Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

and sorority houses. Fort Lauderdale, Fla., Code § 47-11.1 (1985). The zoning authorities insisted that

...[7] Because no specific venue statute addresses mandamus petitions, [8] the general venue statute is applicable in such cases: "Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." § 47.011, Fla....

...to their sentences, [9] and because the final sentence-reducing *1213 decision and act are made by the Department, the "cause of action" under the statute reasonably may be said to "accrue" in Leon County. And finally, to the extent that language in section 47.011 reasonably may be read as being consistent with the home venue privilege, that language must be so read. [10] Thus, under both section 47.011 and the home venue privilege, the circuit court in Leon County is the proper venue for such cases if the prisoner has exhausted administrative remedies and is not alleging entitlement to immediate release....

...Johns County, Florida, where the defendant physician resides and practices, and where the defendant hospital has its sole and only place of business. The trial court transferred the cause from Orange County to St. Johns County for lack of venue in Orange County, Florida, Fla. Stat. § 47.011 (1973), and because of convenience of the parties, Fla. Stat. § 47.122 (1973). *644 The first point raised by the appellant is that the trial court erred in transferring the cause for improper venue. Fla. Stat. § 47.011, as amended, 1973, provides: "Actions shall be brought only in the county where defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...See, City of St. Peterburg v. Earle, 109 So.2d 388 (2nd DCA Fla. 1959), and cases cited therein. The Florida Wrongful Death Act, Fla. Stat. § 768.16 et seq., contains no venue provision, and the general venue statutory provision contained in Fla. Stat. § 47.011 controls, consistent with the law and rationale of the Florida cases herein cited, and the law generally in other jurisdictions....

...A hearing was held thereon and the trial court denied the motion upon the ground that defendant waived his right to object to venue as provided for by RCP 1.140(b), 30 F.S.A. Defendant's motion for rehearing was denied also and this appeal followed. Defendant-appellant first contends that F.S. § 47.011 F.S.A....

...actice in the Dade County Circuit Court. He now appeals from the denial of his motion to transfer the case to Broward County, asserted on the ground that the alleged negligence took place there. On the ground that the cause of action "accrued" under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985) [1] in Dade County, where the defendant's asserted negligence impacted upon the plaintiff's economic interests, we affirm the order below....

...We assume, nevertheless, that the trial judge denied the plea on its merits rather than on the technical grounds referred to. We thereupon reverse the order appealed from, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. Reversed. LILES, A.C.J., and PIERCE, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 47.011 et seq, F.S.A....

...Counsel, Tallahassee, for Department of Health and Rehabilitatives Services, amicus curiae. ADKINS, Justice. This cause is before us by petition for writ of certiorari to review an interlocutory order of the Circuit Court of the 19th Judicial Circuit in and for Martin County holding that section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1977), is unconstitutional....

..., or where the property in litigation is located. This section shall not apply to actions against nonresidents." The court denied the petitioner's (defendant in trial court) motion for change of venue to Leon County and held that: A. Florida Statute 47.011 as interpreted to give the State of Florida the privilege of having cases filed against it litigated and heard in Leon County is unconstitutional as a denial of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 21 of the Declaration of Rights to the Florida Constitution....

...ommon law privilege to seek venue in the county of its headquarters. The court permitted the attorney general to intervene as a party defendant, and it joined in the commission's motion for a change of venue. The court denied the motion and declared section 47.011 and the body of law establishing the venue privilege to be unconstitutional. Defendants challenge the denial of their motion for a change of venue to Leon County, and the finding that section 47.011 and the state's common law venue privilege are unconstitutional....

...See Department of Revenue, 256 So.2d at 526. As such, we find that the "sword-wielder" doctrine does not apply, and that the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motion for change of venue. In denying the motion for change of venue, the court held section 47.011 and the common law venue privilege to be unconstitutional as a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution....

...be accompanied by the creation of new counties. . Under Florida venue law, "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." Fla. Stat.Ann. § 47.011 (West 1994)....

...The order denying appellant's motion to change venue is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter an order transferring the cause to Orange County. REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH, C.J., and COWART, J., concur. NOTES [1] See Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(A). [2] § 47.011, Florida Statutes (1979) provides, (in relevant part), Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.

...to whether or not Sarasota County is in fact a more convenient forum. That issue was resolved by the trial judge after consideration of the evidence before him and has not been assigned as error nor raised as a point in this appeal. Florida Statutes § 47.011, F.S.A., provides as follows: "Where actions may be begun....

...Canal Authority, supra ), and (2) territorial jurisdiction or authority over the land which is the object (subject matter) of a particular in rem action. [9] The venue statute accommodates this jurisdictional requirement by providing that actions can be brought "where the property in litigation is located." See § 47.011, Fla....

...[2] We review the trial court's legal decision de novo and conclude that it was incorrect. II. THE CAUSES OF ACTION FIRST ACCRUED IN ORANGE COUNTY Venue is proper in Pinellas County only if at least one of the three causes of action alleged in the complaint accrued in Pinellas County. See §§ 47.011, .041, Fla. Stat. (1997). The plaintiff does not argue that PWC has an office or agents in Pinellas County. See § 47.051, Fla. Stat. (1997). Willis does not reside in Pinellas County, nor is there property in litigation in Pinellas County. See § 47.011, Fla....

...The trial court came to the wrong legal conclusion in resolving the motion to transfer because it applied the wrong law to this case. The concept of "nexus" is not used to determine whether a tort action accrued in Pinellas County for purposes of venue under sections 47.011 or 47.051....

...Under these cases, venue would lie in Polk County where Stovall is incarcerated. However, we have concluded that these cases were incorrectly decided with regard to the determination of venue and that there is no basis to override the Department's privilege of having the action brought where it "resides." See § 47.011, Fla. Stat. (2001). There is no specific venue statute applicable to petitions for writs of mandamus. Accordingly, the general venue statute, section 47.011, applies. That section provides: 47.011 Where actions may be begun.— Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...may transfer any civil action to any other court of record in which it might have been brought. *1098 Frederick did not assert in his motion or at the hearing that Citrus County was an improper venue for this action under the general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes....

...1st DCA 1982), and Carroll v. Carroll, 322 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), approved, 341 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1977). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The issue presented is whether the "property in litigation" provision of Florida's general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985), [1] applies to marital dissolution cases....

...The subsequently filed affidavit, even if sufficient to expand the issues in the complaint, did not properly state a claim but merely asserted that a claim might be made in some future amended petition. [2] Thus, even if the parties owned property which could be considered "property in litigation" under section 47.011, we could not construe the mere possibility of a claim for special equity as placing that property in issue....

...Ordinarily the court will recognize that county naturally, as do the parties themselves, and the venue problem will be no more difficult than finding where the marriage partners called home." 341 So.2d at 772 (emphasis added). The district court in Carroll also recognized that the property in litigation provision of section 47.011 "is commonly understood to refer only to actions local in nature [e.g., Hendry Corp....

...State, 313 So.2d 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)], which a marriage dissolution proceeding is not." 322 So.2d at 54 n. 1. The First District reaffirmed this view in Crawford, stating that although generally a defendant may not object if sued in any one of the three places listed in section 47.011, "in a dissolution of marriage action, the trial court is to look to the single county where `the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended to remain and to remain married, indefinitely if not permanently.'" 415 So.2d at 870 (quoting Carroll ). There can be no doubt that this is the correct construction and application of section 47.011....

...Venue cannot be hauled from county to county like a sack of potatoes upon the theory of "where the property in litigation is situated"... . Richard Bertram & Co., 155 So.2d at 412. In conclusion, we hold that because an action for dissolution of marriage is personal or transitory, the "property in litigation" clause of section 47.011 is not applicable to marriage dissolution cases....

...Accordingly, we quash the decision of the district court and remand with instructions to direct the trial court to transfer the cause to Broward County. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 47.011 provides, in pertinent part: Where actions may be begun....

...itigation, for the most part, is located." 415 So.2d at 871. [7] We do not consider respondent's arguments relating to the convenience of witnesses and records because they are not relevant to whether an action must be dismissed or transferred under section 47.011, but only to whether an action may be transferred to a court "in which it might have been brought" under section 47.122, Florida Statutes (1985).

...t for negligence and fraud. The complaint alleged that some of the misrepresentations were made in Palm Beach County. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue, arguing that Palm Beach County was an improper venue under section 47.011 because: 1) none of the defendants resided in Palm Beach County for venue purposes; 2) the property in litigation was not located in Palm Beach County; and 3) the causes of action did not accrue in Palm Beach County....

...erent standard of review. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v. Cedar Resources, Inc., 761 So.2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). When a trial court is presented with a motion to transfer venue based on the impropriety of the plaintiff's venue selection under section 47.011, the trial court must resolve any relevant factual disputes and then make a legal decision whether the plaintiff's venue selection is legally supportable....

...a sponte seems to have decided the issue based upon the convenience of the parties and judicial economy. We must first determine, however, whether Palm Beach County is an appropriate venue selection. Thus, we review that legal determination de novo. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, the general venue statute, provides that actions shall be brought "only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." It is the plainti...

...All of the defendants are residents of Brevard County. Because Reserve Realty's claims against BSE have no effect on the title or possession of the property and the complaint seeks only an award of money damages, there is no "property in litigation" for the purpose of the third clause of section 47.011, Florida Statutes....

...another law firm that he had worked out an agreement that he, rather than the appellee, was entitled to a referral fee in a personal injury case. Appellant moved to abate and transfer the lawsuit to Brevard County. The trial court denied the motion. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1989) provides: *332 Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...o the subcontractor and the plaintiff materialman. That alleged breach occurred when and where the general contractor made and delivered the progress payment checks to the subcontractor alone. AFFIRMED. ORFINGER and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 47.011, Fla....

...We find that the trial court correctly determined that venue for this action is not proper in Broward County. However, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint rather than transferring it to either Martin or Polk County, where venue does lie under section 47.011, Florida Statutes....

..."A plaintiff has the `option of venue selection, as long as that selection is one of the statutory alternatives, it should not be disturbed.'" Intercapital Funding, 683 So.2d 530, 532 (quoting Oliver v. Severance, 542 So.2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)). Under Florida Statute section 47.011, appellant could have brought his action in any county where either defendant resides, where the causes of action accrued, or where the property subject to the litigation is located....

...In other words, they are actions filed in the absence of a governmental body pursuing a petition for eminent domain. We hold, therefore, that when a property owner sues to compel compliance with Chapter 73, the venue provision, section 73.021, applies. This decision is also in line with the general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...tion for the specific performance of the contract against the defendant-vendor in the county where the land lies rather than in the county where the defendant-vendor resides. Because defendant is a Florida resident the question is controlled by F.S. Section 47.011, F.S.A....

...Lakeland Ideal Farm and Drainage Dist. v. Mitchell, 1929, 97 Fla. *25 890, 122 So. 516, 519. Although this restriction on process no longer exists, it has been held by the Florida Supreme Court that the modern venue statutes which preceded, but were similar to, F.S. Section 47.011, F.S.A....

...The question we must decide is whether the trial court erred when it did not abate the latter filed action or dismiss it, but instead transferred the latter filed action to the venue of the pending dissolution action, where the identical issues will be litigated. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1993), governs venue choices....

...in Monroe County, and all sales efforts pursuant to the agreement were performed by appellees in Monroe County. Suit may be brought only where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. § 47.011, Fla....

...Beach County. We agree. A plaintiff has "the option of venue selection, and as long as that selection is one of the statutory alternatives, it should not be disturbed." Oliver v. Severance, 542 So.2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In accordance with section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1995), a civil action may be brought in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in the litigation is located....

...if a domestic corporation, where such corporation has, or usually keeps an office for transaction of its customary business; (b) Where the cause of action accrued; (c) Where the property in litigation is located. [9] It will be noted that in both F.S. 47.011 and 47.051 the legislature saw fit to employ the limiting word "only"....

...transfer any civil action to any other court of record in which it might have been brought." We conclude that the concluding phrase of the last quoted statute "in which it might have been brought" refers to the three venue alternatives provided by F.S. 47.011 and F.S....

..., F.S.A., was proper." [12] Our reasoning that the legislature intended to limit change of venue for the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice to a court in another county "in which it might have been brought" under F.S. 47.011 or 47.051 is strengthened by the absence of any such limiting language in the general change of venue statute, F.S. 47.101. In summary, we hold that inasmuch as Dade County was not one of the alternative counties where the subject action was permitted to have been brought under F.S. 47.011 and it was the county from which the action was transferred to Duval County, the learned trial judge erred when entering the order here appealed by which the action was transferred from Duval County to Dade County....

...Bank of Green Cove Springs, 136 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962) nor is it contended that the presence of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company in the suit vests venue in Dade County. (See Walt Disney World Co. v. Leff, 323 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) and Florida Statute 47.011) [5] The relevant portion of that order provides: "That the Plaintiffs' Motion for Change of Venue for forum non conveniens and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice is hereby granted....

...31? "II. Did the trial court err in transferring this case to Dade County pursuant to Florida Statutes § 47.122, where Dade County was not a county where the action `might have been brought'?" [7] The basis for application of F.S. 47.122. [8] See F.S. 47.011 and F.S. 47.051. [9] We are not here concerned with nonresident individuals (F.S. 47.011) nor are we concerned with an agent or representative of a foreign corporation (F.S....

.... American K-9 argues venue is not proper in Orange County because American K-9 is a corporation which has its office in Seminole County, Florida; the cause of action accrued in Afghanistan; and there is no property involved in the litigation. See § 47.011, Fla....

...Organization for Women, Inc., 763 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that a petition for writ of mandamus which challenges the quasi-judicial action of an agency is filed in the county where the agency is headquartered pursuant to the general venue statute, section 47.011)....

...1985) (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)). The trial court dismissed the case against defendant Lee based on improper venue. An action may be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. See § 47.011, Fla....

...Here, the plaintiffs first suffered their injury in Broward County when Walker and Lee allegedly kidnapped Cydney from her elementary school. Although Cydney may have suffered ongoing injury while being transported back to Georgia, this does not change the fact that the case "accrued" in Broward County within the meaning of section 47.011....

...nt to the complaint, and (3) the facts do not show that the guarantor is subject to the long-arm jurisdiction of the court. REVERSED. DAUKSCH, COWART and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b). [2] The Florida general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes, expressly provides that it is not applicable to actions against nonresidents....

...§ 61.14 F.S.A., clearly provides that this action can be brought in a county where either party resides, citing Norton v. Norton, 1938, 131 Fla. 219, 179 So. 414. Mrs. Carr contends that after the "determination of the Court's jurisdiction under § 61.14", the general venue statute, F.S. § 47.011 F.S.A., may be invoked....

...Board of Public Instruction, etc., Fla.App. 1967, 196 So.2d 22. Florida, in common with other States, has a venue statute which determines and fixes, as a general rule, where or in what county civil suits shall be filed. Such venue statute in this State is F.S. § 47.011 F.S.A. (formerly § 46.01 F.S., until amended in minor particulars in 1967 and renumbered as F.S. § 47.011 F.S.A.) which inter alia reads as follows: "Actions shall be brought only in the county * * * where defendant resides, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." This venue statute controls all ac...

...3d DCA), approved, 441 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1983). In sum, feelings of financial frustration do not necessarily equate to findings of frustration or impossibility under the law. Publix filed this action in Polk County and Valencia, the defendant, then asserted its rights under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1983), to transfer venue to either Brevard County, its principal place of business, or Dade County, where the property is located....

...Having concluded that section 47.025 is procedural and that procedural statutes apply retroactively, we further conclude that retroactive application of the statute in the instant case is appropriate. Therefore, the forum selection clause in the subcontract is void, and venue must be determined in accordance with section 47.011, Florida Statutes. Based on section 47.011, we find that venue is in Orange County, Florida....

...ar continuously, the title would revert to Birch's estate. Antioch University is the residual beneficiary of Birch's estate, and in November 1987 filed a two-count complaint in the Second Judicial Circuit in Leon County, the defendants' "residence", Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...sdictional power to adjudicate the class of cases to which the cause belongs and jurisdictional authority over the land which is the subject matter of the controversy. Mobil Oil at 415 (emphasis supplied); Publix Super Markets, Inc. at 487. Further, Section 47.011, the venue statute allowing suit where defendants reside, neither confers extraterritorial jurisdiction on courts nor alters the LAR....

...“Venue refers to the geographical area, that is, the county or district, wherein a cause may be heard or tried.” Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. State, 295 So.2d 314, 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Where a defendant is a Florida resident, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2012), dictates that a cause of action may be brought in a county “where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” However, section 47.011’s mandate does not apply to nonresidents....

...ase on review and determine that the trial court erred in granting the motion for a change of venue. II. ANALYSIS The determination of venue in Florida is governed by a series of statutory provisions set forth in chapter 47, Florida Statutes (2011). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2011), provides that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." With respect to corporations, secti...

...and proving that the venue is improper." Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, 78 So.2d 100, 102 (Fla. 1955). "When a trial court is presented with a motion to transfer venue based on the impropriety of the plaintiff's venue selection under section 47.011, the trial court must resolve any relevant factual disputes and then make a legal decision whether the plaintiff's venue selection is legally supportable." McDaniel Reserve Realty Holdings, LLC v....

...Based on the foregoing, we recede from Enfinger's restriction on a plaintiff's right to select a venue based on the defendants' residency. When reviewing a plaintiff's venue selection, the Florida courts should apply the plain language of sections 47.011, 47.021, and 47.051, Florida Statutes....

...judgment. The complaint prayed for monetary damages and injunctive relief. Appellants filed their motion to dismiss, asserting that the requisites for laying venue in Dade County were not met and that venue was more properly laid in Broward County. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1983), states: "Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...h, as here, one or more corporate codefendants may also "reside" in other counties. We therefore hold that § 47.021, F.S.A. does not apply to the factual situation here and that the action should have been filed in Polk County within the purview of § 47.011, F.S.A....

...Appellant complains that the marriage was made in Alabama and was lived out in Holmes County where, therefore, it must have been irretrievably broken. He insists that the cause of action for dissolution did not arise in Okaloosa County, and that the proceeding is not maintainable there. Sec. 47.011, F.S....

...I then knew the marriage was completely broken and there was no way to get back together. I decided to get a divorce." Since 1829 plaintiffs have been privileged to avoid litigating in the home county of a resident defendant by filing in the county where the cause of action accrued. As amended, § 47.011, F.S....

...In what county were both partners last present with a common intention to remain married and in that place? There the marriage was broken, although recognition of the breach was postponed; there the cause of action for dissolution arose, within the meaning and application of § 47.011....

...2nd, 1973). We recognize that our decision places more severe venue restrictions on the petitioning spouse whose marriage and partner are in Florida than on the comparatively new resident who left spouse and marital home in another state. Taken together, §§ 47.011, 61.021 and 61.061, F.S., permit a resident of six months to file against a nonresident spouse in any county he or she may choose....

...That is not an anomalous preference for the recently-arrived petitioner but rather an application of the legislature's time-honored interest in protecting the venue privileges of resident defendants and its refusal to recognize those of nonresidents. Sec. 47.011, F.S. 1973. The legislature is of course empowered to relax the effect of § 47.011 in dissolution proceedings, as indeed it has done in respect to applications for modification of alimony. Sec. 61.14(1), F.S. 1973. We remand this case with directions that it be transferred within the First Judicial Circuit to Holmes County where, under § 47.011, F.S. 1973, it should have been filed. Reversed. BOYER, C.J., and MILLS, J., concur. NOTES [1] Ms. Carroll makes no attempt to invoke the additional provision of § 47.011 allowing an action to be maintained in the county "where the property in litigation is located." This provision is commonly understood to refer only to actions local in nature [e.g., Hendry Corp....

...State, 448 So.2d 82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Under section 47.122, the trial court may grant a change of venue to another court in which it might have been brought for the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice. Pursuant to section 47.011, actions may be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. There is no showing, under the permitted venue alternatives, that this action could have been brought in Pinellas County. See § 47.011, Fla....

...urt to Dade County Circuit Court. We reverse because plaintiff's initial selection of venue in Broward County was not improper. Cedars filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint alleging, inter alia, [1] improper *925 venue pursuant to sections 47.011 and 47.051, Florida Statutes (1993), because its principal place of business was in Dade County and the lawsuit was based on acts and omissions occurring only in Dade County. Plaintiff countered that although the acts and omissions by Cedars occurred in Dade County, plaintiff suffered his injuries in Broward County. The trial court, finding venue improper in Broward County, transferred the case to Dade County. Section 47.011 provides that actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...This section, which applies only to Florida residents, applies here because Cedars is a Florida limited partnership. The plaintiff has the prerogative to select venue so long as the selection is one of the statutory alternatives. Air S., Inc. v. Spaziano, 547 So.2d 314, 315 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). To change venue based on section 47.011, the defendant must plead and prove that the venue selected by the plaintiff is improper. Id. To show that venue was proper in Broward County, plaintiff relies on the provision in section 47.011 that an action may be brought in the county where the cause of action accrued....

...in Broward County, we cannot state on this record that the cause of action did not accrue in Broward County. See Spaziano, 547 So.2d at 315. We thus find that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff's venue selection was improper pursuant to section 47.011....

...reached in St. Lucie County; and (4) because the claims adjuster's affidavit did not refute this latter allegation it would be accepted as correct and plaintiff's venue selection left undisturbed. Of the several venue selections authorized by either section 47.011 or section 47.051, Fla....

...upon a showing that the lawsuit was filed in the wrong county can the trial court grant a motion for change of venue. Sheffield Steel Products, Inc. v. Powell Brothers, Inc., 385 So.2d 161 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 392 So.2d 1378 (Fla.1980). *236 Section 47.011 of the Florida Statutes (2001) sets forth Florida's general venue provision as follows: 47.011....

...ainst employee accrued in Dade County, for venue purposes, where parties agreed that employee's performance was primarily due in Dade County). REVERSED and REMANDED. COBB and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(A). [2] See §§ 47.011, 47.051, Fla....

...The trial court denied the motion, resulting in this appeal. The venue statute provides that an action may be brought in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. See § 47.011, Fla....

..., as here, one or more corporate codefendants may also `reside' in other counties. "We therefore hold that § 47.021, F.S.A. does not apply to the factual situation here and that the action should have been filed in Polk County within the purview of § 47.011, F.S.A....

...Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. BARKDULL, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent, and would affirm. See: Pearson v. Wallace, 400 So.2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(A). [2] Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1979), providing that an action may be brought in the county where the action accrued, does not apply here because both parties are non-residents and is properly not relied upon on appeal....

...If the defendant makes the proper showing, the court should, if possible, transfer the case to the correct venue, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.060(b), [1] rather than dismiss it. Merrill Lynch, 238 So.2d at 667 (citing Foy v. State Rd. Dep't, 166 So.2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2010), provides in pertinent part that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." With respect to a...

...." Here, it is undisputed that there is no property involved in the litigation, such that the question turns on whether the defendants reside in Broward or whether the causes of action accrued in Broward. Venue is proper where the defendants reside. § 47.011....

...The trial court initially entered an order granting Oliver's motion for change of venue to Clay County, and then, after considering Severance's motion for rehearing, granted the motion for rehearing and denied the motion for change of venue. In affirming the court's order denying the motion for change of venue, we agree that Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1987), permits the cause of action to proceed in Columbia County....

...brought in Orange and there is no showing as to the residences of the witnesses. Thus, this statute is not helpful to our disposition of this appeal. Second, with reference to the venue statute, Chapter 47, Laws of Florida, 1969, we know that under Section 47.011 actions shall be brought where the defendant resides or where the cause of action accrues and that under Section 47.021 actions against two or more defendants residing in different counties may be brought in any county in which any defendant resides....

...ty defendant with a foreign corporation defendant and the corporate defendant has an agent in the county in which the individual defendant resides these statutory sections cannot be applied to defeat the individual defendant's venue privileges under Section 47.011....

...1957, 96 So.2d 538. See also Croft v. Young, Fla.App. 1966, 188 So.2d 859; Commercial Carrier Corporation v. Mercer, Fla.App. 1969, 226 So.2d 270. In the instant case, however, the individual defendant has not complained and asserted his venue privileges under Section 47.011, supra....

...ss in the articles of incorporation of Scuba Bimini and Dive Bimini, either corporation can be said to have "an office for transaction of its customary business" in Duval County for the purpose of establishing venue pursuant to section 47.051. Under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1997), an action must be brought in the county where a defendant resides, where the cause accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel stated that Miles lives in Atlanta, Georgia, that Fishman lives in Dade County, and that the corporation is in Dade County. It was uncontested that Mrs. Schecter lives in Volusia County. The court later entered an order transferring the case to Dade County. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985) provides that actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued or where the property in question is located....

...Hemingway's complaint did not allege that the injuries caused by the two accidents were the same or similar, or that they were difficult or impossible to apportion between Bresney and Lewinstein. Absent such allegations, it is clear that the proper venue for the claim against Bresney lies in Orange or Osceola County. See § 47.011, Fla....

...1st DCA 1992) ("Implicit in this exception is that there must be a statutory basis for venue outside the county of the governmental entity."). The applicable venue statute provides for venue "in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." § 47.011, Fla....

...However, where there are no disputed facts and the venue order turns on a question of law, there is no judicial discretion to be exercised and appellate review is de novo. See Dive Bimini, Inc. v. Roberts, 745 So.2d 482, 483-84 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, the general venue statute, provides as follows: "Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." It is the...

...Separate interlocutory appeals were brought and consolidated for our consideration here. The sole issue presented for our determination is whether the trial court erred in denying the Kilpatricks' respective motions for change of venue. Venue in the instant case is controlled by the provisions of Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1977), which provides in relevant part: Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...Appellees' argument misses the point. Appellants Kilpatrick are residents of Glades and Hendry Counties, respectively. The accident giving rise to the claim for damages for personal injury occurred in Glades County. Thus, the Kilpatricks may claim the privilege granted by Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, and insist that suit be brought in either Glades or Hendry County....

...[1] Rather, appellee initiated an entirely new action joining count one alleging forfeiture under section 30.19 with count two charging negligence. As such, this new action requiring plenary proceedings would be subject to *306 the requirements of section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1987), the general venue statute....

...udulently misrepresented the balance of outstanding obligations which plaintiffs were required to assume (Count II). Count III, like Count I, seeks money damages for an alleged violation of the Florida Rico Act, Chapter 895, Florida Statutes (1985). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985) provides: Where actions may be begun....

...e brought in the county where the real property lies has sometimes been labeled the "local action rule." [Footnote omitted]. We further said in Cheesbro that the local action rule was a rule of subject matter jurisdiction and that the venue statute, section 47.011, accommodates this jurisdictional requirement by providing that actions can be brought "where the property in litigation is located." Id....

...Although the relief requested by the plaintiff will indirectly affect the Brevard County mortgage, the principal question in this action concerns fraud. See also Royal v. Parado, supra . Thus, the local action rule does not apply, nor does the "property in litigation" provision of section 47.011 apply here....

...me been chronically lame. It is undisputed both that the defendants are residents *713 of Pasco County and that the horse was delivered to and received by the plaintiffs there. The trial judge concluded that, under the applicable venue statute, F.S. § 47.011, "the cause of action accrued ..." in Polk County, where the contract of sale was made....

...and the corporate defendant had its offices in Hillsborough County. The court denied the motions of Farfante, Straske and Pinder, which prompted them to institute this appeal. As always, in cases which deal with questions of venue, we must consider Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1979)....

The issue presented in this appeal is whether section 47-11.1.1(d) of the Fort Lauderdale Code of Ordinances

...e governmental entity. See Nyberg, 604 So.2d at 895 ("it is the plaintiff's prerogative to make the initial choice of venue in accordance with the applicable venue statute ") (emphasis added). We find no statutory basis for venue in Columbia County. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1989), requires actions to be brought, "only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." (Emphasis added.) Section 47.021, Florida St...

...Before SCHWARTZ, NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ. BASKIN, Judge. In this action for damages for breach of a written agreement and non-payment of money, venue lies in Dade County. We therefore reverse the order in which the trial court transferred the cause to Broward County. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1979) states: Where actions may be begun.-Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action occurred, or where the property in litigation is located....

...1st DCA 1978); Davis v. Dempsey, 343 So.2d 950 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In this case, the place of payment was not contained in the written agreement; the cause of action therefore accrued in Dade County, the site of the payee's residence and place of business. Applying section 47.011, we find that defendant resides in Broward County but the cause of action occurred in Dade County....

...[5] Section 47.122 provides: Change of venue; convenience of parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice. — For the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice, any court of record may transfer any civil action to any other court of record in which it might have been brought. [6] § 47.011, Fla....

...of the key witnesses, which has been held to be "the single most important consideration of the three statutory factors," Hu, 426 So.2d at 1279. Since the Fund's action could have been brought in Duval County, where the defendant, FPIR, resides, see § 47.011, Fla....

...Since none of the defendants are residents of Dade County, the action may be maintained here only if one or more of the causes of action sued upon accrued in this county. See Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 1986); § 47.011, Fla....

...st residence, Broward County. § 733.101, Fla. Stat. (1979). However, the statutory provision under which appellees filed this independent action does not refer to venue. § 733.705(3) Fla. Stat. (1979). Therefore, the general venue statute applies. § 47.011 Fla....

...In addition, they claimed that the Department had waived its privilege by removing "this" *1247 case to federal court in Jacksonville, not Leon County. Finally, they alleged undue delay in moving for a change of venue. We conclude that none of these arguments overcome the common law venue privilege. Pursuant to section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1999), actions shall only be brought in the county where the defendant resides....

...nd suing only for a money judgment on the note. Of course, venue on an action to foreclose the mortgage would be in St. Johns County. [3] When a cause of action is based on a failure to pay money due under a contract under the general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981), the county where the payment was agreed to be made is where the breach of contract occurs and the cause of action on the contractual obligation accrues....

...nt resides." However, this provision is inapplicable where a corporate defendant resides in the same county as an individual defendant, even though the corporate defendant may have other residences; in such circumstances venue is proper, pursuant to § 47.011, Florida Statutes, only in the county of "joint residence." See Enfinger v....

...1955), Inter-Medic's failure to make an adequate objection does not preclude the assertion of a venue objection by Dr. Shelley. See Maloney v. Fleishaker, supra . Dr. Shelley did file a timely objection, by way of motion to *207 dismiss and transfer venue, citing § 47.011 and alleging St....

...Rule 1.140 R.C.P.; Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, 78 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1955)." 322 So.2d at 54. The trial judge denied respondent's motion. Respondent took an interlocutory appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, contending that venue was improper under Section 47.011, Florida Statutes....

...In what county were both partners last present with a common intention to remain married and in that place? There the marriage was broken, although recognition of the breach was postponed; there the cause of action for dissolution arose, within the meaning and application of § 47.011......

...ancial Services, Inc., a corporation wholly owned by Bauman. Appellee alleges that these acts by Appellants constituted fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Bauman concedes that he is a resident of Orange County; therefore, venue is proper as to him. § 47.011, Fla....

...al parent, Dade County was the residence of J.D.M., and the Dade County Circuit Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings that had been ongoing for the past ten years. He further argued that the initial venue selection was improper under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2001), which provides that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property *1115 in litigation is located." The trial court denied the motion to transfer venue, and this appeal followed....

...contain any venue provisions. Section 39.013(2) authorizes the circuit court to assert exclusive jurisdiction over dependency proceedings under chapter 39, but it says nothing expressly about venue. D.M. contends that the general venue provision of section 47.011 should apply to these proceedings....

residents, the City issued a notice of violation of Section 47-11.1.1(d) of the Fort Lauderdale Code of Ordinance

...improper venue because that was not a county "where Defendant Frieda Van Buren resides, where said estate is, where the alleged cause of action accrued, or where any property in litigation is located." Thus, the motion averred, it was improper under Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985), to bring the action in Alachua County....

...What the trial court did do was to rule on the appellee's tardy venue motion by ordering venue transferred. In this the court erred. REVERSED. BOOTH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(A). [2] Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, provides: 47.011 Where actions may be begun....

...r. J.L.S. v. R.J.L., 708 So.2d 293, 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) ("The plaintiff's choice of venue is presumptively correct, and the burden is clearly upon the party seeking a change of venue to demonstrate the impropriety of the plaintiff's selection."). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2008), provides that a cause of action "shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." All the parties in the inst...

...deliveries in Palm Beach County, Florida," appellants' verified motion and supporting affidavits assert the place for performance was Dade County, and that nothing transpired or occurred in Palm Beach County relevant to the above styled matter. *801 Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985) provides: Where actions may be begun....

...Id. In the instant case, there is no factual issue on appeal, as we assume Blackhawk mailed its letter terminating the contract to Hewitt's office in Lake County. Consequently, we review the trial court's legal decision de novo. Venue is governed by section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2004), which provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." Additiona...

...trial court in the first instance, it would have been most helpful and would have undoubtedly led to a correct decision, thereby eliminating the necessity for this appeal. The order appealed is Reversed. CROSS, C.J., and REED, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 47.011, F.S....

impropriety of the plaintiffs venue selection under section 47.011, the trial court must resolve any relevant

...discovered defective in Broward County. The trial court granted the motion to change venue, citing only A & M Engineering Plastics, Inc. v. Energy Saving Technology Co., 455 So.2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Venue is governed by Florida Statutes section 47.011, which provides in part that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." The plaintiff has the option of selecting venue as long as the plaintiff's choice is supported by the statute....

...tted by its officers in bad faith, etc. The trial court determined that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Appellees, who reside in Union County and are being sued for alleged acts that occurred in Union County. The court concluded that pursuant to section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2003), venue in Leon County is improper *813 for an action against defendants residing in Union County....

...ettlement agreement to the circuit court in Palm Beach County was an act sufficient to make the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit a proper venue for this action. The court declined to address the remaining causes of action. This appeal follows. Pursuant to section 47.011, Florida Statutes, venue is proper “only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or *471 where the property in litigation is located.” 1 “It is the plaintiffs option to select venue in the fi...

...Negrin, Fla.App. 1975, 306 So.2d 606, where that court held, in a negligence action, that the state agency's motion for change of venue to Leon County should have been granted. I would follow the decision of the Court of Appeal, First District. NOTES [1] § 47.011, Fla....

...Ocean Bank sought participation by the receiver in the Dade County action to permit the bank to proceed to judgment and sale of the foreclosed property. Ocean Bank contended that the priority dispute regarding real property in Dade County was not exclusively under the jurisdiction of the receivership court, but asserted that section 47.011 mandated that the exclusive venue for foreclosure actions is in the county where the real property is located....

...rporate defendant, A & F, has its sole corporate office in Palm Beach County, not Miami-Dade County, see § 47.051, Fla. Stat. (2006); [1] the individual defendants (Forkey, Sorena, and Shahak) reside in Palm Beach County, not Miami-Dade County, see § 47.011, Fla. Stat. (2006); [2] the causes of action, including the conversion claim, accrued in Palm Beach County, not Miami-Dade County, see §§ 47.011, 47.051, Fla....

...County and "cause of action accrued when [defendant] obtained possession of the funds by deposit to her account, which took place in Hillsborough County"); and the property in litigation is located in Palm Beach County, not Miami-Dade County, see §§ 47.011, 47.051, Fla....

...inst domestic corporations shall be brought only in the county where such corporation has, or usually keeps, an office for transaction of its customary business, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." [2] Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2006), provides, in part: "Where actions may be begun.—Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located."

...der denying their motion to transfer venue from Pinellas County to Broward County. Because the causes of action filed against them by Hemophilia of the Sunshine State, Inc. ("HOSS"), did not support venue in Pinellas County on any basis set forth in section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1999), we reverse....

...Flagler Hosp., Inc., 316 So.2d 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). HOSS does not contend that any of those exceptions are applicable. Instead, HOSS looks to the general venue statute to support the trial court's determination that venue was proper in Pinellas County. The general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1999), provides: "Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." Addressing venue in matters involving mor...

...The defendants' motion to transfer was denied, and the defendants filed this interlocutory appeal from that order relating to venue, as authorized by Rule 4.2(a) FAR, 32 F.S.A. We hold the appeal has merit. By their motion for transfer the individual defendants (under § 47.011 Fla....

...The complaint further alleges that Dr. Cardella negligently attempted a "trial of labor" resulting in a rupture of the uterus and that the defendants then negligently delayed the caesarean section, resulting in the infant being born deaf, blind, and neurologically impaired. Under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1997), actions may be brought in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...for an order decreasing or increasing the amount of support, maintenance, or alimony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires.... § 61.14(1) (emphasis supplied). This section is in conflict with the general venue statute, section 47.011, which provides that venue would lie in the appellant's county of residence....

...Lawrence Hill, II, challenges a temporary domestic violence injunction entered against him, specifically challenging the venue of the action in Pasco County. Because the cause of action filed against him by Carissa Fields did not support venue in Pasco County on any basis set forth in section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1999), we reverse and remand for further proceedings....

...d in an improper venue. There is validity to this argument. Chapter 741 does not contain a provision regarding venue; therefore, the general venue statute, chapter 47, applies. See Barr v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 644 So.2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Section 47.011 provides that actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, here, Polk County; where the cause of action accrued, again, Polk County; or where the property in litigation is located, a provision that is not applicable in this case....

...child support, and granted the wife exclusive use of the marital home. The day of the hearing the husband filed a motion to transfer the cause of the Pinellas *522 County Circuit Court, asserting that venue in Hillsborough County was improper under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...there is substantial inconvenience or likelihood of injustice to the Wife if this action were transferred; ... . Two issues present themselves on appeal: first, whether the order denying the husband's motion to transfer for improper venue is erroneous; and second, whether the order adjudging the husband in contempt is void. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981), reads: Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...Clarke regarding the stop-loss order while he was in both Pensacola and Orlando but she could not remember where he was when she initially called to sell the stock and he recommended stop-loss orders. Other evidence was adduced that Clarke spoke to other investors from places other than his Orlando office. Section 47.011, Fla....

...tion set forth in the applicable venue *724 statute. James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Company, 238 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). Hart v. Handling Systems Engineering, Inc., 502 So.2d 1319, 1320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). The exception provided in section 47.011 is that venue may also lie where the cause of action accrued....

...Anne Russell appeals from an order which denied Russell's motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue and the final judgment which enjoined her from proceeding with her action for arbitration. We affirm without discussion the trial court's denial of Russell's motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue. See *454 § 47.011, Fla....

...statutory alternatives .... ” Intercapital Funding Corp. v. Gisclair, 683 So.2d 530, 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (quoting Oliver v. Severance, 542 So.2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)). When a party seeks to transfer or dismiss for improper venue under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2015), the trial court’s legal conclusions on venue are *1016 reviewed de novo....

...B.S.E, Consultants, Inc., 89 So.3d 504, 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). By contrast, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to transfer venue for convenience of the parties is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. Several venue statutes must be considered here. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2015) provides that a civil action “shall be .brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.”....

...the Secretary of State. Although Mador was a Florida resident at the time of service, he did not challenge the substituted service on the Secretary of State and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Mador sought a change of venue under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1983), to Lee County, Florida, where he resided and where the cause of action accrued....

...edure 9.130(a)(3)(A). In this appeal we are asked to determine whether a defendant who is a Florida resident at the time a complaint is filed, but who was a non-resident at the time the cause of action accrued, may avail himself of the provisions of section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, an appellate court is required to affirm a trial court's determination regarding change of venue. Fixel v. Clevenger, 285 So.2d 687 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's transfer of venue from Dade County to Lee County, we affirm. Affirmed. NOTES [*] Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1983) provides: Where actions may be begun....

...and Farinella, the Broward County resident, was sued in his capacity as the administrator of St. Anne's in Dade County. The trial court granted the motion. The parties agree that Broward County is a proper venue because Farinella resides there. See § 47.011, Fla....

...; § 61.13(2)(b)(1); § 61.1308, Fla.Stat. (1995). None of those factors is missing in this case since a Florida court originally rendered the dissolution decree, and Florida is the home state of this child. Further, venue is also proper in Brevard County. § 47.011, Fla.Stat.(1995)....

...(Ret.), Associate Judge, dissenting. I must respectfully dissent. In my opinion the court below properly denied Appellants' motion to abate for improper venue. Here, Appellants were non-residents of Florida. The venue privilege afforded a defendant under Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1977) does not apply if the defendant is a non-resident of Florida....

...orida. We reverse. Generally, the defendant's privilege of venue permits him to object to an action being maintained in a county other than the one where he resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property and litigation is located. § 47.011, Fla....

...appellee's president put it, "[W]e had a sale for it, and I wanted some quick action to it. That's why we did it. I felt that we could do it a lot quicker there in Baker County." Appellee excused its failure to bring suit in Duval County pursuant to Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, by alleging that appellant was a nonresident of the state....

...nt resides." However, this provision is inapplicable where a corporate defendant resides in the same county as an individual defendant, even though the corporate defendant may have other residences; in such circumstances venue is proper, pursuant to section 47.011, Florida Statutes, only in the county of "joint residence." See Enfinger v....

...of the FDCPA and that the suit for a deficiency decree is a legal action on a consumer debt under the terms of the FDCPA. The circuit court correctly denied Mr. Aluia's motion. His argument fails for multiple reasons. Florida's general venue provision, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2014), provides that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...venue was proper in Sumter County because his complaint alleged a claim against Hubbard in his personal capacity, alleged that the defamatory statements were made with malice, and alleged that the statements were received in Sumter County. We agree. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2009), provides that “[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” In Perdue v....

...almost exclusively in Miami, Florida. Accordingly, venue would have been proper in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, the State judicial district which encompasses Dade County, Florida, part of the Southern District of Florida. See § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

...Ryan, a resident of Brevard County, moved for a change of venue. MCE, however, contended that venue was proper in Sarasota County, the site where services were to be performed under the contract. The judge denied the motion to change venue, and Ryan appealed. We reverse. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1989), provides for three permissible venues in an action against a Florida resident: the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...he trial court’s conclusion to the contrary. Under the venue statute applicable here, “Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” § 47.011, Fla....

...Boruchow for his $100,000 liability insurance limits and voluntarily dismissed him from the lawsuit. Immediately thereafter, Dr. Vance and his P.A., the only remaining defendants, moved to transfer the case to Palm Beach County, contending that Section 47.021 no longer applied and that they were entitled to that relief under Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981), [2] which did. That section states: 47.011 Where actions may be begun Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued,[ [3] ] or where the property in litigation is located....

...[4] It is of preeminent significance that the statutory language itself, the proper interpretation of which is the key to the resolution of the instant problem, specifically refers to the venue privilege as attaching only when the action is "begun," as stated in the title of Sec. 47.011, or "brought," Secs. 47.011, 47.021, expressions universally regarded as equivalent to "commenced." 5 Words and Phrases, "Begun" (1968); 5A Words and Phrases, "Brought" (1968); Turkett v....

...*679 The sole question presented on this interlocutory appeal is whether the defendants waived their privilege of venue when they did not file a timely motion therefor or claim the privilege in their answer but asserted the venue privilege, apparently under § 47.011, Fla....

...Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Constr., Inc., 743 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). We begin by noting that venue is proper where the defendant is domiciled, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. § 47.011, Fla....

...The trial court denied the motion without explanation. For claims such as these, the only county in which a plaintiff may bring an action, if the defendant does not reside in the *36 county, is the county where the cause of action accrued, or the county where the property in litigation is located. § 47.011, Fla....

...See Blackhawk Quarry Co. of Fla., Inc. v. Hewitt Contracting Co., 931 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v. Cedar Res., Inc., 761 So.2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). Our review requires application of two venue statutes. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2009), provides that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." In cases involving multiple defenda...

...96 So.2d at 540-41. This rule is an exception to section 47.021, Florida Statutes, which provides that a plaintiff may bring an action against multiple defendants in any county in which any defendant resides. However, the joint residency rule is not an exception to section 47.011, Florida Statutes, the general venue statute, which permits a plaintiff to file a civil action where the cause of action accrues....

...The payments under the contract were due in Palm Beach County. The standard of review for an order on a motion to transfer or dismiss for improper venue is abuse of discretion. Air South, Inc. v. Spaziano, 547 So.2d 314, 315 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). In accordance with section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1995), Plaintiffs could have brought their action in any county where Defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property subject to the litigation is located....

...ager of the Hillsborough County Hacienda Villas facility. MIA alleged breach of contract and requested damages. Hacienda Villas moved to dismiss the action for improper venue. The trial court denied the motion and Hacienda Villas has appealed. Under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2009), "Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." MIA selected Miami-Dade County on the theory that this is where the cause of action accrued....

...The present case does not involve an agreement to pay a liquidated sum in Miami-Dade County. This is a suit for damages which are unliquidated. Accordingly the debtor-creditor rule does not apply. The next question is where the cause of action accrued for purposes of section 47.011....

owner Gordon Johnson a notice of violation of Section 47-11.1.1(d) of the Fort Lauderdale Code of Ordinances

...f action did not accrue in Okeechobee County. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal follows. Venue is proper “in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” § 47.011, Fla....

...was whether Appellant failed to settle Appellees' claims against the Crosbys. This appeal followed. Actions must be brought in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. § 47.011, Fla....

...et aside the default entered in the federal lawsuit. The trial court entered an order denying Moscowitz’s motion. Moseowitz challenges this ruling, claiming the proper venue for this lawsuit is not in Brevard County. We agree. Venue is governed by section 47.011 of the Florida Statutes (2008), which states that actions can be brought in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...The appellant also complains that the trial court erred in finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the Hendry County property. Normally, a circuit court cannot exercise in rem jurisdiction over property situated beyond the circuit's territorial boundaries. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, provides that actions shall be brought only in the county where the property in litigation is located....

...e seeks further awards of overcrowding gain-time. Because his petition is filed in the wrong venue, we affirm. A petition for writ of mandamus is a civil action. See Latisi v. Florida Parole and Prob. Comm., 382 So.2d 1355, 1356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2002), provides that venue in civil actions is in a county where any defendant resides, or where the cause of action accrues....

...The contracts between the homeowners and RJG specified Manatee County as the forum for any dispute. Alleging that State Farm did not pay the full amount due for its work, RJG filed suit, claiming that the cause of action accrued in Manatee County. See § 47.011, Fla....

...(2009). State Farm moved to transfer venue to Palm Beach County. State Farm argued that RJG performed the work there, that the physical evidence and the majority of witnesses were located there, and that the insurance policy was issued there. See §§ 47.011, .051....

...theory, accrued in Manatee County. We are constrained to observe that State Farm conceded below that it was a national company with "agents everywhere." Although RJG did not base its venue selection on State Farm's presence in Manatee County, see §§ 47.011, .051, we will assume, for purposes of this opinion, that venue otherwise was appropriate in Manatee County....

...Florida's venue statutes, chapter 47, Florida Statutes, allow a plaintiff to select the venue in which to bring his or her action. See Breed Techs., Inc. v. AlliedSignal Inc., 861 So.2d 1227, 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (stating that a plaintiff generally has the "prerogative to select the venue"). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2005), allows actions to be brought "in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." In her defense of the trial court's order, Ms. Ferrell argues that section 47.011 allows her to select Hillsborough County because that is where the first cause of action accrued. However, section 47.011 refers to only an individual defendant and a single cause of action....

...dual defendant resides, Section 46.02 cannot be applied to defeat the individual defendant's venue privilege granted by Section 46.01." Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So.2d 538, 540-41 (Fla. 1957); see ch. 67-254, § 3, Laws of Fla. (renumbering § 46.01 as § 47.011 and § 46.02 as § 47.021)....

...unty; that when the marriage became irretrievably broken and at the time of the separation, the parties were living in Broward County; that at all times material, the husband was and is a bona fide resident of Broward County; that in accordance with Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, venue would only be proper in the Broward County Circuit Court; and that jurisdiction does not lie in Dade County....

...There was a hearing on the husband's "motion to dismiss and/or transfer for improper venue." The trial court entered its order denying the motion, and this interlocutory appeal ensued. As held in Carroll v. Carroll, 322 So.2d 53, 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), for purposes of Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1975), which provides that, "Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located......

...HENDON, J.  The defendants, Woodson Electric Solutions, Inc., Robert J. Smallwood, and Richard L. Hanson (collectively, “the Defendants”), appeal from a non-final order denying their motion to dismiss and/or transfer for improper venue under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2018)....

...2 accrued in Miami-Dade County. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue and/or to transfer venue from Miami-Dade County to Collier County (“motion to dismiss”), asserting that venue is improper under section 47.011....

...As at least one of the causes of action accrued in Miami-Dade County, we disagree. See Utilicore Corp. v. Bednarsh, 730 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (noting that venue was proper because at least one of the alleged causes of action accrued in the county where the action was filed). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2018), provides: “Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” The plaintiff has the option to sel...

...3d at 508 (“Because [the plaintiff’s] claims against [the defendant] have no effect on the title or possession of the property and the complaint seeks only an award of money damages, there is no ‘property in litigation’ for the purpose of the third clause of section 47.011, Florida Statutes.”). 4 of action of this type accrues at the moment the wrong and the injury both accrue.” PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v....

...Thus, as the causes of action based on the Defendants’ alleged misrepresentation accrued when the contract was signed in Miami, venue is proper in Miami-Dade County. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue under section 47.011. The remaining arguments raised by the Defendants do not merit discussion. Affirmed. 6 

...to Brevard County, Pinellas County or Hillsborough County. [4] In this appeal, Sunshine Yacht argues that the trial court erred because the complaint contains, among other things, a count for breach of contract for the nonpayment of money and under Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1993), [5] Dade County is where this cause of action accrued for venue purposes....

...Seapac Fisheries, Inc., 692 P.2d 956, 957 (Alaska 1984)), rev. denied, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1986) [5] That section provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

...not tenants-in-common, but that the trust continues to own the property, and that Mr. Kirchhoff's interest in the trust is personalty. If Mr. Kirchhoff's interest is in the nature of personalty, then any cause of action accrued in Orange County. See § 47.011, Fla....

..."The general venue statute controls all actions brought under the common law or pursuant to a statute not containing specific provisions concerning venue. . . ." Lane v. Hemophilia of the Sunshine State, Inc., 793 So.2d 992, 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2007), the general venue statute, provides that a legal action may be brought where the defendant resides, the cause of action accrues, or the property in litigation is located....

...Hart responded to the complaint by filing a motion to transfer or dismiss for improper venue. The motion also sought dismissal on the ground that one of the counts was improperly joined with the others. The trial court dismissed the count in question, but rejected the venue challenge. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...Defendant/husband filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, asserting his privilege of being sued in Volusia County, Florida, in which he resides. This appeal is from the order denying that motion. Appellant's position is well founded. Fla. Stat. § 47.011 (1973), the general venue statute, provides: "Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...It provided instead that any legal action “may be brought in any state or federal court located in Florida..." In this order on rehearing and clarification, the trial court also ruled that venue was proper in Palm Beach County pursuant to sections 47.011 and 605.0703(1), Florida Statutes (2016), because appellant resided in Palm Beach County, the LLC’s principal office was located there, the cause of action accrued there, and Meliek’s action to dissolve the LLC was previously filed there....

...Servs., Ltd., 734 So.2d 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). We conclude that the trial court erred in overriding the parties’ express waiver of venue objections to lawsuits filed in Florida courts. It also erred insofar as it looked to the general provisions of section 47.011, Florida Statutes, on venue and section 605.0703(1), Florida Statutes, for dissolution of limited liability companies, particularly when this was not a dissolution proceeding....

...Suncoast timely appealed the nonfinal order. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(A). In an action against a Florida resident, venue is proper “where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” § 47.011, Fla....

of a creditor holding a lien. Bankruptcy Act, § 47 (11 USCA § 75). In other words, had bankruptcy not

...n Sarasota County pursuant to Section 47.122, Florida Statutes. Upon careful review of the record, briefs and having heard oral argument, we reverse for the reasons stated below. The sole issue presented for our determination is one of proper venue. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, provides in essential part: ......

...s fact, standing alone, would not be sufficient to retain venue in Sarasota County under Section 47.051, Florida Statutes. It is clear from the record before us that Janet Amick, appellant, timely asserted her personal privilege of venue pursuant to 47.011, Florida Statutes, and it should not be defeated because she is joined as a party defendant with her insurer, a foreign corporation....

...does not maintain an office in Leon County; and that the conversion and civil theft claims accrued in Broward County where the check was received and negotiated and where the funds were allegedly improperly retained. Thus, they argue, venue cannot be maintained in Leon County. We cannot agree and affirm. Under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2004), actions against individuals "shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action occurred, or where the property in litigation is located." Similarly, under section 47.05...

...ants Mankowitz and Fisherman's Hospital. Defendant American National Red Cross, which successfully opposed Mankowitz's motion to transfer venue from Dade to Monroe, is a federally chartered corporation with chapters in both Dade and Monroe Counties. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1987), states that an action is to be brought in the county where the defendant resides....

...The appellants contend in this appeal that the trial court erred in denying their motions in light of the sworn evidence establishing the impropriety of venue in DeSoto County and the failure of the appellee to file any countervailing affidavits. We agree. According to section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985), “actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued or where the property in litigation is located.” Because there is no property in litigation in th...

...e in counties other than DeSoto, and the appellants asserted in sworn affidavits that their residences were in counties other than DeSoto, it has been clearly established that venue will not lie in DeSoto County based on the residency requirement of section 47.011. The only remaining provision of section 47.011, which would allow the appellee to select DeSoto County as the proper venue for its cause of action would be “where the cause of action accrued.” The appellee’s complaints aver that the fruit purchased by Dempsey from the appelle...

...Tropicana Products v. Shirley, 501 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). With their motions objecting to venue, the appellants filed sworn affidavits that were sufficient to controvert the ap-pellee’s selection of venue in DeSoto County on the basis of section 47.011....

...7.051. It may defend an action pursuant to section 607.354, but like a nonresident individual or a foreign corporation not doing business in Florida, it must defend a transitory action against it in any county where jurisdiction over it is obtained. § 47.011, Fla....

...eared on the face of the complaint that Orange County had no significant relationship to the case. Roadhouse responds that venue was proper for several reasons: 1) the primary defendant, Humana, resides in Orange County; thus venue is proper under §§ 47.011 and 47.051, Florida Statutes; 2) Pozo is bound by a venue selection clause because he acted as Humana's agent; 3) the cause of action accrued in Orange County; and 4) Pozo failed to meet his burden of proving that Orange County was an improper venue....

...Jones, 687 So.2d 937, 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Similarly, Roadhouse's allegations regarding Pozo and his firm are insufficient to establish that they resided in Orange County. Actions brought against individual defendants shall be in the "county where the defendant resides." § 47.011, Fla....

...rued in Dade County, we conclude the trial court was correct in dismissing the subject complaint for improper venue with leave to refile same in Alachua County, the residence of defendant Curtis, or such other county that plaintiff would choose. See § 47.011, Fla....

...the allegations in the complaint are not facially sufficient to support venue in Hillsborough County. Patterson asserted that the place of payment rule does not apply because the damages sought are unliquidated. Instead, Patterson argued that under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2012), 1 venue is proper in Polk County because he is from Polk County and had conducted all of his business under the contract in Polk County....

...e, the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss or to transfer on this basis. We therefore reverse and remand with directions that the trial court transfer venue to Polk County. Reversed and remanded. NORTHCUTT and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. . Section 47.011 provides, in pertinent part, “Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.”

trial judge. Florida’s general venue statute, section 47.011, is applicable to this case. It allows the

...4th DCA 2024), the proper venue for this action concerning return of a security deposit is in Broward County, where the cause of action accrued, where the apartment at issue is located, where the lease contract was entered, and where the lease required service of notices and payments. § 47.011, Fla....

...ts one and three, as those causes of action accrued in Duval County. However, the court found that venue would lie in Escambia County as to count two and denied the motion. The parties agree that venue of this suit is proper in Escambia County under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1989), only if the cause of action alleged in count two accrued there....

the property in this litigation is located. Section 47.011, Fla.Stat.

...Furthermore, in its order the Martin County court only reserved jurisdiction for the limited purpose of establishing the amounts of past AFDC payments. The proper venue for purposes of a custody action was St. Lucie County since all parties resided there. See § 47.011, Fla....

venue properly lies only in Dade County under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1995), there was no basis

...” We agree with the Second District Court of Appeal that the provision of the bastardy statute relating to venue controls in actions of this kind, and the action may be brought by the woman in the county of her residence if she elects to do so. F.S. Section 47.011, F.S.A., the general venue statute applicable to civil actions, is not pertinent to this type of proceeding....

Barr, 343 So.2d 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); and Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1977), with directions to

...s whether Appellant failed to settle Appellees’ claims against the Crosbys. This appeal followed. Actions must be brought in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. § 47.011, Fla....

...petition."). By the time the final judgment was entered, Ms. Vinsand was residing with the parties' three minor children in the former marital residence located in South Dakota,1 and Mr. Vinsand had relocated to Iowa. For purposes of venue, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2012), mandates that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." A proceeding for dissolution of marriage is regarded as a transitory action. Goedmakers v. Goedmakers, 520 So. 2d 575, 579 (Fla. 1988). Our supreme court has held "that because an action for dissolution of marriage is personal or transitory, the 'property in litigation' clause of section 47.011 is not applicable to marriage dissolution cases." Id. at 580....

...With the exception of the location of the Plaintiff’s attorney, there is no clear connection to Palm Beach County. However, the analysis is not so simple. In Florida, chapter 47, Florida Statutes (2016), governs the determination of proper venue, which is generally found in section 47.011....

...f action was for a determination of an entitlement to damages caused by an automobile collision—not a breach of the insurance contract. Id. at 1199. However, in Graci we also noted that “[o]f the several venue selections authorized by either section 47.011 or section 47.051, Fla....

that venue is lacking in Dade County under Section 47.-011, Florida Statutes (1983), and the defendant

...da Statutes (2003). The complaint stated that Stephen Oldock was employed by King Farms, Inc., a Florida corporation engaged in buying fresh produce from DL & B and reselling it in Florida. *485 DL & B filed a Motion to Dismiss and Transfer based on section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2005), which governs venue but states specifically that it does not apply to actions against nonresidents....

dissolution arose, within the meaning and application of § 47.011. ...” 322 So.2d at 57. The Carroll decision specifically

...nd ordered Ford, as the manufacturer, to refund to the Fowlers all amounts paid by them for the vehicle and to pay off the balance owed by the Fowlers to the lienholder. The Fowlers sought to transfer venue based upon an alleged improper venue under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1993), and rules 1.060(b) and 1.140(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure....

because payment was to be made in Broward County. Section 47.011 F.S.1973, Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156

...The court made no suggestion that the venue provisions of chapter 742 would be applicable to declaratory judgments prosecuted by the putative father. As a consequence, we hold that the venue of this declaratory judgment action must be determined according to the general venue statute. When section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985), is applied to this case, venue clearly lies in Hillsborough County....

...aries of Glades County, Florida, and the Rim Canal is bordered on both sides by lands within Glades County. Accordingly, this cause of action accrued in Glades County and appellants’ affidavit was sufficient to support the motion for transfer. See Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Destefano, 300 So.2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Moreover, it is undisputed that none of the defendants reside in Dade County and that the yacht sued upon is located in Palm Beach County. It therefore follows that the venue of this cause does not lie in Dade County, Florida, under Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1991), which requires that an action against a Florida resident, as here, “shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is...

...nder review is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to transfer the cause to Palm Beach County, Florida, or some other appropriate county, at the plaintiff’s option, where the instant action may be maintained under Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The parties were divorced in Georgia and thereafter the wife moved to Duval County, Florida and the husband to Leon County, Florida. The wife filed a complaint in Du-val County seeking enforcement and establishment of a foreign divorce decree, and the husband answered raising improper venue as an affirmative defense under F.S. 47.011 and counterclaimed for establishment of the foreign decree....

...The husband now urges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to transfer for improper venue and in granting the wife’s motion to strike the notice of voluntary dismissal of his counterclaim. We agree with our sister court in Ruscoe, supra, that when a complaint to establish a foreign decree is brought, F.S. 47.011 controls and the action should be brought in the county where the responding party resides....

...iss for improper venue. Because section 784.046, Florida Statutes (2009), providing for a protective injunction against dating violence, does not contain a special venue provision, the trial court was required to apply the general venue provision in section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2009). Barr v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 644 So.2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Under section 47.011, "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located...." See Hill v....

...12.980(n) appended to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, a petitioner filing a petition for prohibition against dating violence is instructed to file the petition in the circuit where she lives. However, these instructions cannot contradict section 47.011....

...contract as to Cannon, for fraudulent misrepresentation as to all of the defendants, and for punitive damages as to all of the defendants. 3  McGrath and McGrath P.A. filed a motion to transfer venue, citing section 47.011, and arguing that venue was proper in Orange County and not in Pinellas County because McGrath resided in Orange County, the law firm was located there, and the causes of action accrued there. No other statute was cited in the motion, nor did McGrath and McGrath P.A....

...indicating that the trial court would be adjudicating the issue of a venue change based on forum non conveniens. A week before the scheduled hearing, the trial court entered the order on review. The trial court denied McGrath and McGrath P.A.'s motion to transfer venue based on section 47.011, noting that venue was proper in Pinellas County....

...The standard of review for an order on a motion to transfer or dismiss for improper venue is abuse of discretion. Carr v. Stetson, 741 So.2d 567, 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). “It is well-established that venue [for the purposes of applying the venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes], in an action for dissolution of marriage, lies in the county where the parties last lived with a common intent to remain married.” Butler v. Butler, 866 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citing Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla.1977)); see also Bowman v. Bowman, 597 So.2d 399, 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (citing Carroll). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2007), provides: “Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. This section shall not apply to actions against nonresidents.” § 47.011, Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). Section 47.011 does not apply to this case because the wife is a nonresident....

...h against four doctors, a nurse and a hospital. All of the defendants resided in Brevard County except Dr. Michael Kohen, who resided in Volusia County. Subsequently, Kohen moved to dismiss the complaint for improper venue, claiming that pursuant to section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1983), 2 he was entitled to be sued where he resided....

...For the foregoing reasons, this case is reversed and remanded with instructions to transfer venue as to Kohen back to Bre-vard County. REVERSED and REMANDED. UPCHURCH and SHARP, JJ., concur. . Review of such orders is permitted under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(A). . Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1983), provides: Where actions may be begun....

...may in their contract agree on a venue for actions related to the 1 Similarly, the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. See W. Bay Plaza Condo. Ass’n v. Sika Corp., 338 So. 3d 32, 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). 2 See § 47.011, Fla....

...Corio filed a paternity action against Brenda Lopez in Orange County Circuit Court. Corio alleged that he, Lopez and their children lived in Orange County until Lopez relocated with the children to Polk County. In response to Corio’s lawsuit, Lopez filed a motion to change venue pursuant to the general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2015), which provides that “[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” Without a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and transferred the action to Polk County....

...tion accrued, where the property in litigation is located, where the defendant resides, or, in the case of a domestic corporation, in the county where such corporation has, or usually keeps, an office for the transaction of its customary business. §§ 47.011, 47.051, Fla....

...Based on Leiva's undisputed affidavit, venue lies in Broward County alone, so we reverse and remand. Reversed and remanded. WARNER and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Notably, our supreme court has instructed that non-resident defendants, like McCarroll, are removed from the scope of section 47.011, Florida Statutes, and courts should apply that section to the resident defendants in order to make proper venue determinations....

PER CURIAM. Because section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1999) regarding venue does not apply to non-residents, and the affidavits presented show that the appellee was not a resident of Florida, we reverse the order-transferring venue....

...The order under review is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to deny the motion to transfer, and for further proceedings consistent herewith. Reversed and remanded. . Absent the governmental privilege, venue was properly laid in Dade County as the county in which the cause of action accrued. § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

...served on either King or AKCA. 2 Because the First Amended Complaint alleged that King resided in Broward County, and because there is no dispute that this negligence action accrued in Broward County, that county would be an appropriate venue selection as to him. See § 47.011, Fla....

...4th DCA 2008) (quoting Premier Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Gavrilis, 554 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)). However, an action must be brought “only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” § 47.011, Fla....

...ue. Because the complaint alleges that the overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, see Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So.2d 170, 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), occurred in Miami-Dade County, it follows that Miami-Dade County is a permissible venue. See § 47.011, Fla....

...On July 7, 1983, appellant filed a motion for change of venue. The motion was denied and this appeal followed. Appellant argues that Pinellas County, Florida was not the proper forum for this dissolution of marriage action because the marriage was broken in Alachua County, Florida. We agree. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that actions may be brought in the county where the defendant resides, where the property in litigation is located, or where the cause of action arises....

question. Dahlberg resides in St. Lucie County. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981), provides: “Actions

...3d 304, 308 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Inverness Coca–Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, 78 So. 2d 100, 102 (Fla. 1955)). Appellants argue that venue is properly located in Orange County because multiple causes of action in the complaint accrued there. 4 See § 47.011, Fla....

...1st. DCA 1987), this court held that in order to maintain suit in a county other than that of the defendant’s residence, the complaint should “circumscribe facts” which bring the cause within one of the permissible venue provisions set forth in section 47.011, Florida Statutes....

...in litigation is located.” § 47.051, Fla.Stat. (1985). An action against a resident individual may be brought “only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” § 47.011, Fla....

...s and injunctive relief against a foreclosure. They contend that the property in litigation is located in Dade County, Florida, because one of the mortgages given as security for the note is on real property located in Dade County, *144 Florida. See § 47.011, Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

...eadquarters, in Brevard County.” Other than actions against nonresidents, “[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” § 47.011, Fla....

...Undoubtedly, the disclosure and division of the property located in Dade County will be the focus of the trial. There is statutory support for the choice of venue and appellant/wife has not demonstrated that the court, for any other reason, should have ordered the case tried in Broward County. See § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

...“We review the trial court’s factual determinations to assure they are supported by competent, substantial evidence; we review the trial court’s legal determinations de novo.” Id. at 796–97 (citing Fla. Gamco, Inc. v. Fontaine, 68 So. 3d 923, 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)). Venue is controlled by sections 47.011 and 47.051, Florida Statutes (2023). Section 47.011 is the general venue statute,1 while section 47.051 governs suits against corporations.2 Because section 47.051 is a specific statute relating to corporations, in the face of conflict, it controls over the general venue statute....

...Here, it is undisputed that appellees are domiciled in Jacksonville, Florida, which is located in Duval County. Appellants’ complaint sounds in breach of contract, quasi-contract, and tort. In determining where a cause of action accrued, this court explained in 1 § 47.011, Fla....

...the “Florida Radiology Defendants”) filed separate motions to dismiss for improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue to Lee County. 3 The Florida Radiology Defendants argued that under the applicable Florida venue statutes, sections 47.011 and 47.051, Lee County is the only proper venue as it is the county where all three doctors reside (and the county where Florida Radiology is based)....

...r the transaction of its customary business. Consequently, the language Mr. Martinez relies on in support of his statutory waiver argument is inapplicable. b. Where the Cause of Action Accrued Under Florida’s general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2021), “[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” See also § 47.051 (“Actions against dom...

question of whether the general venue statute, section 47.011 applied in an action for modification of a

court properly found venue in Orange County. . Section 47.011 provides in relevant part: Actions shall be

....01.[ [3] ] Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So.2d 538, 540-41 (Fla.1957). Plaintiffs argue and we agree that the joint residency rule applies only when venue is based upon residency. Here, plaintiffs selected venue based on where the cause of action accrued. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2010), states in relevant part that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." (emphasis added)....

...the same county. Id. at 539-40. Brown v. Nagelhout, 33 So.3d 83, 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (emphasis added); see also Heartland Organics, Inc. v. MC Devs., LLC, 8 So.3d 1227, 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) ("[T]he joint residency rule is not an exception to section 47.011, Florida Statutes, the general venue statute, which permits a plaintiff to file a civil action where the cause of action accrues.")....

...ovo review. Brown v. Nagelhout, 33 So.3d 83, 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). [2] Now § 47.021, Fla. Stat. (2010) ("Actions against two or more defendants residing in different counties may be brought in any county in which any defendant resides."). [3] Now § 47.011, Fla....

...Based on our de novo review, 3 we agree with the former husband that the trial court should not have dismissed the case with prejudice based on the venue motion filed by the former wife. Venue was proper in Duval County because both parties reside there, see § 47.011, Fla....

...The defendants’ bank is in Orange County, Florida, and it dishonored the checks there. For purposes of the venue statute, the cause of action accrued there. See Shindler v. State Wide Recovery & Research Corp., 330 So.2d 807, 808 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); § 47.011, Fla....

properly in Clay County. We agree and reverse. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes provides that: “Actions shall

...Thompson of Thompson & Thomas, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee. FORST, J. Appellant James Cullen Lowery, III (“Defendant”) appeals from a nonfinal order denying his motion to transfer venue from Palm Beach County. The sole issue on appeal is whether—for purposes of venue under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2019)—a cause of action for libel per se accrued in the county in which an allegedly libelous Facebook post originated (here, Martin County), or in a county where the post was accessed and read by a third party....

...Plaintiff further identified the name of a specific Palm Beach County resident that had allegedly received and read the contents of the Facebook post. Based on Plaintiff’s choice of venue, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or transfer venue. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2019), pertinently provides that a civil action “shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” Defendant stated it was undisputed that he resided in Martin County and that the instant case did not involve property. Defendant therefore maintained that under section 47.011, venue would have been proper in Palm Beach County only if that is where “the cause of action accrued.” In contrast to Plaintiff’s argument that a cause of action for libel accrued where the purportedly libelous statement was...

...1 The trial court therefore found that venue was proper in Palm Beach County. Analysis “When a trial court is presented with a motion to transfer venue based on the impropriety of the plaintiff’s venue selection under section 47.011, the trial court must resolve any relevant factual disputes and then make a legal decision [as to] whether the plaintiff’s venue is legally supportable.” McDaniel Reserve Realty Holdings, LLC v....

...If the defendant sufficiently demonstrates that a plaintiff’s choice of venue is improper and establishes the location of proper venue, “[t]he widely accepted practice in Florida courts” is to transfer the case rather than dismiss it. Russomano v. Maresca, 220 So. 3d 1269, 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). As noted above, section 47.011 provides that “[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” Here, it is undisputed that Defendant is a resident of Martin County....

...Accordingly, 1As to the motion to dismiss, the court found that dismissal was inappropriate because Defendant had already filed an Answer. 3 venue is proper either in Martin County, or “where the cause of action accrued[.]” See § 47.011, Fla....

...If, on the other hand, the cause of action accrued in Martin County, the only remaining statutory alternative for venue would be in Martin County, and the trial court would therefore have erred in denying Defendant’s motion to transfer venue rather than transferring the case to Martin County. See § 47.011, Fla....

...[is] view[ed] in the case of a publication as limited to such county or counties where the publication is distributed or placed on sale.” Id. at 607 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). Both section 47.051 and the venue statute in the instant case (section 47.011) state that actions shall be brought “where the cause of action accrued.” See §§ 47.051 & 47.011, Fla....

plaintiffs. Pursuant to the venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1997), Exotic Botanicals

...We conclude that this question should be answered in the affirmative. Appellant filed her petition for dissolution of marriage in the Circuit Court of Orange County. The appellee-husband filed a motion under Rule 1.060(b), RCP 30 F.S.A., asserting the privilege under F. S. Section 47.011, F.S.A....

...The court *64 granted the motion to transfer, and it is this order which we review. Assuming that the “domicile” of the defendant-husband is Lake County, (see F.S. Section 744.10, F.S.A.; In re Estate of Phillips, Fla.App. 1966, 190 So.2d IS) the venue statute, F.S. Section 47.011, F.S.A., is concerned with the county of a defendant’s “residence”....

...4th DCA 2024), the proper venue for this action concerning return of a security deposit is in Broward County, where the cause of action accrued, where the apartment at issue is located, where the lease contract was entered, and where the lease required service of notices and payments. § 47.011, Fla....

...More importantly, because the appellants may later seek to amend their complaint, we agree with the trial court that the proper venue for this case is Orange County, and not Volusia County. Actions are generally to be brought in the county where the defendant resides. See § 47.011, Fla....

...Our review of the record establishes that the appellant law firms were required to perform their obligations under the contract in Duval County, Florida, and transmitted the letter repudiating the contract from Duval County, Florida. Thus, Duval County, Florida, is where the claimed causes of action accrued. See § 47.011, Fla....

...Jones argues here that the proper venue was Pinellas County where he filed the suit, relying upon B & F of Clearwater, Inc. v. Wesley Construction Company, Fla.App.1970, 237 So.2d 790 , construing the two Florida statutes on the subject, F.S. §§ 47.011 and 47.051 F.S.A. We agree and reverse. § 47.011 inter alia applies to individual defendants, and is as follows: “§ 47.011 Where actions may be begun *277 Actions shall be brought only in the county ....

...and to modify or increase the amount of child support, alleging a change in circumstances since the original foreign decree and stipulation were entered into in 1975. Finding that the husband was a resident of Gulf County, Florida, and relying upon Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, and an earlier opinion of this court involving the same parties in Carr v....

...The lower court erroneously relied upon the wrong venue statute. In Carr I, the husband brought an action to establish the foreign divorce decree and to modify certain provisions in that decree relating to child visitation. This court there observed that the general venue statute, Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, applies to an action to establish a foreign divorce judgment, and the special venue provision, Section 61.14, Florida Statutes, to a modification of a support agreement. Id., at 222. Upon determining that no modification of support was at issue in Carr I, this court held that section 47.011 applied, and that proper venue lay in the county of defendant’s (appellant herein) residence in Leon County....

that venue in Okaloosa County was proper under § 47.-011 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A. We have carefully

such change of venue as provided for in F.S. Section 47.011, F.S.A. It does give us some concern that a

consistent with the meaning and application of section 47.-011, Florida Statutes. This Court established its

...Grosholz (Tallahassee), and Samantha Duke (Orlando), for appellants. Armas Bertran Zincone, J. Alfredo Armas, MSP Recovery Law Firm, and Ryan H. Susman, for appellees. Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ. PER CURIAM.  Affirmed. See § 47.011, Fla....

...The trial court entered a final order granting the motion to dismiss the action as to Thoma-son for improper venue. This timely appeal followed. Venue is proper in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrues, or where the property in litigation is located. § 47.011, Fla.Stat. (1985). When, as here, there is more than one defendant, the defendant’s residence *1093 under section 47.011 for venue purposes is any county in which any of the defendants reside....

...of its right to seek a change of venue. FSU also maintained that the district court's removal jurisdiction was merely derivative. The district court, said FSU, merely inherited what the state court had—an improperly filed case that had to be dismissed under Fla. Stat. § 47.011,2 the state venue statute, or transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C....

...The district court then followed PT United and held that, following removal, a federal court can consider the propriety of venue under state law and dismiss the action if such venue was improper when the action was initially filed. Turning to Fla. Stat. § 47.011, the district court ruled that venue for Mr....

...r division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 2 "Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located[.]" Fla. Stat. § 47.011. 3 "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C....

...e of venue. FSU also maintained that the district court’s removal jurisdiction was merely derivative. The district court, said FSU, merely inherited what the state court had – an improperly filed case that had to be dismissed under Fla. Stat. § 47.011,2 the state venue statute, or transferred 1 “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 2 “Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located[.]” Fla. Stat. § 47.011. 3 pursuant to 28 U.S.C....

...The district court then followed PT United and held that, following removal, a federal court can consider the propriety of venue under state law and dismiss the action if such venue was improper when the action was initially filed. Turning to Fla. Stat. § 47.011, the district court ruled that venue for Mr....

venue statute (§ 46.01, Fla.Stat. (1965), F.S.A.; § 47.011, Fla.Stat. (1967) F.S.A.) entitles her to be sued

...9.130(a)(3)(A), is affirmed upon a holding that: (a) an action for reformation of a warranty deed which seeks to change the title to real property is a local action and may properly be brought, as here, in the county where the real property is located, § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

properly have been commenced in St. Johns County. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2016), explains where an

...Escambia County, Florida. The action in the trial court sought damages for breach of a lease. The order reads in part as follows: “This Court finds that the Defendant is a resident of Escambia County, Florida, and has a right under Florida Statute 47.011, F.S.A....

Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(A). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1977)1 is the statute governing

...A cause of action against Equipment Planners for breach of contract accrued in Polk County, the situs of this action. Additionally, foreclosure of a security interest in the property, now in Seminole County, is sought. The trial judge properly denied appellant’s motion to transfer the cause. Fla.Stat. § 47.011 (1973) states: “Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...Since these materials are public record of the State of Florida, it has been distributed to every County in the State of Florida, including the County where it was delivered to me. After considering the three above-described affidavits and hearing counsels’ arguments, the trial court denied the motion. 1 *351 Pursuant to section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2008), actions against an individual shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...by a venue provision in the agreement guaranteed. Because this action is on the guaranty agreement and not on the automobile leasing agreement and there is no contract provision relating to venue on the guaranty agreement, the general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981), applies....

...ong-arm jurisdiction, then the burden shifts to the defendant to contest the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint, or to claim that the federal minimum contacts requirement is not met, by way of affidavit or other similar sworn proof.”); § 47.011, Fla....

...Ruth Bone and William Bone both reside in Highlands County but Croft resides in Pinellas County. Based on the assertion that Croft is not a bona fide defendant, William Bone filed a motion to abate and transfer venue. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1993), an action must be brought in the county where a defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...appeal, which was timely filed with the agency clerk, as a petition for writ of certiorari and transfer the petition to the Circuit Court of Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Osceola County, which is the county in which Lightsey’s hunting preserve is located.11 § 47.011, Fla....

...On the other hand, if this is actually a lawsuit to determine Mr. Aboul-Hosn’s obligations under the presuit agreement or to compel him to settle his cause of action against Nationwide that concerns property in Osceola County, then Osceola County may be the appropriate venue. See § 47.011, Fla....

...of process in this suit and, further, he was validly served with process within the state of Florida. Therefore, personal jurisdiction in the state of Florida attached as to appel-lee. Wo lfson v. Wolfson, 455 So.2d 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); compare 47.011, Fla.Stat....

...t. Therefore, we reverse the final judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith, without prejudice to appellee to move for a change of venue to Franklin County, Florida, his place of residence, if desired, pursuant to section 47.011, Florida Statutes....

...Nonetheless, the designated venue must fall within the acceptable statutory alternatives. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Smith, 203 So. 3d 1013, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Intercapital Funding Corp. v. Gisclair, 683 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, provides a civil action “shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” Section 47.041, Florida Statutes, fu...

dissolution proceeding. On the subject of venue, section 47.011, Florida Statutes, provides that: Actions shall

of November 21, 1829, Section 7; as amended, Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1977).1 Notwithstanding

...The landlord has established that the proper venue is in Broward County, where the cause of action accrued, where the apartment at issue is located, where the lease contract was entered, and where the lease required service of notices and payments. § 47.011, Fla....

County because both parties reside there, see section 47.011, Florida Statutes, and transfer—not dismissal—is

...Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. In response, Former Wife subsequently filed her motion to transfer the case to Miami-Dade County, as well as her affidavit in support thereof. After a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Former Wife’s motion. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2015) applies to actions to establish a foreign divorce decree as a Florida judgment....

...See Ruscoe v. Ruscoe, 327 So. 2d 93, 94 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). That statute provides that “[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” § 47.011, Fla....

...Accordingly, Florida courts have determined that an action to establish a foreign divorce decree as a Florida judgment is to be filed in the county where the responding party resides. See McIntire v. McIntire, 352 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (“[W]hen a complaint to establish a foreign decree is brought, F.S. 47.011 controls and the action should be brought in the county where the responding party resides.”); Ruscoe, 327 So. 2d at 94 (holding that in action to establish foreign divorce decree as Florida judgment, the only venue alternative under section 47.011 was county where respondent resided)....

...itten documents. This refusal, according to evidence submitted below, took place on October 4, 1982, at a meeting with the plaintiff in Dade County, Florida. Second, the venue in this cause was, therefore, properly laid in Dade County, Florida under Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985) because "the cause of action accrued” in Dade County where the defendant allegedly repudiated the contract between the parties....

...his receipt by mail in Duval County of a check, sent at the direction of his mother, the plaintiff, by a real estate closing agent in Charlotte County. Joseph Tulli stated in the affidavit that he deposited the check in his account in Duval County- Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1997), provides that actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...claim. The foreclosure action may proceed here in Dade County where the land is located. Georgia Cas. Co. v. O’Donnell, 109 Fla. 290 , 147 So. 267 (1933) (suit to foreclose mortgage is local and must be brought in county where land lies). See also § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

...the case from Bradford County (where the former husband visits his mother sporadically when not deployed in his military position) to St. Lucie County (where the former wife and children have continuously lived for two years and where she would be subject to suit). § 47.011, Fla....

...But the trial court simply denied the motion.”). Because the trial court did not explicitly rule on the matter and thereby made no determination under the applicable standards, see McGee v. McGee, 145 So. 3d 955, 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); §§ 47.011, 47.122 & 61.13(2)(d), Fla....

...Appellant Hopie Arnold petitioned the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County for dissolution of marriage. The trial judge granted appellee Holly Arnold’s motion for a change of venue to Polk County the place of his residence. Mrs. Arnold takes this interlocutory appeal. Florida Statutes § 47.011, F.S.A....

...(1971), providing for the dissolution of marriage. However, we hold that the place of the cause of action alleged by the petitioner is sufficient; and, where contested, the locus of the cause of action must be decided by the judge consistent with Fla.Stat. § 47.011....

...dated amounts. Because the damages are unliquidated, the place of payment rule does not apply, and venue was improper in Martin County. We reverse the order of the circuit court and remand with directions to transfer venue to Alachua County. See § 47.011, Fla....

...A suit for declaratory relief does not itself constitute a cause of action for venue purposes, it is the underlying relief sought which determines venue. Oliver v. Severance, 542 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). It was proper to transfer venue to Polk County since that is where the underlying cause of action occurred. § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

agreements. Therefore, venue must be controlled by Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, the general venue statute

...AFFIRMED. WARNER, J., concurs. SHAHOOD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. . See § 119.07(7), Fla. Stat. (2002). . The criminal case was dismissed a few days before the court entered the order denying the motion to dismiss. . See § 47.011, Fla....

...had not been remedied. Thereafter, Air Orlando filed an action against Aztec in the Orange County Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract and fraud in the inducement. Aztec responded by filing its motion to abate the proceedings in Orange County. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1997) provides that “[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” Aztec resides in and has its principal place of business in Broward County....

...Therefore, the only remaining statutory authority to maintain the action outside of Broward County is by way of the location of the property in litigation. Air Orlando asserts the trial court’s decision to maintain venue in Orange County should be upheld because the airplane is “property in litigation,” as described in section 47.011, and Orange County is where the airplane is presently located....

...The action in the instant case arose out of the purchase of property, but neither the property, the airplane, nor its title is the basis of this litigation. Air Orlando seeks damages from Aztec for breach of contract and fraud. There is no dispute over the right of possession of the airplane and it cannot qualify under section 47.011 as the “property in litigation.” We also caution that even if Air Orlando had raised a property or title issue in its action, this would not have given Air Orlando the broad latitude of choosing venue wherever it locates the airplane at the time suit is filed....

...On amended complaint, PCG responded with a motion to change venue to either Hernando County—because its registered agent and managing member is there, or to Hillsborough County—because PCG executed the contract there. At hearing, the trial court determined that the motion was brought under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...The trial court granted PCG's motion for change of venue and transferred the case to Hernando County. Actions must be brought in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. § 47.011....

...There is ample provision for transfer of venue upon motion when *1145 justice would so indicate, (emphasis added) Wells at 139 . If subject matter jurisdiction were truly involved, it would not be possible to transfer the cause to another circuit. Williams . REVERSE; REMAND. DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. . § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

Franklin, 387 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1993) states that “[ajctions

...John's County is a more convenient forum.1 In addition to ILD, New Link sued Michael Lewis and Eddie Brooks, two of ILD's corporate officers. Lewis and Brooks filed a motion to transfer venue to St. John's County and asserted there was no proper statutory basis for venue in Pinellas County under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2013)....

...Thus, the only issue is the denial of ILD's motion that sought a transfer of venue under section 47.122. Although the trial court denied ILD's motion on the basis of the "place of payment venue rule," that rule deals with the issue of whether venue is proper under section 47.011 with respect to where the cause of action accrued....

...State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 678, 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). The trial court either failed to rule on ILD's argument under section 47.122 or erred in denying ILD's motion based on a factor that is applicable to an analysis under section 47.011 and not section 47.122....

PIERCE, Acting C. J., and MANN, J., concur. . See, § 47.011, F.S.A. . See, e. g., Croker v. Powell (1934)

case is governed by the general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1995),1 or the special venue

...’s motion to transfer venue. This appeal followed. “We review a lower court’s order on a motion to transfer or dismiss for improper venue for abuse of discretion.” Huber v. Huber, 314 So. 3d 363, 365 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). Pursuant to section 47.011, Florida Statutes, “[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” “It is the prerogative of the plaintiff to sele...

...t-appellee for rent claimed due on real property located in Dade County, Florida. Defendant, who had removed himself from Dade County, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of his privilege to be sued in the county of his residence. Fla.Stat. § 47.011....

by the specific venue statute were not met. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that “[ajctions

March 1, 1982. The controlling venue statute is Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides that

(Fla.1978), but that selection is limited by Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1979), to the county where

...*31 Although the trial judge has some discretion in venue questions it is not unlimited. Generally, it is proper to bring suit, or to maintain it, in the county where the cause of action arose, the property in dispute is located or the defendant resides. § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

...Florida Dept. of Military Affairs, 576 So.2d 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Gries Inv. Co. v. Chelton, 388 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The plaintiff has the right to initially select venue. Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, 78 So.2d 100 (Fla.1955). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1995) provides in pertinent part: Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

...ees, and the order thereon is accordingly affirmed. CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ„ concur. . M. A. Kite Co. v. A. C. Samford, Inc., (Fla.App.1961) 130 So.2d 99 ; Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733 , 156 So. 146 . . F.S. § 47.011, F.S.A.

because defendant McKay is a Broward resident. See § 47.011, Fla. Stat. (1993). Holiday Inns and Paradise

...This is an appeal from an order denying a transfer of venue from Orange to Bro-ward County. We reverse the order because the cause of action did not accrue in Orange County, the defendants are residents of Broward County, entered into the contracts in Broward County and did business there and not in Orange County. See § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

COBB, Chief Judge. This case presents a venue issue dependent upon ascertaining the county in which the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued. It is governed by section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides: Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.......

PER CURIAM. Finding that venue properly lies in Dade County where the cause of action in this case accrued, § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

...ffs will result in substantial inconvenience, undue expense or the likelihood of injustice. Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. . We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(A). . Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1979), providing that an action may be brought in the county where the action accrued, does not apply here because both parties are non-residents and is properly not relied upon on appeal....

procure uninsured motorist coverage for Conway. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1973), provides: [ajctions

...R.App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(A). Denial of Motion to Transfer Venue. An action against a Florida resident “shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” § 47.011, Fla....

...The Harllees’ complaint shows on its face that venue in Manatee County is improper. The parties correctly agree that there is no property in litigation. It is also undisputed that Procacci is a legal resident of Collier County, Florida, which is thus an appropriate venue selection pursuant to section 47.011....

...Frym filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to foreclose on the mortgage encumbering land in Hillsborough County. Frym challenges the denial of that motion with her current petition for writ of prohibition. In the petition, Frym claims that pursuant to section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2006), actions involving property shall only be brought in the county in which the property in litigation is located....

*499to be sued in the county of his residence under § 47.011, Fla.Stat. The plaintiffs claims that § 47.021

since that is where the accident occurred. See § 47.-011, Fla.Stat. (1991) (venue proper where cause of

...2d DCA 1985). In addition, a change of venue is intended to prevent a miscarriage of justice in the correct venue or to afford a more convenient venue. Trawick, Fla.Prac. and Proc., § 5-8, 5-9 (1987). A basis for venue did exist in Palm Beach County. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1987) states, “Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” Delivery of the trusses and their instal...

...General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 434 So.2d 1020 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (because action was on guarantee agreement, and not on the underlying automobile leasing agreement, and there was no contract provision relating to venue in the guaranty agreement, the general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981) applied)....

...Marvin Maxwell filed motions to transfer venue of the Platts’ suit against them from Polk to Highlands County. 1 The circuit court granted their requests. It is not clear from either the motions or the written order whether the basis for the transfer was improper venue under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2001), or the convenience of the parties under section 47.122. On appeal, however, the defendants basically concede that venue was proper in Polk County, and we agree. Thus, section 47.011 could not support a venue change....

...al parent, Dade County was the residence of J.D.M., and the Dade County Circuit Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings that had been ongoing for the past ten years. He further argued that the initial venue selection was improper under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2001), which provides that “[a]c-tions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the prop *1115 erty in litigation is located.” The trial court denied the motion to transfer venue, and this appeal followed....

...contain any venue provisions. Section 39.013(2) authorizes the circuit court to assert exclusive jurisdiction over dependency proceedings under chapter 39, but it says nothing expressly about venue. D.M. contends that the general venue provision of section 47.011 should apply to these proceedings....

...The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, by an order in which it was held that the cause of action accrued in Dade *808 county because the check was presented for payment to a bank in Dade county and was returned there for insufficient funds by the Martin county (drawee) bank. Section 47.011 Fla.Stat., F.S.A., relied on by the defendant in moving for change of venue, provides as follows: “Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located....

appealed order which denied a transfer of venue. § 47.-011, Fla.Stat. (1989). AFFIRMED. GLICKSTEIN, C.J.

for such action does lie in such county under Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1979), as the cause of action

...m Beach County. We have located no case authority applying such a proposition to a dissolution of marriage case. Rather, it is clearly established in Florida that a cause of action for dissolution accrues, for purposes of applying the venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1991), in the single county where the parties last lived with a *400 common intent to remain married....

...tnesses or in the interest of justice, any court of record may transfer any civil action to any other court of record in which it might have been brought. We recognize that plaintiff properly brought this single cause of action in Palm Beach County. § 47.011, Fla.Stat....

side and rear yard setback requirements of section 47-11.4 of the Code of the City of Fort Lauderdale

...1957), wherein the court held that § 47.021 prevails over, and is a qualification of, the venue privilege afforded under § 47.051, as follows: “Section 46.02 [now F.S. § 47.021] places a qualification upon the venue privilege granted to an individual defendant by Section 46.01 [now F.S. § 47.011] and to a corporate defendant by Section 46.04 [now F.S....

...nt of the wife's remarriage, death, or cohabitation," alleging that she had been cohabiting with a man for several months. The trial court granted the former wife's motion to transfer venue to the county of her residence, accepting her argument that section 47.011, Florida Statutes, the general venue statute, applied....

...See § 61.14(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). The trial court concluded that the former husband was seeking to enforce the parties' agreement, not to modify it. Compare Skinner v. Skinner, 678 So.2d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (reversing order denying transfer in accordance with section 47.011, where former wife filed a motion to domesticate and modify Alabama judgment in county in which she resided, because action was more of an enforcement than modification action, in that what wife sought was an escrow account from which...

...to be the sole officers and directors of Sundance, liable individually. The rub here, however, is that Bravo and Knutsson appear to be residents of Pinellas County, and, on this basis, they have moved for dismissal or transfer of venue. They rely on section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1995), which provides that “[ajctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” Rodriguez responds that t...

...the collision, and the entry of judgment against Sundance, took place in Dade County. As a consequence, she contends, the present cause against the Sundance officers and directors accrued in Dade County and her choice of venue is proper pursuant to section 47.011....

...The record shows, and the carrier admits, that it is a foreign corporation which is not doing business in Florida. Since this is the case, the defendant has no venue privilege, and a transitory action like this one may therefore be maintained against it in any county in the state. § 47.011, Fla.Stat....