposition of sentence of imprisonment shall not be made on a defendant who is to be placed on probation, regardless of whether the defendant has been adjudicated guilty." Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.790(a); see also § 948.01(2) Fla....

...1756 (emphasis added). In Florida, a court may only place on probation a defendant who "has been found guilty by the verdict of a jury, has entered a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, or has been found guilty by the court trying the case without a jury." § 948.01, Fla....

...Importantly, for example, probation in Florida is under the jurisdiction of the courts, rather than an administrative agency like the Parole Commission. See Floyd, 509 So.2d at 920. Furthermore, a court may place a defendant on probation either with or without an adjudication of guilt. See § 948.01(1), Fla....

...These sources make it quite clear and probation is concerned only with suspension of the imposition or pronouncement of sentence. Moreover, in order that one placed on probation will not necessarily be deprived of certain civil liberties that are withdrawn following conviction of a felony, Fla. Stat. § 948.01(1), F.S.A....

...More generally, the court expressed disapproval of such "piecemeal punishments." However, in the instant case, sentence was neither pronounced nor imposed on the appellee, for the fine and intermittent incarceration, though highly unusual, were both imposed as conditions of probation. Fla. Stat. § 948.011, F.S.A....

...years, to follow after the serving of the ten month sentence in the county jail, was unauthorized and improper, for the reasons set out in Williams v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 280 So.2d 518. In Williams it was pointed out that the authority granted by § 948.01(4) Fla....

...We think that in using it in this section the framers of the statute intended that it should mean the same thing as "suspend the imposition of sentence", which is the language used in our statutes dealing with probation procedures generally, Chapter 948, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A. § 948.01(3), because section 7 also provides that when a defendant has been placed on probation for voluntary psychiatric treatment the trial court may at anytime thereafter revoke the probation order and "impose such sentence as might have been imp...

...rary to Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. [1] Santiago 's rationale is capsulized in the following paragraph: Because [section 322.34(1)(c)] requires an adjudication of guilt for the conduct to be punishable as a felony, and because § 948.01, Fla....

...[4] Outside of section 318.14, a judge is authorized to withhold adjudication in criminal cases if he or she places a defendant on probation. See Waite v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 681 So.2d 901 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); State v. Gloster, 703 So.2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); §§ 948.01(2); 921.187(1)(a)3; Fla....

...Stat. (2003). Those sanctions can be quite strict, including "curfew, revocation or suspension of the drivers license, community service, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, or other appropriate restraints on the offenders liberty." § 948.01(3)(a), Fla....

specific sanctions are imposed and enforced." § 948.001(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). Mindful of this definition

...Appellant raises a number of issues as to the sentence imposed: (1) that the written sentence does not comport with the trial court's oral pronouncement; (2) that certain conditions of drug offender probation imposed were not orally pronounced; (3) that section 948.01(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), establishing drug offender probation, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency; and (4) that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay the costs of prosecution....

...Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by imposing "standard conditions" of probation provided in section 948.03(1), and contained in the probation order, which were not orally pronounced at sentencing, because he was specifically placed on "drug offender" probation, pursuant to section 948.01(13)(a)....

...separately in section 948.001, Florida Statutes (1993), and, therefore, was required to be orally pronounced. We reject this argument. As recognized by this court in Mosley v. State, 677 So.2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), reh'g denied, (August 16, 1996): Section 948.01(13)(a) provides that drug offender probation "may include those measures normally associated with community control." Therefore, like a defendant placed on regular probation or community control, a defendant placed on drug offender pro...

...3.986(e). Accordingly, these special conditions should have been orally pronounced and, therefore, must be stricken. See Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 125 (Fla. 1996); Ealy v. State, 681 So.2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Appellant next contends that section 948.01(13)(a), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional on its face as an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency, the Department of Corrections, in violation of article II, section 3, Florida Constitution. Section 948.01(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), states as follows: (a) [t]he Department of Corrections shall develop and administer a drug offender probation program which emphasizes a combination of treatment and intensive community supervision appr...

...In the case at bar, the Department of Corrections is implementing that which the legislature has specifically delegated. The statute sets forth parameters as a guide for the Department of Correction's development and implementation of a drug offender probation program. Section 948.01(13) provides that the program may include the use of graduated sanctions, that the drug offender probation shall include surveillance and random drug testing and that the program may include the measures normally associated with community control....

...urt may uphold the constitutionality of this statute and conclude that there has not been an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. See Southeast *694 Volusia Hosp. Dist., supra . Accordingly, we reject appellant's constitutional challenge of section 948.01(13)(a)....

...he had already spent in jail, and he was placed on probation for the remainder of his natural life. As part of the plea agreement, the state agreed to drop two escape charges. Unknown to appellant, and either unknown or unnoticed by the trial court, section 948.01(1), Florida Statutes (1951), prohibited the imposition of probation for a first degree murder offense....

...The first issue that we must address is whether the trial court erred in revoking appellant's community control after approximately eight months and reimposing a two-year term of community control, resulting in a total term of two years and eight months on community control. Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1991) provides in pertinent part: When community control or a program of public service is ordered by the court, the duration of community control supervision or public service may not be longer than the sentence...

...for the time he had served on community control. The most important distinction between community control and probation in the context of this case, however, is the specific statutory two-year limitation on the term of community control set forth in section 948.01(4)....

...See Kolovrat v. State, 574 So.2d 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Twining v. State, 380 So.2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Swift v. State, 362 So.2d 723 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). In Crawford v. State, 567 So.2d 428, 429 (Fla. 1990) the Florida Supreme Court stated that section 948.01(5) [now 948.01(4)] means that "for any one offense, community control may be imposed for a maximum of two years." Although the court went on to hold that consecutive two-year terms of community control could be imposed, consecutive terms were only authorized when separate crimes had been committed....

...cation of probation or community control. In one situation the defendant, following revocation, is placed again on probation or community control in lieu of being sentenced. See State v. Kendrick, 596 So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). See also §§ 948.01(1), (3), and (4), Fla....

...ut more severe than probation. It is analogous to probation, in that a defendant is not sentenced to probation or community control, but placed on probation or community control in lieu of being sentenced. See State v. Kendrick, supra, at 1154 and §§ 948.01(1), (3) and (4), Fla....

...2d DCA 1980), and thus is amenable to appellate remedy sua sponte. We remand for resentencing by the trial court of an appropriate lesser period of rehabilitative incarceration. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. NOTES [1] Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.380(a). [2] § 948.01(4), Fla....

...We have for review the opinion in State v. Jones, 772 So.2d 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), which the Second District Court of Appeal certified to be in conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's opinion in State v. Williams, 759 So.2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), on the question of whether section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which provides for the sanction of drug offender probation, is an alternative sentencing scheme independent of the sentencing guidelines. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Based on the express language of section 948.01(13), we hold that this statute provides an alternative sentencing scheme for drug offenders that is outside of the sentencing guidelines....

...Subsequently, Jones was charged by information with possession of cocaine in violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). After conducting a hearing in which a psychiatrist testified, the trial court found Jones to be a chronic substance abuser pursuant to section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). Although the sentencing guidelines mandated prison time, Jones argued that the trial court could place her on drug offender probation pursuant to section 948.01(13). The State argued that the sentencing guidelines applied to Jones' case *24 and mandated that the trial court sentence Jones to prison. The trial court agreed with Jones and entered a written order finding that it had the discretion under section 948.01(13) to impose drug offender probation. Based on Jones' written plea of nolo contendere, the trial court adjudicated Jones guilty and placed her on two years of drug offender probation pursuant to section 948.01(13)....

...eparture from the guidelines. See Jones, 772 So.2d at 41. In doing so, the Second District relied on our decision in Disbrow v. State, 642 So.2d 740, 741 (Fla.1994), stating that "the supreme court, in dicta, discussed the fact that sentencing under section 948.01 falls within the sentencing guidelines." Jones, 772 So.2d at 41. However, the Second District observed that in State v. Williams, 759 So.2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the Fourth District held that drug treatment options pursuant to section 948.01(13) were not departure sentences. See Jones, 772 So.2d at 41. The Second District certified conflict with Williams. See Jones, 772 So.2d at 41. ANALYSIS Section 948.01(13) provides in pertinent part: If it appears to the court upon a hearing that the defendant is a chronic substance abuser whose criminal conduct is a violation of chapter 893, the court may either adjudge the defendant guilty or stay...

...e defendant on drug offender probation. Pursuant to this statute, drug offender probation is governed by a program run by the Department of Corrections which must emphasize "a combination of treatment and intensive community supervision approaches." § 948.01(13)(a)....

...n the nonviolent nature of the crime with which they are charged and their status as chronic substance abusers. Nevertheless, a violation of drug offender probation subjects the defendant to revocation of probation and may lead to incarceration. See § 948.01(13)(b) ("Offenders placed on drug offender probation are subject to revocation of probation as provided in s. 948.06."). "This Court has repeatedly held that the plain meaning of statutory language is the first consideration of statutory construction." State v. Bradford, 787 So.2d 811, 817 (Fla.2001). The plain language of section 948.01(13) is designed to vest discretion in a trial court to impose drug offender probation on chronic substance abusers who are charged with drug offenses under chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, in our view, section 948.01(13) by its express terms provides an alternative sentencing scheme for drug abusers that is outside the sentencing guidelines. The State argues, however, that the Legislature implicitly repealed section 948.01(13) through changes made in 1997 to Florida's sentencing guidelines....

...Specifically, the State points to section 921.0026(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which prohibits the use of a defendant's substance abuse or addiction as a reason for downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. According *25 to the State, this prohibition either repeals section 948.01(13), or, at the very least, requires that section 948.01(13) not be exempt from the guidelines....

...lm Harbor Special Fire Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So.2d 249, 250 (Fla.1987). Instead, we are obligated "to adopt an interpretation that harmonizes two related, if conflicting, statutes while giving effect to both." Id. The sentencing guidelines and section 948.01(13) may be so harmonized by recognizing that one is general, whereas the other is specific. The sentencing guidelines as set forth in section 921.0026 apply broadly to all felonies and provide for general sentencing guidelines. Section 948.01(13), on the other hand, applies only to violations of chapter 893, which defines nonviolent drug crimes. See § 948.01(13), Fla....

...alternative to incarceration for specific drug-related crimes. Because a specific statute controls over a general statute and provides an exception to the general rule, see M.W. v. Davis, 756 So.2d 90, 106 n. 31 (Fla.2000), the specific language of section 948.01(13) controls over the more general sentencing guidelines....

...ncing guidelines. See, e.g., Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crime and Punishment CS/HB 241 (1997) Final Bill Research and Economic Impact Statement (June 4, 1997). However, the legislative analysis for the 1998 changes to the sentencing guidelines does not list section 948.01(13) as one of the statutes affected by the enacting bill....

...[1] Although the enactment of section 921.0026(3) may indicate that the Legislature intended to limit the ability of trial courts to impose a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines solely on the basis of drug addiction, there is no question that section 948.01(13), as well as the other specific statutes dealing with treatment for substance abusers, indicate a strong policy in favor of treatment over incarceration for certain nonviolent drug-related crimes. [2] *26 Indeed, in enacting section 948.01(13) and the sanction of drug offender probation, the Legislature's stated purpose was "to provide alternative punishments to fill the void between probation and prison, and to divert offenders from the state prison system." Fla. H.R. Comm. on Corrections, HB 2373 (1991) Staff Analysis (May 2, 1991). The text of section 948.01(13)(a) calls for a Department of Corrections program that includes a specific treatment plan, intensive community supervision, surveillance, and random drug testing. The Legislature has never repealed section 948.01(13), nor has it ever even modified the statute in any material way. See § 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...The Legislature recognizes that the integration of judicial supervision, treatment, accountability, and sanctions greatly increases the effectiveness of substance abuse treatment. Ch.2001-48, § 1, Laws of Fla. [3] In its decision below, the Second District relied on Disbrow for the contention that sentencing under section 948.01 was within the guidelines. See Jones, 772 So.2d at 41. However, the Second District correctly characterized that statement as dicta. See id. Disbrow's plain holding is simply that section 948.01(11), Florida Statutes (1991) [4] is not exempt from the guidelines, and that case makes no binding statement regarding section 948.01(13). See Disbrow, 642 So.2d at 741. Disbrow's reasoning is also revealing. The Court stated that "[w]hen the legislature wants to exempt a sentence from the guidelines, it knows how to do it," and then went on to discuss the fact that section 948.01(11) has no language that could be construed as an exemption. See *27 id. This is not true of section 948.01(13), which authorizes a trial court to "stay and withhold the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on drug offender probation." § 948.01(13), Fla....

...1998). If a court may withhold a sentence for a specific crime based on specific criteria, guidelines as to what form and duration that sentence may take do not apply. The Legislature does know how to exempt a sentence from the guidelines, and did so in section 948.01(13). Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth District correctly recognized that section 948.01(13) was an alternative to the sentencing guidelines and could be imposed completely outside of the guidelines. See Williams, 759 So.2d at 2. We therefore quash the Second District's opinion and approve Jones' section 948.01(13) drug offender probation as imposed by the trial court....

...y to break the cycle of drugs and crime. [5] It is so ordered. SHAW, ANSTEAD, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING and LEWIS, JJ., concur. WELLS, C.J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent as I conclude that section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Her prior misdemeanor convictions include petit theft, worthless checks, and driving while license is suspended or revoked. Given petitioner's prior criminal record, there is no dispute that the sentencing guidelines mandate prison time. The discrete issue in this case is whether section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), is an alternative sentencing scheme independent from the mandatory provisions of the sentencing guidelines established by the Code....

...State, 648 So.2d 183, 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), quashed on other grounds, 681 So.2d 1136 (Fla.1996). Only when the Legislature expressly authorizes sentencing outside the guidelines may a court do so. See Disbrow, 642 So.2d at 741. The Legislature did not do so in adopting section 948.01(13). The majority contends that the plain language of section 948.01(13) establishes that statute as a sentencing alternative to the Code's guidelines. See majority op. at 24. The majority apparently relies upon the permissive language of the statute to reach its conclusion. See § 948.01(13), Fla....

...(Supp.1998) ("[T]he court may either adjudge the defendant guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt; and in either case, it may stay and withhold the imposition of sentence ....") (emphasis *29 added). The majority, however, omits the holding in Disbrow where this Court found that similar permissive language of section 948.01(11), Florida Statutes (1991), did not establish the Legislature's intent that the statute was an alternative to the sentencing guidelines. See Disbrow, 642 So.2d at 741. Section 948.01(11) provided in pertinent part: "The court may also impose ... which may be followed...." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the majority also omits the fact that sections 948.01(11) and (13), Florida Statutes (1991), were adopted by the Legislature in the same section of the same bill....

...This Court should treat similar statutes similarly, especially where the statutes are enacted by the same section of the same bill and there is no indication the Legislature intended the statutes to be treated differently. In Disbrow, this Court concluded that section 948.01(11), a statute providing for split sentences, did not authorize courts to disregard the sentencing guidelines. 642 So.2d at 741. This Court explained: "When the legislature wants to exempt a sentence from the guidelines, it knows how to do it.... However, such an exemption is not mentioned in section 948.01(11) or any place else in section 948.01." Id. at 741 (emphasis added). Importantly, the 1991 and 1998 versions of subsection (13) are identical. While I agree with the majority that the phrase "or any place else in section 948.01" from Disbrow is dicta, 642 So.2d at 741, it does not necessarily follow that this Court erred in stating this observation....

...vince the Legislature's intent that the statute was a sentencing alternative to the guidelines. This Court in Disbrow cited to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1991), as an example of a statute which provided a sentencing alternative. [8] Clearly, section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), contrary to the majority's contention, does not explicitly provide that it is an alternative to sentencing under the guidelines. The majority supports its position by observing that a June 4, 1997, staff analysis to Committee Substitute for House Bill 241, the bill which became chapter 97-194, Laws of Florida, does not indicate that section 948.01(13) was affected by the enactment of the Code....

...olicy choice with regard to sentencing and the inapplicability of a defendant's substance abuse to avoid mandatory prison time. The majority further supports its decision by arguing that chapter 97-194, Laws of Florida, did not repeal by implication section 948.01(13). See majority op. at 25. The majority identifies section 948.01(13) as a more specific statute to the general prohibition of not using a defendant's substance abuse as a valid reason to downwardly depart....

...I cannot agree, however, with the manner in which the majority "harmonizes" these statutes because the majority's construction fails to give any effect to the Code. Pursuant to the mandate of Palm Harbor to give effect to both statutes, 516 So.2d at 250, I would construe section 948.01(13) to allow a court to sentence a defendant to drug probation in those instances where the sentencing guidelines do not require prison time. This construction is preferable because it gives effect to section 948.01(13) and to the mandatory provisions of the Code....

...was not available to Jones. [3] Chapter 2001-48 deals with pretrial intervention programs where, if the defendant successfully completes the program, the charges are dismissed. See, e.g., §§ 948.08, 948.16, Fla. Stat. (2001). In contrast, sections 948.01(13) and 948.034 are sentencing options. [4] Section 948.01(11), Florida Statutes (1991), concerning split sentences, provided: (11) The court may also impose a split sentence whereby the defendant is sentenced to a term of probation which may be followed by a period of incarceration or, with r...

...mpletes a drug treatment program. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crime and Punishment CS/HB 241 (1997) Final Bill Research and Economic Impact Statement (June 4, 1997) at 5. Whether these two statutes were amended by chapter 97-194 has no bearing on whether section 948.01(13) is outside the sentencing guidelines....

...ute for House Bill 241 as amended by the Senate. See Fla. H.R. Jour. at 1870-1891 (Reg.Sess.1997). [11] The majority's invocation of the rule of construction that a more specific statute controls a more general statute fails to address the fact that section 948.01(13) did not plainly express an intent for the statute to be a sentencing alternative. As noted above, section 948.01(13) can be read in pari materia with the Code to give effect to both provisions.

...imposed that sentence loses control over the sentence except to enforce it. [1] This means that the order which placed appellant on probation was void for lack of jurisdiction, and this is fundamental error even if not raised at the trial court. [2] Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1973), which permits the suspension of the balance of a sentence and the placing of a defendant on probation, specifically contemplates that this shall be done at the time of the original sentencing....

...quirements of section 90.610 are satisfied. However, trial courts may withhold adjudication of guilt after a plea has been accepted or after a verdict of guilty has been rendered and place the defendant on probation provided that the requirements of section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (1997), are met....

...Roberts, 450 So.2d at 1127 (Anstead, C.J., concurring specially). Regardless of whether a defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty by a jury, until the defendant is actually adjudicated guilty, the court still has the discretion to withhold adjudication pursuant to section 948.01(2) and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.670....

...However, where the trial court withholds adjudication of guilt as authorized by statute and "stay[s] and withhold[s] the imposition of sentence," the court has found that "the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct." § 948.01(2), Fla....

...entence, grants probation, or revokes probation, the judge shall forthwith inform the defendant concerning the rights of appeal therefrom, including the time allowed by law for taking an appeal. [2] The statutory authority for rule 3.670 is found in section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides: If it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of socie...

§ 784.021(1)(b) Florida Statutes (1987). [3] § 948.001(1) Florida Statutes (1987).

Gibbs. [5] Gamble; Melecio. [6] Palma. [7] Section 948.001(7), Florida Statutes (2000), provides, in pertinent

...rs as the court considers proper may be included, giving considerable latitude to the judge in fixing the conditions by which the convict shall abide, but of course these apply only if the probation is valid in the first instance. The basic statute, Section 948.01 , Florida Statutes 1941, and F.S.A., empowers the court only to suspend the imposition of sentence and instead grant probation where the probable future conduct of the defendant, the ends of justice, and the welfare of society warrant that action....

...nt on drug offender probation at the sentencing hearing, and the record reflects the appropriateness of this form of supervision. The term "drug offender probation" appears in only two places in chapter 948, the definition section noted above and in section 948.01(13). The remainder of the chapter speaks in terms of "probation" or "community control" and describes various conditions that can be made a part of those forms of supervision. Section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (2001) specifically provides: If it appears to the court upon a hearing that the defendant is a chronic substance abuser whose criminal conduct is a violation of s....

...term "drug offender probation" in its Lazo opinion. I agree with the majority that this provision is limited to enumerated crimes under chapter 893, but this is not the provision under which the defendant was sentenced. Thus, while a sentence under 948.01(13) or 948.034 may be restricted to violations of chapter 893.13, I see no reason why a trial court cannot use the more intensive form of supervision defined by section 948.011(4) known as "drug offender probation." I would therefore affirm that part of his sentence....

...having been convicted of a felony. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922 (h)(1) (1976). To the underlying felony charge of grand theft in Florida, Garcia had pleaded nolo contendere, adjudication was withheld, and he was given probation, which he successfully served. Section 948.01, Fla.Stat....

...ot exceed 22 months. But that is not the case. Consistent with this reading is the statutory maximum for community control. See Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(13) ("When community control is imposed, it shall not exceed the term provided by general law."). Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1993), provides, in relevant part: When community control or a program of public service is ordered by the court, the duration of community control supervision or public service may not be longer than the sentence...

...A sentence and probation are distinct concepts. See Landeverde v. State, 769 So.2d 457, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). When a defendant is placed on probation, the court must stay and withhold the imposition of sentence regardless of whether adjudication of guilt is withheld. See § 948.01(2), Fla....

...We certify conflict with McCall. The remand instructions contained in our initial opinion remain in effect. STEVENSON, SHAHOOD and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Such a reading would contradict the plain language of the probation statute and a plethora of precedent. See § 948.01(2), Fla....

...Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. COWART, Judge. This appeal poses the following question: When imposition of sentence upon a defendant has been stayed and withheld, and the defendant placed on probation or community control as permitted by section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes, is the defendant a "convicted person" within the meaning of section 939.01(1), Florida Statute, which provides that the "costs of prosecution ......

...[1] ) conviction means a determination of guilt, whether or not adjudication was withheld, the defendant is not adjudicated guilty and no judgment of conviction is entered against the defendant when the imposition of sentence is stayed and withheld and the defendant is placed on probation or community control under section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes....

...ory limit provided in section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes, is that if the court withholds adjudication of guilt, any period of incarceration imposed as a condition of probation or community control cannot exceed 364 days in certain facilities. Under section 948.011, Florida Statutes, a court may withhold an adjudication of guilt and place a defendant on probation and still, in its discretion, impose a fine....

...At the time of sentencing the trial judge said: "Well, the Court would like to have discretion to order such a presentence investigation report, but the language of Section 775.087 specifically provides that the Court shall proceed, notwithstanding the provision of Chapter 948.01 or Section 948.01 of the Florida Statutes. 948.01 is that section of the Florida Statutes which provides for the ordering of a presentence investigation....

...2 DCA 1975); Jones v. State, 336 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1 DCA 1976); State v. Sweetman, 302 So.2d 164 (Fla. 4 DCA 1974). See also Cunningham v. State, 349 So.2d 702 (Fla. 4 DCA 1977). [1] A suspended sentence is only available if a person is placed on probation. Section 948.01(4) and (5) (1975) Helton v. State, supra. Withholding sentence is referred to in Section 948.01(3) and (4) (1975) and appears to be defined interchangeably with suspended sentence....

...Withholding and suspension of adjudication and sentence means the court declines to convict (adjudicate guilty) the defendant or fine or imprison him until probation is tried. Withholding or suspending adjudication or sentence in a felony case can only be done when the defendant is put on probation. Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...If the defendant successfully completes his probation he is not a convicted person but if the probation is violated the court may then adjudicate and sentence. The purpose of a presentence investigation is to assist the sentencing judge in determining a fair sentence for the defendant and society. Section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (1975) says the sentencing judge shall order a presentence investigation report in every felony case....

...e was initially placed on probation and that she therefore is not entitled to the election provided by the rule. This assertion is without merit. When a defendant is placed on probation, the trial court must stay and withhold imposition of sentence. Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The petard on which we find ourselves hoisted is clearly one of our own construction. The error in Villery, as pointed out at the time by Justice McDonald was to impose the limitation of the period of incarceration which correctly applies to incarceration as a condition of probation pursuant to sections 948.01(3) and 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979) to the unrelated period of incarceration imposed pursuant to the true split sentence authorized by section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...These cases illustrate the dilemma created by that portion of the majority opinion in Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1981), which held invalid incarceration, pursuant to the split sentence alternatives provided in subsections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979), [1] for more than one year....

...ng after the time of the original sentences, petitioners' sentences be reduced to the term of incarceration originally imposed. [3] NOTES [*] Adams v. State, 414 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Beech v. State, 411 So.2d 1384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). [1] § 948.01(4), Fla....

...require incarceration as a condition of probation for felony and misdemeanor offenses pursuant to the general conditions of Section 948.03, Florida Statutes." The actual holding in Jones, however, was that a defendant placed on probation pursuant to section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973), who subsequently violates that probation may be sentenced to imprisonment by the trial judge for the same period of years as the court could have originally imposed, without the necessity of establishing a...

...ntence for the limited purpose of eligibility for parole under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979). After making these pronouncements, the majority opinion held that incarceration, pursuant to the split sentence alternatives found in sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), which equals or exceeds one year is invalid and stated that this applies to incarceration as a condition of probation as well as to incarceration followed by a specified period of probation....

...The 1983 legislature passed the "Correction Reform Act of 1983." Chapter 83-131, Laws of Florida, section 13 thereof, provided for the use of community control. It also interpolated subsections (4) to (7) and renumbered subsections (4) to (6) as subsections (8) to (10). Section 948.01(8) now reads: Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, direct the defendant to be placed on probation o...

custody to include "custody in the community." See § 948.001, Fla. Stat. (1985). Use of community control as

...raffic related offenses, frequently unashamedly calling it punishment. See for example ... Fla. Stat. § 790.22(5)(a) (expressly makes suspension of driving privileges a part of the penalty for a minor being in a possession of a firearm); Fla. Stat. § 948.01(3)(a) (specifically allows the Court to revoke or suspend a driver's license as part of a "community based sanction" during the course of community control plans); Fla....

...Petitioner was tried and convicted on a charge of rape and was sentenced to thirty years in the state penitentiary. Petitioner urges reversal on the grounds that the trial judge failed to exercise his judicial discretion in sentencing by failing to consider possible sentencing alternatives provided for in Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1975). Section 948.01, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part as follows: Any court of the state having original jurisdiction of criminal actions, where the defendant in a criminal case has been found guilty ......

...the probation of such defendant. It is petitioner's position that the trial judge determined that Section 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), requires a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years and that the sentencing alternatives outlined in Section 948.01, Florida Statutes, are inapplicable....

...Different subsections of section 790.001, Florida Statutes (1993), define differently the terms "firearm," see 790.001(6), "electronic weapon or device," see 790.001(14), "concealed weapon," see 790.001(3)(a), and "weapon," see 790.001(13). [4] We note that section 948.01(13) of the Florida Statutes (1993) authorizes a trial court, in sentencing a defendant who is a chronic substance abuser and whose criminal conduct is a violation of chapter 893, to stay and withhold imposition of sentence and place th...

...e 3.790, only if the court finds that he "is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law... ." § 948.01(3), Fla....

...With a deserving defendant in an appropriate case, it may, in a non-capital felony, after a finding of guilty or the entry of a plea of nolo contendere, with or without an adjudication *324 of guilt, withhold imposition of sentence and place the defendant upon probation. § 948.01(1), Fla....

...e. § 948.10, Fla. Stat. (1985). A defendant sentenced under this program may suffer sanctions which can include, among others, curfew, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, and other appropriate restraints on the offender's liberty. § 948.01(4)(a), Fla....

...Section 777.04(4)(c) provides that any attempt of any degree of burglary is a third-degree felony. [3] Massey v. State, 348 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Adjudication was withheld, and she was placed on unsupervised probation for one year. The state argues that the trial court erred in imposing unsupervised probation. Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1975), authorizes the court to impose a term of probation in lieu of a term of imprisonment, and the defendant is to be placed, in certain situations, under the supervision of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation (DOR)....

...ment] unless the court affirmatively and specifically orders such supervision after finding that supervision in the community is necessary to provide adequate protection to the community [or] to assist in the rehabilitation of the offender, or both. Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes....

...However, it has also been held that probation is a creature of statute, and the courts are therefore limited to the authority afforded by the applicable statute. Pickman v. State, 155 So.2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963), cert. denied, 164 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1964); Brown v. State, 302 So.2d 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). We hold that Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1975) providing that a defendant placed on probation for commission of a felony offense be supervised by the Department of Offender Rehabilitation is mandatory....

...Brown and Burdick do not control here where the operative phrases are "shall sentence" and "for a term of years". Neither case holds that a trial court may impose straight probation upon a defendant determined to be an habitual felony offender. The statute originally authorizing probation in Florida (now in section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes), clearly shows that the intent of the concept was that probation was not a sentence at all but was a conditional limbo-like status during a period of time between a finding of criminal guilt and the imposition of a sentence, if a sentence was ever imposed. The placing of a defendant on probation is in lieu of a sentence. (§ 948.01(3), Fla....

...(1), Fla. Stat.). Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1988). As the habitual felony offender statute (§ 775.084(4)(a)2., Fla. Stat.) mandates a "sentence" of "a term of years", the placing of the defendant on straight probation in lieu of sentence (§ 948.01(3), Fla....

...In either event, considering the defendant's propensity to break the law, and the alternative of 3 1/2 years incarceration now or up to 30 years if and when he breaks probation, defense counsel exercised sound judgment in preferring the 3 1/2 year guidelines sentence for his client. [3] See § 948.01(3), Fla....

...r the legality of the sentence. Williams v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 280 So.2d 518; FAR 6.16, 32 F.S.A. This court has held quite succinctly that a designated sentence to the county jail followed by a period of probation is not authorized by Fla. Stat. § 948.01(4), F.S.A....

...As his alleged predicate "conviction," the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a charge by the State of Florida of robbery and aggravated battery. Such offenses under *1493 Florida law are punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year. As is permitted by Section 948.01 of the Florida Statutes, adjudication of guilt was withheld....

...Circuit Court case No. 794 and the information against her husband bore case No. 793. The "Order Consolidating Cases" bore "No. 793, 794. Grand Larceny" and was styled "State of Florida vs. Malcolm Ray Singleton and Grace Marie Singleton." [2] F.S. Section 948.01, F.S.A....

...By this appeal the appellant raises three points: (1) The evidence was insufficient to justify the court's findings that appellant had violated the conditions of his probation. (2) The probation revocation is void because it was entered pursuant to a jail sentence followed by probation and is thereby contrary to F.S. § 948.01(4)....

...Therefore, we affirm appellant's conviction but remand his sentence for correction in light of Villery. In Villery, the Florida Supreme Court held that a period of incarceration followed by probation imposed either as a condition of probation or under a true split sentence as authorized by section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979), cannot equal or exceed one year in either instance....

...ion order any other proper conditions or terms not enumerated in the statute. This section has been commonly cited as the authority under which a trial judge may include incarceration as a condition of probation. However, Villery goes on to say that section 948.01(4), [2] the statute which provides for a true split sentence alternative, is the specific authority for a trial judge to require a defendant to be incarcerated as a condition of probation....

...all be probation or it may withdraw the original sentence and now sentence appellant to be incarcerated for up to ten years with credit for time served. SCHEB, C.J., and GRIMES, J., concur. NOTES [1] See State v. Jones, 327 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1976). [2] Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979): Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, direct the defendant to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence....

...Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979), states that the enumeration of the terms and conditions in subsection (1) does not prevent the imposition of other conditions the court may consider proper. One of these other possible conditions includes incarceration as provided in section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979): ..." 396 So.2d at 1109....

...w for taking an appeal. Committee Notes 1968 Adoption. To the same effect as section 921.02, Florida Statutes, except the portion reading "in writing, signed by the judge" which was added. Last sentence was added to permit the judge to operate under section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes....

...t of conviction; section 924.06, Florida Statutes, specifying when a defendant may take an appeal; section 924.09, Florida Statutes, and Florida Criminal Appellate Rule 6.2 concerning the time for taking appeals by a defendant in criminal cases; and section 948.011, Florida Statutes, providing for a sentence of a fine and probation as to imprisonment....

...r community control, if no such adjudication has been made previously. Pronouncement and imposition of sentence then shall be made upon suchthe defendant. *333 Committee Notes 1968 Adoption. Subdivisions (a) and (b) contain the procedural aspects of section 948.01(1), (2), and (3), Florida Statutes. It should be noted that in (b) provision is made for no pronouncements in addition to no imposition of sentence prior to the granting of probation. The terminology in section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes, is that the trial court shall "withhold the imposition of sentence." The selected terminology is deemed preferable to the present statutory language since the latter is apparently subject to misconstruction whereb...

...tence, enjoyed the benefit of release on community control, and did not complain until after the community control was revoked. The sentence is "illegal" only in the sense that it is not one of the sentences that may be imposed pursuant to Poore and section 948.01, Florida Statutes....

...on without ruling on the question certified); Salgat v. State, 652 So.2d 815, 815 (Fla.1995) ("This Court has no jurisdiction to answer a question certified by a district court when that court has not first passed upon the question certified."). [3] Section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (2004), which was in effect when these crimes were committed, authorizes probation in lieu of imprisonment for commission of a crime "[i]f it appears to the court ......

...art of a split sentence. [7] Similarly, section 921.0017, Florida Statutes (2003), which applies to offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994, specifies that upon revocation of probation when an offender is serving a "split sentence pursuant to section 948.01," the trial court shall only order credit for time served and not for gain time. Although none of the statutory provisions governing forfeiture of gain time define a split sentence, two provisions in section 948.01, Florida Statutes (2003), relating to the trial courts' sentencing options, do explain the split sentence option. Section 948.01(6) provides, in full: Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, impose a split sentence whereby the defe...

...community control after *381 serving such period as may be imposed by the court. The period of probation or community control shall commence immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration, whether by parole or gain-time allowances. Section 948.01(11) provides, in pertinent part: The court may also impose a split sentence whereby the defendant is sentenced to a term of probation which may be followed by a period of incarceration or, with respect to a felony, into community contr...

...ntinue the probation or community control as provided in s. 948.06. If the probation or community control is revoked, the court may impose any sentence that it could have imposed at the time the offender was placed on probation or community control. Section 948.01(6) defines what this Court has described as a "true split sentence." See Poore v....

...In [the probationary split] sentence, if the defendant violates probation, the trial court may impose any sentence it might have originally imposed. 760 So.2d at 889 n. 1; see also § 948.06(1). In State v. Powell, 703 So.2d 444, 446 (Fla.1997), we recognized that section 948.01(11), enacted after Poore, authorizes a sentence not described in that case-a period of probation followed by a period of incarceration, which we labeled a "reverse split sentence." B....

...revocation of probation that, combined with the sentence originally received, exceeds the maximum guidelines sentence. Id. In a decision issued shortly after Tripp, Horner v. State, 617 So.2d 311 (Fla.1993), we stated that the provision now found in section 948.01(6) defines "split sentencing with regard to the sentencing that the trial court is imposing for all cases against the defendant." Id....

...United States, the petitioner, Tyrone Oliver Chong, left the country. Upon his reentry, Customs agents discovered three pounds of marijuana concealed in his belongings. The state of Florida prosecuted Chong in its courts. Pursuant to Florida Statute 948.01(3), the state court withheld adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence, but placed Chong on probation for six months....

...court upon a hearing of the matter that a defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law. § 948.01(3), Fla....

...nts a low risk of harm to the community may, upon satisfactory completion of half the term of probation, be placed by the Department of Corrections on nonreporting status until expiration of the term of supervision." § 948.001(1), Fla.Stat. (1995). Section 948.01(12), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: "The court may also impose split probation whereby, upon satisfactory completion of half the term of probation, the Department of Corrections may place the offender *1096 on administrative probation as defined in s....

...e his probation. See Carson v. State, 489 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (unless interrupted by fault of prisoner, sentence continues to run while he is at liberty). The appellant's probation will not commence until he serves his prison sentence. See § 948.01(8), Fla....

...ceration as a condition of probation. See also Lewis v. State, 298 So.2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); State v. Williams, 237 So.2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). The second type of split sentence, the "true" split sentence, we found in Jones to be authorized by section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973) (codified as amended at section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1983)), which allows the judge to sentence a defendant to incarceration for some portion of the total period of imprisonment for which the defendant could be sentenced, withholding the remainder of sentence and imposing probation. In State v. Holmes, 360 So.2d 380, 383 (Fla. 1978), we held: (1) that a trial judge is authorized by Section 948.01(4) [now 948.01(8)] to sentence a defendant to a period of incarceration followed by a period of incarceration followed by a period of probation; (2) that the combined periods at the time of the original sentence cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by statute for the offense charged......

...[2] We therefore approve the decision of the court in Smith and disapprove the decision in Winkle. We do not decide what should be the appropriate periods of incarceration imposed as a sentence followed by probation, under a "true" split sentence pursuant to section 948.01(8)....

...district courts have. In Alderman v. State, 356 So.2d 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), the court held that six months was the maximum period of probation permitted for second degree misdemeanors. The trial judge had withheld adjudication of guilt pursuant to section 948.01(3) and imposed a one-year probationary period....

...Statutory provisions which set out the procedures for extending probation privileges to those found guilty of violations of criminal laws are not mandatory on trial judges." ( Bernhardt v. State, 288 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1974) and cases therein cited) F.S. 948.01(4) clearly provides that the granting of probation is permissive only and is within the discretion of the trial judge....

...tation. A court may: ... . (g) Impose a split sentence whereby the offender is to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence, which period may include a term of years or less. § 921.187(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1989). 948.01 When court may place defendant on probation or into community control....

...into community control after serving such period as may be imposed by the court. The period of probation or community control shall commence immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration, whether by parole or gain-time allowances. § 948.01(8), Fla....

...Moreover, in State v. Jones, 327 So.2d 18, 25 (Fla. 1976), overruled on other grounds, State v. Holmes, 360 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1978), and receded from on other grounds, Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1980), we construed section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1974), the predecessor of section 948.01(8) which contained essentially similar wording, as follows: We reject the District Court's interpretation of Section 948.01(4) which requires the trial judge at the initial sentencing proceeding to impose a total sentence immediately followed by the withholding of a part thereof for use in the event probation is violated. This interpretation is inconsistent with the procedure for straight probation as authorized by Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes, and in conflict with Section 948.06, Florida Statutes. The latter authorizes the trial judge, upon a finding that probation has been violated, to impose any sentence he might have originally imposed. Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes, pertaining to placing a defendant on straight probation, requires the court to stay and withhold the imposition of sentence. The only difference in the wording of Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, is the addition of the qualifying word "remainder" in the phrase "withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence." We read this provision of the statute to mean that the time spent in jail must be within any maximum jail sentence which could be imposed....

...We acknowledge that Glass makes a legitimate argument for the lack *1102 of statutory authority to impose a probationary split sentence. However, section 921.187(1)(g) is susceptible to the interpretation that it authorizes a probationary split sentence. While section 948.01(8) appears to describe a true split sentence, it does not preclude the imposition of a probationary split sentence....

...guilt or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is a condition precedent to the application of Section 949.10. To the contrary, Section 949.10 states that it applies to one who has been found guilty not necessarily one who has been adjudicated guilty. Section 948.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., specifically provides: "When courts may place defendant on probation....

...during such period of deferment of sentencing the defendant again broke the law he was merely haled into court and sentenced as to the original offense. Probation was intended to take the place of the old practice of deferring sentencing. [3] *1284 Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes, specifically provides that when a sentencing court decides to place a defendant on probation rather than to sentence him "it shall stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon such defendant and shall place h...

...s imposed after a violation of probation has occurred. This is not so as to a split sentence. The sentence imposed on the defendant in this case on September 9, 1982, was a true split sentence. [5] When imposed the authority for a split sentence was section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1981), which provided as follows: (4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, di...

...In such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence imposed upon the defendant, and direct that the defendant be placed upon probation after serving such period as may be imposed by the court. (emphasis supplied) Since the imposition of the original sentence in this case, both section 948.01 and section 958.04 have been amended and sentencing guidelines have been adopted, but such amendments and changes, are not, of course, relevant to a proper determination of the nature of the original sentence imposed in this case....

...probation or community control is applicable only to the usual case where a defendant is originally placed directly on probation or community control and has no applicability to split sentence provisions which were much later added and now exist as section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...The Florida Supreme Court in that case described incarceration as a condition of probation as "also known as the split sentence probation alternative." It treated both kinds of sentences or dispositions the same, limiting the incarceration time to one year. That was later statutorily repealed by sections 921.197 and 948.01(4) for split sentences, [9] but the balance of Villery remains good law....

....06(1), the court may impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed, is correct only when the defendant was originally put on probation in lieu of being sentenced and is not correct when a true split sentence was originally imposed. [6] Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1981), has been amended and transferred to section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...State, 482 So.2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), Clark v. State, 481 So.2d 994 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), Boldes v. State, 475 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), Gale v. State, 483 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 492 So.2d 1332 (Fla. 1986). [4] §§ 948.03, 948.01(3), Fla. Stat. (1983). [5] § 948.01(8), Fla....

...days' jail time served pending trial and disposition, and remand the case to the trial court with directions to allow credit for such time. REVERSED and REMANDED. SHARP, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur. NOTES [1] This distinction derives in part from section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1987) which provides that in placing a defendant on probation, Florida courts must "withhold the imposition of sentence."

...Kelly v. State, 508 So.2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) is only in point if one accepts the majority's view that the facts of this case constitute an ab initio resentencing. That is the question, and one that needs answering by our supreme court. NOTES [1] Section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1985) provides: (8) Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, impose a split sente...

...Probation, on the other hand, may only be imposed if it appears to the court that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law. § 948.01(3), Fla....

...See Gryca, supra, at 223. Thus, this contention of defendants must fail. Defendants third and final point that their sentences as to count 1 takes away their rights and the prerogative of the probation board to decrease the two year incarceration is without merit. See Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes....

accordance with an individualized treatment plan." § 948.001(10), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added); see also

...In 1992, Punta violated the agreement and was sentenced to 30 years in state prison. He filed a 3.850 post-conviction motion which was denied. There is no record of his appealing that decision. Punta here claims that his sentence of community control followed by probation was illegal because it was prohibited by section 948.01(12), Florida Statutes (1989), which provided that "an offender may not be placed in community control if (a) Convicted of or adjudication withheld for a forcible felony as defined in s....

...riod, to follow after the serving of the six months in the county jail, was unauthorized and improper for the reasons set out in Williams v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 280 So.2d 518. In Williams it was pointed out that the authority granted by Fla. Stat. § 948.01(4), F.S.A....

...or, a fortiori, under legislative authority, expunged or destroyed, even when the accused has been acquitted or the charge dismissed, in the absence of statutory authority or strong overriding equitable considerations. We agree. The contention that § 948.01 Fla....

...— When courts may place defendant on probation — logically requires the elimination of all records of the case when the court withholds an adjudication of guilt and places a defendant on probation after a defendant is found guilty or pleads guilty to an offense, is without merit. Both § 30.31 and § 948.01, Fla. Stat. had legislative attention by amendment in 1967. Had § 948.01, amended effective June 19, 1967, been intended as an extension or curtailment of § 30.31 the latter statute would have reflected the intent when it was amended effective October 1, 1967....

...BARKETT, Chief Justice. We review Horner v. State, 597 So.2d 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), based on conflict with Lanier v. State, 504 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), and Washington v. *312 State, 564 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). [1] The issue is whether section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1989), which precludes a time gap in a probationary split sentence, [2] prohibits a separation between incarceration and probation as to each case of a multiple-case sentence, or merely bars a period of freedom between portions of an individual's overall sentence....

...These probationary periods were to be followed by four consecutive five-year probationary terms for the third case. [3] In sum, Horner was sentenced to three-and-one-half years of incarceration, followed by twenty-two years' probation. [4] The sentence length was affirmed on appeal. Horner urges that her sentence violates section 948.01(8), which states in pertinent part: "Whenever ......

...Horner urges this court to adopt the holding in Washington v. State , in which the district court found that a concurrent four-and-one-half year sentence followed by consecutive six-month probationary periods created a time gap for one of the sentences. The court found that the gap violated section 948.01(8) because the latter probationary period did not immediately follow the incarceration for the same offense....

...munity control or probation immediately follows incarceration. In this case, the trial court adjudicated three cases in one hearing and imposed a single split sentence. We therefore find that the trial court did not create a time gap in violation of section 948.01(8), and so approve the district court ruling....

...ceration upon a violation of the probation. The court held that because this sort of sentence would be a downward departure in the instant case the trial court would have to provide written reasons. A reverse split sentence is a legal sentence under section 948.01(11), Florida Statutes (1991). However, we cannot accept the argument that a reverse split sentence is exempt from the sentencing guidelines any more than other sentencing options under section 948.01, which dictates when a court may impose sentences of probation and community control....

...it. For example, in section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1991), another statute which covers special sentences, the legislature expressly stated that the section is exempt from the sentencing guidelines. However, such an exemption is not mentioned in section 948.01(11) or any place else in section 948.01....

...[1] Toombs served the prison term. Toombs then violated a condition of his probation. On October 21, 1980, upon the revocation of Toombs' probation, the trial court imposed a split sentence of one *767 year and one day imprisonment [2] to be followed by three years probation. See § 948.01(4), Fla....

...edit time served, concedes that the one year and one day term of imprisonment exceeds by two days the incarceration period allowable under Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, supra, n. 1, which cannot " equal or exceed one year." [3] Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: "Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, direct the defendant to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence....

...In such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence imposed upon the defendant, and direct that the defendant be placed upon probation after serving such period as may be imposed by the court." [4] Villery groups the split sentence of Section 948.01(4) and incarceration as a condition of probation under Section 948.03(2) together as the "split sentence alternatives." The distinction between these "alternatives," see Lewis v....

...[1] Thus, it can be seen the legislature has authorized the courts to sentence a defendant within the confines of the penalties provided by law or withhold sentence and place him on probation. Bateh v. State, Fla.App. 1958, 101 So.2d 869. The only deviation from those alternatives is that authorized by § 948.01(4), F.S., enabling the court to sentence a defendant to imprisonment for a specified period, withhold a portion of the sentence of imprisonment, and place the defendant on probation for a specified term....

...r place her on probation with such conditions as the court may deem appropriate. We reiterate that incarceration as a condition of probation is lawful. Sentence vacated and cause remanded with directions. OWEN, C.J., and CROSS, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.01(4), F.S., as amended by Chapter 74-112, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1974, grants the judiciary the explicit power to withhold part of a sentence and direct that a defendant be placed on probation "after serving such period as ma...

...NOTES [1] We do not reach the issue of the propriety of the sentence, because it was not raised below. One difficulty in this case arises because, with the exception of section 318.14(10), Florida Statutes (1995), Florida law links a withhold of adjudication with probation. See §§ 921.187(1)(a)3, 948.01, Fla....

..."Time served" means that a defendant is sentenced to a definite period of incarceration and is then given immediate credit for time already spent incarcerated. Incarceration must be either a condition of probation (§§ 921.187(1)(a), 948.03(6)) or a sentence imposed when there has been an adjudication of guilt. See § 948.01(2), Fla....

...on and the imposition of court costs without addressing the jurisdictional issue. E.g., Vamper v. State, 562 So.2d 816 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), aff'd, 579 So.2d 730 (Fla.1991). [3] Both the rules and the statutes use the term "sentence" as a term of art. Section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that when a defendant is placed on probation the court "shall stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon such defendant." The term "sentence" in rules 9.140(b)(1)(D) & (E) relates back to th...

the definition of "community control" under section 948.001(3), Florida Statutes (2011), is virtually identical

...us, *916 but we think that this statement does provide the proper basis for a proceeding under Section 475.25(1)(e). In the eyes of the law a person is not deemed to have committed a crime until an adjudication of guilt has been entered against him. Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1975), permits the court to place a defendant on probation "with or without an adjudication of guilt." The obvious purpose of this statute is to avoid giving certain persons a criminal record when the prospects are good for rehabilitation....

...To allow a conviction such as this to stand, when there is a great probability that the accused is innocent, would be a gross miscarriage of justice. Reversed and remanded with directions to grant the defendant's motion for new trial. NOTES [1] See section 948.01, Fla....

...cases. The trial court was authorized under section 939.01(1), Florida Statutes, to enter a judgment for the costs of prosecution against the defendant as a convicted person notwithstanding that formal adjudication of guilt was withheld pursuant to section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes....

...The appellant argues that the result of this oral pronouncement is that the jail term of Count II will be served after the entire five-year probationary sentence of Count I. He argues that this is an impermissible gap in sentencing in violation of section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...A full reading of the transcript of the sentencing hearing demonstrates that the trial court, both counsel, and the appellant himself, all understood that the court intended to impose the sentences in accord with the state's interpretation in this appeal. This sentencing structure comports with section 948.01(8)....

...Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1981), modinized by statute on other grounds as recognized in Van Tassel v. Coffman, 486 So.2d 528 (Fla. 1986); § 948.03(5), Fla. Stat. (1989). Reversed and remanded for resentencing. CAMPBELL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1989) provides: (8) Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, impose a split sente...

...It is not applicable to the determination of whether a defendant is entitled to credit earned gain-time as "time served" on a sentence. Secondly, the dissent errs in concluding that the sentence was legal on its face and would be deemed valid absent Green. Section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1983), provides: Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, direct the defendant to...

...*1161 Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, and Louis G. Carres, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Michael H. Davidson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant pleaded guilty to burglary and was sentenced under Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1975) to three years incarceration, three years suspended, to be followed by three years probation with the special condition thereof that appellant spend four months in the county jail with credit for sixty-three (63) days jail time previously served....

...he defendant pleads no-contest and adjudication of guilt is withheld. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.986. And, when a defendant pleads no contest and the court withholds adjudication of guilt, it must either place the defendant on probation or community control. § 948.01(2) and (3), Fla....

...it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer or offender on probation." Nevertheless, we do not accept these arguments. In the first place, it is difficult to see how it can be said that appellant was "sentenced" to probation when section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that in placing a defendant on probation the court shall "withhold the imposition of sentence." In any event, section 921.001(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), unequivocally provides that the sentencing guidelines "shall be applied ......

...t affirmatively selects the guidelines. *961 I could engage in some speculation and debate as to whether sentencing in the content of section 921.001 and Rule 3.701 occurs when a defendant is placed on probation. Duggar held that it does not, citing section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...See also Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(13) committee note. The defendant also contends that the length of community control is restricted to two years and therefore the trial court was without authority to impose consecutive terms of community control. We conclude that section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (1987) [1] does not limit the duration of community control to a single two year period when the defendant is sentenced at the same sentencing hearing for multiple offenses but rather, two years is the maximum permissible period of community control for any one offense....

...Then Burrell filed his motion for postconviction relief. *480 We do not agree with Burrell that the existing sentence violates Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1981). The Villery decision was an attempt to reconcile two separate pieces of legislation. Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979), permitted the imposition of jail or prison terms as a condition of probation....

...ly delegated a legislative power to the judiciary. The gist of the judge's rationale is contained in the following paragraph: Because [section 322.34(1)(c) ] requires an adjudication of guilt for the conduct to be punishable as a felony, and because § 948.01, Fla....

...lation of section 322.34(1)(c), the result will be that the defendant's conduct will be treated as a misdemeanor, rather than a felony. This appears to be based on a misperception regarding the effect of a decision to withhold adjudication of guilt. Section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), is the source of the power to withhold adjudication of guilt....

...the cause is remanded for resentencing on those two counts. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In 1958 and 1959 it was held that the practice of withholding or suspending sentencing contravened section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1941), and was "improper" and "illegal." Helton v....

...5th DCA 1994), that is ordered if "it appears to the court . . . that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law." § 948.01(2), Fla....

...gh we assume such was not the purpose of the petitioner in seeking expungement). Those objects or results would not constitute adequate grounds at law or in equity to overcome the public interest involved. The appellee argues that since a purpose of § 948.01 Fla....

...tion of the public. The present statute, as did the statute which was in effect in 1959, requires sheriffs to send copies of all fingerprints made by them to the FBI. [2] That disposition of the case by the criminal court of record was authorized by § 948.01 Fla....

commitment." Community control is defined in section 948.001(1), Florida Statutes (1989), as ... a form

...Bateh, Fla. 1959, 110 So.2d 7; Helton v. State, Fla. 1958, 106 So.2d 79. What was done here was, in effect, a probation, but as such it was an illegal procedure for several reasons. Chapter 948, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., dealing with probation, provides in § 948.01(4) that probation can not be granted except under the custody of the parole commission. Here that was not done. Also, the statute provides that probation, *74 when allowed, be granted prior to sentencing (§ 948.01(3)), and it is provided, again with exceptions not pertinent here, that the period of probation may not extend more than two years beyond the maximum sentence applicable....

...or five years. RCrP 3.701(d)(13) provides that when community control is imposed, it shall not exceed the term provided by general law. Chapter 948, Florida Statutes (1983) sets forth pertinent provisions relating to community control and probation. Section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (1983), provides in part: The sanctions imposed by order of the court shall be commensurate with the seriousness of the offense....

...Sentencing Following Revocation of Probation The original "concept of probation ... was to provide an alternative to the imposition by sentence, of the penalties provided by law for the commission of a criminal offense." Hankey v. State, 529 So.2d 736, 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (Cowart, J., dissenting). Section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (1993) still provides that If it appears to the court ......

...t "has made it clear that sentencing alternatives should not be used to thwart the guidelines. Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161, 165 (Fla. 1988)." Disbrow v. State, 642 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1994) (no exemption from guidelines "mentioned ... any place ... in section 948.01"); Lambert v....

...The sentence consisted of one year imprisonment in the County Jail, plus two years of probation. The court held that the probationary period of the sentence was void. This decision was based upon an interpretation of F.S. § 922.051 (1971) and F.S. § 948.01(4) (1971)....

...The first of these statutes allows a defendant to be imprisoned in the County Jail for an offense for which he could be sent to the State Prison. Importantly, though, it limits the County Jail sentence to one year. The second of the above mentioned statutes, F.S. § 948.01 (1971) [1] provided that a defendant may be "placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence [in the County Jail]." And so in Williams v. State, supra , the court said: "The language of 948.01(4) Fla....

...Perhaps he might be correct if the legislature had not amended the statute. The Florida Supreme Court in Jones held that drug offender probation for chronic substance abusers who commit non-violent drug crimes was available under a predecessor statute (section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)), as an alternative sentencing scheme independent of the sentencing guidelines....

...crimes, and who had in his possession a "firearm," as defined in subsection 790.001(6), or "destructive device," as defined in subsection 790.001(4), shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years. Notwithstanding the provisions of § 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall the defendant be eligible for parole, prior to serving such minimum sentence....

...Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent. GRIMES, Justice. We review Crawford v. State, 558 So.2d 1100, 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), to resolve the following question, which the district court of appeal certified as being of great public importance: Does Section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...years of community control for burglary, with the terms to run consecutively. The district court of appeal affirmed the sentences. Crawford does not contend that his sentences exceeded the range of the sentencing guidelines. However, he argues that section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Crawford's reliance on Allen v. State, 526 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1988), is misplaced. In that case we construed the Youthful Offender Statute as placing a six-year maximum on commitments under the act regardless of the number of crimes which had been committed. Section 948.01(5) places no such limitation on the imposition of community control....

...The original conditions of probation are standard and did not include any provision relating to children or which arguably could be modified to include this prohibition. While it is true that the trial court has the right to rescind or modify terms and conditions of probation at any time pursuant to section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (1991), "[a]bsent proof of a violation, the court cannot change an order of probation by enhancing the terms." Lippman v....

...[3] We cannot agree with this reasoning. In reality a defendant has little say in determining the terms of his probation. Under Florida law, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary authority to grant probation and to set the terms thereof. Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that the trial court may place a defendant upon probation if it appears to the court "that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice a...

...ty. Finally, the trial court sentenced Mick to five years probation on each of the three remaining grand thet counts, the terms to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to the two terms of community control. The issue before us is whether Section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (1985), limits the duration of community control to a single two-year period when the defendant is sentenced at the same sentencing hearing for multiple offenses charged in separate informations....

...Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Daniel R. Aaronson of Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. STONE, J. We affirm the order withholding adjudication and placing Ackerman on drug offender probation, pursuant to section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes....

...However, the state asserts that the trial court lacked authority to impose this sentence and withhold adjudication for the offense. At the sentencing hearing, Ackerman's attorney argued motions for mitigation of the guidelines sentence and imposition of an alternative sentence under section 948.01(13)....

...f [the state] concede[s] you [have authority], I won't go into argument about it. If they're contesting that you don't have this power, I would like to argue that you do. The assistant state attorney responded, "I think the Court can consider—under 948.01, if the Court finds the Defendant is a chronic substance abuser, I think you might have that discretion." The court then granted Ackerman's motion for an alternative sentence, withheld adjudication, and sentenced him to one year of community control and four years probation, during which time he would be required to complete a twelve-month drug program. The state first objected to Ackerman being unlawfully sentenced under section 948.01(13) six weeks after the plea announcement and nearly two weeks after sentencing....

...n agreement between the Defense and the State, and the fact that the Court would have total discretion was also presented as an agreement between the Defendant and the State. It also found, as to the state's notice of the motion for sentencing under section 948.01(13), "that it is represented that is part of an agreement between the State and the Defense....

...Alternative Sentence. The trial court observed that incident to the plea "agreement" announced to the court, the state agreed that the defense could and would argue for a downward departure from the guidelines and an alternative *1231 sentence under section 948.01(13). It also observed that the state either agreed or acquiesced that the court could consider section 948.01(13) and concluded: Bottom line is this matter was presented by the Court by way of agreement, which was represented to the Defendant. The State did not object at the time of the plea colloquy, and did not object at the time of sentencing. Section 948.01 allows the court to withhold adjudication and place a defendant on drug offender probation if that defendant is "a chronic substance abuser whose criminal conduct is a violation of chapter 893." However, section 893.135(3) states: Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 948.01, with respect to any person who is found to have violated this section, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for parole prior to serving the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by this section....

...Cases allowing sentencing errors to be reviewed as fundamental error involve defendants' challenges to their sentences, not the state's. Here, there is record support for the trial court's conclusion that the state agreed, at all stages of the proceedings, that the court could sentence Ackerman under section 948.01....

known as community control, as defined in section 948.001, Florida Statutes (1987), and community control

...ruel and unusual punishment. A sentence is excessive if it is "grossly disproportionate." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, ___, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2683, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). Probation is presumptively less severe than incarceration. See generally § 948.01, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...ed the situation challenged by Dupree in the instant 3.850 motion, i.e., successive terms of community control. "The statutory maximum for a sentence of community control is two years." McGehee v. State, 688 So.2d 1008, 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); see § 948.01(4), Fla....

...ug testing, drug treatment, and curfew conditions set forth in the Drug Offender Probation Standard Conditions. These challenged conditions are also not found in Rule 3.986(e). Additionally, Florida Statutes section 948.20, formerly Florida Statutes section 948.01(13), addressing drug offender probation, does not statutorily mandate these conditions....

...With regard to the state's appeal, McGraw argues that the order placing him on non-reporting probation is not appealable. We disagree, but for purposes of logical progression we address the state's substantive argument first and then McGraw's procedural contention. The state contends that upon conviction of a felony, section 948.01(3) mandates a reporting probation....

...The result we reach is supported by the inclusion of probation within the sentencing guidelines. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701, esp. Committee Note (d)(8), (12). In fact, the order appealed is equally reviewable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(J) as a departure from the sentencing guidelines. Since section 948.01(3) mandates a reporting probation upon conviction of a felony, it establishes a mandatory minimum disposition when such a conviction *292 is obtained....

...Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (2001), implements these rights and requires that a court conduct a probation revocation hearing if the probationer disputes the charges. At the hearing, the State must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Stevens v. State, 823 So.2d 319, 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Section 948.01(13), which authorizes drug offender probation, specifically states that such probation is "subject to revocation of probation as provided in s....

...nt for a term exceeding one year) in the Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida. At that time, the court withheld adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence, and placed the defendant on probation pursuant to the provisions of Section 948.01(3) of the Florida Statutes, which reads in its relevant part that: "(3) If it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justi...

...and he no longer can be tried on the indictment or information. Florida law provides a procedure whereby certain people charged with a crime may have adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence withheld, and instead may be placed on probation. § 948.01(3), F.S., supra....

...This position would seem to indicate that a defendant would remain technically under indictment or information until he was adjudged guilty by the court. While none of the cases cited, supra, have ever been explicitly overruled by the Florida Supreme Court, it is important to remember that prior to the 1959 amendment of Section 948.01(3) of the Florida Statutes (Fla.Laws 1959, c. 59-130) this statute did not provide a judge with the alternative of withholding adjudication of guilt as well as imposition of sentence. The question of the status of one treated pursuant to the present Section 948.01(3) ( i.e., one with respect to whom both adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence have been withheld) has thus become of importance only in recent years....

...The issue has arisen in Florida courts only occasionally since the 1959 amendment, and even in these few cases the discussion has not been entirely dispositive of the question now before this Court. In one case, the Florida Supreme Court found that a decision to place a defendant on probation pursuant to the provisions of Section 948.01(3) of the Florida Statutes without either adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence constituted a "final judgment or decree" so to give that court jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the lower court's disposition of the case....

...uld be a "conviction." See also Singletary v. State, 290 So.2d 116 (Fla.App.), cert. dismissed, 293 So.2d 361 (Fla.1974), where the court said: "Whether or not he [the defendant] was originally adjudged guilty or adjudication was withheld (F.S. Sec. 948.01(3), F.S.A.), persons on probation are beyond the trial or guilt determining stage of the criminal process ....

...238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279 (1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009, 1012 (1927). When the judge decided to withhold adjudication and sentence and instead placed defendant on probation under Section 948.01(3) of the Florida Statutes, it is clear that the defendant could no longer be tried on the information....

...suspended," *792 some courts have concluded that some of the period, but not all, can be suspended. We conclude that the supreme court in Poore was merely summarizing the complex statutory sentencing options available at that time. See §§ 921.187, 948.01, Fla. Stat. (1987). In section 948.01(6), the legislature empowers trial courts to impose a split sentence "whereby the defendant is to be placed on probation ......

...Given the different purposes of incarceration and probation, it is not obvious why the length of probation in a true split sentence must always equal the suspended portion of the sentence of incarceration. In analyzing the legality of this conditional suspended sentence, we have found it useful to consider section 948.01(11), Florida Statute (1995)....

...rial courts to impose this reverse split sentence. Disbrow v. State, 642 So.2d 740 (Fla.1994). There is no requirement that the conditional period of incarceration be equal in length to the preceding term of probation. A reverse split sentence under section 948.01(11) presents a procedural problem, however, because Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) gives a trial court only 60 days in which to reduce a sentence....

...On the other hand, the conditional suspended sentence imposed in this case is a method to impose a sentence comparable to the reverse split sentence without violating rule 3.800(b). Because the conditional suspended sentence does not appear to violate section 948.01(6) and is compatible with the sentencing policy announced in 948.01(11), we conclude that it is an authorized sentence....

...Constitutionally, as to one offense, a defendant can be put on probation many times (i.e., any number of times he may violate probation and it can be terminated and yet he be again placed on probation, with new conditions, etc.) but he can be sentenced for "the same offense" but once. This is why it is imperative, as section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes contemplates, that in a sentencing procedure in which a period of probation follows a period of confinement (in cases other than where a period of confinement is imposed as a condition of probation), the lawful sen...

...Here, the petitioner was charged with violating his probation after the effective date of the amendment. Thus; Lollis is distinguishable, and section 948.06(1) clearly governs the disposition of the present case. We also point out that section 958.05(2) is consistent with section 948.01(8), which provides: Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony ... is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, *945 may, at the time of sentencing, direct the defendant to be placed on probation or, with respect to any such felony, into community control upon completion of any specified period of such sentence. Section 948.01(11) states that "[p]rocedures governing violations of community control shall be the same as those described in s....

...§ 3651 , which expressly predicates such action “[u]pon entering a judgment of conviction.” Under the laws of some states, including the one in which the district court sits, a procedure such as was employed by the district court is authorized. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 948.01 ; United States v....

...The Act, among other things, created Section 921.187, Florida Statutes, which provides for alternative forms of disposition and sentencing. Among the permissible alternatives set forth in that section are: (1) Place an offender on probation with or without an adjudication of guilt pursuant to s. 948.01....

...iod of such sentence, which period may include a term of years or less. The Act further defined the terms "community control" and "probation" and are set forth in Section 948.001, Florida Statutes (1983). [1] *1220 The Act also added subsection 4 to Section 948.01 to provide for the circumstances under which the court may place the defendant in community control: (4) If, after considering the provisions of subsection (3) and the offender's prior record or the seriousness of the offense, it appea...

...rt may place the offender in a community control program... . That subsection also allows the court, with respect to previously committed offenders, to suspend further execution of the commitment and place the offender in community control. See also Section 948.01(3)....

...Further, where the offender has completed "the sanctions" imposed in the community control plan before the expiration of the term previously ordered by the court, the court may grant an early discharge of the offender or transfer the defendant to probation supervision. See Section 948.01(7)....

...The state contends that the subject disposition qualifies as a "split sentence" under Section 921.187(7) which is quoted above. We cannot agree. That section permits the court to impose a sentence such that, upon completion of any specified portion of the sentence, the offender is placed on probation. Section 948.01(8) also provides the same kind of split sentence but provides that the probationary part of the split sentence may instead be community control....

...If the trial court wishes to adhere to its community control disposition, the court will simply vacate and set aside the consecutive probationary term. The court will not have the option of increasing the two year community control term in view of the statutory two-year maximum on community control provided for in Section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...ase such probationary term by no more than an additional two years, the period of time represented by the vacated community control term. Alternatively, the court may vacate both the community control and probationary terms and, pursuant to Sections 948.01(1) and 921.187(7), Florida Statutes (1983), impose a lawful split sentence involving a period of incarceration followed by either probation or community control....

supervision with an individualized treatment plan. See § 948.001(7), Fla. Stat. (2004). The critical component

...Before proceeding to a consideration of the merits of the appeal presented by the points mentioned above, we deem it necessary to first determine whether the order appealed is one of which this Court has jurisdiction to review by appeal. *430 The order appealed was entered pursuant to F.S. Section 948.01, F.S.A., which provides as follows: "(1) Any court of the state having original jurisdiction of criminal actions, where the defendant in a criminal case has been found guilty by the verdict of a jury or has entered a plea of guilty or...

...After violation of community control three months later, the defendant was again placed on two years of community control and, as a special condition of community control, was required to serve 240 days in county jail. [1] Two years is the maximum period of community control available for any one offense. § 948.01(5), Fla....

...Ervin, III, Public Defender, and Michael M. Corin, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. McCORD, Judge. Appellant was convicted of larceny of an automobile and was given a five year split sentence, under § 948.01(4), Fla....

...court may impose any sentence it could originally have imposed, less jail time previously served as part of the sentence; but no credit is given for time spent on probation. Id. at 383. While this holding in Holmes appears to be an interpretation of section 948.01(4), the same is true as to youthful offenders subject to the terms of section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...otice of the special conditions imposed. We do not agree. Section 948.001(4), Florida Statutes (1995), which defines drug offender probation, emphasizes "individualized treatment plans" and does not reference any special conditions of probation. [1] Section 948.01(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), which governs the placement of a defendant on drug offender probation, does not set forth any specific terms and conditions of drug offender probation except for stating that "[d]rug offender probation...

including surveillance on weekends and holidays.” § 948.001(3), Fla. Stat. (2012); see also United States

...idelines range is any nonstate prison sanction. We held in Thompson v. State, 617 So.2d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), that a trial court is limited to twenty-two months' community control when the guidelines range is any nonstate prison sanction. See also § 948.01(4), Fla....

...However, after serving a period of 3 1/2 years imprisonment in State Prison the balance of such sentence shall be suspended and the defendant shall be placed on probation for a period of 1 1/2 years... . This is a true split sentence as described in, and authorized by, section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes....

...We reject appellant's argument that the "standard conditions" of probation provided in section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1993), and contained in the probation order would not apply to her unless orally pronounced because she was specifically placed on "drug offender" probation pursuant to section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (1993). Section 948.01(13)(a) provides that drug offender probation "may include those measures normally associated with community *29 control." Therefore, like a defendant placed on regular probation or community control, a defendant placed on drug offender...

...The State now appeals the defendant's sentence. The result in this case is controlled by statute. Section 921.187(1)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2006), provides that the court may "[p]lace the offender on probation with or without an adjudication of guilt pursuant to s. 948.01" if a prison sentence is not imposed. Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (2006), provides that "the court ....

...The trouble with Tribble's case is that the trial court failed to adhere to the options available to it under Florida Statutes. For this reason, the case is reversed. Reversed and Remanded for Re-sentencing. STEVENSON and GROSS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.01(2) was formerly subsection 948.01(3)....

...When community control was revoked Young was sentenced to one year in jail. This sentence is illegal as the court had no jurisdiction to place defendant on community control for a misdemeanor. Community control may be imposed only for felony offenses. § 948.01(4), (8), Fla....

...ution, [1] and Marine Fisheries Commission Emergency Rule 46ER95-1. [2] On February 9, 1996, after a non-jury trial, the circuit court found him guilty, but withheld adjudication of guilt, in keeping with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.670 and section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...months each, the probationary periods to run consecutively to each other. The practical effect of the sentencing disposition in this case has been to create an unauthorized gap between prison time and probation in regard to one of the sentences. See § 948.01(8), Fla....

...eration as the original sentences imposed in the case sub judice are patently illegal. This court repeatedly has made it absolutely clear that a designated sentence to the county jail followed by a period of probation is not authorized by Fla. Stat. § 948.01(4), F.S.A....

...reased. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874). Appellant's argument that the probation order constituted a sentence is incorrect. In placing a defendant on probation, Florida's courts must "withhold the imposition of sentence." § 948.01(3), Fla....

...Pursuant to said guidelines, the appellant was informed that he could be sentenced to a prison term not to exceed five years. The presentence report prepared for the court in November 1983 persuaded the court that a probation order would be appropriate. Pursuant to Rule 3.700(a), Fla.R.Crim.P., and § 948.01(3), Fla....

...ent Of Acquittal. I. Background It is undisputed that during 1984, Defendant Gispert pled guilty to one count of welfare fraud, a felony, in the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida, in criminal case number 84-3690CF. Pursuant to Florida Statute § 948.01, [2] the state court "withheld adjudication" and placed the Defendant on probation....

...dant undermines the "withheld adjudication" procedure by violating orders of the court, or by committing other crimes while on probation. Accordingly, when the defendant in Orellanes abused the withheld adjudication of his plea under Florida Statute § 948.01 by purchasing weapons illegally, he lost the benefits of that procedure, and was properly defined as a convicted felon....

...nd successful completion of a probationary period." Orellanes, 809 F.2d at 1528 (quoting Senate Report No. 98-583, 98 Cong.2d Sess. 7 (1984)) (emphasis added). Specifically, this Court's findings accommodate the underlying purpose of Florida Statute § 948.01, (the withheld adjudication statute), which is "to provide for the rehabilitation of one who has committed a crime without formally and judicially branding the individual as a convicted criminal with consequent loss of civil rights and other damning consequences." Delaney v....

...State, 541 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla.1989) ("Withholding adjudication can be a powerful tool because, by withholding adjudication of guilt, the court can avoid creating a criminal record for someone with good prospects for rehabilitation."). Clearly, the purpose of Florida Statute § 948.01 was to prevent a defendant, such as Defendant Gispert in the present case, from being branded a "convicted" felon....

...to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. [2] Florida Statute § 948.01 provides in pertinent part: (1) Any court of the state having original jurisdiction of criminal actions may at a time to be determined by the court, either with or without an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant, hear and determine the question of the probation of a defendant.......

presently suffer the penalty imposed by law." § 948.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). The dissenting opinion

sentence. Community control is defined in section 948.001(1), Florida Statutes (1987), as — a form of

...e. Adams v. State, 490 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1986). In this case, however, before the trial court could initially impose probation in lieu of sentence, it necessarily had to find that Williams was not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct. § 948.01(3), Fla....

...or departure when the original sentence was imposed. See Shull v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1987). That principle does not apply to this case, however, because the placement of Williams on probation did not constitute imposition of a sentence. See § 948.01(3), Fla....

...departure." This apparently refers to downward departure, and supports the concept that whereas community control may, in some instances, be substituted for incarceration, it cannot be substituted for probation. See State v. Mestas, infra . See also § 948.01(5), Fla....

...Probation is a matter of grace and its underlying concept is rehabilitation. Russell v. State, 342 So.2d 96 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). Normally, probation presupposes the fact that a probationer is not in confinement. Bernhardt v. State, 288 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1974). We find nothing in Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1979) which authorizes a court to impose a long term prison sentence as a special condition of probation....

...Oaks had, of course, been sentenced. In Florida, the trial judge does not pronounce and impose a sentence of imprisonment upon a defendant who is to be placed on probation, [1] except in the special county jail split-sentence procedure described in Section 948.01 (4), Florida Statutes....

...ndition of probation. As grounds for rehearing, appellant notes that the opinion issued in this cause did not cite a specific authority for affirmance of the driver's license suspension. Assuming the affirmance was based on the state's argument that section 948.01(3)(a), Florida Statutes, authorized suspension of a driver's license, appellant urges this provision applies only if community control is the imposed sanction....

...ve appropriations to fund its programs. In effect, the additional $500.00 which appellant was directed to pay constitutes an unauthorized double assessment for the same purpose. With regard to the two-year suspension of appellant's driver's license, section 948.01(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), provides in part: (3) If, ......

...Community-based sanctions may include, but are not limited to, ... revocation or suspension of the driver's license, ... In the instant case, appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for one offense, and placed on probation with respect to the other offense. The language of section 948.01(3)(a) appears to limit the authority to suspend a driver's license to those cases where community control was imposed in lieu of probation....

...[1] The court found mitigating circumstances under section 921.0026, Florida Statutes (2007), that would justify a downward departure, and ruled that this statute authorized a withhold of adjudication, notwithstanding the language of section 316.1935(6), which provides: Notwithstanding s. 948.01, no court may suspend, defer, or withhold adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence for any violation of this section. Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (2007), generally allows a court to place a defendant on probation or community control and permits a court to withhold adjudication of guilt....

...g charge. McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45, 47 (Fla.1994) (involving the conflict between a mandatory sentencing statute for possession of a short-barreled shotgun, section 790.221, Florida Statutes (1989), and the general sentencing statute found at section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1989))....

is a more severe sanction than probation. Section 948.001, Florida Statutes (1983), defines community

...n denying his motion to correct sentence in which he asserted that the trial court erred in placing him on drug offender probation as a sanction for his conviction of driving while license suspended. See Jones v. State, 813 So.2d 22, 25 (Fla.2002) ("Section 948.01(13) [providing for drug offender probation]......

...This court, upon examination of the record, noted the illegality of the sentence imposed. A sentence may not be imposed for the maximum term of one year in the county jail and be followed by a period of probation for eighteen months. See Fla. Stat. § 948.01(4), F.S.A.; Hutchins v....

...habilitation. The court may: * * * * * * (7) Impose a split sentence whereby the offender is to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence, which may include a term of years or less. (emphasis added) In addition, section 948.01(4) was amended by chapter 83-131 and renumbered as subsection (8)....

...e with the foregoing as to all defendants, except Williams. Turning now to the trial judge's ruling that a presentence investigation is not permissible under the same § 775.087(2) because of the following wording: "Notwithstanding the provisions of § 948.01, adjudication of guilt or IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE shall not be suspended, DEFERRED ......

known as community control, as defined in section 948.001, Florida Statutes (1987), and community control

...Chupka's argument rests on the supreme court's description of a true split sentence as "a total period of confinement with a portion of the confinement period suspended and the defendant placed on probation for that suspended portion." Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988) (emphasis added). Section 948.01(6), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that a trial court may, in its discretion, impose a split sentence where a defendant is to be placed on probation or community control after completing a specified sentence "which may include a ter...

...Powell, 696 So.2d 789, 792 (Fla. 2d DCA), approved, 703 So.2d 444, 445 (Fla.1997). In Powell, 703 So.2d at 446, the supreme court expressly approved split sentences where the period of supervision is shorter than the suspended portion of incarceration. We conclude that section 948.01(6) would also support a split sentence where the period of supervision exceeds the suspended portion of the prison sentence, as in the present case....

...Section 775.14 dealt with a statutory limitation on the ability of the state to sentence a defendant for a conviction of the same crime for which sentence had been earlier withheld and not altered for five years. However, in Gazda, adjudication was not withheld pursuant to section 948.01, Florida Statutes, as it was in Jenkins’ case, but was simply postponed while the defendant was sent for medical treatment.4 Later, in Grinkiewicz, the Eleventh Circuit relied on its prior decision in Orellanes to reach the same conclusion that “conviction” does not require an adjudication of guilt....

...However, when a defendant, such as Jenkins in this case, has his or her adjudication withheld, it is because the trial court has found that the defendant is not likely to engage in further criminal conduct and that justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant suffer the penalty imposed by law. See § 948.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 948.01, titled “When court may place defendant on probation or into community control,” states in pertinent part in subsection (2): (2) If it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defendant is no...

...either adjudge the defendant to be guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt; and, in either case, it shall stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon such defendant and shall place the defendant upon probation. § 948.01(2), Fla....

...For instance, section 790.065, Florida Statutes (2015), governs sale and delivery of firearms. Section 790.065(2)(a)1. provides that upon receipt of a request for a criminal 6. Similar language occurs in the current version of the statute. See § 948.01(2), Fla....

...of guilt as authorized by statute and ‘stay[s] and withhold[s] the imposition of sentence,’ the court has found that ‘the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct.’ ” McFadden, 772 So. 2d at 1216 (quoting § 948.01(2), Fla....

...Because section 790.23(1) is intended to keep firearms out of the hands of persons who are dangerous or who might reoffend, that purpose is not served where the trial court has explicitly determined that the defendant is not a danger and is not likely to reoffend—thus withholding adjudication under section 948.01 as was done in this case....

...us, Carr and McKee conflict with Primm. The concept of probation, as adopted by the Florida legislature in 1941, was to provide an alternative to the imposition, by sentence, of the penalties provided by law for the commission of a criminal offense. Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes, provides for probation when the court finds that "the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law," and that in order to place a defenda...

...This case well illustrates the frustration the sentencing guidelines have created in the trial courts, in the appellate courts, and in the aware portions of the Bar and public. [2] A defendant placed on probation within the context of a true split sentence pursuant to section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes, is not subject to the probation time limitations provided in section 948.04(1), Florida Statutes....

...months recommended maximum sentence under the guidelines. Appellant's position rests upon an erroneous assumption that the imposed probationary terms are sentences for guideline purposes. But the dispositions in this case were expressly pursuant to § 948.01(3) which provides in part that the trial court may " stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon defendant and shall place him upon probation ......

...serving 85 days thereof the defendant should be on probation for a period of five years, again with provision for the sentences to be served concurrently. By that amendment of the sentences the probation provided for became appropriate under § *521 948.01(4) Fla....

...unty jail (for a period as permitted by § 922.051 Fla. Stat., F.S.A.), with direction that he be placed on probation upon completion of a specified period of such sentence with the remainder of the jail sentence stayed and withheld (as permitted by § 948.01(4) Fla....

...ndant, a new sentence of imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period of years, such as the court could have originally imposed (as permitted by § 948.06 Fla. Stat., F.S.A. when sentence has been withheld and probation has been granted under § 948.01(1)-(3) Fla. Stat., F.S.A.), or is the time to be served, following revocation of probation which has been granted pursuant to § 948.01(4) Fla....

...efendant, guilty of the crime forming the basis of his probation, if no such adjudication has been made previously. Pronouncement and imposition of sentence then shall be made upon such defendant." Reading those rules together with the provisions of § 948.01 Fla....

...Stat., F.S.A., it is shown that except where subparagraph (4) of the latter allows probation after imposition of sentence to a county jail (after serving part thereof), a defendant is to be placed on probation only when no sentence is imposed. Under § 948.01 where defendant in a criminal case has been found guilty or has entered a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere (except for an offense punishable by death), he may be placed on probation whether he is then adjudged guilty or adjudication of...

...previously been imposed, and in such case by statute the court may "impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation." § 948.06(1) Fla. Stat., F.S.A. In the county jail probation procedure under § 948.01(4), the sentence already has been "originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation." Consistent with the provisions of the statute above referred to it has been held that a court in sentencing a defendant to imprisonment in the state penitentiary cannot add thereto a period of probation. Robinson v. State, Fla.App. 1972, 256 So.2d 390. Subparagraph (4) of § 948.01 furnishes an exception, where punishment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed....

...a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail does not authorize imposition of probation to follow a designated jail sentence, but authorizes the court to provide for probation upon completion of some designated portion of an imposed jail sentence. Section 948.01 (4) Fla....

...esentence investigatory and probation processes but is not compelled to do so. Chapter 948, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., empowers but does not require the trial court to order a presentence investigation into the character and background of an accused. Section 948.01(2) indicates that when requested by the court, "* * * it shall be the duty of the commission to make an investigation and report in writing at a specified time to the court upon the circumstances of the offense, the criminal record, the social history, and the present condition of defendant together with its recommendation." In section 948.01(3) the court in its discretion and based upon a hearing of the matter may either adjudge defendant guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt and, in either case, stay and withhold the imposition of sentence, substituting th...

...4th DCA 1989); see also State v. McFadden, 772 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla.2000)("Trial courts may withhold adjudication of guilt after a plea has been accepted or after a verdict of guilty has been rendered and place the defendant on probation provided that the requirements of section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes, are met")(emphasis added); Fla....

...re term, he was to be placed on probation for whatever the length of the remaining period. We conclude that, for two reasons, the order of probation is wholly erroneous and must be stricken. First, the term is unauthorized by the applicable statute, section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1983), [1] which provides only that the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, direct the defendant to be placed on probation ......

...3d DCA 1981); Tucker v. State, 388 So.2d 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), pet. for review denied, 392 So.2d 1380 (Fla. 1981), the judgments under review are otherwise affirmed. Affirmed as modified. NOTES [1] In its entirety, the subsection states as follows: 948.01 When court may place defendant on probation or into community control....

...Because the sentence is illegal, we vacate it and remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. Chaney pleaded nolo contendere to robbery with a firearm. On April 3, 1981, the court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to a split sentence pursuant to Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes....

...Chapter 948, Florida Statutes, which equals or exceeds one year is invalid. This rule is applicable to incarceration as a condition of probation (Section 948.03(3), Florida Statutes) and to incarceration followed by a specified period of probation (Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes)....

...Persons who are required to serve a term of incarceration as a condition of probation, or before being released on probation, however, are never eligible for parole because in the first case they are never sentenced, or, in the second, because the terms of Section 948.01(4) so dictate....

...efined as an individualized program in which the freedom of an offender is restricted within the community, home, or noninstitutional residential placement and specific sanctions are imposed and enforced. Section 948.001(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Section 948.01(4) states that the court may place an offender in a community control program, if it appears to the court that probation is an unsuitable dispositional alternative to imprisonment....

...Sub judice, the trial court ruled that community control could be imposed as a part of probation. However, RCrP 3.701(d)(13) specifically provides that community control "is a sanction which the court may impose upon a finding that probation is an unsuitable disposition." See also section *419 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...is adequate inasmuch as the trier of fact may consider and reject evidence which is contrary to that of the State's witnesses. See State v. Young, Fla. 1968, 217 So.2d 567. The State concedes and we find that the sentence is illegal. See Fla. Stat. § 948.01(4), F.S.A....

...Obviously and understandably, the trial judge had sympathy for this woman, who told him that she was being excluded from certain jobs because of her status as a convicted felon. However, her response to the petition filed herein cites no authority except Section 948.05, already discussed, and Section 948.01 which latter section delineates when a court may place a defendant on probation, but makes no mention of vacating an adjudication to remove the stigma of guilt....

...Section 922.051, F.S.A., provides as follows: "When a statute expressly directs that imprisonment be in a state prison, the court may impose a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail if the total of the prisoner's cumulative sentences is not more than one year." F.S. Section 948.01(4), F.S.A., provides: "Whenever punishment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may at the time of sentencing direct the defendant to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence....

...d by the trial judge was less than that allowed by law. Florida Statute 922.051, F.S.A., allows imposition of a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail if the total of the prisoner's cumulative sentence is not more than one year. Florida Statute 948.01(4), F.S.A., provides that when imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed and the court directs that the defendant be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence the "court shall stay and withhold the imposi...

...hich distinguishes it from the case sub judice. From the well written opinion it is made abundantly clear that the sentencing judge in that case did not withhold imposition of any portion of the sentence during the term of probation as required by F.S. 948.01(4), F.S.A., and it is clear that the appellant had served the maximum sentence allowed by law in the county jail....

...dd revocation of probation to the list of circumstances justifying forfeiture of gain-time, these amendments did not become effective until September 1, 1990 and thus are inapplicable to this case. See Ch. 89-526, §§ 6, 8, 52, Laws of Florida. [1] § 948.01(4), Fla....

...his obligation before it is used as a reason to revoke probation. To avoid incarceration and receive the benefits of probation, a defendant must convince the trial court that he or she "is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct." § 948.01(2), Fla.Stat....

...ior felony. We find it unnecessary to determine whether withholding of adjudication on a felony in another state suffices under section 775.08435 because the State in this case failed to produce evidence of the prior felony or the prior withholding. Section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that a trial court can place a defendant on probation without adjudicating the defendant guilty: If it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defendant is not likely again to en...

...(Emphasis added). However, this power is not unlimited. As described above, section 775.08435 provides that adjudication of guilt cannot be withheld on a felony charge if the defendant has received a prior withholding: (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 948.01, the court may not withhold adjudication of guilt upon the defendant for: ....

...pellate review. Notwithstanding the absence of our conflict jurisdiction, petitioner has made no such showing based on the record before us and is not entitled to relief on this point. Third, petitioner contends his probation was revoked contrary to Section 948.01(4), F.S....

...State, 533 So.2d 315, 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). In Clinger, the defendant was not adjudicated guilty and no judgment of conviction was entered because the imposition of sentence had been stayed and withheld and the defendant placed on probation under section 948.01(3) of the Florida Statutes....

...wo. She maintains that this creates an unauthorized gap between prison time and probation. Her argument is supported by Lanier v. State, 504 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), and Washington v. State, 564 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). We recognize that section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1989), requires a period of probation to "commence immediately upon release of the defendant from incarceration" whenever a "split sentence" is imposed....

...A trial court may not, as it did here, impose a sentence on a defendant, suspend execution of that sentence, and release the defendant on conditions, without formally placing him on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, the Salvation Army or some other public or private entity. § 948.01(5), Fla....

...ring a defendant back into court to impose a sentence. In Helton v. State , the trial court's order withholding imposition of sentence was illegal for the same reason as the order suspending Phillips' sentence in the present case; they both violated section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes....

...ing guidelines. This is an accurate statement of the law and applies in this case, but the state's conclusion is inaccurate and their arguments specious. *842 There is no doubt that Mills can be sentenced to two years community control in each case. Section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ns as provided in s. 948.03." Subsection 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (1995), permits out-patient treatment for sex offenders, but appellant clearly is not receiving "out-patient treatment." Subsection 948.03(7) does permit residential treatment, and section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1995), refers to probationary residential treatment under the jurisdiction of DOC or the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (now the DCFS), but neither appellant's sentence nor the order setting fort...

...probation period on the condition of one year in the county jail, was unauthorized and improper for the reasons set out in *147 Williams v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 280 So.2d 518. In Williams, it was pointed out that the authority granted by Fla. Stat. § 948.01(4), 24 F.S.A., to add a period of probation to be combined with a jail sentence was to provide for the defendant to be placed on probation "upon completion of any specified period of such sentence." Thus, for example, where a court in sente...

...llant. Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, Michael Antinori, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Reversed. By withholding adjudication upon the plea, the trial court was obligated to impose some form of probation. See § 948.01, Fla....

...The key word used in subsection (1) is "sentence." If probation or community control is revoked, a court shall "impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed." I do not think the statute equates the terms "probation" and "sentence." This conclusion is supported by section 948.01(2) which distinguishes between probation and a sentence in authorizing a court to "stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon [a] defendant and ......

...In one situation the defendant, following revocation, is placed again on probation or community control in lieu of being sentenced. See State v. Kendrick, 596 So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) [, rev. dismissed, 613 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1992)]. See also §§ 948.01(1), (3), and (4), Fla....

...U.S.C.A. §§ 5861 (d), 5861(e). The prior conviction alleged in this case was a January 7, 1980 guilty plea to a marijuana conspiracy charge for which the state court judge ordered that adjudication of guilt be withheld pursuant to Florida Statutes § 948.01(3)....

...the facts surrounding the violation so justified. We believe Hogan, is sound public policy because it gives trial judges greater flexibility when dealing with the many variables involved in violation hearings. However, in light of the constraints of section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1993), we must remand with instructions to allow Glover credit for time previously served on community control for these offenses....

...Whether a sentence is fully executed, partly executed, or, for some reason, never executed, has nothing to do with the lawfulness or legality of the sentence. A sentence may not be pronounced but may be lawfully stayed and withheld and the defendant placed on probation under section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes....

...tion or imposition of the remainder of the split sentence may be lawfully withheld and the defendant placed on probation for a period of time subject to the execution or imposition of the remainder upon breach of such probation, all as authorized by section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes; or (4) the sentence of confinement may be never fully executed because the defendant is paroled (§ 947.16(4), Fla....

...ecause it was not accompanied by written, clear and convincing reasons. (3) A split sentence. By the words "suspend 32 years," and the reference to 20 years' probation, the trial court may have intended to pronounce a split sentence as authorized by section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes, [2] and intended to have "prescribed" punishment by imprisonment for 40 years and to have directed that upon completion of a "specified" portion of such sentence (here the eight years' difference between the 40 ye...

...The majority opinion declares the provision for 20 years' probation to be unauthorized and void yet holds that the resulting 40 year sentence divided into an 8 year period to be served and a "suspended" 32 year period to be "a true split sentence." A casual reading of the only statute (§ 948.01(8) Fla....

...ve intended to merely "suspend" execution of the last 32 years. Apparently that is what the majority opinion approves. If so, this so-called "suspended sentence," sometimes called a "withheld" sentence or an "inactive" sentence, contravenes sections 948.01(3) and (9), Florida Statutes, and is an "illegal" sentence....

...NOTES [1] Appellant was convicted of robbery of a firearm and four burglaries. The judge gave him twenty years probation on the robbery and concurrent five years probation on each of the burglaries. [1] See, e.g., Griner v. State, 523 So.2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) and cases cited therein. [2] 948.01 When court may place defendant on probation or into community control....

...to weigh conflicting testimony. We cannot find that the court erred in believing the officer. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. Next, appellant contends that the court erred in placing him on drug offender probation. Under section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (1993), a defendant who is a chronic substance abuser and whose criminal conduct is a violation of chapter 893 may be placed on drug offender probation....

...Thereafter, approximately ten days after he was sentenced, appellant filed a petition for reconsideration of the sentence. At this hearing appellant, through his attorney, contended that the probation portion of the said sentence was in violation of Florida Statutes, Section 948.01(4), effective July 1, 1974, Laws of Florida, Chapter 74-112, p....

...The sole issue for our consideration is whether the sentence placing appellant on probation after completion of a prison term without staying any portion of the prison term is illegal and void. We think it is. Appellant contends, and we agree, that his position is supported by Florida Statutes, Section 948.01(4), supra: Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may at the time of sentencing direct the defendant to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence....

...GRIMES, J., concurs. McNULTY, C.J., concurs specially with opinion. McNULTY, Chief Judge (concurring specially). I can agree with the conclusion of the majority and with their observation that under the facts herein, and under the provisions of the aforesaid § 948.01(4), F.S....

...Further, the court reserved jurisdiction as to the issue of costs of prosecution and without objection by Welborn, entered judgment for statutory costs in the amount of $255. On appeal, Welborn contends that the conditions of drug offender probation imposed were not orally pronounced and should be stricken, and that section 948.01(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), establishing drug offender probation, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency....

...appellant failed to preserve this issue. Although given notice and an opportunity to be heard, Welborn did not object. Accordingly, he may not raise this issue on appeal. See Norman v. State, 676 So.2d 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Welborn also claims that section 948.01(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), establishing drug offender probation is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency....

...onsideration for parole. The 30 year sentence is the maximum for involuntary sexual battery, a felony of the first degree, [§ 794.011(4) and 775.082, Fla. Stat. 1975]. The split sentence imposed (part imprisonment and part probation) is pursuant to § 948.01(4), Fla....

...The recommended guidelines sentence provided for community control or 12 to 30 months incarceration. However, section 790.221(2) prescribes a five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for possession of a short-barreled shotgun. At sentencing, McKendry's counsel maintained that section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1989), concerning the trial court's discretion to suspend a sentence, authorized a sentence less than the mandatory minimum. The trial court, agreeing that McKendry's record and the facts of the case did not justify five years of imprisonment, and acting under section 948.01(3), sentenced McKendry to five years, but suspended the sentence with credit for time served, and ordered that McKendry be placed on community control for one year followed by three years probation....

...If the recommended sentence is less than the mandatory penalty, the mandatory sentence takes precedence. If the guideline sentence exceeds the mandatory sentence, the guideline sentence should be imposed. (Emphasis supplied). In contrast with these sentencing provisions, section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1989), states: If it appears to the court ......

...ourt, in its discretion, may either adjudge the defendant to be guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt; and, in either case, it shall stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon such defendant and shall place him upon probation. Section 948.01(3), in some form or other, has been on the books since 1941....

...s (1981). Section 775.087(2)(a) provided that any person convicted of certain specified offenses while having a firearm in his possession shall be sentenced to a three year minimum term of incarceration and further: Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall the defendant be eligible for parole or statutory gain-time under s....

...section 775.087(2)(a) which have mandatory minimum sentences and have explicit preclusive language barring any suspension of sentence. This preclusive language is lacking in section 790.221(2). In addition, section 775.087(2)(a) expressly refers to section 948.01 in barring any suspension of the mandatory sentence. There is no similar reference to section 948.01 in section 790.221(2)....

...Of course, McKendry now also has the Scates decision on his side of the issue. However, unlike the statutes involved in Scates, the statutes here lack any specific relationship: section 790.221(2) is concerned specifically with the possession of a short-barreled rifle, shotgun or machine gun, while section 948.01 is concerned generally with leniency for deserving defendants in all cases. Unlike section 397.12, which specifically refers to chapter 893, there is no reference in section 948.01 to specific offenses or circumstances meriting special treatment. Section 948.01 was first enacted in 1941, well before the minimum mandatory provisions of section 790.221, and well before the sentencing guidelines were adopted as the general sentencing policy in Florida. The purpose of section 948.01 is to avoid giving a criminal record to those persons whose prospects appear good for rehabilitation....

...This section was enacted at a time when trial courts still had virtually unlimited discretion in sentencing, and most sentencing decisions were immune from appellate review or collateral attack. There is clearly a tension, if not a conflict between section 948.01 and the sentencing guidelines, as well as the provisions for minimum mandatory sentences contained in various other statutes. The discretionary application of section 948.01, in all cases, without consideration of the guidelines, would negate the complex and comprehensive provisions of the sentencing guidelines and their underlying policy to standardize sentencing throughout the state. For instance, if section 948.01 is considered in isolation, it would immediately negate the statutory and rule requirements that written reasons be provided for any deviation from the guidelines. We conclude that the only way that section 948.01 can be reconciled with the sentencing guidelines is to limit its application to those situations where the guidelines themselves permit a suspended sentence. In our view, the application of section 948.01 has now been limited by the adoption of the sentencing guidelines. The guidelines in turn, specifically provide in Rule 3.701(d)(9) for the enforcement of minimum *1161 mandatory sentences. Section 948.01 may now be invoked only when the sentencing guidelines provide for a range of sentencing that includes probation or where appropriate reasons exist to deviate from the guidelines....

...ther it makes good sense. Because of the conflicting provisions of the statutes and the substantial effect thereof on a large number of persons across the state, we certify the following as a question of great public importance: DO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 948.01, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), AUTHORIZE THE IMPOSITION OF A SENTENCE OTHER THAN AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 790.221(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith....

...1993), which involved the identical issue presented here. We certify, however, the following question to the supreme court as of great public importance: DOES THE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 790.221 PRECLUDE THE IMPOSITION OF COMMUNITY CONTROL UNDER SECTION 948.01, WHERE THE GUIDELINES SCORESHEET PERMITS ANY NON-STATE PRISON SANCTION? REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING....

...gree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Upon conviction thereof he shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 5 years. [e.s.] At sentencing, the trial judge accepted the defendant's argument that section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1991), allowed the judge to forego any incarceration by, instead, withholding adjudication and imposing a period of community control....

...imum" seems to prescribe the shortest duration of imprisonment that the sentencing judge can specify. Like Humpty Dumpty, however, it seems that when the legislature uses a word, it means only what it chooses it to mean — neither more nor less. [1] Section 948.01(2), broadly speaking, empowers trial judges to withhold adjudications of guilt and impose probation or community control in any case in which the court finds that the defendant is unlikely to engage in criminal conduct in the future, and where the ends of justice and the interests of society do not require imprisonment. Section 948.01 does not, in express terms, refer to or even mention minimum or mandatory minimum sentences, except for subsection (13) which deals only with violators of chapter 893 (controlled substances). [2] Unless there is something in the *1156 individual sentencing statutes to the contrary, section 948.01 is an open-ended invitation to the sentencing judges to impose an alternative to confinement in a prison....

...Section 775.087(2)(a) (concerning crimes committed with a firearm), on the other hand, provides for "minimum" terms of imprisonment for 3 and 8 years (depending on the nature of the violation), but omits the word "mandatory" and then says: Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall the defendant be eligible for parole or statutory gain-time under s....

...Section 775.0823 (involving crimes of violence against police and law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges) provides for a "mandatory minimum sentence without possibility of early release " [e.s.] and goes on to add the following sentence: Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 948.01, with respect to any person who is found to have violated this section, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld....

...The idea of compulsory imprisonment thus has varied expression in the statutes. We find "mandatory minimum" penalties; we find "minimum" penalties, by which the legislature appears to have also intended "mandatory minimum"; and we find those two formulations with the added text to the effect that, in spite of section 948.01, the sentencing judge cannot withhold adjudication or imposition of sentence....

...We have already seen above that there is no difference in meaning between a "minimum" sentence and a "mandatory minimum"; hence I can safely treat the first two categories as one. In the first two, the literal way to read the language employed is to conclude that section 948.01 provides no basis to avoid the "minimum" or the "mandatory minimum"....

...For if "mandatory" truly means "absolutely required", and if "minimum" truly means "not less than", then incarceration is the only disposition that may be imposed, and the term of years expressed is the shortest duration to be set down in the sentencing order. Another equally plausible reading, however, is that section 948.01 can be used by the trial judge to avoid the "minimum" or "mandatory minimum" imprisonment. This construction follows from the legislature's use of the additional text in, e.g., sections 775.0823 and 775.087(2)(a), specifying that notwithstanding section 948.01 the court may not withhold adjudication or imposition of sentence and confer probation or community control in place of the specified period of imprisonment....

...It did not say so in section 790.221(2), and thus I conclude that Judge Moe had the power to do precisely what he did here. Unfortunately, we as a court have just decided this issue under identical facts in State v. McKendry, 614 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), in which we held that section 948.01 has been limited in its effect on section 790.221(2) by reason of the adoption of the sentencing guidelines....

...Frankly, I disagree with our decision in McKendry. Even if the mandatory minimum sentence of section 790.221(2) takes precedence over the guidelines, I do not see how that leads to the conclusion that a mandatory minimum sentence takes precedence over section 948.01. Where the legislature has forborne from adding a provision to statute with the mandatory minimum sentence that its provisions take precedence even over section 948.01, that suggests to me that section 948.01 controls....

...andatory sentence is primary simply because the guidelines control over probation. That seems to me a conclusion in search of a premise. As I have demonstrated in the earlier part of this opinion, whether the mandatory minimum sentence controls over section 948.01 all depends on the precise text of the mandatory minimum sentence provision. If it contains the disclaimer of section 948.01, then it can indeed take precedence over section 948.01....

...NOTES [1] Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, ch. 6 (1872). [2] We now know that the mandatory minimum sentences of chapter 893 are not entirely unavoidable, on account of the grant of authority in section 397.12, Florida Statutes (1989), rather than section 948.01. Scates v. State, 603 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1992). There is no discussion about section 948.01 in the supreme court's opinion in Scates or, for that matter, in our own opinion. State v. Scates, 585 So.2d 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), quashed, 603 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1992). Subsection (13) was added to section 948.01 after the commission of the crime in Scates and was therefore not applicable to the conviction in that case....

...m in Count V, the five year probation period in no way affects the five year prison term and should, therefore, be affirmed. Although a trial judge is authorized to sentence a defendant to a period of incarceration followed by a period of probation, section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1987), the combined periods of incarceration and probation at the time of the original sentence cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by statute for the offense charged....

...On the other hand, the Fourth District, in Richardson v. State, 884 So.2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), rehearing granted 884 So.2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), held that a sentence and probation are distinct concepts. Richardson, 884 So.2d 950, 951. Specifically, the Court referred to section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that when a defendant is placed on probation the court is required to stay and withhold the imposition of the sentence....

...Because the state failed to do so in this case, we must remand for resentencing. We also address the sentencing in count II. Count II was trespass of an occupied structure, a misdemeanor. Community control may be imposed only for a felony offense. § 948.01(4), (8), Fla....

administered by officers with restricted caseloads." § 948.001(4), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). A court

alternative non-incarcerative forms of penance. See § 948.001(9), Fla. Stat. (2016) (" 'Probation' means a form

...1973, 286 So.2d 244; Mylks v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 285 So.2d 434, and other cases, we reverse. The sentence imposing six months in the county jail, absent the suspension of any portion thereof, to be followed by two years on probation, was clearly in violation of Fla. Stat. § 948.01(4), F.S.A. [1] The state in this case, however, argues that our previous construction of Section 948.01(4) in Williams and particularly in Hutchins is inconsistent with Section 948.06(1) [2] which provides that upon a violation of probation the court may "impose any sentence which it might have originally *745 imposed before placing the...

...e penalty for a violation of probation would call for return of the defendant to the county jail for the unserved balance of the jail sentence, or such part thereof as the court should determine." (286 So.2d pp. 246-47). The state contends that when Section 948.01(4) is read in pari materia with Section 948.01(6), the conclusion must be reached that upon violation of his probation, the court may sentence a defendant to the full extent that the law provides for the offense for which the defendant was originally convicted....

...y where the trial court might otherwise feel that probation alone may be too lenient, but that a term in county jail followed by probation, which if violated could bring an even more stringent sentence, would be proper. Second, the interpretation of Section 948.01(4) advanced by the state would permit the trial court to give a defendant a "taste of jail" (up to a maximum one-year in county jail) prior to placing him on probation and would therefore decrease the likelihood that the defendant would violate the terms of his probation. The state argues that Section 948.01(4) has lost its reason to exist if the defendant realizes that after tasting jail time he can only be re-sentenced up to the amount of time which the trial court originally withheld from his designated sentence and cannot be sentenced to a more severe term of imprisonment. However, in our view the state's contention fails to reconcile the provisions of Section 948.01(4) with Fla....

...county jail followed by probation. Moreover, on the facts of the instant case we think it is clear that since the trial judge did not suspend any part of the designated six-month term in county jail which he imposed, the sentence to probation under Section 948.01(4) was void ab initio, and the court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation and impose a new jail sentence....

...Therefore, for the reason stated and upon the authorities cited and discussed, the denial of appellant's motion to vacate is hereby reversed, and the appellant is discharged as to the sentence which followed his revocation of probation. Reversed. NOTES [1] Section 948.01(4) provides as follows: "(4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may at the time of sentencing direct the defendant to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence....

...istrative probation. The Department of Corrections, not the trial court, is charged with transferring a defendant to "administrative probation” and administrative probation is not available for those convicted of a violation of section 800.04. See § 948.013(2), Fla....

...(2010). . The language of the relevant provisions of chapter 948 addressed in this opinion were identical at the time of the commission of the defendant’s crimes in late 1998/early 1999. See §§ 948.001(1), (5), (10), Fla. Stat. (1997 & 1999); 948.01(15), Fla....

...nor the current statutes on substance abuse services permit the trial court to avoid the 3-year term of imprisonment required by section 893.13(1)(c)(1). See also State v. Bazil, 703 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). [2] Finally, Mr. Crews argues that section 948.01, Florida Statutes (2002), authorized the trial court to withhold the imposition of the minimum sentence called for by section 893.13(1)(c)(1) and to impose probation. Section 948.01 provides: (1) Any court of the state having original jurisdiction of criminal actions may at a time to be determined by the court, either with or without an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant, hear and determine the question of...

...riminal course of *1142 conduct and ... the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law" and (2) there is no statutory provision specifically prohibiting the application of section 948.01. Such a broad interpretation would be supported by the fact that various other statutes requiring particular sentences for particular crimes specifically provide that the provisions of section 948.01 will not apply to those sentences. [3] We conclude, however, that the supreme court's opinion in McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45 (Fla.1994), prohibits such an interpretation. In McKendry, the supreme court addressed the interplay of section 948.01 and section 790.221(2), Florida Statutes (1989), which provided that a person convicted of possessing a short-barreled shotgun "shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 5 years." In determining that section 790.221(2)'s minimum mandatory term prevailed and could not be suspended in lieu of probation pursuant to section 948.01, the supreme court noted "accepted rules of statutory construction" that "a specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms" and "when two st...

..." Id. at 46-47. [4] The court noted, "To arrive at any other conclusion would render the specific mandatory language of section 790.221(2) without meaning." Id. at 46. Since the supreme court decided McKendry in 1994, the legislature has not amended section 948.01....

...State, 91 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla.1956) (noting that legislature's failure to amend a statute construed in an earlier case suggests legislative acceptance or approval of the construction rendered in the earlier opinion). Further, we note that since McKendry, cases involving the sentencing guidelines have not applied section 948.01 to permit probation in lieu of the lowest permissible sentence allowed by the guidelines, even though there is nothing in the sentencing guidelines explicitly stating that section *1143 948.01 does not apply....

...Scott, 879 So.2d 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also State v. VanBebber, 848 So.2d 1046 (Fla.2003); State v. Brannum, 876 So.2d 724 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). In this case, section 893.13(1)(c)(1)'s provision requiring a 3-year term of imprisonment was enacted after section 948.01 was amended to authorize a court to withhold sentence and impose probation in certain cases. See ch. 85-288, § 14 at 1813, Laws of Fla. (amending § 948.01, effective July 1, 1985); ch....

...section 397.705 no longer contains the phrase "instead of." See ch. 97-194, § 38, at 3726-27, Laws of Fla. [3] See, e.g., § 893.135(3), Fla. Stat. (2003) (involving offenses for drug trafficking and providing, "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of s. 948.01, with respect to any person who is found to have violated this section, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld"); § 316.1935, Fla. Stat. (2003) (involving fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer; providing, "[n]otwithstanding s. 948.01, no court may suspend, defer, or withhold adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence for any violation of this section."); § 784.08(1), (3), Fla. Stat. (2003) (requiring that person convicted of aggravated assault or aggravated battery on elderly person "shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years" and "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of s. 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld"); see also § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...erm of imprisonment of 3 years"). [4] But see State v. Robertson, 614 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (Farmer, J., specially concurring) (concluding that when a statute calls for "minimum" or "mandatory minimum" sentence and does not explicitly state section 948.01 will not apply, tenets of statutory interpretation — including the presumption that the legislature passes statutes with knowledge of other existing statutes and that the use of different terms in different statutes on the same subjec...

...codified at section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (1991), requires judges choose the construction that favors the defendant). [5] We note that the 18-month drug offender probation sentence Crews received for possession of cocaine was permissible. See § 948.01(13), Fla....

...(2004), permitting trial court to "stay and withhold the imposition of sentence" of a chronic substance abuser who violates section 893.13(6)(a) "and place the defendant on drug offender probation"); Jones v. State, 813 So.2d 22 (Fla.2002) (holding section 948.01(13) permits court to impose a sentence of drug offender probation for possession of cocaine irrespective of the guidelines).

...ed to ten years, with five years suspended. These are true split sentences. See Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Crews v. State, 779 So.2d 492, 493-94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); see also § 948.01(6), Fla. Stat. (1991) (subsequently renumbered as § 948.012(1), see ch....

...o presents a low risk of harm to the community may, upon satisfactory completion of half the term, of probation, be transferred by the Department of Corrections to nonreporting status until expiration of the term of supervision.” (emphasis added). Section 948.013(1), Florida Statutes (2011), further provides, in pertinent part: “The Department of Corrections may establish procedures for transferring an offender to administrative probation.” (emphasis added)....

...t the offender satisfactorily complete half the term of probation before being considered for administrative probation; and (2) the Department of Corrections’ procedures for transferring an offender to administrative probation as established under section 948.013(1)....

...of a dwelling. We reverse and remand for resentencing the sentences imposed for the offenses of battery and trespass because the trial court originally improperly sentenced the appellant to community control on those misdemeanor charges. Pursuant to section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, community control may be imposed only for felony offenses....

...We further conclude that even if the claimed sentencing errors had been reviewable, Senger’s arguments are merit-less. First, the decision by a trial court to impose or withhold an adjudication of guilt is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Sanchez v. State, 541 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla.1989) (quoting § 948.01(3), Fla....

...3d DCA 1985). In McGraw, the defendant was found guilty, following a trial, of felony witness tampering. The court withheld adjudication and placed defendant on three years of non-reporting probation. The State appealed this as an illegal sentence, contending section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1983), mandates reporting probation upon conviction of a felony.6 McGraw argued that, because probation is not a “sentence,” the State did not have the right to appeal under section 924.07. We held to the contrary: 6 “Conviction” in this context includes a withhold of adjudication following a finding of guilt. At that time, section 948.01(3) provided in pertinent part: If it appears to the court....

...not considered a “sentence”). The trial court ordered community control and probation in lieu of sentencing as a matter of its discretion and grace in accordance with what “the ends of justice and the welfare of society” appeared to require. § 948.01(2), Fla. Stat....

specific sanctions are imposed and enforced.” Id. § 948.001(3) (emphasis added). Numerous other sources similarly

...nce. REVERSED and REMANDED. ORFINGER, C.J. and EVANDER, J., concur. . Henderson finally contends that the court has the discretion to place a defendant on community control or probation because the DUI statute allows for alternative sentencing under section 948.01 Florida Statutes. She points out that other statutes specifically prevent the trial court from using section 948.01 to reduce a sentence to probation or community control, but the DUI statute does not. She is correct that the DUI statute does not appear to prohibit alternative sentencing under section 948.01, Florida Statutes....

...period *593 earlier than August 4, 2010. Clearly, this type of sentence does not have the same effect as the probationary split sentences discussed in Poore. We are therefore uncertain whether such a sentence as that imposed at bar is authorized by section 948.01(8)....

...ain time at any time before he served the entire term, he was to be placed on probation for whatever the length of the remaining period." Easton, 472 So.2d at 1369. That court found the probation order to be erroneous, because it was unauthorized by Section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1983), and because it improperly interfered with the application of gain-time....

...ute. [8] We note that first degree felonies are punishable under Section 775.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), by "imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." (Emphasis added.) The imposition of a probationary sentence under Section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1983), does not, however, require the "period of probation" to be stated in a term of years.

...The sole issue is whether this is a departure sentence. Judge Cobb has done a good job in attempting to make sense out of this ambiguous hybrid sentence and in trying to twist it into something resembling a lawful split sentence as authorized and described in section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes....

...[1] The *419 underlying problem is that a split sentence is not any combination of confinement and probation as is implied by the parenthetical description of the split sentence contained in Rule 3.701(d)(12) and the state sponsored sentence form now in use. Instead, a split sentence is the particular sentence authorized by section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes, which provides for the splitting of one term of confinement into two parts or portions and separating the two portions by a period of probation (or community control); the defendant is required to serve the first...

...ent immediately but the execution or service or "imposition" of the second portion of the one sentence is stayed and withheld subject to successful completion of a period of probation (or community control). In the "true" split sentence described in section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes, the term of probation may be shorter or longer than the withheld second portion of the confinement, although it is often for the same period of time. This confuses some into the belief that the probation period is the same thing as the withheld portion of the confinement sentence. It definitely is not. The sentence in this case is not a true split sentence as provided in section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes, but is a "redundant, confusing, and erroneous" sentence more properly termed a "hybrid" or "combination" sentence....

...(execution) of the "remainder" of the sentence (being three years) withheld (or "suspended") subject to the successful completion of the three year probationary period. The very purpose and essence of the concept of a split sentence, as contained in section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes, is that the total period of confinement is pronounced (imposed) at one time so that there will be no double jeopardy problem in reconfining the defendant for the second portion of the one sentence in the event he violates his probation....

...The total sanction (incarceration and probation) shall not exceed the term provided by general law. [2] Literally construed, the trial court's written sentence herein provided for a total of six years' probation (3 + 3), which clearly was not intended. [1] 948.01 When court may place defendant on probation or into community control....

entitled “Probation and Community Control.” Section 948.001(8), Florida Statutes (2015), defines probation

...his obligation before it is used as a reason to revoke probation. To avoid incarceration and receive the benefits of probation, a defendant must convince the trial court that he or she "is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct." § 948.01(2), Fla....

...The state appealed and this court held: The result in this case is controlled by statute. Section 921.187(1)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2006), provides that the court may "[p]lace the offender on probation with or without an adjudication of guilt pursuant to s. 948.01" if a prison sentence is not imposed. Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (2006), provides that "the court ......

...Section 775.14 dealt with a statutory limitation on the ability of the state to sentence a defendant for a conviction of the same crime for which sentence had been earlier withheld and not altered for five years. However, in Gazda, adjudication was not withheld pursuant to section 948.01, Florida Statutes, as it was in Jenkins’ case, but was simply postponed while the defendant was sent for medical treatment.4 Later, in Grinkiewicz, the Eleventh Circuit relied on its prior decision in Orellanes to reach the same conclusion that “conviction” 4....

...However, when a defendant, such as Jenkins in this case, has his or her adjudication withheld, it is because the trial court has found that the defendant is not likely to engage in further criminal conduct and that justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant suffer the penalty imposed by law. See § 948.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 948.01, titled “When court may place defendant on probation or into community control,” states in pertinent part in subsection (2): (2) If it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defendant is not...

...guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt; and, in either case, it shall stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon such defendant and shall place the defendant upon probation. - 16 - § 948.01(2), Fla....

...without an actual adjudication of guilt, is rehabilitation of one who has committed the crime charged without formally and judicially branding the individual as a convicted criminal and without the loss of civil rights 6. Similar language occurs in the current version of the statute. See § 948.01(2), Fla....

...adjudication of guilt as authorized by statute and ‘stay[s] and withhold[s] the imposition of sentence,’ the court has found that ‘the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct.’ ” McFadden, 772 So. 2d at 1216 (quoting § 948.01(2), Fla....

...Because section 790.23(1) is intended to keep firearms out of the hands of persons who are dangerous or who might reoffend, that purpose is not served where the trial court has explicitly determined that the defendant is not a danger and is not likely to reoffend—thus withholding adjudication under section 948.01 as was done in this case....

"intensive, supervised custody." See § 948.001(2), Fla. Stat. (1998) (defining "community

...natives, prohibiting lengthy terms of incarceration as a condition of probation appears to be eminently sensible. However, the rationale for such prohibition would not appear to apply to legitimate split sentences. First, the legislature by enacting Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979) appears to have specifically authorized split sentences....

...The latter alternative may well be imposed more out of considerations of public protection than for the specific rehabilitation of the defendant, although both purposes may be served. In any case it is difficult to understand, given the specific legislative endorsement contained in Section 948.01(4), why split sentences have been placed in the same category with imprisonment as a condition of probation....

...originally imposed without giving the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his negotiated plea? Having done so, we affirm the orders of the trial courts in all three of the consolidated cases before us. DOWNEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.01(4) provides: (4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, direct the defendant to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence....

...We review a trial court's determination of its subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Mobley, 197 So. 3d at 574 (citing Sanchez v. Fernandez, 915 So. 2d 192, 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). A trial court retains jurisdiction over a defendant's probationary sentence. See § 948.01(1) ("Any state court having original jurisdiction of criminal actions may ....

...The state relies on the language of section 784.08 to argue that the court erred in withholding adjudication. Section 784.08(2)(c) elevates a misdemeanor battery on a victim 65 years of age or older to a third degree felony. Section 784.08(3) provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld. Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (2005), is the statute that generally sets forth the *232 sentencing options of probation and community control....

...provision in section 784.08(3) concerning adjudication of guilt is one such penalty authorized by law. Had the legislature desired to require adjudication of youthful offenders, section 784.08(3) would have begun: "Notwithstanding the provisions of ss. 948.01 and 958.04....

release of the defendant from incarceration.” § 948.-01(8), Fla.Stat. (1987); Horner v. State, 597 So

SALCINES, Judge. In this appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced Alethia Jones to two years’ drug offender probation pursuant to section 948.01(13), Florida *41 Statutes (Supp.1998), without giving written reasons for the downward departure sentence....

...It is undisputed that under the sentencing guidelines her score required a sentence of imprisonment. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which a psychiatrist testified that Jones was a chronic substance abuser. The trial court concluded that it had the discretion under section 948.01(13) to order drug offender probation in lieu of imprisonment under the sentencing guidelines....

...dant has been convicted of certain enumerated offenses involving controlled substances which are third degree felonies. See § 893.13(l)(a)2., (2)(a)2., (5)(b), and (6)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The statute which is applicable in the present case, section 948.01(13), does not contain such a provision. Further, in Disbrow v. State, 642 So.2d 740, 741 (Fla.1994), the supreme court, in dicta, discussed the fact that sentencing under section 948.01 falls within the sentencing guidelines. The Williams opinion specifically held that the drug treatment options pursuant to section 948.01(13), technically were not departure sentences....

...However, we disagree with the holding in Williams and note that in the more recent opinion of State v. Moss, 758 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), the Fourth District made no reference to the Williams ease, but stated: We affirm appellee’s downward sentence pursuant to section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...nded, followed by a period of probation, is a legitimate sentencing option in Florida. See Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988), superseded by statute on other grounds recognized in Crews v. State, 779 So.2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); see also § 948.01, Fla....

...V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. The Florida Bar’s Criminal Procedure Rules Committee (Committee) has filed a fast-track report proposing amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.790 in response to the enactment of recent legislation amending section 948.01, Florida Statutes (2021) (When court may place defendant on probation or into community control). See ch. 2022-166, § 1, Laws of Fla. The proposal was unanimously approved by the Committee and The Florida Bar Board of Governors. The Legislature recently amended section 948.01(1)(a) to authorize the Department of Corrections to supervise misdemeanor offenders when the offender is placed on probation by a circuit court and the court orders the Department to supervise the offender. Id. And section 948.01(5) was amended to remove the prohibition on private entities providing supervision for misdemeanor offenders....

I is a true split sentence as described in section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes. Not only does the 15

...However, counsel failed to inform the trial court of a similar provision enacted in 1982, as section 322.281(1), Florida Statutes *547 (1982) (effective July 1, 1982, ch. 82-155, Laws of Florida). That section provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of section 948.01, no court shall suspend, defer, or withhold adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence for any violation of section 316.193 or section 316.1931....

...Based upon a similar factual situation, 2 the Jones decision *852 professed to “clarify and establish” that area of the law dealing with probation, 3 in general, and, specifically, with “split sentences” pronounced prior to the July 1, 1974, amendment of Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes. 4 In arguing to this court that the probation portion of his split sentence was a nullity in that it was entered pursuant to a felony conviction prior to the effective date of Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1974), Wilcox recites the following paragraph from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jones: “We hold that prior to July 1, 1974, the provisions of Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973), granted specific authority to the trial judge to prescribe a period in the county jail followed by probation for those offenses punishable only by imprisonment in the county jail (misdemeanor offenses). It is our opinion that the term ‘whenever punishment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed’ is descriptive of the offenses to which the subparagraph was applicable. The new amendment to Section 948.01(4), effective July 1, 1974, expands the trial judge’s specific statutory authority to include felonies as well as misdemeanors in the use of the split sentence probation alternative.” Standing alone, the above quoted paragraph appe...

...Williams appealed and the Fourth District, citing the same above quoted paragraph from Jones , vacated the sentence and remanded for resen-tencing stating: “The problem in this case is that the offense with which appellant was charged took place before the effective date of the amendment to § 948.01, F.S., so that the trial judge did not have the authority to utilize the split sentence procedure in sentencing appellant to the Division of Corrections.” The apparently insurmountable obstacle that precludes us from reversing the instant cause is the actual disposition of the Jones decision....

...imposed concurrent one year jail sentences. The Third District certified the issue to be one of great public interest to the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. . Chapter 948, Fla.Stat. (1973). . Sec. 948.01(4), Fla.Stat....

...In such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence imposed upon the defendant, and direct that the defendant be placed upon probation after serving such period as may be imposed by the court.” However, in an act that took effect July 1, 1974, the legislature amended Sec. 948.01(4) to read, in pertinent part, as follows: “(4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed ....

...t have committed a violation of the terms and conditions of his probation. It has been firmly established by the Legislature and the courts for quite some time that the period of probation commences when the defendant is released from incarceration. § 948.01(6), Fla....

...rt. [2] Specifically, the trial court observed at the conclusion of the violation of probation hearing that the defendant "has apparently a financial inability to comply with these terms of his probation...." [3] This provision is currently found at section 948.012(1), Florida Statutes (2008)....

prison to be followed by a period of probation. Section 948.01 F.S.;1 RCrP 3.790. In the case sub judice,

...State, 367 So.2d 264 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); State v. Williams, 237 So.2d 69 (Fla.2d DCA 1970); The trial court denied the motion and Wilcher has filed a timely appeal pursuant to Rule 9.140(g), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. The state contends, and we agree, that section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979), specifically authorizes the sentence imposed in this case....

...While this argument may have previously had merit under Robinson v. State, 256 So.2d 390 (Fla.3d DCA 1973) and its progeny, it is now clear that a trial court may in its discretion sentence a defendant to a period of incarceration followed by a period of probation. See Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1977); State v....

...“is not a ‘sentence.’” State v. Summers, 642 So. 2d 742, 744 (Fla. 1994) (citing Villery v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 396 So. 2d 1107)); see also Landeverde v. State, 769 So. 2d 457, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Furthermore, under the terms of section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (2014), the trial court, “in its discretion, may either adjudge the defendant to be guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of 3 guilt. In either case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon the defendant and shall place a felony defendant upon probation.” The trial court also has the option provided in Section 948.012, Florida Statutes (2014), to impose a split sentence of probation or community control and imprisonment. As authorized by the legislature in section 948.012: (2) The court may also impose a split sentence whereby the defendant is sentenced to a term of probation which may be followed by a period of incarceration ....

...We read the language of the foregoing statutes as granting the trial court broad discretion in fashioning a term of probation when “the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law.” § 948.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). Section 948.012(2)(a) authorizes the trial court to modify any term of incarceration “to eliminate” it altogether should “the offender meet[] the terms and conditions of probation ....

....” Logically, if the serving of a suspended sentence hinges on whether or not the defendant first successfully serves his or her term of probation, it is merely inchoate. That is to say, under those 4 circumstances, no sentence has yet to be imposed. Of course, under section 948.012(2)(a), the trial court still retains the discretion to impose sentence....

...We hold, therefore, that the trial court erred in believing it had no choice but to adjudicate Appellant guilty because it had imposed a conditional suspended sentence. Certainly, the trial court had the discretion to adjudicate Appellant guilty, as section 948.01(2) permits, but it was not required to do so under the particular circumstances of this case....

...nce if it determines “that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law.” Id. § 948.01(2)....

...nce if it determines “that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law.” Id. § 948.01(2)....

PER CURIAM. Fisher appeals, contending the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because it is in violation of section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1983), under the rationale of Easton v....

organization agreeing to supervise him or her. Section 948.01(1), F.S., as amended by s. 7, Ch. 90-337, Laws

between true split sentences imposed pursuant to § 948.01(4), Fla.Stat. and incarceration as a condition

...sions of section 775.08435. Section 948.20(1) is the last expression of legislative intent because it was amended after section 775.08435. And the rule of lenity supports his argument. We agree with the defendant. Our supreme court has held that section 948.01(13) 3 is an alternative sentencing scheme independent of the sentencing guidelines....

...2002). Although the enactment of [the sentencing guidelines] may indicate that the Legislature intended to limit the ability of trial courts to impose a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines solely on the basis of drug addiction, there is no question that section 948.01(13), as well as the 3 Section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...criminal conduct is a violation of chapter 893, the court may either adjudge the defendant guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt; and, in either case, it may stay and withhold the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on drug offender probation.” Section 948.01(13) was renumbered as section 948.20 in 2004 and became effective on July 1, 2004....

...2004-373, § 10, Laws of Fla. 3  other specific statutes dealing with treatment for substance abusers, indicate a strong policy in favor of treatment over incarceration for certain nonviolent drug-related crimes. Indeed, in enacting section 948.01(13) and the sanction of drug offender probation, the Legislature’s stated purpose was “to provide alternative punishments to fill the void between probation and prison, and to divert offenders from the state prison system.” Id. at 25–26 (footnote omitted) (quoting Fla. H.R. Comm. on Corrections, HB 2373 (1991) Staff Analysis (May 2, 1991)). Our supreme court also noted that section 948.01(13) applied only to nonviolent drug crimes whereas the sentencing guidelines applied broadly to all felonies. Id. at 25. Because a specific statute controls over a general statute, the specific language of section 948.01(13) controlled over the more general sentencing guidelines....

...y control. Section 947.23 (6)(c), F.S. 1983. Chapter 83-131, Laws of Florida, also amended Ch. 948 , F.S., to provide the courts with the authority to place a person into a community control program instead of ordering imprisonment or incarceration. Section 948.01 (4), F.S., as amended by s 13, Ch....

...limited to, rehabilitative restitution in money or in kind, curfew, revocation or suspension of the driver's license, community service, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, or other appropriate restraints on the offender's liberty. Section 948.01 (4)(a), F.S., as amended by s 13, Ch....

...ice. After the court determines the appropriate sanctions, it shall develop and order a community control plan which will contain the rules, requirements, conditions and programs designed to encourage noncriminal behavior and promote rehabilitation. Section 948.01 (4)(b), F.S., as amended by s 13, Ch....

...On completion of the sanctions imposed in the community control plan before expiration of the term ordered by the court, the Department of Corrections may petition to discharge the offender from community control or to return the offender to a program of regular probation supervision. Section 948.01 (7), F.S., as amended by s 13, Ch....

...m any of the conditions from the original parole order which are compatible with Ch. 948 , F.S., as amended. Since community control is intended to be more restrictive, it could reasonably include special conditions imposed in normal parole. See , s 948.01 (4)(a), as amended, which provides that a court, and thus the commission, may order "other appropriate restraints on the offender's liberty"; s 948.03 , F.S....

...that could be relaxed later. The courts appear to have that authority in implementing community control; s 948.03 (4), as amended by Ch. 83-131, specifically gives the courts the authority to modify or rescind community control orders; see also , ss 948.01 (7), 948.05 , 948.06 ; and s 947.23 (6)(c), F.S....

...The commission does not have to formally revoke the original release order because it is forfeited or suspended, subject to reinstatement, on the finding a parole violation took place. However, it appears that the commission could adopt conditions from the original parole order compatible with ss 948.01 (4), 948.03 and 948.06 , F.S., as amended, in its new order placing the parolee into a community control program....

...le, the original release order is forfeited or suspended and unless reinstated, superseded and replaced by a subsequent order placing the parolee into a community control program. However, the commission may incorporate conditions compatible with ss 948.01 (4), 948.03 and 948.06 , F.S....

...eration will follow the period of probation supervision. Not less than thirty (30) days before the term of probation expires, you will need to set a hearing with the Court to demonstrate that you have met the terms and conditions of your probation. (Section 948.01(13) Florida Statutes)....

...This conditional imposition of incarceration is a departure from the mandatory concept of guideline sentencing and written reasons are required. It is possible that the legislature intended to exempt from guideline consideration those sentences imposed under the authority of section 948.01(11)....

...WARD DEPARTURE FROM THE GUIDELINES WHICH REQUIRES WRITTEN JUSTIFICATION? REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing. PETERSON and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This appears to be an incorrect statutory reference. Apparently the court is referring to section 948.01(11), Florida Statutes....

six months to two years. Id.; see Fla. Stat. § 948.001(3), (13). B.

...om custody” the rule not only avoids the various definitions of “conviction,” but makes the rule open to defendants who have been adjudicated guilty and defendants who have had their adjudication withheld and have been placed on probation. See § 948.01(2), Fla....

...*1291 The Court strikes the specific proposed language: “and has been sentenced by.” This language is stricken because a defendant who has had his or her adjudication withheld and has been placed on probation is not “sentenced” under the Florida Statutes. See § 948.01(2), Fla....

...ts discretion, may either adjudge the defendant to be guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt; and, in either case, it shall stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon such defendant and shall place the defendant upon probation. § 948.01(2), Fla....

...s prescribed. However, at the time of sentencing the legislature had expanded the authority to use split sentence procedure to include felonies. Appellant contends that the trial court did not have authority to sentence him to a split sentence under Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, as amended effective July 1, 1974....

adjudication of guilt at sentencing, as does section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (1995). If adjudication

...od of probation or community control, provided the combined periods of time do not exceed the maximum period for incarceration provided by statute. Smith v. State, 584 So.2d 154 (Fla 2d DCA 1991); Howland v. State, 420 So.2d 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); § 948.01, Fla.Stat....

involves neither a “true split sentence” under section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes, nor a “probationary split

accepted his initial plea was precluded, under section 948.01(10), Florida Statutes (1991), from placing

...er action thereby making it inappropriate to consider this matter as originally presented. * Accordingly, we discharge the petition for review. MCDONALD, C.J„ and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW and BARK-ETT, JJ., concur. We further note that section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes, has been amended to delete the requirement of reporting while on probation.

because the decision is based upon a reading of section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1981).4 This statute

...ty control. On August 7, 1987, nunc pro tunc July 31, 1987, it spelled out six reasons for sentencing the defendant as an adult, not for departing from the guidelines. Unfortunately, the three years of community control is excessive by one year. See § 948.01(5), Fla.Stat....

sentence was withheld, pursuant to the authority of § 948.01 (3), Fla.Stat., F.S.A. We reverse. The evidence

...d of a crime to receive drug abuse treatment in addition to the penalty otherwise required by the sentencing guidelines. Chapter 948, cited by the judge in the written order, also gives trial judges drug treatment options for certain drug offenders. Section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (1997), authorizes “drug offender probation” for chronic substance abusers who violate chapter 893, and section 948.034 authorizes probation with drug treatment for drug possession offenders who violate certain enumerated provisions of section 893.13. Section 948.034 gives the trial judge the discretion to order probation and drug treatment in lieu of a sentence under the sentencing guidelines; section 948.01(13) allows the court to withhold *2 the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on drug offender probation. Sentences under sections 948.034 and 948.01(13) are not technically “departures” since they are imposed completely outside of the guidelines. 1 The terms of “drug offender probation,” pursuant to section 948.01(13)(a), require the court to place the defendant in a program developed by the Department of Corrections “which emphasizes a combination of treatment and intensive community supervision approaches and which includes provision for sup...

...e space). On appeal, the State acknowledges the trial court’s discretion to impose probation and drug treatment outside of the guidelines, but argues that the probation ordered in the instant case qualifies neither as drug offender probation under section 948.01(13) nor probation with drug treatment under section 948.034(2)(b). The State maintains that appellee’s probation is not properly classified as “drug offender probation” under section 948.01(13) because he was not placed in a program developed by the Department of Corrections, and that the probation is not proper under section 948.034(2)(b) because the program to which appellee was ordered, Turning Point Bridge, is not a d...

...On remand, after the basis for the sentence is clarified, the State may then present its challenge to the propriety of the sentence ordered. REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing. GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ„ concur. . Violation of probation imposed under either section 948.01(13) or 948.034 may lead to a sentence under the guidelines. See §§ 948.034(0(0 & 948.01 (13)(b).

withhold adjudication of guilty, pursuant to section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (1997), unless a withholding

...r the defendant is entitled to credit for time served on the community control sentence for time already served in community control. The State properly concedes that the maximum community control sentence the court could have imposed was two years. § 948.01(4), Fla.Stat....

...and-delivered copy. Committee Notes 1968 Adoption. To the same effect as section 921.02, Florida Statutes, except the portion reading “in writing, signed by the judge” which was added. Last sentence was added to permit the judge to operate under section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes....

...t of conviction; section 924.06, Florida Statutes, specifying when a defendant may take an appeal; section 924.09, Florida Statutes, and Florida Criminal Appellate Rule 6.2 concerning the time for taking appeals by a defendant in criminal cases; and section 948.011, Florida Statutes, providing for a sentence of a fíne and probation as to imprisonment....

THOMPSON, Judge. Curtis W. Carlin, appellant, appeals his sentence of community control imposed for two misdemeanors, to be served concurrently. Community control can only be imposed for felony offenses. Section 948.01(3), Fla....

...gal apart from the probation order. When, as in the instant case, the probationer violates, a probation condition by committing a crime, he demonstrates his unsuitability for probation, notwithstanding his belief that he is no longer on probation. 1 Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provides in relevant part: If it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfa...

confinement as a condition of probation. F.S. § 948.01(4) F.S.A. provides that the Court may impose a

...the Fifth District that this type of house arrest can only be imposed as a condition of community control. Coleman v. State, 564 So.2d 1238 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). See §§ 948.001, 948.-03(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987). As such, it cannot exceed two years. § 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Accordingly, the oral condition of probation imposing twenty-four years of house arrest was illegal. On remand, the trial court is authorized to impose reasonable residential confinement as a condition of community control to precede a term of probation upon the requisite findings pursuant to subsections 948.01(3)-(4), Florida Statutes (1987)....

. prior to July 1, 1974, the provisions of Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973), granted specific

...In one situation the defendant, following revocation, is placed again on probation or community control in lieu of being sentenced. See State v. Kendrick, 596 So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) [, rev. dismissed, 613 So.2d 5 (Fla.1992)]. See also §§ 948.01(1), (3), and (4), Fla.Stat....

...The judge was correct that sections 948.-01(11) and (12), Florida Statutes (1991), permit a reverse split sentence. These sections, however, do not apply to appellant. She committed the offenses on October 8, 1990. Chapter 91-225, which added subsections 11 and 12 to section 948.01, was not approved until May 29, 1991....

...d to have occurred within a single criminal episode. Rodgers v. State, 325 So.2d 48 (Fla.App.2 1975), and Robinson v. State, 323 So.2d 62 (Fla. App.l 1975). Appellant Adkins also contends that the trial court was not authorized under Florida Statute 948.01(4) to place the appellant on probation for a period of two years after serving three months in the Duval County Jail, in that the probationary period exceeded the concurrent one year sentences imposed....

...Thus, the defendant argues, he had completed the 2010 case’s two-year probation term while serving the 2012 case’s eight-year prison term, and he was no longer on probation in 2018. Our Review Because we have been asked to review an alleged sentencing error under section 948.012(1), Florida Statutes (2010), our review is de novo. See State v....

...standard of review is de novo.”); State v. Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557, 560 (Fla. 2015) (“The interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of review.”) (citation omitted). 1. Framing Our Analysis of Section 948.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2010) The 2010 version of section 948.012(1), Florida Statutes, provided: Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, impose a s...

...posed by the court. The period of probation or community control shall 3  commence immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration, whether by parole or gain-time allowances. § 948.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added). 1 As emphasized above, section 948.012(1) uses three different phrases to refer to when a defendant is to commence a probation term after completing a prison term: (1) “upon completion of any specified period of such sentence which may include a term of years or less”;...

...easy to reconcile and apply in this case, where the defendant was sentenced to serve a two-year probation term after the 2010 case’s three-year prison term, at a time when he was still serving the 2012 case’s eight-year prison term. Taking section 948.012(1)’s first and second emphasized phrases in isolation – that a defendant is to be placed on probation “upon completion of any specified period of such sentence which may include a term of years or less” and “after serving such period as may be imposed by the court” – seemingly would have required the 2010 case’s two-year probation term to 1 The current version of section 948.012(1) contains minor amendments from the 2010 version, none of which are material to this case. See § 948.012, Fla. Stat....

...whether by parole or gain-time allowances.”) (strikethrough and underling added to show amendments). 4 have commenced immediately after the defendant completed the 2010 case’s three-year prison term. On the other hand, taking 948.012(1)’s third phrase in isolation – that a defendant is to be placed on probation “immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration” – seemingly would have required the 2010 case’s two-year prison term to be tolled until after the defendant had completed both the 2010 case’s three-year prison term and the 2012 case’s eight-year prison term. Our duty, however, is not to view any one or more of section 948.012(1)’s three clauses in isolation....

...intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless. Id. at 316 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Applying those principles, our supreme court already has analyzed section 948.012(1)’s predecessor statute, containing the exact same language....

...tion term for the 5 first case. Id. These probationary periods were to be followed by four consecutive longer probationary terms for the third case. Id. The defendant appealed, arguing her sentence violated section 948.012(1)’s predecessor, section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1989). Id. Specifically, the defendant argued the trial court’s imposition of the second case’s probation term created a time gap between the first case’s prison term and probation term, thereby violating section 948.01(8). Id. The supreme court found the defendant’s argument unpersuasive. Id. The supreme court framed the issue as whether section 948.01(8) “prohibits a separation between incarceration and probation as to each case of a multiple-case sentence, or merely bars a period of freedom between portions of an individual’s overall sentence.” Id. (emphasis added). The supreme court concluded the latter interpretation was correct. Id. The supreme court began its reasoning by encapsulating section 948.01(8)’s pertinent words and phrases as follows: Whenever ......

...llows incarceration. Id. at 312-13 (emphases added; internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 3. Applying Our Supreme Court’s Reasoning to the Instant Case Our supreme court’s reasoning in Horner applies here. Giving effect to section 948.012(1)’s “every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute,” Knighton, 235 So....

...2d DCA 2002), with State v. Powell, 703 So.2d 444, 446 (Fla.1997) (holding “[a] trial court may also impose a true split sentence in which the period of community control and probation is shorter than the suspended portion of incarceration”); see also § 948.01(11), Fla....

...had been reviewable, Senger’s arguments are meritless. First, the decision by a trial court to impose or withhold an adjudication of guilt is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Sanchez v. State, 541 So. 2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. 1989) (quoting § 948.01(3), Fla....

on the date of the offense. Question Three Section 948.01, Florida Statutes, provides that a court having

...We affirm the trial court’s acceptance of appellant’s plea of nolo contendere to the felony offense of dealing in stolen property, proscribed by Section 812.019(1), Florida Statutes (1977). However, we remand for correction of the order placing appellant on probation. Appellant was placed on unsupervised probation. Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1977) provides that a defendant placed on probation for a felony shall be under the supervision of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation....

1973, 280 So.2d 518, in which it was held that § 948.01(4) Fla.Stat., F.S.A. did not make provision for

LEHAN, Judge. Defendant appeals from his sentences consisting of 18 months incarceration, 18 months community control, and 10 years probation. He contends that (a) section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1985), prohibits the imposition of community control and probation together in one sentence, and (b) that incarceration followed by community control is a departure from the sentencing guidelines requiring proper written reasons which were not provided in this case....

State, 302 So.2d 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1979), clearly states

a sentence of community control is two years. § 948.01(4), Fla.Stat., (1995). Thus, McGehee is entitled

sentencing is authorized by statute in Florida.1 § 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979); State v. Holmes,

...t such a split sentence was unlawful. The trial court, in its order denying Cronce’s motion without a hearing, found that Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Com’n, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla.1981), did not “apply to ‘split’ sentences under Section 948.01(4) such as the one imposed on [Cronce].” We recognize that the Supreme Court in Villery specifically held: “that incarceration, pursuant to the split sentence alternatives found in sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), which equals or exceeds one year is invalid....

...Appellant entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement wherein the State agreed, with the trial court’s approval, that “the maximum period of incarceration that [appellant] would face would be one year under the agreement.” Subsequently, appellant was given a true split sentence as authorized by section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1981), committing him to the custody of the Department of Corrections for a term of three years, but providing that, after serving one year in prison, the imposition of the remainder of the sentence imposed be stayed and withheld and appellant be placed on probation for a period of two years....

...te it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence. The credit must be for a specified period of time and shall be provided for in the sentence.” Under Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1975), the trial court is authorized to stay and withhold imposition of sentence, and place a defendant on probation....

...commence upon the completion of a prior probationary period without the probationer having been charged with any violations of that probation. The authority of placing an individual on probation is contained in Chapter 948, Florida Statutes (1977). Section 948.01(4) provides: “Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, direct the defendant to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence....

The Florida Supreme Court has also held that section 948.01(6), Florida Statutes (1995), requires the inearcerative

...and impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation. (2) No part of the time that the defendant is on probation shall be considered as any part of the time that he shall be sentenced to serve. . Section 948.01(1) provides: (1) Any court of the state having original jurisdiction of criminal actions, where the defendant in a criminal case has been found guilty by the verdict of a jury or has entered a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contender...

PER CURIAM. Upon the State’s proper confession of error, we reverse the sentence of community control as to Count I, a misdemeanor, and remand for resentencing. See § 948.01, Fla....

has been used to refer to any 8. Section 948.001(13), Florida Statutes (2010), defines “sex

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. We affirm appellee’s downward sentence pursuant to section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...scribed times. Section 947.16 (1), F. S., as amended. You did not specify which statutory provision authorized the type of sentence in question. However, for purposes of this opinion, I assume that your inquiry concerns sentences entered pursuant to s. 948.01 (4), F. S. Section 948.01 (4) authorizes the imposition of a sentence popularly known as a `split sentence,' that is, a sentence imposing a specified period of incarceration followed by a specified period of probation....

...The split sentence probation alternative is one of three primary sentencing alternatives available to a trial judge. State v. Jones, 327 So.2d 18 , 22 (Fla. 1976). In 360 So.2d at 383 , the Supreme Court held, among other things, `that a trial judge is authorized by [s.] 948.01 (4) to sentence a defendant to a period of incarceration followed by a period of probation.' In the instant case the affected persons appear to have been sentenced to a period of confinement or imprisonment of less than 12 months' duration; that is the only sentence of imprisonment imposed by the trial court....

...Thus, I conclude that it is only that period of incarceration or confinement which is within the purview of s. 947.16 (1), id ., for determining whether the affected persons are eligible for parole consideration. Therefore, if the period of confinement ordered under the authority of s. 948.01 (4), id ., is less than 12 months, the person's `sentence' does not `total 12 months or more' for purposes of parole eligibility under s....

...Katsaris, et al ., pending in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County, Florida (no number assigned, filed May 15, 1979). However, the Burns case does not involve the split sentence probation alternative authorized by s. 948.01 (4), F....

...erms of s. 947.16 (1), F. S., as amended, to consider eligible for parole, and interview, any person sentenced to a period of incarceration of less that 12 months followed by a period of probation pursuant to a split sentence probation imposed under s. 948.01 (4), F....

...Luxenburg on a seven-day term of “court-supervised” probation, which was to terminate once Mr. Luxen-burg paid his court costs. Probation is a sanction authorized upon a court’s entry of an adjudication of guilt or a withhold of adjudication. See § 948.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 948.001(5) defines probation as “a form of community supervision requiring specified contacts with parole and probation officers and other terms and conditions as provided in s. 948.03.” Section 948.01(1) explains that “[i]f the court places the defendant on probation or into community control for a felony, the department shall provide immediate supervision by an officer employed in compliance with the minimum qualifications for of...

splitting of sentence is permissible under Fla.Stat., § 948.01(4), F.S.A.

gain time or for any other reason. Pursuant to section 948.01, Florida Statutes, the duration of community

classic true “split sentence”2 authorized by section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes,3 with a “prescribed”

...of suspension. See § 921.187(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) (providing the court may, as a sentencing alternative, impose “a split sentence whereby the offender is to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence”); § 948.01(5), Fla....

...In such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence imposed upon the defendant and direct that the defendant be placed upon probation or into community control after serving such period as may be imposed by the court.” § 948.012(1), Fla....

PER CURIAM. Alexander appeals the summary denial of his motion to vacate and correct his sentence. He was sentenced to a term of twelve years which was split, pursuant to section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979), into a two-year term of imprisonment followed by ten years of probation....

since the trial court had authority under F.S. Section 948.01, F.S.A., to have withheld an adjudication of

...for which the Miami-Dade judge entered a withhold of adjudication, but suspended entry of a sentence without imposing probation or community control. Such a sentence was illegal because a withhold of adjudication on a felony requires the imposition of probation or community control. See § 948.01(2), Fla....

...2018) (“Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.”). We hold that a withhold of adjudication can be used as an HFO- qualifying prior “conviction” under section 775.084(1)(a)2.b., even when the withhold of adjudication was entered without imposing probation or community control as required by section 948.01(2) and rule 3.670. We presume that the Legislature, in drafting section 775.084(2), did not contemplate a court entering a withhold of adjudication without imposing probation or community control, because such inaction would be illegal under section 948.01(2) and rule 3.670....

...qualifying prior “conviction” under section 775.084(1)(a)2.b. Here, the defendant has already reaped the bargain of his illegal sentence for the Miami-Dade felony by receiving the withhold of adjudication without also receiving probation or community control as required by section 948.01(2) and rule 3.670....

...The probationer or community controllee may not knowingly visit places where intoxicants, drugs, or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used. (o) Submit to the drawing of blood or other biological specimens as prescribed in ss. 943.325 and 948.014, and reimburse the appropriate agency for the costs of drawing and transmitting the blood or other biological specimens to the Department of Law Enforcement. 7  (p) Submit to the taking of a digitized photograph by the department as a part of the offender's records....

...(Arguing: “[T]he trial court erred by imposing ‘standard conditions’ of probation provided in section 948.03(1), and contained in the probation order, which were not orally pronounced at sentencing, because he was specifically placed on ‘drug offender’ probation, pursuant to section 948.01(13)(a).”). 9 The Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit may wish to consider revising the forms used for its orders of probation to eliminate references to the conditions listed in the pre-2019 form in Rule 3.986, and repla...

...w that community control by an additional year. . Even considering that the May 30, 2012, order erroneously modifying his community control went unchallenged, Mr. Nealy was only serving probation at the time of the alleged violation in May 2012. See § 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (2008) (stating that community control can be for a period of no more than two years)....

...Dorfman v. State, 351 So.2d 954 (Fla.1977); Price v. State, 393 So.2d 69 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The Supreme Court has revised the opinion in Viilery, (April 23, 1981) [1981 FLW 313] and has made it clear that the split sentence alternative provided for in section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, prohibits incarceration for a term which equals or exceeds one year, so the last sentence imposed here must be revisited by the trial court....

its construction of split sentencing under section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, and incarceration as

...obligation before it is used as a reason to revoke probation. To avoid incarceration and receive the benefits of probation, a defendant must convince the trial court that he or she “is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct.” § 948.01(2), Fla....

...The trial court found several violations, and entered an order modifying appellant’s sentence to two additional years of community control followed by eight years of sex offender probation. Appellant moved to correct his sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). As grounds, he argued that under section 948.01(4), 'Florida Statutes (2004), the maximum period of community control that a court could impose is two years, and that he was entitled to credit for the community control he served prior to his arrest on the violation of community control....

...Over appellant’s objection, the trial court converted the two-year community control sentence into two years of “regular probation” with house arrest as a special condition of probation, to be followed by eight years of sex offender probation. Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (2004) provides that the duration of a community control sentence may not exceed two years....

sentence as described in and authorized by section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes. As contemplated by that

...(2) A person who commits the offense of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise is guilty of a life felony, punishable pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code and by a fine of $500,000. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of [section] 948.01, [Florida Statutes (2020),] with respect to any person who is found to have violated this section, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence may not be suspended, deferred, or withheld. At bottom, the parties disagree over the meaning of "punishable ....

imposed by the Department of Corrections. See § 948.001, Fla. Stat (2008) ; State v. Nazario, 100 So.

imposed by the Department of Corrections. See § 948.001, Fla. Stat (2008) ; State v. Nazario, 100 So.

imposed as part of a split sentence pursuant to section 948.-01(4), Florida Statutes (1979) is invalid. Accordingly

withheld when a defendant is placed on probation. See § 948.01(3), Fla.Stat. (1983). Consequently, Florida’s

withheld when a defendant is placed on probation. See § 948.01(3), Fla. Stat. (1983). Consequently, Florida’s

withheld when a defendant is placed on probation. See § 948.01(3), Fla. Stat. (1983). Consequently, Florida’s

withheld when a defendant is placed on probation. See § 948.01(3), Fla. Stat. (1983). Consequently, Florida’s

rather than the DJJ, that provides the supervision. § 948.01(1)(a), (3), Fla. Stat. (2018); see also § 948

...orrections, suspending the entire term and placing the defendant on unsupervised probation. As a condition of probation, the defendant was ordered to refrain from committing further acts of violence on his wife, the victim of the aggravated battery. Section 948.01(7), Florida Statutes, provides that “[i]n no case shall the imposition of sentence be suspended and the defendant placed on probation or into community control unless such defendant is placed under the custody of the department or another public or private entity.” See also Helton v....

...the circuit courts.” § 34.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Further, by Florida Statute, “[a]ny state court having original jurisdiction of criminal actions” is authorized to place offenders on probation, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld, § 948.01(1), Fla....

...f imprisonment required by section 790.221(2). 1 Millet concedes the error based on McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45 (Fla.1994). Accordingly, we reverse Millet’s sentence and remand for further proceedings. In McKendry , the supreme court held that section 948.01, Florida Statues (1989), which grants trial courts the authority to suspend a sentence and impose community control, does not authorize trial courts to depart from the minimum mandatory sentence set forth in section 790.221(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

split sentence since, at the time of the crime, Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1971), did not allow

for placing Lopez on probation is found in Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1983), which gives the

the court does not impose a prison sentence. Section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes, further provides that

violated her community control. 2 See generally § 948.001(3), Fla. Stat. (2019). While there may have been

...stitution, 1 and Marine Fisheries Commission Emergency Rule 46ER95-1. 2 On February 9, 1996, after a non-jury trial, the circuit court found him guilty, but withheld adjudication of guilt, in keeping with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.670 and section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...months each, the probationary periods to run consecutively to each other. The practical effect of the sentencing disposition in this case has been to create an unauthorized gap between prison time and probation in regard to one of the sentences. See § 948.01(8), Fla.Stat....

effectively repealed split sentences under section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, it should be noted that

argument regarding the constitutionality of section 948.01(13)(a), Florida Statutes. First, appellee concedes

...orrections because of his conviction of a criminal statute. Yates also argues that he was not subject to the “escape” statute because he was not serving a “sentence of imprisonment” when he escaped. As charged in the information, pursuant to section 948.01(6), Yates had been committed to the Department of Corrections and he was serving the balance of his probation in the community facility after having violated the terms of his probation....

proposed by the Committee. The amendments mirror section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes, to avoid confusion about

...t exceed 22 months. But that is not the case. Consistent with this reading is the statutory maximum for community control. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(13) ("When community control is imposed, it shall not exceed the term provided by general law.”). Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1993), provides, in relevant part: When community control or a program of public service is ordered by the court, the duration of community control supervision or public service may not be longer than the sentence...

...The supreme court held that an adjudication of guilt in conjunction with a probation sentence could not be removed more than sixty days after imposition as the court interpreted rule 3.800(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and sections 921.187, 948.01 and 948.-01(3), Florida Statutes....

...ispositive of this matter. In this case the statute under which appellant was originally charged, section 849.-25(2), prohibits the withholding of adjudication of guilt for any person convicted under this subsection notwithstanding the provisions of section 948.01....

appellant challenges the constitutionality of section 948.01(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). Appellant

...to make reports. Defendant Williams argues that State v. Jones, 327 So.2d 18 (Fla.1976), which permits a court to impose upon probation violation any sentence which might originally have been imposed, does not apply to a split sentence entered under Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1974)....

appellant. Specifically, appellant contends that section 948.01(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), is unconstitutional

...al of a sentencing court to order a presentence investigation of a person convicted of a crime deprives such person of due process or equal protection of the laws. The judgment appealed is affirmed. CARROLL, DONALD K., and RAWLS, JJ., concur. . F.S. § 948.01, F.S.A....

...Thereafter, the Florida Legislature adopted and implemented these changes in accordance with section 921.001, Florida Statutes. Ch. 86-273, § 2, Laws of Florida. We find that this subsequent Supreme Court and legislative expression controls and affirm Ray’s sentence. Though neither section 921.187, Florida Statutes, nor section 948.01 expressly prohibit a sentence of community control and probation in tandem, this court in Williams held that these statutes do not contemplate a sentence with a probationary term consecutive to a community control term since probation and community control are alternative forms of disposition and sentencing....

...es became a statute). Since the Legislature has now expressly authorized the imposition of community control and probation in tandem, this subsequent legislative expression is controlling over the more generally worded statutes, sections 921.187 and 948.01 and nullifies the effect of this court’s Williams decision. Notwithstanding the Williams interpretation of sections 921.187 and 948.01 as in effect prohibiting a community control term followed by a probationary term, the Legislature’s enactment of Chapter 86-273, as the last expression of the legislative will, is the law and prevails....

and DOWNEY, JJ., concur. . Amending Fla.Stat. § 948.01(4) (1973).

...entence to the next higher category of community control or twelve-thirty months’ incarceration and sentenced the appellant to thirty months’ imprisonment to be followed by a two-year term of community control. The appellant argues that although section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1985), authorizes a split sentence of incarceration and community control and because committee note (d)(12) to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701 does not discuss community control, any split sentence excee...

is a “nullity and is void”. The language of F.S. 948.-01(4) makes it clear that “ . . . in order to impose

...sentence was legally imposed, nor was it authorized by Rule 3.800(b) because the granting of probation does not constitute a reduction of a sentence, Cuneo v. State, 335 So.2d 278 (Fla.1976), and finally, it was not a suspended sentence pursuant to Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1975), since it was not “done at the time of the original sentencing.” Solomon v....

...pursuant to Sections 948.03 and 948.06(2), Florida Statutes. The Jones opinion did not involve the issue before us concerning the time frame in which a trial court can exercise its original jurisdiction to place a defendant on probation pursuant to Section 948.01, Florida Statutes....

terms and conditions as provided in s. 948.03.” § 948.001(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). See generally Larson v

...f such *1336 sentence," and that the period of probation or community control "shall commence immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration, whether by parole or gain-time allowances." Id., quoting (with added emphasis) Fla. Stat. § 948.01(6). At the time of Petitioner Doss's offense and sentencing, the same relevant language was set forth in subsection (8) of the statute. § 948.01(8) (1989)....

...f breaking and entering an automobile, contending that the sentence imposed is invalid. We agree. The trial judge sentenced Woodruff to 90 days in the county jail to be followed by three years probation. This was contrary to the authority granted by § 948.01(4) F. S. In Williams v. State, Fla.App.3rd 1973, 280 So.2d 518 , it was pointed out that the language of § 948.01(4) F.S....

...makes it clear that in order to impose a valid term of probation under said section the trial court must withhold imposition of a portion of the sentence imposed upon the defendant. The cause is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of the provisions of §§ 948.01(4) and 922.051 F.S....

...(1989). . § 784.07(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989). . The defendant was also convicted and sentenced on Count II of disorderly intoxication, section 856.011, Florida Statutes (1989). This sentence has not been challenged. .§ 775.082(3)(d), Fla.Stat. (1989). . § 948.01(7), Fla.Stat....

commenced. The state relies on language in section 948.01(6), Florida Statutes, which relates to parole

two years probation was contrary to Fla.Stat. § 948.01(4) (1973). Consequently, the cause is hereby remanded

...e recommended sentence shall not be state prison. Therefore, neither the statute nor the rule hinder the trial court’s discretion in the imposition of respondent’s sentence. For re *830 spondent, community control is an authorized sanction under section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...), Florida Statutes (1995). . Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.702(d)(16) provides in pertinent part that "[i]f the total sentence points are less than or equal to 40, the recommended sentence, absent a departure, shall not be state prison.” . Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1993), provides in pertinent part: "[I]f ......

...4th DCA), rev. denied, 569 So.2d 1279 (Fla.1990); Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So.2d 403 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 , 109 S.Ct. 250 , 102 L.Ed.2d 239 (1988). The state correctly argues, however, that appellee’s sentence was improper pursuant to section 948.01(10), Florida Statutes (1991), which provides: An offender shall not be placed in community control if: (a) Convicted of or adjudication withheld for a forcible felony as defined in s....

PER CURIAM. Appellant pled guilty to violating his probation. The trial court sentenced him to seven years in prison followed by five years of community control. The state concedes that section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986), limits the duration of community control to a maximum of two years....

...ion to correct sentence, which alleged that the probationary period could not exceed the maximum one year time for jail sentence. In denying appellant’s motion, the trial court found that a defendant placed on probation pursuant to Florida Statute 948.01(1) is not subject to the pro *1156 bation limitations of Florida Statute 948.-04(1)....

appellant placed on probation for seven years. Section 948.01, Florida Statutes 1941, and F.S.A. *167Evidently

...after conviction, but these are cases wherein a deferred sentencing is expressly authorized by statute. For example, where a convict has been placed on probation in accordance with the authority granted trial courts by the probation code, F.S.1969, section 948.01, et seq., F.S.A., there are occasions when probation can be rescinded and sentence imposed after a period of five years from the date of conviction....

v. Payne, 404 So.2d 1055, 1057-58 (Fla.1981); § 948.01(3), Fla.Stat. (1989). Further, as the First District

...We reverse his sentence and remand to the trial court with directions to credit appellant's two-year community control sentence by four months for time already served on community control. See Ogden v. State, 605 So.2d 155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Crawford v. State, 567 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1990); § 948.01(4), Fla....

...s an unauthorized excessive sentence because a further violation of probation could result in the imposition of further imprisonment in excess of the 372 years. We find this reasoning specious. Probation is not limited to the guideline sentence. See section 948.01(1), Florida Statutes (1988); Addison v....

...Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla.1981). In Villery , the Florida Supreme Court held that a period of incarceration followed by probation imposed either as a condition of probation or under a true split sentence as authorized by section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979), cannot equal or exceed one year in either instance....

PER CURIAM. We affirm the order of the trial court which withheld adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on concurrent terms of probation as an alternative to the imposition of sentences. See § 948.01(3), (4), Fla....

(Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (Cowart, J., dissenting). Section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (1993) still provides

was void as contrary to Florida Statutes, Section 948.-01. We do not agree and hold that the case of

...judication on 2 all counts, imposing a term of imprisonment with credit for all time previously served followed by a period of probation. When a court, in its discretion, withholds adjudication, section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes (2016), provides that “the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon the defendant and shall place a felony defendant upon probation.” Further, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.670 pr...

...ith the intent to sell (case 02-06656) rendered those sentences illegal. Mr. Haynes correctly argued that drug offender probation is a sanction limited to chronic drug abusers who violate sections 893.13(2)(a) or (6)(a), Florida Statutes (2001); and section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (2001), does not authorize drug offender probation for the foregoing offenses....

...He contends the trial court was without jurisdiction to act because the affidavit of probation violation was filed after the probationary period had expired. The defendant’s probationary period commenced immediately on his release from incarceration. § 948.01, Fla....

split sentence as defined and authorized in section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes, and as is exempted by

This is a true split sentence as described in section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes, and the issue is whether

case is a true split sentence as described in section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes. Not only does the 15

...You shall remain at your approved residence except thirty (30) minutes before [and] thirty (30) minutes after ... the time you are at work or at school. Any other absences from your approved residence must have prior approval in writing from your officer. Section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (1988) provides that a term of community control cannot exceed two years....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. Section 948.01, Florida Statutes (2000)....

authority for the cost provision in condition 12. Section 948.001(1), Florida Statutes (1995) dealing with probation

community control which exceeds two years. See § 948.001, Fla.Stat. (1987); § 948.03(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987);

...nd-delivered copy. Committee Notes 1968 Adoption. To the same effect as section 921.02, Florida Statutes, except the portion reading “in writing, signed by the judge” which was added. Last sentence was added to permit' the judge to operate under section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes....

...t of conviction; section 924.06, Florida Statutes, specifying when a defendant may take an appeal; section 924.09, Florida Statutes, and Florida Criminal Appellate Rule 6.2 concerning the time for taking appeals by a defendant in criminal cases; and section 948.011, Florida Statutes, providing for a sentence of a fine and probation as to imprisonment....

PETERSON, Judge. We vacate the “reverse split sentence” which was imposed upon the appellant without contemporaneous written reasons for the downward departure, and we remand for sentencing within the guidelines. § 948.01(11), Fla.Stat....

indefinite and uncertain, is not authorized by Section 948.01, Florida Stat*363utes (1987). We agree and

WIGGINTON, Judge. AFFIRMED. See Sanchez v. State, 538 So.2d 923 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Mick v. State, 506 So.2d 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). However, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question as one of great public importance: Does Section 948.01(5), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988) limit the duration of community control to a single two-year period when the defendant is sentenced at the same sentencing hearing for multiple offenses charged in a single information? SHIVERS, C.J., a...

the trial judge pursuant to the provisions of Section 948.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., withheld an adjudication

...After violation of community control three months later, the defendant was again placed on two years of community control and, as a special condition of community control, was required to serve 240 days in county jail. Two years is the maximum period of community control available for any one offense. § 948.01(5), Fla.Stat....

Corrections probation officer. See § 948.001(2), (5), Fla. Stat. (2000). One codified condition

PER CURIAM. The appellant’s motion to expedite appeal is granted. *788 We hold that when the court stays and withholds the imposition of sentence and places a defendant on probation, as authorized by section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes, the probationer is entitled to credit under section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes, for all time he spent in the county jail before “sentence” against any incarceration imposed as a condition of probation....

years probation, is not authorized by Fla. Stat. § 948.01(4), F.S.A.; and therefore, the sentence for appellant

PER CURIAM. In State v. McGraw, 474 So.2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), this court affirmed the defendant’s felony conviction and, on the State’s cross-appeal, held that “upon conviction of a felony, section 948.01(3) mandates a reporting probation.” Consequently, we reversed the order placing McGraw on non-reporting probation and remanded the cause for resentencing....

...1st DCA 1971). Neither is the aggravated battery included in the offense of shooting into the vehicle such as would make it a Brown 1 category (4) lesser included offense. Appellant’s contention that he could not be given a split sentence pursuant to section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, is likewise unavailing....

...Because we conclude that the trial court entered contemporaneous written reasons for departure, we do not need to address Stone’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which arises from this issue. The trial court, however, erred in sentencing Stone to community control pursuant to section 948.01(10), Florida Statutes (1991)....

means any term that is within the general law. See § 948.01(8), Fla.Stat. (1983); see also Davis. . §§ 810

...a judgment of conviction, which means a plea necessarily precedes imposition of probation. That is, there cannot be the imposition of probation without a formal determination of guilt, which always comes after a defendant enters his plea to the criminal charges filed against him. See § 948.01(1), Fla....

...probation” as an authorized “sentencing alternative in Florida”); see also Glass v. State, 574 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 1991) (reaffirming the court’s “position that courts are authorized to impose probationary split sentences”); but cf. § 948.012, Fla....