Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...to: (a) Appear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a statement under oath for the record; and (b) Submit a written statement under oath to the office of the state attorney, which statement shall be filed with the sentencing court." § 921.143(1), Fla....

...m, including social, psychological, or physical harm, financial losses, loss of earnings directly or indirectly resulting from the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, and any matter relevant to an appropriate disposition and sentence." § 921.143(2), Fla....

...These statements shall be limited solely "to the facts of the case and the extent of any harm, including social, psychological, or physical harm, financial losses, and loss of earnings directly or indirectly resulting from the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced." § 921.143(2), Fla....

...ave a place in the criminal justice system." Booth, 107 S.Ct. at 2536 n. 12. It is also clear, however, from the Booth decision, that the legislature may not make this judgment in capital punishment cases. Accordingly, we hold that the provisions of section 921.143 are invalid insofar as they permit the introduction of victim impact evidence as an aggravating factor in death sentencing....

...[4] The Court was careful to state that its decision implied no opinion as to the use of victim impact statements in non-capital cases. [5] Like the Booth court, we limit our holding to death penalty cases. [6] Prior to 1984, only the victim of a crime could testify during the sentencing proceeding as to its impact. Since § 921.143 was amended by ch....

...ation report prior to suggesting any sentence; however, if victim input will not be received until a later time, the judge must make it clear on the record that the court is required to and will consider any victim input which is offered pursuant to section 921.143, Florida Statutes, [13] prior to making a final determination regarding an appropriate sentence....

...reements and their views regarding the proposed rule—that proposed modification to rules of civil and criminal procedure should be rejected on the basis of established norm that "[a] trial judge should not participate in plea bargaining"). [13] See § 921.143(1), Fla.Stat....

imposition of the death penalty.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.143(6)(h). . Krop also testified as to his own belief

...a new sentencing order consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [*] In our recent decision in Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1988), we held that section 921.143(2), Florida Statutes (1985), was invalid insofar as that statute permits the introduction of victim impact evidence as an aggravating factor in capital proceedings....

...against him. We accordingly reverse Owen's convictions on the basis of the inadmissible statements given after the response, "I'd rather not talk about it." [1] We address additional issues which may recur should a retrial occur. In accordance with section 921.143, Florida Statutes (1983), the trial judge heard testimony from the victim's family on the impact of the crime after receiving the jury's advisory recommendation of death....

...that trial counsel was not ineffective under the circumstances where he also kept evidence and testimony of Power's prior crimes, including victim impact evidence, away from the jury; successfully argued a motion challenging the constitutionality of section 921.143, Florida Statutes; and challenged the HAC instruction at the charge conference, even objecting again after the instruction was given....

...After the jury recommendation of death, the judge agreed, over objection, to hear victim impact evidence from the relatives of the victims. The judge, at the time, did not have the benefit of Booth or of Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1988), and determined that the provisions of section 921.143, Florida Statutes (1985), gave the relatives the right to be heard....

...We conceive *824 that Wilhoit's argument must fail for two reasons: First, there was a material change in a factor pertinent to the trial court's decision on the matter of adjudication and sentence, that of course being the revelation of objections by the complaining witnesses. See § 921.143, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ation report prior to suggesting any sentence; however, if victim input will not be received until a later time, the judge must make it clear on the record that the court is required to and will consider any victim input which is offered pursuant to section 921.143, Florida Statutes, prior to making a final determination regarding an appropriate sentence.” Warner, 762 So.2d at 514 (footnote omitted)....

...the court will (as opposed to may) habitualize requires the court to make its decision prior to receipt and review of a presentence investigation, § 921.231, Fla. Stat. (1993), prior to a sentencing hearing and prior to review of any victim impact, § 921.143, Fla....

...The appellant's third claim alleged that trial counsel failed to object to a letter from the victim's brother submitted for consideration during sentencing when the letter was not authenticated, not handwritten and not signed. The circuit court held that, pursuant to section 921.143, Florida Statutes, a statement from a victim's family member may be considered at the sentencing hearing and the appellant failed to demonstrate any error by counsel. However, section 921.143, Florida Statutes, requires that the victim or family member either appear before the sentencing court under oath or submit a written statement under oath to the state attorney, neither of which occurred in this case....

...n being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death. Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as a part of victim impact evidence. Another statute, section 921.143, Florida Statutes, allows victim statements about the extent of harm resulting from the crime being prosecuted at any felony sentencing....

...brief and ordered merits briefing. We affirm his judgment and sentences without comment and write only to address whether the trial court's consideration of unsworn victim impact statements during Mr. Dickie's sentencing was improper pursuant to section 921.143(1)(a)-(b), Florida Statutes (2015), and Patterson v....

...d that it "had reviewed everything given to it." The trial court then denied Mr. Dickie's request for downward departure and sentenced him to a total of 397.5 months' imprisonment. Pursuant to our order for merits briefing, Mr. Dickie argues that section 921.143(1) acts as a bar to the admission of unsworn victim impact statements at sentencing, and therefore the trial court erred in considering such statements....

...must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for a particular defendant, given the crime committed." Howard v. State, 820 So. 2d 337, 340 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984)). The plain language of section 921.143(1) does nothing to restrict the type of information that a court may consider when fashioning a criminal defendant's sentence. In pertinent part, section 921.143(1)(a)-(b) provides that a sentencing court "shall permit the victim of [a] crime" to "[a]ppear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a statement under oath for the record" and "[s]ubmit a written statement under oat...

...3 The statute also affords the same right to the victim's parents, guardians, or lawful representatives if the victim is a minor, or to the victim's next of kin if the victim has died from causes related to the crime. § 921.143(1). -4- statute's plain language says nothing about what a sentencing court shall not permit, and courts have declined to read such restrictive verbiage into the statute. Cf. Smith v. State, 982 So. 2d 69, 71-72 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that section 921.143(1) did not bar the sentencing court from hearing testimony from the victim's mother and sister, even though the text of the statute states that a court "shall permit" such testimony only if the victim is a minor or dead). We conclude that section 921.143(1) was meant to create a narrow class of victim impact statements which the trial court shall permit to be heard prior to imposing a sentence....

...-5- constitutionally and statutorily permissible information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for a particular defendant. Howard, 820 So. 2d at 340.5 The sole judicial opinion construing section 921.143(1) as a barrier to the admissibility of unsworn victim impact statements is Patterson....

...fendant claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a letter from the victim's brother which was not authenticated, handwritten, or signed. Id. In remanding for an evidentiary hearing on this ground, the First District read section 921.143(1) as a statute which "requires that the victim or family member either appear before the sentencing court under oath or submit a written statement under oath to the state attorney, neither of which occurred." Patterson, 994 So. 2d at 429 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the First District reversed the summary denial of this single issue. The Patterson court's construction of section 921.143(1) is unsupportable by the statute's text. The plain language of section 921.143(1) does not impose any "requirement" on victims or their families. In fact, the word "require" does not appear in the statute at all. The only constraint section 921.143(1) creates is on trial courts, to the extent that the trial courts "shall permit" victims the opportunity to be heard so long as 5 We also note that the current form of section 921.143(1) was passed by the legislature as part of the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA)....

...assist victims and witnesses of crime without infringing on the constitutional rights of defendants." Id. § 2. -6- those victims make their statements under oath. The Patterson court's interpretation of section 921.143(1) as "requiring" that only sworn statements of victims be considered by the trial courts markedly changes the meaning of the statute, encroaches on the legislature's role to write the laws of our state, and therefore contravenes bedrock principles of separation of powers. In fairness, we recognize that the Patterson opinion was meant only to be a concise reversal of a summary denial of postconviction relief. But the Patterson court's construction of section 921.143(1) seems to have influenced legal scholars, who now regard Florida as a state which requires all victim impact statements to be sworn.6 We disagree with Patterson and the proposition that unsworn victim impact statements are per se inadmissible at sentencing hearings. Trial courts have the discretion to consider such statements, just as they did before passage of section 921.143(1)....

...See Bracero, 10 So. 3d at 665; Howard, 820 So. 2d at 340. We affirm Mr. Dickie's convictions and sentences in all respects. The trial court did not err by considering unsworn victim impact statements in fashioning Mr. Dickie's sentences. Section 921.143(1) does not preclude a trial court from considering unsworn victim impact statements while fashioning a criminal defendant's sentence. We certify conflict with the First District's decision in Patterson. 6 See William H. Burgess, III, Florida Sentencing §§ 1:32, 1:36 (2015-16 ed. 2015) (citing Patterson for the proposition that section 921.143 "requires that [a] victim or family member either appear before the sentencing court under oath or submit a written statement under oath to the state attorney" and that "it is reversible error" to admit unsworn statements); see also 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 26.5(d) (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2015) (listing Florida among the states which "require that victim statements be made under oath to meet minimal standards of reliability" and citing to section 921.143(1) as supportive authority). -7-  Affirmed; conflict certified. VILLANTI, C.J., and SALARIO, J., Concur. -8- 

...Buckalew, 561 P.2d 289, 291 (Alaska 1977). To this list, which is taken substantially from the ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 3.3(a), Commentary at 72-73 (1968), we add considerations of concern for victims' legislatively created rights. Section 921.143, Florida Statutes, requires that before the court imposes a sentence upon any defendant, it must first hear from the victim....

...This tragic reality, however, is not relevant to the issue of the admissibility of the evidence in question. Likewise, the victim's daughter's emotionally moving statement at the sentencing hearing, although clearly permissible, see Art. I, § 16(b), Fla. Const.; § 921.143, Fla....

making a statement under oath for the record.” § 921.143(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). Like in Kirkpatrick

...On direct appeal, Tammera Smith contends she is entitled to be resentenced before a different judge because the judge who in fact sentenced her erred in permitting the victim's sister and mother, in addition to the victim herself, to testify at the sentencing hearing, section 921.143(1), Florida Statutes (2005), notwithstanding. We affirm. Ms. Smith argues section 921.143(1) should be read to permit testimony of an adult victim's mother at a sentencing hearing only if the victim has died from causes related to the crime; and of a sister only if the victim has died from causes related to the crime and the sister is the next of kin. Section 921.143(1) provides: At the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition of sentence upon any defendant who has been convicted of any felony or who has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to any crime, including a criminal violation of a pro...

...to: (a) Appear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a statement under oath for the record; and (b) Submit a written statement under oath to the office of the state attorney, which statement shall be filed with the sentencing court. § 921.143(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). She urges a construction of the statute which would require exclusion of any witness at a sentencing hearing not named in section 921.143(1). Her argument boils down to little more than variations on the theme of "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." [1] *71 Today, as when section 921.143 was originally enacted, see Ch....

...Where possible, such submissions should be done informally, but the rule does not preclude an evidentiary hearing if it should be necessary." In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So.2d 65, 124 (Fla. 1972). Much has transpired as regards putting on evidence in sentencing hearings since section 921.143(1) was originally enacted....

...Johnston, 367 So.2d 1003 (Fla.1978) (internal citation omitted)); Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. (1968). See also Cashatt v. State, 873 So.2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (ruling "a statute is to be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions"). Now codified as section 921.143(1), chapter 76-274, section 9, at 748, Laws of Florida (1976), was *72 enacted as part of House Bill No. 3996, which passed the House of Representatives, as amended, 60 to 49, i.e., without a two-thirds majority in each house. See Fla. H.R. Jour. 992 (Reg. Sess. 1976). See generally Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. (1968). Section 921.143(1) vindicates important victims' rights. [2] But, if construed so as to conflict with Rule 3.720(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (2005), section 921.143(1) might create as many constitutional problems as it helps solve....

...upreme Court. . . . Thus it has been held that a statute which purports to create or modify a procedural rule of court is constitutionally infirm."). Appellant's construction of the statute raises both separation of powers and due process questions. Section 921.143(1) fosters important victims' rights-as article I, section 16(b) of the Florida Constitution now contemplates-without appellant's restrictive interpretation no less than with it....

..., to be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused. Art. I, § 16(b), Fla. Const. Although previously enacted, section 921.143(1) could be said to advance this constitutional objective.

defendant’s plea agreement. See 731 So.2d at 692; § 921.143, Fla. Stat. Victim input is not relevant to drug

...Jules petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus apparently seeking to compel the trial court once again to review Jules’s allegation that when Jules was found guilty of several crimes1 in 1989, the trial court failed to consider victim input pursuant to Florida Statutes section 921.143(1) (1989)....

...(stating that under the Criminal Punishment Code, a trial court “may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation or community control”) (emphasis added); § 921.143(1), Fla....

victim impact statements are inadmissible under section 921.143, Florida Statutes, and this court’s precedent

...3.800(b)(2)(B). 3  Appellant next argues that the trial court fundamentally erred in considering the victims’ letters at sentencing because the victims did not testify or submit a sworn written statement in violation of section 921.143(1), Florida Statutes (2022), which states: At the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition of sentence upon any defendant ....

...GERBER, C.J. The defendant appeals from his sentence for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon following his no contest plea. The defendant argues that the circuit court erred by accepting the victim’s unsworn statement at sentencing in violation of section 921.143(1), Florida Statutes (2018)....

...2  2. The Parties’ Arguments on Appeal This appeal followed. The defendant argues that the circuit court erred by accepting the victim’s unsworn statement at sentencing in violation of section 921.143(1), Florida Statutes (2018). Section 921.143(1) states, in pertinent part: At the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition of sentence upon any defendant ....

...He argued his counsel was ineffective when, at sentencing, counsel failed to object to the state’s reliance upon an unsworn letter from a victim’s family member. Id. The First District reversed for an evidentiary hearing, reasoning: [S]ection 921.143, Florida Statutes, requires that the victim or family member either appear before the sentencing court under oath or submit a written statement under oath to the state attorney, neither of which occurred in this case....

...2d DCA 2017). In Dickie, the Second District concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it considered several unsworn victim impact statements at sentencing. Id. at 39. The Second District reasoned: The plain language of section 921.143(1) does nothing to restrict the type of information that a court may consider when fashioning a criminal defendant’s sentence. In pertinent part, section 921.143(1)(a)-(b) provides that a sentencing court “shall permit the victim of [a] crime” to “[a]ppear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a statement under oath for the record” and “[s]ubmit a wr...

...under oath to the office of the state attorney.” (Emphasis added.) The statute’s plain language says nothing about what a sentencing court shall not permit, and courts have declined to read such restrictive verbiage into the statute. We conclude that section 921.143(1) was meant to create a narrow class of victim impact statements which the trial court shall permit to be heard prior to imposing a sentence. That is, the legislature mandated that the trial courts permit all...

...The trial court must be permitted to consider, and afford the appropriate weight to, any constitutionally and statutorily permissible information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for a particular defendant. The sole judicial opinion construing section 921.143(1) as a barrier to the admissibility of unsworn victim impact statements is Patterson, 994 So....

...issues, save for one; the defendant claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a letter from the victim’s brother which was not authenticated, handwritten, or signed. Id. In remanding for an evidentiary hearing on this ground, the First District read section 921.143(1) as a statute which “requires that the victim or family member either appear before the sentencing court under oath or submit a written statement under oath to the state attorney, neither of which occurred.” Accordingly, the First District reversed the summary denial of this single issue. The Patterson court’s construction of section 921.143(1) is unsupportable by the statute’s text. The plain language of section 921.143(1) does not impose any “requirement” on victims or their families. In fact, the word “require” does not appear in the statute at all. The only constraint section 921.143(1) creates is on trial courts, to the extent that the trial courts “shall permit” victims the opportunity to be heard so long as those victims make their statements under oath. The Patterson court’s interpretation of section 921.143(1) as “requiring” that only sworn statements of victims be considered by the trial courts markedly changes the meaning of the statute, encroaches on the legislature’s role to write the laws of our state, and therefore contravenes bedrock principles of separation of powers....

.... We disagree with Patterson and the proposition that unsworn victim impact statements are per se inadmissible at 5  sentencing hearings. Trial courts have the discretion to consider such statements, just as they did before passage of section 921.143(1)....

...Indeed, his case has now been re-assigned to a new judge (from a different circuit) who may or may not sentence Hayes to probation. Judge Bryant, of course, also had the right as the victim in the case to be heard prior to sentence being imposed. See Art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const.; § 921.143(1), Fla....

...et. However, section 921.001(7), Florida Statutes (1993), expressly provides: A sentence may be imposed outside the guidelines based on credible facts, which may include an oral or written statement submitted by the victim or next of kin pursuant to § 921.143, proven by preponderance of the evidence, which demonstrate that the victim suffered excessive physical or emotional trauma at the hands of the defendant; and such departure is not barred because victim injury has been utilized in the calculation of the guidelines sentence....

...“At the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition of sentence . . . the sentencing court shall permit the victim of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced . . . to: [a]ppear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a statement under oath for the record[.]” § 921.143(1)(a), Fla....