CopyCited 53 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 381484
...The circuit court reasoned that because the suit amounted to an appeal from an administrative decision of the Board, it was required to be filed within thirty days of the Board's decision under Florida Appellate Rule 3.2 (1962). The circuit court also concluded that section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1975), which provided a sixty-day time limit for instituting civil actions in circuit court to challenge property tax assessments, violated the Court's exclusive authority to adopt rules of practice and procedure....
...covered by the appellate rules. See id. at 1287 ("[Section
194.032(6)(a)] clearly contemplates that injunctive relief shall be sought by way of an original civil action rather than by appeal."). The Court stated that the sixty-day limit set forth in section
194.171(2) "constitutes a statute of limitations governing the time for filing an original action to challenge [a decision of the Board of Tax Adjustment]" and "the legislature clearly has the authority to establish such limitations." Id....
CopyCited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 2050106
...[7] The Powells assert that the twenty-five and thirty-day deadlines for administratively challenging assessments contained in section
194.011(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2001), assure sufficient notice to property appraisers, and the sixty-day deadline in section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2001), for a civil complaint contesting the assessment provides notice of a legal challenge....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 3313749
...PARIENTE, J. In State Department of Management Services v. Cason,
909 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), the First District Court of Appeal certified the following as a question of great public importance: DO THE JURISDICTIONAL NON-CLAIM PROVISIONS OF SECTION
194.171, FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY TO BAR A CLAIM OF THE STATE THAT ASSERTS AN ASSESSMENT IS VOID BECAUSE IT WAS MADE ON PROPERTY IMMUNE FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION? Id....
...In ruling on and certifying this question, the First District vested us with jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We agree with the First District that because of its sovereign immunity from ad valorem taxation, the State is not a "taxpayer" subject to the sixty-day jurisdictional nonclaim provisions of section 194.171....
...thful offenders housed there, and the juvenile justice system. The Ottingers moved for summary judgment, asserting that the failure to challenge the tax assessments within sixty days after the assessments were certified for collection as required by section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2006), created *309 a jurisdictional bar to the action to enjoin the tax deed sale. DMS argued that section
194.171(2) was inapplicable because the State's immunity from taxation rendered any ad valorem tax assessment on the property void. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Ottingers. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the suit to enjoin the tax deed sale because the complaint was untimely under section
194.171(2). The trial court did not decide whether the property is immune from ad valorem taxation. On appeal, the First District reversed and held that the jurisdictional bar in section
194.171 does not apply to a claim by the State contesting a tax assessment based on an assertion of sovereign immunity. See Cason,
909 So.2d at 381-82. In reaching this conclusion, the First District determined that decisions by this Court broadly applying section
194.171 to actions by private property owners contesting assessments should not be extended to property owned by the state and federal governments that is immune from taxation. Id. at 381. The First District also presumed that the Legislature was aware of court decisions recognizing the State's immunity from taxation when it enacted section
194.171, and found no language in the statute reflecting an intent to waive that immunity and classify the State as a taxpayer subject to the same jurisdictional requirements as private property owners....
...However, because of uncertainty caused by language in this Court's opinions construing the statute, the First District certified the issue to this Court as a question of great public importance. Id. ANALYSIS The certified question asks whether the provisions of section 194.171 apply when the State is the owner of property that is immune from taxation....
...the State." Alford,
107 So.2d at 29. However, the authority to tax the State cannot be inferred. Such authority must be manifested by "clear and direct expression of the State's intention to subject itself to" the tax. Dickinson,
325 So.2d at 4. II. Section
194.171, Florida Statutes (2006) We next examine the statute at issue in this case, which governs challenges to tax assessments. Section
194.171 is part of a "comprehensive statutory scheme for counties to assess and collect taxes simultaneously with procedures for taxpayer challenges to tax assessments." Ward v. Brown,
894 So.2d 811, 814 (Fla.2004). Section
194.171 provides: (1) The circuit courts have original jurisdiction at law of all matters relating to property taxation....
...We have classified this as a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, which means that failure to meet its requirements deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction to hear the case. See Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club,
527 So.2d 814, 815 (Fla. 1988). In Markham, we concluded that section
194.171 applied to an action by condominium associations and developers challenging, on due process and equal protection *311 grounds, the constitutionality of a statute governing ad valorem taxation of fee time-share property.
527 So.2d at 814. [5] In addition to categorizing section
194.171 as a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim rather than a statute of limitations, we rejected the argument that the statute applies only to "voidable" assessments and not also to those that are being challenged as "void." Id....
...[6] More recently, in Ward, we rejected an assertion by leaseholders of county property that because they were contesting the classification of the property rather than the tax assessment, their lawsuit opposing ad valorem taxation was governed by the general civil statute of limitations rather than section
194.171.
894 So.2d at 813. It was in this context, an action by lessees of governmental property, that we stated that section
194.171 applies "regardless of the legal basis of the challenge." Id....
...The First District correctly summarized the public policy considerations with respect to the sixty-day filing period for tax assessment challenges when it stated: "[W]e are cognizant of the legislative intent and public policy behind the adoption of the nonclaim provision contained in section
194.171(2) and (6), Florida Statutes, which is to ensure prompt payment of taxes due and making available revenues that are not disputed." Chihocky v. Crapo,
632 So.2d 230, 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In section
194.171, the Legislature required taxpayers to pay "not less than the amount of the tax which the taxpayer admits in good faith to be owing" but provided that challenges will be dismissed in cases wherein the taxpayer fails to pay the undisputed amount of taxes "before they become delinquent." §
194.171(3), (5), Fla....
...in Ward were clearly taxable entities. The First District concluded that this Court would not have intended to apply the holdings in Markham and Ward to actions by the State contesting an ad valorem assessment. Id. If the procedural requirements of section 194.171 are construed to apply to an action brought by the State to challenge an assessment on grounds that property it *312 owns is immune from ad valorem taxation, the immunity would be nullified by the State's failure to challenge the assessment within sixty days after it is certified for collection....
...l 1 of the year following the assessment, [7] purchase or redeem any tax certificates that are issued for the delinquent taxes, [8] or risk losing its property at a tax deed sale. [9] Indeed, as Judge Ervin observed in the majority opinion below, if section
194.171 applies to all actions challenging tax assessments without exception, even "the government of the United States would be barred from contesting a patently illegal and void assessment on property owned by it and situated in this state by reason of its failure to challenge an assessment within the required 60 days." Cason,
909 So.2d at 381. III. Applicability of
194.171 to Challenges by the State We now consider the effect of sovereign immunity on the application of section
194.171 to actions filed by the State. The crucial inquiry is whether the language of section
194.171 clearly and unambiguously demonstrates legislative intent to apply this section to challenges by the State on State-owned property....
...Although legislative intent is the "polestar" of statutory interpretation, such intent is derived primarily from the language of the statute. See State v. J.M.,
824 So.2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002). We conclude that no such "clear and direct" expression is manifested from the language of this statute. Dickinson,
325 So.2d at 4. Section
194.171(2) provides that "[n]o action shall be brought" beyond the sixty-day period. It does not identify specific entities or persons to whom this requirement applies. Thus, we look to the other provisions of section
194.171 to determine whether the State is subject to the requirements of subsection (2)....
...ead together to determine legislative intent. . . ."); Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist.,
604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992) ("It is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole."). Section
194.171(6), which provides that all the requirements of subsections (2), (3), and (5) are jurisdictional, refers to "the taxpayer." Both subsections (3) and (5) also refer to actions "the taxpayer" must take to contest an assessment....
...he pays taxes admittedly owed for subsequent tax years. We conclude that the Legislature intended subsection (2), like subsections (3), (5), and (6), to apply to "taxpayers." Cf. Ward,
894 So.2d at 812 (stating that the sixty-day time requirement in section
194.171 "applies broadly to taxpayers' actions challenging the assessment of taxes against their property regardless *313 of the legal basis of the challenge") (emphasis supplied). "Taxpayer" is not defined in section
194.171 or elsewhere in chapter 194....
...ning and effect on the objectives and purpose of the statute's enactment." Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n v. Florida Div. of Administrative Hearings,
686 So.2d 1349, 1354 (Fla.1997). Thus, the term "taxpayer" as used in section
194.171 should be construed in a manner consistent with the statute's purpose, which is to ensure a reliable and predictable method for counties to collect revenue while also providing for taxpayer challenges to tax assessments....
...not in dispute. See id. Under these provisions, a "taxpayer" is not merely the entity in whose name the property is assessed, but one whom the county has the power to tax subject to disputes about individual assessments. In short, a "taxpayer" under section 194.171 is a taxable entity....
...them." Dickinson,
325 So.2d at 3. Accordingly, where the State files suit challenging ad valorem taxation on grounds of sovereign immunity, the State's assertion that it is not a taxable entity takes it outside the category of "taxpayer" targeted by section
194.171....
...See Cason,
909 So.2d at 381 (expressing doubt that this Court intended the rationale of Markham and Ward to be extended beyond their facts). The necessity of a clear expression of legislative intent to authorize taxation of the State reinforces our construction of section
194.171....
...We presume that the Legislature was aware of precedent recognizing both the State's immunity and the *314 necessity of a clear and direct expression of intent to authorize taxation of the State when it enacted the jurisdictional nonclaim provision, section 194.171, in 1983....
...(2006). Thus, we conclude that the absence of a clear and unmistakable waiver of immunity from taxation and the exemption of State property used for governmental purposes from ad valorem taxation demonstrate that the Legislature does not intend for section 194.171(2) to constitute a jurisdictional bar to lawsuits brought by the State to challenge tax assessments on State property that is either immune or exempt from taxation....
...perty for nonpayment of taxes on leased property but allows the loss through a tax deed sale of State property that has not been leased merely because the State failed to file a timely challenge to the assessment. We also note that the provisions of section 194.171 differ from the civil statute of limitations, which specifically includes the State within its operation....
...for future benefits it well knows how to express itself") (quoting Pizzarelli v. Rollins,
704 So.2d 630, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). Section
95.011 shows that had the Legislature chosen to make the State subject to the sixty-day filing requirement in section
194.171(2), it knew how to do so....
...The petitioners actually use the statute of limitations to support their position that because the Legislature clearly intended the State to be subject to the limitations periods set forth in chapter 95, Florida Statutes (2006), the Legislature also intended the State to be bound by section 194.171(2)....
...t time is prescribed elsewhere in these statutes, within the time prescribed elsewhere. (Emphasis supplied.) The petitioners contend that for lawsuits challenging ad valorem tax assessments, the "time prescribed elsewhere" is the sixty-day period in section
194.171(2). We disagree. The reference to "the time prescribed elsewhere" in section
95.011 encompasses other provisions that can also be construed as statutes of limitations, but not jurisdictional statutes of nonclaim such as section
194.171....
...Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co.,
771 So.2d 1143, 1151 (Fla.2000) (quoting Barnett Bank v. Estate of Read,
493 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla.1986)). Conflating the two would muddle the distinction and yield confusion *316 as to whether actions brought outside the sixty-day period in section
194.171(2) are barred automatically or only when the issue is affirmatively pled. In addition, when the State is the party challenging an ad valorem tax assessment on property it owns, treating section
194.171(2) as a statute of limitations would extract a waiver of the State's immunity from less than clear and unambiguous language. Accordingly, for all these reasons we conclude that the Legislature did not intend that the sixty-day filing requirement of section
194.171(2) be imposed upon a nontaxpaying governmental entity such as the State. IV. Risk of Delay Finally, we caution that although the State is not subject to the sixty-day requirement in section
194.171(2) under these circumstances, lengthy delay by the State in filing suit to vindicate its nontaxable status on property that is nonetheless being taxed remains risky....
...g delinquent tax sale of State-owned land where the present owner had been in possession more than eleven years under a deed issued by the State). However, because the issue before us concerns only the State's status as property owner in relation to section 194.171, we need not address other means by which the sovereign may be precluded from challenging ad valorem property assessments and issuance of tax certificates and tax deeds because of nonpayment of taxes wrongly imposed....
...ust be filed within sixty days after the assessment is certified for collection cannot be used to preclude the State from contesting sales of tax deeds on property that the State owns and claims is immune from taxation. We do not find, either within section 194.171 or elsewhere, the clear and unambiguous expression of legislative intent necessary to conclude that the Legislature intended that the State be subject to the harsh provisions of section 194.171 and as a result lose its immunity from taxation. Therefore, we answer the certified question in the negative and hold that the jurisdictional nonclaim provisions of section 194.171 do not apply to a claim by the State challenging a tax assessment as void on the ground that the property assessed is immune from ad valorem taxation. We emphasize that our holding does not address whether the property at issue in this case is in fact immune from ad valorem taxation. [10] Rather, we simply determine *317 that sections 194.171(2) and 194.171(6) do not deprive the trial court of the jurisdiction necessary to decide the issue....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 423, 1988 Fla. LEXIS 795, 1988 WL 70702
...cations, Inc. v. Schultz,
479 So.2d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), review denied,
488 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1986), on the issue of whether an action challenging a tax assessment as void is barred when the complaint is not filed within the sixty-day limitation of section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....
...On March 1, 1984, respondents filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of both the assessment and the authorizing statute on due process and equal protection grounds. [1] Respondents also sought an injunction against enforcement of the assessment. [2] Relying on section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides "[n]o action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection" and section 194.171(6), Florida Statutes (1983), which makes compliance with subsection (2) "jurisdictional," the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss....
...validity of a 1983 assessment of timeshare property made pursuant to section
192.037 because the complaint was filed more than sixty days after the tax rolls were certified. The district court upheld the trial court's dismissal, reasoning that since section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1983), is clearly a "jurisdictional statute of nonclaim," a trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a suit contesting a tax assessment, unless such suit is filed within the time frame prescribed by section
194.171(2).
479 So.2d at 778. The Gulfside court based its decision on the "plain meaning" of subsection (6) of section
194.171 which was added to that section by chapter 83-204, section 7, Laws of Florida....
...We agree with the Gulfside court that the plain meaning of subsection (6) requires that the sixty-day requirement of subsection (2) be construed as a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim rather than as a statute of limitations. See Bystrom v. Diaz,
514 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 1987) (under section
194.171(6) compliance with the requirement of section
194.171(5) that a taxpayer pay, prior to delinquency, the undisputed amount of taxes assessed while his suit is pending is jurisdictional). The respondents appear to concede that, after the 1983 amendment to section
194.171, the sixty-day requirement of subsection (2) is properly characterized as a statute of nonclaim....
...In Lake Worth Towers, a taxpayer brought an action seeking to enjoin the enforcement of an assessment which was not authorized by law. We held "[b]ecause the assessment was illegal and void, it was properly challenged, even though the statute of limitations [section 194.21(2), predecessor to section
194.171(2)] had run and administrative remedies had not been exhausted."
262 So.2d at 4. (emphasis added). As the Department points out, in Lake Worth Towers we referred to section 192.21(2), Florida Statutes (1967), the predecessor to section
194.171(2), as a statute of limitations. Then in Coe v. ITT Community Development Corp.,
362 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1978), we recharacterized section
194.171(2) as a nonclaim statute and noted that our use of the term "statute of limitations" in Lake Worth Towers was the result of "an *816 inartful use of the term."
362 So.2d at 9. Finally in Miller v. Nolte,
453 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1984), we expressly receded from our characterization of the statute as a nonclaim statute in Coe and held that "[d]ue process requires that section
194.171(2) be considered a statute of limitations." Id. at 401. [5] However, as pointed out by the Gulfside court, although Miller was released subsequent to July 1, 1983, the effective date of section
194.171(6), in Miller we were addressing a pre-1983 tax assessment and did not address the clear expression of legislative intent contained in subsection (6) that subsection (2) be considered a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim....
...524, 528 (1933); Lake Worth Towers,
262 So.2d at 4. A tax assessment which is made in good faith but is merely irregular or unfair is voidable rather than per se void.
151 So. at 528;
262 So.2d at 4. [5] The respondents do not challenge the constitutionality of §
194.171(6)....
...83-204, § 7, Laws of Fla. was the legislature's response to a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, Cape Cave Corp. v. Lowe,
411 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied,
418 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1982), wherein the Second District held, as we did in Miller, that §
194.171(2) was a statute of limitations, the benefit of which the tax assessor may by his actions become estopped from claiming.
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 462
...The Marshalls filed suit challenging a 1982 tax assessment. While the suit was pending, the 1984 taxes became delinquent by operation of law on April 1, 1985. § 197.0124(1) Fla. Stat. (1985). The tax collector filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to subsections 194.171(5) and (6), Florida Statutes (1985), which provide in pertinent part: (5) No action to contest a tax assessment may be maintained, and any such action shall be dismissed, unless all taxes on the property assessed in years after the action is...
...vil Procedure 1.190. The trial court granted the motion to amend, but in the same order dismissed the action with prejudice on the grounds that the Marshalls failed to pay their 1984 taxes before they became delinquent in accordance with subsections 194.171(5) and (6)....
...The Marshalls' payment of the 1984 taxes is not a claim or defense arising out of the original complaint contesting the 1982 tax assessment. Further, even if treated as relating back, the amended pleading did not and could not assert the crucial fact that the 1984 taxes were paid before they became delinquent as required by section 194.171(5). The Third District Court of Appeal, in contrast to Marshall, reversed a section 194.171(5) dismissal in Diaz, finding that the taxpayer's delinquent payment, prior to dismissal, cured the jurisdictional defect....
...Property appraiser Bystrom certified the assessment for collection on October 25, 1983. While Diaz's suit challenging the assessment was pending, his 1983 taxes became delinquent by operation of law on April 1, 1984. Accordingly, Bystrom moved for a dismissal pursuant to subsections 194.171(5) and (6). Diaz paid the delinquent taxes on May 30, 1984, prior to the hearing on the motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice under subsections 194.171(5) and (6). The district court, in reversing, placed significance on the fact that section 194.171 does not expressly create an incurable jurisdictional bar....
...Indeed, the threat of an absolute impediment to continuing a judicial attack upon an assessment is a vastly greater source of inducement to meet the tax paying obligation than would be present in sanctioning the delayed delinquent payment by those disputing an assessment.
494 So.2d at 507. Although subsections
194.171(5) and (6) appear to be somewhat harsh, their meaning is clear. Subsection
194.171(5) *1075 plainly states that a taxpayer may not maintain a suit contesting a tax assessment, and that such an action "shall be dismissed, unless all taxes on the property assessed in years after the action is brought, which the taxpay...
...sdiction of a case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (5)." The statute does not allow a court to retain jurisdiction once taxes become delinquent. Marshall and Diaz both argue that a literal interpretation of section 194.171 unconstitutionally limits a taxpayer's access to judicial relief in violation of article I, section 21, and article VII, section 13 of the Florida Constitution. Subsections 194.171(5) and (6) supplement rather than conflict with article VII, section 13, which requires that all legally assessed taxes be paid before a court may grant relief from illegal taxes....
...Examples of reasonable restrictions include "the fixing of a time within which suit must be brought, payment of reasonable cost deposits, [and] pursuit of certain administrative relief such as zoning matters or workmen's compensation claims... ." Id. As a prerequisite to maintaining suit, subsection 194.171(5) requires only that a taxpayer pay, prior to delinquency, the undisputed amount of taxes assessed while his suit is pending. This requirement does not unreasonably restrict a taxpayer's access to court. Neither do we find that subsections 194.171(5) and (6) deny the taxpayer due process of law....
...urt's decision in Marshall. We remand to the third district court for further proceedings consistent herewith. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The requirements set forth in subsection 194.171(6) "apply to assessment rolls and taxes levied thereon for 1983 and each year thereafter." Ch. 83-204, § 43, Laws of Fla. In each of the instant cases, the delinquent taxes were assessed in 1983 or thereafter. [2] The subsections 194.171(2) and (3) filing requirements for an action contesting a tax assessment are not at issue in either of the instant cases.
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...ore an action for libel may be filed." One might also mention that by statute a taxpayer must pay all tax assessments which he admits in good faith to be owing before he can bring suit to contest a tax assessment against him claimed to be excessive. Section 194.171(3)(4), Florida Statutes (1975)....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...The Appraiser, joined by the Department of Revenue, challenged the Board's reduced valuation by filing suit in the circuit court pursuant to Section
194.032(6)(a), Paragraphs 1 and 2, Florida Statutes (1977). [1] The Taxpayers filed their answer and a counterclaim as expressly authorized by Sections
194.032(6)(b) and
194.171, Florida Statutes (1977)....
...acts of the Board presumptive validity. *1143 (b) The Taxpayer in Circuit Court [11] Whether the Board upholds the appraiser's preliminary assessment or overturns it, the taxpayer may nonetheless seek review in circuit court. §§
194.032(6)(b) and
194.171, supra....
...t be appropriate to further reduce the assessment, because of this factor, in order to arrive at the just valuation. Erroneous Computation of Interest When the Taxpayers initiated the counterclaim as authorized pursuant to Sections
194.032(6)(b) and
194.171, supra, they tendered to the Tax Collector a good faith payment of the admitted taxes due and owing based upon a $37,000,000 valuation as required by Section
194.171(4), supra....
...ss. First, a taxpayer desiring to challenge his ad valorem real property tax assessment may avail himself of the opportunity to be heard at the administrative level of the Board without undertaking, as he initially might, see Sections
194.032(3) and
194.171, Florida Statutes (1977), a more costly and time-consuming action in the Circuit Court....
...but not in excess of $500,000; 7 1/2 percent variance from any assessment in excess of $500,000 but not in excess of $1,000,000; or... . [2] HEARING COMPLAINTS. ... . (6)(b) Any taxpayer may bring an action to contest a tax assessment pursuant to s. 194.171. 194.171 CIRCUIT COURT TO HAVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN TAX CASES....
...d effect of the statute if made within the scope and intent of the authority conferring them. Florida Livestock Board v. W.G. Gladden,
76 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954). [10] A taxpayer is not required to seek review before the Board. See §§
194.032(3) and
194.171, Fla. Stat. (1977). In lieu of this, a taxpayer may directly challenge the appraiser's preliminary assessment in circuit court. §
194.171, supra....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 991017
...The Reinishes admit that they stay in the Florida property only about 4-5 months each year and reside in Illinois for the greater part of the year. In the trial court, Executive Director Fuchs and the other defendants argued 1) *202 that the Reinishes could not circumvent the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1997), by seeking relief in the form of a refund under Chapter 86; and 2) that the Reinishes failed to allege that they had contested their assessment within 60 days from the date the assessment was certified for collection in any of the tax years in question. § 194.171(2), Fla. Stat. On that basis, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. § 194.171(6), Fla....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 11664
...s within 60 days of certification of the tax rolls. Petitioner Markham filed a motion for summary judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the complaint was untimely because it was filed beyond the 60 days allowed for filing pursuant to section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....
...A writ of prohibition is the appropriate procedural device to quash the improper exercise of power without jurisdiction. Such a writ may issue where a trial court exceeds its jurisdiction by failing to dismiss a cause of action contesting a tax assessment where the jurisdiction requirements of section
194.171 are not met. Markham v. Hinckley,
544 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied,
553 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 1989); Clark v. Cook,
481 So.2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Section
194.171, Florida Statutes provides in part: (emphasis added) (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested *1309 is certified for collection under s....
...194.036(1)(a) or (b) by the property appraiser shall be filed prior to extension of the tax roll under subsection (2) or, if the roll was extended pursuant to s.
197.323, within 30 days of recertification under subsection (3). The language of the statute is clear. The 60 day filing period referred to in section
194.171 is 60 days from the date of the initial certification as long as no petition challenging the assessment is pending before the Board and not 60 days from the date of a recertification....
...nt, and remand to the trial court with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of petitioner. HERSEY, C.J., and STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The Florida Supreme Court previously had determined that the jurisdictional requirements of § 194.171 must be strictly enforced in Bystrom v....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 32 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1057, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 159, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1335, 25 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1672
...7,706,390 $173,461.87 1993 $ 7,706,390 $153,413.98 The Debtor did not file an action contesting the tax assessments on either its real or personal property within sixty (60) days of the date of the assessments, as required under state law. Fl.Stat. § 194.171(2)....
...the county to a third party in the form of a tax certificate? [4] *418 DISCUSSION I. THE DEBTOR MAY SEEK RELIEF UNDER SECTION 505 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE EVEN THOUGH THE DEBTOR FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE ASSESSMENT UNDER APPLICABLE STATE LAW PROCEDURES. Section 194.171(2) of the Florida Statutes requires all actions contesting a tax assessment to be brought within sixty (60) days from the date the tax assessment is certified for collection. Failure to do so deprives the Florida circuit court of jurisdiction to hear such matters. Fla.Stat. § 194.171(6)....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The school districts of the State, like the citizens, have a right to rely on the findings of their duly-elected assessors where the findings have been reviewed and certified by the reviewing body. The proper method for challenging the validity of an assessment is through the circuit court (Fla. Stat. § 194.171, F.S.A.), and the State has the power, through the Department of Revenue, to bring such an action....
...So long as the law is followed, the assessments are presumed valid until the presumption is overcome by sufficient proof to defeat every reasonable hypothesis of a valid assessment. Powell v. Kelly, supra . The State has the authority and power to challenge an assessment through circuit court (Fla. Stat. § 194.171, F.S.A.), and has a duty to the taxpayers of the State to do so in cases such as is presented here where underassessment in a county requires the State to pick up a portion of the county's fair share of the cost of education....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...provides a more accurate method than the subjective opinion of the Department of Revenue (Section
193.114, Florida Statutes), the Board of Tax Adjustment (Section
194.015, Florida Statutes), or the courts in reviewing the propriety of an assessment (Section
194.171, Florida Statutes)....
...These statutory devices include review of the tax rolls by the Department of Revenue (§
193.114, Fla. Stat. (1975)), appeals to the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board for relief from assessment (§
194.015, Fla. Stat. (1975)), and actions in the circuit court to review the propriety of assessments (§
194.171, Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 2360129
...Because we agree with the First District Court of Appeal's opinion in Ward, we approve the decision below and disapprove of the Day and Pepperidge Farm decisions to the extent they conflict with our analysis herein. We hold that the mandatory sixty-day provision of section 194.171(1), Florida Statutes, applies broadly to taxpayers' actions challenging the assessment of taxes against their property regardless of the legal basis of the challenge....
...ject to ad valorem taxation pursuant to section
196.199, Florida Statutes (2001). Id. The circuit court struck the class action pleadings upon concluding that members of the class did not comply with the sixty-day limitation and time requirements of section
194.171(1). Id. Section
194.171(1) provides: The circuit courts have original jurisdiction at law of all matters relating to property taxation. Venue is in the county where the property is located, except that venue shall be in Leon County when the property is assessed pursuant to s.
193.085(4). §
194.171(1), Fla....
...The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's decision that members of the class were time-barred from challenging the tax assessments because they did not file an objection to the assessments within the sixty-day time frame set forth in section
194.171(2), explaining: Whether couched in terms of an "assessment" or a "classification," the appellants are challenging the property appraiser's judgment to deny them an exemption under chapter 196, place their properties on the tax roll, and impose ad valorem taxes. Denial of exemptions are "assessments" subject to the requirements of section
194.171, Florida Statutes. See Hall v. Leesburg Regional Medical Center,
651 So.2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (rejecting argument that
194.171 applies only to actions contesting tax values, and not denial of not-for profit exemption status); Markham v. Moriarty,
575 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (imposing 60-day requirement of section
194.171 on challenge alleging Abundant Life Christian Center property was exempt from taxes); *813 Macedonia Hous. Auth.
641 So.2d at 131. Ward,
892 So.2d at 1060. In a petition for review in this Court the petitioners contend that section
194.171(2) does not apply to their action. §
194.171(2), Fla. Stat. (2001) This Court has held that the sixty-day filing period in section
194.171 is jurisdictional....
...Neptune Hollywood Beach Club,
527 So.2d 814, 815 (Fla.1988) ("No court shall have jurisdiction in such cases until after the requirements of both subsections (2) and (3) have been met."). However, the petitioners argue that instead of the sixty-day period of non-claim provided for in section
194.171(2), they are entitled to a four-year statute of limitations period in which to challenge the authority of the tax assessor to tax their property....
...Department of Revenue,
714 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) [1] , the Day court held: Florida courts recognize a difference between a claim involving the classification of property, and a claim challenging a tax assessment on property. A classification claim is not governed under section
194.171; a claim challenging a tax assessment is subject to the statute....
...ther, ... it challenges the classification of its computer software as tangible personal property. *814 Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's determination that Pepperidge Farm's lawsuit was not one barred by the sixty-day time limit in section 194.171....
...Legislative Scheme and Intent The Legislature has set out a comprehensive statutory scheme for counties to assess and collect taxes simultaneously with procedures for taxpayer challenges to tax assessments. See §§
192.001-.123,
193.011-.155,
194.011-.037,
195.0011-.207,
196.001-.32 Fla. Stat. (2001). Section
194.171, Florida Statutes, entitled "Circuit court to have original jurisdiction in tax cases," states in pertinent part: No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...193.122(2), or after 60 days from the date a decision is rendered concerning such assessment by the value adjustment board if a petition contesting the assessment had not received final action by the value adjustment board prior to extension of the roll under s.
197.323. §
194.171(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). As noted above, this Court has given a strict construction to the sixty-day non-claim period provided in section
194.171(2) and has held that compliance with its provisions is mandatory regardless of the nature of the taxpayer's claim....
...The First District correctly summarized the public policy considerations with respect to the sixty-day filing period for tax assessment challenges when it stated: "[W]e are cognizant of the legislative intent and public policy behind the adoption of the nonclaim provision contained in section
194.171(2) and (6), Florida Statutes, which is to ensure prompt payment of taxes due and making available revenues that are not disputed." Chihocky v. Crapo,
632 So.2d 230, 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In section
194.171, the Legislature required taxpayers to pay "not less than the amount of the tax which the taxpayer admits in good faith to be owing" but provided that challenges will be dismissed in cases wherein the taxpayer fails to pay the undisputed amount of taxes "before they become delinquent." §
194.171(3), (5), Fla....
...We conclude that the petitioners' argument that "classification" challenges resulting in a denial of a tax exemption are entitled to a four-year statute of limitations period while other claims are not, would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the tax assessment statutes, as well as the explicit provisions of section 194.171, which we have construed as a statute of non-claim....
...t-owned and leased property. In any case, whether they are claiming an exemption or claiming that the assessors' action is illegal, unlawful, or void as an improper "classification" or for some other reason, they are still bound by the provisions of section 194.171(1) as we construed those provisions in Markham....
...w of those challenges. We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the "classification" argument is merely an attempt to circumvent the petitioners' failure to properly and timely challenge the tax assessment of their properties as required by section 194.171(1)....
...'s error in failing to classify his property." Id. at 1141. The Fifth District found in Sartori that the four-year statute of limitation provided in section
197.182, Florida Statutes (1995), applied in that case, and that the sixty-day time limit in section
194.171, did not apply....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8235, 1990 WL 56513
...Section 602a(d) provides: With respect to any interest in real property acquired under the provisions of this section, the same shall be subject to State and local taxes until title to the same shall pass to the Government of the United States. 2 . Section 194.171 Florida Statutes (1987) provides in pertinent part: (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after sixty days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection ......
CopyCited 12 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 166, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1012, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 262, 1992 WL 159868
...nsel, finds as follows: The basic issue in this matter involves a conflict between the provisions of Section 505(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.) relating to a bankruptcy court's power to determine a debtor's tax liability and the provisions of Section 194.171(2) of the Florida Statutes limiting the time within which a taxpayer may contest a tax assessment....
...On July 19, 1991, Debtor filed its Objection to Claim which disputed the claim of Claimant. On February 21, 1992, Claimant filed its Motion to Dismiss which sought to have Debtor's Objection to Claim dismissed. Claimant's Motion to Dismiss asserted Debtor was barred from contesting Claimant's tax claim by the provisions of Section 194.171(2) of the Florida Statutes which provides: No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...ow under consideration. Accordingly, Claimant maintains since more than 60 days passed between the certification of the 1989 tax roll and Debtor's filing its Objection to Claim, Debtor should be prevented from asserting any challenge to the claim by Section 194.171(2) of the Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 47118
...We find that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the property appraiser complied with the statutory notice provisions which trigger the running of the 60-day period contained in section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes....
...utes, until sometime in 1991. Appellant and her son both claimed to have looked for the tax roll several times between November 1990 and January 2, 1991. [1] Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the challenge was untimely under section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes....
...ober 30, 1990, his deposition indicated that he could not remember who had posted it. He stated that he asked his employees about the matter, and that none of them could remember posting the notice. The trial court granted summary judgment. Sections 194.171(2) and (6), Florida Statutes, state in pertinent part: (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...of nonclaims. Miller v. Nolte,
453 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1984). Appellee, therefore, argues that the alleged failure to post notice is irrelevant to the jurisdictional question where appellant waited more than 60 days after certification of the tax roll. Section
194.171(2), however, states that no action shall be brought "after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...r notice were not strictly complied with. This issue has not been addressed by Florida courts. In addressing this issue, we are cognizant of the legislative intent and public policy behind the adoption of the nonclaim provision contained in sections 194.171(2) and (6), Florida Statutes, which is to ensure prompt payment of taxes due and making available revenues that are not disputed....
...We do, however, certify the following question to be one of great public importance: WHETHER THE FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY NOTICE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN SECTION
193.122(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), TOLLS THE RUNNING OF THE 60-DAY PERIOD CONTAINED IN SECTION
194.171(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 33 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 445, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 1222, 2008 WL 2609005
...mbers of the county school board. In 1974, the statutes were revised to expressly provide that a taxpayer's decision to pursue an administrative hearing before the board of tax adjustment would not preclude an action in the circuit court pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes....
...tion to grant property appraisers a statutory right to file a lawsuit challenging a tax assessment. Ch. 76-234, § 3, Laws of Fla. [6] Newly created subsection
194.032(6) provided that a taxpayer could file an action in the circuit court pursuant to section
194.171 to contest an assessment and that a property appraiser who disagreed with the decision of the board could appeal to the circuit court in limited circumstances....
...of any portion of the constitution or of any duly enacted legislative act of this state." §
194.036(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added). Section
194.036(2) provides that a taxpayer could bring an action to contest a tax assessment pursuant to section
194.171 without placing conditions on this statutory right....
...Section
194.034(b), Florida Statutes (1999), which outlines procedures for value adjustment board hearings, provides that "[n]othing herein shall preclude an aggrieved taxpayer from contesting [in circuit court] his or her assessment in the manner provided by s.
194.171, whether or not he or she has initiated an action pursuant to s....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 914104
...Because appellant's property is not part of the exclusive list, it was not entitled to an exemption. Accordingly, the summary judgment for appellee is affirmed. We also affirm the trial court's refusal to entertain appellant's counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See §
194.171, Fla. Stat. (1997); Nikolits v. Delaney,
719 So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(subsection
194.171(2)'s time limit provides for subject matter jurisdiction); Bancroft Inv....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...David Tyner of Sumner, Tyner, Williams, McKnight & Ross, Dade City, for appellant. H. Clyde Hobby of McClain & Hobby, Dade City, and David W. Rynders, Port Richey, for appellees. SUNDBERG, Justice. This cause is before us on direct appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Pasco County, Florida, invalidating section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1975), as it relates to the time limit for seeking judicial review of a decision of a county Board of Tax Adjustment....
...da Appellate Rule 3.2 (1962) to be filed within thirty days of the board's final decision. The circuit court granted the motion, ruling that appellant's suit was an appeal which was not timely filed pursuant to rule 3.2. The court further found that section 194.171(2), [1] which provides a sixty-day time limit for instituting a civil action in circuit court to challenge a property tax assessment, violates article V, section 2(a), Florida Constitution, [2] insofar as it attempts to extend beyond...
...hich provides for the continuation of this jurisdiction of the circuit courts over actions challenging tax assessments. Pursuant to these provisions a taxpayer may invoke the original jurisdiction of the circuit court, subject to the restrictions of section 194.171, to challenge an assessment decision of the county Board of Tax Adjustment....
...This provision indicates that an action brought by the property appraiser pursuant to section
194.032(6) is also intended to be an original action rather than an appeal. Therefore, we conclude that the property appraiser has the right, subject to the limitations imposed by section
194.032(6) and section
194.171(2), to commence an original civil action in circuit court to challenge a decision of the county Board of Tax Adjustment....
...The determination of the circuit court that the sixty-day time limit on filing an original action to challenge a tax assessment is in violation of article V, section 2(a), Florida Constitution, is necessarily erroneous in light of our interpretation of section
194.032(6). The sixty-day limit set forth in section
194.171(2) is not a time limit for filing an appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Adjustment but, rather, constitutes a statute of limitations governing the time for filing an original action to challenge such decision....
...Accordingly, the order of the Circuit Court of Pasco County, Florida, dismissing appellant's action is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further action not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 194.171(2), Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 210590
...ful, and seeking a determination by the court of the correct assessed value and the tax legally due on its property. A similar action was filed with respect to the 1988 valuation. Jurisdiction of the circuit court was invoked under the provisions of section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 379900
...the time of the recertification under section
193.122(3), as the respondent taxpayer contends and as the respondent judge apparently held. In the cited case we held that: The language of the statute is clear. The 60 day filing period referred to in section
194.171 is 60 days from the date of the initial certification as long as no petition challenging the assessment is pending before the Board and not 60 days from the date of a recertification....
...t he was not limited to sixty days from that date, but had the benefit of a later filing, i.e., sixty days after the board rendered its decision on his petition. [2] In order to remove any doubt, we hold that the sixty day filing period contained in section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes commences on the date of the initial certification of the rolls under section
193.122(2) for all taxpayers who either did not file a petition with the Value Adjustment Board, or filed a petition that had received...
...on had been taken by that time, the sixty day filing period commences to run from the date the board renders its decision on such taxpayer's petition. [3] The recertification of the rolls under section
193.122(3) has no bearing on the time limits of section
194.171(2)....
...CL 92-4948 AE is quashed and this opinion shall serve as the writ prohibiting respondent from exercising further jurisdiction in that case other than to enter an order dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. HERSEY, J., concurs. LETTS, J., concurs in conclusion only. NOTES [1] While section 194.171(2) fixes this time as prior to "extension of the roll under section 197.23" (a statute which permits the roll to be extended and certified prior to completion of the Value Adjustment Board hearings), we think it clear under the legisl...
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...t. The Property Appraiser at trial presented a prima facie case that the reduction produced a value below the "just value" required by the Article VII, Section 4, Constitution of the State of Florida (1968). Defendant, Valencia, counterclaimed under Section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1979), claiming that the reduced assessment was still greater than "just value"....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 685951
...alidity of the assessment for ad valorem tax purposes of certain real and tangible property for the years 1990 through 1992. We grant the petition for writ of prohibition because respondent FDIC did not comply with the jurisdictional requirements of section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1993), governing challenges to property tax assessments. We reject respondent FDIC's contention that section
197.182, Florida Statutes (1993), governing administrative refunds with its four-year statute of limitation, rather than section
194.171, with its sixty-day jurisdictional limitation, can be used as a vehicle by which a subsequent property owner may *805 challenge tax assessments for years prior to the respondent's ownership of the property....
...440,
116 L.Ed.2d 458 (1991), we issued a writ of prohibition where the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to dismiss a cause of action challenging a tax assessment because the sixty-day filing period for contesting a tax assessment of subsection
194.171(2) had not been met. See also Markham v. Hinckley,
544 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied sub nom. Bond v. Markham,
553 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 1989); Clark v. Cook,
481 So.2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). The sixty-day requirement of subsection
194.171(2) has been strictly enforced as a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, even where the authority to assess is challenged on constitutional grounds or the assessment is attacked as void and not merely voidable....
...Neptune Hollywood Beach Club,
527 So.2d 814 (Fla. 1988). Thus, in Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, the supreme court rejected the notion that an action challenging the assessment as void or unauthorized could be filed at any time. Recognizing the clear and strict limitations of subsection
194.171(2), respondent FDIC has attempted to circumvent those limitations by couching its complaint as an action for a refund, which it asserts falls within the scope of section
197.182....
...llector to pay refunds based upon its determination of the "just value assessment of the subject properties for the years in question." Respondent FDIC was neither the owner nor the taxpayer of the subject property during the time period mandated by section 194.171 for challenging the assessments....
...Without reaching the question of whether the property appraiser would be an indispensable party to an action contesting valuation decisions made by his office, we find that the allegations of the second amended complaint fall clearly within the scope of section
194.171 and not the scope of
197.182. Section
194.171 is located in the chapter on administrative and judicial review of property taxes....
...nd (3) have been met. A court shall lose jurisdiction of a case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (5). (Emphasis supplied.) The jurisdictional limitations on challenges by a taxpayer to an assessment found in section 194.171 have been held to be constitutional and not to unreasonably restrict a taxpayer's access to the courts....
...284,
9 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1942). We are advised that this is a case of first impression. No appellate case has discussed the possibility that by invoking section
197.182, a litigant could successfully circumvent the clear and strict jurisdictional requirements of section
194.171. Respondent contends that the two statutes provide alternative forms of relief to taxpayers section
194.171 to apply when a taxpayer attacks the assessment without payment of the taxes and section
197.182 to apply when payment in full has been made....
...We do not find section
197.182 to be applicable to an action challenging the basis for an assessment. By its own language, the section governs disputes involving "collections" of taxes, not "assessments" and is found in the chapter on tax collections, sales and liens. While section
194.171 provides the vehicle for challenging assessments, section
197.182, upon which respondent FDIC relies, is a complete administrative procedure for applying for refunds or cancellations through the Department of Revenue under certain circumstances....
...Respondent FDIC would have us construe overpayment to include a situation where a taxpayer or subsequent property owner has belatedly paid its property taxes, but then contends an "overpayment" was made by attacking the amount of the assessment. We would be effectively overriding the plain meaning of section
194.171 governing actions contesting tax assessments, by providing an alternative mechanism to attack assessments up to four years after the fact as long as the amount of the delinquent taxes were first paid disregarding the time of payment. By claiming an "overpayment" under section
197.182, respondent FDIC is, in effect, conceding that some amount of the tax was admittedly owed. It thus chooses to ignore subsections
194.171(3) and (5), which bar an action challenging the assessment unless the taxes admitted to be owed in good faith are paid before they become delinquent....
...No case authority is offered in support of this position. Despite respondent FDIC's attempt to invoke section
197.182 as a jurisdictional basis for relief, we agree with petitioners that it would be illogical and unreasonable to have two such disparate periods of limitations (sixty days in section
194.171 and four years in section
197.182) and disparate requirements concerning payment of taxes applicable to the same cause of action a property appraiser's valuation decision....
...he same general field. Howarth v. City of DeLand,
117 Fla. 692,
158 So. 294 (1934). The law favors a rational, sensible construction. Realty Bond & Share Co. v. Englar,
104 Fla. 329,
143 So. 152 (1932). The rational and sensible construction is that section
194.171 is the only statute which applies when an assessment decision is to be challenged....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Gen., Tallahassee, for appellants. Frank E. Booker, of Ryan, Taylor, Booker & Law, North Palm Beach, for appellee. *228 OWEN, Judge. By interlocutory appeal the defendants in a taxpayer's suit filed in the Circuit Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 194.171, F.S....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1975 Fla. LEXIS 3316
...of the 1968 Constitution, Appellant argues that, since the state has the burden of showing an overpowering public necessity for the enactment of this statute, the state has available to it a reasonable alternative, i.e., the procedure established by Section
194.171 (4) and Section
194.192(2), Florida Statutes, relating to real property, which read as follows: "Section
194.171(4) Florida Statutes: "No action to contest a tax assessment may be maintained unless all taxes on the property which the taxpayer in good faith admits to be owing, including taxes assessed in years after the action is brought, are pai...
...at the taxpayer's admission was not made in good faith, the court shall also assess a penalty at the rate of 10% of the deficiency per annum from the date the tax became delinquent." *686 Appellant compares Section 199.242(3), Florida Statutes, with Section 194.171(4), Florida Statutes, and concludes that the former creates a classification by which taxpayers of intangible taxes are required to pay the full amount of the taxes claimed due by the taxing authority prior to the institution of litig...
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...On December 4, 1981, the taxpayer was mailed a written notice of the denial of his petition. On March 2, 1982, the taxpayer filed a complaint in the circuit court. The property appraiser filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging, among other things, that the statute of limitations, section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1981), prohibited taxpayer's suit. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the property appraiser on that basis. The taxpayer appealed to the Fourth District *399 Court of Appeal which affirmed the circuit court's order. Section 194.171(2) provides: No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...The district court found the issue presented in this case had been resolved by this Court in Coe v. ITT Community Development Corp.,
362 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1978). Miller v. Nolte,
427 So.2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). In its brief opinion, the district court stated that Coe held that the sixty-day time limitation expressed in section
194.171(2) is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim rather than a statute of limitation....
...In reaching its conclusion, the district court stated: [T]here is no escaping the fact that Cape Cave is wholly predicated on a chance remark from Williams v. Law,
368 So.2d 1285 (Fla. 1979). Admittedly, Williams does use the term "statute of limitations" in reference to section
194.171(2)....
...e, without a word of explanation. Thus, we conclude that Coe expresses the law of Florida and is dispositive of this case. Id. (citation omitted). We must admit that an examination of the handful of cases which have dealt with the time limitation in section 194.171(2) do not provide an obvious answer to the issue in this case....
...substance, purpose, and rationale for the statute had not been altered since Rudisill. Eight months after Coe this Court decided Williams v. Law,
368 So.2d 1285 (Fla. 1979). In Williams we were faced with the issue of whether the time limitation in section
194.171(2) for seeking judicial review was a violation of article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution which provides that this supreme court shall adopt rules for practice and procedure in all courts including time for seeking appellate review. In our opinion we stated that section
194.171(2) "constitutes a statute of limitations governing the time for filing an original action to challenge [the board's] decision." Id....
...The decision is to contain findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for the appraiser's determination and is to be issued within twenty days of the last day the board is in session. In Cape Cove the court concluded that the board was estopped from raising section 194.171(2) as a bar to the corporation's action because of its failure to give proper and timely notice of its decision to the taxpayer/corporation....
...[T]he legislature made it clear in section
194.032 that the taxpayer is entitled to notification of the reasons for the denial as well as the bare fact of denial. Accordingly, we hold that the PAAB is estopped to raise the statute of limitations contained in section
194.171(2) as a defense to appellant's action....
...be a requirement of due process. Hollywood Jaycees v. Department of Revenue,
306 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1974). The non-fulfillment of the procedural prerequisites in the taxing scheme would deny the taxpayer of his right to due process were we to hold that section
194.171(2) is a non-claim statute....
...OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion in which McDONALD, J., concurs. OVERTON, Judge, dissenting. I dissent. In 1978, in Coe v. ITT Community Development Corp.,
362 So.2d 8, 9 (Fla. 1978), this Court unanimously held: *402 We have consistently held that the 60-day time limitation expressed in Section
194.171(2), and in its predecessor statutes, is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim rather than a statute of limitations....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 15540, 2009 WL 3271164
...equiring the Association to maintain the pool. The court declined to set aside the tax deed, accepting the argument of the Property Appraiser and Tax Collector (collectively "the County") that this relief was barred by the tax non-claim statute. See § 194.171(2), Fla....
...no difference in substance. For purposes of chapter 718, Tract F satisfies the statutory definition. It is a common element which cannot be separately sold. The County argues, and the trial court agreed, that the Association's action is barred by subsection
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2003), which provides that "[n]o action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s.193.122(2)...." The statute is inapplicable here. The Association's claim is that Tract F is a common element which is prohibited from being sold separately by section
718.107, Florida Statutes. That is not a challenge to the assessment. The claim is not barred by subsection
194.171(2)....
...ion of the property had resulted in an overpayment of taxes. This court agreed with the trial court that the challenge was, in substance, a challenge to the assessment of the property which was time-barred under the sixty-day limit established by subsection 194.171(2), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 284111
...By ordering the property appraiser to grant exemptions for 1990, 1992 and ensuing years, without the property appraiser's consideration of the required information presented in a timely fashion, the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof established by the legislature. Under sections
194.011-194.036,
194.171, and
196.193-196.194, Florida Statutes (1991), a taxpayer may request an informal conference with the property appraiser and/or may timely petition the value adjustment board to reverse the denial of exemption, and may thereafter bring an action in circuit court to contest the board's action, so long as the taxpayer fulfills the jurisdictional requirements of section
194.171 by filing the action within 60 days after the board's decision is rendered. Alternatively, the taxpayer may directly seek a judicial remedy under *133 section
194.171, so long as the action is filed within 60 days after the tax roll is certified for collection....
...4th DCA 1991), a case where, like the one before us, the taxpayer claimed an exemption from ad valorem taxes. Application of the filing requirement in this situation is consistent with "the legislative intent and public policy behind adoption of the nonclaim provision contained in sections 194.171(2) and (6), Florida Statutes, which is to ensure prompt payment of taxes due and making available revenues that are not disputed." Chihocky v....
...A] taxpayer ... may timely petition the value adjustment board to reverse the denial of exemption, and may thereafter bring an action in circuit court to contest the board's action, so long as the taxpayer fulfills the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171 by filing the action within 60 days after the board's decision is rendered. Alternatively, the taxpayer may directly seek a judicial remedy under section 194.171, so long as the action is filed within 60 days after the tax roll is certified for collection....
...authorizing statute ... and sought an injunction against enforcement of the assessment." Id. Because they did so more than 60 days after the tax roll had been certified for collection, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction [2] *134 to hear the case. § 194.171(2), Fla....
...d filed no separate action to contest the denial, nor had it effectively amended its complaint, but even had it done so, the evidence did not show that it was entitled to the classification for 1974[.]
382 So.2d at 785. The court also concluded that section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes, did not allow a challenge to the amount of an assessment more than 60 days after the tax roll had been certified. In neither of the cases on which the majority relies did a taxpayer make timely application for an exemption. [3] In each, the taxpayer sought to alter or undo a tax assessment. Both taxpayers ran afoul of section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides: "No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection... ." A taxpayer seeking to overturn in court the administrative denial of an application for exemption is not contesting a tax assessment within the meaning of section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...refunds which do not result from changes made in the assessed value on a tax roll certificate to the tax collector." §
197.182(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993). Because Macedonia Housing Authority does not contest its tax assessment, within the meaning of section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1993), it was not obliged to file its action for refund of taxes within 60 days of the date the assessment was certified for collection....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...a nonagricultural basis, and directed that the property be assessed and taxed for 1974 as agricultural. We find error, and reverse. On March 13, 1975, the plaintiff landowner R.M.S. Holding Corp. filed suit in the circuit court of Dade County, under Section 194.171 Florida Statutes (1973), contesting the amount of the 1974 assessment on its real property as nonagricultural ($152,600.00), contending the property should have been classified as agricultural and assessed accordingly, for a lesser amount....
..., although the prior owner, had he not sold the property, could have used that short form renewal application. Second. The plaintiff failed to comply with legally imposed conditions precedent to filing suit to challenge the amount of the assessment. Section 194.171(3), Florida Statutes (1973) provided that before a taxpayer may bring an action to contest a tax assessment "he shall pay to the collector the amount of the tax which he admits in good faith to be owing"....
...isled the plaintiff in any regard with respect to the assessment placed on the property for 1974. The same applies to the tax collector, acting on the certified assessment roll. There was no basis to apply an estoppel against the defendants. Fourth. Section
194.171(2) Florida Statutes (1973) states that no action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment roll is certified for collection under section
193.122(2), which provides for certification of th...
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1920
...Appellants seek review of a final order denying them class action status and dismissing their challenge to ad valorem tax assessments. Appellants Herbert and Marlene Hirsh claim their filing as representative plaintiffs *261 a class action to challenge tax assessments within the 60-day claims period provided under section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes, commenced the action for all members of the class....
...The Hirsh's individual claim is approximately $120, while the aggregate claim of the class members, who number from 2500 to 4000, is approximately $246,500. Appellants Hirsh admitted in pleadings that no taxpayers other than themselves had complied with the provisions of section 194.171 that require filing of an action to challenge a tax assessment within 60 days of the date the assessment is certified, and the filing of a receipt for the payment of the disputed tax. The lower court found that the action was not maintainable on behalf of a class of taxpayers who had not brought an action within the claim period. Section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1983), provides that: (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after sixty (60) days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection ......
...ve been met. A court shall lose jurisdiction of a case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (5). The Supreme Court, in Miller v. Molte,
453 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1984), expressly rejected its prior characterization of section
194.171(2) as a statute of nonclaim, holding it to be instead a statute of limitation. Although Miller was decided after the 1983 amendment of section
194.171, which added subsection (6), the amendment did not apply to the pre-1983 tax assessment at issue in that case. Subsequently section
194.171(2), as amended, has been construed to *262 be a statute of nonclaim acting as an absolute bar to any suit filed after the 60 day time limit. Gulfside Vacations Inc. v. Schultz,
479 So.2d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). We find that construction to be correct and controlling. Because section
194.171 is jurisdictional, payment of taxes owed by the representative plaintiffs alone, filing of their tax receipt, and filing of an action within the 60 day limit as a class action, would not satisfy the requirements of the statute as to the other members of the class. Under the statute as amended, the trial court had no power or authority to determine the rights of taxpayers who did not meet the requirements of section
194.171....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2630
...We grant the relief and direct the trial judge to enter an order of dismissal with prejudice against the property owner. We have realigned the parties, upon request of the property appraiser and executive director, reflecting them to be co-petitioners. The issue is not complex. Section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1983), is clear to us, saying: 194.171 Circuit court to have original jurisdiction in tax cases....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2562
...Cook, County Atty., and Michele Russell, Sp. Asst. County Atty., Clearwater, for appellees Schultz and Jasper. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and J. Terrell Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee Miller. DANAHY, Judge. In this case of first impression, we consider the application of section 194.171(6), Florida Statutes (1983), as a bar to a suit contesting an allegedly void tax assessment....
...by Florida law and enjoining its enforcement. Count 2 sought a declaratory decree passing upon the constitutionality of section
192.037. The appellees moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the application of section
194.171(2) and
194.171(6). Subsection (2) of section
194.171 provides that no action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after sixty days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection. In this case, that time limitation obviously was not met. Subsection (6) of section
194.171 provides that the requirement of subsection (2) is jurisdictional and that no court shall have jurisdiction in such cases until after the requirement of subsection (2) has been met....
...The trial judge agreed with the appellees' position that there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, granted their motion to dismiss, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed. *778 The appellants rely on those cases interpreting subsection (2) of section 194.171 as a statute of limitations which does not apply to an action contesting a tax assessment on the ground that it is void....
...terization of subsection (2) and specifically held it to be a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim. Miller v. Nolte,
453 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1984). The appellees counter by pointing out that subsection (6) was added to section
194.171 by the Florida legislature in chapter 83-204, Laws of Florida (1983)....
...Nolte , in which that court expressly rejected its prior characterization of subsection (2) as a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim and held it to be a statute of limitations. As the appellants point out, Miller v. Nolte was decided after the addition of subsection (6) to section 194.171....
...Therefore, we cannot assume that the court could or would adhere to its characterization of subsection (2) as a statute of limitations in the face of the express language of subsection (6). We have found no Florida decision applying subsection (6) of section 194.171 to a suit contesting an allegedly void tax assessment....
...d raises serious due process concerns. As the supreme court said in Miller v. Nolte , persons have a right to due process when the protection and enforcement of their private rights are at issue. The court expressly stated "due process requires that section 194.171(2) be considered a statute of limitations." However, the record does not reflect that the question of the constitutionality of applying subsection (6) in this case was raised in the trial court, and it has not been raised on this appeal....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...sdiction over an action brought against the school board. A group of citizens instituted a class action seeking to quash portions of the school *361 board's resolution levying a tax. The school board moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1979), provides that an action seeking to contest a tax assessment shall be dismissed unless the taxpayers involved shall have paid to the collector all taxes which the taxpayer in good faith admits to be owing....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge. Plaintiff Cape Cave Corporation appeals an order dismissing the instant case for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse. Appellant filed a complaint against appellees challenging its property tax assessment, alleging jurisdiction under Section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1979). Appellees moved to dismiss for failure of appellant to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171(2), which requires that suit be filed within sixty days from the date the challenged assessment was certified for collection, alleging that the tax roll was certified on November 12, 1980, and that the instant complaint was not filed until February 18, 1981....
...(1979). Any property owner who objects to his assessment may, within specified time limits, either seek administrative review by petitioning the PAAB for review pursuant to section
194.011(3) or seek judicial review in the circuit court pursuant to Section
194.171....
...If the taxpayer elects to pursue his administrative remedies, as appellant did here, the PAAB hearing procedure is governed by Section
194.032, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980). That section states that "nothing herein shall preclude an aggrieved taxpayer from contesting his assessment in the manner provided by s.
194.171, whether or not he has initiated an action pursuant to this section." §
194.032(3). However, section
194.032 further provides that following the PAAB's decision on a petition: "(6) Appeals of the board's decision shall be as follows: ... (b) Any taxpayer may bring an action to contest a tax assessment pursuant to s.
194.171." Thus, it is clear that the legislature intended to afford the taxpayer access to the courts if he remains aggrieved after the PAAB's review as well as if he decides to bypass the PAAB entirely, and the procedures and requirements governing judicial review are the same in either case. Section
194.171(2) provides: "No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...Yet it was not issued until January 19, 1981, well over sixty days after appellant's assessment was certified for collection. Appellant filed the instant complaint on February 18, 1980, less than forty days after the PAAB's decision was issued. The sixty-day limit set forth in section 194.171(2) has been held to constitute a statute of limitations, Williams v....
...1979), and a defendant may by its actions become estopped from claiming the benefit of a statute of limitations. Salcedo v. Asociacion Cubana, Inc.,
368 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied,
378 So.2d 342 (Fla. 1979); North v. Culmer,
193 So.2d 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). We conclude that the PAAB has become estopped to raise section
194.171(2) as a bar to appellant's action by virtue of its failure to properly and timely notify appellant of its decision on appellant's petition....
...As mentioned above, the legislature made it clear in section
194.032 that the taxpayer is entitled to notification of the reasons for the denial as well as the bare fact of denial. Accordingly, we hold that the PAAB is estopped to raise the statute of limitations contained in section
194.171(2) as a defense to appellant's action....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 533, 2011 WL 222150
...The circuit courts of this state have original jurisdiction to consider all matters relating to property taxation, notwithstanding the fact the taxpayer might have, as in this case, contested the decision of the property appraiser before the value adjustment board. See § 194.171(1), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 8248, 1994 WL 444886
...er April 14, 1976, shall be subject to ad valorem taxation unless the lessee is an organization which uses the property exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. CPA challenged the assessment by filing suit pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1991), against Brevard County's property appraiser and tax collector....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...Metropolitan Dade County,
290 So.2d 573 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). The lower court determined Deltona owed an amount of tax, for each of the four *172 years, greater than the sums it had admitted were due and had paid into the registry of the court, pursuant to section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1981)....
...It necessarily required projections of costs, interest, and other elements over too long a time period. [8] The trial court found that Deltona acted in good faith in challenging the tax assessments, and in estimating the amount of the tax due and calculating the deposit required by section 194.171, even though Deltona's estimate was less than the amount of the tax later found due by the court, after trial of the case....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2138
...to section
192.032(2), (5), Florida Statutes (1983). We find no merit to the first two points. Appellees were not required to file a receipt of payment because the challenge *294 here was to taxability, not the evaluation of assessment of property. §
194.171(3), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...nits. A careful reading of the record in this case reveals no evidence this issue was ever raised in the trial court or on appeal to the district court. The proper method for challenging the validity of a tax assessment is through the circuit court. § 194.171, Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 2068, 1995 WL 84471
...DOR was added as a party defendant by order of the court after a motion by Hall. On May 5, 1994, the trial court entered a final judgment ordering Hall to refund the ad valorem taxes paid by LRMC for the 1988 tax year. Hall and DOR appeal the trial court's final judgment. They argue that LRMC's action was barred by section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1987) because neither LRMC, nor its predecessor owner of the property, brought a timely action within the limits of section 194.171, Florida Statutes to contest the 1988 assessment. We agree. Section 194.171 provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) The circuit courts have original jurisdiction at law of all matters relating to property taxation....
...onstrued as a jurisdictional statute of non-claim rather than as a statute of limitations. Therefore, the circuit court has no subject matter jurisdiction if the time limits in this statute have not been met. We find no merit in LRMC's argument that section
194.171 applies only to actions contesting tax assessments, but does not apply to actions relating to exemptions, as in the present case. The First District Court of Appeal in Davis v. Macedonia Housing Authority,
641 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), considered the denial of a tax exemption to be within the definition of a tax assessment under section
194.171, Florida Statutes....
...The court recognized that a taxpayer may timely petition the *233 PAAB to reverse the denial of an exemption and that it may bring an action in circuit court to contest the PAAB's action, as long as the taxpayer fulfills the jurisdictional requirements of section
194.171 by filing the action within sixty days of the board's decision, or by filing an action within sixty days after the tax roll is certified for collection. See also Department of Revenue v. Stafford,
646 So.2d 803 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (rejecting FDIC's attempt to circumvent the limitations of section
194.171(2) by couching its complaint as an action for a refund). LRMC should have filed a complaint contesting the assessment within sixty days from the date the 1988 tax roll was certified. §
194.171(2) and (6), Fla....
...been certified before the September 25 and 26, 1989 meeting of the PAAB. LRMC did not file the complaint contesting the assessment until June 12, 1991. Thus, the complaint filed by LRMC was not filed within the jurisdictional time limit set forth in section 194.171, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...This leaves the property appraiser's contention that the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider the back assessment because appellants did not exhaust their administrative remedies or file their action within sixty days of the contested assessment as required by section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1977), citing Coe v....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 62424
...n action filed by John L.A. Bond v. William Markham, Broward County Property Appraiser, et al., Case No. 86-32883. Petitioners claim the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to dismiss respondent Bond's suit which was brought pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1985), to contest a 1986 assessment on his property....
...sal of tender, to be the equivalent of actual payment for the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss. Id. at 931. The Florida Supreme Court unequivocally stated in Bystrom v. Diaz,
514 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 1987), that the jurisdictional requirements of section
194.171 must be strictly enforced: Although subsections
194.171(5) and (6) appear to be somewhat harsh, their meaning is clear. Subsection
194.171(5) plainly states that a taxpayer may not maintain a suit contesting a tax assessment, and that such an action "shall be dismissed, unless all taxes on the property assessed in years after the action is brought, which the taxpayer in...
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1978 Fla. LEXIS 4866
...This case comes to us by petition for a writ of certiorari directed to the First District Court of Appeal, which recently held [1] that a complaint challenging an ad valorem real property tax assessment need not be filed within the 60-day period prescribed by Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...assessment challenge and indicated that the "resulting conflict ... may be remedied in the Supreme Court." [3] To remedy the conflict, we now quash the district court's decision. We have consistently held that the 60-day time limitation expressed in Section 194.171(2), and in its predecessor statutes, is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim rather than a statute of limitations....
...inartful use of the term "statute of limitations" in a recent decision of this Court, [4] and a consequential reluctance of other Florida appellate courts to treat the statute as jurisdictional. [5] While *10 an inapt label may have been ascribed to Section 194.171(2) by our recent decision, the substance, purpose, and rationale for the statute have not been altered since Rudisill....
...The Maccabee court's conclusion that this provision constitutes a statute of limitation rather than a jurisdictional requisite was based largely on our misappellation in Gerstung.
311 So.2d at 726. Bailey, in turn, relied entirely upon Maccabee for the same proposition.
335 So.2d at 17. [6] Respondents also contend that if Section
194.171(2) is held to be jurisdictional, it would be an unconstitutional encroachment upon our rule-making power under Article V, Section 2(a), Florida Constitution....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...informal conference with the Property Appraiser (Section
194.011, Florida Statutes (1981)) or at a hearing before the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board (Section
194.032, Florida Statutes (1981)) or by means of judicial review in the circuit court (Section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1981))....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 13118, 2009 WL 2605426
...ent, as all of the issues in this case are controlled by well reasoned precedent. We consider first the issue presented in the cross-appeal. The defendants contend that the trial court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, because section
194.171, Florida Statutes, requires that an action such as this be filed within sixty days of the tax assessment. This argument was considered and rejected by the court in Reinish v. Clark,
765 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). There we held that the sixty-day time period in section
194.171 applies only to an action to contest a property tax assessment or the *297 denial of an exemption and that it does not apply to litigation such as this involving the validity of the tax laws. See Reinish,
765 So.2d at 202. Our decision in Reinish is supported by the plain meaning of the statute, and we see no reason to recede from it now. Section
194.171, Florida Statutes states in material part:
194.171 Circuit court to have original jurisdiction in tax cases....
...tion or a refund. The point of the case is that the Florida property tax scheme has a discriminatory effect on nonresidents. The case has nothing to do with the assessment made on any particular property in Florida, and so the sixty-day provision in section 194.171 and the policy considerations underlying the statute do not come into play....
...1988), a case in which the plaintiffs raised a constitutional challenge to their ad valorem tax assessments on condominiums and to the authorizing statute. The supreme court held that the trial court had properly dismissed the case for failure to file within sixty days under section 194.171(2).
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1801
...e statute. In the same order, however, the trial court granted the tax collector's motion to dismiss on the jurisdictional ground stemming from the Marshalls' failure to pay their 1984 taxes before they had become delinquent. In its pertinent parts, section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1983), the controlling statute, provides as follows: (3) Before a taxpayer may bring an action to contest a tax assessment, he shall pay to the collector not less than the amount of the tax which he admits in good faith to be owing....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 238763
...Sohn filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court. The Department moved to dismiss, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the certificate holder's action was nothing more than a contest of a tax assessment, and that such an action was time barred pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes, because it had not been filed within 60 days from the date the assessment had been certified for collection....
...sment. As the court noted in that case, no matter how the complaint was couched the taxpayer was clearly challenging the assessment on grounds that it was "unjust, capricious, arbitrary and illegal," an action cognizable only under the strictures of section
194.171, which allows a suit to be filed only within 60 days from the date the assessment roll is certified for collection. In contrast to Stafford, the case before us involves a legitimate reclassification of the property as authorized under section
197.122(1), Florida Statutes. In maintaining that this action is also governed by the 60-day period provided in section
194.171(2), we believe the department ignores both the nature of the action and its own rules interpreting the applicable statutes....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 172842
...Although no one questions the trial judge's finding that Smith predecessor's assessments were invalid, Countryside contends that the trial judge should have granted a summary final judgment adopting its income approach valuations as the just values. When the circuit court has jurisdiction, pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1987), to establish just values for ad valorem tax assessments, it is bound to *16 follow the same statutory criteria as are the Property Appraiser and the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board....
...[2] Section
193.092, Florida Statutes (1987). [3] "To `escape taxation' means to get free of tax, to avoid taxation, to be missed from being taxed or to be forgotten for tax purposes." Okeelanta Sugar Refinery, Inc. v. Maxwell,
183 So.2d 567 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966). [4] Section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1987) provides that the circuit court does not acquire jurisdiction to review a contested assessment until sixty days after the assessment has been certified for collection and the taxpayer has paid the good faith estimate of taxes....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...If it was requisite that the Board of Tax Adjustment afford Appellants notice and hearing therein, similar treatment should have been accorded them by the DOR since its power to deny exemptions was equally as great as the Board's. It is true the statutes afford Appellants judicial review de novo in the Circuit Court. Section 194.171, F.S....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...al court refusing to dismiss an action challenging a 1972 tax assessment of certain lands owned by the taxpayer. The principal basis of error urged is that the taxpayer failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and bring his suit, as provided in § 194.171, Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Fredericks may possibly obtain the relief desired before the Board which may make such substantial changes in the final rolls that Fredericks will have no complaint. Alternatively, if he is dissatisfied with the Board's action, he may then file suit in circuit court as provided by Section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1977)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...In response thereto defendants filed a motion to dismiss and as grounds therefor alleged (1) that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter in that plaintiff failed to bring this action within 60 days from the date the tax assessment roll was certified for collection (on October 3, 1972) as required by § 194.171(2), Fla....
...la. Stat. because plaintiff did not hold legal title to the real property in question, (2) plaintiff was not required to file a timely petition for equalization to appear before the Board of Tax Adjustment or to file suit within the time provided by § 194.171(2), Fla....
...ppear before the Board of Tax Adjustment. In light of the above determination, plaintiff-appellee, having failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, now is precluded from complaining. See Marx v. Welch, Fla.App. 1965,
178 So.2d 737. In addition, §
194.171(2), Fla....
...1972,
262 So.2d 1, upon which the trial judge relied in holding the subject assessment invalid and, in effect, void and, therefore, finding that the plaintiff was not required to file a timely petition for equalization to appear before the Board of Tax Adjustment, or to file suit within the time provided by §
194.171(2), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 9476, 2000 WL 1033038
...at the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the issues involved, because respondents failed to file actions in court or petitions with the Value Adjustment Board to contest the assessment of ad valorem taxes within sixty days, as mandated by section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1999)....
...In effect, the tax validity issues were raised for respondents, in the prior litigation by the Port Authority, the owner of the property and the proper party to contest the assessment. They cannot be raised again. Further, respondents are also barred by section 194.171 by their failure to contest the yearly assessments within the applicable statutory sixty day periods....
...However, counts involving the validity of the tax assessments and ministerial matters, which are inappropriate for a declaratory judgment action, should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petition for Writ of Prohibition GRANTED in part; DENIED in part. HARRIS and PETERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 194.171, Florida Statutes, provides: (1) The circuit courts have original jurisdiction at law of all matters relating to property taxation....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 396717
...In August 1996, Sartori filed this declaratory judgment action requesting the trial court to enter an order directing DOR to refund the taxes which he had paid on his pollution control equipment. DOR moved to dismiss Sartori's complaint arguing it was not timely filed because, pursuant to subsection 194.171(2) of the Florida Statutes (1993), a challenge to a tax assessment must be raised within sixty days of the date the county tax rolls are certified and Sartori missed the sixty-day deadline. Section 194.171 provides, in relevant part: 194.171 Circuit court to have original jurisdiction in tax cases. (1) The circuit courts have original jurisdiction at law of all matters relating to property taxation....
...The trial court conducted a hearing on the matter. Upon review of the arguments presented, the trial court entered an order dismissing Sartori's lawsuit. In so ruling, the trial court concluded that Sartori's lawsuit was untimely filed because this matter was governed by section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1993)....
...ified for collection on October 19, 1993). The trial court reasoned that by filing suit in August 1996, more than sixty days after the certification, Sartori missed the deadline. Sartori argues that his declaratory judgment action was not subject to section 194.171's sixty-day deadline because his lawsuit was not asserting a "contest to a tax assessment", but instead, involved a request for a tax refund based on the theory that the County had improperly "classified" his pollution control equipment for valuation purposes....
...d of any overage. The trial court denied Tompkins' request, ruling that Tompkins was not entitled to relief on its claim for a refund for the 1974 tax year because, inter alia, the complaint was not filed within the sixty-day time period provided in section 194.171....
...property." As a result, the ruling in Goembel is not necessarily controlling. We must further analyze this issue. Upon review, we conclude that Sartori is correct that his declaratory judgment action is not time barred by the sixty-day time limit in section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1993) because the lawsuit does not challenge the County's valuation of his property (i.e., contest a tax assessment)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15025
...s on its property enjoined pending a determination as to whether plaintiff's property should have been classified as agricultural lands. Dade County moved to dismiss Millstream's complaint, citing the latter's failure to comply with Florida Statutes § 194.171(3) & (4) (Supp. 1976), which require a taxpayer to pay those taxes which are admittedly owing as a prerequisite to suit: "194.171 Circuit court to have original jurisdiction in tax cases * * * * * * (3) Before a taxpayer may bring an action to contest a tax assessment, he shall pay to the collector the amount of *1277 the tax which he admits in good faith to be owing....
...a suit challenging an allegedly excessive assessment. However, in Adler-Built Industries, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County,
231 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1970), the court noted that the Legislature had amended Florida Statutes § 196.01 the predecessor to §
194.171 in order to overcome the holding of the Collins case: "It is noteworthy that in ......
...iff had tendered the amount which it admittedly owed to the tax collector on the day of the hearing on the property appraiser's motion to dismiss. Although the court in Hilltop Ranch raised certain constitutional questions concerning the validity of § 194.171(3), it never actually reached the question of payment as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit; nor was that particular question resolved in the Brooks case....
...Were it not so, it would be an easy matter to avoid paying legitimate taxes simply by challenging one facet of an otherwise valid assessment. We therefore find that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint due to Millstream's failure to comply with Florida Statutes § 194.171(3) & (4)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 791693
...action within "60 days from the date the assessment [became] final." According to the Department, the passage of 60 days rendered the agency action final and barred a circuit court from entertaining the suit for refund. The Department analogizes to section 194.171, Florida Statutes. In Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, the supreme court found that a trial court could not exercise jurisdiction over an ad valorem tax case because the 60-day time period in section 194.171(2) is jurisdictional....
...he taxes. Certainly, during the course of formal and informal proceedings before the circuit court the Department concurred in this view and repeatedly advised Pogge of his right to seek review in circuit court. The Department's attempted analogy to section 194.171 fails because that statute expressly includes refund actions within its provisions....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 1824123
...sure but pointed out that he was obligated by law to follow the statute. The Tax Collector raised the defense that with *1042 respect to tax years 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, the refunds sought by the Taxpayers were barred by the nonclaim statute in section 194.171(6), Florida Statutes (1997)....
...The Taxpayers timely appealed the circuit court's order. IV. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES The Tax Collector contends that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as to tax years 1998 to 2001 because the Taxpayers' claims for relief for those years are barred by the statute of nonclaim in section 194.171(6), Florida Statutes (1997)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...The present system is based upon timely, good faith payments of taxes. Accordingly, in order to maintain a judicial action which contests a tax assessment, the taxpayer must pay all taxes, which he admits in good faith to be owing before they become delinquent. Section 194.171(4), Florida Statutes (1979)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 670421
...We find that the Respondents Delaneys' claim that the homestead tax assessment on their property exceeds the statutory cap on increases of homestead assessments, in violation of section
193.155, Florida Statutes (1997), is an action to contest a tax assessment governed by section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1997). Since respondents' action was filed beyond the sixty-day time limit prescribed by subsection
194.171(2), the trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction over the claim....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 17266, 2009 WL 3818216
...sage of Amendment 1. Accordingly, we affirm the final order of dismissal. As for the issue raised on cross-appeal, that the trial court erred in concluding it had subject matter jurisdiction despite appellants/cross-appellees' failure to comply with section
194.171(1), Florida Statutes, this issue is governed by Lanning,
16 So.3d at 296-97....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 303239
...The Utility filed its application to the VAB on January 3, 2000, but ten days later was advised the VAB had elected not to hear it. The Utility then filed suit in the circuit court. In March of 2000, both Heffner and Day filed motions for summary judgment, alleging the complaint was untimely based on section 194.171(2), which provides: No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...had not received final action by the value adjustment board prior to extension of the roll under s.
197.323. (emphasis supplied) Subsection (2) is jurisdictional, and no court has jurisdiction in tax cases until subsections (1) and (2) are met. *497 §
194.171(6), Fla....
...However, Florida courts recognize a difference between a claim involving the classification of property, and a claim challenging a tax assessment on property. Sartori v. Department of Revenue,
714 So.2d 1136, 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). A classification claim is not governed under section
194.171; a claim challenging a tax assessment is subject to the statute. Sartori. See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Day,
742 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (challenge to ad valorem tax assessment as excessive, untimely where not filed within sixty-day period of section
194.171(2)); Department of Revenue v....
...[4] In this case, the lawsuit did not challenge the tax assessment-the valuation of the property-but rather challenged the classification of the property for valuation purposes, i.e., its classification or status as a non-exempt governmental entity. It is therefore not subject to the sixty-day period of section 194.171(2). Sartori; Sohn. Because the summary judgment was improperly granted based upon the Utility's failure to file suit within the sixty-day period of section 194.171(2), we must reverse....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 1204107
...An answer was filed and in August 2002 the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to include a challenge to the denial of homestead exemption for the year 2001. Defendant Page objected, asserting, among other things, that the challenge to the 2001 assessment was not timely filed in accordance with section 194.171(2)....
...West Volusia Hospital Authority v. Jones,
668 So.2d 635 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); School Board of Broward County v. Surette,
394 So.2d 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Daniels v. Weiss,
385 So.2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). This same rule of law should apply in the instant matter, which involves section
194.171(2), a statute of non-claim....
...ct that the original denial of the exemption was in litigation when the time for the subsequent year's challenge arose. The respondents argue that this case involves reclassification of property, and therefore they are not bound by the time limit of section 194.171(2)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 1088219
...We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(6). See Key Club Ass'n, Ltd. v. Mayer,
718 So.2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The issue we must resolve is whether the trial court correctly determined that certain members of the proposed class were time barred from bringing an action pursuant to section
194.171(1), Florida Statutes, challenging a property tax assessment on the basis that the property was exempt governmental property pursuant to section
196.199, Florida Statutes. We determine that the trial court correctly determined that the actions were untimely because they were not filed *1060 within 60 days of the tax roll being certified as required by section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes....
...Auth.,
641 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Therefore the trial court correctly struck the allegations relating to the class action. See Hirsh v. Crews,
494 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Appellants argue they were not subject to the 60 day time limits contained in section
194.171, Florida Statutes, because rather than challenging the assessment on the particular piece of property, they are challenging the classification placed on the property by the assessor....
...Whether couched in terms of an "assessment" or a "classification," the appellants are challenging the property appraiser's judgment to deny them an exemption under chapter 196, place their properties on the tax roll, and impose ad valorem taxes. Denial of exemptions are "assessments" subject to the requirements of section
194.171, Florida Statutes. See Hall v. Leesburg Regional Medical Center,
651 So.2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (rejecting argument that
194.171 applies only to actions contesting tax values, and not denial of not-for profit exemption status); Markham v. Moriarty,
575 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (imposing 60-day requirement of section
194.171 on challenge alleging Abundant Life Christian Center property was exempt from taxes); Macedonia Hous....
...The issue was whether the MHA timely challenged denial of a charitable purpose exemption. This court in Davis found the trial court did not have jurisdiction to review the exemption for the 1990 taxes because the taxpayer had failed to file its challenge within the 60-day time restriction of section 194.171....
...4th DCA 1991), a case where, like the one before us, the taxpayer claimed an exemption from ad valorem taxes. Application of the filing requirement in this situation is consistent with "the legislative intent and public policy behind adoption of the nonclaim provision contained in sections 194.171(2) and (6), Florida Statutes, which is to ensure prompt payment of taxes due and making available revenues that are not disputed." Chihocky v....
...at 133 (Wolf, J., specially concurring). Similarly, in Nikolits v. Ballinger,
736 So.2d 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the issue was whether a challenge to the removal of an exemption was part of the "tax assessment" within the meaning of the 60-day requirement of section
194.171(2)....
...e taxable value is the value "upon which the tax is actually calculated." Id. From this statutory and administrative framework, it is clear that the application of a homestead exemption is an integral part of a "tax assessment" within the meaning of section 194.171(2)....
...5th DCA 2000), the Fifth District faced a challenge similar to the one made by appellants the denial of governmental tax exemption based on a government leasehold. [1] There, respondents failed to file action in court within sixty days, as mandated by section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes. The DOR filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to require the trial court to dismiss the declaratory judgment action on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issues involved. The Fifth District found that section 194.171 did apply to the decision regarding the exemption and that the trial court had no jurisdiction....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 14852
...We reverse a summary judgment in this case based on a ruling by the trial judge to the contrary. Appellant Malibu, a limited partnership and the record title holder of a piece of real property in Lee County, wished to contest the 1977 assessment of the property for tax purposes. Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that a suit to contest a property tax assessment must be brought within 60 days following the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection....
...Subsequent to January 1, 1978, appellant filed an amended complaint adding its general partners as plaintiffs. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the action was not legally commenced within the time period provided by Section 194.171(2) because the suit was originally filed by an entity not empowered by the laws of Florida to sue or be sued and appellant's general partners were made parties plaintiff after the limitations period had expired....
...Appellant advances an alternative argument that its amended complaint, which added its general partners as plaintiffs, related back to the date on which the original complaint was filed, so that the addition of the general partners as plaintiffs was made within the time provided for in Section 194.171(2)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 493103
...Ballinger's action would be timely. This court exercises its prohibition jurisdiction to review orders denying summary judgment when a trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a lawsuit. See Nikolits v. Delaney,
719 So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1997) provides that "[n]o action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under §
193.122(2)." Section
194.171(6) states that the requirements of subsection (2) are "jurisdictional." In State, Department of Revenue v. Stafford,
646 So.2d 803, 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), this court observed that the 60 day requirement of subsection
194.171(2) "has been strictly enforced as a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, even where the authority to assess is challenged on constitutional grounds or the assessment is attacked as void and not merely voidable." See Markham v....
...Moriarty,
575 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The issue in this case is whether the challenge to the 1996 homestead removal can survive as a challenge to the 1997 tax assessment, or whether it was part of the 1996 "tax assessment" within the meaning of section
194.171(2), such that the challenge was time barred since it was not filed within 60 days of October 14, 1996....
...e taxable value is the value "upon which the tax is actually calculated." Id. From this statutory and administrative framework, it is clear that the application of a homestead exemption is an integral part of a "tax assessment" within the meaning of section 194.171(2)....
...The problem in this case is that Ballinger did not challenge the 1996 removal of the homestead exemption until the end of 1997. This result is consistent with Hall v. Leesburg Regional Medical Center,
651 So.2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), where the court rejected the argument that section
194.171 applies only to actions contesting tax assessments, but does not apply to actions relating to exemptions....
...The fifth district held that because the taxpayer "should have filed a complaint contesting the assessment within sixty days from the date the 1988 tax roll was certified," the trial court should have dismissed the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction for failing to comply with the time limits of section
194.171. Id. at 233. Similarly, in Davis v. Macedonia Housing Authority,
641 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the first district considered the denial of a tax exemption to be within the definition of a tax assessment under section
194.171....
...at 132. The first district recognized that a taxpayer may timely petition to reverse the denial of an exemption and that it may bring an action in circuit court to contest the denial, so long as the taxpayer fulfills the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 10777, 41 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1614
...for the 2005 to 2010 tax years, as well as the removal of her homestead exemption for the 2011 tax year. The trial court dismissed her complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that it had been filed beyond the sixty-day statute of non-claim under section 194.171, Florida Statutes....
...More than two years later, the trial court dismissed the second and third counts of her complaint because they were filed more than 160 days after the Property Appraiser sent the notice on February 20 — well beyond the sixty-day statute of nonclaim under section
194.171. This appeal followed. Miles claims on appeal that the Property Appraiser did not submit any evidence proving the date on which the taxes and penalties were “certified for collection under s.
193.122(2),” §
194.171(2), Fla....
...ess language unless it is clear that the plain meaning was not intended. After reviewing the plain text and meaning of the applicable statutes, we disagree with the Property Appraiser’s interpretation of the legal effect of the February 20 notice. Section
194.171(2) provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s.
193.122(2).” §
194.171(2) (emphasis added)....
...payer who requests one in writing. These certificates and notices shall be made in the form required by the department and shall be attached to each roll as required by the department by regulation. §
193.122(2), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added). Section
194.171(2) specifically establishes an unambiguous trigger for the running of the sixty-day nonclaim period: the certification of the assessment pursuant to section
193.122(2). §
194.171(2)....
...e disagree with the Property Appraiser’s position. Moreover, in an analogous case, the First District recently held that a tax lien filed for a retroactive removal of a religious exemption on a school’s property was not subject to nonclaim under section
194.171(2). Genesis Ministries, Inc. v. Brown,
186 So.3d 1074, 1077-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). There, the court stated: Section
194.171(2), by its clear and unambiguous terms, applies only to actions contesting “a tax assessment” and it requires such actions to be filed within 60 days after the assessment is “certified for collection under s....
...at 1077 (emphasis added). The Property Appraiser relies on Ward v. Brown,
894 So.2d 811 (Fla.2004), for the proposition that the nonclaim statute bars Miles’ challenge. However, we agree with our sister court that although Ward held that the sixty-day period in section
194.171(2) applied “broadly to taxpayers’ actions challenging the assessment of taxes against their property regardless of the legal basis of the challenge,”
894 So.2d at 812 , there is “no support in Ward for the proposition that section
194.171(2) should be construed to apply to actions challenging tax liens.” Genesis Ministries,
186 So.3d at 1078 . On that point, we find the following passage from Genesis Ministries particularly instructive as to why section
194.171(2) applies to tax assessments, but not to tax liens: Furthermore, basic notions of due process — i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard — weigh against interpreting section
194.171(2) to apply to actions challenging tax liens....
...There is no requirement that the property appraiser give the property owner actual notice of the tax lien, and unlike valuation, classification, and exemption determinations which can be appealed to the value adjustment board before the tax rolls are certified and the 60-day period in section
194.171(2) is triggered, there is no procedure for the property owner to obtain administrative review of the property appraiser’s determination under section
196.011(9)(a) before the tax lien is recorded in the public records. Accordingly, if section
194.171(2)-was construed to apply to tax liens, the only opportunity a property owner would have to challenge the property appraiser’s “back-assessment” of taxes under section
196.011(9)(a) would be by filing suit within,60 days after the tax lien is recorded in the public records....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 717, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 132, 54 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 54, 2011 WL 180085
...and scheduling a final evidentiary hearing. DONE and ORDERED. NOTES [1] Debtor's Objection to Claim No. 43 of Pinellas County Tax Collector ("Objection") (Doc. No. 192 ¶ 14). [2] Fla. Stat. §§
192.042,
192.053, and
197.122 (2008). [3] Fla. Stat. §
194.171(2) (2009)....
...243-1 and 243-2). [5] Objection, supra note 1. [6] Id. ¶ 4. [7] Debtor's Amended Objection to Claim No. 43 of Pinellas County Tax Collector and Pinellas County Property Appraiser ("Amended Objection") (Doc. No. 394). [8] 11 U.S.C. § 108(a). [9] Fla. Stat. § 194.171(2). [10] Fla. Stat. § 194.171(1)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 75479
...On the day it filed suit, Washington Square met the statutory prerequisites for bringing a judicial challenge to its 1993 assessment, assuming as we do that the amount of tax it paid then was "not less than the amount of the tax which the taxpayer admits in good faith to be owing." Section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1995), provides: (3) Before an action to contest a tax assessment may be brought, the taxpayer shall pay to the collector not less than the amount of the tax which the taxpayer admits in good faith to be owing....
...he action. At issue here, however, is what the statute requires to prevent dismissal of a judicial challenge to an assessment, when duly initiated court proceedings have not concluded by the time taxes fall due in subsequent year(s). In this regard, section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1995), provides: (5) No action to contest a tax assessment may be maintained, and any such action shall be dismissed, unless all taxes on the property assessed in years after the action is brought, which the taxpayer in good faith admits to be owing, are paid before they become delinquent....
...Unless a petition is pending before the value adjustment board when an assessment is certified for collection, "[n]o action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection." § 194.171(2), Fla....
...Once the deadlines for challenges passed, the tax assessments for the taxable years 1994 and 1995 were no longer subject to adjustment. Thereafter, payment of anything less than the full amounts levied could no longer be deemed payment of amounts "which the taxpayer in good faith admits to be owing." § 194.171(5), Fla....
...axes for those years became delinquent on April 1, 1995, and April 1, 1996, respectively, partial payments notwithstanding. These delinquencies required dismissal of Washington Square's complaint challenging its assessment for the taxable year 1993. § 194.171(5), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Steinmeyer, III, of Folsom & Steinmeyer, and Peter Guarisco, Tallahassee, for appellee. JOHNSON, Judge. Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's order dismissing with prejudice its amended complaint challenging a tax assessment for the reason that said complaint did not show a compliance with F.S. §
194.171. Essentially, this appeal involves one question: Must a taxpayer suffer denial of access to the courts for failure to pay his taxes within 60 days of the certification of the tax roll for collection? The portions of F.S. §
194.171 applicable to this case are as follows: "(2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days *125 from the date the assessment roll is certified for collection under section
193.133(2)....
....." The various appellees herein then moved to dismiss the complaint because appellant failed to allege that it paid the amount of the tax which it admits in good faith to be owing and failed to file the receipt with the complaint in accordance with § 194.171, F.S....
...collection. On January 23, 1974, the trial court entered its order granting appellees' motions to dismiss and the appellant's amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice. To reiterate the question now before us, must the payment required by F.S. § 194.171(3) be made within the 60 day limitation period provided by F.S. § 194.171(2) and is this a jurisdictional prerequisite? If the answers be in the affirmative, we note as dictum our concern with the constitutionality of subsection (3) and its apparent conflict with subsection (4)....
...It was concluded in that case that the Legislature never intended *126 that the payment of taxes be a jurisdictional prerequisite that must be made during the 60 day period allowed for the filing of the complaint. Admittedly, that case was decided prior to the 1972 amendments to § 194.171, which amendments, particularly subsection (3), do appear to require as a prerequisite to filing suit the payment of the tax to the collector. In any event, we do not deem it necessary to decide these issues under the particular facts of this case. Here, the original complaint was filed within the 60 days required by F.S. § 194.171(2)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...time barred as far as the ad valorem taxes paid for the years 1968, 1969 and 1970. Appellant's contention is that the taxes paid for the above three years would be time barred under former Florida Statutes, similar in language to the present statute Section 194.171(2)....
...ied for collection under section
193.122(2). The affidavit of the tax assessor establishes that the certification dates on the above three years were November 13, 1968; December 5, 1969, and December 2, 1970, respectively. However, Florida Statutes, Section
194.171(2) does not apply to a "void" assessment, as distinguished from a "voidable" assessment....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 5257, 2010 WL 1563544
...Williams Pawn & Gun, Inc.,
800 So.2d 267, 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing State v. Barnes,
686 So.2d 633, 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). In Cason v. Florida Department of Management Services,
944 So.2d 306, 308 (Fla.2006), the supreme court interpreted the term "taxpayer" as used in section
194.171, Florida Statutes (2006). Because section
194.171 did not define "taxpayer," the supreme court looked at the definition of "taxpayer" in section
192.001(13), Florida Statutes (2006)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 13844, 2007 WL 2480785
...nded complaint, alleging that she had been too ill to complete it. The property appraiser opposed both motions on the grounds that the fourth amended complaint was not attached to the motion to amend and that the sixty-day filing period specified in section 194.171, Florida Statutes, had expired and could not be enlarged, as it is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim. First, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(a) states that “the party shall attach the proposed amended pleading to the motion.” This is a mandatory requirement. Second, subsection (2) of 194.171, Florida Statutes, provides that “[n]o action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection ......
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 767399
...e proceedings *1074 since it did not sell the questioned tax certificates. Because the complaint challenged the assessment on the 1991, 1994, and 1996 tax rolls and was not filed within sixty days of the certification of the tax rolls as required by section 194.171, the appraiser alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter. The trial court then duly dismissed the complaint as to the property appraiser. The revenue collector filed an answer also raising the jurisdictional bar of section 194.171....
...ejudice, resulting in this appeal from all of the dismissals. The property appraiser and tax collector both characterize the complaint for declaratory judgment as one challenging the property assessment and therefore argue it is untimely pursuant to section 194.171....
...Erroneous listing of ownership of property, including common elements. (emphasis added). Section (4) provides that "[a]ny error or any act of omission or commission may be corrected at any time by the party responsible." Thus, correction of these types of errors is not limited by section 194.171....
...We analogize this case to State, Department of Revenue v. Gerald Sohn, P.A.,
654 So.2d 249, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), in which the first district held that a complaint alleging an error in classification in property which would change its value was not governed by section
194.171, and the complaint could be brought at any time....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 392688
...On May 27, 1993, the property appraiser moved to dismiss on the grounds that the taxes for the subject property had become delinquent by operation of law on April 1, 1993 and, consequently, the circuit court lacked the power to exercise jurisdiction over the contest because of section 194.171(5), (6), Florida Statutes (1991)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 2741632
...g these same values proportionately to the assessments of the individual owners' condominium units. [2] In response, the Property Appraiser filed its motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, on the ground that the sixty-day statute of non-claim, section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2001), expired. [3] On June 30, 2005, after a hearing, the trial court granted the Property Appraiser's motions, concluding that the action was time-barred based on both section 194.171(2) and Ward v....
...We review de novo the trial court's order which determined, as a matter of law, that Hidden Bay's claims were time-barred. See City of Hollywood v. Petrosino,
864 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Hidden Bay contends that its claims are not governed by section
194.171 because the Property Appraiser violated section
193.023(5), Florida Statutes (2001), by appraising the common areas at their full market value....
...subject to the sixty-day statute of non-claim, rather than an error of fact, which can be corrected at any time. In response, the Property Appraiser argues that the trial court correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction under the sixty-day rule of section 194.171....
...a minimal amount. Id. The tax certificate holders sued to force the property appraiser to increase the assessments on the basis that the common elements were never deeded to the condominium association. Id. On appeal, the Fourth District found that section 194.171 does not apply to bar the tax certificate holders' action because errors in classification of property are not subject to the sixty-day statute of non-claim....
...issue. Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Ward held that, even when the taxpayers are challenging an assessment as void due to improper classification or for any other reason, they are still bound by the jurisdictional requirements of section
194.171. Ward,
894 So. 2d at 816. In Ward, the Florida Supreme Court held that "the mandatory sixty-day provision of section
194.171(1) applies broadly to taxpayers' actions challenging the assessment of taxes against their property regardless of the legal basis of the challenge." Id....
...Ward involved a challenge by lessees of property owned by the county against the property appraiser for imposing ad valorem taxes on their allegedly exempt leasehold interests. Id. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the First District, finding that the taxpayers' action was subject to the sixty-day filing period of section 194.171, irrespective of whether they were "claiming an exemption or claiming that the assessors' action [was] illegal, unlawful, or void as an improper `classification' or for some other reason." Id....
...ons in Revenue v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.,
847 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) and Florida Governmental Utility Authority v. Day,
784 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), which found that claims challenging the classification of property were not governed by section
194.171. The Ward court, guided by legislative intent and public policy, held that section
194.171 was adopted in order to ensure timely payment of taxes to facilitate the continuing function of county governments....
...The Florida Supreme Court held that applying a four-year statute of limitations to classification challenges while applying a sixty-day filing period to other claims, "would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the tax assessment statutes, as well as the explicit provisions of section 194.171." Id....
...classification of the property. Therefore, we will not permit Hidden Bay to use section
197.182 and the Florida Administrative Code "to circumvent [their] failure to properly and timely challenge the tax assessment of their properties as required by section
194.171(2)." Ward, 894 So....
...elements. §
193.023(5), Fla. Stat. (2001). [2] In reviewing this allegation on appeal from the summary judgment, we note that there is nothing in the record to support appellants' claim that the Property Appraiser taxed the common areas twice. [3] Section
194.171, Florida Statutes, states, in relevant part: (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s.
193.122(2). . . . . . . (6) The requirements of subsections (2), (3), and (5) are jurisdictional. No court shall have jurisdiction in such cases until after the requirements of both sections (2) and (3) have been met. §
194.171, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 513536
...Land owners seek review of an order dismissing with prejudice their complaint contesting a tax assessment which was filed sixty-seven days after certification of Duval County's tax roll. The trial court concluded that the sixty-day statutory filing period under section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1991) began to run when the tax roll was certified....
...We recently held in Chihocky v. Crapo,
632 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), that a property appraiser's failure to adhere strictly to the notice provisions in section
193.122(2), Florida Statutes prevents the running of the sixty-day period provided for in section
194.171(2)....
...Otherwise, if plaintiffs prove their allegations, the sixty-day statutory period should be deemed to have begun as to their assessments on the day they received actual notice or the day the property appraiser mailed notice, if he did, whichever was earlier. REVERSED and REMANDED. BOOTH and MICKLE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1991) provides: (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...193.122(2), or after 60 days from the date a decision is rendered concerning such assessment by the value adjustment board if a petition contesting the assessment had not received final action by the value adjustment board prior to extension of the roll under s.
197.323. Section
194.171(6), Florida Statutes (1991) specifies that the "requirements of subsection (2) ......
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...red by the board. The clerk, upon issuance of the decisions, shall, on a form provided by the Department of Revenue, notify by first-class mail each taxpayer, the property appraiser, and the department of the decision of the board. (Emphasis added.) Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1985): 194.171 Circuit court to have original jurisdiction in tax cases....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 18004, 2010 WL 4740293
...itations bars Milan Investment’s constitutional challenge to the 2008 ordinance fixing a half-mill per dollar ad valorem tax exclusively within the boundaries of the DDA district. In doing so, we confirm the applicability of the non-claim statute, § 194.171, to that challenge....
...As the parties have recognized in their briefs, the four-year statute of limitations is not the only timeliness issue presented on the face of the complaint. Milan Investment’s claim challenging the annual imposition of the special DDA levy also required compli-anee with the non-claim statute, section § 194.171, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 11779, 1992 WL 353381
...Palmer,
89 Fla. 514,
105 So. 115 (Fla. 1925) (action to enforce payment of ad valorem taxes); Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen,
77 Fla. 341,
81 So. 503 (Fla. 1919) (taxpayer seeking injunction to prevent tax collector from selling the property to collect taxes). Section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1991), grants original jurisdiction at law to circuit courts in all matters relating to property taxation....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 12301, 1996 WL 672985
...J. & L Enterprises v. Jones,
614 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied,
626 So.2d 206 (Fla.1993). Although it is not clear from the current statutes, special assessments by counties may be barred 60 days from the date the assessment is certified. §
194.171(2), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 216, 42 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 233, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 632, 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 492
...served. With respect to the Motion to Abstain, DOR argues that in the spirit of comity this Court should abstain from deciding issues, such as tax assessments, which are governed by state law. Furthermore, DOR asserts that by failing to comply with § 194.171, Florida Statutes, which requires timely challenges to tax assessments, Plaintiff cannot challenge those assessments now because "all Florida State Courts lacks (sic) jurisdiction to here (sic) such a challenge now." DOR claims that becaus...
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...ave to amend. The court dismissed the complaint but with leave to amend. Appellant contends the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties, and therefore the complaint should have been dismissed without leave to amend. Pursuant to § 194.171, Florida Statutes, appellees filed a complaint within the 60 day period allowed by that statute seeking review of ad valorem tax assessments on their property....
...Appellant property appraiser moved to dismiss the complaint without leave to amend on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction as aforesaid in that appellees had failed to pay the tax and obtain a receipt as a prerequisite to filing suit as required by § 194.171(3) which provides as follows: "(3) Before a taxpayer may bring an action to contest a tax assessment, he shall pay to the collector the amount of the tax which he admits in good faith to be owing....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...ithout protest. In fact, he was not served with process until approximately six days later. By paying the taxes in full without protest, appellant chose to ignore the statutory provisions governing the payment of taxes upon an assessment in dispute. Section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1975), establishes the procedure whereby a taxpayer, before bringing an action, shall pay to the Tax Collector only the amount of tax which is admitted in good faith to be owed....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 591, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 1063, 1989 WL 17238
...McIver,
514 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). For the reasons stated below, we grant the petition and remand to the trial court with directions to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. On February 8, 1988, the Feinsteins filed a complaint, pursuant to section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1987), against the petitioners contesting an assessment of ad va-lorem taxes....
...The complaint alleged that a “good faith” payment of taxes which the Feinsteins admitted to be owing had been paid “in accordance with § 704.71, Fla. Stat. [sic].” The Feinsteins later stated that the payment was actually made pursuant to section 194.171....
...Wilkinson, the Lee County Property Appraiser. The complaint further alleged that the Feinsteins had not received a receipt for the payment, but would file a copy when acquired. On March 7, 1988, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with section 194.171(6), which made the payment of the taxes and attachment of the receipt a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a complaint under that statute....
...fore the taxes became delinquent, and that their amended complaint related back to February 8, 1988, the date of the filing of the original complaint. Accordingly, the trial court denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Section 194.171, which pertains to judicial review of tax cases, provides in pertinent part: (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...ents of subsection (5). The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in applying the “relation back” doctrine to determine that it had jurisdiction of the present action. We agree. Prior to the legislature’s addition of subsection (6) to section 194.171, see ch....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 657
...Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of both the assessment and the authorizing statute on due process and equal protection grounds. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint because it was filed after the sixty-day limitation period which section 194.171(2), *692 Florida Statutes (1983), imposes on the filing of challenges to tax assessments....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Under Count II, however, the court was requested to authorize interim tax bills, and such other equitable relief as was necessary to eliminate financial hardship. The circuit court has jurisdiction as to Count II under the main provision of Section 195.098(1), and under Sections
194.171 and
194.181, Fla....
...I think the Supreme Court can [send out supplemental tax bills if the initial roll is too low], but if the Supreme Court can do it, Judge Willis, this court could do it. THE COURT: Not necessarily. They can get away with a lot of things I can't." [10] Section 194.171(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...urisdictional
grounds, finding Genesis was barred from challenging both the
imposition of the tax lien and the denial of the 2013 exemption
because Genesis failed to file suit within 60 days after the
certification of the tax rolls as required under section
194.171(2),
Florida Statutes (2013). Genesis appealed, and this Court
reversed. See Genesis Ministries, Inc. v. Brown,
186 So. 3d 1074,
1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (Genesis I). We held that the 60-day
period in section
194.171(2) does not apply to actions challenging
a tax lien....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 2913295, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 11703
...ose years. In 2011, the property appraiser learned that the owners had not paid their property taxes for 2009 or 2010. He moved to dismiss counts I and II of the third amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to subsections 194.171(5) and (6), Florida Statutes, which provide as follows: (5) No action to contest a tax assessment may be maintained, and any such action shall be dismissed, unless all taxes on the property assessed in years after the action is brought, which...
...(6) The requirements of subsections (2), (3), and (5) are jurisdictional. No court shall have jurisdiction in such cases until after the requirements of both subsections (2) and (3) have been met. A court shall lose jurisdiction of a case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (5). § 194.171(5) & (6), Fla....
...(concerning declaratory judgments). They contend that these statutes do not require the payment of taxes for subsequent years in order to maintain an action. They argue that because they do not pose a challenge to a tax assessment, the provisions of section
194.171 do not apply. However, it is well established that a challenge concerning entitlement to a tax exemption is a challenge to an assessment of taxes, for purposes of section
194.171. E.g., Nikolits v. Ballinger,
736 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“[I]t is clear that the application of a homestead exemption is an integral part of a ‘tax assessment’ within the meaning of section
194.171(2)....
...A timely challenge is therefore necessary to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of that section.”); Nikolits v. Delaney,
719 So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (concluding that taxpayers’ claim that the homestead tax assessment exceeded the statutory cap on such increases is challenge to tax assessment, governed by section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1997)); Hall v....
...dismissed action for lack of jurisdiction; holding denial of exemption was “assessment” subject to statute of limitations applicable to real property tax assessments). It does not matter whether the challenge is brought under section
196.151 or
194.171. See Ward v. Brown,
892 So.2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (rejecting taxpayers’ semantic argument that they were not subject to sixty-day time limit of section
194.171 because they were not challenging the assessment on particular property, but only its classification (whether or not exempt government property); denials of exemption are assessments subject to requirements of section
194.171), approved,
894 So.2d 811 (Fla.2004). Pursuant to the clear language of subsections
194.171(5) & (6), the petition is granted....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 11178, 2011 WL 2752686
...ive an advisory opinion which is improper in a declaratory action. Appellants did not allege that taxes were not paid and tax liens had been placed on any of their properties. Indeed, tax liens could not have been placed on any of the property since section 194.171, Florida Statutes, imposes a stay on the collection of taxes until an appeal is final....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...That case was assigned to and is still pending before Judge Thomas Testa. As points on appeal the Property Appraiser asserts (1) as to the first parcel, the taxpayer's suit was filed more than sixty days after certification, so there was no subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1981), (2) as to parcels two and three, there was no subject matter jurisdiction because the assessments on those parcels had never been certified by the Property Appraiser to the Tax Collector, (3) the court sho...
...In either case, the taxpayer's appeal was timely. We reject appellant's argument in the second point on appeal, that certification of the PAAB's assessment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a taxpayer's suit in the circuit court to review the Board's written decision. Section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1981) bars the bringing of a suit to contest a tax assessment after sixty days from the date the assessment is certified for collection, but does not preclude commencement of an action prior to certification....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 537, 1996 WL 31884
...specific procedure for delivery *862 of notice of the proposed tax assessment to a taxpayer voids the notices of tax assessment actually received by Ray Construction. We disagree with this conclusion. In Chihocky, the pertinent statutory provision, section 194.171, barred any action to contest an assessment "after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 10221
...Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing the complaint. NOTES [1] A further reason for dismissal was based on the trial court's finding that BCA failed to demonstrate that all taxes were paid on property involved in the suit as required by section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2016 WL 606685
... WETHERELL, J.
Genesis Ministries, Inc. (Genesis) appeals the dismissal of its complaint
challenging the ad valorem taxes imposed on its property for 2005 to 2013. Genesis
argues that the trial court erred in finding that its challenge was barred by section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes....
...federal
constitutions, as well as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act codified in chapter
761, Florida Statutes.
The property appraiser and DOR filed motions to dismiss the complaint.2 The
motions argued that the complaint was barred by section 194.171(2) because, with
respect to the 2005 to 2012 taxes, the complaint was filed more than 60 days after
2
The tax collector subsequently filed a “notice of joinder” in the motion to dismiss
filed by the property appraiser....
... the Tax Lien was recorded, and with respect to the 2013 taxes, the complaint was
filed more than 60 days after the 2013 tax rolls were certified.
The trial court granted the motions to dismiss, finding that all of Genesis’
claims were barred by section
194.171(2). With respect to the 2005 to 2012 taxes,
the court found that the recording of the Tax Lien triggered the 60-day period in
section
194.171(2) because the lien was equivalent to a denial of the exemption for
those years, and pursuant to Ward v. Brown,
894 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2004), the denial
of an exemption is subject to the requirements of section
194.171(2)....
...smissed is a question of
law. See City of Gainesville v. Dep’t of Transp.,
778 So. 2d 519, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA
2001). And, like the trial court, our review is confined to the well-pled allegations
in the complaint and its attachments. Id.
Section
194.171(2) provides in pertinent part that “[n]o action shall be brought
to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being
contested is certified for collection under s....
... statute of nonclaim” that bars suits filed after the period expires, and it applies
regardless of the ground on which the assessment is being challenged. See Ward,
894 So. 2d at 814; Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club,
527 So. 2d 814,
816 (Fla. 1988); see also §
194.171(6), Fla....
...No court shall have jurisdiction in such cases
until after the requirements of both subsections (2) and (3) have been met. A court
shall lose jurisdiction of a case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with the
requirements of subsection (5).”). However, we have previously held that the 60-
day period in section 194.171(2) does not begin to run if the property appraiser fails
to strictly comply with the applicable statutory notice requirements....
...1st DCA 1994).
Here, although it is undisputed that Genesis’ complaint was filed more than
60 days after the Tax Lien was recorded and more than 60 days after the 2013 tax
rolls were certified, Genesis contends that the trial court erred in dismissing its
complaint pursuant to section 194.171(2) because [A] with respect to the 2005 to
2012 taxes, the 60-day period in that statute is not applicable, and [B] with respect
3
“Before an action to contest a tax assessment may be brought, the taxpayer shall
pay to the collector not less than the amount of the tax which the taxpayer admits in
good faith to be owing.” § 194.171(3), Fla....
...Stat.
4
“No action to contest a tax assessment may be maintained, and any such action
shall be dismissed, unless all taxes on the property assessed in years after the action
is brought, which the taxpayer in good faith admits to be owing, are paid before they
become delinquent.” § 194.171(5), Fla....
...d for 2013. We will address
each argument in turn.
A. 2005 to 2012 Taxes
Genesis argues that the Tax Lien that “back-assessed” the 2005 to 2012 taxes
on its property is not subject to the 60-day period in section 194.171(2) because the
statute does not apply to actions challenging tax liens. We agree.
Section 194.171(2), by its clear and unambiguous terms, applies only to
actions contesting “a tax assessment” and it requires such actions to be filed within
60 days after the assessment is “certified for collection under s....
...2013 (or any other year) under
section
193.122. Instead, it was based on the property appraiser’s retrospective
determination under section
196.011(9)(a)5 that Genesis was not entitled to the tax
exemption it received from 2005 to 2012.
Section
194.171 does not refer to section
196.011(9)(a) nor does it mention
tax liens. To interpret section
194.171(2) in the manner urged by Appellees (as the
5
This statute, commonly referred to as the “claw-back statute,” provides in pertinent
part:
The owner of any property granted an exemption who is not required
to file an...
...To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.”). Instead, we
must construe the statute as it is written, and as written, the statute simply does not
apply to actions challenging tax liens.
We recognize that, in Ward, the Florida Supreme Court held that the 60-day
period in section
194.171(2) “applies broadly to taxpayers’ actions challenging the
assessment of taxes against their property regardless of the legal basis of the
challenge.” See
894 So. 2d at 812. However, we find no support in Ward for the
proposition that section
194.171(2) should be construed to apply to actions
challenging tax liens.
The taxpayers in Ward argued that section
194.171(2) did not bar their suit
challenging the imposition of taxes on their property because they were challenging
9
the “classification” of the property as taxable rather than the property appraiser’s
valuation of the property. Id. at 813. The Court rejected this “semantic argument”
and held that taxpayers are bound by section
194.171(2) “whether they are claiming
an exemption or claiming that the assessors’ action is illegal, unlawful, or void as an
improper ‘classification’ or for some other reason.” Id. at 816. The Court based its
holding on public policy considerations, explaining that section
194.171(2) is part
of the comprehensive statutory scheme for ad valorem taxation that is “intended to
facilitate tax collecting and to put individual taxation issues on the fast-track to
resolution so that counties may continue to function and count on tax revenues to do
so.” Id. at 815. Accord Chihocky,
632 So. 2d at 232 (explaining that the legislative
intent and public policy underlying section
194.171(2) “is to ensure prompt payment
of taxes due and making available revenues that are not disputed”).
Unlike Ward which arose from a challenge to a current-year tax assessment,
this case involves an effort by the property a...
...x Lien’s “back-assessment”
of Genesis’ property for 2005 to 2012.
10
Furthermore, basic notions of due process – i.e., notice and an opportunity to
be heard – weigh against interpreting section 194.171(2) to apply to actions
challenging tax liens....
...There is no requirement that the property appraiser give the
property owner actual notice of the tax lien, and unlike valuation, classification, and
exemption determinations which can be appealed to the value adjustment board
before the tax rolls are certified and the 60-day period in section
194.171(2) is
triggered, there is no procedure for the property owner to obtain administrative
review of the property appraiser’s determination under section
196.011(9)(a) before
the tax lien is recorded in the public records. Accordingly, if section
194.171(2) was
construed to apply to tax liens, the only opportunity a property owner would have to
challenge the property appraiser’s “back-assessment” of taxes under section
196.011(9)(a) would be by filing suit within 60 days after the tax lien is recorded in
the public records....
...e property owners to routinely (at
least every 60 days) check the public records to determine whether a tax lien has
been recorded against their property.
11
In sum, because the 60-day period in section
194.171(2) does not apply to
actions challenging a tax lien, the trial court erred in dismissing the Genesis
complaint challenging the 2005 to 2012 taxes.6
B. 2013 Taxes
Genesis contends that the trial court erred in dismissing its challenge to the
2013 taxes under section
194.171(2) because the property appraiser did not provide
the notice required by section
196.193(5)7 before “revoking” its religious exemption
6
In reaching this decision, we did not overlook the property appraiser’s “tipsy
coachman” argument that dismissal of Genesis’ challenge to the 2005 to 2012 taxes
was also mandated by section
194.171(5). That statute divests the trial court of
jurisdiction over an action contesting a tax assessment “unless all taxes on the
property assessed in years after the action is brought . . . are paid before they become
delinquent.” §
194.171(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). However, on its face,
section
194.171(5) has no application here because Genesis’ complaint was filed in
2014 and there were no taxes assessed on the property in the years “after the action
[was] brought” – i.e., after 2014 – that were unpaid or delinquent....
...1987) (approving decision affirming
dismissal of suit challenging 1982 assessment because, while the suit was pending,
the 1984 taxes became delinquent); Higgs v. Armada Key West Ltd. P’ship,
903 So.
2d 303 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (granting petition for writ of prohibition because section
194.171(5) divested the trial court of jurisdiction over suit challenging 2001
assessment when, after the suit was filed, the taxpayer failed to pay or timely
challenge the 2002 assessment).
7
This statute provides:
(5)(a) If the pr...
...existing religious exemption.
The parties have not cited, nor has our research located any cases directly
addressing the consequences of the property appraiser’s failure to provide notice of
the denial of an exemption on the 60-day period in section 194.171(2)....
...However,
we considered a somewhat analogous situation in Chihocky.
In Chihocky, the property owner filed a suit challenging the denial of her
application to classify her property as agricultural. See
632 So. 2d at 231. The suit
was filed more than 60 days after the tax rolls were certified and, pursuant to section
194.171(2), the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property
appraiser....
...233.
Similar to the argument made by Appellees in this case, the property appraiser
in Chihocky argued that his compliance with the statutory notice requirements was
irrelevant because the property owner’s suit was jurisdictionally barred by section
194.171(2)....
...because its property was listed on the 2013 tax rolls and Genesis did not file suit
within 60 days after the tax rolls were certified.
Accordingly, as the record presently stands, the trial court erred in finding that
Genesis’ challenge to the 2013 taxes was barred by section 194.171(2)....
...notice to Genesis before July
1, 2013, explaining why its religious use exemption was denied for 2013 and
advising Genesis of its right to appeal that determination to the value adjustment
board. If so, then, as Genesis conceded at oral argument, section 194.171(2) will bar
Genesis’ challenge to the 2013 taxes because Ward held that the denial of an
exemption is a “tax assessment” for purposes of that statute and it is undisputed that
the Genesis’ complaint was filed more than 60 d...
...after the 2013 tax rolls were
certified.
18
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the trial court erred in finding that Genesis’ suit
was barred by section 194.171(2)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 1135, 2000 WL 145956
...n 1991 at a total value of $14,129,914.00. GE paid $266,564 in taxes under protest, and unsuccessfully appealed to the Value Adjustment Board pursuant to Section 94.011, Florida Statutes. Case No. 92-10367 was thereafter commenced in accordance with Section 194.171, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...3d DCA 1978) to support its assertion that the taxpayer must protest an illegal tax in order to receive a refund. In our view, those cases do not decide the issues before us. In Willig, the court considered the sufficiency of notice to the tax collector of a contest under section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1975), governing ad valorem taxation....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...ecause of such status, the lower court entered summary judgment against the Department because no claim had been brought by it contesting the assessment of the property within 60 days from the date of its certification for collection, as required by section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2000)....
...ccurred, appellant sought to enjoin the sale, alleging its ownership of the property. The Ottingers moved for summary judgment, contending that the state's failure to challenge the assessments on the property within the limitation period required by section 194.171(2) constituted a jurisdictional bar against the state's assertion of sovereign immunity....
...1st DCA 2003). Because this is an appeal from a final summary judgment, our review standard is de novo, a standard that is particularly applicable to the issue before us in that the lower court's decision turned primarily upon an interpretation of section 194.171, which provides in part: (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...ollowing broad language: "[W]hether they [petitioners] are claiming an exemption or claiming that the assessors' action is illegal, unlawful, or void as an improper `classification' or for some other reason, they are still bound by the provisions of section 194.171(1) as we construed those provisions in Markham....
..., when it decided Ward and Markham, of its prior opinions recognizing the immunity of sovereignty land from taxation, we cannot believe that the court, in abandoning the void/voidable dichotomy previously employed, intended for its interpretation of section 194.171 to apply to property owned by the state or its subdivisions and used by them for a governmental purpose....
...In so saying, we note that in both the above cases the parties contesting the assessments were private holders of the property in dispute. Thus, we strongly doubt that the court intended that its particular holding, or ratio decidendi, should be extended beyond the facts therein recited. Nor do we find any provision in section 194.171, or elsewhere, reasonably implying that the nonclaim bar should be applied to actions brought by the sovereign on an assertion of immunity....
...the assessment of the tax. Because the legislature is presumed to be aware of prior existing laws and the constructions placed upon them, it is inconceivable to us that the legislature, at the time it enacted the jurisdictional nonclaim provision of section 194.171(6), by chapter 83-204, Laws of Florida, intended to include within the classification of taxpayer the state of Florida as a party contesting as void the assessment of lands by reason of the property's immune status....
...The legislature has itself paid heed to this dictum by providing: "All property of this state which is used for governmental purposes shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation, except as otherwise provided by law." §
196.199(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). Other than section
194.171, a statute, which, like one of limitation, is procedural in nature, not substantive, in that it affects the procedure whereby one may assert a right of action, cf....
...statute, substantive or procedural, nor have we found any that subjects property of the state used for a governmental purpose to ad valorem taxation. In the absence of a clear expression of the legislature to such effect, we are of the opinion that section 194.171 was not designed to bar a claim by the state contesting an assessment because of the property's immunity from taxation. We therefore conclude that the lower court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the issue by reason of the provisions of section 194.171(2) and (6), which we determine are inapplicable to property owned by the state and used by it for a governmental purpose....
...Because, however, it is not altogether clear from some of the language used by the court in Ward and Markham in its construction of the nonclaim statute, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: DO THE JURISDICTIONAL NON-CLAIM PROVISIONS OF SECTION 194.171, FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY TO BAR A CLAIM OF THE STATE THAT ASSERTS AN ASSESSMENT IS VOID BECAUSE IT WAS MADE ON PROPERTY IMMUNE FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION? REVERSED and REMANDED. WOLF and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] During the pendency of the suit, the Department served notice that the duties of the Commission had been transferred to the Department. [2] This section, as section 194.171, is placed under Part II of chapter 194, Florida Statutes, pertaining to judicial review.
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 830
...ssment, asserting as grounds therefor that plaintiff was delinquent in paying his 1983 property taxes which, by statute, divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the challenge to the 1982 assessment. The statute in question is section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1985), which provides in pertinent part: (3) Before a taxpayer may bring an action to contest a tax assessment, he shall pay to the collector not less than the amount of the tax which he admits in good faith to be owing....
...ich in good faith was owing before it became delinquent. To the extent that Clark held that the jurisdictional defect was not curable, we disagree. Significantly the statute does not say that the jurisdictional bar cannot be lifted. To the contrary, section 194.171(6) clearly contemplates that the court shall have jurisdiction after the requirements of the preceding sections, which establish the jurisdictional prerequisites, have been satisfied notwithstanding that the court may have been without jurisdiction to hear the cause after the taxes became delinquent....
...of the statute. *1114 They offered nothing that persuades us. By paying the taxes due in subsequent years, plus any accrued interest and penalties caused by the delinquency, plaintiff could and did cure the jurisdictional defects in accordance with section 194.171(6)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1998 WL 199342
...[other than exceptions for homestead]." Dade County acknowledges that 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) preempts the state's procedure for the debtor/taxpayer to dispute an assessment, so that an incorrect tax assessment *494 may be redetermined by the bankruptcy court. However, the time limit to contest a tax assessment, set forth in Section 194.171(2), Fla.Stat., is not at issue in this case....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 228274
...The trust first applied for an agricultural classification in 1991. The Property Appraiser denied that application, as well as the application made in 1992. The trust appealed to the Lee County Value Adjustment Board, which denied the appeal. Thereafter, the trust filed suit in circuit court pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1991)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 11868, 1999 WL 682609
...Levy of The Levy Law Firm, Tallahassee, for Appellees. W. SHARP, J. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. appeals from a final judgment which determined that its lawsuit challenging a 1997 tax assessment of property in two stores located in Osceola County was untimely under section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1997)....
...(Wal-Mart), complaint alleging that the property appraiser's assessment of its tangible personal property for tax year 1997 was excessive. The question presented is whether Wal-Mart timely filed its complaint within the 60-day time period set forth in section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1997). 2. Section 194.171 provides a 60-day time period in which to file ad valorem cases. Section 194.171 is a jurisdictional non-claim statute....
...2) and (3) have been met. A court shall lose jurisdiction of a case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (5). (Emphasis added.) The Florida Supreme Court has clearly held that the 60-day time period set forth in section 194.171(2) must be strictly enforced as a jurisdictional nonclaim statute rather than a statute of limitations....
...ms only when a party asserts the operation of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense; a statute of nonclaim operates as an automatic bar to untimely claims." Thames v. Jackson,
598 So.2d 121, 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In accordance with section
194.171, therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction of the case if the complaint was not filed within the 60-day time period set forth in subsection (2)....
...nue v. Stafford,
646 So.2d 803 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (taxpayer cannot avoid 60-day time period in which to challenge ad valorem tax assessment by arguing that it is seeking a refund of taxes paid); Robbins v. Friedman,
625 So.2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (section
194.171 does not allow court to retain jurisdiction once taxes become delinquent); Hinkley (same); Walker v....
...stment board is the "trigger date" and, therefore, its lawsuit was timely filed within 60 days from October 17, 1997. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 6. This court holds that the date the tax roll was certified for collection is the applicable trigger date under section 194.171(2) in this case. Thus, Wal-Mart's lawsuit, filed December 15, 1997, was untimely as not being filed within 60 days from October 10, 1997. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction under section 194.171 and grants final summary judgment in the defendants' favor....
...y complied with the notice requirements of the tax roll certification date set forth in section
193.122(2). Thus, the sole issue presented to this court is the appropriate "trigger date" to commence the running of the 60-day time period set forth in section
194.171(2)....
...193.122(2), or after 60 days from the date a decision is rendered concerning such assessment by the value adjustment board if a petition contesting the assessment had not received final action by the value adjustment board prior to extension of the roll under s.
197.323. The language of section
194.171(2) must be read in conjunction with section
197.323, Florida Statutes (1997), and section
193.122, Florida Statutes (1997). See Walker v. Garrison,
610 So.2d 716 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Chihocky v. Crapo,
632 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Joyner v. Roberts,
642 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Chihocky and Joyner each analyzed the 60-day time period set forth in section
194.171(2) in light of the notice requirements set forth in section
193.122(2). Walker analyzed the extension of the roll language of section
194.171(2) in light of the provisions of sections
197.323 and
193.122....
...applicable. When the provisions of §
193.1145 are exercised, the requirements of this subsection shall apply upon extension pursuant to §
193.1145(3)(a) and again upon reconciliation pursuant to §
193.1145(8)(a). (Emphasis added.) The language of section
194.171(2) which provides a trigger date other than the date of certification of tax rollswas amended in 1983, after the provisions allowing the property appraiser to make an initial or partial certification of the tax roll originated in 1980....
...or after 60 days from the date a decision is rendered concerning said assessment by the property appraisal adjustment board if a petition contesting the assessment had not received final action by the property appraisal adjustment board prior to extension of the roll under s. 197.0134." When section
194.171(2) is read in light of section
197.323 and section
193.122, the 60-day trigger date from the date the VAB renders its decision only applies if there has been an initial or partial certification of the tax roll followed by completion o...
...all taxpayers who either did not file a petition or had filed a petition that had received final action of the board prior to that time period. As the court stated: In order to remove any doubt, we hold that the sixty day filing period contained in section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes commences on the date of the initial certification of the rolls under section
193.122(2) for all taxpayers who either did not file a petition with the Value Adjustment Board, or filed a petition that had received...
...action had been taken by that time, the sixty day filing period commences to run from the date the board renders its decision on such taxpayer's petition. The recertification of the rolls under section
193.122(3) has no bearing on the time limits of section
194.171(2)....
...w
197.323] contemplates the same time frame as the extension and certification of the rolls referred to in section
193.122(2), Florida Statutes."
610 So.2d at 718, n. 1. Thus, Walker recognized the interrelationship of sections
197.323,
193.122, and
194.171(2)....
...Respondent claims that the date of the second certification of the tax roll by the property appraiser is the correct date to use as starting the running of the sixty day filing period. * * * The language of the statute is clear. The 60 day filing period referred to in section 194.171 is 60 days from the date of the initial certification as long as no petition challenging the assessment is pending before the Board and not 60 days from the date of a recertification....
...Thus, no disparate treatment has been indicated under the facts of this case and Wal-Mart has not been denied equal protection under the law. * * * * * * * * AFFIRMED. GOSHORN and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The Walker decision is consistent with a review of the legislative history of the 1983 amendment to section 194.171(2)....
...ty appraisal adjustment board." Fla. H.R. Jour. 726 (Reg.Sess.1983). [2] Wal-Mart's reliance upon Bystrom v. Florida Rock Indus., Inc.,
452 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), also is unavailing. That case involved the 1981 version of section
193.122 and section
194.171....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 22142534
...Petitioners sought to dismiss the City of Gainesville's complaint below, asserting that it constituted a challenge to a tax assessment, but that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint had not been filed within the 60 day statute of nonclaim set forth in section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2001). The trial court declined to dismiss the complaint, finding that it was a challenge to the property appraiser's tax classification of the property at issue, rather than to a *204 tax assessment, and that section 194.171(2) was thus inapplicable....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15903
...e it failed to exhaust administrative remedies, Blake v. R.M.S. Holding Corp. (3d DCA 1977)
341 So.2d 795, 800; Monroe County v. Gustinger (3rd DCA 1973)
285 So.2d 431, and because it did not bring this suit within the applicable non-claim period. F.S.
194.171(2)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 23529
December 1, 1981. Pursuant to the provisions of section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1981),1 appellants paid
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 17151
...VII, § 4(c)(1) and (8), Fla. Const. Appellants argue that these amendments violate several federal constitutional provisions. Because the trial court erroneously concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction when appellants did not comply with section 194.171(1), Florida Statutes, we reverse on the authority of Lanning v....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2009 WL 3817905
...VII, § 4(c)(1) and (8), Fla. Const. Appellants argue that these amendments violate several federal constitutional provisions. Because the trial court erroneously concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction when appellants did not comply with section 194.171(1), Florida Statutes, we reverse on the authority of Lanning v....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 WL 2609522, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 6983
...jurisdictional. §
72.011(5). This is the language of a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim.
See Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club,
527 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 1988)
- 10 -
(holding that analogous language in section
194.171, Florida Statutes, setting time
limitations for actions contesting property tax assessments was "a jurisdictional statute
of nonclaim")....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 7997
...Finally, Milan sought a refund, on behalf of all members of the
Class, of “all sums illegally collected.”9
Appellees moved to dismiss Milan’s complaint below, asserting, inter alia,
that its claims were barred by: (1) the sixty-day non-claim statute pursuant to
section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (except for the current year’s tax bill); and (2)
9 It is not clear from the complaint whether Milan sought a refund on behalf of
itself or any class members for taxes paid in the years prior to 2008, but it a...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 7357, 2004 WL 1161740
...nt. In due course, the trial court found in its favor on the merits. On rehearing, however, the action was concededly-prop-erly-dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the taxpayer did not pay the 2000 and 2001 taxes as required by section 194.171(5), Florida Statutes (2002)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 66218
...the receipt must be attached to the complaint. The respondent denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the receipt related back to the date of the filing of the complaint. Petitioner argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, relying on section 194.171 which provides: (1) The circuit courts have original jurisdiction at law of all matters relating to property taxation....
...(6) The requirements of subsections (2), (3), and (5) are jurisdictional. No court shall have jurisdiction in such cases until after the requirements of both subsections (2) and (3) have been met. A court shall lose jurisdiction of a case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (5). § 194.171, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 3498, 2011 WL 904277
...South Pointe alleged that any change to its ad valorem tax status was erroneous, and thus, Miami-Dade improperly sold tax certificates that resulted in a faulty tax deed application. Also, South Pointe claimed it was exempt from the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171, Florida Statutes (2007), the Non-Claim Statute, *258 for failure to timely contest the tax assessments because it did not receive actual notice of the change from non-taxable to taxable property....
...refore, the sixty-day deadline to contest the 2006 assessment expired December 18, 2006. Accordingly, the time to contest the 2004, 2005, and 2006 tax assessments had expired given that the complaint was filed on April 26, 2007. We agree and affirm. Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2007), states (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...193.122(2), or after 60 days from the date a decision is rendered concerning such assessment by the value adjustment board if a petition contesting the assessment had not received final action by the value adjustment board prior to extension of the roll under s.
197.323. §
194.171(2), Fla....
...ax assessment of their properties as required by [the Non-Claim Statute].'" Id. at 603 (quoting Ward v. Brown,
894 So.2d at 816). Furthermore, South Pointe has failed to pay ad valorem taxes that became due in subsequent years in direct violation of section
194.171(5) and
194.171(6), Florida Statutes....
...(6) The requirements of subsections (2), (3), and (5) are jurisdictional. No court shall have jurisdiction in such cases until after the requirements of both subsections (2) and (3) have been met. A court shall lose jurisdiction of a case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (5). §§ 194.171(5), 194.171(6), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 1345433
...Petitioners claim that because the 2002 action was not timely filed, the 2002 taxes became delinquent resulting in ouster of the circuit court's jurisdiction to entertain the earlier filed action regarding the 2001 tax assessment. For the following reasons, we agree. Section 194.171 of the Florida Statutes confers jurisdiction on the circuit courts to hear ad valorem tax assessment contests and authorizes such contests (1) if brought within sixty days of the date the contested assessment is certified for collecti...
...193.122(2), or after 60 days from the date a decision is rendered concerning such assessment by the value adjustment board if a petition contesting the assessment had not received final action by the value adjustment board prior to extension of the roll under s.
197.323. §
194.171(1), (2) Fla. Stat. (2004). Section
194.171 also makes clear that jurisdiction to entertain an assessment contest is conditioned on the taxpayer's obligation to keep taxes current for all years subsequent to the year in question: (5) No action to contest a tax assessment may be...
...(6) The requirements of subsections (2), (3), and (5) are jurisdictional. No court shall have jurisdiction in such cases until after the requirements of both subsections (2) and (3) have been met. A court shall lose jurisdiction of a case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (5). § 194.171(5), (6), Fla....
...Diaz,
514 So.2d 1072, 1074 (Fla.1987) (confirming that failure to pay successive years' taxes deprives a court of jurisdiction to entertain a tax challenge); Robbins v. Friedman,
625 So.2d 83, 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ("[i]t is now settled beyond any doubt that [section
194.171(5), (6)] does not allow a court to retain jurisdiction once taxes become delinquent")....
...ified tax roll by the tax collector) and are delinquent if not paid by April 1 of the following year (or immediately after 60 days have expired from the mailing of the original tax notice, whichever is later). §
197.333, Fla. Stat. (2004). Although section
194.171 suspends these deadlines while an assessment is being contested, it does so only upon the good faith payment of an amount the taxpayer believes is due and upon the timely filing of an assessment contest action: (3) Before an action to...
...Notwithstanding the provisions of chapter 197, payment of the taxes the taxpayer admits to be due and owing and the timely filing of an action pursuant to this section shall suspend all procedures for the collection of taxes prior to final disposition of the action. § 194.171(3), Fla....
...* * * * At issue here, however, is what the statute requires to prevent dismissal of a judicial challenge to an assessment, when duly initiated court proceedings have not concluded by the time taxes fall due in subsequent year(s).... * * * * Once the deadlines for challenges passed [under section 194.171(2)], the tax assessments for the taxable years [succeeding the year contested] were no longer subject to adjustment. Thereafter, payment of anything less than the full amounts levied could no longer be deemed payment of amounts "which the taxpayer in good faith admits to be owing." § 194.171(5), Fla....
...paid in full, taxes for those years became delinquent on April 1 [of the succeeding years], partial payments notwithstanding. These delinquencies required dismissal of [the] complaint challenging [the] assessment for the taxable year [in question]. §
194.171(5), Fla. Stat. (1995). Washington Square Corp. v. Wright,
687 So.2d 1374, 1374-75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (emphasis added); §
194.171(5), (6), Fla....
...However, we withhold formal issuance of a writ secure in our belief that in light of this opinion that it will be unnecessary. See Friedman,
625 So.2d at 84 (granting relief but withholding issuance of a formal writ of prohibition upon finding that section
194.171 does not authorize a court to exercise jurisdiction once taxes become delinquent); see also Walker v....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 9971, 2016 WL 3541045
...property in Hillsborough County. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the
Hillsborough County Property Appraiser, concluding that while the court had jurisdiction
when the action was filed, it subsequently lost jurisdiction under section 194.171,
Florida Statutes (2009), when Forest Brooke failed to timely pay the 2009 taxes
assessed on the property. On appeal, Forest Brooke argues, among other things, that
the trial court departed from the plain meaning of section 194.171....
...approximately 474
acres of undeveloped land in Hillsborough County. Forest Brooke filed its action
against the Property Appraiser in August 2009 and paid the 2008 taxes in an amount
that Forest Brook admitted in good faith was due and owing. See § 194.171(3)....
...During
the pendency of the action, however, the 2009 taxes were not paid in a timely manner.
Taxes assessed in the years after 2009 were timely paid. In 2012, the Property
Appraiser filed a motion to dismiss Forest Brooke's complaint for lack of jurisdiction
based on the following language in section 194.171:
(5) No action to contest a tax assessment may be
maintained, and any such action shall be dismissed, unless
all taxes on the property assessed in years after the action is...
...A court shall lose jurisdiction of a
case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with the
requirements of subsection (5).1
The Property Appraiser argued that because Forest Brooke did not timely pay the 2009
taxes, the language of section 194.171(5) requires dismissal of the action. Forest
Brooke responded that section 194.171(5) did not require dismissal because "all taxes
on the property assessed in the years after the action was brought" were timely paid;
the action was brought in 2009, and all taxes were timely paid for the subsequent years.
Forest Brooke argued that the Property Appraiser misconstrued section 194.171(5) by
reading it to require the timely payment of taxes for the year in which the action was
brought....
...trial court's jurisdiction over its tax
challenge. See Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc.,
108 So. 3d 587, 592 (Fla. 2013);
Artz ex. rel Artz v. City of Tampa,
102 So. 3d 747, 749 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). The
question of law turns on the language of section
194.171(5), and if the language is clear
and unambiguous, we must enforce it according to its terms. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v.
Fla. Mun. Power Agency,
789 So. 2d 320, 323 (Fla. 2001). In regard to section
194.171
specifically, courts have given effect to the literal jurisdictional language....
...-3-
v. Diaz,
514 So. 2d 1072, 1074-75 (Fla. 1987); Marshall v. Perkins,
494 So. 2d 506, 507
(Fla. 2d DCA 1986), approved by Bystrom,
514 So. 2d 1072.
There is no mistaking the clear language of section
194.171(5): a taxpayer
may not maintain an action challenging a tax assessment unless all the taxes on the
property assessed in years after the action is brought are paid before they become
delinquent....
...ed effort to apply
the statute in the way it felt the legislature intended, by requiring the taxes to be timely
paid for all the years after the year being challenged. See Marshall,
494 So. 2d at 507
(recognizing that the legislative objective of section
194.171 is "the timely availability of
2
The Property Appraiser cites to Wilkinson v....
...rt lost jurisdiction over the 2010 complaint
challenging a 2009 assessment because the taxpayer had not timely paid its 2010
taxes. But it appears from the language of that opinion that the taxpayer did not dispute
the application of the language of section 194.171(5) to the facts of that case; rather,
the taxpayer argued that the trial court's delay in entering the summary judgment in its
favor should not be held against the taxpayer because 2010 taxes became delinquent
during the trial court's delay....
..."depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity." Fla. Dep't
of Revenue,
789 So. 2d at 323 (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion
Control Dist.,
604 So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 1992)). If the legislature intended for the
dismissal provisions of section
194.171 to apply to taxes assessed in the year in which
the action was brought or to taxes assessed in all the years after the year being
challenged, it could have clearly said so....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 3055442, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 10584
...On April 7, 2011, the Property Appraiser filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. *898 The motion alleged that the Trustee failed to pay its 2010 real property taxes by the April 1, 2011, deadline and, consequently, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (2010)....
...n the same day, the trial court also issued an order denying the Appraiser’s motion to dismiss as moot in light of the court’s ruling on the motion for summary judgment. The Property Appraiser and Department of -Revenue timely filed this appeal. Section 194.171(5) provides in full: “No action to contest a tax assessment may be maintained, and any such action shall be dismissed, unless all taxes on the property assessed in years after the action is brought, which the taxpayer in good faith...
...payer’s obligation to keep taxes current for all years subsequent to the year in question.” Higgs v. Armada Key West Ltd. P’ship,
903 So.2d 303, 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Therefore, once taxes become delinquent, dismissal is required pursuant to section
194.171....
...Washington Square Corp. v. Wright,
687 So.2d 1374, 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Here, it is undisputed that the Trustee failed to timely pay its 2010 taxes on the real property at issue in this suit. Once the Trustee’s taxes became delinquent on April 1, 2011, section
194.171 divested the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the case....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21394455
...NOTES [1] VGA filed a separate action for each tax year, but its suits challenging the 1999 and 2000 tax assessments were later consolidated. [2] The Appraiser's motion to dismiss the suit also alleged that VGA had failed to file its complaint within the sixty-day period prescribed by section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1999)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...creation of a trust.
We conclude that the documents established a trust for
the benefit of the University of Florida, and thus
appellant, as trustee, has standing to contest the tax
assessment and is not barred by the time limit of section
194.171(2).
Thereafter, Appellee filed a second and third amended complaint,
seeking a declaration of tax immunity for the property “for partial
year 2010 and for the years 2011 through 2016; and alternatively,
to exemption for 2014 th...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 2006, 2003 WL 367068
...is opinion. We have jurisdiction. See Department of Revenue v. Eastern American Technologies, Corp.,
762 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Nikolits v. Ballinger,
736 So.2d 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Robbins v. Friedman,
625 So.2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); §
194.171(6), Fla....
...Mastroianni’s circuit court complaint against Primeco was filed June 25, 2002, and the proceeding relating to ARC IV was commenced on June 27, 2002. The defendant taxpayers moved to dismiss, contending that the claims were time barred pursuant to section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes: No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...194.036(l)(c), but such appeal shall be *1159 filed within 20 days after receipt of the decision of the department relative to further judicial proceedings. The circuit court found, and the parties agree that, under these facts, the circuit court filings were untimely under section
194.171(2) but timely under section
193.122(4). Petitioners argue that section
194.171(2) should be given its plain meaning because it provides that “[n]o action shall be brought....” They also note that section
194.171(2) is the more recent expression of the Florida Legislature, having been last substantively amended in 1983....
...Section
193.122(4) sets out the time limits within which the property appraiser may appeal a decision of the VAB pursuant to
194.036(1). By contrast, section
194.036(2) states that “[a]ny taxpayer may bring an action to contest a tax assessment pursuant to s.
194.171” (emphasis supplied). Read in pari materia,
194.171(2) has no bearing on appeals by the property appraiser to the circuit court contesting a decision of the VAB....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...2012, 2013, and 2014, on a Gainesville property that appellant owns and operates
as graduate student apartments for the University of Florida. We reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
under section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2013), a statute of non-claim that
requires actions to challenge tax assessments to be filed within 60 days from
certification....
...The University, the real party in
interest, is a subdivision of the state and thus is exempt from the 60-day time limit
as stated in Cason v. Department of Management Services,
944 So. 2d 306 (Fla.
2006) (the 60-day jurisdictional time limit in section
194.171(2) does not apply to
2
a challenge by the state or its political subdivisions that a tax assessment is void,
because the state is not a “taxpayer” under the statute).
The circuit court dismissed appellant’s action with prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction....
...lish the creation of a trust.
We conclude that the documents established a trust for the benefit of the
University of Florida, and thus appellant, as trustee, has standing to contest the tax
assessment and is not barred by the time limit of section 194.171(2).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
PADOVANO, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., CONCUR.
5
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 1988, 36 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 391
...ims against him. We affirm the circuit court's dismissal of Mr. Bennett's suit against the chairman of the VAB without comment but reverse and remand the dismissal of the suit against the property appraiser. Mr. Bennett filed his lawsuit pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (2008), challenging the denial of a homestead exemption for the 2007 tax year. Section 194.171 governs suits against the property appraiser contesting tax assessments and provides that a taxpayer must file his complaint within sixty days from the date the tax assessment is certified for collection or within sixty days from the date a decision is rendered by the VAB as to such assessment. § 194.171(2)....
...Following a twenty-three-minute hearing on all three defendants' motions, at which counsel for the defendants argued their positions and Mr. Bennett, appearing pro se, was given an opportunity to respond, the circuit court granted the motions to dismiss. The court expressly granted the property appraiser's motion based upon section 194.171 but denied it as to the service of process issue....
...n may be made at any time or may be stated as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b), (h)(2). Nevertheless, in his motion to dismiss, the property appraiser correctly argued *669 that the sixty-day filing period in section
194.171 is not a statute of limitation or repose but is a jurisdictional requirement. See Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club,
527 So.2d 814, 815 (Fla. 1988) ("No court shall have jurisdiction in such cases until after the requirements of both subsections (2) and (3) [of section
194.171] have been met.")....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 11804
from the tax collector with the complaint. See § 194.-171(3), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1982).1 Appellant paid taxes
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 18399, 2015 WL 8348320
...Neff’s declaratory judgment action. We agree
with the Property Appraiser that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to
grant the relief requested because Neff’s action is, at its heart, an untimely
challenge to the 2012 assessment of her former homestead. Section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2012), is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim
that precludes any challenge or adjustment to the 2012 assessment at this
time....
...(emphasis supplied); see also §
193.155(8)(a),
Fla. Stat. (2012).
-3-
The Property Appraiser moved to dismiss Neff’s action arguing, in
relevant part, that any challenge to the 2012 just value assessment of the
former homestead was time barred by section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes
(2012). The trial court denied the motion. After some discovery, the
Property Appraiser moved for summary judgment arguing, among other
things, that Neff’s action was time barred by section
194.171(2), and that
Neff lacked standing to challenge the 2012 assessment of her former
property....
...The trial court denied summary judgment, and this petition
followed.
Analysis
A writ of prohibition “may issue where a trial court exceeds its
jurisdiction by failing to dismiss a cause of action contesting a tax
assessment where the jurisdiction requirements of section 194.171 are not
met.” Markham v....
...193.122(2), or after 60 days
from the date a decision is rendered concerning such
assessment by the value adjustment board if a petition
contesting the assessment had not received final action by the
value adjustment board prior to extension of the roll under s.
197.323.
§
194.171(2), Fla....
...expired on or about December 10, 2012. Neff filed her declaratory
judgment complaint on October 24, 2013. While this action was timely-
filed within 60 days of the 2013 assessment of her new homestead, it was
filed well outside the time for challenging the 2012 assessment.
Section 194.171(2) is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim. See §
194.171(6), Fla....
...(2012) (“This subsection does not authorize the
consideration or adjustment of the just, assessed, or taxable value of the
previous homestead property.”).
Under the circumstances of this case, Neff’s challenge is actually to the
2012 assessment. The strict jurisdictional time limit of section 194.171(2)
cannot be circumvented by embedding a challenge to a prior year’s
assessment in the form of a challenge to the current year’s assessment.
Neff’s action relies on the $5.1 million actual sale price of the former
homestead in 2...
...to create an SOH benefit
after the fact where none existed at the time the former homestead was
abandoned. This is contrary to the purpose of the amendment allowing
portability of an SOH benefit and contrary to the strong public policy
reflected in section
194.171(2) requiring finality in tax assessments.
Although the circuit court generally has jurisdiction to consider a
declaratory judgment action under section
86.011, Florida Statutes, the
action in this case would necessarily involve a...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 80705
...ser. However, the previous holdings of our courts do not permit me to join with the majority. Section
193.011, Florida Statutes (1985), sets forth eight factors that a property appraiser must consider in arriving at a just valuation of property. [1] Section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that a taxpayer may bring an action to contest a tax assessment in circuit court....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 147667
...While a distinction between Kesl and the instant case exists in that sixteen unit owners have paid their taxes without objection, counsel for the property appraiser at oral argument represented that those unit owners are not estopped from participation in the present action. Section 194.171, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida
...Turner, one of the named Plaintiffs in this case and a plaintiff in the state action, Winicki v. Mallard. Plaintiff, Winicki’s, State Action. Winicki instituted his state action on January 4, 1982 against Mallard, Roberts and Miller, invoking the jurisdiction of the state court pursuant to Section 194.171, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 195, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2171, 1997 WL 828292
...In the event the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the determination, the taxpayer is authorized to file a petition with the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board established by Florida Statutes §
194.015. Florida Statutes §
194.036 provides for a procedure to appeal the determination by the Board. Florida Statutes §
194.171 provides for a judicial review of the determination by the Board as to the value of the assessed property. This statute requires that the action shall be brought in the Circuit Court of the County in which the property is located. Fla. Stat. §
194.171(1)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 8 Educ. L. Rep. 887, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 21254
SHARP, Judge. The appellants are taxpayers who reside in Marion County. They filed a class action suit 1 pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1981), challenging the validity of a discretionary two (2) mill tax levy imposed by the School Board of Marion County as authorized by subsection 236.25(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...3.School bus replacement. .This suit was apparently filed before the tax assessment had been certified for collection pursuant to section
193.122, Florida Statutes (1981). Therefore, it was obviously within the 60-day jurisdictional time limit provided by subsection
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...immunity unless immunity is expressly waived." Id. at 497-98 (quoting Pan–Am
Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr.,
471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984)).
The supreme court's decision in Cason is instructive. In analyzing
whether the nonclaim provisions of section
194.171, Florida Statutes (2006), applied to
State-owned property, such that the failure to comply with the statute would result in the
issuance of tax certificates and the sale of tax deeds, the supreme court considered "the
effect of sovereign immunity on the application of section
194.171 to actions filed by the
State."
944 So. 2d at 312. The court determined that "[t]he crucial inquiry is whether
the language of section
194.171 clearly and unambiguously demonstrates legislative
intent to apply this section to challenges by the State on State-owned property." Id.
That inquiry turned on whether the State is a taxpayer as used in chapter 194....
..."the person or other legal entity in whose name property is assessed." This definition
remains unchanged in the 2014 version of the statute.
- 17 -
that in construing the statutory term consideration must be given to the purpose of
section 194.171, "which is to ensure a reliable and predictable method for counties to
collect revenue while also providing for taxpayer challenges to tax assessments."
Cason, 944 So....
...The supreme court concluded that
a "taxpayer" is not merely the entity in whose name the
property is assessed, but one whom the county has the
power to tax subject to disputes about individual
assessments. In short, a "taxpayer" under section 194.171
is a taxable entity....
...2d at 313 (quoting Dickinson,
325 So. 2d at 3). "Accordingly, where the State
files suit challenging ad valorem taxation on grounds of sovereign immunity, the State's
assertion that it is not a taxable entity takes it outside the category of 'taxpayer' targeted
by section
194.171." Id. Section
192.011, like section
194.171, is part of "a
comprehensive statutory scheme for counties to assess and collect taxes
simultaneously with procedures for taxpayer challenges to tax assessments." Ward v.
Brown, 894 So....
...ions of the State. The supreme
court in Cason went on to hold as follows:
The necessity of a clear expression of legislative
intent to authorize taxation of the State reinforces our
construction of section 194.171....
...We presume that the
[l]egislature was aware of precedent recognizing both the
State's immunity and the necessity of a clear and direct
expression of intent to authorize taxation of the State when it
enacted the jurisdictional nonclaim provision, section
194.171, in 1983....
...Thus, the absence of specific language
- 18 -
imposing the procedural requirements on the State, rather
than on taxpayers generally, is significant.
....
We do not find, either within section 194.171 or elsewhere,
the clear and unambiguous expression of legislative intent
necessary to conclude that the [l]egislature intended that the
State be subject to the harsh provisions of section 194.171
and as a result lose its immunity from taxation.
Id....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 7287, 1990 WL 138422
...to pay the taxes assessed on the condominium building. As a result, the taxes on the building became delinquent. The condominium association challenged the amount of the tax assessments on the building and deposited in escrow the amount required by section 194.171, Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Argued: Apr 19, 2024
in the circuit courts. See Fla. Stat. §
194.171(1); Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 12D-13.066(1)
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 10409, 1996 WL 577151
...In August of 1993, not having received a refund for the $27,485.10 which it paid for taxes in 1989, Palmer brought an action challenging the assessment of ad valorem taxes for the year 1989. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The circuit court held that pursuant to Florida Statute section 194.171(2) (1993), it did not have jurisdiction over the case because Palmer had not filed the action contesting the assessment within sixty days from the date that the assessment was certified for collection....
...aling the denial of the exemption within sixty days of the date that the tax roll was certified since it received actual notice of the denial well before that date and so the commencement of the sixty day period should not be tolled. Florida Statute section
194.171 (1988) provided that: (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under section
193.122(2), or after 60 days from the date a decisio...
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 17396
...on , which, as we have noted, are distinguishable from the present case. The suggestion that it is inequitable to charge the taxpayer interest on an underpayment and yet deny him interest on a refund loses much of its force when examined in light of Section 194.171(3), Florida Statutes (1979), which permits a contesting taxpayer to pay only those taxes which he admits in good faith to be owing....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 2932868
...The real issue in this case is not whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction, because it is clear that it did have subject matter jurisdiction over appellant's action to compel the production of financial records necessary to determine the value of appellee's nonhomestead property for taxation purposes. See § 194.171(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...ght; it has stated that the time limit is
jurisdictional. §
72.011(5). This is the language of a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim.
See Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club,
527 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 1988)
(holding that analogous language in section
194.171, Florida Statutes, setting time
limitations for actions contesting property tax assessments was "a jurisdictional statute
- 10 -
of nonclaim")....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...assessment, or procedural or constitutional violations by the VAB. The
record shows that the Appellant originally challenged certain property
appraisals or assessments before the VAB. The VAB rendered a quasi-
judicial ruling pursuant to sections
194.036(2) and
194.171, Florida
Statutes. Dissatisfied with the process and outcome, the Appellant
“appealed” the VAB’s decision before the circuit court, 2 but as the record
shows, he did not sue the proper party, which is the Miami-Dade Property
Appraiser. Pursuant to section
194.171, a taxpayer may contest a tax
2
A VAB decision is not “appealable” in the formal sense of an appeal as a
review proceeding....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 5214, 1994 WL 234519
...ile to replead. It does not appear that there was such a concession with respect to counts 2 and 3. The County argues alternatively for affirmance under authority of section 194.-171(3) — (6), Florida Statutes (1993). However, the cited portion of section 194.171 relates to a challenge to a tax assessment....
...We express no view on whether an order on count 1 would have been appealable. . The rule is otherwise where subsections 194.-171(3)-(6) apply. See Adler-Built Indus., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County,
231 So.2d 197 (Fla.1970) (construing predecessor to §
194.171); Millstream Corp....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...immunity unless immunity is expressly waived." Id. at 497-98 (quoting Pan–Am
Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr.,
471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984)).
The supreme court's decision in Cason is instructive. In analyzing
whether the nonclaim provisions of section
194.171, Florida Statutes (2006), applied to
State-owned property, such that the failure to comply with the statute would result in the
issuance of tax certificates and the sale of tax deeds, the supreme court considered "the
effect of sovereign immunity on the application of section
194.171 to actions filed by the
State."
944 So. 2d at 312. The court determined that "[t]he crucial inquiry is whether
the language of section
194.171 clearly and unambiguously demonstrates legislative
intent to apply this section to challenges by the State on State-owned property." Id.
That inquiry turned on whether the State is a taxpayer as used in chapter 194....
..."the person or other legal entity in whose name property is assessed." This definition
remains unchanged in the 2014 version of the statute.
- 17 -
that in construing the statutory term consideration must be given to the purpose of
section 194.171, "which is to ensure a reliable and predictable method for counties to
collect revenue while also providing for taxpayer challenges to tax assessments."
Cason, 944 So....
...The supreme court concluded that
a "taxpayer" is not merely the entity in whose name the
property is assessed, but one whom the county has the
power to tax subject to disputes about individual
assessments. In short, a "taxpayer" under section 194.171
is a taxable entity....
...2d at 313 (quoting Dickinson,
325 So. 2d at 3). "Accordingly, where the State
files suit challenging ad valorem taxation on grounds of sovereign immunity, the State's
assertion that it is not a taxable entity takes it outside the category of 'taxpayer' targeted
by section
194.171." Id. Section
192.011, like section
194.171, is part of "a
comprehensive statutory scheme for counties to assess and collect taxes
simultaneously with procedures for taxpayer challenges to tax assessments." Ward v.
Brown, 894 So....
...ions of the State. The supreme
court in Cason went on to hold as follows:
The necessity of a clear expression of legislative
intent to authorize taxation of the State reinforces our
construction of section 194.171....
...We presume that the
[l]egislature was aware of precedent recognizing both the
State's immunity and the necessity of a clear and direct
expression of intent to authorize taxation of the State when it
enacted the jurisdictional nonclaim provision, section
194.171, in 1983....
...Thus, the absence of specific language
- 18 -
imposing the procedural requirements on the State, rather
than on taxpayers generally, is significant.
....
We do not find, either within section 194.171 or elsewhere,
the clear and unambiguous expression of legislative intent
necessary to conclude that the [l]egislature intended that the
State be subject to the harsh provisions of section 194.171
and as a result lose its immunity from taxation.
Id....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 6168
...Concluding that the Accardo decision
broadly expanded the reach of “equitable ownership,” the County issued an
assessment to Dadeland Station for 2015 property taxes on the Land. Dadeland
Station paid the taxes under protest and filed a suit to recover the payment under
section 194.171, Florida Statutes (2015).1
The County’s interpretation overreached....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
filed a suit to recover the payment under section
194.171, Florida Statutes (2015).1 The County’s
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 20105
subject only to the limitations imposed under section 194.-171, Florida Statutes (1979). The facts pertaining
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1996).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
Section
193.122(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). 10 Section
194.171(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). 11 See, Op. Att'y Gen
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...definition of “charitable purpose” in section
196.012(7) as
eliminating any need for a traditional “charitable” purpose. The
Chamber presented extensive record evidence of its functions,
option to contest an assessment before the VAB or directly in
circuit court. §
194.171, Fla. Stat. A party that is unsuccessful
before the VAB may file suit in circuit court. §§
194.036(2),
194.171, Fla....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1991).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
assessment within the time frame set forth in section
194.171, Florida Statutes, or to order a refund resulting
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 20620
...The Appraiser, joined by the Department of Revenue, challenged the Board’s reduced valuation by filing suit in the circuit court pursuant to Section
194.032(6)(a), Paragraphs 1 and 2, Florida Statutes (1977). 1 The Taxpayers filed their answer and a counterclaim as expressly authorized by Sections 194.-032(6)(b) and
194.171, Florida Statutes (1977)....
...t be appropriate to further reduce the assessment, because of this factor, in order to arrive at the just valuation. Erroneous Computation of Interest When the Taxpayers initiated the counterclaim as authorized pursuant to Sections
194.032(6)(b) and
194.171, supra, they tendered to the Tax Collector a good faith payment of the admitted taxes due and owing based upon a $37,000,000 valuation as required by Section
194.171(4), supra....
...xcess of $500,000; 7V2 percent variance from any assessment in excess of $500,000 but not in excess of $1,000,000; or .... .
194.032 HEARING COMPLAINTS.— (б)(b) Any taxpayer may bring an action to contest a tax assessment pursuant to s. 194.-171.
194.171 CIRCUIT COURT TO HAVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN TAX CASES.— (1) The circuit courts have original jurisdiction at law of all matters relating to property taxation....
...Gladden,
76 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954). . A taxpayer is not required to seek review before the Board. See §§
194.032(3) and 194.-171, Fla.Stat. (1977). In lieu of this, a taxpayer may directly challenge the appraiser’s preliminary assessment in circuit court. §
194.171, supra....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 1076899, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3788
...We conclude that these issues are either without merit or are not
cognizable by prohibition.1 Accordingly, we deny the City’s petition but write to
address the City’s principal argument: that the Class claims were barred by the
sixty-day jurisdictional non-claim statute (§ 194.171(2), Fla....
...3
pursuant to the City ordinance. It is also undisputed that, during the same relevant
time period, no applicant received a written denial of their application.
The City argues that the sixty-day non-claim provision of section 194.171(2)
bars the action below and deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. Section
194.171(2) provides:
No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60
days from the date the assessment being contested is certified
for collection under s....
...193.122(2), or after 60 days from the
date a decision is rendered concerning such assessment by the
value adjustment board if a petition contesting the assessment
had not received final action by the value adjustment board
prior to extension of the roll under s.
197.323.
Section
194.171(6) provides that the “requirements of subsection[] (2) . . . are
jurisdictional” and that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction in such cases until after
the requirements of [] subsection[] (2) . . . have been met.”
While we are doubtful that section
194.171(2) applies to the instant case, we
need not decide that issue.2 Even if section
194.171(2) does apply, the City’s
2 The Class does not challenge any action of the county in its tax assessment or
certification of the tax roll; instead, the Class challenges the City’s action (or
inaction) under its own ordinance for approval or denial of applications for a tax
exemption....
...That ordinance contains no provision for issuing a denial within a
timeframe that permits the applicant to appeal the denial prior to certification of the
tax rolls, or to otherwise contest the denial within sixty days after certification. If
we were to hold that the sixty-day non-claim provision of section 194.171(2)
applies to this case, the City could wait until the tax rolls are certified and, sixty-
one days later, issue its denial of the application for tax exemption....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 141, 1993 Fla. LEXIS 329, 1993 WL 64632
...E TO THE *1098 ASSESSED VALUATION OF HER PROPERTY?
598 So.2d at 168 . We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. The respondent, Palm Beach Commerce Center Associates, Ltd., filed a complaint pursuant to section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1989), contesting the 1990 assessed valuation of its property....
...a good faith payment of the taxes due.
598 So.2d at 168 . According to the district court, the only burden placed on a taxpayer seeking injunctive relief under section 194.-211 is to establish a good faith payment of the taxes due in accordance with section
194.171(3)....
...Although we agree with the district court that section
194.211 applies to the sale of tax certificates, we do not agree that the only burden placed on a taxpayer seeking to enjoin the collection process is to make a good faith payment of the taxes due in accordance with section
194.171(3)....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...For example, the power to
establish time limitations for bringing some actions resides with the
legislature. See, e.g., §
775.15, Fla. Stat. (2017). But when the legislature
intends a time bar to be jurisdictional, it generally states as much. See,
e.g., §
194.171(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...automatic, unchallengeable forfeiture of the exemption for all tax years, upon
a property appraiser’s determination, under section
196.161(1)(b), that an
exemption has been wrongfully granted. 11
The Property Appraiser also argues that sections
194.171(2) and (6)
of the Florida Statutes precluded the lower court from exercising jurisdiction
over Hassett’s claims that he was entitled to the homestead exemption for
tax years 2008 through 2015. By its plain and unambiguous language,
though, section
194.171(2) imposes deadline limitations on an action
contesting a tax assessment and does not apply to a challenge, such as
Hassett’s, to a property appraiser’s revocation of a homestead exemption
11
Hassett makes the argument that...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 9166, 2002 WL 1394723
...t entitled to the “public purpose” exemption because the operator of the golf course, Concorde, was a for-profit business. Turner denied Concorde the exemption for the tax years 1997 and 1998, and Concorde filed suit in circuit court pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1997)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21394197
...It filed a motion for class certification and a request for approval of class notice. The Department and the Tax Collector opposed Pep-peridge Farm’s motion, arguing that Pep-peridge Farm’s complaint was a challenge to the assessment of property which, under subsection 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1997), should have been brought within sixty days of the date the county tax rolls were certified. They argued that the failure to bring the action within that time deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. See § 194.171(6)....
...ther, that it challenges the classification of its computer software as tangible personal property. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that Pepperidge Farm’s lawsuit was not one barred by the sixty-day time limit in section 194.171....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...or all from
among three options to challenge the denial: request an informal
conference with the property appraiser under section
194.011(2),
Florida Statutes; petition the VAB for review under section
194.011(3); or file suit in circuit court under section
194.171, either
first among these options or after exercising one or both of the
others....
....
in all cases involving legality of any tax assessment or toll” unless
the Legislature changes that by general law. Art. V, § 20(c)(3), Fla.
Const. (emphasis added). Far from having been changed by
general law, this requirement remains codified at section
194.171(1) of the Florida Statutes (“The circuit courts have
original jurisdiction at law of all matters relating to property
taxation.”), and at section
26.012(2)(e) (“[Circuit courts] shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction: ....
...informal resolution with the property appraiser or the VAB before
filing suit in court. §
194.011(2), (3), Fla. Stat. Both the property
appraiser and the taxpayer can go straight to circuit court to
litigate an assessment or exemption issue, and skip the VAB
altogether. §
194.171, Fla....
...Chief among the legal principles driving this result
are the status of Florida’s property appraisers as elected,
independent constitutional officers; the exclusive original
jurisdiction of circuit court in tax assessment matters under the
constitution and sections
26.012(2)(e) and
194.171(1); the de-novo
standard of review required by section
194.036(3); and the one-
year-at-a-time concept embedded in rules, regulations, and
longstanding tax law practice and procedure....
...By statute, the property appraiser may appeal under
specified circumstances such as a legal error by the board or a
specific violation of an administrative rule. §
194.036(1)(a), Fla.
Stat. (2019). Property owners may appeal by bringing “an action to
contest a tax assessment” under section
194.171, Florida Statutes,
which provides for circuit courts to have original jurisdiction in tax
cases....
...in the circuit courts, which also continue to have original
jurisdiction—but not exclusive original jurisdiction—in tax cases
filed there directly. The specific jurisdictional statute in the tax
code dealing with tax matters does not use the word “exclusive.”
See § 194.171(1), Fla....
...original” jurisdiction in “all cases involving legality of any tax
assessment or toll or denial of refund, except as provided in s.
72.011”), as to certain tax matters, does not trump the specific
jurisdictional statute in the tax code with language to the contrary.
See §
194.171(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 7508, 1994 WL 390783
...though the yard was effectively unusable as a result of the sloping. Once the tax assessor was informed of the property’s true condition in 1992, it was no longer assessed. The Salva-tos cannot now challenge the assessor’s past assessments. See § 194.171(2), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 10684, 2002 WL 1723915
...However, we affirm without comment the trial court’s finding that the valuation rendered by the Property Appraiser was excessive. See §
193.011, Fla. Stat. (1999). In order to challenge the Property Appraiser’s assessment of its property for the years 1999 and 2000, Venice Golf filed suit pursuant to section
194.171, Florida Statutes (1999)....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...claim for declarative and injunctive relief as to the denial of the
ad valorem exemption for 2015 and 2016).
The property appraiser argues the trial court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the 2015 and 2016
years pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes, because
Faith Christian failed to pay the taxes due and owing for the
2016 tax year prior to delinquency. Section 194.171 provides in
relevant part:
(5) No action to contest a tax assessment may be
maintained, and any such action shall be dismissed,
unless all taxes on the property assessed in years after
the action is brought, whic...
...No court shall have jurisdiction in
such cases until after the requirements of both
subsections (2) and (3) have been met. A court shall lose
jurisdiction of a case when the taxpayer has failed to
comply with the requirements of subsection (5).
§§ 194.171(5), (6), Fla. Stat. (2016). Prohibition is an appropriate
vehicle for review of the denial of a motion to dismiss which
raises a claim that a trial court lost subject matter jurisdiction
over a tax challenge pursuant to subsections 194.171(5) and (6).
See Nikolits v....
...2d DCA 1986)); see also Washington Square
Corp. v. Wright,
687 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Wilkinson
v. Clarke,
91 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Nikolits,
92 So. 3d at
299; Higgs,
903 So. 2d at 305. As the Florida Supreme Court has
observed:
Although subsections
194.171(5) and (6) appear to
be somewhat harsh, their meaning is clear. Subsection
194.171(5) plainly states that a taxpayer may not
3
maintain a suit contesting a tax assessment, an action
“shall be dismissed, unless all taxes on a property
assessed in years after the act...
...urisdiction of
the case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with
the requirements of subsection (5).” The statute does
not allow a court to retain jurisdiction once taxes
become delinquent.
Bystrom,
514 So. 2d at 1074-75.
Section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes, requires a taxpayer to
contest a tax assessment within “60 days from the date the
assessment being contested is certified for collection under s.
193.122(2), or after 60 days from the date a decision is rendere...
...original
complaint. We do not find this argument to be persuasive;
“[e]ven if treated as relating back, the amended pleading did not
and could not assert the crucial fact that the [2016] taxes were
paid before they became delinquent as required by section
194.171(5).” Bystrom,
514 So. 2d at 1074 (emphasis in original).
Although it is possible for an amended complaint to relate back to
the original complaint for purposes of the sixty-day jurisdictional
time frame set forth in section
194.171(2), this is generally
limited to situations in which the taxpayer makes a payment
before the taxes become delinquent and files an amended
4
complaint so reflecting....
...The lack of payment or a timely challenge prior to
delinquency resulted in the lower tribunal’s loss of subject matter
jurisdiction. “[I]t is well established that a challenge concerning
entitlement to a tax exemption is a challenge to an assessment of
taxes, for purposes of section 194.171.” Nikolits, 92 So....
...3d at 301.
“A timely challenge is therefore necessary to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of that section.” Nikolits v. Ballinger,
736 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
The petition for writ of prohibition is granted. In accordance
with section
194.171, Florida Statutes, the lower tribunal is
directed to dismiss the Respondent’s challenge to the 2015 and
2016 tax years.
PETITION GRANTED.
LEWIS, BILBREY, and M.K....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 14392
...Assuming without deciding that the taxpayer’s action herein challenged the subject tax as being void rather than voidable and that, accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain this action, despite a contrary conclusion by the trial court, Lake Worth Towers, Inc. v. Gerstung,
262 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1972); §
194.171(1), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 9900, 2003 WL 21502783
PER CURIAM. Richard and Patricia Lee appeal a final summary judgment in which the trial court ruled that, pursuant to section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1999), it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Lees’ action for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the authority of the Leon County Property Appraiser to correct the assessment of their property. We agree with the trial court that the fundamental nature of the appellant’s lawsuit is a challenge of an assessment and, thus, it is governed by the sixty day non-claim statute. See § 194.171(2), Fla....
...Stafford,
646 So.2d 803, 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), regardless of how the complaint is couched, when a taxpayer is challenging the assessment on grounds that it was “unjust, capricious, arbitrary and illegal,” the action is cognizable only under the strictures of section
194.171, which allows a suit to be filed only within 60 days from the date the assessment roll is certified for collection....
...Gerald Sohn, P.A.,
654 So.2d 249, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(citing Stafford with approval); Nikolits v. Delaney,
719 So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(holding claim that an assessment is made in violation of section
193.155 is an action to contest an assessment and is governed by section
194.171(2))....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 5042, 1990 WL 96241
...aken on a different status by having been transferred to other property, which occurred in Fudosan and has not occurred under the facts of this case. Contrary to the property appraiser’s additional argument, the taxpayer’s failure to comply with section 194.171(3) by paying “the amount of the tax which he admits in good faith to be owing” before contesting the assessment did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 131, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 34, 1988 WL 790
...l’s allegations that the statute of limitations barred such a challenge. We affirm. We affirm as to Issue I based on our holding in Bell v. Bryan,
505 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied,
513 So.2d 1060 (Fla.1987). As to Issue II, we note that section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1983), 1 applies on its face to instances *1025 where the taxpayer is in the posture of a plaintiff bringing an action contesting a tax assessment, and that in the instant case, the taxpayers are the defendants....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 1006, 2016 WL 313977
WELLS, Judge. On the City of Miami’s acknowledgement that the application of section
194.171 of the Florida Statutes (the 60-day non-claim period for filing challenges to tax assessments) would produce the same result as to both the named class representative and all class members in this action, we affirm the Order Granting Class Certification. In doing so, we do not address the trial court’s factual or legal determinations as to the applicability of either section
194.171 or section
95.11 of the Florida Statutes, as we find any such determinations premature to the question at hand....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...McNulty, Assistant City Attorney, for appellant.
Pardo Gainsburg, Stevan J. Pardo and Nicole R. Rekant, for appellees.
Before WELLS, ROTHENBERG and EMAS, JJ.
WELLS, Judge.
On the City of Miami’s acknowledgement that the application of section
194.171 of the Florida Statutes (the 60-day non-claim period for filing challenges
to tax assessments) would produce the same result as to both the named class
representative and all class members in this action, we affirm the Order Granting
Class Certification. In doing so, we do not address the trial court’s factual or legal
determinations as to the applicability of either section
194.171 or section
95.11 of
the Florida Statutes, as we find any such determinations premature to the question
at hand....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...subject to the ad valorem taxes.
The Tax Collector and Clerk asserted that the trial court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant’s amended
complaint because he had failed to challenge the tax assessments
within the 60-day limit of section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes.
That section provides that “[n]o action shall be brought to contest
a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being
contested is certified for collection.”
Appellant admitted that he had not complied with the time
limit in section 194.171(2), but argued below and continues to
argue here that he was not contesting a “tax assessment,” but
rather was “challenging the legality of the issuance and sale of tax
certificates” and the resulting tax deed sales and conveyance of
property....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 309, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 6370
...suit. We cannot agree. Here, Bystrom deliberately withheld certification of the two properties at issue, for the sole purpose of extending the time within which he could file suit, as is stated by him in his own more definite statement. Pursuant to section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1975), petitioning property owners had only sixty days “from the date the assessment being contested [was] certified for collection under s....
CopyPublished | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6985
...osition ordinarily this Court should not be involved in the resolution of controversies between non-debtors. PROPRIETY OF THE PROCEDURE EMPLOYED BY FDIC TO CHALLENGE THE TAX IN QUESTION The procedure to challenge taxes in this State is dealt with by § 194.171 of the Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 169, 53 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1221, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 150, 2005 WL 419701
...On July 13, 2004, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Determination of Tax Liability Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 505, arguing that the Complaint failed to allege compliance with the statutory conditions precedent for challenging an excessive assessment pursuant to Section 194.171(2), (3) and (6), Florida Statutes (2003)....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1995).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
certification is before the value adjustment board. Section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.), provides:
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 3454, 2009 WL 413361
...Brian J. Shank and Alane Rae Shank appeal from a final order dismissing their complaint against the Lake County Property Appraiser with prejudice. The trial court found that the Shanks had failed to comply with the conditions precedent set forth in section 194.171, Florida Statutes (2007)....
...da Statutes do not allow us to collect a partial payment.... ” The property appraiser subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the Shanks’ complaint, alleging that they had failed to comply with the jurisdictional conditions precedent set forth in section 194.171....
...the Plaintiffs attempted to make their good-faith payment, they failed to indicate their intention to the Tax Appraiser. When the payment was returned, the Plaintiffs failed to take further steps to correct the situation and obtain their receipt.... Section 194.171(6) provides that the requirements of subsections (2), (3), and (5) are jurisdictional....
...Subsection (3) requires the taxpayer to file a receipt with the payment [sic]. Because the Plaintiffs did not do this, this Court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (6). We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of section 194.171. Section 194.171(6) provides that no court shall have jurisdiction in a case challenging a property tax assessment unless the requirements of subsection (2), (3), and (5) are met....
...This objective is satisfied when the taxpayer makes his good faith payment in a timely manner. To accept the property appraiser’s argument would mean that even where a taxpayer made his good-faith payment on the fh'st day of the sixty-day time period, and otherwise complied with the requirements set forth in section 194.171, he would lose his right to challenge a tax assessment if the tax collector failed or refused, for whatever reason, to timely issue a receipt....
...ent and not simply a partial payment of their taxes. Although we agree that the better practice would be for a taxpayer to provide a cover letter to the tax collector expressly reciting that the payment being made is a good faith payment required by section 194.171(3), we cannot find that doing so is statutorily required....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 19119
...Eighty-four days later — on March 1, 1982 — the appellant/taxpayer filed an action in the circuit court to contest the assessment. The trial court eventually entered a summary judgment in favor of the appellee/property appraiser and this appeal ensued. Section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1981), states that “[n]o action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under §
193.122(2).” Given the Supreme Cour...
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS 7533
...In response to the arguments on cross appeal, the Taxpayers contend that § 194.033, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., is unconstitutional in violation of Art. V, § 6 of the Florida Constitution of 1968, which vests exclusive jurisdiction over the legality of certain tax matters in the circuit court. They further contend that under § 194.171, Fla.Stat., F.S.A....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...The circuit court denied
the motions.
As litigation over the 2014 exemptions proceeded, Gulf Marine filed
additional exemption applications for tax years 2015 through 2019. The
property appraiser denied each application. After each rejection, Gulf
Marine filed suit pursuant to section 194.171, advancing theories why
the exemption's disapproval was improper and should be overturned.
The circuit court consolidated the property appraiser's suit and those
filed by Gulf Marine, and ultimately it rendered a summary judgment in
f...
...It relies on two ad valorem tax
cases in which the relation-back principle was held to be inapplicable.
See Wilkinson v. Reese,
540 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Merrick Park,
LLC,
299 So. 3d 1096.
But Wilkinson and Merrick Park concerned a different statute
altogether, section
194.171(2), which imposes a sixty-day deadline for
suing to contest a tax assessment....
...Wilkinson,
540 So. 2d at 142–43;
Merrick Park,
299 So. 3d at 1103. Notably, that statute is referred to in a
different provision of section
194.036(2) that applies when a "taxpayer
. . . bring[s] an action to contest a tax assessment pursuant to
s.
194.171." §
194.036(2) (emphasis added). But here the property
appraiser brought the action, not the taxpayer, and the property
11
appraiser did not sue under section
194.171 to contest a tax
assessment. Rather, he sued under section 934.036(1) to challenge the
tax exemption awarded by the VAB.
Moreover, Wilkinson and Merrick Park recognized that section
194.171 is a statute of nonclaim, i.e., one that reflects a "clearly
evidenced" legislative intent to deprive a court of the power to adjudicate
an untimely claim....
...5th DCA 2010) ("A statute is a 'nonclaim statute' if there
is a clearly evidenced legislative intent in the statute to not merely
withhold the remedy, but to take away the right of recovery when a
claimant fails to present his or her claim as provided in the statute.").
Thus, section
194.171(2) declares that "[n]o action shall be brought" to
contest a tax assessment after the sixty-day period. Further, that
deadline is expressly jurisdictional; subsection (6) of the statute states
that "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction in such cases" if the sixty-day
filing requirement in subsection (2) is not met. §
194.171(6). Section
194.171, then, is a statute of nonclaim. See Wilkinson,
540 So. 2d at
143; Merrick Park,
299 So. 3d at 1103.
Notably, Wilkinson recognized that before the sixty-day deadline in
section
194.171 was made jurisdictional by the addition of subsection (6)
in 1983, ch....
...2d at
143 (first citing Cowart v. Perkins,
445 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984);
and then citing Hilltop Ranch, Inc. v. Brown,
308 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1975)). The Florida Supreme Court later confirmed that it was the
addition of subsection (6) that caused section
194.171 to become a
jurisdictional statute of nonclaim rather than a statute of limitations.
12
Markham v....
...The Third District
affirmed the dismissal, holding that (1) the amended counterclaim
challenging the land valuation, which was separate and distinct from the
improvements valuation, was filed after the land valuation claim was
barred by expiration of the jurisdictional sixty-day nonclaim period set
forth in section 194.171, and (2) the amended counterclaim regarding
the land valuation could not relate back to the original counterclaim
because the original was filed by a nonparty and therefore it was a
nullity....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 19 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1, 1993 Fla. LEXIS 1997, 1993 WL 528461
...Augustine,
104 Fla. 261 ,
139 So. 880 (1932); City of Tampa v. Palmer,
89 Fla. 514 ,
105 So. 115 (1925). When Powell, Palmer, and Day were decided, the statutes declared tax protests to be in equity, while the present statute makes no specific reference to equity. §
194.171, Fla.Stat....
...ial in this type of action exists. Clearly the legislature has not afforded a jury trial in a tax assessment challenge. Had it intended to grant such a right, it could have done so with clear and unambiguous language. The mere fact that section *597 194.171 proclaims that the circuit courts have original jurisdiction at law of all matters relating to taxes does not evidence the legislature’s intent to mandate jury trials 'in ad valorem tax assessment cases....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 25264
under protest “or to follow the provisions of Section
194.171(3), F.S. and tender to the Revenue Collector
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 2924206
...roved use as a citrus grove. After the denial was sustained by the Value Adjustment Board, the taxpayer sought declaratory relief. The appraiser moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the taxpayer failed to comply with the requirements of section 194.171, Florida Statutes, a jurisdictional statute, in that she failed to pay the amount she in good faith thought she owed and failed to attach a receipt for taxes paid....
...hat the property was not subject to ad valorem taxation under section
196.199, which exempts certain governmental property from taxation. The trial court struck the taxpayers' pleadings because they had failed to comply with the time requirements of section
194.171. The taxpayers contended that section
194.171 did not apply to them because they were challenging the "classification" of their property rather than the "assessment." Id....
...t-owned and leased property. In any case, whether they are claiming an exemption or claiming that the assessors' action is illegal, unlawful, or void as an improper "classification" or for some other reason, they are still bound by the provisions of section 194.171(1) as we construed those provisions in Markham [v....
...w of those challenges. We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the "classification" argument is merely an attempt to circumvent the petitioners' failure to properly and timely challenge the tax assessment of their properties as required by section 194.171(1). Id. at *5, at ___. In the instant case, like the taxpayers in Ward, the taxpayer is seeking an exemption from taxation. Like the taxpayers in Ward, Pultz did not comply with the requirements of section 194.171. In this case, the taxpayer did not comply with section 194.171(3), which requires the taxpayer to pay the amount the taxpayer admits in good faith to be owing and to file a copy of the receipt with the complaint, while the taxpayers in Ward did not comply with the time requirements of the statute. Section 194.171(6) expressly states that "[t]he requirements of subsections (2), (3) ......
...s against their property regardless of the legal basis of the challenge." Id. at *1, ___ So.2d at ___. Although the instant case involves an agricultural exemption rather than a governmental exemption, and although this case involves subsection 3 of section
194.171, we conclude that the difference does not take it out of the purview of the "broadly" decided Ward. Accordingly, we issue the writ. See, e.g., Department of Revenue v. Eastern American Technologies Corp.,
762 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 5th DCA *949 2000) (issuing writ of prohibition where the plaintiff did not comply with the jurisdictional provisions of section
194.171)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 19096, 2010 WL 5093142
...but that decision was overturned upon petition by the Andonies to the Miami-Dade County Value Adjustment Board. In due course, the Property Appraiser contested the decision in an original proceeding filed in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court. See § 194.171(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 19097, 2004 WL 2895610
...” amendment. Art. VII, § 4, Fla. Const.; §
193.155, Fla. Stat. (1997). The Property Appraiser responded to the action, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the action had not been filed within the sixty-day window provided by section
194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1997-2002)....
...When the trial court decided this case, it logically believed that it had jurisdiction under this court’s holding in Department of Revenue v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.,
847 So.2d 575 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The supreme court recently disapproved our Pepperidge Farm decision and held that section
194.171(2) “applies broadly to taxpayers’ actions challenging the assessment of taxes against their property regardless of the legal basis of the challenge.” Ward v....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...VAB
proceedings was not within section
26.012 of the Florida Statutes’ schedule
of matters over which Florida’s circuit courts have jurisdiction.2
II. Analysis3
2
The appellate division’s decision also noted that, pursuant to section
194.171 of the Florida Statutes, the VAB was not a proper party to a legal
proceeding challenging a tax assessment and, as this Court had held in a
prior opinion, was immune from the claims that had been alleged in that
lawsuit, i.e., a verified complaint filed in circuit court by Johansson related to
the 2019 tax year....
...t, exclusive –
5
role in adjudicating taxpayer disputes. Indeed, the exclusive venue for legal
adjudication of taxpayer challenges to tax assessments is an original, de
novo proceeding in circuit court. § 194.171(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 9 Fla. L. Weekly 1728, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 14612
assessment is barred by the provisions of Section 194.-171(3), (5) and (6), Florida Statutes (1983).
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 7590, 1991 WL 147701
...of appellee, Dade County Property Appraiser Joel Robbins, (Robbins), in an action contesting the denial of an ad-valo-rem tax exemption. We reverse. The trial court based its dismissal on ISKCON’s failure to meet the jurisdictional requirement in section 194.171(3), Florida Statutes (1989): Before an action to contest a tax assessment may be brought, the taxpayer shall pay the collector not less than the amount of the tax which he admits in good faith to be owing....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 12185
...ecause of such status, the lower court entered summary judgment against the Department because no claim had been brought by it contesting the assessment of the property within 60 days from the date of its certification for collection, as required by section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (2000)....
...urred, appellant sought to enjoin the sale, alleging its ownership of the property. The Ottingers moved for summary judgment, contending that the state’s failure to challenge the assessments on the property within the limitation period required by section 194.171(2) constituted a jurisdictional bar against the state’s assertion of sovereign immunity....
...1st DCA 2003). Because this is an appeal from a final summary judgment, our review standard is de novo, a standard that is particularly applicable to the issue before us in that the lower court’s decision turned primarily upon an interpretation of section 194.171, which provides in part: (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s....
...broad language: “[W]hether they [petitioners] are claiming an exemption or claiming that the assessors’ action is illegal, unlawful, or void as an improper ‘classification’ or for some other reason, they are still bound by the provisions of section
194.171(1) as we construed those provisions in Markham.” Ward,
894 So.2d at 816 ....
...when it decided Ward and Markham , of its prior opinions recognizing the immunity of sovereignty land from taxation, we cannot believe that the court, in abandoning the void/voidable dichotomy previously employed, intended for its interpretation of section 194.171 to apply to property owned by the state or its subdivisions and used by them for a governmental purpose....
...In so saying, we note that in both the above cases the parties contesting the assessments were private holders of the property in dispute. Thus, we strongly doubt that the court intended that its particular holding, or ratio decidendi, should be extended beyond the facts therein recited. Nor do we find any provision in section 194.171, or elsewhere, reasonably implying that the nonclaim bar should be applied to actions brought by the sovereign on an assertion of immunity....
...the assessment of the tax. Because the legislature is presumed to be aware of prior existing laws and the constructions placed upon them, it is inconceivable to us that the legislature, at the time it enacted the jurisdictional nonclaim provision of section 194.171(6), by chapter 83-204, Laws of Florida, intended to include within the classification of taxpayer the state of Floiida as a party contesting as void the assessment of lands by reason of the property’s immune status....
...The legislature has itself paid heed to this dictum by providing: “All property of this state which is used for governmental purposes shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation, except as otherwise provided by law.” §
196.199(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). Other than section
194.171, a statute, which, like one of limitation, is procedural in nature, not substantive, in that it affects the procedure whereby one may assert a right of action, cf....
...statute, substantive or procedural, nor have we found any that subjects property of the state used for a governmental purpose to ad valorem taxation. In the absence of a clear expression of the legislature to such effect, we are of the opinion that section 194.171 was not designed to bar a claim by the state contesting an assessment because of the property’s immunity from taxation. We therefore conclude that the lower court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the issue by reason of the provisions of section 194.171(2) and (6), which we determine are inapplicable to property owned by the state and used by it for a governmental purpose....
...Because, however, it is not altogether clear from some of the language used by the court in Ward and Markham in its construction of the nonclaim statute, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: DO THE JURISDICTIONAL NON-CLAIM PROVISIONS OF SECTION 194.171, FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY TO BAR A CLAIM OF THE STATE THAT ASSERTS AN ASSESSMENT IS VOID BECAUSE IT WAS MADE ON PROPERTY IMMUNE FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION? REVERSED and REMANDED. WOLF and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. . During the pendency of the suit, the Department served notice that the duties of the Commission had been transferred to the Department. . This section, as section 194.171, is placed under Part II of chapter 194, Florida Statutes, pertaining to judicial review.
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18466, 56 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 258, 2012 WL 3738062
...es owned by the Debtor. The Debtor
did not file a judicial challenge to the value of her property in a Florida state court
within 60 days of the October 12, 2009 certification of the 2009 tax rolls by the
Property Appraiser pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 194.171(2) (2009).1 The Debtor filed
1
Section 194.171(2), Fla....
...had not
received final action by the value adjustment board prior to extension of the roll
under s.
197.323.
The Debtor did not file an appeal with the value adjustment board within the prescribed
time.
2
Section
194.171(6), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...This conclusion is reinforced by the supreme court's decision in Bystrom v. Diaz,
514 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 1987), wherein the taxpayers challenged a 1982 tax assessment. While the suit was pending, their 1984 taxes became delinquent. The tax collector moved to dismiss pursuant to the provision in section
194.171(5), Florida Statutes (1985), that a taxpayer may not maintain a suit contesting a tax assessment, and that such an action shall be dismissed unless all taxes on the property assessed in years after the action is brought that the taxpayer in good faith admits to owing are paid before they become delinquent. The motion also relied on the provisions in section
194.171(6) that the requirements of the foregoing section are jurisdictional and a court shall lose jurisdiction of the case if the taxpayer fails to comply therewith....
...Examples of reasonable restrictions include "the fixing of a time within which suit must be brought, payment of reasonable court deposits, [and] pursuit of certain administrative relief such as zoning matters or workmen's compensation claims... ." Id. As a prerequisite to maintaining suit, subsection 194.171(5) requires only that a taxpayer pay, prior to delinquency, the undisputed amount of taxes assessed while his suit is pending....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 12944, 2007 WL 2362362
...x roll. The VAB issued its written order regarding 'Whispering Oaks’ petition on October 27, 2006, and respondent filed its complaint in circuit court on December 21, 2006. Alvarez moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely under the provisions of section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 16036
obvious that the Plaintiff failed to comply with Section
194.171(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (1975) in that
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 187098
...s funds should be refunded to the former District taxpayers. The trial court initially determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these unlawful taxation claims, because the Moore appellants failed to timely contest taxes pursuant to section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 4730, 1992 WL 83903
...’s alleged good faith payment of a portion of the taxes pending appellant’s legal challenge of the 1990 assessed valuation of its property. We reverse and certify an issue of great public importance. FACTS Appellant filed a complaint pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1991), alleging that the property appraiser had assigned its property a value greater than its just value....
...Appellant contends that the statutory scheme relating to good faith challenges to tax assessments implicitly contemplates a stay of the tax collection process pending resolution of the challenge. Appellant asserts that, upon filing an appropriate complaint in compliance with section 194.171, Florida Statute (1989) and making a good faith payment, it was entitled to enjoin further collections of any balance pending determination of the suit....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Prior to filing suit to challenge the assessments and taxes for each of those years, TWA elected to pay the full amount of taxes due in November of each year rather than some lesser amount equivalent to the tax which TWA admitted in good faith to be owing. See § 194.171(3), Fla....
