Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...3d DCA 1998)( Fuchs II ) [8] as to whether a property appraiser could offensively assert the unconstitutionality of a statute. In Turner, the property appraiser for Hillsborough County assessed value to a Tampa sports facility, notwithstanding the fact that the facility was exempt from property taxes under section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997). The taxpayer appealed to the Value Adjustment Board, which reduced the property appraiser's assessment. The property appraiser appealed the board's decision to the circuit court and argued that section 196.012 was unconstitutional....

...In addition to the constitutional points raised, such commercial taxpayers assert that the operation of their facilities constitutes a governmental or public purpose or function and, accordingly, such leaseholds are exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes....

...orem real property tax upon them consistent with the tax imposed upon persons who make similar uses of property. The proposition put forth by the appellants with respect to leaseholders of commercial property to the effect that they are exempt under Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes, as performing a public purpose has, we believe, been aptly disposed of in Straughn v....

...aytona Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) (a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...Having established that the Legislature has the power constitutionally to tax the leasehold interests in question as real property, we turn to the question of whether or not it has done so. Appellants submit that even if such leasehold interests are not exempt under Sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(5), Florida Statutes, that the tax imposed by Section 196.001(2), Florida Statutes, is merely an ad valorem intangible personal property tax because none of the statutory provisions relied upon by the appellees expressly state that the leasehold estates in question are to be taxed "as an interest in real property"....

...y private purpose. In the Walden case, supra, the lessee asserted that it performed a public purpose or function and should thereby enjoy an exemption from taxation upon the same principle as the appellants here contend that they are exempt under Subsection 196.012(5), Florida Statutes....

...orida Statutes, effectively removes from the exemption afforded property owned and used by the designated governmental units all leasehold interests which do not serve or perform a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function as defined in Section 196.012(5), regardless of the length of the lease, it must be concluded that Subsection (6) dealing with 99-year leases was intended by the Legislature to provide a standard for valuation....

...the municipality's payment of ad valorem *254 taxes, and specified that payment of the taxes is necessary for the facility to serve a public purpose under the municipal powers clause of the Constitution. [2] In the same act, the Legislature amended section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1995), to exclude the telecommunications services authorized in section 166.047 from the statutory ad valorem tax exemption for municipally owned property "used for governmental, municipal or public purposes" contained in section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995). See ch. 97-197, § 3, Laws of Fla. [3] The pertinent portion of section 196.012(6), as amended, specifies that "[p]roviding two-way telecommunications services to the public for hire by the use of a telecommunications facility, as defined in s. 364.02(13), and for which a certificate is required under chapter 364 does not constitute an exempt use for purposes of s. 196.199," with exceptions inapplicable here. § 196.012(6), Fla. Stat. (1997). The amended provisions operate in tandem. Section 166.047(3) invokes the municipal powers provision of the state constitution to mandate ad valorem taxation, and the amendment to section 196.012(6) disqualifies municipally owned and operated telecommunications facilities from a statutory ad valorem tax exemption for municipal property....

...he property as a condition of operation is unconstitutional on its face. The term "municipal or public purposes" is not defined in article VII, section 3(a). Although "governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function" is statutorily defined in section 196.012(6), Florida *257 Statutes (2004), [6] which also concerns tax exemptions for governmentally owned property, "[a] reading of section 3(a) of article VII clearly establishes that it is a self-executing provision and therefore does not require statutory implementation." City of Sarasota v. Mikos, 374 So.2d 458, 460 (Fla.1979). Therefore, the statutory definition does not control the construction of the term "municipal or public purposes" in the constitutional provision. In addition, the statutory definition in section 196.012(6) applies only to property leased from governmental entities....

...irport Auth. v. McIntyre, 783 So.2d 238, 246-48 (Fla.2001) (quoting Roberts, supra, at 1092). In Sebring Airport Authority we applied this standard, known as the "governmental-governmental" test, to invalidate a statutory tax exemption granted under section 196.012(6) for profitmaking endeavors such as convention and visitor centers, sports facilities, concert halls, arenas and stadiums....

...t *266 from ad valorem taxation under article VII, section 3(a). III. CONCLUSION For the reasons we have stated, we hold that section 166.047(3), Florida Statutes (1997), as enacted in chapter 97-197, section 2, Laws of Florida, and the amendment to section 196.012(6) contained in section 3 of the same act are not unconstitutional on their face....

...Its complaint challenging taxation on these facilities was dismissed on procedural grounds. See Crapo v. City of Gainesville, 855 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), review denied, 895 So.2d 404 (Fla.2005). [5] See art. VII, § 4(a)-(e), Fla. Const. [6] The statutory tax exemption in section 196.012(6) is as follows: Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state or any of its politica...

...We have jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to Article V, § 3(b)(1), Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. and Rule 2.1, subd. a(5)(a), F.A.R., 32 F.S.A., because the Circuit Court held Section 14 of Chapter 71-133, Laws of Florida 1971, and provisions of said Chapter brought forward as Sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(5), Florida Statutes 1971, F.S.A....

..., or of municipalities, agencies, authorities and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal or public *694 purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012(5)...." Fla. Stat. § 196.012(5) (1971), F.S.A., which is also a new section, defines public purpose as follows: "Governmental, municipal or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in pro...

...1965) 179 So.2d 349, text 355. The Legislature also has the power to provide for the taxing of private leaseholds previously exempt as it has done in Chapter 71-133. The pertinent provisions of Chapter 71-133 so providing now appear as Sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(5), F.S. 1971, F.S.A. See application of the holding of Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Walden (Fla. 1968) 210 So.2d 193, to Section 192.62, F.S., F.S.A., a predecessor statute to Sections 196.199(2) (a) and 196.012(5)....

...ivilege." (Emphasis supplied.) I would therefore hold that, based upon the declaration of the Legislature and our holding in State v. Escambia County, supra , the development of Santa Rosa Island constitutes a public purpose as defined by Fla. Stat. § 196.012(5) (1971), F.S.A., and is therefore exempt under Fla....

...utes (1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or . . which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Thompson, 101 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1958)." Williams v. Jones, supra, at 435. Mr. Justice Sundberg, writing for the Court in Williams v. Jones, supra , delineated the scope of the exemption at issue here in the following words: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...rida Constitution, which provides in part: Such portions of property as are used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation. A "charitable purpose" is defined in section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1981), as follows: "Charitable purpose" means a function or service which is of such a community service that its discontinuance could legally result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or service....

...er, in Chapter 196 it prescribed valid specifics for exemption in keeping with the constitutional limitation of predominate use which separately and independently stand apart from *560 the too restrictive "income test" provisions of the Act. In F.S. Section 196.012(1), F.S.A. 1971 definitions, the general nature of "`exempt use of property'" is declared to mean "predominant or exclusive use of property for ... religious, charitable ... use, as defined in this chapter." Subsection (3) of Section 196.012 states: "`Predominant use of property' means property used for exempt purposes in excess of fifty percent (50%) but less than exclusive" Subsection (6) of the same section states: "`Charitable purpose' means a function or service whic...

...The tests to be applied by taxing authorities and by the courts, if resort is had thereto, in determining whether to allow tax exemption for a home for the aged or disabled after deletion of F.S. Section 196.197(1), (2), (3), F.S.A., are found in the remainder of Chapter 196 and particularly the definitions in F.S. Section 196.012, F.S.A....

...Together, sections 196.001, 196.199(2), and 196.199(4) require ad valorem taxation of fee interests in property owned by an authority and subject to a lease by a nongovernmental lessee unless the lessee is serving a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function as defined in section 196.012(6) or uses the property exclusively for a literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purpose....

...IX of the 1885 Constitution (text 416). In point of law, no court has authority to grant a tax exemption in the absence of an authorizing statute or constitutional provision. 2. Neither Section 196.25(2)(c), F.S. 1969, nor the successor statutes, Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), (3), F.S....

...1957). [6] State v. Dade County, 157 Fla. 859, 27 So.2d 283 (1946). [7] This legislative declaration has been judicially approved by this Court. State v. Okaloosa County Airport and Industrial Authority, 168 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1964). Also see Fla. Stat. § 196.012(5) for definition of "public purpose," effective December 31, 1971....

...Shepherd, Tampa, FL, for Rob Turner, Hillsborough County Property Appraiser, Amicus Curiae. LEWIS, J. We have on appeal the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 718 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (" Sebring III "), which declared a portion of section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), to be unconstitutional....

...That section provided, in pertinent part, that "[p]roperty owned by the following governmental units but used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation ... when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6)." Section 196.012(6), in turn, provided: (6) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state or any of its...

...mental lessee utilizes governmental property for-proprietary and for-profit aims. [2] We have no doubt that Raceway's operation of the racetrack serves the public, but such service does not fit within the definition of a public purpose as defined by section 196.012(6)....

...1st DCA 1992), to the extent that it may be read to grant ad valorem tax exemption to a nongovernmental lessee of governmental property that uses such property for governmental-proprietary purposes." Id. at 1074. Following the outcome in Sebring II, the Legislature amended section 196.012(6)("the 1994 amendment")....

...aytona Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...se cited as being inconsistent with the amendment have either been approved or affirmed. [17] *252 Nonetheless, Raceway urges that the Legislature "used the normal and ordinary meaning of the constitutional term `public purposes' when it included in § 196.012(6) the types of for-profit-operated facilities which are recognized ......

...e of government," citing Black's Law Dictionary 1219 (6th ed.1990). Sebring II, 642 So.2d at 1074 n. 1. [3] The Second District agreed "with the trial court that the property involved in this litigation falls squarely within the quoted provisions of section 196.012(6), and this case cannot be resolved without determining the constitutionality of the statutory provision." 718 So.2d at 298 n....

...[8] "Immunity and exemption differ in that immunity connotes an absence of the power to tax while exemption presupposes the existence of that power." Canaveral Port Authority v. Department of Revenue, 690 So.2d 1226, 1234 n. 7 (Fla.1996). [9] These statutory provisions are still included in sections 196.199 and 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...rts have generally relied on the statutory definition of public purpose as identified in Williams v. Jones, 326 So.2d 425 (Fla.1975), a case addressing leasehold interests in Santa Rosa Island. The court found that the "exemptions contemplated under s. 196.012(5) and s....

...995), provided at all pertinent times: Leasehold interests in property of ... municipalities,... shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6). In all such cases, all other interests in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem taxation. One law [2] subsequently amending section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes, specifically made the amendment "appl[icable] to the 1994 and subsequent tax rolls." Ch. 94-353, § 59, at 2566, Laws of Fla. Since the present dispute has to do with tax rolls prepared before 1994, this amendment to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes, does not purport to control....

...Department of Revenue, 690 So.2d 1226, 1229-30 (Fla.1996) (holding that "the fee interest in the property at issue is not exempt from ad valorem taxation because the property is leased to a nongovernmental entity for a nongovernmental use"); Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So.2d 448, 452 (Fla.1993). Section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1991), provided: Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state o...

...ERVIN, J., specially concurs. DAVIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. ERVIN, Judge, specially concurring. I concur with Judge Benton's decision to affirm in part and reverse in part, and I write only to address the applicability of the 1993 amendment to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), in relation to the tax exemption claimed for the airport property during the years 1990, 1992 and 1993. Section 196.012(6) provides a definition of "governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function" within the context of leasehold interests....

...ommerce shall be deemed an activity which serves a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function. (Emphasis added.) The trial court held that the airport was exempt from ad valorem taxation and noted the "clarifying language" of the amended section 196.012(6), but it emphasized that it was not retroactively applying a new exemption to the earlier tax years in question....

...in the record, however, showing that the airport language was enacted to address any controversy over the interpretation of governmental versus proprietary functions in relation to leasehold interests. Indeed, the governmental-function definition of section 196.012(6) has existed for 27 years, since 1971....

...The beach property is also exempt from ad valorem taxation, as stated by the majority, because the leasehold did not even exist on tax assessment day. Furthermore, I would affirm the trial court's judgment that the use of the beach, public restroom, and concession stand serve a governmental-governmental purpose pursuant to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...nongovernmental lessees when the property was being utilized for a valid public purpose. It is not necessary for a marina to partake of an "aspect of sovereignty" in order to constitute a valid public purpose as defined in sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(6). As stated in Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture, [u]nder the definitional provisions of Section 196.012(6), a municipal or public purpose is defined to include either a function "which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds....

...erest. Pursuant to section 196.199(2)(a), (nongovernmental) leasehold interests in municipal property are exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in section 196.012(6)....

...of an aircraft full service fixed base operation which provides goods and services to the general aviation public in the promotion of air commerce shall be deemed an activity which serves a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function .... § 196.012(6), Fla....

...Appellants were obligated to raise this issue on appeal because the Final Judgment explicitly construed the "added [amendment] language— not as a new exemption created in 1993—but rather as a mere clarification of an exemption that existed since Florida Statute § 196.012(6) (defining public use) was originally created in 1971." If the trial court's construction of the statute, i.e., that the amendment did not create a new exemption but merely clarified existing law, was in error, then it behooved appellants to frame such error as an issue on appeal. The issue is not whether the property appraiser relied upon the new amendment; the issue should have been whether the trial court properly applied section 196.012(6) (and seemingly the "clarifying language" of the 1993 amendment) to the airport property for the tax years at issue....

...e, as amended, to the airport property. Despite the trial court's specific finding that "the activity undertaken by the airport lessees is deemed to be an activity which serves a governmental-governmental public purpose as defined by Florida Statute § 196.012(6)," appellants failed to even mention section 196.012(6), its applicability to this property, or the propriety of the trial court's ruling for our review....

...Regis Paper Co. v. Hill, 198 So.2d 365, 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); Pursell v. Sumter Elec. Coop., Inc., 169 So.2d 515, 518 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964) (generally, matters raised for the first time in appellant's reply brief cannot be considered on appeal). If section 196.012(6) had not been amended or applied by the trial court below, I would agree that the airport property leases are not tax exempt....

...It would appear that following the majority's rationale, which is contrary to the property appraiser's current interpretation of the statute, [7] the statutory amendment does not exempt the airport property even for the post-1994 tax years due to their "proprietary use." I would affirm the application of section 196.012(6) and the exemption granted to the airport property by the trial court....

...e's obtaining exemptions for "[l]easehold interests in government property." At issue here is the City's own asserted exemptions for its fee interests in real property. [2] Chapter 94-353, section 59, at 2566, Laws of Florida, added the following to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1993): The use by a lessee, licensee, or management company of real property or a portion thereof as a convention center, visitor center, sports facility with permanent seating, concert hall, arena, stadium, park...

...et the property will revert back to the Federal Government, then such property shall be deemed to serve a municipal or public purpose. [3] Effective May 15, 1993, chapter 93-233, section 3, at 2381, Laws of Florida, added after the first sentence of section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1991), the following: For purposes of the preceding sentence, an activity undertaken by a lessee which is permitted under the terms of its lease of real property designated as an aviation area on an airport layou...

...vice fixed base operation which provides goods and services to the general aviation public in the promotion of air commerce shall be deemed an activity which serves a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function. After the last sentence of section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1991), chapter 93-233, section 3, at 2381, Laws of Florida, added: "Owned by the lessee" as used in this chapter does not include personal property, buildings, or other real property improvements used for the adm...

...ent in his initial brief. His clear contention is that, in the years in question, airport property was "not being used for governmental-governmental purpose and would be taxable." Initial Brief, p. 29. The City's answer brief cited "the amendment to Section 196.012(6)," arguing that it was a "clarifying amendment" explicating the prior, governing statutory language....

...[4] The Clause mandates that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Art. XIV, § 1, U.S. Const. [5] "`Permanent resident' means a person who has established a permanent residence as defined in subsection (18)." § 196.012(17), Fla....

...he has the intention of returning. A person may have only one permanent residence at a time; and, once a permanent residence is established in a foreign state or country, it is presumed to continue until the person shows that a change has occurred." § 196.012(18), Fla....

...ons, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities, and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6). Section 196.012(6) defines public purpose or function as follows: (6) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United Stat...

...The instant case is similar to Volusia, in which we found that "[o]perating an automobile racetrack for profit is not even arguably the performance of a `governmental-governmental' function." 341 So.2d at 502. Our finding in Volusia was premised on Williams, which limits the exemptions in sections 196.012(6) and 196.199(2)(a) to governmental-governmental functions: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) [now 196.012(6)] and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...A governmental-proprietary function occurs when a nongovernmental lessee utilizes governmental property for-proprietary and for-profit aims. [1] We have no doubt that Raceway's operation of the racetrack serves the public, but such service does not fit within the definition of a public purpose as defined by section 196.012(6)....

...purposes, of the Florida Constitution, and Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), which defines exemptions applicable to municipally owned and operated properties when used to serve a governmental, municipal, or public purpose as defined in Section 196.012(5)....

...Specifically, Section 196.199(2)(a) provides: *523 (a) Leasehold interests in property of ... municipalities ... shall be exempted from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in Section 196.012(6). Under the definitional provisions of Section 196.012(6), a municipal or public purpose is defined to include either a function which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds....

...Their applications for such status, however, were pending. In their summary judgment motion, the Homeowners asserted that they had satisfied all the requirements of section 196.015, Florida Statutes (2002). Their supporting affidavits stated that they met all the requirements of section 196.012 to prove that they were "permanent residents." The property appraiser offered no opposing affidavits....

...The Florida Constitution affords a homestead exemption to every person who has legal or equitable title to real estate on which he or she maintains a permanent residence. Art. VII, § 6(a), Fla. Const. (1968). The implementing statutes provide, in relevant part, as follows: 196.012 Definitions....

...The form used to apply for the homestead exemption is not inconsistent: The forms shall require the taxpayer to furnish certain information to the property appraiser for the purpose of determining that the taxpayer is a permanent resident as defined in s. 196.012(17)....

...ty for ad valorem taxation"); § 193.011, Fla. Stat. (1991) (effectuating the constitutional provision by specifying eight factors to be considered in deriving just valuation of property). In Turner, the taxpayer had claimed an exemption pursuant to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997), [2] for that part of the property which served as a sports facility with permanent seating....

...Appellants urge (1) that an exemption exists under Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), because International holds a leasehold granted by an agency or public body corporate of the state and "serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function" as defined by Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975); (2) that Chapter 73-647, Laws of Florida, unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of a contract of the State of Florida, in violation of Article I, Section 10, United States Constitution, by repealing th...

...ption on the alternative statutory ground which is the source of appellants' claims here that International has been "demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Section 196.012(5), Fla....

this case. One of these is now contained in Section 196.12, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., having been originally

...This appeal concerns a dispute over the 1997 ad valorem tax status of property owned by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, leased to the Tampa Sports Authority and licensed to the New York Yankees for use as a baseball facility. At issue is the application of section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997), which authorizes a governmental tax exemption to certain sports facilities with permanent seating....

...ursuant to section 194.011(3), Florida Statutes (1997), seeking to overturn Turner's assessment. The VAB ruled in favor of the Aviation Authority and reduced the assessment to approximately one million dollars based on its decision that, pursuant to section 196.012(6), the portion of the property on which the baseball diamonds and public seating were located qualified for tax exemption as a "sports facility with permanent seating." The VAB adjusted the assessment accordingly, and the tax rolls were recertified reflecting the adjusted assessment on March 11, 1998....

...On appeal, Turner first argues that his suit is not a challenge to the constitutionality of the "assessment of any tax," and therefore, the joinder of DOR is not required. In response, the Appellees contend that Turner's suit is, in fact, a challenge to the constitutionality of the sports facility exemption in section 196.012(6) and that Turner, as an elected official who is sworn to uphold and enforce the laws, lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the tax-exemption statute....

...The last exception Turner asserts is that the constitutionality of a statute can be raised defensively by a public official. In his brief, Turner argues that if this court reinstates his complaint and if the Aviation Authority asserts the sports facilities provision of section 196.012(6), or any other questionable statute, he may defensively raise the constitutionality of the statute....

...as follows. The portion of the property which contains the baseball diamonds and permanent seating and for which access is open to the general public clearly meets the criteria for the "sports facility with permanent seating" exemption authorized by section 196.012(6)....

...find the VAB violated the State Constitution by granting the exemption. The only way a court can determine that the VAB decision violates the constitution is to find that the exemption is unconstitutional. The property at issue meets the criteria of section 196.012(6), in which the legislature deemed certain uses of property by certain lessees to be governmental uses....

...And, as we stated earlier, this express prohibition leads us to conclude that the "public funds" exception does not apply to appeals of a VAB decision initiated by a property appraiser. Conclusion Turner's suit is a challenge to the constitutional validity of section 196.012(6), and therefore, is expressly prohibited by section 194.036(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...3d DCA 1998)(en banc), appeal filed, No. 96,182 (Fla. Aug. 4, 1999), and certify the conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida. Affirmed. THREADGILL, A.C.J., and JACOBSEN, DONALD G., ASSOCIATE JUDGE, Concur. NOTES [1] On September 11, 1998, this court held unconstitutional the portion of section 196.012(6) exempting sports facilities with permanent seating....

...Levy of The Levy Law Firm, Tallahassee, for Appellee C. Raymond McIntyre. QUINCE, Judge. The Sebring Airport Authority (the airport authority), Sebring International Raceway, Inc. (the raceway) and the Department of Revenue (the department) challenge an order of the trial court declaring section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), unconstitutional....

...We affirmed the trial court's denial of an exemption and the supreme court agreed. See Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 623 So.2d 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), aff'd, 642 So.2d 1072 (Fla.1994). The use of the property has not changed since the prior litigation. The statutory provision, section 196.012(6), under which the raceway now claims an exemption was amended in 1994 and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The use by a lessee, licensee, or management company of real property or a portion thereof as a convention center, vi...

...is deemed a use that serves a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function when access to the property is open to the general public with or without a charge for admission. There is no doubt that the raceway falls within this provision of section 196.012(6)....

...[2] However, there is nothing in article VII, section 3 that allows the legislature to exempt from ad valorem taxation municipally owned property or any other property that is being used primarily for a proprietary purpose or for any purpose other than a governmental, municipal or public purpose. To the extent that section 196.012(6) attempts to exempt from taxation municipal property used for a proprietary purpose, the statute is unconstitutional....

...aytona Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...atutes (1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or., which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The operation of the Sebring International Raceway is a for-profit, proprietary activity despite the legislature's attempt to blur the distinctions between proprietary and municipal purposes. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's ruling that the 1994 amendment to section 196.012(6), is unconstitutional....

...gy provision and historic preservation provisions. None of these provisions are applicable to the facts of this case. [3] We also agree with the trial court that the property involved in this litigation falls squarely within the quoted provisions of section 196.012(6), and this case cannot be resolved without determining the constitutionality of the statutory provision....

...nal, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Dobbs Houses, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Bonanni Exports, Inc., a Florida corporation, and each of them, have been performing *285 a governmental and public purpose or function, as those terms are defined in Section 196.012(5) of the Florida Statutes, in the operation of their respective businesses conducted in and upon various spaces leased to them by the Plaintiff, Hillsborough County Aviation Authority in the Terminal Building at the Tampa Internation...

...ons, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities, and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(5)....

...which are used predominantly for a private, commercial purpose and serve no governmental, municipal, or public purpose. The "governmental, municipal, or public purpose," necessary to qualify for the exemption in section 196.199(2)(a), is defined in section 196.012(5), which provides: (5) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state or any of its po...

...shall be deemed to perform an essential national governmental purpose and shall be exempt. In Williams, we were faced with the question of whether commercial leaseholders of county-owned Santa Rosa Island were entitled to the exemptions in sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)....

...The commercial leaseholders, operating such diverse enterprises as barber shops, plumbing businesses, laundries, and restaurants, argued that the operation of their businesses constituted a governmental or public purpose or function, and thus their leaseholds were exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 196.012(5). We rejected this argument and held that the exemptions contemplated by sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions and, quoting from our decision in Straughn v....

...Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District, 341 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1976), wherein we held that the Daytona International Speedway, which was operated by a private corporation under a lease from a public body, was not entitled to exemption under sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) because the operation of an automobile racetrack was not the performance of a "governmental-governmental" function....

...utes (1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or ... which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...ource that determines *287 whether it is taxable under the Constitution." Straughn v. Camp, supra, at 695. 341 So.2d at 502. Similarly, in Markham v. Maccabee Investments, Inc., 343 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1977), we refused to apply the exemption of sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) to a private, profit-making corporation utilizing a government leasehold. The Fourth District in Markham had held that a private party's leasehold interest in a municipally-owned facility used primarily for theater productions was tax exempt because the use of the facility served a public purpose under section 196.012(5)....

...Review in the circuit court shall be either by a trial de novo, which shall be governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, or by petition for writ of certiorari, which shall be governed by the Florida Appellate Rules. The election of remedies shall lie with the appellant. [2] § 196.012(13), Fla....

owner or the property owner’s dependents. Section 196.012(18), Florida Statutes (2006), defines “permanent

...nt resident of this state and *1038 thus cannot place residence owned in state beyond reach of creditors under homestead exemption from forced sale). Appellants are thus ineligible for a homestead exemption from ad valorem taxes. Affirmed. NOTES [1] Section 196.012(16), (17), Florida Statutes (1981) provides: (16) "Permanent resident" means a person who has established a permanent residence as defined in subsection (17)....

...vate medical practices for professional compensation and profit. Such a use of real property is not a charitable use or purpose within the meaning of Article 7, Section 3(a), Florida Constitution of 1968, nor is it a charitable purpose as defined in Section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes....

...ited States, of the state or any of its several political subdivisions, or of municipalities ... shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in Section 196.012(6)....

...1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or . . [sic] which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Thompson, 101 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1958)." Williams v. Jones, supra, at 435. Mr. Justice Sundberg, writing for the Court in Williams v. Jones, supra , delineated the scope of the exemption at issue here in the following words: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

..., or of municipalities, agencies, authorities and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs *124 a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012(5). In all such cases, all other interests in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem taxation." The pertinent portion of Section 196.012(5), F.S.A....

...Answers were filed, after which appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the lower court granted final summary judgment in favor of appellees, ruling that the relevant property was exempt. The lower court, basing its ruling upon section 196.192, Florida Statutes (1981) [1] and section 196.012(1), Florida Statutes (1981), [2] held that property which is used exclusively for educational purposes need not be titled in the name of the educational institution in order to be exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 196.192, Florida Statutes....

...urposes, controls and therefore a concurrence of educational use and ownership of the property by the institution is required for the exemption to apply. Appellants urge that, moreover, when section 196.198 is read together with sections 196.192 and 196.012(4), [4] the clear meaning of the total statutory enactment is that an educational institution must also be the holder of the legal title in order for the exemption to apply....

...AFFIRMED. SCHEB and RYDER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 196.192, Fla. Stat., provides in pertinent part: Exemptions from ad valorem taxation. — (1) All property used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation. [2] Section 196.012(1), Fla....

...[3] Section 196.198, Fla. Stat., provides in pertinent part: Educational property; exemptions. — Educational institutions within this state and their property used exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (Emphasis added.) [4] Section 196.012, Definitions....

...In pertinent part it reads: Every person who, on January 1, has the legal title or beneficial title in equity to real property in this state and who resides thereon and in good faith makes the same his or her permanent residence ... is entitled to an exemption ... Section 196.012(17) and (18), Florida Statutes, define the terms "permanent resident" and "permanent residence" in pertinent parts, as follows: (17) "Permanent resident" means a person who has established a permanent residence as defined in subsection (18)....

...mprovement District v. McIntyre , to like effect. 800 So.2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). See also Turner v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 739 So.2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (finding property appraiser lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of section 196.012)....

...Florida Constitution does not require the taxation of leasehold interests conferred by governmental agencies, [1] and that the taxability or exemption of such interests is determined by sequential reference to sections 196.001(2), 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(5), Florida Statutes....

...The disposition of this case which I would approve does not require a ruling on this question or on the other points of law raised on appeal. [2] Section 196.001(2), Fla. Stat., enacted as section 16 of chapter 71-133, Laws of Florida. [3] Sections 196.199(2) (a) and 196.012(5), Fla....

...pose in which each lease falls." (emphasis added). See also Gamma Phi Chapter of Sigma Chi Bldg. Fund Corp. v. Dade County, 199 So.2d 717, 718 (Fla. 1967) ("the question of whether or not property in a given case is exempt becomes one of fact.") [5] Section 196.012(5), Fla....

...The trial court listed as one of twelve "findings of fact", in a part of its order distinct from its four "conclusions of law", that Hertz' use of the Outside and the Remote Facilities "does not serve or perform a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function, as defined in Florida Statutes Chapter 196.012(5)." [6] "No authority needs to be cited for the proposition that this court is not entitled to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact......

Kooman, Florida Chancery Pleading and Practice § 196; 12 Fla.Jur., Equity § 78; and cases cited. However

...In reaching that conclusion, the trial court relied on our opinion in Gainesville I. There, we affirmed the trial court's determination that section 2 of chapter 97-197, Laws of Florida, which created section 166.047, Florida Statutes, [1] and a portion of section 3 of chapter 97-197, which amended section 196.012, Florida Statutes, to provide that a municipality's provision of two-way telecommunications services to the public is not an exempt use for ad valorem tax purposes unless the services comply with certain conditions, were facially unconstitutional because they contravened article VII, section 3(a)....

...ons, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities, and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(5) ... (emphasis supplied) A governmental, municipal or public purpose or function is defined in Section 196.012(5) as follows: (5) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state or any of its politic...

...development of water borne commerce in the port of Jacksonville. Therefore, since a governmental, municipal or public purpose is performed when the lessee carries out a function which could properly be performed by the appropriate governmental unit, Section 196.012(5), its use of the land complies with the statutory definition and its leasehold interest is exempt....

..., tourist camps, etc. The commercial lessees contended, as does the taxpayer here, that the operation of their facilities constituted a governmental, public purpose or function and that the leaseholds were exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to Section 196.012(5)....

...na Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for *38 such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "Governmental-proprietary" functions....

...munications services, because the statute contravened Article VII, Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution. For the same reason, the trial court also declared facially invalid a portion of section 3 of chapter 97-197, Laws of Florida, which amended section 196.012, Definitions, Florida Statutes, to provide that a municipality's provision of *597 two-way telecommunications services to the public does not constitute an exempt use for ad valorem tax purposes unless the services complied with certain conditions therein specified....

...jurisdiction in which the municipality or other entity of local government operates. Any entity of local government may pay and impose such ad valorem taxes or fees. . . . (emphasis supplied). In section 3 of chapter 97-197, the legislature amended section 196.012(6), *598 which sets out definitions for governmental, municipal, or public purposes or functions, by adding the following language: Providing two-way telecommunications services to the public for hire by the use of a telecommunications facility, as defined in s....

...n, by requiring the property of municipalities to share also in the tax burden, whether or not leased by them to commercial establishments or operated by the cities themselves. In seeking a declaration below that section 166.047 and the amendment to section 196.012(6) facially conflict with Article VII, section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution, the City took the position that all of its telecommunications property is absolutely exempt from ad valorem taxation, because the constitutional exemptio...

...overnmental *605 purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." § 196.012(5), Fla....

...lenging assessment of their leaseholds for ad valorem tax purposes, contending that their property was exempt from ad valorem taxation because the operation of such facilities constituted a governmental, public purpose or function exempt pursuant to section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes....

...aytona Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...lid municipal purpose under the constitution. [6] In addition, telecommunication services were specifically included in the public service tax assessed by municipalities. See Ch. 98-277, Laws of Fla. [7] This provision now appears in subsection (6). § 196.012(6), Fla....

...nk was exempt from ad valorem taxation based on its use for educational purposes. Our decision as to the issue of whether the trial court correctly found that the property qualified for an ad valorem tax educational use exemption under Sections *326 196.012(1) and 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1985), depends upon an analysis of whether, under these particular facts, the property can be said to have been in "actual use" for educational purposes on the assessment date....

...We recognize that an argument can be made that neither the Lake Worth Towers, Inc. case nor the Dade County Taxing Authorities case should control our decision. The Lake Worth Towers, Inc. case did not construe the educational use exemption derived from Sections 196.012(1) and 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and these sections, which apply to the present case, do not require that a particular qualifying type of institution be in existence or operating as of January 1 of the taxable year for the property to be exempt....

...RT ORGANIZATION AND, ON THE ASSESSMENT DATE, IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING REMODELED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE BY THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, DOES THE PROPERTY QUALIFY AS BEING IN "ACTUAL USE" FOR PURPOSES OF ACQUIRING THE EDUCATIONAL TAX EXEMPTION UNDER SECTIONS 196.012(1) AND 196.192(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985)? Reversed....

...Furthermore, we agree with the County's contention that the property does not qualify for an exemption under Sections 243.33 or 196.198, Florida Statutes (1985), because the Foundation does not fall within the definition of an educational institution. We note that our conclusion here would also be different under the revised Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...sions, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012(5). In all such cases, all other interests in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem taxation." (Emphasis supplied) and Fla. Stat. § 196.012(5) which in pertinent part provides: "(5) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interests created in property of the United States, the state or...

...and municipal purposes of the park and serve purposes which could otherwise be properly accomplished through use of municipal funds. The appellee argues the lands it seeks to tax are not governmental within the purview of Fla. Stat. §§ 196.199 and 196.012(5)....

...sions, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012(5). In all such cases, all other interests in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem taxation." (Emphasis added.) The public purpose or function hereinabove mentioned is defined in sec. 196.012(5) as follows: "(5) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state or any of its political subd...

...d used principally for legitimate theatre productions and other productions of the performing arts for the entertainment and cultural instruction of residents of the City serves a municipal or public purpose or function within the definition of sec. 196.012(5) and within the meaning of Art....

...Accordingly, we affirm. To qualify for an economic development ad valorem tax exemption, section 196.1995(8)(d) requires proof to the satisfaction of the Board that the applicant is "a new business or an expansion of an existing business, as defined in s. 196.012(15) or (16)." Gulf Power intends to expand its existing business. Section 196.012(16)(a)1 defines "Expansion of an existing business": A business establishing 10 or more jobs to employ 10 or more full-time employees in this state, which manufactures, processes, compounds, fabricates, or produces for sale items of t...

...145, 822 P.2d 498, 502 (Ct.App.1991)(electricity is tangible personal property). Gulf Power contends, and the trial court ruled: The definition of "tangible personal property" in section 192.001(11)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), cannot apply to the use of that term in section 196.012(16)(a)(1), because the latter statute refers to tangible personal property produced for sale, i.e., inventory, and the former statute explicitly excludes items of inventory from its definition of tangible personal property....

...urchased and sold electricity); City of Ames v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 246 Iowa 1016, 71 N.W.2d 15, 22 *301 (1955)(generating electricity is manufacturing). Accordingly, we hold that for purposes of section 196.1995, Florida Statutes (1999), and section 196.012(16) referenced therein, electricity is tangible personal property and the generation of electricity in Gulf Power's plant is a manufacturing process in a manufacturing plant....

...§ 196.192(2), Fla. Stat. (1989). "`Exempt use of property' or `use of property for exempt purposes' means predominant or exclusive use of property owned by an exempt entity for education, literary, scientific, religious, charitable, or governmental purposes ..." § 196.012(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). (Emphasis added). Whether PHAI is exempted from ad valorem taxation thus turns on whether Montclair Village is operated for a "charitable purpose," as defined in section 196.012(7), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...to provide low income housing to indigent farm workers. The discontinuance of PHAI's services could legally result in the allocation of public funds to provide such housing. We hold therefore that PHAI operates for a charitable purpose as defined by section 196.012(7)....

...He contends that the lessee, Graham, does not serve or perform a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, *85 and that the property is not entitled to an exemption for any other reason. The city, on the other hand, contends that under section 196.199(2) and section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1989), the use of the land by Graham for the leasing of docks to the general public is a municipal park and recreational purpose and clearly a governmental function....

...Property owned by municipalities but leased to nongovernmental lessees is only exempt from taxation under certain conditions. § 196.199(2). Such property is exempt from ad valorem taxes if the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in section 196.012(6)....

...literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to consider if Graham serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function under section 196.199(2)(a). We find that he does not. Section 196.012(6) provides that a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function is served or performed when a lessee performs a function or serves a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governme...

...McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)); see also Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d 1260, 1265 (Fla.2008). Appellants argue they are exempt from intangible personal property tax under sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(6), Florida Statutes, which exempt nongovernmental lessees on government-owned real property who serve "a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function." They maintain that the legislature exempted them from intangible taxation in 1993 when it amended section 196.012(6) to expressly designate FBOs as being exempt from taxation....

...the state or any of its several political subdivisions, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities, and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6)....

...In sum, the appellant companies operate fixed-base operations on government-owned airport properties which serve a governmental, municipal or public purpose. While their leasehold interests are exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(6), [6] the Department's assessment of intangible taxes was proper under the plain language of section 199.023(1)(d). We, therefore, affirm. Affirmed. HAZOURI and CIKLIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The appellant companies do not contest on appeal the dollar amounts of the Department's respective assessments. [2] In 1993, section 196.012(6) was amended and the following language was added to include FBO exemptions, as follows: (6) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold intere...

...4th DCA 2003) (holding that hangars of Boca Airport, Inc. (one of the appellant companies here) were exempt from ad valorem taxation because they perform a governmental, municipal and public purpose under section 196.199(2)(a), and constituted an aviation facility specifically exempted by section 196.012(6)); see also Nolte v. Paris Air, Inc., 975 So.2d 627, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing § 196.012(6), Fla....

...ational institutions within this state and their property used exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." [4] The statute defines the "`exclusive use of property'" as "property that is used 100 percent for exempt purposes," § 196.012(2), Fla. Stat. (1987); and states that the "`exempt use of property'" is defined as "predominant or exclusive use of property for educational ... use, as defined in this chapter." § 196.012(1), Fla....

...In 1991, the School sold its ten-acre parcel to the Department of Natural Resources. The Department purchased the property pursuant to a project which acquires and preserves environmentally endangered property. [2] The appraiser concedes that the School is an educational institution as defined by section 196.012(4), Florida Statutes (1987)....

shows that a change has occurred. Fla. Stat. § 196.012(17) (2018) ; see also Fla. Stat. § 196.015 (2018)

totally exempt from ad valorem taxation.” Section 196.012(1) defines “[ejxempt use of property” or “use

one hundred percent for exempt purposes.” See § 196.012(2), Fla.Stat. *208However, we note that the 1988

...Dade County Property Appraiser, 705 So.2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the court addressed whether an applicant for political asylum qualified for a homestead exemption. The applicant, to qualify for the exemption, must have established a permanent residence. Section 196.012(18), Florida Statutes, defines "permanent residence" as "that place where a person has his or her true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment to which, whenever absent, he or she has the intention of returning." Id....

presumed to be used for commercial purposes. § 196.012(13), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). “Real

educational institution within the meaning of § 196.012(5), Florida Statutes? 2) Do the doctrines

also a “charitable purpose” as defined in section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes.4 Since this particular

implementing this constitutional provision, see § 196.012(17), Fla. Stat. (2014), we examine the text of

the exemption provided in s.196.198, F.S. Section 196.012(5), F.S. (1992 Supp.), defines "[e]ducational

educational institute within the meaning of Fla.Stat. § 196.-012(4). The property involved in this litigation

"permanent residence" are defined respectively in section 196.012 (17) and (18), Florida Statutes, as follows:

defined the words "permanent residence" in section 196.012(18), Florida Statutes, as: "that place where

taxation pursuant to F.S. 196.-*1177199(2)(a) and F.S. 196.012(5). This appeal followed. The issue to be resolved

as defined in Section 196.012(6). Under the definitional provisions of Section 196.012(6), a municipal

current wording of the statute; see Fla.Stat. § 196.012(1), F.S.A. The judgment directly appealed from

public with or without a charge for admission.” § 196.012(6), Fla. Stat. (2014). Additionally, marinas are

public with or without a charge for admission.” § 196.012(6), Fla. Stat. (2014). Additionally, marinas

the Constitution. But the term is defined in section 196.012(7), Florida Statutes (2014), as providing

Property Tax Assessor for Indian River County. See § 196.012(6), Fla. Stat. (2007). In this regard we necessarily

to be totally and permanently disabled." [Section 196.012(10), F.S. (1972 Supp.)] Thus, pursuant to the

and used by a governmental agency, and under section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1999), because this is

or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6). Section 196.012(6) defines “public purpose” as one which “could

the continuance of the function of service. [Section 196.012(6), F.S.] At the time this exemption standard

utilized for educational and charitable purposes. § 196.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). Florida Statutes do not

an “educational institution” as defined in section 196.012(5)—and we agree. Procedurally, the Academy

unenforceable after twenty years under the provisions of .§ 196.12, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. The same applies to municipal

...fect of eliminating the minimum income requirements of residents prescribed in Fla. Stat. § 196.197(1) and (2) (1971). The Assessor asserts that to be entitled to the exemption, Plymouth must also show that it meets the requirements of Fla. Stat. §§ 196.012(6) and 196.196 (1971), and that the record demonstrated a conflict of fact on these points so as to preclude a summary judgment....

...rt is had thereto, in determining whether to allow tax exemption for a home for the *632 aged or disabled after deletion of F.S. Section 196.197(1), (2), (3), F.S.A., are found in the remainder of Chapter 196 and particularly the definitions in F.S. Section 196.012, F.S.A....

...Regrettably, we have now determined that our conclusions with respect to the record in this case were more sweeping than they should have been. Our attention has been more specifically directed to the applicability of the statutory definition of charitable purpose set forth in Fla. Stat. § 196.012(6) (1971), which reads as follows: "(6) `Charitable purpose' means a function or service which is of such a community service that its discontinuance could result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or ser...

...ferences which may be drawn therefrom are conflicting. Moreover, it is evident that additional facts are available which if made known would aid in the determination of whether the Plymouth Harbor property serves the function specified by Fla. Stat. § 196.012(6)....

...of appellee's claim for charitable exemption for the tax years 1979, 1980 and 1981. We dispose of the cross-appeal first. Appellee/cross-appellant attacked the denial of its claimed charitable exemptions on the basis of a constitutional challenge to section 196.012(6) and section 196.1975, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Canterbury Tower." What occurs is that the resident receives a "license" to occupy a residential unit during the remainder of his life. The medical/nursing facility of appellee has been granted a charitable exemption from taxes pursuant to sections 196.012 and 196.1975....

*1326196.101(1) or (2). That word is defined in section 196.012(4) as follows: “Use” means the exercise of

“educational institution” as defined in F.S. § 196.-012(4) [, F.S.A.]), which residence is-not on the

or public purpose or function as defined in Section 196.012(5), regardless of the length of the lease,

entity by providing, as emphasized below, in section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1994 Supplement), "(6)

operated for a “charitable purpose” as defined in section 196.012(7), Florida Statutes (1989). We stated therein:

...rem taxation to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the nonexempt use. An "exempt" use of property is defined as "educational, literary, scientific, religious, charitable, or governmental purposes, as defined in this chapter." § 196.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). "Exclusive use" is defined as "use of property solely for exempt purposes. Such purposes may include more than one class of exempt use." § 196.012(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). "Predominant use" is defined as "use of property for exempt purposes in excess of 50 percent but less than exclusive." § 196.012(3), Fla....

disability within the meaning of s. 196.202, supra. Section 196.012(10), F.S., provides that, as used in Ch.196

exemption under ss. 196.202 and196.031(3)(b), F.S. Section 196.012(10), F.S. 1971, as amended by Ch. 72-367, Laws

...llowing two separate and independent scenarios: *520 1. Where the owner of the property is a permanent resident on the property, or 2. Where someone legally or naturally dependent on the owner is a permanent resident on the subject property. See id. Section 196.012, Florida Statutes (2006), defines "permanent residence" for purposes of this provision as follows: (18) "Permanent residence" means that place where a person has his or her true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment to which, whenever absent, he or she has the intention of returning....

this state shall be exempt from taxation. Section 196.012(10), F. S., provides that, as used in Ch. 196

before a special magistrate, who held that section 196.012(5), which defines “educational institution”

he or she has the intention of returning.” § 196.012(17), Fla. Stat. (2014). Our

subject for the allocation of public funds. § 196.012(6), Fla. Stat. (2014). Under this statute, airports