Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...3d DCA 1998)( Fuchs II ) [8] as to whether a property appraiser could offensively assert the unconstitutionality of a statute. In Turner, the property appraiser for Hillsborough County assessed value to a Tampa sports facility, notwithstanding the fact that the facility was exempt from property taxes under section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997). The taxpayer appealed to the Value Adjustment Board, which reduced the property appraiser's assessment. The property appraiser appealed the board's decision to the circuit court and argued that section 196.012 was unconstitutional....

...In addition to the constitutional points raised, such commercial taxpayers assert that the operation of their facilities constitutes a governmental or public purpose or function and, accordingly, such leaseholds are exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes....

...orem real property tax upon them consistent with the tax imposed upon persons who make similar uses of property. The proposition put forth by the appellants with respect to leaseholders of commercial property to the effect that they are exempt under Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes, as performing a public purpose has, we believe, been aptly disposed of in Straughn v....

...aytona Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) (a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...Having established that the Legislature has the power constitutionally to tax the leasehold interests in question as real property, we turn to the question of whether or not it has done so. Appellants submit that even if such leasehold interests are not exempt under Sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(5), Florida Statutes, that the tax imposed by Section 196.001(2), Florida Statutes, is merely an ad valorem intangible personal property tax because none of the statutory provisions relied upon by the appellees expressly state that the leasehold estates in question are to be taxed "as an interest in real property"....

...y private purpose. In the Walden case, supra, the lessee asserted that it performed a public purpose or function and should thereby enjoy an exemption from taxation upon the same principle as the appellants here contend that they are exempt under Subsection 196.012(5), Florida Statutes....

...orida Statutes, effectively removes from the exemption afforded property owned and used by the designated governmental units all leasehold interests which do not serve or perform a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function as defined in Section 196.012(5), regardless of the length of the lease, it must be concluded that Subsection (6) dealing with 99-year leases was intended by the Legislature to provide a standard for valuation....

...the municipality's payment of ad valorem *254 taxes, and specified that payment of the taxes is necessary for the facility to serve a public purpose under the municipal powers clause of the Constitution. [2] In the same act, the Legislature amended section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1995), to exclude the telecommunications services authorized in section 166.047 from the statutory ad valorem tax exemption for municipally owned property "used for governmental, municipal or public purposes" contained in section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995). See ch. 97-197, § 3, Laws of Fla. [3] The pertinent portion of section 196.012(6), as amended, specifies that "[p]roviding two-way telecommunications services to the public for hire by the use of a telecommunications facility, as defined in s. 364.02(13), and for which a certificate is required under chapter 364 does not constitute an exempt use for purposes of s. 196.199," with exceptions inapplicable here. § 196.012(6), Fla. Stat. (1997). The amended provisions operate in tandem. Section 166.047(3) invokes the municipal powers provision of the state constitution to mandate ad valorem taxation, and the amendment to section 196.012(6) disqualifies municipally owned and operated telecommunications facilities from a statutory ad valorem tax exemption for municipal property....

...he property as a condition of operation is unconstitutional on its face. The term "municipal or public purposes" is not defined in article VII, section 3(a). Although "governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function" is statutorily defined in section 196.012(6), Florida *257 Statutes (2004), [6] which also concerns tax exemptions for governmentally owned property, "[a] reading of section 3(a) of article VII clearly establishes that it is a self-executing provision and therefore does not require statutory implementation." City of Sarasota v. Mikos, 374 So.2d 458, 460 (Fla.1979). Therefore, the statutory definition does not control the construction of the term "municipal or public purposes" in the constitutional provision. In addition, the statutory definition in section 196.012(6) applies only to property leased from governmental entities....

...irport Auth. v. McIntyre, 783 So.2d 238, 246-48 (Fla.2001) (quoting Roberts, supra, at 1092). In Sebring Airport Authority we applied this standard, known as the "governmental-governmental" test, to invalidate a statutory tax exemption granted under section 196.012(6) for profitmaking endeavors such as convention and visitor centers, sports facilities, concert halls, arenas and stadiums....

...t *266 from ad valorem taxation under article VII, section 3(a). III. CONCLUSION For the reasons we have stated, we hold that section 166.047(3), Florida Statutes (1997), as enacted in chapter 97-197, section 2, Laws of Florida, and the amendment to section 196.012(6) contained in section 3 of the same act are not unconstitutional on their face....

...Its complaint challenging taxation on these facilities was dismissed on procedural grounds. See Crapo v. City of Gainesville, 855 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), review denied, 895 So.2d 404 (Fla.2005). [5] See art. VII, § 4(a)-(e), Fla. Const. [6] The statutory tax exemption in section 196.012(6) is as follows: Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state or any of its politica...

...We have jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to Article V, § 3(b)(1), Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. and Rule 2.1, subd. a(5)(a), F.A.R., 32 F.S.A., because the Circuit Court held Section 14 of Chapter 71-133, Laws of Florida 1971, and provisions of said Chapter brought forward as Sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(5), Florida Statutes 1971, F.S.A....

..., or of municipalities, agencies, authorities and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal or public *694 purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012(5)...." Fla. Stat. § 196.012(5) (1971), F.S.A., which is also a new section, defines public purpose as follows: "Governmental, municipal or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in pro...

...1965) 179 So.2d 349, text 355. The Legislature also has the power to provide for the taxing of private leaseholds previously exempt as it has done in Chapter 71-133. The pertinent provisions of Chapter 71-133 so providing now appear as Sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(5), F.S. 1971, F.S.A. See application of the holding of Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Walden (Fla. 1968) 210 So.2d 193, to Section 192.62, F.S., F.S.A., a predecessor statute to Sections 196.199(2) (a) and 196.012(5)....

...ivilege." (Emphasis supplied.) I would therefore hold that, based upon the declaration of the Legislature and our holding in State v. Escambia County, supra , the development of Santa Rosa Island constitutes a public purpose as defined by Fla. Stat. § 196.012(5) (1971), F.S.A., and is therefore exempt under Fla....

...utes (1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or . . which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Thompson, 101 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1958)." Williams v. Jones, supra, at 435. Mr. Justice Sundberg, writing for the Court in Williams v. Jones, supra , delineated the scope of the exemption at issue here in the following words: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...rida Constitution, which provides in part: Such portions of property as are used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation. A "charitable purpose" is defined in section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1981), as follows: "Charitable purpose" means a function or service which is of such a community service that its discontinuance could legally result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or service....

...er, in Chapter 196 it prescribed valid specifics for exemption in keeping with the constitutional limitation of predominate use which separately and independently stand apart from *560 the too restrictive "income test" provisions of the Act. In F.S. Section 196.012(1), F.S.A. 1971 definitions, the general nature of "`exempt use of property'" is declared to mean "predominant or exclusive use of property for ... religious, charitable ... use, as defined in this chapter." Subsection (3) of Section 196.012 states: "`Predominant use of property' means property used for exempt purposes in excess of fifty percent (50%) but less than exclusive" Subsection (6) of the same section states: "`Charitable purpose' means a function or service whic...

...The tests to be applied by taxing authorities and by the courts, if resort is had thereto, in determining whether to allow tax exemption for a home for the aged or disabled after deletion of F.S. Section 196.197(1), (2), (3), F.S.A., are found in the remainder of Chapter 196 and particularly the definitions in F.S. Section 196.012, F.S.A....

...Together, sections 196.001, 196.199(2), and 196.199(4) require ad valorem taxation of fee interests in property owned by an authority and subject to a lease by a nongovernmental lessee unless the lessee is serving a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function as defined in section 196.012(6) or uses the property exclusively for a literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purpose....

...IX of the 1885 Constitution (text 416). In point of law, no court has authority to grant a tax exemption in the absence of an authorizing statute or constitutional provision. 2. Neither Section 196.25(2)(c), F.S. 1969, nor the successor statutes, Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), (3), F.S....

...1957). [6] State v. Dade County, 157 Fla. 859, 27 So.2d 283 (1946). [7] This legislative declaration has been judicially approved by this Court. State v. Okaloosa County Airport and Industrial Authority, 168 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1964). Also see Fla. Stat. § 196.012(5) for definition of "public purpose," effective December 31, 1971....

...Shepherd, Tampa, FL, for Rob Turner, Hillsborough County Property Appraiser, Amicus Curiae. LEWIS, J. We have on appeal the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 718 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (" Sebring III "), which declared a portion of section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), to be unconstitutional....

...That section provided, in pertinent part, that "[p]roperty owned by the following governmental units but used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation ... when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6)." Section 196.012(6), in turn, provided: (6) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state or any of its...

...mental lessee utilizes governmental property for-proprietary and for-profit aims. [2] We have no doubt that Raceway's operation of the racetrack serves the public, but such service does not fit within the definition of a public purpose as defined by section 196.012(6)....

...1st DCA 1992), to the extent that it may be read to grant ad valorem tax exemption to a nongovernmental lessee of governmental property that uses such property for governmental-proprietary purposes." Id. at 1074. Following the outcome in Sebring II, the Legislature amended section 196.012(6)("the 1994 amendment")....

...aytona Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...se cited as being inconsistent with the amendment have either been approved or affirmed. [17] *252 Nonetheless, Raceway urges that the Legislature "used the normal and ordinary meaning of the constitutional term `public purposes' when it included in § 196.012(6) the types of for-profit-operated facilities which are recognized ......

...e of government," citing Black's Law Dictionary 1219 (6th ed.1990). Sebring II, 642 So.2d at 1074 n. 1. [3] The Second District agreed "with the trial court that the property involved in this litigation falls squarely within the quoted provisions of section 196.012(6), and this case cannot be resolved without determining the constitutionality of the statutory provision." 718 So.2d at 298 n....

...[8] "Immunity and exemption differ in that immunity connotes an absence of the power to tax while exemption presupposes the existence of that power." Canaveral Port Authority v. Department of Revenue, 690 So.2d 1226, 1234 n. 7 (Fla.1996). [9] These statutory provisions are still included in sections 196.199 and 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...rts have generally relied on the statutory definition of public purpose as identified in Williams v. Jones, 326 So.2d 425 (Fla.1975), a case addressing leasehold interests in Santa Rosa Island. The court found that the "exemptions contemplated under s. 196.012(5) and s....

...995), provided at all pertinent times: Leasehold interests in property of ... municipalities,... shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6). In all such cases, all other interests in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem taxation. One law [2] subsequently amending section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes, specifically made the amendment "appl[icable] to the 1994 and subsequent tax rolls." Ch. 94-353, § 59, at 2566, Laws of Fla. Since the present dispute has to do with tax rolls prepared before 1994, this amendment to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes, does not purport to control....

...Department of Revenue, 690 So.2d 1226, 1229-30 (Fla.1996) (holding that "the fee interest in the property at issue is not exempt from ad valorem taxation because the property is leased to a nongovernmental entity for a nongovernmental use"); Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So.2d 448, 452 (Fla.1993). Section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1991), provided: Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state o...

...ERVIN, J., specially concurs. DAVIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. ERVIN, Judge, specially concurring. I concur with Judge Benton's decision to affirm in part and reverse in part, and I write only to address the applicability of the 1993 amendment to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), in relation to the tax exemption claimed for the airport property during the years 1990, 1992 and 1993. Section 196.012(6) provides a definition of "governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function" within the context of leasehold interests....

...ommerce shall be deemed an activity which serves a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function. (Emphasis added.) The trial court held that the airport was exempt from ad valorem taxation and noted the "clarifying language" of the amended section 196.012(6), but it emphasized that it was not retroactively applying a new exemption to the earlier tax years in question....

...in the record, however, showing that the airport language was enacted to address any controversy over the interpretation of governmental versus proprietary functions in relation to leasehold interests. Indeed, the governmental-function definition of section 196.012(6) has existed for 27 years, since 1971....

...The beach property is also exempt from ad valorem taxation, as stated by the majority, because the leasehold did not even exist on tax assessment day. Furthermore, I would affirm the trial court's judgment that the use of the beach, public restroom, and concession stand serve a governmental-governmental purpose pursuant to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...nongovernmental lessees when the property was being utilized for a valid public purpose. It is not necessary for a marina to partake of an "aspect of sovereignty" in order to constitute a valid public purpose as defined in sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(6). As stated in Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture, [u]nder the definitional provisions of Section 196.012(6), a municipal or public purpose is defined to include either a function "which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds....

...erest. Pursuant to section 196.199(2)(a), (nongovernmental) leasehold interests in municipal property are exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in section 196.012(6)....

...of an aircraft full service fixed base operation which provides goods and services to the general aviation public in the promotion of air commerce shall be deemed an activity which serves a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function .... § 196.012(6), Fla....

...Appellants were obligated to raise this issue on appeal because the Final Judgment explicitly construed the "added [amendment] language— not as a new exemption created in 1993—but rather as a mere clarification of an exemption that existed since Florida Statute § 196.012(6) (defining public use) was originally created in 1971." If the trial court's construction of the statute, i.e., that the amendment did not create a new exemption but merely clarified existing law, was in error, then it behooved appellants to frame such error as an issue on appeal. The issue is not whether the property appraiser relied upon the new amendment; the issue should have been whether the trial court properly applied section 196.012(6) (and seemingly the "clarifying language" of the 1993 amendment) to the airport property for the tax years at issue....

...e, as amended, to the airport property. Despite the trial court's specific finding that "the activity undertaken by the airport lessees is deemed to be an activity which serves a governmental-governmental public purpose as defined by Florida Statute § 196.012(6)," appellants failed to even mention section 196.012(6), its applicability to this property, or the propriety of the trial court's ruling for our review....

...Regis Paper Co. v. Hill, 198 So.2d 365, 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); Pursell v. Sumter Elec. Coop., Inc., 169 So.2d 515, 518 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964) (generally, matters raised for the first time in appellant's reply brief cannot be considered on appeal). If section 196.012(6) had not been amended or applied by the trial court below, I would agree that the airport property leases are not tax exempt....

...It would appear that following the majority's rationale, which is contrary to the property appraiser's current interpretation of the statute, [7] the statutory amendment does not exempt the airport property even for the post-1994 tax years due to their "proprietary use." I would affirm the application of section 196.012(6) and the exemption granted to the airport property by the trial court....

...e's obtaining exemptions for "[l]easehold interests in government property." At issue here is the City's own asserted exemptions for its fee interests in real property. [2] Chapter 94-353, section 59, at 2566, Laws of Florida, added the following to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1993): The use by a lessee, licensee, or management company of real property or a portion thereof as a convention center, visitor center, sports facility with permanent seating, concert hall, arena, stadium, park...

...et the property will revert back to the Federal Government, then such property shall be deemed to serve a municipal or public purpose. [3] Effective May 15, 1993, chapter 93-233, section 3, at 2381, Laws of Florida, added after the first sentence of section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1991), the following: For purposes of the preceding sentence, an activity undertaken by a lessee which is permitted under the terms of its lease of real property designated as an aviation area on an airport layou...

...vice fixed base operation which provides goods and services to the general aviation public in the promotion of air commerce shall be deemed an activity which serves a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function. After the last sentence of section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1991), chapter 93-233, section 3, at 2381, Laws of Florida, added: "Owned by the lessee" as used in this chapter does not include personal property, buildings, or other real property improvements used for the adm...

...ent in his initial brief. His clear contention is that, in the years in question, airport property was "not being used for governmental-governmental purpose and would be taxable." Initial Brief, p. 29. The City's answer brief cited "the amendment to Section 196.012(6)," arguing that it was a "clarifying amendment" explicating the prior, governing statutory language....

...[4] The Clause mandates that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Art. XIV, § 1, U.S. Const. [5] "`Permanent resident' means a person who has established a permanent residence as defined in subsection (18)." § 196.012(17), Fla....

...he has the intention of returning. A person may have only one permanent residence at a time; and, once a permanent residence is established in a foreign state or country, it is presumed to continue until the person shows that a change has occurred." § 196.012(18), Fla....

...ons, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities, and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6). Section 196.012(6) defines public purpose or function as follows: (6) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United Stat...

...The instant case is similar to Volusia, in which we found that "[o]perating an automobile racetrack for profit is not even arguably the performance of a `governmental-governmental' function." 341 So.2d at 502. Our finding in Volusia was premised on Williams, which limits the exemptions in sections 196.012(6) and 196.199(2)(a) to governmental-governmental functions: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) [now 196.012(6)] and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...A governmental-proprietary function occurs when a nongovernmental lessee utilizes governmental property for-proprietary and for-profit aims. [1] We have no doubt that Raceway's operation of the racetrack serves the public, but such service does not fit within the definition of a public purpose as defined by section 196.012(6)....

...purposes, of the Florida Constitution, and Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), which defines exemptions applicable to municipally owned and operated properties when used to serve a governmental, municipal, or public purpose as defined in Section 196.012(5)....

...Specifically, Section 196.199(2)(a) provides: *523 (a) Leasehold interests in property of ... municipalities ... shall be exempted from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in Section 196.012(6). Under the definitional provisions of Section 196.012(6), a municipal or public purpose is defined to include either a function which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds....

...Their applications for such status, however, were pending. In their summary judgment motion, the Homeowners asserted that they had satisfied all the requirements of section 196.015, Florida Statutes (2002). Their supporting affidavits stated that they met all the requirements of section 196.012 to prove that they were "permanent residents." The property appraiser offered no opposing affidavits....

...The Florida Constitution affords a homestead exemption to every person who has legal or equitable title to real estate on which he or she maintains a permanent residence. Art. VII, § 6(a), Fla. Const. (1968). The implementing statutes provide, in relevant part, as follows: 196.012 Definitions....

...The form used to apply for the homestead exemption is not inconsistent: The forms shall require the taxpayer to furnish certain information to the property appraiser for the purpose of determining that the taxpayer is a permanent resident as defined in s. 196.012(17)....

...ty for ad valorem taxation"); § 193.011, Fla. Stat. (1991) (effectuating the constitutional provision by specifying eight factors to be considered in deriving just valuation of property). In Turner, the taxpayer had claimed an exemption pursuant to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997), [2] for that part of the property which served as a sports facility with permanent seating....

...Appellants urge (1) that an exemption exists under Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), because International holds a leasehold granted by an agency or public body corporate of the state and "serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function" as defined by Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975); (2) that Chapter 73-647, Laws of Florida, unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of a contract of the State of Florida, in violation of Article I, Section 10, United States Constitution, by repealing th...

...ption on the alternative statutory ground which is the source of appellants' claims here that International has been "demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Section 196.012(5), Fla....

this case. One of these is now contained in Section 196.12, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., having been originally

...This appeal concerns a dispute over the 1997 ad valorem tax status of property owned by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, leased to the Tampa Sports Authority and licensed to the New York Yankees for use as a baseball facility. At issue is the application of section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997), which authorizes a governmental tax exemption to certain sports facilities with permanent seating....

...ursuant to section 194.011(3), Florida Statutes (1997), seeking to overturn Turner's assessment. The VAB ruled in favor of the Aviation Authority and reduced the assessment to approximately one million dollars based on its decision that, pursuant to section 196.012(6), the portion of the property on which the baseball diamonds and public seating were located qualified for tax exemption as a "sports facility with permanent seating." The VAB adjusted the assessment accordingly, and the tax rolls were recertified reflecting the adjusted assessment on March 11, 1998....

...On appeal, Turner first argues that his suit is not a challenge to the constitutionality of the "assessment of any tax," and therefore, the joinder of DOR is not required. In response, the Appellees contend that Turner's suit is, in fact, a challenge to the constitutionality of the sports facility exemption in section 196.012(6) and that Turner, as an elected official who is sworn to uphold and enforce the laws, lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the tax-exemption statute....

...The last exception Turner asserts is that the constitutionality of a statute can be raised defensively by a public official. In his brief, Turner argues that if this court reinstates his complaint and if the Aviation Authority asserts the sports facilities provision of section 196.012(6), or any other questionable statute, he may defensively raise the constitutionality of the statute....

...as follows. The portion of the property which contains the baseball diamonds and permanent seating and for which access is open to the general public clearly meets the criteria for the "sports facility with permanent seating" exemption authorized by section 196.012(6)....

...find the VAB violated the State Constitution by granting the exemption. The only way a court can determine that the VAB decision violates the constitution is to find that the exemption is unconstitutional. The property at issue meets the criteria of section 196.012(6), in which the legislature deemed certain uses of property by certain lessees to be governmental uses....

...And, as we stated earlier, this express prohibition leads us to conclude that the "public funds" exception does not apply to appeals of a VAB decision initiated by a property appraiser. Conclusion Turner's suit is a challenge to the constitutional validity of section 196.012(6), and therefore, is expressly prohibited by section 194.036(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...3d DCA 1998)(en banc), appeal filed, No. 96,182 (Fla. Aug. 4, 1999), and certify the conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida. Affirmed. THREADGILL, A.C.J., and JACOBSEN, DONALD G., ASSOCIATE JUDGE, Concur. NOTES [1] On September 11, 1998, this court held unconstitutional the portion of section 196.012(6) exempting sports facilities with permanent seating....

...Levy of The Levy Law Firm, Tallahassee, for Appellee C. Raymond McIntyre. QUINCE, Judge. The Sebring Airport Authority (the airport authority), Sebring International Raceway, Inc. (the raceway) and the Department of Revenue (the department) challenge an order of the trial court declaring section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), unconstitutional....

...We affirmed the trial court's denial of an exemption and the supreme court agreed. See Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 623 So.2d 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), aff'd, 642 So.2d 1072 (Fla.1994). The use of the property has not changed since the prior litigation. The statutory provision, section 196.012(6), under which the raceway now claims an exemption was amended in 1994 and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The use by a lessee, licensee, or management company of real property or a portion thereof as a convention center, vi...

...is deemed a use that serves a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function when access to the property is open to the general public with or without a charge for admission. There is no doubt that the raceway falls within this provision of section 196.012(6)....

...[2] However, there is nothing in article VII, section 3 that allows the legislature to exempt from ad valorem taxation municipally owned property or any other property that is being used primarily for a proprietary purpose or for any purpose other than a governmental, municipal or public purpose. To the extent that section 196.012(6) attempts to exempt from taxation municipal property used for a proprietary purpose, the statute is unconstitutional....

...aytona Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...atutes (1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or., which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The operation of the Sebring International Raceway is a for-profit, proprietary activity despite the legislature's attempt to blur the distinctions between proprietary and municipal purposes. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's ruling that the 1994 amendment to section 196.012(6), is unconstitutional....

...gy provision and historic preservation provisions. None of these provisions are applicable to the facts of this case. [3] We also agree with the trial court that the property involved in this litigation falls squarely within the quoted provisions of section 196.012(6), and this case cannot be resolved without determining the constitutionality of the statutory provision....

...nal, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Dobbs Houses, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Bonanni Exports, Inc., a Florida corporation, and each of them, have been performing *285 a governmental and public purpose or function, as those terms are defined in Section 196.012(5) of the Florida Statutes, in the operation of their respective businesses conducted in and upon various spaces leased to them by the Plaintiff, Hillsborough County Aviation Authority in the Terminal Building at the Tampa Internation...

...ons, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities, and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(5)....

...which are used predominantly for a private, commercial purpose and serve no governmental, municipal, or public purpose. The "governmental, municipal, or public purpose," necessary to qualify for the exemption in section 196.199(2)(a), is defined in section 196.012(5), which provides: (5) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state or any of its po...

...shall be deemed to perform an essential national governmental purpose and shall be exempt. In Williams, we were faced with the question of whether commercial leaseholders of county-owned Santa Rosa Island were entitled to the exemptions in sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)....

...The commercial leaseholders, operating such diverse enterprises as barber shops, plumbing businesses, laundries, and restaurants, argued that the operation of their businesses constituted a governmental or public purpose or function, and thus their leaseholds were exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 196.012(5). We rejected this argument and held that the exemptions contemplated by sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions and, quoting from our decision in Straughn v....

...Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District, 341 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1976), wherein we held that the Daytona International Speedway, which was operated by a private corporation under a lease from a public body, was not entitled to exemption under sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) because the operation of an automobile racetrack was not the performance of a "governmental-governmental" function....

...utes (1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or ... which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...ource that determines *287 whether it is taxable under the Constitution." Straughn v. Camp, supra, at 695. 341 So.2d at 502. Similarly, in Markham v. Maccabee Investments, Inc., 343 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1977), we refused to apply the exemption of sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) to a private, profit-making corporation utilizing a government leasehold. The Fourth District in Markham had held that a private party's leasehold interest in a municipally-owned facility used primarily for theater productions was tax exempt because the use of the facility served a public purpose under section 196.012(5)....

...Review in the circuit court shall be either by a trial de novo, which shall be governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, or by petition for writ of certiorari, which shall be governed by the Florida Appellate Rules. The election of remedies shall lie with the appellant. [2] § 196.012(13), Fla....

...for the constitutional tax exemption. We next turn to the appropriate legal standards to be used to determine whether a piece of property is being used as the “permanent residence” of either a property owner or the property owner’s dependents. Section 196.012(18), Florida Statutes (2006), defines “permanent residence” for ad valorem taxation purposes and states that the inquiry to be made in determining whether one’s property qualifies as a “permanent residence” is whether the pr...

...“true” permanent home of the individual: “Permanent residence” means that place where a person has his or her true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment to which, whenever absent, he or she has the intention of returning.... § 196.012(18), Fla....

...The question of fact centers upon whether the Florida property is being used and maintained as the “true” and actual permanent home of either the owner or the owner’s dependents, to be governed by the definition of permanent residence contained in section 196.012(18) and the factors set forth in section 196.015....

...This appeal was the foundation of the Third District’s opinion in Andonie . In Andonie , the Third District affirmed the circuit court’s order granting the Taxpayers’ motion for summary judgment. In its opinion, the Third District referred to the definition of “permanent residence” contained in section 196.012(18) and concluded that the Taxpayers’ affidavit, which established that the true and actual permanent residence of the minor children was on the Florida property, went uncontested and sufficiently established that the Taxpayers’ property was used as the children’s permanent residence....

...he Florida property. Moreover, regardless of the applicability of Beekman to issues of domiciliary law, the issue here is not one of domicile, but rather, one involving the meaning of "permanent residence” as used in article VII, section 6(a), and section 196.012(18), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...de Ann. r. 12D-7.014(2) (1976) nor this Court’s decision in Beekman upon which the rule is based, are controlling authority relative to the issue of constitutional interpretation before us. . The Property Appraiser argues that the last sentence of section 196.012(18) prohibits the Florida property here at issue from serving as the permanent residence of the Taxpayers' minor children. This sentence states: A person may have only one permanent residence at a time; and, once a permanent residence is established in a foreign state or country, it is presumed to continue until the person shows that a change has occurred. § 196.012(18), Fla. Stat. (2006). The Property Appraiser’s argument on this point overlooks that the term "permanent residence” in the last sentence of section 196.012(18) is not self-defining or synonymous with the concept of domicile, but rather follows the specific statutory definition whereby the phrase is limited to the "true” residential dwelling place where the individual in fact lives....

...nt resident of this state and *1038 thus cannot place residence owned in state beyond reach of creditors under homestead exemption from forced sale). Appellants are thus ineligible for a homestead exemption from ad valorem taxes. Affirmed. NOTES [1] Section 196.012(16), (17), Florida Statutes (1981) provides: (16) "Permanent resident" means a person who has established a permanent residence as defined in subsection (17)....

...vate medical practices for professional compensation and profit. Such a use of real property is not a charitable use or purpose within the meaning of Article 7, Section 3(a), Florida Constitution of 1968, nor is it a charitable purpose as defined in Section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes....

...ited States, of the state or any of its several political subdivisions, or of municipalities ... shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in Section 196.012(6)....

...1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or . . [sic] which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Thompson, 101 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1958)." Williams v. Jones, supra, at 435. Mr. Justice Sundberg, writing for the Court in Williams v. Jones, supra , delineated the scope of the exemption at issue here in the following words: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

..., or of municipalities, agencies, authorities and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs *124 a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012(5). In all such cases, all other interests in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem taxation." The pertinent portion of Section 196.012(5), F.S.A....

...Answers were filed, after which appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the lower court granted final summary judgment in favor of appellees, ruling that the relevant property was exempt. The lower court, basing its ruling upon section 196.192, Florida Statutes (1981) [1] and section 196.012(1), Florida Statutes (1981), [2] held that property which is used exclusively for educational purposes need not be titled in the name of the educational institution in order to be exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 196.192, Florida Statutes....

...urposes, controls and therefore a concurrence of educational use and ownership of the property by the institution is required for the exemption to apply. Appellants urge that, moreover, when section 196.198 is read together with sections 196.192 and 196.012(4), [4] the clear meaning of the total statutory enactment is that an educational institution must also be the holder of the legal title in order for the exemption to apply....

...AFFIRMED. SCHEB and RYDER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 196.192, Fla. Stat., provides in pertinent part: Exemptions from ad valorem taxation. — (1) All property used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation. [2] Section 196.012(1), Fla....

...[3] Section 196.198, Fla. Stat., provides in pertinent part: Educational property; exemptions. — Educational institutions within this state and their property used exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (Emphasis added.) [4] Section 196.012, Definitions....

...In pertinent part it reads: Every person who, on January 1, has the legal title or beneficial title in equity to real property in this state and who resides thereon and in good faith makes the same his or her permanent residence ... is entitled to an exemption ... Section 196.012(17) and (18), Florida Statutes, define the terms "permanent resident" and "permanent residence" in pertinent parts, as follows: (17) "Permanent resident" means a person who has established a permanent residence as defined in subsection (18)....

...mprovement District v. McIntyre , to like effect. 800 So.2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). See also Turner v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 739 So.2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (finding property appraiser lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of section 196.012)....

...Florida Constitution does not require the taxation of leasehold interests conferred by governmental agencies, [1] and that the taxability or exemption of such interests is determined by sequential reference to sections 196.001(2), 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(5), Florida Statutes....

...The disposition of this case which I would approve does not require a ruling on this question or on the other points of law raised on appeal. [2] Section 196.001(2), Fla. Stat., enacted as section 16 of chapter 71-133, Laws of Florida. [3] Sections 196.199(2) (a) and 196.012(5), Fla....

...pose in which each lease falls." (emphasis added). See also Gamma Phi Chapter of Sigma Chi Bldg. Fund Corp. v. Dade County, 199 So.2d 717, 718 (Fla. 1967) ("the question of whether or not property in a given case is exempt becomes one of fact.") [5] Section 196.012(5), Fla....

...The trial court listed as one of twelve "findings of fact", in a part of its order distinct from its four "conclusions of law", that Hertz' use of the Outside and the Remote Facilities "does not serve or perform a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function, as defined in Florida Statutes Chapter 196.012(5)." [6] "No authority needs to be cited for the proposition that this court is not entitled to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact......

Kooman, Florida Chancery Pleading and Practice § 196; 12 Fla.Jur., Equity § 78; and cases cited. However

...In reaching that conclusion, the trial court relied on our opinion in Gainesville I. There, we affirmed the trial court's determination that section 2 of chapter 97-197, Laws of Florida, which created section 166.047, Florida Statutes, [1] and a portion of section 3 of chapter 97-197, which amended section 196.012, Florida Statutes, to provide that a municipality's provision of two-way telecommunications services to the public is not an exempt use for ad valorem tax purposes unless the services comply with certain conditions, were facially unconstitutional because they contravened article VII, section 3(a)....

...ons, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities, and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(5) ... (emphasis supplied) A governmental, municipal or public purpose or function is defined in Section 196.012(5) as follows: (5) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state or any of its politic...

...development of water borne commerce in the port of Jacksonville. Therefore, since a governmental, municipal or public purpose is performed when the lessee carries out a function which could properly be performed by the appropriate governmental unit, Section 196.012(5), its use of the land complies with the statutory definition and its leasehold interest is exempt....

..., tourist camps, etc. The commercial lessees contended, as does the taxpayer here, that the operation of their facilities constituted a governmental, public purpose or function and that the leaseholds were exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to Section 196.012(5)....

...na Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for *38 such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "Governmental-proprietary" functions....

...munications services, because the statute contravened Article VII, Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution. For the same reason, the trial court also declared facially invalid a portion of section 3 of chapter 97-197, Laws of Florida, which amended section 196.012, Definitions, Florida Statutes, to provide that a municipality's provision of *597 two-way telecommunications services to the public does not constitute an exempt use for ad valorem tax purposes unless the services complied with certain conditions therein specified....

...jurisdiction in which the municipality or other entity of local government operates. Any entity of local government may pay and impose such ad valorem taxes or fees. . . . (emphasis supplied). In section 3 of chapter 97-197, the legislature amended section 196.012(6), *598 which sets out definitions for governmental, municipal, or public purposes or functions, by adding the following language: Providing two-way telecommunications services to the public for hire by the use of a telecommunications facility, as defined in s....

...n, by requiring the property of municipalities to share also in the tax burden, whether or not leased by them to commercial establishments or operated by the cities themselves. In seeking a declaration below that section 166.047 and the amendment to section 196.012(6) facially conflict with Article VII, section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution, the City took the position that all of its telecommunications property is absolutely exempt from ad valorem taxation, because the constitutional exemptio...

...overnmental *605 purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." § 196.012(5), Fla....

...lenging assessment of their leaseholds for ad valorem tax purposes, contending that their property was exempt from ad valorem taxation because the operation of such facilities constituted a governmental, public purpose or function exempt pursuant to section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes....

...aytona Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...lid municipal purpose under the constitution. [6] In addition, telecommunication services were specifically included in the public service tax assessed by municipalities. See Ch. 98-277, Laws of Fla. [7] This provision now appears in subsection (6). § 196.012(6), Fla....

...nk was exempt from ad valorem taxation based on its use for educational purposes. Our decision as to the issue of whether the trial court correctly found that the property qualified for an ad valorem tax educational use exemption under Sections *326 196.012(1) and 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1985), depends upon an analysis of whether, under these particular facts, the property can be said to have been in "actual use" for educational purposes on the assessment date....

...We recognize that an argument can be made that neither the Lake Worth Towers, Inc. case nor the Dade County Taxing Authorities case should control our decision. The Lake Worth Towers, Inc. case did not construe the educational use exemption derived from Sections 196.012(1) and 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and these sections, which apply to the present case, do not require that a particular qualifying type of institution be in existence or operating as of January 1 of the taxable year for the property to be exempt....

...RT ORGANIZATION AND, ON THE ASSESSMENT DATE, IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING REMODELED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE BY THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, DOES THE PROPERTY QUALIFY AS BEING IN "ACTUAL USE" FOR PURPOSES OF ACQUIRING THE EDUCATIONAL TAX EXEMPTION UNDER SECTIONS 196.012(1) AND 196.192(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985)? Reversed....

...Furthermore, we agree with the County's contention that the property does not qualify for an exemption under Sections 243.33 or 196.198, Florida Statutes (1985), because the Foundation does not fall within the definition of an educational institution. We note that our conclusion here would also be different under the revised Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...sions, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012(5). In all such cases, all other interests in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem taxation." (Emphasis supplied) and Fla. Stat. § 196.012(5) which in pertinent part provides: "(5) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interests created in property of the United States, the state or...

...and municipal purposes of the park and serve purposes which could otherwise be properly accomplished through use of municipal funds. The appellee argues the lands it seeks to tax are not governmental within the purview of Fla. Stat. §§ 196.199 and 196.012(5)....

...sions, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function, as defined in § 196.012(5). In all such cases, all other interests in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem taxation." (Emphasis added.) The public purpose or function hereinabove mentioned is defined in sec. 196.012(5) as follows: "(5) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state or any of its political subd...

...d used principally for legitimate theatre productions and other productions of the performing arts for the entertainment and cultural instruction of residents of the City serves a municipal or public purpose or function within the definition of sec. 196.012(5) and within the meaning of Art....

...Accordingly, we affirm. To qualify for an economic development ad valorem tax exemption, section 196.1995(8)(d) requires proof to the satisfaction of the Board that the applicant is "a new business or an expansion of an existing business, as defined in s. 196.012(15) or (16)." Gulf Power intends to expand its existing business. Section 196.012(16)(a)1 defines "Expansion of an existing business": A business establishing 10 or more jobs to employ 10 or more full-time employees in this state, which manufactures, processes, compounds, fabricates, or produces for sale items of t...

...145, 822 P.2d 498, 502 (Ct.App.1991)(electricity is tangible personal property). Gulf Power contends, and the trial court ruled: The definition of "tangible personal property" in section 192.001(11)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), cannot apply to the use of that term in section 196.012(16)(a)(1), because the latter statute refers to tangible personal property produced for sale, i.e., inventory, and the former statute explicitly excludes items of inventory from its definition of tangible personal property....

...urchased and sold electricity); City of Ames v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 246 Iowa 1016, 71 N.W.2d 15, 22 *301 (1955)(generating electricity is manufacturing). Accordingly, we hold that for purposes of section 196.1995, Florida Statutes (1999), and section 196.012(16) referenced therein, electricity is tangible personal property and the generation of electricity in Gulf Power's plant is a manufacturing process in a manufacturing plant....

...§ 196.192(2), Fla. Stat. (1989). "`Exempt use of property' or `use of property for exempt purposes' means predominant or exclusive use of property owned by an exempt entity for education, literary, scientific, religious, charitable, or governmental purposes ..." § 196.012(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). (Emphasis added). Whether PHAI is exempted from ad valorem taxation thus turns on whether Montclair Village is operated for a "charitable purpose," as defined in section 196.012(7), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...to provide low income housing to indigent farm workers. The discontinuance of PHAI's services could legally result in the allocation of public funds to provide such housing. We hold therefore that PHAI operates for a charitable purpose as defined by section 196.012(7)....

...He contends that the lessee, Graham, does not serve or perform a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, *85 and that the property is not entitled to an exemption for any other reason. The city, on the other hand, contends that under section 196.199(2) and section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1989), the use of the land by Graham for the leasing of docks to the general public is a municipal park and recreational purpose and clearly a governmental function....

...Property owned by municipalities but leased to nongovernmental lessees is only exempt from taxation under certain conditions. § 196.199(2). Such property is exempt from ad valorem taxes if the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in section 196.012(6)....

...literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to consider if Graham serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function under section 196.199(2)(a). We find that he does not. Section 196.012(6) provides that a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function is served or performed when a lessee performs a function or serves a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governme...

...McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)); see also Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d 1260, 1265 (Fla.2008). Appellants argue they are exempt from intangible personal property tax under sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(6), Florida Statutes, which exempt nongovernmental lessees on government-owned real property who serve "a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function." They maintain that the legislature exempted them from intangible taxation in 1993 when it amended section 196.012(6) to expressly designate FBOs as being exempt from taxation....

...the state or any of its several political subdivisions, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities, and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6)....

...In sum, the appellant companies operate fixed-base operations on government-owned airport properties which serve a governmental, municipal or public purpose. While their leasehold interests are exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(6), [6] the Department's assessment of intangible taxes was proper under the plain language of section 199.023(1)(d). We, therefore, affirm. Affirmed. HAZOURI and CIKLIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The appellant companies do not contest on appeal the dollar amounts of the Department's respective assessments. [2] In 1993, section 196.012(6) was amended and the following language was added to include FBO exemptions, as follows: (6) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold intere...

...4th DCA 2003) (holding that hangars of Boca Airport, Inc. (one of the appellant companies here) were exempt from ad valorem taxation because they perform a governmental, municipal and public purpose under section 196.199(2)(a), and constituted an aviation facility specifically exempted by section 196.012(6)); see also Nolte v. Paris Air, Inc., 975 So.2d 627, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing § 196.012(6), Fla....

...ational institutions within this state and their property used exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." [4] The statute defines the "`exclusive use of property'" as "property that is used 100 percent for exempt purposes," § 196.012(2), Fla. Stat. (1987); and states that the "`exempt use of property'" is defined as "predominant or exclusive use of property for educational ... use, as defined in this chapter." § 196.012(1), Fla....

...In 1991, the School sold its ten-acre parcel to the Department of Natural Resources. The Department purchased the property pursuant to a project which acquires and preserves environmentally endangered property. [2] The appraiser concedes that the School is an educational institution as defined by section 196.012(4), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...intention of returning. A person may have only one permanent residence at a time; and, once a permanent residence is established in a foreign state or country, it is presumed to continue until the person shows that a change has occurred. Fla. Stat. § 196.012 (17) (2018) ; see also Fla....

...On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the Association’s property was entitled to the exemption. Section 196.192(1) provides that “[a]ll property owned by an exempt entity *242 and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation.” Section 196.012(1) defines “[ejxempt use of property” or “use of property for exempt purposes” as “predominant or exclusive use of property owned by an exempt entity for education, literary, scientific, religious, charitable, or governmental purposes.” Section 196.012(2) defines “[exclusive use of property” in part as “use of property solely for exempt purposes.” Section 196.012(7) defines “[cjharitable purpose” in part as “a function or service which is of such a community service that its discontinuance could legally result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or servi...

...mption, the statute requires that the property in question be “used exclusively for educational purposes” (emphasis supplied) and that the chapter defines “exclusive use of property” as “used one hundred percent for exempt purposes.” See § 196.012(2), Fla.Stat....

...ties “as being essential to the educational process.” This 1971 version was already enacted at the time Berkeley’s “broader sense” opinion was issued in 1976. Furthermore, at the time of Berkeley, the one hundred percent use requirement in section 196.012(2) was already in place by reason of the 1971 amendment....

...instant controversy was before the trial court. However, the 1988 subsection is in the nature of a clarification and, therefore, pertinent. We also note the legislative’s somewhat confusing employment of the following language in subsection (1) of section 196.012: Exempt use of property, or use of property for exempt purpose means predominant or exclusive use.......

...Dade County Property Appraiser, 705 So.2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the court addressed whether an applicant for political asylum qualified for a homestead exemption. The applicant, to qualify for the exemption, must have established a permanent residence. Section 196.012(18), Florida Statutes, defines "permanent residence" as "that place where a person has his or her true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment to which, whenever absent, he or she has the intention of returning." Id....

...VII of the State Constitution, but less any portion thereof used for commercial purposes, with the title of such property being recorded in the official records of the county in which the property is located. Property rented for more than 6 months is presumed to be used for commercial purposes. § 196.012(13), Fla....

...1) Is a post-secondary school or educational institution such as the Academy certified and regulated by the Florida Department of Education Commission for Independent Education and thereby an educational institution within the meaning of § 196.012(5), Florida Statutes? 2) Do the doctrines of administrative finality or res judicata apply to decisions of value adjustment boards? By divided vote, this Court has declined certification of both questions....

...But section 154.233 does not grant tax exemption for the performance of an essential public function. At best this argument would establish an exemption under chapter 196, Florida Statutes, if the “essential public function” being performed by appellee is also a “charitable purpose” as defined in section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes....

...to section 154.2331 (formerly 154.233), but are exempt only in accordance with the provisions of section 196.1975, Florida Statutes. No party contends that this 1984 law is applicable to the present dispute involving assessments for 1981 and 1982. . Section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1981), reads in pertinent part: "Charitable purpose” means a function or service which is of such a community service that its discontinuance could legally result in the allocation of public funds for the conti...

implementing this constitutional provision, see § 196.012(17), Fla. Stat. (2014), we examine the text of

...6 You have not informed this office as to whether the property is being used for any nonexempt purpose. In light of the above, however, such a factual determination must be made in order to determine the applicability of the exemption provided in s. 196.198 , F.S. Section 196.012 (5), F.S....

...XVI, Fla. Const. 1885, which provided that the property of all corporations shall be subject to taxation "unless such property be held and used exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary or charitable purposes." (e.s.) 5 See, s. 196.012 (2), F.S. (1992 Supp.). 6 See, s. 196.012 (4), F.S....

educational institute within the meaning of Fla.Stat. § 196.-012(4). The property involved in this litigation

"permanent residence" are defined respectively in section 196.012 (17) and (18), Florida Statutes, as follows:

..., if both a husband and wife have established separate domiciles and residences, the Florida Constitution requires that the owner "maintain thereon the permanent residence of the owner." The Legislature has defined the words "permanent residence" in section 196.012 (18), Florida Statutes, as: "that place where a person has his or her true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment to which, whenever absent, he or she has the intention of returning....

...o taxation in the same manner as any other private property. The learned trial judge entered a final judgment in favor of appellee holding that its leasehold interests are exempt from ad va-lorem taxation pursuant to F.S. 196.- *1177 199(2)(a) and F.S. 196.012(5)....

...Specifically, Section 196.199(2)(a) provides: *523 (a) Leasehold interests in property of ... municipalities ... shall be exempted from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in Section 196.012(6). Under the definitional provisions of Section 196.012(6), a municipal or public purpose is defined to include either a function which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would ot...

...We concur in the judgment of the Circuit Court that the statute was constitutional, and further that the appellee was in compliance with it in 1971. In passing, we note that “fraternal” has been deleted from the current wording of the statute; see Fla.Stat. § 196.012(1), F.S.A....

...activities, convention centers, visitor centers, sports stadiums, parks, and beaches are all entities or uses deemed to serve a municipal purpose “when access to the property is open to the general public with or without a charge for admission.” § 196.012(6), Fla....

...activities, convention centers, visitor centers, sports stadiums, parks, and beaches are all entities or uses deemed to serve a municipal purpose “when access to the property is open to the general public with or without a charge for admission.” § 196.012(6), Fla....

...educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation. (Emphasis added). The term “charitable purposes” is not defined in the Constitution. But the term is defined in section 196.012(7), Florida Statutes (2014), as providing a function or service which is of such a community service that its discontinuance could legally result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or service....

...construction, however wise it may seem to alter the plain language.”). The question presented in this appeal is therefore a simple one: do the activities of the Gainesville Chamber of Commerce qualify as “charitable purposes” as the Florida Legislature has defined that term in section 196.012(7)? Alachua County has not challenged the findings of fact made by the circuit court that 2  [t]he Chamber is the delegated local provider of economic development and related functions an...

...All income generated by the Chamber is used for charitable purpose.” Given these activities, the Chamber performs a community service such that a discontinuance of such service “could legally result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or service.” § 196.012(7)....

...The purpose of this publically-funded department is to “create, expand, and retain business in this state, to recruit business from around the world, and to facilitate other job-creating efforts.” § 20.60(4)(a). While not challenging the constitutionality of section 196.012(7), Alachua County argues that despite its unambiguous language, a tax exemption for “charitable purposes” should be limited to “benevolent” purposes, such as providing material assistance to the needy....

...ut in its analysis, undertakes judicial construction of an unambiguous statute. See Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010) (holding courts should not construct an unambiguous statute). Further, the dissent has overlooked the plain meaning of section 196.012(7) to impose what it believes should be the meaning of “charitable purposes” under the statute: to provide relief to the needy. While relief to the needy is a laudable charitable purpose, the statute is not so limited....

...roperly equates “charitable purposes” with “public purposes.” But this ignores the fact that it was the Legislature which first equated charitable purpose, for determining tax exemption, with public purpose. The Legislature plainly stated in section 196.012(7) 4 that a charitable purpose is an activity for which “public funds” could be legally allocated. In conclusion, the function of the Chamber mirrors some of the functions already undertaken...

...us, the Chamber performs a function the discontinuance of which could result in the legal allocation of public funds. Therefore, the Chamber is entitled to an exemption from ad valorem taxation pursuant to the application of the unambiguous terms of section 196.012(7)....

...9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ KELSEY, J., dissenting. The Alachua County Property Appraiser challenges the lower tribunal’s decision granting the Gainesville Area Chamber of Commerce a charitable exemption from ad valorem property tax under section 196.012(7), Florida Statutes (2014), which provides as follows: “Charitable purpose” means a function or service which is of such a community service that its discontinuance could legally result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or service....

...1985). A taxpayer has the 7 Appraiser’s denial of the exemption. The Chamber then challenged the denial de novo in circuit court, resulting in the order now on appeal, which interpreted “charitable purpose” in section 196.012(7) as eliminating any requirement of a traditional charitable purpose under the plain meaning of “charitable.” The Chamber is a typical chamber of commerce as defined in section 501.973(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes....

...impossible for the Chamber to satisfy the statutory definition of a nonprofit applicant. See § 196.195(4), Fla. Stat. The Chamber nevertheless relies on its economic development activities, because it interprets the statutory definition of “charitable purpose” in section 196.012(7) as eliminating any need for a traditional “charitable” purpose....

...their reach and activities, hosts and promotes job fairs and networking activities, and numerous other activities along the same lines. To repeat, the Chamber’s argument is that all of these activities satisfy the definition of “charitable” in section 196.012(7) because the statute refers to activities for which government could legally pay (whether government actually pays for them or not), which the Chamber interprets as eliminating any requirement that such activities be “charitable” within the traditional plain meaning of that word. III....

...“Charity” means “an institution engaged in relief of the poor; public provision for the relief of the needy.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Charitable, Charity (last visited October 29, 2018). The statute implementing the charitable exemption, now section 196.012(7), originally consisted only of what is now its first sentence, without the word “legally” in it, thus: “‘Charitable purpose’ means a function or service which is of such a community service that its discontinuance could re...

...two categories of exemption are defined separately in light of their constitutional underpinnings. Compare Art. VII, § 3(a), Fla. Const. (“All property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation.”); § 196.012(6), Fla....

...(separately defining and regulating “[g]overnmental, municipal, or public purpose or function”) with Art. VII, § 3(a), Fla. Const. (“Such portions of property as are used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation.”); § 196.012(7), Fla....

...2005). The Florida Supreme Court in Sebring set out the same principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation on which I rely here, with a special emphasis on principles governing tax exemptions. 738 So. 2d at 244-45. The court invalidated a provision of section 196.012(6) that purported to extend a public purpose tax exemption to lessees of public property when the lessees used the property in profit-making enterprises—in that case a raceway and related activities being operated on property leased from a local airport authority....

...2005) (refusing to construe “municipal purposes” for use and spending under article VIII as synonymous with “municipal or public purposes” under article VII’s exemption provisions). Yet the Chamber’s interpretation of the statutory definition of “charitable purpose” in section 196.012(7) as being co-extensive with any “public purpose” under separate provisions partakes of the same analytical error....

...municipal purposes, the argument raised here was not raised there, and we cannot properly conclude that the court intended to create precedent on an issue not expressly argued and decided. Even if Turner could validly be read as an express holding on that issue, that interpretation of section 196.012(7) exceeds the Florida Constitution’s grant of exemption-making authority. C....

...could legally result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or service. It is not necessary that public funds be allocated for such function or service but only that any such allocation would be legal. § 196.012(7), Fla....

...That is what the Legislature intended to do in implementing the charitable exemption—adhere to the plain-meaning definition of “charitable” used in the constitution’s limited grant of exemption authority. 17  IV. Conclusion. Section 196.012(7) is not properly severed from its constitutional mooring....

...to the general aviation public in the promotion of air commerce, serves a municipal, governmental or public purpose or function and is therefore exempt from the taxation sought to be imposed by the Property Tax Assessor for Indian River County. See § 196.012(6), Fla....

...(Section 196.202 , F.S.) "Totally and permanently disabled persons" means those persons who are currently certified by the Florida department of health and rehabilitative services, two licensed physicians of this state, or the veterans' administration to be totally and permanently disabled." [Section 196.012 (10), F.S....

...mp sum payment. *1055 The condominium association alleged that the forty-one hangars were exempt from real property taxes under section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), which exempts property owned and used by a governmental agency, and under section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1999), because this is an activity of “an aircraft full service fixed base operation which provides goods and services to the general aviation public.” The latter statute provides in part: Governmental, munic...

...ed by private aircraft owners. The remaining hangars are leased by the fixed base operator directly to private aircraft owners in return for periodic payments. The property appraiser concedes that the latter are exempt from real property taxes under section 196.012(6), but differentiates the condominium hangers on the theory that they are real property owned by the association under the condominium statute, section 718.106, Florida Statutes, which provides that “a condominium parcel created by...

...ons, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities, and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6). Section 196.012(6) defines “public purpose” as one which “could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit” or “which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds.” The Hillsborough County...

...e “public purpose” exemption. Id. at 1074, n. 1 . The Florida Supreme Court recently reiterated its position on this issue in Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 783 So.2d 238 (Fla.2001), when it declared the legislature’s 1994 amendment to section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1994), unconstitutional....

the continuance of the function of service. [Section 196.012(6), F.S.] At the time this exemption standard

...1976)). Property owned by “exempt entities” and used predominantly for “exempt purposes” is exempt from ad valorem taxation, to the extent of the exempt use. § 196.192(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). “Exempt uses” of property include property utilized for educational and charitable purposes. § 196.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). Florida Statutes do not define educational purposes, but section 196.198, the educational-property exemption statute, provides that “[e]ducational institutions [1] within this state and 1 Section 196.012(5), Fla. Stat. (2015), defines educational institution: 2 their property used by them . . . exclusively for educational purposes are exempt from taxation.” A “charitable purpose” is defined in section 196.012(7), Florida Statues (2015) as a function or service which is of such a community service that its discontinuance could legally result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or service....

...y that any such allocation would be legal. Appellant argues that because it performs an educational function – a charitable purpose – and because the government spends tax dollars on education, Appellant is entitled to a tax exemption under section 196.012(7), Florida Statutes. In 1988, the Legislature amended section 196.192 to require that property used for exempt purposes be owned by an “exempt entity” in order to receive ad valorem tax exemption. Mastroianni v....

...Department of Education of Florida, Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, or the Florida Council of Independent Schools . . . . 3 educational institution). 2 Appellant is not an “educational institution” as defined by section 196.012(5), and therefore is not eligible to receive an exemption for the use of its property for “educational purposes.” 3 Appellant argues, however, that because the government can spend tax dollars on education, “educational purposes” are also “charitable purposes,” if they are engaged in by a nonprofit entity, even if that entity is not accredited as an “educational institution” as defined in section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes. Appellant’s interpretation would abrogate the accreditation requirements of section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes, as any nonprofit engaged in an educational function could receive a “charitable purposes” exemption, regardless of whether it is an 2 Section 196.198, Florida Statutes (2015), contains additional support for the conclusion that entities claiming exemption for educational purposes must meet the “educational institution” criteria from section 196.012(5): Sheltered workshops providing rehabilitation and retraining of individuals who have disabilities and exempted by a certificate under s. (d) of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, are declared wholly educational in purpose and are exempt from certification, accreditation, and membership requirements set forth in s. 196.012. (Emphasis added.) By stating that sheltered workshops can receive an exemption for educational purposes without meeting the “educational institution” requirements, section 196.198 indicates that those requirements are otherwise neces...

...Acupuncture, Inc. an educational property tax exemption under section 196.198, Florida Statutes. On the merits, Property Appraiser Crapo argues that the Academy does not qualify for the exemption because it is not an “educational institution” as defined in section 196.012(5)—and we agree....

...The Academy petitioned the Alachua County VAB to resolve the dispute, and a special magistrate heard the case. The special magistrate concluded, with substantial hesitation, that the Academy qualified as an educational institution under section 196.012(5), and recommended that the VAB grant the exemption....

...3  for eligibility to certification by, accreditation to, or membership in the State Department of Education of Florida, Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, or the Florida Council of Independent Schools . . . . § 196.012(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The parties disagree about whether the Academy falls within the section-196.012(5) definition of an “educational institution” and thus qualifies for this particular exemption....

...health science. But Property Appraiser Crapo argues that the Academy is not entitled to the exemption because it is not credentialed by, and does not offer classes or courses as required for credentialing by, one of the three entities identified in section 196.012(5): the State Department of Education of Florida, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, or the Florida Council of Independent Schools....

...The circuit court concluded that Commission-issued licenses satisfy the statute’s reference to certification by “the State Department of Education,” but Property Appraiser Crapo argues that the Commission and Department are different entities for purposes of the exemption statute. We cannot read section 196.012(5)’s reference to the “Department” as applying equally to the Commission, because Florida law distinguishes between Commission- and Department- certified schools....

...Crapo that the Commission’s licensure is not the same as the Department’s certification within the meaning of the tax- exemption statute. On the record presented, we cannot conclude that the Academy’s programs satisfy the Department’s certification requirements under section 196.012(5) merely because the programs satisfy the Commission’s licensing requirements....

...(2015); and a state Department of Revenue Consumer’s Certificate of Exemption (2013). This evidence was key to bolstering the Academy’s case for the 2014 and 2015 exemptions because of the statutory importance of showing that it conducted “regular classes and courses.” § 196.012(5), Fla....

...of this evidence in the circuit court: It is the Defendant’s burden to establish that they conduct regular classes and courses of study “required for eligibility to certification by . . . the State Department of Education of Florida . . .”. (DOE) § 196.012(5), Fla....

...founded in 1995 as a not-for-profit private postsecondary school to provide academic instruction and clinical training in acupuncture, which is a regulated medical profession in Florida. See Chapter 457, Florida Statutes. The Academy held an educational tax exemption under 196.012(5), Florida Statutes, on its real and personal property in Broward County for over a decade. In 2008, the Academy moved to Gainesville, Florida, where it purchased property in the southeastern quadrant of historic downtown and applied for the same tax exemption....

unenforceable after twenty years under the provisions of .§ 196.12, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. The same applies to municipal

...fect of eliminating the minimum income requirements of residents prescribed in Fla. Stat. § 196.197(1) and (2) (1971). The Assessor asserts that to be entitled to the exemption, Plymouth must also show that it meets the requirements of Fla. Stat. §§ 196.012(6) and 196.196 (1971), and that the record demonstrated a conflict of fact on these points so as to preclude a summary judgment....

...rt is had thereto, in determining whether to allow tax exemption for a home for the *632 aged or disabled after deletion of F.S. Section 196.197(1), (2), (3), F.S.A., are found in the remainder of Chapter 196 and particularly the definitions in F.S. Section 196.012, F.S.A....

...Regrettably, we have now determined that our conclusions with respect to the record in this case were more sweeping than they should have been. Our attention has been more specifically directed to the applicability of the statutory definition of charitable purpose set forth in Fla. Stat. § 196.012(6) (1971), which reads as follows: "(6) `Charitable purpose' means a function or service which is of such a community service that its discontinuance could result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of the function or ser...

...ferences which may be drawn therefrom are conflicting. Moreover, it is evident that additional facts are available which if made known would aid in the determination of whether the Plymouth Harbor property serves the function specified by Fla. Stat. § 196.012(6)....

...of appellee's claim for charitable exemption for the tax years 1979, 1980 and 1981. We dispose of the cross-appeal first. Appellee/cross-appellant attacked the denial of its claimed charitable exemptions on the basis of a constitutional challenge to section 196.012(6) and section 196.1975, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Canterbury Tower." What occurs is that the resident receives a "license" to occupy a residential unit during the remainder of his life. The medical/nursing facility of appellee has been granted a charitable exemption from taxes pursuant to sections 196.012 and 196.1975....

...her things: (1) Any real estate used and owned as a homestead by any quadriplegic is exempt from taxation. (2) Any real estate used and owned as a homestead by a paraplegic, hemiplegic, or other totally and permanently disabled person, as defined in s. 196.012(11), who must use a wheelchair for mobility or who is legally blind, is exempt from taxation....

...The trial court agreed with the property appraiser, and Mrs. Crain’s son, who succeeded to her interests, has appealed. The issue is whether the property was being “used” within the meaning of section *1326 196.101(1) or (2). That word is defined in section 196.012(4) as follows: “Use” means the exercise of any right or power over real or personal property incident to the ownership of the property. Section 196.012(13) provides in part: “‘Real estate used and owned as a homestead’ means real property to the extent provided in s....

“educational institution” as defined in F.S. § 196.-012(4) [, F.S.A.]), which residence is-not on the

...orida Statutes, effectively removes from the exemption afforded property owned and used by the designated governmental units all leasehold interests which do not serve or perform a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function as defined in Section 196.012(5), regardless of the length of the lease, it must be concluded that Subsection (6) dealing with 99-year leases was intended by the Legislature to provide a standard for valuation....

...t of Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre. 6 In McIntyre, the Legislature sought to create an ad valorem tax exemption for private, profit-making ventures conducted on property leased from a governmental entity by providing, as emphasized below, in section 196.012 (6), Florida Statutes (1994 Supplement), "(6) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the...

...to fulfill Southlake’s requirements of the FQD (Florida Quality Development) order to enable the Chapman family to develop their $300,000,000 project. (4) The physical use of the Aurora project as of January 1, 1995, qualified as a charitable use (§ 196.012(7))....

...rental housing. This court made it clear in Public Housing Assistance, Inc. v. Havill, 571 So.2d 45 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) that whether a property is entitled to an exemption turns on whether it is operated for a “charitable purpose” as defined in section 196.012(7), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Housing is striking. While the provision of affordable housing to “low income” people generally constitutes a “charitable purpose,” here, the actions of Foundation simply do not fall within the definition of “charitable purpose” found in section 196.012(7)....

...nce, does not support that finding. We agree with the trial court in respect to the estoppel issue raised by Foundation. Accordingly, Havill’s denial of the charitable exemption is affirmed. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur. . See § 196.012(7), Fla....

...rem taxation to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the nonexempt use. An "exempt" use of property is defined as "educational, literary, scientific, religious, charitable, or governmental purposes, as defined in this chapter." § 196.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). "Exclusive use" is defined as "use of property solely for exempt purposes. Such purposes may include more than one class of exempt use." § 196.012(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). "Predominant use" is defined as "use of property for exempt purposes in excess of 50 percent but less than exclusive." § 196.012(3), Fla....

...totally and permanently disabled person who is a bona fide resident of this state shall be exempt from taxation." The question then arises as to what method is to be used to determine total and permanent disability within the meaning of s. 196.202 , supra. Section 196.012 (10), F.S., provides that, as used in Ch....

QUESTIONS: 1. Should a licensed practicing chiropractic physician be considered a licensed physician within the intent of s. 196.012 (10), F.S.? 2. Should a licensed practicing osteopathic physician be considered a licensed physician within the intent of s. 196.012 (10), F.S.? SUMMARY: The written certification by licensed practicing chiropractic or osteopathic physicians that a person is totally and permanently disabled from a disabling ailment that chiropractic or osteopathic physicians, respectively, are qualified by training and experience, and authorized by statute, to diagnose and treat satisfies the requirement of s. 196.012 (10), F.S., and is sufficient professional medical evidence that a person may be eligible for a tax exemption under ss. 196.202 and 196.031 (3)(b), F.S. Section 196.012 (10), F.S....

...those persons who are currently certified by the Florida department of health and rehabilitative services or two licensed physicians of this state or the veterans' administration to be totally and permanently disabled. (Emphasis supplied.) Chapter 74-234, Laws of Florida, amended s. 196.012 (10), F.S., to read: (10) "Totally and permanently disabled persons" means those persons who are currently certified by two licensed physicians of this state who are professionally unrelated, or the veterans' administration to be totally and permanently disabled....

...icensed doctors of medicine. I have reviewed the provisions of Ch. 196, F. S., and Ch. 12B-1, Part III, Florida Administrative Code, and find no legislative definition or administrative interpretation of the term licensed physicians as it is used in s. 196.012 (10)....

...741.051, "is not qualified, confined or limited to the physician practicing any particular branch of the healing arts." It cannot be said, therefore, that the use of the words licensed physicians of itself and without qualification indicates clearly and unequivocally a legislative intent to confine certification under s. 196.012 (10), F.S., exclusively to licensed practicing doctors of medicine....

...permanently disabled from a disabling ailment that chiropractic physicians are qualified by training and experience, and authorized by law, to diagnose and treat would appear to satisfy the requirement of, and to be within the intent and purview of, s. 196.012 (10), F.S....

...(3) It is the intent and purpose of this chapter to grant to osteopathic physicians and surgeons the right to practice as taught and practiced in the standard colleges of osteopathy. The legislative intent, as expressed, would seem to allow osteopathic physicians to make the certification required by s. 196.012 (10), F.S., as to whether a person is totally and permanently disabled from a disabling ailment that osteopathic physicians are qualified by training and experience, and authorized by statute, to diagnose and treat....

...llowing two separate and independent scenarios: *520 1. Where the owner of the property is a permanent resident on the property, or 2. Where someone legally or naturally dependent on the owner is a permanent resident on the subject property. See id. Section 196.012, Florida Statutes (2006), defines "permanent residence" for purposes of this provision as follows: (18) "Permanent residence" means that place where a person has his or her true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment to which, whenever absent, he or she has the intention of returning....

this state shall be exempt from taxation. Section 196.012(10), F. S., provides that, as used in Ch. 196

...At that time, the property appraiser—Mr. Crapo—denied the exemption, asserting the Academy was not an “educational institution” for exemption purposes. The Academy petitioned the VAB and the case was heard before a special magistrate, who held that section 196.012(5), which defines “educational institution” within the Florida tax code, was unclear and ambiguous....

...courses of study required for eligibility to certification by, accreditation to, or membership in the State Department of Education of Florida, Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, or the Florida Council of Independent Schools. § 196.012(5), Fla....

...The Academy petitioned the VAB in opposition to Crapo’s action and a hearing was held before a special magistrate, who—contrary to the 2008 disposition—denied the Academy’s petition. The special magistrate concluded that the Academy was not accredited by any of the institutions enumerated in section 196.012(5), and that its licensure by the Commission for Independent Education—a state-created entity within the Department of Education that oversees “the operation and establishment of independent postsecondary educational...

...The Legislature has defined the term “permanent residence” to mean “that place where a person has his or her true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment to which, whenever absent, he or she has the intention of returning.” § 196.012(17), Fla....

...- 12 -  III. We have considered Rebholz’s arguments in support of the district court’s decision, and we find them unpersuasive. The parties and the courts below wrestled with whether and how section 196.012(13), Florida Statutes (2014), applies in this case....

...- 13 - the generic homestead provisions applicable to Rebholz. Furst, 302 So. 3d at 429-30; §§ 196.091, 196.101, Fla. Stat. (2014). We agree with the district court that this case does not put directly at issue section 196.012(13)’s definition of “real estate used and owned as a homestead.” As the district court explained, Chapter 196 uses that term only in provisions that have not been applied to Rebholz. The trial court erred by taking up the “constitutionality” of a defined term embedded in those provisions. But in his arguments to our Court, Rebholz now attempts to use section 196.012(13) to his advantage....

...He contrasts that provision with section 192.001(8), Florida Statutes (2014), which gives the following definition of the term “homestead”: “that property described in s. 6(a), Art. VII of the State Constitution.” Rebholz argues that reading sections 196.012(13) and 192.001(8) together shows that homestead property can be used for commercial purposes. Otherwise, says Rebholz, there would be no need for section 196.012(13) explicitly to subtract “any portion thereof used for commercial purposes” from “real property to the extent provided in s. 6(a), Art. VII of the State Constitution.” - 14 -  It is true that, to the extent it is part of the overall statutory scheme governing homestead tax exemptions, section 196.012(13) could inform the meaning of the provisions that are directly applicable to Rebholz. But we do not think that section 196.012(13) helps Rebholz here....

...Nothing in that provision undermines our analysis showing that, under the constitution and section 196.031(1)(a), the owner or a dependent must himself use property as his residence for that property to qualify for the homestead exemption. Rebholz has perhaps offered an interpretation of section 196.012(13) suggesting that homestead property could be used both as a residence and for commercial purposes....

...is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds. § 196.012(6), Fla....