CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 497
...3d DCA 1984), review denied,
461 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1985). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution. The issue is whether Ringling's circus tour property is permanently located in Sarasota County for ad valorem tax purposes under subsections
192.032(2) and (5), Florida Statutes (1983)....
...After an extensive discussion of national case law, the second district determined that the circus property was permanently located in Sarasota County for ad valorem tax purposes. Shortly after the district court's decision, however, the legislature amended section 192.032, Florida Statutes (1979), which deals with ad valorem taxation. Subsection 192.032(5), Florida Statutes (1983), now provides that with respect to tangible personal property the term "permanently located" means "habitually located or typically present for the 12-month period preceding the date of assessment." [2] In...
...empted. §
196.001, Fla. Stat. (1983). Mikos relies on this statutory provision as well as a historical overview of judicial decisions in the area of ad valorem taxation to support his claim of taxation. Indeed, were it not for the 1979 amendment to section
192.032, we might well agree. The language currently contained in subsection
192.032(5), however, is unambiguous and specifically defines the term "permanently located." Such a specific statutory definition is controlling and must be followed by the courts of this state....
...In the words of the Autotote court: To regard the legislative definition of "`permanently located'" as imposing an additional stricture on taxing tangible personal property located in Florida on January 1 would be incompatible with the patent intent of the Florida Legislature to render taxable under §
192.032(2) property brought into the state after January 1 and before April 1.
454 So.2d at 662-63. In our view, the Autotote court erred in relying upon rule 12D-1.03(1)(c) as an aid in interpreting subsection
192.032(5). Rule 12D-1.03(1)(c) was adopted three years prior to the 1979 amendment. As the district court in the instant case pointed out, rule 12D-1.03(1)(c) was intended to aid in interpreting subsection
192.032(2), which deals with the taxation of property present in more than one Florida county during the taxable year....
...ther view the rule as relevant nor read that subsection as applicable solely to multicounty disputes. Therefore, we reject the rationale of Autotote. We further agree with the second district that, although the second district's interpretation of subsection 192.032(5) appears to create an inconsistency with subsection 192.032(2), which authorizes the taxation of property brought into the state after January 1 and before April 1, subsection 192.032(5) *633 is the later enactment and therefore must prevail....
...As noted by the district court, there is a strong presumption that, when the legislature amends a statute, it intends to alter the meaning of the statute. Seddon v. Harpster,
403 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1981); Arnold v. Shumpert,
217 So.2d 116 (Fla. 1968). Indeed, the plain language of the 1979 amendment to section
192.032 indicates that the legislature intended to restrict the meaning of "permanently located," thus altering the interpretation the courts had previously given to the term....
...ADKINS, OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur. McDONALD, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which BOYD, J., concurs. McDONALD, Chief Justice, dissenting. Because the majority's interpretation of the situs statute creates both unnecessary discord between portions of section 192.032, Florida Statutes (1983), and disparity between similarly situated taxpayers, I dissent....
...Instead, the property need only have a more or less permanent location, as distinguished from a transient or temporary one. 1961 Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 061-195 (Dec. 19, 1961). Permanent does not mean always. City of Lakeland v. Lawson Music Co.,
301 So.2d 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). The majority's interpretation of section
192.032, however, requires such a fixed permanence and dangerously displaces a fundamental precept of tax law. Subsection
192.032(2), Florida Statutes (1983), authorizes the ad valorem taxation of tangible personal property brought into the state between January 1 and April 1 of the taxable year. The majority's interpretation of the term "permanently located" as set forth in subsection
192.032(5) renders subsection
192.032(2) inoperative by requiring, as a condition precedent to taxation, twelve months of presence in the taxing jurisdiction prior to the date of assessment. Such a prerequisite has never before been imposed and surely was not the intent of the legislature when it amended section
192.032 in 1979....
...e basis for consistency. Woodgate Development Corp. v. Hamilton Investment Trust,
351 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1977); State v. Putnam County Development Authority,
249 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1971). Accordingly, the majority opinion applies an erroneous construction to section
192.032(2) because both subsections
192.032(2) and
192.032(5) could have been given full effect under the interpretation applied in Autotote Limited, Inc. v. Bystrom,
454 So.2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied,
461 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1985). In Autotote the third district found that subsection
192.032(5) applied only to multicounty disputes and, therefore, had no effect with regard to Autotote's property.
454 So.2d at 662-63. Likewise, because no such intercounty situs dispute occurred in the case at bar, the definition of "permanently located" as set forth in subsection
192.032(5) should not have applied here either. *634 The rationale for Autotote seems compelling. First, when read in context, it is apparent that the primary function of section
192.032 is to set out a systematic approach to settling intercounty situs disputes. Integrated Container Services, Inc. v. Overstreet,
375 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Subsection (5) defines the term "permanently located" as "habitually located or typically present for the 12-month period preceding the date of assessment." §
192.032(5), Fla. Stat. (1983). Subsection
192.032(2) utilizes this defined term when it sets out the applicable rules for determining which county shall have the right to levy an ad valorem tax on a given item of tangible personal property. Accordingly, Autotote's conclusion that subsection
192.032(2) is intended to function merely as a tool to resolve multicounty tax disputes and thus should have no application beyond that narrow fact situation appears correct....
...Florida Development Commission,
211 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1968). Rule 12D-1.03(1)(c)1 states that an object is "normally and usually permanently located" where it is generally kept for use or storage or where an object is consistently returned by its owners for use or storage. Clearly, if subsection
192.032(5) is only applied to multicounty disputes, that provision can have no effect on rule 12D-1.03(1)(c)1, which was promulgated in order to aid in the interpretation of subsection
192.032(2). Fla. Admin. Code Rule 12D-1.03(1)(c). The fact that the rule was in existence prior to the 1979 amendment is irrelevant because, outside of the narrow arena of multicounty disputes, the taxing rules of section
192.032 were otherwise unaffected....
...e or storage" to Sarasota County and that the property was present in Sarasota County on January 1 of each year in question. Accordingly, under rule 12D-1.03(1)(c)1, the tour property is taxable. Third, it is inconceivable that the 1979 amendment to section 192.032 was intended to narrow Florida's tax base by freeing from tax liability all tangible personal property not habitually present in one county for twelve full months prior to the assessment date....
...at 202,
26 S.Ct. at 37. Clearly, Ringling uses at least as much in the way of costly public services as do the numerous seasonal businesses that operate in Sarasota for *635 only a few months out of each year and which are subject to taxation under section
192.032. Therefore, the majority's interpretation of section
192.032 treats similarly situated taxpayers differently....
...Moreover, imposing a condition precedent of habitual twelve-month presence in the taxing jurisdiction allows unscrupulous taxpayers to evade paying ad valorem taxes indefinitely simply by moving the property from county to county. Surely the legislature could not have intended such a result when it amended section 192.032....
...Accordingly, I would quash the decision of the second district. BOYD, J., concurs. NOTES [1] Both Ringling's tour property and Hagenbeck-Wallace's costumes and props shall be cumulatively referred to as "tour property" for purposes of this opinion. [2] The 1979 amendment originally appeared as § 192.032(7), Fla. Stat. (1979), but has been renumbered as § 192.032(5).
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2138
...e property is located in various parts of the United States and Canada with the traveling circuses. The trial court held that the assessments of the property for the tax years 1980 through 1983 are hereby declared to be contrary to the provisions of § 192.032, Florida Statutes, in that the property was not "permanently located" in Sarasota County, Florida[,] within the meaning of the statute, as amended, and the assessments are null and void; ......
...al court erred in denying appellant's motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute; (3) Whether appellees' traveling circus property tangible personal property was permanently located in Sarasota County for ad valorem tax purposes, according to section 192.032(2), (5), Florida Statutes (1983)....
...1334,
63 L.Ed.2d 773, reh'g denied,
446 U.S. 947,
100 S.Ct. 2178,
64 L.Ed.2d 804 (1980). In this earlier decision this court reasoned: Under Florida law the situs of tangible personal property for taxation purposes is determined in accordance with Section
192.032(2), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides that property shall be "permanently located" in the State of Florida on the assessment date of January 1....
...The court then determined from the applicable case law that the subject property was permanently located and acquired a situs in Sarasota County, Florida, for the purpose of tangible personal property taxation. However, in 1979, subsequent to the Mikos decision, section 192.032 was amended by the addition of subsection 6, now subsection 5, which provides as follows: "For the purposes of this section and with respect to tangible personal property the term `permanently located' means habitually located or typically present for the 12-month period preceding the date of assessment." § 192.032(5), Fla....
...ngible personal property prior to the January 1 assessment date to render such property subject to taxation. Review of Department of Revenue Regulation 12D-1.03(1)(c), Fla. Admin. Code, defining "normally and usually permanently located" in light of § 192.032(2), Fla. Stat., however, clarifies the intent of the Legislature in enacting § 192.032(5), Fla. *295 Stat. (Supp. 1982). [now § 192.032(6), Fla....
...To regard the legislative definition of "`permanently located'" as imposing an additional stricture on taxing tangible personal property located in Florida on January 1 would be incompatible with the patent intent of the Florida Legislature to render taxable under § 192.032(2) property brought into the state after January 1 and before April 1, which assessment is mandated where a property appraiser has reason to believe that such property will be removed from the state prior to January 1 of the next succeeding year....
...This regulation could hardly clarify the intent of a separate subsection enacted three years later which contains different language and makes no reference to multicounty disputes over taxation. In the instant case there emerges a strong presumption that the plain language of the 1979 amendment to section 192.032 represents a legislative purpose to focus upon and change the meaning of the phrase permanently located....
...A taxing statute should be construed in favor of the taxpayer and strictly against the governmental entity seeking to impose the tax. Maas Brothers, Inc. v. Dickinson,
195 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1967). The word for is generally a term of limitation and, when used in conjunction with a stated period, imputes a meaning of duration. Section
192.032(5) states that for the property to be taxable it must be habitually located or typically present for a period of twelve months....
...last expression of legislative intent prevails. Askew v. Schuster,
331 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1976). Accordingly, we believe that the court below properly held that the subject property was not permanently located in Sarasota County, Florida, as defined by section
192.032, Florida Statutes, as amended, and was not subject to taxation thereunder....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...rt, owned by appellee. This suit was filed challenging the assessment as void on the grounds, inter alia, that the assessed property was not permanently located in Dade County on the taxing dates in question, for the years 1974 and 1975, pursuant to Section 192.032(2), Florida Statute (1975)....
...The county was and is of the view that the general taxing statute, Section
192.011, Florida Statutes (1975), prevails, authorizing the ad valorem tax assessed on appellee's property. The trial judge, after a non-jury trial and with benefit of lengthy and scholarly memoranda of law determined that Section
192.032(2) prevailed and no tax could be levied upon appellee, as the property in question was not permanently located in Dade County on the taxing dates....
...(As will be discussed later, this period of limbo lasted, in most cases, for more than two years.) As such, we believe that the constitutional contention of unapportioned taxation is completely without merit and shall be mentioned no further. We now come upon the crux of this appeal: the questions of whether Section 192.032, Florida Statute (1975) requires that personal property taxed must be permanently located in the county which assesses the tax and whether the property in question was, for tax purposes, permanently located in Dade County. Section 192.032, Florida Statutes (1975) provides, in pertinent part: "Situs of property for assessment purposes....
...tutory section does not condition the right to tax upon permanency of the personal property within the county, but rather, said permanency requirement pertains to the resolution of disputes between counties. As such, appellant argues, the purpose of Section 192.032(2) is to determine the taxable situs of personalty....
