Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ida constitution grants to the state’s circuit courts jurisdiction to hear challenges to any state tax. Fla. Const, art. V, § 20(c)(3). Florida courts are also given power to issue declaratory and injunctive relief in tax cases. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 72.011 (West Supp....

...revailing confusion by making significant revisions to the statutes relating to civil tax procedures for contesting the legality of tax assessments. Of particular relevance to this case are the amendments to section 26.012(2)(e), the creation of new section 72.011, and the repeal of section 212.15(5)....

...tive agency, the adoption of the statutory exception to facilitate such administrative action, as done by this 1981 amendment, would have been unnecessary and a clearly superfluous act. Section 213.19 referred to in this amendment (later codified as section 72.011 in Florida Statutes 1981) was an entirely new section created by section 11 of chapter 81-178. [20] Section 72.011 provided detailed *954 provisions by which a taxpayer could contest the legality of a tax assessment under chapter 212 (and other chapters in title XIV, Florida Statutes) "by filing an action in circuit court, or alternatively the taxp...

...the disputed tax. It required, however, as a condition to filing an action in court, that the taxpayer tender the disputed amount into the registry of the court or post a bond to secure payment of the disputed tax. But most significant to this case, section 72.011(5) made the alternative administrative procedure established by section 72.011 "not applicable to actions for refund for taxes previously paid." It is obvious, therefore, that in 1981 the legislature expressly authorized, for the first time, an administrative procedure for contesting tax assessments and expressly...

...d by general law the existing exclusive original jurisdiction of circuit courts, but explicitly excepted from this administrative procedure "actions for refund of taxes previously paid." See 50 Fla.Jur.2d, Taxation, §§ 13:2-4 (1983). Newly created section 72.011, when read in para materia with section 26.012(2)(e), as amended, thus preserved the exclusivity of circuit court original jurisdiction in tax refund cases. For this reason, the explicit legislative clarification of DOR's concurrent jurisdiction made in section 72.011, Florida Statutes (1981), even if susceptible to retroactive effect as suggested by appellees, would not remove this refund case from the circuit court's exclusive original jurisdiction. [21] Additionally, we note that section 18, chapter 81-178, repealed subsection (5) of section 212.15, and justifiably so, as those provisions had now been made superfluous by the new provisions in section 72.011....

...'s quasi-judicial jurisdiction. To avoid unnecessary concern and misinterpretation of this opinion, it is appropriate to state what we do not decide. We do not find it necessary to reach and decide whether the 1981 and subsequent amendments creating section 72.011 can be given retroactive effect in appropriate cases, nor do we decide the extent of DOR's quasi-judicial power to adjudicate tax disputes not involving tax refund claims such as this....

...protest of the assessment out of a judicial arena and places it squarely in an administrative arena. I consider that this conclusion has been commonly assumed by all until now. Indeed, it must have been assumed by the legislature, when, in enacting Section 72.011(5), Florida Statutes (1981), providing alternative judicial or administrative remedies *960 for contesting the "assessment of any tax," it explicitly excluded from the provisions of the statute actions for refunds of taxes....

...initial payment of the tax due was had in Stewart Arms Apartments, Ltd. v. Department of Revenue, 362 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). [19] See note 15, supra. This provision amounts to no more than a venue provision implementing section 26.012. [20] Section 72.011, Florida Statutes (1981), reads in full: Jurisdiction of circuit courts in specific tax matters; administrative hearings and appeals; time for commencing action; parties; deposits....

...circuit court having jurisdiction over the administration of the estate. (5) This section is not applicable to actions for refund of taxes previously paid. [21] While we are not required to decide the legal effect of the 1984 and 1985 amendments to section 72.011 made in sections 1 and 9 of chapter 84-170 and section 34 of chapter 85-342, Laws of Florida, we do not perceive those amendments to adversely affect our conclusion regarding the legislative intent expressed by section 72.011 as originally enacted; rather, such amendments corroborate our conclusion that actions for refund based on the legality of the tax assessment must be filed in circuit court only....

the child by the step-mother (as authorized by § 72.11 Fla. Stat., F.S.A.) operated to divest the rights

...ents do not support the quantum leap required for the entirely novel conclusion (3) for which we are referred to no precedent. Conversely, appellees present no persuasive response to appellant's alternative contentions that (1) the explicit terms of section 72.011(2), (3) and (5), [1] Florida *371 Statutes, preclude challenge of a warrant after 60 days from issuance; (2) even assuming the Rudds could challenge the warrant by motion for summary judgment in June 1987, the funds improperly refunded...

...e affidavits presented by the parties upon motion for summary judgment clearly show material factual issues with respect to the status of the mortgage as a fraudulent conveyance lacking the bona fides required to establish priority over the warrant. Section 72.011, Florida Statutes, and companion predecessor statutes have long imposed a requirement that the taxpayer shall begin contest proceedings within a specified time after the assessment becomes final, and also a requirement that prior to challenge the taxpayer shall pay any portion admittedly owed....

...Ty-Tan, Inc., 48 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1950); Chaves Construction Co. & Subsidiaries v. Metropolitan Dade County, 256 So.2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). Distinctions between void and voidable levies were put at rest when the legislature amended chapter 194, Florida Statutes, in 1983 and section 72.011 in 1984 and 1985 to make the time limit and prepayment requirements jurisdictional....

...iquor taxes at issue in McKesson were not encompassed within the procedures for predeprivation relief in chapter 72 of the Florida Statutes, the sales tax paid by Newsweek could properly have been contested in a predeprivation proceeding pursuant to section 72.011....

...ll as the possibility that the Division might revoke or decline to renew the distributor's license. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 38 n. 20, 110 S.Ct. at 2251 n. 20. In the present case, the taxpayer could have availed itself of a predeprivation remedy under section 72.011, Florida Statutes (1987). Newsweek had the option of filing suit in circuit court to contest the legality of this tax and paying the amount of the contested tax into the registry of the court. See § 72.011(1), (3)(b)....

...ted in interest-bearing certificates at the discretion of the clerk,..." the taxpayer also has the right to file a cash bond or surety bond in the amount of the contested tax assessment, or to seek a court order approving an alternative arrangement. § 72.011(3)(b)2.; see also Don's Sod Co., Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 661 So.2d 896 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). See generally Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Nu-Life Health and Fitness Center, 623 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(section 72.011 not an *364 unconstitutional deprivation of access to courts, because the taxpayer has the alternative of seeking a waiver from the Department of the obligation to pay the contested tax into the registry of the court or to file a motio...

...not factors in this case. The taxpayers in McKesson were subject to onerous penalties if they did not pay the disputed tax before seeking a refund in a proceeding contesting the constitutionality of the tax. They had no predeprivation remedy because section 72.011 was not available to contest the liquor taxes at issue in that case; for that reason, McKesson is inapplicable....

...1438, 113 L.Ed.2d 494 (1991) decision holding that distinctions in taxation between different *365 types of media are not necessarily violative of the First Amendment. BENTON, Judge, concurring in result. I concur on the narrow ground that sections 72.011(1) and 120.575, Florida Statutes (1987), taken together, "provided a fair and meaningful predeprivation procedure," McKesson Corp....

...ase agreements and, accordingly, the portion of the shares of the Trust attributable to repurchase agreements is not exempt from taxation. REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of judgment consistent herewith. ORFINGER and COBB, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 72.011(3), Fla....

...a refund of its payment of interest on an earlier assessed tax deficiency. For the following reasons, we affirm on appeal but reverse on the cross-appeal. The undisputed facts show that on May 4, 1992, Kemper filed its original complaint pursuant to section 72.011, Florida Statutes (1991), contesting the legality of a tax assessment and concurrent denial of tax credit by the Department....

...The Department moved to dismiss the original complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a cause of action, asserting *1126 that because the underlying audit adjustments were uncontested, the assessment must be paid as an uncontested sum pursuant to section 72.011(3)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Clifton Cox, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Cass D. Vickers of Vickers Madsen & Goldman, LLP, Tallahassee, for Appellee. CANADY, Judge. Val-Pak Direct Marketing Systems, Inc. (VPDMS), sued the Florida Department of Revenue (the Department), pursuant to section 72.011, Florida Statutes (2000), seeking a refund of sales taxes paid on printed advertising materials distributed by mail....

...e they receive for the hotel rooms. Only in the event of an affirmative answer will tax collection efforts be undertaken and at that time the administrative process referenced above will be fully implemented, culminating in a final assessment as per section 72.011, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...It is without dispute that Wingray paid the State $14,160.00 in Intangible Personal Property Tax and $22,656.00 in Documentary Stamp Tax upon the recording of the mortgage. Sometime thereafter Wingray filed suit in the Circuit Court seeking a refund, pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 72.011....

...rida. SHAW, Justice. We have for review the decision of the district court of appeal certifying the following question: IS A TAXPAYER ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, IN A TAX REFUND CASE UNDER SECTION 72.011(1), FLORIDA STATUTES, WHERE ONE OF THE CONDITIONS OF SECTION 72.011(3), FLORIDA STATUTES, HAS BEEN MET? Printing House, Inc....

...Turning to the instant case, we find that this is not a refund case and consistent with our determination, there is no right to a jury trial to challenge the tax assessment. *501 PHI has no constitutional right to have a jury determine the validity of DOR's tax assessments. [5] PHI's options under section 72.011(3) included either tendering the contested amount plus penalties and accrued interest into the court registry or having DOR waive payment pending the contestation....

...Auley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. KAHN, Judge. Kenneth J. Pogge appeals an adverse final summary judgment entered against him in his circuit court action for a tax refund. The Department of Revenue (Department) persuaded the circuit court that Pogge's action was barred by section 72.011(2), Florida Statutes (1987), and also by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction....

...ccount, and not by Pogge individually. The Department further advised that the Notice of Decision was final for purposes of "court action or administrative proceeding." Within 60 days, Pogge filed this action for a refund. The Department relies upon section 72.011(2), Florida Statutes (1987), and argues that Pogge lost his right to a refund because he did not, pursuant to the provisions of that statute, bring the action within "60 days from the date the assessment [became] final." According to t...

...This jeopardy assessment was a final assessment pursuant to section 212.15(4), Florida Statutes, and Rule 12A-1.090, Florida Administrative Code. Pogge never filed a challenge or objection to that assessment within 60 days of August 26, 1987, as required by section 72.011(2)....

...nor did he willfully direct any employee of the corporation to fail to collect or pay over, evade, defeat, or truthfully account for such tax, *526 pursuant to section 213.29, Florida Statutes. Pogge also notes that although the Legislature amended section 72.011 in 1991, at all times pertinent to this lawsuit, section 72.011(6), Florida Statutes (1987), provided that section 72.011 "is not applicable to actions for refund of taxes previously paid." The Legislature's subsequent amendment of this section, Chapter 91-112, Laws of Florida, does not apply to this case. Pogge reasons therefore that the 60-day constraint of section 72.011(2), Florida Statutes (1987), does not apply at all to this case....

...llegedly collected unlawfully. See Florida Export Tobacco Co. v. Department of Revenue, 510 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied 519 So.2d 986 (Fla.1987). We hold that the circuit court did have jurisdiction of this matter. Until amended in 1991, section 72.011(6) provided: "This section is not applicable to actions for refunds of taxes previously paid." Although Pogge could not challenge the assessment under chapter 72, he did not lose his right to bring a refund action, once having paid the taxes....

...eek review in circuit court. The Department's attempted analogy to section 194.171 fails because that statute expressly includes refund actions within its provisions. Accordingly, the trial court erred by finding that the refund action was barred by section 72.011(2)....

4, Laws of Fla.; § 63.061, Fla. Stat. (1967); § 72.11, Fla. Stat. (1943). One-third of Florida's adoptions

...Having determined that the ultimate issue is governed by Florida law, the Court now considers whether DOR's tax claim was *695 "assessed" in 1981 under Florida law as determined by the lower court. In reaching that conclusion, the lower court relied on Fla.Stat. § 214.26, § 26.012(2)(e), § 214.03(2) and § 72.011. Three of these four sections, however, are not relevant. Sections 214.26 and 26.012(2)(e) are jurisdictional statutes and clearly do not speak to the issue at hand. [3] Section 72.011 states that "[n]o action may be brought to contest an assessment" of tax "after 60 days from the date the assessment becomes final." See Fla.Stat. § 72.011 (1981). The Debtor argues that § 72.011 suggests that an assessment must be final before suit can be brought in state court. That argument is irrelevant to this case as § 72.011 became effective on October 1, 1981 and therefore, was not Florida law at the time the Notice of Decision was delivered to the Debtor on April 18, 1981. Section 72.011 thus is inapplicable....

...The appellant seeks review of a final order of dismissal in an action involving a *1298 tax levy and assessment. The order reads in part as follows: "1. According to its own allegations, Plaintiff's Complaint seeks `equitable relief' and contests the `legality of a tax assessment pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 72.011.' 2. Under § 72.011(3)(b)1, Fla....

...unt of the contested assessment, or (2) filed a cash or surety bond, or (3) already obtained a written waiver from the Department of Revenue or, (4) requested by motion a `security arrangement' at the time of bringing this cause of action. 5. As per § 72.011(5), Fla. Stat., the requirements of § 72.011 are `jurisdictional.' Therefore, without Plaintiff having satisfied any of the requirements of § 72.011, including the alternative requirements of either a written waiver or a motion for security arrangement, this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction." We find no merit and affirm....

...Don's suit sought to contest sales and use tax assessments ($154,475 for the period of May 1985 through April 1988, and $7,932.76 for the period May 1988 through August 1988). In addition to challenging the constitutionality and propriety of the assessments, Don's complaint also asked the circuit court to find section 72.011(3) unconstitutional. The trial court ruled it was without subject matter jurisdiction to dispose of any issues raised. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. The circuit court concluded it had no subject matter jurisdiction because of the provisions in section 72.011(3)....

...sal of the action and imposition of an additional penalty in the amount of 25 (twenty-five) percent of the tax assessed. * * * * * * (5) The requirements of this section are jurisdictional. Don's made no attempt to satisfy any of the requirements of section 72.011(3)....

...The Department relies on Mirabal v. Department of Revenue, 553 So.2d 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), which involved the same statute as this case, and which approved dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, in that case, the constitutionality of section 72.011 was apparently not raised, and it clearly was not discussed....

...The Department also suggests that the circuit court did not need to consider the constitutionality of the statute because it would be bound by our sister court's decision in Department of Revenue v. Nu-Life Health and Fitness Center, 623 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), which upheld section 72.011 against a similar constitutional challenge. Since this district has not issued an opinion concerning the constitutionality of section 72.011, we agree that the circuit court was bound to follow Nu-Life....

...if a *900 plaintiff were too impoverished to pay or bond the full amount. The First District Court of Appeal in Nu-Life thought that the Legislature had followed the supreme court's blueprint for constitutionality, stated in North Port, in drafting section 72.011(3). It pointed to two alternative remedies open to challenging a tax assessment: the power of the Department to waive the bond or payment requirements as provided in section 72.011(3); and an administrative proceeding pursuant to Chapter 120, which has no bond or payment requirements....

...If it is, it is so broad and general, there is no difference between what the executive director is doing and what a circuit court would be doing pursuant to North Bank. Further, these guidelines have no statutory basis, which poses still another constitutional delegation of powers problem. [10] In order to salvage section 72.011 from constitutional challenge, pursuant to North Bank and Psychiatric Associates, it is necessary to read into subsection (b)2, "by any other security arrangement as may be approved by the court," the right of the taxpayer to move the...

...The statute expressly provides the director can waive this requirement. But it does not expressly deprive the court of this discretionary power. This is a close question, [11] but we err on the side of endeavoring to uphold the constitutionality of a statute where possible. [12] Thus we construe section 72.011(3) as allowing a taxpayer filing a suit in the circuit court to challenge a tax assessment, the right to petition the court to hold a hearing in order to allow the taxpayer to make other security arrangements in lieu of paying the full assessed contested taxes or posting a bond for the full amount....

...Further, the taxpayer need not have petitioned for this alternative relief prior to filing suit or simultaneously with filing suit, as argued by the Department. The statute only provides for dismissal of the taxpayer's complaint, if the taxpayer fails to pay the uncontested amount of taxes. § 72.011(3)(b)2....

...In this case there are no uncontested taxes. Prior to any hearing on the merits, however, such alternative security arrangements must be sought, for the contested tax amount, and if the court's orders in this regard are not complied with by the taxpayer, then the suit should be dismissed. Section 72.011(5) provides that the bond/payment/alternative arrangements are "jurisdictional." But, the plaintiff taxpayer must be afforded a realistic opportunity to make alternative security arrangements after filing suit, before facing dismissal of the cause of action....

...al judgment for Ray Construction on the merits of the complaint. We affirm in part and reverse in part. The Department asserts error in the circuit court's ruling that the 60-day jurisdictional time limit for contest of tax assessments prescribed by section 72.011(2), Florida Statutes (1993), was tolled by the Department's failure to promulgate rules as required by section 72.011(2), and because the notice of proposed assessment issued by the Department with respect to the four specific land conveyances was ambiguous, and thus, was insufficient to notify the taxpayer and begin the 60-day time limitation prescribed by the statute. The Department also asserts that the circuit court erred in entertaining a declaratory judgment action and in entering final judgment for Ray Construction on the merits of the claim. We reverse the ruling that the 60-day time limitation of section 72.011(2) was tolled, and remand with directions to dismiss the complaint, so far as it pertains to the four tax assessments, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon Ray Construction's failure to comply with the statutory time limits for filing suit....

...However, we affirm the final judgment insofar as it provides a declaratory judgment determining that Ray Construction is not liable for additional tax assessments with respect to similar land conveyances not yet subjected to audit and assessment by the Department. Section 72.011(2) provides, in part: (2) No action may be brought to contest an assessment of any tax, interest, or penalty assessed under a section or chapter specified in subsection (1) after 60 days *861 from the date the assessment becomes final....

...Under the provisions of this statute a taxpayer has 60 days from the date an assessment becomes final within which to file a petition for administrative proceedings pursuant to chapter 120, Florida Statutes, or to file a complaint in the circuit court. The requirements of section 72.011(2) are jurisdictional, and therefore, failure to comply precludes the circuit court from entertaining jurisdiction over the matter....

...Nu-Life Health and Fitness Center, 623 So.2d 747, 752 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The court below determined that the 60-day period was tolled because the Department failed to sufficiently promulgate rules of procedure by which the taxpayer shall be notified as required by section 72.011(2)....

...yer on notice that the assessment would become final, and that the taxpayer had 60 days from the period the notice became final within which to challenge the assessment. The Department's duty to promulgate rules regarding tax assessments is found in section 72.011(2), which provides in pertinent part: The Department of Revenue ......

...consequences imposed under the 60-day limitation period, the court held that strict compliance with the statutory notice requirement was necessary in order to commence the running of the 60-day period. Id. at 233. [2] By contrast, the statute here, section 72.011(2), plainly states that the 60-day period begins to run "from the date the assessment becomes final." The statute contains no provision concerning the manner in which notice of finality of the assessment shall be communicated to the taxpayer. Instead, the department is given discretion concerning the procedure and method for such notice, albeit the department is statutorily directed, under section 72.011(2), to exercise that discretion by enactment of a rule....

...*863 We similarly reject, as unsupported by any legal authority which has been brought to our attention, Ray Construction's assertion that an action for declaratory relief is maintainable without regard for the 60-day jurisdictional limit found in section 72.011(2)....

...The disposition of the due process issue makes it is unnecessary to reach the other issues raised by the parties on appeal. . Florida Constitution, Article V, § 20(c)(3), grants Florida circuit courts jurisdiction to hear challenges to any state tax. Florida Statutes § 72.011 (1988) and § 86.011 (1987) give Florida circuit courts the power to issue declaratory and injunctive relief' in tax cases....

...ry judgment against Newsweek. The district court of appeal affirmed. Newsweek, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 689 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The district court reasoned that Newsweek *247 should have availed itself of the prepayment remedy under section 72.011, Florida Statutes (1987), which allowed a taxpayer to file suit and pay the contested amount into the court registry rather than to the government....

...The trial court certified a class and, on the merits, ruled that the Department had misinterpreted the statute. The Department has appealed. As was true in Westring, we conclude that Bauta was required to file a claim for refund before invoking the jurisdiction of the circuit court. See Westring, 682 So.2d at 172; see also § 72.011, Fla....

...Lauderdale, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kelly M. Behmke, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. SALARIO, Judge. This is an appeal from the Florida Department of Revenue's dismissal of a petition to review the denial of a tax refund. Section 72.011(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), provides that an action to contest the assessment of certain taxes, including those at issue here, must be brought within sixty days of the date the assessment becomes final and also that an action to...

...al. The notice also informed American Heritage that it could seek either administrative review under chapter 120 or judicial review by filing a petition or complaint, as appropriate, no later than sixty days after the assessment became final. See § 72.011(1)(a), (2)(a) (providing right to administrative or judicial review and establishing time limit)....

...The Department responded by filing a motion asking DOAH to relinquish jurisdiction. The Department argued that the petition was a challenge to the Department's 2010 assessment of a sales tax deficiency and was, for that reason, time- barred under section 72.011(2)(a) because it was not brought within sixty days of the date the assessment became final....

...associated with the procedural mechanisms employed at the agency level. -4- not an action to contest the assessment of a tax, but rather was a challenge to a refund denial and, as such, was permitted by section 72.011(2)(a) to be brought within sixty days of the date the denial became final....

...It characterizes the transfer from its bank account to the Department as all three of those things and argues that its petition sought review of the Department's denial of its application within sixty days of the date the denial became final. American Heritage thus contends that the Department misinterpreted section 72.011(2)(a) by characterizing the petition as a challenge to the 2010 assessment and dismissing it as untimely. There is no dispute about the underlying facts, and American Heritage's argument is one of statutory construction. Because we may set aside an agency's final order where the agency interprets the law wrongly and the right interpretation compels a particular result, see § 120.68(7)(d), we consider de novo the issue of whether the agency misinterpreted section 72.011 when it dismissed the petition. See M.H. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 977 So. 2d 755, 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). -5-  Our consideration begins with the text of the statute. In relevant part, section 72.011 provides as follows: (1)(a) A taxpayer may contest the legality of any assessment or denial of refund of tax, fee, surcharge, permit, interest, or penalty provided for under ....

...Labeling an action brought to contest an assessment as one brought to contest a refund denial does not change its purpose as an action brought to contest an assessment. American Heritage's argument that we should interpret the statute differently, if accepted, would place section 72.011(2)(a)'s separate time limitations for assessment and refund contests in conflict....

...l) (citations omitted) (quoting -9- Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992))); B.R. v. State, 145 So. 3d 196, 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (same). Interpreting section 72.011(2)(a) to allow a taxpayer to mount an untimely action to contest a tax assessment through a petition to review a refund denial under circumstances like those here would render the statute's sixty-day limitation on actions brought to contest tax assessments meaningless....

...s to be effective—but it is especially so here. In this statute, the legislature has not merely specified a time limit within which actions brought to contest tax assessments must be brought; it has stated that the time limit is jurisdictional. § 72.011(5)....

...Such a statute "automatically bars untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension," May v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So. 2d 1143, 1157 (Fla. 2000), and operates as a divestiture of jurisdiction to hear a claim, Taylor v. City of Lake Worth, 964 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). In section 72.011(2)(a), then, the legislature established an absolute rule that assessment contests must be brought within sixty days of finality....

...the statute setting a jurisdictional time limit for refund contests in conflict with the provision of the statute setting a jurisdictional time limit for assessment contests. In contrast, interpreting the statute as we have allows both jurisdictional time periods in section 72.011(2)(a) to have effect and to function harmoniously....

...Judicial relief through an action seeking review was filed. Ultimately, the First District held that Newsweek had a prospective, prepayment remedy to challenge the constitutionality—it could have filed a lawsuit and deposited the disputed tax in the court registry, see § 72.011(1), (3)—and that due process therefore did not require that it also have a retrospective, postpayment refund action....

...postpayment remedy for the kind of dispute American Heritage seeks to have decided. The assessment dispute in this case was subject to an explicit statutory limitation that it may not be brought "more than 60 days after the date the assessment becomes final." § 72.011(2)(a)....

...rtiorari in their challenge to the assessment of certain sales and use taxes. The trial court denied their motion for alternative security arrangements, and determined that petitioners were not entitled to a waiver of the bond posting requirement of section 72.011, Florida Statutes....

...The facts, as set forth in the trial court's order, are as follows: Plaintiffs filed suit against the Florida Department of Revenue ("Department") challenging the assessment of sales and use taxes. On April 5, 2000, Plaintiffs requested that the Department waive the bond posting requirements enumerated in section 72.011, Florida Statutes....

...atisfy any possible judgment in favor of the Department. Plaintiffs' request was denied on April 18, 2003. The Department advised Plaintiffs that in order to determine whether a taxpayer's financial resources are sufficient to warrant a waiver under section 72.011, it is necessary to ensure that the taxpayer will have the resources to pay the Department in full if it prevails in the litigation....

...s for tax years 1996 through 1998, and that although Plaintiffs' net income was $996,300.00 in 1998, they failed to retain that income and made almost $1.1 million in distributions. Plaintiffs now seek an alternative security arrangement pursuant to section 72.011(3)(b)(2), Florida Statutes. Under section 72.011, a taxpayer who challenges the legality of a tax assessment in circuit court must pay the amount of the uncontested tax and either: (1) deposit the contested amount of the assessment into the court's registry with the complaint; or (2) file with the complaint a cash or surety bond for the contested amount endorsed by a surety company, or by any other security arrangement approved by the court. § 72.011(3), Fla....

...Plaintiffs had the opportunity to provide such documentation prior to, and at, the hearing, but have continually failed to do so. The court then found that plaintiffs "failed to provide sufficient evidence of financial viability to warrant a waiver under section 72.011." Petitioners now seek review of the circuit court's order. Petitioners request that this court grant a writ of prohibition restraining the circuit court from requiring them to post a bond or make any other financial security arrangement in favor of respondent when, according to them, section 72.011 is "silent as to whether any security arrangement is required when a taxpayer files, and is denied, a refund of tax concurrently with its challenge to an assessment on the very same tax issue as the one assessed." In the alternative, petitioners seek from this court a writ of certiorari. In this regard, they argue that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by denying their motion for an alternative security arrangement and effectively ruling that absent compliance with section 72.011, it is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear their challenge to the assessment....

...rable harm. See, e.g., Beekie v. Morgan, 751 So.2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). In the instant case, neither component of certiorari is present. There is no departure from the essential requirements of law because the ruling was pursuant to the terms of section 72.011(3), which provides in part as follows: (3) In any action filed in circuit court contesting the legality of any tax, interest, or penalty assessed under a section or chapter specified in subsection (1), the plaintiff must: (a) Pay to th...

...itioned upon payment in full of the judgment, including the taxes, costs, penalties, and interest, unless this requirement is waived in writing by the executive director of the applicable department or by the county official designated by ordinance. Section 72.011(3) clearly applies in the instant case, as it covers "any" action challenging a tax....

...The class members were notified that their assets would be frozen or seized if the tax and penalties were not immediately paid. Most class members did not challenge the assessments or seek refunds within the short time periods prescribed by sections 72.011, providing an administrative remedy, or section 215.26, for applications for refund....

...In 1996, the class plaintiffs sought refunds for the taxes and penalties paid between 1986 and 1994. The Department moved to dismiss the action because the plaintiffs had not previously filed administrative refund requests within 60 days and/or 3 years of payment, as required by sections 72.011 and 215.26, respectively....

...taxes pursuant to a statute later declared unconstitutional. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990). They argued that state law, including the procedures in sections 72.011 and 215.26, did not provide "meaningful" relief because use of the procedures would have been futile....

...crued." Each of the persons in the certified class, including the individual appellees, was sent a written assessment for the amount of the tax. The vast majority of the class failed to challenge their assessment within the 60 day period required by section 72.011(2), but some class members did challenge the assessment in a timely manner....

...nt and entered a final judgment for the plaintiffs. II. Legal Discussion Our decision is controlled by Department of Revenue v. Nemeth, 733 So.2d 970 (Fla.1999), where the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the administrative remedies provided by section 72.011 were inadequate because the Comptroller of the Department of Revenue could not declare a tax unconstitutional....

...r fuel taxes paid during those two quarters. The Department denied the refund because the requests were time-barred under subsection 206.41(5)(c)(1). The School Board contested the refund denial by filing a timely complaint in the circuit court. See § 72.011, Fla....

...n 72.041, and asserts that section 95.091(1)(b) is applicable. Section 95.091(1)(b), entitled "Limitation on actions to collect taxes," provides: Any tax lien granted by law to the state or any of its political subdivisions for any tax enumerated in s. 72.011 shall expire 20 years after the last date the tax may be assessed, after the tax becomes delinquent, or after the filing of a tax warrant, whichever is later. An action to collect any tax enumerated in s. 72.011 may not be commenced after the expiration of the lien securing the payment of the tax. Section 72.011 applies to sales tax which is the type of tax appellant is seeking to recover....

WEBSTER, J. Appellants commenced an action in Leon County circuit court pursuant to section 72.011, Florida Statutes (2003), challenging the denial by the Department of Revenue of their application seeking refunds of state corporate income taxes paid for the years 1996 through 1999....

...fy the Due Process Clause, and taxpayers cannot complain if they fail to avail themselves of this procedure. Id. at 39 n. 21, 110 S.Ct. at 2251 n. 21 (citations omitted; emphasis added). This court recently determined that the procedure, pursuant to section 72.011, whereby a taxpayer can contest a tax without penalty, by filing suit and paying the amount of the contested tax into the court registry, constituted a meaningful predeprivation remedy, consistent with due process, and made it unnecessary to provide meaningful backward-looking relief....

...not factors in this case. The taxpayers in McKesson were subject to onerous penalties if they did not pay the disputed tax before seeking a refund in a proceeding contesting the constitutionality of the tax. They had no predeprivation remedy because section 72.011 was not available to contest the liquor taxes at issue in that case; for that reason, McKesson is inapplicable. Newsweek, 689 So.2d at 364. In this case, Sharper Image has availed itself of the predeprivation procedure under section 72.011....

...lenged exemptions. IV. Conclusion We hold that Sharper Image is subject to the use tax assessment because it distributed catalogs in this state. A McKesson remedy is out of place here because Sharper Image had an adequate predeprivation procedure in section 72.011, which it has pursued, and the tax involved in this case is a legal tax that did not competitively disadvantage the taxpayer....

...Had the legislature meant for the statute to function as a statute. of limitations, a statute of repose, or a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim it would and quite easily could have used language that served that function. The statute books are filled with language that does that kind of thing. See, e.g., § 72.011(5), Fla....

...tified and should be transferred to Leon County. The DOR did not dispute venue in Broward County prior to Citrix withdrawing because Citrix had initially filed its action to contest a final assessment of corporate income and excise taxes pursuant to section 72.011, Florida Statutes, whereas Appellants brought suit only as payors of sales taxes and did not allege that the DOR issued a final assessment or denied a refund pursuant to section 72.011, Florida Statutes. Section 72.011(l)(a)-(b) states: l)(a) A taxpayer may contest the legality of any assessment or denial of refund of tax, ......

...[[Image here]] (b) A taxpayer may not file an action under paragraph (a) to contest an assessment or a denial of refund of any tax ... until the taxpayer complies with the applicable registration requirements contained in those statutes which apply to the tax for which the action is filed. Section 72.011(4)(a), specifically relating to venue, states: 4)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), an action initiated in circuit court pursuant to subsection (1) shall be filed in the Second Judicial Circuit court in and for Leon County or in the circuit court in the county where the taxpayer resides.......

...any assessment of a tax or denial of a refund. In Department of Revenue v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 720 So.2d 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), this court stated that “having to pay sales tax cannot be construed as an assessment’ within the meaning of section 72.011.” Id. at 271 . This court recognized that an assessment under section 72.011 “comprehends only two situations:” (1) when the taxpayer has received an assessment of tax which the taxpayer has not paid; and (2) when the taxpayer has paid a tax, requested a refund and received a denial of refund....

...e Act) (b) Chapter 440 (the Florida Workers' Compensation Act) (c) Section 24.110 (All civil or administrative actions against the Lottery Department) (d) Section 39.074 (Decisions of Governor and Cabinet regarding siting of juvenile facilities) (e) Section 72.011 (Actions by taxpayers, resident and non-resident, challenging tax assessments) (f) Section 99.097(5) (Action to contest verification of ballot petition by Department of State if more than one county is involved) (g) Section 102.1685 (A...

was waived because the suit was brought under section 72.011, Florida Statutes, which provides for circuit

...Lauderdale, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kelly M. Behmke, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. SALARIO, Judge. This is an appeal from the Florida Department of Revenue's dismissal of a petition to review the denial of a tax refund. Section 72.011(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), provides that an action to contest the assessment of certain taxes, including those at issue here, must be brought within sixty days of the date the assessment becomes final and also that an action to...

...al. The notice also informed American Heritage that it could seek either administrative review under chapter 120 or judicial review by filing a petition or complaint, as appropriate, no later than sixty days after the assessment became final. See § 72.011(1)(a), (2)(a) (providing right to administrative or judicial review and establishing time limit)....

...The Department responded by filing a motion asking DOAH to relinquish jurisdiction. The Department argued that the petition was a challenge to the Department's 2010 assessment of a sales tax deficiency and was, for that reason, time- barred under section 72.011(2)(a) because it was not brought within sixty days of the date the assessment became final....

...associated with the procedural mechanisms employed at the agency level. -4- not an action to contest the assessment of a tax, but rather was a challenge to a refund denial and, as such, was permitted by section 72.011(2)(a) to be brought within sixty days of the date the denial became final....

...It characterizes the transfer from its bank account to the Department as all three of those things and argues that its petition sought review of the Department's denial of its application within sixty days of the date the denial became final. American Heritage thus contends that the Department misinterpreted section 72.011(2)(a) by characterizing the petition as a challenge to the 2010 assessment and dismissing it as untimely. There is no dispute about the underlying facts, and American Heritage's argument is one of statutory construction. Because we may set aside an agency's final order where the agency interprets the law wrongly and the right interpretation compels a particular result, see § 120.68(7)(d), we consider de novo the issue of whether the agency misinterpreted section 72.011 when it dismissed the petition. See M.H. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 977 So. 2d 755, 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). -5-  Our consideration begins with the text of the statute. In relevant part, section 72.011 provides as follows: (1)(a) A taxpayer may contest the legality of any assessment or denial of refund of tax, fee, surcharge, permit, interest, or penalty provided for under ....

...Labeling an action brought to contest an assessment as one brought to contest a refund denial does not change its purpose as an action brought to contest an assessment. American Heritage's argument that we should interpret the statute differently, if accepted, would place section 72.011(2)(a)'s separate time limitations for assessment and refund contests in conflict....

...l) (citations omitted) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992))); B.R. v. State, 145 So. 3d 196, 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (same). Interpreting -9- section 72.011(2)(a) to allow a taxpayer to mount an untimely action to contest a tax assessment through a petition to review a refund denial under circumstances like those here would render the statute's sixty-day limitation on actions brought to contest tax assessments meaningless....

...s to be effective—but it is especially so here. In this statute, the legislature has not merely specified a time limit within which actions brought to contest tax assessments must be brought; it has stated that the time limit is jurisdictional. § 72.011(5)....

...Such a statute "automatically bars untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension," May v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So. 2d 1143, 1157 (Fla. 2000), and operates as a divestiture of jurisdiction to hear a claim, Taylor v. City of Lake Worth, 964 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). In section 72.011(2)(a), then, the legislature established an absolute rule that assessment contests must be brought within sixty days of finality....

...the statute setting a jurisdictional time limit for refund contests in conflict with the provision of the statute setting a jurisdictional time limit for assessment contests. In contrast, interpreting the statute as we have allows both jurisdictional time periods in section 72.011(2)(a) to have effect and to function harmoniously....

...Judicial relief through an action seeking review was filed. Ultimately, the First District held that Newsweek had a prospective, prepayment remedy to challenge the constitutionality—it could have filed a lawsuit and deposited the disputed tax in the court registry, see § 72.011(1), (3)—and that due process therefore did not require that it also have a retrospective, postpayment refund action....

...postpayment remedy for the kind of dispute American Heritage seeks to have decided. The assessment dispute in this case was subject to an explicit statutory limitation that it may not be brought "more than 60 days after the date the assessment becomes final." § 72.011(2)(a)....

...d have exclusive jurisdiction “In all cases involving the legality of any tax assessment or toll,” by adding “except as provided in s.213.19.” Chapter 81-178, § 11 created § 213.19, Fla. Stat., which was renumbered in statutory revision as § 72.011, Fla.Stat. (1981). Section 72.011 provides that a taxpayer may contest the legality of any assessment of tax, interest, or penalty under various *267 chapters by filing an action in circuit court, or alternatively, by filing a petition under the applicable provisions of Chapter 120....

...The total of the tax, penalty, and interest assessed was $12,698.75. The tax was calculated based on the amount of the outstanding indebtedness secured by the mortgage at the time of the transfer — $1,096,828.87. PMR challenged the assessment pursuant to section 72.011, Florida Statutes (2000), contending that it was not a purchaser which had given consideration for the transfer of the property....

...The total amount of those taxes was $760,034.88. Swago filed a three count complaint for declaratory relief against the Department, contending that no taxes were owed. At the same time, it filed a motion with the court to approve an alternative security arrangement under section 72.011, Florida Statutes (1995), to provide it with a security arrangement other than paying into the court' the entire amount of the taxes contested....

...registration. It therefore abated the assessment, and the Department appealed. The Department contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Swago’s complaint because Swago failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of section 72.011....

...“A taxpayer may contest the legality of any assessment or denial of refund of tax, fee, surcharge, permit, interest, or penalty ... by filing an action in circuit court; or, alternatively, the taxpayer may file a petition under the applicable provisions of chapter 120.” § 72.011(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). Subsection 72.011(3) provides: In any action filed in circuit court contesting the legality of any tax, interest, or penalty assessed under a section or chapter specified in subsection (1), the plaintiff must: *763 (a) Pay to the applicable department t...

...good faith de minimis error, failed to comply with any of the requirements of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b), the plaintiff shall be given a reasonable time within which to comply before the action is dismissed. (Emphasis added). The requirements of section 72.011 are jurisdictional. See § 72.011(5); see also Mirabal v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 553 So.2d 1297, 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (affirming trial court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where requirements of 72.011 were not satisfied)....

...The fact that Swago’s action is one for declaratory relief does not excuse it from complying with these jurisdictional requirements. See State Dep’t of Revenue v. Ray Constr. of Okaloosa County, 667 So.2d 859, 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (finding language in 72.011(2) that jurisdictional requirement applies to an “action” includes actions for declaratory relief). Swago complied with 72.011(3)(a) by paying to the Department the amount of the assessment that was not contested....

...esting that it not be required to pay the full amount of the portion of the assessment contested. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that Swago did not need to post a bond. The Department argues that Swago did not satisfy the requirements of 72.011(3)(b) because it did not develop the alternative security arrangement with the Department. It claims that Swago should have first proposed the alternative arrangement to the Department so the Department would have the opportunity to waive the requirement. According to the Department’s interpretation of 72.011(3)(b)2., the trial court is only permitted to review whether the alternative agreement ensures “payment in full of the judgment, including the taxes, costs, penalties, and interest.” The Department also contends that by granting Swago’s motion for an alternative arrangement, the court impermissibly waived the requirements of 72.011(3)....

...The Department’s ability to waive the requirements does not limit the court’s authority to approve an alternative security arrangement. In Department of Revenue v. Nu-Life Health & Fitness Center, 623 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), the court considered whether section 72.011(3) was unconstitutional for denying access to the courts....

...t or to post as bond pending the outcome of the litigation.”' Nu-Life, 623 So.2d at 749 . The first district determined the legislature implemented the supreme court’s decision in North Port by providing the following two express alternatives in 72.011(3): “[t]he taxpayer may either obtain a written waiver of these requirements from the executive director of the Department or file a motion for an alternative security arrangement to be approved by the court.” Id.- (emphasis added). Thus, the court found 72.011(3)‘does not deprive taxpayers of the constitutional right of access to courts. See id. at 750 . Because Nu-Life did not “satisf[y] any of the requirements of section 72.011(3) and did not attempt to obtain a written waiver from the director or file a motion for a court-approved security arrangement” the district court found the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the judgment finding the statute unconstitutional....

...5th DCA 1995), the court also approved the right of a taxpayer to move the court to post a lesser bond or make alternative security arrangements. Id. at 900-01 . The court-approved alternative security arrangement obtained by Swago was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 72.011(3)(b)2. The statute does not require Swago to obtain the Department’s approval of the alternative agreement. The fact that the statute expressly provides that the director of the Department can waive the requirements in 72.011(3)(b)2....

...This was a tax assessment as described in Florida Export Tobacco Co. v. Department of Revenue, 510 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 519 So.2d 986 , 987 (Fla.1987). Jai alai pari-mutuel taxes under chapter 551, Florida Statutes, are not included in the concurrént jurisdiction provisions of section 72.011, Florida Statutes....

...*1096 The trial court denied the DOR’s motion to strike the Tribe’s affidavit, granted the Tribe’s motion for summary judgment, and denied the DOR’s motion for summary judgment. In its order and final judgment, the trial court found that it had jurisdiction, pursuant to section 72.011(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...rough an 1 Section 95.091(3)(a)1.b., Florida Statutes (2010), the statute of limitations at issue, provides in part that “the Department . . . may determine and assess the amount of any tax, penalty, or interest due under any tax enumerated in s. 72.011, which it has authority to administer” “within 3 years after the date the tax is due, any return with respect to the tax is due, or such return is filed, whichever occurs later.” (Emphasis added). 2 informal protest, an administrative hearing, or a judicial proceeding....

...Dep’t of Revenue, 597 So. 2d 380, 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). As we explained, section 95.091(3)(a)1.b., Florida Statutes (2010), provides that the Department may “determine and assess the amount of any tax, penalty, or interest due under any tax enumerated in s. 72.011” “within 3 years after the date the tax is due, any return with respect to the tax is due, or such return is filed, whichever occurs later.” (Emphasis added)....

...The Department argues that the proposed assessment was the pertinent assessment for purposes of the statute of limitations. As the parties acknowledge, section 95.091 does not define the word “assess.” In support of its argument, the Department relies upon section 72.011, Florida Statutes (2010), which addresses in part the jurisdiction of circuit courts in specific tax matters. Section 72.011(1)(a) provides that a “taxpayer may contest the legality of any assessment or denial of refund of tax . . . by filing an action in circuit court; or, alternatively, the taxpayer may file a petition under the applicable provisions of 6 chapter 120.” Section 72.011(2)(a) provides in part that “[a]n action may not be brought to contest an assessment of any tax, interest, or penalty assessed under a section or chapter specified in subsection (1) more than 60 days after the date the assessment becomes final.” The date upon which “an assessment . . . becomes final and procedures by which a taxpayer must be notified of the assessment . . . must be established: [b]y rule adopted by the Department . . . .” § 72.011(2)(b)1., Fla....

...1)(c) of the rule provides that the “Assessment becomes final for purposes of Chapter 72, F.S., upon the expiration of 60 consecutive calendar days . . . after the date of issuance on the Assessment . . . .” As the Department contends, section 72.011(2)(a) supports its position that the Legislature contemplated both non-final and final tax assessments. Although the word “non-final” was not used in the statute, the implication is clear by virtue of the Legislature’s use of the language “assessment becomes final.” Nevertheless, we find that neither the language of section 72.011 nor rule 12-6.003 settles the specific matter at hand of whether the assessment contemplated in section 95.091(3)(a) is a final assessment. 7  As did the trial court, the Department also relies upon our decision in Florida Export Tobacco Co., Inc....

...available administrative remedies. To receive a tax refund, a taxpayer must file a refund application with the Department. § 215.26(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). If the refund application is denied, the taxpayer can contest the denial in the circuit court. § 72.011(2)(a), Fla....

...jurisdiction” in the general jurisdiction statute, section 26.012(2)(e), Florida Statutes (circuit courts have “exclusive original” jurisdiction in “all cases involving legality of any tax assessment or toll or denial of refund, except as provided in s. 72.011”), as to certain tax matters, does not trump the specific jurisdictional statute in the tax code with language to the contrary. See § 194.171(1), Fla....

...t area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms.” McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994); Stevens v. State, 127 So. 3d 668, 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (same). To read section 26.012(2)(e) and section 72.011 as both providing “exclusive original jurisdiction” is mistaken; the word “exclusive” is only in the general statute....

limitations. For example, subsection (2) of section 72.011 sets forth a sixty-day limit for contesting

...The Department of Revenue, State of Florida, appeals a judgment in favor of Imperial Builders & Supply, Inc. invalidating a tax assessment. Appellee sells greenhouse materials at retail and also constructs greenhouses. It instituted suit pursuant to section 72.011, Florida Statutes, challenging the legality of a sales and use tax assessment made by the department....

...bonds, as required by section 220.13(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes. State Farm paid the assessed amount and interest under protest to avoid interest continuing to accrue. It then sued in circuit court to contest the legality of that assessment in full. See § 72.011(1)(a), Fla....

...Stat. (1979). The purpose of this bond is precisely to ensure that taxes assessed by DOR are collectible at such time as their legality is upheld by the courts. This conclusion is also supported by the Florida Legislature’s subsequent enactment of Section 72.011, Fla.Stat....

...ax ... by filing an action in circuit court; [[Image here]] (2) No action may be brought to contest an assessment of any tax, interest or penalty assessed ... after 60 days from the date the assessment becomes final. Effective as of October 1, 1981, Section 72.011 was intended to clarify existing law. Taken together, Sections 72.011(1) and (2) reinforce the Court’s conclusion that the DOR assessment became final in April of 1981, and that GDC timely commenced an *132 action in the Leon County Circuit Court to contest the legality of that assessment within sixty days of its finality....

...bond. . The Court regards the subsequent repeal of this provision to be immaterial, in that there is no question that it was in effect at the time the Leon County Circuit Court action was commenced. Moreover, upon repeal § 214.26 was replaced with § 72.011, Fla.Stat. (1981), which contains a similar requirement of payment or filing of a bond. Section 72.011(3), Fla.Stat....

...ee. In the order on appeal, the trial court ruled that it lacked the authority to set an alternative security arrangement under section 72. 011 (3) (b)2, Florida Statutes (2001), and that, since PageNet did not fulfill any of the other conditions in section 72.011(3), Florida Statutes (2001), the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action....

...Because the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked the authority to establish an alternative security arrangement, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Before a taxpayer can pursue its statutory remedy to challenge an assessment in circuit court, see section 72.011(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), the taxpayer must comply with one of the conditions set forth in section 72.011(3)....

...iting by the executive director of the *826 applicable department or by the county official designated by ordinance. (Emphasis supplied). At the time it filed its complaint, PageN-et filed a motion for alternative security arrangement asserting that section 72.011(3)(b)2 provided the court with the authority to set an alternative security arrangement. In the motion, PageNet asked the trial court to waive the security requirements of section 72.011 on the grounds that: (1) since the complaint involved questions regarding the constitutionality of the Department’s rules as well as its application of the taxing statute, only the circuit court was permitted to hear the action; and...

...sufficient financial security to cover the assessments. Alternatively, PageNet asked for any other relief the court deemed just and appropriate including, but not limited to, setting a lesser alternative security amount. Simultaneously, pursuant to section 72.011(3)(b)2, PageNet requested from the Department a waiver of the requirement for posting bond....

...ing of the complaint, PageNet was obligated to file a cash bond or make some security arrangement that guaranteed “payment in full of the judgment, including costs, penalties, and interest” in accordance with the Department’s interpretation of section 72.011(3)(b)2....

...irector and file with an amended complaint an alternative security arrangement that may be approved by the court which ... [was] conditioned upon payment in full of the judgment, including the taxes, costs, penalties and interest, in accordance with section 72.011(3)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2001).” 1 PageNet was either unable or unwilling to exercise the first three options in the trial court’s order....

...court entered the order appealed dismissing the case with prejudice determining that “it could not, on its own cognizance, substitute its judgment for that of the Department of Revenue’s executive director and waive the cash/bond requirement of section 72.011(3)(b), Florida Statutes.” The trial court ruled that it was “without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the matter complained of.” This appeal ensued. The issue before us is whether the circuit court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over an action challenging a tax assessment pursuant to section 72.011(3) when the taxpayer files a motion requesting the court to approve an alternative security arrangement, but does not fulfill *827 either the tender or bond conditions of section 72.011(3)(b) and does not obtain a waiver from the executive director of the Department or the concurrence of the Department to the alternative security arrangement....

...SC04-1836, 889 So.2d 71 , 2004 WL 2979731 (Fla. November 17, 2004), a case involving nearly identical issues. We agree with the Swago court that, by filing a motion for alternative security arrangement at the time it filed its complaint, PageNet satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of section 72.011(3). Id. at 762. See also Department of Revenue v. Nu-Life Health & Fitness Center, 623 So.2d 747, 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In Swago, the Department argued that the taxpayer had not complied with section 72.011(3)(b) “because it did not develop the alternative security arrangement with the Department.” Swago, 877 So.2d at 763 (emphasis in original)....

...nsures ‘payment in full of the judgment, including the taxes, costs, penalties, and interest.’ ” Id. The Stvago court addressed these arguments, saying: The plain reading of the statute belies the Department’s interpretation. The language of 72.011(3)(b)2....

...As for the circuit court’s discretion in addressing a motion for alternative security arrangement, we agree with the reasoning of the Fifth District in Don’s Sod Co. v. Department of Revenue, 661 So.2d 896, 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). There, the court explained: Thus, we construe section 72.011(3) as allowing a taxpayer filing a suit in the circuit court to challenge a tax assessment, the right to petition the court to hold a hearing in order to allow the taxpayer to make other security arrangements in lieu of paying the full assessed contested taxes or posting a bond for the full amount....

...§ 1341; (3) The court should abstain because there is an identical action pending in state court in Sarasota, Florida; and (4) The court lacks jurisdiction because plaintiff has failed to timely file suit and failed to meet any of the required financial security arrangements listed in Fla. Stat. § 72.011....

...Defendant's memorandum of law, however, fails to discuss this issue or cite any legal authority to the Court. Accordingly, the Court deems this issue to have been waived. D. State Statutory Procedures: Defendant argues that the case must be dismissed because it was not filed within the limitations period of Fla. Stat. § 72.011....

...The Florida Constitution grants the state’s Circuit Courts with jurisdiction to hear challenges to any state tax. Fla. Const, art. V, § 20(c)(3). Florida courts are also given power to issue declaratory and injunctive relief in tax cases. See FLA. STAT.ANN. § 72.011 (West Supp.1988) and § 86.011 (West 1987)....

Accredited filed the action below pursuant to section 72.011(1), Florida Statutes (1993) contesting the

...vehicle components, parts, and labor related to goodwill repairs provided by GM to its Florida customers. After exhausting its administrative remedies with the Department, GM challenged the Department’s assessments in the trial court, pursuant to section 72.011(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), which grants the trial court jurisdiction to hear challenges to “the legality of any assessment” of various taxes, including sales tax and use tax....

...The Code then instructs dealers to file an application to seek a refund from the Department of Revenue. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12A–1.014(5). But when an application for refund is denied, the statute permits only the “taxpayer” to “contest a denial of refund of tax . . . paid under a section or chapter specified in section 72.011(1) pursuant to the provisions of section 72.011.” § 215.26(6), Fla. Stat. 2 Section 72.011 also provides that it is the “taxpayer” who may contest a refund denial in circuit court or by petitioning under chapter 120. § 72.011(1)(a), Fla. Stat. And “the requirements of [section 72.011(1)] are jurisdictional.” § 72.011(5), Fla. Stat. Then section 120.80(14)(b) tells us that “in any administrative proceeding brought pursuant to this chapter as authorized by section 72.011(1), the taxpayer shall be designated as the ‘petitioner.’” (emphasis supplied). And so we see that, unlike the Code which says a dealer is the proper party to seek a refund from the Department, Florida law only allows the taxpayer to receive a refund or to contest a refund denial....

...that section 215.26 means what it says—that the person who paid the tax is the proper person or entity to be refunded. Further, after an application has been denied, Florida law unequivocally states the “taxpayer” is the person or entity who may contest the refund denial. § 72.011(1)(a), Fla....

...But we need not overcomplicate it. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a taxpayer as “someone who pays or is subject to a tax.” Taxpayer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). And there is nothing in the statutes that suggest any other meaning. Reading section 215.26(1) and section 72.011(1)(a) together, therefore, requires that the refund be paid to the person who paid the tax (i.e., the person who bore the tax burden), and that taxpayer is the person entitled to contest a refund denial. Applying the text here, w...

...The Code then instructs dealers to file an application to seek a refund from the Department of Revenue. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12A–1.014(5). But when an application for refund is denied, the statute permits only the “taxpayer” to “contest a denial of refund of tax . . . paid under a section or chapter specified in section 72.011(1) pursuant to the provisions of section 72.011.” § 215.26(6), Fla. Stat. 2 Section 72.011 also provides that it is the “taxpayer” who may contest a refund denial in circuit court or by petitioning under chapter 120. § 72.011(1)(a), Fla. Stat. And “the requirements of [section 72.011(1)] are jurisdictional.” § 72.011(5), Fla. Stat. Then section 120.80(14)(b) tells us that “in any administrative proceeding brought pursuant to this chapter as authorized by section 72.011(1), the taxpayer shall be designated as the ‘petitioner.’” (emphasis supplied). And so we see that, unlike the Code which says a dealer is the proper party to seek a refund from the Department, Florida law only allows the taxpayer to receive a refund or to contest a refund denial....

...that section 215.26 means what it says—that the person who paid the tax is the proper person or entity to be refunded. Further, after an application has been denied, Florida law unequivocally states the “taxpayer” is the person or entity who may contest the refund denial. § 72.011(1)(a), Fla....

...But we need not overcomplicate it. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a taxpayer as “someone who pays or is subject to a tax.” Taxpayer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). And there is nothing in the statutes that suggest any other meaning. Reading section 215.26(1) and section 72.011(1)(a) together, therefore, requires that the refund be paid to the person who paid the tax (i.e., the person who bore the tax burden), and that taxpayer is the person entitled to contest a refund denial. Applying the text here, w...

...The Code then instructs dealers to file an application to seek a refund from the Department of Revenue. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12A–1.014(5). But when an application for refund is denied, the statute permits only the “taxpayer” to “contest a denial of refund of tax . . . paid under a section or chapter specified in section 72.011(1) pursuant to the provisions of section 72.011.” § 215.26(6), Fla. Stat. 2 Section 72.011 also provides that it is the “taxpayer” who may contest a refund denial in circuit court or by petitioning under chapter 120. § 72.011(1)(a), Fla. Stat. And “the requirements of [section 72.011(1)] are jurisdictional.” § 72.011(5), Fla. Stat. Then section 120.80(14)(b) tells us that “in any administrative proceeding brought pursuant to this chapter as authorized by section 72.011(1), the taxpayer shall be designated as the ‘petitioner.’” (emphasis supplied). And so we see that, unlike the Code which says a dealer is the proper party to seek a refund from the Department, Florida law only allows the taxpayer to receive a refund or to contest a refund denial....

...that section 215.26 means what it says—that the person who paid the tax is the proper person or entity to be refunded. Further, after an application has been denied, Florida law unequivocally states the “taxpayer” is the person or entity who may contest the refund denial. § 72.011(1)(a), Fla....

...But we need not overcomplicate it. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a taxpayer as “someone who pays or is subject to a tax.” Taxpayer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). And there is nothing in the statutes that suggest any other meaning. Reading section 215.26(1) and section 72.011(1)(a) together, therefore, requires that the refund be paid to the person who paid the tax (i.e., the person who bore the tax burden), and that taxpayer is the person entitled to contest a refund denial. Applying the text here, w...

applicable provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. § 72.011, Fla.Stat. (1991). The DOR as respondent argues

Department of Revenue, all as is required under section 72.011(3)(b)l as a jurisdictional prerequisite to

...See §§ 210.30(1) & 210.276(1), Fla. Stat. C&S requested a tax refund for OTP taxes it paid between August 2013 and June 2015 (the refund claim). On August 14, 2015, the Division denied the refund claim. The denial letter notified C&S that under section 72.011, Florida Statutes, it had sixty days within which to contest the denial via an administrative or judicial proceeding. On October 13, 2015, C&S filed a petition for formal administrative hearing with the Division (the initial petition)....

...2022, the Division filed a final order dismissing the petitions with prejudice (the final order). 3 The final order concluded the initial petition was “insufficient” and the amended petition was barred by the sixty- day jurisdictional window in section 72.011. The final order stated: The [initial petition] cannot be indefinitely held while waiting on an indeterminate outcome in an unrelated case. The [amended petition], filed outside the 60-day statutory requirement pursuant to section 72.011, F.S., cannot cure any initial petition deficiencies nor include an additional independent basis first asserted years after the Division’s refund denial. The Division concluded neither it nor the Division of Administrati...

...We reverse the portion of the final order dismissing the initial petition. II. That leaves the amended petition. We agree with the Division in this regard. It had no jurisdiction to consider Count one of the amended petition because the jurisdictional statute of nonclaim expired. Section 72.011(2)(a) prohibits filing an action to contest the denial of a refund more than sixty days after the date the denial becomes final. In this case, that date was October 13, 2015. C&S’s initial petition was filed just in time – on the sixtieth day. The amended petition was not filed until years later. The sixty-day window in section 72.011(2)(a) is jurisdictional. § 72.011(5), Fla....

...The circuit court denied the Department's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and entered final judgment for Nu-Life on the merits of its complaint. The Department asserts error in the circuit court's ruling that the provisions in section 72.011(3), Florida Statutes (1989), specifying the jurisdictional prerequisites for filing an action in circuit court to contest the legality of a tax assessment made under chapter 212, are unconstitutional. It also asserts that the circuit court erroneously entered judgment for Nu-Life on the merits of its action. We reverse the ruling that section 72.011(3) is unconstitutional and remand with directions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Nu-Life's failure to comply with that section....

...owed by Nu-Life for the months of January 1, 1986, through November 1, 1988. In February 1989, Nu-Life filed its complaint in circuit court, alleging that these assessments were illegal, null, and void. Nu-Life also alleged that the requirements in section 72.011(3) — that a taxpayer post a bond or tender a deposit in the court registry in the amount of the assessed taxes and penalties as a jurisdictional condition to its proceeding in circuit court — unconstitutionally deprived it of the rig...

...The Department moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Nu-Life had not paid the assessed taxes and had failed to follow any of the conditions to maintaining this suit as required by section 72.011(3). After a pretrial hearing, the circuit court denied the Department's motion to dismiss. Agreeing with Nu-Life, the court ruled that section 72.011(3) is unconstitutional because it denies aggrieved taxpayers such as Nu-Life access to courts as provided in the Florida Constitution, and it unlawfully delegates legislative authority to determine when and under what conditions and circumstances a bond will be required. The court entered final judgment for Nu-Life, ruling that the challenged assessments were illegal, null, and void. [1] On appeal, the Department first challenges the circuit court's ruling that section 72.011(3) violates article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution, governing access to courts. Section 72.011(3), Florida Statutes (1989), reads: (3) In any action filed in circuit court contesting the legality of any tax, interest, or penalty assessed under a section or chapter specified in subsection (1), the plaintiff must: (a) Pay to the a...

...judgment or decree in full, including the taxes complained of, costs, and penalties, the taxpayer could petition the court to fix the amount to deposit in the registry of the court or fix the amount of the bond pending the outcome of the litigation. Section 72.011(3) merely implements this aspect of the court's decision in North Port Bank....

...he taxes, costs, penalties, and interest. The taxpayer may either obtain a written waiver of these requirements from the executive director of the Department or file a motion for an alternative security arrangement to be approved by the court. Thus, section 72.011(3), unlike section 199.242(3), the statute at issue in North Port Bank, contains two express alternatives, one of which is similar to, if not the same as, the alternative the supreme court read into section 199.242(3). The rationale of the supreme court's decision in North Port *750 Bank that section 199.242(3) does not violate the constitutional provision for access to courts leads us to similarly conclude that section 72.011(3) does not deprive Nu-Life of the constitutional right of access to courts....

...The motion also relied on the provisions in section 194.171(6) that the requirements of the foregoing section are jurisdictional and a court shall lose jurisdiction of the case if the taxpayer fails to comply therewith. (A similar provision is found in section 72.011(3).) The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, although the taxpayers had paid the 1984 taxes by the time the order was entered....

...This requirement does not unreasonably restrict a taxpayer's access to court. 514 So.2d at 1075. The principles espoused by the supreme court in Bystrom and in North Port Bank support our conclusion that the restrictive conditions for filing suit in circuit court to contest the validity of a tax assessment contained in 72.011(3) are reasonable and not violative of article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution, and that the circuit court erred in finding section 72.011(3) unconstitutional on this ground. There is, moreover, a further reason for not holding the statute unconstitutional on this ground. A taxpayer is authorized by section 72.011 to file an administrative petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings under chapter 120 to contest the legality of any tax assessment in lieu of filing suit in circuit court....

...1990); Scholastic Systems, Inc. v. LeLoup, 307 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1974); Hill Top Developers v. Holiday Pines Service Corp., 478 So.2d 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 488 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1986). We next discuss the circuit court's ruling that the waiver provision of section 72.011(3) constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority and thereby renders the statute unconstitutional....

...[Citations omitted.] The very conditions which may operate to make direct legislative control impractical or ineffective may also, for the same reasons, make the drafting of detailed or specific legislation impractical or undesirable. [Citation omitted.] 523 So.2d at 1214. Section 72.011(3) does not delegate to the executive director of the Department the power to make a law; rather, it authorizes the law to be applied with obviously necessary flexibility....

...On the contrary, pursuant to section 212.18, the Department promulgated rule 12-3.007(33), Florida Administrative Code, setting out clear, non-arbitrary guidelines for the exercise of that flexibility. Rule 12-3.007(33) states: (33) The Executive Director may waive the requirements of Section 72.011(3)(b) or (c), Florida Statutes, under the following circumstances: (a) When, in the judgment of the Executive Director, the financial resources of the taxpayer are sufficient to ensure that any final judgment upholding an assessment of tax, penalty and interest will be satisfied. (b) When, in the judgment of the Executive Director, payment into the registry of the court or the obtaining of a surety bond would be manifestly unjust because of the circumstances of the assessment or of the taxpayer. Section 72.011(3) delegates to the executive director of the Department limited authority concerning the execution of the statutory provisions in that section. The circuit court erred in ruling that section 72.011(3) amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. As provided in section 72.011(5), the requirements of section 72.011(3) are jurisdictional. Since Nu-Life has not satisfied any of the requirements of section 72.011(3) and did not attempt to obtain a written waiver from the director or file a motion for a court-approved security arrangement, the final judgment must be reversed and the case remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Mirabal v. State, Department of Revenue, 553 So.2d 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (court affirmed a final order dismissing an action challenging a tax levy and assessment because the plaintiff failed to satisfy any of the requirements of section 72.011(3), including the alternative requirements of either a written waiver or a motion for security arrangement, and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction). However, the dismissal should grant Nu-Life leave to amend the complaint, as Nu-Life may be able to cure the jurisdictional deficiencies by complying with the jurisdictional prerequisites contained in section 72.011(3)....

...ON MOTION FOR REHEARING ZEHMER, Chief Judge. The Department contends on motion for rehearing that we erred in directing the trial court to dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. We adhere to this disposition with the following clarification. We reiterate that the requirements of section 72.011(3), Florida Statutes (1989), are jurisdictional....

...Nu-Life contends, however, that its conduct prior to filing the lawsuit legally satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the statute, although these facts were not alleged in its complaint. Since the trial court granted Nu-Life the relief it requested by declaring the jurisdictional requirements of section 72.011(3) unconstitutional, which ruling we have reversed, this case is being remanded to the trial court with directions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice solely for the purpose of allowing Nu-Life to file an amended complaint that...

...Nor does it reveal whether the art work JES purchased was created for JES, another important factor under Southern Bell. In the absence of a statement of facts that it deemed satisfactory, JES had the option of filing in circuit court or asking DOR for an evidentiary hearing at the Division of Administrative Hearings, § 72.011(1), Fla....

legal challenges to taxes and claims for refunds, § 72.011, Fla. Stat. Taxpayers can challenge Department

commencing suit in the Circuit Court, pursuant to Section 72.-011, Florida Statutes, U.S. Shoe entered into a