Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Public Defender, Miami, for petitioner. Michael H. Davidson, Gen. Counsel for the Florida Parole and Probation Commission, Tallahassee, for respondent. SUNDBERG, Chief Justice. This suit raises questions concerning a prisoner's eligibility for parole under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979), when he or she has been incarcerated as a special condition of probation pursuant to sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ion Commission informed petitioner that she could not be considered for parole. As a result, petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus from this Court compelling respondent to exercise its statutory duty to determine her eligibility for parole pursuant to section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979). We issued an order to respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Jurisdiction vests in this Court under article V, section 3(b)(5), Florida Constitution (1972). Section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979), states that every person whose sentence or cumulative sentences equal or exceed one year shall be eligible for parole....

...ic or private, by virtue of transfer from the Department of Corrections under any applicable law. Petitioner takes the position that incarceration as a condition of probation is a "sentence" for purposes of eligibility for parole consideration under section 947.16(1)....

...ndition of probation when it was imposed for punitive rather than rehabilitative purposes, and when such a device served to divest the Parole Board of its exclusive authority to parole a prisoner. Petitioner argues that unless the word "sentence" in section 947.16(1) is construed to include incarceration imposed as a condition of probation, it will violate the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution [1] by permitting the judiciary rather than the Parole and Probation Commission t...

...mposed before placing the defendant on probation. § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). Once a sentence is imposed, a defendant falls within the jurisdiction of the Parole and Probation Commission under the authority granted to the Commission pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ll a sentence of imprisonment where *1111 the express objective is to punish the defendant. Unless otherwise provided by law, a defendant who is sentenced to imprisonment for a term in excess of five years will be eligible for parole after one year. § 947.16(1), Fla....

...State, supra ; Freeman v. State, 329 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). We decline, however, to adopt petitioner's suggestion that we construe a probation condition of incarceration as a sentence for the limited purpose of eligibility for parole under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...[6] We must determine, then, the point in time at which incarceration ceases to serve a rehabilitative function and is, therefore, invalid as a condition of probation. In Olcott v. State, supra , the district court suggested that a maximum limitation of one year would be appropriate because it would avoid any conflict with section 947.16. We agree. Under section 947.16(1) a prisoner does not become eligible for parole consideration unless he has been sentenced to at least one year in prison....

...is state. Where possible we must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another. State ex rel. School Board v. Department of Education, 317 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1975). Our construction of section 947.16(1) in conjunction with section 948.01(4) achieves these objectives....

...on provided by the particular criminal statute for the offense involved. [4] As to certain serious crimes the trial judge may enter an order at the time of sentencing retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a Commission release order. § 947.16(3), Fla....

...one who has already decided to commit rape or robbery. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. [2] § 787.01(1)(a)2, Fla. Stat. (1979) (kidnapping); § 794.011, Fla. Stat. (1979) (sexual battery); § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979) (burglary). [3] § 947.16, Fla....

...Accordingly, this case is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part and REMANDED. 1 . It is not clear from the record whether appellant has in fact exhausted each of his claims, but it appears that appellee has waived the exhaustion requirement. See Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir.1983). 2 . Section 947.16(3) of the parole statute is an example relied upon by appellant: (3) A person who has become eligible for an initial parole interview and who may, according to the objective parole guidelines of the commission, be granted parole shall...

...Prior to the time the commission adopted AGO 85-11 as its own policy, it had been granting paroles to prisoners who had not begun to serve subsequent consecutive sentences. This practice was specifically authorized by AGO 74-11 which reflected the Attorney General's interpretation of section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1973). Although section 947.16(1) has not changed in any material way since 1974 (though it has been reworded for clarity), other amendments to chapter 947, a shift in the legal definition of parole, the authorization of minimum mandatory sentences, and "the passage of time" were cited as reasons for the shift in interpretation of the law....

...t-degree murder and the jury, if inclined to exercise its "pardon" power, could have returned verdicts of second-degree or third-degree murder. State v. Abreau, 363 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 1978). Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in applying section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1982), by retaining jurisdiction over the first half of the sixty-year sentence on the burglary sentence. Appellant was also sentenced to death for first-degree murder and life imprisonment for robbery with a firearm, all sentences to be concurrent. Section 947.16(3) provides: "When any person is convicted of two or more felonies and concurrent sentences are imposed, then the jurisdiction of the trial court judge as provided herein shall apply to the first half of the maximum sentence imposed fo...

...with a firearm and that the trial judge could not retain jurisdiction over the indeterminant sentences for these convictions. Cordero-Pena v. State, 421 So.2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Thus, appellant argues, the trial court had no jurisdiction under section 947.16(3) to retain jurisdiction for the lowest felony....

...Appellant's argument is ingenuous but circular. We agree that the trial court could not retain jurisdiction of one-half of an indeterminate sentence, but disagree that the trial court erred. The appellant's argument is meritless. The clear intent of section 947.16(3) is to permit the trial court to retain jurisdiction of up to one-half the maximum determinate sentence....

...on the fifth, all to run consecutively, and imposed three year mandatory minimum sentences under section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1983), for those crimes involving a firearm. The trial court additionally retained jurisdiction over parole, under section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), for thirty years of the first sexual battery sentence....

...State, 462 So.2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Finally, Murray contends that the trial court's retention of jurisdiction over parole must be vacated in light of the trial court's failure to "state the justification [therefor] with individual particularity." § 947.16(3)(a), Fla....

...llegal ex post facto law as applied because the crimes here occurred before the effective date of chapter 82-171. Mills, however, unlike Williams, stood subject to the existing retention of jurisdiction statute at the time the crimes were committed. § 947.16(3), Fla....

...OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. NOTES [*] The legislature later reduced the maximum retained jurisdiction period to one-third of the sentence for certain crimes, but provided that ch. 82-171 would still apply to persons convicted during its effective period. § 947.16(3), (5), Fla....

...defendant to fifteen years for escape, five years for rioting, and twenty-five years for each count of kidnapping, with the sentences to run consecutively. The judge retained jurisdiction over the first third of each defendant's sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ngs were incidental to the offense of attempted escape; that the court abused its discretion in limiting cross examination of a state's witness; and that the court erred in retaining jurisdiction over one third of each of their sentences pursuant to section 947.16(3)....

...State, 28 Md. App. 150, 344 A.2d 130 (Ct.Spec.App. 1973). Appellants' fifth point on appeal is that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first third of each of their sentences. They argue that attempted escape and rioting do not come under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), and that the judge failed to justify his retention of jurisdiction with individual particularity as required by subsection 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). We disagree with the first argument but agree with the second. Section 947.16(3) authorizes a judge to retain jurisdiction over the first third of a defendant's sentence for certain enumerated crimes including "any felony involving ......

...As for the second argument, the trial judge did not make any findings justifying his retention of jurisdiction. Therefore we vacate that portion of the judgment and sentence and remand these cases so that he may make such findings part of the record as required by section 947.16(3)(a)....

...on his two life sentences “within 5 years after the initial date of confinement in execution of the judgment,” and would be eligible for parole on his remaining fifteen-year sentence “within 24 months” of that same date. See Fla. Stat. § 947.16(1)(c)-(d) (1983)....

...Had the resentencing jury fixed Bates’ sentence for first-degree murder at life, it appears that he would have been eligible for parole on all of his convictions within 37 years of his initial 1983 confinement or 25 years after his 1995 resentencing proceeding. See id. § 947.16(2)(g) (“For purposes of determining eligibility for parole interview and release, ....

...Frost, Jr., Public Defender and Charles M. Johnston, Asst. Public Defender, Jacksonville, for petitioner. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent. ADKINS, Justice. This case tests the constitutionality of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). [1] It also asks us to decide whether trial counsel properly raised and preserved his objections for appeal. Williams pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and the trial judge sentenced him to prison for ninety-nine years. Pursuant to section 947.16(3), the judge retained jurisdiction to review any parole release order issued during the first thirty-three years of petitioner's confinement....

...Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the statute at the sentencing hearing, but the First District Court of Appeal refused to consider the issue, ruling that the absence of a specific objection precluded its review. Williams v. State, 378 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Petitioner first maintains that section 947.16(3) is an ex post facto law as *511 applied to him....

...of the law when the crime was committed prior to the statute's effective date. Under this authority, we agree with petitioner's contention. Petitioner's procedural question focuses on whether his counsel preserved his objections to the invocation of section 947.16(3) by properly presenting them to the trial judge....

...plicability in this instance. I think moreover there is a question as to whether or not that statute was in effect at such time that it can be applied in this case. (T. 33 emphasis supplied). The court, in response, announced its intention to invoke section 947.16(3) while recognizing counsel's objections. The Court will invoke the provisions of Chapter 783.18, Laws of Florida, which has been codified in the Florida Statutes as Section 947.16 as amended, Subsection 2, subject to, of course, or with the understanding that counsel for the defendant has already interposed an objection to such invocation of that provision....

...en. Trial counsel did not specifically cite to the prohibition against ex post facto laws *512 as the basis for his legal argument. But magic words are not needed to make a proper objection. His articulated concern with whether the effective date of section 947.16(3) permitted the statute's application to petitioner's case was sufficiently specific to inform the trial judge of the alleged error....

...Accordingly, we quash the opinion of the district court and remand the cause with instructions to quash the "Order Retaining Jurisdiction Pursuant To Chapter 78-318, Laws of Florida" entered by the trial court. SUNDBERG, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 947.16(3) reads: "[p]ersons who have become eligible for parole and who may, according to the objective parole guidelines of the commission, be granted parole shall be placed on parole in accordance with the provisions of this law; except tha...

...ment whether incarceration is a condition of probation or not. The legislature has repeatedly and consistently distinguished between a sentence of imprisonment and probation. Compare chapter 948, Florida Statutes (1979) (probation) with chapter 947, section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979) (sentence)....

...The Parole Act required the Commission to adopt parole “guidelines,” creating presumptive parole release dates based on the “seriousness of the offense” committed and “the likelihood of a favorable parole outcome,” and to consider these guidelines in making release decisions. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 947.165 (1983 Supp.)....

...“objective guidelines” to channel its decision making. These guidelines must be “developed according to an acceptable research method and ... based on the seriousness of offense and the likelihood of favorable parole outcome.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 947.165(1) (1983 Supp.). They must also be revised yearly to take into account the latest statistical data regarding prior parole decision results. Id. at 947.165(2)....

...They did not substantively alter petitioner’s parole eligibility or confine the Commission’s discretion to release him; they merely clarified the exercise of administrative discretion. Accord, May v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 435 So.2d 834 (Fla.1983). Compare Fla.Stat.Ann. § 947.16 (1973) with Fla.Stat.Ann. 947.16(1) (1983 Supp.); see also id....

...welfare of society.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 947.18 (1983 Supp.); see also Gobie v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 416 So.2d 838 (Fla.App.1982). *1180 Moreover, the guidelines were based on prisoner and parolee case histories, see Fla. StatAnn. § 947.165(1) & (2) (1983 Supp.), and called for inmates to serve terms equivalent to those served by previous offenders who committed the same crime and constituted a similar parole risk....

...1st DCA 2000); and Macias v. State, 614 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The Second District in Wright held that the failure of a sentencing court to provide written reasons for retaining jurisdiction, in violation of section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), [1] does not constitute an "illegal sentence," as contemplated by the provisions of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), [2] thereby permitting a challenge long after the sentence has been imposed....

...The court retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of both sentences. Id. In 2002, twenty-three years after the sentences were imposed, Wright filed a pro se motion in the trial court pursuant to rule 3.800(a), arguing that both his sentences were illegal because, first, under section 947.16(4), a trial court may retain jurisdiction over one-third of only one sentence, not both sentences, and, second, because the trial court did not explain its reasons for retaining jurisdiction over the sentences....

...l nature. We find merit in the Second District's analogy of retaining jurisdiction over a sentence to a trial court's failure to provide departure reasons for a sentence, as was the case in Davis. Wright, 864 So.2d at 1155. Regarding certain crimes, section 947.16(4) provides: [A]t the time of sentencing the judge may enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a commission release order....

...the total consecutive sentences imposed. (a) In retaining jurisdiction for the purposes of this act, the trial court judge shall state the justification with individual particularity, and said justification shall be made a part of the court record. § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1978). The purpose of section 947.16 was to prevent early parole of prisoners convicted of dangerous crimes without the consent of the sentencing judge....

...Wright and disapprove of the other district court decisions conflicting with Wright. It is so ordered. PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Subsection (3) was renumbered (4) with the 1985 amendments to section 947.16....

...1st DCA 1984); compare Williams v. State, 414 So.2d 509, 511 (Fla. 1982), and Cofield v. State, 453 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (on motion for rehearing) (contemporaneous objection required as prerequisite to appeal from trial court's retention of jurisdiction under F.S. 947.16)....

...Carithers, Jr., of Sheppard & Carithers, Jacksonville, for respondent. OVERTON, Justice. The First District Court of Appeal has certified for our review the following question as one of great public importance: Does the retention of jurisdiction by a trial judge and denial of release through gain time pursuant to § 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...rder, attempted kidnapping, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced Williams to a total of 150 consecutive years in state prison and, pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), retained jurisdiction for the first one-third of Williams' sentence. The applicable portion of section 947.16 was enacted after the commission of the offense for which Williams was convicted but before his actual trial, and provides that if a defendant is convicted of certain enumerated, severe crimes, the trial court may retain jurisdiction for the first one-third of the maximum sentence imposed. This in effect imposes an additional requirement before a prisoner can be paroled: he must obtain the approval of both the parole commission and the trial court, as compared to just the commission's approval as it was under the prior law. Section 947.16 also provides that if a trial court retains jurisdiction, the defendant may not be released due to gain time during the first one-third of his sentence, although gain time continues to accrue. On appeal, Williams asserted that the trial court's retention of jurisdiction under section 947.16 constituted an ex post facto application of the statute, because both the trial court's veto power over parole and the denial of release pursuant to gain time in effect enhanced his sentence....

...isadvantageous fashion? If the answer to both questions is yes, then the law constitutes an ex post facto law and is void as applied to those prisoners. Under the facts of the instant case, we find that both prongs of the Weaver test are met. First, section 947.16 attaches the legal consequences of the trial court's parole veto and no gain-time release to those who committed crimes before the provision's effective date. Second, these consequences have a disadvantageous effect in that the prisoners' sentences are enhanced. We note that for many years prior to section 947.16's enactment, the Parole and Probation Commission informally gave notice to the sentencing judge of a prisoner's parole date and sought the judge's comments....

...All sentences were consecutive, totaling 260 years. In 1988, the First District remanded the case for resentencing because the trial court erroneously retained jurisdiction for one-half, rather than one-third, of the sentence. Wemett v. State, 529 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1981). On remand, the circuit court could have merely corrected the illegal portion of its sentence to comply with section 947.16(3)....

...nder the original sentence, whereas he could not under the guidelines life sentences. It is clear that under the original sentence, Wemett was eligible to earn gain-time, sections 944.275, .291, Florida Statutes (1981), and to be released on parole, section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...y time a trial court announces it intends to aggravate a sentence beyond the recommended range. See, Arnett v. State, 397 So.2d 330 (Fla.1st DCA 1981), cert. denied, 408 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 1981). Arnett involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 947.16(3), Florida *398 Statutes (1979), which allows the trial court to retain jurisdiction over some offenders for review of a Parole Commission release order....

...e fit to do so in the event an appellate court undertakes to review for substance and reasonableness. Cf. Moore v. State, 392 So.2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (trial judge must state with particularity his reasons for retaining jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes)....

...DERED AND ORDERED by the Court that the defendant NEVER be considered for release." Appellant contends that the inclusion of this language was improper because there is no authority for such a provision. We agree. The trial court had authority under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.) to retain jurisdiction over appellant for the first third of the maximum sentence imposed for the highest enumerated felony [2] charged and proven which was committed after its effective date, June 19, 1978, Ch....

...Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] The defendant was sentenced on two counts of armed robbery to consecutive terms of life and 99 years of imprisonment, with the trial court retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the 99-year sentence. The defendant contends that under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), the retention of jurisdiction on one of several consecutive sentences is prohibited, and since jurisdiction over a portion of a life sentence cannot be retained, retention is therefore prohibited when a life sentence is imposed in a multi-count consecutive sentence case....

...lative power in one subsection of that article does not render the delegated power nugatory. The placement is functional, as with executive powers conferred in the judicial article (art. V, § 11) and in the legislative article (art. III, § 8). [5] Section 947.16(1), Fla....

...this knowledge. The court accepted the plea and ordered a presentence investigation. Later, at the sentencing hearing, the state requested that the court sentence Green to a lengthy term of years and retain jurisdiction over the sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...e eligible for parole in a significantly shorter period than the possible forty-seven years under the retention. While retention of jurisdiction does not guarantee that the defendant will remain imprisoned for that period of time, the purpose behind section 947.16 is to prevent the early parole of dangerous prisoners without the sentencing judge's consent....

...June 25, 1910, c. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819; Jan. 23, 1913, c. 9, 37 Stat. 650; Title 18 U.S.C. § 1940 ed., § 714, Title 18 U.S.C.A., § 4202. See also section 12, Chapter 20519, Laws of Florida, 1941; section 3, Chapter 21775, Laws of Florida, 1943; section 947.16, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A....

of a convicted person for parole and to read Section 947.16, Florida Statutes 1941, relating to parole

...Based on a plea of guilty to a charge of sexual battery in violation of section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1979), appellant was adjudged guilty and sentenced to incarceration for seventy-five years. The court retained jurisdiction over the first twenty-five years of the term, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Despite two opportunities given appellant to do so, no good cause was shown the trial court, and we cannot say that he abused his discretion in rejecting the motion. Appellant next contends that the trial court had no authority to retain jurisdiction over the first one-third of his sentence, because section 947.16(3) was first enacted in 1978, and the crime of which he was convicted was committed in 1976. Without question, the application of section 947.16(3) to a crime committed in 1976 is an ex post facto application of the law....

...manently deprive is an essential element of the charge of armed robbery; (3) that the trial court erred in convicting them on the second armed robbery count because that count and the first armed robbery count charged only a single offense; (4) that Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional; (5) that the trial court erred in failing to state with individual particularity why it was retaining jurisdiction over their sentences; and (6) that the trial court erred by imposing sentence...

...from the two tellers during the robbery was money that belonged to a single victim, the bank. We have recently rejected such an argument. See Brown v. State, 413 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Appellants' argument regarding the constitutionality of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, has also been conclusively rejected....

...1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The third point raised by appellant is that the order revoking her probation on attempted arson imposes a five-year prison term with retention of jurisdiction over all five years. This contravenes the applicable statute, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), in two respects: first, retention can be for only one-third the sentence; [2] second, the applicable statute allows *1061 for retention of jurisdiction by the trial court only for certain enumerated offenses — and attempted arson is not one of them....

...NOTES [1] The state did not seek the death penalty. [2] Neal was arrested on December 26, 1981. She was sentenced on February 16, 1983. Under the law in effect on the date of Neal's arrest, a trial court could retain only up to one-third of a sentence. By a 1982 amendment to section 947.16(3), effective April 20, 1982, a trial court was authorized to retain up to one-half....

...775.084, Florida Statutes (1981). In State v. Snow, 462 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1985), the trial court, in retaining jurisdiction over one-third of defendant's sentence, failed to state with individual particularity its reasons for doing so, as required by Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...See also Judge Pearson's dissenting opinion in Whitehead, 450 So.2d at 546. We recognize that our decision places us in conflict with the Third District's opinion in Whitehead. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over his sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3)....

...Second, defendant argues that the court improperly retained jurisdiction. The court should have retained jurisdiction over one-third of the total consecutive sentences. See Adams v. State, 435 So.2d 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Wicker v. State, 438 So.2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1982). Also, jurisdiction should be retained over only one of the concurrent sentences for attempted murder. See § 947.16(3), Fla....

...An information was filed against appellant, charging him with indecent assault upon a female child. After a jury trial appellant was found guilty and sentenced to nine years in prison, with credit for time already served. The trial court retained jurisdiction over part of appellant's sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979), and ordered him to pay (a) court costs of $12 and (b) the public defender an attorney's fee of $1,000 plus costs pursuant to section 27.56, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...mission in making parole decisions. This act established a structured parole review process based on objective criteria. This law requires that an inmate be interviewed within a specified time period depending on the length of the inmate's sentence. § 947.16....

...Commission in the sense that, once established, it is not to be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct, acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview, or for good cause in exceptional circumstances. §§ 947.16(4), 947.173(3); Jackson v....

...nes Act has restricted the Commission's previously unbounded discretion in granting parole. The Objective Parole Guidelines Act's ultimate intent is to prevent arbitrary and capricious action by the Commission. § 947.002(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). *820 Section 947.165(1), Fla....

...ircuit Judge Virginia Beverly of Duval County to sentence Williams to 30-year and 50-year terms of imprisonment, to be served consecutively. However, the judge did not reserve jurisdiction to review future parole orders entered by the Commission, as section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ing Judge Beverly to raise objections pursuant to section 947.1745(4), which had the legal effect of deferring his EPRD and preventing his release at PPRD even though she had declined to retain jurisdiction to review a commission release order under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...State, 398 So.2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 411 So.2d 384 (Fla. 1981); see also Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170. Retrospective application of the statutory authorization for a judge to retain jurisdiction over an offender under section 947.16(3) was held to violate the ex post facto clause because it imposed an additional requirement on eligibility for parole that was more onerous than the previous law, which did not grant judges such authority....

...In addressing these issues it is necessary to briefly review the statutes and rules governing the Commission's responsibilities when conducting an inmate's EPRD review and determining to defer the EPRD. It likewise is necessary to review the court's role in affording limited judicial review of the Commission's action. Section 947.165(1), Florida Statutes (1989), sets forth the following mandate to the Commission: The commission shall develop and implement objective parole guidelines which shall be the criteria upon which parole decisions are made....

...lable and considered in the last interview that establishes good cause in exceptional circumstances. See Florida Parole and Probation Comm'n v. Paige, 462 So.2d 817; Taylor v. Florida Parole and Probation Comm'n, 543 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); §§ 947.16(5), and 947.173(3), Fla....

...idelines Act has restricted the Commission's previously unbounded discretion in granting parole. The Objective Parole Guidelines Act's ultimate intent is to prevent arbitrary and capricious action by the Commission. § 947.002(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). Section 947.165(1), Fla....

...The Commission may supplement its response to the circuit court's order to show cause and, if deemed necessary, the court may hold an evidentiary hearing. Cf. Taylor v. Florida Parole and Probation Comm'n, 543 So.2d 367. REVERSED AND REMANDED. KAHN, J., and SHIVERS, DOUGLASS B., Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] In 1978, section 947.16(3) authorized the sentencing judge to retain, for the first third of the sentence, jurisdiction over an offender convicted of sexual battery and kidnapping to review a Commission parole release order....

...agreement on a ... date is reached." The only explicitly stated exceptions to the binding effect of the date entered are "for reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview." Section 947.16(4). Additionally, we are of the view that Section 947.16(4) should be considered in pari materia with Section 947.173(3), permitting the Commission to modify a parole release date "for good cause in exceptional circumstances." The record fails to show the applicability of any exceptional circumstance....

...methods. See Section 947.002 and Daniels v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, supra . Under the present act, parole decisions can only be made after the Commission has applied objective parole guidelines to a specific factual situation. See §§ 947.165 and .172....

...d as supported by the record, is simple possession of hard drugs, thereby requiring that the offense characteristic be placed in the category of "low moderate." Finally, in the absence of a showing of either the statutory exceptions delineated under Section 947.16(4), or exceptional circumstances for good cause permitted by Section 947.173(3), the Commission had no discretion to increase the salient factor score or add an aggravating factor after it had previously entered its order fixing a presumptive parole release date....

...oner for parole — the major concern of the Villery Court in prohibiting incarceration for a period greater than one year as a condition of probation. Any prisoner under sentence for a period greater than one year is unarguably within the purview of section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...on of probation. In Villery we stated that incarceration as a condition of probation does not constitute a sentence and declined to construe a probation condition of incarceration as a sentence for the limited purpose of eligibility for parole under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...nalty prescribed by statute. See cases above cited. The legislature has provided a method for judicial mitigation of sentences. See § 921.13 Fla. Stat., F.S.A. In addition there has been provided a review of sentences by the State Pardon Board. See § 947.16 Fla....

...d girl. Snow objected generally to the court's retaining jurisdiction. Snow appealed his sentence on the basis that the trial judge erred in retaining jurisdiction without stating the reasons for doing so with individual particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...cts with Pedroso v. State , wherein the Second District affirmed the trial court's summary denial of a rule 3.850 motion where Pedroso attempted to raise the claim that the trial court had failed to state with individual particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), the reasons for retaining jurisdiction over the first third of his sentence....

...ion over one-third of Snow's sentence provided that "[i]n retaining jurisdiction for purposes of this act, the trial court shall state the justification with individual particularity, and said justification shall be made a part of the court record." § 947.16(3)(a), Fla....

...The district court, therefore, should have considered this issue. Accordingly, the decision of the district court declining to consider the issue raised by Snow is quashed, and this cause is remanded to the district court to determine whether the trial court complied with section 947.16(3)(a) It is so ordered....

...3d DCA 1977); Massey v. State, 348 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1977). Second, the trial court's retention of jurisdiction over one-third of the defendant's sentences is unsupported by the findings justifying retention required by Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ecessary findings part of the record. See Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 1982). The trial court is advised that it may not, as it did, retain jurisdiction for the first one-third of each of the consecutive sentences imposed, but, as stated in Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), "......

...If the State fails to make such discovery before the State can use such rebuttal witness the trial court must comply with the requirements of Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971). In like spirit, if upon retrial the trial court considers retaining jurisdiction over parole as permitted by section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), the majority opinion in Moore v....

...insure that you serve a substantial period of time without being eligible for parole, the Court is going to retain jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence, ... . *317 (Emphasis added.) Retention of jurisdiction would have been appropriate under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), in view of the nature of the offense and the other factors adverted to by the trial court at the sentencing hearing....

...Nor are we convinced that Bellcase is dispositive of this issue. State v. Barber, 301 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1974), remains good law unless the holding in Villery v. The Florida Parole & Probation Board, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1980), must be read as applying not only to the meaning of "sentence" as used in section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979), governing the right to parole, but also to the term "custody under sentence," as used in rule 3.850....

...should not be so read. The problem with such an expansive reading of Villery is aptly described in the concurring opinion of Justice Overton. The Villery court was called on only to determine the meaning of "sentence" for parole purposes as used in section 947.16(1) in the context of a person on probation after serving time in prison pursuant to a split sentence under sections 948.01-948.03, Florida Statutes (1979), and the actual holding in that case is necessarily limited to the meaning of "sentence" under section 947.16(1)....

...Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. McDONALD, Justice. Following a trial in which Raleigh Borden was found guilty of second-degree murder and false imprisonment, the trial judge sentenced Borden to terms of ninety-nine and five years, respectively. Relying on section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), the trial judge retained jurisdiction over the sentence....

...role may be granted. We see no reason to retreat from that position now. The First District Court of Appeal recently addressed the constitutionality of this statute in Arnett v. State, 397 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). We agree with that court that section 947.16(3) is constitutional....

...5th DCA 1980). Borden has perfected this point on appeal. The conviction is vacated, and this cause is remanded for a new trial. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C.J., and OVERTON, J., concur. ADKINS, Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part: "I would hold § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1979) unconstitutional, but I concur in that portion of the opinion granting a new trial because of the failure to instruct on the penalty." ALDERMAN, Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part: "I agree that section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979) is constitutional and I would affirm the conviction....

...1980) I do not believe that it was reversible error for the trial judge to omit the requested penalty instruction." ENGLAND, J., dissents with an opinion with which ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur. ENGLAND, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully disagree with my colleagues with respect to the constitutionality of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). In my view, the statute violates article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, which declares that a member of one branch of the government shall not exercise powers pertaining to another branch. There is no dispute that section 947.16(3) accords to members of the judiciary a veto power over a prisoner's release from parole during the first one-third of his sentence....

...That is precisely what this statute has done, and irrespective of the asserted desirability of the statute in terms of penology or sociology, I can find no authority for its enactment under Florida's constitutional separation of powers. ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 947.16(3), Fla....

...When any person is convicted of two or more felonies and consecutive sentences are imposed, then the jurisdiction of the trial court judge as provided herein shall apply to one-third of the total consecutive sentences imposed. [2] Because Borden's crimes were committed in 1979 after the enactment of § 947.16(3), our recent opinion in State v....

...The parties agree and we agree that this case must be remanded to the trial court with instructions to either relinquish jurisdiction over the first third of Fagan's sentence or to state with individual particularity the justification for retaining jurisdiction. Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981); Oliver v....

...By agreement she entered a plea to the lesser offense of second degree murder. At the time of the plea the trial court advised Fairweather that the maximum penalty for second degree murder was life in prison, but failed to warn her that it was considering retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...atory minimum imprisonment provision of section 775.0875(1), Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count. Other Provisions: Retention of Jurisdiction ____ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...issue because such failure was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, appellants' reliance on State v. Stacey is misplaced. In that case, the trial court retained jurisdiction for one-third of Stacey's sentence in accordance with Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.)....

...(Emphasis supplied.) Appellant next submits that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction to review — and veto — any parole release order for the first third of his sentence (he received consecutive sentences totaling 150 years). The court retained jurisdiction pursuant to § 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...right and may be withdrawn, modified or denied." Harris v. Wainwright, 376 So.2d 855, 856 (Fla. 1979); see Weaver v. Graham, 376 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1979), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 1311, 63 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980). In the instant case, however, § 947.16, by its retrospective application, appears to reflect the type of circumstances the Supreme Court disapproved in Harris, supra, at 857, "in which a new law has been passed eliminating the allowance of gain time in certain situations." To cl...

...d pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (1980), we certify the following question as being one of great public importance: Does the retention of jurisdiction by a trial judge and denial of release through gain time pursuant to § 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...tes. Like petitions have been presented to the court with increasing frequency, and counsel for the respondent admits that without direction from this court the commission is unable to chart a course out of what is perceived as an insoluble dilemma. Section 947.16, Florida Statutes, provides that every person who has been convicted of a felony or who has been convicted of one or more misdemeanors and whose sentence or cumulative sentences total 12 months or more, who is confined in execution of...

...incarcerated, and recommendations of the trial judge. While it is true that there is no absolute right to parole, the Florida Legislature has mandated the setting of a presumptive parole release date by the Florida Parole and Probation Commission. §§ 947.16; 947.172, Florida Statutes....

...the Department to acquire the information for the Commission's use. [2] Petitioner Battis, incarcerated prior to the 1978 enactment of the requirement that a presumptive parole release date must be set for all inmates, was interviewed pursuant to §§ 947.16 and 947.12, Fla....

...ceeding years of the sentence; and the prisoner shall be entitled to credit for a month as soon as the prisoner has served such time as, when added to the deduction allowable, would equal a month. [4] The statute retrospectively applied to Williams, § 947.16, Fla....

...prevented the release of the defendant due to gain time during the portion of the sentence over which jurisdiction was retained. Thus, the subsequently enacted statute imposed a new obstacle to parole and cut off a statutory right to gain time. [5] § 947.16(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). [6] § 947.165, Fla....

...lant in the same room where the weapon was located. Based upon the circumstances, the trial judge could extend the time for trial for a reasonable period of time. Appellant's final argument is an attack upon the constitutionality of Florida Statutes section 947.16(3)....

...Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. BROWNING, J. A jury found Timothy Hampton, the appellant, guilty of one count of second-degree murder; he was sentenced in May 1982 to 75 years' imprisonment. The trial court included a special provision, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statute (1981), whereunder it retained jurisdiction over the first third of the appellant's sentence, i.e., 25 years, to monitor any Parole Commission release order....

..."). A December 1999 order of the trial court includes an attachment of a portion of the 1982 sentencing transcript in support of the court's conclusion that the earlier pronouncement provided legally sufficient reasons to satisfy the requirements of section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) [1] ....

...usness of the offenses," and "the gravity of the offenses," without setting out any specific facts and circumstances of the crimes. See Abbott v. State, 421 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (statement of justification for retention of jurisdiction under § 947.16(3) failed to satisfy statute's "specificity and particularity" requirement); Saname v....

...1st DCA 1983) (trial court adequately justified retention of jurisdiction by including specific observations and enumerating defendant's offenses). Because the challenged findings are no more specific than the findings that we deemed inadequate for purposes of section 947.16(3) in Abbott, 421 So.2d at 24, we VACATE the sentencing order retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence and REMAND, with instructions. ERVIN and LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR. NOTES [1] The pertinent provisions of the statute state: 947.16 Eligibility for parole; powers and duties of commission.— (1) Every person who has been, or who may hereafter be, convicted of a felony ......

...expanded to include all adults, without regard to race or gender, who possessed a driver's license. [4] Notably, Mr. Williams was sentenced to life for this crime, but at a time when this sentence would have made him eligible for parole. See, e.g., § 947.16, Fla....

...The trial court departed from the recommended guidelines range of 22 to 27 years in prison and imposed consecutive sentences of 30 years in prison on each of two counts of armed robbery and 10 years in prison on one count of attempted armed robbery. The trial court also retained jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1983), over 1/3 of each sentence....

...Insofar as this might apply to the capital offense, it effectively is moot because Hallman will be ineligible for parole for at least twenty-five years. As to the other counts, they are governed by the sentencing guidelines, under which there is no parole. Therefore, section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1985), authorizing retention of jurisdiction in order to limit parole is inapplicable....

...[Footnote omitted]. Id. at 12. See also State v. Watson, 453 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1984); Harmon v. State, 438 So.2d 369 (Fla. 1983). Stangherlin next argues that the trial court erred when it retained jurisdiction for one half of the 300 year sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982). She argues that the court could retain jurisdiction for not more than one third of the sentence, and that her objection to such retention should have been sustained. At the time of the commission of the offense on April 1, 1982, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) permitted retention of jurisdiction for up to one third of the sentence....

...to one half of the sentence. [1] The Florida Supreme Court has recently considered and rejected this argument. Mills v. State, 462 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 1985). As in Mills, Stangherlin stood subject to the existing retention of jurisdiction statute, *336 section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), at the time the crimes were committed....

...The judgments and sentences are affirmed. AFFIRMED. COWART, J., and POWELL, R.W., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] The statute was further amended in 1983 by Chapter 83-131, Laws of Florida, and once again provides for retention of jurisdiction for up to one third of the sentence. See section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983).

...ith a firearm. We affirm the conviction but remand for correction of the sentence. The only point appellant raises which has merit is his contention that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction for the first third of his sentence pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.). The date of the offense with which appellant was charged was February 13, 1978. The effective date of the amendment to Section 947.16 allowing the trial court to retain jurisdiction to review a parole release order during the first third of the sentence of a person convicted of any of the enumerated crimes, including robbery, was June 19, 1978. Appellant was convicted and sentenced on September 20, 1978. We agree with appellant that Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978) is an ex post facto law as applied to him....

...es the punishment, or, in short, which in relation to the offense or its consequences alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage. " Higginbotham v. State, 88 Fla. 26, 31, 101 So. 233, 235 (1924) (emphasis added). The challenged amendment to Section 947.16 clearly does alter appellant's situation to his disadvantage....

...Appellant pled guilty to an amended two-count information charging sexual battery with a firearm and kidnapping with a firearm. He was sentenced to two consecutive thirty-year sentences with consecutive three-year mandatory minimum sentences. The court retained jurisdiction under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...judicial officer elected by the people alone, should make the determination as to when you are eligible for parole. By no stretch of the imagination does that articulated reason satisfy the requirements of specificity and particularity set forth in section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...consecutive thirty-year sentences. As recognized by our sister courts in the second and third districts in Adams v. State, 435 So.2d 953 (Fla.2d DCA 1983) and Goree v. State, 411 So.2d 1352 (Fla.3d DCA 1982), the trial court has the authority under section 947.16(3) to retain jurisdiction over one-half of the total consecutive sentences imposed, but not over the first one-half of each of the consecutive sentences imposed....

...l court reserves jurisdiction for one-third or one-half of each consecutive sentence, or for one-third or one-half of the total consecutive sentences, the result is numerically equal. Nevertheless, we are compelled to reverse by the plain meaning of section 947.16(3) which authorizes a trial court judge to reserve jurisdiction for one-half "of the total consecutive sentences imposed." [Emphasis added.] Therefore, on remand the court is directed to reconsider the period of retention in accordance with section 947.16(3)....

...NIMMONS, Judge, specially concurring. I concur in the court's opinion. I wish, however, to clarify my reason for considering *824 on appeal the defendant's claim pertaining to the procedural error in the trial court's alleged failure to comply with Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...However, I favor certifying to the Supreme Court the following question as one of great public importance: Do the appellate courts of this State have jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the reasons stated by trial courts for retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3)(a)? ON REHEARING PER CURIAM. We are not persuaded to grant rehearing on the ground asserted by the state, that ground being that the sufficiency of the trial court's reasons for retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3)(a) are not subject to appellate review....

...State, 438 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1983)? *826 We have certified a similar question in Ames v. State, 449 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). LARRY G. SMITH, WIGGINTON and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Harmon, Adams and Goree were decided under the 1981 version of section 947.16(3) which authorizes the trial court judge to reserve jurisdiction for one-third of the total consecutive sentences. Section 947.16(3) was amended in 1982 by chapter 82-171, Laws of Florida, to allow retention of jurisdiction for one-half of the sentences imposed....

...We think also that, inasmuch as retention of jurisdiction has been characterized as enhancement of the sentence, State v. Williams, 397 So.2d 663, 665 (Fla. 1981), such retention, if incorrect, constitutes an illegal sentence which should be corrected. According to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, (1979), now section 947.16(4), "When any person is convicted of two or more felonies and consecutive sentences are imposed, then the jurisdiction of the trial court judge as provided herein shall apply to one-third of the total consecutive sentences imposed." Ca...

...Gen., and Margie Starnes, Legal Intern, Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The sole question presented in this appeal from the sentence imposed following appellant's plea of guilty to the offense of second degree murder is the constitutionality of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). Under the provisions of Section 947.16(3), the trial court judge, at the time of sentencing for certain enumerated crimes, may enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a parole commission release order. The retention of jurisdiction is limited in its duration to the first one-third of the maximum sentence imposed. In retaining jurisdiction, the trial court judge must "state the justification with individual particularity". § 947.16(3)(a), Fla....

...he parole commission's release order was based, may vacate the release order if it is found that "the commission's order is not based on competent substantial evidence or that the parole is not in the best interest of the community or the inmate". §§ 947.16(3)(e), (f), Fla....

...The State contends that appellant lacks standing to raise the constitutional issues and that the constitutional questions have not been adequately preserved for appeal. Initially, we reject the State's argument that appellant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 947.16(3)....

...s constitutionality. See State v. Benitez, 395 So.2d 514, 1981 FLW 319 (Fla. 1981). Additionally, we reject the State's assertion that appellant has not properly preserved his challenge to the statute. Appellant clearly objected to the invocation of Section 947.16(3) on specific constitutional grounds and the trial court ruled upon appellant's challenges....

...State, 378 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) [review granted Case No. 58,704]: Chatman v. State, 393 So.2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Having disposed of these preliminary matters, we now consider the merits of appellant's constitutional challenges. Appellant asserts Section 947.16(3) violates Florida's constitutional separation of governmental powers. Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. Appellant, relying upon Article IV, Section 8(c), Florida Constitution, submits that the parole powers are an executive function vested solely in the parole and probation commission. Appellant reasons, therefore, that Section 947.16(3) violates the constitutional provision regarding separation of governmental powers by usurping the parole function from the executive branch and assigning it to the judicial branch in certain circumstances....

...State, 300 So.2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), appeal dismissed 305 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1974). The rationale of these decisions is that Article IV, Section 8(c) does not restrict the legislature from establishing minimum conditions under which parole may be granted. In effect, Section 947.16(3) merely establishes minimum conditions under which parole may be granted during the first one-third of the maximum sentence imposed. Such conditions are within the legislature's prerogatives and within its constitutional powers to prescribe punishment for crimes. Appellant further asserts that Section 947.16(3) violates the due process provisions of Article I, Section 9, Florida Constitution and Amendments V and XIV, United States Constitution....

...ainst retention of jurisdiction, and because the statute prohibits an appeal from a trial court's decision to vacate a parole commission release order. Appellant's due process arguments are primarily premised upon his assertion that sentencing under Section 947.16(3) is akin to sentencing as an habitual offender pursuant to Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1979). Relying upon Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967); Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1980); and Adams v. State, 376 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), appellant asserts Section 947.16(3) does not fulfill the due process requirements which must attend the imposition of an enhanced sentence. We find that retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3) is not analogous to proceedings under the habitual offender statute. See Moore v. State, 392 So.2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (Cowart, J., concurring specially). Invocation of Section 947.16(3) does not constitute an enhanced sentence nor is it dependent upon a new finding of fact that was not an ingredient of the offense charged. Rather, the invocation of Section 947.16(3) is similar to traditional sentencing procedures where, within limits fixed by the legislature, the trial judge is given broad discretion to determine the type and extent of punishment for convicted defendants....

...t, placed on eight years probation; however, following a hearing at which he was found to have violated the terms of his probation agreement, his probation was revoked, he was adjudicated guilty, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...agreement. We now consider petitioner's challenge of the trial judge's retention of jurisdiction over him for the first one-third of the sentence imposed. Petitioner contends that such is improper and that the section pursuant to which it was done, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), is unconstitutional. We need not address the constitutional question because petitioner is correct regarding the propriety of the retention. The provisions of section 947.16(3), allowing a trial judge to retain jurisdiction over a convicted offender for up to one-third of the sentence imposed, were enacted in 1978....

...The offense for which petitioner was convicted occurred in 1977, almost eleven months prior to the effective date of chapter 78-318. We held, in State v. Williams, 397 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1981), that retention of jurisdiction by a trial judge pursuant to section 947.16 constitutes an ex post facto application of the law when the crime in question was committed prior to said section's effective date....

...denied, 229 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1053, 90 S.Ct. 1393, 25 L.Ed.2d 668 (1970) (only executive, not judiciary, has power to reduce lawful sentence after sixty days from imposition); McRae v. State, 383 So.2d 289 (Fla.2d DCA 1980) (under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), judiciary cannot retain jurisdiction over defendant beyond one-third of maximum sentence of imprisonment imposed)....

...e facts of the case. [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Respondent was found guilty of armed robbery with a firearm and sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison. The trial court retained jurisdiction for one-third of the sentence in accordance with section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...rida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 alleging, among other things, that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first one-third of the sentence because the crime for which he was convicted was committed before the effective date of section 947.16(3)....

...On review the district court held that failure to object to retention of jurisdiction did not preclude review on a rule 3.850 motion. The court also noted that if it were true, as alleged in the motion for relief, that the crime occurred before the effective date of section 947.16(3), then the sentencing court lacked retention jurisdiction....

...State v. Williams . Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the retention issue. In State v. Williams we responded to a certified question of great public importance, [2] by holding that retroactive application of section 947.16(3) to a crime occurring before its effective date violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution and that such retention sentences were void....

...2d DCA 1980), to the same end. Thus, the district court here correctly stated the rule of law from State v. Williams and Rodriguez. However, in remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the crime was committed prior to the effective date of section 947.16(3), the court apparently overlooked the finding of the trial court that "[d]efendant is correct that since the crime for which he was convicted occurred several days prior to the effective date of the law authorizing such retention, its application to defendant's sentence is ex post facto." Thus, it is clear that no evidentiary hearing is necessary because the trial court has already determined that the crime occurred before the effective date of section 947.16(3)....

...BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] State v. Williams, 397 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1981). [2] Williams, 397 So. 2 at 664: Does the retention of jurisdiction by a trial judge and denial of release through gain time pursuant to § 947.16, Fla....

...We affirm the appellant's convictions. We vacate that portion of the sentence for first-degree murder wherein the trial court retained jurisdiction for one-third of the life sentence imposed to review any parole commission release order pertaining to the defendant. See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1981). We conclude that where a court imposes a life sentence, Section 947.16(3) is inoperable, since because a life span is immeasurable, see Alvarez v. State, 358 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1978), no calculation of the length of time jurisdiction is retained can be made. With the exception of the capital felony, all crimes set forth in Section 947.16(3) as to which a trial court may retain jurisdiction over the defendant, including life felonies, are punishable by imprisonment for a term of years, see § 775.082(3), Fla....

...rsuant to section 874.04, Florida Statutes, to have been committed for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang. Retention of Jurisdiction ____ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(34), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...On remand, defendant should be resentenced to no more than 15 years imprisonment. As his second point on appeal, defendant contends that the trial court improperly retained jurisdiction over one-half of the 50 year sentence for the conviction of burglary with assault. We agree. The 1982 amendment to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, allows a court to retain jurisdiction for one-half of a sentence....

...nterview in February 2022. However, in February 2022, when Atwell will be forty-seven years of age, his presumptive parole release date will'be able to be changed only for “reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information.” § 947.16(5), Fla....

...1974); Ivey v. State, 308 So.2d 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first half of the concurrent sentences imposed upon revocation of his probation. He contends that the amendment to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...s invalid, "the Commission should be given the opportunity to recalculate the Petitioner's presumptive parole release date," and to reinstate the aggravating factors found by the hearing examiners, but not relied upon by the Commission. Relying upon Section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1979), respondent asserted that "[i]f the Commission is unable to utilize the 1951 conviction to extend the Petitioner's presumptive parole release date, it may well decide to follow the recommendation of the hear...

...er and impose as an aggravating factor the concurrent sentences received by the Petitioner." The Commission might well have decided to do what respondent suggests; however, Florida law forbids it. First, the very provision relied upon by respondent, Section 947.16(4), specifically states that the Commission may from time to time review the parole date established for an inmate, but that "the presumptive parole release date shall not be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct or the a...

...ce imposed upon petitioner. This recommendation was specifically rejected by the Commission. It is self-evident that the existence of the concurrent sentence is not new or previously unavailable information upon which the Commission could rely under Section 947.16(4)....

...on when agreement on a ... date is reached.' The only explicitly stated exceptions to the binding effect of the date are `for reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview.' Section 947.16(4). Additionally, we are of the opinion that Section 947.16(4) should be considered in pari materia with Section 947.173(3), permitting the Commission to modify a parole release date `for good cause in exceptional circumstances.' The record fails to show the applicability of any exceptional circumstance....

...e within a certain period of time for each entitled inmate. The chapter contemplates an objective system, Section 947.02, Fla. Stat. (1980); the Commission may exercise its discretion only in limited circumstances with adequate explanation. Sections 947.165, 947.172, Fla....

...Florida Parole and Probation Commission, supra . Similarly, aggravations may not be applied later than 45 days from the date of an inmate's initial interview "except for reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview". Section 947.16(4), Fla....

...Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1979), permitted the imposition of jail or prison terms as a condition of probation. Such split sentences had been approved by the supreme court in State v. Jones, 327 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1976). However, in Villery the court partially receded from Jones in light of section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which conferred parole eligibility upon anyone serving a sentence of one year or more....

...Since probation, technically, is not a sentence, McGowan v. State, 362 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), a trial judge could avoid the likelihood of a defendant qualifying for early parole release by imposing a prison term as a condition of probation, thereby removing the offender from the ambit of section 947.16(1) and "negat[ing] the parole policy of this state." Villery, 396 So.2d at 1111....

...e maximum sentence allowed. " 327 So.2d at 25 (emphasis added). We do not believe, however, that Jones decided the issues presented by this case because it did not consider the impact on the parole process of a jail term as a condition of probation. Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1977), states in pertinent part: Every person who has been, or who may hereafter be, convicted of a felony or who has been convicted of one or more misdemeanors and whose sentence or cumulative sentences total 12 mon...

...s a condition of probation is more onerous than a simple prison sentence of the same length. We affirm the remaining judgments and sentences. BOARDMAN and RYDER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] One solution to the problems posed by this case would be to read Section 947.16 broadly enough to encompass a term of confinement of twelve months or more imposed as a condition of probation....

...Crockett, 377 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1979) (five years of prison on a five year period of probation). [3] The legislature has now provided a method whereby the sentencing court can retain jurisdiction to review orders granting early parole in cases involving serious crimes. Sec. 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1977). [4] There is much to be said for a maximum limitation of one year because it would avoid any conflict with Section 947.16....

...Next, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in granting a view of the scene. Cf. Rankin v. State, 143 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1962). *600 Finally, concerning the trial court's retention of jurisdiction over the first one-third of defendant's sentence, the controlling statute, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), reads: Persons who have become eligible for parole and who may, according to the objective parole guidelines of the commission, be granted parole shall be placed on parole in accordance with the provisions of this law; except that, in any case of a person convicted of ....

...Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are affirmed, but the order of retention of jurisdiction over the first third of the sentence is vacated and the cause remanded with directions that if upon further hearing the trial court determines that appellant is to be sentenced in accordance with section 947.16(3)(a), then the trial court shall make findings of fact as required by the statute....

...The appellant was sentenced to serve ninety-nine years on the kidnapping charge and thirty years on the sexual battery charge. In addition to making the sentences run consecutively, the court retained jurisdiction over one-third of each of them. At the time the appellant committed the offenses for which he was convicted, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provided in part: When any person is convicted of two or more felonies and consecutive sentences are imposed, then the jurisdiction of the trial court as provided herein shall apply to one-third of the total consecutive sentences imposed....

...3d DCA 1982). We therefore affirm the appellant's convictions and sentences but strike each of the *954 special provisions for retention of jurisdiction and remand to the trial court with directions to reconsider the period of retention in accordance with section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...t declined to follow the state's recommendation that it impose the death penalty in this case but, instead, inflicted two life sentences, retaining jurisdiction over one-half of each. Nor was any objection made when the court gratuitously pronounced Section 947.16(3), *410 Florida Statutes (Supp....

...On the merits, the court, having imposed a life sentence, had no right to retain jurisdiction of an immeasurable sentence. See Cordero-Pena v. State, 421 So.2d 661, 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); accord Rodriguez v. State, 424 So.2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). I am moreover of the view that retroactive application of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1981); Brown v. State, 428 So.2d 369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Under the circumstances the sentence should be vacated and the cause remanded for the purpose of the lower court's imposing a sentence consistent with the authorities cited. NOTES [1] We note that section 947.16 was again amended in 1983 and now allows retention over only one-third of sentences rather than one-half....

...We find no merit in the issues raised by defendant with regard to the trial proceedings, so the convictions are affirmed. Appellant contends also that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over one-half of each sentence, because effective June 15, 1983, the legislature had amended section 947.16(3) to permit retention of jurisdiction over one-third of a defendant's sentence, instead of one-half, and defendant was sentenced after that date....

...he alias capias which had been issued for his arrest. After hearing, his probation was then revoked because of his failure to appear on June 1, and he was resentenced to 15 years in the state prison; the court also retained jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ranting of his own request for a reciprocal *1348 benefit. [4] See also, Loeb v. State, 387 So.2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); cf., State v. Belien, 379 So.2d 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We will not approve such a result. [5] The trial court's application of Section 947.16(3) was, however, erroneous....

...It is apparent that, since burglary is not one of the specified crimes, the section could not properly be invoked in this case. Robinson v. State, 368 So.2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Williams v. State, 374 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). [7] The reservation of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Appellant was charged with first-degree murder. A jury rejected his defense of self-defense and returned a verdict for second-degree murder. The court imposed a sixty-year sentence, then enhanced it by retaining jurisdiction to veto parole during the first one-third of the sentence pursuant to Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981). [1] As justification for the retention of jurisdiction, which justification must be stated "with individual particularity," Section 947.16(3)(a), [2] the court announced: [T]he offense was [a] deliberate act and bolstered by considerable time by consumption of alcohol, apparently enough to carry it out. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) has generated considerable discussion in recent months....

...ntence is VACATED. NOTES [1] Retention of jurisdiction which empowers a trial court to veto a parole recommendation and deny release pursuant to gain time is, in effect, an enhancement of a sentence. State v. Williams, 397 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1981). [2] Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) provides: In retaining jurisdiction for the purposes of this act, the trial court judge shall state the justification with individual particularity, and said justification shall be made a part of the court record....

...In this appeal from a sentence in a murder case the appellant assigns as error the method by which the trial judge retained jurisdiction to review any parole release order issued during the first third of appellant's term of confinement. Under the provisions of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Everything a trial judge does should be done in a reasonable manner but that does not mean that everything he does is, or should be, reviewable by appeal. *279 Proceedings under the habitual offender statute, Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, do not resemble, and provide no analogy to, Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, which provides for trial court review of parole releases....

...appeal when its ultimate action, actually vacating parole, is not reviewable creates an amazing legal paradox; yet this is the result here because the final action of the trial court vacating or approving the parole release order is not appealable. Section 947.16(3)(g), Florida Statutes....

...The requirement of a record permits the sentencing judge or his successor, to later have a record of why the initial decision was made in that particular case; it also serves to cause the parole commission to send a notice of the release order to the trial court under Section 947.16(3)(c), Florida Statutes....

...Accordingly, we order that the trial court's marks on these blanks be struck so that Wainwright's sentencing forms for the non-capital offenses reflect the imposition of no mandatory minimum terms under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993), and no retention of jurisdiction under section *516 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...mistrial, prohibit the party from calling a witness not disclosed or introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. [7] See § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (1993). [8] See generally § 947.16(4), Fla....

...1217 his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant contends that the reasons given by the trial court in its order retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the defendant's sentence [§ 947.16(3), Fla....

...(1981)] were legally insufficient, and that, accordingly, the subject retention of jurisdiction should be vacated. We agree and reverse. First, we reject the state's sole argument on this appeal that an attack on the legal sufficiency of a trial court order retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the prison sentence [§ 947.16(3), Fla....

...y the legislature. In any case, we believe the evidence was sufficient to support the implicit finding of the jury that the weapon carried by Watson was a firearm. The trial court retained jurisdiction over one third of Watson's sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) which authorizes retention for the purpose of reviewing the defendant's release on parole during a period up to one-third of the sentence imposed....

...State v. Bassham, 352 So.2d 55 (Fla. 1977); Cameron v. State, 376 So.2d 248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). The main thrust of the appeal is the argument that a trial judge cannot retain jurisdiction over "the first third of the maximum sentence imposed" under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), when that sentence is life, because the period of retention cannot be calculated....

...jurisdiction to review any parole determination during the first one-half of his sentence, was constitutionally infirm because at the time of sentencing the statute permitted retention of jurisdiction for no more than one-third of his sentence. See § 947.16(3), Fla....

...A defendant convicted of thirteen counts of first degree murder would be subject to a total mandatory minimum sentence of three hundred twenty-five years as opposed to the thirty-nine years imposed in the instant case. We find no merit in this argument. Appellant challenges the constitutionality of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes....

...jurisdiction of his sentence. When the court announced the sentence the trial judge stated that, "This court will retain jurisdiction for the first third." Then the court reduced its order to writing, in a manner consistent with the requirements of Section 947.16(3)....

...State, 400 So.2d 519 (Fla.3d DCA 1981), however, in Hayes, the trial judge did not mention retaining jurisdiction at the time of sentencing but rather placed a handwritten note on the judgment which was recorded later, "The court retains jurisdiction on this matter." We find no departure from the requirements of Section 947.16(3)....

...Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981). Lastly, appellant argues that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction on the first one-third of his sentence for carrying a concealed weapon. He asserts that this offense is not an offense enumerated in the statute. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, provides: [E]xcept that, in any case of a person convicted of murder, robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, kidnapping, sexual battery or attempted sexual battery, incest or attempted incest, an unnatur...

...review of a commission release order. The Second District Court of Appeal in Robinson v. State, 368 So.2d 638 (Fla.2d DCA 1979), determined that carrying a concealed weapon does not constitute a felony "involving the use of a firearm," as defined in Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes....

...e justification with individual particularity, and such justification shall be made a part of the court record. A copy of such justification shall be delivered to the department together with the commitment issued by the court pursuant to s. 944.16. § 947.16(3)(a), Fla....

...See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984). The statute contemplates a statement on the record of the reasons justifying retention of jurisdiction which is then to be appended to the sentencing document to be delivered to the department of corrections. § 947.16(3)(a), Fla....

...tence without stating with particularity its justification for doing so. On resentencing, if the court wishes to retain jurisdiction over a portion of Roberts's sentence, it must state with particularity its justification for doing so as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and sentence for grand theft, second degree. Finally, appellant points out that the trial court included the fifteen year sentence for dealing in stolen property when it computed the term of his imprisonment over which it could retain jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981). This was error. Section 947.16(3) lists the crimes for which a trial court may retain jurisdiction over the offender for review of a parole commission order....

...We therefore remand this cause to the trial court for the purpose of allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, should he so desire. For purposes of any subsequent proceeding, we also note that the trial judge may not retain jurisdiction over the defendant's sentence for burglary. § 947.16(3), Fla....

...The appellant pled guilty to charges of armed robbery and kidnapping, and was sentenced to 60 years imprisonment on the former count and to a consecutive 30-year term of probation on the latter. He appeals the trial court's retention of jurisdiction, pursuant to § 947.16(3), Fla....

...the particular incidents ... the nature of both offenses ... the seriousness of the offenses ... and the gravity of the offenses...," without citing any of the facts or circumstances of the crimes. This statement does not satisfy the requirement of § 947.16(3)(a) that justification for retention of jurisdiction be stated with individual particularity....

...State, 338 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); § 794.022(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). The court sentenced appellant to concurrent fifteen and five year terms of imprisonment, and the sentencing order stated that the "court maintains jurisdiction over defendant." Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that where a defendant is convicted of certain enumerated offenses a trial judge may retain jurisdiction over the defendant for the first one-third of his sentence....

...Moreover, in the McKee case the opinion does not disclose the extent of the discussion of the jury instruction. It merely recited in the concluding paragraph of the opinion that there was a contention "that it was error for the trial court to discuss with the jury the eligibility of a convicted person for parole and to read Section 947.16, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., relating to parole to the jury during the trial * * *." [9] In the case sub judice the State concedes, so far as the harmful nature of the error is concerned, "that the question asked of the trial court...

...1960), 123 So.2d 703. [3] F.A.R. 1962 Revision 6.16, 31 F.S.A. See 924.32, Florida Statutes 1961, F.S.A. [4] Singer v. State, Fla. 1959, 109 So.2d 7, 28. [5] Pait v. State, Fla. 1959, 112 So.2d 380, 381, 384. [6] The pertinent statutes on this subject are Sections 947.16, 947.17, 947.18, 947.19, Florida Statutes 1961, F.S.A....

...The Florida Supreme Court has likewise recently held that failure to object at trial to the trial court's failure to state with individual particularity the reasons for retaining jurisdiction does not bar a direct appeal on that basis. Snow v. State, 462 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1985). The trial court has a mandatory duty under section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981), to provide those reasons for retention....

...proper in this particular case to strike the costs pursuant to section 939.15. Appellant contends next that we should vacate the retention of jurisdiction and remand with directions that the court satisfy the individual particularity requirement of section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Gaskins raises two points on appeal. First, he argues that the trial judge unlawfully retained jurisdiction over his sentence. Second, he alleges that the trial judge unlawfully habitualized his sentence for grand theft. We deal with each in point of order. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), enumerated certain offenses upon conviction of which a defendant could be subject to retention of jurisdiction. Section 947.16(3) provided, in pertinent part, that: Persons who have become eligible for parole and who may, according to the objective parole guidelines of the commission, be granted parole shall be placed on parole in accordance with the provision...

...Lopez challenged Rule 23-19.05 F.A.C. in a proceeding under § 120.56 Fla. Stat. (1979). The challenge was denied. We affirm. Lopez was convicted of second degree murder in 1977. At that time parole consideration was in the discretion of the Parole and Probation Commission, § 947.16 Fla. Stat. (1977). Pursuant to § 947.165 Fla....

...Lopez now challenges the amendment of Rule 23-19.05 F.A.C., contending that the March rules should have been used. Lopez makes two arguments which require discussion. First, he argues that the Commission exceeded its authority by not complying with § 947.165 Fla....

...se. The Commission relied on its collective experience in the area of parole release dates when it enacted the June amendments. Several months use of the March rules had convinced the Commissioners that the original times were too low. Section *1355 947.165(2) Fla....

...Second, the trial court retained jurisdiction over one-third of each of the consecutive sentences imposed. However, for the purpose of retention of jurisdiction *399 in this case, the authority of the court applies only to one-third of the total consecutive sentences imposed. Section 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1981); Adams v. State, 435 So.2d 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Goree v. State, 411 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The 1982 amendment to section 947.16(3) is inapplicable because its effective date was after the crimes were committed....

...with. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC PER CURIAM. The appellant's motion for rehearing en banc is denied. We adhere to our holding that the 1982 amendment to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. PER CURIAM. Sawyer, convicted of first degree murder on a nolo contendere plea appeals his sentence urging that the trial judge erred in retaining jurisdiction without specifying his reason for doing so as required by Section 947.16(3)(a) Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Appellant was sentenced to two thirty-year concurrent sentences of imprisonment for the armed robberies, and a consecutive five-year sentence for the aggravated assault. Jurisdiction was retained for the first one-third of the thirty-year sentence, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), and a written order was entered justifying this action....

...erred from the juvenile to the adult court. See Goodson v. State, 403 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 1981). [2] § 39.111(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979). [3] § 39.111(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979). [4] See § 958.04, Fla. Stat. (1979). The written order entered pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes also failed to touch on all of the criteria set forth in section 39.111(6)(c), and it was obviously done after and not before any other "determination of disposition."

...NOTES [1] The trial court initially announced a sentence of life on the burglary offense, but on motion by the State, changed the life sentence to a 100 year sentence. The State asked for this change in conjunction with its request for the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the defendant. See § 947.16(3), Fla....

...Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. MILLS, Judge. Fredricks contends the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction for the first half of four sentences pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...as freely and voluntarily made, after he had been fully advised of his rights, so we will not disturb that finding. Rubasky v. State, 401 So.2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The court did err, however, in retaining jurisdiction over defendant's sentence. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983) permits the retention of jurisdiction in sentences for certain enumerated offenses, among which is the offense of burglary of a structure or conveyance in which a human being is present (a second degree felony)....

...UPCHURCH, Jr., J., concurs. COWART, J., concurs specially with opinion. COWART, Judge, concurring specially. This case involves the applicability of the contemporaneous objection rule to sentencing errors. Effective June 16, 1983 (chapter 83-131), section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, was amended to reduce the time for which a judge may retain jurisdiction to review a proposed parole release from one-half to one-third of the sentence. When the defendant was sentenced on June 28, 1983, the trial judge erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first one-half of the sentence. See Hayes v. State, 452 So.2d 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, applies only to certain enumerated offenses, including burglary of a dwelling and burglary of a structure or conveyance in which a human being is present....

...equired by § 39.111(6), Fla. Stat.). Canty v. State, 402 So.2d 1232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), cited Jones and Smith and applied the COR to a sentencing error (retention of jurisdiction over parole release without stating reasons on record as required by § 947.16(3)(a), Fla....

...State, 411 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), cited Rubasky and Dunman and applied the COR to sentencing errors (failure to make findings required by § 39.111(6), Fla. Stat., and the retention *919 of jurisdiction without stating reasons as required by § 947.16(3), Fla....

...5th DCA 1982), affirmed a denial of post-conviction relief on the authority of Jones and Smith. Gaskins v. State, 415 So.2d 132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), applied the COR to a sentencing error (retention of jurisdiction over parole release without stating reasons as required by § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat.), citing Barlow, Jones and Smith. Brown v. State, 428 So.2d 369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), applied the COR to a sentencing error (the ex post facto application of § 947.16(3), Fla....

...1st DCA 1984), the First DCA followed Rhoden in a case where the sentencing error was failure to make findings required by section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes, but in Cofield v. State, 453 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), a case involving a sentencing error (the ex post facto application of § 947.16(3), Fla....

...ontemporaneous objection rule to the sentencing error in Rhoden applies equally to all sentencing errors. In Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), this court applied Rhoden to a sentencing error resulting from an improper application of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, authorizing retention of jurisdiction over parole releases....

...Therefore the admissibility of the confession was proper and the defendant's conviction is properly affirmed. However, because no waiver resulted from the failure to make a contemporaneous objection in the trial court, Rhoden, and the record in this case is sufficient to determine that section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, was improperly applied, the special provision of the sentence for retention of jurisdiction under that section is properly stricken and the sentence, as modified, is properly affirmed....

...ential prerequisite findings in the prescribed manner, such as, the findings required by (a) section 39.111(6), Fla. Stat., to sentence a juvenile as an adult, (b) section 775.084(3), Fla. Stat., to impose an enhanced habitual offender sentence, (c) section 947.16(3), Fla....

...ctober 1, 1983, by a term of imprisonment for life or for a term of years not less than 30 ... Defendant asserts, and the State does not disagree, that if not sentenced under the guidelines, defendant would be eligible for parole consideration under section 947.16(1), (2)(g)(3), which provides that: (1) Every person who has been, or who may hereafter be, convicted of a felony or who has been convicted of one or more misdemeanors and whose sentence or cumulative sentences total 12 months or more,...

...Once a PPRD is set, it becomes binding on the Commission, and it is not to be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct, acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview, or good cause in exceptional circumstances. Sections 947.16(5), 947.172(3) and 947.173(3); Fla....

...'s behavior while released on parole from 1984-87, citing Carr v. Fla. Parole and Probation Comm'n, 510 So.2d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). In Carr, this court upheld the Commission's rule permitting aggravation based on alcohol abuse, as consistent with § 947.165(1)....

...ve indicant of parole prognosis. For example, the Commission stated its first aggravating circumstance in the following manner: "PSI dated 12-27-73 indicates a weapon (knife) was used in the Commission of this offense." Clearly, this reason violates § 947.16(5) because it was previously known and documented, but was not used to aggravate appellant's 1979 PPRD....

...To suggest that Detective Pruett's testimony in the case sub judice offends the Fifth Amendment is to suggest an expansion of the construction of the Fifth Amendment to an illogical and unreasonable extent. We decline to do so. McCoy also attacks the sentences imposed by the trial judge who retained jurisdiction pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, and imposed extended terms under Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, the Habitual Offender Act. McCoy claims that the trial judge failed to state his justification therefor with the requisite particularity. See Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes; Eutsey v....

...he justification for retaining jurisdiction over the sentence for purposes of parole review is without merit. The record reveals sufficient justification for retaining jurisdiction and the court's observations and enumeration of offenses accord with Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...h of them arose out of one criminal episode. Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1983); State v. Suarez, 485 So.2d 1283 (Fla. 1986). Since the sentencing guidelines apply to this case, the court should not retain jurisdiction over the sentences under section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1985)....

..., 787.01(2), and 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), exceed the statutory maximum sentence in that the court retained jurisdiction for one-third of each sentence, aggregating 200 years, to review the Parole Commission's parole release order. Sec. 947.16(3)....

...While the effect of the sentence package is that the judge retained power to review and vacate any release order that the Commission may enter during Harmon's lifetime pursuant to objective parole release criteria that are themselves mandated by statute, that, apparently, is precisely what the legislature intended by section 947.16(3) to make possible in these circumstances....

...Florida State Turnpike Authority, 134 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1961); State v. Farmer, 384 So.2d 311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Second, Canty argues on appeal that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first one-third of his sentence without stating the reasons on the record pursuant to section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...r. Petitioner contends it was improper for the *1183 Commission to consider his prior conviction for possession of a firearm in setting his second PPRD because this information was before the Commission when the first PPRD was established. We agree. Section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1983), provides, in relevant part: [T]he presumptive parole release date may not be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview....

...hall vacate any established presumptive parole release date. Any subsequent return to incarceration shall require an initial interview to establish a presumptive parole release date. [emphasis added] We cannot agree with the Commission's contention. Section 947.16(4) and section 947.173(3), Florida Statutes (1983), clearly prohibit modifying a prisoner's PPRD absent new information, evidence of institutional conduct, or extraordinary circumstances....

...[7] Section 893.135(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes, is binding on trial judges and mandates that the trial court impose a sentence of imprisonment of not less than three calendar years. That statute is also binding on the Parole and Probation Commission as to parole ( see § 947.16(2)(g)) and administrative gain time ( see § 944.276(1)(a))....

...ence is not an inherent element of this offense." Id. at 1314. [1] In Duque v. State, 526 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), this court considered whether solicitation to commit murder involved *1153 the use of intentional violence within the meaning of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Albert Williams, appellant, was convicted of attempted sexual battery and sentenced to a term of thirty years in prison. The trial judge retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of the appellant's sentence, pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). We affirm the appellant's conviction, but reverse the retention of jurisdiction by the lower court. Section 947.16(3) enumerates various offenses and provides that when a criminal defendant is convicted of an enumerated offense, the trial judge may retain jurisdiction for the first one-third of the defendant's sentence....

...he sentence imposed. While the statute expressly includes sexual battery as an enumerated offense, it makes no mention of "attempts." Therefore, the question raised by the present appeal is whether the trial judge may retain jurisdiction pursuant to Section 947.16(3) when the appellant was convicted of an attempt to commit an enumerated offense? We hold that Section 947.16(3) does not apply to attempts....

...xcludes from its operation any offenses not expressly enumerated. See Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1976); Graham v. Azar, 204 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1967). Applying this principle, we find that the legislative intent was to limit the application of Section 947.16(3) to the expressly enumerated offenses, and not to extend the application of this section to attempts to commit those offenses. *1088 The judgment is affirmed, but the retention of jurisdiction over the sentence pursuant to Section 947.16(3) is hereby stricken....

...his sentence, claiming that the trial court did not make the appropriate findings to retain jurisdiction in his case. Because the trial court failed to make specific and particular findings justifying the retention of jurisdiction in accordance with section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), and Hampton v....

...stakenly failed to provide jail time credit on one of the sentences imposed. In all other respects, we affirm. The trial court entered various sentences and retained jurisdiction over Blackwell for one-third of each sentence. This was improper under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), which limits the jurisdiction which the trial court may retain over Blackwell to one-third of the total consecutive sentences imposed. We therefore strike the various provisions of retention of jurisdiction and remand this case for reconsideration of the period of retention in accordance with section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...See Wicker v. State, 438 So.2d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Adams v. State, 435 So.2d 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). We also strike the retention of jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence imposed for Blackwell's conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm. § 947.16(3), Fla....

...The appellant alleged that his sentence is illegal because the trial court did not justify the retention of jurisdiction over one-third of his sentence. In order to retain jurisdiction over the appellant's sentence, the trial court must provide justification *178 "with individual particularity." See § 947.16(3)(a), Fla....

...on. Under the statutory parole system in effect at the time, a sentencing judge could retain jurisdiction over a defendant's sentence so that the judge's approval as well as that of the parole commission was necessary for the prisoner's release. See § 947.16(3), Fla....

...1986, the parole commission was not required to receive opinions or objections from judges before making parole decisions. However, it is worth noting that in State v. Williams, 397 So.2d at 665, the supreme court noted "that for many years prior to section 947.16's enactment, the Parole and Probation Commission informally gave notice to the sentencing judge of a prisoner's parole date and sought the judge's comments....

...Appellant appealed the conviction, but not the sentence, and we affirmed without a written opinion. Pedroso v. State, 386 So.2d 647 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). In May 1982 he filed a Rule 3.850 motion alleging that the trial judge did not state the reasons for retaining jurisdiction with individual particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...t possessed a firearm. Drug Trafficking — [] It is further ordered that the ______ year minimum mandatory minimum provisions of F.S. 893.135(1)()() are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count. Retention of [] The Court pursuant to F.S. 947.16(3) retains Jurisdiction jurisdiction over the defendant for review of any parole Commission release order for the period of ________....

...PER CURIAM. Ragan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to present for review the trial court's failure to give contemporaneous, specific reasons for retaining jurisdiction as required by § 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...The trial court retained jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence imposed "for the same reasons that I have previously ascribed in retaining jurisdiction in the case of James Thompson." This statement regarding Ragan does not satisfy the requirement of § 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes, that justification for retention of jurisdiction be stated with individual particularity....

...ons stated therefor are, "... the defendant showed absolutely no remorse for the crime that he committed and that he was a one-man crime wave that greatly endangered society." We find that these stated reasons fail to comply with the requirements of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Gen., Tampa, for appellee. GRIMES, Chief Judge. The appellant was sentenced to five years upon conviction of the offense of carrying a concealed firearm. In this appeal he contests the court's reservation of jurisdiction over a portion of his sentence under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...In that section, the felonies in question are those in which "the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use" a firearm. If, in Section 775.087, the terms "uses" and "carries" have different meanings, then it should follow that the legislature also conceived of those terms as different when it enacted Section 947.16(3), and thus did not intend for that section to apply to a carrying offense. The judgment is affirmed, but the retention of jurisdiction over the sentence pursuant to Section 947.16(3) is hereby stricken....

...us. [1] Since the majority has concluded based on this distinction that "the use" does not include carry, then it follows that "the use" must not include display. A logical extension of the majority's reasoning would result in the inapplicability of Section 947.16(3) to felonies where firearms or deadly weapons were "displayed" but not "used." I do not believe that the legislature intended such a result. If Section 947.16(3) contemplated actual employment of a firearm, "use" would have been included in the statute as a verb rather than as a noun....

...After jury conviction for crimes committed in March, 1978, John Myles, Jr. was sentenced to consecutive sentences of ninety-nine years in the state penitentiary for second-degree murder and to thirty years for involuntary sexual battery. The trial judge elected to retain jurisdiction pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979) (originally enacted in 1977 and made effective June 1978). Myles appeals. The trial court's retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16, constitutes an ex post facto application of the statute because this law attaches legal consequences to crimes which Myles committed before the law took effect and affects him in a disadvantageous fashion by in effect extending his jail time....

lawful remedy is to declare unconstitutional section 947.16(6), Florida Statutes, to the extent that it

...Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for first degree burglary and grand theft. We strike the retention of jurisdiction provision of defendant's burglary sentence but otherwise affirm. The trial court retained jurisdiction over defendant's burglary sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The only reason given by the court for retaining jurisdiction was this statement on the sentence: "Defendant has prior criminal activity." This is not a sufficient reason to retain jurisdiction over the jail sentence of a criminal defendant. It does not satisfy the requirement of section 947.16(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), for individual particularity....

...The Supreme Court found that the rule it announced in Villery is required in order to construe the split sentence statutes consistently with the state's parole policy. Florida's parole policy is that every person who has been sentenced to a term of incarceration of one year or more shall be eligible for parole (Section 947.16, Florida Statutes)....

...Johnson also argues that his life sentences are illegal, in that they provided for no possibility of parole. [1] At the time, sexual battery upon a child was a capital felony punishable by life imprisonment with "no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole." §§ 775.082(1), 794.011(2), Fla. Stat.(1989). [2] Section 947.16(2)(g)3, Florida Statutes (1989) provided that an inmate serving a mandatory minimum sentence was entitled to an initial interview for parole consideration no sooner than 18 months prior to the expiration of the mandatory minimum portion of the sentence....

...ddress the propriety of the seizure of the other items of contraband involved in those charges. Jacobs v. State, 389 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). [2] Affirmed. NOTES [1] There is no eligibility for parole as to a one year county jail sentence, see § 947.16(1), Fla....

...Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Katherine V. Blanco, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, George W. Mobley, is challenging the trial court's retention of jurisdiction over one-half of his sentence on the grounds that section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981) was amended to provide an increase from one-third to one-half of the sentence after the date of commission of the offense....

...We grant the petition and order the Commission to establish a PPRD for petitioner and to notify petitioner and this Court of its action within 15 days of the date of this order. Oishi has been confined in execution of a three year sentence since August 26, 1981. Section 947.16(1), Fla....

...s minimum mandatory term of imprisonment. It appears that the Commission is establishing a date at its convenience rather than at the expiration of an inmate's minimum mandatory term of imprisonment or within the time limits imposed by the statutes. Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979), does not permit such an exercise of discretion....

...lready been established, and hence-forth timely establish presumptive parole release dates for all inmates with mandatory minimum sentences, if they are otherwise entitled to such dates. McCORD, ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr. and ERVIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 947.16(1), Fla....

...ission. As used in this section, the term "confined" shall be deemed to include presence in any appropriate treatment facility, public or private, by virtue of transfer from the Department of Corrections under any applicable law. (emphasis supplied) Section 947.16(2), Fla....

...d in the official record. However, in no case shall such postponement result in a hearing being conducted any time later than one year after the initial date the inmate is confined in execution of the judgment of the court. (emphasis supplied) While Section 947.16 does contain several exceptions under which an inmate is not entitled to have his PPRD established within a short time from his initial confinement, no such exception speaks to minimum mandatory terms.

...jurisdiction statute at the time he committed the crimes and the increase in the period of retention did not increase the quantum of punishment for ex post facto purposes. [1] Nazworth was not convicted during the effective period of Chapter 82-171, section 947.16(3), (5), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...We find no merit in the issues raised by defendant regarding errors allegedly occurring at trial. Therefore, we affirm the conviction. As to his sentence, defendant contends that the trial court improperly retained jurisdiction over one-half of the 99-year sentence imposed. We agree. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), was amended to reduce the maximum amount of jurisdiction that a judge could retain from one-half to one-third of a sentence. The amendment was effective June 15, 1983. Defendant argues that the amended statute should have been applied to his sentencing on June 22, 1983. This court has previously held that when section 947.16(3) was amended to increase the portion of a sentence over which a trial judge could retain jurisdiction, the correct statute to be applied was the statute in effect on the date the crime was committed, not the statute in effect on the date the defendant was sentenced....

...Any reference by the trial judge to impermissible reasons for departure from the guidelines does not vitiate these valid reasons. Brinson v. State, 463 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Webster. We agree with defendant's contention that the trial judge erred in retaining jurisdiction over his sentences pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...PER CURIAM. The appellant appeals the denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) in which he argues that his sentence is illegal because the trial court improperly retained jurisdiction over his case in violation of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...s for armed sexual battery and armed robbery were to run consecutive to the armed burglary assault charge. The court retained jurisdiction over one-third of each sentence. At the time the appellant committed the offenses, for which he was convicted, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provided in part: When any person is convicted of two or more felonies and consecutive sentences are imposed, then the jurisdiction of the trial court judge as provided herein shall apply to one-third of the total consecutive sentences imposed....

...State, 428 So.2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Wicker. We, therefore, affirm the appellant's convictions but strike each of the special provisions for retention of jurisdiction and remand to the trial court with directions to reconsider the period of retention in accordance with section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Wicker; Wicker; Adams v. State, 435 So.2d 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Therefore, we strike each of the special provisions for retention of jurisdiction and remand to the trial court with directions to reconsider the period of retention in accordance with section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...We further find that the state's position is welltaken, and grant the petition. In 1983 respondent Kenneth Arduengo was sentenced to two consecutive 99-year sentences for armed burglary and armed robbery. The court retained jurisdiction over half of each term pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1982)....

...Among the arguments made by Arduengo in that motion was a claim that the trial court incorrectly retained jurisdiction over one-half of the sentence rather than one-third. The trial court appears to have agreed with Arduengo on this question and, rather than reduce the retention period, deleted any reference to section 947.16(3)....

...ve crimes, § 921.16(1), Fla. Stat. (1981), as well as to retain jurisdiction to review *1158 any possible parole release of the defendant for a period of one-half the total prison sentences imposed in this case, i.e., for a period of 127 1/2 years. § 947.16(3), Fla....

...1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980); also compare Solem v. Helm, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). Indeed, the trial court carefully set forth its reasons for retaining jurisdiction to approve any parole release of the defendant, as required by Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1982), which reasons more than adequately justify the constitutionality of the sentences imposed herein, to wit: "This Court, pursuant to Florida Statute 947.16 enters the following delineation of facts and findings in order to support or retain jurisdiction for one-half of the entire sentence....

...Additionally, after Bellcase and Ferguson were decided, the legislature superseded the supreme court's decision in Villery that incarceration *459 as a condition of probation does not constitute a sentence for the limited purpose of parole eligibility under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...cing rather than at the time that the offense was committed. See Mills v. State, 462 So.2d 1075 (Fla.1985). At the time of Barnhill's sentencing in September, 1983, the trial court could retain jurisdiction for only one-third of Barnhill's sentence. § 947.16(3), Fla....

...ed by rule 3.701. Rodriguez v. State . Appellant received the maximum statutory sentence of five years imprisonment for each crime to be served consecutively, and the crimes were not offenses over which the trial court could retain jurisdiction. See § 947.16(3), Fla....

...State, 273 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); see Booker v. State, 397 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1981); Leach v. State, 132 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1962). In addition, we find error in the trial court's failure to state its reasons for retaining jurisdiction over defendant Rosa pursuant to section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...r. The remaining point has two aspects to it. It suggests first that the circuit court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the appellant for the first one-third of the sentence without stating the grounds therefor with the particularity required by Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Any reference by the trial judge to impermissible reasons for departure from the guidelines does not vitiate these valid reasons. Ragan. We agree with defendant's contention that the trial judge erred in retaining jurisdiction over his sentences pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...ning jurisdiction. The court did announce retention of jurisdiction three weeks later. The recorded judgment and sentence contain a handwritten notation initialed and dated February 4, 1980, that the "court retains jurisdiction on this matter". *521 Section 947.16(3) Florida Statutes (1979) states in pertinent part: Persons who have become eligible for parole and who may, according to the objective parole guidelines of the commission, be granted parole shall be placed on parole in accordance wit...

...uble punishment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. See, e.g., Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1973); Gonzalez v. State, 384 So.2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Katz v. State, 335 So.2d 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Section 947.16(3) gives a trial court veto power over parole and thus has the effect of enhancement of a sentence....

...Defense counsel objected to the retention of jurisdiction, arguing that the evidence did not warrant it. The conviction and the sentence were subsequently entered on June 28, 1983, wherein the trial court retained jurisdiction for one-half of respondent's sentence. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), permits the retention of jurisdiction in sentences for certain enumerated offenses which do not include the offense for which respondent was convicted....

...The trial court sentenced King to ninety-nine years' incarceration on the armed robbery charge and to thirty years on the attempted murder charge, the sentences to run consecutively. The trial judge retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of each sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ow that appellant is not entitled to relief, or order the state attorney to file an answer or other pleading pursuant to the provisions of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Jackson v. State, supra . Appellant's second claim is without merit. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), authorizes the trial court to retain jurisdiction over a defendant who commits certain enumerated crimes, such as robbery....

...Following a jury's conviction of the appellant for the crimes of sexual battery and burglary/assault, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of sixty years imprisonment on each of a two count information and it retained jurisdiction over one-third of both sentences contrary to the provisions of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The free and voluntary quality of the waiver was not challenged in the trial court. Therefore, the appellant's statements to the police are admissible. *338 The only other point on appeal with which we must deal is the trial court's application of the retention of jurisdiction statute, Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District. February 25, 1987. PER CURIAM. John Johnson appeals from the summary denial of his motion to correct sentence. He alleges that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction for one third of his 60-year prison sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...As to parole, we find no authority and none has been furnished us that authorizes a restriction against consideration for parole in a sentence for a felony of the first degree. Authority relative to the giving or withholding of parole has been granted by the legislature to the Florida Parole and Probation Commission. See § 947.16, Fla....

...of kidnaping, and to 30 years in prison for a count of sexual battery, again with credit for time served. The sentences were to run consecutively, with the court stating on each count that it would retain jurisdiction over that sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes....

...The trial court did not provide that it would retain jurisdiction over one-third of the total years imposed in the sentences on the two counts. Instead, it simply imposed the retention on each count. We find that this violates the express language of section 947.16, Florida Statutes, and case law interpreting it....

...On January 28, 1980, Kosek was convicted of second degree murder, false imprisonment and aggravated assault. Kosek was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder charge and to two five-year terms for the other charges, each sentence to run consecutively. The court also retained jurisdiction under section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1978), for the first one-third of the total consecutive sentences imposed. Kosek contends that the court could not retain jurisdiction over one-third of a life sentence as that would effectively deny him the possibility of parole contrary to the legislative intent of section 947.16. We agree. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...entences imposed. *58 Kosek argues that retention of jurisdiction over the first one-third of a life sentence is improper because the period of retention of jurisdiction cannot be calculated. The Third District has recently adopted the position that section 947.16(3) is inapplicable where a life sentence is imposed....

...State, 439 So.2d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Rodriguez v. State, 424 So.2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Cordero-Pena v. State, 421 So.2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). In Cordero-Pena, the court explained its reasoning as follows: We conclude that where a court imposes a life sentence, Section 947.16(3) is inoperable, since because a life span is immeasurable, see Alvarez v. State, 358 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1978), no calculation of the length of time jurisdiction is retained can be made. With the exception of the capital felony, all crimes set forth in Section 947.16(3) as to which a trial court may retain jurisdiction over the defendant, including life felonies, are punishable by imprisonment for a term of years, see § 775.082(3), Fla....

(Padovano, J., concurring) (suggesting that section 947.16(6), Florida Statutes, should be deemed unconstitutional

...erversion of the rule. Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first one-third of appellant's sentence without stating the basis therefor in the record in open court with particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a) (1983)....

...1981) (Boyd, J., dissenting), and Campbell v. State, 342 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and sentence appealed from in all respects except for the trial court's retention of jurisdiction over the first one-third of the sentence, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...nal gang. [Include all findings, sentencing enhancements, and mandatory minimum provisions, as authorized by law and pronounced at sentencing.] Retention of Jurisdiction The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail Credit - 55 -  It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of days as credit for time incarcerated bef...

...to section 874.04, Florida Statutes, to have been committed for the purpose of *1132 benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang. Retention of Jurisdiction ____ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...offense, to insure the total term of probation does exceed the statutory maximum for that offense); Villery v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n., 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla.1980) (answering the question of whether or not a defendant was eligible for parole under section 947.16(1) in a situation where the defendant was incarcerated for two and one-half years, as a special condition of probation); Landeverde v....

...[1] In 1979, Hogan was convicted and sentenced for attempted second-degree murder and involuntary sexual battery. Judge Bergstrom imposed consecutive sentences of fifteen years and ninety-nine years, respectively, and retained jurisdiction over the defendant on one-third of the sentences, pursuant to section 947.16(3), [2] Florida Statutes (Supp.1978)....

...Four remaining issues concern prior proceedings, such as the original sentencing and parole hearings, which are not properly before this court for review, and we do not address those issues. [2] This provision is now contained in subsection (4). See § 947.16(4), Fla....

...they do not afford him a meaningful opportunity for release upon a demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation. This argument was premised on the length of the 1,000-year sentences and the fact that the sentencing court retained jurisdiction, under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), to approve or deny any decision by the Parole Commission to release him during the first third of his sentence, or for 333-1/3 years....

...The fact that Appellant’s PPRD is currently set at September 1, 2352, does not establish a Graham error in the sentence. The Parole Commission, not the sentencing court, is responsible for setting a parole-eligible prisoner’s PPRD and for periodically reviewing that determination. See §§ 947.13(l)(a), 947.16(4)-(5), 947.172, 947.174(2)-(3), Fla....

...e on which the crimes took place. The date the crimes occurred is crucial because during only a brief period of time possibly pertinent to this case were trial courts authorized to retain jurisdiction over one-half of a defendant's sentence. Compare § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1981), with § 947.16(3), Fla....

...1st DCA 1982), another appeal from the same trial judge, in which we held that simply referencing such things as "the circumstances surrounding this offense," without citing any of the facts or circumstances of the crime, were insufficient to meet the requirement of Section 947.16(3)(a) that justification for retention of jurisdiction be stated with individual particularity....

...However, I favor certifying to the Supreme Court the following question as one of great public importance: Do the appellate courts of this State have jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the reasons stated by trial courts for retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3)(a)? I adhere to those sentiments and, although concurring in the court's opinion, would again favor certifying to the Supreme Court the above question as one of great public importance.

...made a life sentence permissible under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). Miller v. State, 370 So.2d 73 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). *1016 Also the sentencing order stated that "Judge Coe retains jurisdiction for one third of sentence" pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...owever, it is remanded to the lower court with instructions to either relinquish the retention of jurisdiction over the one third of appellant's sentence or to make findings of fact and justification, with individual particularity, as is required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), to justify the retention of jurisdiction....

...V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Respondent was charged with, convicted of and sentenced concurrently for burglary with an assault, robbery, false imprisonment and kidnapping. The convictions and sentences were entered subsequent to the effective date of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), which reduced the maximum retained jurisdiction period to one-third of the sentence....

...Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. MILLS, Judge. Snow appeals his sentence for kidnapping and sexual battery. He contends the trial judge erred in retaining jurisdiction without stating the reasons for doing so with individual particularity as required by Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Nevertheless, we conclude that the second motion was also without merit and so was properly denied, if for the wrong reason. In that motion, Amazon presented four interrelated arguments dealing with the retention of jurisdiction over one third of his sentence. § 947.16, Fla....

...SCHEB, Judge. Terry Lee Willis was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen years and life imprisonment. The trial court retained jurisdiction over twenty-five years of the appellant's life sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...e of 30 years. On the charge of threatening to throw, place, or discharge a destructive device, he was also sentenced as an habitual felony offender to the enhanced maximum sentence of 30 years. These sentences were to run consecutively. Pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), the trial court retained jurisdiction over the unarmed robbery sentence for a period of ten years....

...Finally, Valdes contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him as an habitual felony offender on the unarmed robbery conviction while simultaneously retaining jurisdiction over the first one-third of that sentence. We find no merit in that contention. Pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), the trial court may retain jurisdiction over the first one-third of "the maximum sentence imposed." We believe that the legislature intended for the trial court to have such authority regardless *225 of the...

...a, appellant contends that the court erred in sentencing him to a term of 199 years. The sentence also provided that appellant would have no parole eligibility for 25 years, and the court reserved jurisdiction to review any release order pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, for 66 years....

...Appellee agreed that the appropriate sentence would be life imprisonment with the requirement that no less than 25 years be served before parole eligibility, citing Craig v. State, 290 So.2d 502 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), and recommended that the sentence be revised to conform with Sections 775.082 and 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981). In analyzing the case and arguments of appellant, there appeared a potential problem in the application of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, should the sentence be revised according to the parties' recommendations. On resentencing appellant to life imprisonment, should the trial court again enter an order pursuant to Section 947.16(3), it would be for one-third of the life sentence....

...Defendant was sentenced on July 29, 1983, to sixty-five years in prison. While his direct appeal was pending, in an order dated August 31, 1983, nunc pro tunc to July 29, 1983, the trial court issued an order retaining jurisdiction, in accordance with section 947.16(3), for the first one-half of Defendant's sentence....

...Although appellant presented some evidence supporting an allegedly reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the hypothesis was rebutted in almost every instance by other evidence produced by the State and therefore we affirm appellant's conviction. We believe appellant's second contention to be meritorious. Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979) [1] , allows a trial judge to retain jurisdiction over one-third of a defendant's sentence after a conviction of second degree murder....

...Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of appellant are affirmed. However, the order of retention over the first one-third of appellant's sentence is vacated and the cause is REMANDED with directions that the trial judge make findings of fact and justification, with individual particularity, as is required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), retaining jurisdiction over one-third of appellant's sentence. SCHEB, C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. NOTES [1] 947.16(3)(a)....

...J. In 1981, Appellant was sentenced to six consecutive terms of 100 years in the custody of the Department. The trial court entered an order retaining jurisdiction over the first one-third of each of the Defendant’s 100-year sentences pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes, to review the Parole Commission’s parole release order....

...Attys. Gen., for appellee. Before HENDRY, BARKDULL and BASKIN, JJ. PER CURIAM. We affirm the convictions appealed. We remand, however, for the entry of an order detailing the trial court's reasons for retaining *604 jurisdiction in accordance with section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), and for clarification to reflect that the court retains jurisdiction during one third of the total sentence. Goree v. State, 411 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); § 947.16(3), Fla....

...At the sentencing hearing, the State was requested to submit an order detailing the justification for retention of jurisdiction. Although the State Attorney agreed to prepare the order, it is not present in the file and was apparently never submitted to the court for signature. Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), clearly requires a specific justification....

...on his two life sentences “within 5 years after the initial date of confinement in execution of the judgment,” and would be eligible for parole on his remaining fifteen-year sentence “within 24 months” of that same date. See Fla. Stat. § 947.16(1)(c)-(d) (1983)....

...Had the resentencing jury fixed Bates’ sentence for first-degree murder at life, it appears that he would have been eligible for parole on all of his convictions within 37 years of his initial 1983 confinement or 25 years after his 1995 resentencing proceeding. See id. § 947.16(2)(g) (“For purposes of determining eligibility for parole interview and release, ....

...e corrected to reflect appellant’s conviction for lewd assault. We also vacate the court’s reservation of jurisdiction over the first one third of the sentence because appellant committed the offense prior to June 19, 1978, the effective date of section 947.16(3) Florida Statutes (Supp.1978)....

...However, we remand for clarification of the order relating to the trial judge’s statement that he retained jurisdiction on the sexual battery charge, inasmuch as he did not state with individual particularity the basis for retaining such jurisdiction as is required by section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...We affirm the conviction but remand for correction of the sentence. 367 So.2d 651 (Fla. App.). After reviewing each point raised by appellant, we find only one point which has merit. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction for the first third of his sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp.1978)....

...The effective date of the amendment to section 947.-16 allowing the trial court to retain jurisdiction to review a parole commission release order during the first third of an offender’s sentence was June 19, 1978. Appellant’s contention is correct. The amendment to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978), is an ex post facto law as applied to him....

ORFINGER, Judge. The trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction for one-half of appellant’s sentences because, at time of sentencing, the statute permitted retention of jurisdiction for a maximum period of one-third of any sentence. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...In this case, the Commission, having found no new information, declined to change appellant’s PPRD. The Commission is not required to mitigate a PPRD either on the basis of the Paige factors, or in the absence of those factors. Appellant contends also that under section 947.16(5), Florida Statutes, the Commission may not modify an established PPRD except for the specified reasons of institutional conduct or new information not available at the time of the initial interview. We conclude that the restructuring of a PPRD pursuant to a court order in these circumstances is not subject to the constraints of section 947.16(5)....

...established, is binding upon the Commission except for good cause in exceptional circumstances (Section 947.173(3)) 1 , or for reason of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview (Section 947.16(4))....

...Here, the Commission has “explicated its reasons” for extending petitioner’s PPRD, to an extent. 4 However, it has failed to point out, specifically, whether any of the circumstances given in explanation of its action were based on “newly acquired information” (Section 947.16(4), Rule 23-21.15(5), Florida Administrative Code), or if not, whether there was “good cause in exceptional circumstances” (Section 947.-173(3)) for the Commission’s action in establishing a PPRD beyond the date arrived at by use of the Guidelines....

...Appellant’s conviction is affirmed; however, we remand with instructions to correct the sentence by striking the retention of jurisdiction as to Count III, see Kelly v. State, 414 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), and by reducing the retention of jurisdiction to fifteen years in accordance with Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

at the time of sentencing. AS TO QUESTION 2: Section 947.16, F.S., as amended by s. 2 of Ch. 74-122, Laws

jurisdiction over defendant’s sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The basis of the

...ny of the informant. We find the facts of this case more consistent with those in Yolman v. State, 473 So.2d 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) and affirm on the authority of Yolman . The trial court retained jurisdiction over defendant’s sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

retaining such jurisdiction as is required by section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). BOARDMAN, Acting

...is binding on the Commission except for good cause in exceptional circumstances, section 947.173(3), Florida Statutes, 2 or for reason of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview, section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes....

...in no case shall this modified date be after the date established under the procedures of s.947.172. It is the intent of this legislation that, once set, presumptive parole release dates be modified only for good cause in exceptional circumstances. .Section 947.16(4) provides: Within 90 days after any interview for parole, the inmate shall be advised of the presumptive parole release date....

...2d DCA 1991). Having reviewed the merits of the underlying motion and order, we reverse for further proceedings. The motion is directed to a 1979 life sentence. Ford alleges that the trial court retained jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979)....

the defendant’s life sentence pursuant to section 947.-16(4), Florida Statutes (1985). We hold that the

...In his motion, Surace alleged that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first third of his sentence and in imposing sentences for both second degree felony murder and the underlying felony of sexual battery. *298 The state concedes that because Surace was sentenced prior to the effective date of section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp....

jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail Credit _

...After his motion was denied, Johnson filed a motion for rehearing on February 4, 1986, which was also subsequently denied by the trial court. Johnson filed a timely appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion for rehearing. Johnson was sentenced in 1981, making the governing statute section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). Section 947.16(3), which specifies the manner in which the trial court may retain jurisdiction over a convicted party’s sentence, provides that “when any person is convicted of two or more felonies and consecutive sentences are imposed, then the...

...The Second District Court of Appeal in Adams v. State, 435 So.2d 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), reversed a defendant’s consecutive sentences for kidnapping and sexual battery and remanded the case with directions to reconsider the period of retention in accordance with section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) after observing: [t]he trial court had the authority to retain jurisdiction to review any parole commission release order for one-third of the total consecutive sentences imposed, but not the first one-third of each of the consecutive sentences imposed....

...State, 454 So.2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (holding that trial court’s sentencing orders should be remanded for resentencing where the trial court had incorrectly retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of each of the defendant’s consecutive sentences). In sum, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), and the courts which have construed that statute support our determination that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first one-third of each of Johnson’s sentences. We therefore remand Johnson’s sentencing order for resentencing in a manner consistent with section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

MILLS, Judge. Bundy appeals Florida Parole and Probation Commission action establishing his presumptive parole release date. We affirm. Bundy argues that § 947.165(1), Florida Statutes (1981), prohibits an aggravation for exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior because a depraved mind is an element of second degree murder of which he was convicted....

...Accordingly, this cause is remanded with instructions that the court strike the reservation of jurisdiction from one of the thirty-year sentences. Otherwise, the judgments and sentences are affirmed. GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur. . While section 947.16(3) does not contemplate the retention of jurisdiction over a sentence for attempted murder, as such, see Crotzer v....

...Upon consideration of the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and the facts of the case presented at trial, the Court finds it appropriate and in the best interest of the public to retain jurisdiction of the offender to review any Florida Parole and Probation Commission release order under the provision of Section 947.16, Florida Statutes....

...f the criminal justice system’s rehabilitative efforts, the Court finds the Defendant a serious threat and danger to society. Accordingly the Defendant is sentenced to 155 years in the state penitentiary and under the provisions of Florida Statute 947.16, this Court retains jurisdiction over the offender for review of a Commission release order during the first third of the sentence imposed....

...Florida Statutes, to have been committed for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang. Retention of Jurisdiction The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail Credit It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of days as credit for time incarcerated before imposition of this sentence. C...

period of time. This the trial court may not do. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), the statute in

...However, as in Kronz , we certify that our holding conflicts with Zulla v. State, 404 So.2d 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), and Rehfuss v. State, 432 So.2d 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Buxton also contends that he was entitled to relief because the trial court, in retaining jurisdiction pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), failed to state, either in writing or in open court, the justification for retention of jurisdiction as required by Section 947.16(3)(a)....

...which contain the justification for retention articulated by the court when the defendant was sentenced. However, if, when the defendant was sentenced, the trial court failed to state its justification for retention with particularity as required by Section 947.16(3)(a), the trial court is directed to either state the requisite justification or vacate the retention....

was within the discretion of the Commission. Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1975). Therefore, there

PER CURIAM. We affirm the conviction but remand to the trial court for an order stating with individual particularity the facts upon which it relied in retaining jurisdiction, as required by Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), and Robinson v....

...t.” The order of commitment must conform to Chapter 947, Florida Statutes, as the judge expressed at the sentencing hearing. Jurisdiction of the trial court is limited to the first third of the maximum sentence imposed for the most serious felony. Section 947.16(3)....

authority of the April 21, 1982, amendment to section 947.16(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982). It is irrelevant

...Sanford appeals from the denial of his second 3.850 motion. The first motion was denied by the trial court and was not appealed. He alleges that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over one-third of each of the sentences imposed pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court summarily denied this ground without attaching those parts of the record which would support its determination. Section 947.16(3) states that a trial court may at the time of sentencing enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender....

PER CURIAM. Kevin Olmstead appeals the denial of his ;pro se “motion for voluntary relinquishment of jurisdiction.” In 1982 the trial court retained jurisdiction, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), for ten years....

However, it retained jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981), without stating the

...The jury found him guilty of those offenses. He was sentenced to a 120-year sentence of imprisonment as to the offense of robbery. The trial judge retained jurisdiction for one-third of the sentence to review any future parole commission release order, pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978)....

...For the first time on appeal, the appellant contends such sentence is illegal. The appellant recognizes the holding in Alvarez v. State, 358 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1978), 1 but contends that it is inapplicable to the case at bar due to the Legislature’s *763 subsequent passage of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978), which enables the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the offender for the first third of the maximum sentence imposed....

...He cannot do so on appeal, because the sentence is facially valid. Clinton v. State, 389 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Cannon v. State, 384 So.2d 970, 971 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Compare Gonzalez v. State, 392 So.2d 334 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The sentence was within the parameters of Alvarez v. State, supra, and Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1978) does not affect its validity. Affirmed. . Alvarez v. State, supra, upheld the validity of a sentence of 125 years for the crime of robbery. . The appellant contends that pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978), he will receive harsher treatment in consideration for parole which the Supreme Court specifically declined to address in Alvarez v....

and not long before they are ever begun. See § 947.16(l)(g), Fla.Stat. (1991). For my taste, there is

...This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition for a writ of mandamus to require the parole and probation commission to hold a parole interview. We recognize that whether or not to grant such an interview is discretionary. See § 947.16(2)(f), Fla.Stat....

...mandatory minimum imprisonment provision of section 775.0857(1), Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count. Other Provisions: Retention of Jurisdiction _The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from a judgment and sentence following appellant’s conviction for second degree murder. Among the points raised on appeal is a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979) which authorizes the trial court to retain jurisdiction over a defendant sentenced to imprisonment for the first one-third of the term of imprisonment....

specify his reasons therefor as mandated by section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). Accordingly, the

retaining such jurisdiction as required by section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). SCHEB, C. J.,

...ioning him regarding his understanding of the consequences of retention of jurisdiction; and (2) that the trial court erred in retaining juris- diction over his sentence without stating its justification for doing so with particularity, according to section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...As these sentences imposed are consistent with the applicable statutory penalties, they will not be disturbed upon appeal. Appellant’s final point upon appeal concerns the retention of jurisdiction during consecutive terms of incarceration and mandates remand for correction of the sentences imposed. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, provides for the retention of jurisdiction of one-third of the maximum sentence imposed for certain enumerated crimes, including those of which Brown was convicted....

...d under the guidelines. § 921.001(4)(a), Fla.Stat. (1983); Blackwelder v. State, 476 So.2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Second, defendant also correctly points out that the court’s retention of jurisdiction over one-third of his sentence was improper. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), authorizes retention of jurisdiction for certain enumerated felonies. Since escape, the underlying crime in this case, is not listed under section 947.16(3), the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over defendant’s sentence....

with individual particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). GRIMES, A.C

...ion over one third of his sentences. We remand to the lower court with directions to either relinquish the retention of jurisdiction over one third of Hernandez’s sentences or to state the justification with individual particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

sentence. The sole issue before us is whether section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) is unconstitutional

...Anderson appeals his jury trial conviction and sentence of ninety-nine years with retention of jurisdiction for one-third of the sentence. He argues that the retention along with the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum of life. We do not agree. Retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) has been upheld as constitutional....

...Accordingly, we REMAND to the court with instructions to either relinquish jurisdiction over the first third of the sentence or state with individual particularity the justification for retaining jurisdiction. See Sanders v. State, 400 So.2d 1015, 1016 (Fla.2d DCA 1981); § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat....

...Controlled Substance Within 1,000 Feet ó? School __ It is further ordered that the 3-year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.13(l)(e)l, Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count. *1153 Retention of Jurisdiction - The Court pursuant to F.S. 947.16(3) retains jurisdiction over the defendant-for review of any Parole Commission release order for-4he period of = The requisite findings by the Court- are set forth in a separate-order or stated on the record in open court....

...Continuing Criminal Enterprise __ It is further ordered that the 25-year minimum sentence provisions of section 893.20, Florida Statutes, are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court. Other Provisions: Retention of Jurisdiction __ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

Probation Commission release order pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978). Jacobs then

...ar “split” sentence consisting of fifteen (15) years in prison and fifteen (15) years thereafter on probation. Two weeks after the trial, the State requested that the court retain jurisdiction over the first one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). The court entered an order retaining jurisdiction, and Knight appeals the order and judgment. Section 947.16(3) provides that where a defendant is convicted of certain specified crimes, a trial judge may “at the time of sentencing” enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the defendant for the first one-third of the maximum sentence imposed for the highest felony charged and proven. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 provides that a court may reduce a legal sentence imposed by it within sixty (60) days. Retention of jurisdiction over an offender under section 947.16(3) is not a “reduction” of sentence, but rather it constitutes a modification which enhances the severity of the sentence....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Alvarez v. State, 358 So.2d 10 (Fla.1978); § 947.16, Florida Statutes....

...nd Probation Commission. See Chapters 947 and 948, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. According to Chapter 947, F.S.A., supra: . . . Every person . . . shall, unless otherwise provided by law, be eligible for consideration by the commission for parole. . . . (Section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes, 'F....

...(1981), review is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We therefore remand this cause for consideration of appellant’s claim pertaining to new information, that the federal district court for the Southern District of Florida invalidated one of appellant’s convictions. See § 947.16(4), Fla.Stat....

...The sentence for Count II was to run consecutive to the sentence set forth in Count I. The trial court retained jurisdiction over appellant’s sentences for review of any parole commission release orders for a period of ten years on each count or a total of twenty years. At the time appellant was sentenced, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), provided in part: When any person is convicted of two or more felonies and consecutive sentences are imposed, then the jurisdiction of the trial court judge as provided herein shall apply to one-half of the total consecutive sentences imposed....

...State, 403 So.2d 943, 954 (Fla.1981). Therefore, a sentence of a term of years is unauthorized and violates the relevant sentencing scheme. See Hall v. State, 492 So.2d 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Hopkins v. State, 418 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Furthermore, section 947.16(3) of the Florida Statutes (1979), which addresses the court’s retention of jurisdiction, does not authorize the trial court to retain jurisdiction over one-third of Moore’s sentence....

The court should address the issue of whether section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1983), was correctly interpreted

...This cause is before the Court on appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County. Wilson pled guilty to charges in two separate informations. At sentencing, the trial court retained jurisdiction for one-third of the sentences pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). While so doing, the court expressly upheld the constitutionality of section 947.16(3)....

...The court entered a written order retaining jurisdiction over Wilson for review of any release order of the Parole and Probation Commission during the first forty-five years of the total sentence. Wilson’s first issue raises the impropriety of applying section 947.16(3) to a crime committed in 1976....

...Wilson next asserts that the imposition of a fifteen-year sentence for attempted armed burglary is an illegal sentence. The state agrees on this point. The maximum sentence allowed under section 777.04(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), for this crime is five years. Finally, Wilson contends that section 947.16(3) is unconstitutional. We find no merit in his arguments and uphold the constitutionality of the statute based on our recent decision in Borden v. State, 402 So.2d 1176 (Fla.1981). * The circuit court’s application of section 947.16(3) to the 1976 offenses is reversed....

...We remand for the trial court to enter an order in accordance with this opinion. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and OVERTON, JJ., concur. ALDERMAN, J., concurs specially with an opinion. Although we uphold the constitutionality of § 947.16(3), this section should be used sparingly and carefully....

judge’s retention of jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 947.16(3) Florida Statutes, for review of any parole

Parole Commission Release Order Pursuant to Florida Statute 947.16.” The trial court lost the chance to properly

...It should have. II. Coto’s petition was ripe for dismissal because he failed to establish that he had a “clear legal right” to the performance of a “legal duty” owed by the Commission. See Crews, 132 So. 3d at 899. Section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes, states that “[e]very person who has been convicted of a felony ....

...No right to such an additional interview exists in statute. Section 947.174(2), Florida Statutes states that “[t]he [C]ommission, for good cause, may at any time request that a hearing examiner conduct a subsequent hearing according to the procedures outlined in this section.” (emphasis supplied). Similarly, section 947.16(5), Florida Statutes, states, in pertinent part, that “[s]ubsequent to the establishment of the [PPRD], the [C]ommission may, at its discretion, review the official record or conduct additional interviews with the inmate.” (emphasis supplied)....

...hird of his sentence constituted error; and (2) the court erred in imposing sentences for both second degree felony murder and the underlying felony of sexual battery. 2 The court held that because Surace was sentenced prior to the effective date of Section 947.16, Florida Statutes, the court’s retention of jurisdiction constituted an ex post facto application of the statute and remanded for the entry of an appropriate order....

...partment of Corrections. We agree that the trial court imposed a split sentence within the meaning of section 921.187(g), and that the sentence must be modified for the reasons stated below. Construing sections 948.01 and 948.03 in pari materia with section 947.16, as they existed in 1979, the supreme court held in Villery that a trial judge could not impose incarceration of twelve months or longer as a condition of probation and “that incarceration, pursuant to the split sentence alternatives...

...3d 1040 (Fla. 2016). We reverse and remand for resentencing. In 1972, Davis was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for rape and robbery. At that time, a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment was eligible for parole. See § 947.16(1), Fla....

jurisdiction over her sentence pursuant to section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The purpose of

PER CURIAM. In 1980, Gerald Shiflet was sentenced to 150 years in prison, with the trial court retaining jurisdiction over the first third of that sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes....

...er setting forth justification for retaining jurisdiction over one-third of defendant’s sentence. In State v. Snow, 462 So.2d 455 (Fla.1985), this Court held that the rule enunciated in Rhoden is applicable to retention of jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Failure to object at the time of sentencing does not *1069 waive the right to appeal the trial court’s failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the statute. The decision of the district court is approved in part and quashed in part and remanded to the trial court for resentenc-ing in compliance with section 947.16(3)....

...IS THE EFFECT OF A NEW COMMITMENT PROVIDING FOR A CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE CONTAINING A MANDATORY MINIMUM TERM OF INCARCERATION, UPON AN INMATE'S PAROLE ELIGIBILITY ON ANY PRESENT UNEXPIRED COMMITMENTS FOR WHICH HE IS OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE UNDER SECTION 947.16 (1), F.S.? Your question involves a determination of what point a consecutive mandatory minimum sentence is added to an inmate's cumulative sentence when computing the total cumulative number of years for the purpose of determining a presumptive parole release date pursuant to s 947.16 , F.S....

...State, 356 So.2d 297 , 299 (Fla. 1978). Therefore, the only way a consecutive mandatory minimum sentence could really be termed consecutive would be if it were added to the unexpired original sentence when computing the presumptive parole release date under s 947.16 , F.S....

...literal interpretation of the term "parole" in AGO 074-10 is inapplicable. This is especially true in light of the advent of mandatory minimum sentences under statutes like s 775.087 , F.S. Finally, the Legislature has specifically contemplated in s 947.16 (2)(g), F.S., that inmates serving mandatory minimum sentences shall not receive parole interviews until shortly before the mandatory portions of their sentences are due to expire....

...The trial judge adjudicated the defendant guilty and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment with a three year mandatory sentence. Defendant was sentenced under the sentencing guidelines. The trial court retained jurisdiction over one-third of the defendant’s term under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The second issue is whether retention of jurisdiction over a life sentence is appropriate. As stated by the Third District Court of Appeal in a case apparently not involving failure to make a contemporaneous objection, “where a court imposes a life sentence, Section 947.16(3) [retention of jurisdiction] is inoperable ......

since all of the procedural requirements of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), have now

...nt contemplated by rule 3.701. Rodriguez v. State. Appellant need not be resentenced since he received the maximum statutory penalty of fifteen years imprisonment and escape is not an offense over which the trial court could retain jurisdiction. See § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. The defendant challenges the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction over the first one-third of the sentences imposed after he pled guilty to charges of kidnapping and aggravated battery. Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...1 See Nazworth v. State, 473 So.2d 214 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Second, it was error for the trial court to retain jurisdiction over a portion of each of the consecutive sentences imposed, rather than over one-third of the total of the consecutive sentences imposed. § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat....

...982), was in place allowing a trial judge to retain jurisdiction over one-half of the sentence imposed. However, effective June 15, 1983, the statute was amended to allow the trial judge to retain jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence imposed. § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat....

...Snow, 462 So.2d 455 (1985), the Supreme Court quashed this Court’s decision and remanded the case for it to determine whether the trial court complied with Section 947.-16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court did comply and we affirm. Section 947.16(3) provides that “in any case of a person convicted of ......

......” The Supreme Court on page 1 of its opinion noted that “on the record, the trial judge stated his justification for retaining jurisdiction was that Snow terrified and terrorized a sixteen-year-old girl.” It is clear that the trial judge complied with the explicit requirements of Section 947.16(3)(a)....

...After pleading guilty, appellant was placed on probation for ten years. Thereafter, his probation was revoked, and the court sentenced appellant to fifteen years in prison, retaining jurisdiction over the first one-third of the sentence, pursuant to Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...We have considered appellant’s several points on appeal and find that only one of them has merit, i.e., the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first one-third of the sentence. The thrust of the attack upon the retention of jurisdiction is that the statute in question, Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), was not passed until after the criminal episode for which appellant was sentenced occurred....

PER CURIAM. By this certiorari proceeding the appellant seeks to quash an order that retained jurisdiction over him as a defendant serving *1163 a criminal sentence pursuant to Section 947.16 Fla.Stat....

...State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), and noting that defense counsel agreed to the consolidation of cases, we affirm the conviction of kidnapping and sexual battery; however, we strike as untimely the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction over one-third of defendant Neal’s sentence. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979) provides that “at the time of sentencing the judge may enter an order retaining jurisdiction .......

...period of incarceration of less than 12 months followed by a period of probation pursuant to a split sentence probation. The duties of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission (hereafter the commission) concerning parole interviews are set out in s. 947.16 (1), F....

...(Emphasis supplied.) To be eligible for parole, the convicted defendant must, at a minimum, be subject to a sentence of 12 months or more and be confined in execution of the court's judgment. The commission is required to interview all eligible confined inmates within the prescribed times. Section 947.16 (1), F....

...and Jones , the period of confinement or incarceration ordered to be served is the only sentence of imprisonment imposed by the trial court. Thus, I conclude that it is only that period of incarceration or confinement which is within the purview of s. 947.16 (1), id ., for determining whether the affected persons are eligible for parole consideration. Therefore, if the period of confinement ordered under the authority of s. 948.01 (4), id ., is less than 12 months, the person's `sentence' does not `total 12 months or more' for purposes of parole eligibility under s. 947.16 (1)....

...However, the Burns case does not involve the split sentence probation alternative authorized by s. 948.01 (4), F. S. In summary, therefore, unless and until judicially determined to the contrary, the Parole and Probation Commission is not obliged under the terms of s. 947.16 (1), F....

2d and no retention of jurisdiction under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983).” Wainwright I

jurisdiction over a portion of a sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981), he must, in determining

first one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). This statute became

the of-fencse involved in case No. 81-1121, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provided that

...ere from probation to life imprisonment. Thereafter, the trial court accepted his guilty plea, sentenced him to concurrent terms of fifteen years in prison on each count, and retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of the sentence pursuant to Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981)....

one-third of the defendant’s sentence under section 947.-16(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), which, although

McCORD, Judge. Appellant appeals his conviction of sexual battery, raising four points for review. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We first consider appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s finding that § 947.16, Florida Statutes, is constitutional and we find no error....

...The jury returned a verdict of guilty of the solicitation charge and not guilty of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The appellant was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to serve thirty years in state prison. The trial judge, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of the appellant’s sentence....

...Because these arguments lack merit, we decline to address them and, accordingly, affirm the appellant’s conviction. We agree, however, with the appellant’s contention that the trial court improperly retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of her sentence. Section 947.16 authorizes retention of jurisdiction for certain enumerated felonies and for any felony involving the use of a firearm or other deadly weapon or the use of intentional violence....

discretion of the Parole and Probation Commission, § 947.-16 Fla.Stat. (1977). Pursuant to § 947.-165 Fla.Stat

Department of Corrections on October 11, 1981. Section 947.-16(1), Fla.Stat.(1981), requires the Florida Parole

PER CURIAM. John Varnes appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief. Varnes is currently serving a life sentence for murder. He alleges that the trial court retained jurisdiction over one-third of that sentence pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...We affirm appellant's convictions and, except as hereinafter specifically provided, the sentences. Retention of jurisdiction over one-half of each of several consecutive sentences is improper. Retention, where otherwise justified, may be retained over one-half of the total consecutive sentences imposed. § 947.16(3), Fla....

...ping with a weapon. We affirm. Appellant filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(a) and argued, inter alia, that the trial court failed to offer sufficient reasons for its retention of jurisdiction as required under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1982)....

...See Larkin v. State, 474 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction over appellant’s forty-five year sentence for kidnapping with a weapon. AFFIRMED. DELL, GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur. . Section 947.16(3) is now section 947.16(4), Fla.Stat....

his plea without any factual basis and that section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979), by which the court

...Roberts seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his “Petition to Invoke all Writs,” arguing that he was denied due process and equal protection when the trial court retained jurisdiction for thirty-three (33) years of his life sentence. Roberts contends that the trial court lacked statutory authority under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), to retain jurisdiction over one-third of his life sentence because a life sentence is indefinite, making one-third indeterminable. Appellee State of Florida concedes to this argument and we agree. In Cordero-Pena v. State, 421 So.2d 661, 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), this Court held that the trial court cannot retain jurisdiction over a life sentence imposed under section 947.16(3) and that a defendant’s entitlement to parole consideration is solely controlled by the separate statutory requirement that he be required to serve no less than twenty-five (26) years before becoming eligible for parole....

PER CURIAM. Upon review the only error we find involves the failure of the trial court to make specific findings of fact regarding the necessity to retain jurisdiction over the first third of appellant’s sentence for purposes of parole review. Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981); Mobley v....

...Accordingly, appellant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed but this cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to either strike the provision retaining jurisdiction or to enter an order setting out those findings of fact required by Section 947.16(3)(a)....

...how long appellant would actually be incarcerated under the guidelines sentence. It is a matter of common knowledge that sentences imposed before the adoption of the guidelines did not reflect the actual time of incarceration because of parole. See § 947.16, Fla.Stat....

...Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 423 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); and (2) the record contains substantial competent evidence to support the sixty-month extension as being based upon institutional conduct and new information not available at the time of the initial interview. § 947.16(4), Fla.Stat....

...Clearly, the appellant has no cause to complain regarding any “stacking” of sentences in 82-396. In 82-334, appellant was sentenced on two counts of armed robbery — 30 years on each count and the 3-year mandatory minimum on each count under Section 775.-087(2), with a retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes....

...ole and Probation Commission release order pertaining to appellant’s sentence for attempted sexual battery. Since the trial court has not stated with individual particularity the facts upon which it relied in retaining jurisdiction, as required by section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), and Robinson v....

...nal gang. [Include all findings, sentencing enhancements, and mandatory minimum provisions, as authorized by law and pronounced at sentencing.] Retention of Jurisdiction The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail Credit - 52 -  It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of days as credit for time incarcerated bef...

...arm, but it reversed the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction over the first third of that sentence. The court noted that life is the maximum sentence the defendant could receive under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). According to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), the trial court could retain jurisdiction over one-third of the maximum sentence which the statute authorized....

...In both Canter and Hall, supra, the inmates had sought and received § 947.173 reviews of the establishment of their PPRDs. Neither appealed the Commission action to this court. Several months after receiving the final order of Commission action, the inmates again petitioned the Commission for subsequent reviews, pursuant to § 947.16(4), Fla....

...The inmates appealed to this court, alleging both that the Commission erred in refusing to grant the second review requests and arguing the issues raised and considered at their initial § 947.173 reviews. We found that the Commission has no obligation to grant special reviews but that §§ 947.16(4) and 947.174(2), Fla....

...� 947.173 review, over two years ago. [5] We therefore affirm the action of the Commission declining to grant review of the issues again raised by appellant at his biennial review. MILLS, J., and VICTOR M. CAWTHON, Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Section 947.16(4) provides in part, "Subsequent to the establishment of the presumptive parole release date, the Commission may, at its discretion, review the official record or conduct additional interviews with the inmate....

...In 1982 a jury found Thompson guilty of two counts of armed robbery and he also pleaded guilty to two robbery charges. He was sentenced on these charges to a total of 120 years imprisonment and the trial judge retained jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...burglary with assault, unarmed robbery, and attempted unarmed robbery. The state asked this court to relinquish jurisdiction, so that the trial court might correct the sentence to reflect retention of jurisdiction for one-third of the sentence. See § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat....

court’s retention of jurisdiction is unlawful, see § 947.16(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1981); Rosa v. State, 412 So

...However, we do not agree that our holding conflicts with Castle . Therefore, we deny the state’s mo *657 tion to withdraw the mandate, but we hereby modify our opinion to clarify the basis for the holding. In this case the trial court retained jurisdiction over one-half of the sentence imposed pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), which was the statute in effect at the time defendant committed the crime. The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court should have retained jurisdiction over only one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), which became effective seven days before the defendant was sentenced....

...The trial court also erred in retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the robbery sentence and one-third of the burglary sentence. The written sentences must be changed to indicate that jurisdiction was retained over one-third of the total consecutive sentences imposed. § 947.16(3), Fla....

robbery conviction, must be stricken, since section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), which.permits

...e-third of the sentence. We remand to the lower court with directions to either relinquish the retention of jurisdiction over one-third of Miller’s sentence or to state with particularity the justification for retaining jurisdiction as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...One of those issues is whether the trial judge improperly retained jurisdiction over one-half the defendant’s sentence in view of the fact that the offenses committed by the defendant occurred prior to the effective date of the 1982 amendment to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1983), increasing from one-third to one-half the length of sentence over which a trial court may retain jurisdiction. At the time the offenses in this ease were committed, section 947.16 permitted retention of jurisdiction for one-third of a sentence....

...2d DCA 1984). The trial judge should only have retained jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence, wherein the greatest amount of time was given. Emshwiller v. State, 464 So.2d 1339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Maddox v. State, 438 So.2d 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Section 947.16(4) Florida Statutes (1985)....

...We find no reversible error in the Commission’s failure to conduct an initial interview of the appellant within six months after his initial date of confinement in execution of his judgment because he was sentenced to more than five years. Since the appellant was sentenced to a total term of 5 years and 58 days, § 947.16(1), Fla.Stat....

...requires that he be given an initial interview within one year of his initial confinement in execution of the judgment. It was therefore proper for appellant’s initial interview to be conducted within one year after his initial date of confinement rather than within six months of his initial date of confinement. Section 947.16(1), Fla.Stat....

General issued Opinion 85-11, which, construing section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1973), opined that a prisoner

...The five-year sentence imposed for the crime of attempted manslaughter is also affirmed. The order entered one day subsequent thereto, however, which purports to retain jurisdiction in the trial court for one-half of the above sentence so as to permit the trial judge to review any decision to parole the defendant pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) is reversed, as said order aggravates the defendant’s previously imposed sentence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional right against double jeopardy....

...State, 421 So.2d 160, 165 (Fla. 1982). We find no adequate demonstration of ineffective assistance of counsel in the record. Therefore, the trial judge was correct in rejecting that ground for post-conviction relief. Turning to the validity of the sentence vel non, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provides in pertinent part that persons eligible for parole shall be placed thereon in accordance with the provisions of this law; except that in any case of a person convicted of murder, the sentencing jud...

...Thus, retention of jurisdiction over one-third of a life sentence is prohibited because it cannot be determined how long the court will be retaining jurisdiction. Although it can be determined how long the court will be retaining jurisdiction in the case at bar ( i.e., fifteen years), section 947.16(3) states that the trial court's jurisdiction shall be limited to the first third of the maximum sentence imposed and we cannot say that the trial court's retention of fifteen years in this case complies with that provision....

...Florida Statutes, to have been committed for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang. Retention of Jurisdiction . The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail Credit ....

PER CURIAM. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), which authorizes a sentencing judge to retain

...Defendant was convicted of burglary and sexual battery and sentenced to a term of 99 years with the trial court retaining jurisdiction for one-third of that sentence. Defendant appeals. We affirm. The trial court failed to make the requisite statement of its findings of fact under Florida Statute 947.16(3)(a) (1981), but defendant did not object or preserve this error in the trial court....

...In a separately filed motion to disqualify judge, appellant seeks disqualification of the judge who originally imposed sentence and retained jurisdiction over a portion of that sentence. The theory underlying appellant’s jurisdictional challenge seems to be the changes effected in section 947.16(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), by the 1982 amendments to the statute....

...time requirements of s. 947.17(4), shall send notice of its release order to the original sentencing court and to the appropriate state attorney. Such notice shall stay the time requirements of s. 947.17(4). (Emphasis supplied.) The 1982 version of section 947.16(3)(c) provides: In such cases of retained jurisdiction, the commission, within 30 days of the final parole interview, shall send notice of its release order to the original sentencing judge and to the appropriate state attorney....

entering offense pursuant to the authority of section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). That statute was

here on the merits of prior final agency action. § 947.16(4), § 947.-174(2), Florida Statutes. The motion

one-third of appellant’s sentence pursuant to section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). In Williams v

...We affirm. Thomas was convicted, in 1983, of armed robbery. The trial court imposed a seventy-five year sentence. The sentencing judge, Judge Howard Gross, stated that he was retaining jurisdiction over one-third of Thomas’ sentence pursuant to subsection 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982)....

...The motion sought to set aside the retention of jurisdiction. The Rule 3.850 motion came to the attention of Judge Gross. In April, 1988, Judge Gross entered an “Order Retaining Jurisdiction Over Defendant for Review of Future Parole Commission Release Orders Pursuant to Florida Statute 947.16.” The order recited that the cause had been heard on August 23, 1983, upon conviction of defendant after jury trial....

...Dugger, *1327 526 So.2d at 146 , we find no deficiency with respect to the sentencing court’s retention of jurisdiction. To begin with, the sentencing court is required to make findings but is not required to enter a separate written order. Paragraph 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), states, “In retaining jurisdiction ......

...ity, and such justification shall be made a part of the court record.” The uniform judgment and sentencing form, Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.986 (1983), used by the sentencing judge and approved by the Florida Supreme Court, states “The Court pursuant to F.S. 947.16(3) retains jurisdiction over the defendant for review of any Parole Commission release order for the period of _The requisite findings by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.” (Emphasis added)....

...isdiction redundant. On the unique facts there presented, this court in the exercise of discretion “deem[ed] it inappropriate to remand for further proceedings.” 563 So.2d at 200 (citations omitted). 5 In sum, under the settled interpretation of section 947.16 the sentencing court was only required to make findings on the record and was not required to enter a written order....

...Thus, although the successor judge stated he was denying the motion because he did not have jurisdiction, the record is clear he also would have denied the motion had he reached the merits. . The Diaz court also commented about the pending prospective repeal of section 947.16. 563 So.2d at 200 . The prospective repeal has since been delayed, ch. 90-337, § 16, Laws of Fla., with a new prospective repeal date set for 1993. No actual repeal has taken place. See § 947.16, Fla.Stat. (1991). Should section 947.16 actually be repealed, it would not necessarily eliminate any retention of jurisdiction already imposed....

...State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971). We also find that the judge did not err in entering judgment and sentence on both charges; the state’s pleadings and proof were sufficient to establish two separate crimes. Finally, we reject Burwick’s attack on the constitutionality of Section 947.16....

...presumptive parole release date (hereinafter PPRD) of June 2, 1981, the date recommended by the hearing examiners since the Florida Parole and Probation Commission failed to notify him of his PPRD within 45 days of his initial parole interview. See § 947.16(4), Florida Statutes....

...ecommended a PPRD of June 2, 1981. See § 947.172(2), Florida Statutes. The petition, filed more than 45 days after the initial interview, alleged that the Parole *1123 and Probation Commission had not yet established petitioner’s PPRD pursuant to § 947.16(4), Florida Statutes....

...Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 395 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), for the proposition that the June 2,1981, date recommended by the hearing examiner is binding on the Parole and Probation Commission. Petitioner argues that the Parole and Probation Commission has violated § 947.16(4), Florida Statutes, and the rationale of James by applying aggravating factors more than 45 days after his initial interview....

...the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ramiro C. Areces, Judge. Parnell Smith, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before EMAS, HENDON, and MILLER, JJ. PER CURIAM.  Affirmed. § 947.16(3), Fla....

over one-half of his sentence, pursuant to section 947.16(3) Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982). Mrozowski

...violating only condition (5). Accordingly, violation of condition (3) is stricken from the record. Chester v. State, 355 So.2d 509 (Fla.2d DCA 1978). The lower court retained jurisdiction for one-third of appellant’s 99 year sentence, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...e sentencing order. Accordingly, this cause is remanded to the lower court with instructions to either relinquish the retention of jurisdiction over the one-third of appellant’s sentence or to make findings of fact and justification as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), to justify the retention of jurisdiction....

...See Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509, 511-12 (Fla. 1982) (While “counsel did not specifically cite to the prohibition against ex post facto laws as the basis for his legal argument[,] . . . . [h]is articulated concern with whether the effective date of section 947.16(3) permitted the statute’s application to petitioner’s case was sufficiently specific” for appellate review.); see also Harden, 87 So....

over one-third of his sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982). Cooper contends

...5th DCA 1989), we do not think the reference to a three year minimum mandatory sentence in this case is meaningful or substantive. By sentencing Bernadini to four years, the trial judge more than complied with section 893.135(1)(b)1. That statute is also binding on the Parole and Probation Commission as to parole (see § 947.16(2)(g)) and administrative gain time (§ 944.-276(l)(a))....

first question is answered in the affirmative. Section 947.16(1), F. S., as amended by s. 88 of Ch. 77-120

...Florida Statutes, to have been committed for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang. Retention of Jurisdiction . The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail Credit ....

...Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 , 99 S.Ct. 2132 , 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979); Damon v. State, 397 So.2d 1224 (Fla.3d DCA 1981). His challenges to the retention of jurisdiction over the first third of his fifteen year sentence for third-degree murder under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979) are similarly without merit....

confinement, most would be assigned such a date. § 947.16(1), Fla.Stat. (1981). Once established, the date

...Once this PPRD has been agreed upon, it becomes binding on the Commission and may be modified only for reasons of institutional conduct, acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview, or for good cause in exceptional circumstances. §§ 947.16(4) and 947.173(3), Fla.Stat.; Florida Parole and Probation Commission v....

...In this case, the trial court recognized that the supreme court in Paige construed Section 947.18 as leaving the ultimate parole decision to the discretion of the Commission. The trial court viewed the Paige decision as inapplicable, however, because the Commission had expressly based its denial of parole in this instance on Section 947.16(4), in that the Commission considered that the MHSR contained “new information” which justified extension of Cunard’s PPRD....

...Further, the Commission formerly reduced Cunard’s initial PPRD from 1986 to 1984, and on two subsequent occasions Commission interviewers recommended additional reductions. We disagree, however, that the Commission denied parole solely on the basis of Section 947.16(4)....

...2649 , 41 L.Ed.2d 239 (1974); Kirsch v. Greadington, 425 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We find, however, that the Commission acted outside the scope of the objective parole guidelines when it extended Cunard’s PPRD an additional sixty months. See: §§ 947.16(4) and 947.173(3), Fla.Stat....

...In this appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction on three grounds: (1) that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over one-half of the sentence where he was not given notice of that possibility prior to acceptance of the guilty plea, (2) that section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), permitting retention of jurisdiction over one-half of a defendant’s sentence, is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him, and (3) that the trial court’s stated justifications were insufficient to warrant the retention of jurisdiction. In Springfield v. State, 443 So.2d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), this court held that section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...equires the parole examiner to make findings of fact. Therefore, the Commission is *691 not bound by any determinations of the parole examiner. Second, the Commission suspended Chapman’s presumptive parole release date. It did not modify it. While section 947.16(5), Florida Statutes, bars the Commission from modifying a PPRD absent reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information, Florida Parole & Probation Commission v....

...earm by a convicted felon. He sought correction of his sentence because the court retained jurisdiction for one-third of his sentence (a period of 65 years) without stating with individual particularity his justifications for so doing as required by Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes....

...§ 775.082(3)(c). Therefore, we vacate defendant’s thirty-year sentence for the handling and fondling charge and remand to the trial court for correction of that sentence. We also strike the retention of jurisdiction on the handling and fondling charge. Section 947.16(3) limits the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction to “the first one-third of the maximum sentence imposed.” See Martin v....

erroneously failed to follow the requirements of Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979) in entering

imposed. The reservation of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), is stricken from

...State, 316 So.2d 267 (Fla.1975). Thus, in State v. Green, 421 So.2d 508 (Fla.1982), the supreme court held that if a defendant is not advised of the trial judge's determination to retain jurisdiction over a portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979), the court must either strike that retention letting the original plea stand or let the defendant withdraw his guilty plea....

the parties agree, the order entered under Section 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1981) should be corrected after

...At resentencing, the trial court sentenced appellant to fifteen years’ imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively, for a total of forty-five years’ imprisonment. The trial court found that the intentional use of violence and the vicious manner in which the crimes were committed justified application of section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1985), and the retention of jurisdiction over the offender, for review of a commission release order during the first one-third of the total sentence. Accordingly, the court sentenced appellant to three fifteen-year consecutive prison terms and retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of the period. On appeal, appellant contends the court erred in the retention of jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16(4), because attempted second-degree murder is not one of the offenses authorizing retention of jurisdiction....

...State, 374 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), and Crotzer v. State, 425 So.2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), are cited as authority for appellant’s position; however, they are distinguishable. It is true that attempted murder, standing alone, cannot be the basis for application of section 947.16(4); nevertheless, after delineating the specific crimes to which the statute is applicable, the legislature went on to authorize retention when the criminal episode involves “any felony involving the use of a firearm or other deadly...

...The trial court found the allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel conclusively refuted by the record and, even if true, not legally sufficient to allege ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion alleges the crime for which Stacey was convicted occurred on 8 May 1978. Section 947.16(3) took effect on 19 June 1978....

...1 June 1983 to 21 June 1993. Clark says the reasons given for this change were that he had not sought or received treatment for substance abuse and still had psychosexual problems. Among other things, Clark contends the Commission's actions violated Section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1983), providing that the presumptive parole release date may not be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview....

appellant’s sentence, pursuant to the terms of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). On appeal appellant

...*579 A jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court adjudicated him as an habitual offender and sentenced him to an extended term of ten years imprisonment under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1981). The trial judge also retained jurisdiction over one-half of his sentence under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), 1 because he concluded that the crime involved the use of intentional violence and the victim was injured. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly retained jurisdiction over his sentence. Defendant was not convicted of any of the specific crimes set forth in the statute. See § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (1981). Consequently, the only classification under section 947.16(3), which might apply to defendant, is “any felony involving ......

...RANDOLPH, Associate Judge, concur. . Defendant correctly argues that, under the statute in force when the crime was committed, the trial judge could only retain jurisdiction over one-third of his sentence. See Reid v. State, 440 So.2d 651 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Cf. §§ 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (1981) and 947.16(3), Fla....

PER CURIAM. The only issue meriting discussion is whether the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over “the first third of the maximum sentence imposed” pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), of a life sentence. We adopt the position of the Third and Fifth Districts that Section 947.16(3) is inoperable....

PETERSON, Judge. The state appeals Bernard King’s guideline sentence based upon the trial court’s refusal to assess points for legal constraint. We reverse. King was under “control release” pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1992), but the release was revoked and a warrant was issued for his arrest....

...etition for writ of certiorari 1 and deny relief. In 1981 Blaekwelder was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 75 years. The sentencing judge retained jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence for purposes of disapproving parole. See § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat....

...r paroling eligible inmates resides with the Florida Parole Commission. It is the commission who first, consistent with objective guidelines, interviews and establishes release dates for such inmates. Where jurisdiction has been retained pursuant to section 947.16(4), the commission must also notify both the state attorney who prosecuted the crime and “the original sentencing judge” (or, where unavailable, the chief judge of the circuit) in the event it decides the inmate should be released during the retention period. § 947.16(4)(c), Fla....

...1st DCA 1986) (certiorari granted for trial court to consider motion for modification on the merits); Bivins v. Makemson, 567 So.2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (certiorari granted for trial court to exercise its jurisdiction to sentence youthful offender). . The statute has been renumbered as 947.16(4).

the time of sentencing in accordance with Section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes (1979)1 and Hayes v. State

...State, 558 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). In Heath the court held that it was error for the trial court to retain jurisdiction over a portion of each of the consecutive sentences imposed, rather than over one-third of the total of the consecutive sentences imposed citing section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

BOOTH, Judge. This cause is before us on appeal from the judgment and sentence of the Circuit Court, Duval County. The sole question presented is the constitutionality of Florida Statute, Section 947.16(3), which allows trial courts to retain jurisdiction over certain felony convictees for up to one-third of the maximum sentence imposed....

...On September 8, 1978, he was permitted to withdraw his plea of not guilty and to enter a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree. On October 13, 1978, following the presentence investigation and hearing of witnesses, appellant’s counsel argued in mitigation of sentence; and the State orally invoked Florida Statute, Section 947.16(3). The Court adjudged the defendant guilty and sentenced him to 99 years. The Court further entered a written order pursuant to Section 947.16(3) pointing out the particularly heinous nature of the crime and retaining jurisdiction over the defendant for review of any release order of the Parole *838 and Probation Commission, pursuant to the Statute. The record of the sentencing hearing reveals that appellant’s counsel objected to the invocation of Section 947.16(3) as follows: [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL] “As far as the invocation of the Florida Statute, apparently recently passed, with the Court retaining jurisdiction, counsel for the State advised me of this approximately ten minutes before we...

...The court also failed to provide reasons for retaining jurisdiction over appellant’s sentence. The court must either relinquish its retention of jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence or state its justification for retention with individual particularity, as required by Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...on 947.146. "Effective July 1, 1996, all control release dates established prior to such date become void and no inmate shall be eligible for release under any previously established control release date.” Ch. 96-422, § 19, Laws of Fla., amending § 947.16, Fla....

...This should have been done. Sing Eng v. State, 350 So.2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Dunlap v. State, 405 So.2d 796 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Additionally, in adjudicating the appellant guilty the trial court retained jur *834 isdiction over one-third of the appellant’s sentence. Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), requires that a trial court must state the reasons for retaining jurisdiction over an individual and make the justification part of the court record....

SHIVERS, Chief Judge. Stewart appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to relinquish jurisdiction, arguing: (1) that the sentencing court erred in retaining jurisdiction, pursuant to section 947.16(3), F.S. over the first third of his two pre-sentencing guidelines life sentences; and (2) that section 947.16(3), F.S. (1979) is unconstitutional. We find appellant’s second argument to be without merit, noting that the Florida Supreme Court has ruled on this issue and found the retention of jurisdiction provisions of section 947.16(3) 1 to be constitutional....

...We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction, and remand for the court to strike the retention portion of appellant’s sentences in Case Nos. 77-2038 and 77-2039. REVERSED and REMANDED. ERVIN and JOANOS, JJ., concur. . This provision is currently found in section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1987).

...r mandatory minimum prison term under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1981). He imposed three consecutive thirty-year sentences for each count of attempted murder and retained jurisdiction over ten years over each of *914 these sentences under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...assault. He was sentenced to a term of thirty years in prison on the robbery charge and ten years on the aggravated assault charge. The sentences were to run concurrently, and the court retained jurisdiction over one-half of appellant’s sentence. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983) was amended to limit the amount of jurisdiction that a trial judge could retain *541 from one-half to one-third of a sentence. In this case, appellant was charged on April 15, 1983. The amendment to section 947.16 became effective on June 15, 1983....

...is affirmed. However, the court below failed to make findings of fact supporting retention of jurisdiction a part of the record. In adjudicating the appellant guilty the trial court retained jurisdiction over one third of the appellant’s sentence. Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), requires that a trial court state the reasons for retaining jurisdiction over an individual and make the justification part of the court record....

the first third of each sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1978). We reverse the retention

human being is present and/or sexual battery. § 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). However, in retaining

COBB, Chief Judge. The defendant was convicted and sentenced on three counts of lewd and lascivious assault. We find the trial court’s justification for retention of jurisdiction was stated with individual particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). The defendant is correct, however, in his contention that those portions of the sentencing orders retaining jurisdiction of the first one-third of each consecutive sentence are invalid. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983) provides that where consecutive sentences are concerned, the court’s retention is limited to one-third of the total of the consecutive sentences imposed, rather than one-third of each consecutive sentence....

one-third of his *1238present sentence pursuant to section 947.-16(4), Florida Statutes (1985). If, as Hepburn

over one-third of a life sentence pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1985). We remanded with

of his confinement in execution of judgment, Section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes, and was interviewed under

...statutes against the minimum mandatory sentences. We disagree and affirm. Weller’s 15-year minimum mandatory sentence for the first degree felony of trafficking in cocaine was required by section 893.135(l)(b)3, Florida Statutes (1987). Therefore, section 947.16(2)(g)3 fixes Weller’s initial parole interview date as “no sooner than 18 months prior to the expiration of the mandatory minimum portion of the sentence.” The obvious legislative intent manifested in these two sections is to com...

...However, we remand the cause for correction of the written sentences so as to make them reflect, consistent with the oral pronouncement of the court, that the trial court retains jurisdiction over one-half of the total consecutive sentences imposed, rather than, as now appears, one-half of each sentence. § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat....

...VILLANTI and LaROSE, JJ., Concur. . Conionilli's claim — that release during his lifetime would be possible even with a "life sentence” — is at least initially plausible in that parole for a life sentence did exist until several years prior to Conionilli’s offense, see § 947.16(l)(d), Fla....

...The trial court sentenced him to five-years imprisonment on the conspiracy count, a concurrent fifteen-year term for grand theft, and imposed a ninety-nine-year term for the attempted murder count to run consecutive to the other sentences. Pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), the court retained jurisdiction over Marquez for thirty-eight years without specifying the length of retention as to each conviction....

...Here, there was sufficient evidence from which the court could conclude that Marquez used intentional violence and a firearm in commission of the grand theft. As such, the grand theft falls in the category of a “felony involving the use of a firearm ... or the use of intentional violence.” § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat....

...Further, subsequent vacation of one of defendant’s sentences as a result of a collateral attack could lead to an ambiguity as to the period of retention of jurisdiction of remaining sentences by the trial court. Therefore, we hold that a trial court, which retains jurisdiction under section 947.16(3), must indicate the extent of retention as to each offense....

initial interview.” Section 947.16(4). Additionally, we are of the view that Section 947.16(4) should be considered

...sentence. Brainard v. State, 380 So.2d 1302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Kohn v. State, 289 So.2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). When a trial court retains jurisdiction over a sentence, its jurisdiction is limited to the first third of the maximum sentence imposed. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). See Williams v. State, 374 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Also, the court should state with individual particularity its justification for retention of jurisdiction. Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...4th DCA 1983), we found no reversible error as to the sentence imposed except for: 1. Failure to make written findings pursuant to Section 39.111(6)(d), Florida Statutes (1981). 2. Failure to enter a written order justifying the retention of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...ears in the state prison with credit for time served. The maximum penalty of this offense is fifteen years in the state prison. The trial judge retained jurisdiction over the appellant for the first third of the sentence pursuant to the provision of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978)....

...Initially, these two sentences included mandatory minimum terms of 25 years and three years, respectively, also to run consecutively. However, in 2006, on Nerey’s rule 3.800(a) Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, the sentencing court ordered the mandatory minimum terms to run concurrently. Pursuant to section 947.16(2)(g)3., Florida Statutes, the Commission scheduled Nerey’s initial parole interview date for May 2017, six months prior to the November 2017 expiration of the consecutively-imposed 28-year total mandatory minimum sentences....

...The statutory provision governing the setting of initial parole interviews provides: “For purposes of determining eligibility for parole interview and release . . . [e]ach mandatory minimum portion of consecutive sentences shall be served consecutively[.]” § 947.16(2)(g), Fla....

...The mandatory minimum portions of consecutive sentences run consecutively for purposes of setting an inmate’s initial parole interview date. The Commission complied with this statutory directive when setting Nerey’s interview date. We find nothing in section 947.16 providing for an alternative calculation method when a sentencing court has imposed consecutive sentences but concurrent mandatory minimum terms, and we will not read such an alternative into this unambiguous provision. In light of the clear language of section 947.16(2), the circuit court correctly denied Nerey’s petition for writ of mandamus, and we, in turn, deny his petition for writ of certiorari on the merits. DENIED. RAY and SWANSON, JJ., CONCUR....

...Appellant, Kenneth Lang, appeals from an order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence, contending that the trial court erred in entering an order retaining jurisdiction over one-third of his sentence without providing justification for the retention at the time of sentencing, contrary to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982). We affirm. When appellant was sentenced on November 9, 1982, section 947.16(3) authorized trial judges “at the time of sentencing ... [to] enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a commission release order.” In so doing, the trial judge was required to “state the justification [for retention] with individual particularity.” Section 947.16(3)(a), Fla....

...The trial judge obviously gave considerable credit to Warncke for his attitude. We can find no warrant in the statutes or cases for Warncke’s statement that he would be eligible for parole in less than half the time had he been given a life sentence. See Fla.Stat. § 947.16(1) (1969)....