Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

permanent custody of the child. See Fla.Stat. § 61.13 (1977). Florida law provides that the deliberate

...odify existing principles regarding the use of that test in other family law contexts. History Before proceeding, we briefly outline the historical development of the Florida grandparental visitation statute. First, in 1978, the legislature modified section 61.13(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes....

...ld's best interest. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require that grandparents be made parties or given notice of dissolution pleadings or proceedings, nor shall such grandparents have legal *1273 standing as "contestants" as defined in s. 61.1306. § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...other spouse, may be present to tip the scales back in favor of the award of custody to the adulterous spouse. In the latter event, it may be that the best interest of the child would be served by awarding custody to a third party. While Fla. Stat. § 61.13(2), F.S.A., provides for equal consideration of the spouses in the award of custody, it is still the law in this State that, other essential factors being equal, the mother of the infant of tender years should receive prime consideration for custody....

...V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. At issue is the test courts should use in proceedings to modify rotating custody agreements. The conflict to be resolved is whether the trial court should base modification of rotating custody agreements on the considerations set forth in section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2003), as if it were making an initial custody determination as *931 the Fifth District Court of Appeal held in Wade, or whether the trial court should utilize the "substantial change test," [2] as the First District Court of Appeal held should be used in Cooper....

...The trial court found that the rotating custody plan had failed, that there had been substantial and material changes in circumstances since the entry of the final judgment, and that the rotating custody agreement was no longer in the best interest of the child. The trial court then applied the factors in sections 61.13(3)(a) and 61.13(4)(c)(5), Florida Statutes (2003), [6] and ordered the parties to have shared parental responsibility with the Father [7] as the primary residential parent....

...an has failed and is doomed to future failure, for whatever reason (the child's obtaining school age, or one party's complete refusal to adhere to the plan), then the court should be free to redetermine custody based on the considerations set out in section 61.13, as though it were making an initial custody determination." Wade, 872 So.2d at 954-55 (emphasis added). [8] The rationale articulated in Wade was that in rotating custody cases, there is no primary residential parent; thus, the court should be free to make a de novo custody determination based on the considerations set forth in section 61.13(3)....

...Bennett v. Bennett, 73 So.2d 274, 278 (Fla.1954). III. The Substantial Change Test in Statutory and Common Law The trial court determines the initial custody of children in dissolution of marriage proceedings pursuant to the guidelines set forth in section 61.13, which require all matters related to the custody of a minor to be determined in accordance with the best interest of the child. § 61.13(2)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 61.13(2)(c) grants continuing jurisdiction to the circuit court to modify the custody order but does not state the conditions necessary for modification....

...st interest of the child" prong of the substantial change test, which when properly applied ensures the stability of custody-related awards because of the res judicata effect of the original decree. Moreover, the detriment requirement conflicts with section 61.13(3), which enumerates the factors affecting the welfare and best interest of the child, which the trial court is to consider in proceedings dealing with shared parental responsibility and primary residence....

...ent. [12] We disapprove of the test to modify existing rotating custody agreements as announced by the Fifth District in Wade. That test simply requires proof that the rotating custody plan has failed and then applies the "best interest" standard of section 61.13 as used in an initial determination of custody....

...other's unilateral change of the child's elementary school and her unilateral change of the child's therapist; and the finding that the Mother was in contempt of court for her actions relative to visitation. The trial court considered the factors in section 61.13(3)(a) through (j) and (m) [13] and found that the shared rotating custody agreement was no longer in the best interest of the child....

...The district court reversed, ruling that to allow the child to be permanently removed from Florida would be contrary to its precedent discouraging removal. Florida law presumes that parents will share in decisionmaking about their children even though the parents are no longer married. Section 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...at 420. Moreover, notwithstanding Justice Shaw's view to the contrary, the majority opinion specifically acknowledges the Legislature's determination that the best interests of children are served by frequent and continuing contact with both parents. § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...It is the public policy of this state to assure that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of childrearing. § 61.13(2)(b)1, Fla....

...[8] The move toward joint custody in Florida led to the Dissolution of Marriage Act of 1971, [9] which substantially increased the father's right to custody and visitation, and the Shared Parental Responsibility Act of 1982, [10] which is codified in chapter 61, Florida Statutes (1989), and provides in part: [61.13(2)](b)1....

...finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child.... ... . b. The court shall order sole parental responsibility, with or without visitation rights, to the other parent when it is in the best interests of the minor child. § 61.13, Fla....

...NOTES [1] For example, Section 9 of House Bill 17C, amending F.S. Section 61.071, F.S.A., permits either party to claim alimony pendente lite; Section 10, which amends F.S. Section 61.08, F.S.A., permits the court to grant alimony to either party; under Section 15, amending F.S. Section 61.13, F.S.A., both the father and the mother of the minor child are given the same consideration in determining custody....

...First, the regulations amply demonstrate that the role accorded WYO companies is in minor respects more than that of mere functionary. WYO companies may issue policies in theft own names (as Capital issued Newton’s) rather than in that of FEMA or the United States, see 44 C.F.R. § 61.13 (f), and they may use theft own, individual “customary business practices”, id....

...Riley, 131 So.2d 491 (Fla.App.1st, 1961) ], he appears to have been in error in requiring that the insurance be maintained with the appellant as the first beneficiary." (Emphasis supplied) 154 So.2d 717, p. 720. The applicable law at the time the divorce action was commenced is found in Fla. Stat. § 61.13, F.S.A....

...Thus, although the chancellor presiding in a dissolution proceeding is imbued with broad discretion in the exercise of his authority, such authority is strictly delineated by the statutory rubric fashioned by the legislature. The authority of a court to award child support in dissolution proceedings is *484 granted by Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...t as a bar to a court of competent jurisdiction in awarding support for a dependent child. Finn v. Finn, 312 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1975). However, in a dissolution proceeding, the legislature saw fit to specify an additional requirement to that imposed by Section 61.13; namely, that the adult child in order to receive support must be dependent. Thus, when reading Section 743.07 in pari materia with Section 61.13, it is clear that before a court in a dissolution proceeding may order support for an adult child, it must find (1) that the parent owes a duty of support, and (2) that the child is dependent upon that parent for such support....

...on proceeding can only be overcome by satisfying an extraordinary burden. The following review of the cases describing the extraordinary burden test suggests a change of custody is appropriate when, after a review of all of the factors enumerated in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, the trial court finds that a change in custody will so clearly promote or improve the child's well-being to such an extent that any reasonable parent would understand that maintaining the status quo would be detrimental to the child's overall best interests....

...82-96, Laws of Fla. At the same time, the legislature added a list of "best interest" factors to be considered in all custody proceedings and specified that sole parental responsibility should only be awarded if shared responsibility would be "detrimental." See § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...The record is clear that the son is benefitting from liberal visitations with his father. Although the son has expressed a desire to live with his father, there is no competent, substantial evidence that this desire, standing alone, supports a change in custody at this time. See Heatherington, 677 So.2d 1312; § 61.13(3)(i), Fla....

...In proceedings under chapter 765, Florida Statutes (2003), these decisions literally affect the lives or deaths of patients. The trial courts also handle other weighty decisions affecting the welfare of children such as termination of parental rights and child custody. See § 61.13(2)(b)(1), Fla....

...On appeal the Second District reversed the trial court's ruling on the authority of Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1950), and its progeny and certified the question now before this Court. As a matter of public policy, the state of Florida imposes a statutory duty upon parents to support their children. § 61.13(1)(a), Fla....

...nce that support payments will be made. Staff of Fla.H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, CS for HB 1313 (1986) Staff Analysis 1-2 (rev. Jan. 31, 1986) (on file with committee). In addition to providing for the establishment of liens as a method of enforcement, section 61.1352, Florida Statutes (1987), the legislature adopted section 61.17(3), Florida Statutes (1989), which provides: Alimony and child support; additional method for enforcing orders and judgments; costs, expenses....

...of law he was also determining if there had been changes in circumstances after the divorce which warranted and required modification of the original decree for the welfare, interests and guidance of the child. He so decided and he was correct. See § 61.13, Florida Statutes; Wilson v....

...w."5 Policies issued under the National Flood Insurance Program are contracts.6 "As contracts, the standard policies issued under the Program are governed by federal law, applying "standard 3 See 42 U.S.C. § 4051 (1994); 44 C.F.R. § 61.13(f)(1996)....

...for federal flood insurance, require residential structures in zone AE to "have the lowest floor 12 Mussoline v. Morris, 692 F.Supp. 1306, 1315 (S.D.Fla.1987). 13 42 U.S.C. §§ 4003(b), 4013(a) (1994). 14 44 C.F.R. §§ 61.4, 61.13(a) & (f) (1996). 15 44 U.S.C....

...Therefore, the trial court's erroneous finding requires no correction. (4) Income deduction order In the former wife's petition for modification of child support, she alleged that "[t]he judgment fails to provide that payments should be made through the Central Government Depository, as required by § 61.13(d)" and "fails to provide for entry of a separate order requiring that support be paid by income deduction as required by § 61.1301(1)." The trial court denied the former wife's petition and ordered the former husband to continue paying child support directly to the former wife because the parties agreed at the time of the divorce that he would pay his support directly to her, and he had always paid on time. Section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes (1997), provides that where the parties have previously agreed that payments need not be made through the depository, "[t]he order of support shall provide, or shall be deemed to provide, that either party may s...

...y apply to the depository to require direction of the payments through the depository. The court shall provide a copy of the order to the depository." This provision appears to require payment through the depository simply upon application. However, section 61.13(1)(d)4 provides: If the parties elect not to require that support payments be made through the depository, any party may subsequently file an affidavit with the depository alleging *1159 a default in payment of child support and stating that the party wishes to require that payments be made through the depository....

...Fifteen days after receipt of the affidavit, the depository shall notify both parties that future payments shall be paid through the depository. This provision appears to provide for subsequent payments through the depository only upon a default, which did not happen here. Before the legislature amended related section 61.1301 in 1997, it provided that "[u]pon the entry of an order establishing, enforcing, or modifying an obligation for alimony, for child support, or for alimony and child support, the court shall enter a separate order for income deduction if one has not been entered." § 61.1301(1)(a), Fla....

...73 (Sept. 30, 1985) and citing Note, Congress Demands Stricter Child Support Enforcement: Florida Requires Major Reforms to Comply, 10 Nova L.J. 1371 (1986)). Eight days before the trial court entered the modification order, the legislature amended section 61.1301 to require that "[u]pon the entry of an order establishing, enforcing or modifying an obligation for alimony, for child support, or for alimony and child support, the court shall include provisions for income deduction of the alimony and/or child support in the order.... The order establishing, enforcing, or modifying the obligation shall direct that payments be made through the depository. " § 61.1301(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997); 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-170 (emphasis added). Section 61.1301(1)(c) further provides, "The income deduction order is effective immediately unless the court upon good cause shown finds that income deduction shall be effective upon a delinquency in an amount specified by the court but not to excee...

...quires, with due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial ability of the parties or the child, decreasing, increasing, or confirming the amount of separate support, maintenance, or alimony provided for in the ... order. (Emphasis added.) Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1995), which governs the power of courts to issue orders regarding child support, additionally provides: (1)(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may at any time order either or both parents who o...

...circumstances. Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So.2d 66 (Fla.1954) (analysis in the context of alimony rather than child support); Deatherage v. Deatherage, 395 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Brown v. Brown, 315 So.2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). However, under section 61.13(1)(a), a court that initially entered an order requiring a parent to pay child support has jurisdiction to modify the amount of that support under three circumstances: (1) when the modification is necessary for the best interests of the...

...Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So.2d 1250 (Fla.1992). In Lacy, the district court concluded that parties who, as in the instant case, entered into a support agreement could not seek modification under the "best interests" prong. The court first concluded that under section 61.13 a trial court does not "initially" enter an order requiring child support payments if the parties themselves execute a property settlement agreement that is subsequently incorporated into the order....

...if there has been a substantial change in circumstances. We disagree with this interpretation of the statutes. First, the court cited no support for the initial conclusion, and we find no basis in the statute for this holding. Second, both sections 61.13 and 61.14 on their face govern the modification of orders. Thus, we conclude that sections 61.13 and 61.14 must be read in pari materia. In sum, we find that the incorporation of a settlement agreement into a final judgment ordering support is irrelevant in determining whether a court initially ordered support for purposes of bringing an action under sections 61.13 and 61.14....

...payor parent had control. Under the circumstances at issue, we find that the question should not be whether the reduction is voluntary; instead, the focus should be on whether the temporary reduction will be in the best interests of the recipients. Section 61.13(1)(a) contemplates the distinction between the best interests and voluntary change of circumstances methods for evaluating a reduction in child support by providing that a court may enter an order modifying child support payments when t...

...SHAW, GRIMES and WELLS, JJ., concur. HARDING, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which KOGAN, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur. HARDING, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. While I agree with the majority's conclusion that section 61.13(1)(a) contemplates a distinction between the best interests of the child and a voluntary change in the parties' circumstances when a court evaluates a request for a reduction in child support, majority *816 op....

...Under these circumstances, we find that the wife did not relinquish her right to child support. A duty to support their minor children rests equally upon both parents, Kern v. Kern, 360 So.2d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Condon v. Condon, 295 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Birge v. Simpson, 280 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); § 61.13(1), Fla. Stat. (1979), although prior to the 1971 amendment to section 61.13, the obligation to support belonged to the father....

...se of the parties' behavior toward each other. Despite their mutual inability to communicate effectively, both parties were found to be very committed, devoted parents who appear to seek the best for their children. Tracking the factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1999), which are typically used to make initial custody determinations, the trial court made findings regarding each party and designated the former wife as the primary residential parent....

...$427.10 per month). Appellant argues the trial court erred by awarding this support for a period when the child allegedly never lived with Appellee. Florida law sets out criteria for determining entitlement to child support, and the amount thereof. § 61.13, Fla....

...Child support, though, is quite another matter here. The trial court may order either or both parties to a dissolution proceeding to pay child support in an amount which is equitable in light of the circumstances of each party and the nature of the case. § 61.13(1), Fla....

...We note that Florida's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act concerns which state can properly exercise jurisdiction over a custody matter but does not provide compensation for damages resulting from intentional interference with child custody. See §§ 61.1302.1348, Fla. Stat. (1997); cf. § 61.13(4)(c) (providing certain remedies for noncustodial parent when custodial parent interferes with visitation); accord Wood, 338 N.W.2d at 126; Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 48-49 (Popovich, C.J., dissenting); see generally Hillebrand, supra note 8.

...The appellee-mother petitioned the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, to change the permanent custody of her children from the father to her. She attempted to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction solely under a provision of Florida's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Section 61.1308(1)(c)2, Florida Statutes (1981), the requirements of which are that the subject child be physically present in this state, and "[i]t is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with...

...petition for change of permanent custody. The father appeals, and we reverse upon a holding that the allegations of the mother's petition are insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of a Florida court to change the permanent custody of the children. Section 61.1308(1)(c)2 is designed to vest jurisdiction in courts of this state for emergencies only....

...tody does not exist. We acknowledge that in Hegler v. Hegler, 383 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and Moser v. Davis, 364 So.2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), our sister courts have, without discussion of this distinction, found jurisdiction to exist under Section 61.1308(1)(c)2, under circumstances similar to the present *1017 case. We decline to follow these holdings because we believe they extend the jurisdiction of courts of this state beyond that intended by the Legislature. [2] We concede that it is arguable that the language of Section 61.1308(1)(c)2 is susceptible to the construction that even though alleged prior abuse and mistreatment have been interrupted by the non-custodial parent gaining physical custody of the child, the threat of resumption of such conduct when the...

...y and control of the children in Florida through visitation, to *1018 vest jurisdiction in a Florida court by alleging past mistreatment and abuse in the domicile state on the part of the custodial parent would be to allow the emergency provision of Section 61.1308(1)(c)2 to subsume all other jurisdictional provisions in total disregard of the purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act....

...See Hricko v. Stewart, 99 Misc.2d 266, 415 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1979) (emergency jurisdictional provision of Act should not be misused so as to defeat the purposes or objectives of the Act). Particularly pertinent here are the following declared purposes of the Act: "61.1304 Purposes of act; construction of provisions....

...of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act not satisfied). Reversed with directions to dismiss. JORGENSON, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority's analysis of the Florida Uniform Custody Jurisdiction Act, sections 61.1302-.1348, Florida Statutes (1981), I do not believe that this record supports reversal....

...Rhoades, 121 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1960); Marshall v. Marshall, 404 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Bailey v. Malone, 389 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Adams v. Adams, 374 So.2d 29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Elliott v. Weyman, 337 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). This is so notwithstanding section 61.1308 which must, in my view, be read in pari materia *1021 with section 61.13(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The trial court's order did nothing more than find jurisdiction and require certain social reports from the state of Florida and the state of New York. Under the facts of this case I do not believe that order was in error. It may well be that under section 61.1316, Florida Statutes (1981), New York will be the most appropriate forum to litigate this dispute. That issue, however, is not before us. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act clearly contemplates communication between the trial courts and on this record I would give them that opportunity. See § 61.1316(4), (5), Fla....

...tion was filed, assumed jurisdiction; that the children had no significant connection with the State of Florida, see Mondy v. Mondy, 428 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1983); and that, therefore, the Florida court was without jurisdiction under other provisions of Section 61.1308....

...clusive jurisdiction to modify the decree. See Marshall v. Marshall, 404 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Bailey v. Malone, 389 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Adams v. Adams, 374 So.2d 29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). [1] The wife's petition brought pursuant to section 61.1308(1)(c)2, Florida Statutes (1981), should have been treated as a petition to enforce the original custody award. There are few cases addressing extrajudicial modification of custody which would implicate section 61.1318, Florida Statutes (1981), which concededly is not involved here.

...on of parental rights. In the related area of custody under Chapter 61, Florida Statutes, sibling and spouse abuse are relevant. Carr v. Phillips, 540 So.2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), holds sibling abuse was relevant in custody battle between parents; Section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes, provides in part as follows: The court shall consider evidence of spouse abuse as evidence of detriment to the child......

...[9] If support orders, whether based on settlement agreements or not, were personal to the minor's custodian, who is the usual recipient, the obligation would not survive the death of the designated payee and this is not true. The trustee nature of the recipient of child support is also illustrated by the last sentence in section 61.13(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which provides that the court entering the support can require "the person or persons awarded custody of the child or children to make a report to the *742 court on terms prescribed by the court as to the ex...

...1.210(b). [6] See §§ 409.2564, 88.101, 88.181(2), Fla. Stat. (1979). [7] Armour v. Allen, 377 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). [8] See also § 1.01(14), Fla. Stat. (1979) (defining "minor" as any person who has not attained the age of 18 years). [9] See § 61.13(1), Fla....

...with our conclusion, or giving great weight to some factors, such as the child's strong preference in this case, we hold that the ultimate test in determining the custody award should be the best interests and welfare of the child as contemplated by section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1979), and that when the trial judge's discretion relating to custody has been exercised in a reasonable manner [1] it should not be disturbed on appeal....

...he enforceability of the award of child support in this case. Upon remand the trial court can now consider imposing a lien on appellant's interest in the home, and the proceeds of *80 any sale thereof, to secure support for the child as permitted by section 61.13(4), Florida Statutes....

...Richardson, 734 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), a decision of the district court declaring invalid a state statute. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Consistent with our recent rulings on similar issues, we affirm the district court decision and hold that section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1999), is facially unconstitutional in vesting custody rights in others because it violates a natural parent's fundamental right to rear his or her child....

...ital Separation Agreement and that the mother's living arrangement had subjected the child to harm. In February 1997, the grandparents moved to intervene in the modification proceedings and petitioned for custody of the child under the provisions of section 61.13(7) which authorizes custody for grandparents if a child is "actually residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship," and the trial court granted the motion to intervene....

...The father subsequently withdrew his motion for custody and took the position that the grandparents should be awarded custody. [1] After a two-day trial in September, 1997, the trial court transferred custody of the child to *1038 the grandparents pursuant to the provisions of section 61.13(7). The mother appealed the trial court's transfer order. The district court held that section 61.13(7) violated article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution by "permitting evaluation of the grandparents' custody request solely upon a best interest [of the child] standard." Richardson, 734 So.2d at 1064 (relying on Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla.1998), and Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 1996)). The court reasoned that section 61.13(7) suffered from the same constitutional infirmity as the grandparents' visitation statute in Von Eiff and Beagle because it invoked a best interest standard without requiring proof of a substantial threat of significant and demonstrable harm to the child as required by those decisions. See 734 So.2d at 1064. LEGAL ARGUMENT Section 61.13(7) states: In any case where the child is actually residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship, whether the court has awarded custody to the grandparent or not, the court may recognize the grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child. See § 61.13(7), Fla....

...f the child based solely on the "best interest of the child" standard, without first determining whether the parent is unfit or whether detriment would result to the child if custody was awarded to the parent. The grandmother, appellant, argues that section 61.13(7) is not facially unconstitutional under the reasoning of Von Eiff and Beagle because those decisions dealt with a completely different statutory provision. Alternatively, she argues that section 61.13(7) may be saved by interpreting the statute in a way that passes constitutional muster....

...While we recognize the obvious good intentions of the Legislature in passing this legislation as well as the grandparent visitation legislation, we disagree with both of the grandmother's contentions. Under our prior holdings, including Von Eiff and Beagle, it is apparent that section 61.13(7) unconstitutionally violates a natural parent's fundamental right to raise his or her child absent a compelling state justification. [2] In Von Eiff and Beagle the *1039 statute in question was limited to visitation rights to grandparents, [3] while section 61.13(7) grants custody rights....

...ew that the natural parent had a clear preference to custody over all others based upon the status of parenthood. Id. at 370. The reasoning and logic of D.A. McW, Von Eiff and Beagle applies with equal, if not more compelling, force here. In effect, section 61.13(7) treats grandparents and natural parents alike by giving grandparents custody rights equal to those of a parent, and allows courts to make its custody determination between parents and grandparents based solely on the best interest of the child standard....

...Hence, we find no valid basis to distinguish the custody statute we consider here from the visitation statute we considered in Von Eiff and Beagle, except for the fact the custody statute is even more intrusive upon a parent's rights. SAVING CONSTRUCTION The grandmother also contends that section 61.13(7) may be saved by interpreting the provision in light of well-established case law on grandparents' rights to custody, or by adding conditional language to the statute. [4] She relies on the First District's holding in S.G. v. C.S.G., 726 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), which rejected the argument that section 61.13(7) requires courts to place grandparents on equal footing with natural parents....

...Rather, the First District held there that the statute merely gives grandparents standing to seek custody of a minor child. See id. at 808; see also In re J.M.Z., 635 So.2d 134, 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). [5] Under this construction of the statute, even though a court determines that the grandparent has standing under section 61.13(7) to seek custody, the court may still not intervene in a parent-child relationship or determine whether custody with a grandparent is in the best interest of the child, unless it has been established that the parent abandoned the chil...

...id the Legislature intended to pass one but not the other, and the act remained complete in itself after the invalid provisions were stricken. Id. at 693-94. Here, however, it would be virtually impossible to sever the unconstitutional language from section 61.13(7) and yet maintain the Legislature's clear purpose in enacting the statute....

...ves we have recognized. If we follow appellant's suggestion and strike the words "actually residing," "stable relationship," "same" and "best interest of the child" we would be defeating the obvious purpose of the statute. The legislative history to section 61.13(7) also confirms this conclusion....

...As noted above, we recognize the Legislature's obvious good intentions in enacting the statute and the Legislature's continuing authority to enact a statute in accord with our decisions on this issue. However, under fundamental principles of separation of powers, this Court is without authority to *1043 change the wording of section 61.13(7) by judicially inserting a harm to the child element where the Legislature clearly has not done so....

...We can only hope that such a healthy relationship will continue despite this litigation. It is clearly in the best interest of all and consistent with the public policy of Florida that there be a cooperative and healthy relationship among family members, grandparents, parents, and children alike. Accordingly, we hold that section 61.13(7) is unconstitutional on its face because it equates grandparents with natural parents and permits courts to determine custody disputes utilizing solely the "best interest of the child" standard without first determining detriment to the child....

...Appellant did not argue this point to the district court below and, therefore, has not properly preserved the issue for appeal. Nevertheless, we disagree with appellant's contention that this Court may apply such tools of statutory construction to save section 61.13(7). Neither option applies in this case. [5] Cf. Russo v. Burgos, 675 So.2d 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). [6] In interpreting section 61.13(7) the Second District, however, has reached the opposite conclusion. The court in S.G. v. G.G., 666 So.2d 203, 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), holds that section 61.13(7) permits courts to apply the "best interest of the child" standard in a custody dispute between a parent and a grandparent without first determining parental unfitness or harm to the child. That court stated: The second issue raised by appellant is linked to the previously-discussed issue and also involves an interpretation of section 61.13(7)....

...nt because a parent may not be deprived of custody absent a finding of unfitness or long-term detriment to the child. While the principle relied upon by appellant is correct for the cases cited, appellant's argument overlooks the clear provisions of section 61.13(7) that are applicable to the circumstances of this case....

...ion in that field. Thus, the court's reliance on this fact does not support its imputation. With respect to the second issue raised in the amended final judgment, the trial court held that "after considering all of the statutory factors set forth in Section 61.13(3)(a)-(m), that is it [sic] in the paramount interests of the child that the court award the mother sole parental responsibility for the two minor children and so the court so orders." "In the absence of an agreement, the husband shall have the children with him on Wednesdays from 4:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. and every other weekend from Saturday at 9:00 a.m. until Sunday at 11:00 a.m." Former wife concedes error in part, and we agree, as to the trial court's award of sole parental responsibility to former wife. "The wife agrees that section 61.13(2)(b)2 requires that a trial court `shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child.'" Grimaldi v....

...Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. GRIMES, C.J., and HOBSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] Chapter 88, Fla. Stat. (1977), amended by Ch. 79-383, Laws of Florida (effective October 1, 1979). [2] § 88.081, Fla. Stat. (1977). [3] A circuit court has continuing jurisdiction under § 61.13, Fla....

...We find no basis for overturning the substance of the court's ruling; however, we note that the trial court erred in awarding sole parental responsibility to the mother absent a specific finding that "shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child[ren]." § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla....

...1st DCA 1983); see also Holland v. Holland, 458 So.2d 81 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). We therefore reverse that portion of the final judgment granting Mrs. Hunter sole parental responsibility, and remand to enable the trial court to make the determination required by section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statute (Supp....

...[2] , [3] Visitation *238 rights may be modified if there is a substantial change in circumstances and the modification will benefit the child. Buckingham v. Buckingham, 492 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Manuel v. Manuel, 489 So.2d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Although termination of visitation rights is disfavored, § 61.13(2)(b)1, Fla....

...We grant the mother's petition for rehearing en banc to resolve conflict with Lovelady v. Lovelady, 576 So.2d 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), and Braman v. Braman, 602 So.2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), and to address an issue of exceptional importance. Our focus is on section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1991), which requires a trial court, *124 in determining the best interests of a child for purposes of awarding shared parental responsibility and primary residential custody, to evaluate all factors, some of which...

...In fact, the judgment does not contain even a bare conclusion that the best interests of the children would be served by the living arrangements ordered. We are led to the conclusion, therefore, that the trial court may have overlooked the necessity to evaluate the relevant factors [of section 61.13(3)], and we must remand for the trial court to make the requisite findings. 576 So.2d at 947. Although not cited by the mother, we also note our decision in Braman in which we reversed an award of sole parental responsibility under section 61.13(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (1989), and remanded with directions that "the trial court enter appropriate findings disclosing its evaluation of the criteria set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1989)." 602 So.2d at 683....

...In doing so, we recede from Lovelady and Braman to the extent they conflict with this opinion and align ourselves with Murphy v. Murphy, 621 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), review granted, 630 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 1993). [1] We agree with the basic principle of Murphy that section 61.13(3) does not require a trial court to embody specific findings of fact supporting a custody decision in its final judgment....

...e child. The trial court properly took judicial notice of the written report under section 90.202(6), Florida Statutes. This case presents a question of apparent first impression as to the applicability of the shared parental responsibility statute, section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), to unwed parents. Section 61.13(2)(b)1 provides that it is "the public policy of this state to assure that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of childrearing." Section 61.13(2)(b)2 provides that "the court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child." (e.s.) The order here concluded that appellee posed no danger to his child....

...y situated with the unwed mother or the married father." See, Kendrick v. Everheart, 390 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1980); DeCosta v. North Broward Hospital District, 497 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). A statute in derogation of these common law principles, as section 61.13(2)(b) would appear to be, is to be strictly construed under ordinary rules applicable to such statutes....

...stantial competent evidence to support that decision. See Ross v. Bandi, 566 So.2d 55, 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The trial court is charged with determining matters relating to the custody of minor children in accordance with their best interests. See § 61.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997); Race v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Section 61.13(3) provides a list of factors which the trial court should evaluate in considering issues of shared parental responsibility and primary physical residence....

...However, there is no statutory requirement that the trial court make specific written findings in a custody decision. See Murphy v. Murphy, 621 So.2d 455, 456-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). In the instant case, the trial court stated that it had considered the criteria of section 61.13 and had concluded that the husband should be primary residential custodian of the children....

...ent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the non-residential parent." This factor is actually listed twice in the statute, thus impressing its considerable importance in primary physical residence decisions. See § 61.13(3)(a), (j). Throughout the divorce proceedings, the wife failed to evidence a willingness to encourage a close relationship between the children and the husband. Another factor to consider is the permanence of the existing custodial home. See § 61.13(3)(d), (e)....

...hildren, and the statute specifies "[a]fter considering all relevant facts, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of the child." See § 61.13(2)(b)....

...itional temporary relief pending final adjudication of the parties' rights. While the court is authorized by statute to modify the provisions of the final judgment as the same pertain to the care, custody and maintenance of children of the marriage (Section 61.13, F.S....

...Mitchell to pay for all of the children's medical and dental insurance coverage without any sharing provision except as to deductibles and noncovered expenses. On remand the court must apportion the cost of such coverage by adding it to the basic obligation determined pursuant to section 61.30(6). § 61.13(1)(b); .30(8)....

...Mitchell's overtime experience since the final hearing, and it shall determine whether Ms. Mitchell is voluntarily underemployed for purposes of imputing income to her pursuant to section 61.30(2)(b). When refashioning the child support award, the court shall also comply with sections 61.13(1)(b) and 61.30(8) by including the children's health insurance and health care costs in the basic obligation established pursuant to section 61.30(6) and apportion those costs accordingly....

...tions. Fla. Stat. § 90.242(3)(b) (1975). There is no doubt, in a child custody dispute, that the mental and physical health of the parents is a factor that the court can and should consider in determining the best interests of the child. Fla. Stat. § 61.13(3)(g) (1975)....

...1974), thus enabling this court to resolve the appellate issue presented. However, it seems to me that when the appellant filed her counter petition alleging that she was a fit and proper person to have the custody of the two minor children of the parties and praying for custody, Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1975), became applicable to this case....

...n in the absence of any compelling evidence. Finally, I think we should give some effect to the concept of "shared parental responsibility." That term found its way into Florida law by virtue of chapter 82-96, Laws of Florida (1982), now codified at section 61.13(b)2.a, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides: "Shared parental responsibility" means that both parents retain full parental rights and responsibilities with respect to their child and requires both parents to confer so that major decisions affecting the welfare of the child will be determined jointly....

...to Arizona. The final hearing was held on several dates between May and July of 1997. On August 12, 1997, the trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution that gave Mrs. Borchard custody of the children and permitted her to return to Arizona. Section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), took effect on July 1, 1997....

...Mize, 621 So.2d 417 (Fla.1993), which trial courts utilize in deciding whether to permit a primary residential parent to relocate. The statute, however, continues to require the trial court to determine, as the sixth factor, whether the move would be in the best interest of the child. See § 61.13(2)(d)(6), Fla....

...concluded that the trial court intended to award shared parental responsibility. Nevertheless, this court remanded to the trial court "to clarify whether it intended to award shared parental responsibility, and if so, to consider the application of Section 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Florida Statutes (1997), which provides that a court may grant one party the `ultimate responsibility' over specific aspects of a child's welfare." Id....

...We reach the same conclusion in this case and remand for the trial court to clarify its intent with respect to shared parental responsibility. We reject, however, the husband's claim that the final judgment is fundamentally deficient for failure to make written findings of the section 61.13 factors regarding the best interests of the children for purposes of primary residential custody....

...In so holding, this Court relied upon language from an Alabama case which provided: "`Other things being equal, ... the mother of infants of tender years [is] best fitted to bestow the motherly affection, care, companionship, and early training suited to their needs.'" (197 So. 531) F.S.A. § 61.13(2) providing for equal consideration of the father in the award of custody is not inconsistent with this rule of law historically enunciated by the courts....

...to the father. The 3rd District affirmed, finding sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's decision. The district court apparently considered the general rule, still viable despite the "equal consideration" set forth in F.S.A. § 61.13(2), that, other essential factors being equal, the mother of infants of tender years should receive prime consideration for custody....

...The 3rd District concluded sub judice the father should have the children under its "overall view of this record," thereby sustaining the chancellor's valid exercise of discretion. We are not permitted to disturb the exercise of a sound discretion but we are impelled to point out the above clarification of the statute (§ 61.13(2)) and to reject the quoted trial court language which seems to select an economic and financial basis for an award of custody to the father....

...insurance in the amount of $50,000.00 to secure his child support obligation. Wife also properly argues that the trial court erred by failing to address the parties' responsibility for the child's non-covered medical expenses in the final judgment. Section 61.13(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1999), provides as follows: 61.13....

...rty may apply for modification. § 61.14(1)(a) Fla. Stat. (2004). The court has jurisdiction to make orders "as equity requires, with due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial ability of the parties...". Id. Similarly, Florida Statute § 61.13(1)(a)(2004) confers jurisdiction on the trial court to modify child support "when there is a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties." There are three fundamental prerequisites to modification of alimony....

...It did not expressly treat the question presented here. The rule that housekeeping services are not compensable was apparently first announced in South Coast Construction Co. v. Chizauskas, 172 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1965). [3] 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 61.13(d) (1983).

...t an issue until November, 1991. Up to that point, the children and Click had visitation without dispute. Schweinberg did not interfere in visitation. Obviously, the children want to visit with their mother and this is encouraged by Florida law. See § 61.13, Fla....

...In addition, the petition sought an increase in child support pursuant to the child support guidelines, consistent with appellee Craig Fortson's increased income and the children's escalating needs. After a trial, the court denied Flint's request to relocate in a final judgment which discussed the six. factors set forth in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...1993) and Russenberger v. Russenberger, 669 So.2d 1044 (Fla.1996), [1] controlled this case, there would have been a presumption in favor of allowing Flint's relocation, since she was the primary residential parent. However, the legislature's passage of section 61.13(2)(d) eliminated this presumption....

...The statute imposes an intensely fact specific framework on the relocation decision, where the trial judge may base a decision on what is best for the child, even though a result may not be best for the primary residential parent seeking to relocate. See § 61.13(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997). Flint cites to a number of relocation cases which predate the enactment of section 61.13(2)(d)....

...The standards of appellate review prevent us from reweighing the evidence and making the value judgments that are appropriate for the trial judge. Because there is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's findings concerning the factors set forth in *1219 section 61.13(2)(d)1.-6., we must affirm the decision denying relocation....

...Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. DELL and STONE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] As discussed below, the presumption applied in Mize v. Mize, 621 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1993) and Russenberger v. Russenberger, 669 So.2d 1044 (Fla.1996), was superseded by section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1997).

...o the Court's attention that either party is abusing alcohol or any other controlled substance, upon proof thereof the Court will deal with the offending party severely. * * * In our decision today, we explicitly acknowledge that there is nothing in section 61.13(3) to require a trial judge to set out written findings of fact in a custody decision. In the first place, section 61.13(3) visibly lacks a requirement that the judge make written findings on its factors....

...sts of the children, in light of the record itself, suggested that the trial judge forgot to evaluate the factors mentioned in the statute. That is not the same thing, however, as saying that every custody decree must contain written findings on the section 61.13(3) factors....

...But for that, I may well have been persuaded the other way. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING We deny appellant's motion for rehearing in which she calls our attention to Braman v. Braman, 602 So.2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (trial court required to "enter appropriate findings disclosing its evaluation of" section 61.13(3) criteria in awarding sole parental responsibility to one parent)....

...The issue of primary residential responsibility was ripe for decision when the case came on for final hearing, and it was the obligation of the court to enter a judgment determining this issue with finality, subject to subsequent modification upon a substantial change in circumstances. Section 61.13(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1989), provides that "[t]he court shall determine all matters relating to the custody of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act." Section 61.1326, a provision of the UCCJA, provides that: [a] custody decree rendered by a court of this state which has jurisdiction ......

...Martinez as "interim" residential parent and remand with directions to award Mr. Martinez permanent primary residential responsibility, subject to future modification in accordance with the general law of modification upon a showing of substantial change in circumstances. See § 61.1326, Fla....

...ue an unhappy relationship at the school manifested by hostility between him and the school's principal, who has been and continues to be Mrs. Martinez's paramour and a primary cause of the dissolution of the marriage. Again we agree with appellant. Section 61.13(2)(b)2.a, Florida Statutes (1989), provides that: [i]n ordering shared parental responsibility, the court may consider the expressed desires of the parents and may grant to one party the ultimate responsibility over specific aspects of...

...rial court's order granting the husband ultimate responsibility over that aspect of the children's welfare and giving effect to the husband's decision that the children continue their Catholic education and religious training. We decline to construe section 61.13(2)(b)2.a as giving a trial court authority to direct which school the children shall attend; that section only authorizes the court to determine, based on competent substantial evidence, which parent shall make that decision based on the best interests of the children....

...meeting his other financial obligations contained in the final judgment of dissolution. For these reasons, we hold that the lower court erred as a matter of law in requiring Mr. Martinez to continue the children's education at the specified school. § 61.13(2)(b)2.a, Fla....

...her constitutional right to refuse medical treatment as guaranteed by article I, sections 3 and 23 of the Florida Constitution. Such an interpretation would also undermine the principle of shared parental responsibility, to which this state adheres. § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...5th DCA 1995) (Husband's desire for visitation during a particular time period did not constitute an emergency). Although there was evidence presented at the emergency hearing that the mother was interfering with the father's visitation rights, and section 61.13(4)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (1993), does authorize a change of custody on that ground if it is in the best interests of the children, the mother did not receive a full and complete hearing on the issue....

...e dispute between the parties in accordance with the best interests of their children by attempting to restore a meaningful relationship between the children and their father by assuring them unhampered, frequent and continuing contact with him. See § 61.13(2)(b)1, Fla....

...(1985) (the court shall determine all matters relating to custody of minor children in accordance with the best interests of each child and it is the public policy of this state to assure a minor child frequent and continuing contact with both parents after marriage has been dissolved); id. § 61.13(3)(a) ("frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent" is generally considered to be in best interest of child)....

...464, 466 (1933) (recognizing a noncustodial parent's "inherent right" to "enjoy the society and association of [his or her] offspring, with reasonable opportunity to impress upon them a father's or a mother's love and affection in their upbringing"); § 61.13(2)(b)1 (minor child is assured frequent and continuing contact with both parents)....

...necessary to protect an award of child support, the court may order the obligor to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure the child support award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose." § 61.13(1)(c), Fla....

...d the son from the State of Florida. [1] In response, appellant petitioned for a modification, seeking custody of the parties' daughter. The most critical issue of law is whether the trial court erred in misconstruing the effect of the newly amended Section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1982), by determining that the new law changes the requirements for modification of a custody decree....

...Avery, 314 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). The question is whether the 1982 amendments eliminated the requirement of showing a "substantial change in circumstances" in modification proceedings. Before enactment of Chapter 82-96, Laws of Florida (1982), Section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes, read in part as follows: The court shall award custody and visitation rights of minor children of the parties as a part of proceedings for dissolution of marriage in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act....

...include modification proceedings. The problem presented by the statutory amendment is that while the statutes provide (as they have since 1975) specific factors to be considered by the trial courts in determining "best interests of the child," (see Section 61.13(3)(a)-(j), inclusive), the statutes are silent with respect to the "substantial change in circumstances" requirement in modification proceedings....

...." Therefore, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, not merely subparagraphs (3)(a) through (j), setting forth factors "affecting the best welfare and interests of the child," must be considered. It is clear that other provisions, specifically Section 61.1326, relating to the binding force and res judicata effect of a custody decree, must also be considered. That provision reads as follows: 61.1326 Binding force and res judicata effect of custody decree — A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which has jurisdiction under s. 61.08 binds all parties who have been served in this state or notified in accordance with s. 61.1312 or who have been given an opportunity to be heard....

...custody determinations. [2] Thus, *18 we find no error in the trial court's use of the "best interests of the child" standard in this modification proceeding. One of the statutory factors to be considered is the "reasonable preference of the child," Section 61.13, subparagraph (3)(i)....

...ent, an opportunity for the children to live in Japan, and an indication by the children of their preference to go there. Though not expressed in the order, it is clear from the record that the trial court determined, because of recent amendments to section 61.13, Florida Statutes, it was unnecessary to decide whether a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred and, accordingly, gave no consideration to this essential requirement in reaching the decision to modify the custody provisions in the final judgment. I. SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES I agree with the majority opinion that the 1982 amendments (chapter 82-96, Laws of Florida) to section 61.13, Florida Statutes, are controlling on this modification proceeding and do not eliminate the long-standing requirement of showing a "substantial change in circumstances ......

...hange in circumstances sufficient to warrant abrogation of the custody arrangement previously agreed to by each party and approved in the final judgment of dissolution. The majority opinion acknowledges the res judicata effect of that judgment under section 61.1326, Florida Statutes, and correctly concludes that such res judicata effect cannot be disregarded or modified unless "a change in circumstances sufficient to bring the matter before the court for redetermination has been shown." Having c...

...I disagree, however, because this holding is in direct conflict with Stricklin v. Stricklin, 383 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). In that case, as in this, the trial court refused to determine whether a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred because of its misconception that, under section 61.13, Florida Statutes, a substantial change in circumstances was no longer relevant in proceedings *23 to modify child custody....

...re of the child, no doubt because the record affirmatively refutes such a finding. Yet, as noted above, this fact is a critical consideration in modification proceedings. I agree with the majority that chapter 82-96, Laws of Florida (1982), amending section 61.13, Florida Statutes, is applicable to this case. That amendment adopted the principle of "shared parental responsibility" as the public policy of Florida and amended, in part, the factors in section 61.13(3), which the trier of fact is mandated to consider and evaluate in determining custody issues and the best interest of the child....

...ty has followed that mandate and evaluated the evidence under the statutory factors. [3] The trial court actually considered only one of the statutory factors in awarding the wife custody of both children — "the reasonable preference of the child." § 61.13(3)(i)....

...The statutory factors appear to support modification placing custody of both children with the father, with long summer vacation visits with the mother while she remains in Japan or at other duty stations remote from Jacksonville. II. REMOVAL OF CHILDREN FROM FLORIDA Section 61.13(2)(b) mandates that "upon considering all relevant factors, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining custody." That provision was enacted to substantially increase the father's right to...

...n custody and temporary residence outside the United States." I cannot agree that such decisions can or should be so lightly distinguished. The majority opinion wisely avoids "sweeping generalizations" concerning the effect of the 1982 amendments to section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...As things now stand, the mother has permanent custody of both children and the father must prove a substantial change in circumstances in order to again modify the present custody arrangement. The trial court, believing that requirement to have been eliminated by the recent statutory amendments to section 61.13, may well have omitted a two-year restriction on absence from the state based on the mistaken belief that he could again modify custody arrangements regardless of any demonstrated change in circumstances....

...r himself and the children. The record indicates these parents are of modest means. The modification order awarding the mother permanent custody of both children and authorizing their removal from Florida flies directly in the face of the purpose of section 61.13 to assure the father equal consideration with the mother in all custody and visitation matters in accordance with the recently adopted policy of shared parental responsibility....

...te of Florida, and the former husband's Amended Motion to Modify Final Judgment dissolving the marriage. Having considered the testimony of the parties and their witnesses, evidence and argument of counsel, the Court makes the following findings: 1. Section 61.13, Florida Statutes, as amended this year effective July 1, 1982, is applicable and provides that it is now the public policy of Florida to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child-rearing and to confer so that...

...apan, at a military base which affords both the children adequate schooling and recreational facilities. 5. Both children have indicated to their parents a preference to go to Japan which the Court finds to be a reasonable preference pursuant to Ch. 61.13(3)(i), Florida Statutes, therefore, IT IS ORDERED: 1....

...r party's custodial or visitation privileges and responsibilities without first obtaining written permission of the other party or the court." [2] In addition to introducing the new concept of "shared parental responsibility," the 1982 amendments to Section 61.13 added one additional factor (subsection (3)(a)) to be considered in determining the best interests of the child....

...She offered no evidence that the father was a poor or unfit father or that the children had suffered or would suffer any adverse effects in his custody. [3] A brief evaluation of the record with respect to each of the ten statutory factors listed in section 61.13(3)(a) through (j) does not support awarding custody of both children to the mother: (a) The parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent....

...Peak, 411 So.2d 325, 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), the court noted: The trial court may order either or both parties to a dissolution proceeding to pay child support in an amount which is equitable in light of the circumstances of each party and the nature of the case. § 61.13(1), Fla....

...ces of this case, is in the best interest of the children. (1) Age. The children are not infants nor "of tender years." They are eleven and fifteen years of age respectively. We are therefore not called upon to determine what effect the provision of Section 61.13(2)(b) Florida Statutes (1979) that: "Upon considering all relevant factors, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining custody ......

...bility, noted in his report that the father and stepmother have actively avoided attempts at co-parenting, while the mother has demonstrated a consistent attempt at co-parenting. While the trial court stated that it considered all of the elements of section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1997), and found that there had been a substantial change in circumstances warranting a change in primary residential custody, we cannot agree based on the record before us....

...INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA FAMILY LAW FORM 12.901(f), UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT AFFIDAVIT (UCCJA) You must fill out this form and file it with the court in any lawsuit involving custody of or visitation with a child. For further information, see sections 61.1302-61.1354, Florida Statutes....

...Generally, you would file this request in the county where your (great)-grandchild resides. This form can be used in a dissolution of marriage (divorce) between the child(ren)'s parents, in a paternity or support proceeding, or as a separate action. For more information, see sections 752.01 and 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...See Family Law Form 12.923, Notice of Hearing (General Form). Once the order is signed by the court, Family Law Form 12.940(b), you need to mail the signed order and Family Law Form 12.940(c) to the other parent's employer. *1184 For further information, see § 61.13(1)(b), Florida Statutes....

...CHILD SUPPORT [✓ all that apply, fill in all blanks that apply] ____ a. Respondent shall pay to Petitioner the sum of $ ____ per child ____ weekly/ ____ bimonthly/ ____ monthly, as temporary support for the parties' minor child(ren), as provided in section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...INCOME DEDUCTION ORDERS Income deduction is when the court ordered support comes straight from the obligor's wages. When the court enters an order is entered beginning, enforcing, or changing a spouse *1259 or child support duty, the court must enter a separate order for income deduction. This order must follow with section 61.1301, Florida Statutes....

...me deduction order because of mistake of fact regarding the amount of support owed under the court's support order, the amount of arrearages (payments that are past due) of support, or identity of the obligor (the person who must pay the money). See section 61.1301(2), Florida Statutes, for additional information....

...____________________________\ CHILD SUPPORT INCOME DEDUCTION ORDER [✓ check all which apply, fill in all blanks that apply] THIS COURT entered an order on ______________ establishing support obligations owed by the obligor, { name } _______________, whose social security number is ____________. In compliance with section 61.1301, Florida Statutes, IT IS ADJUDGED: INCOME DEDUCTION: From all income due and payable to obligor __________, the following amounts shall be deducted: A....

...ion from a spouse's employer or other third party). b. Family Law Form 12.931(c) — Request for Copies, Family Law Form 12.930(a) — Notice of Service of Interrogatories, and Family Law Form 12.930(b) — Standard Interrogatories. Please see sections 61.13 and 61.30, Florida Statutes, for further information....

...n. This court explained: *542 Overbey indicated that a court may enter an order modifying child support payments when the modification is found to be necessary in the best interest of the child or when there is a substantial change of circumstances. § 61.13(1)(a), Fla....

...primarily on the fact that the children in that case, because of their ages, would never benefit from the husband's prolonged educational pursuits. Thus, the trial court concluded that it was appropriate to impute income to the husband. Pursuant to section 61.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may at any time order either or both parents who owe a duty of support to a child to pay support in accordance with the guidelines in section 61.30....

...We conclude under these circumstances that the trial judge's two pronouncements were incompatible. Third, passing next to the question of whether the husband or the wife should be preferred as the custodial parent of two female children aged one and three, we note the provision in section 61.13(2)(b)(1) that "the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of the child irrespective of the age of the child." (emphasis supplied) This statutory language at first blu...

...orably by the Circuit Court for Polk County, Florida. We affirm. Appellant Rodney Brown contends the chapter is unconstitutional because it denies the father of a bastard child the rights the father of a legitimate child enjoys. Appellant notes F.S. Section 61.13(2), F.S.A....

...The drugstore real estate and the wife's investment real estate are also encumbered. HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES Two modifications to the final judgment would have little effect on the husband and would give some security to the wife and the minor son. Section 61.13(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), requires that an order for child support include a provision for health insurance when the insurance is reasonably available....

...Kauffman Milling Co., 42 Fla. 328, 29 So. 435 (1900). Moreover, trial courts must look to all available assets in determining whether an individual has the ability to pay child support. Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 1985); § 61.30, Fla. Stat. (1991); [3] § 61.13(1)(c), Fla....

...[3] Section 61.30(10) provides in pertinent part: The Court may adjust the minimum child support award, or either or both parent's share of the minimum child support award, based upon the following considerations: ..... (h) Total available assets of the obligee, obligor, and the child. [4] Subsection 61.13(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1991) provides in pertinent part: To the extent necessary to protect an award of child support, the court may order the obligor to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or bond, or to otherwise secure the...

...Andrews' attorney called Ms. Andrews as a witness, her attorney was not allowed to cross-examine Ms. Andrews beyond the narrow scope of direct examination. Decisions affecting child custody require a careful consideration of the best interests of the child. § 61.13, Fla....

...As this Court recently noted in Elebash v. Elebash, 450 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), the trial court does have the authority to decline to follow a settlement agreement between the parties relating to child custody, visitation and support. Sections 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Florida Statutes (Supp....

...I will then enter all of the remaining paragraphs . .. and in every respect except that of having the ultimate responsibility rest with one person, it would read identically with the shared parental responsibility provisions of the Legislative act. Section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...en in this case. ORFINGER, J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents with opinion. COWART, Judge, dissenting: The problem in this case is solely one of words, context, semantics, and philosophy, not judicial error. Many persons apparently believe that under section 61.13, Florida Statutes, "shared parental responsibility" is an antonym or the antithesis of child custody and that the statute has abolished the concept of custody....

...g authority as to major decisions relating to long range matters concerning which there is ample time to consider available alternatives, such as education, religious training, and non-emergency medical and dental care. In fact, as presently worded, section 61.13, Florida Statutes, which provides for "shared parental responsibility," refers, affirmatively and favorably, seven times to " custody. " The statute refers to "child custody dispute" (§ 61.13(3)(j)); to the " custodial home" (§ 61.13(3)(e)); to the person or persons "awarded custody of the child" (§ 61.13(1)), and refers to the court "determining custody " (§ 61.13(2)(b)1.). The statute states clearly that the court "shall have jurisdiction to determine custody " (§ 61.13(2)(a)); "shall determine all matters relating to custody " (§ 61.13(2)(b)1.), and "may make such orders about what security is to be given for the care, custody, and support of the minor children" (§ 61.13(4)). The statutory term "primary physical residence" (§ 61.13(2)(b)2.a.) appears to be the equivalent of the proper meaning of the word custody, while the statutory term "sole parental responsibility" (§ 61.13(2)(b)2.b.) appears to approximate what is the erroneous concept of custody....

..." The trial judge then entered the final judgment in this case with the husband's attorney saying that the "only objection to it is the one paragraph, numbered five, the first sentence, that provides for a custody award to the wife ... ." (emphasis supplied) In defining "shared parental responsibility" section 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Florida Statutes (1983), explicitly provides in part: In ordering shared parental responsibility, the court ......

...cluding primary physical residence or "custody," does not require that the trial judge first "determine that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child" as is necessary for the court to order "sole parental responsibility." See § 61.13(2)(b)2., Fla....

...[3] It is incongruous that there is no such requirement for an adoption in which the relationship and effects are permanent. NOTES [1] Although not directly applicable to adoption proceedings, Florida's new Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (Ch. 61.1302 et seq.) makes it clear that the public policy of this state requires parties seeking orders regarding the custody of a child, is to require them to fully disclose to the court making such a determination all prior custody proceedings concern...

...uld reveal to appropriate authorities any knowledge he may have of such improper conduct. [3] § 744.391 Fla. Stat. (1979). [4] § 62.062(2)(a) Fla. Stat. (1979). [5] § 63.092(2) Fla. Stat. (1979). [6] § 732.103 Fla. Stat. (1979) (inheritance) and § 61.13(2)(b) Fla....

...Nothing in the order, however, indicates, nor do the parties argue here that the contempt motion was argued or ruled on in the September hearing. In the written order on the husband's motion for temporary custody and child support, the substitute judge followed the statutory criteria in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, in making his findings and fully explicated his determination of the best interests of the children....

...Hunter, 540 So.2d 235, 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (stating that: "the trial court erred in awarding sole parental responsibility to be mother absent a specific finding that `shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the children,'") (quoting § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla....

...d encouraging more modification proceedings between two otherwise fit parents in the process. This we will not do. As poignantly stated by our sister court, a change of custody is appropriate only when, having considered all of the factors listed in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes: [T]he trial court finds that a change in custody will so clearly promote or improve the child's well-being to such an extent that any reasonable parent would understand that maintaining the status quo would be detrimental to the child's overall best interests....

...5th DCA 1998); Holmes v. Greene, 649 So.2d 302, 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Gaber v. Gaber, 536 So.2d 381, 381-82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Berlin v. Berlin, 386 So.2d 577, 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Pollak v. Pollak, 196 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); see also § 61.13(3)(i), Fla....

...arents and foster a breakdown in discipline, neither of which is in the best interests of children. 433 So.2d at 1253 (citations omitted). The reasonable preference of a child is indeed but one of many factors to be considered by a court pursuant to § 61.13(3), Fla....

...§ 36-6-106(7) (1995) (stating that the court shall hear "[t]he reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or older. The court may hear the preference of a younger child upon request. The preferences for older children should normally be given greater weight than those of younger children."). [8] Section § 61.13, Fla....

...in full parental rights and responsibilities with respect to their child and in which both parents confer with each other so that major decisions affecting the welfare of the child will be determined jointly," as defined in section 61.046(11). Under section 61.13(2)(b)(2), a court is required to order shared parental responsibility unless it finds that such an arrangement would be detrimental to the child....

...ordance with the statutory terms, making findings that would comport either with shared parental responsibility, granting to the mother "the ultimate responsibility over specific aspects of the child's welfare," or with sole parental responsibility. § 61.13(2)(b)(2)(a),(b)....

...having primary custody every other week. At the three-day trial, among the evidence presented on the issue of child custody was considerable testimony about the sexual conduct of each party and its relation to the "moral fitness" of each party under section 61.13(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1995), [1] including evidence relating to Valerie Maradie's admitted bisexuality and involvement in lesbian relationships....

...ed her parenting ability or had negatively impacted the child. [2] The trial court awarded Mr. Maradie primary residential custody of the parties' daughter, in part on the following basis: In deciding the child custody issue, the only factor under F.S. 61.13 that seems to have particular significance is subsection (f) regarding the moral fitness of the parties....

...Hayes, 407 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The trial court's first announcement of this judicially-noticed fact was in the final judgment, which effectively denied Valerie Maradie any opportunity to dispute the matters noticed. "Moral Fitness" Under Section 61.13(3)(f) By reversing here, we do not mean to suggest that trial courts may not consider the parent's sexual conduct in judging that parent's moral fitness under section 61.13(3)(f) or that trial courts are required to have expert evidence of actual harm to the child....

...See Chittenden v. Boyd, 669 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Thus, we are compelled to reverse and remand to the trial court to make a determination of custody in conformance with Chapter 61 after consideration of all pertinent factors set forth in section 61.13(3)....

...As a result of our ruling here, we do not now reach the issue Mr. Maradie raises on crossappeal regarding the award of child support. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JOANOS, BENTON and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1995) provides: (3) For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary residence, the best interests of the child shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child,...

...Reeves of Davis, Schnitker, Reeves & Browning, P.A., Madison, FL, for Appellant. Harvey E. Baxter, Gainesville, FL, for Appellee. LEWIS, J. We have for review Sullivan v. Sapp, 829 So.2d 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), in which the First District Court of Appeal expressly declared section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...Following the mother's death, the child's maternal grandmother, Elizabeth Sullivan, filed a "Motion to Intervene and for the Award of Reasonable Visitation to Grandparent," seeking to intervene in the paternity action that was pending on rehearing and requesting grandparent visitation rights pursuant to section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...In its opinion, the district court did not address the issue as to whether the grandmother even had a right to intervene in the underlying paternity action. Instead, the court only addressed the substantive issue concerning the constitutionality of section 61.13(2)(b)2.c., which was relied upon by the grandmother in her motion for intervention and visitation. The district court held that this case is controlled by Richardson *32 v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 2000), in which this Court determined that section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1999), which attempted to confer standing on grandparents to request custody based solely on the best interests of the child, violated the natural parent's fundamental right to privacy. See Sullivan, 829 So.2d at 952. In addition to Richardson, the district court noted that the reasoning outlined in Beagle, Von Eiff, and Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So.2d 26 (Fla.2000), supported the conclusion that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...action. See Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992). The parties, in their respective briefs, have seemingly overlooked the first step of the analysis, and instead have proceeded to only debate the constitutionality of section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...ied the grandmother's motion to intervene. Although this case may be resolved exclusively on the basis of the grandmother's failure to satisfy the intervention test, we deem it necessary to further address the decision of the First District, holding section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...of the Florida Statutes unconstitutional, to support and maintain uniformity in Florida law. The First District's decision is in express and direct conflict with that of the Fourth District in Spence v. Stewart, 705 So.2d 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), wherein that court held that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...ning matters of great importance involving important principles of constitutional law affecting the powers and duties of public officials, even though a decision on the constitutional points in the particular case was unnecessary to dispose of it"). Section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...Grandparents have legal standing to seek judicial enforcement of such an award. This section does not require that grandparents be made parties or given notice of dissolution pleadings or proceedings, nor do grandparents have legal standing as "contestants" as defined in s. 61.1306. A court may not order that a child be kept within the state or jurisdiction of the court solely for the purpose of permitting visitation by the grandparents. § 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Fla....

...grandparents. See id. The grandparents eventually filed a petition for unsupervised visitation with the child, pursuant to section 752.01(1)(a). See id. One important difference between section 752.01(1)(a), the statute relied upon in Von Eiff, and section 61.13(2)(b)2.c., is that section 752.01(1) mandates that the court "shall" award visitation when it is in the best interests of the child, see § 752.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1995), while section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. holds that courts " may award the grandparents visitation rights with a minor child if it is in the child's best interest." § 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Fla....

...2d DCA 1999) (declaring section 752.01(1)(b) facially unconstitutional). Finally, the First District determined that the present case is controlled by this Court's holding in Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036 (Fla.2000). See Sullivan, 829 So.2d at 952. In Richardson, this Court held that section 61.13(7) of the Florida Statutes "is facially unconstitutional in vesting custody rights in others because it violates a natural parent's fundamental right to rear his or her child." 766 So.2d at 1037. Section 61.13(7) provided: "In any case where the child is actually residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship, whether the court has awarded custody to the grandparent or not, the court may recognize the grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child." § 61.13(7), Fla. Stat. (1999). Relying upon Von Eiff and Beagle, we held, in Richardson, that there was no compelling state interest to justify the violation of a parent's fundamental right to raise his or her child inherent in enforcement of section 61.13(7). See Richardson, 766 So.2d at 1038. There, we concluded: In effect, section 61.13(7) treats grandparents and natural parents alike by giving grandparents custody rights equal to those of a parent, and allows courts to make its custody determination between parents and grandparents based solely on the best interest of the child standard....

...Clearly, this Court has consistently held all statutes that have attempted to compel visitation or custody with a grandparent based solely on the best interest of the child standard, without the required showing of harm to the child, to be unconstitutional. We agree with the district court below and likewise hold that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...of the Florida Statutes is unconstitutional as violative of Florida's right of privacy because it fails to require a showing of harm to the child prior to compelling and forcing the invasion *38 of grandparent visitation into the parental privacy rights. Section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. provides that a court "may award the grandparents visitation rights with a minor child if it is in the child's best interest." § 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Fla....

...Here, the grandmother did not claim in any pleading and has not asserted that any harm will come to the child if visitation with her does not occur. Under the authority of this Court's holdings in Beagle, Von Eiff, Saul, and Richardson, we hold that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c., which fails to require a showing of harm to the affected child, does not further a compelling state interest, and, therefore, it is facially unconstitutional as violative of a parent's fundamental right of privacy....

...outdated because it holds that a grandparent visitation statute does not violate the Florida Constitution. In Spence, which was decided prior to our decisions in Von Eiff, Saul, and Richardson, but subsequent to Beagle, the Fourth District held that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...See Beagle, 678 So.2d at 1276-77; Von Eiff, 720 So.2d at 514; Saul, 753 So.2d at 29; Richardson, 766 So.2d at 1039-40. Most notably, in Richardson, grandparents moved to intervene in a modification of custody action, seeking custody of a child pursuant to section 61.13(7), and this Court held that the statute was unconstitutional in part because the statute failed to require evidence of demonstrable harm to the child....

...A father who has been a party in paternity litigation has no lesser right to privacy under this state's constitution than a parent who has not been before a court. Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the First District to the extent the lower court properly held section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...The majority's main reason for reaching the constitutional issue is the need to "support and maintain uniformity in Florida law." Majority op. at 34. I am unconvinced that such a need exists in this case. In the decision below, the First District held section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...eir differences amicably. The record is again silent as to the outcome of any negotiations between the parties, or if they even occurred. [3] The portion of the statute reading, "nor do grandparents have legal standing as `contestants' as defined in s. 61.1306" was repealed from section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...ncerning modification of child custody and visitation. See Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So.2d 1034, 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), citing Teta v. Teta, 297 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). We also observe that the final judgment herein predated the enactment of Section 61.13, Florida Statutes, relating to shared parental responsibility. Section 61.13 has no retroactive application....

...marriage case based on a finding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings solely because the Former Husband did not file a Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) [1] affidavit as required by section *178 61.132, Florida Statutes (2000), [2] when he sought a modification of the final judgment....

...arwater. In February 2001, the Former Wife filed a counterclaim for modification of the final judgment, in which she sought primary residential responsibility for the child. Apparently, neither party thought to file a UCCJA affidavit, as required by section 61.132, at any time during these proceedings....

...There is no question that the circuit courts in Florida generally have subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving dissolution of marriage or the modification of judgments dissolving marriages so long as certain factual prerequisites regarding the parties are established. See §§ 26.012(2)(c), 61.043(1), 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2000). The relevant statutory provisions regarding subject matter jurisdiction to modify child custody or child support in a dissolution judgment are found in sections 61.13(1)(a) and 61.13(2)(c). Section 61.13(1)(a) provides in pertinent part: "The court initially entering an order requiring one or both parents to make child support payments shall have continuing jurisdiction after the entry of the initial order to modify the amount and terms and conditions of the child support payments." See also § 88.2051, Fla. Stat. (2000). Section 61.13(2)(c) provides: "The circuit court in the county in which either parent and the child reside or the circuit court in which the original award of custody was entered have jurisdiction to modify an award of child custody." See also Poliak v....

...iction to modify its custody orders, including visitation privileges, until such time as the minor children reach their majority). Further provisions regarding subject matter jurisdiction in child custody proceedings are found in the UCCJA, sections 61.1302-61.1348, Florida Statutes (2000). Under section 61.1308(1), a court of this state has "jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree" if certain requirements regarding the child's residency or presence in the state are met....

...The UCCJA also recognizes the exclusive continuing jurisdiction of a state court that issues an initial custody decree. See Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So.2d 1327, 1332 (Fla.1990) (stating "jurisdiction must be presumed to continue once it is validly acquired under section 61.1308; and it continues up until a Florida court expressly determines on some other basis that jurisdiction no longer is appropriate, until virtually all contacts with Florida have ceased"); Steckel v....

...ourt. The Former Wife's rule 1.540 motion, however, argued that the circuit court that entered the dissolution judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the modification proceedings because the Husband failed to file the affidavit required by section 61.132. Section 61.132(1) requires that "[e]very party in a custody proceeding, in his or her first pleading or in an affidavit attached to that pleading" give certain information under oath regarding the residency of the child and any other custody proceedings....

...ed by the broadly written language of at least one case from this court, Ruble, and cases from the other district courts of appeal, Kochinsky, Walt, Perez, and Mouzon. Tracing the language of Ruble to its source is helpful in analyzing the effect of section 61.132 on subject matter jurisdiction....

...ed custody in his pleadings. After discussing these errors, this court also noted that neither party had filed a UCCJA affidavit, even though the initial pleadings reflected that the wife and child were residing in California. This court noted: *181 Section 61.132(1) requires every party in a custody proceeding in his or her first pleading or in an affidavit attached to that pleading to give information under oath concerning the child's custodians and residences during the past five years and any other proceedings involving the custody of the child....

...a timely UCCJA affidavit in that jurisdiction and (2) the decree was entered without a valid basis for jurisdiction under the UCCJA's provisions. The court stated, "There is no question that an unexcused failure to file the information requested by section 61.132 leaves the court without jurisdiction to enter a valid child custody order under the UCCJA." Id....

...The complaint's failure to adequately allege a basis for long-arm jurisdiction voided any service of process, resulting in a lack of in personam jurisdiction over the respondent husband. And, according to Mouzon: Neither does the complaint or any affidavit attached to it show any of the jurisdictional requirements of section 61.132 or 61.1308, Florida Statutes (1981), so as to vest the court with custody jurisdiction, nor does the complaint even allege that the children reside in Florida, so there is no basis upon which the court could have acquired jurisdiction over the children. Id. at 383. This statement in Mouzon, which seems to be the source of the confusion, was made with no citation to any legal authority. It implies that both sections 61.132 and 61.1308 contain "jurisdictional requirements." However, a plain reading of the statutes reveals otherwise. Section 61.1308 contains the jurisdictional provisions. Section 61.132 contains the vehicle by which a party provides the information necessary to determine jurisdiction. Significantly, section 61.132 says nothing about jurisdiction, although the information it requires to be provided to the court (information about whether the party has participated in any capacity in any litigation concerning custody of the same child, about any custody proceeding concerning the child pending in any court, and about any nonparty's interest in custody or visitation) is often key in making a determination of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction under section 61.1308, and if so, whether it should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under section 61.1316. Therefore, failing to file the section 61.132 affidavit may severely hinder the court's ability to make a determination of jurisdiction. However, failing to file the section 61.132 affidavit is not in itself fatal to jurisdiction, despite the concededly broad language of Mouzon and its progeny....

...But, it does not automatically deprive the court of jurisdiction, void the court's judgments, and subject the judgments to collateral attack. Therefore, Ruble's holding was no doubt limited to its facts — the wife in Ruble was entitled to relief from judgment not simply because the husband failed to comply with section 61.132 but because the factual basis for Florida's subject matter jurisdiction was called into question in light of the wife and child's residence in California....

...We do not by any means intend to downplay the importance of filing a UCCJA affidavit in any case involving a child custody determination. Ruble, Kochinsky, Walt, Perez, and Mouzon are correct in underscoring the UCCJA affidavit's importance. As the cases point out, section 61.132 contains mandatory language that every party in a custody proceeding "shall" give the information required by the statute — which is why when a party to a custody proceeding fails to allege such information, that party's pleadings may...

...cy in defense of any request for custody. See generally Fla. Power & Light Co., 423 So.2d 421 (discussing the differences between a pleading deficiency and lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Further, a court armed with the information required by section 61.132 can easily make an accurate decision as to whether it has a factual basis for subject matter jurisdiction under section 61.1308, and if so, whether jurisdiction should be declined....

...tes when the sister state assumed jurisdiction "under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act," the filing of a proper UCCJA affidavit will strengthen any decree against a jurisdictional challenge made in another state. § 61.1328, Fla. Stat. (2000); Kochinsky, 698 So.2d at 398. A court that has considered all of the information in section 61.132 is more likely to have properly exercised jurisdiction, and its order is therefore more likely to be enforceable in other states. Given these concerns, a circuit court would be wise to ensure compliance with section 61.132 in all cases, even in the absence of the issue being raised by a party....

...It was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), effective October 1, 2002. However, the UCCJA continues to apply to all custody proceedings filed before the UCCJEA's effective date. See § 61.542, Fla. Stat. (2002). [2] Section 61.132 was repealed by chapter 2002-65, section 7, at 870, Laws of Florida, effective October 1, 2002....

...ld produce far-reaching results. We granted review of the instant case to resolve the conflict between these decisions rendered by District Courts of Appeal, and now conclude that we must quash the decision under review and remand with instructions. Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2001), provides a court that has entered an order requiring a parent to pay child support with continuing jurisdiction to modify the original order upon a showing of necessity to further the supported child's best interest, when the child reaches the age of majority, or if there is a substantial change *490 in the circumstances of the parties. See § 61.13(1)(a), Fla....

...the fundamental goal of solving the human problem before us, rather than exacerbating an already difficult situation. The instant action requires that this Court consider and address a purported internal conceptual conflict between the provisions in section 61.13 that provide a basis for the trial court to modify a child support decree when it is necessary to the child's best interests, and those which allow modification when there is a substantial change in the parties' circumstances....

...It is quite possible that the obligor's payments toward the amounts accumulated after the petition to modify was filed will continue beyond the time that the child support obligations would otherwise naturally terminate, for instance when the child reaches the age of majority. See § 61.13(1)(a), Fla....

...the child' prong [as opposed to] the substantial change [of circumstances] test, which when properly applied ensures the stability of custody-related awards because of the res judicata effect of the original decree." Id. at 934. Without reference to section 61.13(2)(b)(2.), Florida Statutes, the Florida Supreme Court concluded in the Wade case that [r]equiring proof of detriment to the child in order to [justify modification] misstates the burden that is necessary to overcome the res judicata ef...

...Grimaldi, 721 So.2d 820, 821-22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (reversing trial court's modification of custody from shared parental responsibility to sole parental responsibility where the evidence did not show that shared parental responsibility was detrimental to the child, quoting section 61.13(2)(b)(2.), Florida Statutes, which provides that "[t]he court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child."); Hunter v. Hunter, 540 So.2d 235, 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (same). [3] There is also some question as to whether the trial court actually considered the required "best interest" factors, pursuant to section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2005), to determine that modification of the New York decree was in the best interest of the children. See § 61.13(3), Fla....

...Ortiz, 654 So.2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding "that the lower court should have entered a final order on custody"). Even a temporary award of custody, moreover, requires consideration of the child's best interests and findings based on evidence, in accordance with section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2000). A trial court need not make separate findings as to each of the factors in section 61.13(3), but it must find, at a minimum, that its custody determination is in the best interests of the child....

...e is residing is dangerous" without ever addressing the broader question of the best interests of the child. The supplemental final judgment fails to find that awarding Mr. Clark primary residential custody is in the best interests of the child. See § 61.13(3), Fla....

...g the Husband primary residential custodian because the reasons cited by the trial court in support of its designation are not supported by the record, and do not satisfy the statutory requirements for custody determinations as set forth in sections 61.13(3)(a),(j), Florida Statutes. We find the trial court's reasons satisfy the statutory requirements of section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, and the record contains a plethora of substantial competent evidence to support its designation. Accordingly, we affirm. Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, requires a trial court, in deciding issues of shared parental responsibility and primary residence, to evaluate "all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child" to determine the child's best interest....

...ining which parent should be designated primary residential custodian, where the evidence could favor either parent. Despite there being no requirement, the trial judge provided a thorough, written evaluation of *170 each of the factors contained in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes. Each of the trial judge's findings were supported by substantial competent evidence. We commend the trial judge for his very thorough consideration of each element of section 61.13(3), and the detailed written opinion delineating each factor considered....

...Similarly, in this action, the child is not a party and is pursuing no claims or defenses. We conclude that this statutory exception to the assertion of the privilege does not apply nor are any other exceptions relevant. III. Best Interests of the Child Pursuant to section 61.13(2)(a), the court shall determine all matters pertaining to custody of minor children according to their "best interest." That best interest calculation "shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child, including, but not limited to: ... [t]he love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parents and the child[,] ... [t]he mental... health of the parents[,] ... [and][e]vidence of ... child abuse ...." § 61.13(3)(b), (g), and ( l ), Fla.Stat....

...McIntyre, 404 So.2d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). While the parents assert the need of the trial court for information necessary to decide the child custody issue, the trial court may not ignore the rules of evidence. Indeed, even if we could somehow construe section 61.13 as a general authority for the court to gather all evidence necessary to decide the issue, purely on statutory construction principles, the specific privilege allowed under the evidence code would prevail over any general grant of authority under the dissolution statute....

...otherwise and intellectually their development is impaired and their ability and interest in forming relationships with people diminishes... ." [3] While, all things being equal, mothers and fathers get equal consideration in matters of custody, see § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...s presented, it is incumbent upon the chancellor to evaluate, among other crucial factors, the mental health of each of the parents in making a final custody determination which is in accord with the best interest of the minor child or children. See Section 61.13(3)(g), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Best Interests On appeal, the mother argues that the temporary custody award was improper *503 because the record fails to reflect that the trial court considered the best interests of the child in making the temporary custody award. We agree. The shared parental responsibility law, section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2002), applies to custody disputes between unmarried parents as well as married parents. See Stepp v. Stepp, 520 So.2d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Although separate findings as to each factor in section 61.13(3) are not required to sustain a temporary award, nevertheless, the record or the final judgment must reflect that the custody determination was made in the best interests of the child....

...pronouncement) addresses the best interests of the child. Therefore, we must reverse and remand the case for a further hearing. II. Relocation The mother also asserts that the trial court erred in not considering the relocation factors set forth in section 61.13(2)(d)(1)-(6) in making its temporary custody determination....

...h the child. See generally Mian v. Mian, 775 So.2d 357 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Nevertheless, relocation factors are to be considered as part of the court's evaluation of "all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child." Id. at 359 (quoting § 61.13(3), Fla....

...She alleged that the Father had been arrested for criminal charges and was being held in jail. She also filed a supplemental petition for modification of parental responsibility and requested sole parental responsibility for the children. The Grandmother moved to intervene pursuant to section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.1995). *593 The Mother next argues that the Florida Supreme Court decision in Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 2000), mandates reversal. At the time of trial, Richardson had not yet been decided. The supreme court held "that section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1999), is facially unconstitutional in vesting custody rights in others because it violates a natural parent's fundamental right to rear his or her child." Richardson, 766 So.2d at 1037....

...proceedings were commenced, had actual physical custody of the children and had custody for a lengthy period of time—is excluded from participating or lacks standing in a custody proceeding with a parent. Instead, the supreme court determined that section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1999), was unconstitutional because it gave grandparents custody rights equal to those of a parent, and it allowed courts to make custody decisions between parents and grandparents using solely the best interest of the child standard....

...Yet this rule has not been universally accepted and, in fact, appears to rest on a tenuous foundation. Prior to July 1, 1973, the question of whether a court could order a parent who had the ability to do so to provide his child with a college education was seldom if ever raised. Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1979), then provided, as it does now, that in a dissolution proceeding a court could require a parent who owed a duty of support to a child to pay such support as was necessary and equitable....

...der that either grants specified visitation rights or denies visitation rights after considering the best interests of the minor child. Also, the final judgment improperly conditions the husband's visitation rights upon his payment of child support. Section 61.13(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: "When a noncustodial parent who is ordered to pay child support or alimony and who is awarded visitation rights fails to pay child support or alimony, the custodial parent shall not refuse to ho...

..."It is the public policy of this state that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of childrearing." § 61.13(2)(c)1., Fla....

...A judge is certainly free to view such testimony with some skepticism. But even apart from the weight of the only expert's testimony, there is independent statutory authorization to order psychological evaluation in child custody proceedings. We first note that in section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1991), subsection (3) directly and expressly requires a judge *845 in a custody case to consider and evaluate certain specific issues and provides as follows: For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary...

...In short, her accusation that he has allegedly sexually abused the child and his allegation that she has deliberately concocted these charges to achieve sole custody — both equally reprehensible conduct — furnish a relevant foundation for the examinations of both parents as well as the child. If section 61.13 supplies the relevancy, then section 61.20, Florida Statutes (1991), furnishes the specific tool....

...1957, 95 So.2d 521; Terry v. Terry, Fla.App. 1961, 126 So.2d 890. The increased allowance for child support stands upon an even firmer foundation. Meltzer v. Meltzer, Fla.App. 1972, 262 So.2d 470; Waller v. Waller, Fla. App. 1968, 212 So.2d 352. See also Fla. Stat. § 61.13, F.S.A., which provides in part: * * * * * * "The court initially entering an order requiring one or both parents to make child support payments shall have continuing jurisdiction after the entry of such initial order to modify the amount of...

...3rd DCA 1974); Lee v. Kepler, 197 So.2d 570 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1967). Each of these cases relies on Parker, supra . The legislature has now granted authority to the trial court to award visitation rights to grandparents if it is in the child's best interest. § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...to pay such support as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case is equitable." The order appealed is reversed with directions to grant appellant a new hearing not inconsistent herewith. WIGGINTON and CARROLL, DONALD K., JJ., concur. NOTES [1] F.S. § 61.13, F.S.A. (1969); Pollack v. Pollack, 159 Fla. 224, 31 So.2d 253 (1947), and Heckes v. Heckes, 129 Fla. 653, 176 So. 541 (1937). [2] F.S. § 61.13 (1971), F.S.A....

...When the entire paternity, custody and support case came to trial and after hearing conflicting evidence on the issues, the court found that it was in the best interests of the child for the parents to share custody, with the father being the primary residential parent. The court determined that the criteria listed in section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1999), favored the father as primary residential custodian....

...Viscito compels that result here. We therefore reverse for the trial court to set forth its findings on this issue. The court may, in its discretion, take additional testimony on the issue. Finally, the court miscalculated the health insurance expense in the child support award. Section 61.13(1)(b) provides, "the court shall apportion the cost of [health insurance] coverage, and any noncovered medical, dental, and prescription medication expenses of the child, to both parties by adding the cost to the basic obligation determined pursuant to s....

...61.30(6)." Section 61.30(6) lists the schedules to be applied to the combined net income of the parents to determine the child's minimum need of support. Section 61.30(8) further provides that, "[h]ealth insurance costs resulting from coverage ordered pursuant to s. 61.13(1)(b) ......

...First, the regulations amply demonstrate that the role accorded WYO companies is more than that of mere functionary. WYO companies may issue policies in their own names (as Capital issued Newton’s) rather than in that of FEMA or the United States, see 44 C.F.R. § 61.13 (f), and they may use their own, individual “customary business practices”, § 62.23(a); see also § 62.23(e)....

...of him and/or her. Rosemary, meanwhile, relying upon section 63.13(1), Florida Statutes (1981), contends that the modification was proper since the court found that it was in the children's best interests to grant an increase. We agree with William. Section 61.13(1) reads in pertinent part as follows: 61.13 Custody and support of children, etc., power of court in making orders....

...to be necessary by the court because there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties. (Emphasis added) In Wood v. Wood, 272 So.2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), cited by Rosemary in support of her argument, our sister court held that section 61.13(1) permits a trial court to modify child support payments when it finds that it is in the children's best interests, even though it does not find that there has been a substantial change in circumstances. However, section 61.13(1) is inapplicable in the instant case for two reasons....

...anted. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the order modifying the child support provision of the dissolution judgment and remand with directions to vacate such portion. REVERSED and REMANDED. BOARDMAN and RYDER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In ruling section 61.13(1) inapplicable under the facts at bar, we intimate no opinion as to how we would have construed this statute if the parties had not entered an agreement providing for support and the court had initially entered an order requiring suppo...

...A court which enters an order requiring one or both parties to make child support payments has continuing jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of the payment, whether the source of the obligation was a court order or an agreement between the parties approved by the court. § 61.13, Fla....

...diction after the entry of such order to require the person or persons awarded custody of the child or children to make a report to the court on terms prescribed by the court as to the expenditure or other disposition of said child support payments. § 61.13(1), Fla....

...In July 1982, the California court, where the earlier temporary order was entered, declined to continue its jurisdiction to consider the wife's petition for visitation rights, for the express reason that the "courts in Florida are the more convenient courts to resolve any custody disputes." See § 61.1308(1)(d), Fla....

...[3] It is agreed that the children had been living in Florida for almost a year and that Florida is the home state. We make several observations, at the outset, regarding the controlling laws. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA") does not mandate recognition of custody decrees of foreign nations. See § 61.1348, Fla. Stat. (1981). However, the courts are not free to disregard custody decrees of other nations simply because they are non-UCCJA decrees. Section 61.1348, Florida Statutes (1981) provides that before the provisions of the UCCJA relating to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of other states can be applied to decrees of foreign nations, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard must have been given by the foreign tribunal to all affected persons. Section 61.1348 also extends the general policies of the Act to the international area....

...But we find the Bahamian proceeding and final judgment are exceedingly difficult to square with the general policies of the UCCJA in matters of jurisdiction and substance. First, the inquiry conducted by the Bahamian court does not meet the requirements of Section 61.1348, i.e., that "reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard" be given....

...California temporary order, with no live witnesses present and testifying, conducted five days after the parties entered the jurisdiction, constituted "reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard." Even if we were to find that the requirements of Section 61.1348 were met, Section 61.1328 — which, by reference in Section 61.1348, applies to foreign nation decrees [4] — weighs against recognition of the Bahamian order....

...The Bahamian court's exercise of jurisdiction, even if valid under its own laws, did not satisfy, substantially, UCCJA prerequisites, and the Bahamian decree was not entered under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Act. § 61.1328, Fla. Stat. (1981). The jurisdictional standards that must be adhered to by a court of this state and, according to the above analysis, must also be met by a court of a foreign nation, are defined in *667 Section 61.1308, Florida Statutes....

...3d DCA 1981) (custody decree of foreign state (Texas) need not be recognized by Florida court where Texas was without jurisdiction under its own laws to enter a custody decree, and Texas law permitting exercise of jurisdiction over minors is inconsistent with residency requirements of UCCJA). Section 61.1308(2) provides that physical presence in the state of the children, or of the children and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction except (1) in cases of abandonment, mistreatment, abuse, or neglect, Section 61.1308(1)(c), or (2) where (a) "[i]t appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with [Section 61.1308(1)(a)-(c)]," or (b) it is shown that another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine custody, and it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction. § 61.1308(1)(d)....

...The Bahamian court's jurisdiction rests solely on the physical presence of the children in the Bahamas — that presence being temporary, and obviously for the purpose of obtaining a favorable ruling on custody. There is no showing that the exceptions to Section 61.1308(2) apply here....

...Under Florida law, a court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody, unless required in the interest of the child. § 61.1318(2), Fla. Stat. (1981). [5] Not only does the Bahamian decree contravene the jurisdictional standards of *668 the UCCJA, but it also defeats the purposes and policies of the Act, as stated in Section 61.1304, among which are: (1) to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict, (2) to assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child takes place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connectio...

...comity do not require recognition since the decree is offensive to a public policy of our state, i.e., that a custody decision be based upon the best interests and welfare of the minor children. Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 122 A.2d 593 (1956). Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1981) states that the court shall consider and evaluate all factors affecting the best interests of the child, and enumerates some of the significant factors. There are conspicuously missing, among the factors considered by the Bahamian court, the following considerations of Section 61.13(3): (1) length of time the children lived in a stable environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity; (2) education of the children; (3) psychological stability of the parents based on competent evidence; and (4) physical health of the parents....

...versing the trial court. There is an alternative and more fundamental basis for disposition of the case. Assuming, without deciding, that the Bahamian decree is entitled to recognition, the Florida court has jurisdiction to modify that decree, under Section 61.133, Florida Statutes (1981), because it is clear that at the time the wife filed her petition in Florida to modify the foreign decree, (1) the Bahamian court had no jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter under prerequisites substantially in accordance with the provisions of the UCCJA, and (2) the Florida court did have jurisdiction pursuant to Section 61.1308(1)(a) or (b)....

...their father alone since the mother left Florida in January, 1982 to file the California action. [3] The wife sought a modification that she and her husband share the parental responsibility and that the children reside primarily with the wife. [4] Section 61.1348 refers indirectly to Section 61.1328 as follows: "The provisions of this act relating to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of other states......

...2d DCA 2001), the Second District held that the failure to include in a divorce record evidence of a husband's insurability, cost of proposed insurance, and a husband's ability to afford insurance warranted reversal of an order requiring the husband to purchase insurance to secure child support and an alimony obligation. Section 61.13(1)(c), provides that a court may order an obligor to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy to the extent necessary to protect an award of child support, § 61.13(1)(c), Fla....

...The court also noted that the Fourth District's opinions in Gordon and Pariser conflicted with the "essential holding" of T.M.W. Russenberger, 623 So.2d at 1245 n. 2. In addition, the court specifically found that the case did not present the type of situation contemplated by section 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Florida Statutes (1991). [1] *965 In Gordon the Fourth District found that section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1991), [2] gives a trial judge independent statutory authorization to order a psychological evaluation in child custody proceedings....

...In such a case, the judge need not comply with the requirements of rule 1.360. Thus, we need not disapprove the decisions in Pariser and Gordon. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW and KOGAN, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. NOTES [1] Section 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Florida Statutes (1991), provides: In ordering shared parental responsibility, the court may consider the expressed desires of the parents and may grant to one party the ultimate responsibility over specific aspects of the ch...

...bilities between the parties based on the best interests of the child. Areas of responsibility may include primary residence, education, medical and dental care, and any other responsibilities which the court finds unique to a particular family. [2] Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1991), provides in relevant part: (3) For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary residence, the best interests of the child shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child, including, but not limited to: ......

...ed that the wife have sole parental responsibility of the child. The court did not, however, make a finding that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child before awarding sole parental responsibility to the wife as required by section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...This is not to say that the court was without the authority to modify the TSA absent a breach of the agreement. However, it could not do so absent a showing of “a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and that the modification is in the best interest of the child.” § 61.13(3), Fla....

...of majority to 18 years shall not prohibit " any court of competent jurisdiction from requiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 years." (Emphasis supplied). The statute does not define the term, "court of competent jurisdiction." Section 61.13 empowers a court in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage to order a parent to pay child support....

...The court which enters such an order is expressly given "continuing jurisdiction" to modify the child support provisions when required *280 by the best interest of the child, change of circumstances of the parties, or "when the child or any one of the children has reached the age of 18 years." Sec. 61.13(1), Fla....

...For these reasons, the order of the lower court under review is affirmed. AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] At the time the Judgment was entered, the "disability of nonage" or age of majority had been changed from 21 years to 18 years. § 743.07(1), Fla. Stat. (1973). [2] § 61.13(1), Fla....

...The funds were to be used for Bill's support, care and benefit. Should there be any doubt or problem concerning use of the funds for Bill's benefit, or should Bill no longer make his home with Mrs. Fagan, there are remedies available to Mr. Fagan. § 61.13(1), Fla....

...Appellant contests this award claiming that she should have been given custody of the minor child as she is his mother. However, the "tender years" doctrine has been statutorily abolished, and courts may not give any preference in determining custody to the mother based solely on the age of the child. See § 61.13(2)(b)1, Fla. Stat. (1993); Cherradi v. Lavoie, 662 So.2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Instead, courts must evaluate all relevant statutory factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child. See § 61.13(3), Fla.Stat....

...mentally and physically abused appellant. Thus, there is competent evidence of abuse in the present record, yet it is unreflected in the trial court's findings. We agree with appellant that this factor was not given due consideration as required by section 61.13(2), Florida Statutes, which provides: The court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child....

...iked to see her naked. She also related that the child told her the grandfather told her to "take it [her clothes] off." Ms. Smith expressed her belief that it would be in the child's best interests to permit the grandfather supervised contact only. Section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), provides that a court may award grandparents visitation rights if the court deems that such visitation would be in the child's best interest. Wishart v. Bates, 531 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1988) (emphasis supplied); see also § 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...FARMER, J., dissents with opinion. FARMER, Judge, dissenting. I am unable to agree with a reversal of this final order in a proceeding to modify a final judgment in a paternity action. As to the custody issue, shared custody is the norm, not the exception. See § 61.13(2)(b)1., Fla....

...As a result, because no court of any other state would have had jurisdiction under section 61.514, the Florida trial court had jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination. In making an initial custody determination, the trial court must evaluate the non-inclusive factors listed in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, and determine the best interests of the child. See § 61.13, Fla....

...e of lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Cunningham, 630 So.2d at 181. "A trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction makes its judgments void...." Strommen, 927 So.2d at 179. [2] Contrary to the mother's contention, section 61.1312, Florida Statutes (2002), does not apply in this case. In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted the UCCJEA, to replace the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, sections 61.1302 to 61.1348, Florida Statutes, which had included that section....

...ourt may order any party who is ordered to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure such alimony award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose. A similar amendment was made to section 61.13(1), pertaining to child support....

...Finally, concerning health insurance for the minor children, it may be reasonable for the trial court to place that obligation upon the husband. Prior to ordering the husband to assume this responsibility, however, the trial court must determine that the insurance is "reasonably available." § 61.13(1)(b), Fla....

...ural parent's unfitness). In reversing that portion of the order denying appellant's motion to modify custody, we note the necessity of provisions for liberal and reasonable visitation of the children by the maternal grandparents and the mother. See section 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Accordingly, we reverse the court's appointment of the father as primary residential parent, and remand with directions to enter a new custody order. Because we are remanding, we further note that a number of the court's other findings under the custody factors set out in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1997), were not supported by the evidence, and in some cases were contrary to the undisputed evidence. In reaching a new custody decision, the court must reconsider these factors. Section 61.13(3)(d) requires that a court consider "[t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity." The final judgment found "that due to the rotating custody, there has been no stable environment favoring one parent over the other...." Similarly, section 61.13(3)(h) directs the court to weigh "[t]he home, school and community record of the child." Again, the court found this factor did not favor either parent because of the rotating custody....

...The psychologist testified that the children's artwork was very positive concerning their mother and her partner. He believed the father's fiancée was an "unknown quantity." The court's conclusory finding that, because of the rotating custody arrangement, the factors in sections 61.13(3)(d) and (h) had no bearing on this case was not supported by the evidence. In its finding concerning the permanence of the proposed custodial homes, section 61.13(3)(e), the court focused on the psychologist's speculation that the mother might not, in fact, be homosexual....

...into his third marital home. Finally, the court noted that the legislature must have believed that the fostering of a relationship between the children and the noncustodial parent was very important because it addressed this issue twice, in sections 61.13(3)(a) and (j)....

...If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the trial court's action, then it cannot be said the trial court abused its discretion. See id. at 1203. In this case, I believe the trial court gave thorough consideration to the criteria set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...he trial court. Under such circumstances, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary residential responsibility to Mr. Jacoby. I would affirm on that issue. Otherwise, I concur in the majority opinion. NOTES [1] Section 61.13(3)(a): "The parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent." Section 61.13(3)(j): "The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent." [2] The circuit court did not make any findings that the other factors discussed in Rosen v....

...SILBERMAN, Judge. In this post dissolution proceeding, Leslie Ann Fredman, n/k/a Leslie Ann Melton (the Mother), appeals a final order denying her supplemental petition and prohibiting her from relocating with the parties' two children to Texas. She contends that section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2004), the parental relocation statute, [1] is unconstitutional because it abridges her fundamental rights to privacy and travel and violates her right to equal protection of the law....

...family on Tuesday nights. Furthermore, the Father testified that both the Father and the Mother attend the children's bowling league on Saturdays. On December 10, 2004, after a final hearing, the trial court rendered an order applying the factors in section 61.13(2)(d) regarding relocation and denying the Mother's request for modification of visitation. On appeal, this court reversed and remanded for the trial court to use the proper legal standard set forth in section 61.13(2)(d)(4) regarding the proposed substitute visitation for the Father....

...n appeal). The constitutionality of the relocation statute appears to be a question of first impression in the State of Florida. We emphasize, however, that this opinion does not address the significantly amended version of the relocation statute in section 61.13001 but applies only to the version of the statute in section 61.13(2)(d). Section 61.13(2)(d) provides as follows: No presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to remove the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact and access with the secondary residential parent....

...mption of constitutionality, and the reviewing court should, if possible, construe a statute in a manner resulting in a constitutional outcome. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla.2005). When the legislature enacted section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes, in 1997, it provided, "No presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact and access with the secondary residential parent." See Ch....

...Here, the Florida relocation statute expressly states that there is no presumption in favor of or against relocation. Because the Father's constitutional rights must also be considered, we reject the Mother's argument that the lack of a presumption in favor of the Mother is unconstitutional. Further, section 61.13(2)(d) is silent as to the burden of proof....

...4th DCA 1998) ("Although there is no longer any presumption favoring relocation, the burden of proof as to whether a relocation meets the statutory criteria is not addressed by the statute.") When a primary residential parent seeks to relocate a child, section 61.13(2)(d) requires the court to consider all the statutory factors without any presumptions in favor of either party. The factors address, among other things, the relocating parent's quality of life, the other parent's ability to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the child's best interests. See § 61.13(2)(d)(1), (4), (6)....

...e, the parties are not similarly situated; thus, the statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, we conclude that the statute is constitutional on its face. II. DENIAL OF REQUEST TO RELOCATE The Mother contends that, in applying section 61.13(2)(d), the trial court abused its discretion in denying her relocation request on remand following the earlier appeal....

...The standard of review regarding a trial court's order on relocation is abuse of discretion. Botterbusch v. Botterbusch, 851 So.2d 903, 904 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Competent, substantial evidence must support the trial court's findings as to the factors in section 61.13(2)(d) that the trial court must consider in making its determination....

...in denying the Mother's request to relocate to Texas. In this court's prior opinion in Fredman v. Fredman, 917 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), we reversed and remanded for the trial court to again consider the mother's proposed relocation under section 61.13(2)(d), with directions to use the proper standard as stated in section 61.13(2)(d)(4): "Whether the substitute visitation will be adequate to foster a continuing meaningful relationship between the child and the secondary residential parent." In its new order, rendered on March 24, 2006, the trial court found th...

...Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Mother's request to relocate with the children to Texas. Affirmed. WHATLEY and KELLY, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] The legislature significantly amended the parental relocation statute and moved it to section 61.13001, effective October 1, 2006. See Ch.2006-245, §§ 2, 4, at 2017-22, Laws of Fla. The parties did not mention the new statute in their briefs, and the trial court's orders were entered prior to the amendment, pursuant to section 61.13(2)(d). Thus, this opinion does not address section 61.13001.

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District. June 14, 1984. *1269 Donald J. Sasser of Johnston, Sasser, Randolph & Weaver, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Walter T. Rose, Jr., of Rose & Weller, Cocoa Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. This case involves "shared parental responsibility" under section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...l responsibility, any language contained in Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, to the contrary notwithstanding. The father appeals and argues that placing the ultimate responsibility on the wife as to the most important aspects of child rearing violated section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1983). We cannot agree. Section 61.13(2)(b)2.a....

...discretion to provide for the best interest and welfare of children as to their custody, visitation, and support. We again hold that the ultimate test in determining the custody award is the best interests and welfare of the child as contemplated by section 61.13(2)(b)2.a....

...f child support, [2] in not requiring the wife to remain in a certain location for five years or in awarding attorney's fees. AFFIRMED. ORFINGER, C.J., COWART, J., and WATSON, R.O., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Query. Does the last sentence in section 61.13(2)(b)1. limit section 61.13(3)(j) and prohibit the trial judge in determining custody to consider the age of the child as a relevant factor? Does this abolish the "tender years" doctrine? [2] Whether a child is a dependent beyond the age of 18 years should be dete...

...Gerde, of Johnston, Harris & Gerde, Panama City, for appellant. Elizabeth A. Nichols, pro se. WENTWORTH, Judge. Appellant seeks review of an order assigning to appellee "the primary parental responsibility for the care and upbringing" of the parties' children. Section 61.13(2)(b) 2 Fla....

...Our holding in the case on appeal is controlled by our decision in Music v. Rachford, 654 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In Music, we held that chapter 61, Florida Statutes, does not allow non-parents to seek custody or visitation. By its explicit provisions, section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2004), concerns only the parents' custody, support and visitation....

...the public policy of this state to assure that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parties separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of childrearing. § 61.13(2)(b)1., Fla....

...The former husband points out that he cannot afford a two bedroom apartment on his meager income and that this provision is patently unreasonable. Overnight visitation is a very important component of a non-custodial parent's visitation rights. It should be awarded, absent some overriding concern for the child's safety. See § 61.13(7), Fla....

...child, as they are in dissolution proceedings. See Privette v. State of Florida, Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 585 So.2d 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), approved, 617 So.2d 305 (Fla.1993); Benac v. Bree, 590 So.2d 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Under section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), a court may award grandparental visitation rights in a dissolution proceeding if the court deems that such visitation is in the child's best interest....

...one parent as to child rearing decisions absent agreement by the other parent. With respect to grandparent visitation, the legislature has provided that grandparents may receive visitation privileges if that is in the best interest of the child. See § 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c)....

...r grandparental visitation is in the best interest of the child is not violative of the right to privacy. The trial court passed on the issue of the constitutionality of section 752.01(1)(d) without considering that visitation could be granted under section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c), as applied to paternity actions....

...Such areas of responsibility may include primary physical residence, education, medical and dental care, and any other responsibilities which the court finds unique to a particular family and/or in the best interests of the child. (Emphasis added). § 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Fla....

...The Legislature has opted for this course of action as a matter of public policy. [3] The purpose is to prevent there being any "big loser" in child custody cases, if possible. If the parties cannot agree or work together at all, then a finding pursuant to section 61.13(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (1983) would be appropriate....

...be specifically worked out in the final judgment. [4] However, to lump all decision-making authority in one party for all matters, undermines the mandate of the law that decisions be "jointly made," unless there is a finding as required pursuant to section 61.13(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (1983)....

...especially this one, the transcript reveals, of valued judgment in this regard I think her wishes should have been honored. Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1958). Primary physical residency should have gone with the father. Florida Statute 61.13(2)(b)(1) (1983) provides: The court shall determine all matters relating to custody of each minor child of the parties as a part of any proceeding under this chapter in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act....

...This statute should have been followed as should the wishes of the child. Eades v. Dorio, 113 So.2d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959). I would reverse the award of primary physical residency and remand for reconsideration of the other matters attached thereto. NOTES [1] Section 61.13(2)(b)2., Fla....

...arents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child. If the court determines that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child, the court may order sole parental responsibility. [2] § 61.13, Fla. Stat. (1983). [3] Section 61.13(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes (1983) provides: It is the public policy of this state to assure each minor child frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing. [4] § 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Fla....

...Dorta-Duque, 791 So.2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). We review the trial court's decision on relocation for abuse of discretion. Id. The Mother's Petition for Relocation To adjudicate the petition for relocation, the trial court analyzed the factors listed in section 61.13(3)(d), Florida Statutes, and concluded that relocation was not in the best interest of the child. See § 61.13(3)(d), Fla....

...*546 Paragraph 2 of the MSA provides that "[n]either party shall relocate from the Miami-Dade County area without the written consent of the other party or an Order of Court." Florida law does not recognize a presumption in favor of or against a primary residential parent who seeks to relocate a child. See § 61.13(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005). Instead, the trial court must evaluate the factors enumerated in section 61.13(3)(d), Florida Statutes, when considering a petition....

...The father objected to the request and the matter was referred to a magistrate under Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.490 for resolution. Following an evidentiary hearing at which eleven witnesses testified, the magistrate made detailed findings of fact and, as to the criteria set forth in section 61.13(2)(d)1-6 of the Florida Statutes, concluded that relocation would likely improve the general quality of life for both the residential parent and the child; that although the mother had consistently facilitated visitation, the father had...

...he trial court abused its discretion. See Dorta-Duque v. Dorta-Duque, 791 So.2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). We look to see if there is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's findings concerning the statutory factors listed in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...runk v. Sistrunk, Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 53, 55, the Supreme Court said: "While the court is authorized by statute to modify the provisions of the final judgment as the same pertain to the care, custody and maintenance of children of the marriage (Section 61.13, F.S....

...ntial, competent evidence to support that decision. Adair v. Adair, 720 So.2d 316, 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The Husband has not met this burden. The record reflects that the trial court considered the best interests of the children as required under section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...the mother's home for summers and holidays. The guardian ad litem testified that the father was "very bonded with the child" and that the child was "very happy" at the father's home, located in a school district with an A-rated school. Applying the section 61.13 criteria, the guardian ad litem opined that it would be in the child's best interest for the father to be the primary residential parent, explaining that the father would allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the mother,...

...r incident, finding that the mother's actions were "indicative of frustrating the father's access and contact to the minor child and not in the child's best interest." Ultimately, the trial court stated that it considered the factors set forth under section 61.13, adopted the recommendations of the court-appointed guardian ad litem, and determined that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances warranting a modification of primary residential custody....

...s still in high school and reasonably expected to graduate before the age of 19. PRIMARY PHYSICAL RESIDENCE We are cognizant that the trial court's determination of a child's primary physical residence, made after evaluation of the factors listed in section 61.13, is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review....

...court judge. However, our review of the record reveals the trial court made no determinations regarding the credibility of either party. Our conclusion does not turn on a question of credibility. Rather we address the trial court's failure to apply section 61.13 as intended by its authors....

...s our finding an abuse of discretion. We are troubled not only by the absence of any meaningful analysis of the extensive evidence of domestic violence, but also by the apparent misapplication of record evidence to the statutory factors contained in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1995). That statute provides: 61.13 Custody and support of children; visitation rights; power of court in making order.— * * * * * * (3) For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary residence, the best interests of the child shall include an evaluation of all facto...

...e to express a preference. (j) The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent. (k) Any other fact considered by the court to be relevant. Section 61.13(3), Fla....

...[2] Fredrica Lehrman's article, Factoring Domestic Violence into Custody Cases, TRIAL, Feb. 1996, at 32, is commended as offering an excellent explanation of the interaction between "friendly-parent" provisions, such as those contained in sections 61.13(3)(a) and (j), and provisions addressing domestic violence, such as that contained in Section 61.13(2)(b)2., which requires a court to consider evidence of spousal or child abuse as evidence of detriment to the child when making a determination regarding shared parental responsibility. Section 61.13(2)(b)2., Fla....

...Because the trial court failed to change the date, the final judgment erroneously orders a child support reduction retroactive to a date prior to the change to rotating custody. The final judgment also inexplicably orders child support to be paid directly to the Wife contrary to section 61.13(1)(d)(3), Florida Statutes, which requires payments to be made through the Central Governmental Depository absent a request by both parties and a finding by the court that it is in the best interest of the child....

...t failed to address factors required to overcome that presumption. The Husband argues first that the Wife failed to assert the presumption in the trial court and has, therefore, waived this issue. Alternatively, he argues that the 2008 amendments to section 61.13 apply in this case and that those amendments were intended to remove any adverse distinction for rotating custody....

...A judgment provision simply stating the amount of attorney's fees required to be paid without any specific findings regarding the basis for the determination of the amount is facially invalid. Maas v. Maas, 541 So.2d 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). On this issue we remand for further proceedings. (c) Insurance Requirement Section 61.13(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), authorizes the trial court to order the obligor to maintain a life insurance policy to the extent necessary to secure an award of child support....

...We could reverse the order if an error of law appears on the face of the order even without a transcript. Sugrim v. Sugrim, 649 So.2d 936 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 642 So.2d 20 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Here, however, there is no error in the trial judge's detailed findings supporting the change of custody. Section 61.13(4)(c) [1] permits a change of custody if the custodial parent interferes with visitation....

...nd" could be a proper basis to make the change. Appellant says that the court acknowledged that any visitation problems had long since been solved but we have no way to determine that *113 the evidence does not support the court's finding. NOTES [1] Section 61.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: (c) When a custodial parent refuses to honor a noncustodial parent's visitation rights without proper cause, the court may: * * * * * * 2. Award the custody or primary residence to the noncustodial parent, if the award is in the best interests of the child. [2] See §§ 61.13(3)(a)-(k), Fla....

...Without any evidence demonstrating how the children would adjust to the rotating custody, there is no way for a court to evaluate whether there may be "special circumstances" that justify the arrangement. Upon remand, the trial court shall consider the mother's relocation request in accordance with section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...Sullivan v. Sullivan, 668 So.2d 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), and no abuse has been shown, see Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So.2d 265 (Fla.1986); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). We find the court correctly applied the criteria of section 61.13, Florida Statutes, in determining who should be the primary residential parent....

...The husband received exclusive use and occupancy of the marital residence, which had an equity of under $7,000. The former wife challenges the award of primary residential custody to the former husband because no specific findings were made by the trial court with regard to the statutory considerations set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes....

...ion of visitation attempts made by Deloris. The lower court cogently found as expressed in its order: 1. The Father, Elijah Williams, has willfully refused to honor the Mother's visitation rights with Elijah Terrell Williams, without just cause. See Section 61.13(4)(c)(2), Florida Statutes. He caused her to drive four hours one way on several occasions only to deny her visitation upon arrival. 2. That it is in the best interest of Elijah Terrell Williams to reside with his Mother, Deloris Williams. Section 61.13(4)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (1995) provides: (c) When a custodial parent refuses to honor a noncustodial parent's visitation rights without proper cause, the court may: * * * * * * 2....

...n of visitation alone will not support a change of custody. The record clearly shows, however, that the "best interests" issue was argued to the lower court and that the court was well informed as to the controlling test for a change of custody. [1] Section 61.13(3) provides a non-inclusive list of factors which the court is required to evaluate in determining shared parental responsibility, primary residence, and the best interests of the child: (a) the parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent....

...h Deloris rather than Elijah. Elijah urges, however, that the lower court could not change custody because Deloris did not offer evidence on the other statutory factors. We disagree and conclude there is enough evidence in the record consistent with section 61.13 to support the lower court's best interests finding....

...I do not disagree with the majority that competent substantial evidence exists in the record to support the trial court's finding that Elijah frustrated efforts by Deloris to exercise her right of visitation. If frustration of visitation was the sole statutory criteria under section 61.13(4)(c)(2), I would agree with the majority's affirmance....

...I conclude that Elijah lost custody in this case because he frustrated visitation, and Terrell's sister, Tiffany, wanted to reside with her brother. Noticeably absent from the testimony is any input by nine-year-old Terrell, as to his desires in the matter, one of the criteria under section 61.13(3)(i)....

...NOTES [1] Elijah also seems to want to argue that a material change in circumstances is also required. The statute does not require the moving party to establish a "substantial change of circumstances." We conclude that when a non-custodial parent proceeds under section 61.13(4)(c), no substantial change of circumstances is necessary to be proven where a violation of visitation rights is found by the court to have occurred and the court further finds that the best interests of the child lie in transferring custody to the other spouse....

...ological well-being of the children and created confusion in the children and a lack of stability and consistency in their lives, the trial court, in an obvious effort to be fair to the parents and with the apparent view that the recent amendment to Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1982) (commonly known as the "Shared Parental Responsibility Act"), required not only shared parental responsibility, but also divided residence, ordered, inter alia: "2....

...The non-residential parent shall pick up the children at school on Friday after school and shall have the children until Sunday before dinner, then return the children to the residential parent Sunday before dinner. This weekend schedule shall alternate every other weekend." While Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1982), does mandate that parental responsibility of minor children shall be shared in the absence of a finding, not present here, that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the children, § 61.13(2)(b)2, it does not mandate that the physical residence of the children is to be shifted back and forth between the parents as a necessary concomitant of shared parental responsibility. Indeed, the statute itself envisions that there is to be a primary physical residence for the children, the place of which is to be determined by reference to the nonexclusive factors enumerated in Section 61.13(3)....

...t parental responsibility be shared, that is, that "both parents retain full parental rights and responsibilities with respect to their [children] and ... confer so that major decisions affecting the welfare of the child will be determined jointly," § 61.13(2)(b)2.a, their best interests were not, under the evidence in this record, well served by attempting to accomplish *62 this goal by alternating the children's primary physical residence....

...See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Matilla v. Matilla, 474 So.2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). We affirm because there is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's findings concerning the six statutory factors listed in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Although the trial judge spoke of the "ultimate welfare of the child" according the court "a broad judicial discretion," in reality, in rendering its decision, the trial court applied the best interest of the child standard. That standard is applied in custody disputes between parents. See § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...adopted by the trial court." Artuso v. Dick, 843 So.2d 942, 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citations omitted). The determination of the best interests of the child is made by evaluating over twenty factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child. § 61.13(3), Fla....

...ient to sustain the award so long as there is substantial, competent evidence in the record that permits the court to properly evaluate the relevant factors. Id. (citations omitted). In the instant case, the trial court considered several factors in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes....

...icy of this state to assure that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after ... the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of childrearing." § 61.13(2)(b)1., Fla....

...Chapter 61 states the preference that divorced parties share parental responsibility; a court "shall order that the parental responsibility... be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility *341 would be detrimental to the child." § 61.13(2)(b)2....

...Withholding support was an acceptable method of enforcing visitation, but there was not a corresponding rule that allowed a custodial parent to withhold visitation when child support was not paid. Howard v. Howard, 143 So.2d 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). The law did not change until 1986 when the legislature enacted § 61.13(4)(b)....

...thers, who most frequently were the custodial parents. It was clearly a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation for them. Perhaps recognizing the harmful effect the denial of visitation defense was having on children, the Florida Legislature amended section 61.13 by adding subsection (4), effective October 1, 1986....

...In this statute, the Legislature has decreed that child support and child visitation are separate rights and duties, and should be dealt with separately. One is no longer to be treated as the reciprocal of the other. Denial of visitation is no longer a valid basis to reduce or deny child support. It appears that section 61.13 quoted above may completely abolish denial of visitation as a defense to a suit to enforce child support arrearages en toto....

...3d DCA 1995); Kuharcik v. Kuharcik, 629 So.2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). "The court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child." § 61.13(2)(b)2., Fla....

...es with a history of hostile relations failed to agree about three key aspects of children's lives, and acknowledging trial court's authority to invest former wife with ultimate authority *196 over specific aspects of the child's welfare pursuant to section 61.13(2)(b)2.a.)....

...4th DCA 2007). Accordingly, we reverse the award of shared parental responsibility and remand with instructions to the trial court to make specific factual findings justifying Former Husband's inclusion in major decision-making concerning the parties' child. In section 61.13(3)(a)-(m), Florida Statutes (2005), the Florida Legislature has set out a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered by the trial court in evaluating the child's best interests and determining whether shared parental responsibility is appropriate....

...The court therefore did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss the proceeding on jurisdictional grounds. Appellant having failed to demonstrate error, the order appealed is affirmed. RAWLS, C.J., and WIGGINTON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] F.S., § 61.13(1), F.S.A....

...Following a hearing during which Barranco presented expert testimony concerning the amount of a reasonable fee, the trial court awarded attorney's fees of $12,500 to be paid by Mr. Winner directly to the Barranco firm. § 61.16, Fla. Stat. (1977). Approximately two weeks later, "pursuant to the authority vested in it by Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1978), general equitable principles, and in consideration of the attorneys [sic] fee award rendered ......

...-old daughter. [3] *1228 Because the trial court's decision to grant relocation was not supported by competent substantial evidence, we reverse. In deciding a request for relocation, including a request made prior to a final judgment of dissolution, section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), [4] requires a trial court to consider the following factors: 1....

...Whether the cost of transportation is financially affordable by one or both parties. 6. Whether the move is in the best interests of the child. See Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So.2d 748, 749-50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Kuntz v. Kuntz, 780 So.2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Under section 61.13(2)(d), there is no presumption in favor of, or against, relocation. Further, although the record must reflect that the trial court considered the statutory factors, section 61.13(2)(d) does not require the court to make specific findings regarding the factors....

...rk, such as time, distance, finances, computer and videocam access or ownership, and work schedules; nor was there any evidence suggesting that such a substitute visitation scheme would generally be in the child's best interests—the sixth factor of section 61.13(2)(d), acting as a linchpin, summarizing the other five factors....

...Cecemski's motion for relocation was filed after Mr. Cecemski's petition for dissolution. All issues were tried together and determined under the umbrella of the same final judgment for dissolution of marriage. [4] We note that the requirements provided for by section 61.13(2)(d) were deleted and different requirements were implemented in the newly added section 61.13001, effective October 1, 2006. See ch.2006-245, § 2, Laws of Fla. However, the old requirements of section 61.13(2)(d) apply to the present case because the trial was held on January 17, 2006, and the final judgment for dissolution was rendered on April 19, 2006, prior to the statutory change. See § 61.13001(11)(b), Fla....

...ts a chancellor *946 to consider any factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties in determining a proper award of alimony and, where custody and visitation are at issue, an inquiry into the moral fitness of the parents, pursuant to Section 61.13(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1975), must necessarily include an examination into their lifestyles, i.e....

...closely align ourselves with our sister courts. See Pro v. Pro, 300 So.2d 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) and McClelland v. McClelland, 318 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). In addition, as concerns the areas of custody and visitation, we feel that pursuant to Section 61.13(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1975), any inquiry into the lifestyle and moral fitness of each parent must in some ways include an investigation into any alleged adulterous behavior of the parties....

...he purpose of calculating child support and it did not explain how the calculation was performed). We also note that when establishing the child support award, the trial court failed to address health care coverage for the minor child as required by section 61.13(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...of the mother. This same issue has been dealt with by our sister courts in Barnes v. Frazier, 509 So.2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) and Stepp v. Stepp, 520 So.2d 314 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1988). These cases have held that the shared parental responsibility law (Section 61.13, Florida Statutes) now controls custody disputes between unmarried parents, and that an unwed natural father need not prove unfitness of the illegitimate child's mother in order to be awarded primary residential custody of the child....

..."rotating custody" as that term has, from time to time, been used. Under paragraph b, upon reaching age one, the child is to spend two consecutive weeks each month with the father. Shared parental responsibility of minor children as provided for in Section 61.13 does not contemplate the shifting back and forth of the physical residence of the children. Frey v. Wagner, 433 So.2d 60 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983). In fact, Section 61.13(2)(b) provides for a "primary physical residence" for the children....

...*817 Accordingly, the order in question is to be considered a temporary order, and we remand with directions to the trial court to conduct a final hearing after due notice on the issues pertaining to the primary residence of the minor child in accordance with the shared parental responsibility law, Section 61.13(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (1983)....

...WALDEN, J., and GREEN, OLIVER L., Jr., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] The order used the phrase "temporary and permanent custody of the minor child." It is assumed that the trial court intended to order "shared parental responsibility" for the child pursuant to Section 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Florida Statutes (1983), and did not intend to order "sole parental responsibility" pursuant to Section 61.13(2)(b)2.b., Florida Statutes (1983). The only issue involved here appears to be the primary residence of the child. It is not clear why the court below did not use the language of Section 61.13(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Upon remand, the trial court shall give the parties an opportunity to submit evidence not only on the former husband's motion for contempt but also on the former wife's petition for modification. The trial court may then determine in accordance with the criteria set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1987), what is in the best interest of the child at this time with regard to which parent should be designated to provide the child's primary physical residence....

...e the MSA. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the motion and enjoined any relocation pending further court order. In deciding that the move was not in the child's best interests the court considered all of the statutory factors. See § 61.13(2)(d), Fla....

...to modify custody or to add a residence restriction to the final judgment because relocation is not a substantial change in circumstances to support modification. In addition, she argues the trial court erred in considering the relocation factors in section 61.13(2)(d) because she has not requested relocation....

...[1] Bartolotta also emphasized that at the time, the case law had established a presumption *1057 in favor of allowing the custodial parent to relocate. Russenberger v. Russenberger, 669 So.2d 1044 (Fla.1996); Mize v. Mize, 621 So.2d 417 (Fla.1993). In 1997, the legislature enacted section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes, stating that "[n]o presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule of conta...

...s with the secondary residential parent." The statute lists factors the court must consider in determining whether the residential parent should be allowed to relocate with the child. In this case, the trial court carefully considered the factors in section 61.13(2)(d) in deciding that the move would not be in the child's best interest....

...Father's motion for an injunction sought to prevent the relocation of the child in order to enforce his existing rights under the final judgment and the MSA. See, e.g., Johnson, 455 So.2d at 1332. Even without a request to relocate, it was not improper for the court to consider the factors in section 61.13(2)(d) to decide whether to temporarily enjoin relocation....

...t in the best interests of the primary residential parent who is seeking to relocate. Kuntz v. Kuntz, 780 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The "desirability of maintaining continuity" may be a factor in deciding the child's best interests. See, e.g., § 61.13(3)(d), Fla....

...adopted by the trial court. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980). "Decisions affecting child custody require a careful consideration of the best interests of the child." Andrews v. Andrews, 624 So.2d 391, 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2005). However, section 61.13(3) does not require the trial court to make specific written findings in a custody decision. See Murphy v. Murphy, 621 So.2d 455, 456-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). In this case, while the trial court did not make specific written findings regarding its analysis of the factors of section 61.13, the trial court stated that it had considered the criteria of section 61.13 and concluded that the mother should be the primary residential parent....

...owing up in a small town" and that "there's no substitute for a (natural) mother's care." Although the majority of this court apparently agrees with that latter argument, it contravenes the public policy of Florida as expressed by the legislature in section 61.13(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1989): (b)1....

...children from leaving the state, or forcing them to surrender primary residential custody. In the past, mothers were most often given primary custody. However, under Florida's dissolution law, fathers and husbands have equal claim to child custody (section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1989)), and we are reviewing and affirming a substantial number of cases awarding fathers primary residential custody....

...of the parties less stability and insulation from parental conflict than either of the solutions urged by the parties below. [2] There was testimony that the mother had thwarted the father's visitation on a number of occasions. In this respect, see section 61.13(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), which provides that for purposes of determining primary residence and the best interests of a child, an evaluation will include a determination as to which parent would be more likely to allow a child frequent and continuing contact with a nonresidential parent....

...Throughout 1994, on six different days, the trial court heard testimony regarding custody. In May 1995, the trial court entered a final judgment wherein it made findings of fact in accordance with the statutory factors that are normally used for making an initial custody determination. § 61.13(3), Fla.Stat....

...e of discretion as it does in entering the original decree," Stricklin v. Stricklin, 383 So.2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and that therefore, the trial court erred by conducting a review of custody as if it was an initial custody determination. § 61.13(3), Fla....

...g that the wife is the predominant residential custodian. Further, even were there a basis to conduct a de novo review of custody, the trial court did not properly evaluate the statutory factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child under section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...e to express a preference. (j) The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent. (k) Any other fact considered by the court to be relevant. § 61.13, Fla.Stat....

...Elebash, 450 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Callahan v. Cambron, 445 So.2d 394 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). However, the more interesting issue involved in this case, which was not raised by the parties at trial or on appeal, is whether the Shared Parental Responsibility Law, section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1985), is applicable to custody battles between unmarried parents, and whether it supersedes the prior authority in Florida which makes the mother of an illegimate child the child's natural guardian, and entitles her to custody unless she is found to be unfit....

...court also specifically disagreed with our opinion in S.G. v. G.G., 666 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), on the issue of what standard should be applied when a grandparent with whom the child has resided in a stable relationship seeks custody of the child under section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes....

...1996)(courts lack authority to deviate from statutory requirements as to placement of dependent child); see also In re Guardianship *52 of D.A. McW, 460 So.2d 368 (Fla.1984); Murphy v. Markham-Crawford, 665 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), review denied, 675 So.2d 928 (Fla.1996). Compare § 61.13(2)(b)(1), Fla....

...The Husband petitioned this Court for discretionary review of the Second District’s decision in Arthur . His petition was based on express and direct conflict with the First District’s decisions in Sylvester, Janousek, and Martinez . We granted review to resolve this conflict. ANALYSIS Section 61.13001, Florida Statutes (2006), titled “Parental relocation with a child,” establishes the procedures involved in the relocation of a child, whether relocation is sought after agreement between the parties or alternatively contested by one party....

...r against a request to relocate with the child when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact, access, and time-sharing with the nonrelo-cating parent or other person.” § 61.13001(7), Fla. Stat. (2006). Instead, section 61.13001(8) states: The parent or other person wishing to relocate has the burden of proof if an objection is filed and must then initiate a proceeding seeking court permission for relocation....

...relocation is not in the best interest of the child. In addition to the burden that the parties must meet, the statute outlines several factors a trial court must consider before reaching a decision on a parent’s request for permanent relocation. Section 61.13001(7) provides that the court shall evaluate: (a) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to relocate with the child and with the nonrelocating parent, other perso...

...741.28 or which meets the criteria of s. 39.806(l)(d) by either parent, including a consideration of the severity of such conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at rehabilitation. (k) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child or as set forth in s. 61.13. Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2006), requires trial courts to “determine all matters relating to custody of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act [UCCJEA].” § 61.13(2)(b)l, Fla....

...Such a “prospective-based” analysis is unsound. Indeed, a trial court is not equipped with a “crystal ball” that enables it to prophetically determine whether future relocation is in the best interests of a child. Any one of the various factors outlined in section 61.13001(7) that the trial court is required to consider, such as the financial stability of a parent or the suitability of the new location for the child, could change within the extended time period given by the court before relocation....

...We find the most telling phrase of the order to be the court’s statement that “[b]ut for the Court’s concern for the Husband’s ability to bond with his son, the Wife’s relocation would have been granted without further delay.” In its consideration of subsection (b) of section 61.13001(7), the court found that “[r]equiring the Wife to wait until the child turns three (3) years old allows the Husband and child the time necessary to form a lasting bond with each other.” Thus, although the court may have favored r...

...On remand the computation of net income should reflect the foregoing applications of section 61.30(3) if supported by the evidence. The order contains no reference to health insurance for the children. Initially appellee was carrying such insurance made available by her employer. Section 61.13(1)(b) provides in pertinent part: 61.13....

...s (1)(b) Each order for child support shall contain a provision for health insurance for the minor child when the insurance is reasonably available. Insurance is reasonably available if the obligor has access at a reasonable rate to group insurance. § 61.13(1)(b) Fla....

...If the parties reach impasse, then the dispute is presented to the court for resolution. See Tamari v. Turko-Tamari, 599 So.2d 680, 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Vazquez v. Vazquez, 443 So.2d at 314. [7] In the event the court must resolve an impasse, the test to be applied is the best interests of the child. See § 61.13(2)(b)(1), Fla....

...ts her well and is loved in return. Experience, common sense *1000 and therefore the law teach—without the need for expert testimony—both that stability is better than disruption for the psychic health of everyone, and particularly small children, § 61.13(3)(d), Fla.Stat....

...Bennett, 73 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1954), which held that decisions of that nature are for the parent to whom custody of the children has been awarded. The husband counters this contention by citing the new 1982 legislative act providing for "shared parental responsibility." Section 61.13(2)(b)2 a, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The legislature pronounced that: It is the public policy of this state to assure each minor child frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of childrearing. 61.13(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...the court may consider the expressed desires of the parents and may grant to one party the ultimate responsibility over specific aspects of the child's welfare or may divide those aspects between the parties based on the best interests of the child. 61.13(2)(b)2 a, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...f alimony or child support or both, the court shall make a finding of the obligor's imputed or actual present ability to comply with the order. Here, no such finding was made. Further, on this record, we believe no such finding could have been made. Section 61.13, Florida Statutes, states that "the court may at any time order either or both parents who owe a duty of support to a child to pay support in accordance with the guidelines in s....

...An examination of the cases relied upon by the wife, which undoubtedly contain language which supports her position, shows that these cases all were decided under the law existing prior to the Dissolution of Marriage Act of 1971 which substantially increases a father's rights to custody and visitation. See Fla. Stat. § 61.13(2)(b)....

...Holland, 602 So.2d 652 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), there are two separate and distinct legal sources for the obligation of child support. Until the child reaches majority, the law of the state of Florida imposes on a parent the obligation to support his or her minor children. See § 61.13(1)(a), Fla....

...Initially, we note that, because the former husband's petition was filed after 1 October 1993, both the circuit court in which either parent or the child resides and the circuit court which issued the original judgment of dissolution have jurisdiction over the petition seeking modification of child custody. See § 61.13(2)(c), Fla....

...Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the former wife's motion for change of venue. Tindall v. Smith, 601 So.2d 627, 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Hu, 426 So.2d at 1281. AFFIRMED. GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(3)(A). [2] Section 61.13(2)(c) provides: The circuit court in the county in which either parent or the child resides and the circuit court in which the original award of custody was entered have jurisdiction to modify an award of child custody. The court may change the venue in accordance with s. 47.122. § 61.13(2)(c), Fla....

...ivered the child to one Charles Wishart (the step-grandfather of the child) and Bobbie Sue Wishart (a grandmother of the child). The Wisharts, appellees here, were joined as necessary party defendants in the child custody matter pursuant to sections 61.1306 and 61.131, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...2d DCA 1975)). In support of its holding, the district court also relied on Tamargo v. Tamargo, 348 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), and Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 295 So.2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). These decisions, however, were issued prior to the effective date of section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Accordingly, the district court below erred in holding that the trial court could not grant visitation to the Wisharts and we quash that portion of the decision below. We remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because section 61.13(2)(b) provides that an award of visitation rights to a grandparent may be made by the trial court if it is deemed to be in the child's best interests, the only issue before the district court on remand will be whether the trial court ab...

...I would reverse the judgment below in its entirety. In my opinion, depriving the father of a legally recognized role in Virginia's upbringing is not justified, as required, by a showing that the previously ordered shared responsibility had become "detrimental to the child." § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla....

...al problem that her parents are divorced and do not get along. There is nothing which permits the disruption of her established routine, in defiance of the rules of experience and of law that stability and continuity are paramount to her well-being. § 61.13(3)(d), Fla....

...ermine whether or not to participate in such visitation and should be allowed to arbitrarily refuse to go on a previously-scheduled visitation because she wanted to do something else. That conclusion is contrary to both common sense and the law. See § 61.13(3)(i), Fla....

...Nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests that the legislature intended to abolish the presumption. Our review of the limited legislative history offers little insight on the issue. We note that House Bill 1421, which enacted this provision, also amended section 61.13, Florida Statutes as follows: 61.13 Custody and support of children: visitation rights; power of court in making orders.— (2)(d) No presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and the move will ma...

...four-count complaint against Alison Boggs. The complaint alleged an independent action for fraud and a petition to establish paternity and visitation on behalf of Gilbertson, individually, and on behalf of the minor child, under sections 742.011 and 61.13....

...Following Boggs' Motion to Dismiss and to Seal Record, the trial court dismissed Gilbertson's complaint with prejudice. In its order of dismissal, the court held that: 9. Count III seeks to establish paternity and visitation pursuant to Chapter 742 and section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes....

...Without a substantive basis for the award of temporary appellate fees, the trial court erred in ordering Starkey to pay fees. See id. As in the case at bar, Starkey's petition for paternity and custody required that he seek relief under sections 742.011 and section 61.13....

...Nonetheless, we sua sponte remand for a further hearing on the child custody aspect. The final judgment provides that the wife shall be the primary residential custodian of the minor children. But there is in the final judgment no recognition of the provisions of section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1983), that shared parental responsibility shall be ordered "unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child." As in Nichols v....

...Nichols, 432 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the trial court here found that it would be in the best interests of the children that they reside with the wife, but, as in Nichols, the lack of any finding by the trial court of the type referred to in section 61.13(2)(b)2 requires reversal....

...al court's order granting the mother, Alyce Sabrina Grant Mian, temporary custody of their seven-year-old daughter. His primary contention is that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the statutory relocation factors found in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...The Garone court therefore concluded that "any contested decision on relocation made prior to final hearing must have the same factual basis as would be necessary to support a provision permitting relocation in a final judgment." Id. In this case, however, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Section *359 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1999), requires a trial court, in deciding shared parental responsibility and primary residence, to evaluate "all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child" to determine the child's best interest. The list of those factors, in section 61.13(3)(m), includes "[a]ny other fact considered by the court to be relevant." In this case, the fact that the mother had relocated with the child was relevant, and the trial judge did in fact consider the issue at the hearing in spite of her conclusion that this was not a "relocation" case....

...[2] Accordingly, we affirm the order granting temporary custody to the mother and dissolving the order on ex-parte emergency motion for child pick-up order and other relief. ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and GREEN, J., Concur. NOTES [1] In O'Neill v. Stone, 721 So.2d 393, 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), our court addressed whether section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), would require a custodial parent to ask for court approval prior to relocating but declined to decide that issue....

...The court did find, however, that when the mother in that case filed an emergency motion to set aside a pick-up order (as did the mother in this case), the "relocation issue was then before the court for determination" and it "was incumbent upon the trial court to consider the factors set forth in section 61.13(2)(d)." Unlike in the situation in this case, however, the parent in Stone was not attempting to relocate prior to the filing of the dissolution papers. [2] Although requiring the court to consider the statutory factors, section 61.13(2)(d) does not require the court to make specific record findings in regard to relocation....

...the father and the child, the reasons for the proposed relocation, the problems that would exist if relocation were allowed, and possible solutions to the problems including an altered visitation schedule. The trial court correctly noted that under section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2001), there are six factors that must be considered and there is no presumption in favor of or against relocation....

...The standard applicable to factor four of the statute is whether the proposed substitute visitation is adequate to foster a continuing meaningful relationship, not whether the same degree of frequent and continuing contact would be maintained. See § 61.13(2)(d)4; Card v....

...to facts that Ms. Hendry is a naturalized American, a native of another country, and that she and the child took successive residences in Amsterdam and Beirut in the time between entry of the final decree and the filing of the modification petition. Section 61.13(1), F.S....

...rt. REVERSED AND REMANDED. DOWNEY, J., and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Sec. 61.14(1), F.S. 1967, contained similar provisions. There is no contention here that the criteria for modifying child support payments, as stated in § 61.13(1), F.S....

...In interstate enforcement cases, payment cannot be conditioned upon allowing visitation. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Ciferni, 429 So.2d 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Davis v. Davis, 376 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Vecellio v. Vecellio, 313 So.2d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). New section 61.13(4)(a) and (b) effective October 1, 1986, Chapter 86-220, Florida Session Law Service, 1986 Laws, now makes the law uniform in cases where the parents are both residents of Florida, and it is not a URESA case....

...ce regarding the child's best interests. We agree. Once the former wife returned to the state of Florida with the child, any determination as to the continued primary residence of the child required a consideration of the child's best interests. See § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...e final judgment and had deprived the child contact with the former husband for over a year, we fully understand why the trial judge believed that he had heard sufficient evidence to award the former husband temporary primary residence of the child. Section 61.13(3)(a), (j), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that the best interests of a child may be determined in part based upon "the parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent" and...

...acilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent." The former wife's actions provided evidence sufficient to support a finding that these two factors did not weigh in her favor. However, section 61.13(3) requires the trial court to consider numerous other factors in determining the best interests of a child....

...rt's time-sharing schedule and did not address parental responsibility. The wife filed a motion for rehearing as to the time-sharing schedule. The motion argued that the court erred by failing to: (1) engage in a "best interest" analysis pursuant to section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2010); (2) order shared parental responsibility pursuant to section 61.13(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2010); and (3) establish a parenting plan pursuant to section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2010). In response to the motion, the court entered an additional order stating: "The Court set a more stable relationship for the children and determined that it is in the best interest of the children pursuant to FS 61.13....

...blishing the time-sharing schedule. In Winters v. Brown, 51 So.3d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), we held: The determination of the best interests of the child is made by evaluating over *987 twenty factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child. § 61.13(3), Fla....

...Here, the circuit court, in its order on the wife's motion for rehearing, found that the time-sharing schedule was in the children's best interests. Although the court did not address independently each of the twenty factors affecting the welfare and interests of the children under section 61.13(3), the court provided two grounds which fall within two of the factors. First, as stated on the record at the final hearing, the court found that the husband would be in a position to care for the children so that they would not require "day care, after care, pre care, post care, or any other kind of care." See § 61.13(3)(b), Fla....

...Second, as stated at the final hearing and in the order on the wife's motion for rehearing, the court found that moving away from the alternating night schedule and providing the husband with more time "set a more stable relationship for the children" and caused the children to improve "measurably in school work." See § 61.13(3)(k), Fla....

...egard to the child and sets forth a time-sharing schedule." In re Amendments to the Fla. Family Law Rules, 995 So.2d 445, 445 (Fla.2008). Here, the court did not create or approve any parenting plan, much less one which satisfies the requirements of section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2010): A parenting plan approved by the court must, at a minimum, describe in adequate detail how the parents will share and be responsible for the daily tasks associated with the upbringing of the child; the ti...

...ination and registration, and other activities; and the methods and technologies that the parents will use to communicate with the child. Because the court did not create or approve a parenting plan, much less one which satisfies the requirements of section 61.13(2)(b), we are required to reverse the orders establishing the time-sharing schedule. It appears from Chapter 61 that a court is to determine a time-sharing *988 schedule as part of its creation of a parenting plan, not as a separate determination. See § 61.13(3), Fla....

...ip between each parent with regard to his or her minor child, the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration."). Thus, the court must revisit its time-sharing schedule determination in consideration of the requirements of sections 61.13(2)(b) and 61.13(3)....

...the parties may present further evidence related to the parenting plan's requirements. As part of its creation of the parenting plan, the court is free to maintain or modify the time-sharing schedule in consideration of the requirements of sections 61.13(2)(b) and 61.13(3)....

...The Florida legislature has made it clear that visitation rights and the obligation to provide child support are unrelated and that the inability to exercise visitation rights does not relieve the noncustodial parent from the obligation to pay child support. § 61.13(4)(b), Fla....

...is presented it is incumbent upon the chancellor to evaluate, among other crucial factors, the mental health of each of the parents in making a final custody determination which is in accord with the best interest of the minor child or children. See Section 61.13(3)(g), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...1st DCA 1997) (permitting dismissal on grounds of res judicata where trial court has complete history of prior litigation). In addition, the trial court has a responsibility when presented with such a petition to guard the best interests of the child. See § 61.13(1)(a), Fla....

...See Bethea v. Langford, 45 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1949). However, we remand for further proceedings as to whether recoupment should be ordered under all the circumstances. Recoupment for child support overpayments may be proper in given equitable circumstances. See section 61.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985); Tash v....

...The final judgment at issue in Kuharcik stated that the "[p]arents are to consult each other on long range and major decisions, and if no agreement can be reached, the primary residential parent will decide." Id. at 225. We reversed the final judgment "[b]ecause the trial court failed to follow the intent of section 61.13 and failed to delineate [the] specific aspects of the child's welfare [over which the] wife should have ultimate responsibility." (Emphasis in original)....

...ildren was not compatible with shared parental responsibility. The case did not forbid the delineation of areas where one parent would have final decision-making authority, in situations where the parties were unable to come to an agreement. Indeed, section 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Florida Statutes (2002), allows a trial court to give *1195 one parent the ultimate authority over specific matters when ordering shared parental responsibility: In ordering shared parental responsibility, the court may consi...

...Here, the final judgment cannot be interpreted as giving the former wife sole parental authority. The trial court has implemented a rational decision-making plan in the event the parties are unable to agree about three aspects of the children's lives. Section 61.13(2)(b)2.a....

...ocating with the children to the state of Texas." The order further concluded that the Former Husband had also raised the issue in his motion for a temporary injunction. The trial court made specific factual findings related to the factors listed in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2004), and concluded that both the Former Wife's petition for modification and the Former Husband's petition for modification should be denied....

...Although the Former Wife's petition did not directly request that approval, her petition for modification did impliedly raise the issue, and the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on it. In determining whether the request for permission to relocate should be granted, the trial court must consider the factors outlined in section 61.13(2)(d), which include whether there is a substitute visitation schedule that will be "adequate to foster a continuing meaningful relationship between the child and the secondary residential parent," § 61.13(2)(d)(4)....

...ill not be the same type or to the same degree as existed before the move. Rather, the focus of the fourth factor is whether the substitute visitation is adequate to allow the parent to maintain a "continuing meaningful relationship" with the child. § 61.13(2)(d)(4)....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read "General Information for Pro Se Litigants" found at the begining of these forms. The words that are in "bold underline" in these instructions are defined there. For further information, see sections 61.130261.1354, Florida Statutes....

...Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read "General Information for Pro Se Litigants" found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in "bold underline" in these instructions are defined there. For further information, see sections 61.052 and 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...Respondent. NOTICE OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER I, { full legal name } _____________________________________________________, certify that may social security number is ________________________________________ as required in section 61.052(7), sections 61.13(9) or (10), section 742.031(3), sections 742.032(1)-(3), and/or sections 742.10(1)-(2), Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...Some circuits may require the completion of mediation before a final hearing may be set. Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read "General Information for Pro Se Litigants" found at the beginning of these forms. For further information, see chapter 752 and 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Florida Statutes....

...This Court has jurisdiction over issues surrounding the minor child(ren) listed below based on the following: [√ all that apply] ___ a. This Court exercised and continues to exercise original jurisdiction over the minor children listed below under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), specifically, section 61.1308, Florida Statutes....

...A certified out-of-state custody decree has been presented to this Court with a request for full faith and credit recognition and enforcement under the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. This Court has jurisdiction to enforce this decree under the UCCJA, specifically section 61.1328, Florida Statutes....

...he State of Florida and no prior court action involving the minor child(ren) has addressed a putative father's rights to custody or other parental rights. See sections 742.031 and 744.301, Florida Statutes. ___ d. Pursuant to the UCCJA, specifically section 61.133, Florida Statutes, this Court has jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state and has consulted with the Court who took initial jurisdiction over the minor child(ren) to determine this authority....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that temporary support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests that temporary support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Government Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payment through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.08 or 61.13, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...their own children and of their adopted children, during minority." This portion of section 744.301 is typically interpreted to apply only to married parents for whom the best interest of the child is the determining factor in awarding custody. *316 § 61.13, Fla....

...ative father. While not directly overruled or questioned, that case has not been generally followed. Without citing Allen, the First and Fourth District Courts of appeal have held contrary to Allen and applied the shared parental responsibility law (section 61.13) to custody battles between unmarried parents....

...The motion failed to put the father on notice that custody was at issue, and it did not invoke the court's jurisdiction to consider a change in custody. See VonHegel, 732 So.2d at 1133. Moreover, the trial court did not evaluate the factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child as required by section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2003), and it did not make a determination of the child's best interests....

...On August 26, 1994, the trial court entered the order which is the subject of this appeal awarding custody of Michael, but not Mark, to appellee. While appellant raises several issues in this appeal, we will discuss only two. Appellant first argues that section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1993) does not create in appellee, the paternal grandparent of Michael, a cause of action whereby appellee could seek custody of Michael. We disagree. Section 61.13(7) provides as follows: In any case where the child is actually residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship, whether the court has awarded custody to the grandparent or not, the court may recognize the grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child. *205 Appellant relies on In the Interest of J.M.Z., 635 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) for the authority that section 61.13(7) does not create an independent cause of action for custody of a child by its grandparents....

...Appellee invoked that court's jurisdiction when she filed an action seeking custody of the children. Michael had, in fact, been residing with appellee in a stable relationship for the greater part of his life. We find that under these circumstances, appellee had standing under section 61.13(7) to petition the circuit court of Hardee County for custody of Michael. The second issue raised by appellant is linked to the previously-discussed issue and also involves an interpretation of section 61.13(7)....

...nt because a parent may not be deprived of custody absent a finding of unfitness or long-term detriment to the child. While the principle relied upon by appellant is correct for the cases cited, appellant's argument overlooks the clear provisions of section 61.13(7) that are applicable to the circumstances of this case....

...t held a hearing on the paternity and support action and rendered a final judgment of paternity. The judgment established Bunnell as the legal and natural father of S.R.B. and ordered joint custody and shared responsibility of the child, pursuant to section 61.13(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...As support the Former Husband cites Willey v. Willey, 703 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(reversing trial court's order modifying child support because it failed to deduct the father's payment of the child's health insurance from his support obligation). The Husband also references section 61.13(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides as follows: Each order for child support shall contain a provision for health insurance for the minor child when the insurance is reasonably available ......

...[T]he court shall apportion the cost of coverage to both parties by adding the cost to the basic obligation determined pursuant to s. 61.30(6). Additionally, section 61.30(8), Florida Statutes, provides: Health insurance costs resulting from coverage ordered pursuant to s.61.13(1)(b) shall be added to the basic obligation....

...Gress, 854 So.2d 262, 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ("The posture of a modification proceeding is entirely different from that of an initial custody determination, and the party seeking to modify custody has a much heavier burden to show a proper ground for the change."). Pursuant to section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, "A determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and a determinat...

...ll of the child's needs. We agree that the trial court erred in failing to applying the child support guidelines after it concluded that there had been a substantial change in the former husband's financial circumstances justifying modification. See § 61.13(1)(a), Fla....

...Botterbusch, 851 So.2d 903, 904 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)(citing Dorta-Duque v. Dorta-Duque, 791 So.2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)). In reviewing the trial court's order, we must determine if there is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's findings under section 61.13001(7), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...hat are appropriate for the trial judge." Id. (citing Flint v. Fortson, 744 So.2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). *734 Florida law does not recognize a presumption in favor of or against a primary residential parent seeking to relocate a child. See § 61.13001(7), Fla. Stat. (2006). Instead, in making a determination as to whether the primary residential parent may relocate with a child, section 61.13001(7) requires a trial court to consider the following factors: (a) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the child's relationship with the parent proposing to relocate with the child and with the nonrelocating par...

...741.28 or which meets the criteria of s. 39.806(1)(d) by either parent, including a consideration of the severity of such conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at rehabilitation. (k) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child or as set forth in s. 61.13. Id. After a thorough review of the entire record, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Mother's petition to relocate with the child to Grand Junction. Although the trial court noted each of the factors listed under section 61.13007(7) in its order, the record is devoid of corroborating facts supporting *735 nearly every subsection of the statute....

...the mother accepted a job offer with the United States Customs Department, and would earn more money and work fewer hours in her new position). Because there was no substantial competent evidence to support relocation under the factors set forth in section 61.13001(7), we find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Mother's petition for relocation....

...The former wife's parents and support structure are in Colorado. The evidence as chronicled in the Final Judgment reflects that, support structure in place, the former wife has a greater chance of bettering herself economically and educationally in Colorado for the support of the minor child in the future. See § 61.13001(7)(e), Fla....

...4th DCA 2003)("An appellate court's standard of review of a trial court's order regarding relocation is whether the trial court abused its discretion. We look to see if there is substantial *738 competent evidence to support the trial court's findings concerning the statutory factors listed in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...tute as section 11(a) mandates that this version apply "[t]o orders entered before October 1, 2006, if the existing order defining custody, primary residence, or visitation of or with the child does not expressly govern relocation of the child." See § 61.13001(11)(a)(1), Fla....

...1st DCA 1987); Jones v. Jones, 471 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). We agree that the duty of the noncustodial parent to support a child is independent of the custodial parent's duty to permit visitation. In Interest of D.F.W., 497 So.2d 925 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); § 61.13(4)(b), Fla....

...Sanctions include holding the custodial parent in contempt, see Martin v. Martin, 215 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968), cert. denied, 222 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1969), and ordering a modification of custody. See Tessler v. Tessler, 539 So.2d 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); § 61.13(3)(a), Fla....

..., Florida Statutes (2007). When ordering a parent to obtain life insurance as security for child support, trial courts must bear in mind that such an order is authorized only to the extent that it is necessary to protect the child support award. See § 61.13(1)(c), Fla....

...t the parties to a custody action be apprised of all of the evidence and considerations brought before the trial judge before the court arrives at a judgment in such a controversy. We dispose of the appellant's second point by noting that Fla. Stat. § 61.13(2) directs that the father and mother shall be afforded equal consideration in matters of custody, and that there was substantial competent evidence to support the award of custody to the father, notwithstanding the court's finding that the father and mother were "fit and proper persons" to have custody....

...d attempting to sidestep the issue presented by the motion by improperly abrogating its decisional power to the former husband. Contrary to the former husband's assertions, we do not find that this case presents the type of situation contemplated by section 61.13(2)(b)2.a, Florida Statutes....

...order denying an increase *189 in child support. See Pross v. Pross, Fla. 1954, 72 So.2d 671; Rogoff v. Rogoff, Fla. App. 1959, 115 So.2d 456. In deciding this question upon this record, it is incumbent upon us to take into consideration Fla. Stat. § 61.13, which places "......

...hose needs. In considering the amount of the increase called for by the needs of the children and the ability of the parents, we are mindful that the statute places a duty upon each parent to contribute to the support of the children. See Fla. Stat. § 61.13....

...[4] In fact, the same memorandum of law of the wife later requests an equal division of cash on deposit and refers back to the petition for dissolution which alleged the amount to be approximately $35,000. [5] The husband testified that it was his handwriting on the document. [6] Due to statutory authority granted in section 61.13(4)-(5), Florida Statutes (1983), a court may require a father to maintain insurance on his life for the benefit of his minor children as security for their support....

...me until the child is eighteen years were provided. In the absence of proof of a greater need, we cannot say this amount is inadequate. Should the needs of the child increase, appellant may petition the court at a later date to modify the award. See § 61.13, Fla....

...We, therefore, remand to the trial court to make findings supporting the decision to deviate from the guidelines or, in the alternative, to make a definitive child support determination. We also hold that it was error for the court not to make a specific provision regarding the child's health insurance. See § 61.13(1)(b), Fla....

...The trial court's decision concerning custody will not be disturbed unless there is no substantial competent evidence to support that decision. See Adair v. Adair, 720 So.2d 316, 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). In deciding a child's custody, the trial court must evaluate the factors listed in section 61.13, Florida Statutes, and determine the best interests of the child....

...re apparent on the face of the record. Fugina v. Fugina, 874 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). We find that only one of Maslow's arguments has merit: that the trial court erred in awarding sole parental responsibility of the minor child to the mother. Section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes, provides: The court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child....

...On appeal, the wife and mother contends that since the trial judge did not find her to be unfit, due to the tender age of the child, there is a presumption that she should have custody of the child. Her statement of the law is well taken. Although § 61.13(2), Fla....

...Blair, 380 So.2d 1305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Smith v. Smith, 118 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). Accordingly we grant the writ of certiorari and quash the order. WRIT OF CERTIORARI GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED. DAUKSCH, C.J. and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 61.13(3)(g), Fla....

...r a hearing to determine whether grandparent visitation is in Amber's best interest under the facts of the case. In 1978, the Florida legislature enacted the first statutory provision related to grandparent visitation with minor grandchildren. *1261 Section 61.13(2)(b) Florida Statutes (Supp....

...tody would be in the best interest of the child. Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So.2d 1034, 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (emphasis in original). Pursuant to this test, a change of custody is appropriate only when, having considered all of the factors listed in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, the trial court finds that a change in custody will so clearly promote or improve the child's well-being to such an extent that any reasonable parent would understand that maintaining the status quo would be detrimental to the child's overall best interests....

...n intrastate custody dispute). In 1977 the legislature enacted in Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), see Ch. 77-433, Laws of Fla., which abrogated the common law with respect to jurisdiction to entertain interstate custody disputes. See § 61.1308(2), Fla....

...e in the state in which the child has the closest connection; discourage controversies and abductions; avoid relitigation of child custody decisions; and facilitate enforcement of child custody decrees. [Footnote omitted.] 378 So.2d at 814. See also § 61.1304, Fla....

...We note, as we did in Marshall, that section 61.14, Florida Statutes (1987), pertaining to modification of alimony and child support awards, permits modification in the county in which either of the parties resides, see 404 So.2d at 1183, but no such authority exists under section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1987), pertaining to child custody awards....

...Such issues are to be determined upon the best interest of the children, and are not to be foreclosed because of pleading defaults. Rhines v. Rhines, 483 So.2d 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), rev. den., 488 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1986); Seibert v. Seibert, 436 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1989) requires the court to order shared parental responsibility unless the court finds that it would be detrimental to the child. The trial court did not make this specified finding of detriment in the final judgment and therefore erred in granting sole custody of the children to the wife. See Hicks v. Hicks, 511 So.2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). As stated in section 61.13(2)(b)1, "[i]t is the public policy of this state to assure that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the ......

...al court’s order rendered without jurisdiction “is not entitled to the preclusive effect of res judi-cata,” citing Kassewitz). In the present case, the trial court had the power to order visitation with Alexander only while he was a minor. See § 61.13(2), Fla....

...2d DCA 1970) (holding the law of Florida “is well settled” that a circuit court retains continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify its custody orders, including visitation privileges, until such time as the minor children reach their majority). The trial court does, however, have continuing jurisdiction under sections 61.13(1) and 743.07(2), Florida Statutes (2012), to order support for Alexander, despite his having reached adulthood, because of his mental and physical incapacity....

...der does not say.' ” 107 So.3d at 1248 (quoting Keitel v. Keitel, 716 So.2d 842, 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). Reversal in Hardman was not, on its face, predicated on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and reflects no consideration of the issue. . Section 61.13(l)(a)l.a., provides that "the court may at any time order either or both parents who owe a duty of support to a child to pay support to the other parent,” and this duty ceases after the "child’s eighteenth birthday unless the court finds or previously found that s....

...Arce and, should she fail to do so, the primary residential responsibility of the parties' minor child would "automatically transfer" to Mr. Arce. On appeal, Ms. Pelliccia contends that it was error to change the custody of the child as her punishment. Mr. Arce responds that the transfer is authorized by section 61.13(4)(c)(5), Florida Statutes (2002). Section 61.13(4)(c)(5) provides that, as a sanction for a custodial parent's refusal to honor the noncustodial parent's visitation rights, the court may award primary residence of the child to the noncustodial parent "if the award is in the best interests of the child." Although Mr....

...Fagan required the father to make payments to the mother of a dependent child who had reached majority, stating that the mother was the proper party to bring an enforcement suit when payments were not made. No authority for the pronouncement was cited, but a footnote indicates that section 61.13(1), Florida Statutes (1978), was available as a remedy if any doubt or problem arose concerning the use of funds for the dependent's benefit or should the dependent no longer reside with the mother. Section 61.13(1)(a) makes reference to the continuing jurisdiction for modification found necessary when a child reaches majority and provides that a court has continuing jurisdiction after initially entering a child support order to require an obligee to account. However, nothing in section 61.13(1)(a) dispenses with the necessity of an appointment of a guardian for an [sic] adult entitled to receive support. I am of the opinion that section 61.13(1)(a) merely enables the court ordering support to maintain jurisdiction to modify support and to require either the adult obligee or guardian of the incapacitated adult obligee to account to the court for the support ordered by it. Section 61.13(1)(a) does not enable either parent to receive support on behalf of the "obligee" as that term is used in the subsection and a term that I interpret to mean the adult dependent child entitled to receive support or the court-appointed guardian for that adult child....

...child custody to the mother constitutes an unconstitutional infringement upon her free exercise of religion. It is generally well-recognized in Florida that the controlling consideration in a custody determination is the best interests of the child. Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, provides that the court shall consider and evaluate all factors affecting the welfare of the child, including but not limited to : (a) The parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent....

...(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference. (j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute. (e.s.) We construe Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, to permit the trial court to consider a parent's religious beliefs or values as one of several factors aiding in its child custody determination....

...5th DCA 2009) (finding that an error regarding a spouse's income "requires the trial court to revisit and recalculate the child support to be awarded"). Finally, Mrs. Smith contends that the trial court did not properly consider the best-interest factors enumerated under section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2008), when it determined the parties' parenting plan and time-sharing schedule....

...Smith and her paramour and made several offhand remarks in reference to Mrs. Smith's decision to leave Mr. Smith throughout the final judgment. [1] The trial court found, without a detailed discussion, that of the twenty best-interest factors listed under section 61.13(3), three factors were inapplicable, one factor favored Mrs....

...n's welfare. See Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla.1975); Willis, 818 So.2d at 533. It appears from the final judgment that the trial court unduly focused on Mrs. Smith's alleged indiscretions in its analysis of the best-interest factors under section 61.13(3), particularly the morality factor in subsection (f)....

...father and/or the mother by the adult dependent child. AFFIRMED. GOSHORN, J., concurs. W. SHARP, J., dissents with opinion. W. SHARP, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent because I believe the dissolution court has continuing jurisdiction under § 61.13....

...The authority to order and enforce support obligations is found in chapter 61. In my view, chapter 61 is the comprehensive statute which deals with support for family members. In the case of minor children, a direct action for support against a parent by the other parent may be brought. Section 61.13(1)(a) provides: The court initially entering an order requiring one or both parents to make child support payments shall have continuing jurisdiction after the entry of the initial order to modify the amount and terms and conditions of...

...[1] *748 Hope's mother was the Rameys' only child, and she is their only descendant. It appears to us a harsh and unnecessary result to excise through adoption, a child's family relationship with natural grandparents. Even in the context of dissolution cases, grandparent rights are better protected than this. See § 61.13(2)(b)2 c, Fla....

...s of grandparents through a natural parent in the context of stepparent adoptions, although obviously the legislative intent was to continue these grandparent relationships. This is clearly an area which should be "revisited" by the legislature. [2] Section 61.13(2)(b)2 c, Florida Statutes (1983) permits a court in dissolution proceedings to award grandparents visitation rights if it is in the child's best interest....

...In so doing, this court held: "[I]n the context of an award of sole parental responsibility, . . . a trial court is only required to make a specified finding, either on the record or in the final judgment, that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to a child." The public policy behind section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2003), clearly favors shared parental responsibility. We note, however, that two provisions within section 61.13 appear to be at odds. Section 61.13(2)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2003), provides that "[t]he court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child." Section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), provides that "[t]he court shall order `sole parental responsibility, with or without visitation, when it is in the best interests of' the minor child." Both provisions were contained within the sta...

...ld that the trial court was required to find that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to a child before awarding sole parental responsibility to a parent. Reading the two provisions in pari materia, we interpret the latter provision, section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(b), to apply only to a determination concerning whether to afford the noncustodial parent visitation where a trial court awards sole parental responsibility to one parent rather than shared parental responsibility to both. Under those circumstances, the trial court should apply the best interests test. We interpret the former provision, section 61.13(2)(b)(2), to apply to matters in which a trial court must determine the propriety of shared parental responsibility....

...tion of the trial court. Mandamus is not an appropriate remedy for the trial court's refusal to give additional time to take additional testimony. Second, Ms. Buckhalt appeals the order granting temporary custody on the grounds that Florida Statutes section 61.13(7) (1993) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied....

...The trial court did not address the constitutionality of the statute. We find that, at this stage of the proceeding, after an order which only addresses the temporary custody of the child, it is not necessary or appropriate for us to decide the constitutionality of section 61.13(7)....

...sing time sharing. Like the parenting plan in Magdziak, these findings “lack specificity.” See Magdziak, 185 So. 3d at 1293 n.2. As a result, the trial court’s failure to include a more specific parenting plan that complies with section 61.13(2)(b) in the final judgment is an error apparent from the face of the final judgment....

...3d at 748; Packo, 120 So. 3d at 234. THE PARENTING PLAN We agree with Former Husband’s argument that the trial court’s parenting plan fails to comply with statutory requirements because it does not make findings required by section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2015). Section 61.13(2)(b) states that a parenting plan must, at a minimum: 1....

...sing time sharing. Like the parenting plan in Magdziak, these findings “lack specificity.” See Magdziak, 185 So. 3d at 1293 n.2. As a result, the trial court’s failure to include a more specific parenting plan that complies with section 61.13(2)(b) in the final judgment is an error apparent from the face of the final judgment....

...s imperative that the court evaluate the singular needs of each child in determining the issue of custody. Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1975), reiterated the basic precept for determining custody of children of tender years: While Fla. Stat. § 61.13(2), F.S.A., provides for equal consideration of the spouses in the award of custody, it is still the law in this State that, other essential factors being equal, the mother of the infant of tender years should receive prime consideration for custody....

...Mary Rudd Robinson of Legal Aid Service of Broward County, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. LETTS, Judge. A stepfather petitioned for custody of his stepson, but the trial court found it had no jurisdiction to consider the petition. We disagree and reverse. It is true that the wording of Section 61.13(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1981), which refers to the "minor children of the parties," would not appear to envisage or encompass a stepfather absent adoption although the language does not specifically exclude him....

...s should be ignored. They have provided him with love and care and are entitled to the opportunity to continue to participate actively in his life. To this end the legislature has made special provision for the visitation rights of grandparents. See § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...He has changed as many diapers, served as many meals and given as many baths as has appellee. The statutory law of Florida specifically provides that the father of a child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining custody. (F.S. 61.13(2)) In Brust v....

...iled to establish a substantial and material change in circumstances relating to custody since entry of the final judgment of dissolution and because there was no evidence that a change in primary residence would be in the children's best interests. Section 61.13(4)(c)5., Florida Statutes (2004), provides in relevant part: (c) When a custodial parent refuses to honor a noncustodial parent's or grandparent's visitation rights without proper cause, the court shall, after calculating the amount of...

...e child support the change in custody. See, e.g., *249 Compton v. Compton, 701 So.2d 110, 112 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Steiner v. Romano-Steiner, 687 So.2d 21 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Williams v. Williams, 676 So.2d 493, 493-94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); see also § 61.13(4)(c), Fla....

...It can exercise its contempt powers to compel a reluctant parent to comply with visitation orders or award a make-up period of visitation to square the loss of past visitation rights. Julian v. Bryan, 710 So.2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The trial court can also change custody pursuant to section 61.13(4)(c)5., Florida Statutes, if the standard adopted in Wade is met.

...moved to intervene in the paternity action, seeking visitation rights. The trial court denied the motion to intervene based on Beagle, but we reversed, concluding that it was unnecessary to reach the constitutionality of section 752.01(1)(d) because section 61.13(2)(b)2.c, Florida Statutes (1995) authorizes courts to award grandparent visitation in dissolution proceedings....

...ion to enter orders regarding children's custody and best interests while they are minors. S.G. v. G.G., 666 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (citing Cone v. Cone, 62 So.2d 907 (Fla.1953)). This case is still distinguishable from Spence, though, because section 61.13, on which Spence is grounded, is only applicable if there is "a proceeding." § 61.13(1)(a)....

...We concluded in Spence that where there was a pending paternity action, the parents "abandoned their right of familial privacy by bringing their dispute before the court." Id. at 998. Finding that the parents had abandoned their constitutional right to privacy enabled the panel in Spence to rely on section 61.13(2)(b)2.c, which authorizes grandparent visitation in dissolution proceedings and to avoid having to decide the constitutionality of section 752.01(1)(d)....

...to the former than is required for the latter. Beagle, 654 So.2d at 1265 (Webster, J., concurring specially). I have somewhat the same problem as Judge Webster raised, in that I fail to understand how the "compelling state interest" was satisfied by section 61.13(2)(b)2.c in Spence, if it was not satisfied by section 752.01 in Beagle.

...to the husband could survive the final order denying the husband's petition for modification."). Because we reverse, we decline to consider the other issue raised on appeal, i.e., whether the trial court properly considered the relocation factors of section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2002), when it determined the child should move with the Father to California....

...CANADY, J., and SEXTON, SUSAN, Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] What transpired at this hearing is unclear to us because the parties did not provide a transcript of the hearing. We note, however, that by its written order the trial court awarded temporary custody to the grandmother pursuant to section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides: (7) In any case where the child is actually residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship, whether the court has awarded custody to the grandparent or not, the court may recognize the...

...s parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child. After the trial court granted the grandmother custody, she filed a petition to intervene in the custody litigation and be awarded permanent custody pursuant to section 61.13(7). The Father moved to dismiss the grandmother's petition, relying on Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036 (Fla.2000), in which the Florida Supreme Court determined section 61.13(7) was an unconstitutional violation of a parent's fundamental right to raise his or her child....

...Merchant, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. GARRETT, Judge. Appellant, the former husband, seeks reversal of the non-final order that granted his former wife's verified petition for temporary injunction. We affirm. For whatever reason, the wife chose not to move pursuant to section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes for modification of the final judgment of dissolution....

...residence." A "noncustodial parent" means "the parent with whom the child does not maintain his or her primary residence." § 61.046(7). Custodial parents have residential custody, and noncustodial parents have visitation with the child. See, e.g., § 61.13(2)(a)("[t]he court shall have jurisdiction to determine custody"); § 61.13(4)(b)("[w]hen a custodial parent refuses to honor a noncustodial parent's visitation rights")(emphases added). In fact, the statutes equate custody with the primary residence of the child. See §§ 61.046(1), (7); see also § 61.13(2)(b)1....

...f the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child.... After considering all relevant facts, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of a child")(emphases added); § 61.13(8)("[i]f the court orders that parental responsibility, including visitation, be shared by both parents, the court may not deny the noncustodial parent overnight contact and access to or visitation with the child solely because of the age or sex of the child")....

...rders ruling that the guardian ad litem (GAL), appointed for the benefit of the parties' minor son, has the authority to make all decisions regarding visitation of the child with his parents. We grant the petition and remand for further proceedings. Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2005), sets forth the trial court's obligations when determining custody and visitation matters. Section 61.13(2)(a), provides that " [t]he court shall have jurisdiction to determine custody"; subsection (2)(b)(1) requires " [t]he court [to] determine all matters relating to custody of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child"; and subsection (2)(b)2.b....

...149 the main appeal dealing with the provision in the final judgment which reads: 7. The Husband shall maintain a term life insurance policy on his life in the sum of $50,000.00 with HOLLY JOY TRAGER as the beneficiary of said life insurance policy. Section 61.13(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that: To the extent necessary to protect an award of child support, the court may order the obligor to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure the child support award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose. In Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court held that a trial judge has the power, pursuant to section 61.13, Florida Statutes, to require the maintenance of a life insurance policy insuring the life of the payor of child support payable to the minor children until the children reach majority or are emancipated....

...on proceeding can only be overcome by satisfying an extraordinary burden. The following review of the cases describing the extraordinary burden test suggests a change of custody is appropriate when, after a review of all of the factors enumerated in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, the trial court finds that a change in custody will so clearly *353 promote or improve the child's well-being to such an extent that any reasonable parent would understand that maintaining the status quo would be detrimental to the child's overall best interests....

...respect to the stipulation to appoint a psychologist, the stipulation did not address the burden of proof at trial. Instead, it simply required that the psychologist examine the best interests of the children by examining those factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...After this court issued its original opinion in this matter, the Former Husband sought rehearing and clarification. In this motion, the Former Husband raised a third argument as to why the Gibbs standard did not apply in this case. Specifically, the Former Husband argued that pursuant to section 61.13(4)(c)(5), Florida Statutes (2000), the court could order a change in custody if it was in the best interests of the minor children because the Former Wife refused to honor his visitation rights without proper cause. See Steiner v. Romano-Steiner, 687 So.2d 21 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Williams v. Williams, 676 So.2d 493 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). In Steiner and Williams, the Fifth District held that a noncustodial parent proceeding under section 61.13(4)(c)(5) need not prove a substantial change in circumstances to obtain a modification of custody, but must simply prove a violation of visitation rights has occurred and the best interests of the child support the change in custody. We need not decide whether we agree with the Fifth District's decisions in Steiner and Williams, however, because we hold that section 61.13(4)(c)(5) does not apply to the present situation....

...[3] Moreover, although the final order modifying the final judgment mentioned the Former Wife had "interfered with visitation," it made no finding that she had denied visitation or refused to honor such visitation without cause on any specific occasion. We conclude that in order to invoke the provisions of section 61.13(4)(c)(5), the noncustodial parent must prove and the court must find that the custodial parent willfully violated court-ordered visitation provisions on specific dates and times, such as would support a finding of contempt....

...one, is sufficient to allow a change of custody under this provision. The Former Husband's argument, read broadly, would seem to permit a change in custody based upon best interests even in circumstances involving only one missed visitation. Because section 61.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2000), provides numerous remedies for noncompliance with visitation, it would seem that the most drastic of these would be employed only in circumstances where there had been substantial, willful non-compliance....

...The trial judge ruled "(t)he husband shall not have overnight visitation with the child due to the tender years until further order of this Court." We assume the trial judge was applying the "tender years doctrine" which has been effectively abolished in Florida by section 61.13(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (1983) which provides: Custody and Support of Children; Visitation Rights; Power of Court in Making Orders....

...After an evidentiary hearing the trial court found that it would not be in the child's best interest to have him brought back to Florida at the present time for purposes of awarding the father temporary custody, and the father appeals. The father argues that the trial court failed to apply the factors contained in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1997) which provides: (d) No presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact and access with the secondary residential parent....

...order itself"). Coincidentally, one week before we issued MacConnell, we affirmed a temporary order allowing relocation which did not contain any written findings. Garone v. Parks, 668 So.2d 307 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Prior to the legislature adopting section 61.13(2)(d), the supreme court had established six factors for courts to consider when determining whether a custodial spouse can relocate in Mize v....

...Russenberger, 669 So.2d 1044 (Fla.1996), and concluded that where a custodial parent seeking to relocate is in good faith, there is a presumption in favor of allowing relocation. The presumption announced in Russenberger prompted the Florida legislature to pass section 61.13(2)(d), which expressly states that there is no presumption, but uses factors which are similar to the Mize factors. The present case is governed by section 61.13(2)(d), not Mize. Although the legislature has required specific findings of fact for some chapter 61 determinations, [1] it did not require them for section 61.13(2)(d)....

...s children's Florida residence. It is good public policy, and in the minor child[ren]'s best interest, to devise a visitation plan "adequate to foster a continuing meaningful relationship between the child[ren] and the secondary residential parent." § 61.13(2)(d)4., Fla....

...ce stricken against. There is no provision in our laws purporting to authorize such judicial enforcement in married parents. In a dissolution of marriage action, the court's powers as to matters relating to the custody of minor children are found in section 61.13(2) and (3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...The order here is thus indistinguishable from Rogers, which was reversed in spite of expert testimony that the mother's religious practices had a detrimental effect on her ability to raise her children. It seems clear to us that the Rogers court simply concluded that religious training of children is not an issue covered by section 61.13(2) and (3)....

...use of her religion and that the order actually precluded her from exposing the child to anything inconsistent with the Catholic religion, that is not what the majority concluded. [2] We are unable to find conflict *1161 in a dissenting opinion. [3] Section 61.13 commands parents to confer on all major decisions affecting the welfare of their child and to reach an agreement as to any required decision....

...The wife, Patricia C. Nash, appeals from an amended final judgment for dissolution of marriage. We affirm, in part, reverse, in part, and remand. *371 The wife's first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to follow the dictates of section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1991), by not ordering the husband to provide insurance for the minor children where such insurance was reasonably available to the husband through his employer....

..."It is the public policy of this state to assure that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of childrearing." Section 61.13(2)(b)1, Fla....

...sibility. Since there was no specific finding that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the children, it appears that the court intended to award shared parental responsibility. See Bader v. Bader, 639 So.2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla....

...ut their own visitation schedule, attaching the court's schedule to the final judgment only as a fallback. We remand to the trial court to clarify whether it intended to award shared parental responsibility, and if so, to consider the application of Section 61.13(2)(b)2.a, Florida Statutes (1997), which provides that a court may grant one party the "ultimate responsibility" over specific aspects of a child's welfare....

...he children such as would be required if he were seeking a modification of the judgment on this issue. Id. at 29 (footnote omitted). Sub judice the final judgment provided for "shared parental responsibility as contemplated by Florida Statutes." See § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...sult of appellant's willful refusal to comply with visitation orders. Accordingly, the order under review is affirmed. Affirmed. NOTES [1] Both parties have represented themselves on this appeal. [2] A circuit court has continuing jurisdiction under § 61.13, Florida Statutes (1979), to modify an award of child support in a final judgment of dissolution of marriage.

...ed, we simply cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion. We reject the former husband's argument that the time the child spends with each parent, which can be ascertained from the face of the judgment in this case, is determinative. See § 61.13(3), Fla....

...in court approval prior to leaving the state with the child and because the trial court failed to consider any of the factors that should be considered in making a determination on relocation by a custodial parent. Stone argues that the enactment of section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), imposes an obligation on a custodial parent to seek permission from the court to relocate if the relocation will materially affect the current schedule of contact and access with the noncustodial parent. Stone points out that O'Neill failed to request a hearing pursuant to section 61.13(2)(d) so that the parties could address the relevant statutory factors....

...Just prior to the time O'Neill first sought temporary custody, the law granted a custodial parent a rebuttable presumption in favor of relocation and the burden of rebutting the presumption was on the noncustodial parent. See Russenberger v. Russenberger, 669 So.2d 1044 (Fla.1996). A 1997 amendment to section 61.13(2)(d) removed this presumption. [2] At the time O'Neill left the state, the new statute had been in effect almost four months. We need not decide in this case whether section 61.13(2)(d) mandates that a custodial parent seek court approval prior to relocating as Stone contends....

...It is clear that when O'Neill filed her emergency motion to set aside the pick-up order and returned to Florida for the hearing on this motion, the relocation issue was then before the court for determination. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the trial court to consider the factors set forth in section 61.13(2)(d)....

...However, the trial court focused exclusively on the fact that O'Neill left the state without telling Stone and infringed on his rights as a parent to have visitation and a meaningful relationship with his six-month-old child. The trial court did not conduct a hearing as required *396 by section 61.13(2)(d) to consider the factors enumerated therein regarding relocation....

...aith measures to ensure that the child visit and otherwise have frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent and refraining from doing anything likely to undermine the relationship naturally fostered by such interaction”); see also § 61.13(2)(c)l., Fla....

...court had the authority to impose this remedy if it found that the former wife deprived the former husband of his time-sharing with the child. Second, it appears that the trial court was required to impose this remedy under the circumstances because section 61.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2010), unequivocally provides: When a parent refuses to honor the time-sharing schedule in the parenting plan without proper cause, the court: 1....

...May impose any other reasonable sanction as a result of noncompliance. Nevertheless, we are compelled to reverse the makeup time-sharing orders because the trial court did not find that the manner in which the makeup time-sharing was imposed was in the best interest of the child, as is required by section 61.13(4)(c)l....

...as deprived of visitation by the mother because the trial court did not give any consideration to the child’s best interests or needs). The best interests of the child are always the paramount concern in child custody and time-sharing matters. See § 61.13(2)(c), Fla....

...ild”). This point is specifically stated several times in section 61.1S(4)(c), including in subpara-graph 1, which requires the makeup time-sharing to be scheduled “in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of the child.” See also § 61.13(4)(c)6., Fla. Stat. (permitting the court to modify the custody arrangements to remedy violations of the time-sharing schedule so long as the modification “is in the best interests of the child”). Thus, under section 61.13(4)(c), it is not enough that imposing makeup time-sharing is in the best interests of the child; the manner in which the time-sharing is imposed must also be in the child’s best interests....

...in the child having a relationship with his father. However, as explained above, before ordering a temporary change of custody or any other type of makeup time-sharing, the trial court was required to consider the best interests of the child. See §§ 61.13(4)(c)1., 6., Fla....

...ody of their grandchildren... ." Fla.H.R., tape recording of proceedings (April 23, 1984) (tape available from Florida House of Representatives) (floor debate on H.B. 487). [4] In 1978, the Legislature enacted Chapter 78-5, Laws of Florida, amending Section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...Arons v. Arons, 94 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1957). However, like most rules of law this proposition is not absolute and is subject to a determination as to what custody arrangement would be best for the child. Miller v. Miller, 371 So.2d 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (Supp 1978) sets forth the general standards that a trial court should consider in determining what is best for the child: (2)(b) The court shall award custody and visitation rights of minor children of the parties as...

...perience to express a preference. *699 (j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute. The wife asserts that the only factor supporting the trial court's award is the stated preference of the child. Section 61.13(3)(i), supra....

...Custody has been awarded to Sierralta, with only infrequent telephone contact between mother and child. All of this was accomplished without Cobo having adequate representation and without explanation in the final judgment or otherwise. Needless to say, section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes expressly requires consideration of a number of factors when making a custody determination. [4] See Velazquez v. Millan, 963 So.2d 852, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). While section 61.13(3) does not mandate written findings justifying a custody award, the record must at least demonstrate that section 61.13 factors were considered in making the award....

...Cobo, on the other hand, with no skills, and according to Sierralta, working illegally as a hairdresser, had no funds to join the fight. [4] We acknowledge that, effective October 1, 2008, the Florida Legislature amended various sections of Chapter 61, including section 61.13, to remove the references therein to "custody," "primary residence," "primary residential parent," and "visitation" in favor of a "parenting plan" that includes "time sharing." See Ch. 2008-61, s. 8 at 793-802, Laws of Fla.; In re Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules, 995 So.2d 445 (Fla.2008). The statutory revisions do no alter our analysis in this case, as section 61.13 still requires the lower court to consider factors to determine the best interests of the child.

...This post-dissolution conduct—interfering with visitation coupled with creating emotional problems in the children—was a substantial change. See Kudick v. Kudick, 622 So.2d 159 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Tessler v. Tessler, 539 So.2d 522 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 549 So.2d 1014 (Fla.1989). See also § 61.13(4)(c)2., Fla.Stat....

children’s best interests was never litigated. Section 61.13(4)(c)6., Florida Statutes (2009), provides that

...Fazzaro if the parents are unable to agree, although it limited her ultimate authority to the areas of “Education/Academic decisions” and “Non-emergency health care.” Under the parenting and time-sharing statute, shared parental responsibility is preferred unless it would be contrary to the child’s best interests. § 61.13(2)(c)(2), Fla....

...welfare or may divide those responsibilities between the parties based on the best interests of the child. Areas of responsibility may include education, health care, and any other responsibilities that the court finds unique to a particular family. § 61.13(2)(c)(2)(a). The statute then sets forth a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider in establishing parental responsibility, § 61.13(8)(a)-(t), but the....

...mother is unfit to have custody or that the best interests of the children would be served by a custody change. We disagree. The children in this case are ages four and five, respectively. Under the new no-fault divorce law, specifically Fla. Stat. § 61.13(2), F.S.A....

...Claims are paid out of a National Flood Insurance Fund in the United States Treasury. 42 U.S.C. § 4017(a). By statute and regulation, private insurers such as Fidelity may offer a SFIP under a "Write-Your-Own" ("WYO") program. See 42 U.S.C. § 4051; 44 C.F.R. § 61.13(f)....

...This order awarded visitation to the grandparents ever fourth weekend, and eliminated one of the weekend visits previously granted to the father. In this latter proceeding the father was not served with notice of nor was he present at the hearing. The sole issue for our consideration is whether § 61.13, Fla....

...We conclude that although the statute as amended authorizes the granting of visitation rights if it is deemed by the court to be in the child's best interest, it does not authorize the grandparents to become parties to the litigation itself so as to obtain an order of modification granting such rights. As amended, § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...he child's best interest. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require that grandparents be made parties or given notice of dissolution pleadings or proceedings, nor shall such grandparents have legal standing as `contestants' as defined in s. 61.1306. No court shall order that a child be kept within the state or jurisdiction of the court solely for the purpose of permitting visitation by the grandparents." (§ 61.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1978)) (Emphasis supplied) § 61.1306(1), Fla....

...(1977) [2] , defines "contestant" as follows: "(1) `Contestant' means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to custody or visitation rights with respect to a child." So far as we have been able to determine no appellate court in Florida has construed the new language of § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...e limited primarily to cases in which either or both parents are unfit to rear the child, as in Behn v. Timmons, 345 So.2d 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). See also 10A Fla.Jur. Dissolution of Marriage, etc., §§ 94, 340. However, prior to the amendment of Section 61.13 the trial court could not grant visitation rights to a non-parent of a child whose custody had been awarded to a fit parent. Tamargo v. Tamargo, 348 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977); Sheehy v. Sheehy, 325 So.2d 12 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1975); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 295 So.2d 328 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974). See 10A Fla.Jur. Dissolution of Marriage, etc., § 95. The amendments to § 61.13 abrogated this rule established by case law, but the amending act (Ch....

...The grandparents had no standing to maintain this proceeding, and the order appealed from must be and is hereby reversed. MILLS, Acting C.J., and ERVIN, J., concur. NOTES [1] The words "and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act" were added to § 61.13(2)(b) by Ch. 77-433, Laws of Fla., as a part of the enactment of the uniform act (see Ch. 77-433, § 26). [2] § 61.1306(1), Fla....

...Thus far, there have been no ‘issues or problems’ with timesharing and the parties have structured periods that are consistent with the Husband’s work obligations. This shall continue.” No other language in the final judgment discussed the parties’ rights as to timesharing. Section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2012), explicitly requires the parenting plan approved by a trial court “must, at a minimum, describe in adequate detail ....

...Here, rather than providing detailed timesharing arrangements, the trial court simply noted that the parties had not encountered any timesharing issues and should continue working together to create their own timesharing schedule. We hold the trial court’s order did not meet the requirement of section 61.13(2)(b) that timesharing schedule arrangements be “describe[d] in adequate detail” and “specify the time that the minor child will spend with each parent.” 3  However, as noted...

...itself noted the child was the focal point of the dissolution proceedings and when timesharing was at issue in the case. For those reasons, we reverse the trial court’s final order and remand for the trial court to include a detailed timesharing schedule pursuant to section 61.13(2)(b). Because we reverse and remand for the entry of a detailed timesharing schedule, we also reverse on the issue of the child support obligation of the former husband....

...Only his contention regarding the propriety of the child support award has merit and requires reversal of the final judgment in part. First, the former husband asserts the lower court committed error by not considering shared parental responsibility as provided by section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.)....

...5th DCA 1982), we articulated the factors relevant to a determination of child support: The trial court may order either or both parties to a dissolution proceeding to pay child support in an amount which is equitable in light of the circumstances of each party and the nature of the case. § 61.13(1), Fla....

...Peak and Judge Cowart's concurring opinion in Hughes v. Hughes . AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with directions. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Through Chapter 82-96, the legislature in many respects amended section 61.13, effective July 1, 1982....

...th parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child. If the court determines that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child, the court may order sole parental responsibility. § 61.13(2)(b)2....

...42 U.S.C.A. § 4011(a) (West 1994). Pursuant to this authorization, FEMA prescribes a Standard Flood Insurance Policy, which governs the issuance of flood insurance policies. Insurance Coverage and Rates: Standard Flood Insurance Policy, 44 C.F.R. § 61.13 and Part 61 App. A (1994). Private sector property insurance companies, denominated as "Write Your Own" companies, are authorized to issue the Standard Flood Insurance Policy. 44 C.F.R. § 61.13(f)....

...Appellant advances two arguments in support of her contention that the trial court erred in failing to award her custody: 1) the "tender years presumption" and 2) that the trial judge improperly used the placement of the child as a tool to facilitate a reconciliation. Section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that when considering all relevant factors in the determination of child custody and visitation, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother....

...he mother. Klavans v. Klavans, 330 So.2d 811 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. dismissed, 353 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1979). The above cases do not enumerate the essential factors which a court should specifically consider. However, in 1975, the Legislature amended section 61.13 to include some of the criteria to be considered when determining the welfare and best interests of the child: (3) For purposes of custody, the best interests of the child shall be determined by the court's consideration and evaluation...

...Holmes, of Lovett, Kreuter & Holmes, Orlando, for appellee. PER CURIAM. From time immemorial the controlling consideration in awarding custody has been, is, and hopefully will continue to be the welfare of the child. 10A Fla.Jur. Dissolution of Marriage, Sec. 88; Section 61.13(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...esponded well to the attorney. Finally, Carol Lumpkin, who is a neighbor and family friend, testified that both parents are loving and caring parents, and that both have a lot to offer the children. After evaluating the relevant statutory factors of section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1995), the trial court awarded primary residential custody of the children to the attorney, with frequent and continuing contact with the architect....

...Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I, American Law Institute, § 2.14, at 250 (1998). A parent's financial resources is only one factor that must be balanced with the remaining statutory factors outlined in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...ort the children (regardless of the amount of her income), and the *1163 father who unilaterally and steadfastly refused to do the same, the trial court's designation of the mother as custodial parent cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. [7] See § 61.13(3)(c), Fla....

...with the parent who had continuously been there to care for their needs throughout their young lives rather than the parent who had devoted a substantial amount of time with them perhaps only when it was convenient and/or opportunistic to do so. See § 61.13(3)(d), Fla....

...ompromised by any purposeless change in their caregiver. In many areas, the law properly recognizes the undesirability of disrupting the children's circumstances any more than is already necessarily required by their parents' separation and divorce. § 61.13(3)(d), Fla....

...685, 694 N.E.2d 654, 657 (1998); In re Marriage of Jackson, 682. N.E.2d 549 (Ind.Ct. App.1997); Wright v. Stovall, No. 01A01-9701-CV-00040, 1997 WL 607508, at *5 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct.3, 1997). This salient factor was wholly ignored by the trial court. Section 61.13(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1995), in part provides "the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of the child." In Cherradi v....

...In addition, no reasons are given to support a departure from the amount specified in the guidelines. On remand, both of these oversights should be corrected. The final judgment fails to explain the status of any medical insurance which may be reasonably available for the child, as required by section 61.13(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...17, 2001, to relocate the parties' seven-year-old child from Tampa, Florida, to Coral Springs, Florida. *173 Because the trial court's findings are not supported by substantial competent evidence, we reverse. In ruling on a petition for relocation, section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), provides that the court must consider the following factors: 1....

...The statute further directs that "[n]o presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact and access with the secondary residential parent." § 61.13(2)(d). After thorough review of the record, we find the facts do not provide substantial competent evidence to support a finding that relocation is in the best interests of the child. See § 61.13(2)(d)(6); Flint v....

...There was no evidence presented to counter the counselor's testimony, nor was there any evidence presented that the relocation would be good for the child. Any evidence regarding the benefits of relocation related to the Mother and her new husband. Section 61.13(2)(d), however, directs the court to consider the best interests of the child, not just the petitioning parent....

...Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in granting the petition for relocation, and we reverse. Additionally, we note as a matter of clarification that the order granting relocation appears to be based in part on an incorrect legal standard. Section 61.13(2)(d) overrules a presumption previously adopted by the Mize v....

...trial court properly found material change in circumstances). Although the report largely reflects the child's preference to live *382 with the father, the child's wish is merely a factor to be considered in determining modification of custody. See § 61.13(3)(i), Fla....

...judgment of dissolution which placed custody of the minor child with I.C.C.G.'s natural mother, C.S.G., the appellee. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not using a "best interest of the child" standard in making a custody decision under section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1995), as between a natural parent and a grandparent with whom the child had been residing in a stable relationship. We agree with the trial court that in a custody dispute under section 61.13(7) custody can be denied to the parent only when it is established that the parent has abandoned the child, that the parent is unfit, or that granting custody to the parent will be detrimental to the child....

...sense, an unfit parent, or that placing the child with the parent will be detrimental to the child's welfare. On the authority of In Re J.M.Z., 635 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the trial court rejected the grandmother's argument that, pursuant to section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes, grandparents with custody of a child are now on equal standing with natural parents in a custody dispute....

...Accordingly, the trial court ordered that after a transition period custody is to be returned to the natural mother. Grandparent—Parent Custody Dispute This case involves the question of the standard to apply in a dispute between a parent and grandparent for custody of a minor child pursuant to section 61.13(7)....

...ural parents "to raise their children except in cases where the child is threatened with harm," Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271, 1276 (Fla.1996), we agree with the trial court that in a custody dispute between a natural parent and grandparent under section 61.13(7), custody should be granted to the natural parent unless it is demonstrated that such custody will be detrimental to the child....

...Poe, 699 So.2d 348, 348-349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)). While the discussions of parental rights in Beagle and Von Eiff were in the context of visitation disputes, we find the rationale of those cases equally applicable to the custody dispute before us. Section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes The appellant argues that, by enacting subsection (7) of section 61.13 in 1993, the Legislature modified the standard adopted in D.A. McW. We cannot agree. Section 61.13(7) provides: In any case where the child is actually residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship, whether the court has awarded custody to the grandparent or not, the court may recognize the grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child. As noted by the trial court, this court held in In Re J.M.Z., 635 So.2d at 135, that section 61.13(7) did not authorize grandparents to institute separate custody actions....

...Begines, 701 So.2d 616, 617-618 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Similarly, we do not read subsection (7) as altering the existing case law, see D.A. McW., which establishes the appropriate standard to apply in a custody dispute between a natural parent and a grandparent. Were we to read section 61.13(7) as requiring the application of a "best interests" standard when considering a custody dispute between a natural parent and a grandparent who has lived in a stable relationship with the child at issue, we would be interpreting the st...

...Weekly at S585-586. "If a statute may reasonably be construed in more than one manner, [we are] obligated to adopt the construction that comports with the dictates of the Constitution." Vildibill v. Johnson, 492 So.2d 1047, 1050 (Fla.1986). Interpreting section 61.13(7) in harmony with the privacy provision, we read this section to grant to a grandparent, who has previously resided with a child in a stable relationship, the right to intervene or be named as a party in a child custody proceeding under chapter 61....

...McW., 460 So.2d at 369-370; Matzen, 600 So.2d at 488; Murphy v. Markham-Crawford, 665 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), rev. denied, 675 So.2d 928 (Fla. 1996). [6] We recognize that the Second District in S.G. v. G.G., 666 So.2d 203, 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), has interpreted section 61.13(7) as requiring the application of a "best interest of the child" standard in a custody dispute between a parent and a grandparent with whom the child had resided in a stable relationship....

...We note, however, that the decision in S.G. predates the Supreme Court's announcement of the constitutional parental rights in Beagle and Von Eiff and S.G. did not address any constitutional issues. Thus, with respect, we are not persuaded that S.G. has correctly interpreted section 61.13(7) in light of Beagle and Von Eiff....

...Therefore, we certify conflict with S.G. under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. We also recognize that the Fourth District in Spence v. Stewart, 705 So.2d 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), has ruled that in considering grandparent visitation in a paternity proceeding under section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c), the court's "consideration of whether grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the child is not violative of the right to privacy." Id....

...e court's further consideration of whether grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the child is not violative of the right of privacy. Spence, 705 So.2d at 998. With respect, we are not persuaded that the analysis in Spence should apply to section 61.13(7)....

...cy under article I, section 23, Florida Constitution. Brunetti v. Saul, 724 So.2d 142, 144, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2619, D2620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(Klein, J., concurring). Finally, in our view, there would seem to be no logical reason for concluding that section 61.13(7), if it did require a "best interest" test, would satisfy the "compelling state interest" requirement when this requirement was not satisfied in section 752.01....

...grounds. See In re Petition of Santoro, 578 N.W.2d 369, 375-376 (Minn.App.1998), and cases cited therein. [6] In Richardson v. Richardson, ___ So.2d ____, 1999 WL 1529, Case No. 98-1240 (Fla. 1st DCA January 5, 1999), a panel of this court held that section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1997), was unconstitutional insofar as it authorized an evaluation of a grandparents' custody request solely on a best interest of the child standard. In Richardson, the trial court had transferred custody from the natural mother to the child's grandparents pursuant to section 61.13(7) based on an application of the best interest standard. The parties in Richardson made no argument regarding an interpretation of section 61.13(7) which might have avoided an unconstitutional application of the statute in that case. By contrast, in the instant case, the appellee argued below and on appeal that under section 61.13(7), while the statute granted the grandparents standing to intervene, custody could be awarded to grandparents only if the parents were first found unfit and the trial court applied the statute in a manner that was consistent with the privacy provision of the Florida Constitution. Because of the application of section 61.13(7) in the instant case, unlike the Richardson panel, we find it unnecessary to address its constitutionality as applied.

..., until the psychologist explained it to her. She also testified she realized she had made a mistake with Hafner, and she did not intend to ever get into a similar relationship or situation. The trial court made the following findings as required by section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1989): (a) the mother's testimony that she wants minimal contact with the father of the unborn child shows the mother fails to understand the need for children to have frequent and continuing contact with both parents....

...iate from statutory requirements as to placement of dependent child); see also In re Guardianship of D.A. McW, 460 So.2d 368 (Fla.1984); Murphy v. Markham-Crawford, 665 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), review denied, 675 So.2d 928 (Fla.1996). Compare § 61.13(2)(b)(1), Fla....

...First is the strong policy of shared parental responsibility as articulated by the "[l]egislature's determination that the best interests of children are served by frequent and continuing contact with both parents." Mize v. Mize, 621 So.2d 417, 420 (Fla.1993) (Barkett, J., concurring); see § 61.13(2)(b), Fla.Stat....

...They recommended placement with the father because they concluded that Lee County afforded the child a more stable environment. The mother had changed jobs and moved somewhat more often than the father. Their report summarized their opinions regarding the factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...There was no evidence that these changes had any adverse effect on the child or that she possessed an unstable personality. The parties' settlement agreement expressly contemplated a move within the state. The joint evaluators' testimony concerning stability is based upon the factor found in section 61.13(3)(d), "[t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity." This factor and the others utilized by the joint evaluators are required in an original determination of custody....

...ies' minor child, and required her to obtain a life insurance policy for as long as she is required to pay child support. However, the court is required by statute to apportion the cost of the insurance between the parties on a percentage basis. See § 61.13(1)(b), Fla....

...The relocation requirement is, in effect, a denial of part of the motion to modify. The former wife appeals this denial. Undoubtedly, the purpose of the relocation requirement was to ensure increased accessibility of the children to their father and vice-versa. Section 61.13(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1987), states in part: "It is the public policy of this state to assure that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing." Section 61.13(4)(c)2 provides that "[w]hen a custodial parent refuses to honor a noncustodial parent's visitation rights without proper cause, the court may: Award the custody or primary residence to the noncustodial parent, upon the request of the noncustodial parent, if the award is in the best interests of the child." Section 61.13(3)(a) states that "[f]or purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary residence, the best interests of the child shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child, including, but not l...

...4th DCA 1984), where the district court affirmed an order directing the former wife to return the parties' child to the state of Florida within 30 days. The court found that the final judgment provided for "shared parental responsibility as contemplated by Florida Statutes" under section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Stowbridge of Patricia L. Stowbridge, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Sharon Lee Stedman of Sharon Lee Stedman, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. HARRIS, Judge. The primary issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in its application of section 61.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes in this action to modify child custody when the reason for such modification is the custodial parent's alleged refusal to honor the noncustodial parent's visitation rights. We find that the trial court erred in determining that one who seeks a change of custody under section 61.13(4)(c) must first show a substantial change of circumstances....

...reshold of a substantial change of circumstances." We held in Williams v. Williams, 676 So.2d 493 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), a decision not available to the trial court at the time of its ruling in this case, that when a noncustodial parent proceeds under section 61.13(4)(c), no substantial change of circumstances is necessary to be proved where a violation of visitation rights is found by the court to have occurred and the court further finds that the best interests of the child lie in transferring custody to the other parent....

...arties remain the same as when the decree was entered. Eaton v. Eaton, 238 So.2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). The law is clear, however, that a modification may be granted only upon a showing of substantial, material, involuntary, and permanent changes. Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1949); In Re Marriage of Johnson, 352 So.2d 140 (Fla....

...pportunities. Id. at 341. We rejected the former wife's argument the trial court lacked authority to order makeup time-sharing under the facts. Id. at 341-342. Even so, we felt compelled to reverse the makeup time-sharing orders because, contrary to section 61.13(4)(c)1., Florida Statutes, the trial court failed to find that the manner in which the court *356 imposed the makeup time-sharing was in the child's best interests....

...ility for their child and that the child spend equal time with each parent, by rotating year to year between the residences of the parents, with the child finishing the 2010-2011 school year with her mother. The parties are coequal in all factors of Section 61.13(3) Florida Statutes although the Court has come [sic] concerns regarding the child's school changes....

...unusual arrangement, which forces a minor child with special needs to change schools and acclimate to new surroundings every year is, in fact, in the best interests of the child. The mere fact that the trial court feels both parents are equal under section 61.13(3) does not mean that this rotating parenting plan is in the best interest of the child....

...primary residential parent and both parents must comply with a parenting plan that sets out in detail each parent's responsibilities and involvement in the minor child's life. See Ch. 2008-61, § 8, at 742, Laws of Fla. The Legislature also modified section 61.13(2)(c)(1) to state, "[t]here is no presumption for or against the father or mother of the child or for or against any specific time-sharing schedule when creating or modifying the parenting plan of the child." See Ch....

...2009-180, § 3, at 1853, Laws of Fla. Thus, currently no presumption exists disfavoring the underlying time-sharing plan. However, as discussed below, there is no evidence that the specific nature of this time-sharing plan is in the best interest of the child. Section 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Florida Statutes (2010), lists factors which are to be considered in determining the best interests of the child for the purposes of creating a parenting plan. In the instant case, the trial court dealt with all of the statutory factors in only two sentences in the order granting annual, rotating custody. While the trial court stated that it found all of the factors of section 61.13(3) equal with respect to each parent, it engaged in no discussion of these factors....

...Miller, 842 So.2d 168, 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Adair v. Adair, 720 So.2d 316, 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). For the reasons stated below, we find that the trial court's order granting an annual, rotating time-sharing plan was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Section 61.13(3)(e), Florida Statutes (2010), is of particular importance in the case of rotating custody and states, "[t]he geographic viability of the parenting plan, with special attention paid to the needs of school-age children and the amount of...

...Sullivan v. Sullivan, 604 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). While we acknowledge there is no longer a presumption to overcome, we feel that these factors are still useful in determining the best interests of the child, especially when considering section 61.13(3)(e) and the propriety of this type of time-sharing plan....

...her. As such, that custody cannot be modified except by court order which, by law, must be based on a "substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child." § 61.13(3), Fla....

...n element of his or her claim or defense." Section 90.503 reflects an awareness that "confidentiality is essential to the conduct of successful psychiatric care." Attorney ad Litem for D.K. v. Parents of D.K., 780 So.2d 301, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Section 61.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), requires a trial court to decide the custody of minor children by ascertaining what is in the child's best interest....

...Culbertson, 90 So.3d 355, 356 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). The legislature determined that “[i]t is the public policy of this state that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after ... the marriage of the parties is dissolved.” § 61.13(2)(c)1., Fla....

...Ritter was entitled to attorney's fees associated with Mr. Kuttas's failure to comply with an order on motion for contempt and for other bad faith conduct during the litigation. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. *5 Substantial Change in Circumstances Section 61.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that a court has the authority to modify child support orders "when there is a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties." See also Overbey v....

...based simply on his move to Maryland and his concomitant inability to exercise weekend visitation, asserting that there is no correlation between visitation and child support. See Bassett v. Saunders, 835 So.2d 1198, 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (citing section 61.13(4)(b), Fla....

...Kuttas claims that there had been no substantial change in circumstances, in that the financial ramifications of his new employment were not substantial and a mechanism was in place by which Ms. Ritter would be compensated for child care costs. Mr. Kuttas's argument is without merit, however, not only because section 61.13(4)(b) speaks to a circumstance not present here—a noncustodial parent's withholding of child support based on the custodial parent's refusal to honor the noncustodial parent's visitation—but also because this case presents a unique situation....

...Despite the conflicting evidence, the record supports the trial court's determination that the Mother was entitled to be the residential parent. In its *414 order, the trial court evaluated the evidence and credibility of the witnesses vis-a-vis the criteria set forth in section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1995). The trial court further found that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the children. See § 61.13(2)(b)2....

...year old child to move from Florida to California over the objection of the other parent, the natural father. The supreme court began its analysis by noting that Florida law presumes that both parents will participate in child-rearing after divorce. § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...of Palm Beach County; Donna MacRae of Three Rivers Legal Services; Deborah A. Schroth of Jacksonville Area Legal Aid; and Deborah M. Weissman of Bay Area Legal Services, Inc. ERVIN, Judge. The natural parents of J.M.Z. appeal a final order, entered pursuant to section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1993), [1] designating the paternal grandmother the primary custodian of J.M.Z. They argue that section 61.13(7) does not create an independent cause of action for custody on behalf of the grandmother....

...In the latter part of 1991, the child's parents moved to North Carolina for employment *135 and left the child with the grandmother for an extended visit. In October 1992, the grandmother relocated to Pensacola, taking J.M.Z. with her, and commenced an action for non-parental custody, pursuant to both chapter 39 and section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes....

...J.M.Z., (2) that the parents were unfit, or (3) that the placement of J.M.Z. in her parents' custody would be detrimental to her welfare. Consequently, the court denied the grandmother's custody petition pursuant to chapter 39, but granted it under section 61.13(7), ruling that the award of custody to the grandparent was in the child's best interest. We find nothing in section 61.13, or, for that matter, any other provision within chapter 61, Florida Statutes, affording a child's grandparents the right to commence an independent action for custody. Although Schilling v. Wood, 532 So.2d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), was decided before the adoption of section 61.13(7), we consider its reasoning highly persuasive....

...their grandchild's father, who had not legally surrendered custody of the child, in a case wherein neither a chapter 61 dissolution nor a chapter 39 dependency proceeding had been initiated. Id. at 14. There is nothing in the subsequent enactment of section 61.13(7) compelling a different result....

...es do not encompass independent actions brought by grandparents to gain permanent custody of children over the parents' objections. REVERSED and REMANDED with directions that the order entered be vacated. [3] MICKLE and DAVIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 61.13(7) provides: In any case where the child is actually residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship, whether the court has awarded custody to the grandparent or not, the court may recognize the grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child. No one has argued that the provisions of section 61.13(7) are inapplicable to the case at bar on the ground that they did not become effective until after the custody petition was filed....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self-Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in “bold underline” in these instructions are defined there. For further information, see sections 61.1302-61.1354, Florida Statutes....

...Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self-Represented Litigants” found at the begin *157 ning of these forms. The words that are in “bold underline” in these instructions are defined there. For further information, see sections 61.052 and 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...FORM 12.902(3)- NOTICE OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE_JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR_COUNTY, FLORIDA [[Image here]] NOTICE OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER I, {full legal name}_, certify that my social security number is-, as required in section 61.052(7), sections 61.13(9) or (10), section 742.031(3), sections 742.032(l)-(3), and/or sections 742.10(l)-(2), Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is *169 (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...ild(ren) listed below based on the following: [/ all that apply] — a. This Court exercised and continues to exercise original jurisdiction over the minor children listed below under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), specifically, section 61.1308, Florida Statutes....

...A certified out-of-state custody decree has been presented to this Court with a request for full faith and credit recognition and enforcement under the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. This Court has jurisdiction to enforce this decree under the UCCJA, specifically section 61.1328, Florida Statutes....

...tate of Florida and no prior court action involving the minor children) has addressed a putative father’s rights to custody or other parental rights. See sections 742.031 and 744.301, Florida Statutes. *289 _ d. Pursuant to the UCCJA, specifically section 61.133, Florida Statutes, this Court has jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state .and has consulted with the Court which took initial jurisdiction over the minor child(ren) to determine this authority....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that temporary support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(l)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests that temporary support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(l)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(l)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Some circuits may require, the completion of mediation before a final hearing may be set. Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self-Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. For further information, see chapter 752 and section 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Florida Statutes....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the children) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(l)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...th any depository service charge. _ b. Both parties have requested and the court finds that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(l)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(l)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(l)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.08 or 61.13, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...o Lori Jan Usher (mother). We reverse because the mother failed to carry her burden of showing a substantial change of circumstances to justify the transfer. See Agudo v. Agudo, 411 So.2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 418 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 1982). Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1989), provides the court with guidelines for determining the best interests of the children in matters regarding custody. Additionally, section 61.13(1)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1989), instructs the court to give the father the same consideration as the mother *472 when determining custody....

...thout exception. The doctrine directs the trial court to give prime consideration to the mother when determining custody of young children. However, the doctrine only applies after the trial court finds that both parents equally meet the criteria of section 61.13(3)....

...Dinkel, 322 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1975). In the instant case, not only was there a lack of evidence to justify the transfer, but also, the evidence presented weighed against awarding temporary custody to the mother. Both parents do not meet the criteria of section 61.13(3); the factors are not equal....

...ole parental responsibility for the minor child or, in the alternative, primary residential responsibility. On October 23, 2003, the trial judge stated her oral ruling. She analyzed the statutory factors for determining primary residence detailed in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2002), and concluded that the factors were either *1171 equal or not applicable....

...isitation entered on October 29, 2003, the trial judge declared: "If the child were older, this court would be granting primary residency to the Father, because the evidence indicates that he attempts to follow the visitation and holiday orders." Subsection 61.13(2)(b)(1) expressly states: The court shall determine all matters relating to custody of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act....

...After considering all relevant facts, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of the child. (Emphasis added.) The First, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal have interpreted the underlined portion of subsection 61.13(2)(b)(1) as clearly negating any further application of the "tender years" doctrine....

...ation for custody." Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla.1975). In Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So.2d 1 (Fla.1975), the Florida Supreme Court held that the preference recognized by the "tender years" doctrine remained the law of the state despite subsection 61.13(2), which then provided, "Upon considering all relevant factors, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining custody." However, since these decisions, legislative amendments have been enacted "to override the court's persistence in applying this doctrine." Ketola, 636 So.2d at 851. Subsection (2)(b)(1) of section 61.13 now provides that "[a]fter considering all relevant facts, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of the child." Effective July 1, 1982, the phrase "regardless of the age of the child" was added to the original language in subsection 61.13(2)....

...residential responsibility solely on the basis of the child's age. Moreover, the trial court's statements that it was basing its decision on the age of the minor child were not made in reference to its analysis of the statutory factors enumerated in section 61.13(3)....

...Ring, 834 So.2d 216 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Newsom v. Newsom, 759 So.2d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Cassin v. *1173 Cassin, 726 So.2d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Here, the trial court erroneously limited its inquiry to a consideration of the factors set forth in section 61.13(3), as if it were making an initial custody determination....

...conflicted with Usher. See Kuutti, 645 So.2d at 83; Ketola, 636 So.2d at 852. Because the discussion in Usher of the "tender years" doctrine was dicta, that opinion does not conflict with this court's current position that a reasonable reading of subsection 61.13(2)(b)(1) results in the conclusion that the "tender years" doctrine has been abolished by the legislature....

...is reversed and remanded with directions to grant modification of the final judgment in accordance with the directions herein. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. NOTES [1] We have not overlooked chapter 93-236, section 1, Laws of Florida, the legislature's 1993 amendment to section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1991), but rather find inapplicable this amendment to the child custody law which provides that where a child is actually residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship, the court may recognize the grandparents...

...The Florida legislature has made it clear that visitation rights and the obligation to provide child support are unrelated and that the inability to exercise visitation rights does not relieve the noncustodial parent from the obligation to pay child support. § 61.13(4)(b), Fla....

...er. It is clear, however, that a further hearing, if same has not already taken place, is necessary in this matter for resolution of permanent custody. Issues to be considered likely will include whether, in accordance with the statutory criteria of section 61.13(2)(d), a relocation of the primary custodian with the children is in their best interests, and whether, in consideration of the statutory criteria of section 61.13(4)(c), permanent *474 custody should be transferred to the father....

...If the trial court erroneously interprets or applies a controlling *59 statute, then it violates “clearly established law.” See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So.2d 885, 890-91 (Fla.2003). Florida’s rules regarding visitation and timesharing are governed by section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2014). And “[b]y its explicit provisions,” section 61.13 applies only to parents’ visitation rights and does not extend to nonparents....

...1st DCA 1995); Johns v. Richards, 717 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Cartee v. Carswell, 425 So.2d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). The Florida Legislature has also made it clear that visitation rights and the obligation to provide child support are unrelated. § 61.13(4)(b), Fla....

...Schou, 616 So.2d 436, 438 (Fla. 1993). The trial court made such a determination in this case and was confronted with what to do with, if anything, the excess of the support allocation. Three 1993 amendments to chapter 61 affect this case: 1. In pertinent part, section 61.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes was amended as follows: 61.13....

...to pay support in accordance with the guidelines in s. 61.30 as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case is equitable. Ch. 93-208, § 2, at 1602, Laws of Fla. (additions are indicated by underline: deletions by strikeout). 2. Section 61.13(5), Florida Statutes, was amended as follows: (5) The court may make specific orders for the care and, custody, and support of the minor child as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case is equitable and provide for child support in accordance with the guidelines in s....

...re commonplace. As set forth below, we will therefore attempt *999 to define in broad terms the authority of the trial courts in this area. In addition to the inherent power of the court, we find authority for the trial court's concept of a trust in section 61.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), which states in pertinent part: The court initially entering a child support order shall also have continuing jurisdiction to require the obligee to report to the court on terms prescribed by the court regarding the disposition of the child support payments. In Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Trovillo, 516 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), the court held that section 61.13(1)(a) authorized the trial court to require the custodial parent to make a quarterly accounting to the court as to the expenditure of child support payments....

...Reversed and remanded with instructions. RYDER, A.C.J., and WHATLEY, J., concur. NOTES [1] The amendment to section 61.30 is to conform to the requirement in the federal guidelines that there can be no cap on the application of the guidelines. The legislative intent of the amendments to section 61.13(1)(a) & (5) is to require that the guidelines be applied in all cases in response to a number of cases, including Huff v....

...For this reason, the trial court concluded that the Mother's relocation with the child outside Florida constituted a substantial change of circumstances. Having found a substantial change of circumstances, the trial court proceeded to a consideration of the factors listed in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2003), in order to resolve the custody modification issue....

...did not have "a `right' to grandparent visitation with the [W]ard." Sullivan is one of a line of Florida cases that have held various legislative efforts to establish "grandparental visitation rights" to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., id. (holding section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), unconstitutional); Saul v....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self-Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in "bold underline" in these instructions are defined there. For further information, see section 61.13002, Florida Statutes....

...___ Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that temporary support payments need not be directed through the State Disbursement Unit. However, either party may subsequently apply, pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the State Disbursement Unit....

...___ Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests that temporary support payments need not be directed through the State Disbursement Unit. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the State Disbursement Unit....

...This form or a similar form should be used in the development of a Parenting Plan. If the case involves supervised time-sharing, the Safety Focused Parenting Plan, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.995(b) or a similar form should be used. If the case involves relocation, pursuant to Section 61.13001, Florida Statutes, then a Relocation/Long Distance Parenting Plan, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.995(c) or a similar form should be used....

...n into consideration. Determination of the best interests *1266 of the child(ren) shall be made by evaluating all of the factors affecting the welfare and interest of the particular minor child(ren) and the circumstances of that family, as listed in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, including, but not limited to: • The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship, to honor the time-sharing schedule, and to be...

...her order of the court. Any substantial changes to the Parenting Plan must be sought through the filing of a supplemental petition for modification. XIV. RELOCATION Any relocation of the child(ren) is subject to and must be sought in compliance with section 61.13001, Florida Statutes....

...e providing protection for the child(ren). If safety or supervised time-sharing is not a concern, Parenting Plan, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.995(a) or a similar form should be used. If the case involves relocation, pursuant to Section 61.13001, Florida Statutes, then Relocation/Long Distance Parenting Plan, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.995(c) or a similar form should be used....

...e taken into consideration. Determination of the best interests of the child(ren) shall be made by evaluating all of the factors affecting the welfare and interest of the particular minor child(ren) and the circumstances of that family, as listed in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, including, but not limited to: • The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship, to honor the time-sharing schedule, and to be...

...f their child. The father continued to care for his son while the mother was at work even after the parties' separation. In its order determining custody, the trial court detailed its findings regarding several of the statutory factors enumerated in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...v. Hein, 541 So.2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) and Kuutti v. Kuutti, 645 So.2d 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)]. However, the Court is not giving the Tender Years Doctrine or the age of the child more emphasis than the other criteria set forth in Florida Statute 61.13(3)....

...uld be equally fit candidates to be the primary residential parent. Only the trial court's improper application of the statutorily-abolished tender years doctrine tipped the scales in favor of designating the mother as primary residential parent. Subsection 61.13(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...mother as custodian of a young child. It is true that in DeCamp v. Hein, 541 So.2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 551 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1989), we rejected the fifth district's conclusion in Kerr v. Kerr, 486 So.2d 708 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), that subsection 61.13(2)(b)1 had abolished the tender years doctrine....

...Following our decision in DeCamp the first district, in Ketola v. Ketola, 636 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA), review dismissed, 649 So.2d 233 (Fla. 1994), followed Kerr and acknowledged a possible conflict with DeCamp. The first district reviewed the legislative history of the statutory amendments to section 61.13 which "clearly evidence an intent to abolish any and all preference for a mother over the father to receive custody of their minor child, regardless of the age or sex of the child." Ketola, 636 So.2d at 852....

...s state to give no preference to either the mother or the father in judging each parent's right to custody or primary residence of the minor child; rather, that determination will have to rest upon an impartial evaluation of the factors listed in subsection 61.13(3)....

...er finding that the parents were otherwise equally fit candidates. On remand the trial court may re-evaluate any factors it previously considered and evaluate *754 any additional relevant factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child. See § 61.13(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994). These factors may include the capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care and other material needs. See § 61.13(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994). The trial court may also specifically receive additional evidence and re-evaluate which parent is more likely to encourage and foster continuing contact with the noncustodial parent. See § 61.13(3)(j), Fla....

...It thereupon denied Former Wife's request to relocate with the child, and made the parties bear their own attorney's fees and costs. Former Wife argues that, under Mize v. Mize, 621 So.2d 417 (Fla.1993), there was a presumption in favor of her relocating with the child. Section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), however, specifically abolished the Mize presumption. As such, the trial court was bound only by the statutory factors in section 61.13(2)(d), including the child's best interests, the likelihood of Former Wife's compliance with any substitute visitation arrangements, the adequacy of the substitute visitation, and the costs of transportation. § 61.13(2)(d), Fla....

...We write only to express our views on the current viability of the so-called "tender years" doctrine. Among other things, the former wife argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider and apply the "tender years" doctrine when performing the analysis required by section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1993), and reaching its decision to name the father as primary residential parent....

...Usher, 568 So.2d 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1975), and DeCamp v. Hein, 541 So.2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 551 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1989). We reject this argument because certain amendments now incorporated in subsection 61.13(2) have clearly and effectively negated any further application of the "tender years" doctrine....

...Under this doctrine, as stated by the supreme court, "other essential factors being equal, the mother of the infant of tender years should receive prime consideration for custody." Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So.2d at 24. In Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1975), notwithstanding the language in subsection 61.13(2), Florida Statutes, that then provided, "Upon considering all relevant factors, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining custody," the court held that the preference recognized by the tender years doctrine remained the law of this state. The court reasoned that subsection 61.13(2) "providing for equal consideration of the father in the award of custody is not inconsistent with this rule of law historically enunciated by the courts." 309 So.2d at 2. Thus, whatever the legislative intent underlying this provision in subsection 61.13(2) may have been, the supreme court continued to insist on following the preference created by the "tender years" doctrine. Since these decisions, however, legislative amendments intended to override the court's persistence in applying this doctrine have been enacted. Subsection 61.13(3) provides in part that when determining the child's best interests with respect to parental responsibility and primary residence, the trial court shall *852 evaluate "all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child, including but not limited" to those factors listed in this subsection. Subsection (2)(b)1 of section 61.13 now provides that "[a]fter considering all relevant facts, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of the child." (Emphasis added.) Effective July 1, 1982, the phrase "regardless of the age of the child" was added to the original language in subsection 61.13(2)....

...override the `tender years' doctrine and if successful, might prove to be the most substantial change included in this legislation." Accordingly, we agree with the Fifth District's decision in Kerr v. Kerr, 486 So.2d 708 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), that subsection 61.13(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1983), effectively abolished the "tender years doctrine" in Florida....

...s state to give no preference to either the mother or the father in judging each parent's right to custody or primary residence of the minor child; rather, that determination will have to rest upon an impartial evaluation of the factors listed in subsection 61.13(3)....

...Accordingly, the courts have no business perpetuating a court-made doctrine of preference that is patently inconsistent with this policy. To the extent that the decisions in Usher v. Usher and DeCamp v. Hein may be inconsistent with our construction and application of subsection 61.13(2), we decline to follow them....

...NOTES [1] This decision is not intended to foreclose Appellant from seeking modification upon the requisite showing of substantial change in circumstances. [2] The following commentators agree that one of the effects of the 1982 and subsequent amendments to section 61.13 is the abolishment of the tender years doctrine: (1) Stanton L. Cobb, Parental Responsibility, II Florida Dissolution of Marriage, § 11.42, at 11-59 (Fla.Bar CLE July 1993) ("The Florida Legislature continued to reject the tender years doctrine, despite its reaffirmation by the courts. A 1982 amendment to F.S. 61.13(2)(b) gives the father and mother equal consideration in determining custody regardless of the age of the child. After a 1991 amendment, F.S. 61.13(2)(b)1 now requires the father to receive equal consideration irrespective of the age or sex of the child....

...1987) (citing Barnes for the principle that the trend in Florida is to treat both sexes equally in child custody cases, whether the child is legitimate or illegitimate, and noting that the determination of which party should be the primary residential parent would be according to section 61.13 and the 10 factors listed in subsection (3) of that statute)....

...r) which denies her supplemental petition to relocate with the parties' two children from Collier County, Florida, to Broward County, Florida. Because the trial court applied the incorrect legal standards when it considered the petition, we reverse. Section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2001), sets forth the following six factors that the trial court must consider in determining whether to allow relocation: 1....

...With respect to the second factor, the trial court used the old factor from Mize v. Mize, 621 So.2d 417, 420 (Fla. 1993), which was "whether the motive for seeking the move is for the express purpose of defeating visitation." The trial court found that the mother was not trying to defeat visitation. Although section 61.13(2)(d) essentially codifies the Mize factors, the second factor is different under the statute. See Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). On remand, the trial court must apply the statutory factor and determine "[t]he extent to which visitation rights have been allowed and exercised." § 61.13(2)(d)(2). The trial court correctly identified the third factor as whether the mother, "once out of the jurisdiction, will be likely to comply with any substitute visitation arrangements." § 61.13(2)(d)(3)....

...ourt must reconsider the petition using the proper factor. The fourth factor is "[w]hether the substitute visitation will be adequate to foster a continuing meaningful relationship between the child or children and the secondary residential parent." § 61.13(2)(d)(4)....

...ill not be the same type or to the same degree as existed before the move. Rather, the focus of the fourth factor is whether the substitute visitation is adequate to allow the parent to maintain a "continuing meaningful relationship" with the child. § 61.13(2)(d)(4)....

...County to Broward County. When the parties could not agree concerning the move, they each sought relief from the trial court. Once the issue was brought to the court for resolution, the trial court was required to follow the framework established in section 61.13(2)(d) to resolve the issue. See Leeds, 832 So.2d at 128. In addition to the six factors that the trial court had to consider under the statute, section 61.13(2)(d) *652 provides that "[n]o presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact and access...

...Williams, 676 So.2d 493, 493-94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), held that disobeying court-ordered visitation on a continuing and persistent basis constitutes a substantial change along with consideration of the best interest of the child. Under the factors listed in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1995), this consideration would encompass *1039 "the parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent." § 61.13(3)(a), Fla....

...Former wife argues the final judgment must be reversed as to the parenting plan and time-sharing schedule because the trial court presumed that the child’s time had to be split equally between the parties. She contends that the presumption used by the court violates section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2010), which requires the court to determine all matters relating to parenting plans and time-sharing of each minor child in accordance with “the best interests of the child.” Determination of the child’s bes...

...renting plan. Both he and former wife were granted equal time with the child, an arrangement he contends is consistent with Florida’s expressed public policy of frequent and continuing contact with both parents following a divorce, as set forth in section 61.13(2)(c)l., Florida Statutes (2010)....

...In 2008, the Legislature abolished the concept of custody and replaced it with parenting plans and time-sharing. Bainbridge, 68 So.3d at 313 . Moreover, the Florida Legislature eliminated any presumption against rotating custody or time-sharing by amending section 61.13(2)(c)l., Florida Statutes, to now state: It is the public policy of this state that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to enc...

...Thus, there is no presumption under current Florida law for or against any particular time-sharing schedule, including one calling for a fifty-fifty division of time. Instead, the sole requirement is that the time-sharing schedule must be set in accordance with “the best interests of the child.” See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2010). Florida law requires the trial court to make the determination of the best interests of the child by evaluating at least twenty factors. See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2010). In the past, several factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, were considered particularly relevant to the decision of whether to rotate time-sharing. One such factor was “[t]he geographic viability of the parenting plan, with special attention paid to the needs of school-age children and the amount of time to be spent traveling to effectuate the parenting plan.” § 61.13(3)(e), Fla....

...Most of these factors are listed in the statute, and therefore appear relevant to the trial court’s determination. . This does not mean, however, that the court itself decides the issue. Instead, the court is entitled to grant one parent decision-making responsibility if the parties are unable to reach agreement. § 61.13(2)(c)2.a., Fla....

...Vining, Jr., Miami, for appellant. Robert L. Koeppel and Wayne Kaplan, Miami, for appellee. Before HENDRY, HUBBART and JORGENSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. We reverse the trial court's order modifying custody status from the mother to shared parental responsibility pursuant to section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1982), since it is clear from this record that no material change in circumstances has occurred since the date of the entry of the original custody order....

...ody must be reversed because petitioner did not prove substantial change in circumstances). We explained in Mesibov: The preliminary question of a substantial and material change is a prerequisite to considering the best interests of the child under section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes....

...Ogilvie, 954 So.2d 698, 700 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), citing Wade, 903 So.2d at 933-34. Because the father failed to satisfy the extraordinary burden of showing a substantial and material change, we need not address the best interest analysis under section 61.13(2)(d)....

...Determining the amount of child support rests primarily in the discretion of the trial judge. The court may order either or both parties to a dissolution proceeding to pay child support in an amount which is equitable in light of the circumstances of each party and the nature of the case. § 61.13(1), Fla....

...[2] *397 The welfare of children lies within the first category. Accordingly, the court house door is always open for the consideration of the care and maintenance of children. Thus, the legislature has codified such primary judicial responsibility by the enactment of section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides, in part: The court initially entering an order requiring one or both parents to make child support payments shall have continuing jurisdiction after the entry of such initial order to modify the...

...The trial court did err, however, in placing the children in the primary residential care of the husband without making any findings as to how that arrangement would serve the best interests of the children. The trial court ordered the parents to share parental responsibility for the children, as is mandated by section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1989), "unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child[ren]." The court is empowered in section 61.13(2)(b)2a to divide the responsibilities between the parents, including primary residence. The determination of primary residence is to be based upon consideration of the best interests of the child, and section 61.13(3) requires the trial court to evaluate "all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child." For guidance, the statute includes a number of factors that may be considered....

...ife for the children. The uncontradicted evidence was that the girls would be attending private schools which are "feeder schools for Cambridge and Oxford." A review of the trial court's careful and detailed order reviewing the criteria set forth in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), finds the parents essentially at equipoise, with the decisive factor being the preference of the children, as testified to by the Guardian ad Litem....

...rcumstances. The Former Husband argues that the substantial change in circumstances is the Former Wife's relocation to Jersey Island. In order to resolve the Former Wife's Petition for Relocation, the Court must apply the factors in Florida Statute, Section 61.13(d)....

...It seems apparent from the judgment that it represents an appropriate exercise of the trial court's discretion on that issue—with which we cannot justifiably interfere—considered in the light both of the applicable statutory factors, and those stated in previous decisions on the subject which the statute mirrors. See § 61.13(2)(d), Fla....

...Hector, 740 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (upholding trial court's discretion on custody issues), review dismissed, 763 So.2d 1046 (Fla.2000). In fact, the denial of relocation would likely have been regarded as an appropriate discretionary call even in the pre 61.13(2)(d) period in which at least something like a "presumption" in favor of relocation under similar circumstances obtained....

...See Pino v. Pino, 418 So.2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)."). II. As I think is justified by the applicable law, and although the court regrettably does not do so, I would, however, draw a distinction between the relocation question which is controlled by section 61.13(2)(d), Fla....

...e an immediate response. [3] For an explanation of the tone and form of this opinion (and of a good deal of the majority's), see Insurance Company of North America v. Pasakarnis, 425 So.2d 1141, 1142 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)(dissenting opinion). [4] Section 61.13(2)(d) (d) No presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact and access with the secondary residential parent....

...March 28, 2001. *1023 Troy W. Klein, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Gregory S. Burdick of Burdick, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We affirm the thoughtful final judgment of dissolution entered by the trial court. On the relocation issue, section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2000) "imposes an intensely fact specific framework on the relocation decision, where the trial judge may base a decision on what is best for the child, even though a result may not be best for the primary residential parent seeking to relocate." Flint v. Fortson, 744 So.2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The trial judge extensively addressed the six factors enumerated in section 61.13(2)(d)1.-6....

...As we concluded in Flint, "[t]he standards of appellate review prevent us from reweighing the evidence and making the value judgments that are appropriate for the trial judge. Because there is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's findings concerning the factors set forth in section 61.13(2)(d)1.-6., we must affirm the decision denying relocation." 744 So.2d at 1218-19 (citations omitted)....

...hild support lost by the father's death. The orders affecting insurance in Riley, Harloff and Bosem were unambiguously for the absolute benefit of the minor children, yet they were sustained on appeal as means properly taken under Section 65.14, now Section 61.13(4), Florida *888 Statutes (1975), to secure support payments otherwise ordered....

...COBB, WARREN H., Associate Judge, concurs in part, dissents in part, with opinion. COBB, WARREN H., Associate Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: In Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court expressly held that a trial judge has the power, pursuant to Section 61.13, Florida Statutes Annotated to require maintenance of a life insurance policy insuring the life of the payor of child support payable to the minor children until they reach majority or are emancipated....

...ontemplated by Section 61.20, F.S. 1967, F.S.A. [1] Counsel for the parties had no objection. An order was prepared but was not entered prior to receipt of the Rule Nisi issued by this court in prohibition proceeding which commenced August 15, 1969. Section 61.13, F.S. 1967, F.S.A. gives the court in a divorce suit the power to award custody. This section provides: "61.13 Custody of children, etc., power of court in making orders....

...Appellant again objected on the basis that appellee had not requested attorney's fees in her answer. The trial court deferred ruling on the matter. After a nonjury trial, the trial court entered its final judgment designating appellee as the primary residential parent. The final judgment contained the findings required by section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1993), to determine the primary residential parent....

...the first one, so long as that court affords an effective opportunity to be heard and is motivated by the best interests of the child — when, in other words, it is acting substantially in conformity with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, section 61.1314, Florida Statutes (1979). [3] See § 61.1348, Fla....

...ecause, as affirmatively appears and as the appellee may not deny, general principles of concern for the child and fair notice to the parties have prevailed. [5] See Suarez *1213 Ortega v. Pujals de Suarez, 465 So.2d 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (Mexico). Section 61.1348, Florida Statutes (1979) specifically provides that "[t]he general policies of this act extend to the international area....

...ather than with the mother. Even if we accepted the proposition that Haitian law on this point differs somewhat from Florida's, see Anderson v. Anderson, 289 So.2d 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Goodman v. Goodman, 291 So.2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); but see § 61.13, Fla. Stat. (1979), a subtle distinction like this is hardly such as would justify disregarding the jurisdiction and judgment of another nation under section 61.1348....

...t entitled to invoke the assistance of Florida's courts in what was plainly a bona fide emergency. In my view, the trial court was entirely correct in concluding that Florida had concurrent jurisdiction of the matrimonial matter, based on paragraphs 61.1308(1)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The parties' child was a dual citizen. Upon the parties' separation, the wife and child returned to Dade County, Florida, to reside with her parents. The trial court concluded, correctly in my view, that there was concurrent jurisdiction by reason of paragraph 61.1308(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...and first threatened to kidnap him, and then actually succeeded in doing so. The child was eventually retrieved, after considerable time and difficulty, from Canada. There was, therefore, jurisdiction for purposes of emergency relief under paragraph 61.1308(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), for purposes of physical protection....

...[2] While there is no need to consider the father's claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction vel non over the child custody issue, we note that since Florida was not the child's home state when the action was brought and jurisdiction obviously did not lie under section 61.1308(1)(c)2, see Suarez Ortega v....

...From that point, the father paid child support. But when the father challenged his obligation to pay medical bills related to a shoulder injury to the daughter resulting from her roughhousing with the mother's boyfriend, the mother sued him for fifteen years back child support. Although section 61.13(4)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that "[w]hen a custodial parent refuses to honor a noncustodial parent's visitation rights, the noncustodial parent shall not fail to pay any ordered child support or alimony," this provision merely den...

...As a consequence, she was not permitted to present any witnesses at the hearing resulting in the change of custody. In reversing, the second district stated: Decisions affecting child custody require a careful consideration of the bests interests of the child. § 61.13, Fla.Stat....

...A significant factor, of course, is the relationship of the intervenors to the child — they are his great -grandparents. None of the pertinent statutes confers a visitation right by any blood relative in the lineage beyond the grandparents. Under section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1987), grandparents can be awarded visitation rights if it is found to be in the child's best interest....

...Once the right is granted the grandparents have standing to seek its enforcement. Grandparents are not required to be parties, however, "nor shall grandparents have legal standing as `contestants' [in the dissolution proceeding] as *1080 defined in section 61.1306." § 61.13(2)(b)2 C, Fla....

...d the children about their mother's activities. Based on these considerations, the court found that shared parenting was not in the children's best interest and granted sole parental responsibility to Victoria, subject to visitation with Tyrone. See § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla.Stat....

...s conduct. For example, section 61.08(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that the lower court "may consider the adultery of either spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded." [1] In addition, section 61.13(3) provides that "[f]or the purpose of shared parental responsibility and primary residence, the best interest of the child shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child." (Emphasis added)....

...It was essentially founded on an unsworn report by a guardian ad litem. Although not clear, Appellee's petition resulting in the order was apparently brought under chapter 61, Florida Statutes. However, regardless of whether the temporary custody change and restraining order is founded on section 61.13, Florida Statutes, section 741.30, Florida Statutes, or rule 1.610, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, it cannot be entered without sworn evidence....

...and church, her lifestyle does not demonstrate a substantial and material change to justify a custody modification. The preliminary question of a substantial and material change is a prerequisite to considering the best interests of the child under section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes....

...Ogilvie, 954 So.2d 698, 700 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), citing Wade, 903 So.2d at 933-34. Because the father failed to satisfy the extraordinary burden of showing a substantial and material change, we need not address the best interest analysis under section 61.13(2)(d)....

...ld support. The custody of Aaron is not disputed and it was agreed that Nancy would retain custody of him. Nancy's attack upon that portion of the judgment awarding the custody of James, Jr., solely to James is based upon the principle, expressed in section 61.13(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes, that shared parental responsibility is the desired objective unless it would be detrimental to the child. If, however, a trial court finds that shared parental responsibility would result in detriment to the child, the court, in furtherance *683 of the child's best interests, may confer sole responsibility for the child upon one parent. § 61.13(2)(b)2 b, Fla. Stat. (1989). To aid in this determination, the legislature has fashioned ten factors relevant to the interests and welfare of the child. § 61.13(3)(a)-(j), Fla....

...cy's way of life. The trial court erred, however, in not supporting its decision with more extensive findings, either orally or in the final judgment, to bolster the conclusion that "shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to" James, Jr. § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla....

...Hunter, 540 So.2d 235 (Fla.3rd DCA 1989); Hicks v. Hicks, 511 So.2d 628 (Fla.2d DCA 1987). Accordingly, we reverse the award of sole parental responsibility to James, and remand with directions that the trial court enter appropriate findings disclosing its evaluation of the criteria set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...It seems to be a “hybrid” time-sharing judgment because a time-sharing judgment is usually between parents rather than between a parent and a grandparent. Nevertheless, even as a hybrid time-sharing judgment, it is still subject to modification. See § 61.13(3), Fla....

...In this instance, the trial court stated that it would award custody to the parent more likely to comply with the concept of shared parental responsibility after finding that the parties were equally fit candidates for primary custodial parent. This was a valid consideration for the trial court. See *438 § 61.13(3)(a), Fla....

...tion of all factors affecting the welfare and interest of the child, including, but not limited to: (a) The parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent."). All other factors outlined in section 61.13(3) being equal, the trial court did not err in seeking to award the children to the parent more likely to encourage and foster continuing contact with the noncustodial parent....

...he abused his discretion. Tagliarini v. Tagliarini, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 10; Ebaugh v. Ebaugh, Fla.App. 1973, 282 So.2d 14. The present status of the statutory law in this State is that the parents are to be treated equal in considering custody. § 61.13(2), Fla....

...ests of the child, which parent's decision should prevail. Tamari v. Turko-Tamari, 599 So.2d 680, 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Under appropriate circumstances, the trial court may grant one parent ultimate responsibility for making educational decisions. § 61.13(2)(b)2.a, Fla....

...s. Appellant contends the trial court was without authority to require child support after the 18th birthday of each minor child. We agree. Kowalski v. Kowalski, 315 So.2d 497 (Fla.2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 319 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1975). Of course, under Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1975), the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of support payments for children....

...nt. STONE, Judge. The final judgment in this paternity action orders shared parental responsibility. Chapter 742 of the Florida Statutes, governing paternity suits, is silent as to shared parental responsibility, which is authorized only pursuant to section 61.13(2)(b)(2), Florida Statutes....

...The issues in Allen concerned the admissibility of evidence and custody. There, this Court applied established law in recognizing that, under the statute, there must be a showing that a mother is unfit in order to award custody to an unmarried father. However, the application of section 61.13(2)(b) to actions under chapter 742 was not raised in that case....

...Rather, the parties here, in jointly petitioning on October 26, 1993 for a court adjudication of custody and support, invoked the provisions of Chapter 61, Florida Statutes. Chapter 61 has recognized since May 15, 1993, that grandparental custody may be awarded in certain situations. See § 61.13(7), Fla.Stat. [1] See generally Russo v. Burgos, 675 So.2d 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Indeed, section 61.13(7) is significant because when it is properly invoked, it affords the grandparents the same standing as a natural parent for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child....

...5th DCA 1993); Stricklin v. Stricklin, 383 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Because an erroneous legal standard was applied below, the cause is remanded for reconsideration using the proper standard. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 61.13(7) provides: In any case where the child is actually residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship, whether the court has awarded custody to the grandparent or not, the court may recognize the grandparents as having the same stan...

...ldren from state to state as a way of forum shopping, and (2) preventing conflicts among jurisdictions once a state has entered a custody decree." The Yurgel court stated: [J]urisdiction must be presumed to continue once it is validly acquired under section 61.1308; and it continues up until a Florida court expressly determines on some other basis that jurisdiction no longer is appropriate, until virtually all contacts with Florida have ceased, until some other Florida statute terminates jurisdiction, or until jurisdiction is terminated by operation of the PKPA....

...This court's determination that Florida has continuing jurisdiction is in keeping with the great deference afforded the state exercising initial jurisdiction in order to discourage forum shopping and relitigation of custody decisions resulting in conflicting decisions. § 61.1304, Fla....

...on, we reverse the order restricting his visitation. See Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So.2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1949); Davis v. Dixon, 604 So.2d 1236, 1237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Saenz v. Saenz, 602 So.2d 973 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 613 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1992); § 61.13(2)(b)1, Fla. Stat. (1993). [8] Our holding, however, does not preclude future trial court rulings declining to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA's inconvenient forum provision. § 61.1316(1), Fla....

...Tamarago, 348 So.2d 1163 (Fla.2d DCA 1977); Sheehy v. Sheehy, 325 So.2d 12 (Fla.2d DCA 1975); Lee v. Kepler, 197 So.2d 570 (Fla.3d DCA 1967). The only exception to this rule is that, by statute, the court may award child visitation rights to the grandparents of a minor child. § 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c), Fla....

...But she acknowledged that as of the final hearing date she had not seen either child in nearly a year. A custody investigator for the Sixth Judicial Circuit interviewed the children and the parties, and visited each home. Applying the statutory factors for determining the best interests of children set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1995), the investigator opined that Mr....

...a child support (or alimony) obligation. See, e.g., Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So.2d 863 (Fla.1973); Eberly v. Eberly, 344 So.2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). This interpretation is favored in light of the statutory authority for such insurance provisions. See § 61.13, Fla....

...ld. In addition, the fact that the original purpose of the life insurance obligation is being served through the child's receipt of social security benefits should also affect whether it is equitable to take the widow's interest in the proceeds. See § 61.13(1)(c), Fla....

...nt. However, by the time the hearing on the petition was held on October 24, 2008, the only changes at issue were Mr. Halbert's new job and his relocation from Largo to Brandon, Florida. The trial court noted that it considered all of the factors in section 61.13(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), and it found that there had been a substantial change in circumstances due to Mr....

...She filed a motion to transfer venue to Baker County, and a counterclaim to increase Alfred's child support obligations. The sole premise for her motion was that she and the children presently reside in Baker County. No additional findings were made by the Seminole County circuit court. Section 61.13(1)(1)(a) [2] gives the original circuit court that entered the decree requiring child support payments continuing jurisdiction to modify, based on change of circumstances....

...would also have been proper for that reason alone. Torres; Stewart v. Carr, 218 So.2d 525 (Fla.2d DCA 1969). REVERSED. COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(A). [2] Section 61.13(1)(a) states: 61.13 Custody and support of children; visitation rights; power of court in making orders....

...n. See Foster, 83 So.3d at 748 ; Packo, 120 So.3d at 234 . THE PARENTING PLAN We agree with Former Husband’s argument that the trial court’s parenting plan fails to comply with statutory requirements because it does not make findings required by section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2015). Section 61.13(2)(b) *1083 states that a parenting plan must, at a minimum: 1....

...parent is exercising time sharing. Like the parenting plan in Magdziak, these findings “lack specificity.” See Magdziak, 185 So.3d at 1293 n.2. As a result, the trial court’s failure to include a more specific parenting plan that complies with section 61.13(2)(b) in the final judgment is an error apparent from the face of the final judgment....

...obligations. We reverse the court's order as to child support, and we remand for the court to make the required findings. A trial court is authorized to modify child support when there has been a substantial change in the parties' circumstances. See § 61.13(1)(a), Fla....

...The grandmother retained an attorney who prepared a joint stipulation authorizing the grandmother to intervene in the dissolution action, to have the "same standing as the parents in evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interests of the children." This language tracks the language in section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1997). The grandmother attached to the stipulation a petition in which she requested the primary residential care of the children and shared parental responsibility with the parents, pursuant to section 61.13(7)....

...No one asked the court in January to take any action on this amendment. Instead, the grandmother's attorney motioned the trial court to set a nonjury trial on her petition. Trial was set for February 18, 1999. Three days before the addendum to the agreement was filed in the circuit court, the First District held section 61.13(7) unconstitutional....

...Ours is the easier task. Reversed and remanded for dismissal. PATTERSON, C.J., and FULMER, J., Concur. NOTES [1] Although Richardson v. Richardson, 734 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), aff'd, 766 So.2d 1036 (Fla.2000), was the first case to declare section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional, prior decisions of the supreme court regarding the competing interests of grandparents and parents may have predicted this result....

...ultimate authority to make long-range and major decisions affecting the child and in awarding wife rehabilitative alimony. In the final judgment, the trial court provided that the parents shall have shared parental responsibility of the minor child. § 61.13(2)(b)2., Fla....

..."In ordering shared parental responsibility, the court may consider the expressed desires of the parents and may grant to one party the ultimate responsibility over specific aspects of the child's welfare or may divide those responsibilities between the parties based on the best interests of the child." § 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Fla....

...Shared parental responsibility contemplates that after dissolution parents will continue to make joint decisions affecting a child without regard to whom primary physical residence is given. Markham v. Markham, 485 So.2d 1299, 1300 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Because the trial court failed to follow the intent of section 61.13 and failed to delineate which specific aspects of the child's welfare wife should have ultimate responsibility over, we reverse that portion of the final judgment dealing with parental responsibility. On remand, the trial court should determine, in accordance with section 61.13, which specific aspects of the child's welfare wife should have ultimate responsibility over....

...As a consequence, she was not permitted to present any witnesses at the hearing resulting in the change of custody. In reversing, the Andrews court held: Decisions affecting child custody require a careful consideration of the best interests of the child. § 61.13, Fla....

...See Bader v. Bader, 639 So.2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA) (en banc), *353 rev. denied, 649 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1994). Such an error has been held to be reversible. Hicks v. Hicks, 511 So.2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Nichols v. Nichols, 432 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes, requires that parental responsibility be shared by both parents unless the court finds that "shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child." Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to revisit this issue and make appropriate findings....

...ould be granted the right to visit the child at reasonable times unless such visits are shown to be detrimental to the child's welfare. " [Emphasis added]. 198 So.2d at 375. Florida courts have also recognized that the shared responsibility statute, section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1989), applies to both legitimate and illegitimate children, and that fathers of illegitimate children have the same rights with respect to their illegitimate children as legitimate fathers have with respect to their legitimate children, Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Brown v. Bray, 300 So.2d 668, *64 669 (Fla. 1974); Stepp v. Stepp, 520 So.2d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), unless those rights have been waived or legally terminated by a court. Section 61.13(2)(b)2.a provides, and Florida courts have held, that in custody proceedings a trial court must order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared, unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child....

...Would the child build an equity of some sort in the property? Would the father, who really pays the "share," gain an equity? Would either of them enjoy a deductible mortgage interest expense? The duty to support children of a dissolved marriage does not rest exclusively with the noncustodial parent. § 61.13(1), Fla....

...Both natural parents share this duty. Id. When providing for the support of minor children in dissolution proceedings, trial courts should impose support obligations in accordance with the circumstances of the parties and the equitable aspects of the case. § 61.13(1), Fla....

...ld support obligation of the father imposed in a prior divorce decree. See id. at 654, 656. According to the Fifth District, "There are several sources for the duty to pay child support. The duty can be strictly legal based on common law or statute (§ 61.13(1), Fla....

...[c.o.] This notion was summed up in Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Holland, 602 So.2d 652 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), where the court stated: "There are several sources for the duty to pay child support. The duty can be strictly legal based on common law or statute (§ 61.13(1), Fla.Stat.) or it can be strictly contractual, or it can be a confusion of both." 602 So.2d at 654 [c.o.]....

...The right of one parent to recover a share of the support necessary to raise a child is undeniably to ensure that the child is supported by both parents. But it is equally to indemnify the custodial parent for those amounts expended on behalf of the noncustodial parent. Filling a similar role is section 61.13(1)(a), which authorizes the judge in a dissolution of marriage case to "order either or both parents who owe a duty of support to a child to pay support in accordance with the guidelines in s....

...e recipients or the children. Overbey indicated that a court may enter an order modifying child support payments when the modification is found to be necessary in the best interest of the child or when there is a substantial change of circumstances. § 61.13(1)(a), Fla....

...primarily on the fact that the children in that case, because of their ages, would never benefit from the husband's prolonged educational pursuits. Thus, the trial court concluded that it was appropriate to impute income to the husband. Pursuant to section 61.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may at any time order either or both parents who owe a duty of support to a child to pay support in accordance with the guidelines in section 61.30....

...rres Millan and effectively ordering Velazquez to pay child support to Millan for a period of time while the child was in her custody. Because we cannot discern from either the record or from the final judgment whether or how the trial court applied section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes in making its custody determination, we reverse the custody determination....

...Velazquez, with whom this child had lived his entire life, sought permission from the court to move to Ft. Myers where she had family support and where the cost of living was more affordable than that in Key West. The trial court, in a form order devoid of any section 61.13 findings, ordered shared parental responsibility and awarded primary residential custody to Millan. Velazquez was ordered to pay child support, including support for a three month period during which she was the primary custodian. Velazquez maintains here that the trial court engaged in no best interest analysis as mandated by section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes, but instead improperly punished *854 her for reporting Millan to INS....

...ve custody decided based on his or her best interests"); Burckle v. Burckle, 915 So.2d 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (reversing change in custody from the father to the mother as a sanction for the father's refusal to comply with court-ordered visitation). Section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes governing shared parental responsibility and primary residence, expressly mandates consideration of a number of factors when making a custody award: (3) For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary...

...(k) Evidence that any party has knowingly provided false information to the court regarding a domestic violence proceeding pursuant to s. 741.30. ( l ) Evidence of domestic violence or child abuse. (m) Any other fact considered by the court to be relevant. § 61.13(3), Fla....

...m Millan; [2] had misrepresented why Millan left town; [3] and had not been truthful about the support Millan had provided, [4] there is nothing in the record to indicate that the best interests of this child were evaluated in conformity with all of section 61.13's dictates....

...nt must reflect that the custody determination was made in the best interests of the child."). As Williams v. Williams, 845 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), confirms, a decision based on less than the court's consideration of all the factors set out in section 61.13 is insufficient: In light of the trial judge's conclusion that the former wife had absconded with the child in violation of the final judgment and had deprived the child contact with the former husband for over a year, we fully understand why the trial judge believed that he had heard sufficient evidence to award the former husband temporary primary residence of the child. Section 61.13(3)(a), (j), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that the best interests of a child may be determined in part based upon "the parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent" and...

...acilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent." The former wife's actions provided evidence sufficient to support a finding that these two factors did not weigh in her favor. However, section 61.13(3) requires the trial court to consider numerous other factors in determining the best interests of a child. Williams, 845 So.2d at 249. Accordingly, we reverse the custody award and remand this matter for entry of a custody award addressing all of the factors mandated by section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes....

...NOTES [1] There is no evidence that Velazquez actually tried to relocate. The record is that she wanted to relocate to a more affordable community where she had family support and that she sought court permission to do so. There is nothing wrong in this. See § 61.13001(7), Fla. Stat. (2006) (expressly stating that "[n]o presumption shall arise in favor or against a request to relocate with the child when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child"); § 61.13001(7)(e) Fla....

...only by considering each parent as possible custodian. See Andrews v. Andrews, 624 So.2d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (although parent may be "ineffective and uncooperative" as litigant, parent may still be better custodian of party's children). Moreover, section 61.13(2)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that "[t]he court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless ......

...ers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record, assumes a new importance because of the many intangibles that must be evaluated in deciding the delicate question of child custody. III. On appeal, appellant also argues that section 61.13(2)(b)2., Florida *255 Statutes (1995), requires reversal here....

...This statute creates a rebuttable presumption that shared parental responsibility by a parent who has been convicted of a felony of the second degree or higher involving domestic violence will be detrimental to the child. Even though the crime for which appellee was convicted would trigger application of section 61.13(2)(b)2., the application of this statute was not argued by appellant to the trial court below....

...At that point, the non-custodial parent's only option is to seek a modification of custody. However, to secure *128 a modification of custody, he or she must show a substantial change of circumstances, and that the modification will be in the best interest of the children. § 61.13(1)(a) Fla....

...would support modification of the custody provisions of a final judgment. Zugda, 553 So.2d at 1295. The non-custodial parent is up the custody creek without the proverbial paddle. This "catch 22" scenario has been reduced by the recent amendment of section 61.13....

...It now provides that refusal to honor a non-custodial parent's visitation rights without just cause will support a modification of custody. But, the non-custodial parent must still show that the modification is in the best interest of the children. § 61.13(4)(c)5 Fla....

...ust be in existence by agreement or order. All that an inclusion of such a provision will do to is allow the parties to either agree to the move or request leave of court to relocate. This will allow the trial court to review the factors outlined in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2001), in an objective and thoughtful manner instead of having to address these sensitive issues after the fact....

determination of a time-sharing schedule. See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2009).

...ding or evidence in the record that there would be some detriment to the child in leaving him or her in the custody arrangement established by the decree sought to be modified? [2] Or, should the standard be the arguably lesser proof requirements of section 61.13(4)(c)(5), which gives the judge the option to award custody to the "non-custodial" parent upon the non-custodial parent's request, if the "custodial parent" refuses to honor the other parent's visitation rights, and if the award is in t...

...*954 Or, since this proceeding involves a split rotating custody arrangement and there is no parent with primary residential custody, should the court, after determining that the split rotating custody arrangement is unworkable and doomed to future failure, make an analysis based on the criteria set forth in section 61.13(3)(a), which are applicable in an original child custody determination and to which appellate courts give much greater deference? [4] The trial court in this case made sufficient fact findings to cover all bases....

...an has failed and is doomed to future failure, for whatever reason (the child's obtaining school age, or one party's complete refusal to adhere to the plan), then the court should be free to redetermine custody based on the considerations set out in section 61.13, as though it were making an initial custody determination. The trial court addressed all of the factors set forth in section 61.13(3)(a) through (j) and (m)....

...The legislature has determined that a trial court’s decision on time-sharing must be made with the best interests of the child as the primary consideration, and it has prescribed a number of factors that the court must consider in making its decision. See § 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Fla. Stat. (2010). The court’s decision must conform to the shared parental responsibility law in section 61.13 even if the parents are unmarried. See Decker v. Lyle, 848 So.2d 501, 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (addressing temporary order). Section 61.13(3) does not require a trial court to make specific findings of fact supporting a custody decision in its final judgment....

...n of property. K. Ms. Furman explained legal remedies and options to litigating parties which affected the procedural and substantive legal rights, duties, and privileges of those parties. L. Ms. Furman construed and interpreted the legal effects of Section 61.13, Florida Statutes, pertaining to shared parental responsibility....

...respective financial positions in denying the father’s request that both parties bear the burden of travel costs related to timesharing. We otherwise affirm. We first address the trial court’s award of sole parental responsibility to the mother. Section 61.13(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2013), provides that “[tjhe court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child.” “This requirement applies in paternity actions.” Maslow v....

...nterests of the child or children, [or] [2] when the child or any one of them has reached the age of 18 years, [or] [3] when such is found to be necessary by the court because there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties." § 61.13(1), Fla....

...odification of child support previously awarded in a substituted final judgment of marriage dissolution. The sole ground relied upon for the requested increase in child support was an alleged "substantial change in the circumstances of the parties." § 61.13(1), Fla....

...to Virginia which was necessitate[d] by her financial situation, the unavailability of affordable housing in the Florida Keyes [sic], and the income the Former Wife could use to purchase afford [sic] a home. The Court has considered Florida Statute 61.13, subparts (2) and (3) regarding whether a residential parent should be permitted to move to another jurisdiction for residence with the child or children. The Court has also considered the enumerated criteria in Florida Statute 61.13(3) regarding the award of primary custody to a parent....

...locate may have been sufficient to permit relocation had the original custody arrangement been different, they are insufficient to change the current joint rotating custody award to shared responsibility with a primary residential custodian. [5] See § 61.13001(7), Fla....

...Therefore, we grant the petition in part and quash the portion of the order that prevents Mr. Rahall from pursuing his emergency motion to transfer temporary custody. Decisions concerning child custody during the pendency of dissolution litigation are governed by the shared parental responsibility law, section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2004), and must be based on the best interests of the child....

...Jane Brehany, Pensacola, for Appellant. Caryn A. Van Matre, Pensacola, for Appellee. BENTON, J. Kylie C. Doyle appeals an order granting Jason Leigh Owens unsupervised visitation with the parties' daughter, now four years old. At issue is the effect, under section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2002), of the father's third degree felony conviction involving domestic violence....

...day, December 20, 2003 and continuing on alternating months thereafter. Visitation shall commence at 10:00 a.m. Saturday morning and continue through 4:00 p.m. Sunday afternoon. .... 4. The Court finds that the presumption created by Florida Statute § 61.13(2)(b)2 is rebutted by the evidence to such extent as to allow the expanded visitation provided for herein....

...Doyle's contention on appeal is that no evidence tended to rebut the statutory presumption against unsupervised visitation [2] and that, in any event, the trial court's award of unsupervised visitation failed to "make such arrangements ... as will best protect the child." § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (2002). Because, she contends, section 61.13(2)(b)2 requires that the court treat Mr....

...isitation would be detrimental to the child, the trial court erred in ordering unsupervised visitation. In any event, she also contends, no evidence supports the inherently problematic view that unsupervised visitation "will best protect the child." § 61.13(2)(b) 2, Fla....

...lving domestic violence, ... a rebuttable presumption of detriment to the child" arises, broadly precluding shared parental responsibilities of many kinds, and rendering him ineligible for unsupervised visitation, if the presumption is not rebutted. § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (2002). Section 61.13(2)(b)2 provides: Evidence that a parent has been convicted of a felony of the third degree or higher involving domestic violence, as defined in s....

...isitation had gone off without incident. Even if this evidence was enough to overcome the statutory presumption that visitation would be detrimental to the child, however, it did not prove that unsupervised visitation would "best protect the child." § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (2002). Section 61.13(2)(b)2 provides: If the court determines that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child, it may order sole parental responsibility and make such arrangements for visitation as will best protect the child ......

...Because the order under review necessarily determined that shared parental responsibility was detrimental to the child, [4] the *721 trial court's authority to order visitation was limited: The trial court was required to "make such arrangements for visitation as will best protect the child." § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla....

...PADOVANO and HAWKES, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In the order under review, the trial court discussed this earlier order: By order entered January 24, 2003 the Court found that the evidence presented at that time failed to rebut the statutory presumption of detriment created by F.S. § 61.13(2)(b)2 as it related to shared parental responsibility, unsupervised visitation and decisions made regarding the child's welfare and benefit....

...The Court further found, however, that as it related to the issue of visitation the evidence successfully rebutted the presumption of detriment to the limited extent of supervised third party visitation. [2] Ms. Doyle has not argued on appeal that supervised visitation runs afoul of section 61.13(2)(b)2, which provides that "[i]f the presumption is not rebutted, shared parental responsibility, including visitation, residence of the child, and decisions made regarding the child, may not be granted to the convicted parent." See F.M.W....

...st be raised clearly, concisely, and separately as points on appeal.'") (quoting Singer v. Borbua, 497 So.2d 279, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)); see also Fla. R.App. P. 9.210(b)(5). [3] While there was no allegation that the child was abused by Mr. Owens, section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2002), provides: Whether or not there is a conviction of any offense of domestic violence or child abuse or the existence of an injunction for protection against domestic violence, the court shall consider evidence of domestic violence or child abuse as evidence of detriment to the child....

...Judiciary Comm., CS for SB 1006 (1997) Staff Analysis 14 (Apr. 16, 1997) (on file with Florida State Archives) ("The bill provides that ... the court must consider evidence of domestic violence or child abuse as evidence of detriment to the child.") (codified at section 61.13(2)(b)(2.), Fla. Stat. (1997), and section 61.13(2)(b)(2.), Fla....

...[4] In addition to finding that Mr. Owens had failed to rebut the statutory presumption against shared custody, the trial court also expressly determined in the order on appeal that shared parental responsibility was not in the best interests of the child. Section 61.13(2)(b)2 mandates: "The court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child. " § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla....

...ed temporary custody of the children remain with the husband, because of the children's schooling, until May, 1972, the end of the term. The husband asserts that the welfare of the children demands that he continue as guardian, especially in view of § 61.13(2), Fla....

...The former husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the petition for modification of child support. We disagree. A trial court has jurisdiction to modify child support awards where "there has been a substantial change in the circumstance of the parties." § 61.13(1), Fla....

...McLaughlin of Thomas J. McLaughlin, P.A., Hollywood, for appellee. EN BANC STONE, Judge. We consider this appeal en banc to maintain uniformity in this court's opinions and to clarify our recognition that the "tender years" doctrine has been abrogated by section 61.13(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes....

...The father, working part-time, cares for two daughters, ages nine and ten; the mother, a full-time homemaker, cares for a seven-year-old son. The father has moved his office into the home and plans to work about 20 hours a week. The trial court's findings of fact placed emphasis on the first factor listed in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, concluding that the father was more likely than the mother to allow frequent and continuing contact with the other parent. § 61.13(3)(a), Fla....

...The court also considered difficulties between the mother and her first husband in connection with his visitation rights. Although the trial court found that the child's emotional ties with the mother were stronger at the time of trial, it recognized the strong bond between the child and his father as well. § 61.13(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993). The court found that the fifth statutory factor, permanence of the family unit, favored the father. The court emphasized the mother's history of brief or unstable relationships. § 61.13(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (1993). The court noted that while there were no school and community records to consider for the child under subsection 61.13(3)(h), the father's other two children had more outstanding records than did the mother's other child. The court also recognized a bond between the child and his half siblings. In connection with "[a]ny other fact," § 61.13(3)(k), the court considered that the father "is an unusually *82 perceptive, patient, loving and caring parent." A trial court has substantial discretion in making child custody decisions....

...Collier, 384 So.2d 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). See also Whitney v. Whitney, 402 So.2d 1351 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The court is required to determine all matters relating to custody of minor children "in accordance with the best interests of the child." § 61.13(2)(b)1, Fla....

...1989), arguing that, there, this court recognized the continuing validity of the "tender years" doctrine, a preference for awarding custody to the mother when the child is young. In DeCamp, we rejected the conclusion of the Fifth District, in Kerr v. Kerr, 486 So.2d 708 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), that section 61.13(2)(b)1 had abolished the tender years doctrine, determining instead that the "equal rights provision" of the statute only applies after considering "all relevant facts," one of which still must be the tender years doctrine. See DeCamp, 541 So.2d at 709-10. We note the emphasis placed on the sex of the child in DeCamp, and that the legislature subsequently added to subsection 61.13(2)(b)1 that the father be given equal consideration "irrespective of the age or sex of the child." Ch. 91-246, § 40, at 2411, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). Recently the First District, in Ketola v. Ketola, 636 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), reviewed the legislative history of the amendments to section 61.13(2) when it followed Kerr and acknowledged a possible conflict with DeCamp: Subsection (2)(b)1 of section 61.13 now provides that "[a]fter considering all relevant facts, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of the child. " (Emphasis added.) Effective July 1, 1982, the phrase "regardless of the age of the child" was added to the original language in subsection 61.13(2)....

...These amendments clearly evidence an intent to abolish any and all preference for a mother over the father to receive custody of their minor child, regardless of the age or sex of the child... . Accordingly, we agree with the Fifth District's decision in Kerr v. Kerr, 486 So.2d 708 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), that subsection 61.13(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1983), effectively abolished the "tender years doctrine" in Florida....

...s state to give no preference to either the mother or the father in judging each parent's right to custody or primary residence of the minor child; rather, that determination will have to rest upon an impartial evaluation of the factors listed in subsection 61.13(3)....

...Accordingly, the courts have no business perpetuating a court-made doctrine of preference that is patently inconsistent with this policy. To the extent that the decisions in Usher v. Usher [568 So.2d 471] [(1990)] and DeCamp v. Hein may be inconsistent with *83 our construction and application of subsection 61.13(2), we decline to follow them....

...s, as dicta, this language indicating a preference for the mother: Third, passing next to the question of whether the husband or the wife should be preferred as the custodial parent of two female children aged one and three, we note the provision in section 61.13(2)(b)(1) that "the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of the child irrespective of the age of the child." (emphasis supplied) This statutory language at first blu...

...But having clarified this, we also emphasize that we do not recede from the recognition, in DeCamp, that the relevant facts considered in any given case still may properly include reference to the age or sex of a child, whenever it is relevant in weighing the statutory factors. Given the intervening amendments to section 61.13, we do not consider this opinion to clash with the supreme court's recognition of a tender years doctrine in Dinkel v....

...nge in circumstances and must be in the best interests of the child. Sidman v. Marino, 46 So. 3d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). The demonstration of a change in circumstances is a prerequisite to considering the best interests of the child under section 61.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes....

...to the iPhone which Ms. Brown gave her; and (4) by ordering specific sleeping arrangements in Mr. Brown’s house. Modifications to a parenting plan require a prerequisite substantial, material, and unanticipated change in the circumstances. See § 61.13(2)(c), Fla....

...In ordering any makeup time-sharing, the court shall schedule such time-sharing in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of the child or children and that is convenient for the nonoffending parent and at the expense of the noncompliant parent. § 61.13(4)(c)l., Fla....

...Our decision does not conflict with Cheek because we do not think that Cheek requires the trial court to include its finding that the makeup time-sharing is in the best interests of the child within the written order. Instead, we believe Cheek and section 61.13(4)(c) only require that the court consider the best interests of the child in reaching its makeup time-sharing decision....

...siderations in its written order, but the failure to include and discuss these issues in the written order does not, in and of itself, compel reversal. See id. We affirm the remaining issue without comment. Affirmed. WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur. . Section 61.13(4)(d), Florida Statutes (2012) provides that a person who violates a time-sharing schedule "may be punished by contempt of court or other remedies as the court deems appropriate.” For the parent improperly deprived of time-sharing, the statutory remedy is makeup time-sharing at the expense of the noncompliant parent. See § 61.13(4)(c)l, Fla. Stat. (2012). Pursuant to section 61.13(4)(c)2, the court may also "order the parent who did not provide time-sharing or did not properly exercise time-sharing under the time-sharing schedule to pay reasonable court costs and attorney’s fees incurred by the nonoffending parent to enforce the time-sharing schedule.” ....

...tional program compatible with the youngsters' needs and the father's financial capabilities. This program of remedial education should be flexible, adaptable, and terminable within the discretionary and equitable powers accorded to the trial court. § 61.13(1), Fla....

best interest of the child or as set forth in [section] 61.13," which *1137itself separately lists twenty

...ng the event or events triggering the provision, or any other circumstance that would enable the court to determine whether a change of custody would be in the best interests of the children if and when a party sought to enforce the provision. Under section 61.13(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes, the court is required to "determine all matters relating to custody of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child...." See also, Jones v....

...Based on the record, I cannot agree with the grant of residential custody to the father. In the final judgment, the trial court based its conclusion on the twelve-year-old boy's testimony that he "wanted to live with his father." This is admittedly one of the statutory criteria to be considered under section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1987), but it is no panacea....

...e right to possession. Nor did the wife's position as custodial parent afford her any derivative right to possession. In this case, there is a secondary basis upon which to support the judgment appealed from. It has long been recognized, pursuant to Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1977), that modification of a separation agreement for the welfare of children and for the grant of exclusive possession of property for their use and benefit is permissible at any stage of the post-dissolution proceedings where circumstances warrant such action....

...The final order stated that the husband could provide the medical insurance because his child support obligation was $50.00 less than the child support obligation he undertook per the parties' stipulation during the pendency of the dissolution case. Section 61.13(1)(b), Florida Statutes, provides in part that "[e]ach order for child support shall contain a provision for health insurance for the minor child when the insurance is reasonably available." Moreover, this court instructed the trial court to find whether the health insurance was reasonably available....

...ting plan” which governs how divorced parents will share the responsibilities of childrearing and decision making with regard to the child and sets forth a “time-sharing” schedule. Ch. 2008-61, §§ 2, 8, Laws of Fla. (amending §§ 61.046 and 61.13, Fla....

..., and form 12.995(b) *174 (Parenting Plan (supervised/safety focused)). The third new form is form 12.993(d) (Supplemental Temporary Judgment for Modification of Parenting Issues for Children of Military Parents) in accord with various amendments to section 61.13002, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation *177 and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the ehild(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the ehild(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the children) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...If the parties have reached an agreement, the Parenting Plan should be signed by both parties. If you have not reached an agreement, a proposed Parenting Plan may be filed. If this case involves a request for relocation of a minor child, pursuant to section 61.13001, Florida Statutes, a proposed Parenting Plan must be attached....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self-Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in “bold underline” in these instructions are defined there. For further information, see section 61.13002, Florida Statutes....

...• Parenting Plan, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form, 12.995(a) or (b). If the parties have reached an agreement, a signed and notarized Parenting Plan should be attached. If you have not reached an agreement, a proposed Parenting Plan may be filed. If this involves relocation of minor child(ren) pursuant to section 61.13001, Florida Statutes, a Parenting Plan must be attached....

..."parenting plan" which governs how divorced parents will share the responsibilities of childrearing and decision making with regard to the child and sets forth a "time-sharing" schedule. Ch. 2008-61, §§ 2, 8, Laws of Fla. (amending §§ 61.046 and 61.13, Fla....

..., and form 12.995(b) *174 (Parenting Plan (supervised/safety focused)). The third new form is form 12.993(d) (Supplemental Temporary Judgment for Modification of Parenting Issues for Children of Military Parents) in accord with various amendments to section 61.13002, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation *177 and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...If the parties have reached an agreement, the Parenting Plan should be signed by both parties. If you have not reached an agreement, a proposed Parenting Plan may be filed. If this case involves a request for relocation of a minor child, pursuant to section 61.13001, Florida Statutes, a proposed Parenting Plan must be attached....

...This means that a neutral person will review your situation and report to the judge concerning parenting issues. The purpose of such intervention is to be sure that the best interests of the child(ren) is (are) being served. For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read "General Information for Self-Represented Litigants" found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in "bold underline" in these instructions are defined there. For further information, see section 61.13002, Florida Statutes....

...• Parenting Plan, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form, 12.995(a) or (b). If the parties have reached an agreement, a signed and notarized Parenting Plan should be attached. If you have not reached an agreement, a proposed Parenting Plan may be filed. If this involves relocation of minor child(ren) pursuant to section 61.13001, Florida Statutes, a Parenting Plan must be attached....

...___ Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that temporary support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...____ Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...____ Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...____ Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...____ Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...____ Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.13(1)(d)3, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...____ Both parties have requested and the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child(ren) that support payments need not be directed through the Central Governmental Depository. However, either party may subsequently apply to the depository pursuant to section 61.08 or 61.13, Florida Statutes, to require payments through the Central Governmental Depository....

...her order of the court. Any substantial changes to the Parenting Plan must be sought through the filing of a supplemental petition for modification. XIV. RELOCATION Any relocation of the child(ren) is subject to and must be sought in compliance with section 61.13001, Florida Statutes....

...The record substantiates that disagreement, and the statutory framework for such decisions provides specifically that the areas of responsibility for which the court may divide and designate responsibility between parents "may include ... education." Section 61.13(2)(b)2 a, Florida Statutes....

...esidence in this case. The statute itself requires that the issue of "primary physical residence ... shall be determined by the court's consideration and evaluation of all factors ... including ... the desirability of maintaining continuity." (e.s.) Section 61.13(3)(d), Florida Statutes....

...the wife an opportunity to be heard on this issue. The appellee has made no appearance in this appeal. Having carefully reviewed the record in this case, we agree with HRS that the lower court erred in terminating child support in the instant case. Section 61.13(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: When a custodial parent refuses to honor a noncustodial parent's visitation rights, the noncustodial parent shall not fail to pay any ordered child support or alimony....

...We do hold that children old enough to have a well considered judgment, who unanimously want to live with their mother, in whose home they find love and good care, should be placed with their mother. This is so not because she has preference: the statute has changed that. Fla. Stat. § 61.13(2), F.S.A....

...However, the error or breach of discretion in this case stems from the trial judge's failure to consider the equitable factors set forth in the guidelines, and Bruce's failure to present evidence which would overcome those considerations and establish special needs of the parties' two minor children. Section 61.13(5) provides that the court may make specific orders for the care, custody and support of the child "as from the circumstances of the party and nature of *142 the case is equitable." In this case, Susan established that her gross yearly income is $15,048 (or $1,245.04 per month) and her monthly net income is $1,032....

CONNER, J. Amie Essex (“the mother”) seeks review of an order directing her to return the parties’ minor daughter to Palm Beach County pending a relocation hearing in conformity with section 61.13001, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...prior to the father filing paternity proceedings. She further contends the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if the relocation statute applied. Legal Analysis The standard of review for orders entered regarding section 61.13001, the relocation statute pertaining to time sharing of children, is abuse of discretion....

...Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980)). The findings of the trial court in support of its rulings will be upheld on appeal if there is competent substantial evidence to support the findings. Open Permit Servs., of Fla., Inc. v. Curtiss, 15 So.3d 822, 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Section 61.13001 was amended effective October 1, 2009....

...The change of location must be at least 50 miles from that residence, and for at least 60 consecutive days not including a temporary absence from the principal residence for purposes of vacation, education, or the provision of health care for the child. § 61.13001(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The 2009 amendment to the statute also no longer provided for a “Notice of Intent to Relocate,” and instead, required a “petition to relocate.” § 61.13001(3), Fla....

...of the statute to be significant for our analysis: (11) Applicability.— (a) This section applies: [[Image here]] *448 2.' To an order, whether temporary or permanent, regarding the parenting plan, custody, primary residence, time-sharing, or access to the child entered on or after October 1, 2009. [[Image here]] § 61.13001(11)(a)(2), Fla....

...The order under review states, “[t]he Mother has since removed the minor child from Palm Beach County, Florida without prior court authority.” (emphasis added). It is clear the trial judge premised her ruling upon her conclusion that the mother had violated section 61.13001, Florida Statutes, by relocating the child to Louisiana....

...Six months later, the mother moved back to Florida with the child. Both parties petitioned the trial court for majority time-sharing. Id. at 71 . The trial court awarded the father majority time-sharing in Pennsylvania after relying on the factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes. Id. The mother argued that the trial court should have relied on the relocation factors set forth in section 61.13001(7); the father asserted that section 61.13001 did not apply, as he already lived in Pennsylvania. The Second District noted that prior to October 1, 2009, relocation under section 61.13001 was defined as a change in the child’s principal residence; after October 1, 2009, relocation was defined as a change in the parent’s principal residence....

...As the mother’s petition for majority time-sharing was filed after October 1, 2009, the relocation statute did not apply, because the father was not seeking a change of his primary residence. Id. at 72 . It appears from the wording of the order under review that the trial court determined that section 61.13001 had been violated by the mother relocating the child’s residence to Louisiana....

...By references to “Notice to Relocate,” it also appears the trial court was contemplating the earlier version of the statute. After October 1, 2009, the critical inquiry, as to the applicability of the relocation statute, is whether the mother relocated her principal residence. Based on section 61.13001(l)(e) and A.F., the mother is correct in arguing that if she had already moved to Louisiana prior to the father’s filing of the petition to determine paternity or any order establishing or modifying time-sharing, then she is not subject to the relocation statute....

...For the reasons stated, we reverse the order directing the return of the child and remand the case for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to whether the relocation statute applies and whether the parties agreed on a temporary relocation of the child to Louisiana. 4 See § 61.13001(2), Fla....

...the former husband to establish a trust, naming a third-party trustee rather than the former wife, into which life insurance proceeds would be deposited upon his death, and from which payments would be made for the benefit of the parties' child. See § 61.13(1)(c), Fla....

...Appellee, who was not married to the mother, alleges he is the father. He filed a petition for custody, and the grandparents counterpetitioned. They bring this appeal from an order dismissing their counterpetition with prejudice, and we reverse. The grandparents' counterpetition for custody is based on section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides: In any case where the child is actually residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship, whether the court has awarded custody to the grandparent or not, the court may recognize the gran...

...the child had been living with the grandparents and at times the parents were also living there. After the parents went out of state for employment and left the child with the grandmother, the grandmother commenced an action for custody pursuant to both chapter 39 and section 61.13(7). The court found that the grandmother did not prove her claim under chapter 39 by clear and convincing evidence, but did award her custody under section 61.13(7) because it was in the child's best interest. [1] The first district reversed, concluding that section 61.13(7) does not authorize a grandparent to bring an independent action for custody, but "merely grants standing to the grandparents to intervene in an existing chapter 61 proceeding for the purpose of determining custody of the minor child." 635 So.2d at 135....

...supports the grandparents' claim that they do have standing to bring their counterpetition. The father also cites Schilling v. Wood, 532 So.2d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), in which we held that grandparents lack standing to initiate a custody action against the child's parents; however, Schilling was decided before section 61.13(7) was enacted in 1993....

...rest, there was a sufficient basis for the grandparent to seek custody in that court. See also Anderson v. Garcia, 673 So.2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In view of the father's petition in this case, the grandparents have standing to seek custody under section 61.13(7), and we therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings....

...he child's best interest. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to require that grandparents be made parties or given notice of dissolution pleadings or proceedings, nor shall such grandparents have legal standing as `contestants' as defined in s. 61.1306, Florida Statutes. No court shall order that a child be kept within the state or jurisdiction of the court solely for the purpose of permitting visitation for the grandparents." [emphasis added] This section is codified Section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1978)....

...See, e.g., Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So.2d 1034, 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Third, the trial court abused its discretion by modifying the time-sharing agreement without findings or evidence that a modification is in the best interests of the children. See § 61.13(3), Fla....

...ion is now settled Florida decisional law [citations omitted]." Ante, at 1275. However, the power to modify the amount or the terms of a parent's child support obligation in circumstances such as those presented by this case is conferred by statute. § 61.13(1)(a), Fla....

...her conduct and relationship with the children, and lacked the inclination to foster a loving relationship between the father and the children. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in applying these findings to the statutory factors of section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...*259 between the parties primarily caused by the wife and her unnecessarily taking the children to doctors for medical treatment, the husband shall have ultimate decision making authority concerning medical/dental decisions regarding both children." Section 61.13, Florida Statutes, provides: In ordering shared parental responsibility, the court may consider the expressed desires of the parents and may grant to one party the ultimate responsibility over specific aspects of the child's welfare or...

...ponsibilities between the parties based on the best interests of the child. Areas of responsibility may include primary residence, education, medical and dental care, and any other responsibilities that the court finds unique to a particular family. § 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Fla....

...eparture, the trial court reasoned that [t]he parties were aware at the time when the Agreement was executed that cohabitation is something which would normally allow for a modification. That was foreseeable and contemplated, because Florida Statute 61.13(3) was in effect at the time this Agreement was entered into....

...In the final judgment, the trial court named the Husband as the primary residential parent. We agree with the Wife that the trial court misapplied the law in reaching its decision on this issue. The trial court applied an incorrect standard by equating the child's "environment," as referenced in section 61.13(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), with the physical structure where the child lived, first with both parties and later—during the parties' lengthy separation—with the Wife....

...[1] Because the trial court *946 used an incorrect standard in reaching its decision to designate the Husband as the primary residential parent, we reverse this provision of the final judgment and remand for reconsideration of this issue in accordance with the factors outlined in section 61.13....

...the primary residential parent. Over the Mother’s objection, the trial court also granted the Father’s motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL PARENT VERSUS TIME SHARING The legislature of our state amended section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2008), effective October 1, 2008....

...Among the various amendments were those removing statutory references to “custody,” “primary residence,” “primary residential parent,” and “visitation”; substituted were terms such as “parenting plan,” which includes “time sharing.” Cobo v. Sierralta, 13 So.3d 493 , 501 n. 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Thus, section 61.13(2)(c)(l) now directs that “[tjhere is no presumption for or against the father or mother of the child or for or against any specific time-sharing schedule when creating or modifying the parenting plan of the child.” The supplemental final judgment is couched in language of “time sharing,” i.e., the language of section 61.13 as amended in 2008....

...There, in 2005, the trial court entered a final judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage that incorporated an MSA. In 2007, each parent filed a supplemental petition seeking modification of visitation and time sharing. Applying the 2008 amendments to section 61.13, the trial court removed Mrs....

...Hahn’s designation as the primary residential parent, ordered a fifty-fifty time sharing plan for the parties with their children, and reduced Mr. Hahn’s child support obligation. On appeal, Mrs. Hahn contended that the retroactive application of section 61.13 as amended in 2008 was improper....

...tunc February 21, 1990, the date of first hearing on the motion. March 23, 1990: The formal order vacating the adoption of the child was entered in the Okaloosa circuit court, back dated to February 7, 1990. Appellants are correct in asserting that section 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Florida Statutes, does not permit an order restricting the movement of a minor child solely to "facilitate" a right of visitation by grandparents....

...efforts by the mother. This supports findings of irreparable injury to both the grandparents and the child, and the lack of an adequate remedy at law to effectuate the visitation. As to the final test, that the injunction be in the public interest, section 61.13(2)(b)2.c....

...Mesibov, 16 So.3d 890, 891 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (citing Cooper v. Gress, 854 So.2d 262, 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)). The mother’s move did not violate the marital settlement agreement or the relocation statute. While the time-sharing schedule largely met the requirements of section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), it did not include a school designation, and the marital settlement agreement does not expressly prohibit a move. Further, section 61.13001(e) defines “Relocation” as “a change in the location of the principal residence of a parent or other person from his or her principal place of residence at the time of the last order establishing or modifying time-sharing....

...the straight-line or “as the crow flies” measure. Here, the parties agree that the mother moved forty-nine miles “as the crow flies,” using the straight-line test. Hence, the mother was not required to file a petition to relocate pursuant to section 61.13001 before she relocated to a different county forty-nine miles away....

...obtain court- ap *290 proval before unilaterally un-enrolling the minor child from his former school and enrolling him in a different school. In such a circumstance, the court must resolve the impasse by determining the best interests of the child. § 61.13(2)(c),(3), Fla....

...agreement without evidence that the welfare of the minor child would be promoted by returning him to his former school in Lake County and changing the timesharing arrangement to have the father assume the primary timesharing responsibilities. 3 See § 61.13(3), Fla....

...Wharton of the Law Firm of Roger L. Berry, Sanford, for appellant. Ned N. Julian, Jr. of Stenstrom, McIntosh, Julian, Colbert & Whigham, P.A., Sanford, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We reverse the order modifying sole custody from the father to shared parental responsibility under section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), because the record shows no substantial material change in circumstances since the entry of the original custody judgment....

...The appellant challenges an order modifying a child custody provision in a preceding marital dissolution decree. Primary residential custody of the appellant's minor child was transferred from the appellant to the appellee grandparents, based on the trial court's application of a best interest standard pursuant to section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes....

...that location with the child, the child's father petitioned for modification in Florida. The father subsequently disavowed any interest in obtaining custody of the child, but the grandparents intervened in the Florida proceeding and sought custody. Section 61.13(7), Fla....

...pelling state interest, Von Eiff and Beagle determined that a grandparental visitation statute violated article I, section 23, by invoking a best interest standard without requiring proof of a substantial threat of significant and demonstrable harm. Section 61.13(7) suffers from the same defect, in permitting evaluation of the grandparents' custody request solely upon a best interest standard. Like the statute in Von Eiff and Beagle, section 61.13(7) thus violates article I, section 23, and is thereby facially unconstitutional....

...Ruffridge to pay $450 per month in child support to Ms. Ruffridge. Trial courts have authority in family law cases to order or approve of plans for rotating child custody. However, the practice of alternating child custody between parents is not favored. Section 61.13, Florida Statutes, does not include rotating child custody among the appropriate methods of sharing parental responsibility. In the Interest of S.M.H., 531 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). On the contrary, the statute states in section 61.13(2)(b)(1) that each child should have a "primary residence," and explains in section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(a), that providing a primary residence is but one of the many parental responsibilities to be shared....

...Serraes filed in Palm Beach County sought judicial modification of visitation rights and apportionment of transportation expenses, in light of these allegedly changed circumstances. Through counsel, Ms. Hirko moved to dismiss his petition alleging that, under section 61.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999) (giving jurisdiction to, inter alia, "the circuit court in which the original award of custody was entered"), venue should be laid in Alachua County, where the marriage had been dissolved, rather than in Palm Beach County....

...rom changing venue back to the transferor court are to prevent a case from being shuttled back and forth and to prevent coordinate courts from effectively overruling each other."). Venue in the circuit court of Alachua County is proper, under either section 61.13(2)(c) or section 61.14(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Serraes could have tested that proposition by appealing the non-final order transferring venue to Alachua County from Palm Beach County, but he did not do so. See Barley, 427 So.2d at 1141 n. 3. There has been no suggestion that venue would lie in any county other than Alachua or Palm Beach counties. Although section 61.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999) refers to section 47.122, Florida Statutes (1999) (authorizing change of venue for "the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice"), without mentioning section 47.131, the conve...

...The appellant husband urges that a modification of a judgment dissolving a marriage by increasing the amount of child support was unfair and unreasonable because there was no substantial change in circumstances. See Andary v. Andary, Fla.App. 1969, 220 So.2d 687. However, appellant overlooks a provision of Fla. Stat. 61.13(1), F.S.A., which is governing in this instance....

...[1] The legislature, by the language of this section, has broadened the basis upon which a modification may be *15 awarded. The trial judge expressly found as follows: "... that it is necessary for the best interests of the minor children of the parties to modify the Final Judgment herein ...". Affirmed. NOTES [1] "61.13 Custody and support of children, etc., power of court in making orders....

...He then filed a new petition for dissolution, seeking custody of the parties' child. Up to that point, the Mother had custody of the child. The Father also filed an emergency motion for temporary custody. In its order granting custody to the Father, the trial court tracked the statutory criteria set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...In two factors, the trial court found that the Father was more likely to allow frequent and continuing contact between the child and the Mother and that the Father was more willing and able to facilitate the relationship between the child and the Mother. See § 61.13(3)(a), (j)....

...oliday visitation: namely, the Father's refusal to sign a commitment to return the child on Christmas Day. In a third factor, the trial court found that the Father had a greater capacity and disposition to provide for the child's material needs. See § 61.13(3)(c)....

...In light of this evidence, we conclude that the record does not support the trial court's finding in the Father's favor on these three factors. In two additional factors, the trial court found that the Father would provide a more stable and satisfactory environment. See § 61.13(3)(d), (e)....

...There was no evidence showing an unwholesome environment. The child was enrolled in a daycare program, but she had not begun because she was visiting with her Father in Florida. In two more factors, the trial court found that the Father was superior to the Mother in moral fitness and mental health. See § 61.13(3)(f), (g)....

...Id.; see also Farrow v. Farrow, 263 So.2d 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). Based on the evidence as a whole in light of the cited cases, we conclude that the record does not fully support the trial court's findings. In the final factor addressing all other relevant facts, see § 61.13(3)(m), the trial court expressed concern over one aspect of the child's behavior where she would pretend to take her medicine and *534 over the Mother's decision to give the child a herbal supplement....

...on appeal, be heard to complain of the trial court's action in acceding to her request. See Arsenault v. Thomas, 104 So.2d 120 (Fla.1958). Appellant also argues reversal is required because the trial court failed to specifically cite and discuss subsection 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), when denying Appellant's relocation request. The order on appeal references section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2003), several times, but does not specifically reference subsection 61.13(2)(d). However, the order states the trial court considered the enumerated factors set forth in section 61.13, Florida Statutes....

...Further, on the issues argued below and here, the trial court reversibly erred by applying the wrong standard of proof as to the child's primary place of residence; and the trial court failed to apply, or show that it applied, the correct relocation factors as required under section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes....

...inciple. IV. Also, it is clear to me that the trial court erred when it determined the child's relocation, because the court was confused about the correct standard to apply, or it is impossible to determine if it applied the mandatory provisions of section 61.13(2)(d), as required. The trial court referenced only "section 61.13" in his order. And as the statute provides the standards for an initial custody determination and the standards for post-custody relocation, one is unable to intelligently determine which standard he utilized. Section 61.13(2)(d) provides that when a trial court makes a determination "......

...as to whether the primary residential parent may relocate with a child, the court must consider all the relocation factors." The order is silent as to whether or not the trial court considered all the factors or the correct factors; the only mention of section 61.13, by the trial court was in the context of determining primary place of residence, not relocation, where consideration of all the factors is required....

...The trial court's findings are amply supported by the record. There is a great disparity between the incomes of the parties. Nonetheless, in this post-dissolution contempt proceeding, the award of attorney's fees and costs is proper for two reasons: under section 61.13(4)(c)1 Florida Statutes (2004), and as part of the inherent authority of the court under the inequitable conduct doctrine. See T/F Sys., Inc. v. Malt, 814 So.2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Bitterman v. Bitterman, 714 So.2d 356, 365 (Fla.1998); Baker v. Green, 732 So.2d 6, 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Section 61.13(4)(c)1 provides that "[w]hen a custodial parent refuses to honor a noncustodial parent's ....

...cision to award fees and costs. The power to award fees is triggered by the wrongful conduct of the custodial parent, without consideration of the noncustodial parent's financial resources. The Former Wife's conduct in this case fell squarely within section 61.13(4)(c)1, so that the award of attorney's fees was proper....

...Carroll feels strongly that the wife and maternal grandparents have caused these problems, the trial judge made no such findings. Florida Statutes do provide a remedy for a noncustodial parent who is denied his or her visitation rights by the custodial parent. See § 61.13(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (1989). Both natural parents share a duty to support a minor child, even though the trial court, under section 61.13(1)(a), may order either or both parents to pay child support upon dissolution of the marriage....

...upport payments. LEHAN, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur. NOTES [1] The current statutes reflect that the legislature recognizes that both parents owe a duty of support to a child and that the support is not dependent upon visitation rights. See §§ 61.13(1)(a), (4)(b) and (c), Fla....

...First, appellee argues the $50.00 figure came from a property settlement agreement, and it is therefore sacrosanct and not as easily modified as amounts set in judgments. Although there is dictum to support this view in some appellate cases, [1] that appears to me to be in conflict with section 61.13(1), Florida Statutes (1983), which permits modification of child support obligations based on a substantial change of circumstances, whether or not the dissolution incorporates or does not incorporate a settlement agreement....

...A child is entitled to share in the good fortune of both parents and its standard of living may not be relegated to that set by the parties during the marriage. Smith v. Smith, 474 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Wanstall v. Wanstall, 427 So.2d 353 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). [6] § 61.13(1), Fla....

...We affirm this latter aspect of the order being appealed by the wife, but reverse the award of custody of the son to the husband. The trial court was bound to make a determination as to custody based primarily upon the best interests of the child. § 61.13(2)(b)1, Fla. Stat. (1983). Various factors enter into that determination, some of which merit discussion here. First, section 61.13(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that in addition to certain specific factors to be considered by the trial judge in determining custody and primary physical residence, the court should consider "[a]ny other factor considered by...

...It is a strong public policy of this state "to assure each minor child frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing." § 61.13(2)(b)1, Fla....

...Thus the trial court's order is directly contrary to the state's public policy. Another of the factors to be considered by the trial court in determining the primary physical residence of the child is which parent is "more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent." § 61.13(3)(a), Fla....

...Appellant contends that she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her child and that under the "tender years" doctrine she should have been given preference in the custody award. She therefore asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding custody to the father. Although section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes, requires that the father of the child shall be given equal consideration as the mother in awarding custody, it appears to be the law of this state that other essential factors being equal, the mother of an infant of tender years should receive prime consideration for custody....

...The mother filed an answer in the Florida proceeding and a counter-suit for dissolution in which she also sought custody of the child. Since Maryland, a possible "home" state, had declined to take jurisdiction, the Florida court then had discretion to proceed under section 61.1308(1)(d)1 of the Act, and subject matter jurisdiction attached....

...The record in this case does not balance heavily in favor of either parent; [6] and since the "tender years" doctrine is apparently still the law in Florida, the mother should have been given permanent custody of this child. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973). NOTES [1] Section 61.1302, et seq., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). [1] § 61.1306(5), Fla. Stat. (1979). [2] § 61.1308(1)(a), Fla....

might have arrived at that amount. Pursuant to section 61.13(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2012), a court may

...parenting plan, except that with regard to the parenting plan, we remand for the limited purpose of having the trial court include in the final judgment a provision that either parent alone may provide consent for a child to receive mental health treatment. See § 61.13(2)(b)(3)(a), Fla....

...Lehman, 962 So. 2d 398, 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), a trial court's decisions about support must be supported by competent substantial evidence and factual findings sufficient to enable this court to determine how the trial court made the decisions it did. See § 61.13(1)(a)(1)(b) (requiring that child support orders provide a payment schedule "based on the record existing at the time of the order"); Cooper v....

...of the child support guidelines worksheets incorporated in the final judgment. The worksheets included an amount for 1This requirement, applicable when a trial court orders shared parental responsibility, is a recent addition to section 61.13 that became effective on July 1, 2016, see ch....

...We therefore affirm the child support portion of the final judgment. We turn now to the trial court's disposition of the husband's request for visitation. A trial court is entrusted with the responsibility of determining the extent of visitation which is in the best interests of the child. Section 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...factual findings as set forth in the final judgment. The second argument presented by the father is that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to secure his child support obligation with a $100,000.00 life insurance policy. We agree. Section 61.13(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes (2007) authorizes trial courts to order a parent to carry a life insurance policy: Support of children; Parenting and time-sharing; Powers of Court [[Image here]] (c) To the extent necessary to protect an a...

...Lastly, the parties agree that the final judgment contains a typographical error with regard to N.B.’s birth date. On remand the error must be corrected. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. MONACO, C.J. and LAWSON, J., concur. . Our court has stated that a trial court may exercise its authority under section 61.13(l)(c) only in certain situations: The courts are statutorily authorized to order the obligor to maintain life insurance to protect alimony awards and child support obligations ......

...The Court finds that the Husband has failed to prove by competent, substantial evidence the existence of special circumstances to overcome the presumption against rotating custody and his claim for the Court to order rotating custody is DENIED. After an analysis of the factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2007), the trial court determined that the mother should be designated the primary residential parent because she offered greater stability and continuity, [1] and because her *318 work schedule afforded her greater availability to the parties' son in the afternoon hours....

...preference. Moreover, it necessarily follows that a parent seeking rotating custody need not establish "exceptional circumstances" to overcome a presumption that no longer exists. The standard is simply the best interest of the child as set forth in section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2007). [3] B. No Competent, Substantial Evidence Additionally, we also find that the trial court's determinations in favor of the mother regarding the factors set forth in subsections 61.13(3)(d) and (m), Florida Statutes (2007), are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. First, with regard to section 61.13(3)(m), the trial court found that the parties' work schedules were a "significant factor" in evaluating the custodial arrangement....

...Moreover, the parties' amendment to the time sharing order provides that if the father cannot pick up the child, the mother will be entitled to pick up the child from school and the father will then pick up the child from her residence. Second, in addressing section 61.13(3)(d), the trial court found that despite the fact that "the child's environment has been stable and satisfactory ......

...t was better, and that she had been a teacher for two years. This conclusory opinion testimony, not based upon any observable facts, did not constitute competent and substantial evidence on the issue of a stable environment for the parties' son. See § 61.13(3)(d), Fla....

...dy had not been overcome. Cf. Mancuso, 789 So.2d at 1250; Hosein, 785 So.2d at 704. II. With respect to the primary residence issue, the trial court's decision was, again, based upon an incisive analysis of the factors set out in the then-applicable section 61.13(3)....

...concerned parents. Since, given the rotating custody decision, a choice had to be made, he based his ruling upon the following: The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and desirability of maintaining continuity. [61.13(3)(d), Fla....

...the continuity and residential stability which he needs. The Court finds that greater stability and continuity will result from the Wife being the primary residential parent. The court also found the following unspecified factor to be relevant under section 61.13(3)(m), Florida Statutes: The Father is a law school graduate and a member of the Florida Bar....

...Ross, 321 So.2d 443, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). [10] As might be appropriate in virtually all of these cases, therefore, in the last analysis I would affirm on the authority of Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). NOTES [1] Specifically, with regard to section 61.13(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), the trial court found as follows: d....

...would be in the child's best interest's [sic] and provide the continuity and residential stability which he needs. The Court finds that greater stability and continuity will result from the Wife being the primary residential parent. [2] Considering section 61.13(3)(m), Florida Statutes (2007), the trial court found as follows: m....

...and's family primarily resides and would therefore be more quickly available if needed or in an emergency. [3] "The trial court determines the initial custody of children in dissolution of marriage proceedings pursuant to the guidelines set forth in section 61.13, which require all matters related to the custody of a minor to be determined in accordance with the best interest of the child." Wade v....

...Nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests that the legislature intended to abolish the presumption. Our review of the limited legislative history offers little insight on the issue. We note that House Bill 1421, which enacted this provision, also amended section 61.13, Florida Statutes as follows: 61.13 Custody and support of children: visitation rights; power of court in making orders.— (2)(d) No presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and the move will ma...

...virtually as a matter of law. See, e.g., Santiago, 830 So.2d at 923 ("We reject the former husband's argument that the time the child spends with each parent, which can be ascertained from the face of the judgment in this case, is determinative. See § 61.13(3), Fla....

...(dissenting) As I view this case, the issue for our determination on this appeal is whether divorced parents can jointly be held liable under section 741.24, Florida Statutes (1997), where: (1) the parents have been awarded shared parental responsibility of their minor child pursuant to section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1989); and (2) the minor child lives with each of the parents on alternate weekends....

...The court found only that a continued relationship between the minor child and the grandmother through visitation was in the child's best interest. Around the time that the instant case was being litigated, the Supreme Court of Florida held in Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So.2d 28 (Fla.2004), that section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), is unconstitutional as violative of Florida's right to privacy because it failed to require a showing of the essential element of harm to the child prior to compelling grandparent visitation and overriding the parental privacy rights. Id. at 37-38. That statute stated that a court "may award the grandparents visitation rights with a minor child if it is in the child's best interest." § 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c), Fla....

...Though the trial court here did not cite to this court's decision in Spence v. Stewart, 705 So.2d 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), it may well have been familiar with that decision, which is similar to the instant case. In Spence, this court decided the case in favor of grandparent visitation relying on section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c)....

...In that case, this court concluded that there was a waiver of familial privacy by bringing the issue of grandparent visitation to the court. That case has now been called an anomaly by the supreme court, Sullivan, 866 So.2d at 38. Moreover, the very statute, section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c), found constitutional by this court in Spence, was declared unconstitutional in Sullivan....

...granted the right to visit the child at reasonable times unless such visits are shown to be detrimental to the child's welfare.' (Emphasis added in Kent ) 198 So.2d at 375. Florida courts have also recognized that the shared responsibility statute, section 61.13, Florida Statutes (1989), applies to both legitimate and illegitimate children, and that fathers of illegitimate children have the same rights with respect to their illegitimate children as legitimate fathers have with respect to their legitimate children ... unless those rights have been waived or legally terminated by a court. Section 61.13(2)(b)2.a provides, and Florida courts have held, that in custody proceedings a trial court must order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared, unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child......

...However, we find merit in the former wife's argument that the trial court erred in changing the custody designation, placing sole parental responsibility in the former husband, without making a finding on the record that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)2 states in relevant part that "[t]he court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child." The...

...child. The Lees' selection of the remedy of habeas corpus is significant. In Walt v. Walt, 574 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), we explained the difference between simply petitioning for enforcement of an order pursuant to the provisions of the UCCJA, section 61.1332, Florida Statutes (1989), *285 and seeking enforcement via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus: Initially, we point out that habeas corpus is by definition an independent proceeding to be used when no other appropriate proceeding for obtaining custody is pending or available....

...While its use as a remedy in this case was not challenged by appellant in the court below, ordinarily habeas corpus is not resorted to where there is another available and adequate remedy, such as the provisions of the UCCJA as adopted in Florida, e.g., §§ 61.1328, 61.1332, 61.1346, Fla....

...It appears that the Tennessee court has continuing jurisdiction over modification of custody because Tennessee was the child's home state within 6 months before appellants filed the petition to modify child custody. See § 36-6-203(1)(B), Tenn. Code Ann. (1988); § 61.1308(1)(a), Fla....

...The Florida court has jurisdiction because the child and his mother reside in Florida and have a significant connection with Florida, and substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is available in Florida. [4] See § 61.1308(1)(b), Fla....

...ly support the trial court's decision to deny enforcement of the Tennessee court order under the UCCJA. [6] *289 A. As adopted in both states, the UCCJA requires that "reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants." § 61.131, Fla....

...rsonal appearance in Tennessee be paid by the moving party. In my view, the UCCJA clearly contemplates, and minimum due process requires, that notification of these matters be given to the appellee as a nonresident party. Section 11(b) of the UCCJA [§ 61.1324(2), Fla. Stat. (1989); § 36-6-212(b) Tenn. Code Ann. (1988)] provides that if the presence of a party is required by the court and if such party "is outside this state with or without the child, the court may order that the notice given under section 5 [§ 61.1312, Fla....

...Stat. (1989); § 36-6-206, Tenn. Code Ann. (1988)] include a statement directing that party to appear personally with or without the child and declaring that failure to appear may result in a decision adverse to that party." Section 11(c) of the UCCJA [§ 61.1324(3), Fla....

...or custody order; (2) the potential adverse consequences that may ensue from a failure to appear when the court expects the nonresident party to attend the scheduled hearing; and (3) the authority of the court pursuant to section 11(c) of the UCCJA [§ 61.1324(3), Fla....

...the Tennessee court in this case, expects that party to attend and declares that the nonresident party, by failing to appear, "is seeking again to frustrate the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court." While the trial court below did not cite to section 61.1324, it nevertheless reached the correct conclusion that the notice sent was inadequate based on due process considerations....

...d Florida subscribe, requires that reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, to any parent whose parental rights have not previously been terminated, and to any person who has physical custody of the child. § 61.131, Fla....

...The order sought to preserve the Tennessee court's jurisdiction over the matter, and Meeks should be required to submit to that jurisdiction without affording her an opportunity to forum shop. After all, that is precisely what the UCCJA was designed to prevent. § 61.1304, Fla....

...with this act, or which decree was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act, so long as this decree has not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this act. § 61.1328, Fla....

...Walt, 574 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The Walt case was decided by the same majority that decided this case. In short, I cannot believe that the UCCJA was not intended to apply to situations involving the writ of habeas corpus. I dissent. NOTES [1] See sections 61.1302-61.1348, Florida Statutes (1989); and sections 36-6-201-36-6-225, Tennessee Code Annotated (1988). [2] Section 61.1304, Florida Statutes (1989), provides in part: The general purposes of this act are to: (1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with the courts of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the...

...Instead of simply redetermining the grandparent visitation rights, the Tennessee court ordered that the appellee be temporarily divested of custody of her child and that such custody be invested in appellants. In Florida, grandparents do not have legal standing to seek custody of a child in a dissolution case. § 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Fla....

...The father/appellant challenges an order awarding temporary custody of the minor child to the mother/appellee, claiming that the court was without jurisdiction to enter such an order because the appellee failed to file a Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA") affidavit pursuant to section 61.132, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...She then commenced a paternity action against the father in Florida, requesting an order of paternity and child support. In December of 1996, the father filed a counterclaim requesting shared parental responsibility and primary residential custody of the child. His counterclaim contained the essential information required by section 61.132, commonly referred to as part of the UCCJA. The mother filed an answer to the counterclaim, denying many of the allegations, including some of the information required by section 61.132....

...e court granted her temporary custody of the child. The father appeals this order. The UCCJA was adopted in Florida and most other states to prevent jurisdictional competition and conflict between the courts of other states in child custody matters. § 61.1304(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). When the court of another state enters a decree in conformity with the UCCJA, it is entitled to full recognition and enforcement in this state. § 61.1328, Fla....

...Otherwise, a sister state's court is not obligated to recognize and enforce the decree, just as our courts are not required to recognize the custody decree of a state which has not assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with the UCCJA as adopted in Florida. § 61.1328....

...court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case. (3) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any custody proceeding concerning the child in this or any other state of which he or she obtained information during this proceeding. § 61.132 (emphasis added). In Walt v. Walt, 574 So.2d 205, 212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the court held that "an unexcused failure to file the information required by section 61.132 leaves the court without jurisdiction to enter a valid child custody order under the UCCJA." The compliance with the requirements of section 61.132 is mandatory....

...The UCCJA by its very terms applies to "custody proceedings" which "includes proceedings in which a custody determination is one of several issues, such as an action for dissolution of marriage or separation, and includes child neglect and dependency proceedings." § 61.1306(3), Fla. Stat. (1995). It also applies to a custody determination which includes orders regarding the custody of a child, "including visitation rights." § 61.1306(2)....

...ution of marriage situation." Id. at 670. Thus, the court placed a paternity determination of custody on the same footing as a determination of custody in a dissolution of marriage. Moreover, we have held that the shared parental responsibility law, section 61.13(2)(b)(2), Florida Statutes, is applicable to non-married parents notwithstanding the fact that the paternity statute does not so provide....

...rmation under oath. During the pendency of this appeal, the mother filed a UCCJA affidavit. The filing of the affidavit after the entry of the order does not cure the jurisdictional defect created. This order is defective for lack of compliance with section 61.132 and may not be enforced in other states....

...As to whether the substitute visitation is adequate to foster a meaningful and continuing father/son relationship, the trial court concluded in its final order that: Relocation is incompatible with the father's interest in maintaining frequent and continuing contact with his son. This is also the state's interest, section 61.13(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes (1993)....

...The trial court does not explain what is meant by its reliance on "traditional family environment." We elect not to guess about the trial court's intended definition of a "traditional family environment" in the context of the circumstances shown by this record and the factors mandated by section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Chateau La Mer II Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 622 So.2d 1105, 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Further, we note that the order on appeal was entered prior to our opinion in Maradie. In Maradie, we explained that the trial court may consider a parent's sexual conduct in determining the parent's moral fitness under section 61.13(3)(f), but that in such consideration "the trial court should focus on whether the parent's behavior has a direct impact on the welfare of the child." Maradie, 680 So.2d at 542, citing Dinkel v....

..."[A] connection between the actions of the parent and harm to the child requires an evidentiary basis and cannot be assumed." Maradie, 680 So.2d at 543. On remand, these principles may provide guidance for the trial court's consideration of these parties' moral fitness under section 61.13(3)(f)....

...interests of the child in its determination of custody. Florida law indicates that in child custody cases, the trial courts are accorded with broad judicial discretion in evaluating factors affecting the best interests of the child as enumerated in § 61.13(3)....

...The appellant also moved for and secured an order releasing to her child support payments being held in appellee's attorneys' trust account. In 1982 the legislature of the State of Florida mandated shared parental responsibility under the conditions and limitations set forth in section 61.13, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...]he court ... finds regarding the Motion for Change of Child Custody that the primary criteria is not the unfitness of the parent but the best interest of the children as is now the law of this State effective July 1, 1982, more specifically Chapter 61.13 which grants shared parental responsibility....

...Culpepper, 408 So.2d 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), and Alonso v. Alonso, 432 So.2d 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). It appearing that the trial court mistakenly concluded a material change in circumstances was not required in a custody modification proceeding under section 61.13, Florida Statutes, we VACATE the order and REMAND for reconsideration in the light of this opinion....

...Therefore, the Court finds that it is not an absolute restriction but in fact is a limitation on relocation to the extent that the Court has to make ultimate decisions if the parties cannot agree. The trial court further considered the factors set forth in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), and found that the move would greatly improve the quality of life for both the mother and children....

...The court also modified the visitation order, permitting visitation during spring break, four consecutive weeks during the summer, a week during winter break, alternating Thanksgiving or Labor Day holidays, and one weekend per month at the children's residence. We note that prior to existing changes in section 61.13(2)(d), Mize v....

...Mize, 621 So.2d 417, 420 (Fla.1993), had required that where an agreement creates such a restriction, the relocating parent must establish that a substantial change in circumstances justifies the relocation. A question therefore arises whether, in light of changes to section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes, subsequent to Mize, such a restriction places a burden on the mother to show a substantial change in circumstances....

...k to Manatee County. Although the order stated that the court undertook to determine whether modification was appropriate, the order actually reflects a detailed analysis of the statutory factors applicable to requests to relocate, *120 contained in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...The purpose of the order directing the e/c to reimburse claimant for the cost of plastic surgery was to correct facial disfigurement that occurred as a result of *188 the industrial accident. The dc's order cites 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 61.13(f), which approves the award of compensation benefits for such purpose....

...Defendant is remarried and is raising two other children by his wife of a previous marriage in addition to the children in the case sub judice. The record further indicates that defendant is retired, is in good health and does not engage in any type of dangerous occupation. Section 61.13(3), Fla....

...Although this section has often been interpreted by the courts of this state, we are unable to find any case in which such security has been required when the children involved in the divorce were in the custody of the person obligated for their support, in this case the defendant father. While Section 61.13(3), Fla....

...1st DCA 2014), “[rjestrictions upon a noncustodial parent’s right to expose his or her child to his or her religious beliefs have consistently been overturned in the absence of a clear, affirmative showing that the religious activities at issue will be harmful to the child.” However, because section 61.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2015) requires Florida courts to “determine all matters relating to parenting and time-sharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child,” we agree with the Suprem...

...Under the particular circumstances of this case, the trial court’s restriction on Appellant’s discussion of “religious matters” during his parenting time did not exceed the court’s discretionary authority or violate Appellant’s rights. The welfare and best interests of the children must prevail. § 61.13(2)(c) & (3), Fla....

...Appellant raises a number of issues on appeal, two of which require reversal. We determine that the trial court erred (as conceded by appellee) in awarding sole parental responsibility to the former husband without a specific finding that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child. See § 61.13(2), Fla....

...[Appel-lee]’s going to be. That’s where the case should have been filed.” On appeal, Appellant asserts that venue was proper in Seminole County and that no showing was made to support transfer based on the convenience of the parties. We agree. Section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2009), authorizes two potential venues: “The circuit court in the county in which either parent and the child reside or the circuit court in which the original order approving or creating the parenting plan was entered may modify the parenting plan.......

...” Where venue is proper in more than one county, the petitioner has the right to select one of the appropriate counties and it is improper to transfer the action to another venue solely because venue is appropriate there as well. Guntner v. Jennings, 980 So.2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). Rather, section 61.13(2)(d) provides that the court may change the venue in accordance with section 47.122, Florida Statutes....

...parties' judgment of dissolution of marriage as to visitation and child support. The former wife raises multiple issues on appeal, but we write only to address her argument that the trial court erred by retroactively applying the 2008 amendments to section 61.13, Florida Statutes, [1] in order to decide issues regarding modifications to the child visitation and support....

...The former husband counter-petitioned, alleging that he was unemployed and moving out of State to seek employment. Given his situation, the *947 former husband also sought a modification of time-sharing, visitation, and child support. At the hearing on pending petitions, the court noted that the 2008 amendments to section 61.13 were applicable to the case and created a presumption of 50/50 time-sharing between the parties because of the Legislature's removal of references to "primary residential parent." [2] After applying section 61.13, as amended, the court modified the final judgment of dissolution of marriage by (a) removing the former wife's designation as the primary residential parent; (b) ordering that the parties have 50/50 time-sharing with their children; and (c) reducing the former husband's child support obligation based on its ruling that the parties would now have a 50/50 time-sharing. The former wife argues that the trial court erred by (a) retroactively applying the 2008 amendments to section 61.13 to modify visitation and child support and (b) holding that the amendments created a presumption of 50/50 time-sharing....

...3d DCA 2000) ("`This rule applies with particular force to those instances where retrospective operation of the law would impair or destroy existing rights.'" (quoting State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla.1983))). In this case, although the trial court correctly noted that the 2008 amendments to section 61.13 removed references to "primary residential parent," the court's retroactive application of these amendments to remove the former wife's designation as the "primary residential parent" and establish 50/50 time-sharing between the parties clearly impaired the former wife's existing rights over her children. See Horn, 752 So.2d at 688. The inclusion of the October 1, 2008, effective date for the amendments also rebuts any argument that retroactive application of section 61.13, as amended, was intended by the Legislature. See State Dep't of Revenue v. Zuckerman-Vernon Corp., 354 So.2d 353, 358 (Fla.1977); see also Imperial Point Colonnades Condo., Inc., 349 So.2d at 1195; Poole v. Savage, 561 So.2d 360, 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) ("Section 61.13 has no retroactive application." (citing Malchiodi v....

...3d DCA 1983) (holding that the Shared Parental Responsibility Act has no retroactive application to child custody judgments *948 which became final before the effective date of the Act))). We hold the trial court erred in applying the 2008 amendments to section 61.13 in order to resolve the issues raised by the parties' respective petitions. Even assuming that the trial court did not err in retroactively applying the 2008 amendments to the case, the court was incorrect to conclude that the amendments created a presumption of 50/50 time-sharing. Based on a strict interpretation of section 61.13, as amended, the trial court must still "determine all matters relating to parenting and time-sharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child [.]" § 61.13(2)(c)1., Fla....

...(2008) (amended Oct. 1, 2008) ("There is no presumption for or against the father or mother of the child when creating or modifying the parenting plan of the child.") (emphasis added); see also Cobo, 13 So.3d at 501 n. 4 (Following the 2008 amendments, section 61.13 "still requires the lower court to consider factors to determine the best interests of the child."). Accordingly, on remand, the trial court must conduct a new hearing on all the issues consistent with this opinion. Reversed and Remanded. STEVENSON and LEVINE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 61.13, Fla. Stat. (2008) (amended Oct. 1, 2008). [2] See Cobo v. Sierralta, 13 So.3d 493, 501 n. 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) ("[Effective October 1, 2008, the Florida Legislature amended various sections of Chapter 61, including section 61.13, to remove the references therein to `custody,' `primary residence,' `primary residential parent,' and `visitation' in favor of a `parenting plan' that includes `time sharing.'"); In re Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules, 995 So.2d 445, 445 (Fla....

...Kanter, 850 So.2d 682, 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). We review the final judgment for error apparent on its face. At the time of Wife's request and the final judgment, requests to relocate, including requests made prior to a final judgment of dissolution, were governed by section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes. [2] Cecemski v. Cecemski, 954 So.2d 1227, 1228 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), provides: "No presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact and access with the secondary residential parent." The statute requires a court considering a request to relocate to consider the six factors enumerated at subsections 61.13(2)(d)(1)-(6). We have thoroughly reviewed the trial court's order and conclude that the trial court adequately considered the six factors required by section 61.13(2)(d)....

...Husband's remaining argument, which challenges a number of the trial court's factual findings, is unreviewable by this court due to the lack of a trial transcript. Affirmed. WARNER and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] One of the parties' children has since reached the age of majority. [2] The requirements of section 61.13(2)(d) were later substituted with different requirements by the newly added section 61.13001(7). However, the new section does not apply to the final judgment in this case, which was rendered prior to October 1, 2006. See § 61.13001(11), Fla....

...Baxter, Gainesville, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from a final order dismissing a motion to intervene in a paternity action and for an award of visitation, which was filed by the maternal grandmother of the child involved in the paternity action, pursuant to section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...The mother filed a motion for rehearing, seeking amendment of the order as it pertained to the federal income tax deduction provision. While the motion was pending, the mother was killed in an automobile accident, and the grandmother moved to intervene, seeking reasonable visitation with the grandchild under section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c). This case is controlled by Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036 (Fla.2000), in which the supreme court held that section 61.13(7), Florida Statutes, violated the natural parent's fundamental right to privacy in raising her child. In opposing the paternal grandparents' motion to intervene in a custody dispute, the mother asserted her privacy rights and argued that section 61.13(7) was unconstitutional, because it conferred standing on the grandparents to request custody based solely on the best interest of the child, without requiring any showing of harm to the child....

...The supreme court agreed with the mother's arguments, concluding as follows: The reasoning and logic of ... Von Eiff [ v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla.1998) ] and Beagle [ v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla.1996) ] applies with equal, if not more compelling, force here. In effect, section 61.13(7) treats grandparents and natural parents alike by giving grandparents custody rights equal to those of a parent, and allows courts to make [their] custody determination between parents and grandparents based solely on the best interest of the child standard....

...Hence, we find no valid basis to distinguish the custody statute we consider here from the visitation statute we considered in Von Eiff and Beagle, except for the fact the custody statute is even more intrusive upon a parent's rights. Richardson, 766 So.2d at 1039-40. In the case at bar, section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c), like section 61.13(7), purports to give grandparents visitation rights based solely on the best interest of the child....

...We agree the trial court did not err by requiring the Wife to pay her own legal fees. Temporary Timesharing Second, the Wife, argues the trial court erred when it failed to make explicit findings based on the best interests of the child or on the factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2011), regarding the temporary parenting plan....

...4th DCA 2010). To support her argument, the Wife relies on cases such as Kelly v. Colston, 32 So.3d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), which held the trial court erred when it failed to make the appropriate factual findings based on the factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes and when it failed to make a finding that the timesharing schedule is in the child’s best interests....

...sted final hearings. The parties need to obtain temporary relief expeditiously. Shorter hearings are required to accomplish that goal. Therefore, we hold it is not reversible error for a trial court to fail to address any of the factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes or to fail to make a rote statement that its decision is in the best interests of the child in temporary relief proceedings....

...or reconsideration of the amount in light of the significant change in the distribution plan. The Former Wife and the Former Husband were married for eleven years. They had two minor children. After making findings regarding the factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2006), the trial court placed responsibility for the primary residential care of the children with the Former Wife but approved a shared parenting schedule prepared by the Former Husband....

...iled to facilitate visitation were "implicit" findings of a substantial change in circumstances. The Mother also argues that no less drastic measures were feasible in this case. As authority for the modification of custody, the trial court relied on section 61.13(4)(c)(5), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...al parent's visitation rights without proper cause and the modification is in the best interests of the child. At least one Florida court has previously held that a substantial change in circumstances was not required for custody modifications under section 61.13(4)(c)(5)....

...However, the supreme court has recently held that the substantial change test "applies to modification of all child custody matters." Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla. 2005). Thus, under Wade, the substantial change test now applies to custody modifications under section 61.13(4)(c)(5)....

...2d DCA 2005). Similarly, entry of a default in a custody modification proceeding is not a proper sanction for a custodial parent's failure to comply with other types of court decrees. See, e.g., Andrews v. Andrews, 624 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). While section 61.13(4)(c)(5) does provide for the modification of custody as a sanction for a custodial parent's refusal to honor the non-custodial parent's visitation rights, it should be done only upon the filing of a petition for modification with proper notice and only as a last resort. Furthermore, the decision to modify custody under section 61.13(4)(c)(5) must also be in the child's best interests....

...NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. NOTES [1] We note that a custodial parent is precluded from withholding visitation from a noncustodial parent in retaliation for the noncustodial parent's failure to pay child support. See § 61.13(4)(a)....

...The court also ordered partition of the real property that the parties purchased during their five-year relationship. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded primary residential custody to appellee. The record shows that the trial court carefully examined the factors set forth in section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), before making its decision, and its findings are supported by competent substantial evidence....

...(the Mother) appeals a final judgment establishing R.P.B.’s (the Father) paternity of the minor child, ordering shared parental responsibility, and awarding the Father majority time-sharing in Pennsylvania. We affirm, but write to explain our holding that the version of section 61.13001, Florida Statutes, effective until September 30, 2009, does not apply....

...y with majority time-sharing in Pennsylvania. The Mother argues that the trial court could not award shared parental responsibility to the Father in Pennsylvania without considering and making factual findings for the relocation factors set forth in section 61.13001(7)(a)-(k). She cites subsection 61.13001(11)(a)(2), which provides that the relocation statute applies where there is “an order, whether temporary or *72 permanent, regarding the parenting plan, custody, primary residence, time-sharing, or access to the child entered on or after October 1, 2009.” The February 2010 order, entered on the basis of the parties’ agreement, was a temporary order regarding time-sharing or visitation. The Father responds that section 61.13001 did not apply because he was not relocating; he already resided in Pennsylvania....

...The trial court agreed and ruled that the statute did not apply because the statutory definition of relocation excluded the situation faced by the Mother and Father from the requirements of the relocation statute. Thus, the court relied on the considerations of section 61.13(3)(a)-(t) in making its time-sharing determination. In 2009, section 61.13001 existed in two slightly different versions at the times relevant here. Until September 30, 2009, a month before the mother filed her petition, section 61.13001(1)(e) defined “relocation” as a change in the location of the child’s principal residence....

...Neither parent was changing his or her place of residence; rather, each sought to change the primary residence of one of the children. Id. Similarly here, the father is not changing his own residence, but seeking to change the child’s principal residence. Thus, under that version of section 61.13001, the relocation statute would have applied to the facts in this case....

...residence to father’s existing home in Maryland). However, the legislature amended the definition of “relocation” to a change in the location of a parent’s principal residence, effective October 1, 2009. See ch. 2009-180, § 4, Laws of Fla.; § 61.13001(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2009). It also changed “notice ... of a proposed relocation of the child’s residence” in the earlier 2009 version to “petition to relocate.” See ch. 2009-180, § 4, Laws of Fla.; § 61.13001(3). The newer version of the statute applies because the Mother filed her petition on November 10, 2009. The newer version still refers to “relocation of a/the child,” § 61.13001(2)(a); (3)(e), (3)(e)(l), (3)(e)(4); (4); (6)(a), (6)(a)(2), (6)(a)(3); (6)(b), (6)(b)(2); and (6)(d), but the amended definition of “relocation”— triggering application of the relocation statute where a parent proposes a change in...

...a different temporary schedule used by the parties had provided a more stable environment. That schedule employed a weekly rotation of the children between the parties. The magistrate evaluated the parents on the majority of the factors outlined in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...heir postdisso-lution lives, the parties should be permitted to freely seek future modification of the schedule based solely on the best interests of the children without also having alleged a substantial change in circumstances. This was error. See § 61.13(3) (“A determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child.”)....

...major holidays. *943 Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the final judgment of dissolution addressing the time-sharing and custody arrangements. On remand the trial court should set time-sharing and holiday schedules that meet the requirements of section 61.13 and that are not subject to modification without the moving party’s alleging and establishing a substantial change in circumstances....

Former Husband to purchase life insurance. Section 61.13(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), states: “To

...Shrove, 724 So.2d 679, 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The final issue concerns the trial court's failure to address the issue of health care coverage for the child. The former wife raised this issue in her counter-petition to the husband's petition for modification. Section 61.13(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), requires every child support order to address "health care coverage for the minor child when the coverage is reasonably available." Id. By failing to address the issue, the court failed to comply with section 61.13(1)(b)....

...ents an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The trial court properly applied this court's opinion in Shuler v. Shuler, 371 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), in dismissing the grandparents' motion to intervene and petition for modification of custody. Section 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...e the parties had not lived in Broward for several years. The applicable venue statute provides that in modification of child custody proceedings, venue may be laid where either parent resides with the child or where the final judgment was rendered. § 61.13(2)(c), Fla....

...The FNC statute permits a trial court to transfer an action on specified grounds but only to a court "in which it might have been brought". § 47.122, Fla. Stat. (2008). The question is therefore whether father might initially have brought the modification proceeding in Collier County. Under section 61.13(2)(c), the modification proceedings could have been brought only in one of two places—namely in North Carolina where mother resides with the children or in Broward County where the final judgment was entered. Neither parent has ever resided with the children in Collier County. Nor is Collier County the place where the final judgment awarding custody was entered. Collier County does not qualify as either of the two places authorized by section 61.13(2)(c)....

...The trial court erred by focusing primarily on the mother and whether it would be detrimental to return the child to the mother. The function of the trial judge in a child custody proceeding is to determine what is in the best interests of the child. § 61.13(2)(b)1., Fla....

...1978), we find that the trial court acted within its authority in granting visitation privileges to appellees herein. [1] The same Order seeks to facilitate its visitation provision by forbidding appellant to remove her children from Broward County, where she and they now reside. This was error. § 61.13(2)(b), Fla....

...etermination of child support. In making the custody determination, the court relied heavily on the stability the marital home could provide for the children. In the final judgment, the trial court specifically stated that the factor provided for in section 61.13(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), which requires a court to assess the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity, was a "significant" factor in this case: The minor children have been residing in the ......

...By all evidence shown ..., it appears that this is a stable situation in terms of schooling, and it also appears to the Court that the home situation and staying in the home is a stable and desirable environment for the children, rather than having to vacate the home and live somewhere else. In considering the factor in section 61.13(3)(e), the permanence as a family unit of the existing or proposed custodial home, the court found "that the marital home is a permanent home for the children and the only home proposed by either of the parties in this case, and that is where the children should remain....

...rsed only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. See, e.g., Artuso v. Dick, 843 So.2d 942, 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). In this case, if the trial court's decision were based solely upon an assessment of the factors in section 61.13(3) without reference to the marital home, it would be difficult to conclude the trial court abused its discretion....

...The trial court apparently concluded this problem could be resolved by the award of exclusive use and occupancy of the home. In light of this and the trial court's apparent conclusion that the parties were equal in regard to many of the other factors in section 61.13(3), it may not have been unreasonable for the court to marginally consider the Husband's nineteen-year-old criminal conviction, resulting in a jail term, when deciding custody....

...Upon a redetermination as to the husband's income, the court must enter a new child-support order in accordance with section 61.30. Furthermore, the trial court should have ordered the husband to provide health insurance for the minor children or should have made findings as to its reason for failing to enter such award. Section 61.13(1)(b), provides that "[e]ach order for child support shall contain a provision for health insurance for the minor child when the insurance is reasonably available." E.g., Dehler, 648 So.2d at 821....

presented evidence on the issue. It is true that section 61.13(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that

...Similarly, "to the extent necessary to protect an award of child support, the court may order the obligor to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure the child support award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose." § 61.13(1)(c), Fla....

...sibility for the parties' teenage daughter, thus giving rise to the first issue asserted by Husband in this appeal. Shared parental responsibility is statutorily required unless the court specifically finds that it would be detrimental to the child. § 61.13(2)(b)2., Fla....

...e other for $100,000 in coverage to secure his child support payments. The courts are statutorily authorized to order the obligor to maintain life insurance to protect alimony awards and child support obligations, see § 61.08(3), Fla. Stat. (2006); § 61.13(1)(c), Fla....

...[2] Too, in the final judgment, the court made what can only be characterized as an inequitable distribution to Wife. The final judgment gives the reasons for the inequitable distribution, and Husband does not raise the inequity as an issue in this appeal. [3] This requirement is now found in section 61.13(2)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (2009).

...The purpose of a dependency proceeding is "the protection of the child and not the punishment of the person creating the condition of dependency." § 39.501(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). It is the public policy of this state that each minor child has "frequent and continuing contact with both parents." See § 61.13(2)(b)(1), Fla....

...ttorney's fees. Having found competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the court's awarding primary residential custody of the parties' minor child to Appellee/Cross-Appellant, the child's mother, pursuant to the factors enumerated in section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2001), we find no abuse of discretion and affirm, without further discussion, those rulings relating to primary residency and child-support obligations....

...cable beneficiary for as long as he is responsible to pay child support. The trial court has broad discretion on whether to require a party to maintain a life insurance policy to secure the child's support. Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1973); § 61.13(1)(b)2, (c), Fla....

...But, giving one parent ultimate authority over specific matters in situations where the parties are unable to come to an agreement is allowed. Id. The final judgment must therefore delineate the “specific aspects of the child’s welfare” over which the parent shall have ultimate responsibility to comply with section 61.13(2)(b)2.a., Florida Statutes (2015)....

...We reversed because the trial court failed to delineate the specific aspects of the child’s welfare the parent would have ultimate responsibility over. Id. But see Schneider v. Schneider, 864 So.2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (language complied with section 61.13 by identifying three aspects of the children’s lives— health, education, and travel)....

...A circuit court has inherent jurisdiction to control the welfare and act for the protection of minors within its territorial jurisdiction although its power to modify a dissolution decree may turn on subject matter jurisdictional requirements set forth in the UCCJA. Id. ; § 61.13(2)(b)(1); § 61.1308, Fla.Stat....

...The court finds that he is not regulating her morals, the court finds that the court is regulating what can be done on the Husband's expenses. While the trial court may make appropriate orders regarding the care, custody and maintenance of a child, § 61.13, Fla....

...Robinson v. Robinson, 333 So.2d 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Neither evidence nor findings are present in this case to support the order appealed. In our judgment, the welfare and best interests of this child have been ignored. This is contrary to the law. Section 61.13(2) provides that "the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining custody." This language is clear and unambiguous....

...The trial court in this case failed to give the same consideration to the father as it gave to the mother. It abused its discretion when it held a six-year-old child, because of her age, must be awarded to the mother. In doing this, it failed to comply with Section 61.13(2); it legislated; it failed to exercise judicial restraint....

...ce July 2002; this, combined with Ms. Giangrande's voluntary separation from the children constituted a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the final judgment of dissolution. The trial court also reviewed the factors enumerated in section 61.13(3)(a)-(m), Florida Statutes (2003), and found that it was in the children's best interest that custody be changed from the mother to the father....

...It is not enough that the change of custody would be better for the child; rather, it must also be shown that maintaining the court-ordered custody arrangement would be harmful to the child. [A] change of custody is appropriate when, after a review of all of the factors enumerated in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, the trial court finds that a change in custody will so clearly promote or improve the child's well-being to such an extent that any reasonable parent would understand that maintaining the status quo would be detrimental to the child's overall best interests....

...provided by the custodial parent. At this extraordinary level, the trial court may veto a custodial parent's desire to retain custody of the child. Id. at 641-42. Here, although the trial court properly applied the factors set forth in section *1106 61.13, Florida Statutes (2003), the court failed to find and the evidence failed to establish that maintaining the original custody arrangement would be detrimental to either child....

...infirmities.” Id. at 1168 . In Hoff , therefore, we held that a trial court setting a pretrial, temporary parenting plan does not commit reversible error in failing to make explicit findings on the best interests of the child or on the factors in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, which dictates in part that “a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances.” See Hoff, 100 So.3d at 1168 ; § 61.13(3), Fla....

...at 932-33 (emphases added); see also Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164 , 147 So. 464, 465-66 (1933) (recognizing that it is a final decree of the court fixing custody of the child that “is to be regarded as res adjudicata as of the time of the decree”); § 61.13(2)(c), (3), (providing the standard for modification of a parenting plan in a final judgment of dissolution); § 61.14(11)(a), Fla....

...sidential parent,” used in the temporary relief order, "have no meaning whatsoever other than to identify [the time sharing] schedule each party will follow.” . The wife's argument that the trial court misapplied the parental relocation statute, section 61.13001, Florida Statutes, is misplaced....

...d General Master) would have had jurisdiction under Rule 9.600(c), to entertain a petition for enforcement of that order pending appeal. [6] Chapter 61 is specific that visitation cannot be withheld because of a claim of nonpayment of child support. § 61.13(4)(a), Fla.Stat....

...Under this Act, private insurers cán issue policies that are reinsured and subsidized by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). See 42 U.S.C.A. at § 4001(b), (d). FEMA has *1332 delegated the authority to issue “Write Your Own” (WYO) policies to private insurance companies. 44 C.F.R. § 61.13 (f) (1999)....

...Child Support Next, the Husband contends that the provisions of the final judgment concerning child support are facially erroneous because they do not include a provision for step-down of the child support amount in violation of section 61.13(1)(a)(1)(a)....

...of the parent's financial obligations, including the payment of child support. See Waugh v. Waugh, 679 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that conditioning the husband's visitation rights upon his payment of child support was improper); see also § 61.13(4)(a), Fla....

...We also disagree with Appellant's contention that the trial court reversibly erred in denying her petition for relocation. An order on a petition for relocation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and the appellate court considers whether competent, substantial evidence supports the court's findings under section 61.13001(7), Florida Statutes. Muller v. Muller , 964 So.2d 732 , 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). While there is no presumption in favor of or against allowing relocation, the party seeking to relocate carries the burden to prove the move is in the child's best interest. See § 61.13001(7) - (8), Fla....

...has been a substantial and material change in circumstances since the final judgment of dissolution, and that the modification will be in the best interests of the child. Lewandowski v. Langston , 969 So.2d 1165 , 1169 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ; see also § 61.13(3), Fla....

...mstances had occurred. Id. at 367 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). Here, under the final judgment of dissolution, the parties were prohibited from moving more than fifty miles from their present residence without following the provisions of section 61.13001, Florida Statutes. While Appellant did notify Appellee of her intention to move a month before the relocation, she did not secure his written consent or file a formal petition, as required. § 61.13001(3), Fla....

...or the father's parents. The trial court determined that it was in the best interest of the parties' seven-year-old daughter to have grandparental visitation with the father's parents so that the child could visit her father at a Florida prison. See § 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Fla....

...Here, the trial court granted former wife primary residential custodianship and ordered shared parental responsibility in its final judgment. It did not grant former wife ultimate responsibility over specific aspects of the child's welfare, including education and healthcare, pursuant to section 61.13(2)(b)2.a, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...r v. Blosser, 707 So.2d 778, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). When a trial court makes an initial child custody determination, the decision is purely based on the best interests of the children, and neither parent begins with an advantage over the other. See § 61.13, Fla....

...These findings were incorporated into the written final judgment, and after the mother's motion for rehearing was denied, this appeal followed. In making an initial custody determination, the trial court must evaluate the non-inclusive factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2007), and determine what residential arrangements would be in the best interests of the child....

substantial, competent evidence. We disagree. Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2010), provides: For purposes

...We find no error in the trial court's ruling as to the children's school tuition and orthodontic and dental expenses, and therefore affirm as to the issues raised on the cross appeal. We hold, however, that the trial court erred in denying appellant's petition for modification of child support. Section 61.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides for modification of child support obligations where "there is a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties." In the instant case, the trial judge found a substantial increase in appellee's financial circumstances....

...n schedule, together with the stabilization of the father’s life. Without analyzing the necessary factors, the court found that it was in the child’s best interests for the father to have increased visitation. The mother appeals. Pursuant to section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2014), “[a] determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and a...

...stances has occurred over a substantial period of time.’” Id. (quoting Pedersen v. Pedersen, 752 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)). Accordingly, when modifying custody, the primary consideration is the best interests of the child. Id.; see also § 61.13(3), Fla....

...See Bartolotta v. Bartolotta, 687 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); see generally Miller v. Miller, 671 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Furthermore, the trial court failed to make any analysis of the “best interest” factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2014). There was simply no evidence introduced at the magistrate’s hearing to support a conclusion that the child’s best interests would be served by a change in the time-sharing provisions....