Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...SUNDBERG, Chief Justice. This suit raises questions concerning a prisoner's eligibility for parole under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979), when he or she has been incarcerated as a special condition of probation pursuant to sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...t and instead place him on probation when it appears to the court that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a course of criminal conduct and the ends of justice do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law. Section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1979), lists the terms and conditions of probation which may be imposed on a defendant. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979), states that the enumeration of the terms and conditions in subsection (1) does not prevent the imposition of other conditions the court may consider proper....

...Our construction of section 947.16(1) in conjunction with section 948.01(4) achieves these objectives. For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we hold that incarceration, pursuant to the split sentence alternatives found in sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), which equals or exceeds one year is invalid....

...n, 715 So.2d at 961. We *106 addressed the same condition of probation in Brock and found that because the condition is statutorily authorized, it does not have to be orally announced at the sentencing hearing. Brock, 688 So.2d at 910-12 & n. 1; see § 948.03(1)(k)1., Florida Statutes (Supp.1996); Torres v....

...We thus approve the opinion in Rider. [12] At the oral pronouncement of sentence, the trial court ordered the defendant to submit to periodic testing, while the written order required him to submit to testing at any time. This is an inconsequential variation because section 948.03(1)(k)1., Florida Statutes (Supp....

...For our purposes, suffice it to say that the Petitioner, Donald Kasischke, pled guilty to three counts each of lewd or lascivious battery and exhibition on a child under age sixteen. He was sentenced to 364 days in prison, followed by two years of community control and eight years of probation. Section 948.03(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), requires that courts impose several conditions on sexual offenders receiving probation or community control....

...ewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...wing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern." § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

..."relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern" relates only to "telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services." Lewis, J., dissenting op. at 817; Bell, J., dissenting op. at 829. For the reasons explained below, we find section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (1999), ambiguous....

...Before 1997, the prohibition on obscene or pornographic materials read: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material. § 948.03(5)(g), Fla....

...Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824-25 (Fla.1981)). We disagree, however, that in this case the bill title reveals the Legislature's intent one way or the other. The title to chapter 97-308, Laws of Florida, states in pertinent part: An act relating to sex offenders; ... amending section 948.03, F.S.; requiring a curfew between specified hours; providing alternatives; revising requirements for treatment for sex offenders; revising a provision that prohibits a sex offender from viewing, owning or possessing certain materials;...

...We have been unable otherwise to resolve this ambiguity and cannot simply choose our preferred *815 construction. We therefore apply the rule of lenity and hold that the limiting phrase "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern" must be interpreted as qualifying each of the prohibitions in section 948.03(5)(a)(7)....

...2000) (declining to address an issue outside the scope of the conflict). We therefore leave it for resolution on remand. III. CONCLUSION We hold that the phrase "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern" qualifies each of the prohibitions in section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. LEWIS and BELL, JJ., dissent with opinions. LEWIS, J., dissenting. This case involves interpretation of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (1999), which is a default term of probation and community control for Florida's convicted sexual offenders. This question of statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review. See, e.g., Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005). The 1999 version of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), [9] reads as follows: *816 Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating...

...adjective "any," [10] (2) the participle "including," [11] (3) the comma preceding "including," which further indicates that the entire clause introduced by "including" is illustrative, [12] or (4) a series of intervening nouns. [13] When one reads section 948.03(5)(a)(7) it is apparent that the clause " including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern," is merely illustrative and indicates that these mat...

...The majority spurns the intent of the Legislature, as expressed through the plain text of the statute, and similarly runs afoul of several canons of statutory construction. For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent. I. ANALYSIS A. The Plain Text of Section 948.03(5)(a)(7) The plain text of section 948.03(5)(a)(7) clearly conveys the intent of the Legislature....

...as the rule of lenity. The Legislature has not in any way indicated an intent to abandon the total prohibition against sexual offenders "viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material." § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...omiciled alien is a party while denying under similar circumstances jurisdiction where a domiciled American is a party." Id. at 349, 40 S.Ct. 516. However, in contrast to Mor, an absurd result will not occur based upon a plain-text interpretation of section 948.03(5)(a)(7). Further, a " natural construction of the language" [16] of section 948.03(5)(a)(7) demonstrates the grammatical incongruity of reading "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern" as modifying a preceding clause which is separated from the former clause by (1) a comma, (2) an illustrative participle, and (3) a string of several nouns. Kasischke and the majority contend that a logical, grammatical reading of section 948.03(5)(a)(7)'s plain text (i.e., interpreting the clause "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern" as modifying "telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services") would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result....

...raphic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material," and simply clarified that this prohibition " includ[es] telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern." § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...nly "telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services" that convicted sexual offenders are prohibited from "viewing, owning, or possessing" are those that are "obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating" as a matter of law ). § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...This is so because the total-prohibition clause, which bans " any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material," " includ[es] telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern." § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). As stated in the statute, the total-prohibition clause applies "[u]nless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program." § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...However, here, the record does not indicate that any qualified decision-maker ever individually tailored Kasischke's *820 treatment plan by altering his default conditions of probation and community control with the approval of the appropriate court. Cf. § 948.03(6), Fla....

...On the contrary, Kasischke's community-control officers advised him that the default total prohibition applied and that, consequently, he was prohibited from "viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material." § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

..."[R]elevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern" cannot modify the total-prohibition clause because of (1) the adjective "any," (2) the illustrative participle "including," (3) the comma preceding "including," and (4) a series of intervening nouns. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...The modifier "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern" merely relates the otherwise innocuous materials outlined in the "including" clause back to the total-prohibition clause's outright ban of " any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material." § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). The construction advanced by Kasischke and the majority is simply unreasonable based upon the plain text of section 948.03(5)(a)(7) because such a construction is inconsistent with the language, punctuation, and syntax of the statute. Moreover, as I explain below, even if we move beyond the plain text of the statute, the relevant legislative history of section 948.03(5)(a)(7) confirms my interpretation of this subsection. [22] B. The Relevant Legislative History In 1995, the Legislature amended section "948.03, F.S., relating to terms or conditions of probation or community control" by "requiring mandatory special conditions of release for sexual predators and other specified offenders, under certain circumstances." Ch. 95-283, title, at 2651, Laws of Fla. As part of that amendment, the Legislature added what was then numbered section 948.03(5)(g)....

...material. Id. (emphasis supplied). Thus, the statutory section began as a total ban against sex offenders "viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material." Id. (emphasis supplied). [23] From 1995 until 1996, section 948.03(5)(g) remained unchanged. In 1997, the Legislature amended section 948.03 inter alia to "prohibit[] a sex offender from possessing telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern." Ch....

...released to the victims and their parents or guardians; and (7) electronic monitoring of offenders "when deemed necessary." Ch. 97-308, § 3, at 5519-21, Laws of Fla. What is particularly relevant for our purposes is that the Legislature renumbered section 948.03(5)(g) as section 948.03(5)(a)(7) and provided the following revised language: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sex...

...e to the total-prohibition clause by ignoring a preceding comma, an illustrative participle, and a string of intervening nouns. The relevant staff analysis, which the majority half-heartedly consults, likewise does not support its labored reading of section 948.03(5)(a)(7)....

...cers with limited caseloads." SB 1930 Staff Analysis, at 1, 8; see majority op. at 810-811. [28] While this is true in an abstract sense, a selective focus on this portion of the staff analysis ignores a fact of which the Legislature was well aware: section 948.03(5)(a)(7) is a default condition that applies to all convicted sexual offenders under their terms of probation and community control so long as they committed their relevant offenses "on or after October 1, 1995." § 948.03(5)(a), Fla....

...This section itself does not represent any type of "individualized treatment" or individualized tailoring of the offender's treatment plan. That tailoring, if any, occurs through the modification of the default prohibition in light of the offender's treatment plan. Cf. § 948.03(6), Fla. Stat. (1999) ("The court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions theretofore imposed by it upon the probationer or offender in community control."); § 948.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2007) (substantially similar). If no modification occurs, then the default prohibition applies and individual tailoring has not occurred. The introductory clause of section 948.03(5)(a)(7) could not make this point any clearer: "Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program," the default total prohibition applies. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...B 1930 Staff Analysis, at 6-8. Individual tailoring is simply not accomplished through the plain text of the statute, which erects a broad default prohibition against " any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material." § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied); see also Woodson v. State, 864 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (describing the default nature of the standard terms of probation and community control contained in section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (2000))....

...offender. Id. As stated in the staff analysis, "the treatment provider, the correctional probation officer, and the polygraph examiner form a triangle of supervision around the sex offender." Id. at 7. It is this group, rather than the plain text of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), that may lead to an individualized treatment plan....

...ewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...[29] I would *827 enforce the statute as written instead of creating a mirage of ambiguity. II. CONCLUSION I cannot agree with the reading of nonexistent ambiguity into a clearly worded statute. Simply because the Third District and the majority have stated that section 948.03(5)(a)(7) "is undeniably susceptible to multiple and irreconcilable interpretations" does not make it so....

...Legislature has maintained the total prohibition against convicted sex offenders "viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material" during the term of their probation or community control. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. BELL, J., dissenting. I dissent for two reasons. First, this Court has no jurisdiction over this case. Second, the majority's holding is contrary to readily discernible legislative intent. As I will show, the Legislature intended section 948.03(5)(a)(7) to prohibit supervised sex offenders from accessing obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material. In addition to this broad antipornography ban, the Legislature intended section 948.03(5)(a)(7) to prohibit these offenders from utilizing telephone, electronic media, computer programs, and computer services that are relevant to their deviant behavior pattern....

...As the Third District correctly noted, the Second District's decision in Taylor did not expressly address the same question of law the Third District addressed in Kasischke, 946 So.2d at 1161. Specifically, the Second District in Taylor "only required that the probationary condition track the statutory language of section 948.03(5)(a)(7)" but "did not address whether or not the phrase `relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern' modified the ban on viewing or possessing pornographic material." Kasischke, 946 So.2d at 1161....

...ve intent using traditional tools). B. Applying This Customary Approach to the Statute Considered as a whole, including (1) the title, (2) the existing status of the law and the history of the statutory *829 change, and (3) the evil to be corrected, section 948.03(5)(a)(7) unambiguously reveals the Legislature's intent that, unless the offender's treatment plan provides otherwise, a sex offender probationer or community controllee is prohibited from viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material....

...ewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. (1999). The 1997 session law enacting section 948.03(5)(a)(7) reveals the changes made to the 1995 statute....

...r vehicle alone without prior approval; prohibiting such offender from obtaining or using a post office box without prior approval; amending s. 948.001, F.S.; defining the terms "sex offender probation" and "sex offender community control"; amending s. 948.03, F.S.; requiring a curfew between specified hours; providing alternatives; revising requirements for treatment for sex offenders; revising a provision that prohibits a sex offender from viewing, owning, or possessing certain materials; proh...

...251, 23 So.2d 265 (1945)); see also Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981); Foley v. State, ex rel. Gordon, 50 So.2d 179, 184 (Fla.1951). In this case, the title to chapter 97-328 answers the question the majority says is dispositive, namely "which part of [section 948.03(5)(a)(7)] is modified by the phrase `relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern.'" Majority op. at 806. The title to chapter 97-308 states in its relevant part that the Legislature amended section 948.03(5)(g) (postamendment section 948.03(5)(a)(7)) to "[revise] a provision that prohibits a sex offender from viewing, owning, or possessing certain materials; [prohibit] a sex offender from possessing telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's behavior pattern." Ch....

...The Existing State of the Law and the History of the Statutory Amendment The previous version of the statute read: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material. § 948.03(5)(g), Fla....

...Not only is it contrary to what the session law title unambiguously reveals, there is also absolutely nothing in the 1997 amendment's history to suggest any intention to *831 relax the preexisting blanket ban on obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating material. Indeed, the opposite is true: The Legislature amended section 948.03(5)(g) (postamendment 948.03(5)(a)(7)) to improve the effectiveness of supervising sex offenders in the community by (1) retaining the broad prohibition against obscene or pornographic materials by leaving that language unchanged; (2) changing the phrase "sexually explici...

...he sentencing court in order for a sex offender to contact the victim; and (4) requiring approval by the sentencing court in order for an offender to engage in unsupervised contact with a child, if certain other conditions are met. Id. Together with section 948.03(5)(a)(7), these measures constitute a comprehensive scheme to fortify community containment of sex offenders. Read in this context, it is apparent that the Legislature amended section 948.03(5)(g) (postamendment 948.03(5)(a)(7)) to expand, rather than limit, the existing prohibition....

...This reasoning that the 1997 change was intended to expand the scope of prohibition, not to retract it as the majority holds, is even more compelling when one considers the evil to be corrected. 3. The Evil to be Corrected As I will explain, the 1997 amendments to section 948.03(5)(a)(7) seek to minimize reoffense by improving the statutory "containment process." Specifically, according to the sponsor of the senate bill that resulted in the session law, the purpose of the changes was to "implement the recommen...

..., therefore, are an integral part of the assault pattern." Id. Accordingly, treatment providers and supervising officers should instill in offenders "the dictum that deviant attitudes and fantasies are not acceptable." Id. In light of the purpose of section 948.03, and especially of the critical role thoughts and fantasies play in preventing reoffense, the majority's supposition that "the 1997 amendment seems intended [by the Legislature] to narrow the prohibition's scope" is clearly erroneous....

...e victim until the boy ejaculated in the defendant's mouth. Additionally, the defendant masturbated in the boy's presence. Kasischke v. State, 946 So.2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Dr. Kasischke agreed to plead guilty. His plea agreement included section 948.03(5)(a)(7) as a standard condition of his two years of community control and eight years of probation that would follow his 364 days in jail....

...Kasischke does not dispute that the video he possessed was pornographic and obscene and that the video showed a young male having oral and anal sex with other males. Instead, Dr. Kasischke disputes whether his possession of this videotape violated section 948.03(5)(a)(7)....

...Thus, the defendant contends that, since the defendant was convicted of a sexual offense on a minor under sixteen years of *834 age, the State must prove that the pornographic material involved a minor under sixteen for a community control violation to be found. Id. at 1157. The majority agrees with Dr. Kasischke that section 948.03(5)(a)(7) only prohibits a community supervised sex offender from viewing or possessing obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating material that is relevant to his "deviant behavior pattern." [35] In other words, to prove that Dr. Kasischke violated his community control condition imposed under section 948.03(5)(a)(7), the State has to establish that the pornographic material he possessed was relevant to his "deviant behavior pattern." What does this mean in practical terms? Does the State now have to establish the existence of a particular...

...The statute is intended to prohibit offenders like Dr. Kasischke from possessing any pornography. [36] And if Dr. Kasischke's use of any "telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services" is relevant *835 to his deviant behavior pattern, as of 1997, section 948.03(5)(a)(7) prohibits any such usage. IV. CONCLUSION After considering the statute as a whole, including the title, the state of the existing law and the history of the statutory change, and the evil to be addressed, it is clear that the 1997 amendments to section 948.03(5)(a)(7) were never intended to narrow the preexisting ban on sex offenders' "viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating material." Instead, these amendments were clearly intended to (1) revise th...

...n ill-defined "particular deviant behavior pattern." Accordingly, if jurisdiction is retained, I would approve the result of the Third District decision in Kasischke and disapprove the Second District's decision in Taylor to the extent it interprets section 948.03(5)(a)(7) as not imposing a blanket ban....

...the offender's "deviant behavior pattern." Bell, J., dissenting op. at 834-835. However, his argument ignores that the condition at issue is not required where the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program provides otherwise. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...We note that even under Justice Bell's view, Florida courts would be required to determine what "telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services" are "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern." [9] In 2004, the Legislature transferred the language contained in the 1999 version of section 948.03(5)(a)(7) to section 948.30(1)(g), Florida Statutes....

...the definitions supplied in 18 U.S.C. § 2256. See, e.g., Simmons, 343 F.3d at 82 ("When the references to minors are omitted [from 18 U.S.C. § 2256], what remains is the definition of the broader category of pornography[.]"). A similar cabining of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (1999), and sections 948.30(1)(g), and 947.1405(7)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (2007), is possible through selective reference to the definitions contained in section 847.001, Florida Statutes....

...[28] The majority also places great reliance upon a model provision of sexual-offender conditional release outlined in the NIJ report. See majority op. at 811. However, the language of that model provision reflects the majority's desired judicial rewrite of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), rather than the statute that the Legislature actually adopted....

...If the Legislature truly intended for that model provision to govern in Florida then it would have simply adopted that language; however, it did not do so. Furthermore, the language, grammatical organization, and punctuation of the model provision and that of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (1999), are materially different, not "strikingly similar." Majority op....

...wing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material—including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services—that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...Narrowing the scope of prohibited materials to that which is "relevant" to the offender's deviant behavior pattern substantially increases the risk of supervised sex offenders accessing material that will stimulate them to commit new crimes. This risk is wholly unnecessary because section 948.03(5)(a)(7) clearly was never intended to apply so narrowly....

...Reyes appeals the demal of his dispositive motion to suppress evidence and the imposition of certain conditions of probation and court costs. We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. We further affirm condition 12 of Mr. Reyes' written probation order because that condition is statutorily mandated, § 948.03(1)(i), Fla....

...t section only authorizes costs upon conviction. Knaus v. State, 608 So.2d 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Clinger v. State, 533 So.2d 315 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Nevertheless, a trial court may impose comparable costs as a special condition of probation under section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Section 28.241 does not authorize the assessment of $250 in this case. Because Mr. Reyes was placed on probation, we have considered whether this assessment could be authorized as a special condition of probation relating to his rehabilitation. See Knaus, 608 So.2d 557; Clinger, 533 So.2d 315. We conclude that section 948.03(5) cannot be read so liberally as to permit this kind of local assessment. As explained in section IV of this opinion, we have employed a similar interpretation of section 948.03(5) to permit the assessment of costs of prosecution in cases in which adjudication is withheld....

...The trial court ordered Mr. Reyes to spend 200 hours in community service. He has not challenged that condition of his probation. Arguably, if the court has the power to order Mr. Reyes to spend 200 hours painting a courtroom as community service, see § 948.031, Fla....

...ctly or indirectly by the defendant's offense, unless it finds reasons not to order such restitution. Restitution may be monetary or nonmonetary restitution. The court shall make the payment of restitution a condition to probation in accordance with s. 948.03....

...On appeal, the Court held that the state had not presented sufficient evidence of the value of the items and thus the degree of the crime, whether grand or petit larceny, had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. [3] Where restitution is a condition of probation, section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), is applicable and states that the probationer may be required to "[m]ake reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the...

...We thus have no constitutional difficulty with the conditions imposed, if they are otherwise valid conditions of probation. The statutory authorization for imposition of probation merely provides that "(t)he court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation... ." Section 948.03(1), Fla....

...This is a petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal reported at 296 So.2d 519 (Fla.App.3d 1974), upon its certified question. The question involves probation which is preceded by a specified period of jail time and requires a construction of Sections 948.01(4), 948.03, and 948.06, Florida Statutes (1973)....

...on after serving such period as may be imposed by the court." [emphasis added] Irrespective of this amendment, the issue raised by the prior law is still one of public interest because of defendants now on probation pursuant to its prior provisions. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1973), prescribes the terms and conditions of probation and specifically authorizes the trial court to add such other conditions as it considers proper. It further grants to the trial judge the authority to rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions of probation imposed by the court upon the probationer. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1973), allows the trial judge upon revocation of probation to impose any sentence which might have been originally imposed before placing the defendant on probation....

...oking his probation and sentencing him to three years in the state prison pursuant to Section 948.06, Florida Statutes. The Second District affirmed. Previously, in State v. Williams, 237 So.2d 69 (Fla.App.2d 1970), the Second District had held that Section 948.03, Florida Statutes, was sufficiently broad to allow a condition which required the defendant to spend sixty days in jail each year of a twenty-year probation....

...the split sentence probation alternative. We hold that the trial courts of this state have the general authority to require incarceration as a condition of probation for felony and misdemeanor offenses pursuant to the general condition provisions of Section 948.03, Florida Statutes, and the reasoning and authorities contained in Washington v....

...We find no legislative intent to require an initial imposition of the total sentence. [3] We further hold that a defendant must be given credit for the time spent in jail pursuant to the split sentence probation order whether it is imposed pursuant to Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, or as a condition of probation under Section 948.03, Florida Statutes....

...ew. I therefore respectfully dissent. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(1), (3), Fla. Const. [2] See Chapters 921 and 922, Florida Statutes. [3] Our interpretation herein is consistent with the provisions of RCrP 3.790. [4] The order is governed by Sections 948.03 and 948.06, Florida Statutes (1973), and the trial judge is not restricted by the sixty-day provision of RCrP 3.800....

...The defense challenged the propriety of setting a sum for restitution without "a hearing and opportunity to be fully heard as to the amount." In disposing of the motion to correct illegal sentence, the trial court passed on the constitutionality of Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction. Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. The trial court included the restitution condition in the order of probation, citing Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...e in an amount to be determined by the court." (emphasis supplied). Both appellant and appellee concur, however, *1022 in the view "that said condition of probation is not authorized by this subsection of the statute." We are likewise persuaded that Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1975), does not authorize the restitution condition imposed in this case....

...There is no basis in the record for distinguishing between injuries sustained in either of the collisions from aggravation of those injuries attributable to such delay, if any, in securing medical attention as the appellant may have caused. The State argues that the language of Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1975), supplies the authorization for the restitution condition, which is lacking in subsection one....

...Inasmuch as the State concedes that "the damage or loss incurred by the aggrieved parties was caused by the auto accident itself, not by the defendant's criminal offense of leaving the scene of the accident," there would be no point in conducting a hearing on remand, in the present case. Accordingly, we find Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975), constitutional; we reverse the order appealed and remand the case for resentencing....

...on 775.089 because such a holding would risk requiring Glaubius to pay a sum in excess of the amount of damages his criminal conduct caused the victim. See, e.g., Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1977) (in reviewing constitutionality of section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975) (governing probation conditions), court held that condition of probation requiring probationer to pay money to, and for benefit of, victim of crime cannot require payment in excess of amount of damage criminal conduct caused victim)....

...We conclude *1066 that the modification order did not violate the double jeopardy clause. To begin with, probation is "a form of community supervision requiring specified contacts with parole and probation officers and other terms and conditions as provided in s. 948.03." § 948.001(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). See generally Larson v. State, 572 So.2d 1368, 1370-72 (Fla. 1991). Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1987), confers broad authority on the trial court to "determine the terms and conditions of probation... ." Id. § 948.03(1)....

...The statute also provides: "The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding such other or others as it considers proper. The court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions theretofore imposed... ." Id. § 948.03(7)....

...and is not prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. So far we have accepted for purposes of discussion Lippman's contention that the no-victim-or-minor-sibling-contact limitation was a new term of his probation, added by the modification order. See § 948.03(7), Fla....

...We also held in Tomlinson, however, that a restriction prohibiting a defendant "from visiting places where certain substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used" was appropriate as constituting a more precise definition of the general condition of probation authorized by section 948.03(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1991), which prohibits association "with persons engaged in criminal activities." 645 So.2d at 1 (emphasis in original)....

...1st DCA 1992) (requirement that defendant receive drug evaluation and screening and any necessary treatment "is a standard condition of probation that can be imposed on any probationer, irrespective of whether it reasonably relates to the type of offense. See section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.); ......

...law. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. RYDER, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 794.041(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). [3] See, e.g., § 948.03, Fla....

...Additionally the court imposed probation upon the appellant in accordance with an order of probation entered the same date. F.S. Section 948.01(1), F.S.A. The order of probation was for a term of seven years and contained the standard conditions substantially similar to those set forth in F.S. Section 948.03, F.S.A....

...(2011)); (2) when the State or the victim attempts to enforce the restitution order (§ 775.089(5), (6)(b), Fla. Stat.); and (3) if the defendant is placed on probation, when the trial court considers revoking probation based on the defendant's failure to pay restitution as ordered (§§ 948.032, 948.06(5), Fla....

...o order restitution in addition to any punishment unless it finds "clear and compelling reasons" not to do so. § 775.089(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). The court is also required to make payment of restitution a condition of probation in accordance with section 948.03, Florida Statutes (2011). That section, entitled "Terms and conditions of probation," states that the trial court "shall" make "restitution a condition of probation, unless it determines that clear and compelling reasons exist to the contrary." § 948.03(1)(f), Fla. Stat. Further, under both sections 775.089(1)(b)1. and 948.03(1)(f), if the court "does not order restitution or orders restitution of only a portion of the damages ......

...We thus turn to the statutes that govern restitution as a condition of probation, which is where the probationer's liberty may be affected by the failure to pay. For a defendant placed on probation, "any restitution ordered under s. 775.089 shall be a condition of the probation." § 948.032, Fla. Stat. (2011). If the defendant fails to comply with the order, the court may revoke probation. Id. The probationer's financial resources are considered when the trial court is determining whether to revoke probation. Significantly, section 948.032, Florida Statutes, provides: "In determining whether to revoke probation, the court shall consider the defendant's employment status, earning ability, and financial resources; the willfulness of the defendant's failure to pay; and any...

...The problem with section 948.06(5) is not what is in the statute, but rather what is not. Section 948.06(5) can be reconciled with Stephens and Bearden by simply reading into the statute the recognized element that there must be evidence presented of willfulness and construing it in pari materia with section 948.032, Florida Statutes (2011), which requires the trial court, when revoking probation, to consider the probationer's employment status, earning ability, financial resources, willfulness of failure to pay, and any other special circumstances that may have a bearing on the probationer's ability to pay....

...under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.570). Lastly, when a defendant is placed on probation by a trial court, the trial court is required to condition that probation on compliance with any restitution order issued pursuant to section 775.089. See § 948.032, Fla....

...Only when a trial court has placed a defendant on probation, and that defendant faces revocation due to an alleged failure to adhere to a restitution order, will that defendant endure the burden of a clear and convincing standard to establish an inability to pay. See §§ 948.032, .06....

...State, 553 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), except that Ford did not admit a violation of community control. As in Holcombe, the district court reversed the order modifying community control and the order revoking probation. Ford, 553 So.2d at 1341. [3] We recognize that section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes (1987), permits the court to "rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions theretofore imposed by it upon the probationer or offender in community control." However, that statute is not applicable here because the court did not modify a term or condition previously imposed....

...[2] Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court below, and disapprove Turner to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur. GRIMES, J., did not participate in this case. NOTES [1] Where restitution is a condition of probation, section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), is also applicable and states that the probationer may be required to "[m]ake reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the court." (Emphasis added)....

...Further, the condition was not announced in open court. We find that the portion of condition six prohibiting appellant from visiting places where certain substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used is valid. This restriction is valid as a more precise defining of conduct prohibited under section 948.03(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1991), which states as an accepted condition of probation that an offender may "not associate with persons engaged in criminal activities." This portion of condition six requires appellant not to associate with...

...The reason why the order of probation is insufficient as a predicate for this appeal lies in the fact any one or more of the following contingencies may occur: (1) The Circuit Court may at any time rescind or modify any of the terms or conditions of probation imposed upon the appellant (F.S. § 948.03, F.S.A.)....

...As the record reflects that none of these conditions was pronounced in open court, the written order should ordinarily be conformed to delete them. See id. This is true in the appellant's case with one exception, the condition for random drug screening. Section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...[3] Other cases have added further limitations upon conditions of probation by holding that such conditions must relate to the specific crime for which the offender has been convicted and must be directed to only diminishing his inclination to commit similar crimes. [4] Probation is solely a creature of statute. Section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1979), expressly authorizes the sentencing court to impose nine enumerated conditions of probation in every case, many of which conditions bear no reasonable relationship to any particular crime. Thus, this statute implies that there need be no relationship between conditions of probation as such and the particular crime of which the probationer stands convicted. In addition, section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979), expressly provides that the enumeration of the specific conditions shall not prevent the sentencing court from adding other conditions as it considers proper....

...with greater respect for the person and property rights of others and self-discipline enabling him to keep his resolutions. To accomplish the latter purpose is the true purpose of conditions of probation. Accordingly, the correct rule should be that section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979), authorizes conditions of probation of the same general kind, class and nature [5] as does section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes, and which to the sentencing judge appear reasonable and proper to accomplish the purposes sought to be achieved. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes, does not require that the trial judge specify his reasons for imposing conditions of probation, but a cautious trial judge may see fit to do so in the event an appellate court undertakes to review for substance and reasonableness....

...ly supervise and monitor the evaluation and counseling. The condition as articulated by the court does not unlawfully delegate to the probation officer the judicial responsibility of setting terms and conditions of probation. Appellant suggests that section 948.03(6), Florida Statutes (1987), provides the *814 proper method for ordering diagnosis and treatment of offenders thought to need mental health services. Appellant misreads section 948.03(6), which applies solely to probationers or offenders in community control who have committed certain pedophilic offenses. The statute requires that, once a court makes a determination that treatment is necessary, it shall order outpatient counseling as a term or condition of the probation or community control. Section 948.03 enumerates a non-exhaustive list of specific kinds of terms and conditions of probation or community control that a court may impose. While alcohol, drug and psychological evaluation and counseling is not specifically included in the list, section 948.03(7) provides that the court may add other terms and conditions as it considers proper....

...cers to conduct a warrantless search of the probationer's home. However, under Florida law a condition which permits probation supervisors to visit a probationer's home is a standard condition of probation which may be included in a probation order. § 948.03(1)(b), Fla....

...[6] If the court does not order restitution, or orders restitution of only a portion of the damages, the court is required by statute to "state on the record in detail the reasons thereof." § 775.089(1)(b) 1. [7] In addition to section 775.089(1), section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1999), also imposes this requirement. 948.03 Terms and conditions of probation or community control.— .......

...for the same offense, the court's disapproval in Bosso of "piecemeal punishments" is not applicable. As we have stated before, payment of a fine and intermittent imprisonment are usually not thought of as conditions of probation. However, Fla. Stat. § 948.03(2), F.S.A....

...Patterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. NIMMONS, Judge. Ballance appeals from an order of the trial court which: (1) determined that Occidental Chemical Company is an "aggrieved party" for purposes of restitution as a condition of probation under Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1981), and established a total amount of loss sustained by Occidental; (2) delegated to the appellant's probation officer the responsibility of determining, from time to time, appellant's ability to pay all or...

...Appellant, however, argues that Occidental is not named in the information as a victim, that MacArthur is the only victim in the case, and that MacArthur has not reimbursed, nor is he obligated to reimburse, Occidental for the security costs incurred by Occidental. Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1981), provides: (1) The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation and may include among them the following, that the probationer shall: * * * * * * (g) Make reparation or restitution to the a...

...s caused by the defendant's offense, if the defendant is able or will be able to make such restitution. Restitution may be monetary or nonmonetary restitution. The court may make the payment of restitution a condition to probation in accordance with s. 948.03....

...There, the defendants in a lottery conspiracy case were ordered, as a condition of probation, to pay restitution in the amount of $14,000 toward the cost of investigation. On appeal, the appellants contended that the trial court's order was not authorized by Section 948.03 because such could not properly be regarded as "restitution to an aggrieved party." The Third District rejected that contention and accepted the state's assertion that "the public, upon which the expense of the investigation ultimately is imposed, is the aggrieved party in this circumstance." Compare Brenner v....

...348 So.2d 944 (condition of probation requiring payment of police investigative costs sustained where defendants had agreed to such condition). If the public can be regarded as an aggrieved party for purposes of requiring payment of investigative costs as a probation condition under Section 948.03, we perceive no valid reason why we should not construe that section to accord aggrieved party status to a private entity such as Occidental under the circumstances of this case....

...ether we are having a violation of either the Community Control or the probation. A yes answer to either of those questions or a no answer which indicates deception would form the basis for a violation of community control or probation in this case. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1993) establishes that probationers may be subject to a variety of requirements, such as mandatory drug or alcohol testing, that would significantly interfere with their rights or liberties in other contexts....

...State, 535 So.2d 359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); see also Jackson v. State, 615 So.2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Newton v. State, 603 So.2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by imposing "standard conditions" of probation provided in section 948.03(1), and contained in the probation order, which were not orally pronounced at sentencing, because he was specifically placed on "drug offender" probation, pursuant to section 948.01(13)(a)....

...eatment, if deemed appropriate by your Officer. (13) You will report to your Officer daily if not employed full-time or a full-time student. Appellant contends that conditions (1) through (9) are patterned after the terms and conditions set forth in section 948.03, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which pertain to "probation" and "community control." He alleges that drug offender probation is separate and distinct from probation and community control since it is defined separately in section 948.00...

...Oral pronouncement, in either case, is not required. See generally State v. Hart, 668 So.2d 589 (Fla.1996); State v. Beasley, 580 So.2d 139, 142 (Fla.1991). In this case, conditions (1), (2), (3), (5), (7), (8), and (9) are statutorily authorized standard conditions under section 948.03....

...Hence this basis for the revocation cannot be upheld. See also Page v. State, 363 So.2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Jones v. State, 360 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Freiberger v. State, 343 So.2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Bienz v. State, 343 So.2d 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); § 948.03(1)(e), Fla....

...to prison for fourteen months. The condition of probation violated required appellant to make a full and truthful report to his probation supervisor not later than the fifth day of each month. This condition is common to almost every probation. See Section 948.03, Florida Statutes....

...A "special condition" of probation not pronounced orally at the sentencing hearing cannot be included in the written order. See, e.g., McCollun v. State, 586 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Rowland v. State, 548 So.2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). However, "standard conditions" of probation ( i.e., those listed in Section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes) may be included in the written order even if they are not pronounced orally at the sentencing hearing....

...State, 585 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). With the exception of the words "at your own expense" (which we conclude amount to a special condition of probation), Condition (12) of the written probation order is consistent with the standard condition of probation set forth as Section 948.03(1)(j)1., Florida Statutes (Supp....

...f the remaining charges and a true split sentence of 158 months' incarceration, which was completely suspended and replaced with ten years' probation. The terms of probation included the mandatory sex offender *1220 probation conditions set forth in section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1997), including the requirement that Lynom actively participate in and successfully complete an outpatient sex offender treatment program....

...2d DCA 1994). Because it was not orally pronounced in this case, it is stricken. Finally, the appellant challenges the portion of condition ten that requires him to submit to random alcohol testing. Condition ten is a general condition set forth in section 948.03(1)(j)1, Florida Statutes (1991), and may be imposed in any case without being orally pronounced....

...Pursuant to a plea agreement, Woodson entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of lewd and lascivious battery in exchange for dismissal of the other two charges and a downward departure sentence of 51 weeks of incarceration followed by three years of supervised sex offender probation, pursuant to section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes. [1] Specifically, Woodson was ordered to comply with the following conditions, which closely parrot the provisions of sections 948.03(5)(a)3. and 948.03(5)(b)4., Florida Statutes (2000): [2] You will actively participate in and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program with therapists specifically trained to treat sex offenders, at your own expense....

...the trial court for compliance; no limits were set for the number of attempts at compliance; and after his first failure at compliance, he expressed a willingness to try again. We reject Woodson's arguments based on our analysis of the provisions of section 948.03(5) and the goals to be accomplished through the imposition of the various conditions of sex offender probation mandated by that statute....

...4th DCA 1998), involved imposition of the batterer's intervention program. In contrast, in a case involving sex offender probation, the trial court must impose certain legislatively mandated conditions; the statute does not allow for judicial discretion. § 948.03(5), Fla....

...rds in the future; 2) society will be protected from further criminal conduct by the offender; and 3) the rights of the crime victim will be protected. In order to achieve these goals in certain cases involving sex offenders, the Legislature enacted section 948.03(5)....

...While the Legislature has clearly indicated that the emphasis of sex offender probation is treatment of the offender, [7] the concomitant goals of rehabilitation and protection of society once the sex offender is released on supervision may only be accomplished if the offender undertakes immediate treatment, as required by section 948.03(5)(a)3....

...at a later date, opens the door to mischievous manipulation by the offender and thwarts all of the goals of probation. The same rationale applies to the requirement that the offender give the results of a mandatory HIV test to the victim pursuant to section 948.03(5)(b)4....

...Ordering a time limit for compliance should not be necessary. Our conclusion that the Legislature intended immediate compliance, without specification of time or number of attempts by the trial court, is strongly supported by an analysis of the other mandatory conditions required under section 948.03(5)....

...f New Jersey. He also had prior convictions for burglary, trafficking in stolen property, and battery. [2] The record contains an exhibit, signed by Woodson, specifically listing these conditions and all of the sex offender conditions required under section 948.03....

...pervision, with or without electronic monitoring, which emphasizes treatment and supervision of a sex offender in accordance with an individualized treatment plan administered by an officer who has a restricted caseload and specialized training. [8] § 948.03(5)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2000). [9] §§ 948.03(5)(a)2. & 6., Fla. Stat. (2000). [10] § 948.03(5)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (2000) [11] § 948.03(5)(a)8., Fla....

...," and he refers to the federal law on the subject and relevant statutes of the states of New York, California, and Nebraska. These do appear to allow such procedure, but the authority *Page 324 for it found in them does not appear in our law. True, Section 948.03 , Florida Statutes 1941, and F.S.A., enumerates the terms of probation, then provides that such others as the court considers proper may be included, giving considerable latitude to the judge in fixing the conditions by which the convi...

...2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). We believe a trial court has the power to provide as a condition of probation that a defendant pay a reasonable sum as attoney's fees to the State for the services of a public defender under the broad grant of authority contained in § 948.03, F.S....

...Although the State argues that Brock v. State, 688 So.2d 909 (Fla.1997), supports the imposition of the conditions, its reliance on that case is misplaced because it involved the condition of random alcohol and drug testing, which is a general condition of probation authorized under section 948.03, Florida Statutes (2002)....

...That being true, no costs of prosecution can be included and entered in the judgment against such person because no judgment is rendered and the defendant is not a "convicted person" within the statute. However, this appeal poses a further relevant question: Does the sentencing court have the discretion under section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes, to require the defendant to pay the costs of prosecution as a term or condition of probation? The only statutory limit provided in section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes, is that if the court withholds adjudication of guilt, any period of incarceration imposed as a condition of probation or community control cannot exceed 364 days in certain facilities....

...Under section 948.011, Florida Statutes, a court may withhold an adjudication of guilt and place a defendant on probation and still, in its discretion, impose a fine. If a trial court can, in its discretion, impose a fine when adjudication is withheld, under section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes, it should be able to require the payment of costs of prosecution as a condition of probation in the absence of some statutory or constitutional prohibition....

...such costs arise from the commission of an offense and are therefore reasonably related to it. *317 Accordingly, the imposition of costs of prosecution as a condition of probation, even when the court withholds adjudication of guilt, is valid under section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes, although not mandated under section 939.01(1), Florida Statutes....

...In State v. Jones, 327 So.2d 18, 24 (Fla. 1976), we stated: "We hold that the trial courts of this state have the general authority to require incarceration as a condition of probation for felony and misdemeanor offenses pursuant to the general conditions of Section 948.03, Florida Statutes." The actual holding in Jones, however, was that a defendant placed on probation pursuant to section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973), who subsequently violates that probation may be sentenced to imprisonment by the...

...limited purpose of eligibility for parole under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979). After making these pronouncements, the majority opinion held that incarceration, pursuant to the split sentence alternatives found in sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), which equals or exceeds one year is invalid and stated that this applies to incarceration as a condition of probation as well as to incarceration followed by a specified period of probation....

...r. See Rowland v. State, 548 So.2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). However, we find that the further requirement that the appellant submit to blood, breathalyzer, and urinalysis examinations did not need to be orally pronounced, because it is authorized by section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes....

...es of his actions, and was provided an opportunity to be heard and to raise any objections at the sentencing hearing. Because the requirement that the appellant submit to blood, breathalyzer, and urinalysis examinations accords with the provision of section 948.03(1)(j) for "random testing," it is a standard condition of probation, and under the rationale of Beasley it does not need to be orally pronounced. This standard condition may be imposed regardless of whether it is directly related to the circumstances of the appellant's offense, because it is one of the conditions which is made applicable to any probationer under section 948.03. See Ward v. State, 511 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Although some standard conditions may still depend on the circumstances of the offense (e.g., see section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes, providing for restitution "for the damage or loss caused"), section 948.03(1)(j) is not limited in this manner. Even though random drug testing is authorized by section 948.03(1)(j), in Seawright v. State, 572 So.2d 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), it was described as a special condition of probation which needs to be orally pronounced. However, the opinion in Seawright does not refer to section 948.03(1)(j), and does not indicate whether this provision, which was adopted by chapter 88-122, *399 section 71, Laws of Florida, was applicable to the proceedings in that case....

...We think that this right to require reports affirmatively appears from the provisions of Section 948.02, Florida Statutes (1975). Nevertheless, it also appears that it is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the court to set the terms and conditions upon which a probationer's probation may be revoked. See Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975); and Kominsky v....

...The order revoking appellant's probation is reversed with directions to the court to remand appellant to the Department of Offender Rehabilitation for the continuation of his probation under the conditions as originally set out or for the assumption of additional conditions that the court may find proper. See Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The legislature has determined that all those who are placed on community supervision for, inter alia, committing a lewd and lascivious act must as a condition of that supervision participate in and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program at their own expense. § 948.03(5)(a), Fla....

...fty hours of community service. Appellee responds that while the community service condition is a special, additional penalty created by the legislature, D.U.I. probation otherwise is no different than *125 any other form of probation. [2] We agree. Section 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (1985), which permits the sentencing court to fashion special conditions of probation, does not distinguish between felony, misdemeanor, and criminal traffic offenses, or between county and circuit courts....

...er a legal order setting forth the conditions of the probation, and therefore, appellant could not legally have his probation revoked. The authority of the court to place defendant on probation is found in Chapter 948 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Section 948.03 provides that the court shall set the terms and conditions of the probation....

...It is clear that the conditions set forth were to apply in all of the cases. We find no prejudicial error. The judgments and sentences in cases numbered 60-8189, 60-8190 and 60-8208 are reversed and the judgment and sentence in case numbered 61-1833 is affirmed. NOTES [1] § 948.03 Fla....

...ause the State failed to demonstrate that drug and alcohol use were related to his past or future criminal conduct. Id. at 1016. Rather, the district court approved the imposition of the new condition, relying on the reference to such a condition in section 948.03(1)(k)1., Florida Statutes (1995), [2] and Hayes v....

...be imposed on any probationer, irrespective of whether it reasonably relates to the type of offense"). In this case, Brock, unlike Biller, was subject to a general condition of probation requiring random alcohol and drug testing imposed pursuant to section 948.03 [4] rather than a special condition prohibiting alcohol consumption....

...imposing community control. Brock, 667 So.2d at 1015. A statutorily authorized condition of probation or community control may be included in a written order without being orally pronounced at sentencing. State v. Hart, 668 So.2d 589 (Fla.1996). [2] Section 948.03(1) reads in pertinent part: (1) The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation or community control.......

...[4] Brock does not contest that the new condition imposing random drug and alcohol testing was a statutorily authorized, i.e., "general" condition, as opposed to a special condition, of community control. See also Hart, 668 So.2d at 592 (stating that "standard or general conditions" are those contained in sections 948.03-.34, Florida Statutes)....

...ng, including alcohol. However, as we have noted, the State's interest in supervising probationers is very broad. [6] In Nunez, the trial court ordered the defendant to submit to random alcohol testing as a general condition of probation pursuant to section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...bation without making a finding that he had the ability to pay. Restitution is a trial court option which may operate in conjunction with punishment, pursuant to Section 775.089(1), Florida Statutes (1983), or as a condition of probation pursuant to Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...n of those conditions. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Anthony violated conditions 1 and 5 of his community control. Concerning the alleged violations of condition 77 for failure to submit to electronic monitoring, section 948.03(3)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that "[t]he Department of Corrections may, at its discretion, electronically monitor an offender sentenced to community control." However, this provision does not give the Department the authority to impose electronic monitoring as a condition of community control....

...ar and, as a condition of such probation, shall order the defendant to participate in public service or a community work project for a minimum of 50 hours. * * * However, in no event may the total period of probation and incarceration exceed 1 year. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1991), deals generally with the conditions the court may impose as a component of the probation, saying in pertinent part as follows: (1) The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation * * * and may...

...e aspect to it. The hope that the sinner will sin no more, that he will be rehabilitated, does not compel the conclusion that he is relieved of the obligation to do penance for his past offenses. At least the Florida legislature did not think so. In section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1991), it specifically authorized trial judges to impose a period of incarceration as a condition of probation....

...That issue is whether a trial court may sua sponte impose standard conditions of probation on a defendant seventeen months after he was originally sentenced. We hold that it is impermissible to do so and, therefore, reverse the trial court's order which imposes the statutory conditions contained in section 948.03(5)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, as conditions of the sentence of probation imposed on Kevin Kiriazes (Kiriazes)....

...The sentence entered by the trial court reflects the imposition of the 51 weeks of jail followed by four years of probation conditioned upon the special terms contained in the plea agreement. Although oral pronouncement of the probation conditions specified by section 948.03(5) [1] for sex offenders is not required, in the instant case the conditions were neither imposed orally at sentencing nor in the written order of probation. Kiriazes served the incarcerative portion of his sentence and was released on probation when, on August 17, 2000, the trial court sua sponte rendered an order imposing the sex offender conditions of probation mandated by section 948.03(5)(a) and (b)....

...ntence where the original sentence was not illegal and more than 60 days had elapsed since its imposition. Resolution of this issue renders moot the other issues not addressed. The Failure To Include the Mandatory Conditions Of Probation Pursuant to Section 948.03(5) Did Not Render The Sentence Illegal Under Rule 3.800 Or Allow The Trial Court To Modify The Sentence Pursuant To Rule 3.800(c) The legal significance of designating the conditions contained in section 948.03(5) as standard conditions that do not require oral pronouncement at sentencing is based on the rationale that enactment of the statute provides all persons with constructive notice of the conditions *792 contained therein....

...nal legal sentence. See Syverson v. State, 659 So.2d 1344 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); see also State v. Sanderson, 625 So.2d 471 (Fla.1993). That time limit was not met in the instant case. Therefore, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose the section 948.03(5) conditions. Conclusion The trial court's initial failure to impose the standard conditions of probation mandated by section 948.03(5) resulted in an incomplete, but not illegal, sentence....

...More than sixty days had passed since the original sentence was imposed and thus, under rule 3.800(c), the trial court had no jurisdiction to correct the error. Accordingly, we reverse with the direction that the added conditions of probation be stricken. REVERSED. GRIFFIN and PALMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.03(5) makes certain conditions of probation standard with respect to offenders convicted of a violation of section 800.04, lewd act upon a child: (5) Conditions imposed pursuant to this subsection, as specified in paragraphs (a) and (b),...

...847.0145, the court must impose the following conditions in addition to all other standard and special conditions imposed.... (Emphasis added). Additional terms of probation for sex offenders who committed the offense after October 1997 are set forth in section 948.03(5)(b)....

...timony of other witnesses, including his brother, his cousin and his aunt. Barfield also argues that the three special conditions of his probation, [7] in both *566 cases, should be stricken because they were not orally pronounced at sentencing. See § 948.03(1), Fla....

...e judgment and sentence. [*] Following a hearing, he concluded that Appellant's failure to contact his probation officer and his commission of a new crime constituted willful and substantial violations of the general conditions of his probation. See § 948.03(1), Fla....

...n prison (with credit for time already served) for felony petit theft. Except in cases involving certain crimes other than the one here involved, a trial court has discretion to determine which general conditions to include in a probation order. See § 948.03(1), Fla....

...Accordingly, we quash the order of restitution and remand for entry of a revised order limited to damages for loss of the Winchester rifle. Order QUASHED; REMANDED. COWART and PETERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.019, Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] Section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes, provides that restitution for damages is to be made for the "damages or loss caused by [defendant's] offense." (emphasis supplied)

...In its holding the court speaks of incarceration as a condition of probation and incarceration under a split sentence as if they were similar judgments, referring to them both as "the so-called split sentence alternative." 396 So.2d at 1109. They conclude, as they have previously, [1] that section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979), allows a trial judge to include in a probation order any other proper conditions or terms not enumerated in the statute....

...h sentence. In such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence imposed upon the defendant, and direct that the defendant be placed upon probation after serving such period as may be imposed by the court. [3] "Section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1979), lists the terms and conditions of probation which may be imposed on a defendant. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979), states that the enumeration of the terms and conditions in subsection (1) does not prevent the imposition of other conditions the court may consider proper....

...el of an armed robbery. Nonetheless, by definition, probation envisions supervision and control by the department of corrections. Among other normal requirements of this supervision and control, is the duty to report to the probation supervisor [see section 948.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)]....

...has violated the conditions of her probation in a material respect by disregarding: Condition: 9 IT, THEREFORE, IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the probation of the aforesaid defendant, ought to be modified, and it is hereby modified in accordance with Section 948.03 Florida Statutes, in the following manner: ALL RESTITUTION SHALL BE PAID MONTHLY AT A RATE OF NO LESS THAN $440.00 THROUGH AND AS DIRECTED BY YOUR PROBATION OFFICER....

...r good faith or lack thereof. No proof was presented that Appellant was ordered to undertake any specific effort to obtain employment but willfully failed to do so. This unconditional mandate is distinguishable from the lawful condition set forth in section 948.03(1)(c), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the trial court to require a community control offender to "[w]ork faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible." Under these particular circumstances, which also fail to addres...

...disapproving Winkle. In State v. Jones, 327 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1976), we discussed the two ways by which a trial court may impose a split sentence. The trial judge has the general authority to impose incarceration as a condition of probation pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1973). Section 948.03 enumerates the conditions of probation which may be imposed, but does not include incarceration. However, section 948.03(4) provides "[t]he enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper," and it is under this provision that we found authority to impose incarceration as a condition of probation....

...McNulty v. State, 339 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (finding that the open-ended provision of 948.04(1) does not authorize probation for misdemeanors for an unlimited time). [2] In Chapter 85-288, section 15, Laws of Florida, the legislature amended section 948.03 and for the first time expressly recognized that incarceration may be a condition of probation. Section 948.03(4) was amended with the addition of following sentence: "However, if the court withholds adjudication of guilt or imposes a period of incarceration as a condition of probation or community control, the period shall not exceed 364 days...

...ion and restitution center under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, or a community residential facility owned or operated by the Salvation Army or any other private entity providing such services." In an entirely new section added to section 948.03, subsection (5)(b) states: "It is the intent of the Legislature that a county jail be used as the last available alternative for placement of an offender as a condition of probation." The legislative scheme, therefore, is that a misdem...

...al laws are not mandatory on trial judges." ( Bernhardt v. State, 288 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1974) and cases therein cited) F.S. 948.01(4) clearly provides that the granting of probation is permissive only and is within the discretion of the trial judge. F.S. 948.03 authorizes the judge to determine the terms and conditions of probation, specifically providing: "(2) The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper." Further, in Gryca v....

...nly when the incarceration is in the state prison, not to imprisonment in the county jail as a condition of community control. In the latter event, the imprisonment must necessarily be for a period of less than twelve months, in order to comply with section 948.03(7), (8)(a), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...a school, daycare center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate." Both conditions of supervision are now mandatory for individuals convicted of sexual battery upon a minor and other similar offenses, as was appellant. § 948.03(5)(a)2 & 6, Fla....

...caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense, unless it finds reasons not to order such restitution. Restitution may be monetary or nonmonetary restitution. The court shall make the restitution a condition of probation in accordance with s. 948.03....

...State, 553 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). We merely conclude that it is not the only way. The legislature could easily have prescribed fair market value at the time of the offense as the point from which the computation should begin; however, it did not do so. In fact, section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1987), which provides for victim restitution as a condition of community control, expressly leaves the determination of the amount of restitution to the discretion of the trial court....

...rt to order restitution to the victims of crimes for damages or loss caused directly or indirectly by a defendant's offense. Section 775.089(1)(a) also requires the court to make the payment of restitution a condition of probation in accordance with section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Following the logic of Van Tassel, we can discern no reason for denying credit for prior jail time to one confined as a condition of probation. A trial court is limited to imposing up to 364 days' incarceration in the county jail as a condition of probation on a felony conviction, § 948.03(7), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...The record clearly demonstrates that defendants entered into plea negotiations and freely agreed to pay their prorata share of the cost of the investigation as a condition of probation. Having consented to this arrangement, defendants will not be permitted to renege on their agreement. In addition, Section 948.03, Florida Statutes is sufficiently broad to allow for the imposition of intermittent imprisonment and payment of a fine as conditions of probation....

...In order to prove violation of the work condition, however, the State must show that failure to maintain or acquire employment was willful and not caused by circumstances beyond the probationer's control. Chatman v. State, 365 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); § 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing, certify the sentencing question as one of great public importance, and affirm the conviction. ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Although not presented as an error in this appeal, we note that under section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1993), a period of incarceration imposed as a condition of community control or probation cannot exceed 364 days.

...of probation for certain sex offenders. The condition at issue here — "[a]ctive participation in and successful completion of a sex offender treatment program" — is one such condition. See § 948.30(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007) (previously codified at § 948.03(5)(a)(3), Fla....

...fender probation is treatment of the offender, the concomitant goals of rehabilitation and protection of society once the sex offender is released on supervision may only be accomplished if the offender undertakes immediate treatment, as required by section 948.03(5)(a)3....

...Taylor was convicted of unlawful sexual activity with a minor under chapter 794, Florida Statutes (1997). Section 943.325(1), Florida Statutes (1997), requires any individual who has been convicted under that chapter to provide two DNA samples to FDLE. Section 948.03(10) and (11), Florida Statutes (1997), provides that as a condition of probation, any individual convicted for an offense under section 943.325 shall submit to the procedure, and shall reimburse the appropriate agency for the cost of drawing and transmitting the samples to FDLE....

...r sexually explicit material, violates his constitutional rights because it is not specific as to his particular deviant behavior. He also argues that this is a special condition which should be stricken because it was not orally pronounced. Because section 948.03 lists probation conditions for sexual offenses occurring on or after October 1, 1995, they are general conditions which need not be orally pronounced....

...order of probation should be more specific and relate to Taylor's particular *406 deviant behavior pattern. Accordingly, we affirm condition 29 but remand to the trial court so that the written condition can be modified to conform to the language of section 948.03(5)(a)(7)....

...f the investigation. Dealing with those contentions of appellants in reverse order of the statement thereof, we hold the contentions of error regarding said condition of probation and as to denial of the requested jury instruction are without merit. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975) provides that the court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation and may include among them certain conditions therein listed, one of which was to make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved pa...

...tly or indirectly by the defendant's offense, unless it finds reasons not to order such restitution. Restitution may be monetary or non-monetary restitution. The court shall make the payment of restitution a condition to probation in accordance with s. 948.03....

...ction shall be a condition of such probation or parole. The court may revoke probation, and the Parole and Probation Commission may revoke parole, if the defendant fails to comply with such order. §§ 775.089(1)(a), (b), and (4), Fla. Stat. (1985). Section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes, was also amended in 1984 regarding the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation as follows: 948.03 Terms and conditions of probation or community control....

...The court shall make such reparation or restitution a condition of probation, unless it determines that reasons exist to the contrary. If the court does not order restitution, or orders only partial restitution, it shall state on the record the reasons therefor. The intent of Section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes, is further explained in Section 948.032, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1984, follows: 948.032 Condition of probation; restitution....

...That order should be reversed and the imposition of restitution vacated. Nothing in the statutory provisions relating to restitution, as amended in 1984, "reflect[s] clear legislative mandate for imposition of restitution as a part of a sentence," as stated in the majority opinion at page 1350. Sections 775.089, 948.03, 948.032, and 921.187, Florida Statutes (1985), cited in the court opinion, leave the imposition of restitution as part of a criminal sentence to the discretion of the trial judge and only require that if full restitution is not ordered, the trial judge shall state on the record the reasons for not doing so....

...3.720(d)(1); Buiey v. State, 583 So.2d 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Although the trial judge did not orally pronounce the condition of probation requiring Fisher to submit to random drug testing, we nonetheless affirm this portion of the sentence, because section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1995) provides constructive notice of this condition and expressly states that it may be imposed without oral pronouncement....

...Beasley, 580 So.2d 139, 142 (Fla.1991). Condition 14 requires payment of $1.00 per month to First Step, Inc., which we have repeatedly held is unauthorized and must be stricken. See, e.g., Braggs v. State, 671 So.2d 304 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Effective July 1, 1995, section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes, allows such an assessment, but appellant committed the offense in question before the effective date of the amendment....

...on 8 June 1973 placed Patrick on probation for two years. On 3 June 1975, without notice or hearing, the court determined that Patrick had violated the conditions of his probation and extended the period of his probation for one year on authority of Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...it did not have authority to enter the order of 3 June 1975 finding Patrick in violation of his probation and extending the period by one year. The court denied the motion, revoked the probation, adjudged Patrick guilty and sentenced him to prison. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975), does not authorize the extension of the period of probation....

...osed upon the defendant, and direct that the defendant be placed upon probation after serving such period as may be imposed by the court." [4] Villery groups the split sentence of Section 948.01(4) and incarceration as a condition of probation under Section 948.03(2) together as the "split sentence alternatives." The distinction between these "alternatives," see Lewis v....

...One of the conditions of probation was that appellant serve the first year in the county jail. Appellant assigns the imposition of that condition as error. While the requirements that the probationer spend some time in jail or pay a fine are not usually thought of as conditions of probation, § 948.03(2), F.S., has been held to be sufficiently broad to allow the imposition of such conditions....

...home, rather this charge of theft was nolle prossed by the State. Appellant asserts therefore, that the $150.00 restitution award does not bear a significant relationship to the crime for which appellant was convicted, namely burglary of a dwelling. Section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1983) reads: 1....

...ur community control officer without a finding of violation of community control. The State responds that the trial court is not required to orally pronounce conditions at trial, or in the alternative, that only special conditions need be announced. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes, lists certain standard conditions of probation or community control which a trial court may impose, but, of the conditions imposed in Cleveland's case, only community service is specifically provided for by statute....

...the City of Fort Lauderdale. See Sections 168.08, 849.09 and 849.10, F.S.A. *698 The Courts of Florida by Chapter 948, F.S.A., are authorized to place defendants in criminal cases on probation rather than sentence them to prison for a term of years. Section 948.03, F.S.A., prescribes the terms and conditions the Courts of Florida may impose or set out in orders granting probation to defendants in criminal cases....

...Nelson also claims he should have been informed of the prohibition against being within 1,000 feet of a school or place where children congregate. We find no such prohibition in the Florida Statutes. Nelson did agree in the plea agreement to comply with the standard conditions of probation found in section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes, which includes provisions prohibiting him from living or having unsupervised contact with minors within 1,000 feet of places where children congregate, or from working in such environments....

...y one day the maximum which may be served as a condition of probation. Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1981), modinized by statute on other grounds as recognized in Van Tassel v. Coffman, 486 So.2d 528 (Fla. 1986); § 948.03(5), Fla....

...Second, before ordering restitution as a condition of probation, the trial judge should give the defendant notice of the proposed restitution order and allow the defendant the opportunity to be heard as to the amount of damage or loss caused by his offense. Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...rial violations. § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1977). We see no need to require the probation officer to appear before the court for sanction of valid supervisory directions. We also point out that the condition in question is specifically authorized by Section 948.03(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...A trial court's decision regarding withdrawal of a plea will generally not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Wiita, 744 So.2d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). [2] AFFIRMED. SHARP, W., and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.03(5)(a)(b), Fla.Stat....

...McCaskill has appealed, urging as error the failure to set restitution in a specific amount. We *665 find no error in the court's determination to require restitution by the defendant in this case. We are persuaded, however, that the court erred in not setting the amount to be paid by the defendant. Section 948.03(1)(e), Fla....

...th. When Purvis objected to imposition of this condition, the court offered to allow him to either withdraw his guilty plea or accept the condition. Purvis opted to accept the condition, reserving the right to appeal the imposition of the condition. Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1981), mandates that restitution as a condition of probation is to be made "to the aggrieved party" for the "loss caused by his [the probationer's] offense." Purvis' mother-in-law cannot be considered an "aggri...

...r. Moreover, even assuming that the money from the mother-in-law was a loan, not a gift, Purvis' debt was not "caused by his offense" within the meaning of subsection *1087 (1)(g). See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977). We are aware that section 948.03(3) provides that a court may add a condition of probation which "it considers proper." One might conclude at first glance that the restitution condition in question is within the purview of subsection (3) under the facts of this case....

...1st DCA 1991); Ballance v. State, 447 So.2d 974, 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Consequently, Jordan's probation officer exceeded his authority by substantially increasing the monthly amount Jordan was required to pay, more than doubling the original amount. Under Section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The judge also directed that McGowan be eligible for gain time under Sections 944.27, 29, Florida Statutes (1975). Trial courts of this state have the general authority to require incarceration as a condition of probation for felony offenses pursuant to the general condition provisions of Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...tion the requirement that he "[p]ay child support as per Civil Order." The appellant argues that the condition requiring payment of child support is not reasonably related to the offense charged, and, therefore, is an invalid condition of probation. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes, however, expressly authorizes the sentencing court to impose nine conditions of probation in every case....

...denied, 419 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1982), the Fifth District held that the statute implies that there need be no relationship between these enumerated conditions and the particular crime for which the probationer stands convicted. One of the enumerated conditions, stated in section 948.03(1)(f), requires the probationer to "[s]upport his legal dependents to the best of his ability." The trial court's order, requiring the appellant to pay child support, is essentially synonymous with the obligation to support one's dependents. Because such a requirement can be imposed on any probationer under section 948.03, regardless of the crime charged, it is unnecessary that the condition of payment of child support be reasonably related to the appellant's conviction of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon....

...We need not determine whether a defendant could, upon proper motion, have secured the production of this particular statement. The State contends that it must have been the affidavit for the issuance of the information, but that fact does not appear on this record. Defendant's second point does not present reversible error. Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1975), specifically gives the trial court authority to make restitution a condition of probation....

...ity control alleging that Rowan had failed to remain confined to his approved residence. On January 7, 1991, the trial court found that Rowan had violated his community control. The trial court then modified Rowan's community control *42 pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1991), to require two months' county jail as a condition of his community control....

...on to the victim for damage or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense, unless it finds reasons not to order such restitution... . The *237 court shall make the payment of restitution a condition to probation in accordance with s. 948.03. § 775.089(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987) (emphasis supplied). Section 948.03 states that the court may include the following as a condition of probation: (e) Make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the court. The court shall make such reparation or restitution a condition of probation, unless it determines that reasons exist to the contrary... . Section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes, 1987 (emphasis supplied)....

...The condition being imposed by the probation officer, the violation of it cannot serve as a basis for the revocation of probation.). We also reject the state's argument that appellant may be found to be in violation of probation for failure to submit to urinalysis because such testing accords with section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990). Section 948.03(1)(j) provides that the court may include, as a condition of probation, the requirement that the probationer "[s]ubmit to random testing as directed by the correctional probation officer ......

...Nothing in the record indicates that the agreed sum at the time of the stipulation was less than full restitution or, if less, that the circumstances of the defendant changed from the time of the stipulation to warrant his paying more restitution. The provisions of sections 775.089(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), and 948.03(e), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...A "special condition" of probation not pronounced orally at the sentencing hearing cannot be included in the written order. See, e.g., McCollun v. State, 586 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Rowland v. State, 548 So.2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). However, "standard conditions" of probation ( i.e., those listed in Section 948.03(1), Florida *976 Statutes) may be included in the written order even if they are not pronounced orally at the sentencing hearing....

...The portion of condition (8) that requires Kirkland to "work diligently at a lawful occupation" must be modified to read, "seek gainful employment." The portion of condition (8) that requires Kirkland to "support any dependents to the best of [his] ability," is a standard condition that need not be orally announced. § 948.03(1)(f), Fla....

...years, whichever is less. We interpret the above provision as applying to both probation and community control, since both community control and probation involve supervision. See section 948.001(2) (probation means a form of community supervision); section 948.03(2) (the court shall require intensive supervision and surveillance for an offender placed into community control). In addition, community control may include mandatory public service. Section 948.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...the probation. Ex parte Hazlett, 137 Cal. App. 734, 31 P.2d 448 (1934); See People v. Fisher, 237 Mich. 504, 212 N.W. 70 (1927); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1618(8) (1961). In State v. Williams, 237 So.2d 69 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970) the court held that F.S. 948.03 was sufficiently broad so as to allow imposition of intermittent imprisonment as a condition of probation....

...The defendant was required to spend sixty days in jail each year of his twenty year probation. [2] Cf. Sanders v. State, 268 So.2d 553 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972). The statute in question grants broad discretion to courts in determining the conditions of probation: "948.03 Terms and conditions of probation *542 * * * * * * "(2) The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper....

...MAGER and DOWNEY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Rev's Ch. 74-112, eff. July 1, 1974. [2] The court said: "As we have stated before, payment of a fine and intermittent imprisonment are usually not thought of as conditions of probation. However, Fla. Stat. § 948.03(2) is sufficiently broad to allow imposition of such conditions." 237 So.2d at 70.

...failing to fix the amount of restitution, McCaskill v. State, 520 So.2d 664, 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), assuming that, at a future appropriate time, and upon application, the trial court will determine the amount of restitution to be paid pursuant to section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...d HRS shall jointly determine the eligibility of sex offenders for such programs. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the entry of their orders was justified by the broad powers granted to judges in formulating conditions of probation. § 948.03(3), Fla....

...State, 201 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). As so construed, Sections 917.012 and 917.017, dealing specifically with the entry of sexual offenders into residential treatment programs, govern over the general discretionary powers afforded trial judges by Section 948.03(3) regarding probationers....

...ctim of his crime must be predicated by notice to, and the opportunity to be heard by, the defendant so that he may challenge the amount, presumably in regard to reasonableness as well as causal relationship to his offense. The court also noted that section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes, requires the "amount to be determined by the court." In Fresneda, however, there was a motion directed to the trial court to correct an illegal sentence....

...f it appears to the court "that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law." Section 948.03 vests authority in the trial court to determine the terms and conditions of probation....

...Finally, we consider condition seven, requiring appellant to work diligently to support his dependents to the best of his ability. We found that this condition need not be orally pronounced in Brown v. State, 613 So.2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), because it is statutorily authorized by section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1993), thus making it a general condition that need not be orally pronounced....

...*528 We affirm the requirement that Appellant receive drug evaluation and screening and any necessary treatment, as that is a standard condition of probation that can be imposed on any probationer, irrespective of whether it reasonably relates to the type of offense. See section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.); Hayes v....

...The record reflects that the victim was a fifteen-year-old girl who was not related to Wesner. In the plea agreement, Wesner acknowledged that all standard conditions of probation would apply as well as all additional standard conditions of probation "as set forth in the Tenth Circuit Sentencing Order pursuant to F.S. 948.03(5)." In the written probation order, the trial court imposed condition 16 as follows: "If the victim(s) is/are under the age of 18, until successful completion of sex offender treatment, you shall have no unsupervised contact with children less than eighteen (18) years of age without the approval of the sentencing court." This condition is worded differently than the statutory condition contained in section 948.03(5)(a)(5), Florida Statutes (2000), which provides: If the victim was under the age of 18, a prohibition, until successful completion of a sex offender treatment program, on unsupervised contact with a child under the age of 18, unless...

...The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it did not have the authority to allow for unsupervised visitation until after Wesner successfully completed a sex offender treatment program. Wesner argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted the language of section 948.03(5)(a)(5) and probation condition 16 as eliminating the trial court's discretion until the treatment program is completed. Under our certiorari standard of review, we conclude that the trial court's interpretation departed from the essential requirements of law. We read the language of condition 16 and section 948.03(5)(a)(5) as prohibiting unsupervised contact with children under eighteen until after completion of the sex offender treatment program unless, prior to completion of the program, the trial court authorizes such unsupervised contact. We also note that pursuant to section 948.03(6), a trial court has the authority to rescind or modify the terms of probation or community control at any time, but absent a violation of probation or community control, it may not add new conditions or enhance the penalty....

...now exactly what he must do or refrain from doing while on probation. See Almond v. State, 350 So.2d 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. den., 358 So.2d 128 (Fla. 1978). The amount of restitution, if any, must be determined by the trial court pursuant to section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1989), and this purely judicial function may not be delegated to a probation officer....

...offense, see Bunting v. State, 361 So.2d 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), requires the trial court to order restitution as a condition of probation "unless it finds clear and compelling reasons not to order such restitution." See sections 775.089(1)(a) and 948.03, Florida Statutes (1989). Any decision not to order restitution must be supported by reasons stated in detail in the record. See sections 775.089(1)(b) and 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Although the wording of the written conditions differs slightly, we find no error as to those standard probational conditions, as appellant made no objection. See Sumter, 570 So.2d at 1041; Rowland, 548 So.2d at 814. Furthermore, appellant was on constructive notice of these conditions enumerated in section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1989), so that, under the rationale of Beasley and our decision in Hayes, no oral pronouncement was necessary....

...distributed to the individuals named in the informations filed against him. A probationer may be ordered to make reparation or restitution to an aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the court. § 948.03(1)(e), Fla....

...He cannot, therefore, be required to make payments to the victim in excess of the amount of damages caused by the criminal conduct alleged in the twelve informations. Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977). It is true that the words "caused by his offense" contained in section 948.03(1)(e) do not mean that, in order to support a restitution order, the offense charged must describe the damage caused, but mean that the damage must bear a significant relationship to the crime charged....

...We agree with the court below. Because restitution was made an original condition of the probation, the court could properly determine the amount of restitution at a later date. We do not construe rule 3.800 as requiring this to be done within sixty days. Section 948.03(8), Florida Statutes (1989), authorizes the modification of the terms and conditions of probation at any time....

...er of probation and need not be orally pronounced. See State v. Hart, 668 So.2d 589 (Fla.1996). The portion of condition 12 providing for random drug and alcohol testing is also a general condition of probation and need not be orally pronounced. See § 948.03(1)(k)1, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994); Malone v. State, 652 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The portion of condition 12 requiring Gilchrist to pay for the testing is not contained in section 948.03(1)(k)1 and is a special condition of probation....

...prisonment. It is these two sentences which we vacate. In Roy v. State, 207 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), this court held that one cannot be sentenced to probation and incarceration simultaneously, noting that the standard terms of probation found in section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1965) [1] "would have no possible area of compliance so long as the intended `probationer' remained in prison serving an existing sentence." Furthermore, "[t]he underlying concept of probation is rehabilitation rathe...

...We affirm the convictions in case numbers 83-685 and 83-995 but vacate the sentences and remand with instructions to sentence defendant to a term of imprisonment within the presumptive guidelines range. [2] Defendant's other judgments and sentences are affirmed. RYDER, C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. NOTES [1] Amendments to section 948.03 subsequent to Roy do not affect the continued validity of the court's rationale....

...or which he was sentenced, relying on Biller v. State, 618 So.2d 734 (Fla.1993). However, Biller is limited in its application to special conditions of probation or community control. As appellant concedes, all five conditions *160 are authorized by section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...In this appeal from a judgment and sentence pursuant to a no contest plea, appellant's counsel raises two sentencing points. Appellant first contends that eight conditions of his probation order should be stricken because they were not orally announced. Several of these were standard conditions, provided for in section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1991), and, thus, need not be orally pronounced....

...ause those conditions were special in nature despite being called Drug Offender Probation Standard Conditions. The State responds that the challenged conditions were not special conditions and were standard conditions under Florida Statutes sections 948.03 and 948.20, and consequently did not require oral pronouncement prior to being reduced to a written order....

...The rationale for this distinction is as follows: It has been held that the usual "general conditions" of probation are those contained within the statutes. Hart, 651 So.2d [112] at 113 [(Fla. 2d DCA 1995)]. In other words, a condition of probation which is statutorily authorized or mandated, see, e.g., sections 948.03-.034, Florida Statutes (1993), may be imposed and included in a written order of probation even if not orally pronounced at sentencing....

...4th DCA 1996). This Court has determined that conditions which must be *1125 orally pronounced include curfew and substance abuse treatment requirements in drug offender probation cases. See Tory, 686 So.2d at 692. The general conditions enumerated in section 948.03 do not include the financial responsibility for drug testing, drug treatment, and curfew conditions set forth in the Drug Offender Probation Standard Conditions....

...See State v. Beasley, 580 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1991). As to appellant's second point regarding the court's delegation to the probation officer of its authority to order sexual abuse counseling, we observe that the counseling was apparently ordered pursuant to Section 948.03(6), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...probation officer upon presentation of appropriate medical bills. This court observed that the statute authorizing imposition of restitution as a condition of probation provides that the amount of restitution is "to be determined by the court." See § 948.03(1)(e), Fla....

...ount of restitution. In the instant case, the sentencing order stated: "As a further condition of your probation, ... if directed by your probation officer, you will seek evaluation and treatment under the sexual offender program." (Emphasis added.) Section 948.03(6) provides in mandatory language that the court shall first require a diagnosis and evaluation to determine the need of the probationer for treatment, and if the court then decides that a need is established, the court shall thereafter require out-patient counseling as a term or condition of probation....

...Although the section does not specifically provide for notice and hearing before restitution may be imposed, it clearly contemplates that the trial court shall make determinations as to the defendant's ability to pay, and the amount and method of payment. Similar provisions appear in section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1983), which authorizes the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation....

...at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. Reeves protested. Since there was no notice to the defendant, the order requiring restitution was improper. Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977); Latti v. State, 364 So.2d 828 (Fla.2d DCA 1978). Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1977), expressly provides that restitution may be made a condition of probation....

...These cases stand for the proposition that a sentence may not include both a prison term (12 to 30 months) and community control without proper grounds for departure. They do not address the discretion of the sentencing judge to impose jail time as a condition of community control. See § 948.03(7), Fla....

...ts and not visit places where controlled substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used. Neither of these conditions were orally pronounced in open court. Preliminarily, a special condition of probation which is statutorily authorized, see, e.g., section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1991), may be included in a written order of probation without being orally pronounced at sentencing....

...ces where controlled substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used, is a valid condition of probation. See Nank; Tomlinson v. State, 645 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Such a condition is a more explicit clarification of conduct prohibited under subsection 948.03(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1991), which states as an approved condition of probation that an offender may "not associate with persons engaged in criminal activities." This is a general condition that is valid and need not have been pronounced in open court....

...Accordingly, we approve of this condition. Condition seven prohibits defendant from using intoxicants. This special condition was also not announced in open court; however, unlike condition eight, it does not comport with any of the statutory conditions of subsection 948.03(1)....

...robation, and after hearing, so ordered. It is patently obvious that the plea agreement did not contain anything except a two year maximum term of imprisonment. We therefore find no violation of the agreement. Nevertheless, we must be concerned with Section 948.03(2) Florida Statutes (1977) which provides: "(2) The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper....

...eatment plan. See § 948.001(7), Fla. Stat. (2004). The critical component of sexual offender probation is the active participation and completion of a sexual offender treatment program. See § 948.30(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004) (previously codified at section 948.03(5)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (2003))....

...See Vasquez v. State, 663 So.2d 1343, 1347 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)("[W]e continue to adhere to the general principle that all conditions of probation must be orally pronounced at the time of sentencing unless the conditions are statutorily-authorized pursuant to section 948.03 or otherwise based on a Florida statute which will provide the defendant with constructive notice....

...e damage *1145 or loss caused by his offense in a reasonable amount or manner to be determined by the court." (Emphasis added.) The juvenile points out that an analogous statute governing restitution as a condition of probation in adult proceedings, section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1975), was construed by the Florida Supreme Court in Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977). Section 948.03(1)(g), which is similar in wording to its statutory counterpart for juveniles, section 39.11(1)(g), authorizes conditioning probation on the defendant's making "reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss ca...

...court cannot require the defendant to pay the victim an amount "in excess of the amount of damage the criminal conduct caused the victim." Id. at 1022. Inasmuch as the state conceded that the restitution condition of probation was not authorized by section 948.03(1)(g) since the injuries sustained by the occupants of the Volkswagen were not caused by the defendant's crime of leaving the scene of the accident, the supreme court saw no reason to order the trial court to conduct a hearing on the issue of damages on remand....

...p" to the damages caused. We believe that such a construction of that language in section 39.11(1)(g) leads to too narrow an application of that statute. The supreme court in Fresneda certainly never construed the language "caused by his offense" in section 948.03(1)(g) as including only damages flowing directly from the crime charged....

...Our sister court affirmed the restitution condition, notwithstanding the defendant's reliance on Fresneda. It held that when property is destroyed while in the possession of a person who is in the act of stealing such property, there is a sufficient connection to require restitution under the theft charge in compliance with section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1983).

...In its order granting the modification, the trial court determined that it had authority to modify Mr. Springer's conditions of probation, reasoning: 11. The State asserts that the Court does not have the authority to modify a F.S. § 948.30 sex offender probation condition in any respect. 12. Florida Statute 948.03(2) provides in pertinent part that "The Court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and condition theretofore imposed by it upon the probationer." That language existed in § 948.03 at the time § 948.30 was promulgated....

...lation, nor can a single provision of a statute.)[.] The State urges such an interpretation by asserting that the use of the word "must" in § 948.30(1) prohibits the Court from modifying any of the sex offender probation conditions as authorized by § 948.03(2). The Court is not inclined to accept this interpretation. 14. As noted earlier, § 948.03(1)(b) contains the phrase ",as prescribed by the court." [sic] at the end of a list of places proscribed within the 1,000 ft buffer imposed by the legislature....

...vides that the Court may impose rules or conditions applicable to any of the proscribed places within the 1,000 ft buffer. As a general proposition, a trial court has authority to modify or rescind the terms or conditions of probation imposed by it. § 948.03(2), Fla....

...ress terms"). Mr. Springer argues that Wesner v. State, 843 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), gives the court the authority to modify the condition as long as it was originally imposed as required. We disagree. In Wesner, the Second District, reviewing section 948.03(5)(a)5., Florida Statutes (2000), held that the trial court had discretion to modify the defendant's probation to allow him to have unsupervised contact with his young son and grandchildren before completing his four-year sex offender treatment program. However, unlike here, section 948.03(5)(a)5., Florida Statutes (2000), specifically authorized the trial court to allow for unsupervised contact between a defendant and a child under the age of 18: If the victim was under the age of 18, a prohibition, until successful com...

...had the discretion to modify the defendant's probation. In this case, no such authority exists. Accordingly, we quash the order on review. PETITION GRANTED, ORDER QUASHED. MONACO and EVANDER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This section formerly appeared in section 948.03(6), Florida Statutes (2004). The statute was rewritten, effective July 1, 2004. See Ch. 2004-373, §§ 14-25, Laws of Fla. [2] Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006), formerly appeared as section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...). Riner pled guilty and was placed on probation with the condition that he pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $4,626.95 for damages caused by the accident. Riner was adjudicated guilty of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident. Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that a trial judge may require, as a condition of probation, that a defendant make restitution for "damage or loss caused by his offense." See Fresneda v....

...Chapter 948, Florida Statutes, governs terms and conditions of probation and provides in part at subsection (6) that "the court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions theretofore imposed by it upon the probationer or offender in community control." Case law recognizes that a trial court may, pursuant to section 948.03(6), Florida Statutes, at any time during the probationary period, modify any probation conditions with the caveat that the court cannot enhance the penalty or add new conditions without proof of a violation....

...n of probation that can be imposed on any probationer, irrespective of whether it reasonably relates to the type of offense." Id. at 528. The First District was correct because such a requirement was a standard condition of probation provided for in section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.)....

...As to appellant's second point on this issue, the law is clear, and appellee concedes, that the amount of restitution to be paid by defendant must be determined by the court, and that the task may not be delegated to a probation or parole officer. Section 948.03(1)(e), F.S....

...ues of whether the trial court satisfied the requirements of section 39.059(7) in sentencing Berry as an adult and whether the trial court's sentencing structure of consecutive specified residencies in the county jail and restitution center violated section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...y as an adult and also in imposing consecutive specified residencies as special conditions of community control. We therefore reverse Berry's sentence and remand for resentencing. [3] We discuss these issues in inverse order. We have held that under section 948.03(5) "[b]oth the county jail and probation and restitution centers are included in the definition of incarceration." Solis v....

...ally pronounced. See State v. Hart, 668 So.2d 589 (Fla.1996). Condition 12, which requires Reiter to submit to random blood, breathalyzer, and urinalysis examinations, is a standard condition of probation which is applicable to any probationer under section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1993). See § 948.03(1)(j), Fla.Stat....

...Since both the defendant and the state were satisfied with the withholding of adjudication, we remand to the trial court with instructions to impose probation with a condition that the defendant serve two days in jail, with credit for the two days which she has already served. See § 948.03, Fla....

...unt of damage the criminal conduct caused the victim." Id. The state argues that the supreme court's subsequent decision in J.S.H. v. State, 472 So.2d 737 (Fla. 1985), demonstrates that Fresneda and Riner unduly limited the restitution provisions of section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...lly states that "specific treatment conditions and other treatment approaches necessary to monitor this population may be ordered" by the sentencing court. If defendant had been sentenced to a community residential drug punishment center pursuant to section 948.034(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), Conditions I, II and III would have been part of the statutory conditions of probation. However, defendant was not sentenced pursuant to that statute. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1995), which enumerates the terms and conditions of probation for all forms of probation, authorizes the trial court to impose random testing, but does not provide for a defendant to be financially responsible for the testing. See § 948.03(1)(k)1....

...*1142 2d DCA 1994); Tillman v. State, 592 So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). These conditions vary significantly from a condition prohibiting a defendant from visiting places where controlled substances are unlawfully sold, which has been interpreted as a clarification of section 948.03(1)(j) [2] providing that an offender may "[n]ot associate with persons engaged in criminal activities." See Tomlinson v....

...n in the 1991 Florida Statutes, see § 948.001(3), Fla.Stat. (1991), until that section was amended as of October 1, 1993. See Ch. 93-227, § 13, at 2351, Laws of Fla. [2] Prior to being renumbered effective July 1, 1994, this section was designated section 948.03(1)(i)....

...State, 542 So.2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Probation condition (9) was not orally pronounced either. That condition, however, which requires the appellant to submit to tests to determine the use of alcohol or controlled substances, is statutorily authorized by section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...This condition of probation must be stricken as it is a discretionary cost under section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1993), and must be orally pronounced in open court. See Simmons v. State, 662 So.2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We reject appellant's argument that the "standard conditions" of probation provided in section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1993), and contained in the probation order would not apply to her unless orally pronounced because she was specifically placed on "drug offender" probation pursuant to section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...We now address appellant's first point contesting the validity of the felony sentence under section 922.051. The trial court was authorized to impose incarceration in county jail up to 364 days as a condition of probation on the felony conviction by section 948.03(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...last available alternative for placement of an offender as a condition of probation," this provision "shall not create a right of placement for the probationer, nor shall it restrict judicial discretion in ordering such treatment or incarceration." § 948.03(5)(b), Fla....

...rosecuted under separate indictments or informations as well as to sentences for such offenses that result from a prosecution under a single charging instrument. 258 So.2d at 514. This policy rationale is consistent with the legislature's caution in section 948.03(5)(b) that county jails be used as the last available alternative....

...The first portion of condition A, stating that a probationer will submit to alcohol and drug testing, is a statutory, general condition of probation that need not be pronounced at sentencing. See Brock v. State, 688 So.2d 909, 912 n. 4 (Fla.1997); § 948.03(k), Fla....

...The issue is whether the trial judge, as a condition of probation in this case, may require the defendant to make restitution to the victims of twenty other offenses other than the particular offense for which he had been convicted. Under the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 948.03 (1975), the sentencing judge sets the terms and conditions of probation and may include among them the provision that the probationer shall: "Make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the court." Fla. Stat. § 948.03 (1975)....

...Accordingly, we strike both Conditions 4 and 9. Condition 10 orders Luby to submit to random testing as directed by his probation officer, at his own expense, to determine the presence of alcohol or controlled substances. This condition was not orally pronounced at sentencing. Section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1992), authorizes the imposition of the condition to submit for random drug testing; however, the additional requirement that the testing be conducted at "the defendant's own expense" is not authorized by section 948.03(1)(j)....

...The written sentence included these special provisions as well as the general standard provisions contained in the standard order of probation form in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e). It did not contain the additional provisions contained in section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1995), which were required to be imposed for crimes occurring after October 1, 1995, involving, among others, lewd and lascivious assaults. Three years later, a new probation supervisor took over appellant's case. In March of 1999, he reinstructed appellant on the original terms of his probation. In addition, he read verbatim the terms of section 948.03(5), and appellant stated that he understood them. Later, the supervisor filed an affidavit alleging that appellant had violated a condition of his probation by having contact with a minor. This condition is a provision of section 948.03(5)(a)5, but it was not a provision of the written order of probation....

...with minors, and he was found in the presence of a minor. After a hearing on the violations, the court revoked appellant's probation on both grounds and sentenced him to prison followed by probation. The new order of probation included the terms of section 948.03(5) as part of the conditions of probation....

...Recently, the fifth district addressed this very issue in Kiriazes v. State, 798 So.2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Kiriazes was sentenced on March 22, 1999, to a prison term followed by four years of probation for committing a lewd act on a child. At the sentencing hearing, the conditions of section 948.03(5) were neither orally imposed nor were they included in the written order of probation....

...t jurisdiction to modify the sentence more than sixty days after its imposition. See id. at 793-94. In doing so, it addressed the requirements for pronouncing conditions of probation: The legal significance of designating the conditions contained in section 948.03(5) as standard conditions that do not require oral pronouncement at sentencing is based on the rationale that enactment of the statute provides all persons with constructive notice of the conditions contained therein....

...He's to attend any drug counseling that the Department of Corrections indicates that would be helpful to him." We turn first to condition seven. Those portions of condition seven that require appellant to work and support his dependents is statutorily allowed by section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...coholic beverages, or controlled substances. The state concedes that condition (10) is neither statutorily authorized nor contained within the general conditions or probation and thus it must be orally pronounced at sentencing to be validly imposed. § 948.03(1), Fla....

...on officers must be able to conduct warrantless searches in order to properly supervise their probationers. Brown v. State, 697 So.2d 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The court in Brown relied on Grubbs v. State, 373 So.2d 905 (Fla.1979), and determined that section 948.03, [2] provided the necessary notice sufficient to validate this written condition, even though not orally pronounced at sentencing. These holdings were codified in section 948.03(5), Fla....

...Both the state and the public defender agree on this point. AFFIRMED in part; Conditions (10) and (12) STRICKEN; Order Setting Restitution Amount QUASHED; REMANDED. COBB and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 806.13(1)(a) and (b), Fla. Stat. (2000). [2] The relevant subsections of section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1997) provide: (1) The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation or community control....

...(m) Be prohibited from using intoxicants to excess or possessing any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician. The probationer or community controllee shall not knowingly visit places where intoxicants, drugs, or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used. [3] Section 948.03(5), Fla....

...Based on the foregoing, we find that Martin, and not Fairweather, controls herein. We therefore reverse the March 1992 modification order, and remand with directions to strike the condition of community control that restitution be paid. [1] JOANOS, C.J., WIGGINTON and WOLF, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have not overlooked section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), which provides that the trial court shall make restitution a condition of community control unless it determines that clear and compelling reasons exist to the contrary....

...within 60 days. " Martin at 690 (emphasis supplied). The trial court herein was therefore without jurisdiction to modify King's community control to add a condition of restitution, despite its failure to impose restitution at sentencing as required by section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes.

...PER CURIAM. Eric Lee (Lee) pleaded no contest to attempted sexual battery, reserving the right to appeal the issue considered here. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and he was placed on community control for two years under conditions enumerated in section 948.03(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Whether imposition of the conditions at issue are appropriate for those convicted of attempted sexual battery is a legislative matter when, as here, the statute at issue is free of ambiguity. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of Lee's sentence imposing conditions pursuant to section 948.03(5)(a) and remand to the trial court with instructions to strike the conditions at issue....

...The court rejected this argument, explicitly ruling that it was bound by the small claims court's determination of damages. The primary argument made by appellant is that the court lacked authority to order restitution to the victim's mother because she was not an "aggrieved party." Appellant draws this phrase from section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides that, as a condition of probation, an adult may be required to "make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the court." In the present juvenile proceeding, the court did not rely upon section 948.03(1)(e) to award restitution, but relied upon section 39.11(1)(g), which provides that in a juvenile delinquency proceeding the court may place the juvenile in community control and, as a condition, may "order the child or parent to make restitution for the damage or loss caused by his offense in a reasonable amount or manner to be determined by the court." We recognize that several cases have construed the term "aggrieved party" in section 948.03(1)(e) to include persons who are not the direct victim of the crime, [1] but we find no such cases under section 39.11....

...ondition of probation. In the instant case, the trial court imposed restitution as a condition of probation at the time it entered the original March 20, 1990 probation order. It reserved jurisdiction only as to the amount of restitution to be paid. Section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1989) does not specify when the court must determine the amount of restitution, which is a procedural matter within its discretion....

...ronouncement. Crawford's challenge to condition (7), regarding working diligently at a lawful occupation and supporting any dependents to the best of his ability, is without merit. Crawford was given constructive notice of this condition pursuant to section 948.03(1)(c) and (f), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...erapy sessions for the duration of his probationary term. The record shows the trial court appropriately determined that appellant as a sex offender had a need for outpatient counseling based upon Dr. Griffith's initial evaluation and diagnosis. See § 948.03(7), Fla....

...Auerbach's "standing recommendation" for this probationer and others does not relate to the individual needs of these offenders, but rather, he makes broad generalizations concerning a class of persons which we hold are insufficient to support a trial court's determination of need under section 948.03(7)....

...the trial court with instructions to correct the final judgment of conviction to conform to appellant's written plea agreement as accepted by the trial court. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED. GUNTHER and KLEIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.03(7), Fla....

...nt resulting in injury to another. The trial court found the defendant guilty, withheld adjudication of guilt, put the defendant on probation and ordered the defendant to pay $1,600 for the benefit of the injured parties. The supreme court held that section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1975) which authorized conditioning probation on the probationer's making "reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense in the amount to be determined by the cou...

...p" to the damages caused. We believe that such a construction of that language in section 39.11(1)(g) leads to too narrow an application of that statute. The supreme court in Fresneda certainly never construed the language "caused by his offense" in section 948.03(1)(g) as including only damages flowing directly from the crime charged....

...Holland, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. EN BANC BARFIELD, C.J. John Wilcox was convicted of attempted capital sexual battery and sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by probation with conditions imposed pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ns of probation, asserting that attempted capital sexual battery is an offense under chapter 777, Florida Statutes (1997), and not an offense under chapter 794, Florida Statutes (1997). We affirm the imposition of conditions of probation pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), holding that attempted capital sexual battery is an offense under chapter 794, Florida Statutes....

...e. He is to have no contact with the victim." The trial court never stated that it was imposing sex offender probation, and these two conditions are but two of the many conditions encompassed in the standard conditions of sex offender probation. See § 948.03(5), Fla....

...Thus, it was error to impose community control and probation in addition to the five-year prison term. Also, the special condition of probation that Randolph serve five years in prison was illegal. See Rosa v. State, 592 So.2d 769 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); § 948.03(5), Fla....

..."By his or her conviction, the probationer has already demonstrated a need for supervised control". Grubbs v. State, 373 So.2d 905, 909 (Fla. 1979). Also, under Florida law the trial court is vested with broad discretionary authority to grant probation and to set the terms thereof. See section 948.03 Florida Statutes (1985); Dearth v....

...As a special condition of appellant's community control, the trial court required appellant to follow the conditions imposed by the community control counselor. Only a court, however, can set the conditions of probation. See Barber v. State, 344 So.2d 913, 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); § 948.03(1), Fla....

...We also reject his contention that the imposition of a special probation condition was improper. This latter contention, however, bears further comment. When the trial court placed Young on probation, it imposed the standard terms and conditions enumerated in section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1981). Additionally, pursuant to section 948.03(3), the court imposed four special conditions of probation....

...The trial court placed Anthony McDonald on probation for burglary and grand theft and ordered that he pay restitution as directed by his probation officer. From this order, he appeals. We affirm all orders of the trial court except that order directing the appellant to pay restitution as determined by his probation officer. Section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that a probationer shall make reparation or restitution "in an amount to be determined by the court." (Emphasis added)....

...r otherwise involved in any criminal activity. Similarly, to be guilty of violating probation by visiting places where drugs are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used, the defendant must have knowledge of the sale, dispensing, or use of such drugs. See § 948.03(l)(m), Fla....

...As to first and third issues, we affirm. On the second issue, we affirm the split sentence of 10 years in prison followed by 5 years of probation, but we reverse the restitution order and remand for further proceedings consistent with sections 775.089(1)(a) & (6) and 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Under the particular facts, the order of probation is invalid in requiring restitution, however, and we reverse the order insofar as it requires restitution, and remand for the trial court to make further findings in compliance with sections 775.089 and 948.03, Florida Statutes (1989), and consistent with our holdings in Holland and Laster....

...al court's failure to determine ability to pay). In setting the terms and conditions of probation, the trial court may require the probationer to make restitution for damage or loss caused by the offense "in an amount to be determined by the court." Section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Hart, 668 So.2d 589 (Fla.1996). In the light of Hart, we affirm the probationary conditions with the following exceptions. Condition six requiring Washington to "work faithfully at suitable employment" is modified to include the phrase "insofar as may be possible." See § 948.03(1)(c), Fla.Stat....

...place of residence, vehicle or personal effects to a warrantless search at any time, by any probation, or community control officer or any law enforcement officer." "[A] condition of probation which is statutorily authorized or mandated, see, e.g., section 948.03-.034, Florida Statutes (1993), may be imposed and included in a written order of probation even if not orally pronounced at sentencing." Cole v....

..."With regard to a special condition not statutorily authorized, however, the law requires that it be pronounced orally at sentencing before it can be included in the written probation order." Id. (quoting Nank v. State, 646 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)). Section 948.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that a probationer shall "[p]ermit such supervisors to visit him or her at his or her home or elsewhere." Condition (9) of the probation order form found in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3....

...t a probationer for an administrative search without the presence of his or her probation officer. Therefore, a condition which so provides must be orally pronounced. The state asserts that the standard condition satisfies the spirit of section *895 948.03(1)(b) because a law enforcement officer is permitted to accompany a probation officer on an administrative search for the protection of probation personnel....

...iting places where certain substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used." See Nank v. State, 646 So.2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Tomlinson v. State, 645 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Condition six is affirmed because it is statutorily authorized by section 948.03(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...As we stated in Hart, 651 So.2d 112, this may be because we have defined "general conditions" too strictly. In our prior opinions we have not considered conditions four and seven to be "general conditions" because they are not included in the list of terms and conditions set forth in section 948.03(1)(i)....

...In my view, these decisions are erroneous in that they deprive the state of its right to correct an illegal sentence under the provisions of rule 3.800(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Fifth District held in Kiriazes that the trial court's failure to impose a probation condition required by section 948.03, Florida Statutes, could not be corrected more than sixty days after the entry of the order placing the defendant on probation....

...Although submission to drug and alcohol testing is a general condition of probation which need not be orally pronounced at sentencing, the State concedes that the trial court's failure to orally pronounce the requirement that Jones bear the cost of such testing was error. See § 948.03(1)(k)(1), Fla....

...ght to clarify a requirement imposed by Dr. Bowen that he submit to polygraph testing as part of his sex offender treatment. During that hearing, Dr. Bowen testified that he made polygraph testing a part of his program in 1997 when Florida Statutes, section 948.03(5)(b)1, was enacted requiring annual polygraph testing for persons placed on sex offender probation for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1997....

...We have held that a trial court may impose polygraph testing as a condition of probation. See Cassamassima v. State, 657 So.2d 906 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Since 1997, trial courts are required to prescribe annual polygraph testing for those placed on sex offender probation pursuant to section 948.03(5)(b)1....

...nalties, such as incarceration or fine. Originally Chapter 948, providing for probation, did not contemplate the imposition of incarceration as a condition of probation; admittedly, its later invention, use, approval, [6] and recognition by statute (§ 948.03(7), Fla....

...On resentencing, the court may impose general conditions of probation without oral pronouncement, but the court must give the defendant oral notice of the conditions concerning payment for the evaluation and treatment of drug and alcohol problems. § 948.03(1)(k)(1), Fla.Stat....

...Condition (19) requires the appellant to submit to a warrantless search of his person, premises or vehicle by his supervising officer at any time. Under Hart, because it was not pronounced at the appellant's sentencing, is not codified in rule 3.986 as a general condition of probation, nor is found in section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1995), we would ordinarily strike it....

...ence discovered in search may be used in probation revocation proceedings but not to support separate criminal proceeding based on the evidence so found unless Fourth Amendment is complied with), reaffirmed in Soca v. State, 673 So.2d 24 (Fla.1996). Section 948.03 does not specifically state as a condition of probation that a probationer must submit to a warrantless search of his or her person, home, or vehicle; this section does, however, authorize a probation officer to visit a probationer's home or elsewhere at any time. § 948.03(1)(b)....

...1981), the Supreme Court of Florida held that incarceration, pursuant to the split sentence alternatives found in Chapter 948, Florida Statutes, which equals or exceeds one year is invalid. This rule is applicable to incarceration as a condition of probation (Section 948.03(3), Florida Statutes) and to incarceration followed by a specified period of probation (Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes)....

...We affirm the judgments and sentences except those portions of the probation order set forth below. Condition seven of appellant's probation order requiring him to submit to random drug testing, as directed by his probation officer, is a general condition of probation, and therefore need not be orally announced. § 948.03(1)(k), Fla.Stat....

...Although a layperson relying upon common sense could reject this argument on the basis that it is just silly, lawyers and judges do not always have the luxury of relying on common sense. Condition 5 in the standard form, published in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e), has no statutory counterpart in section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1993). [1] Nowhere in that statute does the legislature create an express requirement that probationers obey criminal laws. Section 948.03(1)(i) prevents Mr....

...Green from "associating with persons engaged in criminal activities," but there is no indication that he associated with any person when allegedly committing the serious crimes described in the affidavit. [2] Thus, if obedience to the penal code is a condition of probation comparable to those described in section 948.03(1), it must be orally announced at sentencing to comply with Nank and numerous other precedents....

...ely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct." § 948.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). Thus, obedience to the law is not so much a "condition" of probation, but rather the very foundation for this reduced punishment. The statutory conditions found in section 948.03(1) involve conduct that would not necessarily be criminal if engaged in by an ordinary citizen. "Working faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible," for example, is a good idea for all citizens, but sloth is not per se a criminal act. § 948.03(1)(c), Fla.Stat....

...that must be explained. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the state's affidavit of violation of probation and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. RYDER, A.C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.03 has been amended since Mr. Green's sentencing, but this particular problem still exists in the 1995 statutes. [2] Section 948.03(1)( l ), Florida Statutes (1995), prohibits a person on probation from possessing a firearm under most circumstances....

...I write separately to point out the need for a revision of the language of the standard condition of probation for sex offenders that allowed Mr. Hicks to sell fish and *463 turtles in a mall just feet away from Build-a-Bear and the Disney Store. Condition 72 of the standard sexual offender conditions, section 948.03(5)(a)(6), Florida Statutes (1999), prohibits a sexual offender whose victim was under age eighteen from "working for pay or as a volunteer at any school, day care center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congre...

...d to, schools, day care centers, parks, playgrounds, libraries, zoos, theme parks, and malls." Absent a legislative amendment to the standard conditions of probation, a trial court still has the alternative of imposing its own additional conditions. § 948.03(2), Fla....

...In this case the court imposed only community control for two years. The special condition that appellant spend 51 weeks in the county jail is part of that two year period, not consecutive to it. There is no state prison time added to the community control as it was in Van Kooten, Hankey and Francis. Section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes (1987) specifically recognizes the power of the trial court to impose a period of incarceration in the county jail not to exceed 364 days as a condition of community control, and we find nothing in the guidelines to the contrary....

...When reviewing England's rule 3.800(a) motion, the trial court reached a contrary result based upon its conclusion that the four conditions challenged by England were authorized by statute and therefore were properly imposed even though they were not orally pronounced. The trial court based its conclusion on section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1987), [3] which lists the general conditions of probation that *662 need not be orally imposed and ends with the statement that "the enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper." § 948.03(7), Fla....

...orate the conditions imposed upon England as general conditions of probation. We cannot agree that this "catch-all" provision converts any unlisted condition into a general condition that need not be orally pronounced. In addition to its analysis of section 948.03, the trial court found that the condition imposing psychiatric evaluation and mental health counseling on England was specifically authorized by section 948.03(6)....

...This statute requires a court to order diagnosis, evaluation and treatment for persons convicted of committing lewd and lascivious assault or act on a child or in the presence of a child; sexual battery of a child; or exploitation of a child. As a general condition of probation authorized by section 948.03, no oral statement of the condition at sentencing would have been required....

...is community control: a six-month jail sentence. A trial court may at any time modify community control conditions it has previously imposed but cannot enhance the penalty or add new conditions, as it did with Garvison's six-month jail sentence. See § 948.03(6), Fla....

...Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1997), authorizes a probation officer to arrest a probationer without a warrant and to bring him before the court which entered the probation order, whenever there is a reasonable ground to believe that the probationer has violated his probation. Section 948.03(5)(a)(10), Florida Statutes (1997), imposes as a condition of appellant's probation that the probationer submit to a warrantless search by the probation officer of the probationer's or community controllee's person, residence, or vehicle....

...yment because economic conditions beyond the defendant's control could prevent him from completing such a condition. Based upon the reasoning set forth in Armstrong, we modify the special condition on Johnson's community control to read, pursuant to section 948.03(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1993): You shall work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as possible; and, if you are working less than 35 hours a week, you shall seek full-time employment as directed by the probation officer....

...s not reasonably related to future criminality). However, the Biller analysis only applies to special conditions of probation. Brock v. State, 688 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1997). The condition requiring random drug and alcohol testing is a general condition. § 948.03(1)(j)1, Fla.Stat....

...Appellant raises three points on appeal, one of which we will discuss. First, appellant argues that the trial court's order prohibiting him from work in the carnival business as a condition of community control and probation is not related to his rehabilitation and is therefore contrary to section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...because the trial court could have imposed electronic monitoring even before section 948.063 was enacted. The state is correct in its assertion that the trial court could have imposed electronic monitoring prior to the enactment of the statute. See § 948.03(5)(b)(5), Fla....

...nd genital area. The defendant pled guilty to that offense. The circuit court sentenced the defendant to a term in prison to be followed by a term of sex offender probation. As part of the probation, the circuit court imposed a condition required by section 948.03(5)(a)7., Florida *1065 Statutes (2001), prohibiting the defendant from “viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender’s deviant behavior 'pattern.” § 948.03(5)(a)7., Fla....

...violated a condition of his or her probation.”) (citation and quotations omitted). Here, we conclude that the circuit court erred in finding that the defendant violated the probation condition at issue. The probation condition at issue arises from section 948.03(5)(a)7., Florida Statutes (2001)....

...ing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender’s deviant behavior pattern. § 948.03(5)(a)7., Fla....

...ne, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, such as the DVDs here, cannot constitute a violation of probation unless the state can establish that the material is “relevant to the offender’s deviant behavior pattern.” § 948.03(5)(a)7., Fla....

...See also Johnson v. State, 636 So.2d 792 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Based upon the reasoning set forth in Armstrong and Johnson, we modify this special condition of probation to require Burke to work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible. See § 948.03(1)(c), Fla....

...er of probation and need not be orally pronounced. See State v. Hart, 668 So.2d 589 (Fla.1996). The portion of condition 12 providing for random drug and alcohol testing is also a general condition of probation and need not be orally pronounced. See § 948.03(1)(k)1, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994); Malone v. State, 652 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The portion of condition 12 requiring McDaniels to pay for the testing is not contained in section 948.03(1)(k)1, and is a special condition of probation....

...ed him to spend seven years in prison, followed by eight more years in prison, unless he successfully completed eight years on probation with conditions including *1230 "no unsupervised contact with minor children" and "sex offender counseling." See § 948.03(4), Fla....

...ision of the Department of Corrections." Section 948.001(5), Florida Statutes (1995), defines probation as "a form of community supervision requiring specified contacts with parole and probation officers and other terms and conditions as provided in s. 948.03." Subsection 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (1995), permits out-patient treatment for sex offenders, but appellant clearly is not receiving "out-patient treatment." Subsection 948.03(7) does permit residential treatment, and section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1995), refers to probationary residential treatment under the jurisdiction of DOC or the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (now the DCFS), bu...

...We have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 9.140(c)(1)(K), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although Mr. Miller was sentenced as a youthful offender, we conclude that the lower court's failure to impose sex offender conditions as terms of Mr. Miller's probation, as required by section 948.03(5)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (2002), was erroneous and requires reversal....

...Miller requested the Court not to impose sex offender conditions in connection with the probation, and appears to have argued that the plea offer did not compel the imposition of such conditions. The State responded that because the requirements of section 948.03(5)(a) are mandatory when a defendant is placed on probation for a violation of section 800.04, a probationary placement that did not specifically include these requirements would be "an incomplete sentence." The State urged further that the court did not have the discretion to waive the requirements of the statute. Mr. Miller argued in response that the Florida Youthful Offender Act authorizes its use "in lieu of other criminal penalties," and that the language of section 948.03(5)(a) was, therefore, not mandatory if youthful offender sentencing is utilized....

...turn to the community." See § 958.01, Fla. Stat. (2002). The term, "probation," is defined in section 958.03(4) as a means of community supervision requiring specified contacts with probation personnel "and other terms and conditions as provided in s. 948.03." Section 958.04, Florida Statutes (2002), then contains the following language dealing with the subject of probation for youthful offenders: (2) In lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law and notwithstanding any imposition of co...

...s. Such period of supervision shall not exceed the maximum sentence for the offense for which the youthful offender was found guilty. Thus, it is quite clear that the legislature fully intended to authorize various forms of probation as described in section 948.03, Florida Statutes (2002), as a sentencing alternative for youthful offenders, with the caveat that the probationary placement could not exceed six years or the maximum sentence for the offense, whichever is shorter. *78 Section 948.03(5)(a) indicates that for probationers who committed certain specified sex based crimes after October 1, 1995, "the court must impose the following conditions in addition to all other standard and special conditions imposed." There then...

...State, 864 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, 879 So.2d 626 (Fla.2004). Thus, there is no conflict between the statutes. The Florida Youthful Offender Act specifically recognizes that youthful offenders on probation are subject to the provisions of section 948.03. Section 948.03(5) requires mandatory sex offender conditions upon the conviction of any of the enumerated offenses. Therefore, if a person treated as a youthful offender is convicted of any of the enumerated sex offenses, the conditions of probation described in section 948.03(5) must be imposed....

...The foundation for those decisions, however, was that a youthful offender sentence was to be used "in lieu of other criminal penalties," and in the absence of any legislative intent to override this provision, these enhanced penalties could not be imposed. In the present case, on the other hand, the requirements of section 948.03 are specifically engrafted into the Florida Youthful Offender Act by Chapter 958. The legislative intent is clear on the face of the statute. Accordingly, we must reverse. We note that section 948.03(5), which mandates the imposition of sex offender conditions of probation for persons who commit any of the enumerated crimes, requires no oral pronouncement at sentencing....

a condition of probation in accordance with section 948.03, Florida Statutes. Id. Restitution orders are

...4th DCA 1995) (any authority to exempt an individual from paying all or part of costs of supervision lies initially with the Department of Corrections). That portion of condition (12) requiring Powell to submit to random testing is a general condition set forth in section 948.03(1)(j)1, Florida Statutes (1991); therefore, it may be imposed without oral pronouncement....

...We strike condition (13), that portion of condition (12) requiring Powell to pay for testing, and the 4% processing fee contained in condition (10). SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PARKER and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Chapter 92-310, Laws of Florida amended section 948.03 by adding subsection (8), now subsection (9), which authorizes trial court judges to impose such a condition....

...However, we agree with Russman, and the state concedes, that condition 12 of the probation order [2] must be struck. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge did not orally pronounce this condition and it is not included in the list of standard probation conditions in section 948.03(1)(a)(m)....

...467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), and might justify an inventory search, see Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983), or even a protective sweep of the premises, see Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). Second, Florida Statutes Section 948.03 regulates the terms and conditions of probation, and states, "[t]he court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation ... and may include among them the following, that the probationer ... shall: ... [p]ermit ... [probation] supervisors to visit him at his home or elsewhere." § 948.03(1)(b), Fla....

...ess searches of probationers in accordance with the views set forth in this opinion is not dependent upon a search condition expressly set forth in the order of probation."). Consequently, we find that the parameters derived from Sections 948.06 and 948.03 provided a sufficient regulatory scheme so as to uphold the search in this case under Griffin....

...In addition, Hart held that a condition set forth in conditions 1-11 of the general conditions in the supreme court's form order of probation, see Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.986(e), need not be orally pronounced. Because urinalysis, breathalyzer and blood testing are statutorily-authorized as "random testing," pursuant to section 948.03(1)(k)1, Florida Statutes (1995), [2] this condition need not be stricken simply because it was not orally imposed. While section 948.03, which enumerates the terms and conditions of probation for all forms of probation, authorizes a trial court to impose random testing, the statute does not specifically provide for a defendant to be financially responsible for the testing. See § 948.03(1)(k)1; Dean....

...ndition of random testing could be imposed regardless of whether or not it was directly related to the crime charged: Because the requirement that the appellant submit to blood, breathalyzer, and urinalysis examinations accords with the provision of section 948.03(1)(j) for "random testing," it is a standard condition of probation, and under the rationale of [ State v....

...] Beasley [580 So.2d 139 (Fla.1991)] it does not need to be orally pronounced. This standard condition may be imposed regardless of whether it is directly related to the circumstances of the appellant's offense, because it is one of the conditions which is made applicable to any probationer under section 948.03. See Ward v. State, 511 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Although some standard conditions may still depend on the circumstances of the offense (e.g., see section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes, providing for restitution "for the damage or loss caused"), section 948.03(1)(j) is not limited in this manner....

...at publication in the statutes or in the rules would provide "all defendants with sufficient notice to permit an opportunity to object if probation is imposed." Hart, 668 So.2d at 593. A trial court is not mandated to impose the conditions listed in section 948.03. However, section 948.03(1), which was amended effective July 1, 1994, now reads that: The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation or community control....

...Categorizing random testing as a special condition certainly indicates an intent by our supreme court that this condition should be subject to a Biller relevancy analysis. On the other hand, the legislature, by its recent amendment, may have intended that the standard conditions in section 948.03(1)(a) through (m) could be imposed by a trial court without a case-by-case relevancy analysis....

...You shall be required to pay for such tests unless otherwise waived by your officer. The verbiage of this condition is identical to the supreme court's form order of probation, Rule 3.986, also listing this condition as a special condition with space for the trial court to check off. [2] In 1994, section 948.03 was amended. Ch. 94-294, § 1, Laws of Fla. By the amendment, effective July 1, 1994, the provision for random testing, formerly contained in section 948.03(1)(j), was renumbered as section 948.03(1)(k)1.

...ondition that provides for random drug testing is a valid general condition of probation that need not be pronounced, that portion of condition 14 that requires appellant to pay for the testing was not pronounced and must be stricken under Nank. See § 948.03(1)(j)1., Fla.Stat....

...urt to vacate Brown’s prison sentence and reinstate him to probation. See Miller v. State, 958 So.2d 981, 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Hicks v. State, 890 So.2d 459, 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Reversed and remanded. DAVIS, C.J., and WALLACE, J., Concur. . § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla....

...In response, the trial court resentenced appellant to 14 years and 5 months probation with 51.45 months in prison as a special condition of probation. The sentence is illegal under Florida statutory law. The State correctly agrees that resentencing is necessary. Section 948.03(2) of the Florida Statutes (2007) provides: [I]f the court withholds adjudication of guilt or imposes a period of incarceration as a condition of probation, the period shall not exceed 364 days, and incarceration shall be restricted to...

...Therefore, we affirm without prejudice to appellant to raise this argument in a properly filed motion to strike or correct the alleged illegal conditions of probation. See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977); Bodden v. State, 411 So.2d 1391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); and Section 948.03(3) Florida Statutes (1981)....

...In this regard, we agree with Brooks that departure errors apparent on the face of the record do not require a contemporaneous objection to be preserved for review. See Taylor v. State, 601 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1992). See also Forehand v. State, 537 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1989); State v. Whitfield, 487 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1986). [2] While section 948.03(2)(a)(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), authorizes a trial court to impose surveillance by electronic monitoring of a person placed on community control, and sections 948.03(2)(b)1 and 948.03(3)(a)1 contain provisions pertaining to electronic monitoring of persons in community control programs, this statute does not authorize or mandate imposition of costs for such electronic monitoring.

...M. The petition for writ of certiorari in this cause is addressed to a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District. Because the sole ground stated to support review by this Court is an alleged conflict *806 between the decision and F.S. § 948.03, F.S.A., we conclude that the writ must be denied for lack of jurisdiction....

...2d DCA 1996). However, that did not occur here. As a result, we conclude that the trial court did have jurisdiction to consider the imposition of restitution at the hearing conducted less than sixty days after Ridley's sentencing, but not on the authority of section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), as the State argued....

...92-819, defendant is entitled to be awarded credit for time served. See § 921.161, Fla. Stat. (1991). In circuit court case no. 92-30304, the court imposed a five-year probationary term with a special condition that defendant serve 364 days in jail. See § 948.03(5), Fla....

...The trial court's sole finding was that Ford had a job, a fact that has no bearing on the victim's need. Furthermore, "there is no reason that restitution could not be made a condition of any post-incarceration probation." State v. White, 755 So.2d 830, 832 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); see § 775.089, Fla. Stat. (2009); § 948.03(1)(e), Fla....

...if they were related to his rehabilitation, they would have been valid conditions to this probation. Id. at 540. However, the proscription against visiting places where such intoxicants are unlawfully dispensed or used is a more precise statement of section 948.03(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1993), and thus the trial court had no need to pronounce it orally....

...typical condition of probation prohibiting the use of alcohol. We are frequently forced to strike this condition because the legislature has chosen not to include such a regulation of the use of alcohol among the statutory conditions of probation in section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1993). That section should be substantially revised to include a uniform set of simple rules governing the conduct of persons on probation. Because section 948.03 is inadequate and written in legal jargon, the courts have created a standard probation order with many "special" conditions of probation, including a condition regulating the use of alcohol....

...In Issue I, he claims that the trial court erred by ordering random drug and alcohol testing where, he alleges, drug and alcohol use were not demonstrably related to the appellant's past criminal conduct or future criminality. We affirm as to this issue, on the authority of section 948.03(1)(k)(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), and Hayes v....

...urinalysis examinations) on the basis that the trial court had not orally pronounced it. We concluded that Hayes had demonstrated no reversible error in that Florida defendants received constructive notice of this "random testing" condition in then section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes, which is renumbered subsection (1)(k)(1) in the 1994 version of the statute applicable to the appellant....

...State, 597 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Likewise, the appellant received constructive notice of this statutory condition. Furthermore, because the "random testing" provision is a standard condition of probation that can be imposed on all defendants under section 948.03, we concluded in Hayes that it can be imposed irrespective of whether it directly relates to the circumstances of a defendant's offense....

...The appellant urges us instead to reverse on the authority of Nunez, 633 So.2d at 1146, in which the condition required the defendant to submit to tests to determine the use of alcohol or controlled substances. This condition was not orally pronounced at sentencing. Although our sister court concluded that section 948.03(1) provided Nunez with constructive notice of the condition, the court found the condition deficient in part: [W]e are unable to uphold the requirement of alcohol testing....

...her than the "standard or general condition" set forth in Condition (12). See, e.g., Biller v. State, 618 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1993); Grate v. State, 623 So.2d 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). As additional support for our ruling, we note that the legislature in section 948.03(1)(k)(1) expressly authorizes random testing "to determine the presence or use of alcohol or controlled substances." (Emphasis added)....

...2d DCA 1993). Condition eleven requires Porchia to submit to random drug tests as directed by his probation officer and to pay for such tests. The provision for random drug testing is a general condition of probation and need *1051 not be orally announced. § 948.03(1)(k), Fla....

...Hantman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before COPE, C.J., and FLETCHER, and CORTI—AS, JJ. *1156 ON MOTION FOR REHEARING CORTI—AS, Judge. Defendant, Donald Kasischke, appeals from an order revoking his community control for violating a condition of community control under section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...her males. However, the parties disagree on whether the possession of such a videotape constituted a violation of the defendant's community control conditions. The defendant's community control conditions are based on the legislative requirements in section 948.03(5)(a), Florida *1157 Statutes (1999). [2] Section 948.03(5)(a) requires courts to impose upon all probationers and community controllees, whose sex offense was committed on or after October 1, 1995, various general conditions to their probation or community control. For example, sex offenders whose victim was a minor are prohibited from working at any school, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate. See ß 948.03(5)(a)(6), Fla. Stat. Moreover, section 948.03(5)(a)(7) provides that, unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, sex offenders on probation or community control are prohibited from: viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. ß 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. The various conditions set forth in section 948.03(5)(a) are standard conditions of probation or community control for certain sex offenders that need not be orally pronounced at the time of sentencing. See ß 948.03(5), Fla....

..."[T]he intent of the legislature must guide our analysis, and that intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute." Hale v. State, 891 So.2d 517, 521 (Fla.2004)( citing Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 471 (Fla.1995)). The language of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), as currently written, is undeniably susceptible to multiple and irreconcilable interpretations....

...ith respect to "sexually stimulating visual or auditory material," such material must be "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern." These and other possible interpretations of legislative intent may be gleaned from the actual language of section 948.03(5)(a)(7)....

...on of the statute which read as follows: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material. ß 948.03(5)(g), Fla....

...(1995) (emphasis added). A plain reading of the prior version of the statute clearly demonstrates that the original statute imposed a total ban on viewing, owning, or possessing "any obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material." In 1997, the legislature amended section 948.03(5)(a)(7) through the passage of Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1930 ("CS/SB 1930")....

...The report recommends that certain probation conditions are essential to reduce the opportunities of reoffense, to protect the victims, and to safeguard the general public. In this case, the historical record of the statute in question as well as the legislative history of section 948.03(5)(a)(7) show that the legislature did not intend to alter the pre-existing ban on all pornographic or obscene material....

...As such, we hold that the limiting phrase "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern" only modifies the words "sexually stimulating" . . . material," and not the terms "obscene" or "pornographic." B. Analysis The high rate of recidivism by sex offenders is well known. A reading of the section 948.03(5)(a) community control and probation conditions suggests that these prohibitions were intended to combat such recidivism. Thus, sex offenders whose victims were minors are prohibited from working at places where children congregate to reduce their exposure to children. ß 948.03(5)(a)(6), Fla. Stat. (1999). Similarly, by its words, the section 948.03(5)(a)(7) restriction against possessing or viewing pornography is clearly aimed at reducing stimuli for sex offenders....

...On appeal, the defendant argued that certain conditions of his probation were not reasonably related to the particular sex offense for which he was sentenced. These conditions were essentially the same general conditions authorized and required by section 948.03(5)(a)....

....'" Greenwood, 754 So.2d at 160 ( quoting Brock v. State, 688 So.2d 909, 911-12 (Fla. 1997)) (finding that general conditions of probation have statutory authorization and do not have to be relevant to the defendant's offense). As the community control and probation condition in section 948.03(5)(a)(7) is a standard condition for certain sex offenders, such as the defendant herein, these cases further support our conclusion that such general community control and probationary conditions do not have to be relevant to the defendant's offense or the offender's deviant behavior....

...Taylor, 821 So.2d at 405. Consistent with the First District's holding in Ertley, the Second *1161 District found that the defendant had adequate notice of what was prohibited, but remanded the case so that the written conditions would conform to the statutory language of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes. Id. at 405-06. As the Second District only required that the probationary condition track the statutory language of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), the court did not address whether or not the phrase "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern" modified the ban on viewing or possessing pornographic material....

...The trial court held that the probation condition at issue prohibited the defendant from viewing, owning, or possessing any pornographic material. The court then found that defendant violated his community control by possessing pornographic material. Based on our holding that section 948.03(5)(a)(7) prohibited the defendant from viewing, owning, or possessing any pornographic material while on community control, and because the parties do not dispute that the videotape found inside the defendant's home showed pornographic and obscene images, we affirm the order of the trial court....

...Walker's counsel made a specific objection when the trial court announced the condition. The trial court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions which, in the trial court's opinion, foster rehabilitation. Bentley v. State, 411 So.2d 1361 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Section 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...n in the grand theft case of a condition for payment of unpaid restitution in the fraud case was necessary for appellant's rehabilitation and protection of the public against future theft. By this analysis a probation condition which is proper under section 948.03(8) would not necessarily be precluded by the causal or significant relationship test in section 775.089(1)(a) for an independent restitution condition....

...ctly or indirectly by the defendant's offense, unless it finds reasons not to order such restitution. Restitution may be monetary or nonmonetary restitution. The court shall make the payment of restitution a condition to probation in accordance with s. 948.03....

...t for evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the vacated judgments and convictions in case numbers F05-26150 and F06-2603. Reversed and remanded with instructions. . See Fla. Stat. § 948.03 (1)(1) (2006) (general condition of probation prohibiting a probationer from possessing, carrying or owning any firearm)....

...Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1980), modified on other grounds sub nom., Van Tassel v. Coffman, 486 So.2d 528 (Fla. 1986), that he cannot be sentenced to more than 364 days incarceration as a condition of probation or community control. We agree. Section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1991), which appears to have codified Villery, specifically states that incarceration as a condition of probation or community control may not exceed 364 days....

...where children congregate and that he had failed to complete a mandatory sex offender program. On September 25, 2000, Thurman filed a Motion to Dismiss the affidavit of violation of probation, asserting that the sex offender conditions specified in section 948.03(5) [1] , Florida Statutes (1999), apply only to defendants convicted of sex offenses, and he was convicted only of attempt....

...Also, Thurman agreed to sex offender probation as part of the plea bargain, which distinguishes this case from Lee. The defendant in Lee pled no contest to attempted sexual battery, reserving his right to appeal. He was placed on community control for two years under conditions enumerated in section 948.03(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...1st DCA 2001)( en banc ). We agree with Wilcox that it was not improper for the trial court to subject Thurman to sex offender probation conditions. We also see no reason why the trial court could not, in its discretion, impose the conditions enumerated in section 948.03 on a defendant convicted of an attempted lewd act....

...Appellant pled nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal the propriety of the added condition of community control. The trial court adjudicated appellant guilty of violation of community control, revoked community control, and imposed a county jail sentence of eleven months and fifteen days. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1989) outlines the terms and conditions of probation or community control....

...trol by enhancing the terms thereof, even if the defendant has agreed in writing with his probation officer to allow such a modification and has waived notice and hearing. 579 So.2d at 110-111. At footnote 3 of the opinion, the court recognized that section 948.03(7) permits the court to rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions previously imposed upon the offender in community control, but ruled the statute inapplicable "because the court did not modify a term or condition previously imposed....

...a defendant so as to permit an opportunity to object if probation is imposed; therefore, oral pronouncement is not required. *39 The condition of probation numbered (10) is also a general condition of probation and need not be orally pronounced. See § 948.03(1)(k)(1), Fla.Stat....

...Stated differently, Sellers contends his probation *227 could not be revoked absent some evidence linking the sexually explicit materials seized from his home to his deviant behavior of possessing child pornography. The affidavit of violation of probation tracked section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (2003), which prohibits viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating material that is relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern unless such possession is part of a treatment plan. Thus, section 948.03(5)(a)(7) does not prohibit a probationer from possessing any and all obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating materials, only those materials that are relevant to the charges for which he was placed on probation....

...ich shall be submitted to the community control officer as well as the requirement that she participate in self-improvement programs) were not orally pronounced at the time of sentence and were not standard conditions of community control/probation. § 948.03, Fla....

...ally pronounced at sentencing. All special conditions of probation must be orally pronounced at sentencing. Cumbie v. State, 597 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Only those "standard conditions" of community control/probation which are those listed in section 948.03(1) may be included in the written order even if not pronounced orally at sentencing. The conditions mentioned above are not within the standard conditions of section 948.03(1) and therefore were required to be pronounced orally at sentencing....

...ial or custodial authority and sentenced to seven years of incarceration, followed by five years of probation. Appellant reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of several of the sex-offender probationary conditions set out in sections 948.03(5)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1999), that were imposed. This court has previously rejected most of appellant's challenges. For example, in Greenwood v. State, 754 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), we rejected identical challenges that the conditions set forth in subsections 948.03(5)(a)(1), (a)(10), (b)(2) and (b)(3) were not rationally related to the offense and that subsections 948.03(5)(a)(10), (b)(1) and (b)(3) constituted unlawful delegations of judicial authority to probation officers. In Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), this court rejected appellant's void-for-vagueness challenge to the conditions contained in subsections 948.03(5)(a)(2) and (a)(6). All the other arguments appellant raises, with the exception of his challenge to the condition set forth in section 948.03(5)(a)(7), were not raised below or were perfunctorily raised and, therefore, are not preserved for appeal. See Greenwood, 754 So.2d at 160. Section 948.03(5)(a)(7) provides the following prohibition: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually sti...

...Butterworth, Attorney General, Janelle C. Gillaspie, Assistant Attorney General and Karen M. Holland, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PADOVANO, J. The issue in this appeal is whether the sex offender probation conditions mandated by section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes apply in a juvenile delinquency proceeding in which the offender is found guilty of an applicable sex offense but adjudicated as a juvenile....

...At the close of the disposition hearing on June 12, 2000, the court adjudicated C.C.M. delinquent and committed him to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice in a moderate risk residential program. During a subsequent review hearing, the trial court heard arguments on the applicability of section 948.03(5)....

...obation or community control for certain sex crimes, including lewd and lascivious conduct. C.C.M. conceded that the trial court had discretion to impose probation conditions it deemed appropriate, but objected to the imposition of the conditions in section 948.03(5) on the ground that they are not mandatory in a juvenile delinquency proceeding....

...The trial court rejected this argument and held that the statutory conditions at issue must be applied, even though C.C.M. had not been sentenced as an adult. On July 27, 2000, the trial court entered a modified order of adjudication and disposition, in which the court imposed the sex offender probation conditions listed in section 948.03(5)....

...The order at issue here qualifies as an order entered after adjudication of delinquency, and it is therefore appealable. A proper analysis of the argument on the merits must begin with the text of the statute at issue. We find nothing in the language of section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes, *539 to suggest that the sex offender conditions were intended to apply to juvenile delinquents....

...If the legislature intended to apply the sex offender probation conditions to juvenile offenders, it could have expressed that intention in the statute. In the absence of such an expression, we must conclude that the additional conditions of probation in section 948.03(5) do not apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. This conclusion is supported by the fact that many of the mandatory conditions listed in section 948.03(5) would have no practical application to younger juvenile offenders. Among other things, the statute provides that the offender shall not drive a motor vehicle alone without prior approval, see 948.03(5)(b)2., Fla. Stat.(1999), or rent a post office box without prior approval. See § 948.03(5)(b)3., Fla. Stat. (1999). Furthermore, the statute provides that if the victim was under eighteen, the offender shall have no unsupervised contact with children under eighteen, see § 948.03(5)(a)5., Fla. Stat. (1999), shall not live within one thousand feet of a school, see § 948.03(5)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (1999), and shall not work at a school. See § 948.03(5)(a)6., Fla....

...Among other things, the court may determine that a special juvenile sex offender placement is required for the protection of the public. The enactment of these specific procedures in Chapter 985 is yet another reason to conclude that the sex offender conditions of probation in section 948.03(5) are inapplicable to juveniles. The state argues that the trial court had discretionary authority to impose any of the conditions listed in section 948.03(5)....

...Furthermore, the trial court could not add a discretionary condition after the original disposition order, unless the child had committed an act that would be a ground for revocation. See Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.120(a)(5). In summary, we conclude that the sex offender conditions of probation in section 948.03(5), Florida Statute apply exclusively to adults and juveniles sentenced as adults....

...herefore no need for a Richardson inquiry. We therefore affirm the judgment. We must, however, set aside the sentence and remand for resentencing because the trial court impermissibly imposed an undetermined amount of restitution upon the appellant. Section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1983), requires that the trial court determine the amount of restitution to be made by the probationer or offender in community control....

...ntencing hearing to be validly imposed. [5] See, e.g., Queen v. State, 832 So.2d 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding that the requirement that a probationer submit to warrantless searches is valid even though it is not pronounced at sentencing, because section 948.03(5) authorizes the condition, and provides the necessary notice)....

...We also strike condition 10, but remand to allow the trial court to reimpose the condition that requires a monthly payment to First Step, Inc., if it is deemed appropriate. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED. SAWAYA, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] See § 810.02(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003). [2] See § 948.03(1)(a)-(m), Fla. Stat. [3] See § 948.03(1)( o ), Fla. Stat. [4] Section 948.03(1) provides that conditions specified in paragraphs 948.03(a)-(m) do not require oral pronouncement at the time sentencing. By implication, the condition set forth in 948.03(1)( o ) requires oral pronouncement to be imposed. [5] See § 948.03(5)(a)10, Fla....

...contrary to the very definition of sex offender probation. We agree. “Probation” is defined as “a form of community supervision requiring specified contacts with parole and probation officers[ 1 ] and other terms and conditions as provided in s. 948.03.” § 948.001(8), Fla....

...2 Chapter 948 provides that, in imposing probation, a trial court “may” impose a condition requiring the probationer to report to the probation supervisors and permits a trial court to “rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions” imposed. § 948.03(l)(a), (2), Fla....

...The language of the relevant provisions of chapter 948 addressed in this opinion were identical at the time of the commission of the defendant’s crimes in late 1998/early 1999. See §§ 948.001(1), (5), (10), Fla. Stat. (1997 & 1999); 948.01(15), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998 & 1999); 948.03(l)(a), (2), (5), Fla....

...[2] The scale and the marijuana were not in plain view because they had been inside of the blue bag. [3] The record shows that warrantless searches were not a condition of Mr. Ford's community control. Submission to warrantless search is a special condition that must be specified on the order. § 948.03, Fla....

...hanges are made to subdivision (e) (Form for Order of Probation). First, the checklist of conditions of probation and special conditions is deleted, and is replaced with “GENERAL CONDITIONS: [List the general conditions of probation pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes.]” and “SPECIAL CONDITIONS: [List the special conditions of probation as orally pronounced and authorized by law.]” In addition, below the space for “Other,” the paragraph pertaining to rescinding or modifying any of the conditions of probation is modified....

...report immediately to the probation office located at . (12) You shall submit to the drawing of blood or other biological specimens as required by section 943.325, Florida Statutes. (13) You shall submit to the taking of a digitized photograph as required by section 948.03, Florida Statutes. - 59 -  SPECIAL CONDITIONS You must undergo a (drug/alcohol) evaluation and, if treatment is deemed necessary, you must su...

...You will not contact during the period of probation. You will attend and successfully complete an approved batterers’ intervention program. GENERAL CONDITIONS: [List the general conditions of probation pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes.] SPECIAL CONDITIONS: [List the special conditions of probation as orally pronounced and authorized by law.] Other (Use the space below for additional conditions as necessary.) You are here...

...Parsons involved an offense that occurred prior to 1993. The language used in condition seven has now been approved by the supreme court. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.986(e). More important, the language is now taken from a statutory condition of probation. Section 948.03(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1995), authorizes a trial court to require, as a condition of probation or community control, that the defendant [b]e prohibited from using intoxicants to excess or possessing any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician. Section 948.03(1) states that this condition "does not require oral pronouncement at the time of sentencing and may be considered [a] standard" condition of probation....

...ow, and affirm. See Morgan v. State, 491 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by unlawfully delegating its responsibility to the probation officer to determine the correct amount of restitution. We agree. Section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), clearly provides that the amount of restitution is "to be determined by the court." See also McCaskill v....

...Wheatley contends that the circuit court erred in imposing three illegal conditions of probation. We affirm condition # 15 of the probation order, which orders Wheatley to "submit to drug/alcohol evaluation and counseling as directed by your Officer." [1] See § 948.03(1)(j)1, Fla....

...her to administrative probation. However, the defendant argues that the error is harmless because the court had the discretion to sentence her to the same conditions as would be required for administrative probation. In support, the defendant cites section 948.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), which provides, in pertinent part: (1) The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation.......

...Appellant entered into a straight plea of no contest on charges of driving under the influence causing serious bodily injury and driving while his license was suspended or revoked. The trial court placed appellant on probation and required that appellant make restitution as a condition of probation in accordance with section 948.03, Florida Statutes....

...t deceased); Watson v. State, 579 So.2d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (award of restitution to mother of victim for expenses other than child's medical and mental health costs improperly extended the definition of "aggrieved party"). The state argues that section 948.03(1)(e) does not preclude the payment of restitution to the parents as aggrieved parties....

...cing. See State v. Hart, 668 So.2d 589 (Fla.1996); Lutz v. State, 21 Fla.L.Weekly D905, ___ So.2d ___ [1996 WL 172084] (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 12, 1996). We affirm the portion of condition 8 which requires Scott to submit to random alcohol testing because section 948.03(1)(k)1., Florida Statutes (1993), provides notice of its imposition. See Malone v. State, 652 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). As to the drug conditions, random substance abuse testing is statutorily mandated when the offense is for controlled substances and probation immediately follows incarceration. § 948.03(1)(k)2., Fla.Stat....

...l condition' so that the defendant has the opportunity to object `to any condition which the defendant believes is inappropriate'"). Thus, we strike the drug-related special conditions, except the random testing portion, as statutorily authorized by section 948.03, and the portion prohibiting Scott from consuming and possessing illegal drugs....

...Davis report to his probation officer no later than the fifth day of each month was not checked on the order of supervision of probation as a requirement of his probation and therefore cannot serve as a basis upon which to revoke his probation. *154 The reporting requirement of probation provided for in section 948.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), and in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e) is an essential aspect of the supervisory duties of probation....

...f post-commitment probation. The court did not conduct a violation of probation hearing prior to issuing the Modified Disposition Order. Generally, a trial court has authority to modify or rescind the terms or conditions of probation it imposes. See § 948.03(2), Fla....

...So.2d at 961 . We *106 addressed the same condition of probation in Brock and found that because the condition is statutorily authorized, it does not have to be orally announced at the sentencing hearing. Brock, 688 So.2d at 910 -12 & n. 1; see § 948.03(l)(k)l., Florida Statutes (Supp.1996); Torres v....

...We thus approve the opinion in Rider . . At the oral pronouncement of sentence, the trial court ordered the defendant to submit to *106 periodic testing, while the written order required him to submit to testing at any time. This is an inconsequential variation because section 948.03(l)(k) 1., Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ence in a juvenile's case over the definition of "conviction" in section 775.21(2)(c), which generally applies to all sexual offenders. In reaching our conclusion, we note that this court recently decided that the sex offender conditions mandated by section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes, apply exclusively to adults and juveniles sentenced as adults, but are inapplicable to a juvenile who is adjudicated a delinquent child....

...Because the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea and his sentence is legal, we affirm. The defendant argues that a special condition of his probation requiring him to abstain entirely from associating with anyone who is illegally using drugs was improper. We disagree. Section 948.03(l)(k), Florida Statutes (2012) provides, in pertinent part: *521 948.03....

...There, as in the instant case, the defendant filed a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion challenging the probationary condition prohibiting him from associating with persons who use illegal drugs. Id. at 224 . In denying the motion, the trial court held that the condition was permissible because section 948.03 “precluded probationers from associating with persons engaged in criminal activities, and because persons using illegal drugs are engaging in criminal activities, Ms....

...nt case. See Tomlinson v. State, 645 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that prohibiting appellant from visiting places where certain substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used is valid as a more precise defining of conduct prohibited under section 948.03). The probationary condition in this case is not more vague than the condition approved in Tomlinson or the condition specifically authorized by section 948.03, Florida Statutes. Also, the defendant has not challenged the validity of section 948.03....

...made.” Appellant first contends, and the state concedes, that the trial court erred in committing appellant to the probation restitution center for an indefinite period of time. Placement in a probation restitution center may not exceed 364 days. § 948.03(7)(c), Fla.Stat....

...ny error regarding this condition. Nonetheless, we suggest that upon remand the trial court amend this condition to reflect that appellant may not “knowingly visit” such prohibited places. This is consistent with the recently adopted language of section 948.03(10)(m), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...cing. See Tomlinson v. *61 State, 645 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The remaining portion of the condition is valid. Condition 18 — "You shall undergo random blood/urinalysis tests to determine drug/alcohol abuse unannounced and at your own expense." Section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1993) authorizes the imposition of the condition to submit for random drug testing; however, the additional requirement that the testing be conducted at "the defendant's own expense," is not authorized by section 948.03(1)(j)....

...and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This apparently resulted from the use of a video link for first appearances. The paperwork was with the judge; the defendant was in another location and was unable to sign the documentation. [2] Compare this statute with section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which specifically exempts from oral pronouncement at sentencing the conditions of probation specified in subparagraphs (1)(a) through (m) and (2)(a) of the statute....

...Condition 10 of the written probation order requires payment of one dollar per month to First Step of Bay County. These conditions were not announced orally at sentencing, are not standard conditions of probation/community control [i.e., those listed in Section 948.03, Florida Statutes], and must be stricken....

...onment. Subsequent to this trial and the probation order herein, the Florida Supreme Court in Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1981), held incarceration for more than one year as a condition of probation under section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979), to be illegal....

...State, 645 So. 2d 1 -2- (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that prohibiting appellant from visiting places where drugs are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used is valid as a more precise defining of conduct prohibited under section 948.03, Fla. Stat. (1991)). The court also concluded that the condition is no more vague than the general condition contained in section 948.03(1)(k), Florida Statutes (2012) (probationer shall “[n]ot associate with persons engaged in criminal activities”)....

...entitled “Probation and Community Control.” Section 948.001(8), Florida Statutes (2015), defines probation as “a form of community supervision requiring specified contacts with parole and probation officers and other terms and conditions as provided in s. 948.03.” As this Court has observed, “the grant of probation ‘rests within the broad discretion of the trial judge and is a matter of grace rather than right.’ ” Lawson v....

...end the privilege.” Id. (quoting Roberts v. State, 154 So. 2d 695, 696-97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)). While not unfettered, the trial court has broad discretion in determining what probation conditions to impose. This discretion is set forth in section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (2015), which provides that the trial court is vested with the authority to “determine the terms and conditions of probation.” Where a trial court determines that it is appropriate to sentence an offender to...

...particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight of the evidence.” State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 261 (Fla. 2002) (emphasis added). -5-  Demott Section 948.03 provides a list of sixteen conditions of probation that are deemed a standard part of any probation sentence. See § 948.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). One of these standard conditions, set forth in section 948.03(1)(k), states that the probationer shall: “Not associate with persons engaged in criminal activities.” Demott is subject to this standard condition of probation as well as the following special condition: “You will abstain entirely from the use of . . . illegal drugs, and you will not associate with anyone who is illegally using drugs.” Demott does not challenge the validity of section 948.03(1)(k)....

...expressly authorized by the statute.” Demott, 160 So. 3d at 521. The district court then rejected Demott’s argument that the special condition is vague, in part because it “is not more vague than the condition . . . specifically authorized by section 948.03, Florida Statutes.” Id....

...In that case, the Second District upheld the condition that prohibited “visit[ing] places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used.” Tomlinson, 645 So. 2d at 1. The court concluded the restriction was “valid as a more precise defining of conduct prohibited under section 948.03(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1991), which states as an accepted condition of probation that an offender may ‘not associate with persons engaged in criminal activities.’ ” Id....

...iberty without violating any law." The state relies on Tory v. State, 686 So.2d 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), in arguing that the requirement to "live and remain at liberty without violating any law" is a standard condition of probation, authorized under section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1993), and rule 3.986(e), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. For a standard condition, the state contends, no oral pronouncement is necessary. In Tory, we held that standard conditions of probation provided in section 948.03, or included in rule 3.986(e), could be imposed without being orally pronounced, because the defendant was on constructive notice that some or all of the standard conditions listed in the statute could be imposed by the judge....

...contained in the form order of probation found in Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.986(e)). That being said, however, this is a juvenile case, which is controlled by section 985.231(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.947, and not by section 948.03 and rule 3.986(e), pertaining to adult probation....

...elonies. Id. He moved to dismiss the affidavit alleging violation of probation by committing these crimes on the ground that he had never been orally informed that he could not commit these offenses while on probation. Id. After reviewing Fla. Stat. § 948.03(1)(1993) and finding that there was no express statutory requirement, corresponding to Condition 5 of rule 3.986(e), that probationers obey criminal laws, the trial court reluctantly dismissed the probation proceeding....

...On July 14, 1999, the appellant was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment followed by 7 years of probation for two counts of attempted capital sexual battery that occurred on February 28, 1986. The court imposed as special conditions of probation the conditions set forth in section 948.03(5)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), relating to sex offenses. The appellant alleges that the trial court erred in imposing these conditions because the statutes in effect at the time the appellant committed his offenses did not authorize those conditions. Although the statutory language of section 948.03(5)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), requires the imposition of these conditions for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1995, nothing in the statutory language prohibits imposing these conditions for offenses occurring prior to October 1, 1995. Indeed, section 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (1985), specifically authorizes the court to impose any conditions of probation that it considers proper....

...Defense counsel objected to this condition as not reasonably related to the offenses of burglary and petit theft. Defense argued that Colburn was eighteen years old, had no prior criminal record and was working forty-eight hours weekly. While conditions of probation are in the discretion of the sentencing judge pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1985), the supreme court has held that they must be reasonably related to the offense committed and the rehabilitation of the offender....

...nal Procedure 3.850. I concur that the trial court's order must be reversed because the documents attached to the order do not adequately refute the allegations in the motion. Because of the limited record, I hesitate to make additional conclusions. Section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1991), prohibits a trial court from imposing a period of incarceration in excess of 364 days as a condition of probation....

...State, 659 So.2d 718, 720 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). That portion of Condition (6) that prohibits the defendant from visiting places where certain substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used "is valid as a more precise defining of conduct prohibited under section 948.03(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1991), which states as an accepted condition of probation that an offender may `not associate with persons engaged in criminal activities.'" Tomlinson v....

...ve elapsed from the date the sentencing order was entered. Rule 3.800(c) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes a trial court to modify a defendant's sentence for a period of sixty days after the date the sentence is imposed. See also § 948.03(1)(e), Fla....

...The requirement that Pagliuca enroll in a probationers' educational growth program as a special condition is neither statutorily authorized nor contained within the standard conditions of community control. Therefore, it must be orally pronounced at sentencing in order to be validly imposed. § 948.03(1), Fla....

...In these cases the trial court imposed written conditions of probation requiring him to pay for random drug testing and mental health counseling, which it did not orally announce at sentencing. The requirement that a defendant pay for such testing is not authorized by section 948.03(1)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ced on probation regardless of whether the defendant has or has not been adjudicated guilty. Trial courts have general authority to require incarceration as a condition of probation for felony offenses pursuant to the general condition provisions of section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...offenses other than those listed in the statute. 3 In addition, the Legislature itself authorizes some of the individual conditions listed in section 948.30 to be imposed for offenses other than those listed in the statute. See, e.g., §§ 948.014, 948.03(l)(o), Fla. Stat. (2011) (provide blood or other biological speei-mens); §§ 948.03(l)(f), 948.032, Fla....

...fendant’s rehabilitation. The probation statutes mandate certain conditions of probation for certain crimes, but otherwise recognize that trial judges have broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation that promote rehabilitation. See, e.g., § 948.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions [for probation] shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper.”); § 948.039, Fla....

...y required restitution is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge.” Thus, we affirm the restitution requirement in this case. Appellant further contends that the trial court erred in requiring that he pay 15% interest on the restitution. Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes, which provides that, as a condition of probation, the court may require that the probationer make restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense “in an amount to be determined by the court.” We find no abuse of discretion in the interest imposed....

restitution ordered by the trial court under Section 948.03(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1991). The fact that

...ence was for 10 years in prison followed by 5 years of probation. On resen-tencing, he received 63.6 months in prison followed by 5 years sexual offender probation. He now argues that the court’s resentencing him to sexual offender probation under section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1999), enhanced his original sentence and, thus, violated double jeopardy....

...5th DCA 1998)(holding registration requirements of Florida Sexual Predators Act were procedural and regulatory in nature, and, therefore, did not constitute “punishment” in violation of ex post facto clause). Because the probation requirements of section 948.03(5) are mandatory, Muzzo v....

...ed that case for resentencing. The affirming of the trial court’s probation order in the case at bar merits a clarification of the holding in Walker . Walker does not prohibit the use of rehabilitative costs as a condition of probation pursuant to Section 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (1983); however, the trial judge does not possess unbridled discretion in imposing such a condition....

...[1] However, the State properly concedes that defendant's sentence entered on DUI charges filed in Circuit Court case number 92-31026 is illegal and must be corrected on remand. [2] As a special condition of probation, the trial court imposed a four year sentence of imprisonment. Section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1991) provides that "a period of incarceration as a condition of probation ......

affirm the remaining portion of condition 7. See § 948.03(l)(i), Fla.Stat. (1991); Tomlin-son, 645 So.2d

receiving state interstate compact authority.” § 948.03(6), Fla. Stat. (2000). The order did not so stipulate

...We strike the imposition of costs in favor of First Step of Volusia County, Inc., but in all other respects affirm the defendant’s judgment and sentence. The defendant committed the crimes in question in 1992, prior to the effective date of the amendment to section 948.03(l)(h), Florida Statutes (1995), which authorized imposition of costs such as those in question here....

...gal because it resulted in imposing on appellant as a special condition of probation a period of incarceration which, when combined with the one year originally imposed, exceeded 364 days, the maximum period of incarceration which may be so imposed. § 948.03(5), Fla.Stat....

...feet of a school, day care center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate, as prescribed by the court." Although designated a "Special Condition" in the order under review, this condition, which was imposed pursuant to section 948.03(5)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2001), [1] without the necessity of oral pronouncement by the trial court at sentencing, is a standard condition statutorily imposed on defendants like King who are convicted of certain sex offenses....

...hat his probation officer would deem suitable. The trial court entered an order modifying King's probation to require that King reside in the Sumter County jail for 11 months and 29 days, or until such time as King had a suitable residence. Although section 948.03(6), Florida Statutes (2001) (currently section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2008)), authorizes modification of a defendant's probation at any time, it is impermissible to enhance the conditions and terms of probation unless the court determines that the defendant committed a willful and substantial violation....

...s—that is why the trial court found that King violated Special Condition 2 by failing to provide the Department with a suitable address prior to his release from prison. However, neither Special Condition 2 nor the statute requiring its imposition, section 948.03(5)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2001), requires King to give a suitable address prior to his release from prison or, for that matter, that he give any address at all....

...We conclude that it was improper for the Department to seek revocation of King's probation under the circumstances of this case and that it was error for the trial court to enter the order under review modifying King's probation. REVERSED and REMANDED. MONACO and TORPY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.03(5)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2001) (currently section 948.30(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2008)), provides that the court must impose the following standard condition of probation for specified sex offenders: If the victim was under the age...

...damage *1145 or loss caused by his offense in a reasonable amount or manner to be determined by the court.” (Emphasis added.) The juvenile points out that an analogous statute governing restitution as a condition of probation in adult proceedings, section 948.03(l)(g), Florida Statutes (1975), was construed by the Florida Supreme Court in Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla.1977). Section 948.03(l)(g), which is similar in wording to its statutory counterpart for juveniles, section 39.11(l)(g), authorizes conditioning probation on the defendant’s making “reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or los...

...t cannot require the defendant to pay the victim an amount “in excess of the amount of damage the criminal conduct caused the victim.” Id. at 1022 . Inasmuch as the state conceded that the restitution condition of probation was not authorized by section 948.03(l)(g) since the injuries sustained by the occupants of the Volkswagen were not caused by the defendant’s crime of leaving the scene of the accident, the supreme court saw no reason to order the trial court to conduct a hearing on the issue of damages on remand....

...ant’s reliance on Fresneda . It held that when property is destroyed while in the possession of a person who is in the act of stealing such property, there is a sufficient connection to require restitution under the theft charge in compliance with section 948.03(l)(g), Florida Statutes (1983).

...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. *195 PER CURIAM. The trial court's order denying appellant's Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence is reversed. Under section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1993), the one-year term of incarceration is illegal as a period of incarceration imposed as a condition of community control "shall not exceed 364 days." The illegal sentence in this case is not moot....

...State, 411 So.2d 1361, 1365-1366 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 419 So.2d 1195 (Fla.1982). We, accordingly, strike the ten special conditions listed on the back of the probation order. If the appellant’s probation order is subsequently modified pursuant to section 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (1987), and additional conditions of probation are added, we remind the trial court that a condition of probation is invalid unless it is reasonably related to the offense committed and the rehabilitation of the defendant....

...State, 411 So.2d 1361, 1365-1366 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 419 So.2d 1195 (Fla.1982). We, accordingly, strike the ten special conditions listed on the back of the probation order. If the appellant’s probation order is subsequently modified pursuant to section 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (1987), and additional conditions of probation are added, we remind the trial court that a condition of probation is invalid unless it is reasonably related to the offense committed and the rehabilitation of the defendant....

...tion (12) that requires him to submit to random testing to determine the use of alcohol or controlled substances; thus, the trial court was not required to pronounce orally these conditions at sentencing. See State v. Hart, 668 So.2d 589 (Fla.1996); § 948.03(1)(j)1., Fla.Stat. (1993); Fla.R.Crim. P. 3.986(e). We strike, however, the portion of condition (12) that requires Mr. Hill to pay for the random testing unless waived by the probation officer, because that language is not contained in section 948.03 and was not orally pronounced at sentencing....

“aggrieved parties” (within the meaning of Section 948.03, Florida Statutes) to whom the defendant should

...f rule 3.986 add check-off provisions to both forms that read “You will attend and successfully complete a batterers’ intervention program.” These amendments are in response to chapter 2001-50, section 6, at 321, Laws of Florida, which amended section 948.03, Florida Statutes (terms and conditions of probation or community control), to require a person convicted of an offense of domestic violence to attend and successfully complete a batterers’ intervention program as a condition of probation or community control....

...n, as opposed to being a so-called probationary split sentence in which a period of confinement is followed by a period of probation. He is correct. The term of confinement was clearly a condition of probation, which arrangement is authorized by section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2020) (stating that “[t]he enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions does not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper” and imposing requirements “if the court ....

...When a sentencing court imposes a period of incarceration as a condition of probation, “the period may not exceed 364 days, and incarceration shall be restricted to either a county facility, or a probation and restitution center under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.” § 948.03(2), Fla....

...n, as opposed to being a so-called probationary split sentence in which a period of confinement is followed by a period of probation. He is correct. The term of confinement was clearly a condition of probation, which arrangement is authorized by section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2020) (stating that “[t]he enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions does not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper” and imposing requirements “if the court ....

...When a sentencing court imposes a period of incarceration as a condition of probation, “the period may not exceed 364 days, and incarceration shall be restricted to either a county facility, or a probation and restitution center under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.” § 948.03(2), Fla....

...ed at . (12) You shall submit to the drawing of blood or other biological specimens as required by s.ection 943.325, Florida Statutes. (13) You shall submit to the taking of a digitized photograph as required by s.ection 948.03, Florida Statutes. SPECIAL CONDITIONS You must undergo a (drug/alcohol) evaluation and, if treatment is deemed necessary, you must successfully complete the treatment. You will submit to...

...ons of his parole, shall revoke the parole and return the parolee to prison to serve the sentence theretofore imposed upon him, reinstate the original parole order, "order the placement of the parolee into a community control program as set forth in s. 948.03 , or enter such other order as is proper." See , s 15, Ch....

...urfew, revocation or suspension of the driver's license, community service, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, or other appropriate restraints on the offender's liberty. Section 948.01 (4)(a), F.S., as amended by s 13, Ch. 83-131. Section 948.03 (2), F.S., as amended by s 16, Ch....

...y's best interests, the court may discharge the offender from further supervision. Section 948.05 , F.S., as amended by s 19, Ch. 83-131. Finally the court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions of probation or community control. Section 948.03 (4), F.S., as amended by s 16, Ch....

...Since community control is intended to be more restrictive, it could reasonably include special conditions imposed in normal parole. See , s 948.01 (4)(a), as amended, which provides that a court, and thus the commission, may order "other appropriate restraints on the offender's liberty"; s 948.03 , F.S....

...Furthermore I find no statutory inhibitions that would bar the commission from setting a fixed period of very close supervision under community control that could be relaxed later. The courts appear to have that authority in implementing community control; s 948.03 (4), as amended by Ch....

...The commission does not have to formally revoke the original release order because it is forfeited or suspended, subject to reinstatement, on the finding a parole violation took place. However, it appears that the commission could adopt conditions from the original parole order compatible with ss 948.01 (4), 948.03 and 948.06 , F.S., as amended, in its new order placing the parolee into a community control program....

...inal release order is forfeited or suspended and unless reinstated, superseded and replaced by a subsequent order placing the parolee into a community control program. However, the commission may incorporate conditions compatible with ss 948.01 (4), 948.03 and 948.06 , F.S....

...d HRS shall jointly determine the eligibility of sex offenders for such programs. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the entry of their orders was justified by the broad powers granted to judges in formulating conditions of probation. § 948.03(3), Fla.Stat....

...State, 201 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). As so construed, Sections 917.012 and 917.017, dealing specifically with the entry of sexual offenders into residential treatment programs, govern over the general discretionary powers afforded trial judges by Section 948.03(3) regarding probationers....

...(2014) (effective October 1, 2014). In summarily denying Alamo’s motion, the. lower court explained in its order that Alamo was sentenced to 60 months of probation with a special condition of probation that Alamo serve the first six months in the county jail. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2014), permits a court, as a special condition of probation, to impose a period of incarceration not to exceed 364 days....

PER CURIAM. Upon the State’s proper confession of error, we reverse the sentence imposed and remand for resentencing. § 948.03(8), Fla....

...ge. This is an appeal from an order of revocation of community control finding defendant in violation of two conditions of his community control. We reverse. On May 5, 1987, defendant was sentenced to eighteen months’ community control pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes....

...Here, it was the defendant’s com *1070 munity control officer who required him to wear an electronic monitoring device. In our view, the wearing of an electronic monitoring device as a “condition” of community control can only be ordered by the trial judge. The statute provides: 948.03....

...f an electronic monitoring device or system, [emphasis added] Community control may be revoked only for a condition imposed by the court, not by the Department of Corrections officer. See Chatman v. State, 365 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Although section 948.03(3), Florida Statutes, permits the “Department of Corrections, at its discretion, to electronically monitor an offender sentenced to community control,” nothing in the statute elevates this discretion to the level of authority to create and impose a “condition” of community control....

...at 1206 (emphasis in original). In J.M., we found no legislative intent to give the trial court authority to declare a juvenile to be a sexual predator. See also C.C.M. v. State, 782 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)(holding that sexual offender conditions mandated by section 948.03(5) apply to adults and juveniles sentenced as adults, but do not apply to a juvenile who is adjudicated a delinquent child)....

that sexual offender conditions mandated by section 948.03(5) apply to adults and juveniles sentenced

...5th DCA 2003) (finding that a trial court has discretion to exercise jurisdiction and terminate probation at any time pursuant to section 948.05, Florida Statutes). A trial court has authority to modify or rescind the terms or conditions of probation imposed by it at any time. § 948.03(2), Fla....

construed as the standard costs associated with section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1995). Accordingly, we strike

and consented to by the probation officer.” See § 948.03(1)(Z), Fla. Stat. (1995). I believe it would be

probation conditions 9 and 10 were violated. See § 948.03(1), Fla.Stat. (1987); Chatman v. State, 365 So

...In a divided opinion in its Williams case, the First District sidestepped the “causation” requirement of section 775.089(1) and the supreme court’s decision in State v. Williams by theorizing that, in cases involving conditions of probation, restitution for an unrelated offense can be ordered under section 948.03(8), Florida Statutes: The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper. The court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions theretofore imposed by it upon the probationer or offender in community control. § 948.03(8), Fla.Stat....

...Based on Williams and the controlling statutes, however, this appears to be a distinction without a difference. It does appear from a reading of section 775.-089(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as interpreted by the supreme court in State v. Williams, as well as section 948.03(1)(e), Florida Statutes that, whatever the breadth of judicial discretion in fashioning other conditions of probation, when the condition of probation is that restitution be paid, the payment may be ordered only for a loss caused by the offense for which defendant is being sentenced....

period for a drug rehabilitation program. See § 948.03(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). Likewise, we are concerned

...Appellate counsel has pursued this appeal by means of an Anders brief. 1 The appellant was given the opportunity to file a pro se brief but did not do so. We conclude from our review of the briefs and the record that the trial court was correct except in one respect. We reverse only as to that one point. Under section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1993), a period of incarceration imposed as a condition of community control or probation cannot exceed 364 days....

“insofar as may be possible,” contained in section 948.03(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1993). Therefore,

...State, 372 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Further, appellant must be afforded a hearing to establish that the offense with which he was charged has a relationship to the damage to the victim and to establish the amount of damages or loss caused by his offense. § 948.03(l)(g), Fla.Stat....

condition of probation or community control. See § 948.03(8), Fla.Stat. (1989). Since the guideline schedules

...Wilson's sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c) and that his motion was premature because he has not yet begun the probationary period of his sentence. However, Mr. Wilson did not file his motion pursuant to rule 3.800(c). He instead filed his motion pursuant to section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2017), which states that "[t]he court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions theretofore imposed by it upon the probationer." (Emphasis added.) By concluding that it did not have the discretion to modify Mr....

...Statutes. Id. at 235 . Because of this conviction, the trial court could allow his residence in another state only “if the order stipulates that it is contingent upon the approval of the receiving state interstate compact authority.” Id. (citing § 948.03(6), Fla....

...That section was repealed in 1993 and simultaneously re-enacted in section 794.011(8). See Ch. 93-156, Laws of Fla. The elements of the two statutes are identical. See Millien v. State, 766 So.2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), rev. denied, 804 So.2d 329 (Fla.2001). Section 948.03(6), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: “The sentencing court may only impose a condition of supervision allowing an offender convicted of § 794.011, § 800.04, § 827.071, or § 847.0145, to reside in another state, if the order stipulates that it is contingent upon the approval of the receiving state interstate compact authority.” § 948.03(6), Fla. Stat. (2001). This language requiring that the receiving state approve the transfer of sex offender probation was added in 1996. See Ch. 96-312, § 54, Laws of Fla. Section 948.03(6) does not reference section 794.041 because that statute had been incorporated into section 794.011 three years earlier, as noted above....

work faithfully “insofar as may be possible.” § 948.03(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (1993). We also strike the portion

PER CURIAM. The trial court has the responsibility to determine the correct amount of restitution under section 948.03(l)(e), Florida Statutes, and in this case erred in delegating its responsibility to the probation officer....

condition, and thus, need not be orally announced. § 948.03(l)(j)l., Fla. Stat. (1993); State v. Hart, 668

...correct sentencing error, which asserted that the trial court improperly imposed a special probation condition requiring him to pay for urinalysis testing. He argues the condition of payment for testing is not a general condition of probation authorized by either section 948.03, Florida Statutes (2017) or Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e), and therefore, in order to be legally imposed, the condition must have been orally announced at sentencing....

...the law requires that it be pronounced orally at sentencing before it can be included in the written probation order.” Id. (quoting Nank v. State, 646 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)). Appellant committed the subject crime in March 2017. In 2017, Florida Statute 948.03 listed sixteen general conditions of probation. § 948.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). Regarding drug and alcohol testing, section 948.03(1)(l), Florida Statutes (2017), provided: (l) 1....

...Submit to random testing as directed by the correctional probation officer or the professional staff of the treatment center where he or she is receiving treatment to determine the presence or use of alcohol or controlled substances. 3 § 948.03(1)(l), Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphases added). Section 948.03 contained no provision for the payment of drug or alcohol testing, except for section 948.03(1)(o), which stated: (o) Submit to the drawing of blood or other biological specimens as prescribed in ss. 943.325 and 948.014, and reimburse the appropriate agency for the costs of drawing and transmitting the blood or other biological specimens to the Department of Law Enforcement. § 948.03(1)(o), Fla....

...determine possible use of alcohol, drugs, or controlled substances. You shall be required to pay for the tests unless payment is waived by your officer. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.986(e) (2017) (emphasis added). Thus, the version of section 948.03(1) in effect in 2017 clearly made submission to random testing for drugs and alcohol a general condition of probation....

...McDowell challenges his conviction and sentence for the offense of lewd and lascivious assault on a child. Appellant raises a number of issues on appeal, only one of which has merit. Appellant’s sentence to 15 years of probation with the special condition that he serve 85 months in prison fails to comport with section 948.03(6), Florida Statutes (1977). In pertinent part, this subsection reads, “if the court ... imposes a period of incarceration as a condition of probation or community control, the period shall not exceed 364 days.” § 948.03(6), Fla....

...our counts, but the record contains no written order specifying the amount of restitution for the remaining eleven counts. Rather, the written probation order states: “You will pay restitution in all cases as directed by your probation officer.” Section 948.03(l)(e), Florida Statutes, expressly states that the amount of restitution is “to be determined by the court.” In other words, the determination of the amount of restitution to be made in each case may not be delegated to a probation officer....

...se for which he was convicted. We agree. The State concedes that a probationary split sentence cannot exceed the statutory maximum for the offense, which in this case is five years. See Randolph v. State, 626 So.2d 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Moreover, section 948.03(6), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that a court may not impose more than 364 days of incarceration as a special condition of probation....

...onths of probation. Williams correctly argues and the State properly concedes that Williams must be resentenced because his original sentence was illegal and the trial court did not have jurisdiction either time it attempted to correct the sentence. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that if the trial court imposes a period of incarceration as a condition of probation, the period shall not exceed 364 days, and incarceration shall be restricted to either a county facility, a pro...

...g punishment phase I secure residential treatment institution, or a community residential facility owned or operated by any entity providing such services. Thus, the sentence imposing forty-eight months in prison as a condition of probation violated section 948.03(2) because it exceeded 364 days and because the trial court ordered that Williams serve the time in state prison....

and the defendant placed upon probation. F.S. § 948.03 F.S.A. sets forth the general terms and conditions

...ption was not overcome. In an order denying the appellant’s rule 3.800(b) motion, the trial court indicated that imposition of the sex offender conditions for the first time on remand was not vindictive because they were statutorily required under section 948.03(5). Section 948.03(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), provides in part that: Effective for probationers or community controllees whose crime was committed on or after October 1, 1995, and who are placed under supervision for violation of chapter 794 or s. 800.04, s. 827.071, or s. 847.0145, the court must impose the following conditions in addition to all other standard and special conditions imposed. The section then lists the conditions that must be imposed. Thus, section 948.03(5)(a) would require imposition of the sex offender conditions for sexual battery, which is a violation of chapter 794....

...However, the judgment and sentencing documents, as well as the court’s order denying the rule 3.800(b) motion, make it clear that the appellant was placed on probation for the kidnapping *770 count only. The kidnapping conviction is a violation of section 787.01. Section 948.03(5)(a) does not require the imposition of the sex offender conditions for defendants placed on probation for violations of section 787.01....

...Therefore, the court did not err in failing to orally pronounce condition five at sentencing and we affirm that condition. We affirm that portion of condition eight that requires Williams to submit to random testing for alcohol or controlled substances because it is a general condition of probation set out in section 948.03(1)©, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...In a single order, the trial court summarily denied both motions. Relying on Stuart v. State , 988 So.2d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), Petitioner argues that the trial court erred and departed from the essential requirements of the law in denying his motions without an evidentiary hearing. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2018), provides that a trial court may rescind or modify the terms and conditions of probation at any time during the probationary period....

...State , 579 So.2d 109 , 110-11, 110 n.3 (Fla. 1991) (holding that trial court erred in enhancing terms *795 of probation without first conducting hearing, even though defendant agreed to modification, but distinguishing modification under section 948.06 from section 948.03 ); see also Gerber v....

...In this case, Petitioner's motions did not seek enhanced probationary terms; rather, the motions sought rescission and modification of his existing probationary conditions. Thus, the notice and hearing requirements of section 948.06 are not applicable. Because section 948.03(2) does not contain similar requirements, the court properly considered Petitioner's motions without a hearing....

...In a single order, the trial court summarily denied both motions. Relying on Stuart v. State , 988 So.2d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), Petitioner argues that the trial court erred and departed from the essential requirements of the law in denying his motions without an evidentiary hearing. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2018), provides that a trial court may rescind or modify the terms and conditions of probation at any time during the probationary period....

...State , 579 So.2d 109 , 110-11, 110 n.3 (Fla. 1991) (holding that trial court erred in enhancing terms *795 of probation without first conducting hearing, even though defendant agreed to modification, but distinguishing modification under section 948.06 from section 948.03 ); see also Gerber v....

...In this case, Petitioner's motions did not seek enhanced probationary terms; rather, the motions sought rescission and modification of his existing probationary conditions. Thus, the notice and hearing requirements of section 948.06 are not applicable. Because section 948.03(2) does not contain similar requirements, the court properly considered Petitioner's motions without a hearing....

...First, the trial court is not always required to orally announce the con *725 ditions of probation, see Keene v. State, 502 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), and reporting to the probation office as directed, which is a standard condition of probation permitted under section 948.03(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), involves merely an administrative mechanism for enforcement of probation and is not a substantive matter....

...imposing three special probation conditions in the written probation order which were not orally pronounced at sentencing. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the following conditions are special conditions because they are not authorized by section 948.03, Florida Statutes (2020), or Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e): (1) paying $50 per month towards the cost of her probation; (2) obtaining approval from her probation officer before changing her residence, employment, or leavi...

...Appellant contends these restrictions constitute special probation conditions which the trial court was required to announce at sentencing. The State counter-argues the restrictions are consistent with the general probation conditions, and that cooperating with the probation officer is a necessary component of probation. Section 948.03 provides: (1) The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation....

...(a) Report to the probation officer as directed. (b) Permit the probation officer to visit him or her at his or her home or elsewhere. (c) Work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible. (d) Remain within a specified place. § 948.03(1)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added). Pursuant to section 948.03(1), reporting to the probation officer as directed, permitting the probation officer to visit the probationer at his or her home or elsewhere, and remaining within a specified place are standard probation conditions....

...ired information,” “[l]eaving the county without permission,” and “[f]ailure to report a change in employment” are “low-risk violation[s].” § 948.06(9)(b)3., 8., 9., Fla. 4 Stat. (2020). Reading section 948.03 in para materia with section 948.06, we hold that the condition requiring Appellant to obtain her probation officer’s consent before leaving a specified place – her county of residence and the jurisdiction of the court – and before changing her address or place of employment, is consistent with standard conditions of probation. Under section 948.03(1)(a), Appellant is required to report to her probation officer as directed, and it is not uncommon for probation officers to meet probationers at the probationer’s residence or place of employment. Cooperating fully and maintaining...

...Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by entering a probation order which required she not “visit places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used,” because it omits the word “knowingly”. Section 948.03(1)(n), Florida Statutes (2020), states that “[t]he probationer or community controllee may not knowingly visit places where intoxicants, drugs, or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used.” (emphasis added). Although we previously have held the omission of 948.03(1)(n)’s knowledge element in a probation order is not necessarily error, we have remanded suggesting that the trial court amend the condition “to reflect that appellant may not ‘knowingly visit’ such prohibited places.” See Nelson v....

...Hart, 668 So.2d 589 (Fla.1996). In the light of Hart , we affirm the probationary conditions with the following exceptions. Condition six requiring Washington to “work faithfully at suitable employment” is modified to include the phrase “insofar as may be possible.” See § 948.03(l)(c), Fla.Stat....

...The trial court was eminently correct in excluding the letters under Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1991). Next, appellant contests that portion of the probation order requiring him to support his two stepdaughters. We agree that this condition of probation was erroneously imposed. Although Section 948.03(l)(f), Florida Statutes (1989), authorizes as a permissible condition of probation that a probationer support his legal dependents, no legal duty exists in Florida to provide support for a minor child who is not natural or adopted, and for whom care and support has not been contracted....

...in the transcript may be a reporting error, which should be clarified on remand. Third, appellant challenges several conditions of probation and community control. Since, with one exception, the challenged conditions are statutorily authorized, see § 948.03, Fla.Stat....

...ts or possession of any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician because it was not orally pronounced at sentencing. We affirm the second sentence because it is a more precise definition of the general condition of probation authorized by section 948.03(l)(i), Florida Statutes....

...Nor will you visit places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used.” We affirm the second sentence of condition 7 because it is a more precise definition of the general condition of probation authorized by section 948.03(l)(i), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...n a juvenile’s case over the definition of “conviction” in section 775.21(2)(c), which generally applies to all sexual offenders. In reaching our conclusion, we note that this court recently decided that the sex offender conditions mandated by section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes, apply exclusively to adults and juveniles sentenced as adults, but are inapplicable to a juvenile who is adjudicated a delinquent child....

MICKLE, Judge. Vicki Lee Duby (Appellant) appeals an order imposing restitution in the amount of $98,642.00 as a condition of community control. § 948.03(l)(e), Fla.Stat....

...We have considered all of these arguments and conclude that they are without merit and thus affirm the trial court. In doing so, we comment on only one of appellant’s arguments. Appellant contends that restitution was improper in this case. He argues that the statute in question, Section 948.03(l)(g), Florida Statutes (1979), limits restitution to “damage or loss caused by his offense.” Appellant argues that the destruction of *399 the motorcycle was the result of his careless driving and that since he was not charged or...

...unts of uttering a *298 forgery and sentenced to probation. As a condition of probation, the trial judge imposed the requirement that he not live with his mother. The challenged condition does not fall within the category of enumerated conditions in section 948.03, Florida Statutes, which may be broadly imposed as conditions of probation....

...*1129 The trial court failed to orally pronounce probation condition eight, which requires appellant to submit to and pay for random testing to determine the presence of alcohol or controlled substances. Although submission to testing is a general condition of probation pursuant to section 948.03(l)(j)l, Florida Statutes (1998), the unannounced portion of the condition requiring appellant to pay for said testing is a special condition that must be stricken....

...nity control for offenses before the court for sentencing, would exceed the maximum penalty allowable as provided by s. 775.082. (emphasis added). Because the total sentence imposed (five years) was already at the statutory maximum for each offense, section 948.03(6) required that the court reduce the probationary term of the split sentence by all of the time that Billias had served on his many prior terms of probation or community control....

...If you test positive for illegal substance, you must undergo a (drug/alcohol) evaluation, and it [sic] treatment is deemed necessary, you must successfully complete the treatment/aftercare. The parties do not dispute, and we agree, that the testing requirement set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 12 is authorized by section 948.03(l)(k)l., Florida Statutes (2002) and is therefore a valid general condition which need not be pronounced at the time sentence is imposed....

...nor children after his release from prison. Following a brief hearing on Walk’s motion, which the court treated as a motion to modify probation, the court granted the motion over the State’s objection and removed that condition of probation. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes, generally allows a trial court to rescind or modify the terms and conditions of probation at any time....

...ll escalation for violation of probation. The trial court imposed a special probation condition of nine years imprisonment. This was improper. A probation condition of incarceration which equals or exceeds one year in the county jail is invalid. See Section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes (1987); Villery v....

...��s motion to correct sentencing error that challenged the imposition of sex offender probation as part of his sentence for traveling to meet a minor to do unlawful acts pursuant to section 847.0135(4)(a), which is not an enumerated offense under section 948.03, Florida Statutes (2013)....

...Carlos Pardes appeals his judgment and sentence for possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver. We affirm his conviction, including the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. See State v. Butler, 655 So.2d 1123 (Fla.1995). We affirm condition twelve of Mr. Pardes’s probation order. See §§ 948.03(l)(k)l....

...See § 939.01, Fla.Stat. (1993); Reyes v. State, 655 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We modify condition eight of Mr. Pardes’s probation order to comport with the statutory requirement that he “[w]ork faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible.” § 948.03(l)(e), Fla.Stat....

incarceration as a condition of probation. Section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1983),1 establishes certain

...), Florida Statutes (1975), the trial court is authorized to stay and withhold imposition of sentence, and place a defendant on probation. The court may, as a condition of probation, order that the defendant spend a specified period of time in jail. Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975)....

association with Richard Cooper merits discussion. Section 948.03(l)(i), Florida Statutes, permits the courts

include the language “in so far as possible.” § 948.03(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1993); Burke v. State, 642 So

...s are not “relevant” to Appellant’s particular deviant behavior, which he described as molesting an underage girl. In Kasischke , the supreme court applied the rule of lenity and held that the qualifying language relating to “relevance” in section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (1999)— which was renumbered section 948.30(l)(g) — qualifies each of the prohibitions in the statute....

...Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222, 227 n.3 (Fla. 2007) (internal citations omitted). This distinction—between standard conditions and special conditions of probation—is statutorily codified. Statutorily authorized conditions are listed in section 948.03, Florida Statutes (2023), and a probationer is therefore on constructive notice of the existence of these standard conditions....

...As a result, “[c]onditions specified in this section do not require oral pronouncement at the time of sentencing and may be considered 3 The terms “standard” and “general” are used interchangeably in the context of conditions of probation. Section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (2023) refers to “standard” conditions of probation, while Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986 and case law refers to “general” conditions of probation. For consistency, and insofar as possible, we use...

...rth any “general conditions” being imposed under the statute and to list and orally pronounce any “special conditions” being imposed by the trial court: GENERAL CONDITIONS: [List the general conditions of probation pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes.] SPECIAL CONDITIONS: [List the special conditions of probation as orally pronounced and authorized by law.] (Emphasis added). Prior to 2019, however, the form order of probation in Rule 3.986 in...

...provides all defendants with sufficient notice to permit an opportunity to object if probation is imposed. The rules provide the same type of notice as the probation conditions set forth in the Florida Statutes. See, e.g., §§ 948.03–.034, Fla....

...pronounced at sentencing. (Internal citations omitted). Of course, this rationale—that the enumeration of standard conditions of probation in the form provided by Rule 3.986 satisfies the notice requirement in the same way that the publication of section 948.03, Florida Statutes provides constructive notice to the probationer—is no longer viable, 9 given the Florida Supreme Court’s 2019 amendment to Rule 3.986, which removed all listed general...

...You will not use intoxicants to excess or possess any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician. Nor will you visit places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used. (Emphasis added). By contrast, section 948.03(1)(n), which prohibits similar conduct, includes a knowledge component: Be prohibited from using intoxicants to excess or possessing any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician, an advanced practice registered nurse, or a physician assistant....

...after the Form 3.986 as it existed before the amendment of the rule in 2019. 10  Capozzi contends Condition Seven should be modified to add the knowledge element so it mirrors its statutory counterpart in section 948.03(1)(n)....

...are not standard conditions and were not orally pronounced. And in light of the text of Rule 3.986 following its amendment in 2019 (and in light of the material differences in wording between the probation order and the standard conditions listed in section 948.03), we conclude Capozzi is correct. 11 revoked unless it is shown that Capozzi knew or reasonably should have known she was visiting a place where drugs or intoxicants were being sold, dispensed or used, see, e.g., Roundtree v....

...Condition Seven was erroneously imposed by the trial court. See Douchard v. State, 357 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (remanding a similar condition of probation “to include that the probationer must not ‘knowingly’ visit the places enumerated’” and noting that section 948.03(1)(n) includes the word “knowingly”) (citing Sandoval v....

...r provides: You will work diligently at a lawful occupation, advise your employer of your probation status, and support any dependents to the best of your ability, as directed by your officer. (Emphasis added). By contrast, section 948.03(1)(c) and (h), respectively, requiring that a probationer: (c) Work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible. (h) Support his or her legal dependents to the best of his or her ability. 6...

...In contrast, here, Capozzi challenges Condition Seven as an unpronounced, special condition where it does not track the statutory language delineating standard conditions that need not be orally pronounced. 13 (Emphasis added). Section 948.03 contains no provision requiring a probationer to notify an employer of his or her probation status. Capozzi raised two contentions regarding Condition Eight: 1) the requirement that Capozzi “work diligently at a lawful occup...

...Both contentions are correct. (1) “You will work diligently at a lawful occupation . . . .” Similar to Condition Seven and its statutory counterpart, the absence of a willfulness requirement renders Condition Eight different in kind from the corresponding standard condition in section 948.03(1)(c) (“Work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible”) (emphasis added). The State, however, proposes a different construction of Condition Eight....

...� must be modified to read, “seek gainful employment.” The portion of condition (8) that requires Kirkland to “support any dependents to the best of [his] ability,” is a standard condition that need not be orally announced. § 948.03(1)(f), Fla....

...3d 736, 740 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)); Haskin v. Haskin, 399 So. 3d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). Our interpretation of Condition Eight appears all the more proper, given that Condition Eight is actually a combination of two standard conditions enumerated in section 948.03, Florida Statutes: (c) Work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible. *** (h) Support his or her legal dependents to the best of his or her ability. (Emphasis added)....

.... .” 17  As to the requirement that Capozzi advise her employer of her probation status, Capozzi correctly notes that such a condition is found nowhere among the standard conditions enumerated in section 948.03, and must therefore be considered a special (and in this case, orally unpronounced) condition....

...her employer of her probationary status, and remand with directions for the trial court to modify Condition Seven to include the word “knowingly” before the word “visit,” and to modify Condition Eight to more closely track the standard condition in section 948.03(1)(c) (“Work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible”).9 8 The State’s reliance on Tory v. State, 686 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) is misplaced where the defendant raised a different issue than that raised here. (Arguing: “[T]he trial court erred by imposing ‘standard conditions’ of probation provided in section 948.03(1), and contained in the probation order, which were not orally pronounced at sentencing, because he was specifically placed on ‘drug offender’ probation, pursuant to section 948.01(13)(a).”). 9 The Circuit Court of the Elevent...

...revising the forms used for its orders of probation to eliminate references to the conditions listed in the pre-2019 form in Rule 3.986, and replace it with language that more closely tracks the statutory language of the standard conditions set forth in section 948.03....

...Such a change would avoid any confusion regarding a probationer’s obligations and permit probation officers to better manage probationers and enforce standard conditions of probation. At the same time, our opinion should not be read to hold that the standard conditions must be identical to the wording in section 948.03—“every detail need not be spelled out and the language should be interpreted in its common, ordinary usage.” Lawson v....

incarceration as a condition of probation under section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes, disposed of the issue

...ates that the age of prior convictions is inconsequential in sentencing and inappropriate to support a downward departure sentence. The trial court also erred in ordering that two years of the four-year probationary term were to be served in prison. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2008), states that "if the court ......

...without violating any law.” The state relies on Tory v. State, 686 So.2d 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), in arguing that the requirement to “live and remain at liberty without violating any law” is a standard condition of probation, authorized under section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1993), and rule 3.986(e), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. For a standard condition, the state contends, no oral pronouncement is necessary. In Tory , we held that standard conditions of probation provided in section 948.03, or included in rule 3.986(e), could be imposed without being orally pronounced, because the defendant was on constructive notice that some or all of the standard conditions listed in the statute could be imposed by the judge....

...contained in the form order of probation found in Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.986(e)). That being said, however, this is a juvenile case, which is controlled by section 985.231(l)(a)l, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.947, and not by section 948.03 and rule 3.986(e), pertaining to adult probation....

...elonies. Id. He moved to dismiss the affidavit alleging violation of probation by committing these crimes on the ground that he had never been orally informed that he could not commit these offenses while on probation. Id. After reviewing Fla. Stat. § 948.03 (1)(1993) and finding that there was no express statutory requirement, corresponding to Condition 5 of rule 3.986(e), that probationers obey criminal laws, the trial court reluctantly dismissed the probation proceeding....

State, 243 So.2d 189 (4 D.C.A. Fla., 1971). Section 948.03, F.S., sets forth the terms and conditions

...General or standard conditions of probation are statutorily authorized or mandated, and therefore such conditions may be imposed and included for the first time in a written sentencing order because such conditions “do not require oral pronouncement at the time of sentencing.” § 948.03(1), Fla....

...Hart, 668 So. 2d 589, 592 (Fla. 1996). Special terms and conditions of probation must be imposed by oral pronouncement at sentencing before including such terms and conditions 4 in a written sentencing order. § 948.039, Fla....

...3d 142, 148– 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023); Jenkins v. State, 332 So. 3d 1013, 1020 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). On the other hand, Conditions 7, 8, and 9 are general conditions that do not require striking. Condition 7 is a general condition of probation, because section 948.03(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2021), lists restitution as a general condition not requiring an oral pronouncement. § 948.03(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2021); § 948.032, Fla....

...ermine whether a trial court has jurisdiction to place a probationer on an "administrative" probation. [1] Reversed and remanded to reinstate Appellant's non-reporting probation. DELL, C.J., and KLEIN, J., concur. NOTES [1] However, it is clear that section 948.03(5) does provide for rescission and modification of the terms and conditions of probation by the court at any time, and section 948.05 does authorize the court to discharge a probationer.

...In order to effect the deferred sentencing, the trial court sentenced Mr. Fernandez to ten years’ probation with five years’ state prison as a special condition of probation. The State .properly concedes that Mr. Fernandez’s sentence is illegal. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that if the court “imposes a period of incarceration as a condition of probation, the period shall not exceed 364 days.” Additionally, the statute requires that incarceration as a condition of probation must be completed in a county facility, a probation or restitution center, or a community residential facility. Id. Therefore, the sen *1284 tence imposing five years in state prison as a condition of probation is in violation of section 948.03(2) because it exceeded 364 days and because the trial court ordered Mr....

...Fernandez to serve this time in state prison. Accordingly, Mr. Fernandez’s sentence is illegal and requires correction. See Filppula v. State, 106 So.3d 45, 46-47 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (holding that á sentence of two years in state prison as a condition of probation violated section 948.03(2) and was an illegal sentence); Williams v. State, 67 So.3d 249, 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that “the sentence imposing forty-eight months in prison as a condition of probation violated section 948.03(2) because it exceeded 364 days and because the trial court ordered that Williams serve the time in state prison”)....

to submit to random alcohol testing because section 948.03(l)(j)l., Florida Statutes (1993), provides

...iation with persons who use alcohol. On remand, the court may again impose random alcohol and drug testing as pronounced as well as the standard conditions pertaining to drugs and intoxicants contained in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986 and section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The district court also noted that reading the statute as limiting imposition of the condition to only the enumerated offenses is inconsistent with the broad discretion given trial courts to determine what conditions will promote a probationer’s rehabilitation. Id. (citing §§ 948.03(2), 948.039, Fla....

...The Third District assumed the imposed therapy referred to the sex offender therapy required to be imposed upon sex offenders in section 948.30. However, the trial judge could have instead been acting under one of the sections that grants broad discretion to trial courts to determine probation conditions. See §§ 948.03(2), 948.039, Fla....

...fender conditions to be applied to probations for non-enumerated offenses, we must resolve this doubt against our supplying of any “omission” to address the issue. *53 Even using the doctrine of in pari mate-ria, the result is the same. Sections 948.03 and 948.039 describe the broad discretion given to trial courts to determine probation conditions. See § 948.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2008) (“The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper.”); § 948.039, Fla....

...f the condition to only the enumerated offenses is inconsistent with the broad -4- discretion given trial courts to determine what conditions will promote a probationer’s rehabilitation. Id. (citing §§ 948.03(2), 948.039, Fla....

...The Third District assumed the imposed therapy referred to the sex offender therapy required to be imposed upon sex offenders in section 948.30. However, the trial judge could have instead been acting under one of the sections that grants broad discretion to trial courts to determine probation conditions. See §§ 948.03(2), 948.039, Fla....

...- 11 - enumerated offenses, we must resolve this doubt against our supplying of any “omission” to address the issue. Even using the doctrine of in pari materia, the result is the same. Sections 948.03 and 948.039 describe the broad discretion given to trial courts to determine probation conditions. See § 948.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2008) (“The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper.”); § 948.039, Fla....

...This is similar to the Fourth District’s holding and the First District Court of Appeal’s holding that a trial court may not impose drug offender probation other than for the violation of a drug-related offense listed in the drug offender probation statute, section 948.034....

...nd conditions of probation or community control for certain sex offenses.” Id. (emphasis added). Despite this assumption, the ambiguity of the trial court renders it not only possible, but likely, that the trial court actually acted pursuant to section 948.039, Florida Statutes, when it imposed MDSO therapy....

...That section provides: “The court may determine any special terms and conditions of probation or community control. The terms and conditions should be reasonably related to the - 24 - circumstances of the offense committed and appropriate for the offender. . . .” § 948.039, Fla. Stat. (2008).7 Thus, it is not clear whether the trial court imposed the disputed condition under section 948.30, the provision that mandates a lengthy list of conditions for certain sex offenders, or, as I suspect, section 948.039, which grants trial courts wide latitude to impose special conditions of probation....

...The statute does not expressly prohibit or allow such action, and therefore I agree with the majority in its conclusion that section 948.30 is ambiguous on this point. Thus, the majority’s reliance on principles of statutory interpretation, especially the principle of in pari materia and the consideration of sections 948.03 and 948.039, is appropriate here. Section 948.03(2) indicates that the enumeration of specific kinds of terms and 7....

...conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it may consider proper. This provision supports the conclusion that the provisions required by section 948.30 are not exclusive to the enumerated offenses in that statute. Moreover, section 948.039 appears to operate as a limitation on the scope of special conditions, but does so in a permissive manner: “The court may determine any special terms and conditions of probation or community control. The terms and conditions should be reasonably related to the circumstances of the offense committed and appropriate for the offender.” (Emphasis added). Only by reading sections 948.03, 948.039, and 948.30 in pari materia can we actually understand the question presented by this case: is the wide discretion statutorily granted to trial courts expansive enough to allow a court to impose a condition that is otherwise mandatorily im...

...Even if the jury convicted Villanueva of misdemeanor battery alone, rather than lewd and lascivious molestation, the trial judge heard all of the evidence presented to the jury, and the trial judge has a great deal of discretion in fashioning conditions of probation. See §§ 948.03(2), 948.039....

...ould act in this manner in the future. I consider it absurd to conclude otherwise. Therefore, I would affirm the decision below. CANADY, J., dissenting. Because I conclude that the trial court acted within the broad discretion provided by section 948.03, Florida Statutes (2011), for trial courts to impose conditions of probation, I would approve the decision of the Third District on review. I therefore dissent. The majority’s decision is based on a misreading of Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993)—a misreading that unduly limits the discretion afforded to trial judges by section 948.03 to impose special conditions of probation. The statute - 27 - provides that “[t]he court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation.” § 948.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). The statute also provides that “[t]he [statutory] enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper.” § 948.03(2), Fla. Stat....

...which requires the imposition of sex offender therapy for certain enumerated offenses, implicitly precludes the imposition of sex offender therapy in connection with unenumerated offenses. Any such implication is nonsensical in view of the broad authority granted to trial courts by section 948.03. Nothing in section 948.30 suggests that it in any way limits the authority granted by section 948.03. There is nothing ambiguous about section 948.30, and there is no basis for the use of legislative history to rewrite the plain terms of the statute by reading in a limitation on a trial court’s general authority to impose conditi...

the plea agreement and authorized by law. See § 948.03(6), (7), Fla. Stat. (1999); Waite v. City of Fort

...Further, by Florida Statute, “[a]ny state court having original jurisdiction of criminal actions” is authorized to place offenders on probation, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld, § 948.01(1), Fla. Stat., and the sentencing court is permitted to “determine the terms and conditions of probation.” § 948.03(1), Fla....

JJ., concur. . It should be also noted that section 948.03(3), Florida Statutes (1981) (now 948.03(4)

...Brown to pay back these expenses according to a plan or schedule to be worked out between Mr. Brown and his Community Control Officer. The state candidly concedes it to be error for a trial court to delegate its responsibility to determine the amount of restitution due a victim pursuant to section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...5th DCA 1996); Young v. State, 663 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Kirk v. State, 663 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Santoro v. State, 644 So.2d 585 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Although we have struck the imposition of payments to First Step in the past, section 948.03(1)(n), Florida Statutes, now provides that the court may include the following condition: Pay not more than $1 per month during the term of probation or community control to a nonprofit organization established for the sole purpose of...

...See State v. Hart, 668 So.2d 589 (Fla.1996). Condition (A) of Brown’s probation, which was not orally pronounced, requires him to pay for alcohol/drug testing. While submitting to alcohol and drug screening is a standard condition of probation under section 948.03(1)©, Florida Statutes (1993), the portion of the condition which requires the probationer to pay for the screening is a special condition....

terms and conditions of probation is found in Section 948.03. It is clear from this record that the trial

...robation). First, the checklist of conditions of probation and special conditions is deleted, and is replaced with “GENERAL CONDITIONS: [List the general conditions of probation pursuant to section -7- 948.03, Florida Statutes.]” and “SPECIAL CONDITIONS: [List the special conditions of probation as orally pronounced and authorized by law.]” In addition, below the space for “Other,” the paragraph pertaining to rescinding or modifying any of the conditions of probation is modified....

...report immediately to the probation office located at . (12) You shall submit to the drawing of blood or other biological specimens as required by section 943.325, Florida Statutes. (13) You shall submit to the taking of a digitized photograph as required by section 948.03, Florida Statutes. - 56 -  SPECIAL CONDITIONS You must undergo a (drug/alcohol) evaluation and, if treatment is deemed necessary, you must su...

...You will not contact during the period of probation. You will attend and successfully complete an approved batterers’ intervention program. GENERAL CONDITIONS: [List the general conditions of probation pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes.] SPECIAL CONDITIONS: [List the special conditions of probation as orally pronounced and authorized by law.] Other (Use the space below for additional conditions as necessary.) You are here...

...We also strike condition 14, which requires Phelps to attend an HIWAIDS awareness program, because it is a special condition which was not announced at sentencing. 1 *1309 Conviction affirmed, certain costs and probation conditions stricken. THREADGILL, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur. . The legislature has amended section 948.03, Florida Statutes, to include attending an HIV/ AIDS awareness program as a standard condition of probation....

and it is hereby modified in accordance with Section 948.03, Florida Statutes, in the following manner:

...obation. Despite its oral pronouncement, on October 31, 2007, the trial court entered a mitten probation order with additional conditions to those imposed in the June 11, 1996, order. Because the appellant’s crime was committed on August 18, 1995, section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1995), is applicable....

...to the statute’s effective date); see also Plute v. State, 835 So.2d 368, 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (finding that trial courts should conduct resentencing according to the laws in effect on the date that the defendant committed the relevant offense). Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1995), affords trial courts discretion to impose probation terms and conditions; however, that discretion is not without limits....

...monitoring. Although electronic monitoring is now mandatory, at the time of the appellant’s offense, the trial court had discretion to impose electronic monitoring as a condition of the appellant’s probation. See § 948.30(3), Fla. Stat. (2006); § 948.03, Fla....

...e trial court believed that electronic monitoring was mandatory or if the trial court used its discretion). Here, the trial court’s oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing did not conclusively show that it exercised its discretion pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1995)....

DAUKSCH, Judge. We affirm the judgment and sentence except that portion of the sentence which is excessive. Section 948.03(6), Florida Statutes (1995) limits the time which a person can be made to serve under “conditions of probation or community control” to 364 days....

...The first sentence must be stricken because it is a “special condition” that must be pronounced at sentencing. Nank v. State, 646 So .2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The second sentence of the condition is valid as a more precise definition of a general prohibition. § 948.03(l)(i), Fla.Stat....

...ana in its investigation relating to appellant’s sale of cannabis. In this regard, we find the decision in Cuba v. State, 362 So.2d 29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)-persuasive and adopt its reasoning on whether the state is an aggrieved party for purposes of section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes....

...“[W]hether a probation condition is a general condition or a special condition is determined by reference to Florida Statutes . . . and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e)[.]” Id. at 93. A driver’s license suspension is not a general condition of probation. See § 948.03, Fla....

1, 1995 effective date of the amendment to section 948.03, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). See Ch. 95-189

...Administrative probation transfers the probationer to a nonreporting status. See 948.001(1), Fla. Stat. (2004); State v. Giorgetti, 868 So.2d 512, 513-14 (Fla.2004). However, while on administrative probation, the probationer remains on a form of probation, and the standard conditions of probation set forth in section 948.03(1) are still applicable. Phillips had constructive notice of these conditions. See Maddox v. *256 State, 760 So.2d 89 , 105 (Fla.2000). The standard conditions listed in section 948.03(1) include: (k)(l) Submit to random testing as directed by the correctional probation officer or the professional staff of the treatment center where he or she is receiving treatment to determine the presence or use of alcohol or controlled substances....

...[[Image here]] (m) Be prohibited from using intoxicants to excess or possessing any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician. The probationer or community controllee shall not knowingly visit places where intoxicants, drugs, or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used. Under section 948.03(l)(k)(l), Phillips was required to submit to random drug tests. Phillips violated section 948.03(l)(m) when he tested positive for marijuana and cocaine use....

...We find no reversible error with respect to any issue affecting the convictions, and affirm them without further discussion. We agree with appellant, however, that the trial court erred in assessing “First Step Program” costs as a written (but not oral) special condition of probation. 1 Section 948.039, Florida Statutes (2009), mandates that trial courts impose special conditions of probation by oral pronouncement and written order....

...Such special conditions include requirements that the offender “[p]ay not more than $1 per month during the term of probation or community control to a nonprofit organization established for the sole purpose of supplementing the rehabilitative efforts of the Department of Corrections.” § 948.039(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). It appears that the First Step of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Inc., is such a program. These fees used to be included as standard conditions under section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (1996), but in 2004, were made special conditions under section 948.039, Florida Statutes....

...rder now under review, the court did not originally impose any restraint on his contact with his wife. The court now lacks authority, he argues, to add a new condition to his probation when there has been no violation. We agree and reverse. Although Section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes (1987) permits the trial court to add additional conditions to those enumerated in the statute at the time of the original sentence, it may only subsequently modify those conditions “theretofore imposed”....

...artment of Corrections “as a condition of probation.” He appeals. We reverse. Although the amount of incarceration appears to be within the guidelines range, the manner in which it was imposed (condition of probation) makes the sentence illegal. Section 948.03(8), Florida Statutes (1989) limits the period of incarceration as a condition of probation to no more than 364 days....

...ich stated, “You will not use intoxicants to excess or possess any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician. Nor will you visit places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used.” See § 948.03(l)m, Fla....

...court improperly 2 imposed a special probation condition requiring him to pay for urinalysis testing. He argues the condition of payment for testing is not a general condition of probation authorized by either section 948.03, Florida Statutes (2017) or Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e), and therefore, in order to be legally imposed, the condition must have been orally announced at sentencing....

...it be pronounced orally at sentencing before it can be included in the written probation order.” Id. (quoting Nank v. State, 646 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)). Appellant committed the subject crime in March 2017. In 2017, Florida Statute 948.03 listed sixteen general conditions of probation. § 948.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). Regarding drug and alcohol testing, section 948.03(1)(l), Florida Statutes (2017), provided: 3  (l) 1....

...Submit to random testing as directed by the correctional probation officer or the professional staff of the treatment center where he or she is receiving treatment to determine the presence or use of alcohol or controlled substances. § 948.03(1)(l), Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphases added). Section 948.03 contained no provision for the payment of drug or alcohol testing, except for section 948.03(1)(o), which stated: (o) Submit to the drawing of blood or other biological specimens as prescribed in ss. 943.325 and 948.014, and reimburse the appropriate agency for the costs of drawing and transmitting the blood or other biological specimens to the Department of Law Enforcement. § 948.03(1)(o), Fla....

...determine possible use of alcohol, drugs, or controlled substances. You shall be required to pay for the tests unless payment is waived by your officer. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.986(e) (2017) (emphasis added). Thus, the version of section 948.03(1) in effect in 2017 clearly made submission to random testing for drugs and alcohol a general condition of probation....

condition of probation exceeding 364 days. See § 948.03(5), Fla.Stat. (1995); Solis v. State, 622 So.2d

...The defendant seeks review of an order denying his motion to modify his community control and probation. The motion was addressed to the condition that the defendant visit his psychiatrist twice monthly and sought to reduce this requirement on the basis that it was no longer necessary. See § 948.03(6), Fla....

Corrections.” The state agrees this sentence violates section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (Supp.1992) which limits

...We conclude that the modification order did not violate the double jeopardy clause. To begin with, probation is “a form of community supervision requiring specified contacts with parole and probation officers and other terms and conditions as provided in s. 948.03.” § 948.001(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). See generally Larson v. State, 572 So.2d 1368, 1370-72 (Fla.1990). Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1987), confers broad authority on the trial court to “determine the terms and conditions of pro-bation_” Id. § 948.03(1)....

...The statute also provides: “The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding such other or others as it considers proper. The court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions theretofore imposed....” Id. § 948.03(7)....

...d is not prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. So far we have accepted for purposes of discussion Lippman’s contention that the no-victim-or-minor-sibling-contact limitation was a new term of his probation, added by the modification order. See § 948.03(7), Fla.Stat....

...n Sandoval v. State, 337 So. 3d 5 (Fla 4th DCA 2022), which remanded a probation order to include that term. Id. at 7; see also Nelson v. State, 669 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Nelson pointed out that the general condition of probation in section 948.03(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1995), included the word “knowingly.” See § 948.03(1)(n), Fla....

...t the probationer must not “knowingly” visit the places enumerated in the statute. Condition five also required appellant to submit to drug testing at his own expense. While submission to drug testing is a general condition of probation, see section 948.03(1)(l)1., Florida Statutes (2022), payment by the probationer is not part of that general condition....

...Thus, the condition that appellant pay for drug testing must be stricken from the conditions of probation, which the State concedes. Condition five next prohibited appellant from consuming narcotics “unless prescribed and consumed as directed by a physician.” This is a general condition of probation. See § 948.03(1)(n), Fla....

...I am not assessing a cost of prosecution, just the court costs and the fine, which are required.” The record shows that the mandatory costs amounted to $476, and an additional $50 was assessed on the $1000 fine pursuant to the mandatory provision of section 938.04, Florida Statutes (2022). Section 948.03(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2022), provides as a mandatory condition of probation: “[p]ay any application fee assessed under s. 27.52(1)(b) and attorney’s fees and costs assessed under s....

...For the remaining counts of possession of cocaine, the court sentenced Graham to time served in jail. Graham argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve a term of incarceration that exceeded one year as a special condition of his probation. We agree. Section 948.03(6), Florida Statutes (1997), provides that incarceration as a special condition of probation shall not exceed 364 days and shall be restricted to certain types of facilities, which alternatives do not include state prison. 1 As imposed, the sentences on the three sale of cocaine charges and the possession of cocaine with intent to sell charge violate section 948.03....

...serious and patent and, therefore, reversal for resentencing is appropriate pursuant to Bain v. State, 730 So.2d 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). *609 Judgments affirmed; sentences reversed and remanded. FULMER, A.C.J., and GREEN and STRINGER, JJ., Concur. . Section 948.03(6) provides in pertinent part: The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper.......

...Thus, this court is compelled to remand the order of probation to the trial court with instructions to strike this condition. See Gregory v. State, 616 So.2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citing Tillman v. State, 592 So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)). Condition (9) is statutorily authorized pursuant to section 948.03(1)©, Florida Statutes (1989); therefore, it should not be struck....

stands for the proposition that pursuant to F.S. § 948.03(2) a judge may impose a jail sentence as a condition

...on for any violation of section 827.071, Florida Statutes (2005), the trial court correctly denied Kalinow-ski’s request to delete the condition from his sentence. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ„ concur. . Section 948.30 formerly appeared as section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...� within the meaning of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). By entering his plea and accepting the sentence, which avoided a potential thirty-five year prison sentence, appellant waived his right to make various constitutional challenges to section 948.03(5)(b)5, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...ich we treat as alternatively seeking relief by writ of certiorari. We grant certiorari [1] and quash the order modifying the sentence to allow respondent *286 to take up residence with his mother in Virginia under Florida imposed community control. Section 948.03(6) unambiguously provides: "The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper....

...However, the sentencing court may only impose a condition of supervision allowing an offender convicted of s. 794.011, s. 800.04, s. 827.071, or s. 847.0145, to reside in another state, if the order stipulates that it is contingent upon the approval of the receiving state interstate compact authority. " See § 948.03(6), Fla....

...Moreover the change significantly affects the ability of DOC to perform its statutory duty to supervise this community controllee in a way for which the agency would have no remedy except by certiorari. On return of this case, the trial court shall be free to permit a relocation of residency to Virginia upon compliance with section 948.03(6)....

jurisdiction to hear the state’s motion. Clearly, Section 948.03(7) Fla.Stat. (1987) grants the court the authority

...Therefore, neither the statute nor the rule hinder the trial court’s discretion in the imposition of respondent’s sentence. For re *830 spondent, community control is an authorized sanction under section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1993). 5 Additionally, Section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1993), 6 expressly authorizes incarceration not to exceed 364 days as a condition of community control....

...Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1993), provides in pertinent part: "[I]f ... it appears to the court in the case of a felony disposition that probation is an unsuitable dispositional alternative to imprisonment, the court may place the offender in a community control program...." . Section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1993), provides in pertinent part: "[I]f the court ......

...d pornography, the trial court sentenced Mr. Poplar to a two-year term of community control followed by a three-year term of probation. In September 2000, the trial court modified the original sentence by adding conditions of supervision mandated by section 948.03(5)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1999), including condition 21, which stated: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, you will not view, own, or possess any obscene, pornographic...

...Here, the modification occurred years after the sixty-day time period for modification had expired. In Kiriazes v. State, 798 So.2d 789, 794 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), the court concluded: The trial court’s initial failure to impose the standard conditions of probation mandated by section 948.03(5) resulted in an incomplete, but not illegal, sentence....

...The court rejected this argument, explicitly ruling that it was bound by the small claims court’s determination of damages. The primary argument made by appellant is that the court lacked authority to order restitution to the victim’s mother because she was not an “aggrieved party.” Appellant draws this phrase from section 948.03(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides that, as a condition of probation, an adult may be required to “make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the court.” In the present juvenile proceeding, the court did not rely upon section 948.03(l)(e) to award restitution, but relied upon section 39.11(l)(g), which provides that in a juvenile delinquency proceeding the court may place the juvenile in community control and, as a condition, may “order the child or parent to make restitution for the damage or loss caused by his offense in a reasonable amount or manner to be determined by the court.” We recognize that several cases have construed the term “aggrieved party” in section 948.03(l)(e) to include persons who are not the direct victim of the crime, 1 but we find no such cases under section 39.11....

... We begin by interpreting the words “firearm” and “weapon[ ]” in the order that set forth the conditions of Appellant’s probation. The prohibition on firearms and weapons for probationers is a standard condition of probation authorized by section 948.03(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2023)....

...See id. § 790.001(9), (20), Fla. Stat. (2023). Because we presume that statutes dealing with similar subjects accord the same meaning to a word, absent some indication to the contrary, we accord the same meanings to “firearm” and “weapon” in section 948.03 as are given those words in section 790.001....

...On that basis, the circuit court granted the State’s motion. 3 We reverse because the circuit court misapplied Lippman and violated the prohibition against double jeopardy when it enhanced Loncar’s probation without finding that Loncar had violated his probation. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that a trial court “may rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions theretofore imposed by it upon the probationer.” However, “absent a violation of probation or community control, it may not add new conditions or enhance the penalty.” Wesner v....

...Although it is well settled that the court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over a written document, Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Fla.2003), the imposition of two years of incarceration in a state prison facility as a condition of probation is an illegal sentence. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2011), provides that if the court “imposes a period of incarceration as a condition of probation, the period shall not exceed 364 days.” Additionally, the statute provides that incarceration as a condition of probation must be completed in a county facility, a probation or restitution center, or a community residential *47 facility. § 948.03(2); see also Williams v. State, 67 So.3d 249, 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that sentence of forty-eight months in state prison as a condition of probation violated section 948.03(2) and was an illegal sentence)....

...Therefore, the condition must be orally pronounced at sentencing. This court, in Fernandez v. State, 677 So.2d 332, 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), struck that portion of the condition of probation requiring the defendant to pay costs of random testing. In finding it to be improper, the court explained that: While section 948.03, which enumerates the terms and conditions of probation for all forms of probation, authorizes a trial court to impose random testing, the statute does not specifically provide for a defendant to be financially responsible for the testing. See § 948.03(l)(k)l; Dean....

...jeopardy’ so as to invoke the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause”). *296 The next question is whether the pretrial release condition that he submit to an'evaluation and attend certain sex offender counseling sessions under the authority of section 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (2002), constitutes a punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause, so that if he were subsequently convicted and further punished, he would have suffered multiple punishments. We hold that the pretrial condition imposed does not constitute punishment. Mr. Torres argues that section 948.03(4) does not provide statutory authority for the court to impose sex offender counseling as a pretrial release condition....

...Because section 316.193(5) imposed conditions of evaluation and treatment upon conviction, the circuit court’s appellate panel affirmed the trial courts' dismissals on double jeopardy grounds. The State did not seek further review of State v. Price . . Section 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (2002), provides: The court shall require a diagnosis and evaluation to determine the need of a probationer or offender in community control for treatment....

...djudication left to the court’s discretion. Over Muzzo’s objection, the trial court imposed two special conditions of probation not contemplated by the plea agreement. The imposition of the special eondi- *1272 tions would have been mandatory if section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (2000) applied. See § 948.03(5)(a)3 & 5, Fla. Stat. (2000). However, the crime to which Muzzo entered his plea is not one of the crimes enumerated in section 948.03(5)(a)....

...2d DCA), review granted, 663 So.2d 631 (Fla.1995), we will continue to adhere to the general principle that all conditions of probation must be orally pronounced at the time of sentencing unless the conditions are statutorily authorized pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1993), or are otherwise based on a Florida Statute which will provide the defendant with constructive notice....

...Sanderson, 625 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1993). Furthermore, if restitution is made an original condition of probation, a trial court can properly determine the amount of restitution at a later date. Gladfelter v. State, 618 So.2d 1364, 1365 (Fla.1993). Section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (2005), sets forth standard terms and conditions of probation. One of the standard conditions provides that a probationer “[m]ake reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his or her offense in an amount to be determined by the court.” § 948.03(l)(e)....

...l court placed restitution at $4,500— deeming this figure the mid point between the $5,444 total of the credit slips and the $2,800 which Thomas thought she had taken. The applicable provisions governing restitution as a condition of probation are Section 948.03(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1983) 1 *160 and Section 775.089(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...t will comport with the evidence. Therefore, we reverse and remand with directions to amend the restitution order to reflect the amount of $3,700. Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. ERVIN and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . § 948.03(l)(e), Fla.Stat....

..., as here, we may exercise our certio-rari jurisdiction. Cf. Wesner v. State, 843 So.2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (concluding that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law because it erroneously interpreted the language of section 948.03(5)(a)(5) and a condition of probation as eliminating the trial court’s discretion)....

...zer and urinalysis exams as a condition of probation, could be imposed regardless of whether it directly related to circumstances of the defendant’s offense. The court reasoned that this was a standard condition applicable to any probationer under section 948.03, Florida Statutes....

...We affirm in part and reverse in part. The state admits that the trial court erred in ordering Calhoun to pay an unspecified amount of restitution to be later determined by the probation officer. We agree and reverse that provision of the order of probation. Section 948.03(1)(e), Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. We reject appellant’s contention that the trial court erred by finding that he violated condition 10(e) of his probation, a condition required by section 948.03(5)(a)5., Florida Statutes (1997)....

810 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Appellee argues that section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides

...The trial court treated the motion as one filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) or 3.800(c) and denied it without a hearing. This motion, however, is actually a standard motion to modify conditions of probation, which the trial court is authorized to consider under section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...State, 658 So.2d 593, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The trial court found to the contrary, as expressed in its order on Ms. Wilson’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), that condition eighteen was permissible based on section 948.03(j), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The probation officer testified that, only after Maldonado’s arrest for the new offenses, he learned Maldonado 1 The legislature renumbered the statute between the time of the underlying crime and the time of sentencing. See ch. 2004-373, § 18, Laws of Fla. But the text of the relevant subsection did not change. Compare § 948.03(5)(b)5., Fla....

...1st DCA 2001); Justice, 674 So.2d at 125 (Fla.1996). We affirm as to the $1.00 per month payment to First Step, Inc., which is a statutory general condition of probation that the trial court was free to impose in its written order without first announcing it at sentencing. See § 948.03(l)(o), Fla....

...In contrast to payment for the testing, that portion of the order requiring that Appellant submit to random drug and alcohol testing was not error, thus we do not reverse as to this particular part of the order. Submission to drug and alcohol testing is a general condition of probation, authorized by section 948.03(l)(k)l, Florida Statutes. Therefore, there was no need for it to be pronounced orally at sentencing. See § 948.03(l)(k)l, Fla....

...Accordingly, condition 15 of defendant’s probation is vacated and this matter remanded to the trial court for reconsideration. Bentley v. State, 411 So.2d 1361 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Judgment AFFIRMED; sentence VACATED; cause REMANDED. COWART and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . § 948.03, Fla.Stat....

...elony, in exchange for two years of community control. He contests two conditions of his community control because they were not orally announced at sentencing, and, appellant argues, they are not standard conditions of community control pursuant to section 948.03, Florida Statutes....

...t illegal sentence. We find merit in appellant’s contentions. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to vacate that portion of appellant’s five-year term of community control which exceeds two years. See § 948.001, Fla.Stat. (1987); § 948.03(2)(b), Fla.Stat....

...00 in restitution to the victims. We reverse each of these conditions. First, the condition that the appellant move from his grandmother’s house and obtain his own residence within two weeks fails to fall within any of the conditions enumerated in section 948.03, F.S., nor does the record indicate any rational relationship between either the condition and the crime committed or the condition and the possibility of any future criminal conduct....

...Although there was no violation of probation filed, the state moved to have this condition changed to individual anger management. The state also moved to add the condition that Zepeda have no contact with the victim. The trial court granted both requests... The modification of an existing condition is valid. Section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1993), allows the trial court, during the term of probation, to modify any condition previously imposed by the court....

...Section 775.089(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), authorizes the trial court to order restitution to a victim for damages caused “directly or indirectly by the defendant’s offense.” The trial court properly determined SouthTrust to be a victim as defined by this statute. Further, section 948.03(6) allows the trial court to modify probation conditions it has previously imposed at any time, as long it does not enhance the penalty or add new conditions....

...1st DCA 1992) (new condition of community control cannot be added absent violation of community control). The mere modification of the restitution payees does not impose any new obligation upon Ms. Wanner. The trial court properly exercised its authority under section 948.03(6)....

...ns to strike the special condition. Pulecio has been on probation for trafficking in cocaine since 2009. Whether or not he has met the employment condition of his probation has been disputed over the course of his supervision. See § 948.03(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2012) (providing that a trial court may require a probationer to "[w]ork faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible")....

...d to future criminality because the State needs to ensure that Pulecio is deriving his income from legal sources. While the State does have an interest in requiring Pulecio to "[w]ork faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be possible," § 948.03(1)(c), a trial court may not impose a special condition that is overbroad, see Rodriguez, 378 So....

...ndition of probation, that appellant not “use intoxicants to excess or possess any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician,” and that such condition was not orally pronounced at sentencing. This is not a standard condition set out in section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1991); consequently, the court was required to orally pronounce it....

...understanding, community control, that’s one of the standard conditions, you are employed. [Gaines’ counsel]: Full-time or part-time? The Court: Whatever the statute requires. I think it’s full-time. The statute referred to by the trial court, section 948.03, Florida Statutes (2000), provides: *514 (1) The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation or community control ......

...to “full-time” employment. And, while the statute directs the trial court to determine the terms and conditions of community control, it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine which of those conditions “may” be imposed. See § 948.03(1)....

...However, we agree with the state that O'Connell failed to establish the prejudice necessary to show ineffective assistance of counsel. Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So.2d 466 (Fla.1997); Robinson v. State, 707 So.2d 688 (Fla.1998). As to Condition 15, section 948.03(n), Florida Statutes, amended effective October 1, 1996, allows such a condition to be a standard condition of probation and one that therefore need *558 not be orally pronounced....

...warrantless, suspicionless search of his residence by his probation officer. Finding no error, we affirm. At the time of the subject search, Harrell was on probation and community control for manslaughter and battery. His order of probation largely tracked the language of section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (2000). Specifically, one of the conditions of Harrell’s probation was, “You will ....

...” by a Department of Corrections probation officer. See § 948.001(2), (5), Fla. Stat. (2000). One codified condition of probation requires the probationer to “[p]ermit such supervisors to visit him or her at his or her home or elsewhere.” § 948.03(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). There is no subsection, however, which expressly authorizes probation officers to conduct warrantless, suspicionless searches. Harrell points to the lack of an express warrantless search condition in section 948.03....

...2d DCA 2009) (reversing order suppressing evidence obtained in 12:30 a.m. search of apartment); State v. Swank, 399 So. 2d 510, 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (reversing order suppressing evidence obtained in 4:00 a.m. search of hotel room). Furthermore, section 948.03(1)(b), which permits a supervisor to visit a probationer at his home, places no time restrictions on the visits....

...The appellant challenged conditions of probation 6, 11, 16, 18, 21, and 22. As in Tillman v. State, 592 So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), none of the conditions were pronounced in open court, and the written order should be conformed to delete them, with the exception of condi-, tion 18 for random drug screening. See § 948.03(l)(j), Fla.Stat....

...We reverse the order denying Driscoll’s motion to clarify and/or modify the conditions of his probation and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. DAVIS and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. . Section 948.30(1) was originally created as section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1995)....

general condition of probation outlined in section 948.03(l)(j)l., Florida Statutes (1993), we strike

sex offender probation conditions mandated by section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes apply in a juvenile delinquency

...We affirm the revocation order in all other respects.  Standard condition four of the probation order states: "You will not possess, carry[,] or own any firearm. You will not possess, carry, or own any weapon without first procuring the consent of your officer." This language tracks the language of section 948.03(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...ons and Firearms," defines both terms, see § 790.001(6), (13), Fla. Stat. (2015), and neither definition includes ammunition. In fact, a separate definition for "ammunition" is found in section 790.001(19). Additionally, although section 948.03(1)(m) only includes firearms and weapons in its prohibition of what probationers and offenders on community control may possess, section 790.23(1) is more restrictive as to what a convicted felon may possess, specifically making it unlawful for a felon to possess ammunition....

...Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla. 1988) (approving as “one of five basic sentencing alternatives in Florida . . . a ‘probationary split sentence’ consisting of a period of confinement, none of which is suspended, followed by a period of probation”). Section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes, gives the trial court the authority to “determine the terms and conditions of probation.” That subsection enumerates a variety of standard conditions, but 2 that “enumeration . . . does not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper.” Id. (2). Indeed, the trial court “may determine any special terms and conditions of probation or community control.” § 948.039, Fla....

...related to the circumstances of the offense committed and appropriate for the offender” or that the court failed to set them out as part of an “oral pronouncement at sentencing and include the terms and conditions in the written sentencing order.” § 948.039, Fla....

...the ground they were not orally pronounced at sentencing. In light of Hart, however, we need only address his challenge to that portion of condition 12 requiring him to pay for random testing for alcohol, drug, or controlled substance use. Although section 948.03(1)©, Florida Statutes (1993), provides constructive notice to all defendants that such random testing may be imposed as a condition of probation, it does not address payment for that testing....

COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. . § 948.03(l)(g), Fla.Stat. (1977). . The trial court contended