CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 36465
...there is no question here that both natural parents appeared and fully contested the adoption procedure. On the equal protection issue, respondent natural mother argues, as a parent in an intermediary adoption, that her consent is irrevocable under section
63.082(5), absent a showing of fraud or duress, whereas parents in an agency adoption "have the unfettered right to withdraw their `consent' or surrender." In re I.B.J.,
497 So.2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), review denied,
504 So.2d 766 (Fla. 1987). Respondents' argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, the provision in section
63.082(5) that consents to adoptions may not be withdrawn, absent fraud or duress, is applicable in all adoption proceedings....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1115
...On the question of the validity of the revocation of consent, appellant challenges the trial court's application of Florida law rather than Pennsylvania law. While Florida law is well settled that in the absence of fraud, duress, or undue influence a consent freely and voluntarily given is irrevocable, section
63.082(5), Florida Statutes (1983); In Re Cox,
327 So.2d 776 (Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 2467056
...4th DCA 2003); Citibank, N.A. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co.,
398 So.2d 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Because the Department of Children and Family Services concedes that the trial court was required to permit Adoption Miracles to intervene pursuant to section
63.082(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), we reverse....
...[1] Further, as the Department appears to acknowledge, the birth mother's consent to the adoption of S.N.W. could not be set aside without notice to Adoption Miracles and an appropriate evidentiary basis to establish the consent was obtained by fraud or duress. See § 63.082(4)(b)....
...nd no subsequent documents from that proceeding are in our record. It appears, however, that the trial court intended to proceed with the dependency, and the Department intended to offer the birth mother a case plan for reunification with the child. Section 63.082(6) specifically provides: (a) If a birth parent executes a consent for placement of a minor with an adoption entity or qualified prospective adoptive parents and the minor child is in the custody of the department, but parental rights...
...Further, the trial court erred in setting aside the birth mother's consent without notice to Adoption Miracles that this matter was going to be addressed and without an evidentiary basis to conclude that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress. See § 63.082(4)(b) ("A consent executed under this paragraph is valid upon execution and may be withdrawn only if the court finds that it was obtained by fraud or duress."). Adoption Miracles argues additionally that the dependency court was not authorized to set aside the birth mother's consent to the adoption under any circumstances, relying on the language in section 63.082(6)(a) that an adoption consent executed when a child is in the custody of the Department but parental rights have not been terminated "shall be valid, binding, and enforceable by the court." Adoption Miracles does not assert that the b...
...consider whether the consent may be withdrawn based upon an allegation of fraud or duress. We disagree. Pursuant to section
63.032(7), the term "court" when used in chapter 63 adoption proceedings means "any circuit court of this state." Nothing in section
63.082 prohibits a circuit court that is properly exercising jurisdiction in a dependency case from addressing the validity of a birth mother's consent to an adoption....
...3(4) requires that any orders of the dependency court "be filed by the clerk of the court in any dissolution or other custody action or proceeding and shall take precedence over other custody and visitation orders entered in those actions." Further, section 63.082(6) specifically refers to the dependency court as "the court having jurisdiction over the minor pursuant to the shelter or dependency petition." *373 Here, a shelter petition and a dependency petition were filed before the birth mother signed a consent to the adoption of the child....
...chapter 39 with the circuit court in which the petitions were filed. See §
39.013(2). Thus, Adoption Miracles was required to intervene in the dependency proceeding to pursue the adoption of the child that was the subject of those proceedings. See §
63.082(6)(b)....
...rt. [3] However, the proceedings in the adoption case are secondary to the dependency proceedings. That is, if the dependency court determines the birth mother's consent to adoption was valid, the dependency court must then determine, as required by section 63.082(6)(c), that the prospective adoptive parents are properly qualified to adopt the child and that the adoption appears to be in the best interest of the minor child....
...Nevertheless, pursuant to section
39.013(4), any orders of the dependency court "shall take precedence over other custody and visitation orders" entered in any other division of the circuit court. Adoption Miracles was entitled to intervene in the dependency case pursuant to section
63.082(6)(b), given the birth mother's consent to the adoption of S.N.W....
...[4] We note that the "best interest" determination to be made under these circumstances is somewhat unique. If the birth parent has executed a valid and binding consent to an adoption, the court is not making a comparative assessment of the birth parents versus the prospective adoptive parents. Further, section 63.082(6)(d) specifically provides that the court "shall give consideration to the rights of the birth parent to determine an appropriate placement for the child" an explicit recognition of the parents' constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of their children....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Her letters were not sufficient to raise an issue of fraud or duress, which might justify an additional evidentiary hearing. See § 39.464(1), Fla. Stat. (1991) (consent for voluntary relinquishment can be withdrawn only if obtained by fraud or duress). Cf. § 63.082(5), Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...(1971): "Service of process shall be unnecessary when a written consent is filed with the petition, or thereafter executed in the presence of two witnesses and acknowledged before an officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments ..." This statute has been repealed and replaced by Section 63.082, Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 2292311
...Florida Statutes Chapter 63 controls termination of the parental rights of parents who have voluntarily placed their child for adoption. The court may terminate the parental rights of the mother if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the mother executed a valid consent under section
63.082, Florida Statutes, and that the consent was obtained according to the requirements of Chapter 63. See Fla. Stat. §
63.089(3)(a)(2004). A minor mother may consent to the adoption of her child and relinquish control or custody of the child to an adoption entity. See §
63.082(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). Section
63.082(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), expressly provides that consent to an adoption can be withdrawn only if the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress....
...es are allowed to place, it logically follows that an adoption entity must be involved in every non-relative/step-parent adoption. Chapter 63 also specifies that an adoption entity be involved in a minor parent's placement of her child for adoption. Section 63.082(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), states that a minor parent, "has the power to relinquish his or her control or custody of the child to an adoption entity." This implies that a minor does not have the power to relinquish custody of the child to anyone other than an adoption entity....
...All of these requirements went unmet in this case because no adoption entity was involved. One deficiency in the proceedings here that particularly concerns us is the failure of an adoption entity to interview the mother before she executed her consent. Section 63.082(3)(b) requires a representative of the adoption entity to interview the parent before she executes the consent....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...optive parents had gotten the children and was told they had. Appellant also testified that someone else had told him he could revoke his consent within a year. Consent to adoption can not be withdrawn on a mere whim or because of a change of heart. Section 63.082(5), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that consent may only be withdrawn when the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 505254
...In denying the motion to intervene and to consolidate, the trial court found that S.L.H. had not lived with her maternal grandmother at any time subsequent to her birth, and that the biological parents had executed valid waivers of right to counsel, affidavits of birthparents, and consents for adoption. See § 63.082(5), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 23651
...l to the child. In re Adoption of Baby Girl C.,
511 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); In re Guardianship of D.A. McW.,
460 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1984); Hinkle v. Lindsey,
424 So.2d 983 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); In re Adoption of Cox,
327 So.2d 776 (Fla. 1976). [9] §
63.082(5), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 445795
...Children's Home Society of West Virginia,
17 F.Supp.2d 577 (S.D.W.V.1998); see also Gibbs v. Ernst, 538 Pa. 193, 202, 647 A.2d 882, 886 (1994) (noting that "causes of action for wrongful adoption are no more than an extension of common law principles to the adoption setting"). [3] See §
63.082, Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 6636
...In denying the motion to intervene and to consolidate, the trial court found that S.L.H. had not lived with her maternal grandmother at any time subsequent to her birth, and that the biological parents had executed valid waivers of right to counsel, affidavits of birthparents, and consents for adoption. See § 63.082(5), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1687
...The judgment denying appellants' petition for adoption was entered by the trial court on the basis of its determination that the natural mother, about a week after she had consented to the adoption of her child and before appellants took custody of the child, had validly revoked her consent. Section 63.082(5), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that a "[c]onsent [to an adoption] may be withdrawn only when the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress." The trial court found that the natural mother's consent had been rev...
...justice to *353 appellants in this case from permitting the natural mother to keep her child. We recognize that appellants' argument incorporates other legitimate legal contentions that the law of this case was incorrect. For example, the wording of section 63.082(5), which provides the grounds upon which a parent's consent to an adoption can be withdrawn, is, as we have said, that a parent's consent may be withdrawn "only when the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress." N...
...Equity may grant such relief to the complainant despite the fact that the other party did not by commission or omission contribute to the mistake...." 9 Fla.Jur.2d Cancellation, etc. § 30. In the final analysis, the meaning of the word "duress" in Florida Statutes section 63.082(5) is a matter of legislative intent. Therefore, the interpretation of section 63.082(5) which supports the law of this case is that the legislature did not intend that a matter like this should be controlled by rigid rules of law. In other words, that interpretation is that the legislature did not intend to limit the meaning of the term "duress" in section 63.082(5) to what the Missouri court in In the Matter of D....
...rcumstances." That would be in recognition that the potentially permanent loss of a child to whom a mother gave birth goes to the deepest of human sensitivities. That this statutory interpretation is justified might be attributed to the way in which section 63.082(5) is worded....
...taken to indicate that the legislature contemplated an exercise of judgment by a court in its determination of whether fraud or duress should be found to exist, rather than the application of a rigid legal rule. In that sense Florida courts applying section 63.082(5) would weigh the justice and equities of a case in a way somewhat similar to the way the Missouri court did in In the Matter of D. and D.. This is not to say that that Missouri case may be taken to reflect Florida law. The Missouri statute gave much broader leeway to the courts in deciding when an adoption consent may properly be revoked than does section 63.082(5)....
...Thus, while the law of this case did not represent this court subscribing to the holding of that Missouri case, that case, by having enunciated the concept of duress by force of circumstances, does support the law of this case by showing that the term "duress" contained in section 63.082(5) has a dimension beyond that of legal duress....
...We have obtained and examined a copy of the House Staff Report concerning the Florida Adoption Act as enacted in 1973. That report does not contain any manifestation as to any particular meaning of the term "duress" intended by the legislature to be encompassed within that term as used in section 63.082(5)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 15884, 1998 WL 874913
...elying on the consent, as the judgments in this case and Henriquez would make it appear, but rather on the parent seeking to set aside the consent on the grounds of fraud or duress. Parents who have executed consents pursuant to section 39.464(1) or section
63.082 [2] may not challenge the child's subsequent adoption unless a court finds that the consent was "obtained by fraud or duress." §§ 39.464(1);
63.082(5); In re Cox,
327 So.2d 776, 777-78 (Fla.1976)(absent finding of fraud or duress, consent is irrevocable)....
...In the present case, the evidence did not establish that the mother was under duress when she executed the consent, but rather that she did so freely and voluntarily, *813 and, months later, simply had a change of heart. We therefore affirm. DELL, and GUNTHER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 63.082, Florida Statutes (1997), also authorizes consents in adoptions, and it is similar to section 39.464(1) in that it "may be withdrawn only when the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress." § 63.082(5)....
...this case alleged that the child was dependent within the meaning of Chapter 39. [2] Our conclusions regarding the burden of proof where a parent is seeking to set aside a consent based on fraud or duress would apply to consents executed pursuant to section 63.082 as well as section 39.464....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19419, 1994 WL 741812
...s. Hewitt,
459 U.S. at 466,
103 S.Ct. at 868-69, citing Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 223-27,
96 S.Ct. 2532, 2537-40,
49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). Plaintiffs contend that they had a liberty interest of entitlement to a judicial hearing pursuant to either §
63.082(5), Fla.Stat., or § 61.131, Fla.Stat., prior to being deprived of legal custody of Bradley....
...Plaintiffs contend that Bradley should not have been taken unless Ms. Martin's consent was properly revoked and that consent can only be properly revoked when there has been a judicial determination that the consent was originally obtained by fraud or duress. Fla.Stat. § 63.082(5)....
...Martin's status affects Plaintiffs' statutory right as persons in physical custody of Bradley to notice and opportunity to be heard. Defendants suggested at the oral argument that Plaintiffs would have enjoyed a liberty interest in a right to notice and hearing under § 63.082(5) had they simply initiated adoption proceedings. Section 63.082(5) provides that "Consent [to an adoption] may be withdrawn only when the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress." Although this provision is found within the adoption statute, Defendants provide no statutory lang...
...As noted above, § 61.131 requires that, "[b]efore a decree is made under this act, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to ... any person who has physical custody of the child." "Shall" indicates that notice and an opportunity to be heard are mandatory, not discretionary. Furthermore, § 63.082(5) provides that "Consent may be withdrawn only when the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress." As with § 61.131, the need for a judicial determination is mandatory, rather than discretionary, as evidenced by the us...
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2205
...aw her consent and would contest the adoption. A hearing was held in which the mother made a motion to withdraw her consent. It was the opinion of the trial court that the consent could only be withdrawn upon a showing of fraud or duress pursuant to section 63.082(5), Florida Statutes (1985), or if the consent document was executed without full knowledge of its effect....
...Black's Law Dictionary, 1295 (Rev. 5th Ed. 1979). When the natural mother in this case resisted and *1267 the child was taken over her objection, there was no surrender. The trial court erred when it required a showing of fraud or duress to withdraw a valid consent because section 63.082(5), Florida Statutes (1985) does not apply to dependency hearings....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 115954
...She asserts that the consent was executed under duress, that she was not afforded the opportunity to review the document, and that she received no counselling to insure that it was voluntary. She also claims that Bischoff failed to comply with sections
63.022(k),
63.082(5), and
63.092(1) and (3)(c), Florida Statutes (1985). We affirm the trial court's order dismissing Hindman's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Under the present state of the law, a consent to adoption may only be withdrawn upon a judicial finding that it was obtained by fraud or duress. §
63.082(5), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 188243
...confront a critical obstacle in their challenge to the December 2005 order. The impediment derives from the fact that the court's order is merely a preliminary procedural step on the way to the order that they ultimately want to challengea decision that a private adoption is in J.T.'s best interest pursuant to section 63.082(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2006). The Department does not and acknowledges that it cannot challenge the propriety of permitting Heart of Adoptions to intervene in the dependency action pursuant to section 63.082(6)(b), which provides as follows: Upon execution of the consent of the birth parent, the adoption entity shall be permitted to intervene in the dependency case as a party in interest and shall provide the court having jurisdiction over...
...n adoption entity has intervened pursuant to this section. Heart of Adoptions provided the circuit court with the statutorily required home study. However, the circuit court specifically halted the process before taking the next steps as required by section 63.082(6)(c): Upon a determination by the court that the prospective adoptive parents are properly qualified to adopt the minor child and that the adoption appears to be in the best interest of the minor child, the court shall immediately order the transfer of custody of the minor child to the prospective adoptive parents, under the supervision of the adoption entity. . . . Making the best-interest determination under section 63.082(6)(c) would require the circuit court to analyze the factors set out in section (6)(d) as follows: In determining whether the best interest of the child will be served by transferring the custody of the minor child to the prospective a...
...inal order is challenged by way of certiorari. Curry v. State,
880 So.2d 751, 755-56 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The circuit court should not have attempted to transfer the case in the first place until it made the required best-interest determination under section
63.082....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Appellants sought to invalidate M.A.B.'s adoption more than one year after the entry of the final judgment. They maintain that their action is not barred because HRS concealed crucial information concerning the extent of M.A.B.'s psychological problems, in contravention of section 63.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987)....
...[4] Agreeing that fraud is not a mere irregularity, we hold that the motion to annul the adoption is not barred by the time limitations of section
63.182, Florida Statutes (1987). Appellants seek to establish that HRS knowingly failed to provide a complete medical history of the child in contravention of the requirements of section
63.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987)....
...[2] Although annulment of an adoption is not usually in the best interest of the child, the circumstances of this case do not fall within the usual pattern. Annulments are more often sought by the parent who gives the child for adoption rather than by the adopting parent. [3] Section 63.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), requires HRS to attach a copy of the child's medical history to the form providing consent to adoption....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Hirsch Distrib., Inc.,
442 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
3
custody of the foster parents and to be adopted by them. However, it is
not the court’s role to determine which placement would be better for the
child. Section
63.082(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2017), provides that “[i]f a
parent executes a consent for adoption, ....
...that the
prospective adoptive parents are qualified to adopt the child and that the
adoption is in the best interests of the child, “the court shall promptly
order the transfer of custody of the minor child to the prospective adoptive
parents.” § 63.082(6)(d), Fla....
...not that it is the best choice as evaluated by the court or the Department
in light of other alternatives.” See In re S.N.W.,
912 So. 2d 368, 373 n.4
(Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
In determining the best interests of the child, the legislature
enumerated in section
63.082(6)(e), the following non-exclusive factors to
be considered by the trial court:
1....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 16035
...4th DCA 2003); Citibank, N.A. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co.,
398 So.2d 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Because the Department of Children and Family Services concedes that the trial court was required to permit Adoption Miracles to intervene pursuant to section
63.082(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), we reverse....
...1 Further, as the Department appears to acknowledge, the birth mother’s consent to the adoption of S.N.W. could not be set aside without notice to Adoption Miracles and an appropriate evidentiary basis to establish the consent was obtained by fraud or duress. See § 63.082(4)(b)....
...nd no subsequent documents from that proceeding are in our record. It appears, however, that the trial court intended to proceed with the dependency, and the Department intended to offer the birth mother a case plan for reunification with the child. Section 63.082(6) specifically provides: (a) If a birth parent executes a consent for placement of a minor with an adoption entity or qualified prospective adoptive parents and the minor child is in the custody of the department, but parental rights...
...Further, the trial court erred in setting aside the birth mother’s consent without notice to Adoption Miracles that this matter was going to be addressed and without an evidentiary basis to conclude that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress. See § 63.082(4)(b) (“A consent executed under this paragraph is valid upon execution and may be withdrawn only if the court finds that it was obtained by fraud or duress.”). Adoption Miracles argues additionally that the dependency court was not authorized to set aside the birth mother’s consent to the adoption under any circumstances, relying on the language in section 63.082(6)(a) that an adoption consent executed when a child is in the custody of the Department but parental rights have not been terminated “shall be valid, binding, and enforceable by the court.” Adoption Miracles does not assert that t...
...r whether the consent may be withdrawn based upon an allegation of fraud or duress. We disagree. Pursuant to section
63.032(7), the term “court” when used in chapter 63 adoption proceedings means “any circuit court of this state.” Nothing in section
63.082 prohibits a circuit court that is properly exercising jurisdiction in a dependency case from addressing the validity of a birth mother’s consent to an adoption....
...requires that any orders of the dependency court “be filed by the clerk of the court in any dissolution or other custody action or proceeding and shall take precedence over other custody and visitation orders entered in those actions.” Further, section 63.082(6) specifically refers to the dependency court as “the court having jurisdiction over the minor pursuant to the shelter or dependency petition.” *373 Here, a shelter petition and a dependency petition were filed before the birth mother signed a consent to the adoption of the child....
...chapter 39 with the circuit court in which the petitions were filed. See §
39.013(2). Thus, Adoption Miracles was required to intervene in the dependency proceeding to pursue the adoption of the child that was the subject of those proceedings. See §
63.082(6)(b)....
...rt. 3 However, the proceedings in the adoption case are secondary to the dependency proceedings. That is, if the dependency court determines the birth mother’s consent to adoption was valid, the dependency court must then determine, as required by section 63.082(6)(c), that the prospective adoptive parents are properly qualified to adopt the child and that the adoption appears to be in the best interest of the minor child....
...Nevertheless, pursuant to section
39.013(4), any orders of the dependency court “shall take precedence over other custody and visitation orders” entered in any other division of the circuit court. Adoption Miracles was entitled to intervene in the dependency case pursuant to section
63.082(6)(b), given the birth mother’s consent to the adoption of S.N.W....
...We note that the “best interest” determination to be made under these circumstances is somewhat unique. If the birth parent has executed a valid and binding consent to an adoption, the court is not making a comparative assessment of the birth parents versus the prospective adoptive parents. Further, section 63.082(6)(d) specifically provides that the court "shall give consideration to the rights of the birth parent to determine an appropriate placement for the child” — an explicit recognition of the parents' constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of their children....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 20849, 2014 WL 7331269
...Accordingly, the court granted Grandmother’s motion to strike Aunt’s counter-petition for adoption. Aunt then moved to intervene in the adoption proceeding. She argued that she should be able to present evidence as to the factors articulated in section 63.082, Florida Statutes (2013), including Child’s bonding with her and the permanency she offered Child. Grandmother argued, however, that the court had previously determined that section 63.082, Florida Statutes, would only apply if Child was in DCF custody and because Child was not, section 63.082 did not apply....
...ould be conducted without requiring inclusion of such pertinent information and such key participants.” Thus, it relied on considerations such as the Child’s needs and Child’s bonding with his caregiver that “would [have been] required under section 63.082(6)(e) if the child was in the custody of the department and adoption entity legally permitted to intervene [in the dependency proceeding].” As a result, the trial court dismissed Grandmother’s petition....
...t and whether that consent was obtained according to the requirements of chapter 63. Then, he argued, the court should have determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, if adoption by Grandmother was in Child’s best interests, without utilizing section 63.082(6)....
...clear and convincing evidence that the father’s parental rights should be terminated pending adoption by the paternal grandmother.” Grandmother and Father contend that the trial court applied an erroneous “best interests” standard utilizing section 63.082(6), thereby disregarding Father’s constitutional right to select an adoptive parent for Child....
...h in the same proceeding. Section
63.089(3)(a) allows the trial court to terminate parental rights pending adoption if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, supported by written findings, that the parent has executed a valid consent under section
63.082 and the consent was obtained according to the requirements of chapter 63. Before the trial court can consider the best interests of the child, it must first determine that the parent’s consent was given as required by section
63.082....
...s in the best interest of the person to be adopted, a judgment of adoption shall be entered. (Emphasis added). The trial court should have applied section
63.142(4) to consider Child’s best interests with respect to the adoption, without utilizing section
63.082(6), which was inapplicable to this proceeding....
...In such cases, the petitioner may file a joint petition for termination of parental rights and adoption....”). The pendency of the dependency proceeding did not prohibit Grandmother from filing the separate adoption proceeding. See In re S.N.W.,
912 So.2d 368, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). . Grandmother is correct that section
63.082(6)(a) only applies when a child is in DCF custody. See §
63.082(6)(a), Fla....
...e made under these circumstances is somewhat unique. If the birth parent has executed a valid and binding consent to an adoption, the court is not making a comparative assessment of the birth parents versus the prospective adoptive parents. Further, section 63.082(6)(d) specifically provides that the court "shall give consideration to the rights of the birth parent to determine an appropriate placement for the child” — an explicit recognition of the parents' constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of their children....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 13468, 2014 WL 4249679
...When the trial court found, as it did here, that the prospective mother was qualified to adopt and that C.M.’s placement with her was in the child’s best interest, the court was required to “immediately order the transfer of custody” of the child to the prospective mother. § 63.082(6)(d), Fla....
...The mother’s choice of placement with a prospective parent when her parental rights were still intact was an exclusively parental decision. The decision was subject only to the trial court determining that the prospective parent was properly qualified and that the adoption was in C.M.’s best interests. §
63.082(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (2014); In re S.N.W.,
912 So.2d 368 , 373 n. 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (noting §
63.082(6)(d) is “explicit recognition of the parents’ constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of their children” (citing In re C.W.W.,
788 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 1039728
...Wendie Michelle Cooper, Orlando, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Guardian Ad Litem. PALMER, J. P.K. (mother) appeals the trial court's order denying her petition for approval of a conditional surrender of parental rights and proposed adoption of her minor children filed pursuant to section 63.082(6) of Florida's Adoption Act....
...After the case was remanded to the trial court, but before the trial court complied with our mandate, an adoption agency known as A Chosen Child, Inc., filed an emergency motion to intervene in the proceedings. The agency sought a change of custody pursuant to section 63.082(6) of the Florida Statutes....
...charged with the duty of ensuring that the best interests of the children are advanced; this duty exists during dependency proceedings and continues through adoption proceedings. B.Y. *134 v. Dep't of Children & Families,
887 So.2d 1253 (Fla.2004). Section
63.082(6) of the Florida Statutes was enacted to address the factual situation which presents itself in the instant case. Section
63.082(6)(c) of the Florida Statutes provides:
63.082....
...child and that the adoption appears to be in the best interest of the minor child, the court shall immediately order the transfer of custody of the minor child to the prospective adoptive parents, under the supervision of the adoption entity. . . . § 63.082(6)(c), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 2373903
...(Thus there was no way that a determination could be made as to claims by other persons.); contrary to §
63.062, F.S. (2001), Respondent failed to obtain and file a consent to adopt form from the biological father even though the surrender is stated in the petition for adoption. (Bar Exhibit 32); contrary to §
63.082(3)(a), F.S. (2001), Respondent failed to obtain and file a family, social and medical history from the biological father; contrary to §
63.082(3)(b), F.S. (2001), Respondent failed to obtain and file an interview, summary, or statement from the biological father; contrary to §
63.082(6), F.S....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 14744
...Florida Statutes Chapter 63 controls termination of the parental rights of parents who have voluntarily placed their child for adoption. The court may terminate the parental rights of the mother if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the mother executed a valid consent under section
63.082, Florida Statutes, and that the consent was obtained according to the requirements of Chapter 63. See Fla. Stat. §
63.089 (3)(a)(2004). A minor mother may consent to the adoption of her child and relinquish control or custody of the child to an adoption entity. See §
63.082(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). Section
63.082(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), expressly provides that consent to an adoption can be withdrawn only if the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress....
...are allowed to place, it logically follows that an adoption entity must be involved in every non-relative/step-parent adoption. Chapter 63 also specifies that an adoption entity be involved in a minor parent’s placement of her child for adoption. Section 63.082(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), states that a minor parent, “has the power to relinquish his or her control or custody of the child to an adoption entity.” This implies that a minor does not have the power to relinquish custody of the child to anyone other than an adoption entity....
...All of these requirements went unmet in this case because no adoption entity was involved. One deficiency in the proceedings here that particularly concerns us is the failure of an adoption entity to interview the mother before she executed her consent. Section 63.082(3)(b) requires a representative of the adoption entity to interview the parent before she executes the consent....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...ce by
publication. The trial court denied Y.G.’s motion to continue and
conducted the TPR trial, after which it terminated Y.G.’s
parental rights to A.P.
2
II. CONSENT TO ADOPTION
Section 63.082, Florida Statutes, governs proceedings related
to a parent’s consent to adoption.
If a parent executes a consent for adoption of a minor
with an adoption entity or qualified prospective adoptive
parents and the minor child is under the supervision of
the department . . . , but parental rights have not yet
been terminated, the adoption consent is valid, binding,
and enforceable by the court.
§ 63.082(6)(a), Fla. Stat. Once the parent executes a consent for
adoption, the trial court must permit the adoption entity to
intervene in the dependency case. § 63.082(6)(b), Fla....
...Stat. The
“dependency court shall promptly grant a hearing to determine
whether the adoption entity has filed the required documents to
be permitted to intervene and whether a change of placement of
the child is in the best interests of the child.” § 63.082(6)(c), Fla.
Stat....
...“In determining whether the best interests of the child are
served by transferring the custody of the minor child to the
prospective adoptive parent,” the trial court must consider eight
factors, including the “right of the parent to determine an
appropriate placement for the child.” § 63.082(6)(e), Fla. Stat. If
the trial court determines that the prospective adoptive parents
are properly qualified and adoption is in the best interests of the
child, the court must transfer custody of the child to the
prospective adoptive parents. § 63.082(6)(d), Fla. Stat. 1
1 The parties appear to have proceeded on the basis that the
grandfather, or his counsel, was an “adoption entity” for purposes
of section 63.082(6)(b)-(d)....
...as
not addressed below and because it is not relevant to the question
of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Y.G.’s
motion to continue.
3
Appellate courts have addressed compliance with section
63.082 in the context of dependency proceedings when consent to
adoption has been given before parents have lost their parental
rights....
...3d DCA 2017) (holding that when a trial court
considers a motion to transfer a dependent child, it “must
consider the wishes of the parent or parents, if their parental
rights have not been terminated, and weigh those wishes with
the other [] factors articulated in section 63.082(6), which relate
to the best interests of the child”); R.L....
...prospective adoptive
parents).
Here, the question is not whether the trial court erred in
ruling on the motion to intervene, as a ruling was never issued.
After the grandfather filed his motion to intervene, a best-
interests hearing pursuant section 63.082(6) was required.
Because none of the parties were prepared to proceed on a
hearing as to the grandfather’s adoption, Y.G....
...tervene when an
adoptive home study was completed. 2 Shortly after the trial court
2 This delay stems from the grandfather’s counsel’s apparent
belief that an adoptive home study (in addition to the relative
home study) was required under section 63.082(6)(b), Florida
5
denied the motion, the home study was completed, the
grandfather moved to intervene, and Y.G....
...IV. CONCLUSION
While it is understandable that a trial court would deny a
motion to continue filed the day before trial, the trial court should
have granted Y.G.’s motion to continue the TPR trial and
scheduled proceedings consistent with section 63.082(6)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 1813520, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 8019
...” The pleading of misrepresentation is a separate and distinct basis for a motion for relief from *304 judgment under rule 1.540(b)(3), along with “other misconduct by an adverse party.” In addition, we also conclude the mother’s allegation of duress based on section 63.082(7)(f), Florida Statutes (2010), and arising from the circumstances attendant to her signing of the Consent to Adoption, was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss....
...Further proceedings are to be prioritized. BENTON, C.J., and THOMAS, J., concur. The mother’s motions were filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(3), specifically made applicable to these proceedings by Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540, and section 63.082(7)(f), Florida Statutes (2010)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 319, 1999 WL 18399
...In this appeal, the mother argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in not allowing her to withdraw her consent because she signed the papers under duress. While we are sympathetic, we must affirm the order on appeal. Chapter 63 of the Florida Statutes governs the procedures for adoption. Section 63.082(4), Florida Statutes (1997), provides that a consent for voluntary surrender must be executed only after the birth of the child, in the presence of two witnesses, with the acknowledgment of a notary. Section 63.082(5) provides that "[c]onsent may be withdrawn only when the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress." Here, the mother does not allege that the adoption agency engaged in any fraud or duress....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 2232, 2006 WL 398631
...appeals the order of the trial court, contending that the court erred in determining that her consent was valid and binding, because the adoption entity refused to accept the surrender. As the Guardian Ad Litem Program notes, C.G. is not entitled to withdraw the surrender and consent absent fraud or duress in its execution. Section
63.082(6)(a), Florida Statutes, provides: (6)(a) If a birth parent executes a consent for placement of a minor with an adoption entity or qualified prospective adoptive parents and the minor child is in the custody of the department, but parental rights have not yet been terminated, the adoption consent shall be valid, binding, and enforceable by the court. If the child is under six months, section
63.082(4)(b), Florida Statutes, states such a consent “may be withdrawn only if the court finds that it was obtained by fraud or duress.” See also In re Adoption of Doe,
543 So.2d 741 (Fla.1989); J.S....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 5527
...See In re: Adoption of Baby E.A.W.,
658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.1995). We affirm the father’s remaining issues without comment. Section 68.062(1), Florida Statutes (2009), authorizes termination of parental rights pending adoption when the parents have executed written consent that complies with section
63.082, Florida Statutes (2009). Section
63.089, Florida Statutes (2009), permits the circuit court to terminate parental rights pending adoption when it has determined by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has “executed a valid consent under s.
63.082 and the consent was obtained according to the requirements of this chapter.” It is undisputed that the father signed a consent form that was inconsistent with material provisions of section
63.082. Specifically, the consent form expressly allowed the father to withdraw his consent any time before placement of the child with the adoptive parents, which he did. Section
63.082(4)(c), however, provides only a three-day revocation period....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Counsel for Heart of
Adoptions did not object to the delay.
On July 18, 2022, the court entered a written order granting the
motion to intervene but denying the motion for change of placement.
The court found, after considering all the statutory factors, see §
63.082(6)(e), Fla....
...the trial court revoked the consent upon which Adoption Miracles' status
as a party was based, id. at 369, in this case the consent to the adoption
is still valid and enforceable and cannot be withdrawn unless "the court
finds that it was obtained by fraud or duress," see § 63.082(4)(b).
Regardless of where the child is placed during the pendency of the
Department's termination of parental rights action, Heart of Adoptions
would be required to file a separate action in order to achieve permanent
placement of the...
...While the trial court declined to place the child with
the prospective adoptive parents because it determined that adoption by
them would not be in the best interest of the child, the trial court did
find the prospective adoptive parents qualified. See § 63.082(6)(d) ("If ....
...that it would need to
file another motion to intervene, given that the biological mother's
consent to adoption remains valid and did not name the specific
prospective adoptive parent to whom the court declined to transfer
placement of the child. See § 63.082(6)(b) ("Upon execution of the
consent of the parent, the adoption entity shall be permitted to intervene
5
in the dependency case as a party in interest and must provide the court
that acquired juris...
...for
change of placement is the loss of a right to which Heart of Adoptions is
statutorily entitled upon the demonstration of the prospective parents'
qualification and determination that transfer of custody is in the best
interest of the child. See § 63.082(6)(d) ("If after consideration of all
6
relevant factors, including those set forth in paragraph (e), the court
determines that the prospective adoptive parents are properly qualified to
adopt the m...
...Id.
Here, similarly, an appeal after the culmination of the proceedings to
terminate the biological mother's parental rights will not restore the
potential adoptive parents' right to obtain custody over the child prior to
termination. See generally § 63.082(6)(a) (providing that the consent to
adoption remains "valid, binding, and enforceable" prior to termination of
parental rights pursuant to chapter 39).
Furthermore, the inability of Heart of Adoptions to secure the
temporary placement...
...adoption] may be filed by a parent or person having physical
custody of the minor. The petition may be filed by an
adoption entity only if a parent or person having physical or
legal custody who has executed a consent to adoption
pursuant to s. 63.082 also consents in writing to the adoption
entity filing the petition.
8
(Emphasis added)....
...Kaklamanos,
843 So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003).
A.
Heart of Adoptions argues that the trial court failed to hold the
hearing and enter an order on the motion for change of placement within
the time required under section
63.082(6)(c)....
...final hearing on the motion to intervene and the change of
placement of the child must be held within 30 days after the
9
filing of the motion, and a written final order shall be filed
within 15 days after the hearing.
§ 63.082(6)(c) (emphasis added).
Neither the evidentiary hearing nor the written order was timely.
However, Heart of Adoptions failed to preserve the timeliness issue below.
During the hearing on the change of placement, when the court
recounte...
...timeliness of the proceedings below and because the deviations from the
statutory time constraints do not amount to fundamental error, the trial
court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law by failing
to strictly adhere to the time requirements set forth in section
63.082(6)(c).
B.
Heart of Adoptions also contends that the trial court failed to give
proper weight to the biological mother's fundamental liberty interest to
direct the care, custody, and management of her child....
...is specifically
protected by our [state constitutional] privacy provision.' " D.M.T. v.
T.M.H.,
129 So. 3d 320, 335 (Fla. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting
Beagle v. Beagle,
678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996)). "Although parents
have a fundamental right to raise their children, and section
63.082(6)(e)
provides the parents with the statutory right to select a prospective
adoptive parent or parents for the child, that right is not absolute."
Guardian Ad Litem Program v....
...3d 1177, 1181–82 (Fla.
5th DCA 2022) (quoting E.Q. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams.,
208 So. 3d
1258, 1260 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)). The parents' selection of the
prospective adoptive parent is one of eight statutory factors that the trial
court must consider in its determination. See §
63.082(6)(e)8 (directing
the trial court to "consider and weigh all relevant factors including ....
...dependent child who is under the supervision of the
Department, the trial court must consider the wishes of the
natural parent or parents, if their parental rights have not
been terminated, and weigh those wishes with the other seven
factors articulated in section
63.082(6)(e), along with "all
relevant factors."
Campbell,
348 So. 3d at 1182 (emphasis in original) (quoting §
63.082(6)(e)).
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court failed
to give due consideration to the fact that the biological mother executed
the consent in favor of Heart of Adoptions as one consideration among all
of the factors set forth in section
63.082(6)(e)....
...The selection of a particular adoption agency itself could, depending on
the circumstances, be considered one manner in which a parent
12
exercises her "right . . . to determine an appropriate placement for the
child." See § 63.082(6)(e)8....
...C.
Relying on S.C.W., as well as W.K. v. Department of Children &
Families,
230 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), which relies on language
in a footnote in the S.C.W. opinion, Heart of Adoptions argues that in
applying the section
63.082(6)(e) factors, the trial court improperly
compared the current placement with the prospective adoptive parents
and determined that placement with the foster parents was "better" than
placement with the prospective adoptive parents....
...This argument,
however, misapprehends the court's order. Rather, after weighing the
requisite statutory factors, the court determined that a change in
placement was not in the child's best interests and properly denied the
change in placement on that basis.
Section 63.082(6)(e) sets forth the factors that the trial court must
consider "[i]n determining whether the best interests of the child are
served by transferring the custody of the minor child to the prospective
adoptive parent selected by the pare...
...Whether a petition for termination of parental rights
has been filed pursuant to s.
39.806(1)(f), (g), or (h);
7. What is best for the child; and
8. The right of the parent to determine an appropriate
placement for the child.
§
63.082(6)(e).
The trial court did that in this case....
...ourt to assess aspects of any
potential adoptive home in which the child is currently residing when
determining whether to transfer the child to the home of the prospective
adoptive parent selected by the biological parent or adoption agency.
Section 63.082(6)(e) includes an inexhaustive list of factors upon
which the trial court must base its determination of "whether the best
interests of the child are served by transferring the custody of the minor
child to the prospective adoptive parent selected by the parent or
adoption entity." See § 63.082(6)(e) (emphasis added)....
...Whether a petition for termination of parental rights
has been filed pursuant to s.
39.806(1)(f), (g), or (h);
7. What is best for the child; and
8. The right of the parent to determine an appropriate
placement for the child.
§
63.082(6)(e) (emphasis added)....
...opinion, and the conclusion the Fourth District
derived is in derogation of the language of the applicable statute.
In S.C.W., this court indicated that in determining whether to grant
an adoption agency's motion to intervene and to transfer the child to the
custody of the prospective adoptive parents pursuant to section 63.082,
a trial court is "prevented from comparing the birth parents' choice of
prospective adoptive parents with other potential placements that the
court or the Department might choose for the child." S.C.W., 912 So....
....
(emphasis added) (quoting §
39.810). That inapplicable clause describes
the standard that a court must utilize "[i]n a hearing on a petition for
termination of parental rights," see §
39.810—not a motion to intervene
and transfer custody under section
63.082, the terms of which, as
explained above, compel a comparative analysis between the child's
current placement in a prospective adoptive home and the home of the
prospective adoptive parents to which the adoption agency seeks to
transfer the child.
It is not necessary for this court to assess whether the language in
S.C.W. supports the conclusion reached by Heart of Adoptions and the
18
Fourth District that section
63.082 prohibits a trial court from drawing a
comparison between the prospective adoptive home and an existing
placement in another prospective adoptive home. That is because we are
not bound by the S.C.W. court's interpretation of section
63.082(6)
because it is dicta, a "statement of law in a judicial opinion that is not a
holding." Pedroza v....
...appropriate; it had no reason to do so because it denied the adoption
agency's motion to intervene after setting aside the birth mother's
consent. As such, in reviewing and reversing that order, the issue of a
transfer of custody to a prospective adoptive parent under section
63.082(6) was not before this court, rendering any pronouncement
regarding comparison of placements as it relates to a transfer of custody
inessential to the case's holding and therefore nonbinding dicta....
...See id.
The Fifth District's opinion in Guardian Ad Litem Program v.
Campbell,
348 So. 3d 1177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022), cited by the
Department, distinguished what it believed to be S.C.W.'s interpretation
19
of section
63.082(6) by explaining that S.C.W....
...permanency offered,
the child's bonding with any potential adoptive home that the
child has been residing in, and the importance of maintaining
sibling relationships, if possible.
Campbell,
348 So. 3d at 1181 n.2, 1182 n.4 (quoting §
63.082(6)(e), Fla.
Stat. (2015)). The court in Campbell draws a distinction between the two
versions of section
63.082(6), explaining that the former version of the
statute contained a nonexhaustive list of factors whereas the new version
requires that the court consider and weigh all relevant factors.
Campbell,
348 So. 3d at 1182 ("The current version of section
63.082(6)
is clear that when considering a motion to transfer custody of a
dependent child who is under the supervision of the Department, the
trial court must consider the wishes of the natural parent or parents, if
their parental rights have not been terminated, and weigh those wishes
with the other seven factors articulated in section
63.082(6)(e), along
with 'all relevant factors.' " (quoting §
63.082(6)(e))).
The distinction identified by the Fifth District in Campbell is not
compelling. Both the prior and current versions of the statute contain
materially similar language that references an alternative adoptive home
and requires the trial court to assess the child's placement in each home.
Compare §
63.082(6)(d), Fla....
...or the child, the permanency
20
offered, the child's bonding with any potential adoptive home that the
child has been residing in, and the importance of maintaining sibling
relationships, if possible."), with § 63.082(6)(e), Fla....
...the best one "in light of other alternatives." See W.K.,
230 So. 3d at 908.
Regardless of whether the Fourth District's proposition is justifiably
based on a reasonable interpretation of the dicta in S.C.W. construing
21
section
63.082, it is faulty because it is not in accord with the language
of the statute itself.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
22
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
not have party status in an Adoption Entity’s section
63.082(6) intervention proceeding regarding the child’s
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2225, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 15998
...me and on the other hand the natural father who strenuously objects to the adop *1308 tion and removal and himself seeks custody- As a general rule, the release by the mother of her parental rights is irrevocable absent a showing of fraud or duress. § 63.082(5), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Kistner, P.A., acting as the adoption entity, 1 in termination of
parental right proceedings. Chapter 63 requires the court to permit
intervention by an adoption entity “[i]f a parent executes a consent for
adoption of a minor with an adoption entity.” § 63.082(6)(a), Fla....
...Later, the Florida Department of
Children and Families sought to terminate parental rights as to all four
children under section
39.802, Florida Statutes (2020).
Denise E. Kistner, in her capacity as adoption entity, 2 moved to
intervene in the TPR proceeding under section
63.082(6), Florida Statutes
(2020)....
...and the Department of Children and Families in matters
relating to permanent placement options for children in the
care of the department whose birth parents wish to participate
in a private adoption plan with a qualified family.
Although section 63.082(6) used the singular word “parent,” the court
reasoned that reading “parent” to require only one parent’s consent
“ignore[d] those provisions of Chapter 63 requiring the consent of both
parents.”
The court was also co...
... ii. Analysis 4
The adoption entity appeals the denial of the motion to intervene. 5 The
adoption entity argues the circuit court erred when it determined that the
terms “a parent” and “the parent” in sections 63.082(6)(a) and (6)(b),
Florida Statutes (2020), require an adoption entity to obtain the consent
of both parents to intervene in the dependency proceeding....
...dependency court shall promptly grant a hearing to determine
whether the adoption entity has filed the required documents
to be permitted to intervene and whether a change of
placement of the child is in the best interests of the child.
§ 63.082(6)(a)-(c), Fla....
...That appeal, R.R. v. Dep’t of Children
and Families, et al., Case No. 4D21-1366, will be dismissed by separate order on
the date this opinion issues.
4
We first turn to the plain language of sections
63.082(6)(a) and (6)(b).
“Parent” is defined in the statute as “a woman who gives birth to a child .
. . or a man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required
under s.
63.062(1).” §
63.032(12), Fla. Stat. (2021). The statute does not
define “parent” to include both parents.
Nor do the articles preceding “parent” in section
63.082(6)(a) and (b)
suggest both parents’ consent is required....
...definite or has been previously specified by context or by circumstance”).
Based on the statute’s plain language, we conclude that the statute
requires only one parent’s consent for an adoption entity to intervene.
Therefore, intervention under section 63.082(6) does not require both
parents’ consent.
Like the circuit court, we do not view section 63.082(6) in isolation. But
the circuit court turned to provisions requiring the birth mother’s consent
for an adoption. The issue of adoption is not before us. The issue in this
appeal relates solely to intervention.
The limited caselaw discussing section 63.082(6) supports our
conclusion....
...court to permit [the
adoption entity] to intervene in this proceeding once it filed the birth
mother’s consent to the adoption.” Id. at 372; see also id. at 374 (the
adoption entity “was entitled to intervene in the dependency case pursuant
to section 63.082(6)(b), given the birth mother’s consent to the adoption”).
There, as here, only one parent’s consent was sufficient to require the
adoption entity’s intervention.
5
iii....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...ative caregiver. He presents that at the end of the final termination hearing, he and the non-relative caregiver "struck a deal" where he would voluntarily surrender his rights in contemplation of an open adoption. He further argues that pursuant to section 63.082(6)(g), he had the right to participate in Child's placement by consenting to a private adoption plan....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...ative caregiver. He presents that at the end of the final termination hearing, he and the non-relative caregiver "struck a deal" where he would voluntarily surrender his rights in contemplation of an open adoption. He further argues that pursuant to section 63.082(6)(g), he had the right to participate in Child's placement by consenting to a private adoption plan....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 8061, 2005 WL 1249208
...Gift of Life’s motion recites-that the child was born to K.R. and the biological father, that the birth mother and birth father voluntarily executed consents for adoption, and that the prospective adoptive parents are the paternal aunt *330 and uncle of the child. The motion relied upon section 63.082(6), Florida Statutes (2003)....
...and the sibling from whom S.M.A.L. had been separated while in state custody. The attorney for Gift of Life argued that the Legal Father had no standing to object to the intervention because he had no biological connection to S.M.A.L. The attorney asserted that section 63.082, Florida Statutes, provided only biological parents with a right, prior to having their parental rights terminated, to place a child with a private agency; a legal father’s rights were not contemplated under the statute....
...Judicial Review”: “Should the parents of [S.M.A.L.] execute consents for her placement with Gift of Life or qualified prospective adoptive parents, Gift of Life shall be permitted to intervene in this case as a party in interest, pursuant to Ch. 63.082(6), Fla. Stat.” . Section 63.082 governs the execution of consents to adoption. Subsection (6) provides for a “birth parent” the ability to consent to placement of the child with an adoption entity. . It seems that the court was persuaded by the language of the "Consent to Adoption” form set out in section 63.082(4)(e), Florida Statutes (2003), which states, in part: "A biological father may execute a consent at any time after the birth of the child.” .The judgment terminating parental rights erroneously states that the Legal Father failed to...
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1115, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 13797
...On the question of the validity of the revocation of consent, appellant challenges the trial court’s application of Florida law rather than Pennsylvania law. While Florida law is well settled that in the absence of fraud, duress, or undue influence a consent freely and voluntarily given is irrevocable, section
63.082(5), Florida Statutes (1983); In Re Cox,
327 So.2d 776 (Fla.1976); Grabovetz v....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Appellant Guardian Ad Litem Program; Dwight O. Slater, Appellate Counsel,
Tallahassee, for Appellant Department of Children and Families.
No appearance for Appellees.
PER CURIAM.
We affirm the dependency court’s order placing J.R. with Appellees for
adoption pursuant to section 63.082(6), Florida Statutes (2015), because we find no
error in the court’s interpretation and application of the statute under the
circumstances of this case....
...ticulated by the dependency court at the
hearing below (and echoed by Appellants in their briefs) appear to have been
addressed by recently-approved legislation. See Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 590,
§ 2 (2016) (Enrolled) (substantially amending § 63.082(6), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 8184, 1999 WL 396981
...er husband. The relationship between Caballero and Robertson led to Robertson’s decision to allow Caballero’s sister, a citizen of Argentina, to adopt her two children. Robertson executed defective consent affidavits for the adoption pursuant to section 63.082, Florida Statutes (1997)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 13950
...the requirements of Section 63.-082(2) Florida Statutes; (2) no notice was given to the father as required by Section
63.122 Florida Statutes; and (3) that the order of adoption entered by the trial court was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Section
63.082(2) Florida Statutes provides': “A consent that does not name or otherwise identify the adopting parent is valid if the consent contains a statement by the person consenting that the consent was voluntarily executed and that identific...
...However the child’s mother appeared and participated in the adoption proceedings and testified that she wanted her son to be adopted by the appellees. It therefore appears that the mother’s oral consent in the presence of the court meets the requirements of Section 63.082(1) (c) Florida Statutes and, in view of her appearing and participating in the adoption proceedings, the service of process statute for adoption proceedings does not apply to her....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1687, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 9270
...The judgment denying appellants’ petition for adoption was entered by the trial court on the basis of its determination that the natural mother, about a week after she had consented to the adoption of her child and before appellants took custody of the child, had validly revoked her consent. Section 63.082(5), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that a “[cjonsent [to an adoption] may be withdrawn only when the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress.” The trial court found that the natural mother’s consent had be...
...stice to *353 appellants in this case from permitting the natural mother to keep her child. We recognize that appellants’ argument incorporates other legitimate legal contentions that the law of this case was incorrect. For example, the wording of section 63.082(5), which provides the grounds upon which a parent’s consent to an adoption can be withdrawn, is, as we have said, that a parent’s consent may be withdrawn “only when the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or dure...
...Equity may grant such relief to the complainant despite the fact that the other party did not by commission or omission contribute to the mistake....” 9 Fla.Jur.2d Cancellation, etc. § 30. In the final analysis, the meaning of the word “duress” in Florida Statutes section 63.082(5) is a matter of legislative intent....
...Therefore, the interpretation of section 63.-082(5) which supports the law of this case is that the legislature did not intend that a matter like this should be controlled by rigid rules of law. In other words, that interpretation is that the legislature did not intend to limit the meaning of the term “duress” in section 63.082(5) to what the Missouri court in In the Matter of D....
...umstances.” That would be in recognition that the potentially permanent loss of a child to whom a mother gave birth goes to the deepest of human sensitivities. That this statutory interpretation is justified might be attributed to the way in which section 63.082(5) is worded....
...taken to indicate that the legislature contemplated an exercise of judgment by a court in its determination of whether fraud or duress should be found to exist, rather than the application of a rigid legal rule. In that sense Florida courts applying section 63.082(5) would weigh the justice and equities of a case in a way somewhat similar to the way the Missouri court did in In the Matter of D. and D.. This is not to say that that Missouri case may be taken to reflect Florida law. The Missouri statute gave much broader leeway to the courts in deciding when an adoption consent may properly be revoked than does section 63.082(5)....
...Thus, while the law of this case did not represent this court subscribing to the holding of that Missouri case, that case, by having enunciated the concept of duress by force of circumstances, does support the law of this case by showing that the term “duress” contained in section 63.082(5) has a dimension beyond that of legal duress....
...We have obtained and examined a copy of the House Staff Report concerning the Florida Adoption Act as enacted in 1973. That report does not contain any manifestation as to any particular meaning of the term "duress” intended by the legislature to be encompassed within that term as used in section 63.082(5)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 3375933
...5th DCA 2008); W.T. v. Dep’t of Children
& Families,
846 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
Upon executing a consent for the adoption of a child older than six months of age,
the parent has three days in which to revoke that consent. §
63.082(7)(a), Fla. Stat.
(2012). Generally, after the expiration of the three-day revocation period, consent can be
set aside only when the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress. §
63.082(7)(f), Fla....
...tion
entity nor the mother’s attorney was present when the mother signed the consent form.
In addition, the court found that the mother was not provided with reasonable notice of
her right to select a witness of her own choosing, as required by section 63.082(4)(d),
Florida Statutes (2012)....
...ng a consent for the foster parents.
The use of a password, again according to the maternal grandmother, was necessary
because the mother feared that her attorney would “trick her” into signing a consent in
favor of the paternal aunt.
Section 63.082(1)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2012), provides alternative methods for
executing a consent to adopt:
9
§ 63.082....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 3044277, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 12219
...petition. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part. On April 7, 2010, Appellant’s wife gave birth to their daughter while Appellant was in jail. Three days later, Appellant’s wife voluntarily executed a consent to adoption pursuant to section 63.082, Florida Statutes (2010), effectively giving custody of the child to Home at Last Adoption Agency (“the Adoption Agency”), a Florida licensed child-placing agency....
...The order must include written findings in support of the dismissal, including findings as to the criteria in subsection (4) if rejecting a claim of abandonment. Parental rights may not be terminated based upon a consent that the court finds has been timely withdrawn under s. 63.082 or a consent to adoption or affidavit of nonpaternity that the court finds was obtained by fraud or duress....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 7504
withdrawn only if obtained by fraud or duress). Cf. §
63.082(5), Fla.Stat. (1991); In re Adoption of Doe, 543
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Any prejudicial impact from non-
compliance with the statutory requirements was unlikely and
the record did not demonstrate that the Mother was denied
fundamental fairness in the administration of due process.
See also J.S. v. S.A.,
912 So.2d 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)[.]
V. Section
63.082(4)(b), Florida Statutes, expressly
provides that consent can be withdrawn only if the court finds
5
that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...confront a critical obstacle in their challenge to the December 2005 order. The impediment derives from the fact that the court’s order is merely a preliminary procedural step on the way to the order that they ultimately want to challenge — a decision that a private adoption is in J.T.’s best interest pursuant to section 63.082(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2006). The Department does not and acknowledges that it cannot challenge the propriety of permitting Heart of Adoptions to intervene in the dependency action pursuant to section 63.082(6)(b), which provides as follows: Upon execution of the consent of the birth parent, the adoption entity shall be permitted to intervene in the dependency case as a party in interest and shall provide the court having jurisdiction over...
...n adoption entity has intervened pursuant to this section. Heart of Adoptions provided the circuit court with the statutorily required home study. However, the circuit court specifically halted the process before taking the next steps as required by section 63.082(6)(c): Upon a determination by the court that the prospective adoptive parents are properly qualified to adopt the minor child and that the adoption appears to be in the best interest of the minor child, the court shall immediately order the transfer of custody of the minor child to the prospective adoptive parents, under the supervision of the adoption entity.... Making the best-interest determination under section 63.082(6)(c) would require the circuit court to analyze the factors set out in section (6)(d) as follows: In determining whether the best interest of the child will be served by transferring the custody of the minor child to the prospective a...
...inal order is challenged by way of certiorari. Curry v. State,
880 So.2d 751, 755-56 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The circuit court should not have attempted to transfer the case in the first place until it made the required best-interest determination under section
63.082....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 362540, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 733
...Motion to Transfer Custody of the Minor Children [N.Q.] AND [S.Q.], to the
Prospective Adoptive Parents, [the paternal grandparents].
2
to the custody of the childrens’ paternal grandparents. Pursuant to section
63.082(6), Florida Statutes, the attorney representing the Mother was granted leave
by the trial court to intervene as an “Adoption Entity/Intermediary Party” and to
litigate the motion to transfer.
Section 63.082(6) permits intervention by an “adoption entity” in a
dependency case where parental rights have not yet been terminated and a parent
has executed a consent for placement of a minor with an adoption entity or
qualified prospective adoptive parents. See § 63.082(6)(a-b)....
...Both parents signed
consents for adoption by the paternal grandparents, and the attorney representing
the Mother filed the transfer motion prior to the termination of either parent’s
parental rights. The trial court, therefore, had jurisdiction and conducted an
evidentiary hearing in accordance with section 63.082(6)(c) to determine whether
the prospective adoptive parents (the childrens’ paternal grandparents) were
properly qualified to adopt the children and whether the adoption appeared to be in
the best interest of the children.
Section 63.082(6)(e) lists four factors the court must consider when
determining whether the best interest of the child is served by transferring custody
of the minor child to the prospective adoptive parent selected by the current parent.
These f...
...The fourth factor, which requires the trial court to consider the importance
of maintaining sibling relationships, is not a factor in this case. We, therefore, turn
to the remaining three factors. Although parents have a fundamental right to raise
their children, and section 63.082(6)(e) provides the parents with the statutory right
to select a prospective adoptive parent or parents for the child, that right is not
absolute....
...dependent child, who has been placed with the department or a legal custodian, to
a relative, the trial court must consider the wishes of the parent or parents, if their
parental rights have not been terminated, and weigh those wishes with the other
three factors articulated in section 63.082(6), which relate to the best interests of
the child....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 428, 2016 WL 154725
...(prospective adoptive parents) to proceed with the adoption of Do.S. (a minor child). Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s thorough and detailed order, as there was competent substantial evidence in the record to support the court’s factual determinations and its application of section 63.082(6)(a)-(e), Florida' Statutes (2015)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...M.
(prospective adoptive parents) to proceed with the adoption of Do.S. (a minor
child).
Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s thorough and detailed order, as
there was competent substantial evidence in the record to support the court’s
factual determinations and its application of section 63.082(6)(a)-(e), Florida
Statutes (2015)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 11792
...Although annulment of an adoption is not usually in the best interest of the child, the circumstances of this case do not fall within the usual pattern. Annulments are more often sought by the parent who gives the child for adoption rather than by the adopting parent. . Section 63.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), requires HRS to attach a copy of the child's medical history to the form providing consent to adoption....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...While the
appeal was pending, the child's biological father executed a consent to
adoption, surrendering his rights to and custody of M.G. to Heart of
Adoptions, a licensed adoption entity under Florida law.
Pursuant to a provision in the adoption statutes, section 63.082(6),
Florida Statutes (2022), Heart of Adoptions moved to intervene in the
ongoing dependency case, naming the child's foster parents as the
prospective adoptive parents....
...the dependency case pending the outcome of private adoption
proceedings under chapter 63. The order also designated M.G.'s foster
parents as prospective adoptive parents. These certiorari proceedings
ensued.
When Heart of Adoptions filed its motion to intervene, section
63.082(6)(c) required the dependency court to "grant a hearing to
determine . . . whether a change of placement of the child is in the best
interests of the child." § 63.082(6)(c), Fla....
...By the time the
court conducted the hearings giving rise to the order under review, the
statute had been amended to specify that the court must hold an
"evidentiary hearing" to determine whether the change of placement is in
the best interests of the child. § 63.082(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (2023). Both
versions provide that when making this best interests determination, the
court is to "consider and weigh all relevant factors," including but not
limited to a specific list of factors set forth in the statute. § 63.082(e),
Fla. Stat. (2022); § 63.082(f), Fla....
...the factors" in reaching
its decision.
The dependency court was mistaken in its belief that it was not
obligated to consider statutory factors bearing on M.G.'s best interests
because he was to remain in his foster parents' care. On its face, section
63.082 requires the court to consider and weigh the listed factors and all
other relevant circumstances in every case.
The court's confusion on this point stemmed from its
misapprehension that a proposed change of placement to which the...
...surrendering a child for adoption and the prospective adoptive parents
receiving and adopting the child and all actions by any adoption entity
participating in placing the child." (Emphases added.)
As such, the "placement" of a child with an adoption entity
pursuant to section 63.082 involves a change in the child's legal custody.
Legal custody is defined as "the right to have physical custody of the
child and the right and duty to protect, nurture, guide, and discipline the
child and to provide him or her with foo...
...of Adoptions as the
4
"adoption entity." Thus, the dependency court's belief that M.G.'s
continued physical residence with his foster parents excused it from
making the best interests determination mandated by section 63.082
was simply incorrect.
Further, the record flatly contradicts the dependency court's
assertion that it "took testimony" on the factors anyway....
...nt. The court took no
evidence on the statutory best interests factors, and Heart of Adoptions,
the proponent of the change, offered none.
Heart of Adoptions maintains that no evidence was required
because it proceeded under the 2022 version of section 63.082, in effect
when it filed its motion to intervene....
...At that time, the statute simply
required the court to "grant a hearing" to determine whether the
proposed change of placement was in the child's best interests, whereas
the 2023 version enacted thereafter specifies that the hearing must be
evidentiary. However, 63.082 is a procedural question....
...ed to parenting "in
accordance with the best interests of the child" required evidentiary
hearing). Thus, the dependency court's refusal to take evidence before
ordering a change in M.G.'s placement departed from the requirements of
both versions of section 63.082.
To obtain certiorari relief, a petitioner must demonstrate that there
has been a departure from the essential requirements of law that causes
a material injury for the remainder of the case, for which there is no
adequate legal remedy....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Those
proceedings commenced as a dependency action followed by a petition to
terminate parental rights filed by the Department. M.K. sought party
status based upon her own private petition to terminate parental rights,
or alternatively she sought to intervene in the section 63.082(6), Florida
Statutes (2022), proceedings regarding the child’s placement and best
interests....
...the child, and consented to
his relative, A.S.L., adopting the child. The mother’s rights had already
been terminated by constructive consent. The father’s relative, A.S.L., filed
a motion to intervene as a party in the dependency case based on section
63.082, Florida Statutes (2022)....
...The first motion was legally insufficient,
but a revised motion with the proper information was filed. Shortly
thereafter, M.K. filed a petition to terminate the parents’ parental rights.
New counsel, acting as Adoption Entity petitioners, filed a motion to
intervene as an Adoption Entity and party of interest under section
63.082(6), a motion to stay the TPR proceedings, and an order setting a
“best interest hearing,” pending termination of the father’s parental rights
and A.S.L.’s adoption of the child....
...filed a response in opposition to
the motion to stay the TPR, arguing that she had party status to object as
a petitioner in her TPR petition. Alternatively, M.K. moved the court,
pursuant to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.230, to permit her
to intervene in the Adoption Entity’s section 63.082(6) proceeding.
2
After a hearing, the trial court granted the Adoption Entity’s motion to
intervene and rejected M.K.’s claim of party status in the proceedings. The
court noted, “Everything pending before the Court concerning the ongoing
Chapter 39 proceeding and/or the Adoption Entity’s section 63.082(6)
motion to intervene therein are filed in the original Dependency Case ....
...trial court’s
determination whether the prospective parent is qualified and that the adoption
by that prospective parent is in the child’s best interests. See id. at 1055. R.L.,
however, was decided pursuant to an earlier version of the statute, section
63.082(6)(d), Florida Statutes (2014). The 2022 version applicable to this case
provided that the “right of the parent to determine an appropriate placement for
the child” was but one factor to be weighed by the dependency court to determine
the best interests of the child. See § 63.082(6)(e)8., Fla....
...The juvenile rules made her a participant, but
nothing in the rules suggests that the filing of a TPR petition would make
her a party to the dependency, where she did not file a petition for
dependency. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(b).
M.K. points out that section 63.082 was substantially amended by the
Legislature in 2023, with the amendments going into effect a mere three
months after the order denying M.K. party status. See Ch. 2023-257,
§ 63.082(6)(a), Laws of Fla....
...The statute now directs the trial court
to grant party status to a foster parent “who is a prospective adoptive
placement for the limited purpose of filing motions and presenting
5
evidence pursuant to this subsection.” § 63.082(6)(e), Fla....
...Legislature determined that “the right of a parent to determine an
appropriate placement for a child who has been found dependent is not
absolute and must be weighed against other factors that take the child’s
safety, well-being, and best interests into account.” § 63.082(6)(a)3., Fla.
Stat....
...the child’s best interests to remain in that current stable placement when
“the child has been in his or her current placement at least 9 continuous
months or 15 of the last 24 months immediately preceding the filing of the
motion to intervene [by the adoption entity.]” § 63.082(6)(e), Fla....
...cribed
by the statutes governing the proceeding unless these rules or the Florida
Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration, where applicable,
specifically provide to the contrary.” Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.010(2).
The 2022 version of section 63.082, Florida Statutes, in effect for this
proceeding provides the procedure for obtaining the consent of a parent
2 M.K....
...esponsible for keeping
the dependency court informed of the status of the
adoption proceedings at least every 90 days from the date of
the order changing placement of the child until the date of
finalization of the adoption.
§ 63.082(6), Fla....
...The family law rules apply
“except as otherwise provided in the Florida Juvenile Rules of Procedure,”
see Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.010(a)(1), and the family law rules state the
procedure shall be “as prescribed by the statutes governing the
proceeding[.]” See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.010(a)(2). Thus, because section
63.082 requires the Adoption Entity to intervene in the dependency court,
the juvenile rules apply.
We recently held in K.N....
...that the juvenile rules do not permit the trial
court to grant intervention to foster parents in dependency proceedings.
359 So. 3d at 745. Therefore, consistent with K.N., we find no authority
pursuant to the juvenile rules to allow intervention by M.K. in the
dependency proceedings pursuant to section
63.082.
Certification of Conflict
On rehearing in K.N., we certified conflict with T.R.-B....
...in this case.
Conclusion
We hold that the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights
does not provide the filer with party status in dependency proceedings
involving the child. We also conclude that the 2022 version of section
63.082, in effect at the time of M.K.’s petition, did not authorize party
status for a foster parent. Neither the rules nor the 2022 version of section
63.082 permitted intervention in the dependency court proceedings.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s rulings denying party status and
intervention to M.K.
Affirmed.
8
CIKLIN and KUNTZ, JJ., c...
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...evidentiary hearing on the Amended Petition.
Background
With Adoption Entity’s assistance, Stepfather sought to adopt his twelve-year-
old stepdaughter, I.R.M. Father executed the Consent, which closely mirrors the
language of section 63.082(4)(e), Florida Statutes (2021), regarding the required
recitation of rights language....
...“cannot be invalidated unless a court finds
that it was obtained by fraud or under duress.” The Consent further provided
Father with a revocation period of three business days, consistent with section
1
63.082(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2021), governing adoptions of children older than
six months....
...We also
review the trial court’s decision to forego or deny an evidentiary hearing for an
abuse of discretion. See F.R. v. Adoption of Baby Boy Born Nov. 2, 2010,
135 So.
3d 301, 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).
2
Permissible Grounds to Revoke the Consent
Section
63.082, Florida Statutes (2021), states in pertinent part:
[(4)](c) If the minor to be adopted is older than 6 months of age at
the time of the execution of the consent, the consent to adoption is
valid upon execution; howe...
...days after
execution of the consent. . . .
....
(f) Following the revocation period described in paragraph (a),
consent may be set aside only when the court finds that the consent
was obtained by fraud or duress.
§ 63.082, Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphasis added).
When Father executed the Consent, I.R.M. was older than six months; thus,
the Consent became valid upon execution and was then susceptible to a three-
business-day revocation period. § 63.082(4)(c), (7)(a), Fla....
...fundamental fairness). None of the above-noted revocation grounds are
supported by this record nor alleged by Father.
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by invalidating the Consent without
making a finding as to either fraud or duress as required by section 63.082(7)(f),
Florida Statutes (2021), and relevant caselaw....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...of the child. Id.
The GAL claims that it is in the child’s best interest to remain in the
custody of the foster parents and to be adopted by them. However, it is
not the court’s role to determine which placement would be better for the
child. Section 63.082(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2017), provides that “[i]f a
parent executes a consent for adoption, ....
...Therefore, any argument is waived and abandoned. See
Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distrib., Inc.,
442 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
3
order the transfer of custody of the minor child to the prospective adoptive
parents.” §
63.082(6)(d), Fla....
...not that it is the best choice as evaluated by the court or the Department
in light of other alternatives.” See In re S.N.W.,
912 So. 2d 368, 373 n.4
(Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
In determining the best interests of the child, the legislature
enumerated in section
63.082(6)(e), the following non-exclusive factors to
be considered by the trial court:
1....
...The trial court also properly recognized and gave effect to the mother’s
“fundamental right . . . to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of [her] child[].” Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
Additionally, as noted above, section
63.082(6) provides parents with the
statutory right to select prospective adoptive parents for the child....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...The consents stated that the natural parents desired the
Child to be adopted by his paternal grandfather and his wife (the
“Grandparents”), who live in New York. The adoption entity moved to
intervene in the TPR proceeding, and the trial court allowed the intervention
pursuant to section 63.082(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2021), and found the
consents to be valid and binding.
The adoption entity then filed a motion to transfer custody of the Child
to the Grandparents pursuant to section 63.082(6)(d), Florida Statutes
(2021), which both the Department and the Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”)
opposed....
...Statutes, and case law, and the trial court believed these “to be at odds with
4
each other.” The court outlined the statutory process involved in
interventions for purposes of adoption contained in section 63.082(6) and
diligently addressed the best interests factors contained in section
63.082(6)(e), Florida Statutes (2021)....
...See Guardian ad Litem Program v. R.A.,
995 So. 2d
1083 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (granting certiorari and quashing order granting
motion for change of child’s placement when trial court failed to follow
statutory directives). We begin with the plain language of section
63.082(6)’s
text....
...DeSantis,
269 So. 3d 491, 495
(Fla. 2019) (quoting Fla. Soc’y of Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometric Ass’n,
489 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 1986)). Applying these interpretive principles,
we hold that the trial court incorrectly disregarded its analysis of section
63.082(6)(e)’s factors in favor of its interpretation of W.K.’s statement
regarding the standard to be employed in deciding motions to transfer
custody.
Section
63.082(6) permits an “adoption entity” to intervene in a
dependency case where parental rights have not yet been terminated and a
parent has executed a consent for placement of a minor with an adoption
entity or qualified prospective adoptive parents. §
63.082(6)(a)-(b), Fla....
...In this case, both parents signed consents for adoption by the
Grandparents, and the adoption entity filed the motion to transfer custody
prior to the termination of either parent’s parental rights. The trial court then
was required to conduct the evidentiary hearing pursuant to section
63.082(6)(c) to determine whether the Grandparents were properly qualified
to adopt the Child and whether the adoption was in the best interests of the
Child, “after consideration of all relevant factors, including those set forth in
paragraph (e).” § 63.082(6)(d), Fla. Stat. In turn, section 63.082(6)(e) lists
7
eight non-exclusive factors 2 the court must consider when determining
whether the best interests of a child are served by transferring custody of the
child to the prospective adoptive parent selected by the parents. § 63.082(e),
Fla....
...The stability of the potential adoptive home in
which the child has been residing as well as the
desirability of maintaining continuity of placement;
4. The importance of maintaining sibling
relationships, if possible;
2
Prior to 2016, section 63.082(6)(e) contained only four specified
factors without the current requirement that courts consider “all factors”:
In determining whether the best interests of the child
are served by transferring the cu...
...child, the permanency offered, the child’s bonding
with any potential adoptive home that the child has
been residing in, and the importance of maintaining
sibling relationships, if possible.
§ 63.082(6)(e), Fla....
...Whether a petition for termination of parental rights
has been filed pursuant to s.
39.806(1)(f), (g), or (h);
7. What is best for the child; and
8. The right of the parent to determine an appropriate
placement for the child.
§
63.082(6)(e), Fla....
...court concluded that the Child’s best interests would not be served by
transferring custody to the Grandparents. However, the trial court then
erroneously elevated the right of the natural parents to determine the
appropriate placement for the Child (the eighth factor in section 63.082(6)(e))
above all other factors and disregarded what it believed was best for the
Child (the seventh factor in section 63.082(6)(e)), citing W.K. as requiring
that it do so. This was improper, as the Third District Court has explained:
Although parents have a fundamental right to raise
their children, and section 63.082(6)(e) provides the
parents with the statutory right to select a prospective
adoptive parent or parents for the child, that right is
not absolute....
...2d DCA 2005) (holding that, in deference to
parent’s “constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of their
children,” a trial court may not compare the selected prospective adoptive
parents with other placements the court or Department might otherwise
choose), a case relying on a prior version of section 63.082 that did not
contain the “non-exclusive” language of the current statute, instead requiring
The Fourth District Court’s jurisdiction to review the order transferring
3
custody, presumably a nonfinal order, is not...
...priate placement for the child.”
230 So. 3d at 908. Further, unlike this case, nowhere in W.K. is there an
indication that the trial court found that it was not in the child’s best interests
to transfer custody.5
The current version of section
63.082(6) is clear that when considering
a motion to transfer custody of a dependent child who is under the
supervision of the Department, the trial court must consider the wishes of the
natural parent or parents, if their parental rights have not been terminated,
and weigh those wishes with the other seven factors articulated in section
63.082(6)(e), along with “all relevant factors.” §
63.082(6)(e), Fla. Stat.; see
4
In In re Adoption of K.A.G.,
152 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), a
case where section
63.082 was inapplicable because the child was not in
the Department’s custody, this Court expressed in a footnote in dicta its
approval of In re S.N.W.’s best interests analysis. As noted above, S.N.W.
analyzed a prior version of the statute.
5
W.K. also states that all of the factors in section
63.082(6)(e) should
be considered without one overriding the others....
...ced with
the department or a legal custodian, to a relative, the trial court must consider
the wishes of the parent or parents, if their parental rights have not been
terminated, and weigh those wishes with the other . . . factors articulated in
section 63.082(6), which relate to the best interests of the child.”). The trial
court correctly followed this statutory directive and entered an order with
factual findings under section 63.082(6)(e)....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2010 WL 1642789
...See In re: Adoption of Baby E.A.W.,
658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.1995). We affirm the father's remaining issues without comment. Section
63.062(1), Florida Statutes (2009), authorizes termination of parental rights pending adoption when the parents have executed written consent that complies with section
63.082, Florida Statutes (2009). Section
63.089, Florida Statutes (2009), permits the circuit court to terminate parental rights pending adoption when it has determined by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has "executed a valid consent under s.
63.082 and the consent was obtained according to the requirements of this chapter." It is undisputed that the father signed a consent form that was inconsistent with material provisions of section
63.082. Specifically, the consent form expressly allowed the father to withdraw his consent any time before placement of the child with the adoptive parents, which he did. Section
63.082(4)(c), however, provides only a three-day revocation period....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 201, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 327
...there is no question here that both natural parents appeared and fully contested the adoption procedure. On the equal protection issue, respondent natural mother argues, as a parent in an intermediary adoption, that her consent is irrevocable under section
63.082(5), absent a showing of fraud or duress, whereas parents in an agency adoption “have the unfettered right to withdraw their ‘consent’ or surrender.” In re I.B.J.
497 So.2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), review denied,
504 So.2d 766 (Fla.1987). Respondents’ argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, the provision in section
63.082(5) that consents to adoptions may not be withdrawn, absent fraud or duress, is applicable in all adoption proceedings....
