The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Chapter 61
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE; SUPPORT; TIME-SHARING

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F.S. 61.13

61.13 Support of children; parenting and time-sharing; powers of court.—

(1)(a) In a proceeding under this chapter, the court may at any time order either or both parents who owe a duty of support to a child to pay support to the other parent or to a third party who has custody in accordance with the child support guidelines schedule in s. 61.30.

1. All child support orders and income deduction orders entered on or after October 1, 2010, must provide:

a. For child support to terminate on a child’s 18th birthday unless the court finds or previously found that the minor child, or the child who is dependent in fact and between the ages of 18 and 19, is still in high school and is performing in good faith with a reasonable expectation of graduation before he or she reaches the age of 19, or the continued support is otherwise agreed to by the parties;

b. A schedule, based on the record existing at the time of the order, stating the amount of the monthly child support obligation for all the minor children at the time of the order and the amount of child support that will be owed for any remaining children after one or more of the children are no longer entitled to receive child support; and

c. The month, day, and year that the reduction or termination of child support becomes effective.

2. The court initially entering an order requiring one or both parents to make child support payments has continuing jurisdiction after the entry of the initial order to modify the amount and terms and conditions of the child support payments if the modification is found by the court to be in the best interests of the child; the child reaches majority; there is a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties; the minor child, or the child who is dependent in fact and between the ages of 18 and 19, is still in high school and is performing in good faith with a reasonable expectation of graduation before he or she reaches the age of 19; or the child is emancipated, marries, joins the armed services, or dies. The court initially entering a child support order has continuing jurisdiction to require the obligee to report to the court on terms prescribed by the court regarding the disposition of the child support payments.

(b) Each order for support shall contain a provision for health insurance for the minor child when health insurance is reasonable in cost and accessible to the child. Health insurance is presumed to be reasonable in cost if the incremental cost of adding health insurance for the child or children does not exceed 5 percent of the gross income, as defined in s. 61.30, of the parent responsible for providing health insurance. Health insurance is accessible to the child if the health insurance is available to be used in the county of the child’s primary residence or in another county if the parent who has the most time under the time-sharing plan agrees. If the time-sharing plan provides for equal time-sharing, health insurance is accessible to the child if the health insurance is available to be used in either county where the child resides or in another county if both parents agree. The court may require the obligor to provide health insurance or to reimburse the obligee for the cost of health insurance for the minor child when insurance is provided by the obligee. The presumption of reasonable cost may be rebutted by evidence of any of the factors in s. 61.30(11)(a). The court may deviate from what is presumed reasonable in cost only upon a written finding explaining its determination why ordering or not ordering the provision of health insurance or the reimbursement of the obligee’s cost for providing health insurance for the minor child would be unjust or inappropriate. In any event, the court shall apportion the cost of health insurance, and any noncovered medical, dental, and prescription medication expenses of the child, to both parties by adding the cost to the basic obligation determined pursuant to s. 61.30(6). The court may order that payment of noncovered medical, dental, and prescription medication expenses of the minor child be made directly to the obligee on a percentage basis. In a proceeding for medical support only, each parent’s share of the child’s noncovered medical expenses shall equal the parent’s percentage share of the combined net income of the parents. The percentage share shall be calculated by dividing each parent’s net monthly income by the combined monthly net income of both parents. Net income is calculated as specified by s. 61.30(3) and (4).

1. In a non-Title IV-D case, a copy of the court order for health insurance shall be served on the obligor’s union or employer by the obligee when the following conditions are met:

a. The obligor fails to provide written proof to the obligee within 30 days after receiving effective notice of the court order that the health insurance has been obtained or that application for health insurance has been made;

b. The obligee serves written notice of intent to enforce an order for health insurance on the obligor by mail at the obligor’s last known address; and

c. The obligor fails within 15 days after the mailing of the notice to provide written proof to the obligee that the health insurance existed as of the date of mailing.

2.a. A support order enforced under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act which requires that the obligor provide health insurance is enforceable by the department through the use of the national medical support notice, and an amendment to the support order is not required. The department shall transfer the national medical support notice to the obligor’s union or employer. The department shall notify the obligor in writing that the notice has been sent to the obligor’s union or employer, and the written notification must include the obligor’s rights and duties under the national medical support notice. The obligor may contest the withholding required by the national medical support notice based on a mistake of fact. To contest the withholding, the obligor must file a written notice of contest with the department within 15 business days after the date the obligor receives written notification of the national medical support notice from the department. Filing with the department is complete when the notice is received by the person designated by the department in the written notification. The notice of contest must be in the form prescribed by the department. Upon the timely filing of a notice of contest, the department shall, within 5 business days, schedule an informal conference with the obligor to discuss the obligor’s factual dispute. If the informal conference resolves the dispute to the obligor’s satisfaction or if the obligor fails to attend the informal conference, the notice of contest is deemed withdrawn. If the informal conference does not resolve the dispute, the obligor may request an administrative hearing under chapter 120 within 5 business days after the termination of the informal conference, in a form and manner prescribed by the department. However, the filing of a notice of contest by the obligor does not delay the withholding of premium payments by the union, employer, or health plan administrator. The union, employer, or health plan administrator must implement the withholding as directed by the national medical support notice unless notified by the department that the national medical support notice is terminated.

b. In a Title IV-D case, the department shall notify an obligor’s union or employer if the obligation to provide health insurance through that union or employer is terminated.

3. In a non-Title IV-D case, upon receipt of the order pursuant to subparagraph 1., or upon application of the obligor pursuant to the order, the union or employer shall enroll the minor child as a beneficiary in the group health plan regardless of any restrictions on the enrollment period and withhold any required premium from the obligor’s income. If more than one plan is offered by the union or employer, the child shall be enrolled in the group health plan in which the obligor is enrolled.

4.a. Upon receipt of the national medical support notice under subparagraph 2. in a Title IV-D case, the union or employer shall transfer the notice to the appropriate group health plan administrator within 20 business days after the date on the notice. The plan administrator must enroll the child as a beneficiary in the group health plan regardless of any restrictions on the enrollment period, and the union or employer must withhold any required premium from the obligor’s income upon notification by the plan administrator that the child is enrolled. The child shall be enrolled in the group health plan in which the obligor is enrolled. If the group health plan in which the obligor is enrolled is not available where the child resides or if the obligor is not enrolled in group coverage, the child shall be enrolled in the lowest cost group health plan that is accessible to the child.

b. If health insurance or the obligor’s employment is terminated in a Title IV-D case, the union or employer that is withholding premiums for health insurance under a national medical support notice must notify the department within 20 days after the termination and provide the obligor’s last known address and the name and address of the obligor’s new employer, if known.

5.a. The amount withheld by a union or employer in compliance with a support order may not exceed the amount allowed under s. 303(b) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. s. 1673(b), as amended. The union or employer shall withhold the maximum allowed by the Consumer Credit Protection Act in the following order:

(I) Current support, as ordered.

(II) Premium payments for health insurance, as ordered.

(III) Past due support, as ordered.

(IV) Other medical support or insurance, as ordered.

b. If the combined amount to be withheld for current support plus the premium payment for health insurance exceed the amount allowed under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, and the health insurance cannot be obtained unless the full amount of the premium is paid, the union or employer may not withhold the premium payment. However, the union or employer shall withhold the maximum allowed in the following order:

(I) Current support, as ordered.

(II) Past due support, as ordered.

(III) Other medical support or insurance, as ordered.

6. An employer, union, or plan administrator who does not comply with the requirements in sub-subparagraph 4.a. is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $250 for the first violation and $500 for subsequent violations, plus attorney’s fees and costs. The department may file a petition in circuit court to enforce the requirements of this subparagraph.

7. The department may adopt rules to administer the child support enforcement provisions of this section that affect Title IV-D cases.

(c) To the extent necessary to protect an award of child support, the court may order the obligor to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure the child support award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose.

(d)1. All child support orders shall provide the full name and date of birth of each minor child who is the subject of the child support order.

2. If both parties request and the court finds that it is in the best interest of the child, support payments need not be subject to immediate income deduction. Support orders that are not subject to immediate income deduction may be directed through the depository under s. 61.181 or made payable directly to the obligee. Payments made by immediate income deduction shall be made to the State Disbursement Unit. The court shall provide a copy of the order to the depository.

3. For support orders payable directly to the obligee, any party may subsequently file an affidavit with the depository alleging a default in payment of child support and stating that the party wishes to require that payments be made through the depository. The party shall provide copies of the affidavit to the court and to each other party. Fifteen days after receipt of the affidavit, the depository shall notify all parties that future payments shall be paid through the depository, except that payments in Title IV-D cases and income deduction payments shall be made to the State Disbursement Unit. In Title IV-D cases, an affidavit of default or a default in payments is not required to receive depository services. Upon notice by the department that it is providing Title IV-D services in a case with an existing support order, the depository shall transmit case data through, and set up appropriate payment accounts in, regardless of whether there is a delinquency, the Clerk of the Court Child Support Enforcement Collection System as required under s. 61.181(2)(b)1.

(2)(a) The court may approve, grant, or modify a parenting plan, notwithstanding that the child is not physically present in this state at the time of filing any proceeding under this chapter, if it appears to the court that the child was removed from this state for the primary purpose of removing the child from the court’s jurisdiction in an attempt to avoid the court’s approval, creation, or modification of a parenting plan.

(b) A parenting plan approved by the court must, at a minimum:

1. Describe in adequate detail how the parents will share and be responsible for the daily tasks associated with the upbringing of the child;

2. Include the time-sharing schedule arrangements that specify the time that the minor child will spend with each parent;

3. Designate who will be responsible for:

a. Any and all forms of health care. If the court orders shared parental responsibility over health care decisions, either parent may consent to mental health treatment for the child unless stated otherwise in the parenting plan.

b. School-related matters, including the address to be used for school-boundary determination and registration.

c. Other activities; and

4. Describe in adequate detail the methods and technologies that the parents will use to communicate with the child.

(c) The court shall determine all matters relating to parenting and time-sharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, except that modification of a parenting plan and time-sharing schedule requires a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances.

1. It is the public policy of this state that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of childrearing. Unless otherwise provided in this section or agreed to by the parties, there is a rebuttable presumption that equal time-sharing of a minor child is in the best interests of the minor child. To rebut this presumption, a party must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that equal time-sharing is not in the best interests of the minor child. Except when a time-sharing schedule is agreed to by the parties and approved by the court, the court must evaluate all of the factors set forth in subsection (3) and make specific written findings of fact when creating or modifying a time-sharing schedule.

2. The court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment to the child, the court shall consider:

a. Evidence of domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28;

b. Whether either parent has or has had reasonable cause to believe that he or she or his or her minor child or children are or have been in imminent danger of becoming victims of an act of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28 or sexual violence as defined in s. 784.046(1)(c) by the other parent against the parent or against the child or children whom the parents share in common regardless of whether a cause of action has been brought or is currently pending in the court;

c. Whether either parent has or has had reasonable cause to believe that his or her minor child or children are or have been in imminent danger of becoming victims of an act of abuse as defined in s. 39.01(2), abandonment as defined in s. 39.01(1), or neglect as defined in s. 39.01(50) by the other parent against the child or children whom the parents share in common regardless of whether a cause of action has been brought or is currently pending in the court; and

d. Any other relevant factors.

3. The following evidence creates a rebuttable presumption that shared parental responsibility is detrimental to the child:

a. A parent has been convicted of a misdemeanor of the first degree or higher involving domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28 and chapter 775;

b. A parent meets the criteria of s. 39.806(1)(d); or

c. A parent has been convicted of or had adjudication withheld for an offense enumerated in s. 943.0435(1)(h)1.a., and at the time of the offense:

(I) The parent was 18 years of age or older.

(II) The victim was under 18 years of age or the parent believed the victim to be under 18 years of age.

If the presumption is not rebutted after the convicted parent is advised by the court that the presumption exists, shared parental responsibility, including time-sharing with the child, and decisions made regarding the child, may not be granted to the convicted parent. However, the convicted parent is not relieved of any obligation to provide financial support. If the court determines that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child, it may order sole parental responsibility and make such arrangements for time-sharing as specified in the parenting plan as will best protect the child or abused spouse from further harm. Whether or not there is a conviction of any offense of domestic violence or child abuse or the existence of an injunction for protection against domestic violence, the court shall consider evidence of domestic violence or child abuse as evidence of detriment to the child.

4. In ordering shared parental responsibility, the court may consider the expressed desires of the parents and may grant to one party the ultimate responsibility over specific aspects of the child’s welfare or may divide those responsibilities between the parties based on the best interests of the child. Areas of responsibility may include education, health care, and any other responsibilities that the court finds unique to a particular family.

5. The court shall order sole parental responsibility for a minor child to one parent, with or without time-sharing with the other parent if it is in the best interests of the minor child.

6. There is a rebuttable presumption against granting time-sharing with a minor child if a parent has been convicted of or had adjudication withheld for an offense enumerated in s. 943.0435(1)(h)1.a., and at the time of the offense:

a. The parent was 18 years of age or older.

b. The victim was under 18 years of age or the parent believed the victim to be under 18 years of age.

A parent may rebut the presumption upon a specific finding in writing by the court that the parent poses no significant risk of harm to the child and that time-sharing is in the best interests of the minor child. If the presumption is rebutted, the court must consider all time-sharing factors in subsection (3) when developing a time-sharing schedule.

7. Access to records and information pertaining to a minor child, including, but not limited to, medical, dental, and school records, may not be denied to either parent. Full rights under this subparagraph apply to either parent unless a court order specifically revokes these rights, including any restrictions on these rights as provided in a domestic violence injunction. A parent having rights under this subparagraph has the same rights upon request as to form, substance, and manner of access as are available to the other parent of a child, including, without limitation, the right to in-person communication with medical, dental, and education providers.

(d) The circuit court in the county in which either parent and the child reside or the circuit court in which the original order approving or creating the parenting plan was entered may modify the parenting plan. The court may change the venue in accordance with s. 47.122.

(3) For purposes of establishing or modifying parental responsibility and creating, developing, approving, or modifying a parenting plan, including a time-sharing schedule, which governs each parent’s relationship with his or her minor child and the relationship between each parent with regard to his or her minor child, the best interests of the child must be the primary consideration. A determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child. If the parents of a child are residing greater than 50 miles apart at the time of the entry of the last order establishing time-sharing and a parent moves within 50 miles of the other parent, then that move may be considered a substantial and material change in circumstances for the purpose of a modification to the time-sharing schedule, so long as there is a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child. Determination of the best interests of the child must be made by evaluating all of the factors affecting the welfare and interests of the particular minor child and the circumstances of that family, including, but not limited to:

(a) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship, to honor the time-sharing schedule, and to be reasonable when changes are required.

(b) The anticipated division of parental responsibilities after the litigation, including the extent to which parental responsibilities will be delegated to third parties.

(c) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to determine, consider, and act upon the needs of the child as opposed to the needs or desires of the parent.

(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.

(e) The geographic viability of the parenting plan, with special attention paid to the needs of school-age children and the amount of time to be spent traveling to effectuate the parenting plan. This factor does not create a presumption for or against relocation of either parent with a child.

(f) The moral fitness of the parents.

(g) The mental and physical health of the parents.

(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.

(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference.

(j) The demonstrated knowledge, capacity, and disposition of each parent to be informed of the circumstances of the minor child, including, but not limited to, the child’s friends, teachers, medical care providers, daily activities, and favorite things.

(k) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to provide a consistent routine for the child, such as discipline, and daily schedules for homework, meals, and bedtime.

(l) The demonstrated capacity of each parent to communicate with and keep the other parent informed of issues and activities regarding the minor child, and the willingness of each parent to adopt a unified front on all major issues when dealing with the child.

(m) Evidence of domestic violence, sexual violence, child abuse, child abandonment, or child neglect or evidence that a parent has or has had reasonable cause to believe that he or she or his or her minor child or children are in imminent danger of becoming victims of an act of domestic violence, regardless of whether a prior or pending action relating to those issues has been brought. If the court accepts evidence of prior or pending actions regarding domestic violence, sexual violence, child abuse, child abandonment, or child neglect, the court must specifically acknowledge in writing that such evidence was considered when evaluating the best interests of the child.

(n) Evidence that either parent has knowingly provided false information to the court regarding any prior or pending action regarding domestic violence, sexual violence, child abuse, child abandonment, or child neglect.

(o) The particular parenting tasks customarily performed by each parent and the division of parental responsibilities before the institution of litigation and during the pending litigation, including the extent to which parenting responsibilities were undertaken by third parties.

(p) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to participate and be involved in the child’s school and extracurricular activities.

(q) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to maintain an environment for the child which is free from substance abuse.

(r) The capacity and disposition of each parent to protect the child from the ongoing litigation as demonstrated by not discussing the litigation with the child, not sharing documents or electronic media related to the litigation with the child, and refraining from disparaging comments about the other parent to the child.

(s) The developmental stages and needs of the child and the demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to meet the child’s developmental needs.

(t) Any other factor that is relevant to the determination of a specific parenting plan, including the time-sharing schedule.

(4)(a) When a parent who is ordered to pay child support or alimony fails to pay child support or alimony, the parent who should have received the child support or alimony may not refuse to honor the time-sharing schedule presently in effect between the parents.

(b) When a parent refuses to honor the other parent’s rights under the time-sharing schedule, the parent whose time-sharing rights were violated shall continue to pay any ordered child support or alimony.

1. Shall, after calculating the amount of time-sharing improperly denied, award the parent denied time a sufficient amount of extra time-sharing to compensate for the time-sharing missed, and such time-sharing shall be ordered as expeditiously as possible in a manner consistent with the best interests of the child and scheduled in a manner that is convenient for the parent deprived of time-sharing. In ordering any makeup time-sharing, the court shall schedule such time-sharing in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of the child or children and that is convenient for the nonoffending parent and at the expense of the noncompliant parent.

2. May order the parent who did not provide time-sharing or did not properly exercise time-sharing under the time-sharing schedule to pay reasonable court costs and attorney’s fees incurred by the nonoffending parent to enforce the time-sharing schedule.

3. May order the parent who did not provide time-sharing or did not properly exercise time-sharing under the time-sharing schedule to attend a parenting course approved by the judicial circuit.

4. May order the parent who did not provide time-sharing or did not properly exercise time-sharing under the time-sharing schedule to do community service if the order will not interfere with the welfare of the child.

5. May order the parent who did not provide time-sharing or did not properly exercise time-sharing under the time-sharing schedule to have the financial burden of promoting frequent and continuing contact when that parent and child reside further than 60 miles from the other parent.

6. May, upon the request of the parent who did not violate the time-sharing schedule, modify the parenting plan if modification is in the best interests of the child.

7. May impose any other reasonable sanction as a result of noncompliance.

(d) A person who violates this subsection may be punished by contempt of court or other remedies as the court deems appropriate.

(5) The court may make specific orders regarding the parenting plan and time-sharing schedule as such orders relate to the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case and are equitable and provide for child support in accordance with the guidelines schedule in s. 61.30. An order for equal time-sharing for a minor child does not preclude the court from entering an order for child support of the child.

(6) In any proceeding under this section, the court may not deny shared parental responsibility and time-sharing rights to a parent solely because that parent is or is believed to be infected with human immunodeficiency virus, but the court may, in an order approving the parenting plan, require that parent to observe measures approved by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the United States Public Health Service or by the Department of Health for preventing the spread of human immunodeficiency virus to the child.

(7)(a) Each party to any paternity or support proceeding is required to file with the tribunal as defined in s. 88.1011 and State Case Registry upon entry of an order, and to update as appropriate, information on location and identity of the party, including social security number, residential and mailing addresses, telephone number, driver license number, and name, address, and telephone number of employer. Each party to any paternity or child support proceeding in a non-Title IV-D case shall meet the above requirements for updating the tribunal and State Case Registry.

(b) Pursuant to the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, each party is required to provide his or her social security number in accordance with this section. Disclosure of social security numbers obtained through this requirement shall be limited to the purpose of administration of the Title IV-D program for child support enforcement.

(c) In any subsequent Title IV-D child support enforcement action between the parties, upon sufficient showing that diligent effort has been made to ascertain the location of such a party, the court of competent jurisdiction shall deem state due process requirements for notice and service of process to be met with respect to the party, upon delivery of written notice to the most recent residential or employer address filed with the tribunal and State Case Registry pursuant to paragraph (a). In any subsequent non-Title IV-D child support enforcement action between the parties, the same requirements for service shall apply.

(8) At the time an order for child support is entered, each party is required to provide his or her social security number and date of birth to the court, as well as the name, date of birth, and social security number of each minor child that is the subject of such child support order. Pursuant to the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, each party is required to provide his or her social security number in accordance with this section. All social security numbers required by this section shall be provided by the parties and maintained by the depository as a separate attachment in the file. Disclosure of social security numbers obtained through this requirement shall be limited to the purpose of administration of the Title IV-D program for child support enforcement.

(9)(a) A time-sharing plan may not require that a minor child visit a parent who is a resident of a recovery residence, as defined by s. 397.311, between the hours of 9 p.m. and 7 a.m., unless the court makes a specific finding that such visitation is in the best interest of the child. In determining the best interest of the minor child in such cases, the court shall take into account factors including, but not limited to, whether the parent resides in a specialized residence for pregnant women or parents whose children reside with them, the number of adults living in the recovery residence, and the parent’s level of recovery.

(b) A time-sharing plan that does not mention a recovery residence may not be interpreted to require that a minor child visit a parent who is a resident of a recovery residence, as defined by s. 397.311, between the hours of 9 p.m. and 7 a.m.

(c) A court may not order visitation at a recovery residence if any resident of the recovery residence is currently required to register as a sexual predator under s. 775.21 or as a sexual offender under s. 943.0435.

History.—s. 7, Oct. 31, 1828; RS 1489; GS 1938; RGS 3201; CGL 4993; s. 16, ch. 67-254; s. 15, ch. 71-241; s. 1, ch. 75-67; s. 1, ch. 75-99; s. 26, ch. 77-433; s. 1, ch. 78-5; s. 18, ch. 79-164; ss. 1, 4, ch. 82-96; s. 3, ch. 84-110; s. 1, ch. 84-152; s. 118, ch. 86-220; s. 1, ch. 87-95; s. 4, ch. 88-176; s. 1, ch. 89-183; s. 1, ch. 89-350; s. 4, ch. 91-246; s. 4, ch. 93-188; s. 1, ch. 93-208; s. 1, ch. 93-236; s. 9, ch. 94-134; s. 9, ch. 94-135; s. 14, ch. 95-222; s. 5, ch. 96-183; s. 2, ch. 96-305; s. 24, ch. 97-95; s. 3, ch. 97-155; s. 3, ch. 97-170; s. 4, ch. 97-226; s. 1, ch. 97-242; s. 8, ch. 98-397; s. 122, ch. 98-403; s. 3, ch. 99-8; s. 2, ch. 99-375; s. 7, ch. 2000-151; s. 1, ch. 2001-2; s. 4, ch. 2001-158; s. 3, ch. 2002-65; s. 2, ch. 2002-173; s. 2, ch. 2003-5; s. 2, ch. 2004-334; s. 1, ch. 2005-39; s. 1, ch. 2005-82; s. 7, ch. 2005-239; s. 1, ch. 2006-245; s. 8, ch. 2008-61; s. 2, ch. 2009-90; s. 3, ch. 2009-180; s. 1, ch. 2010-187; s. 3, ch. 2010-199; s. 76, ch. 2011-92; s. 81, ch. 2016-241; s. 1, ch. 2017-80; s. 1, ch. 2021-103; s. 1, ch. 2021-139; s. 3, ch. 2021-156; s. 2, ch. 2023-112; s. 7, ch. 2023-152; s. 2, ch. 2023-213; s. 1, ch. 2023-301; s. 2, ch. 2023-315.

Note.—Former s. 65.14.

F.S. 61.13 on Google Scholar

F.S. 61.13 on Casetext

Amendments to 61.13

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 61.13

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 61.13.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

HOWELL, v. U. HICKMAN,, 275 So. 3d 667 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . and adoption determinations must be based on the best interests of the child in accordance with s. 61.13 . . .

TRITSCHLER, v. TRITSCHLER,, 273 So. 3d 1161 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . because they do not include a provision for step-down of the child support amount in violation of section 61.13 . . .

HULL, v. HULL,, 273 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . described as "[a]ny other factor affecting the best interest of the child or as set forth in [section] 61.13 . . . See § 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; Buschor v. . . . court addressed each factor under section 61.13001, as well as the twenty factors described in section 61.13 . . . law in determining that absent his filing a petition or a count to modify timesharing under section 61.13 . . . See § 61.13(2)(c) 1., Fla. Stat. (2017). . . .

WALKER, v. WALKER,, 274 So. 3d 1156 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . other findings, and it did not indicate that it considered the timesharing factors set forth in section 61.13 . . . court held that the trial court erred "by equating the child's 'environment,' as referenced in section 61.13 . . . provision of the final judgment for reconsideration in accordance with the factors outlined in section 61.13 . . . order the payor of child support to maintain a life insurance policy in order to secure the award. § 61.13 . . .

E. V. v. D. M. V. H., 273 So. 3d 1132 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Father argues that the parenting plan is legally insufficient because it does not comply with section 61.13 . . . Section 61.13(b) provides the minimum requirements for a court-approved parenting plan. . . . did not create or approve a parenting plan, much less one which satisfies the requirements of section 61.13 . . . the parenting plan included in the final judgment lacks specific findings in compliance with section 61.13 . . . Under section 61.13(2)(b)(4), the parenting plan must "[d]escribe in adequate detail the methods and . . .

SCHOT, v. SCHOT,, 273 So. 3d 48 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . ." § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018). . . . See generally § 61.13(3), Fla. . . .

PAULETTE, v. ROSELLA,, 267 So. 3d 571 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Second, section 61.13(1)(a)2. provides in pertinent part that: The court initially entering an order . . .

S. JOHNSON, v. JOHNSON,, 268 So. 3d 203 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2014), requires that every child support order "shall contain a provision . . . , to both parties by adding the cost to the basic obligation determined pursuant to s. 61.30(6)." § 61.13 . . . Stat. (2014) ("Health insurance costs resulting from coverage ordered pursuant to s.61.13(1)(b) ... shall . . .

T. CLARK, III, v. WRIGHT NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE COMPANY, 380 F. Supp. 3d 523 (E.D. La. 2019)

. . . . § 61.13(d). . . . be waived only with the express written consent of the Federal Insurance Administrator. 44 C.F.R. § 61.13 . . .

L. LIGHTSEY, v. M. DAVIS,, 267 So. 3d 12 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . The court concluded that based on the factors of section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2018), the father had . . . Section 61.13(2)(c) 2., Florida Statutes (2018), provides that "[t]he court shall order that the parental . . .

KNAPP, v. KNAPP,, 266 So. 3d 224 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . McGee , 145 So.3d 955, 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ; §§ 47.011, 47.122 & 61.13(2)(d), Fla. . . .

ALLENDE, v. VELOZ,, 273 So. 3d 142 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . agreement, which provides, in part, that they have shared parental responsibility pursuant to section 61.13 . . .

GRASSO, v. S. GRASSO,, 267 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . . § 61.13(1)(c) (2017). . . .

PARRIS, v. BUTLER,, 264 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . After expressly considering most of the statutory best-interest factors, see § 61.13(3), the court ordered . . . considered at the earliest opportunity in determining the best interests of the children under section 61.13 . . . trial court only considered the relocation factors to the extent that they overlap with the section 61.13 . . . The section 61.13 best-interest factors expressly considered by the court were found to weigh in neither . . . Cecemski, 954 So.2d at 1229 (noting that the trial court's finding with regard to a pertinent section 61.13 . . .

RAWSON, v. L. RAWSON,, 264 So. 3d 325 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . properties and other assets between the parties; considered each of the factors set forth in section 61.13 . . .

LENNON, v. LENNON,, 264 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . See § 61.13(2)(b)(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . See § 61.13(1)(a)(1)(b) (requiring that child support orders provide a payment schedule "based on the . . . applicable when a trial court orders shared parental responsibility, is a recent addition to section 61.13 . . .

JULIA, v. JULIA,, 263 So. 3d 795 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . , provides in pertinent part: Health insurance costs resulting from coverage ordered pursuant to s. 61.13 . . .

CLARKE, v. STOFFT,, 263 So. 3d 84 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . the child's welfare' over which the parent shall have ultimate responsibility to comply with section 61.13 . . . [now codified as section 61.13(c)2.a.], Florida Statutes." 212 So.3d at 398 (citing and quoting Schneider . . .

P. OLDHAM, v. E. GREENE,, 263 So. 3d 807 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . We also disagree with Mother's argument that section 61.13, Florida Statutes, provides a third, independent . . . See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat.; Gordon v. . . . Smith , 615 So.2d 843, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) ("If section 61.13 supplies the relevancy, then section . . .

A. CHALMERS, v. A. CHALMERS,, 259 So. 3d 878 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . findings of fact as to each factor used to determine the best interests of the child under section 61.13 . . .

PUHL n k a v. PUHL,, 260 So. 3d 323 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Reed , 182 So.3d 837, 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (quoting § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2014) ). . . .

SAPONARA, v. SAPONARA,, 261 So. 3d 570 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . "There is a clear distinction between modification based on changed circumstances under section 61.13 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE O B O E. SALYER, v. J. VOBROUCEK,, 259 So. 3d 228 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2017), both recognizes a parent's obligation to support his or her child . . . See § 61.13(1)(a) ; see also Serio v. . . . See § 61.13(1)(a)(1)(a). . . . Id. at 1022 (first citing § 61.13(1)(a)(1)(a) ; then citing Willens v. . . .

S. HORTON, v. D. HORTON,, 257 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Because the trial court did not discuss the son's current best interests, see section 61.13(3), Florida . . . reasonable approach to restoring the relationship was precluded by the cases which interpret section 61.13 . . . of parental responsibilities after the litigation" clearly requires a prospective determination. § 61.13 . . . See § 61.13(2)(c) & (3). . . . (2)(c) ; see also § 61.13(3). . . .

J. PREUDHOMME, v. F. BAILEY,, 257 So. 3d 1032 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Knowles , 79 So.3d 870, 872 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2011) ). . . . See § 61.13(2)(b) 4., Fla. Stat. . . .

SWEARINGEN, v. SWEARINGEN,, 253 So. 3d 1244 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 61.13(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2016), requires "at a minimum" that parenting plans "include . . .

G. FOSTER, v. S. CHONG,, 254 So. 3d 641 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 61.13(2)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2017); Aranda v. Padilla, 216 So.3d 652, 653 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). . . .

KEOGH, v. KEOGH,, 254 So. 3d 633 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . also lacked jurisdiction to award child support, "either under the UCCJEA or Florida Statute section 61.13 . . . We hold that the plain language of section 61.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2017), provides the trial court . . . Next, we hold that the court erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction under section 61.13, Florida . . . Section 61.13(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n a proceeding under this chapter, the court . . .

A. BUSCHOR n k a A. v. BUSCHOR,, 252 So. 3d 833 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . find that the trial court did not properly consider the best interest factors set forth in section 61.13 . . . (k) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child or as set forth in s. 61.13. . . . Section 61.13 provides twenty factors regarding the best interest of the child for the court to consider . . . Id. § 61.13(3)(a)-(t). . . . For example, as to section 61.13001(7)(a) and section 61.13(3)(d), it is undisputed that Former Wife . . .

LCP WEST MONROE, LLC v. UNITED STATES, 328 F. Supp. 3d 577 (W.D. La. 2018)

. . . . § 61.13(d), I hereby authorize an additional 60-day extension of the time period within which a policyholder . . . only be waived by the express consent of the Federal Insurance Administrator pursuant to 44 C.F.R. § 61.13 . . .

LANE, v. LANE,, 254 So. 3d 570 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Briskin, 660 So.2d 1157, 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ("Section 61.13 commands parents to confer on all major . . .

D. DEMMING, v. D. DEMMING,, 251 So. 3d 284 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See, e.g., §§ 61.13, 61.14, Fla. . . .

MAHONEY, v. MAHONEY,, 251 So. 3d 977 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Here, the trial court was authorized by the provisions of sections 61.08(3) and 61.13(1)(c), Florida . . .

RIVERA, v. PURTELL,, 252 So. 3d 283 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . In fact, section 61.13(2)(b)3.b, Florida Statutes (2016), anticipates that children will start school . . .

SOLOMON, v. SOLOMON,, 251 So. 3d 244 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ("Poliacoff"), to examine the parties and the children and make recommendations pursuant to section 61.13 . . . LAGOA, J., specially concurring, I write separately to address section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2018 . . . Petersburg, 194 So.3d 311, 321 (Fla. 2016), and section 61.13(3) does not mandate the inclusion of such . . . Because section 61.13(3) contains no language mandating that a trial court set forth the specific steps . . . relevant to the determination of a specific parenting plan, including the time-sharing schedule. § 61.13 . . .

NESS f k a v. MARTINEZ,, 249 So. 3d 754 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Langston , 969 So.2d 1165, 1169 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ; see also § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. . . .

CASTLEMAN, v. BICALDO,, 248 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . well as a catch-all "[a]ny other factor affecting the best interest of the child or as set forth in s. 61.13 . . . Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2017), deals with child support, parenting plans and time-sharing schedules . . . There is no language in either section 61.13001 or section 61.13 granting a presumption in favor of a . . .

SMITH, v. DANIEL,, 246 So. 3d 1279 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . (2)(c)2. and 61.13(3)(m), 5 Florida Statutes (2016). . . . mention to domestic violence, which, as previously noted, is a factor to be considered under section 61.13 . . . otherwise devoid of any suggestion that the trial court considered the remaining factors in section 61.13 . . . statutory requirement that a trial court engage in a discussion as to each of the factors [in section 61.13 . . . Section 61.13(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes, provides that when considering whether to order shared parental . . .

WILSON v. EDISON INTERNATIONAL, INC., 315 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2018)

. . . April 29, 2015, on news of Edison's additional ex parte communications, shares of Edison fell from $61.13 . . .

DAVIS, v. DAVIS,, 245 So. 3d 810 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2016), provides that the "[d]etermination of the best interests of . . .

BAJCAR, v. BAJCAR,, 247 So. 3d 613 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See Ch. 2008-61, s. 8, Laws of Fla; § 61.13(3),(5), Fla. Stat. (2017). . . .

LINDEMUTH, v. STATE, 247 So. 3d 635 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See §§ 61.13(2), Fla. Stat. (2018) ; Abbo v. Briskin, 660 So.2d 1157, 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). . . .

D. PREUDHOMME, v. PREUDHOMME,, 245 So. 3d 989 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . We reject Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in its custody determination under section 61.13 . . .

D. QUILLEN, v. E. QUILLEN,, 247 So. 3d 40 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . majority status, she asked the trial court to terminate her child support obligation under section 61.13 . . .

MORRIS, v. MORRIS,, 255 So. 3d 908 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . explicitly based this determination on the best interest of the child standard outlined in section 61.13 . . .

LEWIS, v. JULIANO,, 242 So. 3d 1146 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ." § 61.13(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2017). . . . . § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017). . . .

RUSSELL, v. P. RUSSELL,, 240 So. 3d 890 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 61.13(3), Fla. . . .

ZARUDNY, v. ZARUDNY,, 241 So. 3d 258 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . husband contends that the trial court failed to properly consider the factors enumerated in section 61.13 . . . "The shared parental responsibility law, section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2002), applies to custody disputes . . . Although separate findings as to each factor in section 61.13(3) are not required to sustain a temporary . . . Thus, the trial court clearly considered the factors set forth in section 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Florida Statutes . . .

L. BROWN, v. BROWN,, 239 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2016) ; Clark v. Clark, 825 So.2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). . . .

LAMORTE, v. TESTONI,, 238 So. 3d 855 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 61.13(1)(a)2., Fla. . . .

BRUCE, v. BRUCE,, 243 So. 3d 461 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 61.13(2)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2015), requires a parenting plan to contain a designation of . . . Schwieterman, 114 So.3d at 987 (citing § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2010) ). . . . . § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . instant case, the record does not reflect that the trial court considered the factors listed in section 61.13 . . .

IN RE AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORMS- NOMENCLATURE, 235 So. 3d 357 (Fla. 2018)

. . . For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes. . . . For more information, you’may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes. . . . For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes. . . . For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes. . . . For more information, you may consult section 61.13, Florida Statutes. . . .

MIGLIARO, v. FIDELITY NATIONAL INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, a k a, 880 F.3d 660 (3d Cir. 2018)

. . . . § 61.13(f) (“Policies issued by WYO Companies may be executed by the issuing WYO Company as Insurer . . .

VERRIER, v. E. OAKS f k a E., 235 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)

. . . note that the circuit court declined to set forth any findings regarding the factors under section 61.13 . . . Cf. § 61.13(3) (“A determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule . . .

WOHLBERG, v. CONNER,, 234 So. 3d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)

. . . (alteration and citations omitted); § 61.13(3), Fla. . . .

MARTIN, v. CSAA INSURANCE EXCHANGE,, 300 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2018)

. . . . § 61.13(d). . . .

EKHLASSI, v. NATIONAL LLOYDS INSURANCE CO. Co., 295 F. Supp. 3d 750 (S.D. Tex. 2018)

. . . . §§ 61.4(b), 61.13(d). . . . . § 61.13(f). . . .

DIXON, v. DIXON n k a, 233 So. 3d 1285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)

. . . .§ 61.13(l)(a)(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010)). . . . (citing § 61.13(l)(a)(l)(a)); see also Grapin v, Grapin, 450 So.2d 853, 854 (Fla. 1984); Stultz v. . . . And section 61.13(l)(a)(2)(b), addresses medical support payments within the context .of child support . . .

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, v. BISCOTTI, INC., 878 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2017)

. . . Id. at col. 51. 40-col. 61.13. . . .

IVKO, v. GER,, 233 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 61.13(l)(a)(2), Fla. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, O B O BAKER, v. BAKER,, 232 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . In order to receive certain federal funding, the Legislature enacted section's 742.032(1) and 61.13(7i . . . Stat. (2016); see. also §. 61.13(7)(c), Fla. . . . constitutionally insufficient and, in doing so, also implicitly found that sections ,742.032(2) . and 61.13 . . .

RAMOS, v. RAMOS,, 230 So. 3d 893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Section 61.13(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), states: “To the extent necessary to protect an award of . . . otherwise secure the child support award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose.” § 61.13 . . .

CAMPOS, v. CAMPOS,, 230 So. 3d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 61.13(3), Fla. . . .

D. DUKES, f k a D. v. R. GRIFFIN,, 230 So. 3d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, provides a way for parents like Ms. . . . in the parties’ circumstances and that the child’s best interest (based on the factors listed in § 61.13 . . . What is more, vesting authority in the courts to establish such steps appears contrary to § 61.13(3), . . . modify the present plan, including the time-sharing schedule for her child, by filing a petition under § 61.13 . . .

A. NEVILLE, v. A. MCKIBBEN,, 227 So. 3d 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . substantial evidence, nor does it satisfy the statutory requirements for custody determinations under section 61.13 . . . order shared parental responsibility unless the court finds it would be detrimental to the child. § 61.13 . . . ultimate decision-making authority over specific aspects of the child’s welfare to just one parent. § 61.13 . . . statutory requirement that a trial court engage in a discussion as to each of the factors of section 61.13 . . . best interests of the child,” a plain reading confirms the trial court tracked the factors of section 61.13 . . .

J. CARSON, v. A. CARSON,, 226 So. 3d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Section 61.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), authorizes a court to order a parent who does not comply . . .

PATEL, v. PATEL,, 226 So. 3d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2016); see also Howell v. . . .

CARDONA, v. CASAS,, 225 So. 3d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . While section 61.13(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes authorizes the trial court to order the purchase or . . . bond or life insurance policy) “[t]o the extent necessary to protect an award of child support,” § 61.13 . . .

DOWNS v. D. LEDOUX- NOTTINGHAM,, 219 So. 3d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . denied the grandparents’ motion for make-up grandparent visitation as a -matter of law, finding section 61.13 . . . refusal to honor timesharing rights is make-up timesharing to the nonoffending party under section 61.13 . . . See § 61.13(4)(c), Fla. . . .

ZIRUOLO, v. D. ZIRUOLO,, 217 So. 3d 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 61.13(2)(c)2., Fla. Stat. . . . See § 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Fla. Stat. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE O B O TISDALE, v. L. JACKSON,, 217 So. 3d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Section 61.13(l)(a)l.a., Florida Statutes (2016), provides that child support terminates “on a child’ . . . or previously found that [section] 743.07(2) applies, or is otherwise agreed to by the parties.” § 61.13 . . .

ARANDA, v. PADILLA,, 216 So. 3d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Section 61.13(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2013), provides that “[tjhe court shall order that the parental . . .

RIDDLE, v. RIDDLE, 214 So. 3d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . in failing to make explicit findings on the best interests of the child or on the factors in section 61.13 . . . See Hoff, 100 So.3d at 1168; § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. . . . fixing custody of the child that “is to be regarded as res adjudicata as of the time of the decree”); § 61.13 . . .

B. ZARZAUR, v. A. ZARZAUR, Jr., 213 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 61.13(3), Fla. . . . . § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. . . .

GONZALEZ, v. HEWITT,, 211 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . in failing to make appropriate findings regarding the best interest of the child pursuant to section 61.13 . . .

MCCLURE, v. BECK, Jr., 212 So. 3d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . the child’s welfare” over which the parent shall have ultimate responsibility to comply with section 61.13 . . . Schneider, 864 So.2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (language complied with section 61.13 by identifying . . .

DUKE, v. DUKE,, 211 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . plan fails to comply with statutory requirements because it does not make findings required by section 61.13 . . . Section 61.13(2)(b) states that a parenting plan must, at a minimum: 1. . . . result, the trial court’s failure to include a more specific parenting plan that complies with section 61.13 . . .

GARCIA- LAWSON, v. P. LAWSON,, 211 So. 3d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 61.13(l)(a)l.a., Fla. . . .

ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, v. ALABAMA, v., 231 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (M.D. Ala. 2017)

. . . In Clarke County, which had previously belonged solely to majority-white SD 22, the drafters added a 61.13 . . .

NUNEZ- MILLER, v. MILLER,, 209 So. 3d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Furthermore, pursuant to section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2015), the proper venue in Florida for . . . Section 61.13(2)(d) provides that the proper venue for an action to modify a parenting plan is “[t]he . . .

SLAY S RESTORATION, LLC, v. WRIGHT NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE COMPANY, KLSM d b a Kd P. LLC,, 226 F. Supp. 3d 589 (E.D. Va. 2017)

. . . . § 61.13(a) (incorporating Appendix “A” into the SFIP); Melanson, at 392-93 (“Under the relevant case . . .

NAIME, v. T. CORZO, III,, 208 So. 3d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Florida Legislature revised and extended the then existing factors it had decreed in former section 61.13 . . . (k) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child or as set forth in s. 61.13. § 61.13001 . . . Whether the move is in the best interests of the child. § 61.13(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . .

B. HERNANDEZ, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY OF HARRIS COUNTY,, 673 F. App'x 414 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . For the three components of the Assessment Center, Officer Hernandez received a consolidated score of 61.13 . . .

CRANNEY, v. CRANNEY,, 206 So.3d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . In the order on appeal, the trial court detailed all of the factors listed in section 61.13(3), Florida . . . Further, the trial court’s order on this issue does not evince compliance with section 61.13(2)(c)(2) . . .

MILLER v. AMERICAN STRATEGIC INSURANCE CORPORATION, 665 F. App'x 351 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 61.13(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4129 (noting that the Federal Insurance Administrator is part of FEMA . . .

L. McKAY, v. McELHINEY,, 205 So. 3d 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . the Former Wife argues that the delay in the trial court’s ruling, its failure to comply with section 61.13 . . .

MURPHY, v. MURPHY,, 206 So.3d 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 61.13(b), Fla. Stat. (2015); see also Harris v. . . .

L. HADDAN, v. C. JENKS,, 202 So. 3d 975 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . consideration in establishing parental responsibility must be the best interests of the child, see section 61.13 . . .

KORKMAZ, v. KORKMAZ,, 200 So. 3d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2015); see also Jannotta v. . . .

BLOOM, v. PANCHYSHYN,, 200 So. 3d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See §§ 61.13(l)(a)l.a. . . .

KOCH, v. A. KOCH,, 207 So.3d 914 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . However, because section 61.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2015) requires Florida courts to “determine all . . . The welfare and best interests of the children must prevail. § 61.13(2)(c) & (3), Fla. Stat. . . .

LOZA, v. MARIN,, 198 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . The Textual Framework of Sections 61.13(l)(a) and 743.07 Section 61.13(l)(a)(l)(a) states that “[a]ll . . . In' similar fashion, section 61.13(l)(a)(2) provides: The court initially entering an order requiring . . . upon a child reaching majority, unless section 743.07(2) applies or the parties agree otherwise. § 61.13 . . . force, a court has continuing jurisdiction to modify the order under a variety of circumstances. § 61.13 . . . providing support to a dependent child continues only until the child reaches the age of majority. § 61.13 . . .

GROSS, v. ZIMMERMAN,, 197 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 61.13(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, v. LLAMAS, 196 So. 3d 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 61.13(l)(a)2., Fla. Stat.; see also § 61.14(l)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, v. NUNEZ,, 196 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See also § 61.13(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

J. P. J. P. v. D. P. J. P. Ad, 196 So. 3d 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Considering the best interests factors set forth in section 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Florida Statutes, the court . . . After weighing the evidence and the best interests factors set forth in section 61.13(3)(a)-(t), the . . .

FREIHA, v. FREIHA,, 197 So. 3d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2012), explicitly requires the parenting plan approved by a trial . . . We hold the trial court’s order did not meet the requirement of section 61.13(2)(b) that timesharing . . . order and remand for the trial court to include a detailed timesharing schedule pursuant to section 61.13 . . .

J. N. S. v. A. M. A., 194 So. 3d 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 61.13(3)(m), Fla. . . . order, Mother has failed to show that the court failed to comply with.its obligations under section 61.13 . . . See § 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Fla. Stat. . . .

HARITOS, v. HARITOS n k a, 193 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the issues of child support and alimony is set forth in sections 61.13 . . . Overbey, 698 So.2d 811, 813 (Fla.1997) (“Generally, under [sections 61.13 and 61.14], a fundamental prerequisite . . .

V. CILENTI, v. E. CILENTI,, 192 So. 3d 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . income and the trial court made no findings in the final judgment explaining the deviation from section 61.13 . . . Section 61.13(l)(b) provides that every child support order “shall contain a provision for health insurance . . . for the .purpose of permitting the trial court to make findings on remand in compliance with section .61.13 . . . On remand, the trial court shall also comply with the provisions of section 61.13(1)(b) regarding the . . .