Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 775.082 (2025)
Penalties; applicability of sentencing structures; mandatory minimum sentences for certain reoffenders previously released from prison.
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775.082 Penalties; applicability of sentencing structures; mandatory minimum sentences for certain reoffenders previously released from prison.—
(1)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in a determination that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole.
(b)1. A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age shall be punished by a term of imprisonment for life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. If the court finds that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such person shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at least 40 years. A person sentenced pursuant to this subparagraph is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(a).
2. A person who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age may be punished by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of years equal to life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. A person who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 15 years is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(c).
3. The court shall make a written finding as to whether a person is eligible for a sentence review hearing under s. 921.1402(2)(a) or (c). Such a finding shall be based upon whether the person actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. The court may find that multiple defendants killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.
(2) In the event the death penalty in a capital felony is held to be unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death for a capital felony shall cause such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence such person to life imprisonment as provided in subsection (1). No sentence of death shall be reduced as a result of a determination that a method of execution is held to be unconstitutional under the State Constitution or the Constitution of the United States.
(3) A person who has been convicted of any other designated felony may be punished as follows:
(a)1. For a life felony committed before October 1, 1983, by a term of imprisonment for life or for a term of at least 30 years.
2. For a life felony committed on or after October 1, 1983, by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years.
3. Except as provided in subparagraph 4., for a life felony committed on or after July 1, 1995, by a term of imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.
4.a. Except as provided in sub-subparagraph b., for a life felony committed on or after September 1, 2005, which is a violation of s. 800.04(5)(b), by:
(I) A term of imprisonment for life; or
(II) A split sentence that is a term of at least 25 years’ imprisonment and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation or community control for the remainder of the person’s natural life, as provided in s. 948.012(4).
b. For a life felony committed on or after July 1, 2008, which is a person’s second or subsequent violation of s. 800.04(5)(b), by a term of imprisonment for life.
5. Notwithstanding subparagraphs 1.-4., a person who is convicted under s. 782.04 of an offense that was reclassified as a life felony which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age may be punished by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of years equal to life imprisonment if the judge conducts a sentencing hearing in accordance with s. 921.1401 and finds that life imprisonment or a term of years equal to life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence.
a. A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 25 years is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(b).
b. A person who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 15 years is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(c).
c. The court shall make a written finding as to whether a person is eligible for a sentence review hearing under s. 921.1402(2)(b) or (c). Such a finding shall be based upon whether the person actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. The court may find that multiple defendants killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.
6. For a life felony committed on or after October 1, 2014, which is a violation of s. 787.06(3)(g), by a term of imprisonment for life.
(b)1. For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.
2. Notwithstanding subparagraph 1., a person convicted under s. 782.04 of a first degree felony punishable by a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment, or an offense that was reclassified as a first degree felony punishable by a term of years not exceeding life, which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age may be punished by a term of years equal to life imprisonment if the judge conducts a sentencing hearing in accordance with s. 921.1401 and finds that a term of years equal to life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence.
a. A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 25 years is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(b).
b. A person who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 15 years is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(c).
c. The court shall make a written finding as to whether a person is eligible for a sentence review hearing under s. 921.1402(2)(b) or (c). Such a finding shall be based upon whether the person actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. The court may find that multiple defendants killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b), a person convicted of an offense that is not included in s. 782.04 but that is an offense that is a life felony or is punishable by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment, or an offense that was reclassified as a life felony or an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment, which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age may be punished by a term of imprisonment for life or a term of years equal to life imprisonment if the judge conducts a sentencing hearing in accordance with s. 921.1401 and finds that life imprisonment or a term of years equal to life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. A person who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 20 years is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(d).
(d) For a felony of the second degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years.
(e) For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years.
(4) A person who has been convicted of a designated misdemeanor may be sentenced as follows:
(a) For a misdemeanor of the first degree, by a definite term of imprisonment not exceeding 1 year;
(b) For a misdemeanor of the second degree, by a definite term of imprisonment not exceeding 60 days.
(5) Any person who has been convicted of a noncriminal violation may not be sentenced to a term of imprisonment nor to any other punishment more severe than a fine, forfeiture, or other civil penalty, except as provided in chapter 316 or by ordinance of any city or county.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the operation of any statute of this state authorizing a trial court, in its discretion, to impose a sentence of imprisonment for an indeterminate period within minimum and maximum limits as provided by law, except as provided in subsection (1).
(7) This section does not deprive the court of any authority conferred by law to decree a forfeiture of property, suspend or cancel a license, remove a person from office, or impose any other civil penalty. Such a judgment or order may be included in the sentence.
(8)(a) The sentencing guidelines that were effective October 1, 1983, and any revisions thereto, apply to all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1983, and before January 1, 1994, and to all felonies, except capital felonies and life felonies, committed before October 1, 1983, when the defendant affirmatively selects to be sentenced pursuant to such provisions.
(b) The 1994 sentencing guidelines, that were effective January 1, 1994, and any revisions thereto, apply to all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after January 1, 1994, and before October 1, 1995.
(c) The 1995 sentencing guidelines that were effective October 1, 1995, and any revisions thereto, apply to all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1995, and before October 1, 1998.
(d) The Criminal Punishment Code applies to all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998. Any revision to the Criminal Punishment Code applies to sentencing for all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after the effective date of the revision.
(e) Felonies, except capital felonies, with continuing dates of enterprise shall be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines or the Criminal Punishment Code in effect on the beginning date of the criminal activity.
(9)(a)1. “Prison releasee reoffender” means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit:
a. Treason;
b. Murder;
c. Manslaughter;
d. Sexual battery;
e. Carjacking;
f. Home-invasion robbery;
g. Robbery;
h. Arson;
i. Kidnapping;
j. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon;
k. Aggravated battery;
l. Aggravated stalking;
m. Aircraft piracy;
n. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
o. Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual;
p. Armed burglary;
q. Burglary of a dwelling or burglary of an occupied structure; or
r. Any felony violation of s. 790.07, s. 800.04, s. 827.03, s. 827.071, or s. 847.0135(5);
within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor, a county detention facility following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence pronounced was a prison sentence, or a correctional institution of another state, the District of Columbia, the United States, any possession or territory of the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state.
2. “Prison releasee reoffender” also means any defendant who commits or attempts to commit any offense listed in sub-subparagraphs (a)1.a.-r. while the defendant was serving a prison sentence or on escape status from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor or while the defendant was on escape status from a correctional institution of another state, the District of Columbia, the United States, any possession or territory of the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state.
3. If the state attorney determines that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in subparagraph 1., the state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a prison releasee reoffender. Upon proof from the state attorney that establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as follows:
a. For a felony punishable by life, by a term of imprisonment for life;
b. For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment of 30 years;
c. For a felony of the second degree, by a term of imprisonment of 15 years; and
d. For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment of 5 years.
(b) A person sentenced under paragraph (a) shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release. Any person sentenced under paragraph (a) must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence.
(c) Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084 or any other provision of law.
(d)1. It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders previously released from prison or a county detention facility following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence pronounced was a prison sentence who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection, unless the state attorney determines that extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender, including whether the victim recommends that the offender not be sentenced as provided in this subsection.
2. For every case in which the offender meets the criteria in paragraph (a) and does not receive the mandatory minimum prison sentence, the state attorney must explain the sentencing deviation in writing and place such explanation in the case file maintained by the state attorney.
(10) If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08, and excluding any third degree felony violation under chapter 810, and if the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024 are 22 points or fewer, the court must sentence the offender to a nonstate prison sanction. However, if the court makes written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public, the court may sentence the offender to a state correctional facility pursuant to this section.
(11) The purpose of this section is to provide uniform punishment for those crimes made punishable under this section and, to this end, a reference to this section constitutes a general reference under the doctrine of incorporation by reference.
History.—s. 3, ch. 71-136; ss. 1, 2, ch. 72-118; s. 2, ch. 72-724; s. 5, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 1, ch. 83-87; s. 1, ch. 94-228; s. 16, ch. 95-184; s. 4, ch. 95-294; s. 2, ch. 97-239; s. 2, ch. 98-3; s. 10, ch. 98-204; s. 2, ch. 99-188; s. 3, ch. 2000-246; s. 1, ch. 2001-239; s. 2, ch. 2002-70; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2002-211; s. 4, ch. 2005-28; s. 13, ch. 2008-172; s. 1, ch. 2008-182; s. 1, ch. 2009-63; s. 2, ch. 2011-200; s. 8, ch. 2014-160; s. 1, ch. 2014-220; s. 1, ch. 2016-13; s. 19, ch. 2016-24; s. 3, ch. 2017-1; s. 21, ch. 2017-37; s. 11, ch. 2017-107; s. 30, ch. 2019-167.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2,643
cases (204 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case: Timothy Lee Hurst v. State of Florida, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).
Timothy Lee Hurst v. State of Florida, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). “(quoting § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (2012)). The Supreme Court analyzed Florida’s scheme as one in which a jury renders only an - 17 - advisory verdict without specifying the factual basis of its recommendation, while the judge evaluates the evidence of aggravation and mitigation…”
Rodrick D. Williams v. State of Florida, 242 So. 3d 280 (Fla. 2018). “It amended section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, to provide, in pertinent part: (b)1.”
Mark James Asay v. State of Florida, SC16-102 Mark James Asay v. Julie L. Jones, etc. & SC16-628 Mark James Asay v. Julie L. Jones, etc., 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016). “§ 775.082(1). “A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death” only if an additional sentencing proceeding “results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death.”
John F. Mosley v. State of Florida & SC14-2108 John F. Mosley v. Julie L. Jones, etc., 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016). “that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violated th[e] guarantee of the right to a jury trial on all elements of the crime of capital murder, the Supreme Court evaluated Florida’s existing capital sentencing scheme by first noting that, pursuant to section 775.082(1), Florida…”
Kenneth R. Jackson v. State of Florida, 213 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 2017). “Further, I would not reanalyze the scope of or proper remedy for Hurst errors, which the majority discusses on pages 67-73, because we already addressed these issues, including the inapplicability of section 775.082, Florida Statutes, in Hurst, 202 So.”
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010). “See § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2000). In other words, the PRR statute covers sentencing for all crimes, including those involving the use of a firearm.”
State of Florida v. Dazarian Cordell Lewars, 259 So. 3d 793 (Fla. 2018). “082 confirms the plain meaning of the specific provision at issue, showing that release from a particular type of facility, namely a prison or its equivalent-and not a county jail-is a necessary component of the PRR definition. The PRR statute's focus on the facility where a…”
Reed v. State, 192 So. 3d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). “See- § 775.082(10) Fla. Stat. (2011). After careful review and the benefit of oral argument, we hold that the circuit court’s findings were inadequate to sentence Reed to a state prison sanction.”
Jones v. State, 71 So. 3d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “" § 775.082(10), Fla. Stat. The statute does define "nonstate prison sanction," but the phrase is commonly understood to mean probation, community control, or imprisonment in the county jail for up to one year.”
State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000). “§ 775.082, Fla. Stat. (1997)(emphasis supplied).”
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002). “§ 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2001). [31] See § 921.”
State of Florida v. Anthony Duwayne Horsley, Jr., 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015). “§ 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added).”
775.082(1): 271 cases
Timothy Lee Hurst v. State of Florida, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). “(quoting § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (2012)). The Supreme Court analyzed Florida’s scheme as one in which a jury renders only an - 17 - advisory verdict without specifying the factual basis of its recommendation, while the judge evaluates the evidence of aggravation and mitigation…”
State of Florida v. Anthony Duwayne Horsley, Jr., 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015). “§ 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added).”
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002). “§ 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2001). [31] See § 921.”
Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536 (Fla. 2009).
Rebecca Lee Falcon v. State of Florida, 162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015).
775.082(1)(a): 18 cases
Larry Darnell Perry v. State of Florida, 210 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 2016).
Carpenter v. State, 785 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2001).
Aramis Donell Ayala, etc. v. Rick Scott, Governor, 224 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 2017).
Craig v. State, 685 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 1996).
Mesac Damas v. State of Florida, 260 So. 3d 200 (Fla. 2018).
775.082(1)(b): 39 cases
Rodrick D. Williams v. State of Florida, 242 So. 3d 280 (Fla. 2018). “It amended section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, to provide, in pertinent part: (b)1.”
State of Florida v. Budry Michel, 257 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 2018).
State of Florida v. Kenneth Purdy, 252 So. 3d 723 (Fla. 2018).
Beckman v. State, 230 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).
In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-08., 259 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 2018).
775.082(1)(b)(1): 7 cases
Labronx Bailey v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Labronx Bailey v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Stripling v. State, 209 So. 3d 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).
David Puzio v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).
Miller v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).
775.082(1)(b)(2): 4 cases
David Puzio v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).
Roderick Washington v. State of Florida, 257 So. 3d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
Gustavo Enamorado Dubon v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).
David Puzio v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
775.082(1)(b)(3): 2 cases
Labronx Bailey v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Labronx Bailey v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
775.082(1)(d): 2 cases
Alvin Davis v. State of Florida, 268 So. 3d 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
Alvin Davis v. State of Florida (Fla. 2021).
775.082(10): 89 cases
Reed v. State, 192 So. 3d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). “See- § 775.082(10) Fla. Stat. (2011). After careful review and the benefit of oral argument, we hold that the circuit court’s findings were inadequate to sentence Reed to a state prison sanction.”
Jones v. State, 71 So. 3d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “" § 775.082(10), Fla. Stat. The statute does define "nonstate prison sanction," but the phrase is commonly understood to mean probation, community control, or imprisonment in the county jail for up to one year.”
Reginald Lee Booker, I I I v. State of Florida, 244 So. 3d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
Woods v. State, 214 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
Reginald L. Bryant v. State of Florida, 148 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. 2014).
775.082(2): 53 cases
Timothy Lee Hurst v. State of Florida, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). “(quoting § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (2012)). The Supreme Court analyzed Florida’s scheme as one in which a jury renders only an - 17 - advisory verdict without specifying the factual basis of its recommendation, while the judge evaluates the evidence of aggravation and mitigation…”
Mark James Asay v. State of Florida, SC16-102 Mark James Asay v. Julie L. Jones, etc. & SC16-628 Mark James Asay v. Julie L. Jones, etc., 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016). “§ 775.082(1). “A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death” only if an additional sentencing proceeding “results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death.”
John F. Mosley v. State of Florida & SC14-2108 John F. Mosley v. Julie L. Jones, etc., 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016). “that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violated th[e] guarantee of the right to a jury trial on all elements of the crime of capital murder, the Supreme Court evaluated Florida’s existing capital sentencing scheme by first noting that, pursuant to section 775.082(1), Florida…”
Kenneth R. Jackson v. State of Florida, 213 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 2017). “Further, I would not reanalyze the scope of or proper remedy for Hurst errors, which the majority discusses on pages 67-73, because we already addressed these issues, including the inapplicability of section 775.082, Florida Statutes, in Hurst, 202 So.”
& SC15-1233 Richard Knight v. State of Florida & Richard Knight v. Julie L. Jones, etc., 225 So. 3d 661 (Fla. 2017).
775.082(2)(a): 2 cases
Huffman v. State, 611 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
Juarez v. State, 65 So. 3d 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
775.082(2)(b): 1 case
Hale v. State, 273 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
775.082(2)(c): 3 cases
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010). “See § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2000). In other words, the PRR statute covers sentencing for all crimes, including those involving the use of a firearm.”
Yegge v. State, 186 So. 3d 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
Degregorio v. State, 750 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
775.082(2)(d): 2 cases
Williams v. State, 125 So. 3d 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
Hernandez v. State, 396 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
775.082(3): 33 cases
Peters v. State, 128 So. 3d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
Darriue Montgomery v. State, 230 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
Knight v. State, 808 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2002).
Kemar Rochester v. State of Florida, 140 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2014).
Thomas v. State, 135 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
775.082(3)(a): 142 cases
Kemar Rochester v. State of Florida, 140 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2014).
State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2003).
Laisha L. Landrum v. State of Florida, 192 So. 3d 459 (Fla. 2016).
Thomas v. State, 135 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
Rochester v. State, 95 So. 3d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
775.082(3)(a)(1): 2 cases
Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 2007).
Ruth v. State, 949 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
775.082(3)(a)(2): 2 cases
Robinson v. State, 37 So. 3d 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
Richard Williams v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
775.082(3)(a)(3): 14 cases
Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2005).
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010). “See § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2000). In other words, the PRR statute covers sentencing for all crimes, including those involving the use of a firearm.”
Parks v. State, 223 So. 3d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
Robinson v. State, 37 So. 3d 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
Starks v. State, 128 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).
775.082(3)(a)(3)(b): 1 case
Darling v. State, 886 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
775.082(3)(a)(4): 3 cases
People v. Benton, 817 N.W.2d 599 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
Stephen C. Hanf v. State of Florida, 182 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
John E. Watkins v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
775.082(3)(a)(4)(a): 4 cases
Montgomery v. State, 36 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
Kemar Rochester v. State of Florida, 140 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2014).
Rochester v. State, 95 So. 3d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
Dannie Ray Horner v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
775.082(3)(a)(4)(b): 1 case
Hector Negron-Espada v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2025).
775.082(3)(a)(5): 1 case
Brown v. State, 235 So. 3d 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
775.082(3)(a)(5)(c): 2 cases
Brown v. State, 235 So. 3d 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
Christin Bilotti v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
775.082(3)(b): 172 cases
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010). “See § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2000). In other words, the PRR statute covers sentencing for all crimes, including those involving the use of a firearm.”
Betancourt v. State, 804 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2001).
State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2006).
Blacker v. State, 49 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
Wooden v. State, 42 So. 3d 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
775.082(3)(b)(1): 6 cases
State of Florida v. Chester Ralph Kwitowski, Jr., 250 So. 3d 210 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
Richard Williams v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Omar Rushawn Buggs v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Buggs v. State, 268 So. 3d 878 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Buggs v. State, 268 So. 3d 878 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
775.082(3)(b)(1985): 1 case
Scott v. State, 755 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
775.082(3)(b)(2)(b): 2 cases
David Elkin v. State of Florida, 249 So. 3d 1316 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
David Elkin v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
775.082(3)(b)(l): 1 case
Knight v. State, 213 So. 3d 1019 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
775.082(3)(c): 276 cases
Darriue Montgomery v. State, 230 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
Kelsey v. State, 183 So. 3d 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
Chambers v. State, 975 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
McCloud v. State, 803 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
Collins v. State, 189 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
775.082(3)(d): 326 cases
Adam Lloyd Shepard v. State of Florida, 259 So. 3d 701 (Fla. 2018).
Kiss v. State, 42 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
State of Florida v. Brian Mitchell Lee, 223 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2005).
Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1991).
775.082(3)(e): 41 cases
Christopher Busbee v. State of Florida, 187 So. 3d 1266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
State of Florida v. Brian Mitchell Lee, 223 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
Laverne Brown v. State of Florida, 260 So. 3d 147 (Fla. 2018).
Tate v. State, 191 So. 3d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
Smart v. City of Miami, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2015).
775.082(3Xe): 1 case
Lunford v. State, 400 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
775.082(4): 9 cases
Treiman v. State Ex Rel. Miner, 343 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1977).
Ross v. Baker, 632 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
Sanders v. State, 710 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
P.I.W. v. State, 827 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
Miller v. State, 442 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
775.082(4)(a): 107 cases
Phantom of Clearwater v. Pinellas Cnty., 894 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
McArthur v. State, 351 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1977).
Nusspickel v. State, 966 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Eller v. Shova, 630 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1993).
Berezovsky v. State, 335 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
775.082(4)(b): 61 cases
Alvarez v. State, 358 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1978).
Valdes v. State, 510 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
Purvis v. Lindsey Ex Rel. State, 587 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
State v. Brown, 36 So. 3d 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).
Shieder v. State, 430 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
775.082(4)(c): 2 cases
Baggett v. State, 302 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
Waters v. State, 290 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
775.082(4)(d): 5 cases
Fasenmyer v. State, 457 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1984).
Williams v. State, 341 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
Massey v. State, 338 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
Jose Luis Ventura v. the State of Florida (Fla. 3d DCA 2025).
Dexter v. State, 360 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
775.082(5): 2 cases
Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1993).
Thomas v. State, 583 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
775.082(7): 1 case
Manno v. State, 10 Fla. Supp. 2d 35 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1985).
775.082(8): 147 cases
McKnight v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001).
State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000). “§ 775.082, Fla. Stat. (1997)(emphasis supplied).”
Grant v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
State v. Wise, 744 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
775.082(8)(1)(q): 1 case
State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001).
775.082(8)(B): 1 case
Kenon v. State of Florida (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
775.082(8)(a): 68 cases
Knight v. State, 808 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2002).
Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000).
State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
Plain v. State, 720 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Gordon v. State, 745 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
775.082(8)(a)(1): 9 cases
Brinson v. State, 851 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
Clark v. State, 790 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 2001).
Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Lopez v. State, 864 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
Webster v. State, 837 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
775.082(8)(a)(1)(o): 2 cases
Lopez v. State, 864 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
Larry Anthony Crosley v. State of Florida, 247 So. 3d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
775.082(8)(a)(1)(q): 6 cases
State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001).
State v. Huggins, 744 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Reynolds v. State, 842 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2002).
Rodriguez v. State, 773 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
Foresta v. State, 751 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
775.082(8)(a)(2): 5 cases
Michelson v. State, 805 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
McDonald v. State, 957 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2007).
State v. Wilson, 793 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
Irons v. State, 791 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
Darnell Keno v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
775.082(8)(a)(2)(a): 3 cases
Knight v. State, 808 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2002).
Brown v. State, 830 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Knight v. State, 791 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
775.082(8)(a)(2)(b): 2 cases
Knight v. State, 808 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2002).
Brown v. State, 830 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
775.082(8)(a)(l): 1 case
Ellis v. State, 135 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
775.082(8)(a)(l)(o): 1 case
Ellis v. State, 135 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
775.082(8)(a)(l)(p): 1 case
Young v. State, 54 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
775.082(8)(b): 8 cases
McKnight v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
Cameron v. State, 804 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
Gordon v. State, 745 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Adams v. State, 750 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Stewart v. State, 790 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
775.082(8)(c): 30 cases
Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000).
Clines v. State, 912 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2005).
Reeves v. State, 957 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2007).
State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000). “§ 775.082, Fla. Stat. (1997)(emphasis supplied).”
State v. Wilson, 793 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
775.082(8)(d): 22 cases
State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000). “§ 775.082, Fla. Stat. (1997)(emphasis supplied).”
McKnight v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
Turner v. State, 745 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000).
775.082(8)(d)(1): 2 cases
McDonald v. State, 957 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2007).
State v. Wilson, 793 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
775.082(8)(d)(1)(d): 1 case
Schaeffer v. State, 779 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
775.082(8)(e): 3 cases
Chamblee v. State, 93 So. 3d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).
Desmoke v. State, 912 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
Bohler v. State, 795 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
775.082(9): 128 cases
Reeves v. State, 957 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2007).
McDonald v. State, 957 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2007).
Taylor v. State, 818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
Demeko Ladjuan Sims v. State of Florida, 260 So. 3d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
Williams v. State, 143 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
775.082(9)(a): 198 cases
State of Florida v. Dazarian Cordell Lewars, 259 So. 3d 793 (Fla. 2018). “082 confirms the plain meaning of the specific provision at issue, showing that release from a particular type of facility, namely a prison or its equivalent-and not a county jail-is a necessary component of the PRR definition. The PRR statute's focus on the facility where a…”
State of Florida v. Ray Mon Wright, 180 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 2012).
Nettles v. State, 850 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2003).
Paul v. State, 129 So. 3d 1058 (Fla. 2013).
775.082(9)(a)(1): 35 cases
State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007).
Downs v. Crosby, 874 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
State of Florida v. Ray Mon Wright, 180 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
State v. Miranda, 793 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
Walker v. State, 965 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
775.082(9)(a)(1)(g): 3 cases
Walker v. State, 965 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Cohen v. State, 920 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
Patrick Rivers v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
775.082(9)(a)(1)(i): 1 case
Pablo Diaz v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).
775.082(9)(a)(1)(k): 1 case
Pablo Diaz v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).
775.082(9)(a)(1)(o): 3 cases
Walker v. State, 965 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Lamb v. State, 32 So. 3d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
Brooks v. State, 93 So. 3d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
775.082(9)(a)(1)(q): 12 cases
State of Florida v. Dazarian Cordell Lewars, 259 So. 3d 793 (Fla. 2018). “082 confirms the plain meaning of the specific provision at issue, showing that release from a particular type of facility, namely a prison or its equivalent-and not a county jail-is a necessary component of the PRR definition. The PRR statute's focus on the facility where a…”
State v. Eldredge, 801 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
West v. State, 818 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
Beasley v. State, 964 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Zook v. State, 883 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
775.082(9)(a)(2): 6 cases
McDonald v. State, 957 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2007).
Clark v. State, 779 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Graff v. State, 785 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
Henry v. State, 857 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
Taylor v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
775.082(9)(a)(3): 15 cases
Reeves v. State, 957 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2007).
Major v. State, 814 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2002).
Campbell v. State, 29 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Oberst v. State, 796 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
Jones v. State, 861 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
775.082(9)(a)(3)(a): 3 cases
Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2005).
Burks v. State, 237 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).
Dolansky v. State, 964 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
775.082(9)(a)(3)(c): 7 cases
McCoy v. State, 789 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
State v. Baker, 874 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
State v. Dehart, 913 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
Baskin v. State, 198 So. 3d 828 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
Lawrence E. Briles v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
775.082(9)(a)(3)(d): 7 cases
Reeves v. State, 957 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2007).
Jenkins v. State, 884 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
Ronnie Tray Atmore v. State of Florida, 242 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
Rodriguez v. State, 883 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
Williamson v. State, 988 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).
775.082(9)(a)(l): 20 cases
State of Florida v. Ray Mon Wright, 180 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
Pleas v. State, 41 So. 3d 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Lamb v. State, 32 So. 3d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
Kirkland v. State, 71 So. 3d 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
775.082(9)(a)(l)(c): 1 case
Hicks v. State, 41 So. 3d 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
775.082(9)(a)(l)(g): 1 case
Pleas v. State, 41 So. 3d 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
775.082(9)(a)(l)(j): 1 case
Wheeler v. State, 898 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
775.082(9)(a)(l)(o): 6 cases
Kirkland v. State, 71 So. 3d 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Wheeler v. State, 898 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
Campbell v. State, 29 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Dominguez v. State, 98 So. 3d 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
Wilson v. State, 76 So. 3d 332 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
775.082(9)(a)(l)(p): 1 case
Young v. State, 54 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
775.082(9)(a)(l)(q): 7 cases
Campbell v. State, 29 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Ellis v. State, 135 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
Christopher v. State, 821 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
Williamson v. State, 988 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).
Jackson v. State, 817 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
775.082(9)(b): 21 cases
McDonald v. State, 957 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2007).
Kemar Rochester v. State of Florida, 140 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2014).
Nettles v. State, 850 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2003).
Nettles v. State, 819 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
McDonald v. State, 912 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
775.082(9)(c): 21 cases
Nettles v. State, 850 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2003).
State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000). “§ 775.082, Fla. Stat. (1997)(emphasis supplied).”
Williams v. State, 804 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
Reeves v. State, 957 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2007).
Michel v. State, 935 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
775.082(9)(d): 17 cases
Leronnie Lee Walton v. State of Florida, 208 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 2016).
State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000). “§ 775.082, Fla. Stat. (1997)(emphasis supplied).”
Reeves v. State, 957 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2007).
Nettles v. State, 850 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2003).
State of Florida v. Dazarian Cordell Lewars, 259 So. 3d 793 (Fla. 2018). “082 confirms the plain meaning of the specific provision at issue, showing that release from a particular type of facility, namely a prison or its equivalent-and not a county jail-is a necessary component of the PRR definition. The PRR statute's focus on the facility where a…”
775.082(9)(d)(1): 6 cases
Reeves v. State, 957 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2007).
McDonald v. State, 957 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2007).
Lewars v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
Green v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. (Duval Cnty.) (M.D. Fla. 2023).
Taylor v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
775.082(9)(d)(l): 1 case
Walsh v. State, 198 So. 3d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
775.082(9)(e): 3 cases
Clark v. State, 72 So. 3d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Dolansky v. State, 964 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Mike v. State, 155 So. 3d 1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
775.082(B)(d): 1 case
McLeod v. State, 58 So. 3d 931 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).
775.082(a): 2 cases
Kimbrough v. State, 776 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
Navarro v. State, 805 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
775.082(a)(2): 1 case
Schaeffer v. State, 779 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
775.082(a)(a): 1 case
Gonzalez v. State, 810 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
775.082(a)(l)(q): 1 case
Ellis v. State, 135 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
775.082(b): 1 case
Leppert v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.(Putnam Cnty.) (M.D. Fla. 2024).
775.082(c): 2 cases
Holmes v. State, 650 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
Johnson v. Moore, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
775.082(d): 3 cases
State v. Smith, 832 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
Holmes v. State, 650 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
Burch v. State, 758 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
775.082(l): 3 cases
State of Florida v. Anthony Duwayne Horsley, Jr., 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015). “§ 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added).”
Ralph Monroe v. State of Florida, 191 So. 3d 395 (Fla. 2016).
Horsley v. State, 121 So. 3d 1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).
775.082(l)(a): 5 cases
Larry Darnell Perry v. State of Florida, 210 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 2016).
Aramis Donell Ayala, etc. v. Rick Scott, Governor, 224 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 2017).
Calandra v. State, 64 So. 3d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
Angelo Atwell v. State of Florida, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016).
Burke v. State, 18 So. 3d 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
775.082(l)(b): 6 cases
Roderick D. Williams v. State, 211 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
Darriue Montgomery v. State, 230 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
Davis v. State, 199 So. 3d 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
Anthony Michael Ortiz v. State of Florida, 188 So. 3d 113 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
In Re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Crim. Procedure & Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140, 200 So. 3d 1221 (Fla. 2016).
775.082(l)(b)(3): 1 case
Ejak v. State, 201 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
775.082(l)(b)(d): 1 case
Perales v. State, 714 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
775.082(l)(b)(l): 2 cases
Miller v. State, 208 So. 3d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).
Neely v. State, 207 So. 3d 357 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.