Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...(5) At the end of the intervention period, the administrator shall recommend ... [t]hat dismissal of charges without prejudice shall be entered in instances in which prosecution is not deemed necessary. The state attorney shall make the final determination as to whether the prosecution shall continue. [e.s.] § 948.08(2)-(5), Fla....

...I, BACKGROUND In 2008, Reynaldo Castillo entered a pretrial intervention program as part of a deferred prosecution agreement “with the State of Florida. Florida offers the program to first-time offenders and some, second-time offenders, Fla. Stat. § 948.08 (2), who are then supervised by probation officers....

...he drug pretrial intervention program. Hewlett was arrested for possession of a controlled substance and her case was assigned to the Broward County drug court. The drug court was created by administrative order, pursuant to the authority granted by section 948.08(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Such limits are necessary to promote stability of decisions and to avoid unseemly contests and differences. Id. Thus, in the instant case, the chief judge exceeded his authority by vacating a colleague's order in an appellate fashion. More importantly, we find part of the administrative order under review to conflict with section 948.08(6), the pretrial intervention statute....

...or appellate process. Id. at 1165. The pretrial intervention program statute in the instant case provides only that if the trial court determines that the defendant has not successfully completed the program, the charges can be prosecuted normally. § 948.08(6)(c)1, Fla....

...No criteria exist within the statute that would require automatic termination from the program. If a defendant does not successfully complete the pretrial intervention program, "the court may order the person to continue in education and treatment or order that the charges revert to the normal channels for prosecution." § 948.08(6)(c)1, Fla. Stat. (1993) (emphasis supplied). Following the reasoning of Valdez, supra, the chief judge has exceeded his authority under both rule 2.050(b) and section 948.08(6) by issuing an administrative order which attempts to amend the pretrial intervention statute by adding terms and conditions that were not part of the original legislation....

...Furthermore, Hewlett meets the "irreparable harm" prong of the test for certiorari jurisdiction. This is so because the order under review terminates Hewlett's continued participation in education and treatment in the pretrial intervention program. § 948.08(6)(c)1, Fla. Stat. (1993). Consequently, Hewlett is precluded from receiving the benefit from section 948.08(6)(c)2, which requires dismissal of the criminal charges upon successful completion of the pretrial program. Section 948.08(6)(c)1 allows the court to order the defendant to continue in education and treatment and the drug court judge, in his discretion, did so....

...However, the chief judge's order terminating Hewlett from the pretrial intervention program and vacating the drug court judge's order thereby caused Hewlett irreparable harm. Accordingly, we quash Administrative Order No. III-94-E-2 (17th Jud.Cir. Sept. 27, 1994) to the extent that it conflicts with section 948.08(6)....

...Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and COPE, JJ. SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge. The appellee Turner was charged with the third degree felony of possession of cocaine. Although, because of his prior multiple felony convictions, the state objected and notwithstanding that section 948.08(2), Florida Statutes (1993) [1] explicitly requires the consent of the state attorney, the "drug court" wrongly offered and Turner voluntarily agreed to his placement in a pretrial intervention program which involved a regimen of drug treatment and rehabilitation....

...n direct contradiction with the explicit statutory admonition that, whenever a defendant has entered and completed a pretrial intervention program, [t]he state attorney shall make the final determination as to whether the prosecution shall continue. § 948.08(5), Fla....

...And he will retain the benefits of his success whether the possession charge is pursued or not. [4] , [5] For these reasons, we reverse the order under review and remand for reinstatement of the information and for further consistent proceedings. NOTES [1] 948.08 Pretrial intervention program....

...[2] While a subsequent amendment to the statute provides that, under some circumstances, one charged with simple possession may be "entitled" both to entry into a drug program and dismissal of the charges if he successfully completes it, Turner would not be eligible even under this scheme because of his prior felonies. § 948.08(6), Fla....

...[5] This analysis — that there has been neither reliance nor prejudice to Turner in his participation in the program — applies equally to preclude acceptance of the suggestion that the state may not rely upon the waiver of speedy trial rights which, under section 948.08(2), the defendant was required to execute if he wished to be admitted to the program.

...oceedings. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Whether or not the state would have refiled possession charges is a matter for future decision-making. If it did, appellant might have been eligible to participate in pretrial intervention as authorized by section 948.08(2), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...The majority misconstrues the governing statute and the prosecutor's discretion in regards to PTI. PTI is a grant of prosecutorial grace as it serves as an alternative to criminal prosecution. See Cleveland v. State, 417 So.2d 653, 654 (Fla.1982); S.K. v. State, 881 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). It is governed by section 948.08, Florida Statutes (2007), which gives the state complete discretion to administer the program....

...ve PTI are all subject to the same statutory rules. The nomenclature chosen by the parties does not amend the statute or deprive the state of its prosecutorial discretion. The question thus becomes whether the state had the statutory authority under section 948.08 to withdraw its offer. [1] Section *738 948.08 grants the state broad discretion to withdraw an offer of PTI under almost any circumstances, especially in a case such as this one....

...Third, and perhaps most important, even assuming the defendant had partially performed under the settlement agreement, and even if the state's decision to void the agreement by withdrawing the offer was unfair, the state has the statutory authority to withdraw its offer of PTI at any time. Section 948.08(4) permits the state to resume prosecution "at any time[,]" even after PTI has been entered into, if it (the state) finds: (1) "the offender is not fulfilling his or her obligations under the plan" or (2) "public interest so requires." Under section 948.08(4), the state alone has the discretion to decide if the "public interest" warrants the withdrawal of a PTI offer....

...ed"). Each of the other District Courts of Appeal recognize the state's sole discretion to withdraw PTI offers or to terminate PTI. The statute places no limits on situations where the PTI offer is in writing and restitution is part of the offer. In section 948.08(4), the legislature gave complete discretion to the state attorney and denied the courts any role in PTI decisions. The majority skirts the authority of section 948.08 — indeed it does not even mention the statute — by arguing general principles of contract law and "fairness." But statutes trump principles of contract law and "fairness." When the defendant agreed to the settlement agreement, he agreed to the terms of the statute. To allow the defendant to rewrite the settlement agreement by prematurely offering to pay restitution, and then to allow the defendant's unilateral act to rewrite section 948.08, is the true unfairness....

...Eng and Myra Fried, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. FARMER, C.J. In this appeal from a conviction for purchase of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for admission into drug court because it misconstrued section 948.08(6)(a)....

...Defendant's only argument in response was that the state had no right to object to his admission. In denying his motion, the trial court explained: "The defense's position is, to put it succinctly, that the defendant would be eligible *1228 to enter the PTI program under F.S. 948.08, even without the State's consent, because he is charged with offenses that are PTI eligible under F.S. 948.08(6)(a), i.e....

...to sentence at trial court level or file motion to correct sentence); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b). We therefore have no choice but to reject his attempt to raise it here for the first time. AFFIRMED. SHAHOOD and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 948.08(6)(a), Fla....

...PER CURIAM. The State of Florida's petition for writ of prohibition or certiorari is denied. The state concedes that respondent meets the statutory criteria for the pretrial substance abuse education and treatment intervention program as provided in section 948.08(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). That section excepts otherwise qualified defendants from admission only upon a showing by the state that the defendant was involved in the dealing or selling of controlled substances. § 948.08(6)(a), Fla. Stat. The state failed to establish that the exception applied in the instant case. We reject the state's argument that we should declare section 948.08(6)(a)-(c) to be an unconstitutional interference with the state attorney's obligation and right to prosecute violations of Chapter 893 of the Florida Statutes....

...and held that the "pretrial diversion decision of the state attorney is prosecutorial in nature and, thus, is not subject to judicial review." Id. at 654. However, the Cleveland opinion involved the general pretrial intervention program set forth in section 948.08(2) (previously codified at § 944.025, Fla....

...The statute proscribing the requirements for the general pretrial intervention program explicitly conditions eligibility on the state's consent and provides that the state must ultimately determine whether to dismiss the charges or continue prosecution. See § 948.08(2) and (5). In contrast, section 948.08(6) concerning the drug pretrial intervention program does not make the state's consent a prerequisite to eligibility and mandates that the trial court determine whether to order further treatment, dismiss the charges, or continue prosecution....

...N.S.’s successful completion of the PAY agreement. R.K.’s parents filed a motion requesting the trial court to set aside the PAY agreement, claiming that mandatory counseling should have been required and that the terms of the agreement violated section 948.08(2), of the Florida Statutes 2 since *1211 the agreement constituted a pretrial intervention and diversion agreement but neither R.K....

...makes no mention of the victim or victim’s representatives; therefore, no error occurred. The parents also contend that the instant PAY agreement should have been set aside because the state attorney did not obtain R.K.’s consent as required by section 948.08(2), Florida Statutes. How *1213 ever, such consent was not required. Section 948.08(1) states that the Department shall supervise pretrial intervention programs for persons charged with a crime, before or after any information has been filed or an indictment has been returned in the circuit court. The trial court was correct in holding that the provision of section 948.08(2) were inapplicable since Chapter 948 only applies to defendants who are charged by information or indictment and the instant delinquency charges were filed by petition, not indictment or information....

...e if it believed that one was necessary. However, the provisions in the PAY agreement were deemed adequate. AFFIRMED. SAWAYA, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. . “PAY” is an acronym used to refer to prosecution alternatives for youth agreements. . Section 948.08(2) of the Florida Statutes provides: 948.08....

...noted in Pena, since courts may not be in agreement as to the jurisdiction issue, and as it may be reviewable by petition, we address the merits. PTI programs are a creation of the legislature. State v. Board, 565 So.2d 880, 881 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Section 948.08, Florida Statutes, allows certain first offenders or persons convicted of not more than one non-violent misdemeanor or third-degree felony to be placed in PTI....

...Batista was entered into the first type of PTI program, notwithstanding that one of his charges was drug possession. The Florida statute clearly grants the state attorney the right to make a final determination as to whether the prosecution will continue. § 948.08(5)(c), Fla....

...In Board, the Fifth District held that the trial court's grant of specific performance resulting in reinstatement of a defendant to pre-trial intervention status was outside its authority. 565 So.2d at 881. There, the court recognized that the statute, section 948.08, explicitly recognizes the state's right to determine whether to resume prosecution of the charges against a defendant....

...ention program or receive a meaningful hearing, he filed this petition for writ of error coram nobis which the trial judge dismissed. Since it is clear that a defendant may be subjected at the option of the state to pretrial intervention pursuant to section 948.08, Florida Statutes (1995), with one notable exception, the trial judge correctly observed that the state's discretion is entirely non-reviewable....

...play. This trial court provided that forum. Once the prosecutor offered Upshaw a drug court program, and Upshaw accepted the offer, there was essentially a plea bargain. The plea bargain was tracked and monitored under the auspices of the court and section 948.08(6), Florida Statutes (1993). The relevant parts of section 948.08(6) state: (a) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, a person who is charged with a felony of the second or third degree for purchase or possession of a controlled substance under chapter 893, and who has not previously been co...

...deny the defendant's admission into a pretrial intervention program. ..... (c) 2. The court shall dismiss the charges upon a finding that the defendant has successfully completed the pretrial intervention program. Here, the State offered Upshaw the section 948.08 "drug court" program. In doing *853 so, it waived its statutory right to a "preadmission hearing" on Upshaw's eligibility. At the same time, it acquiesced to dismissal upon Upshaw's successful completion of the program. § 948.08(6)(c)(2), Fla....

...Lastly, because the State has the sole discretion to prosecute, it likewise has the sole discretion to drop or reduce any of Upshaw's charges. Therefore, as the State routinely does, it could discretionarily drop or reduce Upshaw's charges to place Upshaw entirely within section 948.08, Florida Statutes....

...rogram, and because the State acquiesced to a statutory dismissal if Upshaw performed under the agreement, and because we will not tolerate a governmental breach of faith in a judicial forum, the trial court properly dismissed Upshaw's charges under section 948.08(6)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...We ordered the petitioner's immediate release on June 17, 2004. We now grant the writ and issue this opinion. The defendant was arrested and charged with possession of heroin and drug paraphernalia. She pled not guilty and "opted" into the drug court pretrial intervention program, pursuant to section 948.08(6), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...the program rules. However, this does not prohibit the court from using incarceration as a sanction for participants who choose to remain in the program. In 1994, the Florida Legislature added subsection (6) to the pretrial intervention statute. See § 948.08(6), Fla....

...That order provides: "Defendants arrested on or after October 1, 1993, who are otherwise eligible may participate in the program. Participation is strictly on a voluntary basis. " See Administrative Order III-99-3-E, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit (emphasis added). It is this language which dictates the result in this case. Section 948.08(6) provides two alternatives when the defendant fails to successfully complete the pretrial intervention program....

...e pre-trial drug court program is the right to a speedy trial. [5] We also note the facts in Diaz differ from those in this case. First, the court in this case did not discharge the defendant from the program as was done in Diaz. Rather, pursuant to section 948.08(6), the court continued the defendant in education and treatment — that treatment happened to be located in an incarcerated setting....

...The State of Florida seeks certiorari review of a circuit court order that authorizes Jeffrey Leukel's entry into a pretrial intervention drug court program. The State objects to the court-ordered diversion into the drug court program and asserts that section 948.08(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), does not apply to respondent Leukel because he is not charged with committing one of the enumerated offenses therein....

...41 by driving while his license was permanently revoked, and section 322.34(2)(b) by driving while his license was revoked as a subsequent offender. On 27 March 2007, Leukel filed a motion to be allowed into a pretrial drug court program pursuant to section 948.08(6)(a). The State objected to Leukel's entry into that program as he had not been charged with an offense eligible for drug court pursuant to the plain language of section 948.08(6)(a)....

...However, the psychologist testified that Leukel's decision to drive without a license was the result of an emotional relapse related to his alcoholism. In an order dated 1 June 2007, the trial court found that the list of offenses eligible for a drug court program found in section 948.08(6)(a) was not exclusive. The court therefore authorized Leukel to enter the drug court program established in Seminole County. Section 948.08(2) provides that any first offender or any person previously convicted of not more than one nonviolent misdemeanor, who is charged with any misdemeanor *294 or felony of the third-degree, is eligible for release to a pretrial intervent...

...ogram on the approval of the administrator of the program and the consent of the victim, the state attorney, and the judge who presided at the initial appearance hearing. See also State v. Board, 565 So.2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). On the other hand, section 948.08(6)(a) allows defendants charged with certain crimes to be placed in a substance abuse education and treatment program, including a drug court program, without the consent of the state attorney....

...If the state attorney establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence at such hearing, that the defendant was involved in the dealing or selling of controlled substances, the court shall deny the defendant's admission into a pretrial intervention program. § 948.08(6)(a)....

...completed the drug court program, the court may order further treatment or order that the charges revert to the normal channels for prosecution. After successful completion of a treatment-based drug court program, the charges must be dismissed. See § 948.08(6)(c). Although Leukel was not charged with committing one of the crimes enumerated in section 948.08(6)(a), the trial court nevertheless admitted him to the drug court program finding that section 948.08(6)(a) must be read in harmony with section *295 397.334(2), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...The court stated that section 397.334(2) would allow any person who has a substance abuse problem to enter the pretrial drug court program, as long as he or she is not involved with drug dealing and had not previously rejected a pretrial substance abuse program. Unlike section 948.08(6), section 397.334 does not provide for the dismissal of criminal charges upon successful completion of a treatment-based drug court program....

...Section 397.334 authorizes counties to fund treatment-based drug court programs and emphasizes that participation in such programs shall be voluntary. The statute also adopts the ten key components of drug court, recognized by the U.S. Department of Justice. Section 948.08(6)(a), on the other hand, sets forth the eligibility requirements for admission into a drug court program upon the motion of either party or the court's own motion....

...01-19-S implemented the drug court program in Seminole County so that the substance abuse education and treatment program described in section 948.06(6)(a) could become operational in that county. The administrative order stated that its drug court was established pursuant to section 948.08(6)(a)....

...es. An administrative order cannot amend a statute by adding terms and conditions that were not part of the original legislation. See Hewlett v. State, 661 So.2d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Under the trial court's interpretation of sections 397.334 and 948.08(6)(a), the trial court would have sole discretion in every case to determine whether a defendant should be admitted to a drug court program, as long as he or she did not previously reject an offer for substance abuse treatment and is not a drug dealer. Section 948.08(6)(a) does not support that interpretation. The trial court exceeded its authority under section 948.08(6)(a) and the administrative order in permitting Leukel to enter the drug court program. Under the doctrine of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the mention of one thing excludes another thing not mentioned), the legislature would not have enumerated the offenses in section 948.08(6)(a) if it intended to authorize the trial court to determine whether a defendant charged with any crime should be admitted to a drug court program....

...ere is no reason to resort to rules of statutory interpretation and construction, and the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984), cited in State v. VanBebber, 848 So.2d 1046 (Fla.2003). Section 948.08(6)(a) is clear and definite in its meaning. If section 948.08(6)(a) must be harmonized with section 397.334, section 397.334 is the general statute concerning implementation of drug court programs, while section 948.08(6)(a) is the specific statute concerning the eligibility requirements for entry into drug court programs....

...All four respondents, Ashby Nelson, Timothy P. Hopper, Amy Wells and Jeffrey W. Davis are represented by the public defender's office. In their criminal cases below, the public defender filed a motion to allow each defendant entry into the pretrial intervention program, pursuant to section 948.08(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...If the defendant meets the requirements of section 6(a), he or she may be admitted to the program upon the motion of the party or the court, with exceptions spelled out in subsections 1. and 2., which are apparently not applicable to these cases. Gullett distinguished the drug pretrial intervention program of section 948.08(6)(a) and (b) from the general pretrial intervention program, which "explicitly conditions eligibility on the state's consent and provides that the state must ultimately determine whether to dismiss the charges or continue prosecution." See § 948.08(2) and (5), Fla. Stat. Compare Cleveland v. State, 417 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1982) (with regard to the general pretrial intervention program of section 948.08(2), the decision of the state attorney is prosecutorial in nature and not subject to judicial review). The difficulty in this case is that pursuant to section 948.08(6)(a), as a prerequisite there must be in place a "pretrial substance abuse education and treatment intervention program approved by the chief judge of the circuit," in order for persons to be admitted to it....

...The agreement provided that if Rubel met its terms, the charges would be dismissed. Rubel was removed from the program as a result of his failure to satisfy a worthless check and to make certain payments prescribed in the agreement. This proceeding implicates the purpose and application of section 948.08(4), Florida Statutes (1991), which provides that the: Resumption of pending criminal proceedings shall be undertaken at any time if the program administrator or state attorney finds such individual is not fulfilling his obligations under this plan or if the public interest so requires....

...in direct contradiction with the explicit statutory admonition that, whenever a defendant has entered and completed a pretrial intervention program, "[t]he state attorney shall make the final determination as to whether the prosecution shall continue." See § 948.08(5), Fla....

...hey therefore did not comply with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(4). Petitioner argues that since the waivers of counsel were not in compliance with the rule, the waivers of speedy trial and the statute of limitations were also invalid. Section 948.08(2), Florida Statutes, specifically requires consultation with counsel prior to placement in the PTI program and waiver of the right of speedy trial and the statute of limitations....

...Diaz subsequently filed this petition. In the petition, Mr. Diaz argues that his confinement is illegal because there is no statutory authorization for the imposition of a jail sentence upon violation of PTI. We agree. The pretrial intervention program is governed by section 948.08, Florida Statutes (2003). The only "sanctions" available to the trial court for failure to abide by the conditions of PTI are contained in section 948.08(6)(c)(1)....

...1st DCA 2009) (Hawkes, J., dissenting). In Simons, this court held that a defendant can force the State to comply with a settlement agreement in a pretrial intervention program, in which the State has complete discretion to consent to enter. Id. at 736. See § 948.08(2), Fla....

...order such restitution. * ⅜ * (b) 1. If the court does not order restitution, or orders restitution of only a portion of the damages, as provided in *219 this section, it shall state on the record in detail the reasons therefor.- (emphasis added). Section 948.08, Florida Statutes (2006), concerning conditions of a defendant’s probation, also imposes a restitution requirement: (1) The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation.......

...pon N.S.'s successful completion of the PAY agreement. R.K.'s parents filed a motion requesting the trial court to set aside the PAY agreement, claiming that mandatory counseling should have been required and that the terms of the agreement violated section 948.08(2), of the Florida Statutes [2] since *1211 the agreement constituted a pretrial intervention and diversion agreement but neither R.K....

...and makes no mention of the victim or victim's representatives; therefore, no error occurred. The parents also contend that the instant PAY agreement should have been set aside because the state attorney did not obtain R.K.'s consent as required by section 948.08(2), Florida Statutes. However, *1213 such consent was not required. Section 948.08(1) states that the Department shall supervise pretrial intervention programs for persons charged with a crime, before or after any information has been filed or an indictment has been returned in the circuit court. The trial court was correct in holding that the provision of section 948.08(2) were inapplicable since Chapter 948 only applies to defendants who are charged by information or indictment and the instant delinquency charges were filed by petition, not indictment or information....

...t believed that one was necessary. However, the provisions in the PAY agreement were deemed adequate. AFFIRMED. SAWAYA, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] "PAY" is an acronym used to refer to prosecution alternatives for youth agreements. [2] Section 948.08(2) of the Florida Statutes provides: 948.08....

...pecifically advised him that pretrial detention in a treatment program could be imposed if he violated the terms of the program. In July 2009, Walker was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine. He entered into a DPA and the PTI program. See § 948.08(6)(a), Fla....

...r to a plea agreement. State v. Dempsey, 916 So.2d 856, 859 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In the PTI program, the defendant agrees to abide by the terms and conditions of the DPA. Upon successful completion of the program, the court dismisses the charges. See § 948.08(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). A felony PTI program must be at least one year in duration. § 948.08(6)(a), Fla....

...rogram. 884 So.2d at 299. In 2006, after Diaz and Mullin, the legislature responded, amending the statute to expressly provide that incarceration or placement in jail-based drug programs may be imposed as a sanction. Ch. 2006-97, § 8, Laws of Fla.; § 948.08(6)(b), Fla....

...time limits established for contempt of court. The coordinated strategy must be provided in writing to the participant before the participant agrees to enter into a pretrial treatment-based drug court program or other pretrial intervention program. § 948.08(6)(b), Fla....

...— such as the right to speedy trial and pretrial release, the requirements and potential sanctions for violations of PTI should be set forth clearly, provided to, and agreed to by the defendant in writing. Indeed, the statute requires as much. See § 948.08(6)(b), Fla....

to report to the probation supervisor [see section 948.-08(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1983) ]. Without such

that because he satisfied the criteria under section 948.08(7), he was entitled to admission in a veterans'

...The lawyers are then provided skills training or professional enhancement, thereby diverting serious matters of misconduct. We note that a similar pretrial intervention program operating in the criminal justice system has been effective in dealing with persons charged with nonviolent offenses. See § 948.08, Fla.Stat....

...State, 276 So. 3d 797, 803 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). We find no error in the trial court permitting and considering the purported victim’s testimony at the second hearing. However, although a victim’s objections must be heard and considered, they are not determinative. Section 948.08(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2020), provides the criteria “for voluntary admission into a pretrial substance abuse education and treatment intervention program, including a treatment-based drug court program.” A defendant is eligible for voluntary admission if he or she: 1....

...including, but not limited to, murder, sexual battery, robbery, carjacking, home-invasion robbery, or any other crime involving violence. 4. Has two or fewer felony convictions, provided that the prior convictions are for nonviolent felonies. § 948.08(6)(b)1.–4., Fla....

...The “pretrial intervention program” statute further provides that, “[f]or purposes of this subsection, the term ‘nonviolent felony’ means a third degree felony violation of chapter 810 or any other felony offense that is not a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08.” § 948.08(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020). With the possible exception of section 948.08(6)(b)1., Petitioner meets the eligibility requirements....

...5th DCA 1990) (noting that attempted burglary of a dwelling is a “non-violent third degree felony” under section 810.02, Florida Statutes); Butler v. State, 513 So. 2d 780, 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (same). If the trial court determines that Petitioner meets all of section 948.08(6)(b)’s eligibility requirements, including section 948.08(6)(b)1., “[u]pon motion of either party or the court’s own motion, and with the agreement of the defendant, the court shall admit an eligible person into a pretrial substance abuse education and treatment intervention program . . . .” § 948.08(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added). This is subject to three exceptions that neither party contends are applicable here. Thus, if Petitioner met the eligibility requirements of section 948.08(6)(b), the trial court shall admit him into the program, regardless of the inclinations of either the purported victim or the trial court. Conclusion Petitioner has established that the trial court...

...essential requirements of law by finding, “due to the charge and the victim’s objections,” that he was “not eligible for drug court” (emphasis added). If Petitioner meets the eligibility criteria and does not fall under any of the three exceptions set forth in section 948.08(6)(c)1.–3., the trial 3 court lacks the authority to exercise its discretion and exclude Petitioner from the program. Due to the failure to provide notice to the purported victim which led...

...Further, section 907.041(4)(c)7, Florida Statutes (2014), provides that a court may, within its discretion, order pretrial detention if a defendant violates pretrial release conditions. PTI is a discretionary form of pretrial release. See § 948.08(1)–(2)1, Fla. Stat. (2013). The prosecution of a defendant on pretrial release for PTI who does 1 Section 948.08 provides as follows: 948.08 Pretrial intervention program 2 not fulfill his or her obligations may continue at the discretion of the prosecuting authority....

...*461 The State of Florida seeks certiorari review of the trial court's order authorizing Edward Scott Frank to enter into a pretrial intervention ("PTI") program. The State objects to Frank's court-ordered placement in the program without its consent and argues that section 948.08(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), does not apply to Frank because although he was charged with committing one of the enumerated offenses, he was neither identified as having a substance abuse problem nor admitted to a substance abuse education and treatment program. We agree and quash the order. Frank was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia and petit theft. Frank motioned the trial court for entry into a PTI program pursuant to section 948.08(6)(a)....

...His motion stated that Frank had been evaluated for alcohol and substance abuse, but the examiner determined that no treatment was necessary. Thereafter, without notice to, or consent from, the State, the trial court entered an order granting Frank's motion and placing him in a self-supervised PTI program. Section 948.08(2), Florida Statutes (2018), provides that PTI is available to "[a]ny first offender ......

...who is charged with any misdemeanor or felony of the third degree ... on the approval of the administrator of the program and the consent of the victim, the state attorney, and the judge who presided at the initial appearance hearing of the offender." Thus, entry into a PTI program under section 948.08(2) requires the State's consent. However, section 948.08(6)(a) allows a defendant to be placed into a pretrial substance abuse education and treatment intervention program without the State's consent when the defendant is charged with a nonviolent felony and is identified as having a substan...

...or is charged with a felony of the second or third degree for purchase or possession of a controlled substance under chapter 893, ... has not been charged with a crime involving violence ... and ... has not previously been convicted of a felony.... § 948.08(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018) ; see King v. Nelson , 746 So.2d 1217 , 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that if defendant meets requirements under section 948.08(6)(a), he or she may be admitted to pretrial substance abuse and treatment intervention program upon motion of party or court). Entry into a PTI program pursuant to section 948.08(6)(a) requires participation in a substance abuse education intervention program, which may include a treatment-based drug court program, for not less than one year. § 948.08(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). When the court places a defendant into a PTI program under section 948.08(2) over the State's objection, the court acts in excess of its authority and certiorari relief is proper. State v. Espinoza , 42 So.3d 895 , 896 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ; State v. Pugh , 42 So.3d 343 , 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). Similarly, when the court places a defendant into a PTI program under section 948.08(6)(a), but, as here, the defendant is ineligible, certiorari relief is proper. *462 Frank could not be ordered into a PTI program under section 948.08(2) because the State refused to consent. Likewise, Frank could not be ordered into a pretrial substance abuse educational treatment program under section 948.08(6)(a) because he was not ordered into an approved program for at least one year....

...*461 The State of Florida seeks certiorari review of the trial court's order authorizing Edward Scott Frank to enter into a pretrial intervention ("PTI") program. The State objects to Frank's court-ordered placement in the program without its consent and argues that section 948.08(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), does not apply to Frank because although he was charged with committing one of the enumerated offenses, he was neither identified as having a substance abuse problem nor admitted to a substance abuse education and treatment program. We agree and quash the order. Frank was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia and petit theft. Frank motioned the trial court for entry into a PTI program pursuant to section 948.08(6)(a)....

...His motion stated that Frank had been evaluated for alcohol and substance abuse, but the examiner determined that no treatment was necessary. Thereafter, without notice to, or consent from, the State, the trial court entered an order granting Frank's motion and placing him in a self-supervised PTI program. Section 948.08(2), Florida Statutes (2018), provides that PTI is available to "[a]ny first offender ......

...who is charged with any misdemeanor or felony of the third degree ... on the approval of the administrator of the program and the consent of the victim, the state attorney, and the judge who presided at the initial appearance hearing of the offender." Thus, entry into a PTI program under section 948.08(2) requires the State's consent. However, section 948.08(6)(a) allows a defendant to be placed into a pretrial substance abuse education and treatment intervention program without the State's consent when the defendant is charged with a nonviolent felony and is identified as having a substan...

...or is charged with a felony of the second or third degree for purchase or possession of a controlled substance under chapter 893, ... has not been charged with a crime involving violence ... and ... has not previously been convicted of a felony.... § 948.08(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018) ; see King v. Nelson , 746 So.2d 1217 , 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that if defendant meets requirements under section 948.08(6)(a), he or she may be admitted to pretrial substance abuse and treatment intervention program upon motion of party or court). Entry into a PTI program pursuant to section 948.08(6)(a) requires participation in a substance abuse education intervention program, which may include a treatment-based drug court program, for not less than one year. § 948.08(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). When the court places a defendant into a PTI program under section 948.08(2) over the State's objection, the court acts in excess of its authority and certiorari relief is proper. State v. Espinoza , 42 So.3d 895 , 896 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ; State v. Pugh , 42 So.3d 343 , 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). Similarly, when the court places a defendant into a PTI program under section 948.08(6)(a), but, as here, the defendant is ineligible, certiorari relief is proper. *462 Frank could not be ordered into a PTI program under section 948.08(2) because the State refused to consent. Likewise, Frank could not be ordered into a pretrial substance abuse educational treatment program under section 948.08(6)(a) because he was not ordered into an approved program for at least one year....

the initial appear-anee hearing of the offender. § 948.08(2), Fla.Stat. (1993) (emphasis added). For present

...tion. The state appeals, arguing that the trial court did not have the statutory authority to dismiss the charges over the objection of the state. We agree and reverse. It appears that the trial court may have failed to grasp the distinction between section 948.08(1-5), Florida Statutes (2006), which authorizes pretrial intervention in general, and section 948.08(6), which specifically covers, and is limited to, pretrial substance abuse intervention. The intervention program applicable here, which does not involve substance abuse, provides in section 948.08(5): At the end of the intervention period, the administrator shall recommend: (a) That the case revert to normal channels for prosecution in instances in which the offender’s participation in the program has been unsatisfactory; (b)...

...f further supervision; or (c) That dismissal of charges without prejudice shall be entered in instances in which prosecution is not deemed necessary. The state attorney shall make the final determination as to whether the prosecution shall continue. Section 948.08(6), which is limited to pretrial intervention for substance abuse, does not contain the emphasized provision leaving final determination as to prosecution up to the state....

...suspected of selling drugs, no prior rejection of participation after being offered drug court assistance, etc.), the local administrative order grafted additional criteria and exceptions not found in Florida law. This, a local circuit’s administrative order may not do. Section 948.08, Florida Statutes, establishes various pretrial intervention programs within the State....

...To be eligible for admission into a drug court program, the statute provides that a defendant must (1) be identified as having a substance abuse problem or charged with purchase or possession or other specified crimes, (2) have no prior felony convictions, and (3) not be charged with a crime involving violence. § 948.08(6)(a), Fla....

...15, 2017). The local administrative order clearly contravenes the enabling statute by adding terms and conditions that were not part of the original legislation. See Hewlett v. State, 661 So. 2d 112, 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“[T]he chief judge has exceeded his authority under both rule 2.050(b) and section 948.08(6) by issuing an administrative order which attempts to amend the pretrial intervention statute by adding terms and conditions that were not part of the original legislation.”). Further, while section 948.08 provides for the establishment of a drug court program upon 2 approval by a chief judge, Florida law does not recognize the authority of a chief judge, through the promulgation of an administrativ...

....” Hewlett, 661 So. 2d at 115. Preclusion from receiving the benefit of a pretrial intervention program causes irreparable harm. Id. at 116. Accordingly, we quash Administrative Order 2017-04 (19th Jud. Cir. Feb. 15, 2017) to the extent that it conflicts with section 948.08(6)....

...who is charged with a nonviolent felony and is identified as having a substance abuse problem” is “eligible for voluntary admission into a pretrial substance abuse education and treatment intervention program” upon motion of a party or the court. § 948.08(6)(a), Fla....

...Defendants whose offenses occurred on or after October 1, 1997, shall be eligible to participate in such program if they are charged with a second or third degree drug purchase/possession offense under Chapter 893 in accordance with the criteria of Section 948.08(6), Florida Statutes....

...Appellant was charged with a first degree felony (the trafficking charge), which disqualified him under the administrative order that allows participation for only those 2 charged with a second or third degree offense. The administrative order, however, conflicts with section 948.08(6)(a), Florida Statutes, which extends eligibility to a “nonviolent felony,” whose applicable statutory definition includes the charge against Appellant....

...For that reason, Appellant is correct that his case was eligible for possible transfer to the pre-trial treatment-based program notwithstanding the administrative order. Cf. Gincley v. State, No. 4D18-3067, 2019 WL 1371941 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 27, 2019) (quashing a circuit court administrative order that conflicted with section 948.08(6)). Though Appellant was eligible under section 948.8(6), the trial court’s denial of his motion was not an abuse of discretion. Transfers to pre-trial treatment-based programs are discretionary, not mandatory, placing the dec...

...The defendant petitions for a writ of mandamus, or in the alternative a writ of certiorari, to compel his admission into veterans’ court. The defendant argues that because he satisfies the criteria for eligibility into veterans’ court as stated in section 948.08(7), Florida Statutes (2018), he is entitled to admission into veterans’ court. The veterans’ court judge rejected the defendant’s interpretation of section 948.08(7), and exercised its discretion to deny the defendant’s admission into veterans’ court. As a matter of first impression, based on our interpretation of section 948.08(7)’s plain language, we hold that a defendant who satisfies section 948.08(7)’s criteria is “eligible” for, but not entitled to, admission into veterans’ court....

...each charge consecutively, he faces a maximum of 130 years in prison. The defendant’s case initially was assigned to a felony criminal division. However, fifteen months after being charged, the defendant filed a motion to transfer his case to veterans’ court pursuant to section 948.08(7), Florida Statutes (2018). Section 948.08(7) provides, in pertinent part: (a) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, a person who is charged with a felony, other than a felony listed in s. 948.06(8)(c), and identified as a veteran, as defined in s....

...jail-based treatment programs, or order that the charges revert to normal channels for prosecution. The court shall dismiss the charges upon a finding that the defendant has successfully completed the pretrial intervention program. § 948.08(7), Fla....

...determine whether to admit the defendant into veterans’ court. However, the state mentioned that the veterans’ court judge had “never accepted anybody over the state’s objection in ten years.” Defense counsel responded, “[M]y review of [section 948.08(7)] seems to suggest that as long as the veteran meets the criteria, he’s eligible for the drug court, that it’s ....

...court judge determine whether to admit the defendant into veterans’ court. Before the parties appeared before the veterans’ court judge, the defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of his motion to transfer. The defendant’s memorandum argued that as long as he met section 948.08(7)’s eligibility requirements, neither the state’s objection nor the state’s lack of consent could prevent his admission into veterans’ court. 3  The state filed a written objection. The state argued section 948.08(7) does not require that an “eligible” defendant be admitted into veterans’ court....

...4. The Parties’ Arguments on this Petition This petition for mandamus, or in the alternative a writ of certiorari, followed. The defendant argues that because he satisfies the criteria for eligibility into veterans’ court stated in section 948.08(7), he is entitled to admission into veterans’ court....

...other exceptions and no other circumstances in the statute regarding eligibility that should prevent [the defendant’s] lawful admission into the program.” (capitalization removed). Relying on our decision in State v. Gullett, 652 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), which interpreted section 948.08(6)’s criteria for drug court, the defendant further argues, “there is no provision or standing for the State to object or for the State’s lack of consent to prevent admission into the Program.” The defendant concludes his petition by arguing, “[o]utside of the eligibility and charge-exclusion requirements [of section 948.08(7)], the Statute creates no prosecutorial or judicial discretion: if the veteran meets the requirements set forth, the veteran is eligible for the Veterans’ pretrial intervention program.” The state responds that certiorari, not mandamus, is the proper method for seeking review of a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion to transfer into a diversion program under section 948.08....

...possibility of discharge if [the defendant] successfully completed the program, but discharge would still be discretionary.” As for a lack of departure from the essential requirements of law, the state argues: There are no cases that interpret section 948.08(7)(a). The plain language of section 948.08(7)(a) merely establishes eligibility requirements for a veterans’ diversion program....

...defendant’s] assertion that he has a mandatory right to be transferred into diversion is without merit. Furthermore, [the defendant’s] assertion that the veterans’ treatment program approved by the chief judge conflicts with the language of section 948.08(7)(a) is also without merit. As section 948.08(7)(a) gives the chief judge discretion to establish and approve a veterans’ treatment program, and [section 948.08(7)(a)] does not provide a mandatory right to participate in such a program, the program approved by the chief judge is not in conflict with the statute. .... In this case, the trial court exercised its discretion in denying [the defendant’s] motion to transfer....

...While it is true that the trial court decided not to overrule the State’s objection, the record reflects that the trial court was aware that it had discretion to overrule the State’s objection. The trial court correctly found that section 948.08(7)(a) is not mandatory. In reply, the defendant argues that his petition established irreparable harm....

...And more specifically here, the defendant argues, irreparable harm exists because the denial of his motion to transfer into veterans’ court precludes him from having his charges mandatorily dismissed upon his successful completion of the veterans’ court program, pursuant to section 948.08(7)(c). 5. Our Review a. Certiorari, Not Mandamus, is the Proper Remedy As discussed more fully below, we conclude that a defendant who satisfies section 948.08(7)’s criteria is merely “eligible” for, but not entitled to, admission into veterans’ court, and that a judge’s decision on whether to admit an eligible and willing defendant into veterans’ court is a discretionary act, not a ministerial duty....

...remedy on appeal, i.e., that the petitioner has suffered irreparable harm. Gincley v. State, 267 So. 3d 444, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). To the extent the defendant’s petition is based on a theory that the administrative order upon which the veterans’ court judge relied has amended section 948.08(7)’s eligibility criteria for veterans’ court, that theory, if true, would constitute a departure from the essential requirements of the law. See Hewlett, 661 So. 2d at 115-16 (where a chief judge exceeded his authority under both Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b) and section 948.08(6) by issuing an administrative order which attempted to amend the pretrial intervention statute by adding terms and conditions that were not part of the original legislation, such an order constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of the law); Gincley, 267 So....

....”) (quoting Hewlett, 661 So. 2d at 115; internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). To the extent the defendant’s petition is also based on a theory that the veterans’ court judge’s unauthorized order has precluded him from receiving the benefit from section 948.08(7)(c), which requires dismissal of the criminal charges upon successful completion of the veterans’ court program, that theory, if true, would constitute irreparable harm. See Hewlett, 661 So. 2d at 116 (where a chief judge’s unauthorized order terminating a defendant from a pretrial intervention program precluded the defendant from obtaining dismissal of the charges under section 948.08(6) upon successfully completing the program, such an order met the “irreparable harm” prong of the test for certiorari jurisdiction); Gincley, 267 So....

...). b. No Departure from the Essential Requirements of Law is Shown However, the defendant has not shown a departure from the essential requirements of the law in this case, because: (1) the veterans’ court judge properly recognized that under section 948.08(7), he possessed the discretion to deny the defendant’s admission into veterans’ court; and (2) the veterans’ court judge properly exercised that discretion in this case. Our conclusion turns on the plain meaning of the word “eligible” as used in the phrase “eligible for voluntary admission” in section 948.08(7)(a)....

...The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “eligible” as “qualified to participate or be chosen.” Eligible, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/eligible (last visited May 29, 2019). Applying that definition to section 948.08(7)(a), the statute merely provides the criteria which the defendant must satisfy to be “qualified to participate or be chosen” for veterans’ court, but does not require his automatic admission into veterans’ court, if qualified. Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that section 948.08(7)(a) refers to the defendant’s admission into veterans’ court being “voluntary.” The 10 Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “voluntary” as “proceeding from the will or from one’s own choice or consent.” Voluntary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/voluntary (last visited May 29, 2019). Applying that definition to section 948.08(7)(a), the statute merely provides that a defendant cannot be admitted into veterans’ court against the defendant’s “own choice or consent,” not that a defendant possesses unilateral power to decide whether to be admitted into veterans’ court. In the absence of any language in section 948.08(7) requiring an eligible and willing defendant’s admission into veterans’ court, it is logically left to the judge’s discretion whether to admit an eligible and willing defendant into veterans’ court. As with any discretio...

...whether to admit an eligible and willing defendant into veterans’ court may not be abused. Such an abuse of discretion would occur if a judge (or a circuit) issued any kind of blanket policy, rules, criteria, etc., in addition to those set forth in section 948.08(7), which would foreclose an otherwise eligible and willing defendant from being admitted into veterans’ court....

...2d at 115 (chief judge’s administrative order, directing that a defendant be terminated from drug court if the defendant has been rearrested and charged for DUI, exceeded chief judge’s authority under both Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b) and section 948.08(6), by adding terms and conditions that were not part of the original legislation); Gincley, 267 So....

...part of the original legislation). Here, we see nothing in Fifteenth Circuit Administrative Order 4.905- 11/10, or in the order’s incorporated program manual, which contains any kind of blanket policy, rules, criteria, etc., in addition to those set forth in section 948.08(7), which would foreclose an otherwise eligible and willing defendant from being admitted into veterans’ court. On the contrary, the order’s incorporated manual contains key phrases indicating that the determination of whether...

...Probation.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). We also see nothing in the veterans’ court judge’s statements, or in his written order, indicating that he applied any kind of blanket policy, rules, criteria, etc., in addition to those set forth in section 948.08(7), in denying the defendant’s admission into veterans’ court....

...state’s (or anyone’s) concurrence would constitute an abdication of the judge’s discretion, and thus an abuse of discretion. Further, conditioning the dismissal of charges at the time of graduation upon the state’s agreement would contravene section 948.08(7)(c)’s first and last sentences: “At the end of the pretrial intervention period, the court shall consider ....

...the recommendation of the state attorney as to disposition of the pending 12 charges. . . . The court shall dismiss the charges upon a finding that the defendant has successfully completed the pretrial intervention program.” § 948.08(7)(c), Fla....

...We trust that the veterans’ court judge and the state will continue to be cognizant of our observations going forward. Conclusion In sum, we hold as a matter of first impression, based on our interpretation of section 948.08(7)’s plain language, that a defendant who satisfies section 948.08(7)’s criteria is “eligible” for, but not entitled to, admission into veterans’ court. The judge has the discretion to decide whether to admit an eligible and willing defendant into veterans’ court. Here, although the defendant satisfied the criteria for eligibility into veterans’ court, as stated in section 948.08(7), the veterans’ court judge properly exercised his discretion to deny the defendant’s admission into veterans’ court. Based on the foregoing, we deny the defendant’s petition for a writ of mandamus, or in the alternative a...

...However, we grant the petitioner’s motion for certification as a matter of great public importance. We certify the following question of great public importance: Is a defendant who satisfies the criteria for eligibility into veterans’ court as stated in section 948.08(7), Florida Statutes (2018), entitled to admission into veterans’ court, or does a judge have discretion to deny an otherwise eligible defendant’s admission into veterans’ court on a case-by-case basis, based on factors such as the nature of the defendant’s charges and the defendant’s possible sentences, as long as the judge does not apply any kind of blanket policy, rules, or criteria, in addition to those set forth in section 948.08(7)? GROSS and CONNER, JJ., concur. * * * No further motions for rehearing shall be permitted. 2 

..., the trial court’s ruling is reviewable on direct appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel apparent on the face of the record; and (3) the trial court erred in finding her ineligible for drug court based upon an erroneous interpretation of section 948.08(6)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2020)....

...am (drug court) with respect to both of Appellant’s criminal cases. The trial court granted that request for Case 1, but it found Appellant ineligible for admission pertaining to Case 2 based on the court’s analysis of “the plain meaning” of section 948.08(6)(b)2. Based on the court’s ruling, Appellant entered a global open nolo contendere plea, specifically reserving the right to appeal the partial denial of her motion requesting placement in drug court....

...circumstances to be precluded here. 319 So. 3d at 171. Determining that prohibition relief is available here, we next determine whether the trial court exceeded its case jurisdiction. Three statutes are material to this analysis: sections 948.08(7)(a), 948.16(2)(a), and 394.47891(4) and (8), Florida Statutes (2021). Section 948.08 discusses different pretrial intervention programs, including the veterans treatment court programs for persons charged with qualifying felonies. 1 Section 948.08(7)(a) provides: A person who is charged with a felony, other than a felony listed in s....

...ntent clear. 5  veterans treatment court program under s. 394.47891 is eligible for admission into a veterans treatment court program pursuant to the requirements of s. 394.47891(4) and (8). § 948.08(7)(a), Fla....

...power to determine which defendants charged by the state attorney are eligible for [the program].” State v. Leukel, 979 So. 2d 292, 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). Additionally, we agree with the state that if Mancuso successfully completes veterans court, sections 948.16(4) and 948.08(7)(c), Florida Statutes (2021), require that his criminal case be dismissed. Finally, the lower court’s failure to comply with sections 394.47891(4) and (8)(a) constituted a clear departure from the essential requirements of the law....

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING PER CURIAM. The decision previously issued in this case on July 12, 1994, is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted in its place. The State seeks reversal of the trial court’s dismissal of a prosecution pursuant to section 948.08(6), Florida Statutes (1993)....

the $2 per month for supervision pursuant to section 948.08, Florida Statutes, appears to be in error.

...The trial court determined that Higgins had complied with all terms of a pretrial diversion (PTD) contract and was thus entitled to dismissal of her charges. The State argues that the trial court did not have authority to dismiss the charges because the decision to continue prosecution under section 948.08, Florida Statutes (2023), lies solely with the State. We agree and reverse and remand for further proceedings.  Background Following Higgins’s arrest for stalking, the State offered Higgins the opportunity to complete a PTD program under section 948.08(2)....

... Analysis The State argues that the trial court erred by granting Higgins’s motion to dismiss because the State has “non-reviewable” discretion to terminate a defendant’s participation in a PTD program under section 948.08. We agree. Our resolution of this issue turns on the interpretation of section 948.08; thus, our review is de novo....

...“[W]e interpret Florida’s constitution and statutes according to the plain meaning of their text . . . .” State v. Washington, 403 So. 3d 465, 470 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (citing Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022)). Under section 948.08(2), Florida Statutes (2023), [a]ny first offender, or any person previously convicted of not more than one nonviolent misdemeanor, who is charged with any misdemeanor or felony of the third...

...“Resumption of pending criminal proceedings shall be undertaken at any time if the program administrator or state attorney finds that the offender is not fulfilling his or her obligations under this plan or if the public interest so requires.” § 948.08(4), Fla. Stat....

...resume because the offender’s program participation was unsatisfactory; whether 4 the offender needs further supervision; or, if prosecution is not deemed necessary, that the charges should be dismissed. § 948.08(5), Fla. Stat. Finally, the same subsection clearly states: “The state attorney shall make the final determination as to whether the prosecution shall continue.” Id. Section 948.08 provides the State with ultimate authority to resume criminal proceedings either during or after the completion of the program....

...The trial court is authorized to schedule a hearing at the end of statutory pretrial intervention proceedings to determine what additional steps must be taken to close the case, after consideration of the recommendations of the administrator and the state attorney. See § 948.08(6)(b), Fla.Stat....

...This domestic violence deferred prosecution agreement was not based on any statutory pretrial intervention program. Battery of a pregnant woman is a violent second-degree felony and is not an offense for which statutory pretrial intervention is authorized. § 948.08, Fla.Stat. (1991). Apparently, the state attorney’s office in the Sixth Judicial Circuit created this program to cope with the increasing problem of domestic violence. . Cf. § 948.08(5), Fla.Stat....

...The State of Florida seeks certiorari review of a circuit court order that authorizes Respondent Ta'Quieta Beyunka Lanae Pugh's ("Pugh") placement in a pretrial intervention program. The State objects to Pugh entering the pretrial intervention program without its consent and asserts that section 948.08(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), does not apply to Pugh as she was not charged with committing one of the enumerated offenses therein....

...out violence, and providing false identification to law enforcement officers. During a case management hearing held on January 21, 2010, the court, overruling the State's objection, ordered that Pugh be placed into the pretrial intervention program. Section 948.08(2) provides that any first-time offender or any person previously convicted of not more than one nonviolent misdemeanor, who is charged with any misdemeanor or felony of the third-degree, is eligible for release to a pretrial intervention program....

...However, the section requires the consent of the administrator of the program, victim, state attorney, and judge who presided at the initial appearance hearing. Without the State's consent, the court could only place Pugh in the program if she were charged with one of the offenses enumerated in section 948.08(6)(a), which reads as follows: (6)(a) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, a person who is charged with a felony of the second or third degree for purchase or possession of a controlled substance under chapter 893, prostituti...

...The State of Florida seeks certiorari review of a circuit court order that authorizes Leslie Espinoza's ("Espinoza") entry into a pretrial intervention program. The State objects to Espinoza's court-ordered placement into the program without its consent and contends that section 948.08(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), does not apply to Espinoza because she was not charged with committing one of the enumerated offenses therein....

...e or conveyance. During a case management hearing held on January 21, 2010, the court announced its intention to refer Espinoza to the pretrial intervention program. The State objected, but the court ordered that Espinoza be placed into the program. Section 948.08(2) provides that any first-time offender or any person previously convicted of not more than one nonviolent misdemeanor, who is charged with any misdemeanor or felony of the third-degree, is eligible for release to a pretrial intervention program....

...However, the section requires the consent of the administrator of the program, victim, state attorney, and *896 judge who presided at the initial appearance hearing. Without the State's consent, the court could only place Espinoza in the program if she were charged with one of the offenses enumerated in section 948.08(6)(a), which reads as follows: (6)(a) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, a person who is charged with a felony of the second or third degree for purchase or possession of a controlled substance under chapter 893, prostituti...

...han twenty grams of cannabis committed on January 9, 1997, in Duval County. The trial judge denied Gardner’s motion for admission to a pretrial intervention program, and instead sentenced Gardner to county jail for time served — forty-four days. Section 948.08, Florida Statutes (1997), provides: Pretrial intervention program.— [[Image here]] (6)(a) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, a person who is charged with a felony of the second or third degree for purchase or possession o...

...The statute provides that a court “may order an individual to enter into a pretrial treatment-based drug court program.” § 397.334(2), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis supplied). The State does not dispute that petitioner qualifies for participation in the drug court program. See § 948.08(6), Fla. Stat. (2012). Section 948.08(6)(a)2 provides: 2....