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Florida Statute 947.16 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 947.16 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVII
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CORRECTIONS
Chapter 947
FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW; CONDITIONAL RELEASE; CONTROL RELEASE; PAROLE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 947.16
947.16 Eligibility for parole; initial parole interviews; powers and duties of commission.
(1) Every person who has been convicted of a felony or who has been convicted of one or more misdemeanors and whose sentence or cumulative sentences total 12 months or more, who is confined in execution of the judgment of the court, and whose record during confinement or while under supervision is good, shall, unless otherwise provided by law, be eligible for interview for parole consideration of her or his cumulative sentence structure as follows:
(a) An inmate who has been sentenced for an indeterminate term or a term of 3 years or less shall have an initial interview conducted by a hearing examiner within 8 months after the initial date of confinement in execution of the judgment.
(b) An inmate who has been sentenced for a minimum term in excess of 3 years but of less than 6 years shall have an initial interview conducted by a hearing examiner within 14 months after the initial date of confinement in execution of the judgment.
(c) An inmate who has been sentenced for a minimum term of 6 or more years but other than for a life term shall have an initial interview conducted by a hearing examiner within 24 months after the initial date of confinement in execution of the judgment.
(d) An inmate who has been sentenced for a term of life shall have an initial interview conducted by a hearing examiner within 5 years after the initial date of confinement in execution of the judgment.
(e) An inmate who has been convicted and sentenced under ss. 958.011-958.15, or any other inmate who has been determined by the department to be a youthful offender, shall be interviewed by a parole examiner within 8 months after the initial date of confinement in execution of the judgment.
(2) The following special types of cases shall have their initial parole interview as follows:
(a) An initial interview may be postponed for a period not to exceed 90 days. Such postponement shall be for good cause, which shall include, but need not be limited to, the need for the department to obtain a presentence or postsentence investigation report or a probation or parole or mandatory conditional release violation report. The reason for postponement shall be noted in writing and included in the official record. No postponement for good cause shall result in an initial interview being conducted later than 90 days after the inmate’s initially scheduled initial interview.
(b) An initial interview may be deferred for any inmate who is out to court. Such deferral shall not result in an initial interview being conducted later than 90 days after the department provides written notice to the commission that the inmate has been returned from court.
(c) An initial interview may be deferred for any inmate confined in any appropriate treatment facility within the state, public or private, by virtue of transfer from the department under any applicable law. Such deferral shall not result in an initial interview being conducted later than 90 days after the department provides written notice to the commission that the inmate has been returned to the department.
(d) An inmate designated a mentally disordered sex offender shall have an initial interview conducted within 90 days of receiving written notification by the department to the commission of the need for such interview and that the inmate’s file contains all investigative reports deemed necessary by the commission to conduct such interview.
(e) Any inmate who has been determined to be an incapacitated person pursuant to s. 744.331 shall have an initial interview conducted within 90 days after the date the commission is provided with written notice that the inmate has been restored to capacity by the court.
(f) An initial interview may be held at the discretion of the commission after the entry of a commission order to revoke parole or mandatory conditional release.
(g) For purposes of determining eligibility for parole interview and release, the mandatory minimum portion of a concurrent sentence will begin on the date the sentence begins to run as provided in s. 921.161. The mandatory minimum portions of consecutive sentences shall be served at the beginning of the maximum sentence as established by the Department of Corrections. Each mandatory minimum portion of consecutive sentences shall be served consecutively; provided, that in no case shall a sentence begin to run before the date of imposition. The commission shall conduct an initial interview for an inmate serving a mandatory minimum sentence according to the following schedule:
1. An inmate serving a mandatory term of 7 years or less shall have an initial interview no sooner than 6 months prior to the expiration of the mandatory minimum portion of the sentence.
2. An inmate serving a mandatory term in excess of 7 years but of less than 15 years shall have an initial interview no sooner than 12 months prior to the expiration of the mandatory minimum portion of the sentence.
3. An inmate serving a mandatory term of 15 years or more shall have an initial interview no sooner than 18 months prior to the expiration of the mandatory minimum portion of the sentence.
(h) If an inmate is serving a sentence imposed by a county or circuit court of this state concurrently with a sentence imposed by a court of another state or of the United States, and if the department has designated the correctional institution of the other jurisdiction as the place for reception and confinement of such person, the inmate so released to another jurisdiction shall be eligible for consideration for parole, except that the commission shall determine the presumptive parole release date and the effective parole release date by requesting such person’s record file from the receiving jurisdiction. Upon receiving such records, the commission panel assigned by the chair shall determine such release dates based on the relevant information in that file. The commission may concur with the parole release decision of the jurisdiction granting parole and accepting supervision. The provisions of s. 947.174 do not apply to an inmate serving a concurrent sentence in another jurisdiction pursuant to s. 921.16(2).
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of ss. 775.021 and 921.16, if an inmate has received a consecutive sentence or sentences imposed by a court or courts of this state, the inmate shall be eligible for consideration for parole, unless otherwise expressly prohibited by law.
(4) A person who has become eligible for an initial parole interview and who may, according to the objective parole guidelines of the commission, be granted parole shall be placed on parole in accordance with the provisions of this law; except that, in any case of a person convicted of murder, robbery, burglary of a dwelling or burglary of a structure or conveyance in which a human being is present, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, kidnapping, sexual battery or attempted sexual battery, incest or attempted incest, an unnatural and lascivious act or an attempted unnatural and lascivious act, lewd and lascivious behavior, assault or aggravated assault when a sexual act is completed or attempted, battery or aggravated battery when a sexual act is completed or attempted, arson, or any felony involving the use of a firearm or other deadly weapon or the use of intentional violence, at the time of sentencing the judge may enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a commission release order. This jurisdiction of the trial court judge is limited to the first one-third of the maximum sentence imposed. When any person is convicted of two or more felonies and concurrent sentences are imposed, then the jurisdiction of the trial court judge as provided herein applies to the first one-third of the maximum sentence imposed for the highest felony of which the person was convicted. When any person is convicted of two or more felonies and consecutive sentences are imposed, then the jurisdiction of the trial court judge as provided herein applies to one-third of the total consecutive sentences imposed.
(a) In retaining jurisdiction for the purposes of this act, the trial court judge shall state the justification with individual particularity, and such justification shall be made a part of the court record. A copy of such justification shall be delivered to the department together with the commitment issued by the court pursuant to s. 944.17.
(b) Gain-time as provided for by law shall accrue, except that an offender over whom the trial court has retained jurisdiction as provided herein shall not be released during the first one-third of her or his sentence by reason of gain-time.
(c) In such a case of retained jurisdiction, the commission, within 30 days after the entry of its release order, shall send notice of its release order to the original sentencing judge and to the appropriate state attorney. The release order shall be made contingent upon entry of an order by the appropriate circuit judge relinquishing jurisdiction as provided for in paragraphs (d) and (f). If the original sentencing judge is no longer in service, such notice shall be sent to the chief judge of the circuit in which the offender was sentenced. The chief judge may designate any circuit judge within the circuit to act in the place of the original sentencing judge. Such notice shall stay the time requirements of s. 947.1745.
(d) Within 10 days after receipt of the notice provided for in paragraph (c), the original sentencing judge or her or his replacement shall notify the commission as to whether or not the court further desires to retain jurisdiction. If the original sentencing judge or her or his replacement does not so notify the commission within the 10-day period or notifies the commission that the court does not desire to retain jurisdiction, then the commission may dispose of the matter as it sees fit.
(e) Upon receipt of notice of intent to retain jurisdiction from the original sentencing judge or her or his replacement, the commission shall, within 10 days, forward to the court its release order, the findings of fact, the parole hearing examiner’s report and recommendation, and all supporting information upon which its release order was based.
(f) Within 30 days of receipt of the items listed in paragraph (e), the original sentencing judge or her or his replacement shall review the order, findings, and evidence; and, if the judge finds that the order of the commission is not based on competent substantial evidence or that the parole is not in the best interest of the community or the inmate, the court may vacate the release order. The judge or her or his replacement shall notify the commission of the decision of the court, and, if the release order is vacated, such notification shall contain the evidence relied on and the reasons for denial. A copy of such notice shall be sent to the inmate.
(g) The decision of the original sentencing judge or, in her or his absence, the chief judge of the circuit to vacate any parole release order as provided in this section is not appealable. Each inmate whose parole release order has been vacated by the court shall be reinterviewed within 2 years after the date of receipt of the vacated release order and every 2 years thereafter, or earlier by order of the court retaining jurisdiction. However, each inmate whose parole release order has been vacated by the court and who has been:
1. Convicted of murder or attempted murder;
2. Convicted of sexual battery or attempted sexual battery;
3. Convicted of kidnapping or attempted kidnapping;
4. Convicted of robbery, burglary of a dwelling, burglary of a structure or conveyance, or breaking and entering, or the attempt thereof of any of these crimes, in which a human being is present and a sexual act is attempted or completed; or
5. Sentenced to a 25-year minimum mandatory sentence previously provided in s. 775.082,

shall be reinterviewed once within 7 years after the date of receipt of the vacated release order and once every 7 years thereafter, if the commission finds that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted during the following years and states the bases for the finding in writing. For an inmate who is within 7 years of his or her tentative release date, the commission may establish a reinterview date before the 7-year schedule.

(h) An inmate whose parole release order has been vacated by the court may not be given a presumptive parole release date during the period of retention of jurisdiction by the court. During such period, a new effective parole release date may be authorized at the discretion of the commission without further interview unless an interview is requested by no fewer than two commissioners. Any such new effective parole release date must be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g).
(5) Within 90 days after any interview for parole, the inmate shall be advised of the presumptive parole release date. Subsequent to the establishment of the presumptive parole release date, the commission may, at its discretion, review the official record or conduct additional interviews with the inmate. However, the presumptive parole release date may not be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview.
(6) This section as amended by chapter 82-171, Laws of Florida, shall apply only to those persons convicted on or after the effective date of chapter 82-171; and this section as in effect before being amended by chapter 82-171 shall apply to any person convicted before the effective date of chapter 82-171.
History.s. 12, ch. 20519, 1941; s. 3, ch. 21775, 1943; ss. 1, 2, ch. 71-110; s. 2, ch. 74-122; s. 88, ch. 77-120; s. 1, ch. 78-318; s. 11, ch. 78-417; s. 106, ch. 79-3; s. 5, ch. 79-42; s. 195, ch. 79-164; s. 2, ch. 79-310; s. 8, ch. 79-341; s. 1, ch. 81-30; s. 4, ch. 81-322; s. 9, ch. 82-171; ss. 1, 2, ch. 82-401; ss. 9, 34, ch. 83-131; s. 189, ch. 83-216; s. 1, ch. 85-107; s. 3, ch. 85-295; s. 37, ch. 86-183; s. 67, ch. 88-122; s. 111, ch. 89-96; s. 17, ch. 89-531; s. 20, ch. 90-337; s. 1, ch. 93-2; s. 1673, ch. 97-102; s. 1, ch. 97-289; s. 1, ch. 2010-95; s. 45, ch. 2010-117; s. 1, ch. 2013-119.

F.S. 947.16 on Google Scholar

F.S. 947.16 on Casetext

Amendments to 947.16


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 947.16
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 947.16.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

O FRANKLIN, v. STATE, 258 So. 3d 1239 (Fla. 2018)

. . . the Florida Parole Commission that are subject to judicial review, Michel , 257 So.3d at 6 (citing §§ 947.16 . . .

IN RE AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- REGULAR- CYCLE REPORT., 265 So. 3d 494 (Fla. 2018)

. . . Retention of Jurisdiction ___ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

STATE v. MICHEL,, 257 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 2018)

. . . See §§ 947.16-.174, Fla. Stat. . . .

DAVIS, v. STATE, 214 So. 3d 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 947.16(1), Fla. Stat. (1971). . . .

ATWELL, v. STATE, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016)

. . . .” § 947.16(5), Fla. Stat. . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 188 So. 3d 764 (Fla. 2015)

. . . Retention of Jurisdiction The. court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

E. JONES, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION,, 787 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . §§ 947.16(4), 947.172(3), 947.173(3) (1978); McKahn v. Fla. Parole and Prob. . . . Stat. §§ 947.16(4), 947.172(3), 947.173(3) (1978). Mr. . . .

NEREY, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW,, 164 So. 3d 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Pursuant to section 947.16(2)(g)3., Florida Statutes, the Commission scheduled Nerey’s initial parole . . . [e]ach mandatory minimum portion of consecutive sentences shall be served consecutively[.]” § 947.16( . . . We find nothing in section 947.16 providing for an alternative calculation method when a sentencing court . . . In light of the clear language of section 947.16(2), the circuit court correctly denied Nerey’s petition . . .

BATES, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 768 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 947.16(l)(c)-(d) (1983). . . . See id. § 947.16(2)(g) (“For purposes of determining eligibility for parole interview and release, .. . . .

O FRANKLIN, v. STATE, 141 So. 3d 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1982 Supp.). . . . See §§ 947.002, 947.16, 947.18, Fla. Stat. (1981). . . . , and now that the trial court has ordered that it will no longer retain jurisdiction under section 947.16 . . . See §§ 947.002, 947.16(4), 947.18, Fla. Stat. . . . See §§ 947.16(5) & 947.174(2-3), Fla. Stat. . . . the 1,000-year sentences and the fact that the sentencing court retained jurisdiction, under section 947.16 . . . See §§ 947.13(l)(a), 947.16(4)-(5), 947.172, 947.174(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

DORTCH, v. STATE, 137 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . State, 93 So.3d 371, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Padovano, J., concurring) (suggesting that section 947.16 . . .

HARMON, III, v. STATE, 136 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . jurisdiction over the first one-third of each of the Defendant’s 100-year sentences pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

SMITH, v. STATE, 93 So. 3d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . In my view, the only lawful remedy is to declare unconstitutional section 947.16(6), Florida Statutes . . . The only impediment is that section 947.16(6), Florida Statutes provides that inmates sentenced after . . . For these reasons, I believe that the Florida courts have no alternative but to declare section 947.16 . . . Were I not bound by the precedents of this court, I would hold that section 947.16(6) is unconstitutional . . .

SHIFLET, v. STATE, 84 So. 3d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . with the trial court retaining jurisdiction over the first third of that sentence pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

T. FREDRICK, v. STATE, 82 So. 3d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Compare § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1981), with § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1982). . . .

CONIONILLI, v. STATE, 58 So. 3d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . that parole for a life sentence did exist until several years prior to Conionilli’s offense, see § 947.16 . . .

THORNE, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 36 So. 3d 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . request one review of his or her initial presumptive parole release date established according to s. 947.16 . . .

HAYWARD, v. MARSHALL, s, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010)

. . . . §§ 947.16 (parole eligibility), .165 (parole guidelines); Ga.Code Ann. §§ 42-9-40 (parole guidelines . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 26 So. 3d 534 (Fla. 2009)

. . . Retention of Jurisdiction _ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

AYALA- LAIES, v. STATE, 16 So. 3d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . to July 29, 1983, the trial court issued an order retaining jurisdiction, in accordance with section 947.16 . . .

HOGAN, v. STATE, 12 So. 3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . respectively, and retained jurisdiction over the defendant on one-third of the sentences, pursuant to section 947.16 . . . See § 947.16(4), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 998 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 2008)

. . . Retention of Jurisdiction _ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

E. GONZALEZ, v. STATE, 982 So. 2d 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See, e.g., § 947.16, Fla. Stat. (1969). . . . .

GAUTHIER, v. MEKUSKER,, 186 F. App'x 903 (11th Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 947.16. . . .

FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, v. CHAPMAN,, 919 So. 2d 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . While section 947.16(5), Florida Statutes, bars the Commission from modifying a PPRD absent reasons of . . .

I. WRIGHT, v. STATE, 911 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2005)

. . . of a sentencing court to provide written reasons for retaining jurisdiction, in violation of section 947.16 . . . pursuant to rule 3.800(a), arguing that both his sentences were illegal because, first, under section 947.16 . . . Regarding certain crimes, section 947.16(4) provides: [A]t the time of sentencing the judge may enter . . . The purpose of section 947.16 was to prevent early parole of prisoners convicted of dangerous crimes . . . Subsection (3) was renumbered (4) with the 1985 amendments to section 947.16. . . .

MOORE, v. STATE, 902 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Furthermore, section 947.16(3) of the Florida Statutes (1979), which addresses the court’s retention . . .

AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 886 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2004)

. . . : Retention of Jurisdiction _ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

PERRY, Jr. v. STATE, 892 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Fla.1980) (answering the question of whether or not a defendant was eligible for parole under section 947.16 . . .

LOPEZ, v. STATE, 864 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . solicitation to commit murder involved the use of intentional violence within the meaning of section 947.16 . . .

SAPP, v. STATE, 864 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . court stating on each count that it would retain jurisdiction over that sentence pursuant to section 947.16 . . . We find that this violates the express language of section 947.16, Florida Statutes, and case law interpreting . . .

R. KIRTSEY, v. STATE, 855 So. 2d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . See § 947.16(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1981); Hampton v. State, 764 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). . . .

KING, v. STATE, 835 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . The trial judge retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of each sentence pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

D. ROBERTS, v. STATE, 821 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Roberts contends that the trial court lacked statutory authority under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes . . . Court held that the trial court cannot retain jurisdiction over a life sentence imposed under section 947.16 . . .

BINGHAM, v. STATE, 813 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . specific and particular findings justifying the retention of jurisdiction in accordance with section 947.16 . . .

BARNHILL, Jr. v. STATE, 788 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . . § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1983). . . .

AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 794 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 2000)

. . . Provisions: Retention of Jurisdiction _The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

THAMES, v. STATE, 769 So. 2d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . illegal because the trial court improperly retained jurisdiction over his case in violation of Section 947.16 . . .

W. HAMPTON, v. STATE, 764 So. 2d 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . The trial court included a special provision, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statute (1981), . . . the earlier pronouncement provided legally sufficient reasons to satisfy the requirements of section 947.16 . . . 421 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (statement of justification for retention of jurisdiction under § 947.16 . . . challenged findings are no more specific than the findings that we deemed inadequate for purposes of section 947.16 . . . The pertinent provisions of the statute state: 947.16 Eligibility for parole; powers and duties of commission . . .

GAINES, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION,, 743 So. 2d 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1978). . . . Williams, 397 So.2d at 665, the supreme court noted "that for many years prior to section 947.16's enactment . . .

WAINWRIGHT, v. STATE, 704 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 1997)

. . . terms under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993), and no retention of jurisdiction under section 947.16 . . . See generally § 947.16(4), Fla. Stat. (1993). See also Willis v. . . .

VIERA, v. STATE, 698 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . trial court retained jurisdiction over defendant for 20 years as was then permitted under subsection 947.16 . . .

FERGUSON, v. STATE, 677 So. 2d 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Ch. 96-422, § 19, Laws of Fla., amending § 947.16, Fla. Stat. . . .

JOHNSON, v. STATE, 679 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Section 947.16(2)(g)3, Florida Statutes (1989) provided that an inmate serving a mandatory minimum sentence . . .

F. BLACKWELDER, v. STATE, 647 So. 2d 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . See § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (1981). . . . Where jurisdiction has been retained pursuant to section 947.16(4), the commission must also notify both . . . of the circuit) in the event it decides the inmate should be released during the retention period. § 947.16 . . . The statute has been renumbered as 947.16(4). . . .

BRAGGS, v. STATE, 642 So. 2d 129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . See § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1982). . . .

STATE v. KING,, 629 So. 2d 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . King was under “control release” pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1992), but the release . . .

STATE v. JOHNSON,, 627 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . See § 947.16(l)(g), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

J. HARPER, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION,, 626 So. 2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . . §§ 947.16(5) & 947.173(3), Fla.Stat. (1991); Hester v. . . .

WILLIAMS, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION,, 625 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . judge did not reserve jurisdiction to review future parole orders entered by the Commission, as section 947.16 . . . even though she had declined to retain jurisdiction to review a commission release order under section 947.16 . . . application of the statutory authorization for a judge to retain jurisdiction over an offender under section 947.16 . . . Florida Parole and Probation Comm’n, 543 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); §§ 947.16(5), and 947.173(3), . . . In 1978, section 947.16(3) authorized the sentencing judge to retain, for the first third of the sentence . . .

FORD, v. STATE, 624 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . alleges that the trial court retained jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

LANG, v. STATE, 616 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . sentence without providing justification for the retention at the time of sentencing, contrary to Section 947.16 . . . When appellant was sentenced on November 9, 1982, section 947.16(3) authorized trial judges “at the time . . . Section 947.16(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1982). . . .

MACIAS, v. STATE, 614 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . sufficiency of a trial court order retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the prison sentence [§ 947.16 . . .

THOMAS, v. STATE, 611 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . stated that he was retaining jurisdiction over one-third of Thomas’ sentence pursuant to subsection 947.16 . . . Paragraph 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), states, “In retaining jurisdiction ... the trial . . . In sum, under the settled interpretation of section 947.16 the sentencing court was only required to . . . The Diaz court also commented about the pending prospective repeal of section 947.16. 563 So.2d at 200 . . . See § 947.16, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

STATE v. ARDUENGO,, 609 So. 2d 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . The court retained jurisdiction over half of each term pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes . . . Arduengo on this question and, rather than reduce the retention period, deleted any reference to section 947.16 . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 606 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1992)

. . . : Retention of Jurisdiction _ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

THOMPSON, v. C. WADE,, 603 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . imprisonment and the trial judge retained jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- RULES AND, 603 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1992)

. . . Retention of Jurisdiction - The Court pursuant to F.S. 947.16(3) retains jurisdiction over the defendant-for . . . Retention of Jurisdiction __ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

E. WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 592 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . theory underlying appellant’s jurisdictional challenge seems to be the changes effected in section 947.16 . . . The 1982 version of section 947.16(3)(c) provides: In such cases of retained jurisdiction, the commission . . .

MOBLEY, v. STATE, 590 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . imposed, rather than over one-third of the total of the consecutive sentences imposed citing section 947.16 . . .

ANDERSON, v. STATE, 584 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . According to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, (1979), now section 947.16(4), “When any person is . . .

HARRIS, v. STATE, 584 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . court failed to offer sufficient reasons for its retention of jurisdiction as required under section 947.16 . . . Section 947.16(3) is now section 947.16(4), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

TUBB, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION,, 580 So. 2d 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . See §§ 947.16(4), 947.-173(3) Fla.Stat. (1983). . . .

OLMSTEAD, v. STATE, 569 So. 2d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . In 1982 the trial court retained jurisdiction, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) . . .

A. WEMETT, v. STATE, 567 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1990)

. . . See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1981). . . . circuit court could have merely corrected the illegal portion of its sentence to comply with section 947.16 . . . earn gain-time, sections 944.275, .291, Florida Statutes (1981), and to be released on parole, section 947.16 . . .

THOMPSON, v. STATE, 564 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . .-087(2), with a retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes. . . .

HALLMAN, v. STATE, 560 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1990)

. . . Therefore, section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1985), authorizing retention of jurisdiction in order to . . .

T. HEATH, v. STATE, 558 So. 2d 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . . § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (1983); Brown v. State, 458 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). . . . was amended to allow the trial judge to retain jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence imposed. § 947.16 . . .

SWANSON, v. FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION,, 548 So. 2d 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . Sections 947.16(5), 947.173(3), Florida Statutes (1987); cf. . . .

W. WELLER, v. STATE, 547 So. 2d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . Therefore, section 947.16(2)(g)3 fixes Weller’s initial parole interview date as “no sooner than 18 months . . .

STEWART, v. STATE, 546 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . jurisdiction, arguing: (1) that the sentencing court erred in retaining jurisdiction, pursuant to section 947.16 . . . F.S. over the first third of his two pre-sentencing guidelines life sentences; and (2) that section 947.16 . . . Supreme Court has ruled on this issue and found the retention of jurisdiction provisions of section 947.16 . . . This provision is currently found in section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1987). . . .

WEMETT, v. STATE, 547 So. 2d 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . See § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (1983). . . . .

RAGAN, v. DUGGER,, 544 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . court’s failure to give contemporaneous, specific reasons for retaining jurisdiction as required by § 947.16 . . . This statement regarding Ragan does not satisfy the requirement of § 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes, . . .

TAYLOR, v. FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION,, 543 So. 2d 367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . Sections 947.16(5), 947.172(3) and 947.-173(3); Fla. Parole and Probation Comm’n v. . . . Clearly, this reason violates § 947.16(5) because it was previously known and documented, but was not . . .

BERNADINI, v. STATE, 540 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . That statute is also binding on the Parole and Probation Commission as to parole (see § 947.16(2)(g)) . . .

M. AMAZON, v. STATE, 537 So. 2d 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . . § 947.16, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

STATE v. HALL F., 538 So. 2d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . That statute is also binding on the Parole and Probation Commission as to parole (see § 947.16(2)(g)) . . .

FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, v. G. DORNAU,, 534 So. 2d 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . available at the time of the initial interview” or “good cause in exceptional circumstances” (sections 947.16 . . .

DUQUE, v. STATE, 526 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . The trial judge, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), retained jurisdiction over the . . . Section 947.16 authorizes retention of jurisdiction for certain enumerated felonies and for any felony . . .

CARR, v. STATE, 528 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . or (4) the sentence of confinement may be never fully executed because the defendant is paroled (§ 947.16 . . .

M. MARSHALL, v. L. DUGGER,, 526 So. 2d 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . We find that these stated reasons fail to comply with the requirements of Section 947.16(3), Florida . . .

L. WILLIAMS, v. FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION,, 515 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . Under sections 947.16(4) and 947.173(3), F.S., a PPRD may be changed or modified only on the basis of . . .

R. VARNES, Jr. v. STATE, 510 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . trial court improperly retained jurisdiction over one-third of a life sentence pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

D. McCONNELL, v. STATE, 513 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . McConnell also complained that the court accepted his plea without any factual basis and that section 947.16 . . .

YATES, Sr. v. STATE, 509 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . See § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (1983). . . .

FAIRWEATHER, v. STATE, 505 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . her that it was considering retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

C. GASKINS, v. STATE, 502 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), enumerated certain offenses upon conviction of which a defendant . . . Section 947.16(3) provided, in pertinent part, that: Persons who have become eligible for parole and . . .

S. JOHNSON, v. STATE, 502 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . court erred in retaining jurisdiction for one third of his 60-year prison sentence pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

LLIDA, v. STATE, 501 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . State, 438 So.2d 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Section 947.16(4) Florida Statutes (1985). . . .

STANLEY, v. STATE, 501 So. 2d 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), authorizes the trial court to retain jurisdiction over a . . .

A. COBAN, v. STATE, 502 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . judge's determination to retain jurisdiction over a portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to section 947.16 . . .

FAMIGLIETTI, v. STATE, 499 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . violence and the vicious manner in which the crimes were committed justified application of section 947.16 . . . On appeal, appellant contends the court erred in the retention of jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16 . . . It is true that attempted murder, standing alone, cannot be the basis for application of section 947.16 . . .

CARR v. FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, 25 Fla. Supp. 2d 160 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1986)

. . . The Commission is required, under the provisions of Sections 947.16 and 947.172, Florida Statutes, to . . .

McCANT, v. STATE PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION,, 497 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . See § 947.16(2)(f), Fla.Stat. (1985). . . .

JACKSON, v. STATE, 497 So. 2d 962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . his sentence without stating its justification for doing so with particularity, according to section 947.16 . . .

JOHNSON, v. STATE, 495 So. 2d 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . Johnson was sentenced in 1981, making the governing statute section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981 . . . Section 947.16(3), which specifies the manner in which the trial court may retain jurisdiction over a . . . remanded the case with directions to reconsider the period of retention in accordance with section 947.16 . . . In sum, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), and the courts which have construed that statute . . . We therefore remand Johnson’s sentencing order for resentencing in a manner consistent with section 947.16 . . .

SHELEY, v. FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION,, 496 So. 2d 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . Appellant contends also that under section 947.16(5), Florida Statutes, the Commission may not modify . . . PPRD pursuant to a court order in these circumstances is not subject to the constraints of section 947.16 . . .

SLAUGHTER, W. E. L. M. v. STATE, 493 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . the trial court retained jurisdiction for one-third of Stacey’s sentence in accordance with Section 947.16 . . .

MORRIS, v. STATE, 493 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . See § 947.16, Fla.Stat. (1985). . . .

MURRAY, v. STATE, 491 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1986)

. . . .” § 947.16(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1983). We reject this contention. . . .