Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The decision sought to be reviewed is certified by the District Court as one passing upon a question of great public interest, giving this Court jurisdiction under § 4, Article V, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. The question presented is whether under Florida Statutes § 775.14, F.S.A., a sentence is valid which is imposed more than five years from the date a plea of guilty is accepted and adjudication withheld....

...sentenced respondent to five years, sentence to begin on respondent's finishing any sentence previously imposed by other jurisdictions. On appeal the District Court reversed the judgment and sentence, holding that the limitation of Florida Statutes § 775.14, F.S.A., was absolute and that the court could not create exceptions....

...d; because the reason for the delay in sentencing (hospitalization) was reasonable, so that the statutory purpose would not apply, and further that the statute was tolled by issuance of the bench warrant during the five-year period. Florida Statutes § 775.14, F.S.A., provides as follows: "Limitation on withheld sentences....

...entence has not been altered for a period of five years, shall not thereafter be sentenced for the conviction of the same crime for which sentence was originally withheld." We agree with the majority opinion below that for the purposes of construing § 775.14, supra, the term "conviction" means determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not *244 require adjudication by the court....

...[3] support the distinction made here between a judgment of conviction and a conviction. The latter term does not necessarily include an adjudication, whereas the former does. In the instant case respondent was convicted within the intent of Florida Statutes § 775.14, F.S.A., on July 28, 1964, the date the Court accepted his plea of guilty....

...one adjudication and sentence pending pre-sentence investigation and receipt by the defendant of medical care — have the defendant flee or by self-help defeat the court's jurisdiction — enjoy his freedom from sentence while the statute (F.S. 1969, § 775.14, F.S.A.) ran, and thereby defeat the administration of punishment....

...ere was withheld when defendant took himself out of the court's reach and could not be made answerable to a bench warrant." Accordingly, certiorari is granted, the decision of the District Court, insofar as it holds the operation of Florida Statutes § 775.14, F.S.A., was not tolled, is quashed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the judgment and sentence of the trial court....

...[3] In view of the principles hereinbefore delineated, we do not believe the right to a review should be withheld merely because of the accused's failure to challenge the deferment of sentence at trial. The State's petition also directs our attention to F.S. § 775.14, F.S.A., which provides: "Any person receiving a withheld sentence upon conviction for a criminal offense, and such withheld sentence has not been altered for a period of five years, shall not thereafter be sentenced for the conviction of t...

...date of the order here attacked. Under either theory the trial judge had no jurisdiction of the matter, so that his order purporting to impose a sentence on the petitioner was invalid. It might be noted that by Ch. 57-284, Laws of 1957 [appearing as § 775.14 Fla....

...(1995); Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.703(d)(6). Where there is no explicit definition, the wording of a particular statute can be crucial to discerning the meaning of "conviction." For example, in State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242 (Fla.1971), the supreme court confronted section 775.14, which read: Limitation on withheld sentences.— Any person receiving a withheld sentence upon conviction for a criminal offense, and such withheld sentence has not been altered for a period of five years, shall not thereafter be sentenced for the conviction of the same crime for which sentence was originally withheld. (Emphasis supplied). Section 775.14 used the term "conviction" in a way that plainly indicated that there could be a conviction when a sentence was withheld....

...(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), governing aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing proceedings. Limitation on Withheld Sentences: In State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971), this Court construed the term "conviction" for purposes of section 775.14, Florida Statutes (1971), which provides that any person receiving a withheld sentence which has not been altered for five years shall not thereafter be sentenced for conviction of same crime for which sentence was imposed....

...Indeed, the Gazda case involved a question quite different from the second offender question presented in Orellanes and Grinkiewicz. The question presented in Gazda was whether a sentence is valid when imposed more than five years from the date a guilty plea is accepted and adjudication withheld. The issue was controlled by section 775.14 of the Florida Statutes which provides as follows: Any person receiving a withheld sentence upon conviction for a criminal offense, and such withheld sentence has not been altered for a period of five years, shall not thereafter be sen...

...He was not located and returned to the court's jurisdiction for sentencing until six years after his plea was accepted. In holding that the trial court's judgment and sentence were valid, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the statute was applicable because defendant was indeed "convicted" for purposes of section 775.14; and (2) defendant's sentence was nonetheless appropriate because operation of section 775.14 was tolled during the time defendant's whereabouts were unknown....

...State, 106 So.2d 79 (Fla.1958), quoting from Bateh v. State, 101 So.2d 869, 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)(suspension of sentence permitted for unspecified "good and valid reasons"), cert. discharged, 110 So.2d 7 (Fla.1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826, 80 S.Ct. 74, 4 L.Ed.2d 69 (1959); see also § 775.14, Fla....

...s and Villery. If this is done, be he a youthful offender or an adult, the guidelines are applicable. Accordingly, I would vacate this sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with the guidelines. NOTES [1] Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701. [2] See, e.g., § 775.14, Fla....

...on" in the statute, that would not necessarily support appellant's position. In State v. Gazda, Fla. 1971, 257 So.2d 242, the Supreme Court distinguished between a "conviction" and a "judgment of conviction" for the purposes of construing Fla. Stat. § 775.14, Limitation on Withheld Sentences....

...since these decisions, has distinguished a "judgment of conviction" (which requires an adjudication) from a "conviction" (which does not necessarily require an adjudication). State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1971). In Gazda, the court interpreted section 775.14, Florida Statutes which provided: Limitation on withheld sentence....

...Gen., Tallahassee, and Margene A. Roper, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. COBB, Judge. The appellant, Hargis, pled nolo contendere to violating his probation on two burglary charges. He appeals, first claiming his sentencing was violative of section 775.14, Florida Statutes (1983) and, second, contending that the probationary portion of a sentence violative of the Villery [1] case is "void" and therefore cannot be legally violated (even though Hargis expressly declined to seek vacation of the sentence via 3.850)....

...1st DCA 1970), quashed, 251 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1970); Coleman v. State, 205 So.2d 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Hunter v. State, 200 So.2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) cert. dismd., 204 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1967); Drayton v. State, 177 So.2d 250 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) cert. dismd., 181 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1966). Section 775.14, Florida Statutes (1981), also provides that action to alter a withheld sentence must be taken within five years....

...at the court does not lose jurisdiction to impose a lawful sentence even though the term during which the defendant was convicted and the illegal order was entered has passed. * * *" The power to alter the sentence in the instant case is governed by § 775.14, Fla....

...The court had ordered that adjudication and sentence be withheld pending a presentence investigation. Defendant then left the court's jurisdiction and was not returned until some six years later. The question was whether the defendant was "convicted" as that term is used in Section 775.14 of the Florida Statutes, which reads: "Limitation of withheld sentences— Any person receiving a withheld sentence upon conviction for a criminal offense, and such withheld sentence has not been altered for a period of five years, shal...

...ntenced for the conviction of the same crime for which sentence was originally withheld." The court found that the defendant had been "convicted" when he pled guilty. It said: "We agree with the majority opinion below that for purposes of construing § 775.14, supra, the term `conviction' means determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court." The court then proceeded to distinguish those earlier decisions which suggested a contrary result (though it mentioned only Ellis v....

...Consequently, on February 2, 1965, the trial judge issued a bench warrant to bring the defendant before the court for sentencing, but the defendant was not returned to state custody until May 1, 1970. Upon his capture, the defendant moved to vacate the court's sentence asserting that Florida Statute § 775.14, [5] Limitation on withheld sentences, barred the court from imposing a sentence, because the five year limitation had expired. The trial court denied the defendant's motion. On appeal the District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the defendant was "convicted" in 1963 for the purposes of Florida Statute § 775.14....

...t therefore, the trial court could no longer sentence the defendant. The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the District Court of Appeals. In an opinion of limited scope, the Gazda court noted that " for the purposes of construing § 775.14, supra, the term `conviction' means determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court." Id....

...to possessing a firearm. Accordingly, while Grinkiewicz relied on Orellanes and held that the defendant's plea of guilty was a conviction where adjudication was withheld, Grinkiewicz also is distinguishable from the present case. [5] Florida Statute § 775.14, Limitation on withheld sentences, provided as follows: Any person receiving a withheld sentence upon conviction for a criminal offense, and such withheld sentence has not been altered for a period of five years, shall not thereafter be sen...

... Case: 13-15874 Date Filed: 05/11/2016 Page: 14 of 25 § 922(g), the Eleventh Circuit relied on this Court’s decision in State v. Gazda, 257 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1971). In Gazda, we held in a different context that “for purposes of construing § 775.14 . . . the term ‘conviction’ means determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court.” Gazda, 257 So. 2d at 243-44. Section 775.14 dealt with a statutory limitation on the ability of the state to sentence a defendant for a conviction of the same crime for which sentence had been earlier withheld and not altered for five years....

...micide charges. He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment (parole eligible), with a ten-year mandatory minimum term. [1] In October 1995, defendant filed a motion in the Florida court to preclude his being sentenced in Florida. He contended that section 775.14, Florida Statutes, creates a five-year statute of limitations on sentencing....

...In 1999, New Jersey paroled the defendant and he was transferred to Florida. In 2000, a successor Florida judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on defendant's requests for relief. The trial court rejected the defendant's claim that his sentencing was time-barred under section 775.14, and also rejected the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel....

...police officer should be enforced. II. The defendant argues that he should be released because the sentence he agreed to was not formally pronounced until over five years after the plea bargain was accepted by the court. The defendant relies *687 on section 775.14, Florida Statutes, for this proposition. The trial court rejected this argument, and so do we. A. Section 775.14 provides: 775.14 Limitation on withheld sentences....

...The system of withholding sentence was subject to abuse, because sentencing could be withheld indefinitely. In Helton, for example, the trial court had withheld sentencing for twelve years, even though the offense only carried a five-year legal maximum. Id. at 80-81. In this setting, the 1957 legislature enacted section 775.14....

...The defendant was transported to the state tuberculosis hospital for examination and care, with instructions to return him to the court when cured. Instead the defendant absconded and was not found for a period of more than five years. The Gazda court concluded that section 775.14 was applicable, apparently because the trial court had entered an order stating that the court was withholding sentence....

...However, the court decided that the defendant was not entitled to any relief under the statute because the defendant had fled from Florida. The court ruled that the statute was tolled during defendant's absence from the state. The important point about Gazda is that it overturned the district court of appeal's ruling that section 775.14 is absolute and allows no exceptions. The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that the defendant could not be allowed to profit from his own wrong, and on the facts there presented, the defendant would not be allowed to invoke section 775.14. III. The basic question in the present case is whether section 775.14 applies to a plea bargain in which there is an agreed sentence. The answer is no. An agreed sentence is not a "withheld sentence" under section 775.14. The idea underlying section 775.14 is that a defendant should not be left forever in uncertainty about whether, and for how long, he will be incarcerated....

...State v. Bateh, 110 So.2d 7, 10 (Fla.1959) ("But ... one convicted of an offense is entitled to know just when in his life, he meanwhile being at liberty, he is no longer subject to the power of the court to translate his liberty to imprisonment."). Thus, section 775.14 is aimed at the situation in which the trial court has withheld sentence, and has not actually made a decision regarding what the defendant's sentence will be. In the present case, there is no sentencing decision to be made, because the sentence has already been agreed upon. There does not appear to be any reported decision which has applied section 775.14 to a plea bargain in which there was an agreed sentence. In this case, the formal pronouncement of sentence is a mere ministerial act. The fact that there is an agreement for a thirty-year sentence takes this case out of section 775.14. [3] IV. Apart from the foregoing, defendant is equitably estopped from invoking the benefits of section 775.14....

...Thus, what was intended to be a quick trip to New Jersey for testimony, followed by a return to Florida, turned into a protracted delay. Defendant was in New Jersey six years—from 1988 to 1994—before his case came to trial. After the five-year period of section 775.14 expired, defendant filed his motion to preclude Florida sentencing, claiming that he was entitled to be released from any obligation under his plea bargain. Whether analyzed in terms of tolling under Gazda, or equitable estoppel under Major League Baseball, the defendant is not entitled to invoke the five-year limitation of section 775.14....

...From the standpoint of the Gazda decision, the statute should be deemed to have been tolled because the defendant was outside of Florida from 1988 onward. The delay in sentencing was attributable to the defendant's repudiation of the New Jersey plea agreement. B. The defendant argues that he is allowed to invoke section 775.14 because the State never made a formal request to extradite him from New Jersey to Florida. That is unpersuasive. As already explained, section 775.14 does not apply here, but if it does, the defendant is estopped from invoking its benefits....

...es on to specify the intent to be that the defendant serve an actual thirty years in prison, and then be released. Defendant must be resentenced to an appropriate *692 term of years in order to accomplish this. [7] VII. The legislature should repeal section 775.14, a step originally recommended by Professor Clark in 1961....

...As this case and Gazda illustrate, the statute is being applied to situations for which it was never intended. The point of the statute was to prevent defendants from being held endlessly on probation, beyond the expiration of the legal maximum of the crime for which the defendant had been sentenced. To that end, section 775.14 created a five-year limitation on withheld sentences....

...me. Francois v. State, 695 So.2d 695, 696-97 (Fla.1997); State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 744 (Fla.1994); Bateh, 110 So.2d at 10; Helton, 106 So.2d at 81; §§ 948.01(11), 948.06(3), Fla. Stat. (2001). In view of these other developments in the law, section 775.14 is no longer needed. Because of the problems the statute is needlessly causing (of which this case is an example), section 775.14 should be repealed....

...or result in a manifest incongruity." Once the intent is determined, the statute may then be read as a whole to properly construe its effect. Id. at 435 (citations omitted). I am now convinced that to allow Sainz to use the statute of limitations of section 775.14, Florida Statutes (1995) to obtain a discharge would be unreasonable, it would defeat legislative intent, and would result in a manifest incongruity....

...Jur.2d Statutes § 151, at 457 (2000) (footnote omitted). On considering the materials cited earlier in this opinion, it is clear that a "withheld sentence" is a term of art referring to probation imposed by the mechanism of withholding sentence. [3] The State has conceded that section 775.14 applies to the sentencing of this defendant. We are not, however, obligated to accept the State's concession. The trial court rejected the defendant's claim that section 775.14 barred his sentencing in this case, and that ruling by the trial court may be upheld for any reason which appears in the record....

...this case. The Brown court took the position that for purposes of initiating a prosecution, the only reasons for tolling the section 775.15 statute of limitations are the reasons expressed in the statute itself. 674 So.2d at 741-42. For purposes of section 775.14, however, the Florida Supreme Court held in Gazda that nonstatutory tolling reasons can be recognized....

...ranted on his second sentence. Appellant contends that since he was not validly sentenced until 17 years after the original void sentence, then the sentence was withheld. Appellant contends that the sentence was withheld within the interpretation of § 775.14, Fla.Stats., F.S.A., for over five years. We cannot agree with appellant's contentions. The cases cited and found to be in support of this argument and interpreting § 775.14, show fact situations when the sentences were withheld in the first instance and then imposed at a later date....

...The facts in the instant case show that the sentence was imposed and found later to be void. At the time the appellant was sentenced, it was thought to be valid but seventeen years later was found not to be valid. This is not a case of a withheld sentence within the meaning of § 775.14, Fla.Stats., F.S.A....

...the supreme court cases declaring them "improper" and "illegal." The 32 year "withheld" portion of the sentence in this case, as interpreted and modified by the majority opinion, would also exceed the 5 year limitation on such sentences contained in section 775.14, Florida Statutes....

...ol after serving such period as may be imposed by the court. The period of probation or community control shall commence immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration, whether by parole or gaintime allowances. [emphasis added] [3] Section 775.14, Florida Statutes, is an anomaly as it is a statutory limitation, adopted in 1957, on sentences that were declared, in 1958 and 1959, to be illegal.

...However, as appellant correctly points out, we believe that whether or not a defendant is adjudicated guilty at the time of his plea is inconsequential to the outcome of a deferred sentence. See State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242 (Fla.1971). In Gazda, the supreme court addressed section 775.14, Florida Statutes, which prohibits a trial court from sentencing a defendant for a criminal offense after having withheld sentence on a conviction for that offense for more than five years....

...The court construed "conviction" as including a determination of guilt by a plea of guilty. It clarified that a defendant does not have to be adjudicated guilty by the court upon the acceptance of his plea to receive the benefit of the time limitation in section 775.14....

...does not require an adjudication by the Court for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the Eleventh Circuit relied on this Court’s decision in State v. Gazda, 257 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1971). In Gazda, we held in a different context that “for purposes of construing § 775.14 . . . the term ‘conviction’ means determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court.” Gazda, 257 So. 2d at 243-44. Section 775.14 dealt with a statutory limitation on the ability of the state to sentence a defendant for a conviction of the same crime for which sentence had been earlier withheld and not altered for five years....

a five-year general sentence at hard labor. Section 775.14, Florida Statutes (1975), reads as follows:

...On June 16, 1999, Sainz was paroled by New Jersey and returned to Florida. It was not until May 25, 2000, that Sainz’ motion was heard and denied. Finally, on June 19, 2000, he was sentenced. Sainz now appeals the imposition of that sentence. We vacate Sainz’ sentence because, pursuant to section 775.14, Florida Statutes (1995), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence Sainz more than five years after accepting his guilty plea and withholding sentence....

...Reversed and remanded with directions to discharge the defendant. 4 Because of the importance of this issue, we stay the mandate herein for a period of sixty days and certify the following issue to the Florida Supreme Court: WHETHER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON SENTENCING, AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 775.14, FLORIDA STATUTES (1995), IS TOLLED WHEN A DEFENDANT IS REMOVED TO ANOTHER JURISDICTION FOR THE PURPOSES OF PROSECUTION AND/OR SENTENC *676 ING, WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA....

...science argue. The plain meaning of "withhold” is to "refrain from giving, granting, or permitting.” See American Heritage Dictionary 2050 (3d ed.1996). Clearly the trial court refrained from imposing sentence at the request of the prosecutor. . Section 775.14, Florida Statutes (1995), provides as follows: Any person receiving a withheld sentence upon conviction for a criminal offense, and such withheld sentence has not been altered for a period of 5 years, shall not thereafter be sentenced for the conviction of the same crime for which sentence was originally withheld. . We agree with the dissent that the legislature should repeal section 775.14....

the illegal sentence. Rule 3.800(a), R.Cr.P.; § 775.14, F. S.; Drayton v. State, 177 So.2d 250 (Fla.App

...1987) (“The word ‘executed’ . . . mean[s] service upon the defendant.”). While the information was filed within the three-year statutory period, there is no indication in the record that a capias, summons, or other process was executed pursuant to section 775.14(4)(b)....

...State, 177 So.2d 250 , held that the suspension of the sentence from day to day and term to term, was illegal, citing as authority the Bateh case, supra and Helton v. State, Fla., 106 So.2d 79 . In the Drayton case, as in the Bateh case, it was held the trial court could correct an illegal sentence. 1 Section 775.14, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., places a limitation of 5 years within which to alter a sentence. *330 In the case sub judice, the sentence complained of was illegal by reason of the day to day and term to term suspension, but was imposed within the 5 year limitation imposed by F.S. § 775.14, F.S.A., and therefore subject to correction....

...Our previous interpretations of Florida law were based on a series of cases that conclude that a conviction requires either an adjudication of guilt or a plea of guilty. See State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243- 44 (Fla.1971) (stating that "for purposes of construing § 775.14, ......

...Our previous interpretations of Florida law were based on a series of cases that conclude that a conviction requires either an adjudication of guilt or a plea of guilty. See State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla. 1971) (stating that “for purposes of construing § 775.14,....

...f sentence indefinitely after adjudicating a defendant guilty. Bateh v. State, 101 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), cert. discharged, 110 So.2d 7 (Fla.1959). But the trial court retains jurisdiction to subsequently impose a sentence within five years. Section 775.14, Florida Statutes *557 (1983)....

...at a time in excess of five years from the date of the defendant’s conviction. In our opinion, under the particular facts of this case, the question must be answered in the negative. The defendant contends that this case is controlled by F.S.1969, section 775.14, F.S....

...State, Fla.App.1958, 101 So.2d 869 . This practice resulted in unsupervised probation of convicts and left the defendant in a position of not knowing when his obligation to the State arising out of his conviction would be satisfied. Presumably F.S. section 775.14, F.S.A., was enacted to abate these problems....

...But neither of these specific statutory exceptions pertain to the facts in the present case. It does appear from the record in this case that the defendant by his own wrongdoing absented himself from the jurisdiction of the court and thus was partially responsible for the lapse of the five year period. But F.S. section 775.14, F.S.A., contains no provision for tolling the running of the five year period under such circumstance....

...We think this approach to the interpretation of criminal statutes of limitation on prosecutions is equally pertinent to the interpretation of the statute now before the court. We conclude that because of the lapse of five years from the defendant’s conviction, the trial court, under F.S. section 775.14, F.S.A., as applied to the facts of this case lost jurisdiction to sentence the defendant....

...s adjudicated guilty. As a corollary the Court held that any sentence imposed during that period could not extend beyond such period. The important thing to note about this rule, however, is that it applies only to those cases which developed before Section 775.14 became effective. The Supreme Court recognized this in State v. Bateh, supra, wherein it said in 110 So.2d at page 10 : “Such situations arising after the day Sec. 775.14, Florida Statutes 1957, F.S. A., became effective will be governed by that act. * * *” And in Helton v. State, supra, the Court said: “It might be noted that by Ch. 57-284, Laws of 1957 [appearing as § 775.14 Fla.Stat.1957, F.S.A.], the Legislature placed a time limitation of five years on the imposition of sentence upon a convicted criminal whose sentence was ‘withheld’ at the time of his conviction....

...t considered.” Hence, we are of the view that the aforementioned rule developed in State v. Bateh, Helton v. State, and Rodriguez v. State, supra, has no application to cases the controlling facts of which occurred after the effective date of F.S. section 775.14, F.S....

...through the date of the arrest and possibly longer.” This petition followed. 2  II. Whittamore argues the capias was not executed without unreasonable delay as required by section 775.14(4)(b) because there is no evidence the State was diligent in its efforts to locate her....

been legally sentenced on November 28, 1966. Section 775-14, Fla. Stat. (1965), F.S.A. limits the time

...does not... ." If, on the other hand, it was the court's intention to withhold imposition of sentence on the possession offense, its power to later impose sentence thereon is limited to a period of no more than five years following adjudication, see § 775.14, Fla....