Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ed in sections 2 through 7. See Ch. 95-184, §§ 14-25, at 1703-16. In theory, section 19 impacts Heggs' three-year minimum sentence terms, see supra note 2, while section 25 amends another portion of chapter 921 relating to sentencing alternatives (section 921.187)....

majority, nothing within the plain language of section 921.187 or rule 3.203 requires proof as to the causation

...5th DCA 1992) (sentence of ten years of incarceration, suspended upon successful completion of two years of community control, illegal because it was not one of the sentencing alternatives authorized in Poore ). In addition to being unauthorized under Poore, appellant's sentence is also impermissible under Section 921.187, Florida Statutes (1991). Appellant's probationary term preceded an incarcerative term; under section 921.187 all the probationary terms either follow a term of incarceration or are imposed in lieu of incarceration....

...Were it not for this court's decision in Bashlor, I would reverse the ten-year sentence imposed on appellant following the revocation of his probation as to the aggravated battery conviction and remand for resentencing in accordance with Poore and section 921.187....

...guilt because it found no authority for the trial court's action. [1] The first district in Thompson, on the other hand, reached the opposite result from Beardsley and Sanchez, finding support for its holding in rule 3.800(b) and sections 948.01 and 921.187, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...it within sixty days after such imposition." Pursuant to subsection 948.01(3), a court may put a defendant on probation and, "in its discretion, may either adjudge the defendant to be guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt." Finally, section 921.187 [2] provides: "(1) The following alternatives for the disposition of criminal cases shall be used......

...ecause Beardsley moved for relief approximately six months after sentencing, well outside Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(b)'s 60-day time limit. Therefore, we approve the result of, but not the opinion in, Beardsley. [2] Ch. 83-131, § 6, Laws of Fla., created § 921.187 as part of the "Correctional Reform Act of 1983."

...1st DCA 1990), in which the First District Court of Appeal certified the following question as one of great public importance: DOES A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION RESULT FROM THE IMPOSITION OF A PROBATIONARY SPLIT SENTENCE WHEN THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED THAT DISPOSITION IN THE SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES OF SECTION 921.187, FLORIDA STATUTES? Id....

...It should be noted that the certified question presupposes that there is no statutory authorization for a probationary split sentence. *1101 Therefore, we choose to rephrase the question to read: IS THERE STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR A PROBATIONARY SPLIT SENTENCE? The statutes applicable to our consideration are: 921.187 Disposition and sentencing; alternatives; restitution....

...provide the opportunity for rehabilitation. A court may: ... . (g) Impose a split sentence whereby the offender is to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence, which period may include a term of years or less. § 921.187(1)(g), Fla....

...The period of probation or community control shall commence immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration, whether by parole or gain-time allowances. § 948.01(8), Fla. Stat. (1989). Glass's position is that these statutes only authorize the imposition of a true split sentence. Standing by itself, section 921.187(1)(g) clearly does not warrant this conclusion....

...strict court of appeal opinion which once again questioned the statutory authority for such a sentence. We acknowledge that Glass makes a legitimate argument for the lack *1102 of statutory authority to impose a probationary split sentence. However, section 921.187(1)(g) is susceptible to the interpretation that it authorizes a probationary split sentence....

...split sentence was originally imposed. [6] Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1981), has been amended and transferred to section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1985). It now includes provision for community control in lieu of probation. Since 1983, section 921.187(1)(g), Florida Statutes, also authorizes split sentences (see Brown v....

...h involves two sentencing orders, which are unrelated in time, place and forum. Therefore, the trial judge's determination that appellant is still subject to his probationary term is affirmed. WOLF, J., and WENTWORTH, Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Section 921.187(1)(g), F.S....

...s in the county jail prior to adjudication and is required to spend an additional 51 weeks. In addition, as in Van Tassel, we would have the anomalous situation that a prisoner sentenced to 364 days in the county jail as a sentence alternative under section 921.187(1)(e) and section 922.051, Florida Statutes (1987) following a felony conviction would receive credit for prior jail time, while a prisoner in the next cell serving an identical term of 364 days as a condition of probation, would not....

...The sentence must, therefore, be reversed. Calhoun v. State, 522 So.2d 509, 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). We affirm as to the second issue. In Glass v. State, 574 So.2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 1991), the court held that imposition of a probationary split sentence is an authorized disposition under Section 921.187(1)(g), Florida Statutes....

...1988), it does not clearly appear that all of the arguments made by Glass were presented to and considered by the court in Poore. However, the opinion in Poore is so pervasive on the issue of split sentences as to leave us no latitude to vacate the sentence as not being one of the alternatives expressly authorized in section 921.187, Florida Statutes....

...owing *467 question as one of great public importance: DOES A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION RESULT FROM THE IMPOSITION OF A PROBATIONARY SPLIT SENTENCE WHEN THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED THAT DISPOSITION IN THE SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES OF SECTION 921.187, FLORIDA STATUTES? AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED....

...any other special circumstances that may have a bearing on the defendant's ability to pay. § 949.032, Fla. Stat. (1985). The above-quoted statutes must be read in pari materia with Chapter 921, Florida Statutes. In 1984, the Legislature eliminated Section 921.187(9), Florida Statutes, which gave the trial court discretion to require an offender to make restitution pursuant to Section 775.089, Florida Statutes, as an alternative for the disposition of criminal cases. Replacing that section, is Section 921.187(2), which provides: The court shall require an offender to make restitution pursuant to s....

...Nothing in the statutory provisions relating to restitution, as amended in 1984, "reflect[s] clear legislative mandate for imposition of restitution as a part of a sentence," as stated in the majority opinion at page 1350. Sections 775.089, 948.03, 948.032, and 921.187, Florida Statutes (1985), cited in the court opinion, leave the imposition of restitution as part of a criminal sentence to the discretion of the trial judge and only require that if full restitution is not ordered, the trial judge shall state on the record the reasons for not doing so....

...[2] Some judges still have qualms about the legality of a "probationary split sentence" not because of the constitutional double jeopardy problem with which the district court Wayne case was concerned ( see Wayne v. State, 513 So.2d 689 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)) but because of section 921.187 which catalogs all statutory sentencing alternatives....

...fender. We therefore find no error in the trial judge's sentence and affirm. GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur. NOTES [1] During the same session that produced the sentencing guidelines, the legislature also reinstated true split sentences. § 921.187(7), Fla. Stat. (1983). Although Burrell's offense predates the effective date of this statute, we do not perceive this case as involving an impermissible ex post facto application of section 921.187(7) and thus barred by article 1, § 10, United States Constitution, and article 1, § 10, Florida Constitution....

...In the present case, Ferguson was given 364 days in the county jail suspended upon successful completion of probation. This is not one of the sentencing alternatives set out in Poore nor is there express authority for this type of conditional or suspended sentence in section 921.187, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...the two statutes in pari materia, it becomes clear that a term of imprisonment cannot be imposed in addition to both a fine and probation, because these statutes authorize only the payment of a fine in lieu of imprisonment. Appellant also refers to Section 921.187, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...nment, we do not consider that the provisions of either section 775.083(1) or 948.011 in any way preclude the sentence imposed here: three years' incarceration followed by five years' probation and a $1,000 fine. In regard to appellant's reliance on section 921.187(1)(b), authorizing the imposition of both a fine and probation under section 948.011, if the offense is punishable by both fine and imprisonment and probation is authorized, we note that section 921.187(1)( l ), allowing a trial court to sentence an offender to imprisonment in a state correctional institution, similarly makes no provision for the imposition of a fine....

...Nevertheless, fines are clearly authorized under section 775.083, in addition to any incarcerative punishment described in section 775.082. Finally, we observe that general authority to impose fines as well as other penal sanctions is provided in subsection (1)(m) of section 921.187, permitting the court to "[m]ake any other disposition that is authorized by law." We therefore find no statutory impediment to the lower court's decision to impose the sanctions of incarceration, fine, and probation in the same sentence....

...can alleviate prison overcrowding while still providing a sufficient measure of public safety and assuring an element of punishment. Chapter 83-131, Section 2; see also Section 948.10(1), Florida Statutes (1983). The Act, among other things, created Section 921.187, Florida Statutes, which provides for alternative forms of disposition and sentencing....

...We also note that where a probationer has violated the conditions of probation, the court may, instead of revoking probation, place him in community control. See Section 948.06. The state contends that the subject disposition qualifies as a "split sentence" under Section 921.187(7) which is quoted above....

...tionary term by no more than an additional two years, the period of time represented by the vacated community control term. Alternatively, the court may vacate both the community control and probationary terms and, pursuant to Sections 948.01(1) and 921.187(7), Florida Statutes (1983), impose a lawful split sentence involving a period of incarceration followed by either probation or community control....

...State, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1988), the supreme court made it abundantly clear that a "probationary split sentence" is an authorized sentence and is something different from a "true split sentence." This "probationary split sentence" is not authorized by section 921.187, Florida Statutes (1987), the only legislative authority for a split sentence, and the court's opinion in Poore makes no mention of that statute....

...Nevertheless, we are bound by the court's opinion in Poore to consider the "probationary split sentence" as an authorized sentence, different from a "true split sentence." It is reasonably assumed that the court must have been speaking of a split sentence as defined in section 921.187(1)(g) when it described a "true split sentence." Against this background, the decision in Green cannot stand....

...d remains one of the mysteries of Poore. The supreme court has yet to give the courts any direction on how to apply the "probationary split sentence" created by Poore, but since it is in addition to those forms of alternative disposition provided in section 921.187(1), Florida Statutes, we must look for characteristics unique to this form of disposition....

...in this case. The appealed issue in this case stems from the offender's successful completion of his sentence to imprisonment for five years before he violated the conditions of probation. As Judge Barfield has pointed out in his concurring opinion, section 921.187, Florida Statutes, sets forth the statutory authority for the disposition and sentencing alternatives available in criminal cases, yet the supreme court's opinion in Poore makes no mention of this statute in characterizing the five sentencing alternatives available to the courts. Nothing in section 921.187 authorizes the court to sentence an offender to imprisonment for a specified term and, after completing service of the full term of imprisonment, to serve an additional period of probation. The only statutorily authorized basis for imposing a so-called "split sentence" is set forth in subsection 921.187(1)(g), which specifies a "true split sentence" as defined in category 2 of the Poore decision ("consisting of a total period of confinement with a portion of the confinement period suspended and the defendant placed on probation for that suspended portion")....

...lea and withholds adjudication without further sentence than imposition of $663 of fees, fines and costs." The trial court summarily denied the motion. The State now appeals the defendant's sentence. The result in this case is controlled by statute. Section 921.187(1)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2006), provides that the court may "[p]lace the offender on probation with or without an adjudication of guilt pursuant to s....

...Therefore we reverse the assessment of a public defender fee. Lastly appellant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a probation and restitution center without first obtaining an individual assessment and recommendation as provided in section 921.187(1)(b)4, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The record reflects that a presentence investigation report was available to the sentencing judge. A presentence investigation report that contains the same information contemplated by the assessment and recommendation satisfies the requirement of section 921.187(1)(b)4....

...As in Glass and Alexander, however, we certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance: DOES A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION RESULT FROM THE IMPOSITION OF A PROBATIONARY SPLIT SENTENCE WHEN THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED *1041 THAT DISPOSITION IN THE SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES OF SECTION 921.187, FLORIDA STATUTES? Appellant's complaint regarding the probation condition was not preserved for appellate review because no objection was lodged thereto....

...Brown was sentenced to eight years imprisonment followed by seven years probation. The trial court overruled appellant's objection to the split sentence stating that Villery had been statutorily abolished by the legislature when it enacted chapter 83-131, the Correctional Reform Act of 1983. The Act created section 921.187, Florida Statutes, which reads in part as follows: Disposition and sentencing; alternatives....

...If remanded and the trial court again orders probation the maximum legal period of incarceration in the county jail that could be ordered is 364 days. The crimes for which Cigelski was convicted and placed on probation occurred prior to the effective date of § 921.187, Fla....

...in Glass v. State, 556 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990): Does a double jeopardy violation result from the imposition of a probationary split sentence when the legislature has not explicitly authorized that disposition in the sentencing alternatives of section 921.187, Florida Statutes? SHIVERS, C.J., and WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.

...withholding of adjudication of guilt as authorized by the statute is part of the punishment imposed in the sentencing process or merely the predicate for entry of a judgment of conviction and thus unrelated to the extent of punishment and sentence. Section 921.187, Florida Statutes (1985), sets forth various disposition and sentencing alternatives and specifically provides in subsection (1)(a) that the court may "place an offender on probation with or without an adjudication of guilt pursuant to s....

...This construction of the rule gives the circuit court the flexibility to subsequently modify the extent of punishment previously imposed, in its entirety, including the decision whether to impose adjudication, and more fully comports with the statutory intent of sections 921.187 and *44 948.01....

...hat the defendant had not been sentenced and had his sentence reversed, requiring resentencing. Rather, the defendant was before the trial court for a third time after he had violated the conditions of a second alternative disposition to sentencing, section 921.187, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...ons to justify a departure from the presumptive sentence. *728 It is certainly reasonable to assume that the supreme court intended to include in its reference to "sentence" alternative dispositions to incarceration as provided by the legislature in section 921.187, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...[6] Second, the defendant argues that her stay at the Bradenton Restitution and Probation Center cannot last 22 years. She is correct. Bradenton Restitution and Probation Center is a Department of Corrections center. *922 Placement in such a restitution center may not exceed 364 days. § 921.187, Fla....

...re secure state correctional institutions and to assist in the supervision of probationers." § 944.026(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1991). The legislature intends that programs be imposed for a limited term "as a condition of probation or community control." § 921.187, Fla....

...one, it could have sentenced the defendant to yet another 5-year term of probation. [6] See also Latham v. State, 596 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). [7] Placement in a county residential probation facility may be imposed for a period up to 3 years. § 921.187(1)(d), Fla....

...of 70 or below to establish the intellectual functioning prong of mental retardation under Florida law. However, even if the State had stipulated or agreed to a score of 75, the circuit court was obligated to follow this Court’s interpretation of section 921.187(1) and rule 8.203(b) in determining whether Herring was mentally retarded....

...We certify to the supreme court, however, the following question as one of great public importance: DOES A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION RESULT FROM THE IMPOSITION OF A PROBATIONARY SPLIT SENTENCE WHEN THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED *641 THAT DISPOSITION IN THE SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES OF SECTION 921.187, FLORIDA STATUTES? AFFIRMED....

...Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992) (stating that, "[w]here possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another"). Reading section 948.034 together with the relevant portions of sections 921.187 [1] and 893.13 [2] — both of which reference section 948.034 — it follows that a defendant who has a felony conviction of a non -drug related offense is not eligible to receive an alternate sentence under section 948.034....

...d-degree felony. Chapter 893 is entitled "Drug Abuse Prevention and Control," and section *265 948.034 is an alternative to the sentencing guidelines concerning certain chapter 893 drug-related offenses. Jones, 813 So.2d at 25 n. 2. Sections 893.13, 921.187, and 948.034 are not mutually exclusive, and when read together, clearly are part of a legislative package preventing a defendant in Langdon's position, having prior convictions not allowed under section 893.13, from benefiting from a downward departure. The record reflects that the trial court was concerned that section 948.034 did not reference the other two statutes, sections 921.187 and 893.13....

...However, statutes having related purposes may be read together without the need for a specific reference or directive within the language of either statute. See, e.g., DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272, 276 (Fla. 2002). Here, all of the chapters at issue deal with sentencing combined with drug abuse control. Section 921.187 (Disposition and sentencing; alternatives; restitution) states that "[t]he alternatives provided in this section for the disposition of criminal cases shall be used in a manner that will best serve the needs of society, punish criminal offenders, and provide the opportunity for rehabilitation." § 921.187(1), Fla....

...r drug offender probation. The record reflects, and Langdon concedes, that Langdon has more than four drug possession convictions. We, therefore, reverse and remand for imposition of a guideline sentence. STEVENSON and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 921.187, Florida Statutes, states in relevant part: (b)1....

...in Glass v. State, 556 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990): Does a double jeopardy violation result from the imposition of a probationary split sentence when the legislature has not explicitly authorized that disposition in the sentencing alternatives of section 921.187, Florida Statutes? SHIVERS, C.J., and WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.

...4th DCA 2008), after the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine, the trial court imposed court costs and withheld adjudication. The state objected to the sentence as illegal. The state appealed and this court held: The result in this case is controlled by statute. Section 921.187(1)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2006), provides that the court may "[p]lace the offender on probation with or without an adjudication of guilt pursuant to s....

DISPOSITION IN THE SENTENCE ALTERNATIVES OF SECTION 921.187, FLORIDA STATUTES? We hereby certify that same

rehearing, the state has called our attention to section 921.187, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides in

...As in Glass , however, we certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance: DOES A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION RESULT FROM THE IMPOSITION OF A PROBATIONARY SPLIT SENTENCE WHEN THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED THAT DISPOSITION IN THE SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES OF SECTION 921.187, FLORIDA STATUTES? REVERSED and REMANDED in part, and APPROVED in part....

appellant’s sentence is also impermissible under Section 921.187, Florida Statutes (1991). Appellant’s probationary

...At the time the appellant committed the instant offenses he had not fulfilled a community service obligation imposed in a prior case. At the urging of the prosecutor, the trial judge determined that a community service obligation could be equated with a sentence to community control provided as punishment under § 921.187, Fla.Stat....

...We certify to the Supreme Court of Florida, however, the following question as one of great public importance: DOES A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION RESULT FROM THE IMPOSITION OF A PROBATIONARY SPLIT SENTENCE WHEN THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED THAT DISPOSITION IN THE SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES OF SECTION 921.187, FLORIDA STATUTES? ERVIN, BOOTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.

...in Glass v. State, 556 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990): Does a double jeopardy violation result from the imposition of a probationary split sentence when the legislature has not explicitly authorized that disposition in the sentencing alternatives of section 921.187, Florida Statutes? ERVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur.

...1st DCA 1990), however, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: Does a double jeopardy violation result from the imposition of a probationary split sentence when the Legislature has not explicitly authorized that disposition in the sentencing alternatives of section 921.187, Florida Statutes? AFFIRMED....

...We also note that the "suspended” twelve year sentence conditioned upon successful completion of community control is not one of the sentencing alternatives listed in Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla.1988). See also Shieder v. State, 430 So.2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); and section 921.187, Florida Statutes.

DISPOSITION IN THE SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES OF SECTION 921.187, FLORIDA STATUTES?

DISPOSITION IN THE SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES OF SECTION 921.187, FLORIDA STATUTES?

DISPOSITION IN THE SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES OF SECTION 921.187, FLORIDA STATUTES?

...as such, appellant should be entitled, pursuant to section 921.161, Florida Statutes (1983), to credit for time served before imprisonment by the Department of Corrections. We agree that the trial court imposed a split sentence within the meaning of section 921.187(g), and that the sentence must be modified for the reasons stated below....

...n and “that incarceration, pursuant to the split sentence alternatives found in sections 948.01(4) and 948.-03(2), which equals or exceeds one year is invalid.” 396 So.2d at 1111 . The legislative reaction to Villery was enactment of what is now section 921.187(g) in 1983....

...that appellant’s sentence is “no longer illegal.” See Andrews v. State, 462 So.2d 18 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1984). This amendment to the statute is, however, inapplicable to the instant case. Appellant’s offense was committed on October 5, 1979, and section 921.187(g) was not effective until October 1, 1983....

...enses committed before 1983. The limitation of Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla.1980), on the period of incarceration in split sentences still applies to crimes committed prior to 1983, despite the enactment of section 921.187(7), Florida Statutes (1983), which allows split sentences of one year or more incarceration to be followed by probation for crimes committed after August 1, 1983....

...departure.” See also §§ 921.0024(2); 921.00265, Fla. Stat. (2011). The sentences imposed were not, moreover, true suspended sentences authorized by statute, because the trial court failed to impose probation during the period of suspension. See § 921.187(l)(a), Fla....

disposition in the sentencing alternatives of section 921.187, Florida Statutes?

placing Rivera on a term of probation under section 921.187, Florida Statutes (2017). “The legality of

...Thereafter, the Florida Legislature adopted and implemented these changes in accordance with section 921.001, Florida Statutes. Ch. 86-273, § 2, Laws of Florida. We find that this subsequent Supreme Court and legislative expression controls and affirm Ray’s sentence. Though neither section 921.187, Florida Statutes, nor section 948.01 expressly prohibit a sentence of community control and probation in tandem, this court in Williams held that these statutes do not contemplate a sentence with a probationary term consecutive to a...

...328, the rules became a statute). Since the Legislature has now expressly authorized the imposition of community control and probation in tandem, this subsequent legislative expression is controlling over the more generally worded statutes, sections 921.187 and 948.01 and nullifies the effect of this court’s Williams decision. Notwithstanding the Williams interpretation of sections 921.187 and 948.01 as in effect prohibiting a community control term followed by a probationary term, the Legislature’s enactment of Chapter 86-273, as the last expression of the legislative will, is the law and prevails....

...The district court certified the following question as one of great public importance: Does a double jeopardy violation result from the imposition of a probationary split sentence when the legislature has not explicitly authorized that disposition in the sentencing alternatives of section 921.187, Florida Statutes? Id....

...The district court certified the following question as one of great public importance: DOES A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION RESULT FROM THE IMPOSITION OF A PROBATIONARY SPLIT SENTENCE WHEN THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED THAT DISPOSITION IN THE SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES OF SECTION 921.187, FLORIDA STATUTES? Id....

...1st DCA 1982); Van Bever v. State, 405 So.2d 474 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Another allegation in defendant’s motion was that his sentence was a split sentence which was illegal pursuant to Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla.1981). Section 921.187(7), Florida Statutes (1983), is not applicable, and defendant is correct that his sentence of ten years in prison followed by twenty years probation is an illegal split sentence....

...The appellant also contends that the sentences imposed are illegal under Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission,, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1981) in that the incarceration portion of the sentences exceeds one year. In 1983 the legislature enacted § 921.187(7), Fla.Stat., which provides that a court may “impose a split sentence whereby the offender is placed on probation upon completion of any specified portion of such sentence, which period may include a term of years or less.” (emphasis supplied)....

under those circumstances would be illegal. See § 921.187(l)(e).

school equivalency diploma in accordance with F.S. 921.187, or attend vocational training, and/or obtain

PER CURIAM. We affirm the conviction but remand with direction to correct the judgment and sentence to reflect appellant’s sentence to be 364 days’ incarceration in the county jail, the maximum period permissible under section 921.187(l)(b)(5), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...criminal case, except for an offense punishable by death, who has been found guilty by the verdict of a jury, has entered a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, or has been found guilty by the court trying the case without a jury.” (emphasis supplied)); § 921.187(1), Fla....

...State, 461 So.2d 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Green v. State, 455 So.2d 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Garcia v. State, 454 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Appellant’s second point, that the trial judge erred in imposing a split sentence, is also without merit. § 921.187, Fla.Stat....