Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...nty, Florida. We have jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and Rule 2.1, subd. a.(5)(a), Florida Appellate Rules, in that the Circuit Court passed directly upon the validity of Sections 196.001(2), 196.199(6) and 196.199(7), Florida Statutes, by holding that the county appraiser properly assessed certain leasehold interests of the appellants for the three years last past for taxation as real property pursuant to the cited sections. Appellants are lessees of county-owned property from the Santa Rosa Island Authority which was created by Chapter 24,500, Special Laws of Florida 1947. The circuit judge specifically held that Sections 196.001(2), 196.199(6) and 196.199(7) do not violate the equal protection clause of the Florida Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States....

...he Legislature from making only those classifications which would result in some property being taxed at less than its just value, except for the categories enumerated in subsections (a) and (b). The classifications created by Section 196.001(2) and Section 196.199, Florida Statutes, result in the holders of leases of publicly owned lands bearing their fair share of the tax burden, thus placing them on a parity with other real property in the private sector devoted to similar uses....

...This case stands for the proposition only, then, that the Legislature is precluded from classifying property for valuation purposes at less than just valuation except in the instances of the provisos to Article VII, Section 4. The result obtained through application of Sections 196.001(2) and 196.199, Florida Statutes, is to require that the leasehold interests defined therein shall be taxed at a just valuation like "all other property" in the state....

...than form. (Citations omitted) This approach requires us to determine the ultimate effect of the law as applied and enforced by a State or, in other words, to find the operating incidence of the tax." The practical effect of Sections 196.001(2) and 196.199, Florida Statutes, is to withdraw exemption from certain users of property and to impose an ad valorem real property tax upon them consistent with the tax imposed upon persons who make similar uses of property....

...r St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) (a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...Having established that the Legislature has the power constitutionally to tax the leasehold interests in question as real property, we turn to the question of whether or not it has done so. Appellants submit that even if such leasehold interests are not exempt under Sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(5), Florida Statutes, that the tax imposed by Section 196.001(2), Florida Statutes, is merely an ad valorem intangible personal property tax because none of the statutory provisions relied upon by the appellees expressly sta...

...Accordingly, for purposes of condemnation award it has been concluded by the courts of this state that a leasehold interest is a species of real property under a statute that did not expressly so state. The predecessor to Subsection 196.001(2) and Section 196.199, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1971, was Section 196.25, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1969, which in turn was a verbatim reenactment of Section 192.62, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1961....

...See footnote 3 to the majority opinion in Dade County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 275 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1973). That decision also recognized, in footnote 8, that the exemption contained in Section 196.25, Florida Statutes, repealed in 1971, is covered in the present Section 196.199, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1971 as a part of Chapter 71-133, Laws of Florida 1971....

...of the development of the law in this area from Park-N-Shop, Inc., supra , through Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Walden, supra , when it enacted the series of statutes hereinabove considered (192.62, 1961; 196.25, 1969; and 196.001(2) & 196.199 (1971)....

...tatutory Revision and Indexing Division of such provisions in the chapter on exemptions cannot affect the intent of the Legislature as expressed in Chapter 71-133, Laws of Florida 1971. Our attention has not heretofore focused upon Subsection (6) of Section 196.199, Florida Statutes, which reads: "Property which is originally leased for 99 years or more, exclusive of renewal options, shall be deemed to be `owned' for purposes of this section." *436 Since Subsection (2)(a) of Section 196.199, Florida Statutes, effectively removes from the exemption afforded property owned and used by the designated governmental units all leasehold interests which do not serve or perform a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or func...

...e classification by the Legislature. The Constitution employs a similar standard in the Homestead Exemption provision found in Article VII, Section 6, Florida Constitution. Appellants also contest the procedure for enforcement of the tax as found in Section 196.199(7), Florida Statutes....

...recovery by way of an action against the taxpayer. The manner of securing collection of taxes is purely a legislative matter not to be disturbed by the Court unless constitutionally defective. The procedure for collection and enforcement embodied in Section 196.199(7), Florida Statutes, is consistent with the nature of the property being taxed and is a legislative determination resting within the legislative power....

...[2] In the same act, the Legislature amended section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1995), to exclude the telecommunications services authorized in section 166.047 from the statutory ad valorem tax exemption for municipally owned property "used for governmental, municipal or public purposes" contained in section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...roviding two-way telecommunications services to the public for hire by the use of a telecommunications facility, as defined in s. 364.02(13), and for which a certificate is required under chapter 364 does not constitute an exempt use for purposes of s. 196.199," with exceptions inapplicable here....

...form municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law." Thus, both article VII, section 3(a) and article VIII, section 2(b) use the term "municipal purpose." [3] Section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2004), which has remained unchanged since 1995, provides: All property of the several political subdivisions and municipalities of this state or of entities created by general or special law and composed entir...

...Crystal River Three Participants, 686 So.2d 1391, 1392-93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (in absence of general law requiring payments to tax unit in which plant was located, cities' interest in nuclear power plant was tax exempt under article VII, section 3(a) and section 196.199(2)(c), Florida Statutes)....

...We have jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to Article V, § 3(b)(1), Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. and Rule 2.1, subd. a(5)(a), F.A.R., 32 F.S.A., because the Circuit Court held Section 14 of Chapter 71-133, Laws of Florida 1971, and provisions of said Chapter brought forward as Sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(5), Florida Statutes 1971, F.S.A....

...al Acts of 1947 and 1949, and of Chapter 71-133, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1971." The trial court, in its statement above, was referring to that portion of Chapter 71-133 which amended Chapter 196, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., by adding a new section — Section 196.199. Under Fla. Stat. § 196.199(2)(a) (1971), F.S.A., it is provided in pertinent part: "(a) Leasehold interests in property of the United States, of the state or any of its several political subdivisions, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities and other public bodi...

...However, this exemption by Chapter 25,810 did not preclude a subsequent legislature from providing for the taxation of these leaseholds of the County and the Authority to private persons for predominantly private purposes. The Legislature in enacting what is now Section 196.199 has expressly provided for such leasehold taxation....

...Paul, (Fla. 1965) 179 So.2d 349, text 355. The Legislature also has the power to provide for the taxing of private leaseholds previously exempt as it has done in Chapter 71-133. The pertinent provisions of Chapter 71-133 so providing now appear as Sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(5), F.S. 1971, F.S.A. See application of the holding of Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Walden (Fla. 1968) 210 So.2d 193, to Section 192.62, F.S., F.S.A., a predecessor statute to Sections 196.199(2) (a) and 196.012(5)....

...the declaration of the Legislature and our holding in State v. Escambia County, supra , the development of Santa Rosa Island constitutes a public purpose as defined by Fla. Stat. § 196.012(5) (1971), F.S.A., and is therefore exempt under Fla. Stat. § 196.199(2)(a) (1971), F.S.A....

...While the club concedes that the golf course is not being used for municipal or public purposes, it points out that intangible taxes have been imposed upon its leasehold interest. The club contends that the property is exempt from an additional real estate tax by section 196.199(4), Florida Statutes (1991), which reads as follows: Property owned by any municipality, agency, authority, or other public body corporate of the state which becomes subject to a leasehold interest or other possessory interest of a no...

...y. We first held that in the absence of statutory authority, the city's agreement to withhold the imposition of taxes on the property was ultra vires and void. Id. at 880. However, Lykes contended that the city's promise was subsequently ratified by section 196.199(3), Florida Statutes (1973), which authorized municipalities to covenant to withhold taxes on leasehold estates created before December 31, 1971....

...We agreed with the trial judge's conclusion that the constitution required taxation of private leaseholds in government-owned property used for nonpublic purposes. Id. at 881. However, we found it unnecessary to reach the question of the constitutionality of section 196.199(3) if it were construed to pertain to pre-1972 governmental leases for nonpublic purposes. Id. Instead, we stated: Lykes' contention with respect to the application and validity of Section 196.199(3) — that an ultra vires municipal contract can be legislatively ratified if it could have been authorized initially — is generally correct, but it neglects an additional requirement. The legislative attempt at ratification must itself be consistent with the Constitution. At the time Section 196.199(3) was enacted, the Legislature no longer possessed the constitutional power to authorize tax exoneration of property owned by a municipality and used by a private lessee predominantly for non-public purposes. Moreover, we do not read into the language of Section 196.199(3) a legislative attempt to exceed this constitutional limitation by giving legal effect to otherwise invalid pre-1972 contracts, and thereby creating a new category of tax exemption....

...Const., on nonpublic leaseholds of municipal land, the legislature can exempt the land from the higher level of local taxation permitted by article VII, section 9 of our constitution. However, we do not believe it is necessary to hold any portion of section 196.199 unconstitutional....

...1977). Further, it is well settled that all property is subject to taxation unless expressly exempt, and exemptions are strictly construed against the party claiming them. State ex rel. Szabo Food Servs., Inc. v. Dickinson, 286 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1973). Section 196.199(4) does not specifically exempt from real estate taxes land which is subject to a lease entered into before April 15, 1976; it does so only by inference. Therefore, in order to sustain its constitutionality, we do not interpret section 196.199(4) as exempting from real estate taxes land leased from a municipality for nongovernmental purposes before April 15, 1976....

...of the state, or any political subdivision, municipality, agency, *502 authority, or other public body corporate of the state" subject to taxation unless otherwise exempted. [5] Other statutory provisions exempt privately held leaseholds of governmental property from taxation "only when the lessee," Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or ....

...1958)." Williams v. Jones, supra, at 435. Mr. Justice Sundberg, writing for the Court in Williams v. Jones, supra , delineated the scope of the exemption at issue here in the following words: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...ther demonstrates an absence of legislative intent to subject lawsuits brought by the State to challenge tax assessments on grounds of immunity to the jurisdictional statute of nonclaim. Although it speaks in terms of exemption rather than immunity, section 196.199(1)(b) provides that "[a]ll property of this state which is used for governmental purposes shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation except as otherwise provided by law." As noted by the First District, this provision demonstrates that...

...ernmental lessee who "serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6)"; or is "an organization which uses the property exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes." § 196.199(2)(a), (2)(c), Fla....

...The related provisions of the statutory scheme for counties to assess and collect taxes also supports this conclusion. Even when no exemption applies and a leaseholder of State property is subject to ad valorem taxation, the penalty for nonpayment falls on the leaseholder and not the State. Section 196.199(8)(a) prohibits any taxes on a leasehold by a nongovernmental lessee from becoming a lien on the governmental property itself....

...te or the creation of a lien on property owned by a governmental unit that has become subject to taxation due to the lease of the property to a nongovernmental lessee. Delinquent taxes must either be "enforced and collected in the manner provided in s. 196.199(8)" or, in certain circumstances, "the delinquent taxes become a lien on the leasehold." Id....

...Mikos, 605 So.2d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), review denied, 617 So.2d 320 (Fla.1993). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Canaveral Port Authority (CPA) filed suit challenging Brevard County's authority to assess ad valorem taxes pursuant to section 196.199(4), Florida Statutes (1991), on the fee interest of real property owned by CPA and leased to private entities engaged in nongovernmental activities....

...[7] Section 315.11, which was passed in 1959, provides a statutory exemption from various state and local taxes for port authorities including port authority property. [8] This section has never made the exemption it provides dependent on the use of port authority property. *1229 Respondent contends that sections 196.001 and 196.199, Florida Statutes (1991), supersede section 315.11 and make CPA's leased property taxable to the extent the property is leased to nongovernmental entities for nongovernmental uses. Section 196.001 provides that all property is subject to taxation unless expressly exempted. [9] Section 196.199 establishes the exemptions that apply to property owned by CPA and leased to nongovernmental entities....

...ion 315.11. [10] Although the legislature did not expressly repeal the exemption provided by section 315.11, we find that by passing chapter 71-133, it imposed a limitation on that exemption. In view of the express language used in sections 196.001, 196.199(2), and 196.199(4), particularly the term "authorities," we conclude that the legislature intended to provide only a limited exemption for fee interests in port authority property. Together, sections 196.001, 196.199(2), and 196.199(4) require ad valorem taxation of fee interests in property owned by an authority and subject to a lease by a nongovernmental lessee unless the lessee is serving a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function as defined in section 196.012(6) or uses the property exclusively for a literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purpose. We therefore construe section 315.11 in conjunction with sections 196.001, 196.199(2), and 196.199(4), and hold that section 315.11 provides an exemption only when port authority property is being used for a purpose which is specifically set forth in section 196.199(2) and (4). If the property is being used for some purpose other than that provided for in section 196.199(2) and (4), then the fee interest will be subject to taxation. Our construction of these statutes is consistent with this Court's earlier analysis of sections 196.001(2) and 196.199, Florida Statutes, in Williams v. Jones, 326 So.2d 425 (Fla.1975). There we stated: The practical effect of Sections 196.001(2) and 196.199, Florida Statutes, is to withdraw exemption from certain users of property and to impose an ad valorem real property tax upon them consistent with the tax imposed upon persons who make similar uses of property....

...IX of the 1885 Constitution (text 416). In point of law, no court has authority to grant a tax exemption in the absence of an authorizing statute or constitutional provision. 2. Neither Section 196.25(2)(c), F.S. 1969, nor the successor statutes, Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), (3), F.S....

...Okaloosa County Airport and Industrial Authority, 168 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1964). Also see Fla. Stat. § 196.012(5) for definition of "public purpose," effective December 31, 1971. [8] Section 196.25 was repealed in 1971 and covered in a completely new Chapter 71-133, with exemptions being expressly included in present § 196.199, eff....

...Authority v. McIntyre, 642 So.2d 1072 (Fla.1994) (" Sebring II "). In that case, Raceway asserted that the subject property was being used to further a public purpose, and *242 it was therefore entitled to an exemption from ad valorem taxation under section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...[2] We have no doubt that Raceway's operation of the racetrack serves the public, but such service does not fit within the definition of a public purpose as defined by section 196.012(6). Raceway's operating of the race for profit is a governmental-proprietary function; therefore, a tax exemption is not allowed under section 196.199(2)(a)....

...r St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...[8] "Immunity and exemption differ in that immunity connotes an absence of the power to tax while exemption presupposes the existence of that power." Canaveral Port Authority v. Department of Revenue, 690 So.2d 1226, 1234 n. 7 (Fla.1996). [9] These statutory provisions are still included in sections 196.199 and 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...n 4— observed that, in being subjected to the tax, the leaseholders paid their fair share of fire, police, and education services provided by the county in which they were situated: The result obtained through application of Sections 196.001(2) and 196.199, Florida Statutes, is to require that the leasehold interests defined therein shall be taxed at a just valuation like "all other property" in the state....

...relied on the statutory definition of public purpose as identified in Williams v. Jones, 326 So.2d 425 (Fla.1975), a case addressing leasehold interests in Santa Rosa Island. The court found that the "exemptions contemplated under s. 196.012(5) and s. 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to `governmental-governmental' functions as opposed to `governmental-proprietary' functions....

...judgment. The trial judge entered summary judgment in favor of the property appraiser and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment based upon its interpretation of sections 196.192 and 196.199, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...For purposes of this section, each use to which the property is being put must be considered in granting an exemption from ad valorem taxation, including any economic use in addition to any physical use. This section shall not apply in determining the exemption for property owned by governmental units pursuant to s. 196.199. .... 196.199 Government property exemption.— (1) Property owned and used by the following governmental units shall be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: .......

...Therefore, we remand the case for resolution of these issues. It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We reject the Authority's ancillary argument that the project is expressly exempt from taxation under section 196.199(1)(c)....

...ature has implemented by providing that "[a]ll property of the several... municipalities of this state ... used [by them] for governmental, municipal, or public purposes shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation, except as otherwise provided by law." § 196.199(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995). Still on the books, this statutory provision antedates the tax years in question. With regard to City property leased to nongovernmental lessees, section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), provided at all pertinent times: Leasehold interests in property of ......

...ed exclusively by [the City] for municipal or public purposes." Because the City leased the property and did not use it itself, the property did not qualify for the exemption set out in article VII, section 3, of the Florida Constitution of 1968 and section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes, the legislation implementing the constitutional exemption for municipal property unencumbered by lease....

...See Mikos, 374 So.2d at 460-61; McIntyre, 642 So.2d at 1073-74; St. John's Assocs., 366 So.2d at 37-38. The City argues, however, that the exemption for the marina property found by the trial court in the judgment under review should be affirmed, even if wrong on general principles, on the authority of section 196.199(5) (1995), Florida Statutes, which has provided at all pertinent times: (5) Leasehold interests in governmental property shall not be exempt pursuant to this subsection unless an application for exemption has been filed on or before March 1 with the property appraiser....

...ed" by municipalities, legislation has at all pertinent times also recognized an exemption: If "used for governmental, municipal, or public purposes [municipal property] shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation, except as otherwise provided by law." § 196.199(1)(c), Fla....

...1st DCA 1992) ( Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture ). Because there was no evidence that the marina property lessees have changed the use of the property since Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture, the exemption established by that judicial proceeding is valid pursuant to section 196.199(5), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides in pertinent part: If the exemption in whole or in part is granted, or established by judicial proceeding, it shall remain valid for the duration of *1080 the lease unless the lessee changes its use, in which case the lessee shall again submit an application for exemption. § 196.199(5), Fla....

...Historically, the City had never been taxed for either the marina real property or the improvements thereon. Id. at 521. Because the use of the improvements by the lessees was identical to its use by the City, the trial court found that the lessees' use constituted a valid public purpose pursuant to section 196.199(2)(a)....

...See Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 623 So.2d 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The Florida Supreme Court held that the operation of the automobile raceway for profit was a governmental-proprietary function, and therefore, a tax exemption was not allowed under section 196.199(2)(a)....

...nts and leases to nongovernmental lessees when the property was being utilized for a valid public purpose. It is not necessary for a marina to partake of an "aspect of sovereignty" in order to constitute a valid public purpose as defined in sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(6)....

...ations with regard to the ultimate holding in Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture, i.e., that this particular marina does not constitute a governmental-proprietary function, I reject the argument that the Sebring II decision negates the applicability of section 196.199(5) in this case....

...See Wood, 677 So.2d at 18 (citing In re Rule 9.331, 416 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Fla.1982) ("We would expect that, in most instances, a three-judge panel confronted with precedent with which it disagrees will suggest an en banc hearing.")). Alternatively, the majority suggests that section 196.199(5), Florida Statutes (1995), the statute which makes Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture relevant, is inapplicable because it only refers to leasehold interests in governmental property and, in this case, the assessment of ad valorem taxation was imposed upon the City's fee interest, not upon the leasehold interest....

...er raised by any party at trial or on appeal, and thus has been raised only by the majority. I do not believe it is appropriate for this court to reach alternative grounds for reversal which were not even raised on appeal. Second, the application of section 196.199(5) should not be circumvented when there is a valid public purpose exemption....

...of *1082 the leasehold's exemption. Frankly, I am unable to see the logic in a statute which would extend an established exemption on a leasehold interest but would not grant the same exemption to the municipality on their fee interest. Pursuant to section 196.199(2)(a), (nongovernmental) leasehold interests in municipal property are exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in section 196.012(6). "In all such cases, all other interests in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem taxation." § 196.199(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

...The trial judge properly analyzed the effect of Sebring II upon Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture and correctly determined that the exemption on the marina property established in Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture remains binding. The exemption for the marina property was established by judicial proceeding and pursuant to section 196.199(5), the exemption shall remain valid for the duration of the lease unless the lessee changes its use. Section 196.199(5) was properly applied and the exemption of the marina property should be affirmed....

...NOTES [1] In deciding that the City's marina property was exempt, the trial court addressed the issue on the merits but it also ruled that the question was no longer open: The Marina is unique to this consolidated action in that, pursuant to Florida Statute § 196.199(5), the City is exempted from ad valorem taxes for the duration of the leases since the exemption has previously been "granted or established by judicial proceeding" and there is no evidence proving that the lessees have changed the use since then. See Page v. Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture, 608 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Consequently, such ad valorem tax exemption remains valid according to Fla. Stat. § 196.199(5).... We reject this reading of the statute. Like its predecessors, section 196.199(5), Florida Statutes (1995), has to do only with a lessee's obtaining exemptions for "[l]easehold interests in government property." At issue here is the City's own asserted exemptions for its fee interests in real property....

...During the 1991 tax year, the Highlands County Property Appraiser assessed and levied an ad valorem real estate tax on the real property and improvements leased by Raceway from the Authority. Asserting that the property was being used to further a public purpose, Raceway sought an exemption from the taxes under section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District, 341 So.2d 498, 502 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 804, 98 S.Ct. 32, 54 L.Ed.2d 61 (1977); Williams v. Jones, 326 So.2d 425, 435 (Fla. 1975). The exemption relied upon by petitioners is found in section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), which provides, in part, that: (2) Property owned by the following governmental units but used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: (a) Leasehold...

...The instant case is similar to Volusia, in which we found that "[o]perating an automobile racetrack for profit is not even arguably the performance of a `governmental-governmental' function." 341 So.2d at 502. Our finding in Volusia was premised on Williams, which limits the exemptions in sections 196.012(6) and 196.199(2)(a) to governmental-governmental functions: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) [now 196.012(6)] and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...[1] We have no doubt that Raceway's operation of the racetrack serves the public, but such service does not fit within the definition of a public purpose as defined by section 196.012(6). Raceway's operating of the race for profit is a governmental-proprietary function; therefore, a tax exemption is not allowed under section 196.199(2)(a)....

...public use at a future date. The basis for this assertion is that former section 196.191(2), Florida Statutes (1969), allowed an exemption for property that was "intended for public purposes." This section was repealed in 1971, and its replacement, section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), does not expressly allow an exemption for property intended for public use....

...imposing ad valorem taxes on their leasehold interests. Ward v. Brown, 892 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The plaintiffs challenged tax assessments on their interests in property that they alleged was not subject to ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 196.199, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...tax rolls. For example, when property owned by the county and exempt from taxation is sold to a private entity for private use, the tax assessor has an obligation to place that property on the county tax roll and to assess its value. In this regard, section 196.199 provides: (2) Property owned by the following governmental units but used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: (1) Leasehold interests in property of the United States, of the s...

...roperty improvements owned by the lessee from ad valorem taxation. (c) Any governmental property leased to an organization which uses the property exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation. § 196.199(2), Fla....

...ich were substantially amended by the legislature in 1971. As a part of the comprehensive alterations enacted into law, the legislature created Section 196.001(2), Florida Statutes, mandating the taxation of leasehold interests in real property, and Section 196.199(2), Florida Statutes, which provides an exemption from the taxation of leasehold interests in real property....

...urden, unless specifically exempted. First National Bank of Birmingham, supra, at 40; Williams, supra, at 430. In Walden, supra, at 285, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the only exemption to Section 196.001(2), Florida Statutes, is specified in Section 196.199(2), Florida Statutes, which permits an exemption, if the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function....

...In 1980, amendments to chapters 199 and 196, Florida Statutes, were made providing that all leasehold or other possessory interests in real property owned by a government were to be taxed only as intangible personal property. § 199.023(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (1983); [1] § 196.199(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1983). [2] Consequently, such interests were not subject to taxation as real property. See § 196.199(2)(b), Fla....

...23(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1983), [3] thereby rendering it subject to only intangible personal property taxation. Hialeah, Inc. contends that a property is considered government owned unless a taxpayer holds the attributes of ownership specified in section 196.199(7), Florida *1000 Statutes (1983). [4] We are unpersuaded by this argument. Section 196.199(7) merely establishes two exceptions to the general rule that leaseholds or other possessory interests in government owned property are subject to intangible personal property taxation. The exceptions arise only after it is determined that section 199.023(1)(f) is applicable. The exceptions set forth in section 196.199(7) do not guide this court's determination as to whether section 199.023(1)(f) applies in the first place, i.e., is the property government owned? In determining whether government ownership exists, we note that the statute does not p...

...re undeveloped or predominantly used for residential or commercial purposes and upon which rental payments are due in consideration of such leasehold estates or possessory interests; except that leasehold estates or possessory interests described by s. 196.199(7) shall not be included herein....

...The DOR challenged all of the exemptions on appeal. Crossings, 960 So.2d at 24, 26. The First District affirmed the trial court's holding that the properties were exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 189.403(1), Florida Statutes (1999), and section 196.199(1), Florida Statutes (1999) (creating statutory exemption for property of "municipalities of this state or of entities created by general or special law ......

...(1). Finally, the Appraiser argues on appeal that the First District erred in affirming the trial court's decision that the golf course, swim and tennis centers, and playgrounds are exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to sections 189.403(1) and 196.199(1), Florida Statutes (1999), because the properties are used exclusively for an exempt public purpose....

...Thus, the term "ad valorem" tells the voter nothing about the actual change to be effected because it applies to both real and personal property. Leaseholds in government-owned property used for residential and commercial purposes are currently subject to ad valorem taxation as intangible personal property. § 196.199(2)(b), Fla....

...the original contract failed to cure the illegality alleged in Count II; COUNT IV, the original contract violated Article VII, Sections 3, and Section 10, which prohibits the pledging of credit for private purposes, of the Florida Constitution, and Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), which defines exemptions applicable to municipally owned and operated properties when used to serve a governmental, municipal, or public purpose as defined in Section 196.012(5)....

...The court, in deciding the ad valorem taxation of leased public property as real estate was constitutional, also drew upon statutory language which indicated the legislature's desire to limit exemptions from real property taxation for those private uses on leased government land utilizing state sponsored tax exempt bonds. Section 196.199 which addresses tax exemptions for government property provides in part: "Property which is originally leased for 99 years or more, exclusive of renewal options, shall be deemed to be owned for purposes of this section." Fla.Stat.Ann. § 196.199(7) (West 1971) (as amended 1976)....

...cient to satisfy the requirements of the state homestead exemption to forced sale. Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the creditor's objection to the debtor's claimed exemption be, and hereby is denied. DONE AND ORDERED. NOTES [1] In 1980, Section 196.199(7) was amended to provide that leases for terms of 100 years or more, exclusive of renewal options, were deemed to be owned for purposes of the taxation exemption.

...It held that to be entitled to the tax exemption under section 196.192, a tax exempt entity had to be the owner as well as the user and occupant of the property. We do not think these cases are on point. As explained above, they were decided pursuant to section 196.192(1) and not section 196.199(1)(b), which appellants argue should be applied in this case. Section 196.199 provides: (1) Property owned and used by the following governmental units shall be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: * * * * * * (b) All property of this state which is used for governmental purposes shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation except as otherwise provided by law....

...However, in this case, the lessee is the County, taxation of the County's leasehold interest is not involved, and the property is exclusively used for governmental purposes. Although not directly applicable to the facts in this case, cases decided pursuant to section 196.199(2)(a) add collateral support for our conclusion that in determining the *527 taxability of property in this state, courts should look through form to the substance of who is the beneficial owner of the property....

...They had been built by the lessee on real property titled in the city's name. It concluded the city was the owner of the improvements and because they were leased to a private entity and used for a public purpose, they were exempt from taxation pursuant to section 196.199(2)(a)....

...ebt owed to the certificate holders. It cannot be taxed for any interest in the government center because it does not have any beneficial ownership interest in the land or the improvements. And it has no leasehold interest subject to tax pursuant to section 196.199(2)....

...[2] Under this financing arrangement, the County did not have to pledge specific revenue sources as it would for a traditional bond issue. This kept the County bond rating high and resulted in the County having to pay a lower interest rate on the certificates of participation than had bonds been issued. [3] § 196.199(2)(a), Fla....

...Count II of plaintiff's Amended Complaint seeks to have the 1988 assessment and resulting tax on certain Improvements set aside on the ground that plaintiff is not the owner of the Improvements and that it is entitled to the exemption from ad valorem taxation set forth in Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Section 196.199(2)(a) provides that property owned by a municipality but leased to a non-governmental lessee is exempt from ad valorem taxation when the lessee uses the property for a valid public purpose....

...The Court therefore finds that plaintiff is neither the legal owner nor the equitable owner of the Improvements, and that the City is the owner of the Improvements. B. Statutory Exemption Plaintiff has asserted that the Improvements are not subject to ad valorem taxation because a statutory exemption applies. Specifically, Section 196.199(2)(a) provides: *523 (a) Leasehold interests in property of ......

...e Marina. The Court, therefore, finds that the use of the Improvements by plaintiff for the 1988 and 1989 tax years is identical to the use of the Improvements by the City historically, and that this is a valid public purpose as that term is used in Section 196.199(2)(a)....

...ax. The statute clearly and unambiguously states that property leased by a municipality to a non-governmental lessee is exempt from ad valorem taxation when that lessee utilizes the property for a valid public purpose. Page's legal interpretation of Section 196.199(2)(a) turns on the fact that the marina is now operated by a private entity....

...laimed that the case of City of Orlando v. Hausman, 534 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 544 So.2d 199 (Fla. 1988), stands for the proposition that when there is a lease from a governmental entity to a private entity, the exemption allowed by Section 196.199(2)(a) is inapplicable....

...For this reason, the Court finds that the assessments and tax for 1988 and 1989, as alleged in Counts II and VI of plaintiff's Amended Complaint, are invalid *525 and that the Improvements are entitled to the exemption from ad valorem taxation provided in Section 196.199(2)(a)....

...loyed by Page in calculating the amount of tax due. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 1. The assessment and tax of the Improvements for the years 1988 and 1989 are hereby declared void as to plaintiff and the City since the exemption provided in Section 196.199(2)(a) applies to the use of the Improvements....

...any of the ad-valorem taxes imposed by Highlands County, Florida." This agreement apparently was the seed from which this lawsuit grew. In February 1995, the District requested from the Property Appraiser an exemption from ad valorem taxation under section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), for the thousands of lots it held....

...Governor and Cabinet. The special purpose or purposes of special districts are implemented by specialized functions and related prescribed powers. Chapter 97-255, section 4, added a sentence immediately following this provision: "For the purpose of s. 196.199(1), special districts shall be treated as municipalities." Chapter 97-255 stated that this amendment was to "apply to the 1995 tax rolls and thereafter." After the enactment of this law, the Property Appraiser amended its pleadings to challenge the constitutionality of the amendment....

...grant very specific exemptions not applicable here. Article VII does not provide any exemption expressly applicable to an independent special district. The District points to no constitutional basis for its exemption, but instead relies primarily on section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides in pertinent part: (1) Property owned and used by the following governmental units shall be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: ....

...provided by law. Pursuant to section 1.01(8), Florida Statutes (1995), the term "political subdivision" is defined to include "special tax school districts, special road and bridge districts, bridge districts, and all other districts in this state." Section 196.199(1)(c) could thus be facially interpreted to provide special districts an exemption from ad valorem taxation when their property is used for a public purpose....

...Marshall, 355 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1978). See also Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 783 So.2d 238 (Fla.2001). Courts are required to interpret statutes in such a manner as to uphold their constitutionality if it is reasonably possible to do so. Therefore, section 196.199(1)(c) must *721 be reasonably interpreted as a codification of the existing constitutional exemptions and not as an extension of them. See Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So.2d 448 (Fla.1993) (refusing to interpret section 196.199(4) as granting an exemption not authorized by the constitution so as to avoid rendering statute unconstitutional). The reference to "political subdivisions" in section 196.199(1)(c) must therefore refer only to those political subdivisions entitled to immunity from ad valorem taxation....

...See Canaveral Port Auth., 690 So.2d 1226. Likewise, although the statute refers to property "used for governmental, municipal, or public purposes," article VII, section 3(a), clarifies that the property must be used "exclusively" for public or municipal purposes. Thus, section 196.199(1)(c) does not itself provide the District with tax exempt status....

...However, the District argues that the legislature specifically provided the District with such an exemption by its enactment of chapter 97-255, section 4, Laws of Florida. In short, this act amended section 189.403(1) to define an independent special district as a "municipality" for those tax exemptions authorized by section 196.199(1). [4] The Property Appraiser recognizes that the amendment to section 189.403(1) purports to treat special districts as municipalities for the purpose of section 196.199, but the Property Appraiser challenges the constitutionality of the amendment....

...itutionality of section 189.403(1), the trial court erred in finding the provision unconstitutional. The Property Appraiser and the trial court were required to apply the statute to these three consolidated cases. Pursuant to sections 189.403(1) and 196.199(1), the District is to be treated as a municipality, and as such is entitled to an exemption if its property is used exclusively for a public purpose....

...The corporation and the district appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Volusia County, which rejected their claim of exemption for the corporation's leasehold from ad valorem taxation. On appeal to the district court, the issues were whether exemption should be allowed under section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), and whether the repeal [2] of the tax exemption granted to the district in 1955 [3] is an impairment of the obligation of contract in violation of the United States Constitution....

...Appellees are leaseholders who improved their lots for residential purposes. With regard to the taxes to be paid by appellees in 1982 and 1983, the County assessed no tax on the value of the leasehold *691 without improvements. This was apparently taxed by the state as intangible personal property pursuant to Section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...on, municipality, agency, authority, or other public body corporate of the state. The general method of taxation is prescribed in other parts of Florida Statutes, e.g. Chapters 193 and 200. However, within Chapter 196, entitled "Exemptions," appears Section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981) [3] : (2) Property owned by the following governmental units, but used by nongovernmental lessees, shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: * * * * * * (b) ......

...from the District, appeal from a summary judgment of the Volusia County Circuit Court rejecting appellants' claims for exemption from 1976 ad valorem real property taxes assessed by Volusia County. Appellants urge (1) that an exemption exists under Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), because International holds a leasehold granted by an agency or public body corporate of the state and "serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function" as defined by Section...

...s transferring the case to the Supreme Court on issues which we have no jurisdiction to decide. Further proceedings in this court, such as in Simmons, may thus be rendered unnecessary. We consider that the Supreme Court determined both the effect of Section 196.199(2)(a) and the constitutionality of Chapter 73-647, Laws of Florida, in Volusia County v....

...We have considered the other arguments raised by the appraiser and find them to be without merit. Affirmed. GUNTHER, J., and HAWLEY, ROBERT A., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] State and county property being used for governmental purposes would be exempt from taxation because of exemptions provided in section 196.199.

...chapter 31263, Laws of Florida (1955), and revised by chapter 91-358, Laws of Florida. In chapter 91-358, section 18, the legislature designated the SMAA a political subdivision within the meaning of government property tax exemptions granted under section 196.199, Florida Statutes....

...This is true despite statutory *134 references to such property as being exempt. 99 So.2d at 573. We have considered City of Orlando v. Hausman, 534 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), rev. den., 544 So.2d 199 (Fla. 1989), Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Walden, 210 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1968), and section 196.199(4), Florida Statutes, but find these authorities inapplicable in light of our determination that the SMAA is immune....

...We therefore reverse the final order dismissing the SMAA's complaint and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court should determine the taxable status of the various leasehold interests, which are separate and distinct from the SMAA's fee interest, in accordance with section 196.199(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...(the raceway) and the Department of Revenue (the department) challenge an order of the trial court declaring section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), unconstitutional. We agree with the trial court and affirm. The raceway applied for an ad valorem tax exemption under section 196.199, Florida Statutes....

...r St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...Property owned by a governmental unit and leased to a proprietary entity must pay its fair share. As the court noted in Daytona Beach: Other statutory provisions exempt privately held leaseholds of governmental property from taxation "only when the lessee," Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or., which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...erty appraiser. We affirm. Article 7, Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution of 1968 provides in part as follows: All property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation. *1184 Section 196.199, Florida Statutes (1985) provides in part as follows: Exemptions for property owned by governmental units....

...cipal or public purpose. Since the properties were being used for private purposes, there was no exemption from ad valorem taxation and the trial court was correct in upholding the assessment of taxes against the city. The city, however, argues that section 196.199(2)(b) applies here: Exemptions for property owned by governmental units....

...presents some interesting constitutional questions, we need not decide those issues. There is no evidence that the property appraiser included the leasehold interests of the tenants in his assessment. Since the leasehold interests were not included, section 196.199(2)(b) simply has no application here....

...d upon various spaces leased to them by the Plaintiff, Hillsborough County Aviation Authority in the Terminal Building at the Tampa International Airport in Hillsborough County, Florida, and that by reason thereof, and by virtue of the provisions of Section 196.199(2)(a) of said Florida Statutes, were exempt from taxation by Hillsborough County for each of said years 1972, 1973 and 1974....

...This statute evidences the legislative intent that, unless expressly exempted, the holders of leases of publicly-owned land shall bear the same tax burden as private property owners who devote their land to the same uses. The only exemption granted is that allowed by section 196.199(2), which states: (2) Property owned by the following governmental units, but used by nongovernmental lessees, shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: (a) Leasehold interests in property of the United States...

...(b) The exemption provided by this subsection shall not apply to those portions of a leasehold estate which are used predominantly for a private, commercial purpose and serve no governmental, municipal, or public purpose. The "governmental, municipal, or public purpose," necessary to qualify for the exemption in section 196.199(2)(a), is defined in section 196.012(5), which provides: (5) Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the Unit...

...d to perform an essential national governmental purpose and shall be exempt. In Williams, we were faced with the question of whether commercial leaseholders of county-owned Santa Rosa Island were entitled to the exemptions in sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)....

...s constituted a governmental or public purpose or function, and thus their leaseholds were exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 196.012(5). We rejected this argument and held that the exemptions contemplated by sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions and, quoting from our decision in Straughn v....

...Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District, 341 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1976), wherein we held that the Daytona International Speedway, which was operated by a private corporation under a lease from a public body, was not entitled to exemption under sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) because the operation of an automobile racetrack was not the performance of a "governmental-governmental" function. In reaching this conclusion, we stated: Other statutory provisions exempt privately held leaseholds of governmental property from taxation "only when the lessee," Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or ......

...rmines *287 whether it is taxable under the Constitution." Straughn v. Camp, supra, at 695. 341 So.2d at 502. Similarly, in Markham v. Maccabee Investments, Inc., 343 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1977), we refused to apply the exemption of sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) to a private, profit-making corporation utilizing a government leasehold....

...The trial court refused to exonerate Lykes from Plant City's tax levies on two principal grounds. It held that the city's contractual agreement for tax exoneration was beyond the city's authorized power, or "ultra vires", and that the so-called savings (or grandfather) law for pre-1972 leasehold interests, Section 196.199(3), Florida Statutes (1973), is inapplicable to this case or, insofar as it pertains to private lessees on governmental lands who use the property for non-public purposes, is invalid....

...City of Naples v. Conboy, 182 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1965). 2. Lykes next contends that an ultra vires act of a municipality can always be validated by subsequent legislative ratification if the act is one which could have been authorized initially, [9] and that Section 196.199(3), Florida Statutes (1973), did precisely that with respect to the tax on its leasehold interest in the city's property. [10] The trial court determined that Section 196.199(3) does not pertain to governmental leases for non-public purposes, and that it would be unconstitutional if it did. The disputed portion of Section 196.199, entitled "Exemptions for property owned by governmental units", reads: "(3) Nothing herein or in § 196.001 shall require a governmental unit or authority to impose taxes upon a leasehold estate created prior to December 31, 1971 if...

...een governmental owners and private lessees using the property for non-public purposes. Section 196.001, Florida Statutes (1973), provides that all property is subject to taxation unless expressly exempted. Governmental property exemptions appear in Section 196.199....

...Not only did the legislation ostensibly apply to all pre-1972 governmental lessees, without regard to purpose or user as in the related provisions, but the construction urged upon us by Plant City and the Attorney General [11] would require us to hold that the Legislature enacted a redundancy. Section 196.199(3) necessarily applies to private lease agreements such as Lykes'....

...ic purposes. [12] We agree that the Constitution requires taxation of these leaseholds, but we find it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question on which the trial judge ruled. Lykes' contention with respect to the application and validity of Section 196.199(3) — that an ultra vires municipal contract can be legislatively ratified if it could have been authorized initially — is generally correct, but it neglects an additional requirement. The legislative attempt at ratification must itself be consistent with the Constitution. [13] At the time Section 196.199(3) was enacted, the Legislature no longer possessed the constitutional power to authorize tax exoneration of property owned by a municipality and used by a private lessee predominantly for non-public purposes. [14] Moreover, we do not read into the language of Section 196.199(3) a legislative attempt to exceed this constitutional limitation by giving legal effect to otherwise invalid pre-1972 contracts, and thereby creating a new category of tax exemption. Inasmuch as Section 196.199(3) has no application to Lykes' contract with Plant City, there was no need for the trial court to consider its constitutionality....

...The action of the trial court in entering summary final judgment for Plant City, however, is approved. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] In the course of analysis the circuit court declared invalid § 196.199(3), Fla....

...rforming a governmental or other exempt function. [3] The lands involved in the assessments were being used as warehouses, gas stations, deli restaurants, fish markets, charter boat sites and offices. The assessments were made under the authority of section 196.199(4), Florida Statutes (1991): Property owned by any municipality, agency, authority or other public body corporate of the state which becomes subject to a leasehold interest or other possessory interest of a non-governmental lessee oth...

...63, Laws of Florida (1955), and revised by chapter 91-358, section 18, Laws of Florida. In chapter 91-358, section 18, the legislature designated the SMAA a political subdivision within the meaning of government property tax exemptions granted under section 196.199, Florida Statutes....

...ion as does the state. See Andrews v. Pal-Mar Water *1100 Control Dist., 388 So.2d 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), rev. den., 392 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1980). [7] Id. at 133. Given its conclusion that SMAA was a political subdivision of the state, the court found section 196.199, which applies to municipalities, agencies, authorities and other public bodies corporate, to be inapplicable....

...*1102 taxation). Given the nature of the CPA, it is not a political subdivision which is immune from taxation. [11] The CPA's alternative argument is that it is nevertheless exempt. Their claim of exemption concerns the relationship between sections 196.199(4) and 315.11, Florida Statutes (1991). Appellants contend that section 196.199(4) makes the CPA's leased real property taxable to the extent that it is leased to non-governmental lessees who are not using the property "exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes." CPA contends that, despite the provisions of section 196.199(4), it is nonetheless exempt from taxation under section 315.11, [12] which provides as follows: As adequate port facilities are essential to the welfare of the inhabitants and the industrial and commercial development of the area wit...

...The exemption granted by this section shall not be applicable to any tax imposed by chapter 220 on interest, income, or profits on debt obligations owed by corporations. No case was found that interprets the scope of the exemption afforded by section 315.11 or the effect of enactment of section 196.199 on section 315.11. According to appellants, the enactment of section 196.199 has "limited" the general exemption contained in section 315.11. CPA asserts there is no limitation and that section 315.11 provides a blanket exception for CPA property. [13] Although we might use the word "harmony," rather than "limitation," to describe the relationship between 196.199 and 315.11, appellants appear to be correct that CPA property is exempt only to the extent of its governmental or public use....

...stion whether any particular entity was immune from taxation. [8] The act creating the SMAA provided: "Tax Exemption. — (1) The authority as a public body corporate is deemed a political subdivision within the meaning of the exemption granted under section 196.199, Florida Statutes." Since section 196.199 does not reference "political subdivision," it appears that the legislature may have misspoken, confusing "exemption" and "immunity." [9] CPA's argument based on Eldred v....

...ty equitably held by a county. [11] Because we conclude that the CPA is not immune from taxation, we need not decide the taxing authorities' alternative argument that the legislature has waived immunity for its political subdivisions by enactment of section 196.199, Florida Statutes....

...ing in this state; and (2) All leasehold interests in property of the United States, of the state, or any political subdivision, municipality, agency, authority, or other public body corporate of the state. [3] § 196.192, Fla. Stat. (1985). [4] See § 196.199, Fla....

...In the years 1981 through 1984, the Property Appraiser subjected the improvements to ad valorem taxation. Hertz successfully challenged the assessments in the trial court. In the trial court's view, the lease agreement entitled Hertz only to the beneficial use of the fixed improvements, and section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), exempted the improvements from ad valorem taxation....

...The controlling statutory language, pursuant to which the Property Appraiser imposed an ad valorem tax upon the premises Hertz constructed, provides that the leasehold is to be taxed only "as intangible personal property pursuant to chapter 199 if rental payments are due in consideration of such leasehold...." § 196.199(2)(b), Fla....

...views Hertz has entreated us to adopt. Hertz contends that it is has only a possessory interest in the improvements and holds nothing more than a bare legal title to the premises. In urging affirmance of the final summary judgment, Hertz emphasizes section 196.199(7), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides that "[p]roperty which is originally leased for 100 years or more, exclusive of renewal options ... shall be deemed to be owned for purposes of this section." Thus, says Hertz, because its Ground Lease is limited to a term of less than 100 years, it cannot be deemed an "owner" of the improvements. We reject the contention. Section 196.199(7) plays no part in determining Hertz's status as the owner of the improvements. Simply stated, we do not perceive the sweep of the word "owned" appearing in section 196.199(2)(b) to be measurable exclusively by section 196.199(7). Section 196.199(7) is a legislative declaration, the purpose and effect of which are confined to its terms. There is nothing within section 196.199(7) barring the examination of extrinsic criteria in deciding a question of ownership under section 196.199(2)(b)....

...llenge the final summary judgment entered against them in their action against appellees, Raymond McIntyre, the Highlands County Property Appraiser; the Department of Revenue; and J.T. Landress, Highlands County Tax Collector. Appellants, relying on section 196.199, Florida Statutes (1989), had requested and been denied a public purpose exemption from ad valorem taxation for the property used by the raceway. We affirm. The pertinent parts of section 196.199 provide as follows: (2) Property owned by the following governmental units but used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: (a) Leasehold interests in property of the United States...

...Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities Districts, 341 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1976), dismissed, 434 U.S. 804, 98 S.Ct. 32, 54 L.Ed.2d 61 (1977). In Volusia County, the supreme court held as follows: Other statutory provisions exempt privately held leaseholds of governmental property from taxation "only when the lessee," Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), "is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or ....

...1958)." Williams v. Jones, supra, at 435. Mr. Justice Sundberg, writing for the Court in Williams v. Jones, supra , delineated the scope of the exemption at issue here in the following words: The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...This is the critical issue both with respect to the Outside Facility and the Remote Facility. Section 196.001(2), F.S.A. 1973, says that unless expressly exempted, all leasehold interests in the property of any political subdivision or authority of the state are taxable. Section 196.199, F.S.A....

...available car rentals would fall short of fulfilling its responsibility to serve the traveling public. We, therefore, conclude that Hertz's use of the Outside Facility was predominantly public in nature and entitled to exemption from taxation under Section 196.199(2)(a), F.S.A....

...ticle VII, § 10 now precluded the Legislature from even trying to provide for such an exemption. [2] The exemption provisions of Section 196.25, F.S.A. 1969, insofar as pertinent to this discussion, read substantially the same as those contained in Section 196.199, F.S.A....

...xemptions are strictly construed against the party claiming them. Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 642 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 1994). In support of their claim of exemption, the cities rely on Article VII, section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution and section 196.199, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...e payment to the taxing unit in which the property is located. Such portions of property as are used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation. (emphasis added) Section 196.199(1)(c) provides as follows: (1) Property owned and used by the following governmental units shall be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: * * * * * * (c) All property of the several political subdivisions and municipali...

...OUC challenged the assessments and appeared before the Brevard County Property Appraisal Adjustment Board to seek an exemption for the property. In support of its claim of exemption, OUC relied upon Article VII, section 3 of the Florida Constitution [2] and section 196.199(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ced at the expense of the residents of Brevard County. Article VII, section 3 of the Florida Constitution states that "[a]ll property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation." Section 196.199(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes specifically provides that "[a]ll property of ......

...al law to make payment to the taxing unit in which the property is located. Such portions of property as are used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation. [3] Section 196.199(1)(c) provides: 196.199 Government property exemption....

...irect exemption from ad valorem taxes that was not authorized by the Florida Constitution. See Archer v. Marshall, 355 So.2d 781, 781 (Fla.1978); see also Am Fi Inv. Corp. v. Kinney, 360 So.2d 415, 415-16 (Fla.1978). In 1980, the Legislature enacted section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes, which provides in part that a "leasehold or other interest shall be taxed only as intangible personal property ......

...the leasehold or other interest shall be taxed as real property." In 1982 and 1983, the improvements made by the lessees on Santa Rosa Island were assessed at the full real property rate. In Bell v. Bryan, 505 So.2d 690, 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), rev. denied, 513 So.2d 1060 (Fla.1987), we held that pursuant to section 196.199(2)(b), the improvements should have been taxed at the intangible personal property rate. Approximately eighteen years later, we affirmed the trial court's ruling that the Navarre Beach leaseholders were not exempt from ad valorem property taxes pursuant to section 196.199 because they were the equitable owners of the property improvements....

...The court determined that Ward dictated that Appellants were to be considered the equitable owners of the improvements and the land for ad valorem property tax purposes. It ruled that the Tax Collector had standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 196.199(2)(b) and that Appellants' interpretation of the statute as imposing only an intangible tax upon their interests would be unconstitutional....

...Appellants first argue that Bell, not Ward, controls the taxation of improvements. As stated, this Court in Bell held that the improvements on the leased property on Santa Rosa Island were subject only to intangible personal property taxes pursuant to section 196.199(2)(b)....

...ty-nine-year terms. All of these factors lead us to the conclusion that the trial court properly determined that Appellants are the equitable owners of the real property *802 at issue for ad valorem taxation purposes. As such, the exemption found in section 196.199(2)(b) is inapplicable to Appellants....

...payer is the beneficial owner in equity."). We accordingly affirm the trial court's order. Given the significance of the issues presented herein, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following as a question of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 196.199(2)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE REAL PROPERTY AT ISSUE BECAUSE APPELLANTS ARE THE EQUITABLE OWNERS OF THAT PROPERTY? AFFIRMED....

...d boundary, created by general law, special act, local ordinance, or by rule of the Governor and Cabinet. The special purpose or purposes of special districts are implemented by specialized functions and related prescribed powers. For the purpose of s. 196.199(1), special districts shall be treated as municipalities....

...created pursuant to s. 285.17, a municipal service taxing or benefit unit as specified in s. 125.01, or a board which provides electrical service and which is a political subdivision of a municipality or is part of a municipality. (Emphasis added). Section 196.199(1), Florida Statutes (1999), the statutory exemption for government property, provides: (1) Property owned and used by the following governmental units shall be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: ....

...old interests. In Dade County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., Fla. 1973, 275 So.2d 505, the Florida Supreme Court held that leasehold interests like those of plaintiff TAN Airlines were exempt from ad valorem taxation under § 196.25(2)(c) [Now § 196.199(2)(a)]....

...We conclude that the assessment in the instant case was "voidable". The plaintiff's leasehold interests but for the exemption is taxable and thus, there was some statutory authority for imposing the challenged assessment which was made in good faith. §§ 196.001(2) and 196.199(2)(a), Fla....

...The exempt status of the subject leaseholds stems not from the nature or the ownership of the property, but rather from its use which is the determining factor in whether or not otherwise taxable property is exempt from taxation. See, e.g., §§ 196.196 and 196.197, Fla. Stat. and § 196.199(2)(a), Fla....

...its communication towers, its fiber optic network and internet service provision equipment, and its "Deerhaven Property." The City contended that all of the property at issue was exempt pursuant to article VII, section 3(a) Florida Constitution and section 196.199, Florida Statutes, because it was used for a municipal or public purpose....

...nterests in property of the United States, of the state, or any *36 political subdivision, municipality, agency, authority, or other public body corporate of the state. The specific exemption provided by law which St. John's relies upon is stated in Section 196.199(2)(a) as follows: (2) Property owned by the following governmental units, but used by nongovernmental lessees, shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: (a) Leasehold interests in property of the United States...

...Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for *38 such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "Governmental-proprietary" functions....

...roviding two-way telecommunications services to the public for hire by the use of a telecommunications facility, as defined in s. 364.02(13), and for which a certificate is required under chapter 364 does not constitute an exempt use for purposes of s. 196.199, unless the telecommunications services are provided by the operator of a public-use airport, as defined by s....

...in governmental property were taxable unless exempted by law. See § 196.001, Fla. Stat. (1971). The one express exemption allowed for leaseholds was "only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function." § 196.199(2)(a), Fla....

...r St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary" functions....

...This appeal concerns only that portion of Poinciana's assets located in Osceola County. Osceola denied the Utility a tax exemption because it was created under chapter 163, and not chapter 196. Governmental entities are exempt from taxes and assessments under both of these chapters. §§ 163.01(7)(g)4; 196.192; 196.199(1)(c)....

...NOTES [1] Section 196.192, Exemptions from ad valorem taxation, provides: Subject to the provisions of this chapter: (1) All property owned by an exempt entity and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation. (Emphasis added) Section 196.199(1)(c) entitled "Government property exemption" provides: All property of the several political subdivisions and municipalities of this state or of entities created by its general or special law and composed entirely of governmental ag...

...The issue we must resolve is whether the trial court correctly determined that certain members of the proposed class were time barred from bringing an action pursuant to section 194.171(1), Florida Statutes, challenging a property tax assessment on the basis that the property was exempt governmental property pursuant to section 196.199, Florida Statutes....

...After exhausting administrative remedies Marathon Air brought suit to challenge the assessment. Marathon Air contended that as a fixed base operator, it performs a governmental function and that it enjoys exemption from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). The trial court held that the building was not exempt and dismissed the action with prejudice. We conclude that the trial court was correct. Section 196.199(2)(a) grants an exemption of "[l]easehold interests in property ......

...On the contrary, by the express terms of the lease, the building remains the property of Marathon Air until the conclusion of the lease period. Since the building is not part of the leased property, it is not *1341 exempt from ad valorem taxation under section 196.199(2)(a)....

...The trial court was entirely correct in denying the exemption. Because that determination is dispositive, we need not reach Marathon Air's second point on appeal. [*] Affirmed. NOTES [*] The trial court made an alternative ruling that the exemption was also barred by the final sentence of section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...graph barred Marathon Air's exemption. The property appraiser argues that paragraph (2)(b) is a limitation on paragraph (2)(a), and that the last sentence of paragraph (2)(b) is therefore pertinent. For present purposes we have assumed arguendo that section 196.199(2)(b) is inapplicable.

...property can be used exclusively for public purposes if the private purpose has merged into the term `public purposes' and if the property is used solely for such `public purposes.'" The criteria for exemption of municipal property leased by the City to a nongovernmental entity is set out in Fla. Stat. § 196.199(2)(a), which provides: "(2) Property owned by the following governmental units but used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: (a) Leasehold interests in property of the United States,...

...ominant public and municipal purposes of the park and serve purposes which could otherwise be properly accomplished through use of municipal funds. The appellee argues the lands it seeks to tax are not governmental within the purview of Fla. Stat. §§ 196.199 and 196.012(5)....

...1975, 320 So.2d 385, where we reversed the trial court and held that certain facilities used by a rental car agency, although privately operated, were actually of such a predominantly public nature as to be exempt from ad valorem taxes under Fla. Stat. § 196.199(2)(a)....

...He contends that the lessee, Graham, does not serve or perform a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, *85 and that the property is not entitled to an exemption for any other reason. The city, on the other hand, contends that under section 196.199(2) and section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1989), the use of the land by Graham for the leasing of docks to the general public is a municipal park and recreational purpose and clearly a governmental function. We reject the city's contention and agree with the property appraiser. Property owned by municipalities but leased to nongovernmental lessees is only exempt from taxation under certain conditions. § 196.199(2)....

...Such property is exempt from ad valorem taxes if the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in section 196.012(6). The property is also exempt if it is used exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. § 196.199(2)(c)....

...In this case it is clear and the city does not contend otherwise, that the property is not used for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to consider if Graham serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function under section 196.199(2)(a)....

...Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)); see also Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d 1260, 1265 (Fla.2008). Appellants argue they are exempt from intangible personal property tax under sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(6), Florida Statutes, which exempt nongovernmental lessees on government-owned real property who serve "a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function." They maintain that the legislature exempted them from intangi...

...the chapter on exemptions, chapter 196, is inapplicable to intangible personal property taxes, imposed by *143 chapter 199. We agree with Department. We further agree that appellants are subject to the intangible personal property tax under sections 196.199(2)(b) and 199.023(1)(d), Florida Statutes, which subject to taxation the leasehold interests of nongovernmental lessees on government-owned real property "predominantly used for ....

...commercial purposes" where rental payments are due. Section 199.023(1)(d), defines "Intangible personal property" as including: Except for any leasehold or other possessory interest described in s. 4(a), Art. VII of the State Constitution[ [3] ] or s. 196.199(7),[ [4] ] all leasehold or other possessory interests in real property owned by ....

...ngible personal property." (emphasis added). Chapter 199 does not contain any exemption for airports or "fixed-base operations." Appellants argue, however, that they are entitled to the government property exemption within chapter 196—specifically, section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), which provides: (2) Property owned by the following governmental units but used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: (a) Leasehold interests in property of....

...199.023(1)(d), subject to the provisions of subsection (7). Such leasehold or other interest shall be taxed only as intangible personal property pursuant to chapter 199 if rental payments are due in consideration of such leasehold or other interest. . . . [emphasis added] § 196.199(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010). Based on the above statutory provisions, the Department correctly concluded in its notices of final agency action, that [s]ection 196.199(2)(b), F.S., excludes from exemption, the portions of a leasehold defined by s. 199.023(1)(d), F.S., except as provided in s. 196.199(7), F.S., *144 and s. 196.199(2)(c), F.S....

...s. In sum, the appellant companies operate fixed-base operations on government-owned airport properties which serve a governmental, municipal or public purpose. While their leasehold interests are exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(6), [6] the Department's assessment of intangible taxes was proper under the plain language of section 199.023(1)(d)....

...public in the promotion of air commerce shall be deemed an activity which serves a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function. [emphasis added] [3] Article VII, Section 4(a), of the Florida Constitution, is inapplicable to this case. [4] Section 196.199(7), Florida Statutes, deems property that is originally leased for 100 years or more, or property financed through issuance of bonds pursuant to parts II, III, or V of chapter 159, to be owned for purposes of that section. That subsection also is irrelevant to this appeal. [5] Paragraph (c) exempts "[a]ny governmental property leased to an organization which uses the property exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes." § 196.199(2)(c)....

...Runway 5-23 Hangar Condo. Ass'n, 847 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that hangars of Boca Airport, Inc. (one of the appellant companies here) were exempt from ad valorem taxation because they perform a governmental, municipal and public purpose under section 196.199(2)(a), and constituted an aviation facility specifically exempted by section 196.012(6)); see also Nolte v....

...ents are subject to taxation at the ad valorem rate. Jones and Holly cross-appeal the trial court's rulings that the tax collector does not have standing to raise affirmative defenses concerning the constitutionality of the taxing statutes, sections 196.199(2)(b) and 199.023(1), Florida Statutes, and that Holly, as tax collector, may not sell tax certificates on properties if taxes become delinquent....

...x purposes. See State v. Escambia County, 52 So.2d at 130 (upholding statutory exemption of the leaseholds on Santa Rosa Island from ad valorem taxes); and Straughn v. Camp, 293 So.2d at 694 (upholding revocation of previous tax exemption). In 1980, section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes, [1] which reads essentially the *894 same today, was enacted making private leaseholds of government owned property exempt from ad valorem taxation and subject only to intangible personal property taxes when rental payments are due as consideration for the leaseholds....

...Appellants brought an action against these taxing authorities seeking a declaration that the assessments were unlawful and asking that they be enjoined from pursuing and collecting ad valorem real property taxes on the improvements. Relying upon sections 196.199(8)(a), 197.432(9), and 199.023(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2004), appellants asked that Holly be enjoined from creating any liens for taxes on their leasehold estates and from selling any tax certificates to collect any real property taxes should they fail to pay their taxes in the future. *895 In their answer and affirmative defenses, the taxing authorities asserted that section 199.023(1), defining intangible personal property, and section 196.199(2)(b) were unconstitutional. Appellants moved to strike the affirmative defenses challenging the constitutionality of sections 196.199(2)(b) and 199.023(1), contending that the tax collector and tax assessor are ministerial public officers who have no standing to challenge the constitutionality of statutes defining property for purposes of taxation or how such properties should be taxed....

...Bryan leaseholders are the equitable owners of their leasehold improvements. The taxing authorities, Jones and Holly, have not cross-appealed this ruling. Turning to the assertion of the tax assessor and tax collector that they could challenge the constitutionality of section 196.199(2)(b) and other statutes, the trial court ruled that public officials do not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of state statutes....

...In the case before us, we answer each of these inquiries in the negative. There is nothing inherently unlawful in subjecting the appellants to ad valorem taxes, as leaseholders on Santa Rosa Island were subject to ad valorem taxation from 1972 to 1980, before section 196.199(2)(b) was enacted....

...Moreover, appellants did not express the intention not to pay their taxes. Thus, it is entirely hypothetical to speculate that appellants will refuse to pay lawfully imposed taxes. AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part. THOMAS and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 196.199(2)(b), provides, in pertinent part: (2) Property owned by the following governmental units, but used by nongovernmental lessees, shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: * * * (b) ......

...However, even though we do not find the Port immune from taxation, we must remand this case back to the trial court for a determination as to whether any statutory exemptions would apply to the subject of ad valorem taxation in this case — real property owned by the Port and leased to various nongovernmental lessees. See § 196.199, Fla....

...See State v. Alford, 107 So.2d 27 (Fla.1958). The legislature has itself paid heed to this dictum by providing: "All property of this state which is used for governmental purposes shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation, except as otherwise provided by law." § 196.199(1)(b), Fla....

...Chapter 196 of the Florida Statutes, entitled "Exemptions," provides that personal property, buildings, or other real property improvements located on government property, but owned by a lessee of that government property, are not exempt from ad valorem taxation. See § 196.199(2)(b), Fla....

...ermissible and legal. We reject the appellants' contention that the ordinance violates Section 10, Article I and Section 9(a) of Article VII of the Florida Constitution, and Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution, or Chapter 199 and Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida *393 Statutes....

...Not only is it undisputed that the United States never received notice of the sale, but if a state statute cannot divest the United States of its property interests, surely the actions of a local government would be equally unenforceable. Moreover, federal lands are not subject to ad valorem taxes in Florida, see Fla. Stat. § 196.199....

a "political subdivision" for purposes of section 196.199, Florida Statutes, such that the real property

is exempt from ad valorem taxation under section 196.199(1), Florida Statutes. In that event, the unit

Sections 212.031(l)(a)l-ll and *333212.08, or Section 196.199, Fla. Stat. 20. An exemption for ‘public purposes’

Your question is answered in the negative. Section 196.199(1)(a), F.S., provides that property owned and

taxation set forth in Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Section 196.199(2)(a) provides that property

was exempt from ad valorem taxation under section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2016). The School

other public body corporate of the state." Section 196.199, Florida Statutes, sets forth exemptions for

...reasonable and adequate and in the best interests of the City and the public, and that the realty and leasehold interest of said leased premises are exempt from ad valorem taxes in accord with the provisions of Florida Statutes 196.199(2)(a) and Florida Statutes 196.012(5). Scotty’s Landing thereafter began operating a bar and restaurant in the Grove Key Marina pursuant to a management agreement between those parties.1 Grove Key and Scotty’s Landing have the sa...

...There are certain exceptions and nuances to this general rule, however, when the property at issue is governmentally owned. For example, governmentally owned property that is used exclusively for public purposes is completely exempt from property taxation. Art. VII, § 3, Fla. Const.; § 196.199(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). Conversely, when a city owns property that is then leased to a private entity for a non-governmental purpose, the tax exemption is lost. § 196.199(2), Fla....

...non-governmental lessee and has not been exempted from taxation, the tax should be assessed to the non-governmental lessee. If no rental payments are due pursuant to the agreement creating the leasehold estate, or if the property meets the requirements of Section 196.199(7), F.S., the leasehold estate shall be taxed as real property. Ad valorem real property taxes relating to government property, levied on a leasehold that is taxed as real property under Section 196.199(2)(b), F.S., must be paid by the lessee....

...Section 12D-13.046 clarifies that the lessee must pay any taxes resulting from its leasehold interest in the property, which is taxed as intangible property if rental payments are due, as is the case here, and is taxed as real property if no rental payments are due. See § 196.199(2)(b)....

...liability for the ad valorem taxes on the property. 9  Having determined that the City owes the ad valorem taxes on the property, we now address the County’s argument that sections 197.432(10) and 196.199(8) of the Florida Statutes authorize it to seek remedial action against the Lessees irrespective of which party owes the unpaid taxes....

...See generally § 197.432. Subsection (10) of section 197.432, however, exempts governmentally owned property from the typical tax certificate procedure, and instead provides that delinquent taxes owed on such property shall be enforced only as provided in section 196.199(8)....

...created in, property owned by any governmental unit which has become subject to taxation due to lease of the property to a nongovernmental lessee. The delinquent taxes shall be enforced and collected in the manner provided in s. 196.199(8). However, the ad valorem real property taxes levied on a leasehold that is taxed as real property under s. 196.199(2)(b), and for which no rental payments are due under the agreement that created the leasehold or for which payments required under the original leasehold agreement have been waived or prohibited by law before January 1, 1993, must be paid by the lessee. If the taxes are unpaid, the delinquent taxes become a lien on the leasehold and may be collected and enforced under this chapter. (emphasis added). Section 196.199(8) then provides, in full: (8)(a) Any and all of the aforesaid taxes on any leasehold described in this section shall not become a lien on same or the property itself but shall constitute a debt due and shall...

...property appraiser to the Department of State, of the authority of any foreign corporation to do business in this state, as appropriate, which such license, charter, or authority is related to the leased property. (emphasis added). The County emphasizes section 196.199(8)(b) and argues that the statute allows it to pursue remedial action against the Lessees for any taxes owed on property that has lost its governmental exemption by way of a proprietary lease to 11 a private entity. The County makes the novel, although not altogether unreasonable, argument that the Florida Legislature intended 196.199(8) to be a broad remedial measure for precisely this situation, such that the County should be able to collect from either the City or the Lessees when they are both refusing to pay the property tax by pointing the finger towards one another....

...ment, but can then recover in a separate action against his co-tortfeasors for the amount by which he overpaid. See § 768.31(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). The County’s argument on this point, however, is founded on a misreading of the statute. Section 196.199(8)(a) specifies that the subsection only applies to taxes owed “on any leasehold” and allows liens to be imposed on other property in the State “of the taxpayer who owes said tax.” Section 196.199(8)(b) further clarifies that “nonpayment of any such taxes by the lessee” shall result in the remedies enumerated therein. Read holistically, subsections 196.199(8)(a) and (b) 12 simply prevent the County from imposing a lien on governmentally owned property so as not to interfere with the property rights of another governmental entity, but they allow a di...

use to which such lessee puts the property. Section 196.199(1), F.S., is in accord, granting tax exemption

intangible personal property taxes pursuant to section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2011). Background

...Jones, No. SC11-2231 (Fla. Mar. 20, 2014).  In Accardo v. Brown, 63 So. 3d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), the First District Court rejected the claim of the petitioner taxpayers that they were entitled to the benefit of a statutory provision found in section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), under which certain leasehold or other possessory interests in real property owned by a political subdivision of the State are exempt from ad valorem taxation and subject only to taxation as intangible personal property....

...d the improvements thereon and that the statutory provision relied on by the taxpayers is therefore inapplicable. Accardo, 63 So. 3d at 801-02. The District Court certified the following question as one of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 196.199(2)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE REAL PROPERTY AT ISSUE BECAUSE APPELLANTS ARE THE EQUITABLE OWNERS OF THAT PROPERTY? Id....

...nsibility for insurance, maintenance and repair; and they are typically responsible by the terms of the lease documents for taxes imposed upon their interests. II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK As provided in section 196.199(1), Florida Statutes (2013), property owned by governmental units is not generally subject to the ad valorem tax. But government property leased to private parties may be subject to ad valorem taxation. Section 196.199(2) provides generally that where government owned property is “used by nongovernmental lessees,” the leasehold interest in the government property shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs the governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function as specifically defined by law. This rule regarding the taxation of private leasehold interests in governmental property is qualified by section 196.199(2)(b), which is specifically referenced in the certified question and is central to the petitioners’ argument. -4-  Section 196.199(2) provides in pertinent part: (2) Property owned by the following governmental units but used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: .......

...improvements owned by the lessee from ad valorem taxation. (c) Any governmental property leased to an organization which uses the property exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation. Section 196.199(7) provides that “[p]roperty which is originally leased for 100 years or more, exclusive of renewal options, or property which is financed, acquired, or maintained utilizing in whole or in part funds acquired through the issuance of [certain governmental bonds], shall be deemed to be owned for purposes of this section.” The central provision of section 196.199(2)(b) is tied to section 199.023(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), which defines intangible personal property as including, subject to an exception not relevant here, “all leasehold or other -5- possessory interests in real property owned by [governmental entities], which are undeveloped or predominantly used for residential or commercial purposes and upon which rental payments are due.” (Emphasis added.) The provisions in section 196.199(2)(b) were first adopted in 1980 and have not been materially altered since then. Compare § 196.199(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013), with § 196.199(2)(b), Fla....

...THE TAXPAYERS’ ARGUMENTS The petitioners argue that because their leaseholds all are on county property that is either undeveloped or used for residential or commercial purposes, rental payments are due under their leases and their initial lease terms are for less than 100 years, under the plain terms of section 196.199(2)(b), the leasehold interests are taxable only as intangible personal property....

...-6- another location.” Petitioners’ Revised Initial Brief on the Merits at 24. They further argue that subjecting their renewable ninety-nine-year leases to ad valorem taxation is inconsistent with the provision of section 196.199(7) regarding the taxation of “[p]roperty which is originally leased for 100 years or more, exclusive of renewal options.” The petitioners make some additional arguments that we have determined do not merit discussion.2 IV....

...istrict held that each member’s interest was subject to ad valorem taxation. Id. In Hialeah, Inc. v. Dade County, 490 So. 2d 998, 999-1000 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), the Third District Court specifically considered application of the version of section 196.199(2) then in force, along with the corresponding definition of -9- intangible personal property contained in section 199.023....

...The Third District rejected the argument of Hialeah, Inc., that its interest in the land was subject only to the intangible personal property tax. Id. at 999-1000. Rejecting the claim that only leasehold interests falling within the scope of section 196.199(7)—relating to properties originally leased for 100 years or more, exclusive of renewal options, or properties financed by certain governmental bonds —would qualify for ad valorem tax treatment, the court reasoned that the provisions of section 196.199 and section 199.023 concerning taxation as intangible personal property only came into play after a determination that the property was owned by the government....

...le beneficiary of the improvement”); Penick v. Atkinson, 77 S.E. 1055, 1057 (Ga. 1913) (concluding that a perpetual lease is the substantial equivalent of a fee reserving rent)). The First District specifically rejected the argument that section 196.199(7) “provides a safe harbor from being taxed as equitable owners.” Ward, 919 So....

...as owned without the need to further address whether there are sufficient rights and duties to consider the lessees as equitable owners.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the analysis in Hialeah, Inc. concerning the scope of section 196.199(7)....

...The taxpayers hold “virtually all the benefits and burdens of ownership” of both the improvements and the land. Leon Cnty. Educ. Facilities Auth., 698 So. 2d at 530. We reject petitioner taxpayers’ argument that an equitable ownership interest is an “other” interest referred to in section 196.199(2)(b) and section 199.023(1)(d) that is subject to taxation only as intangible personal property....

...improvements and the land. Leon Cnty. Educ. Facilities Auth., 698 So. 2d at 530. Finally, we reject the petitioner taxpayers’ argument that subjecting their leasehold interests to ad valorem taxation is inconsistent with the provision of section 196.199(7) regarding the taxation of “property which is originally leased for 100 years or more, exclusive of renewal options.” We agree with Ward and Hialeah, Inc. that it must first be determined that the governmental entity is the “owner” of the property—not the mere holder of bare legal title—before there is any reason to consider whether the bright line one-hundred-year rule of section 196.199(7) is applicable....

...Here, for ad valorem tax purposes, the “owner” of the property is not a governmental entity. VII. CONCLUSION We therefore conclude that the taxpayers are the equitable owners of the real property at issue and that section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes, is inapplicable here....

...III. In Accardo, we explain at length the significance of the doctrine of equitable ownership in Florida’s law regarding ad valorem taxation and discuss the interaction of the equitable ownership doctrine with the statutory provisions—§ 196.199(2), (7), Fla....

...scope of the equitable ownership doctrine. Florida law recognizes that regardless of how legal title is held, the improvements on lands owned by a governmental entity may—for ad valorem tax purposes—be “owned” by the lessee of the lands. The final sentence of section 196.199(2)(b) provides that “[n]othing in this paragraph shall be deemed to exempt personal property, buildings, or other real property improvements owned by the lessee from ad valorem taxation.” Of course, the reference to “owned by...

use to which such lessee puts the property. Section 196.199(1), F.S., is in accord, granting tax exemption

...laim of entitlement to an exemption from ad valorem taxation. Although we affirm, we deem it helpful to discuss appellants' second issue, asserting that the lower court erred in declining to find that the property LCEFA leases is exempt, pursuant to section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1993), [1] for the reason that the property is both owned and used by a governmental entity created by general law....

...legal title to the property, and the Authority, as lessee, has active, equitable and beneficial ownership of same, and the leased property is being used for a governmental, public purpose, it was exempt from ad valorem property taxation pursuant to section 196.199(1)(c)....

...astroianni and Ocean Highway involved the application of section 196.192 to leased property operated respectively by a nonprofit hospital corporation and a port authority, whereas the pertinent statute essential for resolving the issue before it was section 196.199(1)(b), allowing an exemption for property of the state and its subdivisions used for governmental purposes....

...We cannot agree with the Fifth District's decision that the facts in First Union militate in favor of a different result from that reached in Mastroianni and Ocean Highway. Nor do we agree, as was implied in First Union, that the provisions of sections 196.192 and 196.199 may be read in isolation from each other. Although it is correct that this court emphasized the provisions of section 196.192 in Mastroianni and Ocean Highway, and not those of section 196.199, as in First Union, we regard this to be an immaterial distinction....

...dment was designed to implement the legislative intention to tax all property, notwithstanding its use for a public purpose, if its legal ownership remains in a nonexempt entity. In so doing, the legislature clarified its purpose by pronouncing that section 196.199(1), which provided both before and after the 1988 amendment that "[p]roperty owned and used by [certain specified] governmental units shall be exempt from taxation," meant precisely that—property may not be owned solely by an exempt...

...6. For example, section 196.001, Florida Statutes, requires all real property to be taxed unless there is an express exemption from same. Nowhere in any statute placed under this chapter is any express reference made to equitable ownership. In fact, section 196.199(7) enumerates only two exceptions to the definition of the term "owned" for purposes of the tax exemption, neither of which applies to the case at bar: property leased for 100 years or more, or that which is financed, acquired or maintained through the issuance of bonds pursuant to various parts of chapter 159....

...so provided in subsection (7) of this statute. We therefore decline to follow the Fifth District's decision in First Union National Bank of Florida, and we expressly certify our conflict with it. AFFIRMED. WEBSTER and MICKLE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 196.199(1)(c) provides: (1) Property owned and used by the following governmental units shall be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: * * * * * * (c) All property of the several political subdivisions and municipalities of thi...

were exempt from real property taxes under section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), which exempts

exemption from ad valorem taxes pursuant to section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides

subdivisions called counties.” (emphasis added)); § 196.199(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2014) (creating tax exemptions

they stand — are “owned by the [sub]lessee[s].” § 196.199(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). We rejected exactly

the lessee, are subject to ad valorem taxes. § 196.199(2)(b), Fla. Stat.; see also Parker v. Hertz Corp

valorem property tax assessments pursuant to section 196.199, Florida Statutes, for various tax years. To

...or and against the Appraiser. We affirm the final judgment in favor of the Authority on the alternate ground that the Agreement granted Roadmaster only a license to use the subject parcel, not a lease or other possessory interest in land. Therefore, section 196.199, Florida Statutes (2003 & 2004), is inapplicable, and regardless of whether the Authority is immune from taxation, the subject parcel was not subject to ad valorem taxation for the years in question....

...However, nothing in this section shall grant any person other than the authority an exemption from the tax imposed in chapter 220, and if property of the authority is leased, the property shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only if the use by the lessee qualifies the property for exemption under s. 196.199. The exemption granted by this section shall not be applicable to any tax imposed by chapter 220 on interest, income, or profits on debt obligations owned by corporations. The property of the authority shall be subject to the provisions of s. 196.199. § 616.260 (emphasis added). Thus section 616.260 expressly states that lands owned by the Authority are subject to the provisions of section 196.199 concerning "[g]overnment property exemption[s]." In addition, section 616.260 suggests that lands leased by the Authority are exempt from ad valorem taxation only if the leased lands qualify for an exemption under section 196.199....

...iroperty owned by any municipality, agency, authority, or other public body corporate of the state which becomes subject to a leasehold interest or other possessory interest of a nongovernmental lessee . . . shall be subject to ad valorem taxation." § 196.199(4), Fla. Stat. (2003 & 2004). Relying on section 196.199, the Appraiser asserts that the Agreement is a lease to a nongovernmental lessee that disqualifies the subject parcel for an exemption from ad valorem taxation. However, if the Authority's lands are immune as it claims, then section 196.199 is arguably inapplicable to them because "[t]he exemptions in chapter 196 apply only to property which does not have immunity." Markham v. Broward County, 825 So.2d 472, 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (concluding that the exemptions in chapter 196 do not apply to county property, which is immune from ad valorem taxation). In addition, the Authority argues that section 196.199 is inapplicable regardless of its status as an immune or an exempt entity because the Agreement is a license, not a lease....

...driver school under detailed terms and conditions. The Agreement does not make Roadmaster a tenant or give it any possessory interest in the subject parcel. Because Roadmaster does not have a lease or other possessory interest in the subject parcel, section 196.199(4) is not applicable....

and docks were exempt from taxation under section 196.199, Florida Statutes. Graham obtained a default

court and on this appeal is the interpretation of § 196.199(6) and (7)(a) and § 197.116(7), Fla.Stat.1975

charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation. Section 196.199(2)(b), F.S., presently provides: Except

4 of the Florida Constitution and Florida Statute 196.199, as interpreted by the Florida courts

which is not a party to this action). See, e.g., § 196.199(2)(a), .012, Fla. Stat. (2009); Sebring Airport

...Oct 21, 2004), 2004 WL 2360129, which was not available to the trial court when it denied the motion to dismiss. In Ward , the taxpayers were long-term lessees of property owned by the county and claimed that the property was not subject to ad valorem taxation under section 196.199, which exempts certain governmental property from taxation....

taxation, except as otherwise provided by law.” § 196.199(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). Other than section 194

public purposes shall be exempt from taxation." Section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes, implements this constitutional

...denied, 237 So.2d 539 (Fla.1970)). However, according to Article VII, Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution, "[a]ll property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation." Moreover, Section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that the property of the municipalities of the state used "for governmental, municipal, or public purposes shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation, except as otherwise provided by law." The is...

"municipality" for those tax exemptions authorized by section 196.199(1), Florida Statutes. The court held that the

A.C., be immune from ad valorem taxation. Section 196.199(1), F. S., further provides that such property

subject property was improperly taxed. See Section 196.199(2), Florida Statutes; Schultz v. TM Florida-Ohio

located in Florida is subject to taxation.5 Section 196.199(1), F.S., provides an exemption from ad valorem