Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...§§ 782.071 and 316.062; two counts of leaving the scene of an accident which resulted in death in violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 316.062 and 316.027(1)(b); and two counts of driving with a suspended license and causing serious bodily injury or death in violation of Fla. Stat. § 322.34(6). Reed proceeded to trial in February 2005, during which the State dismissed the leaving-the-scene-of-the-accident counts....

...NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. [2] The other charges were misdemeanor offenses of attaching a registration license plate not assigned, section 320.261 of the Florida Statutes (1987); and driving while license suspended or revoked. § 322.34(1), Fla....

...Because we conclude the motion should have been stricken, we need not address whether the circuit court properly used these procedures. Affirmed with directions to strike the rule 3.170( l ) motion on remand. KELLY and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] See § 322.34(5), Fla....

...City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, .354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001). Under Florida law, driving with a suspended license without knowledge of the suspension is a non-criminal infraction punishable by fine but not by imprisonment. Fla. Stat. § § 322.34(1) and 318.13(3); see Thomas v. State, 614 So.2d 468, 470 (Fla.1993). By contrast, one who knowingly drives with a suspended license is guilty of a misdemeanor or felony. Fla. Stat. § 322.34(2) (2008). While the knowledge element may be critical in securing a conviction under Fla. Stat. § 322.34(2), "[n]o officer has a duty to prove every element of a crime before making an arrest." Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1355; see e.g....

...Ray Poole, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee. WOLF, Judge. Appellant raises a number of issues in this appeal from his conviction and sentence for the offense of felony driving while license suspended, revoked, or cancelled in violation of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (DWLS)....

...5th DCA 1997); the First District Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Gloster, 703 So.2d 1174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); and the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Keirn, 720 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), in which the district courts expressly declared that section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), is constitutional....

...Const.; see also Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418, 420 (Fla.1981). On our own motion, we now consolidate all of these cases for disposition in this opinion. [1] As more fully explained below, we agree with Florida's District Courts of Appeal [2] that section 322.34(1) is constitutional. I. BACKGROUND In 1995, the Legislature amended section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...oked (hereinafter *288 "DWLCSR offense") is, upon a third conviction, guilty of a third-degree felony. See Ch. 95-278, § 1, at 2594, Laws of Fla. Previously, a second or subsequent conviction for a DWLCSR offense was a first-degree misdemeanor. See § 322.34(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). As a result of the 1995 amendment, section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995) [3] , sets forth in full: (1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. In each of the cases before us today, the State charged the defendant with at least one felony DWLCSR offense pursuant to section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995). Each defendant challenged the constitutionality of section 322.34(1), primarily arguing that the statute constitutes an improper delegation of legislative power to the judiciary....

...fendants asserted, the authority of the trial court to withhold adjudication with regard to a DWLCSR offense unconstitutionally infringes upon the Legislature's exclusive authority. The linchpin of the defendant's primary constitutional challenge to section 322.34(1) is the assumption that no "conviction" results in a DWLCSR case when a trial court withholds adjudication....

...s in the respective trial courts, and appeals were taken in those cases to the various District Courts of Appeal. In Raulerson, Gloster, and Keirn, the Fifth District, First District, and Fourth District, respectively, discussed and analyzed whether section 322.34(1) is unconstitutional....

...Each of those district courts, along with the Third District in Pirtle v. State, 700 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (adopting Raulerson analysis), and the Second District in State v. Crossno, 713 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (adopting Keirn analysis), determined that section 322.34(1) is constitutional, but the courts did so on different grounds. We now briefly summarize the analysis employed by the district courts in Raulerson, Gloster, and Keirn. *289 A. RAULERSON In Raulerson, the Fifth District found that the dispositive issue in the case was whether "a defendant's violation of section 322.34(1) constitutes a conviction when the sentencing court decides to withhold an adjudication of guilt instead of entering a judgment against the defendant." 699 So.2d at 340....

...cations within the meaning of "conviction." See Raulerson, 699 So.2d at 340. After considering Gazda, rule 3.701(d)(2), and several other authorities, the Fifth District affirmed the trial court's rejection of Raulerson's constitutional challenge to section 322.34(1), reasoning that: A common sense reading of the instant statute indicates that the legislature intended the term "conviction" to mean a determination of a defendant's guilt by way of plea or verdict. There appears to be no requirement that there be an adjudication. The obvious legislative intent of section 322.34 is to increase the penalty for repeat violations of the statute....

...Raulerson, 699 So.2d at 340. [4] B. GLOSTER In Gloster, the defendant heavily relied upon the decision in State v. Santiago, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 220, 221 (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct. Aug. 2, 1996), reversed, 713 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), wherein the circuit court held section 322.34(1) to be unconstitutional. See Gloster, 703 So.2d at 1175. In Santiago, the circuit court reasoned: Because [section 322.34(1)(c)] requires an adjudication of guilt for the conduct to be punishable as a felony, and because § 948.01, Fla....

...old adjudication of guilt. 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 221. The First District found the circuit court's reasoning in Santiago to be flawed because it assumed that "by withholding adjudication in a case where a defendant is charged with a violation of section 322.34(1)(c), the result will be that the defendant's conduct will be treated as a misdemeanor, rather than a felony." Gloster, 703 So.2d at 1175....

...However, if probation is revoked, the defendant must be adjudicated guilty of the charged offense. § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). Applying the foregoing statutory scheme to the issue at hand, it becomes apparent that there are two possible alternatives when one charged with a violation of section 322.34(1)(c) has adjudication of guilt withheld and is placed on probation—either the term of probation will be successfully completed, in which event the defendant will not have been convicted at all; or probation will be revoked, in which case the defendant must be adjudicated guilty of a violation of section 322.34(1)(c), and sentenced accordingly. Treating the charge as a misdemeanor (as Santiago suggests) is simply not an available alternative. Thus, it is clear that section 322.34(1)(c) does not have the effect ascribed to it in Santiago, and by the trial court below; and, therefore, does not involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. See Raulerson v. State, 699 So.2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (rejecting, on somewhat different grounds, the contention that section 322.34(1)(c) involves an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to trial courts). Gloster, 703 So.2d at 1176. C. KEIRN In Keirn, the Fourth District rejected the circuit court's ruling in Santiago and upheld the constitutionality of section 322.34(1). See Keirn, 720 So.2d at 1086. The Fourth District stated that "[o]ne flaw in Santiago 's reasoning is its assumption that the term `conviction' as used in section 322.34 requires an adjudication of the defendant's guilt." Id....

...The court noted that while an adjudication of guilty is generally required for there to be a "conviction," that term as used in Florida law is a "chameleon-like term which draws meaning from its statutory context." Id. After thoroughly analyzing the interaction of section 322.34(1) with other related statutes, as well as the relevant legislative history surrounding section 322.34(1), the Fourth District held that "a conviction under section 322.34 occurs after final disposition of a case, as a result of a trial or plea, without regard to the court's decision on adjudication of a defendant, unless the disposition is made pursuant to section 318.14(1), Florida Statutes (1995)." Id....

...on,' we do not address the other aspects of the constitutional argument. Cf. Gloster, 703 So.2d 1174." Keirn, 720 So.2d at 1091. II. ANALYSIS After carefully reviewing the decisions of the District Courts of Appeal upholding the constitutionality of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), we join in the same conclusion. In so doing, we agree in large measure with the Fourth District's thorough analysis in Keirn because, in our view, the Legislature clearly intended that the term "conviction" as used in section 322.34(1) include both adjudications and withheld adjudications in DWLCSR cases, unless the disposition is made pursuant to section 318.14(10), Florida Statutes (1995). As stated above, section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), prescribes a progressive scheme of DWLCSR offenses for persons who drive "any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked." The statute s...

...zed in Keirn, however, the term "conviction" as used in Florida law has been a "chameleon-like" term that has drawn its meaning from the particular statutory context in which the term is used. See 720 So.2d at 1086. Accordingly, we must consider how section 322.34 interrelates with other statutory provisions, as well as the legislative history surrounding the statute, to ascertain the Legislature's intent. See, e.g., Streeter v. Sullivan, 509 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla.1987) ("Were these provisions even slightly ambiguous, an examination of legislative history and statutory construction principles would be necessary."). In considering section 322.34(1) in light of both other related provisions and the relevant legislative history, we, as did the Second District Court of Appeal in Crossno, see 713 So.2d at 1093, join the view espoused by the Fourth District Court in Keirn. Accordingly, we now set forth the relevant portion of the Keirn court's thorough analysis of the relationship between section 322.34(1) and other similar statutes and rules, and the legislative history surrounding the statute: To properly determine the meaning of the term "conviction" in section 322.34, it is necessary to read that section in conjunction with other provisions of Chapter 322 and Chapter 318, Florida Statutes, entitled "Disposition of Traffic Infractions." Sections in each chapter cross-reference the other....

...(3) Discourage repetition of criminal action by individuals against the peace and dignity of the state ... and impose increased and added deprivation of the privilege of operating motor vehicles upon habitual offenders who have been convicted repeatedly of violations of traffic laws. For section 322.34 suspensions, the legislature has specified both the type of suspension entitled to leniency and the procedure for obtaining a special disposition of a charge....

...A disposition outside of the section 318.14(10) procedure, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld or imposed, is a "conviction" within the meaning of section 322.01(10), which can be used to habitualize under section 322.264(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), or for aggravation under section 322.34....

...Given this construction of the term "conviction," the concern noted by the trial judge does not exist. Even if the judge in this case were to withhold adjudication on the driving while license suspended charge after a plea or verdict, such a disposition would still amount to a third "conviction" under section 322.34(1)(c), because it is a disposition outside of section 318.14(10). Keirn, 720 So.2d at 1088-90. As aptly explained by the Fourth District in Keirn, it is clear that the Legislature intended that a "conviction" for the purposes of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), include both adjudicated DWLCSR offenses and DWLCSR offenses in which adjudication is withheld. Construing the term "conviction" in such a *295 manner is consistent with both the Legislature's expressed intent in chapter 322, Florida Statutes, and the legislative history surrounding section 322.34(1). Accordingly, we reject each petitioners' separation of powers challenge to section 322.34(1), [6] and approve the result reached by the district courts in each of the decisions under review....

...3d DCA 1997), the Third District adopted the position of the Fifth District in Raulerson, while the Second District in State v. Crossno, 713 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), joined the view espoused by the Fourth District in Keirn. Neither Pirtle nor Crossno are before us for review, however. [3] The Legislature has amended section 322.34 several times since 1995, and as a result of those changes, subsection (1) of the 1995 version of the statute is now located in subsection (2) of the statute. Compare § 322.34(1), Fla. Stat. (1995), with § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Unlike subsection (1) of the 1995 statute, subsection (2) of the current statute contains an express knowledge requirement. See § 322.34(2), Fla....

...Appellant correctly asserts, on grounds of double jeopardy, that he may be convicted and sentenced on only one homicide-related charge because only one death occurred. We do not find that Appellant waived his claim of double jeopardy. See Novaton v. State, 634 So.2d 607 (Fla.1994). Appellant was convicted of violating both section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991)(renumbered as § 322.34(3)(b), Fla....

...laughter and vehicular homicide. Cooper, 634 So.2d at 1074; see Houser v. State, 474 So.2d 1193, 1196 (Fla. 1985) (an offender may not be punished for DWI manslaughter and vehicular homicide). Appellant cannot be convicted of violating both sections 322.34(3) and 782.071 based on a single death....

.... . . 3. The death of any human being is guilty of DUI manslaughter, a felony of the second degree.... While the statute clearly has a causation element, it does not explicitly contain a negligence element, in contrast to a related statute such as section 322.34(3), [21] which does include such an element....

...le, the operator of which is under the influence of any intoxicating liquor ... the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of driving under the influence of liquor or drugs, resulting in death." R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.2(a), (1983). [21] Section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: Any person who operates a motor vehicle: (a) Without having a driver's license as required under s....

...Calegan, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Karen E. Ehrlich, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee. *1086 GROSS, Judge. The central issue presented in this case is whether a conviction within the meaning of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1995), requires there to be an adjudication of the defendant's guilt. Based on a reading of the applicable statutes in light of their historical development, we hold that a conviction under section 322.34 occurs after a final disposition of a case, as a result of a trial or plea, without regard to the court's decision on adjudication of the defendant, unless the disposition is made pursuant to section 318.14(10), Florida Statutes (1995). Appellee, Michael Keirn, was charged by information with possession of cannabis, driving under the influence, and felony driving while license suspended in violation of section 322.34(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995). The information charged that Keirn had two prior convictions. Keirn moved to dismiss the driving while license suspended charge. Section 322.34(1) provides: (1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...cause there would be no third conviction, and the circuit court would lose jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion to dismiss, basing his ruling on State v. Santiago, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 220 (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct. Aug. 2, 1996). Santiago held that section 322.34(1)(c) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary contrary to Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. [1] Santiago 's rationale is capsulized in the following paragraph: Because [section 322.34(1)(c)] requires an adjudication of guilt for the conduct to be punishable as a felony, and because § 948.01, Fla....

...to make the Defendant's conduct punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor by this Court exercising its discretion to withhold adjudication of guilt. Id. at 221. One flaw in Santiago 's reasoning is its assumption that the term "conviction" as used in section 322.34 requires an adjudication of a defendant's guilt....

...in a civil case to victims of crime. In sum, proper construction of the term "conviction" requires a close examination of its statutory context and legislative history and development. II To properly determine the meaning of the term "conviction" in section 322.34, it is necessary to read that section in conjunction with other provisions of Chapter 322 and Chapter 318, Florida Statutes, entitled "Disposition of Traffic Infractions." Sections in each chapter cross-reference the other....

...(3) Discourage repetition of criminal action by individuals against the peace and dignity of the state ... and impose increased and added deprivation of the privilege of operating motor vehicles upon habitual offenders who have been convicted repeatedly of violations of traffic laws. For section 322.34 suspensions, the legislature has specified both the type of suspension entitled to leniency and the procedure for obtaining a special disposition of a charge....

...A disposition outside of the section 318.14(10) procedure, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld or imposed, is a "conviction" within the meaning of section 322.01(10), which can be used to habitualize under section 322.264(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), or for aggravation under section 322.34....

...Given this construction of the term "conviction," the concern noted by the trial judge does not exist. Even if the judge in this case were to withhold adjudication on the driving while license suspended charge after a plea or verdict, such a disposition would still amount to a third "conviction" under section 322.34(1)(c), because it is a disposition outside of section 318.14(10). We note that in Raulerson v. State, 699 So.2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the fifth district has addressed the identical issue as that posed in this case and arrived at a similar result. Raulerson held that in section 322.34, the legislature intended the term "conviction" to mean a determination of a defendant's guilt by way of plea or verdict....

...Gazda, 257 So.2d 242 (Fla.1971), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(2), for its construction of the term "conviction." However, as we stated above, Gazda hinges on the precise wording of the statute it parsed, so it is of limited precedential value for construing the term as it is used in section 322.34. There is no indication that the legislature intended to adopt the definition contained in Rule 3.701(d)(2) for section 322.34 or that the supreme court intended that rule to apply outside of the sentencing guidelines. Raulerson does not cite to section 318.14(11), so the opinion should not be read to include dispositions under that section as convictions. We hold that section 322.34(1)(c) is constitutional and reverse the trial court's order of dismissal....

...ssee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Trisha E. Meggs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant seeks review of his conviction of felony driving while license suspended, in violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...h cancellation, suspension, or revocation. The offense allegedly occurred on March 27, 1999. The information alleged that appellant had previously been convicted of driving while license suspended, canceled, or revoked two or more times, contrary to section 322.34(2), under which the current offense would be raised to the level of a third degree felony. At the time of the offense at issue, section 322.34 provided in part: (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked, except a "habitual traffic offender" as defined in s....

...(4) Any judgment or order rendered by a court or adjudicatory body or any uniform traffic citation that cancels, suspends, or revokes a person's driver's license must contain a provision notifying the person that his or her driver's license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked. (Emphasis added). Prior to October 1, 1997, section 322.34 provided, in relevant part: (1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided ins. 775.082 or s. 775.083. (c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Fla. Stat. § 322.34(1), Fla....

...The predicate convictions relied on by the state to enhance appellant's current offense to felony status occurred prior to October 1, 1997. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the case from circuit court and transfer it to county court. Appellant noted that the statute under which he was charged—section 322.34(2), effective October 1, 1997— added the element of knowledge to the proof required for conviction....

...We agree with appellant's position. At the time appellant received the prior convictions, the statute did not require proof of "knowledge" as an element of the offense, and thus, his prior convictions cannot be counted as "convictions" under the 1997 provisions of section 322.34(2)....

...ntencing enhancement scheme, the legislature would have clearly stated that the enhancement would not apply to any convictions before the enactment of the statute. We find the state's legislative intent argument particularly unpersuasive in light of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1997 and Supp.1998), in which the legislature did in fact make the act of driving while license was canceled, suspended or revoked, without knowledge of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation, a moving violation, rather than an offense punishable by criminal penalties as under the 1997 law. Accordingly, the felony conviction is reversed. We remand with directions to enter judgment and conviction pursuant to section 322.34(2)(a), Fla....

...id not know of it. The Department of Motor Vehicles had suspended his license for failure to pay traffic fines. Its record, admitted into evidence, shows that notice of the suspension was sent to Turner pursuant to section 322.251, Florida Statutes. Section 322.34(2)(a) provides that a person whose driver's license has been suspended who, knowing of such suspension, drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is suspended, is guilty of a second-degree misdemeanor. Knowledge is satisfied if the person was previously cited for driving with a suspended license, the person admits to knowledge of the suspension, or the person received notice by way of a judgment or order suspending the driver's license. § 322.34(2), (4), Fla.Stat....

...was satisfied because there was a notation on the Department's *366 records that a judgment or court order had been entered suspending his license, the presumption does not apply to the administrative suspension for failure to pay traffic fines. See § 322.34(2), Fla.Stat.; Brown, 764 So.2d at 744; see also Haygood v. State, 17 So.3d 894 (Fla.1st DCA 2009). While the driving record did not prove that Turner had knowledge of his suspended license, the state contends that it presented other evidence from which knowledge could be reasonably inferred. See § 322.34(3), Fla.Stat....

...one's driving privilege is suspended or revoked, as appellant did here, the statutory equivalent of driving while one's license is suspended or revoked. Our review of the statutes leads us to agree with the State. Appellant was convicted pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1997), which states: Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...d of suspensions and revocations of driver's licenses. Section 11 creates section 322.28, Florida Statutes relating to the commencement of the period of suspension or revocation of driver's licenses for incarcerated offenders while section 12 amends section 322.34, Florida Statutes dealing with driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled or disqualified. Section 13 creates section 322.341, Florida Statutes which makes it a third degree felony to drive while a license is permanently revoked....

...Fagan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lamya A. Henry, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. EN BANC HARRIS, J. We elect to consider this case en banc. Here, Arthur was charged with violating sections 322.34 and 322.264, Florida Statutes, because he was caught driving a vehicle after being notified that he had been designated an "habitual traffic offender" according to the records maintained by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) resulting in his driving privileges being revoked. Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes makes it a third-degree felony for one whose driver's license has been revoked as an habitual offender to drive a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state....

...ecedes from Sylvester. First, it should be highlighted that the crime at issue in this case is different from the crime at issue in Sylvester. [1] In Sylvester, the defendant was charged with felony driving with license suspended (DWLS), pursuant to Section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Here, on the other hand, Arthur is charged with driving with license revoked as a "habitual traffic offender," pursuant to Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes. The elements of the two offenses are different. As the majority points out, the elements of the 322.34(5) offense are: (1) that while defendant's license was revoked as a habitual offender, (2) he drove a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state. On the other hand, the elements of DWLS pursuant to 322.34(2)(c) are: (1) that while defendant's license was suspended, (2) he, knowing of the suspension, drove a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state, and (3) defendant had been convicted of DWLS two or more times before the instant charge. § 322.34(2)(c), Fla....

...All the driving record in Sylvester reflected was that the Department was notified that the defendant was convicted of DWLS on two or more prior occasions, but it did not reflect whether the defendant was actually convicted. For the two crimes to be analogous, the 322.34(2)(c) offense would have to have these elements: (1) that while defendant's license was suspended, (2) he, knowing of the suspension, drove a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state, and (3) the Department records reflect that defendant was convicted of DWLS two or more times before the instant charge....

...ers. What matters is proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person whose driving record is before the court is actually the person who committed the prior offenses. Again, if linking the driving record is what mattered, then the third element of 322.34(2)(c) would not be that the prior convictions occurred, but rather that the Department's records reflect that two or more prior convictions occurred....

...Pelicane, 729 So.2d at 535. [3] In short, although a driving record is indisputably admissible [4] , nowhere has the majority's opinion shown why a driving *595 record reflecting two or more DWLS convictions is proof that beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant facing the 322.34(2)(c) charge was convicted on two or more prior occasions of DWLS....

...2d DCA 2002), supports the holding of Sylvester and the position articulated in Judge Thompson's dissent. In Fields, the court noted that it had previously cited Sylvester in Garcia v. State, 800 So.2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), and held in Garcia, "that proof under section 322.34(2) requires certified copies of prior convictions." The Fields court does not recede from that holding. Rather, the court acknowledged that if Sylvester spoke to DWLS under 322.34(5), as the Fourth District Court of Appeal believed, see Rodgers v. State, 804 So.2d 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), then it would align itself with the Fourth District. The statute at issue in Sylvester was not section 322.34(5), but rather section 322.34(2), as the present opinion clarifies....

...with the evidence to defendant. Unrefuted, the records are sufficient to sustain a conviction. See State v. Kahler, 232 So.2d 166 (Fla.1970). [5] It is true that Sylvester can be distinguished on the facts. The gravamen of the offense in Sylvester [section 322.34(2)(c)] was that the defendant was thrice convicted of knowingly driving with a suspended license, whereas the gravamen of the offense herein is that Arthur was convicted of driving after his license had been revoked because he was an "habitual traffic offender" [section 322.34(5)]....

...easonable doubt but also insufficient to link Sylvester to the prior convictions. Sylvester relied on State v. Harbaugh, 754 So.2d 691 (Fla.2000), but this reliance was misplaced. Section 322.201, Fla. Stat., makes the driving records admissible and section 322.34(2), Fla....

...It is this portion of the analysis which conflicts with this opinion. [1] The court in Rodgers v. State, 804 So.2d 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), misapprehended the nature of the criminal charge in Sylvester. The crime charged in Sylvester was a violation of § 322.34(2)(c), not § 322.34(5). The Rodgers court concluded that it was in conflict with Sylvester because the elements of section 322.34(5) did not include the prior DWLS convictions. It is true that § 322.34(5) does not have, as an element, the prior DWLS convictions, but in the subsection under which Sylvester was charged (§ 322.34(2)(c)), the prior offenses are an element of the offense. [2] See footnote 3 of the majority's opinion. [3] Apparently underlying the majority opinion is concern that the state would be unable to link a prior misdemeanor DWLS with a defendant standing trial for 322.34(2)(c) DWLS because fingerprints are not necessarily attached to the judgments of convictions for misdemeanors....

...introduction of the certified prior convictions. [4] See Sylvester, 770 So.2d at 250 n. 1; § 322.201, Fla. Stat. [1] Since the Sylvester opinion spoke of prior convictions as an element of the felony DWLS offense, it would seem obvious that it was section 322.34(2) under discussion there: section 322.34(2) is the DWLS crime that describes prior convictions as an element of the offense. Since felony DWLS under 322.34(5) does not include prior convictions as an element, it would seem just as obvious that the Sylvester opinion must not have been speaking to that type of felony DWLS.

...the DUI conviction, in this case, section 316.655(2) is also applicable because the defendant was convicted of another driving offense. Stoletz pled no contest to and was convicted of felony driving while license suspended (habitual), a violation of section 322.34(5)....

...d as a matter of law. Specifically, he argues that the state was required to prove each of the qualifying convictions for DWLS separately and with all the formalities. We disagree and affirm. In this appeal, defendant was convicted of a violation of section 322.34(5), which provides: "Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...riving record reflected that he had three convictions within a 5-year period for DWLS, and that on May 22, 1997, DMV revoked his license and gave him the statutory notice of the revocation. [4] As the statutory text itself provides, to convict under section 322.34(5) the state was required to prove three elements: (1) DMV had revoked defendant's driver's license as a habitual offender under section 322.264; (2) DMV gave defendant notice of the revocation of his license; and (3) defendant operated a motor vehicle upon a highway of Florida while the license was revoked....

...Such entry shall be admissible in the courts of this state and shall constitute sufficient proof that such notice was given." [5] The question we address is defendant's contention that the computer printout was insufficient to present a prima facie case of the first and second elements of the section 322.34(5) violation....

...s required to revoke the motorist's license and give appropriate notice, which can be by first-class mail. [8] Among other things, *483 DMV is also under a statutory duty to require the motorist to surrender the license. [9] The violation created by section 322.34(5) does not involve—as an element of the crime—a finding that the motorist has been convicted on three separate occasions of DWLS....

...s revoked the motorist's license and given notice of the revocation. Thus it is not necessary for the state to prove each separate conviction of DWLS which DMV relied on in revoking the license. [10] To sum up the requirements for a conviction under section 322.34, the statute as written by the Legislature merely makes it necessary for the state to prove by competent evidence that DMV maintains a record on the motorist, that its record shows the requisite three separate DWLS convictions within a 5 year period, and that DMV gave the motorist the statutory notice....

...These statutes permit the state to make this proof by presenting a certified copy of the motorist's driving record maintained by DMV. That is what the state did in its prosecution in this case. Hence the state made out a prima facie case, which allowed the trier of fact to find defendant guilty of the section 322.34(5) violation. [11] We disagree with the contrary holding on this issue in Sylvester v. State, 770 So.2d 249, 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Sylvester analogized the section 322.34(5) offense for driving while a license has been revoked with the entirely inapposite offense of driving under the influence (DUI) with three prior DUI convictions. [12] The manner of proving a violation for the offense under section 322.34, on the one hand, and the DUI offense, on the other, is not the same because they are defined differently in the texts of the respective statutes. The DUI statute is so framed as to make the prior convictions an element of the DUI offense, i.e. driving while under the influence with three prior convictions for the same offense. [13] In contrast, under section 322.34(5) the offense is driving when a DMV revocation of the motorist's license is in effect. The Legislature could have constructed section 322.34 so that the offense was defined as driving with three prior convictions for DWLS, but it did not do that. The burden of proof *484 created by the Legislature in section 322.34 as actually written was therefore merely to establish the fact of revocation by DMV, appropriate notice to the motorist of such revocation, and the fact of driving while the license was revoked....

...2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), requires a jury resolution when any fact other than a prior conviction increases the penalty for an offense. See id. ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime... must be ... proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). Under section 322.34(5), the three prior DWLS convictions do not increase the penalty....

...The offense is in driving after the license has been revoked. The penalty is for that offense, not for having three convictions of DWLS. It would be the penalty whatever the reason for the revocation. It seems to us that the notion behind the drafting of section 322.34(5) is to punish a motorist for acting contrary to agency action revoking his license, not to increase the penalty for another offense of DWLS. We reject defendant's argument that the statutory scheme which we have discussed above is unconstitutional. See Raulerson v. State, 763 So.2d 285 (Fla. 2000). AFFIRMED. STEVENSON and GROSS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 322.34(5), Fla....

...[3] § 322.201, Fla. Stat. (2000). [4] The DWLS conviction dates were March 10, 1992 in Duval County; May 2, 1992 in Indian River County; and January 14, 1997 in Indian River County. The May 2, 1992, conviction was noted as "adjudication withheld." For purposes of section 322.34, a withheld adjudication constitutes a conviction....

..., it is not controlling here. In Boutwell v. State, 631 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 1994), our supreme court held that the defendant could not be convicted of four counts of driving while his license was suspended, where he injured four people in one accident. Section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991), under which Boutwell was convicted, contains language which could literally be interpreted as allowing four convictions from one accident....

...of probation for the first degree misdemeanor of possession of drug paraphernalia. REVERSED. PETERSON and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 893.13(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] § 893.147, Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] § 316.610, Fla. Stat. (1991). [4] § 322.34, Fla....

...5th DCA 2002), based on apparent conflict with the decision in Huss v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The question presented here is the application of the punishment enhancement provisions of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), where the defendant's prior driving while license suspended (DWLS) convictions occurred under an earlier version of the statute that did not require proof of knowledge as an element of the offense....

...For the reasons expressed below, we approve the decision in Huss and quash the decision in Thompson. Facts and Procedural History Paul Thompson pled guilty to a felony charge of knowingly driving with a license that had been suspended or revoked (felony DWLS) under section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...Finally, the Fifth District rejected Thompson's assertion that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment and characterized *1262 the argument as "`clearly lack [ing] merit.'" Id. (quoting Martin v. State, 809 So.2d 65, 66 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)). Analysis Prior to October 1, 1997, section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1995), provided in relevant part: (1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. The Legislature amended the statute by adding language that the driving must be done "knowing of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation," [2] thus adding a knowledge element to the crime. See § 322.34(2), Fla....

...The amended statute also provides that a person who drives while his or her license is canceled, suspended, or revoked but does not have knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation as provided in subsection (2) is merely guilty of a moving violation. See § 322.34(1), Fla....

...this very issue. See Stutts *1263 v. State, 821 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). In Stutts, the First District decided that the defendant's prior DWLS convictions in Alabama could not be the basis for an enhanced felony DWLS offense under the amended section 322.34(2) because the Alabama statute contained no knowledge element....

...nted no evidence of the basic element of failure to possess a permit. Id. at 229, 121 S.Ct. 712. In determining how the Fiore due process principles apply, we must consider the nature of the "change in the law" at issue here. The Legislature amended section 322.34 in 1997 to include a knowledge element....

...'s knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation, was guilty of a second-degree misdemeanor upon a first conviction, a first-degree misdemeanor upon a second conviction, and a third-degree felony upon a third or subsequent conviction. See § 322.34(1), Fla....

...ment of the offense. After the 1997 amendment took effect on October 1, 1997, operation of a vehicle with a canceled, suspended, or revoked license where there is no knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation is a moving violation. See § 322.34(1), Fla....

...uspended, or revoked is subject to progressively *1265 more harsh punishment for repeated violations. See id. § 322.24(2). [5] Thompson pled guilty to the felony charge of knowingly driving while his license was suspended or revoked in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...eviously under subsection (1); admits to knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation; or received knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation via a judgment, order, or uniform traffic citation as provided in subsection (4). § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The trial court may also consider any evidence not mentioned in subsection (2) which would show that the person knowingly violated the statute. Id. § 322.34(3)....

...vict a person of a crime without proving the elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 531 U.S. at 228-29, 121 S.Ct. 712. Here, the State did not and could not prove that Thompson had three previous convictions for the offense proscribed by section 322.34(2), driving with knowledge that his license had been canceled, suspended, or revoked. Thus, Thompson's conviction fails to satisfy federal constitutional due process and his felony conviction must be reversed. However, as in Huss, judgment and conviction may be entered against Thompson pursuant to section 322.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...However, I do not join in the analysis contained in the majority opinion. Rather, I believe that both Thompson and Huss v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), presented issues of statutory construction. The Huss decision was correct because the First District correctly construed section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes. The Thompson decision was wrong because it mistakenly concluded that the issue before it was the retroactivity of the Huss decision rather than the construction of section 322.34(2)....

...It appears to me that the confusion in this case arises from the different procedural presentations of the issue in Huss and the issue in Thompson. Huss was a direct appeal from a conviction for felony driving while license suspended, in violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...wording applies only to a `conviction' for the offense prescribed by the present statute." Huss, 771 So.2d at 593. The First District then reversed Huss's felony conviction and remanded with directions to enter a judgment and conviction pursuant to section 322.34(2)(a)....

...On the other hand, Thompson was a review of a circuit court's denial of a postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Thompson based his postconviction motion on the allegation that the circuit court that sentenced him under section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), did not have jurisdiction to impose the sentence. Thompson's argument regarding the circuit court's jurisdiction rested on the First District's interpretation of section 322.34(2) in Huss....

...This case clearly involves a garden-variety issue of statutory construction which happens to be presented in postconviction. NOTES [1] The statute was amended by the Legislature to include a knowledge element that was not an element of the previous offense of felony driving with a suspended or revoked license. Compare § 322.34(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998) with § 322.34(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). The amended statute became effective on October 1, 1997. See ch. 97-300, §§ 40, 54, Laws of Fla. [2] As amended by the Legislature, section 322.34(2) provides in pertinent part: (2) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...he highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon: .... (c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). [3] Section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), states as follows: (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked ......

...f the cancellation, suspension, or revocation is guilty of a second-degree misdemeanor upon a first conviction of this offense, a first-degree misdemeanor upon a second conviction, and a third-degree felony upon a third or subsequent conviction. See § 322.34(2), Fla....

...[7] Under the current statute, "[t]he element of knowledge is satisfied if the person has been previously cited as provided in subsection (1)," that is, driving with a canceled, suspended, or revoked driver's license without proof of knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation of the driver's license. See § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). Thompson's previous convictions under the pre-amendment statute satisfy this criteria. Thompson's conviction under the amended statute meets the requirements of section 322.34(2)(a), in that his previous convictions without proof of knowledge satisfy the knowledge element required for the current conviction. Thus, Thompson can be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, as provided in section 322.34(2)(a). [8] Section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), provides: Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...d of suspensions and revocations of driver's licenses. Section 11 creates section 322.28, Florida Statutes relating to the commencement of the period of suspension or revocation of driver's licenses for incarcerated offenders while section 12 amends section 322.34, Florida Statutes dealing with driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled or disqualified. Section 13 creates section 322.341, Florida Statutes which makes it a third degree felony to drive while a license is permanently revoked....

...t have a natural or logical connection. See Chenoweth v. Kemp, 396 So.2d 1122 (Fla.1981), receded from on other grounds in Sheffield v. Superior Insurance Co., 800 So.2d 197 (Fla. 2001). In Wittman, the state challenged a trial court order declaring section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, to be unconstitutional on the ground that Chapter 97-300 violated the single subject requirement. Chapter 97-300 altered the penalty in section 322.34(5), driving while license suspended, from a first degree misdemeanor to a third degree felony....

...nce a defendant within the full range set forth in the guidelines. AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 316.193(1) and (3)(a), (b), and (c)3, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] § 316.193(1) and (3)(a), (b), and (c)1, Fla. Stat. (1995). [3] § 322.34(1), Fla....

...ed an accident that resulted in serious injuries to four persons could be convicted of only one offense. In Hallman v. State, 492 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), the defendant had been charged with two counts of driving with a suspended license under section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...one conviction could be obtained unless the defendant had resumed driving following police intervention. The court reasoned that where an illegal act was ongoing, there was no practicable place to draw the line between one charge and several. Under section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1991), a person who drives with a suspended license is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree. However, Boutwell was convicted under section 322.34(3), which provides: Any person whose driver's license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked pursuant to s....

...ded, or revoked and who by careless or negligent operation thereof causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. It is evident that section 322.34(3) does no more than enhance the penalty for driving with a suspended license in cases where the driver through the careless or negligent operation of his vehicle causes death or serious bodily injury. If the violation of section 322.34(1) in a single driving episode can be only one offense, the violation of section 322.34(3) in a single driving episode should be considered as one offense. We agree with Wright that regardless of the number of injured persons, there can only be one conviction under section 322.34(3) arising from a single accident....

...sing serious bodily injury to more than one person. Driving with a suspended license and causing serious bodily injury does not merely enhance the penalty for driving with a suspended license. It is a separate crime which is charged separately under section 322.34(3)....

...Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. ORFINGER, J. James Card appeals his conviction for driving while his license was revoked as an habitual offender, in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...y and Motor Vehicles ("DHSMV") was unavailable and that he had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that person. We hold that a self-authenticating driving record is not testimonial hearsay and affirm Card's conviction. To sustain a conviction under section 322.34(5), the State must prove "(1) that while [the] defendant's license was revoked as an `habitual offender' (2) he drove a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state." Arthur v....

...993), arising out of a single accident because of the principle announced in Boutwell v. State, 631 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 1994). I agree *130 and would reverse but I would certify this issue to the supreme court. In Boutwell, the supreme court considered section 322.34 (driving with a suspended license), a statute structured similarly to section 316.193 involved in our case, and held: Under section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1991), a person who drives with a suspended license is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree. However, Boutwell was convicted under section 322.34(3), which provides: Any person whose driver's license has been canceled, suspended or revoked ......

...and who operates a motor vehicle while his driver's license is canceled, suspended or revoked and who by careless or negligent operation thereof causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being, is guilty of a felony of the third degree .. . It is evident that section 322.34(3) does no more than enhance the penalty for driving with a suspended license in cases where the driver through the careless or negligent operation of his vehicle causes death or serious bodily injury. If the violation of section 322.34(1) in a single driving episode can be only one offense, the violation of section 322.34(3) in a single driving episode should be considered as only one offense. We agree with Wright that regardless of the number of injured persons, there can only be one conviction under section 322.34(3) arising from a single accident....

...Serious bodily injury to another ... is guilty of a felony of the third degree ... 3. The death of any human being is guilty of DUI manslaughter, a felony of the second degree.... Melbourne argues that since the structure of this statute is similar to that in both sections 322.34 and 810.02, it should be construed to reach a similar result....

...That is, each statute is so structured that if one commits the core offense (either burglary, driving while license suspended or driving under the influence), then if additional, more serious elements are proved, the defendant may be subjected to a more serious consequence than had the additional elements not occurred. In section 322.34(3), death or great bodily injury are considered together to form only one new felony, while section 316.193(3) treats them separately and forms two new felonies....

...1991), in which the court held that it was error to convict on two counts of burglary with a battery because only one entry had been proven. Would the result of Boutwell have been different if some of the seriously injured victims had died? The court seems to say no: It is evident that section 322.34(3) does no more than enhance the penalty for driving with a suspended license in cases where the driver through the careless or negligent operation of his vehicle causes death or serious bodily injury. [Emphasis added]. Boutwell, 631 So.2d at 1095. Justice Grimes, in a well reasoned dissent, acknowledges the similarity of the structure of sections 322.34 and 316.193 and the analytical inconsistency between Houser, if it is construed to permit multiple convictions under 316.193, and the result in Boutwell when he states: If multiple convictions are permitted for DUI manslaughter and DUI with se...

...State, 592 So.2d 1123, 1126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), quashed on other grounds, 600 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1992), the court held that, although multiple convictions based on the number of victims would be appropriate under section 316.193(3)(c), such would not be appropriate under section 322.34(3) because the defendant's action of driving with a suspended license was "a single continuing offense and thus a single violation of section 322.34." That is, so long as you are driving with a suspended license uninterrupted, you are committing but one violation of the statute....

...juries) is a second degree felony, should be corrected. AFFIRM in part; REVERSE in part; REMAND. GOSHORN, C.J., and HARRIS, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 316.193(3)(a), (b), (c)3, Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] § 316.193(3)(a), (b), (c)2, Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] § 322.34(3), Fla....

...Gibson, Public Defender, and Janet Brook Goodrich, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. ORFINGER, M., Senior Judge. Appellee was charged by information with and pled guilty to felony driving while license cancelled, suspended or revoked in violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes....

...In contrast, where predicate convictions do not enhance, but are merely elements of, the current charge, this Court has not required convictions to be final on appeal. See Raulerson v. State, 763 So.2d 285 (Fla. 2000) (holding that a "conviction" for purposes of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), includes a withheld adjudication); State v....

...Following treatment and the administration of antipsychotic drugs, his competency was restored. In December 2005, Maxwell was charged with leaving the scene of an accident with death, in violation of section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), and felony driving while license suspended or revoked, in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Kevin Kelly was convicted of the following third-degree felonies: (1) driving under the influence with serious bodily injury, (2) driving without a valid driver's license with serious bodily injury, and (3) leaving the scene of an accident with injury. See §§ 316.193(3)(c)(2), 322.34(6), 316.027(1)(a), Fla....

...The parties do not dispute that DUI with serious bodily injury contains an element of causation. See § 316.193(3)(c)(2). But, contrary to the parties' assertions, the offense of driving without a valid license with death or serious bodily injury also contains an element of causation. See § 322.34(6). Section 322.34(6) provides that a person who operates a motor vehicle without a valid license "and who by careless or negligent operation of the motor vehicle causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being" commits a third-degree felony....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. ANTOON, Judge. James Raulerson (defendant) appeals his judgment and sentence for felony driving while license suspended, claiming that section 322.34(1) of the Florida Statutes (1995) unconstitutionally permits the trial court to determine whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony. We affirm. The defendant was charged with the offense of driving while his license was suspended in violation of section 322.34 of the Florida Statutes (1995). The state prosecuted the offense as a felony, relying upon the fact that the defendant had three prior convictions for the same offense. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, asserting that section 322.34(1) was unconstitutional....

...The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant thereafter entered a plea of nolo contendere after specifically reserving his right to appeal the denial of his dismissal motion. The trial court then adjudicated the defendant guilty of the felony offense of driving while license suspended and imposed sentence. Section 322.34(1) of the Florida Statutes (1995) provides that a driver, upon a third or subsequent conviction for driving with a suspended license, is guilty of committing a third-degree felony: 322.34 Driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified.- (1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...l court exercised its discretion to withhold an adjudication of guilt. In this regard, the defendant maintains that if the trial court withholds a defendant's adjudication of guilt following either a guilty verdict or plea on the charge of violating section 322.34(1), then that charge would not constitute a prior "conviction" for purposes of enhancement under the statute....

...In doing so, we must give the statute a fair construction that is consistent with the constitution and legislative intent. Id. at 1076. Applying these rules of construction to the instant case, the defendant's argument fails. The dispositive issue here is whether a defendant's violation of section 322.34(1) constitutes a conviction when the sentencing court decides to withhold an adjudication of guilt instead of entering a judgment against the defendant....

...A common sense reading of the instant statute indicates that the legislature intended the term "conviction" to mean a determination of a defendant's guilt by way of plea or verdict. There appears to be no requirement that there be an adjudication. The obvious legislative intent of section 322.34 is to increase the penalty for repeat violations of the statute....

...se suspended statute. Therefore, the mere sentencing for the felony, even if adjudication of guilt of the felony is withheld, should be ample "conviction" of the included third offense of driving with license suspended to fulfill the requirements of section 322.34(1)(c)....

...lassified him as a habitual traffic offender and suspended his license as required by section 322.264. Thus, the most serious charge Mr. Patterson faced was the third-degree felony of "driving while license suspended as a habitual traffic offender." § 322.34(5)....

...ial convictions for driving while license suspended may result in an increase in the degree or level of the offense, thus exposing the defendant to a greater penalty. A first offense of driving while license suspended is a second-degree misdemeanor. § 322.34(2)(a). Under section 322.34(2)(b), a second offense becomes a first-degree misdemeanor, and under section 322.34(2)(c), a third or subsequent offense becomes a third-degree felony. Although this was apparently Mr. Patterson's fifth offense of driving while license suspended, he was not charged under section 322.34(2)(c). Instead, he was charged with a violation of section 322.34(5), which provides: Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...Section 322.27(5) requires the DHSMV to revoke the license of a person designated as a habitual traffic offender for a minimum of five years. Thus, a person who is charged with a fourth offense of driving while his license is suspended may be charged with either (1) the third-degree felony described in section 322.34(2)(c), or (2) the third-degree felony described in section 322.34(5), as long as the DHSMV has revoked his driver's license as a habitual traffic offender. Although both offenses are third-degree felonies, the elements of each offense are different. Each requires a current offense of driving while license suspended, but section 322.34(2)(c) specifically relies upon proof of the prior convictions to support the reclassification of the current offense, while section 322.34(5) relies upon proof of the DHSMV's designation of the defendant as a habitual traffic offender to reclassify the offense. Because section 322.34(2)(c) requires proof of the prior convictions as elements of the offense, the validity of those convictions may be challenged in an effort to prevent the reclassification of the charged crime....

...s based on prior convictions. III. THE PRINCIPLES OF BEACH AND HLAD DO NOT APPLY WHEN A RECLASSIFICATION IS BASED ON AN ADMINISTRATIVE DESIGNATION RELYING ON PRIOR UNCOUNSELED CONVICTIONS RATHER THAN DIRECTLY ON PRIOR CONVICTIONS As explained above, section 322.34(5) does not require, as an element of the crime, a finding of specific prior convictions for the same or similar crimes. State v. Fields, 809 So. 2d 99, 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). A conviction under section 322.34(5) simply requires competent evidence showing that the DHSMV maintained a record on the motorist, that the record reflected three prior moving violation convictions, and that the motorist received notice of his designation as a habitual traffic offender and the resulting suspension of his license....

...We recognize that the application of Lewis to the habitual traffic offender provisions seems to create a logical inconsistency between similar statutes. That is, the State may be prohibited from seeking a third-degree felony conviction for driving while license suspended under section 322.34(2)(c) because it cannot rely on convictions that are "unreliable" because they were obtained in violation of the right to counsel, but the State can use the same convictions, by way of an administrative designation that does not assess their reliability, to support a third-degree felony conviction under section 322.34(5)....

...NORTHCUTT and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. NOTES [1] The record is not clear, but it appears these cases involved four other citations for knowingly driving while his license was suspended. See § 322.34(2), Fla....

...At the time Anderson drove the vehicle to the meeting, she allegedly did not have actual knowledge that her license was suspended, and she contended that she had not received a written notice of the suspension. She was charged with driving with a suspended license pursuant to section 322.34, Florida Statutes (2011)....

...However, Anderson still faced a charge of violation of probation based upon the charge of driving with a suspended license. During Anderson’s violation of probation hearing, defense counsel contended that the trial court should not find a violation of probation because the State had failed to satisfy the requirements of section 322.34(2), as it had not proven that Anderson had actual knowledge of her suspended license before she drove to the meeting with her probation officer....

...Therefore, the court held that she violated her probation, and it reinstated her original sentence that had been suspended. On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed. See Anderson, 48 So.3d at 1018-19 . In reaching its decision, the Fifth District construed sections 322.34 and 322.251(1) together....

...se parameters apply to a charge of driving with a suspended license. See id. It also stated that section 322.251(1) permits notice either in person or by mail. See id. The district court then noted the rebuttable presumption of knowledge provided in section 322.34(2), stated that this presumption was unavailable in this case, and held that the unavailability of the presumption did not alter the outcome of this case. See id. at 1018-19 . That rebuttable presumption was not available because this case involved a suspension for failure to pay a traffic fine or financial responsibility. See § 322.34(2)....

...s mailing of written notice of Anderson’s license suspension to her correct address at the time of the mailing. See Anderson, 48 So.3d at 1019 . This review followed. At issue is whether the Fifth District misconstrued the knowledge requirement of section 322.34(2) in light of the decisions in Brown and Haygood . In those decisions, the dis *777 trict courts held that, in instances where section 322.34(2)’s rebuttable presumption does not apply, the State must prove that an individual has actually received notice of a license suspension to establish knowledge of that suspension....

...Similarly, a statute is to be read as a consistent whole, and a court should accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts, with effect given to every clause and related provision. See Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla.2008). Applicable Statutes and Case Law Under section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2011), any person who drives while his or her license is cancelled, suspended, or revoked, with knowledge of this fact, may be convicted of driving while a license is cancelled, suspended, or revoked, which is classified as either a misdemeanor or a felony of the third degree. The text of section 322.34(2)-(4) is as follows: (2) Any person whose driver’s license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...ive the mailed order will not affect or stay the effective date or term of the cancellation, suspension, revocation, or disqualification of the licensee’s driving privilege. (Emphasis added.) In 1999, the Fifth District reviewed a conviction under section 322.34 for driving with a revoked license, and specifically addressed what constitutes notice under section 322.251. See Fields v. State, 731 So.2d 753, 753-54 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). However, Fields pertained to the 1997 version of section 322.34, which did not contain the complete knowledge definition provided in the present version of section 322.34(2) that is the subject of this appeal. See id. Rather, in 1997, section 322.34(2) only provided the following: “The element of knowledge is satisfied if the person has been previously cited as provided in subsection (1); or the person admits to knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation; or the person received notice as provided in subsection (4).” Ch. 97-300, § 40, at 5414, Laws of Fla. In 1998, the Legislature amended section 322.34(2) and constructed the current definition, which the courts considered in Brown and Haygood , and which is at issue in the present case. See ch. 98-223, § 12, at 2108-09, Laws of Fla. Compare § 322.34, Fla. Stat. (1997), with § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (1998 Supp.). Specifically, the 1998 Laws of Florida added the rebuttable presumption to the knowledge definition of section 322.34(2) and formulated the current statutory version....

...bsection (4) appears in the department’s records for any case except for one involving a suspension by the department for failure to pay a traffic fine or for a financial responsibility violation. Ch. 98-223, § 12, at 2109, Laws of Fla.; see also § 322.34, Fla....

...See Fields, 731 *779 So.2d at 753 . The State established that it sent written notice of the revocation to the defendant by mail. See id. at 754 . The Fifth District held that this satisfied the notice requirement of section 322.251 and, concomitantly, the knowledge requirement of section 322.34. See id. The district court concluded that the scienter element of section 322.34 did not require actual knowledge. See id. After Fields , the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided Brown , which applied the current version of section 322.34(2) that is applicable in this appeal....

...The driving record listed the same address as the defendant’s license, stated that the license was suspended for failure to pay a traffic fine, and provided that the required statutory notice of suspension had been sent by mail. See id. The Fourth District examined the text of section 322.34(2) and its knowledge definition. See id. at 743 . The district court stated that, because the case before it involved a suspension for failure to pay traffic fines, the plain text of section 322.34(2) removed the rebuttable presumption that the notice sent to the defendant’s address fulfilled the knowledge requirement of section 322.34(2). See id. It held that, absent the invocation of this presumption, the plain language of section 322.34(2) requires the State to prove the defendant actually received notice of the suspension....

...dress of record, but that there was no evidence that Brown still resided at the same address when the notice was mailed. See id. The Fourth District concluded that the mailing of the notice itself, given the lack of application of the presumption of section 322.34(2), was insufficient to establish that the defendant actually received notice of his license suspension....

...The court accordingly held that the State failed to establish that the defendant received notice and reversed his conviction for driving with a suspended license. See id. After the Brown decision, the First District decided Haygood , which also applied the current version of section 322.34....

...ension had been provided to the defendant. See id. In rendering its decision, the First District agreed with and adopted the reasoning in Brown. See id. at 896. The district court held that the reasoning in Brown was in accord with the plain text of section 322.34....

...The district court stated that according to the driving record of the defendant, the license suspension was due to failure to fulfill a financial responsibility. See id. It held that this negated the appli *780 cation of the rebuttable presumption in section 322.34(2) with regard to knowledge created by an entry in the DHSMV record, and thus required that the State present evidence that the defendant actually received notice of his license suspension....

...It reversed the defendant’s conviction for driving while his license was suspended. See id. Decision Below In the decision below, the Fifth District correctly held that the State sufficiently established the knowledge requirement of the current version of section 322.34(2) because (1) the mailing of the written notice of suspension satisfied the notice requirement of section 322.251(1), and (2) the State proved that this was the address of Anderson at the time of the mailing. This result is in accord with the plain language of sections 322.34 and 322.251(1), as construed together and taken as a whole. As provided by the Legislature, the knowledge requirement of section 322.34(2) is fulfilled when an individual “received notice” of that suspension as contemplated in section 322.34(4). (Emphasis added.) Subsection (4) of 322.34 mandates that any judgment or order rendered by a court or adjudicatory body or uniform traffic citation that results in the cancellation, suspension, or revocation of a license must contain a provision notifying the person of that action. Section 322.251(1), which concerns the same subject matter as section 322.34 — i.e., driving while a license is can-celled, suspended, or revoked — explicitly outlines two mechanisms for delivery of a written notice of a license suspension, revocation, or cancellation under section 322.34....

...��s license suspension to her last known address. The State then established that Anderson received that notice, as evidenced by the testimony of Anderson that she resided at the address to which the DHSMV sent the notice at the time of the mailing. Section 322.34(3) permits the consideration of this type of testimony as evidence of receipt .of notification and knowledge of a license suspension. See § 322.34(3) (permitting a court to consider evidence of knowledge, “other than that specified in subsection (2),” when it determines whether an individual knew of a license suspension). Anderson contends that, in cases such as hers — i.e., when an individual’s license is suspended due to failure to fulfill a financial responsibility — the rebuttable presumption in section 322.34(2) does not apply....

...She asserts that the State, therefore, must prove that she actually received the notice and had actual knowledge of her suspension. The Legislature, however, did not contemplate such an exacting burden of proving actual knowledge for the State, even in *781 instances when the rebuttable presumption of knowledge in section 322.34(2) does not apply. Rather, the plain language of section 322.34(2) permits the State, in instances of a suspension for a reason other than the failure to fulfill a traffic fine or some other financial responsibility, to invoke a rebuttable presumption of knowledge. To do so, the State must only establish that a judgment or order of suspension as provided in section 322.34(4) has been entered on an individual’s driving record. When, as in this case, the suspension is for failure to fulfill a traffic fine or financial responsibility, the plain language of section 322.34(2) negates the applicability of that presumption....

...Gil informed the officer that his driver’s license was suspended, and a records search revealed that Gil was a habitual traffic offender. 1 Gil was then arrested. For purposes of this case, the arrest report listed the following charges: driving with a suspended license (DWLS), in violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2009), and unlawful driving as a habitual traffic offender (HTO), in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2009). Section 322.34 is titled “Driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified” and provides: (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), any person whose driver’s license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked, except a “habitual traffic offender” as defined in s....

...[[Image here]] (5) Any person whose driver’s license has been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual offender) and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.088, or s. 775.084. § 322.34, Fla....

...f provides for an offense with multiple degrees.” Id. at 1076 (quoting State v. Paul, 934 So.2d 1167, 1176 (Fla.2006) (Cantero, J., specially concurring)). According to the State, the crimes of unlawful driving as a habitual traffic offender under section 322.34(5) and driving with a suspended license under section 322.34(2) do not satisfy the second exception delineated in section 775.021(4)(b)(2) because they are located in separate statutory provisions, neither offense is an aggravated form of the other, and the offenses are not degree variants of the same offense....

...ch provided: *790 [WJhile persuasive, the case of Valdes v. State, 3 So.3d 1067 (Fla.2009) does not necessitate the denial of the Defense’s Motion at issue in this case. The Court’s plain language reading of the two statutes at issue, Fla. Stat. § 322.34 (5) and Fla. Stat. § 322.34 (2), lead this Court to find that prosecution of the Defendant for both of these charges would violate Fla. Stat. § 775.021 (4)(b). On appeal, the Third District reversed the dismissal of the information. Gil, 68 So.3d at 1003 . While acknowledging that the HTO provision, codified in section 322.34(5), appears to be a degree variant of the DWLS provision, codified in section 322.34(2), the Third District nonetheless stated: Subsection (5) is not a degree variant of subsection (2) because: subsection (2) punishes for driving with a canceled or revoked license, whereas subsection (5) only punishes for driving with...

...at the driver have knowledge that his license was canceled, suspended, or revoked, whereas subsection (5) does not require knowledge; and subsection (2) provides for different penalties based on the number of convictions the driver has for violating section 322.34 (sixty days incarceration for a first conviction, 364 days incarceration for a second conviction, and five years incarceration for a third or subsequent conviction), whereas a violation under subsection (5) is punishable up to five yea...

...under subsection (5) from its application: “Any person whose driver’s license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. 322.264- [the habitual traffic offender statute].... ” § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). Subsection (5) is also not a degree variant of subsection (2) because a violation of subsection (2) is not a “moving violation,” whereas a violation of subsection (5) is a “moving violation,” see § 322.34(1); and the cancellation, suspension, or revocation of a driver’s license under subsection (2) is based on the number of “points ” a driver has accumulated pursuant to the point system provided in section 322.27 over a certain period...

...ubsection (5) is based on the number of convictions for the offenses listed in sections 322.264(1) and (2) over a five-year period. Id. at 1001-02. The Third District ultimately held that “[b]eeause suspension or revocation under subsection (2) of section 322.34 is based on entirely different conduct and on a completely different criteria than a revocation under subsection (5), subsection (5) cannot be a degree variant of subsection (2), and therefore convictions for violating subsection (2) and subsection (5) do not constitute double jeopardy.” Id....

...in Dees v. State, 54 So.3d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), Duff, 942 So.2d at 926 , and Franklin v. State, 816 So.2d 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In these cases, the First, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal held that dual convictions under sections 322.34(2) and 322.34(5) are prohibited....

...ns, but instead hold that dual convictions are prohibited because subsection (2), by it express terms, does not apply to habitual traffic *791 offenders. Franklin, 816 So.2d at 1204 (“[B]y definition, Franklin cannot be convicted of a violation of s. 322.34(2), which expressly does not apply to persons whose licenses have been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264, i. e., habitual offenders.”); Dees, 54 So.3d at 644 (citing Franklin). ANALYSIS We conclude that the decision below must be quashed. Gil cannot be prosecuted under sections 322.34(2) and 322.34(5) for two reasons. First, the plain language of section 322.34 reflects that the crimes delineated in subsections (2) and (5) are mutually exclusive....

...ecutions of Gil under these provisions would violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the United States and Florida Constitutions. 2 Mutual Exclusivity As previously discussed, Gil entered a plea of nolo contendere to the DWLS charge, codified at section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes....

...Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense. The statute expresses the legislative intent that defendants be charged with every offense that arises out of one criminal episode unless an exception applies. Neither party disputes that subsections 322.34(2) and 322.34(5) each contains an *793 element that the other does not....

...The HTO provision requires that the driver be designated a habitual traffic offender, while subsection (2) does not. Accordingly, dual prosecutions for these offenses are not barred under the “same elements” test articulated in subsection 775.021(4)(a). However, double jeopardy may still attach if subsections 322.34(2) and 322.34(5) satisfy one of the exceptions provided under subsection 775.021(4)(b)....

...fenses are found in separate statutory provisions; neither offense is an aggravated form of the other; and they are clearly not degree variants of the same offense.” Id. at 1077 . Applying the test articulated in Valdes , we conclude that sections 322.34(2) and 322.34(5) qualify as variant offenses under section 775.021(4)(b)(2), Florida Statutes, and double jeopardy precludes the prosecution of Gil under the HTO provision in light of his prior conviction under the DWLS provision based on the same facts. First, unlike Valdes , the two offenses at issue here are located in the same statute, which governs operating a motor vehicle without a valid license. § 322.34, Fla....

...ded for in s. 322.271. A review of the habitual traffic offender statute demonstrates that a number of the offenses detailed in section 322.27 serve as predicates for qualifying a person as a habitual traffic offender. Further, the DWLS provision in section 322.34(2) constitutes a predicate offense as well: A “habitual traffic offender” is any person whose record, as maintained by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, shows that such person has accumulated the specified number...

...ve-year period leads to mandatory license revocation as a habitual traffic offender. §§ 322.264(2), 322.27(5), Fla. Stat. Therefore, the statement by the Third District in the decision below that “suspension or revocation under subsection (2) of section 322.34 is based on entirely different conduct and on a completely different criteria than a revocation under subsection (5)” is not correct....

...atory term of five years rather than using a sliding scale of punishment like that employed in section 322.27(3) for drivers who are not habitual traffic offenders. Thus, when a habitual traffic offender drives with a revoked license in violation of section 322.34(5), we conclude that it is a higher degree offense than when a person who is not a habitual traffic offender drives with a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license in violation of section 322.34(2). The penalties for the two offenses support this conclusion. For a first or second conviction under the DWLS provision, the offense constitutes only a misdemeanor. § 322.34(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. Only upon a third conviction does the DWLS provision share the same level of severity as the HTO provision — a third-degree felony. § 322.34(2)(c), (5) Fla....

...h a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license is supported by the legislative history of the interplay between these two offenses. Prior to 1997, under certain circumstances the HTO provision carried a less severe penalty than the DWLS provision. See § 322.34, Fla....

...Id. at 1010 . The trial court dismissed the felony information, but allowed the State ten days to charge the defendant with a misdemeanor under the HTO provision. Id. The Fourth District affirmed the dismissal on the basis that the DWLS provision of section 322.34 did not apply to habitual traffic offenders....

...Notwithstanding the suggestion of the Fourth District, prior to Harvey the Florida Legislature was already considering the incongruity between the HTO and the DWLS provisions. A Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement dated March 7, 1997, discussed a proposed amendment to section 322.34 that was eventually adopted by the Florida Legislature: The bill further amends [section 322.34] to provide that any person whose license has been revoked for being a Habitual Traffic Offender pursuant to s....

...person with the same number of convictions over a seven year period. Fla. S. Comm, on Transp., CS/SB 1002 (1997) Staff Analysis 5 (Mar. 7, 1997) (emphasis supplied). 7 Shortly after the decision in Harvey was issued, the Florida Legislature revised section 322.34(5) to make any violation of the HTO provision a third-degree felony....

...Based upon the overlap and interaction (both current and prior) between the HTO and the DWLS provisions — the two offenses are located in the same statute; three convictions under subsection (2) within a five-year period qualifies a driver as a habitual traffic offender; the decision of the Florida Legislature to amend section 322.34 so that a violation of the HTO provision is always a felony, whereas a *798 violation of the DWLS provision may be a misdemeanor or a felony depending on the number of prior convictions received by the driver — we conclude that subsections (2) and (5) of section 322.34 constitute degrees of the same offense, as that phrase was most recently construed in Valdes . In this case, Gil was adjudged guilty of and sentenced for a violation of section 322.34(2)....

...exception of section 775.021(4)(b)(2). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss the felony information. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, we hold that dual prosecutions under subsections (2) and (5) of section 322.34 are both statutorily and constitutionally prohibited....

...Over his police radio, Officer Hachigian learned that Love's license was suspended. Officer Hachigian did not know if Love knew about the suspension, so he contemplated issuing a citation for the infraction of driving with a suspended license without knowledge. See § 322.34(1), Fla....

...(2006). However, according to Officer Levey, Love admitted to knowing about the suspension. Corporal Linning Peters, the shift's commanding officer, ordered Officer Levey to arrest Love for the crime of knowingly driving with a suspended license. See § 322.34(2), Fla....

...10M-29.003(11)(c). Thus, even though A.S.'s name appears on the central abuse registry, the incident would be clearly designated as involving neglect. [3] The legislature has used words of a similar general nature to define conduct in other statutes. See § 322.34(3), Fla....

...Menser, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee. WEBSTER, Judge. The state seeks review of an order dismissing an information charging a violation of section 322.34(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), because the trial court concluded that the statute unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the judiciary....

...The state contends that the trial court's order was based *1175 upon flawed reasoning, and that the statute does not involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. We agree and, accordingly, reverse. To the extent relevant, section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), reads: (1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, ......

...was canceled, suspended or revoked; (2) that, on that date, appellee had two previous convictions for driving while his license or privilege to drive was canceled, suspended or revoked; and (3) that, therefore, appellee was guilty of a violation of section 322.34(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995). Appellee responded by filing a motion to dismiss, claiming that section 322.34(1)(c) is unconstitutional because it delegates to the judiciary the legislative power to determine whether conduct such as appellee's will be treated as a misdemeanor or a felony....

...Both in his motion, and at the hearing on the motion, appellee relied exclusively upon the rationale set forth in State v. Santiago, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 220 (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct. Aug. 2, 1996). In Santiago, the circuit judge dismissed an information charging a violation of section 322.34(1)(c), concluding that the statute unconstitutionally delegated a legislative power to the judiciary. The gist of the judge's rationale is contained in the following paragraph: Because [section 322.34(1)(c) ] requires an adjudication of guilt for the conduct to be punishable as a felony, and because § 948.01, Fla....

...In granting appellee's motion to dismiss, the trial court announced that it was adopting the rationale in Santiago. This appeal follows. The flaw in the rationale employed in Santiago consists of the belief that, by withholding adjudication in a case where the defendant is charged with a violation of section 322.34(1)(c), the result will be that the defendant's conduct will be treated as a misdemeanor, rather than a felony....

...However, if probation is revoked, the defendant must be adjudicated guilty of the charged offense. § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). Applying the foregoing statutory scheme to the issue at hand, it becomes apparent that there are two possible alternatives when one charged with a violation of section 322.34(1)(c) has adjudication of guilt withheld and is placed on probation—either the term of probation will be successfully completed, in which event the defendant will not have been convicted at all; or probation will be revoked, in which case the defendant must be adjudicated guilty of a violation of section 322.34(1)(c), and sentenced accordingly. Treating the charge as a misdemeanor (as Santiago suggests) is simply not an available alternative. Thus, it is clear that section 322.34(1)(c) does not have the effect ascribed to it in Santiago, and by the trial court below; and, therefore, does not involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. See Raulerson v. State, 699 So.2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (rejecting, on somewhat different grounds, the contention that section 322.34(1)(c) involves an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to trial courts)....

...Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction for four counts each of driving under the influence (DUI) resulting in serious bodily injury, § 316.193(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1989), and driving with a suspended license and causing serious injury to another, § 322.34(3), Fla....

...1989) the multiple parties injured would permit multiple convictions and sentences. [1] However, defendant is correct in arguing that the above facts justify only a single conviction and sentence for driving with a suspended license. Defendant's action was a single continuing offense and thus a single violation of section 322.34....

..."plain view." The trial court imposed an illegal sentence upon McGraw, however, when he sentenced him to three years' probation for driving with a suspended driver's license. The maximum period of incarceration for this offense is one year in jail. Section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977); § 775.082(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...while license suspended. Here, as a result of Bruce Quinton's death, appellant was convicted of the offenses of second degree murder, pursuant to section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes, and driving while license suspended and causing death, pursuant to section 322.34(6), Florida Statutes....

...Gen., Tampa, for appellant. James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Robert D. Rosen, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellee. OVERTON, Justice. We have on appeal State v. Smith, 624 So.2d 355 (Fla.2d DCA 1993), in which the district court declared section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991), to be unconstitutional because it found that an act of simple negligence in operating a motor vehicle could not be combined with the crime of driving a motor vehicle under a canceled, suspended, or revoked license to create a new criminal offense....

...Const. For the reasons expressed, we find the statute to be constitutional and reverse the decision of the district court. In this case, the appellee, Robert N. Smith, was charged with driving with a suspended license causing death or injury under section 322.34(3), [1] which provides: Any person whose driver's license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked pursuant to s....

...ss or negligent operation thereof causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Smith moved to dismiss the charge on the basis that section 322.34(3) unconstitutionally criminalizes mere negligence....

...ess act, whereas driving with a suspended, canceled, or revoked drivers license is not. We disagree. Only when a driver's license has been suspended, canceled, or revoked due to some wrongdoing on the part of the driver can a person be charged under section 322.34(3)....

...Although the homicide may have been unintentionally committed through negligence, it is the willful act of committing the underlying felony that criminalizes the simple negligence supporting the conviction for felony murder. Consistent with that rationale, we hold that section 322.34(3) does not unconstitutionally criminalize simple negligence. Accordingly, we find section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991), to be constitutional, reverse the decision of the district court, and remand this cause for further proceedings....

...ch his habitualization could have been based even if the challenged predicate offense was uncounseled. This court in State v. Keirn, 720 So.2d 1085, 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), held that a withheld adjudication could be considered a "conviction" under section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...We reverse his felony conviction, but remand for entry of judgment for driving without a license, a lesser included misdemeanor. On supplemental briefing, [1] Mr. Crain argues that, because he never had a Florida driver's license, his conviction for violating section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2009), constituted fundamental error....

...Crain with driving "a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State, while his driver's license or driving privilege was cancelled, suspended or revoked, pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 322.264 (Habitual Offender), contrary to the provisions of Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes," even though section 322.34(5) says nothing about any "driving privilege" distinct from a driver's license....

...ivilege," the trial court also added its own, perhaps contradictory, definition of a distinct "driving privilege," viz., "the privilege to drive if licensed by the State of Florida with a valid driver's license." Mr. Crain was convicted of violating section 322.34(5), which makes it a third-degree felony for a person to drive while his driver's license is revoked pursuant to section 322.264, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...arly . . . described in a statute's very words, as well as manifestly intended by the legislature, shall be considered included within its terms." Ferguson v. State, 377 So.2d 709, 711 (Fla. 1979) (citing Earnest v. State, 351 So.2d 957 (Fla.1977)). Section 322.34(5), the provision under which appellant was convicted of a third-degree felony, does not outlaw driving by drivers never issued a license to drive....

..."Driver's license" is defined as "a certificate that, subject to all other requirements of law, authorizes an individual to drive a motor vehicle and denotes an operator's license as defined in 49 U.S.C. s. 30301." § 322.01(17), Fla. Stat. (2009). Mr. Crain was convicted of violating section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2009) which provides: Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...equivalent of revocation of a driver's license for purposes of section 322.264, Florida Statutes (1997)." But this reads language into the statute that the Legislature did not enact. [5] Nor can it be said that the Legislature "manifestly intended" section 322.34(5) to apply to drivers who have never been issued a license, given the contrasting language in the very next subsection: Section 322.34(6), Florida Statutes (2009), applies even to drivers who have never been issued a license because subsection (6), unlike subsection (5), separately addresses the offenses of driving without a license and driving after cancelation, suspension or revocation of a driver's "license or ....

...(2009). Reversed and remanded with directions. CLARK, J., concurs. MARSTILLER, J., dissents with opinion. MARSTILLER, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for I believe it reaches a result not intended by the Legislature. Section 322.34 sets forth an overall scheme by which the Legislature penalizes individuals who persist in driving even though their driver's license or driving privilege has been suspended or revoked. Although subsection (5), the provision at issue here, does not refer to revocation of one's "driver's license or driving privilege," virtually all the other subsections in the statute do. See §§ 322.34(1) (prohibiting driving while "driver's license or driving privilege" canceled, suspended or revoked); 322.34(2) (prohibiting knowingly driving while "driver's license or driving privilege" canceled, suspended or revoked); 322.34(6) (making it a third degree felony to cause death or serious bodily to a person by negligent operation of vehicle when "driver's license or driving privilege" canceled, suspended or revoked under specified statutes); 322.34(7) (prohibiting driving of commercial vehicle while "driver's license or driving privilege" canceled, suspended or revoked); 322.34(8)(a) ("Upon the arrest of a person for the offense of driving while the person's driver's license or driving privilege is suspended or revoked, " arresting officer must determine, inter alia, if revocation is for habitual traffic offender status) (emphasis added); 322.34(10)(a)(6) and (b) (providing a less severe criminal penalty for driving when one has "been designated a habitual traffic offender under s....

...se or driving privilege of any person upon receiving a record of such person's conviction of" certain offenses, including murder or manslaughter resulting from the operation of a vehicle, or commission of a felony using a vehicle. Or, as provided in section 322.34(10)(a)1, a parent who does not have a driver's license may lose her driving privilege, i.e., the ability to obtain a license, for failing to pay child support. Ignoring the other provisions in section 322.34 and refusing to read the statute in pari materia leads the majority to unreasonably conclude that subsection (5) "does not outlaw driving by drivers never issued a license to drive." (Majority op....

..."[A]lthough strict construction of penal statutes is generally proper, no statute should be construed so as to defeat the intention of the legislature." Dep't of Highway Safety and Motor Veh. v. Patrick, 895 So.2d 1131, 1136 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). The legislative intent behind section 322.34(5) is to punish habitual traffic offenders who persist in driving unlawfully more severely than other offenders who have not been branded "habitual." Today's decision allows the appellant—and now every potential habitual traffic offender—to escape punishment by exploiting an instance of imprecise statutory drafting. I am also concerned that the majority's reading of sections 322.264, 322.27(5) and 322.34(5) as operating only against licensed persons not only obstructs legislative intent as to those provisions, but also affects the operation of any other provisions in chapter 322 that may lack the phrase "or driving privilege." For these reason...

...California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). But we requested supplemental briefing from the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel on the issue of whether appellant had been convicted of a crime not proscribed by section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2009), whether the jury instructions were erroneous as given, and whether the trial court erroneously instructed the jury in response to the jury's questions....

...ieve him from conviction as a habitual traffic offender whose driver's license (driving privilege) had been revoked or suspended." Id. See State v. Bletcher, 763 So.2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (reversing trial court's dismissal of charge under section 322.34(5), citing Carroll ); see also Newton v....

...Gen., Tampa, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Carl Hallman seeks review by certiorari of a decision of the circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity. The question presented is whether two or more convictions for the offense of driving while license suspended, section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1985), may result from a single uninterrupted episode of driving solely because that episode spans different jurisdictions or involves different police officers acting independently of one another....

...Petersburg Police Department discovered Hallman's automobile stopped at an intersection in that city, with Hallman asleep behind the wheel. Following a records check which indicated that Hallman's driving privileges were under suspension, he was cited for a violation of section 322.34....

...Petersburg officer, Hallman's vehicle had been involved in an accident only a short time before, some five miles distant in the neighboring city of Pinellas Park. Though the driver had left the scene of that accident, witnesses obtained the tag number of the car. A second citation for violating section 322.34 was mailed to Hallman....

...Spella, 567 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); however, as in those cases, we elect to affirm with an opinion that addresses the basis for the claim in order to save judicial labor. [2] See § 316.193(3), Fla. Stat. [3] See § 782.071, Fla. Stat. [4] See § 322.34(3), Fla....

...pellate capacity reversing county court orders dismissing traffic charges against them. Petitioner Ivory was issued a traffic citation on July 15, 1986, charging him with driving with a suspended license, a second degree misdemeanor, in violation of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND CLARIFICATION GROSS, J. We grant the State's motion for rehearing and clarification, withdraw our previous opinion, and substitute the following. Woodrow Sorrell appeals his conviction of driving while his license was permanently revoked, contrary to section 322.341, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...Here, it is the existence of the revocation which is an element of the crime charged, not the prior DUI convictions. Confronting a statute similar to the one at issue in this case, this court has disposed of an argument identical to the one appellant makes here. Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2001), prohibits driving while license is suspended (DWLS) as an habitual offender....

...en notice of the revocation. Thus it is not necessary for the state to prove each separate conviction of DWLS which DMV relied on in revoking the license. Id. (emphasis added). We wrote in Rodgers, [t]o sum up the requirements for a conviction under section 322.34, the statute as written by the Legislature merely makes it necessary for the state to prove by competent evidence that DMV maintains a record on the motorist, that its record shows the requisite three separate DWLS convictions within a 5 year period, and that DMV gave the motorist the statutory notice....

...These statutes permit the state to make this proof by presenting a certified copy of the motorist's driving record maintained by DMV. That is what the state did in its prosecution in this case. Hence the state made out a prima facie case, which allowed the trier of fact to find defendant guilty of the section 322.34(5) violation. Id.; see also State v. Fields, 809 So.2d 99, 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (following Rodgers ). Because the statute in Rodgers is so similar to section 322.341, Rodgers compels the conclusion that in this case the state made a prima facie case by introducing a copy of the driving record which showed the requisite permanent revocation on its face....

...The supreme court wrote that section 2 had "no natural or logical connection to driver's licenses, operation of motor vehicles, or vehicle registrations. Thus, we conclude that chapter 98-223 violates the single subject rule." Critchfield, 842 So.2d at 786. Because chapter 98-223, the statute creating section 322.341, is unconstitutional, appellant cannot be convicted of that *1256 crime. See McCormick v. State, 826 So.2d 476, 477 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). The next question is what happens to this case once section 322.341 is declared unconstitutional, rendering that count of the information a non-existent crime....

...Gibson, 682 So.2d 545 (Fla.1996), followed upon remand, 685 So.2d 76, 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), would control. Gibson involved a criminal offense which only became "non-existent" when the supreme court decided State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995). See State v. Wilson, 680 So.2d 411, 412 (Fla.1996). Here, section 322.341 became similarly non-existent when the supreme court decided in Critchfield that Chapter 98-223 failed to meet constitutional muster....

...y of a lesser included offense only when the parties argue to the court that guilt on a lesser charge is a potential outcome. Unlike a jury, a judge is presumed to know of all lesser included offenses. The judgment and sentence for the conviction of section 322.341 are reversed. The case is remanded for a new trial on any offense that falls under rule 3.510(b). POLEN and WARNER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 322.341 provides: Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been permanently revoked......

...to ignore the revocation and continue to drive." Arthur v. State, 818 So.2d 589, 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). [5] Driving without a valid driver's license contrary to section 322.03(1), Florida Statutes (2001) is a necessarily lesser included offense of section 322.341....

...We arrive at this conclusion by applying Hagood v. State, 824 So.2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In that case, we held that driving without a valid driver's license contrary to section 322.03(1) was a necessarily lesser included offense of driving with a revoked license under section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2000). As noted above, section 322.34(5) is similar to section 322.341.

...obation. See Pahud v. State, 370 So.2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Additionally, Williamson was placed on probation for 1 year on count XXXII for driving while license suspended or revoked, a second-degree misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of 6 months. Section 322.34, Florida Statutes....

...Rather, Martin failed to meet his burden of showing the trial judge acted with actual vindictiveness in imposing the sentence. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, C.J., and PALMER, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. [2] § 316.1935(3), Fla. Stat. [3] § 322.34(5), Fla....

...(3) Any person: * * * * * * (c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes: * * * * * * 3. The death of any human being is guilty of DUI manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. *732 Section 322.34, which pertains to driving while license suspended, provides, in pertinent part: 322.34 Driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified....

...E DEATH. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED. W. SHARP, J., and WHITE, A.B., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] § 316.193(3)(c)3, Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] § 316.193(3)(c)2, Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] § 316.193(3)(c)1, Fla. Stat. (1991). [4] § 322.34(3), Fla....

...James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee. GREEN, Judge. The appellees, Roman Fields, James Dinsdale, and Hubert Stepp, were each charged by information as a habitual driving offender in violation of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...s of the prior convictions for driving while license revoked. The State conceded that it was unable to produce all certified copies of prior convictions but asserted that it could establish the guilt of the appellees pursuant to sections 322.264 and 322.34(5), Florida Statutes....

...[1] The trial judges granted the motions to dismiss based primarily on the Fifth District's decision of Sylvester v. State, 770 So.2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). We reverse. It is only by deductive reasoning that one concludes the crimes charged in the instant cases relate to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, as opposed to section 322.34(2). [2] Simply stated, there are two methods for establishing a third-degree felony with respect to one being charged for driving after license has been cancelled, suspended, or revoked under section 322.34. The first is section 322.34(2), which provides a straightforward procedure for matching increased punishment to additional driving offenses provided the accused knows of his former driver's license cancellations, suspensions, or revocations. The first two offenses under section 322.34(2) are misdemeanors, whereas a third or subsequent conviction is a third-degree felony. The second method is under section 322.34(5), which is an entirely dependent provision with respect to an accused's having been determined to be a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.264. Both provisions achieve the same result by different methods of proof. It is not clear to us which subsection of section 322.34 the Fifth District relied on in Sylvester. Sylvester was cited in our prior case of Garcia v. State, 800 So.2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The Garcia case was based on a prosecution under section 322.34(2). We held in Garcia that proof under section 322.34(2) requires certified copies of prior convictions. The Fourth District in Rodgers v. State, 804 So.2d 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), has declared conflict with the Fifth District in Sylvester, contending that Sylvester was decided with reference to section 322.34(5). Because we cannot ascertain under which subsection Sylvester was decided, we decline to declare conflict. *101 We align ourselves with the Fourth District in Rodgers, wherein the court states: The violation created by section 322.34(5) does not involve—as an element of the crime—a finding that the motorist has been convicted on three separate occasions of DWLS....

...MV has revoked the motorist's license and given notice of the revocation. Thus it is not necessary for the state to prove each separate conviction of DWLS which DMV relied on in revoking the license. To sum up the requirements for a conviction under section 322.34, the statute as written by the Legislature merely makes it necessary for the state to prove by competent evidence that DMV maintains a record on the motorist, that its record shows the requisite three separate DWLS convictions within a 5[-]year period, and that DMV gave the motorist the statutory notice....

...These statutes permit the state to make this proof by presenting a certified copy of the motorist's driving record maintained by DMV. That is what the state did in its prosecution in this case. Hence the state made out a prima facie case, which allowed the trier of fact to find defendant guilty of the section 322.34(5) violation....

...We agree that when a driver has been deemed a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.264 and has received adequate administrative due process as provided by that section, it is not necessary to produce certified records of the prior convictions under section 322.34(5)....

...language: "did then and there drive and operate a motor vehicle upon a highway of the State of Florida, while his driver's license or driving privilege was revoked pursuant to Florida Statute 322.264 (habitual offender), contrary to Florida Statute 322.34....

...None Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 *752 Comment This instruction was adopted in 2013. 28.12 OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE CARELESSLY OR NEGLIGENTLY CAUSING [SERIOUS BODILY INJURY] [DEATH] rWITHOUT HAVING A DRIVER’S LICENSE] [WHILE DRIVER’S LICENSE CANCELED, SUSPENDED, OR REVOKED FOR SPECIFIED REASON] § 322.34(6)(a) or (b), Fla....

...*753 Lesser Included Offenses 28.12 OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE CARELESSLY OR NEGLIGENTLY CAUSING [SERIOUS BODILY INJURY] [DEATH] [WITHOUT HAYING A DRIVER’S LICENSE] [WHILE DRIVER’S LICENSE CANCELED. SUSPENDED. OR REVOKED FOR SPECIFIED REASON] — § 322.34(6)(a) or (b) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. INS. NO. STAT. No Valid Driver’s 322.03 28.9 License if 322.34(6)(a) is charged....

...e same upon the demand of a patrol officer, peace officer, or field deputy or inspector of the department. At the time of the incident, failure to display a driver's license was an arrestable offense. § 318.14(1), Fla. Stat. (1985). The citation of section 322.34 on the arrest form was apparently a scrivener's error as the narrative of the arrest report makes clear that Smith was arrested for failure to produce a driver's license....

...Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.160, this court accepts jurisdiction of this appeal from the County Court for Pinellas County in which the following question is certified as one of great public importance: Is a Go-Ped a motor vehicle under section 322.34 of the Florida Statutes? This *375 question arose because Corrie Riley was issued a traffic citation on February 2, 1995, for driving a motor vehicle while his driver's license was suspended or revoked in violation of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...We agree with and, therefore, adopt the following portions of the trial court's order: In his Motion to Dismiss, the Defendant contends that the vehicle he was operating, commonly referred to as a "go-ped," is not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of § 322.34, and this is the dispositive issue....

...State, 915 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Postell v. State, 398 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The trial judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting the testimony. The State Failed to Prove All the Elements of Felony Driving While License Revoked Under section 322.34, Florida Statutes (2007), a person commits felony driving on a revoked license when (1) his "driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual offender) and [2] [he] drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked." § 322.34(5), Fla....

...State, 804 So.2d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). If the record offered by the state fails to designate the requisite convictions to justify the habitual traffic offender designation under section 322.264, then the state has failed to make a prima facie case for a section 322.34 felony violation for driving on a revoked license....

...(holding that knowledge in possession case is question of fact; element of knowledge not proper consideration on motion to dismiss). Under these principles, the trial court should not have dismissed the charge against Mr. James. The violation created by section 322.34(5) does not involve — as an element of the crime — a finding that the motorist has been convicted on three separate occasions of DWLS....

...On December 31, 1984, appellee/defendant John Charles McClain was charged by information with manslaughter by operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, contrary to section 316.1931(2), Florida Statutes, and with operating a motor vehicle while his driver's license was suspended or revoked, contrary to section 322.34, Florida Statutes....

...1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (the reasonableness of a traffic stop is based upon the validity of the basis asserted by the officer involved in the stop); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). AFFIRMED. SAWAYA, C.J., and PETERSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 322.34(5), Fla....

...Paul Thompson appeals an order denying his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion following an evidentiary hearing. [1] We affirm. Thompson pleaded guilty to the felony charge of knowingly driving while his license was suspended or revoked (felony DWLS), a violation of Section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...ed both occupants of the other vehicle. As a result, Lamoureux was charged with: two counts of DUI with serious bodily injury in violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1993); and one count of driving with a suspended license in violation of section 322.34(3), which was later dismissed....

...or a field deputy or inspector of the department. However, no person charged with violating this section shall be convicted if he produces in court an operator's or chauffeur's license theretofore issued to him and valid at the time of his arrest." Section 322.34 makes it a misdemeanor for a person to drive a vehicle when his license is revoked....

...(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court considers whether the allegations of the Complaint sufficiently plead that Perez violated McKally’s clearly established constitutional right to be free from a warrantless arrest without probable cause. Pursuant to Florida Statute section 322.34(1), “any person whose driver license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked ... who drives a vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked is guilty of a moving violation.” Fla. ' Stat. § 322.34(1) (alteration added). Moreover, ány person who, “knowing of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation” drives a vehicle, is guilty of a misdemeanor or felony. See Fla. Stat. § 322.34 (2)....

...Moreover, any lack of evidence that McKally was specifically aware his license had been suspended is not dispositive of the lawfulness of the arrest. “While the knowledge element may be critical in securing a conviction under [Florida Statute section] 322.34(2), no officer has a duty to prove every element of a crime before making an arrest.” United States v....

...revoked. The defendant's record listed the projected expiration of the revocation as August 29, 1994, five years from the revocation. On February 4, 1998, the defendant was charged with unlawful driving as a habitual traffic offender in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes....

...Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Danilo Cruz-Carino, Assistant *60 Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. FULMER, Chief Judge. Toby Inman appeals his conviction for Driving While License Suspended or Revoked — Third or Subsequent, in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...who, knowing of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation, drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon:... (c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree.... § 322.34(2)(c) (emphasis added)....

...As such, it does not fall within the exception for motorized bicycles in section 322.01(26). We therefore conclude that Inman was operating a motor vehicle when he was driving his SunL E-21 Electric Scooter on a public street. As such, he was in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), and his conviction must be affirmed....

...The certified copy of his driving record contained no traffic offenses that would constitute qualifying offenses for habitual offender designation. We reverse, as the court erred in denying Kallelis's motion for judgment of acquittal on this record. Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2003), provides that "[a]ny person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...usly convicted three times of driving with a suspended license, leading to his designation as a habitual traffic offender. We disagreed, noting that the state had produced a certified copy of the DMV driving record. We held: The violation created by section 322.34(5) does not involve—as an element of the crime—a finding that the motorist has been convicted on three separate occasions of DWLS....

...MV has revoked the motorist's license and given notice of the revocation. Thus it is not necessary for the state to prove each separate conviction of DWLS which DMV relied on in revoking the license. To sum up the requirements for a conviction under section 322.34, the statute as written by the Legislature merely makes it necessary for the state to prove by competent evidence that DMV maintains a record on the motorist, that its record shows the requisite three separate DWLS convictions within a 5 year period, and that DMV gave the motorist the statutory notice....

...These statutes permit the state to make this proof by presenting a certified copy of the motorist's driving record maintained by DMV. That is what the state did in its prosecution in this case. Hence the state made out a prima facie case, which allowed the trier of fact to find defendant guilty of the section 322.34(5) violation....

...Based on the investigation into the circumstances of the crash, the State charged Mr. Walton with two offenses: count one, DUI with serious bodily injury, a violation of section 316.193(3)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (2006), and count two, driving while license suspended or revoked, a violation of section 322.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Villanti was arrested, and Cox's truck was seized. The Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ["DHSMV"] filed a complaint seeking forfeiture of Cox's vehicle pursuant to the "Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act," sections 932.701-932.707, Florida Statutes, and section *643 322.34(9), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...t was error to dismiss the entire action with prejudice. Cox should have an opportunity to replead to try to state a cause of action under section 932.704, Florida Statutes (2001). REVERSED and REMANDED. PETERSON and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 322.34(9), Florida Statutes (2001), states: (9)(a) A motor vehicle that is driven by a person under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of s....

...Possession of a controlled substance, § 893.13(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002) 04-12645 1. Delivery of a controlled substance, § 893.13(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) 2. Possession of a controlled substance, § 893.13(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) 05-13573 1. Driving with license suspended or revoked, § 322.34(5), Fla....

...Rebecca Springer, Assistant Attorney General, and Frank K. Ingrassia, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Mark E. Kohl, Tavernier, and Angel Ruiz, Miami, for appellee. Before LEVY, FLETCHER and SORONDO, JJ. PER CURIAM. The State of Florida appeals from an order of the lower court declaring section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional on the ground that chapter 97-300, Laws of Florida, violates the single-subject requirement....

...He was charged by amended information with two counts of driving under the influence (DUI) with serious bodily injury, two counts of DUI with bodily injury, one count of DUI with property damage and one count of driving while license was suspended (DWLS) as a habitual traffic offender, in violation of section 322.34(5). The DWLS, habitual offender charge was severed and is the subject of this appeal. *727 Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to declare section 322.34(5) unconstitutional on the ground that chapter 97-300 violated the single subject requirement of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution....

...ditch. Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing, in pertinent part, that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Appellant was aware his license was suspended at the time of his arrest. The trial court denied the motion. Under section 322.34, Florida Statutes (2006), it is a crime for any person with a suspended driver's license to operate a motor vehicle upon this state's highways if the person knows of the suspension....

...(4) Any judgment or order rendered by a court or adjudicatory body or any uniform traffic citation that cancels, suspends, or revokes a person's driver's license must contain a provision notifying the person that his or her driver's license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked. § 322.34. In Brown v. State, 764 So.2d 741, 743-44 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), the Fourth District addressed whether the state had presented sufficient evidence under section 322.34(2) to show that the defendant knew that his license was suspended when he was found driving....

...-required notice had been provided. Id. On appeal, the Fourth District concluded that because the defendant's license suspension was the result of failing to pay traffic fines, the presumption that the defendant had knowledge of the suspension under section 322.34(2) did not apply....

...The Fourth District held that without the statutory presumption, the state was required to introduce evidence that the defendant actually received the notice of suspension to uphold a conviction for felony driving with license suspended. Id. We agree with the reasoning in Brown because it is based on the plain language of section 322.34....

...court may properly modify the defendant's sentence within sixty days to include the condition mandated by chapter 948. Id. at 798; see also Kiriazes v. State, 798 So.2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 322.34(5), Fla....

...ation and remand the cause with directions. After the arresting officer had stopped Bruno for speeding, he was erroneously advised over the radio first that Bruno's driver's license had been suspended, which constitutes a misdemeanor or felony under section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1995), depending upon the number of prior convictions....

...ch uncovered the presence of marijuana. Following the search and seizure, the officer was next informed that Bruno's license had not been suspended; rather, it was "expired, cancelled or revoked," which also constitutes a misdemeanor or felony under section 322.34....

...Based on the information provided by the computer records, the officer determined that there was probable cause to arrest Allen for the felony offense of driving with a suspended license, which requires that a person have at least two prior misdemeanor driving with a suspended license convictions under section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2002). See § 322.34(2)(c)....

...ctions 57.105 and 932.704, Florida Statutes (2002). On August 20, 2003, Allen filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that she had not been twice previously convicted of the misdemeanor criminal offense of driving with a suspended license under section 322.34(2) and, thus, the predicate necessary to charge her with a felony was not established....

...As such, her jeep should not have been seized under the Act. The motion was supported by certified documents relating to the driving with license suspended charges. Those records showed that Allen was convicted of the misdemeanor criminal offense of driving with a suspended license under section 322.34(2) only once and that the other driving with a suspended license violation was charged under section 322.34(1) as a moving violation, a civil infraction....

...ient facility in legal matters. This was error, and we must reverse the revocation of Thompson's probation. Thompson was on felony probation after his third conviction for knowingly driving while his license was cancelled, suspended, or revoked. See § 322.34(2)(c), Fla....

...ences on all charges except a robbery charge which netted him eight years. Caples *1144 did not appeal. However, after Huss v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), which held that convictions for DWLSR occurring before the statutory revision of section 322.34, Fla....

...The driving record listed the same address as Brown's license and reflected that (1) on April 29, 1998, Brown's license was suspended for failure to pay a traffic fine and (2) the required statutory notice had been provided. *743 Brown offered no evidence in his own defense. The jury convicted him on all counts. Section 322.34, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...(4) Any judgment or order rendered by a court or adjudicatory body or any uniform traffic citation that cancels, suspends, or revokes a person's driver's license must contain a provision notifying the person that his or her driver's license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked. § 322.34(1)-(4)(emphasis added)....

...al knowledge on his part. The State contends that evidence of the mailing of the suspension is all that is required, citing Fields v. State, 731 So.2d 753 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 761 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1999). We agree with Brown. Fields involved section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides in relevant part: "Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...Unlike Fields, the instant case does not involve a statute that is silent on the issue of the defendant's knowledge of the suspension, *744 leaving the State to prove only that the notice requirement of section 322.251 was complied with. The 1998 version of section 322.34 expressly states that driving with a suspended license must be done "knowingly." The statute then goes on to provide that this knowledge element is satisfied if: (1) the defendant has previously been issued a citation for driving with a suspended license as provided in 322.34(1); (2) the defendant admitted that he knew of the suspension of his license; or (3) the defendant received the notice of suspension that the department is required to send....

...must contain a provision notifying the person of the suspension] appears in the department's records for any case except for one involving a suspension by the department for failure to pay a traffic fine or for a financial responsibility violation. § 322.34(2), Fla....

...And, in cases except for those involving suspensions "for failure to pay a traffic fine or for a financial responsibility violation " an entry in the department's records that the notice of suspension was sent to the defendant will satisfy the "knowing" or knowledge requirement of section 322.34(2)....

...James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee. THREADGILL, Acting Chief Judge. The appellee was charged with driving while license suspended or revoked (DWLSR) as a habitual traffic offender, a third-degree felony, under section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...`[d]rive' means to operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in any place open to the general public for purposes of vehicular traffic." According to the plain language of this provision, the definition of "drive" in section 322.01(15) applies to section 322.34....

...The appellee concedes on appeal that actual physical control now applies to DWLSR. He argues, however, that even if actual physical control applies to DWLSR, he was in a private parking lot and not driving upon the highways of this state, which is an element of the offense under section 322.34(5). Section 322.34(5) provides that any person whose driver's license has been revoked as a habitual offender and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree....

driving while license suspended, a violation of section 322.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), when the statute

...predicates to reclassify his current offense from a misdemeanor to a third degree felony. However, at the time those prior offenses were committed, the previous version of the statutory offense did not require knowledge as an essential element. See § 322.34, Fla....

...Phillips, 463 So.2d 1136 (Fla.1985). And his guilty plea, without any attempt to withdraw it, waives his argument based on Huss, that the prior convictions should not have been used to reclassify his present offense. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, C.J., and SAWAYA, J., concurs. NOTES [1] § 322.34(2), Fla....

...ot apply to respondent Leukel because he is not charged with committing one of the enumerated offenses therein. On 3 April 2006, Leukel was arrested in Seminole County for driving after his license was permanently revoked, a third-degree felony. See § 322.341, Fla....

...Because Leukel was an assistant public defender in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, on 2 May 2006, the Governor of the State of Florida assigned the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit as prosecutor for the case. On 1 June 2006, the State filed a two-count information alleging that Leukel violated section 322.341 by driving while his license was permanently revoked, and section 322.34(2)(b) by driving while his license was revoked as a subsequent offender....

...is name and address as required by Section 316.062, Florida Statutes (1979); (2) by driving while impaired, in violation of Section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1979); and (3) by driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended, in violation of Section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The trial court revoked Appellant’s probation upon finding that he committed a new law violation by driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended. Because there was no evidence that Appellant knowingly drove with a suspended or revoked license in violation of and as defined by section 322.34, Florida Statutes (2017), we find that the State failed to prove a willful, substantial violation of probation....

...knowledge of the license suspension. “The element of knowledge is satisfied if the person has been previously cited . . . or the person admits to knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation; or the person received notice . . . .” § 322.34(2), Fla....

...The officer did not arrest the defendant, nor seize his license, but instead issued him a written citation requiring him to appear in Hillsborough County court. The defendant appeared in Hillsborough County court and entered a plea of no contest to the charge of driving while license suspended with knowledge. § 322.342, Fla....

...864 So.2d at 514. The defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he knowingly drove without a valid license; that the Hillsborough County court was never asked to make such a determination. He adds that he possessed a license which on its face was valid. Section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2003), provides: Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law ......

...(2003) (requiring every licensee to have his or her driver's license in immediate possession while operating a motor vehicle and to produce it upon demand). Accordingly, at that point, Shea could validly detain Lanier while he investigated the status of Lanier's driver's license. See § 322.34(2) (making it a criminal offense for a driver to operate a motor vehicle knowing that his or her license has been suspended, revoked, or canceled)....

...Karmelin, Assistant State Attorney, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Louis G. Carres, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee. WARNER, Judge. The state appeals the order of the circuit court dismissing the information charging appellee pursuant to section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), with driving while his license was suspended. The trial court determined that because appellee had been declared a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section *1010 322.264(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1991), section 322.34(1) did not apply, and the state could charge appellee only with a misdemeanor....

...On May 12, 1992, appellee was declared a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.264(1)(d), resulting in the revocation of appellee's driver's license for five years. Appellee was arrested in January of 1996 for felony driving while license suspended or revoked under section 322.34(1)(c)....

...Appellee filed a motion to dismiss contending that because he had already been declared a habitual traffic offender, he could not be charged under that subsection. The trial court agreed and dismissed the information, giving the state ten days to file an amended information charging appellee with a misdemeanor. Section 322.34 provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...ion is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. (b) A second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 322.34(1)-(2)(emphasis supplied). Appellee was declared a habitual traffic offender in 1992 under section 322.264(1)(d). This is not disputed. Under the plain meaning of section 322.34(1), persons who have been declared habitual traffic offenders are excluded from its application. Instead, section 322.34(2) applies to habitual traffic offenders who drive while their license is revoked....

...Only when a statute is of doubtful meaning should matters extrinsic to the statute be considered in construing the language employed by the legislature." Capers v. State, 678 So.2d 330, 332 (Fla.1996) (citations omitted). The state argues that it has the discretion to charge appellee under section 322.34(1) because appellee's license was both suspended for failure to appear and failure to pay traffic fines as well as being revoked under the habitual traffic offender statute....

...un approach without the exercise of executive discretion. Nevertheless, even if that could occur and the state was simply charging him with driving while his license was suspended, the defendant has to be chargeable under the statute selected. Here, section 322.34(1) expressly excepts persons defined as habitual traffic offenders *1011 from its provisions....

...Therefore, the statute does not apply to appellee, and the state's argument of executive discretion is irrelevant. The state also argues that the application of the statute is absurd since appellee will now receive a lighter punishment than if he were charged under section 322.34(1)(c). If his habitualization is ignored, then his three prior traffic offenses permit him to be charged with a third degree felony under the statute. Because he has been declared to be a habitual offender, he can be charged only under section 322.34(2)(a) which makes his violation punishable as a misdemeanor of the first degree on his first conviction after revocation....

...We therefore affirm the ruling of the trial court. STONE, J., concurs. POLEN, J., concurs specially. POLEN, Judge, concurring specially. While I agree the trial court had no discretion but to dismiss the felony charges in lieu of misdemeanor charges as section 322.34 is applied to this appellee, I am wondering if this is what the Legislature really intended. To that end, I would encourage the appropriate legislative committees to revisit the application of the exception in section 322.34(1) for habitual traffic offenders.

...- 47 - vehicle on the day of the murders—he explained that he believed he was less likely to be stopped by law enforcement if he did not drive his own car. Further, driving with a suspended license is a relatively minor infraction. See § 322.34, Fla....

...Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Tonja R. Vickers, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. WHATLEY, Acting Chief Judge. Tina Jones appeals her conviction for driving while her license was suspended in violation of section 322.34(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...l, Tampa, for Appellee. VILLANTI, Judge. Catherine M. Kirschner appeals an order withholding adjudication and placing her on probation for driving while her driver's license was revoked under the habitual traffic offender statute [1] in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2004). Because the State's evidence was insufficient to prove that Kirschner's license was revoked based on the habitual traffic offender statute, we reverse. To sustain a conviction under section 322.34(5), the State is required to prove that Kirschner's license was suspended or revoked under the habitual traffic offender statute and that she drove a vehicle on the highways of the State of Florida at a time when the Department of High...

...n appeal and where in the transcript of the trial the State introduced the driving record into evidence. Because the State failed to actually introduce the driving record into evidence, it failed to establish two essential elements of a violation of section 322.34(5)—that Kirschner's license was revoked and that the revocation was based on the habitual traffic offender statute....

...Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; L. Michael Billmeier, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. WEBSTER, Judge. Appellant was charged in county court with driving a motor vehicle while his license was revoked, in violation of section 322.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). He filed a sworn motion to dismiss in which he asserted that he had been driving a moped at the time of the alleged offense; and argued that, because a moped is not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of section 322.34, no offense had been committed....

...We answer the certified question in the affirmative, based upon the holding and analysis of the recent decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Soto v. State, 711 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). We do not address appellant's argument, made for the first time in his reply brief, that section 322.34 is unconstitutional to the extent that it is intended to apply to the operation of a moped....

...t charge a felony. In the instant case, count II of the information charged that Ledlow drove with a suspended license "after having previously been convicted on two or more occasions of driving while his/her license was suspended." Florida Statutes section 322.34 prohibits knowingly driving with a suspended license and provides in relevant part that upon "[a] third or subsequent conviction [the offender] is guilty of a felony of the third degree...." § 322.34(2)(c), Fla....

...Under § 322.16(6), a violation of a restriction imposed pursuant to another subsection is a moving violation. See Ch.2010-62, § 28, Laws of Fla. This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 2013. 28.11 DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED, REVOKED OR CANCELED WITH KNOWLEDGE § 322.34(2), Fla....

...Failure by the defendant to receive the mailed order shall not affect or stay the effective date or term of the [cancellation], [suspension], [revocation] of the defendant’s driving privilege. Lesser Included Offenses *701 DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED, REVOKED OR CANCELED, LICENSE WITH KNOWLEDGE — § 322.34 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...No Valid Driver’s 322.03 28.9 License Attempt_777.04(1) 5.1 Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981, and amended in 2007 to reflect Laws of Florida 97-300, Section 40, effective October 1, 1997 [ 958 So.2d 361 ] and 2013. 28.11(a) DRIVING WHILE LICENSE REVOKED AS A HABITUAL TRAFFIC OFFENDER § 322.34(5), Fla....

...We know that the crimes the defendant has been convicted of in the instant case arose out of the same criminal transaction, so the first step in the inquiry is to determine whether there is a clear statement of legislative intent to authorize or to prohibit separate punishments for violations of sections 316.192(3)(c)2. and 322.34(6)(b), Florida Statutes....

...ommitted in a single transaction shall be punished separately for each offense. Offenses are separate offenses if each requires proof of an element that the other does not. Both statutes at issue here, sections 316.192(3)(c)2. (reckless driving) and 322.34(6)(b) (driving with a suspended license), require proof of an element that the other does not....

...However, the two statutes at issue in the instant case are not homicide statutes. One involves the regulation of driving on public roads and the other regulates licenses to drive. Section 316.192(3)(c)2. applies to reckless driving that causes serious bodily injury. Section 322.34(6)(b) involves driving without a valid driver's license that causes death or serious bodily injury....

...Hence the fact that each offense in the instant case may stem from the conduct of wrongfully injuring the same victim does not preclude the court from convicting and sentencing the defendant for each offense. Therefore, all convictions and sentences are affirmed. AFFIRMED. ORFINGER, C.J., and JACOBUS, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 322.34(6)(b), Fla....

...ze preference for the Blockburger test over the rule of lenity with three exceptions. Id. at 281. [6] Reckless driving under section 316.192(3)(c)2. cannot be a necessarily lesser included offense of driving with a revoked or suspended license under section 322.34(6)(b) because reckless driving involves an element of intentional misconduct while careless or negligent driving under section 322.34(6)(b) does not....

...entional indifference to consequences and with knowledge that damage is likely to be done to persons or property.' W.E.B. v. State, 553 So.2d 323, 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (quoting Fla. Std. Jury. Instr. (Misd.) (reckless driving))."). A violation of section 322.34(6)(b) cannot be a necessarily lesser included offense of reckless driving under section 316.192(3)(c)2....

...o be relicensed. Accordingly, the postconviction court did not err in denying relief on this ground. After being stopped for speeding in November 2004, Blandin was charged with driving while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...use his revocation period had expired seven years earlier. The postconviction court denied this claim after a hearing based on its finding that because Blandin had not petitioned to have his license reinstated, it was still "revoked" for purposes of section 322.34(5). On appeal, Blandin argues that the postconviction court erred in concluding that his license remained "revoked" under section 322.34(5) after the revocation period expired. Blandin argues that because section 322.34(5) does not define when a person's license is considered "revoked," it is ambiguous. Blandin asserts that the ambiguity should be interpreted in his favor under the rule of lenity. Section 322.34(5) provides as follows: *1203 Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...Because Blandin never petitioned to be relicensed, the Department never investigated his qualification and fitness to drive or held an administrative hearing to determine whether to restore Blandin's driving privileges. Thus, Blandin's license remains "revoked" under section 322.34(5), and his conviction for driving while licensed revoked and admission to a violation of probation based on that conduct was proper....

...3d DCA 1999). In Green, the defendant's license was revoked as a habitual traffic offender. Id. at 1007. Over three years after the statutory revocation period expired, the defendant was charged with driving as a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.34(5)....

...ng Mr. Gomillion with one count of leaving the scene of an accident, see § 316.027(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016), and one count of carelessly or negligently causing serious bodily injury while driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license, see § 322.34(6)(b), Fla....

...Gomillion might present to those charges.4 The absence of any such assertion distinguishes this case 4That aspect of the case is a bit puzzling. To prove the charged offense of carelessly or negligently operating a motor vehicle while causing death or serious bodily injury under section 322.34(6)(b), the State is required to prove that Mr....

...This point was not objected to and thus it was not preserved for review. § 924.051(3), Fla. Stat. In any event, it lacks merit. In Raulerson v. State, 699 So.2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), rev. granted, 709 So.2d 537 (Fla.1998), this court held that the Legislature intended the term "conviction," as used in section 322.34, a similarly-related statute to the one involved in this case, to mean a determination of a defendant's guilt by way of a plea or verdict....

...Since our ruling on these points is determinative, there is no need to consider the other point raised on appeal, i.e., whether ownership of the contraband in question was properly attributed to appellant. The order appealed is hereby Reversed. NOTES [1] § 322.34 Fla....

...The State charged appellant with three counts of driving with a revoked license and by careless or negligent operation of a vehicle causing death or serious injury to Nycole Loudermilk (count I), Charlie Holt (count II), and Everett Phillips (count III), in violation of section 322.34(6), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...Appellant correctly asserts that under Boutwell, the three counts charged in the information could result in only one conviction. See Boutwell, 631 So.2d at 1095 (holding that "regardless of the number of injured persons, there can only be one conviction under section 322.34(3) [now 322.34(6)] arising from a single accident"); see also Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759, 765 (Fla.1996) (explaining that "[t]o allow multiple convictions for a single violation of [section 322.34] would be illogical because the violation does not cause injury to any of the victims")....

...Steven Morris appeals from his convictions and sentences for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), within ten years after a prior DUI conviction in violation of section 316.193(2)(b)l., Florida Statutes (2006), and driving while license suspended or revoked (“DWLS”), in violation of section 322.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...In his motion for postconviction relief, appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that appellant's prior DWLSR convictions under Alabama law did not provide the requisite prior convictions for a Florida DWLSR felony conviction under section 322.34, Florida Statutes....

...Appellant alleges that because he was only guilty of misdemeanor DWLSR, counsel's error resulted in appellant's involuntary plea of guilty to the felony charged and a longer sentence. Appellant explained that because his previous Alabama DWLSR convictions do not contain the knowledge element of Florida's subsection 322.34(2), the Alabama statute was not sufficiently analogous to Florida law to establish a basis for the enhanced offense of felony DWLSR. He cited to this court's decision in Huss v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), in support of this argument. For appellant's Alabama DWLSR convictions to serve as prior convictions for purposes of subsection 322.34(2), the elements of the Alabama provision must be substantially similar to the Florida statute....

...ntencing); Holybrice v. State, 753 So.2d 621, 621 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (stating that in determining score of conviction from other states for guidelines sentencing purposes, elements of crime should be compared to Florida statute). A comparison of subsection 322.34(2) [1] and *451 the relevant Alabama Code provision [2] plainly reveals that the Florida DWLSR offense of which appellant was convicted contains an element not contained in the Alabama law. In Huss v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), this court examined section 322.34, which was amended in 1997. After comparing the amended statute with the previous provision, [3] this court agreed with the defendant in Huss that the previous offense did not contain a "knowledge" element that was clearly contained in new subsection 322.34(2) under which Huss had been convicted of felony DWLSR. Because of this difference in the elements, our court held that under the "plain wording" of the new offense contained in subsection 322.34(2), DWLSR convictions under the predecessor provision could not be counted as prior convictions for purposes of new subsection 322.34(2)....

...edge. Further, the notice provision contained in a related Alabama statute does not provide this missing element. See 771 So.2d at 593 n. 1. As a result, appellant's Alabama DWLSR convictions could not serve as the basis for enhancement under new subsection 322.34(2) because the Alabama law is not sufficiently similar to the Florida law....

...5th DCA 2002) (holding *452 that " Huss represents a change in the law, but the ruling is not retroactive"). Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm all other claims and reverse and remand only as to appellant's first claim. BARFIELD, MINER and POLSTON, JJ., CONCUR. NOTES [1] Subsection 322.34(2) provides as follows in pertinent part: Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...sdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), and in addition thereto may be imprisoned for not more than 180 days. § 32-6-19(a)(1), Ala.Code. [3] Subsection 322.34(1) formerly provided as follows: Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...In this case, however, the erroneous legal basis of Deatherage's claim demonstrates that he is not entitled to relief. Deatherage argues that his felony convictions and state prison sentences should be converted to misdemeanors and county jail sentences by the retroactive application of subsection (10) of section 322.34, Florida Statutes, which became effective July 1, 2008. Ch. 2008-53, §§ 1, 3, Laws of Fla. With the addition of section 322.34(10), a person whose underlying license suspensions or revocations were for violations enumerated in section 322.34(10)(a) will no longer be subject to the third-degree felony penalty as otherwise provided by section 322.34(2)(c) for driving with a suspended license for a third or subsequent time, provided the person does not have a prior forcible felony conviction. Instead, under section 322.34(10)(b)(2), a second or subsequent conviction of driving while a license has been suspended or revoked for violations enumerated in section 322.34(10)(a) is now a first-degree misdemeanor. As a substantive change to a criminal statute, section 322.34(10) does not apply retroactively to offenses committed before its effective date....

...State, 330 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla.1976) (holding that a defendant was not entitled to be sentenced under a later enacted statute that reduced the maximum penalty for his crime); Santiago v. State, 731 So.2d 787, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that an amendment changing the predicate for a felony offense under section 322.34 did not apply retroactively); see also State v....

...2d DCA 1995) ("The controlling statute for punishment is the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the crime."). In his motion, Deatherage alleged that he was sentenced on January 22, 2008, necessarily indicating that the offenses occurred before the effective date of section 322.34(10)....

...Raffel, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant. James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Andrea Norgard, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. In this appeal, the State challenges the trial court's determination that section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

...Schreiber, Public Defender, and Sarah W. Sandler, Assistant Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. SHAHOOD, J. Appellant, State of Florida, appeals from an order of the County Court granting appellee's motion to dismiss on the grounds that section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2001), is unconstitutionally vague as applied to appellee....

...utes, specifically excludes bicycles and mopeds from the definition. Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that a moped is not a motor vehicle. In addition to arguing that other statutes do not consider a moped a motor vehicle, appellee argued that section 322.34(2), concerning licenses to drive a motor vehicle, was unconstitutional as applied. The court held that not only was the definition in section 322.03 at issue but whether 322.34(2) was unconstitutional as applied was also at issue. After hearing argument, the court granted appellee's motion to dismiss declaring section 322.34(2) unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. Section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2001), states as follows: Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...finition of a motor vehicle in section 322.01(26), that driving a moped requires a license. See id. at 1277; see also Wood v. State, 717 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(a moped is a "motor vehicle" which requires a driver's license for operation under section 322.34); Jones v. State, 721 So.2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)(a valid driver's license is required for the operation of a moped under section 322.34(2)). In this case, many of the arguments raised by appellee were rejected by the court in Soto. Although the constitutionality of section 322.34 was not raised in Soto, this court, in affirming Soto's conviction, held that driving a moped requires a license because a moped is not excluded from the definition of a motor vehicle in section 322.01(26). Soto, 711 So.2d at 1276-77. By so concluding, this court impliedly held that there is no vagueness or ambiguity in section 322.34 with respect to mopeds which would render the statute unconstitutionally vague....

...State, 860 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Vidal v. State, 820 So.2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED. SAWAYA, C.J., PETERSON and MONACO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 951.22, Fla. Stat. (2003). [2] § 322.34, Fla....

...legal for [the defendant] to possess or drive the vehicle, it was simply a breach of the contract with the rental company."), it certainly was unlawful for Defendant, an unlicensed and unauthorized driver, to drive or operate the van, see Fla. Stat. § 322.34(5) ("Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...(emphasis added). Like the defendant in Haywood, Defendant was an unauthorized and unlicensed driver. Defendant's license had been revoked and he was not permitted to operate any vehicle; indeed, his operation of any vehicle constituted a felony. See Fla. Stat. § 322.34(5)....

...Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Neil M. Nameroff, Miami, for appellee. WARNER, J. The state appeals an order granting a judgment of acquittal to the defendant who was charged with driving while his license was revoked pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes....

...We affirm, as the state, without an order requiring it to do so, presented only a redacted version of appellant's driving record which did not show that he was a habitual traffic offender as defined in section 322.264, Florida Statutes. [1] See State v. Phillips, 852 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (for purposes of section 322.34(5), making it a felony for a person to drive with a license "revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual offender)," the phrase "pursuant to" means "as defined by" section 322.264). Section 322.34(5) provides that "[a]ny person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to [as defined by] s....

...Failing to include a driving record showing that appellant met the definition of a habitual offender under the statute is insufficient as a matter of law to prove a prima facie case. See Patterson v. State, 938 So.2d 625, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ("A conviction under section 322.34(5) simply requires competent evidence showing that the DHSMV maintained a record on the motorist, that the record reflected three prior moving violation convictions, and that the motorist received notice of his designation as a habitual traffic offender and the resulting suspension of his license."); State v....

...Le appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board") on September 23, 1997. On October 21, 1998, the Board affirmed the immigration judge's removal order and dismissed the appeal. 1 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193(3)(1996). 2 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 322.34(3)(1996).  Mr....

...This is a direct appeal of a judgment and sentence entered after defendant, Michael A. Bowen ["Bowen"], pled guilty to driving while license revoked as a habitual offender. Bowen was charged by information with driving while license revoked as an habitual offender, pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2001): Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...State, 820 So.2d 906 (Fla.2002), Caples v. State, 790 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Second, contrary to Bowen's assumption, proof that he had accumulated three of the enumerated convictions within a five-year period preceding his conviction is not required to establish a violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2000). See Arthur v. State, 818 So.2d 589, 590-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Finally, Huss has no application to a prosecution under section 322.34(5) for driving while one's license is suspended as a habitual offender....

...rior conviction into evidence and allowing the jury to have access to it, we reverse this case and remand it for a new trial. As to the other issues raised by the appellant in this appeal, we affirm in all respects. Finally, specifically as concerns section 322.34(2)(c), while we conclude that it is constitutional, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great public importance, in accordance with rule 9.030(a)(2)(B)(i), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure: IS SECTION 322.34(2)(c) A PERMISSIVE INFERENCE AND DOES IT, AS APPLIED, SATISFY THE RATIONAL CONNECTION TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY? REVERSED and REMANDED; QUESTION CERTIFIED. COHEN, J. and KEST, S., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Ibarrondo also argues that his driving record was insufficient to prove his prior DWLS convictions as required by section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...After the initial collision, the victim was run over by another vehicle. Appellant was sentenced on a no contest plea on charges of leaving the scene of an accident involving death in violation of section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and driving with a suspended license in violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes....

...ry hearing or for the attachment of record portions that conclusively demonstrate that the appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. The appellant claims that he pled nolo contendere to driving while license suspended or revoked pursuant to section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2000), and under that statute could not receive an enhanced sentence for prior offenses committed under the previous statute which lacked the knowledge requirement contained in the current statute. See Huss v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The trial court denied the motion, claiming that the appellant was charged and convicted as a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2001), and that, therefore, Huss did not apply....

...Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Felicia A. Wilcox, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Martin S. Page, Lake City, for Appellee. ERVIN, J. The state appeals from an order in which the trial court dismissed Count I of an amended information, finding that section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2001), the statute upon which Count I was based, was constitutionally deficient, because it did not charge a crime....

...Florida Statutes (1997), [1] his license was revoked under section 322.27(5), Florida Statutes (1997). [2] When Phillips was involved in a traffic accident on September 7, 2001, the state charged him in Count I of the information with a violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2001), [3] which makes it a *923 third-degree felony for a person to drive with a license "revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual offender)." [4] Phillips moved to dismiss Count I. Relying upon the statutory maxim that penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused, the court stated that section 322.34(5) was constitutionally deficient, because it referred to section 322.264 as authority for the revocation of Phillips' license, whereas the latter statute only defined the criteria for finding a person to be a habitual traffic offender....

...The court acknowledged that section 322.27(5) authorizes the revocation of a driver's license of a person who is designated a habitual offender under section 322.264, but reasoned that the reference to that statute in the information could not correct the facial deficiency of section 322.34(5). The court observed that section 322.34(5)'s constitutional infirmity could be cured by the legislature simply amending the language therein by substituting section 322.27(5) for section 322.264....

...While we agree with the lower court that Phillips' driver's license was not revoked in accordance with the provisions of section 322.264, but rather those of section 322.27(5), which provides, as stated, for the revocation of a license of anyone defined as a habitual offender, we cannot agree that such reference renders section 322.34(5) constitutionally invalid....

...[2] Section 322.27(5) provides: The department shall revoke the license of any person designated a habitual offender, as set forth in s. 322.264, and such person shall not be eligible to be relicensed for a minimum of 5 years from the date of revocation.... [3] Section 322.34(5), provides: Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...about the seventh day of SEPTEMBER, 2001, in COLUMBIA County, Florida, while his driver's license had been revoked pursuant to F.S. 322.27(5) (Habitual Offender), did drive a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state, contrary to Florida Statute 322.34(5).

...Accordingly, everything the Raulerson court said concerning the statutory framework continued to apply under the statutory provisions governing the instant case. The Raulerson court specifically dealt with a challenge to the constitutionality of the provision in section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), which provided that a person who is convicted of driving with a cancelled, suspended, or revoked driver's license (DWLCSR) is, upon a third conviction, guilty of a third-degree felony. Section 322.34(1) also provided that a person's first conviction of DWLCSR was a second-degree misdemeanor and the second conviction was a first-degree misdemeanor. (In the 2002 Florida Statutes, these provisions of 322.34(1) appear in section 322.34(2))....

...ne the degree of substantive criminal offense." Raulerson, 763 So.2d at 288. The Raulerson court understood the definition of "conviction" in chapter 322 to be central to the case: "The linchpin of the defendant's primary constitutional challenge to section 322.34(1) is the assumption that no `conviction' results in a DWLCSR case when the trial court withholds adjudication." Id....

...Adopting in large part the analysis of this question undertaken by the Fourth District in State v. Keirn, 720 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the court in Raulerson, 763 So.2d at 294, held: "[I]t is clear that the Legislature intended that a `conviction' for the purposes of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), include both adjudicated DWLCSR offenses and DWLCSR offenses in which adjudication is withheld." In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that the focus of the definition of "conviction" in section 322...

...tions of driving under suspension charges amount to convictions under section 322.01(10), unless adjudication has been withheld pursuant to the procedures of section 318.14(10)....'" Raulerson, 763 So.2d at 293-94 (quoting Keirn, 720 So.2d at 1090). Section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that generally DWLCSR is "a moving violation, punishable as provided in chapter 318" — that is, punishable as a noncriminal traffic infraction. But section 322.34(2) requires that "knowing" DWLCSR offenses be treated differently. Under section 322.34(2), persons with a suspended license who drive "knowing of such ......

...In the instant case, the record before us establishes that Rosenthal's second DWLS offense was not an offense for which adjudication was withheld under section 318.14(10). The disposition sheet for the offense in question describes the offense as "DWLS WITH KNOWLEDGE." The disposition sheet also refers to section "322.342" — which must be understood as a reference to section 322.34(2), since there was no section 322.342 at the time of the disposition. The *607 disposition sheet thus establishes that Rosenthal's second DWLS offense was a knowing offense subject to a criminal penalty pursuant to section 322.34(2) and therefore not subject to disposition as a noncriminal traffic infraction under chapter 318....

...defendant knew that his license was revoked. The defendant relies principally on Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996), and Waites v. State, 702 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The Waites court, relying on Chicone, held that a conviction under section 322.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes, implicitly requires knowledge of the lack of a driver's license be an element of the offense. Fields urges that Waites is "not distinguishable on any principled basis" from this case. We respectfully disagree. The two statutes are quite dissimilar; indeed, the statute at issue here is more akin to subsection (b) of section 322.34(3)....

...te's case. In this case, moreover, appellant admitted he had actual knowledge of the revocation but (erroneously) believed he had done what was necessary to undo the revocation. AFFIRMED. COBB, J., concurs. W. SHARP, J., concurs in result. NOTES [1] § 322.34(5), Fla....

...See Cunningham v. State, 591 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). This case is distinguishable from Cunningham because the arresting officer knew Mr. Pugh and knew that he was driving with a suspended license. Driving with a suspended license is a misdemeanor. § 322.34, Fla....

...the police and McCormick was consensual, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress without further discussion. We do find merit in McCormick's contention that his conviction for driving after his license had been permanently revoked pursuant to section 322.341, Florida Statutes (2001), is erroneous based on our opinion in Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Critchfield, 805 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, No. 02-386 (Fla. Apr. 24, 2002). In Critchfield, decided after the trial judge's ruling, we held chapter 98-223, which enacted section 322.341, to be unconstitutional....

...Based on Critchfield, we vacate McCormick's conviction for driving after his license was permanently revoked and certify conflict with Sawyer. In all other respects, we affirm McCormick's convictions and sentences. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND CONFLICT CERTIFIED. SHARP, W. and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 322.341, Fla. Stat. (2001). [2] § 322.34(5), Fla....

challenges his conviction and sentence for violating section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2012), which makes it

...The instant record contains competent, substantial evidence that the broken taillamp did not meet that statutory requirement. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Mr. Paul's motion to suppress. Affirmed. DAVIS, J., Concurs. WHATLEY, J., Concurs in result only. NOTES [1] See § 322.34(5), Fla....

...elony offender (HFO). Because we conclude that Revell is entitled to relief on this basis, we reverse and remand for new trial. Revell was charged with driving while license suspended or revoked (DWLSR), habitual offender, a third-degree felony. See § 322.34(5), Fla....

...Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Donna A. Gerace, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. THOMAS, J. Appellant appeals his conviction for driving while license suspended (DWLS) for a third time, a third-degree felony under section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2006). We reverse. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pled guilty to felony DWLS under section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes....

...Appellant did not preserve any issues for appeal, but now argues for the first time on direct appeal that his conviction violates his constitutional right to due process under Thompson v. State, 887 So.2d 1260 (Fla.2004). In Thompson, the Florida Supreme Court found that the defendant's conviction for felony DWLS under section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes, had to be reversed....

...We reverse Appellant's conviction and sentence for felony DWLS and remand to the trial court. On remand, since the State is losing the full benefit of its plea agreement, it will have the option of how to proceed, either by having the trial court enter a conviction for first-degree misdemeanor DWLS under section 322.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes, or by allowing Appellant to withdraw his plea and face trial on the original charges, with the felony DWLS charge lessened to a misdemeanor count....

...Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. The State appeals the trial court's order granting Angelica Cantu's motion to dismiss an information charging her with habitually driving with a revoked license. The trial court dismissed the information because section 322.34(10), Florida Statutes (2008), makes the offense a misdemeanor when the current revocation results from the failure to pay specified financial obligations....

...The officer arrested Tarman after he failed road sobriety and breathalyzer tests. The officer then ran a computer check and discovered that Tarman had a revoked license for a previous DUI conviction. The Department seized Tarman's vehicle, pursuant to sections 322.34(9)(a), and 932.701(2)(a)(9), Florida Statutes (2004), which provide for the forfeiture of a vehicle driven by a person under the influence of alcohol whose license has been suspended for a prior DUI conviction. See §§ 322.34(9)(a), 932.701(2)(a)(9), Fla....

...feiture. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. Additionally, we reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, as this action was not frivolous or devoid of merit. Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] Section 322.34(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that "[a] motor vehicle that is driven by a person under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of s....

...t of a prior conviction for driving under the influence." Section 932.701(2)(a)(9), Florida Statutes (2004), the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, provides that a motor vehicle that is used during the course of committing an offense in violation of section 322.34(9)(a) is contraband.

...leeing or eluding a law enforcement officer causing serious bodily injury or death, vehicular homicide, grand theft of a motor vehicle, resisting an officer without violence, and driving with a suspended license. See §§ 316,027(2)(c), .1935(3)(b), 322.34, 782.071(1)(a), 812.014, 843.02, Fla....

...The DWLS statute at issue in Cooper contained language which is congruent to the fleeing or eluding statute here—the defendant must have caused “death of or serious bodily injury to another.” See Cooper v. State, 621 So.2d 729, 732 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (quoting § 322.34(3), Fla....

...Doran, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ann Pfeiffer Howe, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant. James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee. *215 NORTHCUTT, Judge. Ralph Earl Miller was charged with violating section 322.341, Florida Statutes (2000), which makes it unlawful to drive after one's license has been permanently revoked pursuant to sections 322.26 or 322.28....

...However, after the circuit court below granted Miller's motion to dismiss, the Fifth District decided Arthur v. State, 818 So.2d 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (en banc). In that case, the defendant was convicted of driving after he had been designated a habitual traffic offender, in violation of sections 322.34 and 322.264....

...driving record maintained by DMV was sufficient to present prima facie case of driving while license revoked as habitual traffic offender, and that State was not required to prove each qualifying conviction for DWLS.) The statute involved in Fields, section 322.34(5), provides that "[a]ny person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual offender) and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree [.]" The statute under which Miller was charged in this case, section 322.341, provides that "[a]ny person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been permanently revoked pursuant to s....

...notice of the revocation by mail. That statute also provides that notation of the giving of the notice in the DMV's records is sufficient proof that the notice was given. § 322.251(2). Consistent with Fields, we conclude that in a prosecution under section 322.341, the State may make a sufficient prima facie showing that the defendant's license was permanently revoked and that he was given notice of the revocation by introducing a certified copy of the defendant's driving record maintained by the Department of *216 Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles....

...ension, or revocation. At the time Mr. Cobb received the prior convictions, the statute did not require proof of "knowledge" as an element of the offense, and thus, his prior convictions cannot be counted as "conviction" under the 1997 provisions of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...However, the postconviction court failed to attach portions of the record conclusively refuting Mr. Cobb's claim. See Simmons v. State, 824 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (reversing because record attachments did not conclusively refute movant's allegations that he was erroneously convicted under section 322.34(2) when he did not have the qualifying offenses)....

...Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Warren Smokes, appeals his conviction for driving with a revoked driver's license as a habitual traffic offender in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes....

...Thus, Williams' possession of the contraband immediately before it was discovered by the officer, can reasonably be inferred from the undisputed facts in this case. REVERSED and REMANDED. SAWAYA, C.J., and TORPY, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 893.03(2)(a)4., Fla. Stat. [2] § 322.34(2)(a), Fla....

...Webb was involved in an automobile accident where he fled the scene. The state charged Webb with four crimes—leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury, failure to register a vehicle, and two crimes involving driving with a revoked license. One charge was under section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2000), which provides: Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...a. Stat. (2000). Section 322.27(5) requires the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to revoke the license of any person "designated a habitual offender" as set forth in section 322.264. The second statute under which Webb was charged was section 322.341, Florida Statutes (2000), which reads: Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been permanently revoked pursuant to s....

...On the two driver's license crimes and the leaving the scene of an accident charge, the trial court adjudicated Webb to be guilty and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of eighteen months in the Department of Corrections, with credit for 126 days time served. Webb's convictions under sections 322.34(5) and 322.341 did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution....

...to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction." None of the three exceptions to this rule of construction applies in this case. See § 775.021(4)(b)1.-3., Fla. Stat. (2000). Sections 322.34(5) and 322.341 do not require identical elements of proof; the former requires evidence of a habitual traffic offender revocation, while the latter requires proof of a permanent revocation....

...Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Joseph Gorman was charged with driving while license suspended (DWLS) because of an event occurring on August 1, 2002. The DWLS statute was enacted by chapter 98-223, Laws of Florida, which was later codified as section 322.34(6)(b), Florida Statutes....

...Thus, the law of the case and res judicata bar the State's claim that Mr. McManama actually pleaded to a felony DWLS in county court. The statutory scheme for a knowing DWLS violation provides that the resulting offense can be classified either as a misdemeanor or as a felony. § 322.34(2)(a)(c), Fla....

...her or not comprising an element of the felony, or which is acquired by proceeds obtained as a result of a violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. * * * 9. Any motor vehicle used during the course of committing an offense in violation of s. 322.34(9)(a).[ [2] ] § 932.701(2)(a), Fla....

...316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July, 2003. § 316.193(2)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2005)(emphasis added). [2] Section 322.34(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides: 322.34....

...932.701-932.707 and is subject to liens for recovering, towing, or storing vehicles under s. 713.78 if, at the time of the offense, the person's driver's license is suspended, revoked, or canceled as a result of a prior conviction for driving under the influence. § 322.34(9)(a), Fla....

...accident resulting in personal injuries, failure to remain at the scene and give information and render aid in violation of sections 316.027 and 316.062, Florida Statutes (1987), and driving while his license was suspended or revoked in violation of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. SAWAYA, J. The issue we must resolve is whether Michael Neary, who is a resident of Georgia, may be adjudicated guilty as a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, for driving with a revoked license based on Neary's classification in Georgia as a habitual traffic violator....

...statutory definition of "habitual traffic offender." The trial court disagreed, found him guilty of driving with a revoked license—habitual traffic offender, and sentenced him to 24 months' probation. Neary appeals. Neary was convicted of violating section 322.34(5), which states: Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...establish that Neary was a habitual traffic offender, and the State does not contend otherwise. Therefore, Neary asserts, and properly so, that he does not qualify as a "habitual traffic offender" under section 322.264 and cannot be convicted under section 322.34(5). See Patterson v. State, 938 So.2d 625, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ("A conviction under section 322.34(5) simply requires competent evidence showing that the DHSMV maintained a record on the motorist, that the record reflected three prior moving violation convictions, and that the motorist received notice of his designation as a habitual traffic offender and the resulting suspension of his license."); Rodgers v. State, 804 So.2d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("To sum up the requirements for a conviction under section 322.34, the statute as written by the Legislature merely makes it necessary for the state to prove by competent evidence that DMV maintains a record on the motorist, that its record shows the requisite three separate DWLS convictions within a...

...clude that if the records maintained by the Department pursuant to section 322.264 show that a person is a habitual traffic offender, the habitual offender status may be used to elevate the offense of driving with a revoked license to a felony under section 322.34(5)....

...on in the misdemeanor trespass case, the hearing officer found that the teacher's "no" answer was untruthful. The evidence also showed that in May, 1984 the teacher had been found guilty of driving with a suspended or revoked license in violation of section 322.34, Florida Statutes....

...It is improper to revoke probation based solely upon proof that the probationer had been arrested. Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978). The State did not show that the elements of the crime of driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified were met. See § 322.34, Fla. Stat. (2010). License suspension, knowledge of the license suspension, and actually driving are the requisite elements of the crime of driving while license suspended. Faircloth v. State, 50 So.3d 788, 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); § 322.34(2), Fla....

SUAREZ, J. The State of Florida appeals from the trial court’s grant of Jonathan Aiden’s motion to withdraw his plea and vacate his conviction. We affirm. In June 2010, Aiden pled guilty to driving as a habitual traffic offender in violation of Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...Bryan, III appeals his sentencing for violation of probation on the charge of driving while license suspended. We affirm. On 13 March 2000, Bryan was charged by information with one count of felony driving while license suspended or revoked ("DWLSR"), a violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...The trial court revoked Bryan's probation and sentenced him to 24 months in the Department of Corrections. [2] On appeal, Bryan argues that pursuant to Huss, [3] his prior convictions cannot be used as a predicate for a conviction of felony DWLSR because the prior convictions occurred before section 322.34(2)(c) was amended in 1997....

...er 1991, 4 May 1992, and 19 January 1995. [2] The trial court granted Bryan's 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct Bryan's sentence, adjudicated him guilty, and imposed the suspended sentence of 11 months and 29 days. [3] In Huss, the defendant argued that section 322.34(2)(c) had been amended effective 1 October 1997 to "require knowledge as an essential element of the offense." Id....

...Officer Straitt testified that because Appellant's "habitual traffic offender" infraction is a felony, the officers could not merely write a traffic citation. Instead, they properly arrested Appellant, read his Miranda rights, and seized the vehicle. See § 322.34(5), Fla....

...Appellant, Timothy Waites, appeals his conviction and sentence for operating a motor vehicle without having a driver's license, as required under Florida Statutes 322.03(3)(b), in a careless and negligent manner resulting in the death of another human being in violation of Section 322.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes....

...he took it out on the highway in rush hour traffic. I don't know what could be more negligent and dangerous in the operation of a motor vehicle, than that. And but for his operation of that vehicle, we would not have a deceased victim in this case. Section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1995), provides in pertinent part as follows: (3) Any person who operates a motor vehicle: (a) Without having a driver's license as required under s....

...or serious bodily injury to another human being is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. In State v. Smith, 638 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1994), the Florida Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of section 322.34(3)(b)....

...at 510; see State v. Hamilton, 388 So.2d 561 (Fla.1980); State v. Winters, 346 So.2d 991 (Fla.1977). However, simple negligence may be used "to enhance the penalty for a willful criminal *1375 act." Smith, 638 So.2d at 510. Thus, Smith explained that section 322.34(3)(b) is constitutional since the negligent operation of a vehicle merely enhances the penalty for the willful act of knowingly driving with a suspended, cancelled, or revoked license: Only when a driver's license has been suspended, canceled, or revoked due to some wrongdoing on the part of the driver can a person be charged under section 322.34(3)[(b)]....

...element of the offense. Id. at 742 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 617-18, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1803, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994)). We can discern no indication that the legislature intended to dispense with a mens rea requirement in enacting section 322.34(3)(a). Furthermore, the harsh sanction of five years imprisonment imposed in this case further militates against treating section 322.34(3)(a) as a strict liability crime....

...d the appropriate license. We reverse and remand appellant's conviction and sentence for operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 322.03(3)(b), in a careless and negligent manner resulting in the death of another human being in violation of section 322.34(3)(a) and direct that he be discharged as to this charge....

...Pelella, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. MONACO, C.J. This appeal requires us to interpret sections 322.34(5) and 322.34(10), Florida Statutes (2009), in order to determine under the facts of this case whether the appellant, Brittney M....

...Motor Vehicles reflects that he or she has accumulated three convictions within a 5-year period for DUI or for driving a motor vehicle while his or her license is suspended or revoked (among other reasons), then that person is designated as an HTO. Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, in turn, makes it a third-degree felony for one whose license is suspended or revoked as an HTO, to drive a motor vehicle upon the highways of Florida. Thus, if a person is an HTO and is caught driving in the State, he or she is to be charged with a felony. The rub comes because in 2008 the Legislature adopted section 322.34(10)(a)6., Florida Statutes, which states that notwithstanding any other provision of section 322.34, if the offender does not have a prior forcible felony conviction, and if the person is designated an HTO as a result of the suspension of the offender's license because of certain purely financial defaults (as well as some other enume...

...suspended or revoked offenses, both in 2006. The 2006 charges were, however, financial responsibility suspensions; namely, driving without insurance. Ms. Wyrick noted that although she drove her vehicle while being labeled an habitual offender under section 322.34(10), her current offense should have been charged only as a first degree misdemeanor. She takes this position because two of the offenses for which she had previously been convicted fell within the exceptions listed in subparagraph (1)(a)4. To understand her argument, it is helpful to examine section 322.34(10) with greater particularity....

...There was no dispute at the motion hearing that Ms. Wyrick was an HTO and that she had no prior forcible felonies. Her habitual traffic offender status was based on the prior DUI and two other suspensions that fell specifically within the ambit of section 322.34(10)(a)4., Florida Statutes....

...Wyrick to prevail, all three prior convictions would have to fall within the listed exceptions under (10)(a) in order for the current offense to be charged as a misdemeanor rather than a felony. In other words, for the current charge to qualify as an exception to the general rule in section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, it would have to fit all of the criteria set forth in the exception....

...The court considered the intention of the Legislature in adopting the statutes in question and concluded that the Legislature intended for Chapter 322 to be construed to discourage repeat offenders, such as habitual traffic offenders, from driving in Florida, and that for section 322.34(10)(a)6....

...offenders who have been convicted repeatedly of violations of traffic laws. We conclude, as did the trial court, that the Legislature intended Chapter 322 to discourage repeat offenders, such as HTOs, from driving within Florida. Our construction of section 322.34(10), Florida Statutes, therefore, must be guided by this intention. Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, makes it a third-degree felony for one whose driver's license has been revoked as an habitual traffic offender to drive a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State....

...d by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles must show that the person had accumulated three convictions within a 5 year period. See Arthur v. State, 818 So.2d 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), review denied, 839 So.2d 697 (Fla.2003). By adopting section 322.34(10), Florida Statutes, the Legislature made an exception to the general scheme of Chapter 322 by granting certain leniency to persons who became an HTO only because of those reasons listed in (10)(a)1.-5....

...Finally, we note, as did the trial court, that to adopt Ms. Wyrick's position would essentially require us to eliminate her status as an HTO, even though she has worn that badge for three years. The result that she seeks would be absurd in light of the statutes in question, because it would render section 322.34(5) ineffective in this instance....

violate this provision. See § 322.39, Fla. Stat. Section 322.34(2) provides: Any person whose driver’s license

...eral immigration detainer, we reverse and quash the writ. 1 I. Facts A. LaCroix held in custody Twice in January of 2017, LaCroix was charged with driving with a suspended license while an habitual traffic offender, a third degree felony pursuant to section 322.34(5) of the Florida Statutes....

...We agree and grant the petition for a writ of prohibition. On September 25, 1997, petitioner was stopped and cited for driving while his license was suspended (DWLS). He was later charged by information with felony DWLS because of two prior DWLS convictions. See § 322.34(2)(c), Fla....

...e reinstatement fee to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. Thus, petitioner argues, his conduct falls squarely within the purview of the statute. The state disagrees, arguing that because petitioner is charged with felony DWLS under section 322.34(2)(c), he does not qualify for the administrative disposition provided by section 318.14(10)....

...tain types of license suspensions" and, thus, provided for adjudication to be withheld. In Keirn, we also ruled that every disposition of a DWLS charge outside section 318.14(10) amounts to a "conviction" and can lead to the enhanced penalties under section 322.34(2)....

...becomes even more compelling to strictly construe section 318.14(10) to permit any driver whose license was suspended solely for nonpayment of a fine to use this administrative election procedure and avoid a conviction. The legislature declared that section 322.34(2) felony treatment of third-time DWLS violators was designed for persons who "have demonstrated their indifference for the safety and welfare of others." Keirn, 720 So.2d at 1088....

...e elements" test. Although felony DWLS requires proof of an *1098 element that misdemeanor DWLS does not, i.e., the existence of two or more prior DWLS convictions, misdemeanor DLWS does not require proof of an element that felony DWLS does not. See § 322.34(2)(c)....

...n. In Woodruff, the defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI) because, in addition to his current DUI offenses, he had two prior DUI convictions. He was charged under section 316.193, which has a statutory scheme similar to section 322.34 (DWLS), whereby the offense is graded in degrees by the number of prior violations....

...Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeffrey R. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. EVANDER, J. Appellant was convicted of driving while his license was revoked as an habitual traffic offender, in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...Appellant strenuously argued that a failure to bifurcate would be unduly prejudicial because the jury would be informed of his prior criminal activity — thereby destroying his presumption of innocence. Appellant's proposed bifurcation would have been improper. Driving while license suspended, as prohibited by section 322.34(2) is not a lesser included offense of driving while license revoked as an habitual traffic offender....

...Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David M. Schultz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. *1133 STONE, J. Weathers was convicted of felony driving while license revoked as a habitual offender, pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes. Weathers contends that his conviction is unsupported by the evidence because the redacted copy of his driving record placed in evidence did not show the requisite convictions required for the initial revocation. We affirm. Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, provides: Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...ed to this William Weathers, rather than focusing on the driving history omission in the content of the redacted document. In any event, in Rodgers v. State, 804 So.2d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), rev. denied, 828 So.2d 388 (Fla.2002), we said that section 322.34 allows the state to present its proof of the offense of driving while license revoked as a habitual offender through a certified copy of the motorist's driving record as maintained by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). In that case, although the certified copy of the defendant's DMV driving record reflected that the defendant had three convictions within the five-year period, we held: The violation created by section 322.34(5) does not involve—as an element of the crime—a finding that the motorist has been convicted on three separate occasions of DWLS....

...Thus it is not necessary for the state to prove each separate conviction of DWLS which DMV relied on in revoking the license. Id. In Arthur v. State, 818 So.2d 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), rev. denied, 839 So.2d 697 (Fla.2003), the appellant was charged with violating section 322.34(5)....

...llegal for him to drive on those roads without a valid license. The trial court denied Appellant's motion. Florida law makes it illegal for a person with a suspended, canceled or revoked license to drive a motor vehicle on the highways of the state. § 322.34(2), Fla....

...____ On appeal from the County Court for Alachua County. Walter M. Green, Judge. April 18, 2018 LEWIS, J. Appellant, John Eugene Williams, III, challenges in these consolidated cases his convictions for violating section 322.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), which makes it a first-degree misdemeanor for a person, except a habitual traffic offender, to obtain a second conviction for driving a motor vehicle while knowing that his or her driver’s license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked....

...offender and he has never had a Florida driver’s license and does not fall within a statutory exemption to the licensure requirement. For the foregoing reasons, we agree and, therefore, reverse and remand. Appellant entered a plea of no contest to two charges of violating section 322.34(2)(b), while expressly reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the charges....

...The trial court denied the motion upon finding that a person who has never been issued a driver’s license by any government nevertheless has a driving privilege that can be suspended or revoked and that such person can, therefore, be convicted under section 322.34(2). The court reasoned that Appellant’s interpretation of the statutorily undefined term “driving privilege” in section 322.34(2) allows persons who have never had a driver’s license to escape punishment due to imprecise statutory drafting, elevates an unlicensed driver to a legally superior position over a licensed driver, and contravenes the Legislature’...

...foreign), and who is not exempt under section 322.04, have a ‘driving privilege’ in the State of Florida? 2: If the answer to Question One is no, can that person nonetheless be convicted of DWLSR, in violation of either section 322.34(1) or section 322.34(2), if 2  DHSMV[ 1] has suspended or revoked that person’s privilege to obtain a valid driver’s license? We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030 an...

...as follows: Does a person who has never had a Florida driver’s license and who is not exempt from the licensing requirement under section 322.031 or section 322.04, Florida Statutes, have a “driving privilege” such that he or she can be convicted under section 322.34(1) or section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes? We answer the rephrased certified question in the negative. The purpose of a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) is to determine whether the undisputed facts the State wil...

...this state.”). Sections 322.031 and 322.04 set forth exceptions to the Florida driver’s license requirement, which include nonresidents who possess a valid driver’s license issued by their home state. §§ 322.031, 322.04, Fla. Stat. (2016). Section 322.34 provides in part as follows: (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), any person whose driver license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked, except a “habitual traffic offender” as defined in s....

...his state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon: .... (b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. § 322.34, Fla....

...11, 2018) (defining “privilege” as “a right or immunity granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor”). Based on the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, a defendant who is a habitual traffic offender cannot be prosecuted under section 322.34(2)....

...Appellant’s motion to dismiss for two independent reasons. 2 First, 2 We note that the trial court did not have the benefit of Finney 5 given that it is undisputed that Appellant is a habitual traffic offender, he cannot be convicted under section 322.34(2). 3 See § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat.; see also Finney, 219 So. 3d at 256. Second, given that it is undisputed that Appellant has never had a Florida driver’s license and he does not fall within a statutory exemption to the licensure requirement, he cannot be convicted under section 322.34(2)....

...In light of Miller, we answer the rephrased certified question in the negative and conclude that a person who has never had a Florida driver’s license and who is not exempt from the licensing requirement under section 322.031 or section 322.04 does not have a driving privilege such that he or she can be convicted under section 322.34(1) or section 322.34(2)....

...ege was suspended or revoked. Given such, we consider Appellant a habitual traffic offender for the purposes of these cases. 6 about whether a person who has never possessed a driver’s license may be charged under section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, 4 and held that he or she may not, its interpretation of the Legislature’s use of the term “driving privilege” is unequivocal and applicable to our cases. Additionally, we agree with the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of “driving privilege” as deriving from a Florida driver’s license or a statutory exemption. The language of section 322.34(2) is not clear and unambiguous as to the meaning of the term “driving privilege”; thus, resort to the rules of statutory construction is warranted. One such rule is the doctrine of in pari materia, which requires that statutes wit...

...(2016) (requiring the cancellation of certain operators’ driver’s license if they fail to maintain their driving privileges by attending a driver improvement course); § 322.058, Fla. Stat. (2016) (requiring in subsection (1) the suspension of the “driver license” of a person who has a delinquent support 4 Section 322.34(5) provides that “[a]ny person whose driver license has been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual offender) and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree . . . .” § 322.34(5), Fla....

...Stat. (stating, “a person who is ineligible to be granted the privilege of driving”). Moreover, under the principle of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. Miller, 227 So. 3d at 564. Unlike section 322.34(2), which speaks only of a “driver license or driving privilege,” section 322.34(6) expressly distinguishes between persons operating a vehicle “[w]ithout having a driver license as required under s. 322.03” and “[w]hile . . . driver license or driving privilege is cancelled, suspended, or revoked,” which indicates that the Legislature did not intend section 322.34(2) to apply to persons who have never had a license. See § 322.34(6), Fla....

...is that under that interpretation, an unlicensed driver is punished less harshly than a licensed driver and the Legislature’s intent to foster highway safety is not carried out. As we did in Finney, we again recognize that there appears to be “a gaping loophole in section 322.34” and reiterate that it is firmly established that courts must apply a statute as they find it and leave to the Legislature the correction of inconsistencies and inequalities in its operation. 219 So. 3d at 256 (“[B]ecause Finney cannot be prosecuted as a habitual traffic offender under section 322.34(5) since he has never been issued a driver’s license, we agree with the trial court’s observation that the result in this case ‘goes against public policy and neglects public safety.’ Indeed, there appears to be a gaping loophole in section 322.34 because as the statute is written, an offender who is a habitual traffic offender but who has never had a driver’s license can escape felony punishment and receive a lesser punishment than a habitual traffic offender who had obtained a license.”). Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate Appellant’s convictions under section 322.34(2)(b) and adjudicate him guilty of the lesser-included offenses of driving without a valid driver’s license. REVERSED and REMANDED. B.L....

...Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Patricio Santiago raised five issues in his motion for postconviction relief. The trial court summarily denied Mr. Santiago's motion and he appealed. We find that only one issue merits discussion: Mr. Santiago contends that, under section 322.34, Florida Statutes, he should have been convicted of a first degree misdemeanor rather than of a third degree felony....

...Santiago alleged that his conviction for driving with his license suspended or revoked was a first degree misdemeanor because it was his first conviction after having had his license revoked as a habitual traffic offender. The trial court denied the *788 motion on the basis that section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1997), makes it a third degree felony to drive in Florida after a person has had a license revoked as a habitual traffic offender....

...Santiago's motion, he was convicted on March 5, 1997. Under the earlier version of the statute, Mr. Santiago may have a legitimate claim that he should have been convicted of only a first degree misdemeanor. See State v. Harvey, 693 So.2d 1009, 1010-11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1995), reads as follows: (1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...775.083. (b) A second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. (Emphasis supplied.) We therefore remand for reconsideration under the appropriate version of section 322.34, Florida Statutes....

...mitting him to *729 plead to driving while license suspended or revoked because he had previously been designated as a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.264(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), and thus could not be convicted of violating section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2006). Section 322.34(2) expressly states that it does not apply to those who have been designated "habitual traffic offenders," as defined in section 322.264....

...The trial court denied the motion without attaching record portions that would refute the appellant's claim. Because the appellant's claim is facially sufficient, we reverse and remand for the trial court to either attach portions of the record conclusively refuting the appellant's claim that he cannot be convicted under section 322.34(2) where he has previously been designated as a habitual traffic offender, or, in the alternative, to hold an evidentiary hearing at which the appellant may prove his claim....

...imely supplement to his amended ground one.  Balas entered an open guilty plea to one count of causing death or serious bodily injury by carelessly or negligently operating a motor vehicle while his driver's license was revoked. See § 322.34(6)(b), Fla....

...Attorney General, for appellee. Before WELLS, SHEPHERD and SCALES, JJ. WELLS, Judge.  Shanetria Pitts appeals the trial court’s decision to adjudicate her guilty of “[d]riving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified,” § 322.34(5), Fla....

...4th DCA 2005); State v. Bletcher, 763 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), respectively. The Second District has since receded from Carroll in Burgess v. State, No. 2D14-4680, 2016 WL 3607204, at *6 (Fla. 2d DCA July 6, 2016) (en banc) (“Because sections 322.34(5) and 322.271(1)(b) operate harmoniously without denying ‘driver’s license’ its defined meaning, there is no reason to interpret either statute other than in accord with the plain meaning of its text. The plain meaning of section 322.34 is that a person may be prosecuted only when his or her driver’s license has been revoked....

...J. The State of Florida appeals the trial court’s order dismissing the information charging Pedro Gil (“the defendant”) with unlawfully driving a motor vehicle while his driver’s license is revoked as a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2009), based on double jeopardy grounds. Because we agree with the Fourth District Court’s decision in State v. Cooke, 767 So.2d 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), that convictions for violation of sections 322.34(2) and (5) do not constitute double jeopardy, and for the reasons stated herein, we reverse. The defendant was arrested and issued several citations for driving with a revoked driver’s license pursuant to section 322.34(5) (habitual traffic offender revocation), driving with a suspended driver’s license pursuant to section 322.34(2), and various other traffic offenses. On October 27, 2009, the defendant was formally charged with violating section 322.34(2), a misdemeanor, and other traffic offenses in county court, and with violating section 322.34(5), a felony, in circuit court. The defendant pled guilty to violating section 322.34(2) in county court on October 27, 2009, and then moved to dismiss the felony charged under section 322.34(5) filed in circuit court, on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, finding that convictions under section 322.34(2) and 322.34(5) would constitute double jeopardy....

...utively. For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial. A review of subsections (2) and (5) of section 322.34 reflect that violations do not require identical elements of proof because they include elements not found in the other, and that neither offense is a lesser included offense of the other. See also Cooke, 767 So.2d at 469 (concluding that subsections 322.34(2) and (5) contain elements not found in the other offense, and therefore convictions for both offenses do not constitute double jeopardy). Thus, the issue we must resolve is whether these offenses are “degrees of the same offense” under section 775.021(4)(b)(2) or “degree variants” under Valdes . At first blush, section 322.34(5), dealing with habitual traffic offenders, appears to be a degree variant of section 322.34(2), dealing with drivers who have had their licenses canceled, suspended, or revoked for a reason other than being a habitual traffic offender, because they are found in the same statute. However on closer inspection, it is not, and, in fact, these offenses have little in common except they both provide for punishment for driving while a driver’s license or privilege is revoked. Section 322.34 provides in relevant part as follows: (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), any person whose driver’s license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked, except a “habitual traffic offender” as defined in s....

...at the driver have knowledge that his license was canceled, suspended, or revoked, whereas subsection (5) does not require knowledge; and subsection (2) provides for different penalties based on the number of convictions the driver has for violating section 322.34 (sixty days incarceration for a first conviction, 364 days incarceration for a second conviction, and five years incarceration for a third or subsequent conviction), whereas a violation under subsection (5) is punishable up to five yea...

...under subsection (5) from its application: “Any person whose driver’s license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. 322.264 [the habitual traffic offender statute].... ” § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). Subsection (5) is also not a degree variant of subsection (2) because a violation of subsection (2) is not a “moving violation,” whereas a violation of subsection (5) is a “moving violation,” see § 322.34(1); and the cancellation, suspension, or revocation of a driver’s license under subsection (2) is based on the number of “points” a driver has accumulated pursuant to the point system provided in section 322.27 over a certain period of time, whereas subsection (5) is based on the number of convictions for the offenses listed in sections 322.264(1) and (2) over a five-year period. When a driver’s license is suspended under section 322.34(2) it is because the driver has accumulated a specific number of “points” or upon a conviction for certain offenses....

...he death or personal injury of another or property damage in excess of $500, under section 322.27(1)(b); if the driver is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle, under section 322.27(l)(c), etc. Whereas suspension or revocation under subsection (2) of section 322.34 is based on the number of accumulated points or the commission of certain offenses, subsection (5) is based on the number of traffic convictions during a specified period of time....

...fety and Motor Vehicles, shows that such person has accumulated the specified number of convictions for offenses de *1003 scribed in subsection (1) or subsection (2) within a 5-year period.” Because suspension or revocation under subsection (2) of section 322.34 is based on entirely different conduct and on a completely different criteria than a revocation under subsection (5), subsection (5) cannot be a degree variant of subsection (2), and therefore convictions for violating subsection (2) and subsection (5) do not constitute double jeopardy....

...Based on the reasons articulated in this opinion, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the information charging the defendant with driving a motor vehicle while his driver’s license is revoked as a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.34(5)....

suspended, or revoked (DWLS) pursuant to section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2017), and leaving

...Const. For the reasons that follow, we approve the Third District’s decision below and disapprove the conflict cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion. I. Background On May 21, 2014, Daryl Miller was charged with violating section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2017), which provides a third-degree felony penalty for “habitual traffic offenders” who drive with a driver license that has been revoked under section 322.264, Florida.Statutes (2017). Miller filed a sworn motion to dismiss. In support of his motion, Miller argued that he had never possessed a Florida driver license -and therefore could not be convicted pursuant to section 322.34(6), Florida Statutes....

...The Third District affirmed the trial court’s order, aligning its decision with the First District’s decision in Crain v. State, 79 So.3d 118, 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). See Miller, 193 So.3d at 1002 . The Third District concluded that possession of a Florida driver license is a prerequisite for a section 322.34(6) offense and certified conflict with the Second, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal. |d. at 1002-03. We agree with the Third and First Districts that possession of a driver license is a prerequisite to a conviction pursuant to section 322.34(6)....

...“When the statute is clear- and unambiguous,” we use its plain language and avoid rules of statutory construction. Daniels v. Fla. Dept. of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2006); see also W. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So.3d 1, 9 (Fla. 2012). We first examine the plain language of the section under review. Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, provides the following:' Any person whose driver license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...cumulated a combination of specified offenses. 1 The Legislature defined driver license as “a certificate that, subject to all other requirements of law, authorizes an individual to drive.” § 322.01(17), Fla. Stat. (2017). The plain language of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, provides that an offender must have had his or her driver license revoked as a habitual traffic offender in order for the felony penalty to apply. The State cannot revoke a license that never existed. Consequently, a person cannot violate section 322.34(5) without ever having obtained a driver license. The State contends that this Court must look to other sections of Chapter 322 to determine the plain meaning of “driver license” in section 322.34(5) because the plain meaning of a word is derived from its context....

...The State asks us to find “driver license” and “driving privilege” interchangeable, consistent with its practice of charging drivers who have never had a driver license under statutes with “driving privilege” penalties. However, statutory construction is inappropriate because section 322.34(5) is not ambiguous. Even if section 322.34(5) were ambiguous as the State contends, the canons of statutory construction do not support the State’s interpretation....

...Individuals like Miller are guilty of a second-degree misdemeanor for violation of section 322.03, Florida Statutes. See § 322.39, Fla. Stat. (2017). The Legislature has not articulated enhanced penalties for individuals who accumulate multiple violations of section 322.03. The statute under review, section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, only provides enhanced penalties for individuals who continue to drive after having had a valid driver license revoked....

...trol of a vehicle” while impaired by alcohol or other substances, including individuals who drive without ever having obtained a license and those who drive without having an exemption to' licensure. See § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (2017). In addition, section 322.34(6)(a), Florida Statutes, contemplates a felony penalty for any person who has never obtained a license who kills or causes bodily injury to someone while driving. The Legislature could have included individuals who do not have a license or exception to licensure along with license holders in section 322.34(5) as it did in other subsections. See Thayer, 335 So.2d at 817 . It did not do so. III. Conclusion Having a driver license that has been revoked under the habitual traffic offender statute, section 322.264, Florida Statutes, is a necessary element of a section 322.34(5) offense. Therefore, defendants who have never possessed a driver license may not be charged under section 322.34(5)....

...We therefore remand this cause for the purpose of correctly designating the conditions of McMahill’s probation violation, which were alleged, proved at the hearing, and relied upon by the trial judge. AFFIRMED; But REMANDED for Correction of Sentencing Documents. HARRIS and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ., concur. . § 322.34, Fla....

STEVENSON, J. Bruce W. Gabbard, the appellant, contends that section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes, which prescribes increasingly severe punishment for successive convictions of driving with a suspended license, is unconstitutionally vague....

...o be used in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. Evidence presented at the adversarial preliminary hearing demonstrated probable cause to believe that the appellee’s automobile had been operated outside his presence in violation of section 322.34(9), Florida Statutes. Relying upon section 932.701(2)(a)(9) for the proposition that an automobile operated in violation of section 322.34(9) is a “contraband article” under the Act, the department argued that the evidence it had produced demonstrated probable cause to believe that the automobile had been used in violation of the Act....

WELLS, Judge. Affirmed. See § 322.34(5), Fla....

PATTERSON, Judge. The state appeals the dismissal of the charge against Smith for driving with a suspended driver’s license causing death or serious injury, pursuant to section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a third-degree felony....

...Joyce, 361 So.2d 406 (Fla.1978), and found the statute to be unconstitutional. We agree that the statute unconstitutionally criminalizes simple negligence based on Winters and Joyce , and thus, we affirm the dismissal of the charge. The state charged Smith with the violation of section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991), which provides: Any person whose driver’s license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked pursuant to s....

...ehicle in a careless or negligent manner (“careless” and “negligent” are synonymous and therefore redundant); and (3) the negligent operation of the vehicle results in the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being. Subsections 322.34(1), (2), and (4) make the operation of a motor vehicle with a cancelled, revoked, or suspended driver’s license, unconnected with any other unlawful act, a misdemeanor....

...ct. See Baker v. State, 377 So.2d 17, 20 (Fla.1979). In Baker , the court justified the imposition of criminal sanctions without regard to proximate cause as a deterrent to the serious social problem of drunk driving. 1 377 So.2d at 20 . The conduct section 322.34(3) condemns is the operation of a vehicle without the proper credentials and subsequent injury as a result of that vehicle operation....

...Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. WARNER, J. The State appeals a final order imposing a sentence on defendant for driving while his license was suspended (“DWLS”). As defendant had committed three prior DWLS offenses, the State contended that section 322.34(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2019), required a mandatory ten-day jail sentence, which the trial court refused to impose....

...When the officer discovered that appellee’s license was suspended, he was arrested for DWLS. The traffic citation, the booking report, and the probable cause affidavit state that appellee had three prior convictions of DWLS. The State charged appellee with driving on a suspended license contrary to section 322.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2019)....

...However, appellee’s driver’s license record submitted to the court by the State showed three previous convictions for DWLS. Appellee entered an open plea of no contest to the court after the court offered a sentence of an adjudication and payment of court costs. The State objected because section 322.34(2)(b)2....

...mandated a ten-day jail sentence for a third and subsequent convictions. The statute had been amended in October of 2019 to provide for the jail term. Nevertheless, the court adjudicated appellee guilty, ordering him to pay court costs. It did not impose a ten-day mandatory jail sentence required under section 322.34(2)(b)2., concluding that it would be an ex post facto violation to impose the jail sentence. The State appeals the sentence. The standard of review of a claim that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence is de novo. Claycomb v. State, 142 So. 3d 916, 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Section 322.34(2) provides for the punishment for DWLS. In 2019, the Legislature amended the statute to provide for a mandatory jail term for any person convicted for a third or subsequent conviction for DWLS, effective October 1, 2019. See Ch. 2019-167, § 322.34, Laws of Fla....

...m a violation of: 1. Driving under the influence; 2. Refusal to submit to a urine, breath-alcohol, or blood alcohol test; 3. A traffic offense causing death or serious bodily injury; or 4. Fleeing or eluding. § 322.34, Fla....

...Thus, a first conviction for DWLS is a second degree misdemeanor. A second and subsequent conviction is a first degree misdemeanor, although a third and subsequent DWLS conviction can be a felony if the violation is related to the four violations listed in section 322.34(2)(c)....

...facto principles despite the fact that the prior offenses forming a basis for enhancement occurred prior to enactment of the enhancement provision[.]” (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992))). Based on Grant’s reasoning, the amendment to section 322.34 to add subsection (2)(b)2....

...Thus, the statute applied a penalty to the subsequent conviction, not his prior convictions. Appellee does not argue otherwise. The court erred in rejecting the mandatory minimum sentence. Appellee argues, however, that because the information contained only one prior conviction, he was charged with section 322.34(2)(b)1., and not (b)2....

...“It is fundamental error where a defendant pleads to one crime but is convicted of a greater crime with which he was never charged.” Id. at 1250 (quoting Cuevas v. State, 770 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). Keels is inapplicable. Here, the information charged appellee with a violation of section 322.34(2)(b), which is a first degree misdemeanor. Section 322.34(2)(b)2....

...Napodano, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. No appearance for appellee. WARNER, J. The State appeals the trial court’s sentence imposed upon appellee for his conviction for driving while license suspended (“DWLS”) pursuant to section 322.34(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2020)....

...The trial court failed to impose the mandatory ten-day jail sentence for a third or subsequent conviction for DWLS. We reverse, as the jail sentence required by statute is mandatory. The State charged appellee by citation with one count of DWLS, a first- degree misdemeanor, pursuant to section 322.34(2)(b)....

...The court gave appellee a choice: he could enter an open plea and receive a withheld adjudication and $293 in court costs with 180 days to pay; or, he could proceed with the case and hire an attorney or obtain the services of a public defender. The State objected to the court’s offer because section 322.34(2)(b)2....

...The court did not impose the mandatory jail time. This appeal follows. The State contends that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it failed to impose a minimum ten-day jail sentence on appellee, based upon his driving record of two prior DWLS convictions. Section 322.34(2)(b)2....

...775.083, upon a second or subsequent conviction, except as provided in paragraph (c). 2. A person convicted of a third or subsequent conviction, except as provided in paragraph (c), must serve a minimum of 10 days in jail. (Emphasis added). We agree with the State that section 322.34(2)(b)2....

...PER CURIAM. The State appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court on appellee for his third driving while license suspended conviction (“DWLS”). It contends that the trial court failed to impose the mandatory ten-day jail sentence required under section 322.34(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2020). For the reasons stated in State v....

...PER CURIAM. The State appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court on appellee for his fourth driving while license suspended conviction (“DWLS”). It contends that the trial court failed to impose the mandatory ten-day jail sentence required under section 322.34(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2020). For the reasons stated in State v....

...orah Koenig, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. ON CONFESSION OF ERROR DAMOORGIAN, J. Appellant, William Terry Robinson, was charged with Driving While License Suspended with Knowledge, pursuant to section 322.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2021)....

...“The element of knowledge is satisfied if the person has been previously cited . . . or the person admits to knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation, or suspension or revocation equivalent status; or the person received notice . . . .” § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat....

...urt’s judgment, sentence and denial of his demand for jury trial. We hold that Smith was entitled to a jury trial and, therefore, grant certiorari. *263 Smith was charged in county court with violation of a municipal traffic ordinance by violating Section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ving without a valid license, and driving with a suspended license. 1 We find that only one issue on appeal has merit. Appellant argues, inter alia, that double jeopardy prohibits dual convictions for driving with a suspended license in violation of section 322.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), and driving without a valid license in violation of section 322.03(1), Florida Statutes (2013)....

...The State properly concedes that the elements of driving without a valid license are subsumed by the elements of driving with a suspended license. Roedel v. State, 773 So.2d 1280, 1282 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“In other words, section 322.03(1) is a" necessary lesser included offense of section 322.34(2).”)....

...d remand to the trial court to enter a corrected sentencing order consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. CASANUEVA and WALLACE, JJ., Concur. . Cantlon was also charged with and convicted of driving while his license was suspended under section 322.34, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...The motion is untimely, and the retroactivity exception in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(2) does not apply. Appellant filed his motion in 2018 seeking to vacate a plea he entered in 2004 to felony driving while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender. § 322.34(5), Fla....

...(2004). His motion relied on a change in statutory interpretation that was announced in State v. Miller, 227 So. 3d 562 (Fla. 2017). The Florida Supreme Court in Miller held that a defendant, who never obtained a license, could not be convicted under section 322.34(5)....

...or to permit roving judicial error corrections, in the absence of fundamental and constitutional law changes which cast serious doubt on the veracity or integrity of the original trial proceeding.” Id. at 929. Miller is an evolutionary refinement in how section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, should be interpreted—not a constitutional development of fundamental significance....

...th the dictates of this opinion. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. KELLY and WALLACE, JJ., concur. . The information indicates that the driving while license suspended or revoked charge was a first-degree misdemeanor. § 322.34(l)(b), (2)(a), Fla....

...The State’s rebanee on Raulerson v. State, 763 So.2d 285 (Fla.2000), for the proposition that a “conviction” includes both adjudicated offenses and offenses in which adjudication is withheld, is misplaced, because Raulerson applies to convictions under section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes, for driving with a canceled, suspended, or revoked license....

PER CURIAM. Appellant was charged and convicted of felony driving with a suspended or revoked license in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2014) (Count I), and leaving the scene of a crash involving damage to an attended vehicle in violation of section 316.061(1), Florida Statutes (2014) (Count II)....

...Milton Jones appeals a judgment and sentence adjudicating him guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell in violation of section 893.13(l)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (1987), and driving with a suspended or revoked license in violation of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1987)....

is valid. Appellees were both charged under section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1977), with the criminal

...ER CURIAM. The state charged Mr. Sampson with negligently causing the death of another human being while driving with a suspended license. The trial court dismissed this charge pursuant to State v. Smith, 624 So.2d 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), which held section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991), unconstitutional. Thereafter, in State v. Smith, 638 So.2d 509 (Fla.1994), the supreme court reversed this court’s opinion in Smith and held section 322.34(3) constitutional....

...ike term that has drawn its meaning from the particular statutory context in which the term is used. 772 So.2d at 1215 (citations and other quotations omitted); see also State v. Keirn, 720 So.2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“a conviction under section 322.34 [, Florida Statutes (1995),] occurs after a final disposition of a case, as a result of a trial or plea, without regard to the court’s decision on adjudication of the defendant,” except under specified circumstances)....

...In Huss, the charge of driving with a suspended or revoked license had been reclassified to the level of a third-degree felony because the defendant therein had previously been convicted of driving with a suspended or revoked license two or more times contrary to section 322.34, Florida Statutes. At the time defendant committed the offense at issue, section 322.34(2) required knowledge of the suspension or revocation of license....

...As a result, Huss held that the prior convictions could not be used for enhancement under the current version of the statute. However, unlike the situation in Huss, in the instant case Warren was charged with driving with a suspended or revoked license as a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.34(5)....

...State of Florida. See Arthur v. State, 818 So.2d 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ( en banc ), review denied, 839 So.2d 697 (Fla.2003). As we explained in Bowen v. State, 833 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), "Huss has no application to a prosecution under section 322.34(5) for driving while one's license is suspended as a habitual offender." Warren's remaining grounds are meritless and do not warrant discussion....

revoked on two prior occasions, in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999). Appellant claims

...§ 316.1935(3)(a); (2) reckless driving, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.192(1); (3) leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.061(1); (4) driving with a suspended license, in violation of Fla Stat. § 322.34(2)(a); (5) resisting an officer without violence, in violation of Fla....

driving on a suspended license in violation of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (2014). The two passengers

PLEUS, C.J. Sean Duff appeals his conviction for driving while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2005). He argues that this conviction violated his right against double jeopardy because he had *927 already pled to and served a 30 day sentence for driving while license suspended, cancelled or revoked in violation of section 322.34(2)....

...We note that both Duffs initial brief and the officer’s arrest affidavit refer to the last citation as one for driving while license suspended, but the actual citation refers to driving while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender in violation of section 322.34(5)....

...There are two problems with this argument. First, not only is driving while license suspended not a necessary lesser included offense of driving while license revoked as a habitual offender, these two crimes are mutually exclusive. The plain language of section 322.34(2) (driving while license suspended) expressly excludes habitual traffic offenders....

...suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. 322.26A....” (Emphasis added). Section 322.264 is the habitual traffic offender statute. Instead, driving while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender is proscribed in section 322.34(5)....

...Consequently, Duffs convictions violate double jeopardy because the offenses are degree variants of the same primary evil. Roedel . The State argues that these offenses “address different types of drivers and are not merely degree variants of one another.” Specifically, the State contends that section 322.34(2) is designed to punish those who knowingly drive while their license is suspended, whether it be for failure to maintain insurance, becoming delinquent in child support or a variety of other reasons for which a license may be suspended. On the other hand, section 322.34(5) punishes those who drive while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender, regardless of knowledge or the number of times it is done....

...mbent on the trial judge to examine the defendant to determine whether the waiver of this right is made knowingly and intelligently before allowing the defendant to proceed without the assistance of counsel). . § 893.13(l)(c)l, Fla. Stat. (2001). . § 322.34(2)(c), Fla....

...finding no error as to those convictions. We reverse his conviction of felony driving with license suspended (“DWLS”) based on Huss v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Appellant was convicted of felony DWLS based on the 1998 version of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes, which provides in part: *891 Any person whose driver’s license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...spended, or revoked, upon: [[Image here]] (c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree .... (emphasis added). The requirement of knowledge became effective October 1, 1997. Prior to that, knowledge was not required. § 322.34(1), Fla....

...As the first district explained in Huss : At the time appellant received the prior convictions, the statute did not require proof of “knowledge” as an element of the offense, and thus, his prior convictions cannot be counted as “convictions” under the 1997 provisions of section 322.34(2)....

...encing enhancement scheme, the legislature would have clearly stated that the enhancement would not apply to any convictions before the enactment of the statute. We find the state’s legislative intent argument particularly unpersuasive in light of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1997 and Supp.1998), in which the legislature did in fact make the act of driving while license was canceled, suspended or revoked, without knowledge of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation, a moving viola...

PER CURIAM. The State appeals the order of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the appellee, Jeffrey Rairdon. The trial court stated that a driver’s license was not required to operate a moped under section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1995), and granted appellee’s motion to dismiss....

PER CURIAM. Jeffrey Pirtle and Daniel Tholl appeal convictions for felony driving with license suspended pursuant to section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....

CANCELED WITH KNOWLEDGE § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Driving

PER CURIAM. Appellant seeks review of his conviction of felony driving while license suspended, in violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). In accordance with the decision in Huss v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), appellant’s felony conviction is reversed. We remand with directions to enter judgment and convic *104 tion pursuant to section 322.34(2)(a), Fla....

PER CURIAM. Appellant seeks review of his conviction of felony driving while license suspended, in violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). In accordance with the decision in Huss v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), appellant’s felony conviction is reversed. We remand with directions to enter judgment and conviction pursuant to section 322.34(2)(a), Fla....

...Legislative intent in this regard may also be determined from a particular statutory scheme which clearly contemplates that “the term ‘conviction’ ... include both adjudications and withheld adjudications.” Raulerson v. State, 763 So.2d 285, 290 (Fla.2000) (holding that the term “conviction” as used in section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes, contemplates both adjudications and withheld adjudications)....

...Burke, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee. WARNER, J. The state appeals an order of dismissal under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) of the charge of felony driving while license revoked as a habitual offender in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes....

...(2014). When an officer pulled him over for going nearly double the speed limit, the officer discovered that Floyd’s license had been suspended or revoked some fifteen times—and that it was still revoked. The State charged Floyd with violating section 322.34(5), which provides that “[a]ny person whose driver license has been revoked pursuant to [the habitual traffic offender statute] and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty...

...ho never had a license in the first place, State v. Miller, 227 So. 3d 562, 565 (Fla. 2017) (“Having a driver license that has been revoked under the habitual traffic offender statute, section 322.264, Florida Statutes, is a necessary element of a section 322.34(5) offense.”)....

“driving while license suspended or revoked” under section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes, preserving his right

...Second District Court of Appeal in Robinson v. State, 290 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), which involved an appeal of a conviction for driving as a habitual traffic offender while one’s driver license is revoked (DWLR-HTO). In Robinson, the district court held that under section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2016), a conviction for DWLR-HTO does not require the State to prove that the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) provided the defendant with notice of the habitual traffic offender (HTO) driver license revocation....

...2d 589, 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We hold that proof that DHSMV provided a defendant with notice of an HTO driver license revocation is not an element of the crime of DWLR-HTO under section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2016). Consequently, we approve the holding in Robinson, and we disapprove the decisions in Rodgers, Neary, and Arthur to the extent that they state that section 322.34(5) requires proof of notice. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Henry Robinson was charged with DWLR-HTO and was tried by a jury in Pinellas County....

...at 1011. On appeal, Robinson raised two issues: (1) insufficient evidence of notice, and (2) error in denying the use of his proposed special jury instruction. Id. at 1008. Sitting en banc, the district court affirmed Robinson’s conviction and held that a conviction for DWLR-HTO under section 322.34(5) does not require proof of notice....

...state and constitutes sufficient proof that such notice was given.” Id. For instance, in a prosecution for knowingly driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified (DWLS), proof of notice creates a rebuttable presumption of the defendant’s knowledge. See § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). The certified conflict issue we address is whether, pursuant to section 322.34(5), a DWLR-HTO conviction requires the State to prove that DHSMV provided the defendant with notice of the HTO driver license revocation. As we explain, the answer is no. -4-  II. DWLR-HTO and Section 322.34(5) Florida law specifies the criteria by which an individual is designated as an HTO....

...322.264 (habitual offender) and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 322.34(5), Fla. Stat. (2016). 1 At Robinson’s trial, consistent with section 322.34(5), the jury was instructed as follows: (1) One, Henry Lee Robinson drove a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state; (2) Two, at the time, Henry Lee Robinson’s license was revoked as a habitual traffic offender. 1. Effective October 1, 2019, section 322.34(5) was amended as follows: Any person who has been designated a habitual traffic offender as defined by s....

...A DWLR-HTO Conviction Does Not Require Proof of Notice Robinson argues that for his conviction to be valid, the State was required to prove that DHSMV provided him with notice of his HTO driver license revocation. We reject Robinson’s argument because under the plain meaning of section 322.34(5), proof of notice is not required. The offense of DWLR-HTO consists of two elements: (1) the defendant drove a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State, and (2) at the time of the offense, the defendant had his driver license revoked as an HTO. See § 322.34(5), Fla. Stat. (2016). Nowhere in the text of section 322.34(5) is proof of notice required. 2....

...The standard jury instruction has also been slightly modified since 2016, but it remains substantively unchanged as to the elements the State must prove. -7-  To that end, the district court properly concluded that “[t]he text of section 322.34(5) is plain, clear, and unambiguous.” Robinson, 290 So....

...atutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” State v. Peraza, 259 So. 3d 728, 730 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)). “[T]he statutory elements of a section 322.34(5) offense are just what the statute states they are.” Robinson, 290 So....

...on’s conviction. IV. Certified Conflict Cases We now turn to the certified conflict with Rodgers, Neary, and Arthur. While none of these cases involved the express question of law at issue in the present case—whether section 322.34(5) requires proof of notice—the analysis in each case erroneously states that the statute requires proof of notice. -8-  Rodgers In Rodgers, the Fourth Distr...

...for DWLR-HTO that is based on three convictions of driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified (DWLS) requires proof of each individual suspension. Rodgers, 804 So. 2d at 481. The district court held that “[t]he violation created by section 322.34(5) does not involve—as an element of the crime—a finding that the motorist has been convicted on three separate occasions of DWLS.” Id....

...revoking the license.” Id. Neary In Neary, the Fifth District explained: “The issue we must resolve is whether Michael Neary, who is a resident of Georgia, may be adjudicated guilty as a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, for driving with a revoked -9- license based on Neary’s classification in Georgia as a habitual traffic violator.” Neary, 63 So....

...the State relied to obtain the conviction were not maintained by DHSMV, the district court quoted language from Patterson v. State, 938 So. 2d 625, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), and Rodgers, 804 So. 2d at 483, wherein both opinions state that proof of notice is required under section 322.34(5)....

...to ignore the revocation and continue to drive. Arthur does not contend he was without knowledge of the revocation.” Id. To the extent that Rogers, Neary, and Arthur state that proof of notice is required, they do so contrary to the plain language in section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we approve the holding in Robinson that section 322.34(5) does not require proof of notice, and we disapprove Rodgers, Neary, and Arthur to the extent that they interpret section 322.34(5) as imposing such a requirement. It is so ordered. CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. MUÑIZ, J., concurs in result. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DE...

...We affirm the denial of relief under rule 3.850 but reverse the portion of the order directing the clerk to amend the judgment and sentence. Godwin was arrested for driving with a revoked license as a habitual traffic offender, a third-degree felony in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2016). However, the State charged Godwin by information with driving while his license was canceled, suspended, or revoked after two or more prior convictions, a third-degree felony in violation of an earlier subsection, section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2016). He entered an open plea of no contest to that offense and was sentenced to ten years in prison. In a rule 3.850 motion, Godwin argued that counsel failed to advise that he could not be prosecuted under section 322.34(2)(c) because he had been designated as a habitual traffic offender. See § 322.34(2), Fla....

...3d 254, 255–56 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). Godwin alleged he would not have entered a plea and instead would have insisted on going to trial if counsel had advised him of this “complete defense.” The State conceded Godwin should not have been charged under section 322.34(2)(c) but argued he was not entitled to relief under rule 3.850 because he failed to establish prejudice. The court agreed with the State that Godwin was not entitled to relief under rule 3.850 but directed the clerk to amend the judgment and sentence to reflect that he had entered a plea to a violation of section 322.34(5) instead of section 322.34(2)(c). We affirm the court’s ruling that Godwin was not entitled to relief under rule 3.850 because he failed to establish prejudice resulting from counsel’s alleged error. To establish prejudice, Godwin needed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have entered a plea—and would have insisted on going to trial—if counsel had advised him that he had a “complete defense” under section 322.34(2)(c)....

...See Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d at 1179–82. Godwin did not demonstrate that his designation as a habitual traffic offender would have been a viable defense at trial as he failed to show that the State would have been precluded from amending the information to charge him under the proper subsection, section 322.34(5), if he had raised the issue. 1 A charge under section 322.34(5) would have required the same substantive proof and carried the same potential sentence as a charge under section 322.34(2)(c), and Godwin was on notice that his conduct likely violated section 322.34(5) because he was arrested under that subsection....

...traffic offender would have been a viable defense at trial, the court did not err in ruling that he failed to establish a reasonable probability that he 1 Godwin’s reliance on Finney, 291 So. 3d at 255–56, is misplaced. In Finney, the defendant could not be prosecuted under section 322.34(2)(c) because he had been designated as a habitual traffic offender. Id. However, he also could not be prosecuted under section 322.34(5) because he had never had a driver’s license. Id....

...2 would have insisted on going to trial. However, we reverse the portion of the court’s order directing the clerk to amend the judgment and sentence to reflect that Godwin entered a plea to a violation of section 322.34(5) instead of section 322.34(2)(c). The information was never amended to charge Godwin under section 322.34(5), and it is a due process violation for the judgment and sentence to show that he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced for a crime that was not charged in the information....

...See Bodie v. State, 143 So. 3d 420, 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (citing Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 69 (Fla. 2004)). On remand, the court is directed to reinstate the original judgment and sentence reflecting that Godwin entered a plea to a violation of section 322.34(2)(c) as charged in the information....

...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sonya Roebuck Horbelt, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. WALLACE, Judge. Leo Zarba pleaded nolo contendere to driving while his license was revoked (habitual traffic offender), a third-degree felony. § 322.34(5), Fla....

...STATUTES? Remand is also necessary, as the state concedes, to correct a scrivener’s error on the judgment of conviction to reflect that appellant was found guilty of the second-degree misdemeanor of driving with license suspended in violation of section 322.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2019). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. WARNER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of...

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995),- is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional

PER CURIAM. We ■ reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional....

...Because we believe that this case is controlled by Boutwell v. State, 631 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 1994), we reverse in part and affirm in part. In Boutwell, the defendant, driving with a suspended license, caused an accident injuring four people. Boutwell was convicted of four counts of DUS with injury pursuant to section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991). Construing DUS as a "continuing offense," the supreme court held "that regardless of the number of injured persons, there can be but one conviction under section 322.34(3) arising from a single accident." 631 So.2d at 1095 (footnote omitted). The court stated that it was merely "fortuitous" that four persons were injured as a result of the defendant's negligence. Id. *1068 In discussing the relationship between the offense of simple DUS in section 322.34(1) and DUS with injury in section 322.34(3), the court in Boutwell stated: It is evident that section 322.34(3) does no more than enhance the penalty for driving with a suspended license in cases where the driver through the careless or negligent operation of his vehicle causes death or serious bodily injury. If the violation of section 322.34(1) in a single driving episode can be only one offense, the violation of section 322.34(3) in a single driving episode should be considered as one offense....

...riving episode. We find no reason to distinguish DUI from DUS for determining whether separate convictions are permissible in instances where multiple injuries arise from the same traffic accident. We hold that, like DUS with injury proscribed under section 322.34(3), the commission of DUI with serious bodily injury under section 316.193(3)(c)2 or DUI with property damage or injury under section 316.193(3)(c)1 which arises out of a single driving episode should each be considered single offenses regardless of the number of persons injured or items of property damaged....

...3d DCA 1991), quashed on other grounds, 600 So.2d 457 (1992), and this court's decision in Boutwell, 625 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The supreme court's holding in Boutwell affirmed that part of the Wright decision which stated that regardless of the number of injured persons, there can be only one conviction under section 322.34(3) (driving with suspended license/serious bodily injury)....

...ed it, however no marijuana was ever found. Upon learning that the 2  Defendant’s license was suspended, he arrested the Defendant for driving while license suspended, in violation of § 322.34(2), Florida Statutes....

has not complied with the court's directives. Section 322.34, Florida Statutes, authorizes the imposition

...If he wishes to seek any relief from his lengthy sentence, he must file either a timely motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to rule 3.800(c) or a motion to withdraw his plea pursuant to rule 3.850. Affirmed with instructions. NORTHCUTT and LaROSE, JJ., Concur. . § 322.34(3)(a), Fla....

Per Curiam. REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to vacate Appellant's convictions under section 322.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), and adjudicate him guilty of the lesser included offense of driving without a *916 valid driver's license....

..._____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. Walter M. Green, Judge. May 31, 2018 PER CURIAM. REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to vacate Appellant’s convictions under section 322.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), and adjudicate him guilty of the lesser included offense of driving without a valid driver’s license....

...The sentencing document imposing a sentence of five years incarceration is corrected to reflect that the sentence is imposed as to case number 88-172. . Attempted burglary of a dwelling, §§ 810.02 and 777.04(4)(c), Fla.Stat. . Driving under the influence, § 316.193(1), Fla.Stat. . Driving with a suspended license, § 322.34, Fla.Stat....

...*364 Lesser Included Offenses No Valid Commercial Drivers License — § 322.03 CATEGORY CATEGORY FLA. INS-ONE_TWO_STAT. NO. No Valid Driver’s License 322.03 28.9 Comment This instruction was adopted in 2007. 28.11 DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED, REVOKED OR CANCELED-LICENSE, WITH KNOWLEDGE § 322.34(2), Fla....

...e effective date or term of the [cancellation], [suspension], [revocation] of the defendant’s driving privilege. Lesser Included Offenses No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense, SUSPENDED, REVOKED OR CANCELED LICENSE — § 322.34 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...“Actual physical control” of a vehicle means the defendant must be physically in or on the vehicle and have the capability to operate the vehicle, regardless of whether [he] [she] is actually operating the vehicle at the time. Lesser Included Offenses Driving While License Revoked as a Habitual Traffic Offender — § 322.34(5) CATEGORY CATEGORY FLA....

...ach, for appellee. POLEN, C.J. Arising out of a singular offense, Anthony Franklin was convicted of the dual offenses of (1) driving after his license had been revoked pursuant to Florida Statutes section 322.264 [habitual offender], in violation of section 322.34(5), and (2) driving while his license was suspended, canceled, *1204 or revoked, in violation of section 322.34(2), felony level. By their express terms, these offenses are mutually exclusive, and accordingly we reverse Franklin's conviction of driving while his license was suspended, canceled, or revoked in violation of section 322.34(2)(c). In pertinent part, section 322.34 provides: Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual offender) and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 322.34(5), Fla....

...the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon: . . . (C) A third subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 322.34(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2000). (Emphasis added.) Here, the trial court found Franklin's privilege to drive had previously been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 as an habitual offender. Accordingly, by definition, Franklin cannot be convicted of a violation of s. 322.34(2), which expressly does not apply to persons whose licenses have been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264, i.e., habitual offenders. Franklin's conviction for driving with a revoked license in violation of s. 322.34(5) is supported by competent substantial evidence, and is thus affirmed....

...not supported by an adequate factual basis. See Harris v. State, 32 So.3d 197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Silverstein v. State, 985 So.2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); see also State v. Tucker, 761 So.2d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (in DWLSR prosecution under section 322.34, actual physical control is an element of the offense); State v....

...and three others injured. Although she was acquitted of several charges, Coto claims that the trial court erred in adjudicating her guilty of and sentencing her on four counts of driving without a license and causing death or serious bodily injury under section 322.34(6), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939)). Each time an individual with no license or whose license has been suspended, cancelled, or revoked “makes the decision to assume control of his vehicle, he has broken the law.” Id. But in Boutwell, the Court made clear that section 322.34(6) only enhanced the punishment for that offense “in cases where the driver through the careless or negligent operation of his vehicle causes death or serious bodily injury.” See Boutwell, 631 So....

...judicially resolved in favor of construing a single transaction as a single offense.” Hallman, 492 So. 2d at 1138 (quoting People v. Dillingham, 249 N.E.2d 294, 297 (1969)). We find that Coto’s adjudication and sentence for multiple counts under section 322.34, the driving with a suspended license statute, violates double jeopardy. While Justice Grimes makes a compelling argument in his Boutwell dissent that multiple convictions under section 322.34 should be permitted, that viewpoint was expressly rejected by the Florida Supreme Court when they held in Melbourne that “only one conviction can arise from a single violation of the driving with a suspended license statute even though injury results to several persons.” 679 So. 2d at 765. We are constrained to follow that result. Section 322.34(6) contains no language similar to that found in the DUI statute, section 775.021(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), which states that the legislature intends to convict and sentence a defendant for “each criminal offense” they commit in the course of one criminal transaction, unless several exceptions are present. Though the State makes several arguments about public policy and legislative intent as to why multiple convictions under section 322.34(6) should be authorized just as they are in DUI cases, the expression of such intent “belong[s] to the legislature.” See Stanley v. Quest Intern....

...construction.” State v. Cable, 51 So. 3d 434, 443 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Goldenberg v. Sawczak, 791 So. 2d 1078, 1081 (Fla. 2001)); accord Faro v. Porchester Holdings, Inc., 792 So. 2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). For those reasons, Coto’s multiple convictions under section 322.34 cannot stand. However, there is no error in the court’s assessment of multiple victim injury points in this case....

...These victim injury points “must be scored for each victim physically injured and for each offense resulting in physical injury whether there are 1 or more victims” for all offenses which the defendant has been convicted. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(9). When an individual is charged under section 322.34(6), “a determination already has been made that the person is no longer fit to be driving on Florida’s highways.” State v....

...“was injured as a direct result of [the defendant’s] careless or negligent operation of the car without a license.”); see also Block v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2019 WL 700113, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2019) (stating that a conviction under section 322.34(6) can support the imposition of victim injury points). In sum, Coto can only be convicted and sentenced once under section 322.34(6) as her violation of that section constituted only one criminal offense. See Boutwell, 631 So. 2d at 1095. We therefore vacate three of Coto’s four convictions under section 322.34(6)(a) and remand with directions for the trial court to sentence her accordingly for the remaining conviction pursuant to that section....

...Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent. PER CURIAM. Alphonso Finney filed a petition for writ of prohibition seeking review of the order denying his motion to dismiss the amended information charging him with violating section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...that the highest offense he can be charged with is a misdemeanor over which the circuit court lacks jurisdiction. We agree and grant the petition. Background Finney was originally charged with violating section 322.34(5), 1 but the trial court granted Finney’s motion to dismiss that charge because he has never had a Florida driver’s license. The State thereafter filed an amended information charging Finney under section 322.34(2)(c) for driving while his driving privilege was suspended or revoked. Finney again moved to dismiss, arguing that he could not be charged under section 322.34(2)(c) because he was a “habitual traffic offender” as defined in section 322.264. 2, 3 The trial court denied Finney’s motion, noting that the 1 Section 322.34(5) provides that “[a]ny person whose driver license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...�� Finney sought review of the order denying his motion to dismiss by filing a petition for writ of prohibition in this court. The petition argues that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction because Finney is not subject to prosecution under section 322.34(2)(c) and the highest offense that he can be charged with is driving without a valid license, a misdemeanor. We issued an order to show cause, and in response, the State argued that the “evil” addressed by section 322.34(2)(c) is the “exact indifference and disrespect [Finney] flagrantly continues to participate in” and that to preclude his prosecution under section 322.34(2)(c) “would limit the scope of the statute unreasonably and lead to absurd results.” Analysis Section 322.34(2)(c) provides: Any person whose driver license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. level); one conviction for possession of an open alcoholic...

...(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree . . . . (emphasis supplied). Section 322.264 defines “habitual traffic offender.” Based on this clear and unambiguous language, we agree with Finney that section 322.34(2) does not apply to persons who are habitual traffic offenders. See State v. Harvey, 693 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“Under the plain meaning of section 322.34(1) [now (2)], persons who have been declared habitual traffic offenders are excluded from its application. Instead, section 322.34(2) [now (5)] applies to habitual traffic offenders who drive while their license is revoked.”); see also Gil v. State, 118 So. 3d 787, 791 (Fla. 2013) (noting that section 322.34(2) “expressly provides that it does not apply to habitual traffic offenders”). Accordingly, Finney, an undisputed habitual traffic offender, cannot be prosecuted under section 322.34(2)(c). The exemption of habitual traffic offenders from prosecution under section 322.34(2) was likely based on the fact that such offenders are subject to prosecution under section 322.34(5). However, offenders such as Finney who have never had a driver’s license cannot be prosecuted under section 322.34(5). See Crain v. State, 79 So. 3d 118, 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding that section 322.34(5) “does not outlaw driving by drivers never issued a license to drive” because the statute only applies to 4 persons whose “license” has been revoked as a habitual traffic offender)....

...3d 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (review pending in case no. SC16-1751); State v. Miller, 193 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (review pending in case no. SC16-1170). In sum, because Finney is a habitual traffic offender that cannot be prosecuted under section 322.34(2)(c), the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the amended information. That said, because Finney cannot be prosecuted as a habitual traffic offender under section 322.34(5) since he has never been issued a driver’s license, we agree with the trial court’s observation that the result in this case “goes against public policy and neglects public safety.” Indeed, there appears to be a gaping loophole in section 322.34 because as the statute is written, an offender who is a habitual traffic offender but who has never had a driver’s license can escape felony punishment and receive a lesser punishment than a habitual traffic offender who had obtained a license....

...ersons who have the requisite number of convictions for driving while their driving privilege is 5  Conclusion In sum, because Finney cannot be prosecuted under section 322.34(2)(c) and the highest crime with which he can be charged is misdemeanor driving without a valid license5 over which the circuit court lacks jurisdiction, see Sections 26.012(2)(d), 34.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), we grant the petition for writ of prohibition....

...court for driving without a valid license. PETITION GRANTED. WETHERELL, OSTERHAUS, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR. suspended or revoked. See note 3, supra. 5 See §§ 322.03(1), 322.39, Fla. Stat. (2015); Crain, supra (reversing conviction under section 322.34(5) because defendant never had a driver’s license and remanding with instructions to adjudicate defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of driving without a license, a second-degree misdemeanor)....

...The State appeals the trial court’s order granting Wayne Norman’s motion to dismiss. The same issue was addressed by this court in State v. Fields, 809 So.2d 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Norman’s informa *260 tion charging him with driving while license revoked in violation of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (2001), is identical to that in Fields ....

PER CURIAM. John Magee appeals his judgments and sentences which were imposed by the trial court after a jury found him guilty of driving under the influence, section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1993), and driving while license suspended, section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1993). We affirm the judgments and sentences except that the sentence imposed on the driving while license suspended is corrected to read that Mr. Magee must serve a jail term of 60 days, not 65 days. See §§ 322.34, 775.082(4)(b), Fla.Stat....

...postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Because his claim is not refuted by the record attachments to the postconviction court's order, we reverse. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(5). Myers was charged with a violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2012), which makes it a third-degree felony for a habitual traffic offender to drive when his or her driver's license has been revoked pursuant to section 322.264....

...Myers alleged that he never possessed a Florida driver's license and that his trial counsel was therefore ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the information on that basis. See State v. Miller, 227 So. 3d 562, 563 (Fla. 2017) ("[P]ossession of a driver license is a prerequisite to a conviction pursuant to section 322.34(5).")....

...2d 1066, 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)). And at the time Myers entered his plea there was a dispute among Florida courts regarding whether someone who had never possessed a driver's license could ever be lawfully charged and convicted of a violation of section 322.34(5). Compare Carroll v. State, 761 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (upholding a conviction under section 322.34(5) even though the defendant had never had a driver's license), receded from, Burgess v....

...2d -2- 1277, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (same), with Crain v. State, 79 So. 3d 118, 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (concluding that possession of a driver's license was required to support a conviction under section 322.34(5))....

PER CURIAM. The Defendant was charged with felony driving with a suspended license in violation of section 322.34 of the Florida Statutes....

...presumption of knowledge of suspension. Based on the record before us, we find the trial court correctly applied the law and was well within its discretion to determine that the evidence presented by Ramirez was insufficient to rebut the presumption. See § 322.34(2), Fla....

...his latest offense to a felony. We reverse. In Citrus County Circuit Court case number 08-CF-654, Vaughan was charged with, and ultimately pled no contest to, numerous offenses, one of which was felony driving while license suspended, a violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...(emphasis added). The statute also provides that a person who drives while his or her license is cancelled, suspended or revoked, without knowledge of the cancellation, suspension or revocation, is guilty only of a moving violation, not a criminal offense. See § 322.34(1), Fla. Stat. (2008); Thompson v. State, 887 So.2d 1260, 1262 (Fla.2004). Vaughan correctly argues that convictions under section 322.34(1), driving with a suspended license without knowledge of the suspension, cannot be used as a predicate to enhance later convictions of driving while license cancelled, suspended or revoked with knowledge....

...offenses charged by the State, charged that Vaughan "did while his operator's or chauffer's license or driving privilege had been cancelled, suspended or revoked, drive a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State, in violation of Florida Statute 322.34(1)." Unless the information was amended, which is not apparent from the record before us, it did not charge Vaughan with driving while license suspended with knowledge of the suspension, an offense that could serve as a predicate for felony driving while license suspended....

sentenced to 364 days in county jail under section 322.-34(1), Florida Statutes (1991). That offense is

...ular Homicide in violation of Section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1985); Leaving the scene of an accident with personal injuries in violation of Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1985); and Driving with a revoked or suspended license in violation of Section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...The facts are that he drove his automobile while intoxicated into another vehicle and seriously injured the four occupants thereof. The state attorney filed an information charging him with four violations of section 316.193(3)(c)(l) and four violations of section 322.34(3)....

...We agree that it supports him but reject the conclusion reached by the third district. Wright is based on Hallman v. State, 492 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), which held that, in spite of multiple victims, a driver cannot face multiple charges under section 322.34 arising from a single incident. We believe that Wright’s reliance upon Hall-man is misplaced. In Hallman , the defendant had been charged under section 322.34, without specifying any particular subsection....

...he wheel of his car when it was parked at an intersection (count two). There is no mention of any injured persons. The only reasonable inference possible from the facts presented by the court in its opinion is that Hallman was actually charged under section 322.34(1), while the defendant in Wright and the appellant here have been charged, and convicted under section 322.34(3). Subsections (1) and (3) of section 322.34 deal with two different crimes....

...ing under the influence and causing damage to the property or person of another. As will appear later, the amendment of the charge from an offense under subsection (c)(1) to an offense under subsection (c)(2) is a principal issue in this case. . See § 322.34(3), Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. The appellant was convicted of driving while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender, in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2009) (Count I); driving while license suspended, revoked or canceled with knowledge, in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2009) (Count II); and driving without a valid license, in violation of section 322.03(1), Florida Statutes (2009) (Count III)....

...Based on the information provided by the computer records, the officer determined that there was probable cause to arrest Allen for the felony offense of driving with a suspended license, which requires that a person have at least two prior misdemeanor driving with a suspended license convictions under section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2002). See § 322.34(2)(c)....

...ctions 57.105 and 932.704, Florida Statutes (2002). On August 20, 2003, Allen filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that she had not been twice previously convicted of the misdemeanor criminal offense of driving with a suspended license under section 322.34(2) and, thus, the predicate necessary to charge her with a felony was not established....

...As such, her jeep should not have been seized under the Act. The motion was supported by certified documents relating to the driving with license suspended charges. Those records showed that Allen was convicted of the misdemeanor criminal offense of driving with a suspended license under section 322.34(2) only once and that the other driving with a suspended license violation was charged under section 322.34(1) as a moving violation, a civil infraction....

...This is not one of those rare cases. Id., 805 So.2d at 995. We agree with the First District Court of Appeal that Miles has no retroactive application. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 316.193(3)(c)3., Fla. Stat. (1997). [2] § 322.34(1), Fla....

...(1995) (indicating that victim injury points should be scored only when the injury is a direct result of an offense for which the offender is convicted). In this case, Benson was convicted of, among other things, driving without a license in violation of section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...ing a driver’s license as required under s. 322.03 ... [[Image here]] and who by careless or negligent operation of the motor vehicle causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being is guilty of a felony of the third degree.... § 322.34(3), Fla....

...Peck requested a computer check on Warren’s driver license and determined it had been suspended so he arrested him for driving on a suspended license or driving without a valid license (the testimony varies) and searched underneath the seat and found the firearm. A violation of Section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1983) calls for an arrest....

...Initially, Crawley was charged with two counts of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, a motor vehicle, in violation of section 784.045, Florida Statutes (1999), and one count ■ of. driving while license suspended or revoked, third offense, in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...2020) (quoting Tambriz-Ramirez v. State, 248 So. 3d 1087, 1094 (Fla. 2018)). - 13 - after another. See § 316.193(3)(c)1.-2.; see also Gil v. State, 118 So. 3d 787, 794 (Fla. 2013) (concluding that driving with a suspended license under section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2009), and unlawful driving as a habitual traffic offender under section 322.34(5) qualified as variant offenses and noting as one consideration the fact that the offenses were located in the same statute)....

...We affirm the first two issues without discussion as they are not cognizable in postconviction proceedings, but reverse and remand' on the ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary plea claims. Appellant was charged with driving while his license was suspended or revoked in violation of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...denied effective assistance of counsel, because counsel failed to investigate the charge and, as a consequence, he entered a plea to a felony offense notwithstanding that the most he could 'have been accused of was a misdemeanor. He explained that he had been charged and convicted under section 322.34(1), but that because he had been previously classified as a habitual traffic offender under section 322.264, Florida Statutes, he was specifically excepted from prosecution under section 322.34(1). See State v. Harvey, 693 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Instead, he should have been charged under section 322.34(2). Appellant further alleged that if he had been properly accused under section 322.34(2), he could not have been convicted of a felony, because he did not have the requisite number of prior convictions in that one ,of his prior charges had resulted in adjudication being withheld and he had successfully completed the probationary term imposed therefor....

...to vacate Morris’s conviction. Reversed and Remanded with Directions. WARNER and KLEIN, JJ., concur. . Section 316.191, Florida Statutes, deals with drag racing; section 316.193, Florida Statutes, deals with driving while under the influence; and section 322.34, Florida Statutes, deals with driving while license has been suspended, revoked, cancelled, or otherwise disqualified.

...In the instant rule 3.850 motion, the appellant alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue in the motion for judgment of acquittal that the state failed to prove the element of knowledge required for driving while license was suspended. Under section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2002), an individual is guilty of the criminal offense of driving with a suspended license if he drives a motor vehicle while knowing of such a suspension. See § 322.34(2), Fla....

...ecords for any case except for one involving a suspension for failure to pay a traffic fine. Id. One who unknowingly drives with a suspended license may only receive a moving violation and is not subject to punishment for a' third-degree felony. See § 322.34(1), Fla....

...KUNTZ, J. Lesomer Franklin appeals the circuit court’s judgment of convictions and sentence of forty-eight months incarceration against him for driving with a suspended license as a habitual traffic offender, a third-degree felony offense under section 322.34, Florida Statues (2016)....

...He was charged with DWLR and all of the sentencing documents refer to DWLR, but his written plea agreement refers to DWLS. Again, appellant failed to preserve *1101 this issue. Furthermore, he has not shown how he was prejudiced, as the two ■violations are similar crimes with identical punishments. See § 322.34(2)(e), (5), Fla....

...see, for Appellee. BENTON, J. After a non-jury trial, Antarus Jackson was convicted of driving a motor vehicle on a state highway even though his driver’s license had been revoked pursuant to the habitual traffic offender statute. See § 322.34(5), Fla....

...Mervine, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. Before WELLS, SALTER and SCALES, JJ. WELLS, Judge.  Daryl Miller was charged with violating section 322.34(5) of the Florida Statutes titled “[d]riving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified.” See § 322.34(5), Fla....

...Stat. (2014) (providing “[e]xcept as otherwise authorized in this chapter, a person may not drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid driver license”); § 322.39(1), Fla. Stat. (2014) (providing “[i]t is a 1 Section 322.34(5), provides: (5) Any person whose driver license has been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual offender) and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s....

...(2014). 2 misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of this chapter, unless such violation is declared to be otherwise by this chapter or other law of this state”); see also Crain v. State, 79 So. 3d 118, 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (reversing a conviction under section 322.34(5) and remanding with instructions to “adjudicate [the defendant] guilty of the lesser included offense of driving without a valid driver’s license”). Concluding as a matter of law that having, at some time, a Florida driver’s license is an element of a section 322.34(5) offense—the offense charged here—and considering that it was undisputed that Miller never had a Florida’s driver’s license, the court below granted Miller’s motion and adjudicated him guilty of the lesser offense....

...For the following reasons, we affirm that ruling. In doing so, we align ourselves with the First District Court of Appeal in Crain where that court concluded that in accordance with our obligation to strictly construe penal statutes, a defendant may not be convicted as a habitual traffic offender under section 322.34(5) for driving with a suspended license when no license had ever been issued to that defendant: “One of the most fundamental principles of Florida law is that penal statutes must be strictly construed according to their letter.” Perkins v. State, 576 So....

...Cole, 537 P. 2d 1073, 1074 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (“The Department of Motor Vehicles could not suspend that which [defendant] did not have.”). 4  As our sister court pointed out, we need look no further than section 322.34(6) to confirm that the legislature clearly knew how to extend a punishment to those without licenses: Any person who operates a motor vehicle: (a) Without having a driver’s license as required under s....

...322.28(2) or (4), and who by careless or negligent operation of the motor vehicle causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being is guilty of a felony of the third degree. ... Crain, 79 So. 3d at 121 (quoting § 322.34(6), Fla. Stat. (2009)). In sum, because Miller never has had a driver’s license, he could not be convicted as a “person whose driver license has been revoked” under section 322.34(5)....

...with the Second, Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal on this issue and therefore certify conflict with the decisions of those courts on this issue. See Carroll v. State, 761 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that a person may be convicted of violating section 322.34(5) without ever having been issued a driver’s license); see also Newton v. State, 898 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (affirming a section 322.34(5) conviction, citing Carroll); State v. Bletcher, 763 5 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (citing Carroll to support reversal of an order dismissing a section 322.34(5) charge). Affirmed; conflict certified. 6 

...For each of the four cases, the offenses, statutory máximums, agreed sentences, and jail credits are as follows: Case 10-7485 Possession of a Schedule II Controlled Substance; § 893.13(6)(A); Third Degree Felony; 5 year max. Sentence: 304.58 months Jail Credit: 4 days Case 11-1374 Felony Driving with a Suspended License; § 322.34(2)(c); Third Degree Felony; 5 year max....

...4D10-5362, 4D10-5363, and 4D10-5364, with his related rule 3.800 appeal, case no. 4D10-2149, and affirm the summary denial of all four motions. With respect to the first appeal, appellant's rule 3.800(a) motion actually challenged his conviction in lower tribunal case no. 2005CF015334AXX for violating section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2005) (driving while license has been revoked pursuant to section 322.264 (habitual offender)), not the legality of his sentence; thus, the ground was not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion....

...We also note that he based his challenge on the alleged invalidity of certain prior convictions that presumably had caused his license to be revoked as a habitual offender. However, the convictions that cause a driver to be classified as a habitual offender under section 322.264 are not an element of the offense of violating section 322.34(5): The violation created by section 322.34(5) does not involve-as an element of the crime-a finding that the motorist has been convicted on three separate occasions of DWLS....

...State, 804 So.2d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (footnote omitted). In the three rule 3.850 motions, appellant sought to vacate three convictions, in three separate cases-L.T. case nos. 2002CF014236AXX, *1171 2003CF000688AXX, and 2003CF000769AXX-for violating section 322.34(5). [1] The same ground, identical in each motion, was based on an argument that chapter 98-223, Laws of Florida, which the supreme court held violated the single subject requirement of the Florida Constitution, [2] "created" section 322.34, Florida Statutes, and that the three convictions were nonexistent because the offenses in question all were committed during the window period when section 322.34 was unconstitutional. [3] However, the session law in question did not create section 322.34, but merely amended subsection 322.34(2) of that statute....

...On the records provided, we cannot determine whether it did so. [2] Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Critchfield, 842 So.2d 782 (Fla.2003). [3] See Gillman v. State, 860 So.2d 1099, 1100 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (providing that those persons who committed violation of section 322.341, a statute which was created by sections 2 and 13 of chapter 98-223, Laws of Florida, "on or after July 1, 1998, but before the reenactment became effective on May 21, 2003," were entitled to relief under Critchfield). [4] Subsection 322.34(2) provides the degree of offense and the penalty for first, second, and third convictions for driving while license canceled, suspended, or revoked, with knowledge of the cancelation, suspension, or revocation. Section 12 of Chapter 98-223 added the following language concerning the knowledge element of subsection 322.34(2): There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the knowledge requirement is satisfied if a judgment or order as provided in subsection (4) appears in the department's records for any case except for one involving a suspension by the...

...Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Johnny T. Salgado, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. EN BANC SALARIO, Judge. Donald Burgess challenges his conviction and sentence for violating section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2012), which makes it a third-degree felony for one to drive a motor vehicle when his or her driver's license has been revoked for being a habitual traffic offender....

...We answered a similar question affirmatively in Carroll v. State, 761 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), and the trial court denied Mr. Burgess's motion to dismiss on that basis. For the reasons that follow, we now recede from Carroll, conclude that a conviction under section 322.34(5) requires a defendant to have had a driver's license, and reverse Mr....

...In a one-count information, the State charged only that Mr. Burgess "did unlawfully operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while his driver's license had been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual traffic offender), contrary to Florida Statute 322.34(5)." Mr....

...Burgess's timely appeal. II. We review an order on a motion to dismiss under rule 3.190(c)(4) de novo. State v. Pasko, 815 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). On appeal, Mr. Burgess argues that we should reconsider our holding in Carroll and hold that section 322.34(5) applies only when the defendant had an actual, physical driver's license that was subsequently revoked because the defendant was a habitual traffic offender....

...to persons who . . . have demonstrated their indifference to the safety and welfare of others." § 322.263(2). To enforce the revocation of driver's licenses imposed on habitual traffic offenders, the legislature also added subsection (5) to section 322.34 in 1972. That statute establishes various criminal offenses and noncriminal infractions related to -5- driving after a license has been suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified. Section 322.34(5) makes it a third-degree felony to drive when a driver's license has been revoked for being a habitual traffic offender....

...oked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual offender) and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree . . . . § 322.34(5), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added). We must enforce section 322.34(5) in accord with "the plain meaning of the actual language" the legislature used....

...We resort to other rules of statutory construction only where the statute is ambiguous in the sense that it could be reasonably understood to mean two different things. Fajardo v. State, 805 So. 2d 961, 963-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). On its face, section 322.34(5) created an offense that can only be committed when a defendant who was issued a driver's license has had that license revoked because he or she is a habitual traffic offender....

...2d 412, 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005))); see also § 322.01(36) (defining the term "revocation" for the purposes of chapter 322 as applying only to "the termination of a licensee's privilege to drive" (emphasis added)). We see no ambiguity in section 322.34(5) and, for that reason, conclude that a defendant must actually have a driver's license—i.e., a certificate authorizing the defendant to operate a motor vehicle—in order to be convicted under the statute. There is simply no reasonable reading of section 322.34(5) that does not require the revocation of a driver's license....

...revoked because he was a habitual traffic offender. B. In Carroll, we held that the defendant's "lack of a driver's license did not relieve him" from prosecution and conviction under section 322.34(5)....

...We reasoned that the legislature must have meant "driver's license" and "driving privilege" to be used interchangeably so as to "mean the same thing and to apply equally to either situation." Id. at 419. Thus, this court concluded, a habitual traffic offender whose driving privilege was revoked could be convicted under section 322.34(5) of driving while his driver's license was revoked for being a habitual traffic offender....

...Id. In sum, Carroll held (a) that the term "driving privilege" in section 322.271(1)(b) carries a broader meaning than the right to drive conferred by a certificate authorizing one to drive, which the defendant in Carroll never had, and (b) that this broader meaning controls the scope of section 322.34(5) because "driver's license" and "driving privilege" mean the same thing....

...throughout chapter 322. See § 322.01 (stating that defined terms carry their specified meanings "[a]s used in this chapter"). We see no indication in the text that the legislature intended the term "driver's license" to have a different meaning in section 322.34(5) than it does anywhere else in chapter 322 and certainly not the clear indication required to justify departing from the meaning the legislature expressly gave that term....

...rt. II)(4) (defining the term "driver's license" for purposes of the Nonresident Violator Compact as "any license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle issued under the laws of the home jurisdiction"). The legislature did not do so with respect to section 322.34(5). -9- appears.")....

...2d DCA 2015) (holding that a court may not "rewrite the statute to insert an additional requirement not placed there by the legislature"). When due regard is given to the fact that the legislature defined the term "driver's license," the offense created by section 322.34(5) cannot be committed by someone who never held a certificate even if driving privilege and driver's license could mean the same thing. More fundamentally, however, Carroll's conclusion that the term "driver's license" in section 322.34 means the same thing as "driving privilege" in section 322.271 is itself unsound. Section 322.34 in particular, and chapter 322 in general, commonly refer to the terms "driver's license" and "driving privilege" disjunctively as "driver's license or driving privilege." See, e.g., § 322.34(1) (establishing violation for driving by "any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been cancelled, suspended, or revoked"), (2) (establishing criminal offenses against "[a]ny person whose driver's license or driving pr...

...to a nonresident, shall be subject to suspension or revocation . . . ."). When properly interpreted to include the right to drive both the license and exemption from licensure, the legislature's use of the term "driver's license" in section 322.34(5) is harmonized with its use of the term "driving privilege" in section 6 That meaning is consistent with both the understanding of the term "privilege" at the time the habitual traffic offender statutes were adopted and the understanding of that word today....

...2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992))). The driving privilege that is the subject of an application for restoration under section 322.271(1)(b) includes and refers to the "driver's license" that was revoked under the habitual traffic offender statutes as described in section 322.34(5). After having a driver's license revoked for being a habitual traffic offender, one can have the privilege that license conveyed restored by petitioning to have the license reinstated. Because sections 322.34(5) and 322.271(1)(b) operate harmoniously without denying "driver's license" its defined meaning, there is no reason to interpret either statute other than in accord with the plain meaning of its text. The plain meaning of section 322.34 is that a person may be prosecuted only when his or her driver's license has been revoked. Because Carroll is at odds with that meaning, we must recede from it. We note in closing that while it might appear that extending section 322.34(5) to driving without ever having had a license, as Carroll did, would better comport with the expressed legislative purpose to deter habitual traffic offenders, see § 322.263, one cannot say that interpreting the statute in accord with its plain language leads to absurd or unreasonable results....

...The defined term "driver's license" will presumably capture the lion's share of individuals who become habitual traffic offenders because obtaining a driver's license is, by statutory design, the primary way people become able to drive. While the plain language of section 322.34(5) excludes offenders - 13 - who flout the requirement of licensure, driving without a valid license is a separate offense....

...It has long been recognized that the absurdity doctrine 'is to be applied to override the literal terms of a statute only under rare and exceptional circumstances.' " (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930))). If it is important to expand section 322.34(5) to reach habitual traffic offenders who never had a license, that policy choice can and should be made by the legislature. III. Mr. Burgess's motion alleged that he never held a driver's license, an allegation deemed admitted by virtue of the State's failure to file a traverse. Because he never held a driver's license, he could not be convicted under section 322.34(5) of driving while his license was revoked for having been a habitual traffic offender....

with Deputy Metroka. Brown was charged under section 322.34(6)(a) or (b), Florida Statutes (1997), which

PER CURIAM. The appellant in this direct criminal appeal challenges his conviction and sentence for felony driving while license suspended or revoked, in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Because at least one of the predicate convictions for his current conviction of felony driving while license suspended or revoked was under a prior version of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes, this predicate conviction should not have been relied upon in imposing judgment and sentence in the present case....

PER CURIAM. We reverse an order dismissing the charges against Appellee on the grounds that section 322.34(l)(a), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional....

...We affirm appellant’s conviction of felony driving with a suspended license, to which he pled guilty, along with thirty-one other offenses. He contends that his conviction violated Franklin v. State, 816 So.2d 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), which held that one cannot be guilty of both a violation of Florida Statute section 322.34(2), felony driving while license suspended, and section 322.34(5), habitual offender driving while license suspended, based upon a singular offense. We disagree, as Franklin is inapplicable. *953 Section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2001), penalizes driving on a suspended or revoked license. A third conviction results in a felony conviction. See § 322.34(2)(c). Section 322.34(2) excludes persons found to be habitual traffic offenders. On the other hand, section 322.34(5) penalizes driving while one’s license is revoked pursuant to section 322.264, Florida Statutes (2001), which defines a habitual traffic offender. Thus, sections 322.34(2) and 322.34(5) are mutually exclusive as applied to a single offense, as Franklin held....

...Appellant’s convictions and sentences did not involve a single offense. Instead, he was charged with one offense in 2001 and three offenses in 2002, but they were all resolved by a plea agreement in 2002. For the offense in 2001, he pled guilty to felony driving while license suspended in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), which requires two prior convictions for driving while license suspended. For the 2002 offenses, he also pled guilty to three charges of violating section 322.34(5) for driving while his license was revoked as a habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.264. To be convicted of a violation of section 322.34(5), one must first qualify as a habitual traffic offender, which requires three separate convictions of specified traffic offenses....

...The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles must then revoke the person’s license pursuant to section 322.27(5), Florida Statutes (2001). A person who drives while his or her license is revoked pursuant to section 322.264 may then be charged under section 322.34(5). Appellant was charged and pled guilty to three violations of section 322.34(5) for his 2002 offenses....

...before the court at the time of sentencing of the primary offense. Thus victim injury points for the additional offense of reckless driving were properly scored. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, C.J., ORFINGER, R.B., J., concur. . § 316.027(l)(a), Fla. Stat. . § 322.34(2)(a), Fla....

ROTHENBERG, J.' The defendant, Latorya Latrice Cooper, was charged with Unlawful Driving as a Habitual Traffic Offender, as defined in section 322.264, Florida Statutes (2012), in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2012), a third degree felony....

...Thereafter, the defendant filed a Motion to Reduce the Charge to a Misdemeanor, arguing that because her license suspensions relate to failures to appear for civil traffic infractions and she has never been convicted of a forcible felony, the offense must be punished as a misdemeanor under section 322.34(10), not as a felony under section 322.34(5)....

...In case number CRC07-14490CFANO, the term was imposed for felony driving with a revoked license, a third-degree felony. *960 In his motion, Mr. Robinson primarily argues that while his offense of driving with a revoked license was treated as a habitual driving offense for purposes of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (2007), he was not orally pronounced a habitual offender for purposes of section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2007)....

as proscribed by section 322.34(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)-formerly section 322.34(3)(a) — to be unconstitutional

PER CURIAM. Petitioner was arrested at 7:15 p.m. on July 12, 1998, for unlawfully driving in violation of the habitual traffic offender provision of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1997)....

PER CURIAM. Joe Eddie Wilson appeals his conviction for driving while his license was canceled, suspended, or revoked with two or more previous convictions for the same offense in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. The appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty in three cases to two charges of possession of a controlled substance, and two counts of driving while license suspended or revoked (habitual offender revocation), a violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2013), in exchange for concurrent sentences of 18 months’ imprisonment for each count....

...Cline, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, an d Daniel P. Hyndman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. WARNER, J. Appellant, Lamercus Law, appeals his convictions for driving while license revoked pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, and DUI impairment....

...We affirm on all issues, but write to correct a misreading of State v. Byrd, 969 So.2d 581 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), involving the use of redacted records maintained by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("DHSMV"). The state charged Law with a violation of section 322.34(5) as well as driving while impaired. "A conviction under section 322.34(5) simply requires competent evidence showing that the DHSMV maintained a record on the motorist, that the record reflected three prior moving violation convictions, and that the motorist received notice of his designation as a habitual traffic offender and the resulting suspension of his license." Patterson v....

...State, 938 So.2d 625, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). If the record offered by the state fails to designate the requisite convictions to justify the habitual traffic offender designation under section 322.264, then the state has failed to make a prima facie case for a section 322.34 felony violation for driving on a revoked license....

...Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Joe Eddie Wilson appeals his conviction for driving while his license was canceled, suspended, or revoked with two or more previous convictions for the same offense in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2012)....

SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. The State appeals from an order dismissing an information for the felony charge of unlawful driving as a habitual offender under section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...The basis of the ruling below was the view that the suspension for the third “failure to appear” charge did not qualify as one of the required three suspensions because it was contained within the provision which reduced the charge to a misdemeanor, § 322.34(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011), 3 when the suspension was based on the failure to comply with a civil penalty required in section 318.15, Florida Statutes (2011). See § 322.34(10)(a)3., Fla....

...in s. 318.15,” § 822.34(10)(a)3., includes by reference all the provisions of section 318.15, including the failure to appear at a scheduled hearing as involved in this case. Contrary to the ruling below, we think the answer is self-evidently no. Section 322.34(10)(a)3....

..., it must be added, would actually preclude the valid assessment of a penalty because there would have been no trial in the first place. Accordingly, we reverse the order below with instructions to reinstate the information. Reversed and remanded. . Section 322.34(5) provides that ”[a]ny person whose driver’s license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...ther; or (f) Driving a commercial motor vehicle while his or her privilege is disqualified. (2) Fifteen convictions for moving traffic offenses for which points may be assessed as set forth in s. 322.27, including those offenses in subsection (1). . Section 322.34(2) provides: Any person whose driver’s license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. (c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. . Section 322.34(10)(a) provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if a person does not have a prior forcible felony conviction as defined in s....

driving without a license resulting in death. See § 322.34(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). The legislature has

...1st DCA 2005) (remanding for correction of scrivener’s error in the judgment); Bol ware v. State, 668 So.2d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (same). The judgment erroneously recites that appellant was convicted of first-degree misdemeanor driving while license suspended or revoked under section 322.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2001). However, appellant was charged with and convicted of second-degree misdemeanor driving while license suspended or revoked under section 322.34(2)(a). Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The judgment must, therefore, be corrected to reflect appellant’s conviction for second-degree misdemeanor DWLSR under section 322.34(2)(a)....

...over for a traffic stop. Id. at 980. The officer learned that the defendant’s license had been revoked, and that the defendant was considered a habitual traffic offender. Id. at 980-81. The officer arrested the defendant for a “violation of F.S.S. 322.34(5), driving while license revoked (habitual offender).” Id. at 981 (emphasis added). The officer also issued a traffic citation for “DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED OR REVOKED” under section 322.34(5), again noting that the defendant’s license had been “revoked.” Id. After the arrest, the state filed an information, the heading of which incorrectly described the offense as “Driving With License Suspended – 6 Habitual Traffic Offender,” which is a non-existent crime. Id. (emphasis added). However, the information’s body correctly alleged that the defendant drove with a revoked license in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2017), which, as mentioned above, pertains to driving with a revoked license as a habitual offender....

....” Id. (emphasis added). And both the judgment and probation order incorrectly referred to the defendant’s offense as “DRIVING WITH LICENSE SUSPENDED – HABITUAL TRAFFIC OFFENDER.” Id. (emphasis added). However, the judgment correctly cited section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, as the “offense statute number.” Id. On appeal, the defendant contened that he had not pled guilty to the offense of driving with a revoked license as a habitual offender, as charged in the information....

...Rather, he asserted that he had pled guilty to driving with a suspended license as a habitual offender – a non-existent crime for which he was not charged. Id. We affirmed the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 982. We reasoned: The body of the information charged a crime under section 322.34(5), the same charge for which [the defendant] was arrested, the same charge contained in the officer’s uniform traffic citation....

...Alhindi was stopped for speeding, and when asked to show his driver's license, he acknowledged to the officer, "my license is suspended." We reverse an order granting Alhindi's motion to dismiss charges of felony driving while license revoked as a habitual offender, in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes....

...charge of driving while license revoked as a habitual offender, arguing that when Alhindi was stopped, the DMV "had illegally placed a 5-year revocation" on his license. The state replied with a motion to strike and/or traverse of Alhindi's motion. Section 322.34(5) provides that "[a]ny person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s....

...s that such person has accumulated the specified number of convictions for offenses described in subsection (1) or (2) within a 5-year period." This court, in Rodgers v. State, 804 So.2d 480, 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), explained that "to convict under section 322.34(5) the state [must] ....

...n a highway of Florida while the license was revoked." Id. (holding that the state does not have to "prove each separate conviction . . . which DMV relied on in revoking the license"). Elaborating on the first two elements, we stated in Rodgers that section 322.34(5) "merely makes it necessary for the state to prove by competent evidence that DMV maintains a record on the motorist, that its record shows the requisite ....

...rthur court explained that "[i]f after receiving the notice of revocation Arthur believed his driving record was in error his remedy was to have his record corrected, not to ignore the revocation and continue to drive." Id. at 591-92 (reasoning that section 322.34(5) "requires that one whose license is revoked because he is an habitual traffic offender must not drive unless or until his revocation is set aside")....

...Later, the Second District analyzed the significance of challenging the underlying prior conviction. Arguing that an underlying conviction was based on a plea entered without a factual basis, the defendant in State v. James, 928 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), moved to dismiss the 322.34(5) charge. Id. ("Without that conviction on the DMV records, Mr. James would not have had the habitual traffic offender designation."). "At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the State did not object to continuing the [section 322.34(5)] case so that Mr. James could try to set aside the [underlying] conviction and correct the DMV records." Id. However, the James court reversed the trial court order granting James' motion to dismiss the section 322.34(5) charge, explaining: *224 Whether or not [James'] challenge to the [underlying] convictions has merit, at the time of the [322.34(5) ] charge, the DMV records accurately reflected the existence of three prior convictions....

...There, the court distinguished between statutes that require proof of prior convictions, as an element of the offense, and statutes that require "proof of an administrative designation that was based on prior convictions." Id. at 630. Reasoning that the habitual traffic offender statutes, such as section 322.34(5), "do not focus on the `reliability' of the prior convictions," the Patterson court noted that Patterson "had the opportunity to challenge the validity of one or more of his convictions by seeking post-conviction relief before they resulted in a finding that he was a habitual traffic offender." Id....

driving with a suspended license in violation of section 322.34(2) of the Florida Statutes (1999). Based upon

...y to section 316.1931, Florida Statutes (1985); manslaughter, contrary to section 782.07, Florida Statutes (1985); vehicular homicide, contrary to section 782.-071, Florida Statutes (1985); and driving while license suspended or revoked, contrary to section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1985)....

is a second-degree misdemeanor pursuant to section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.*9201994). The trial

driving while license suspended (DWLS) under section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1995). See Chicone v. State

PER CURIAM. We affirm Appellant’s conviction and sentence for driving while her license was revoked as a habitual offender, contrary to section 322.34(5), see State v....

resentenc-ing. HARRIS, C.J., and GOSHORN, J., concur. . § 322.34(3), Fla.Stat. (1991).

...ed since 06/06/2016 due to three prior driving while license suspended charges and failure to appear charges,” and that appellant was considered a habitual traffic offender. As a result, the officer arrested appellant for a “violation of F.S.S. 322.34(5), driving while license revoked (habitual offender).” The officer also issued a traffic citation for “DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED OR REVOKED” under section 322.34(5), again noting that appellant’s license was “revoked on 06/06/16.” Appellant was later charged in a one-count information. The heading of the information described the offense as “Driving With License Suspended – Habitual Traffic Offender.” However, the body of the information alleged that appellant drove with a revoked license in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes. Appellant entered a negotiated plea....

...imposed the agreed-upon jail sentence, followed by two years of probation. Both the judgment and probation order refer to appellant’s offense as “DRIVING WITH LICENSE SUSPENDED-HABITUAL TRAFFIC OFFENDER.” However, the judgment cites section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, as the “offense statute number,” and this section pertains to driving with a revoked license as a habitual offender. On appeal, the parties acknowledge that “[w]hen a ‘discrepancy exists between the of...

...State, 929 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting Troyer v. State, 610 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)). Therefore, both parties agree that appellant was charged with “Driving While License Revoked – Habitual Offender” in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2017). -2-  The parties disagree as to the crime to which appellant entered his plea. Appellant contends that he did not plead to the offense of driving with a revoked license as a habitual offender, as charged in the information; rather, he asserts that he pled guilty to driving with a suspended license as a habitual offender—a non-existent crime for which he was not charged. The offense of driving with a suspended license is set forth in section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes, which provides: (2) Any person whose driver license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...775.083. (b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. (c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 322.34(2), Fla....

...Therefore, while driving with a suspended license is a recognized offense in Florida, driving with a suspended license as a habitual offender is not. After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that appellant pleaded guilty as charged. The body of the information charged a crime under section 322.34(5), the same charge for which appellant was arrested, the same charge contained in the officer’s uniform traffic citation....

...We therefore affirm appellant’s sentence, but remand with instructions to correct the judgment and probation order to reflect a conviction for -3- Driving While License Revoked – Habitual Offender pursuant to section 322.34(5). MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. -4- 

...Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. No appearance for appellee. *469 PER CURIAM. The state appeals from the dismissal of the information filed against William Cooke for driving while his license was revoked as a habitual traffic offender under section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1997). [1] The information was dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. Cooke had previously been acquitted of driving while his license was suspended under section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997). [2] Cooke's motion for judgment of acquittal was granted based upon his argument that he was a habitual traffic offender and section 322.34(2)(c) specifically prohibits persons who have been declared habitual traffic offenders under section 322.264, Florida Statutes (1997), from prosecution under that section....

...Section 775.021(4) provides, in pertinent part, that "offenses are separate if each offense, requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial." Knowledge on the part of the defendant that his driver's license was revoked must be proven under section 322.34(2)(c) and not under section 322.34(5). Revocation of a defendant's driver's license as a habitual traffic offender must be proven under section 322.34(5) but not under section 322.34(2)(c)....

...However, he contends the trial court erred in *1107 denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the driving with a suspended license charge, where the State failed to establish he had “knowledge” that his license was suspended. We agree. Under section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2001), an individual is guilty of the criminal offense of driving with a suspended license if he or she drives a motor vehicle in the state of Florida while knowing of such suspension....

...ension by the department for failure to pay a traffic fine or for a financial responsibility violation. Id. One who unknowingly drives with a suspended license is guilty of only a noncriminal moving violation, punishable pursuant to chapter 318. See § 322.34(1), Fla. Stat. Where the State fails to establish one drove with knowledge of a suspension, the trial court should enter a judgment of acquittal on the charge of driving with a suspended license under section 322.34(2)....

...Since the State did not introduce any evidence that Quest received notice of his December 2000 suspension (much less that notice was even sent out), and Quest did not admit knowledge of the instant suspension, the conviction for driving with a suspended license under section 322.34(2) cannot stand....

...cember 2000 suspension since he was cited for driving with a suspended license on two previous occasions: once in August of 1997 (convicted in January of 1998) and once in February of 1998 (convicted in April of 1998). These past two citations under section 322.34(1), for prior suspensions (which were subsequently reinstated), do not impute knowledge of the new December 2000 suspension. See § 322.34(2). Knowledge of the particular suspension at issue, whether by way of direct proof or one of the statutory presumptions, must be established in order to support a conviction for driving with a suspended license under section 322.34(2)....

...After reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), Leonardo Marrero pled no contest to felony driving while license suspended as a habitual offender in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...d that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for VOP on a cocaine offense. The traffic citation charged Clayton with “driving while license suspended or revoked” and “habitual traffic offender,” indicating that Clayton had violated section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1997), a third degree felony criminal violation, and it indicated a hearing would be set in the circuit court....

...2 He was apparently sentenced and served a period of 75 days in the Orange County jail. 3 *244 On July 9, 1999, the state filed an information formally charging Clayton with the offense of driving while license revoked as a habitual offender in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The order which resulted from Clayton’s plea was entered June 11, 1999, within the time frame that Judge Blech-man was authorized to act as a circuit court judge. Thus, double jeopardy bars a second prosecution in this case. AFFIRMED. HARRIS and PLEUS, JJ., concur. . § 322.34(5), Fla....

...On September 22, 2000, the State charged O’Quinn by information with one count of driving under the influence resulting in serious bodily injury to another, section 316.193(1) & (3)(a), (b) & (c)2, Florida Statutes (2000) (count I), and one count of felony driving while license suspended, revoked, or canceled, section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2000) (count II)....

...State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), O’Quinn maintained that the State improperly used his prior convictions to reclassify his sentence as a third-degree felony. O’Quinn claimed that his convictions had all occurred prior to 1997 when the legislature amended section 322.34 to include a “knowing” element....

...The court did not address the prior convictions issue, nor does the State on appeal. O’Quinn is correct that, under Huss , the State could not have utilized his prior convictions for driving while his license was revoked to reclassify the charge as a third-degree felony. In 1997, the legislature amended section 322.34(2)(c) to require a “knowing” element....

...AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. SHARP, W., and PETERSON, JJ., concur. . There are arguments against Huss. Huss arguably contravenes legislative intent because it essentially grants defendants amnesty for convictions obtained under the pre-amendment version of 322.34(1)....

...Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and NORTHCUTT, J., Concur. . It is not clear from the attachments to the trial court's order whether Payne's conviction for the misdemeanor of driving while license suspended or revoked was pursuant to subsection (1) or (2) of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1993).

Is a law enforcement agency authorized under section 322.34(5)(e), Florida Statutes, to release without

QUASHED. GOSHORN and THOMPSON, JJ, concur. . § 322.34. Fla. Stat. (1995). . § 316.193, Fla. Stat.

...The Judgment and Sentence convicting the Appellant of the third degree felony of Driving While License Revoked (habitual offender) must be vacated and corrected to reflect that the defendant entered a plea to, and was convicted of Driving While License Suspended, a violation of Florida Statutes § 322.34(2)(b), a first degree misdemeanor....

...Therefore, the police chase and subsequent arrest would still be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 21 p. 5). The Government argues that the officers did have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was committing a crime of driving while license suspended, revoked, can-celled or disqualified in violation of Fla. Stat. § 322.34 (2)....

...y without violating any law. Appellant told the officer that she did not know her license had been suspended. Appellant was charged with violating Condition 5 of her community control by driving while her license was suspended or revoked contrary to section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...t had knowledge that his license had been suspended when the only proof of such was evidence of mailing notice to the defendant's last known address. The Brown court did not apply section 322.251(2), but instead relied upon the following language in section 322.34(2): The element of knowledge is satisfied if the person has been previously cited as provided in subsection (1); or the person admits to knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation; or the person received a notice as provided in subsection (4)....

...There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the knowledge requirement is satisfied if a judgment or order as provided in subsection (4) appears in the department's record for any case except for one involving a suspension by the department for failure to pay a traffic fine or for a financial responsibility violation. § 322.34(2), Fla....

...Because the defendant's suspension had been for failure to pay a traffic fine and the statutory presumption of knowledge was unavailable, the Brown court concluded that proof of knowledge was lacking as a matter of law, because, absent an admission or prior citation, section 322.34(2) requires proof that the notice had been received. To reach this conclusion, the court necessarily assumed that the list of methods to prove knowledge contained within section 322.34(2) was intended to be exhaustive, and that proof of receipt of the notice must be by direct evidence. Although Brown may be distinguished, [3] we nevertheless disagree with its interpretation of the applicable statute. Assuming that section 322.34(2) is intended to provide an exhaustive list of the available methods for proving knowledge, the statute does not dictate that proof of receipt of the notice may only be made by direct evidence....

...J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 198 (Fla.2007) (court must give effect to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of statute; words in statute should not be construed as mere surplusage). [4] We also observe that the Brown court did not consider the effect of section 322.34(3), when it implicitly concluded that section 322.34(2) contains an exhaustive list of methods of proving knowledge. [5] That this list is not intended to be the sole method of proof on this issue is made clear by the application of that section. Section 322.34(3) provides that the court may consider evidence "other than that specified in subsection (2)" to establish a knowing violation....

...State, 327 So.2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Again, we are constrained by statutory construction principles to avoid any construction that renders an entire subsection meaningless. We do not view the unavailability of the statutory presumption set forth in section 322.34(2) to compel a different result....

...[4] Of the two authorized methods of service, only personal delivery would provide direct proof of receipt. Certified mail, return receipt requested with restricted delivery, would be direct evidence of receipt, but it is not an authorized method of service under section 322.251. If the legislature had intended section 322.34(2) to mandate personal delivery, it could have so stated in simple terms....

...Le appeals the Board’s determination that driving under the influence with serious bodily injury is an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA. 1 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193(3)(1996). 2 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 322.34(3)(1996). 2 For the reasons set forth below, we hold that Mr....

...rated by the greater weight of the evidence” (citing Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996))). As Faircloth points out, knowledge of the license suspension is a requisite element of the crime of driving while license suspended. See § 322.34(2), Fla....

...’s errors contained in the written *429 judgment. 1 The judgment erroneously cites to section “322.26 or 28,” when the correct statutory citation for the offense of driving while license suspended or revoked as charged against the appellant is section 322.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...subject federal immigration detainer, we reverse and quash the writ.1 I. Facts A. LaCroix held in custody Twice in January of 2017, LaCroix was charged with driving with a suspended license while an habitual traffic offender, a third degree felony pursuant to section 322.34(5) of the Florida Statutes....

offender, a third degree felony pursuant to section 322.34(5) of the Florida Statutes. LaCroix was out

...be suppressed. Torres’ interrogation of Jordan disclosed that Jordan had no driver’s license (it had been suspended), automobile registration, proof of insurance, or identification. Driving without a valid operator’s license is a violation of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1989), and justifies an arrest....

SHAHOOD, J. Appellant, Rodney Mickens, appeals his conviction and sentence on the charge of driving while license revoked (habitual), in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, punishable as a third degree felony following a non-jury trial....

...He was on probation when he was charged with felony DWLS. He admitted the violation of probation and pled no contest to the new charge of felony DWLS, reserving a right to this appeal. Pickett raises two constitutional challenges to his conviction under section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), which renders the third conviction for driving while one’s license is cancelled, suspended, or revoked, a third-degree felony....

...1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); accord State v. Hamilton, 388 So.2d 561 (Fla.1980); Wilburn v.. State, 763 So.2d 353, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Regardless, the supreme court has held that in Raulerson that [I]t is clear that the Legislature intended that a “conviction” for purposes of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), include[s] both adjudicated DWLCSR offenses and DWLCSR offenses in which adjudication is withheld....

...esaid state statutory provisions.... (emphasis added) Meek had fourteen previous convictions for traffic offenses for which points may be assessed when he pleaded no contest to the charge of driving while license suspended or revoked in violation of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1983)....

WELLS, Chief Judge. The State appeals a trial court’s ruling granting defendant’s motion to dismiss and, citing section 318.15, Florida Statutes (2011), reducing the charge of unlawful driving as a habitual traffic offender in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2011), a third degree felony, to a second degree misdemeanor. We find State v. Wooden, 92 So.3d 886, 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) determinative, and reverse on that basis. 1 As we stated in Wooden : The issue is whether the term “[flailing to comply with a civil penalty required in s. 318.15,” § 322.34(10)(a)3„ includes by reference all the provisions of section 318.15, including the failure to appear at a scheduled hearing as involved in this case. Contrary to the ruling below, we think the answer is self-evidently no. Section 322.34(10)(a)3....

...statute does. Garrett’s prior convictions occurred on January 31, 1995, and November 15, 1995. Under the statute in effect on those dates, one could be guilty of driving while license suspended without knowing that the license had been suspended. § 322.34, Fla. Stat. (1995). However, the statute under which Garrett was charged in the instant offense does require that the defendant know that the license has been suspended or revoked. See § 322.34(2)(c), Fla....

...in violation of section 782.071(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2023), one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”) manslaughter, in violation of section 316.193(3)(c)(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2023), and one count of no valid driver’s license with death, in violation of section 322.34(6), Florida Statutes (2023)....

with license suspended (DWLS) offense under section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes. We reverse only the conviction

....... 2. Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933 commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (2014). 3. Section 322.34(6), Florida Statutes (2014), provides: (6) Any person who operates a motor vehicle: (a) Without having a driver license as required under s....

...322.28(2) or (4), and who by careless or negligent operation of the motor vehicle causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. § 322.34(6), Fla. Stat. (2014). -6- suspended licenses, and the DWLS statute provides no aggravation for any level of intoxication. See § 316.193(3)-(4), Fla. Stat.; § 322.34(2), (5)-(7), Fla. Stat. Both may be aggravated when the driver causes serious bodily injury, and in this case were, but each statute provides separately for that aggravation. See §§ 316.193(3), 322.34(6), Fla....

PER CURIAM. This appeal arises from the appellant’s conviction and sentence for felony driving while license suspended, in violation of section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995)....

STONE, J. We reverse Hagood’s conviction and sentence on the charge of driving while his license was revoked as a habitual traffic *253 offender pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...holding in Lanier v. State, 226 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), determined that a person could not be convicted and sentenced for driving without a valid driver’s license under section 322.03(1) and driving with a suspended or revoked license under section 322.34(2), without violating double jeopardy. Id. at 1282. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that a person who violates section 322.34(2), by driving with a revoked or suspended license, necessarily violates section 322.03(1), driving without a valid license. Id. We recognize that Hagood was convicted of driving after his license had been revoked as a habitual traffic offender in violation of section 322.34(5) and not section 322.34(2), the statute in question in Roedel ....

...) he did so while his driver’s license was revoked; (3) the driver’s license was revoked as a habitual traffic offender; and (4) notice had been given to Hagood before he drove the vehicle. While knowledge of revocation is a necessary element of section 322.34(2), which specifically excludes habitual offenders like Hagood, it is not required for subsection (5)....

...ed. In all other respects we affirm. The appellant was charged with possession of cocaine (count I), in violation of section 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), driving while license is cancelled, suspended, or revoked (count II), in violation of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), alteration of license plates (count III), in violation of section 320.061, Florida Statutes (1993), and false proof of insurance (count IV), in violation of section 316.646(4), Florida Statutes (1993)....

ALTENBERND, Judge. Ernso Simon appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. He is serving a five-year prison term for felony habitual driving with a license that was suspended, revoked, or cancelled. See § 322.34, Fla....

...The trial court correctly ruled that this sentence is legal, but Mr. Simon may be correct that his offense should have been classified as a misdemeanor. Mr. Simon’s primary argument is that his offense should be categorized as a first-degree misdemeanor and not a third-degree felony in light of section 322.34(10)(a). See Wyrick v. State, 50 So.3d 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). This portion of section 322.34 was added shortly before Mr....

...�� may be a second-degree misdemeanor, a first-degree misdemeanor, or a third-degree felony, depending on the number of times the driver has been convicted based on that behavior or depending on whether the driver is a habitual traffic offender. See § 322.34(2), (5), Fla....

...(2), (3); and failing to timely update a license after a name or address change, § 322.19. Id. Raleigh’s alleged drivers’ license violation is not on the list of “noncriminal traffic infractions.” To the contrary, as mentioned, violation of section 322.34(2) is a misdemeanor or a felony, depending on the number of times the defendant has previously been convicted of it....

...of rule 3.220 in order to take a deposition. Cf. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Rosenthal, 908 So.2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that “Rosenthal’s second DWLS offense was ... subject to a criminal penalty pursuant to section 322.34(2) and therefore not subject to disposition as a noncriminal traffic infraction under chapter 318”)....

...new trial. See Jefferson v. State, 595 So.2d 38 (Fla.1992). Accordingly, we affirm defendant Wright’s conviction on four counts of driving under the influence, § 316.193(3), Fla. Stat. (1989), and on one count of driving with a suspended license, § 322.34(3), Fla....

(Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding a new version of section 322.34 did not apply retroactively to a defendant

...§ 322.03(1), F.S.A. “No person, except those hereinafter expressly exempted, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid license as an operator or chauffeur under the provisions of this chapter. * * * ” . F.S. § 322.34, F.S.A....

...The defendant argues that counsel advised him that he faced a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment if convicted of driving with a suspended or revoked license, but failed to advise him of the potential of receiving a habitual offender sentence of ten years on the driving charge. See § 322.34(5), Fla....

THOMPSON, C.J. The state appeals the dismissal of the information against Leander Bletcher. Bletcher was charged by information with the felony of driving while his license was revoked pursuant to the habitual traffic offender statute. See § 322.34(5), Fla....

...The court dismissed the information and discharged Bletcher, ruling that because Bletcher had never been issued a license, there was no license that could have been revoked. We reverse. See Carroll v. State, 761 So.2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)(holding that defendant may be convicted of violating section 322.34(5) even though he was never issued a driver’s license, where his driving privilege was revoked pursuant to the habitual traffic offender statute)....

SILBERMAN, Judge. Jonathan Wayne Lipovsky appeals his conviction and sentence for driving while license suspended and causing serious bodily injury pursuant to section 322.34(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2000). Lipovsky argues that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted, therefore his conviction must be reversed because the State failed to prove the elements of the crime. We agree. Section 322.34(6)(b) provides that: Any person who operates a motor vehicle: (b) While his or her driver’s license or driving privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked pursuant to s....

...322.28(2) or (4), and who by careless or negligent operation of the motor vehicle causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. In order for Lipovsky to be convicted under section 322.34(6)(b), his license must have been suspended for one of the reasons enumerated in the statute....

...State, 760 So.2d 1113, 1114-15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). It was undisputed that at the time of the events giving rise to the charges, Lipov-sky’s license had been suspended. However, the State did not establish that the suspension was for one of the reasons enumerated under section 322.34(6)(b)....

...Instead, it appears that Lipovsky’s license was automatically suspended pursuant to Section 318.15, Florida Statutes (2000), because he failed to pay traffic fines and to appear in response to traffic summonses. Because the suspension of a license under section 318.15 is not one of the qualifying suspensions under section 322.34(6)(b), and because the State did not otherwise establish that Lipovsky’s license was suspended for one of the reasons identified in section 322.34(6)(b), his conviction and sentence must be reversed....

with a suspended drivers license contrary to Section 322.34 Florida Statutes (1977). He filed a motion

...The supreme court’s rationale for its decision is explained in Thompson v. State, 887 So.2d 1260 (Fla.2004). Accordingly, we reverse Bryan’s felony conviction and remand with directions to enter judgment and resentence him for misdemeanor driving while license was canceled, suspended, or revoked pursuant to section 322.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

PER CURIAM. This is a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a three-judge circuit court decision below which affirmed a county court conviction for the first degree misdemeanor of driving while license suspended, as a second offense. § 322.34(1), Fla.Stat....

...a driver's license as required by Section 322.03, Florida Statutes, and, by careless or negligent operation of the motor vehicle did cause the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being, Crystal Riley and/or Cynthia Riley, contrary to Section 322.34(6)(a), Florida Statutes." (emphasis added).

...otherwise legally sufficient to withstand the motion. We agree, and accordingly, reverse. Seward was charged with driving a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State of Florida while his driver’s license was revoked as a habitual traffic offender in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2014)....

...State , 621 So.2d 729 , 730 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), approved , 634 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 1994). The supreme court determined that the defendant could be convicted of both DUI manslaughter and DWLS as long as the latter charge was not enhanced for causing death as provided in section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ehicle while driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury to two of its passengers. Marsh's convictions for DWLS causing serious bodily injury were actually enhanced by a later version of the same enhancement statute in Cooper . See § 322.34(6), Fla. Stat. (2014). Both versions provide for enhancement when the defendant "causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another." § 322.34(3), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added); § 322.34(6), Fla....

...2d 729, 730 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), approved, 634 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1994). The supreme court determined that the defendant could be convicted of both DUI manslaughter and DWLS as long as the latter charge was not enhanced for causing death as provided in section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...icle while driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury to two of its passengers. Marsh's convictions for DWLS causing serious bodily injury were actually enhanced by a later version of the same enhancement statute in Cooper. See § 322.34(6), Fla. Stat. (2014). Both versions provide for enhancement when the defendant "causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another." § 322.34(3), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added); § 322.34(6), Fla....

at 798 (holding that dual prosecutions under section 322.34(2) and 322.34(5) are statutorily and constitutionally

at 798 (holding that dual prosecutions under section 322.34(2) and 322.34(5) are statutorily and constitutionally

PER CURIAM. On the authority of State v. Harvey, 693 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), we reverse the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss the charges under section 322.34(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995). We re *1012 mand with leave to the state to proceed under section 322.34(2)(a)....

...The first was battery on a person over 65, a violation of sections 784.03, 784.08(2)(c), Florida Statutes. The victim was his mother. The other charges were resisting arrest with violence, a violation of section 843.01, and driving while license revoked, a violation of section 322.34(1)....

...Green, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. In this appeal filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), James Julius Robinson challenges his judgment and sentence for driving while license suspended or revoked. See § 322.34(2)(b)1, Fla. Stat....

...Martinez, Public Defender, and Jennifer Thornton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General and Linda Katz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before EMAS, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 322.34(2)(a)–(c), Fla....

...revocation equivalent status, drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, or while under suspension or revocation equivalent status, commits” either a misdemeanor or felony); § 322.34(3), Fla....

...Pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act (the Act), the Sheriff seized Mr. Gainous's automobile. After an adversarial preliminary hearing, the trial court found probable cause that the automobile was used in violation of the Act. See §§ 932.701-.707 and § 322.34(9), Fla....

...932.701-932.707 and is subject to liens for recovering, towing, or storing vehicles under s. 713.78 if, at the time of the offense, the person's driver's license is suspended, revoked, or canceled as a result of a prior conviction for driving under the influence. § 322.34(9)(a)....

...Gainous also committed the first-degree misdemeanour of failure to submit to testing, which carried a fine of up to $1000. See § 775.083(1)(c) and (d). Moreover, Mr. Gainous's offense of driving with a suspended or revoked license can be punished by a fine of up to $500. See § 322.34(2)(a), Fla....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, and Sherri T. Rollison, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. William B. Richbourg, Pensacola, for Appellee. POLSTON, J. Appellee Scott Alan Craycraft was charged with violating section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1999)(unlawfully driving a motor vehicle on a highway while his driver's license had been revoked pursuant to § 322.264 (habitual offender))....

...1st DCA 2000), his convictions prior to October 1, 1997 for driving while his license was suspended could not be used to declare him a habitual traffic offender. The trial court granted his motion to dismiss, ruling that: The First District's decision in Huss is applicable to Section 322.264 and Section 322.34(5)....

...tober 1, 1997 *865 lack the requisite knowledge element. Therefore, under Huss, these convictions may not be used to classify an individual as a habitual traffic offender, and accordingly may not be used to support a charge under Section 322.264 and 322.34(5)....

...Because all but one of Appellee's prior convictions for driving with a suspended or revoked license occurred prior to October 1, 1997, the trial court ruled that none of those charges may be used to enhance his charge to a felony pursuant to sections 322.264 and 322.34(5), and dismissed the case. Appellant State of Florida argues on appeal that the trial court erred because (i) it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and (ii) Huss was erroneously applied to offenses charged under section 322.34(5)....

...s order implicit in its dismissal of the subsequent felony offense. We agree with Appellee that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction because it did not overturn the findings of an administrative agency. Appellee was charged with violating section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1999), a third degree felony....

...Therefore, the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction. See § 26.012(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1999)(circuit courts have exclusive original jurisdiction of all felonies). II. In Huss, this Court reversed the conviction of felony driving while license suspended, in violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which states: "Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s....

...322.264, who, knowing of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation, drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, ...." 771 So.2d at 591-92 (emphasis added). The Court noted that section 322.34(2) was changed, effective October 1, 1997, to add the element of knowledge to the proof required for conviction thereunder, and stated that "[a]t the time appellant received the prior convictions, the statute did not require proof of `knowledge' as an element of the offense, and thus, his prior convictions cannot be counted as `convictions' under the 1997 provisions of section 322.34(2)." Id. at 592-93. However, Appellee was charged with violating section 322.34(5) rather than section 322.34(2), and section 322.34(5) does not require the element of knowledge for conviction thereunder....

...ee. GRIFFIN, J. James Lee Bullard ["Bullard"] appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm. In 2008, the State charged Bullard with driving while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2008)....