Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...[*], 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). [6] The United States Supreme Court has recognized that different categories exist concerning attorney's fees. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). [7] See § 440.34, Fla....

...Compensation Law. Wage loss requests were also filed for the months of January and February. The January request was approved on March 7, 1980, and the February request was approved March 10, 1980. A hearing was held pursuant to the requirements of Section 440.34(2)(b) for the sole purpose of determining liability for interest, penalties and attorney's fees....

...In our view the deputy commissioner correctly ruled that the notice to controvert did not comply with the statute, payment was not made within fourteen days, and the punitive penalty for late payment was properly assessed. We next consider the assessment of attorney's fees under the "bad faith" provision. Section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that a claimant shall be responsible for the payment of his own attorney's fees, except under limited circumstances set forth in subparagraph (a) of subsection (2), and except as provided in subpar...

...lful, wanton or reckless disregard of the rights of the claimant. Any determination of bad faith shall be made by the deputy commissioner through a separate fact-finding proceeding; ... The carrier argues that the "bad faith" definition contained in Section 440.34(2)(b) tracks the longstanding case law dealing with punitive damages....

...4th DCA 1978); Carlile v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977); Allstate Mortgage Company v. Strasser, 277 So.2d 843 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1973), aff'd 286 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1975). Finally, the carrier maintains that the elimination of Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978), providing for assessment of attorney's fees against the employer or carrier "if the claimant proves to the judge that the employer or carrier handled his claim in a negligent, arbitrary, or capricious manne...

...ove the amount necessary to compensate for his loss. Punitive damages are damages that "go beyond the actual damages suffered in the case... ." Richards Company v. Harrison, 262 So.2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). We have not overlooked the provisions of Section 440.34(2)(c), arguably punitive in nature, which prohibit the carrier from directly or indirectly recouping any such attorney's fees assessed against it in the rate base, premium, or any rate filing....

...Under the new act, the claimant pays his own attorney's fees as a general rule. Provision is made, however, for payment of attorney's fees by the carrier or employer in certain limited instances: when the claimant successfully asserts a claim for medical benefits only (Section 440.34(2)(a)), or when the claimant prevails on the issue of compensability after the same has been denied by the carrier or employer (Section 440.34(2)(c)). The third circumstance under which attorney's fees may be recovered is the "bad faith" provision of Section 440.34(2)(b) involved in this case....

...the rights of all parties." The self-executing tenor of the new act is emphasized further by the reenactment of provisions effectively discouraging the claimant's resort to legal assistance in the early stages of a worker's compensation proceeding. Section 440.34 provides that no attorney's fees may be paid for services rendered for a claimant in connection with any proceedings under the law unless approved as reasonable by the deputy commissioner, or the court having jurisdiction over such proceedings....

...The further withholding of needed benefits for more than six additional weeks adds further justification, in our opinion, for a finding that the carrier's conduct in the handling of this claim amounts to "oppression," or "willful ... or reckless disregard of the rights of the claimant." Section 440.34(2)(b)....

...Whether and to what extent the new act has or will accomplish its desired purposes, as convincingly explicated by the authors of this law review, are matters not before us for consideration. [2] Id., pp. 649-654. [3] This provision, appearing in the prior law as Section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...g approach to its chapter 440 obligations, we cannot find the deputy erred in assessing an attorney's fee for having acted "in bad faith with regard to handling an injured worker's claim," resulting in an injured worker suffering economic loss. Sec. 440.34(3)(b), (5)....

...ermining whether the appellant has fairly and expeditiously determined its obligation to place needed benefits in the hands of the injured *328 worker, or whether it has instead acted recklessly in handling the claim. That is the necessary effect of section 440.34(5), which is juxtaposed to the statutory criteria for awarding fees when "a carrier has acted in bad faith with regard to handling an injured worker's claim and the injured worker has suffered economic loss." Section 440.34(5) provides: If any proceedings are had for review of any claim, award, or compensation order before any court, the court may allow or increase the attorney's fees, in its discretion, which shall be paid as the court may direct....

...case-by-case basis, and the reasons for the delay must be closely scrutinized. We are nevertheless satisfied, however, on the record before us that there is competent and substantial evidence supporting the deputy's determination. In accordance with section 440.34(5), we grant claimant's motion for an appellate attorney's fee, we assess the fee at $3,000 based on the documentation furnished after oral argument, and we direct that this fee, like the fee to be awarded by the deputy on remand, "not be recouped, directly or indirectly, by any carrier [or group self-insurer, section 440.02(7)] in the rate base, the premium or any rate filing." Sec. 440.34(3)....

...If I thought the record evidence supported the deputy's finding of carrier [*] bad faith in withholding initiatives required of it under chapter 440, I would also agree, for the reasons stated by the Court, that the deputy's award of attorney fees should be sustained under section 440.34(3)(b)....

...Alternatively an appellate fee, paid in the manner directed by the Court, is justified to deter carrier appeals that are wholly without merit. That is the case here, for the carrier's appeal on the $350 issue is but an inconsequential struggle over labels. I note, as does the Court, that section 440.34(5) does not require a finding of bad faith in a carrier's appeal as a predicate for awarding fees not recoverable through the rate base; to deter wholly groundless carrier appeals it is necessary that the Court employ this economic disincentive....

...assisted by a servicing agent, or is insured by Peninsular Fire Insurance Company. In any case the term "carrier" is all-encompassing, section 440.02(7)(a), though there is some difficulty in speaking of a self-insured as a "carrier" for purposes of section 440.34(3), which directs that attorney fees assessed for carrier bad faith "shall not be recouped, directly or indirectly, by any carrier in the rate base, premium, or any rate filing." Assessing such a fee against a self-insured has the same...

...Nevertheless, in the instant case, the district court concluded that Zabawczuk was no longer relevant in light of the subsequent overhaul of the worker's compensation law in 1979. As the basis for its conclusion, the court said: It is clear, however, that the present attorney's fees provisions found in section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1983), reflect a recognition by the legislature that in specific circumstances — namely, those covered by 440.34(3)(a)-(c) — without the intervention or potential intervention of an attorney acting for the claimant, medical or compensation benefits due the claimant are likely to be delayed or denied to the claimant....

...We agree with the district court of appeal that because the present worker's compensation law places primary responsibility for the claimant's attorney's fees on the claimant, those limited instances in which the claimant may recover attorney's fees represent a substantial benefit to the claimant. § 440.34(3), Fla....

...lso be included in the award, but it is clear from the record that the award was predicated only upon the attorney's services rendered through the second hearing. [2] The affidavit may also include any other pertinent factors which are recognized by section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and opposing counsel should be permitted the opportunity to challenge in writing both the reasonableness of the time spent and the applicability of such other factors.

...was error because this type of percentage fee was abolished when section 733.617 was amended in 1975 and 1976. In response, Patterson asserts that, since the lodestar approach is inapplicable in workers' compensation cases where fees are governed by section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1987), the lodestar approach should not be applicable under the provisions of section 733.617, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...First, we reject respondent's contentions that the lodestar approach is not applicable because it does not apply in workers' compensation or condemnation proceedings. The statutes in those two types of cases are distinctive. In workers' compensation cases, section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1987), specifically sets forth how the fee should be calculated....

...(e) The time limitation imposed by the claimant or the circumstances. (f) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant. (g) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing services. (h) The contingency or certainty of a fee. § 440.34(1), Fla....

...not infrequently are due to the preliminary conduct of the case, ... ." Shattuck v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra at 348. The lower court, no doubt assuming that Sohn would be paid a fee for his services in the workmen's compensation claim as required by Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1977), in essence discounted the value of those labors in evaluating the fee it awarded Sohn in the tort proceeding....

...Zientz, P.A., Miami, FL, on behalf of NPAC Worker's Compensation Section of The Florida Bar, as Amici Curiae. WELLS, J. In this case petitioner Emma Murray, the claimant in a workers' compensation case, challenges the constitutionality of the statute governing attorney fees in such cases, section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...Giorgetti, 868 So.2d 512, 518 (Fla.2004) ("We are also obligated to construe statutes in a manner that avoids a holding that a statute may be unconstitutional."). We hold, based upon the plain language of the statute, that when a claimant is entitled to recover attorney fees from a carrier or employer as provided by section 440.34(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d), the claimant is entitled to recover "a reasonable attorney's fee." See § 440.34(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 440.34(3), does not define "reasonable attorney's fee," and an ambiguity results when subsection (1) and subsection (3) are read together....

...Hearings Compensation Order filed May 9, 2005) at 5. Accordingly, the JCC found that petitioner's claims were compensable and awarded her $3,244.21 in benefits. When petitioner prevailed at the hearing, the next issue to be addressed by the JCC was attorney fees. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2003), governs attorney fees in workers' compensation cases....

...edings filed under s. 440.24 or s. 440.28. Regardless of the date benefits were initially requested, attorney's fees shall not attach under this subsection until 30 days after the date the carrier or employer, if self-insured, receives the petition. § 440.34(1), (3), Fla....

...ying on its own prior cases addressing constitutional challenges to the statute: The claimant, Emma Murray, appeals the Judge of Compensation Claims' (JCC) order awarding an attorney's fee in strict accordance with the guideline formula set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Murray, 946 So.2d at 39. II. ANALYSIS Petitioner urges that the JCC and the district court erred as a matter of law in determining that the amount of the reasonable attorney fees award paid by the respondents for the petitioner's attorney under subsection 440.34(3) was determined solely under the statutory formula in subsection 440.34(1)....

...In the case below, the district court affirmed the JCC's order by relying on several prior decisions that addressed these issues, including Wood v. Florida Rock Industries, 929 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 935 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 2006). Murray, 946 So.2d at 39. [3] Examining only subsection 440.34(1) of the revised statute in Wood, the district court concluded that the Legislature had defined a "reasonable attorney's fee" as the amount determined under the percentage formula of subsection (1) and held that the statute prohibited the JCC from approving an amount exceeding that percentage figure....

...Below, we analyze the issue presented under this standard, keeping in mind that "[w]herever possible, statutes should be construed in such a manner so as to avoid an unconstitutional result." State v. Jefferson, 758 So.2d 661, 664 (Fla.2000). A. Plain Language and Ambiguity An examination of the plain language of subsections 440.34(1) and (3) reveals that when the formula requirement of subsection (1) is read together with the reasonable attorney fee authorization of subsection (3), a statutory ambiguity is created....

...the JCC "must equal" the statutory formula, which is based on a percentage amount of the dollar value of the compensation benefits obtained by the claimant; and the JCC cannot approve an attorney fee exceeding "the amount permitted by this section." § 440.34(1), Fla....

...We rejected strict application of a contingent percentage of the benefit award, finding such to be inappropriate for this area of the law, and remanded for determination of a reasonable attorney fee by applying the factors in our rule. Lee Eng'g, 209 So.2d at 458-59. The Legislature later amended section 440.34(1) and incorporated these factors as follows: (1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in s....

...(f) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant. (g) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services. (h) The contingency or certainty of a fee. Ch. 77-290, § 9, at 1293-94, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 440.34, Fla....

...Any determination of bad faith shall be made by the deputy commissioner through a separate fact-finding proceeding; or (c) In a proceeding where a carrier or employer denies that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable, and the claimant prevails on the issue of compensability. § 440.34(1)-(2), Fla....

...d by the employer/carrier. Nothing in subsection (2) referred directly to the formula or factors of subsection (1). In 1980, the provision for the employer/carrier-paid fee award was renumbered as subsection (3). See ch. 80-236, § 14, Laws of Fla.; § 440.34(3), Fla....

...Further, we expect the appellate courts to review the factors in cases presented to the courts so that only reasonable and necessary fees are awarded. III. CONCLUSION In sum, our decision in Lee Engineering controls our decision here. We find it to be unclear why in the 2003 revision to section 440.34 the Legislature deleted reference to the reasonable fee factors which had been included in the earlier revisions of the statute....

...bell. We direct that this case be remanded to the JCC for entry of an attorney fee award to respondent in the amount of $16,000. Petitioner is also entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees for the appeal in the First District and this Court. § 440.34(5), Fla....

...l purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Having disposed of the question of compensation, the Deputy Commissioner proceeded to the more difficult question of awarding attorneys fees to the successful claimants' attorneys. He concluded that under Section 440.34, F.S., F.S.A., attorneys for the successful claimants were entitled to compensation and that their fees should be paid by the carrier....

...On appeal to the full Commission, the finding of the Deputy Commissioner was affirmed on a two to one judgment. The sole question before the full Commission was that of attorneys fees. The full Commission held that since the carrier "declined" to pay the claims on or before the 21st day after notice, Section 440.34(1), F.S., F.S.A., was activated and accordingly entitled the successful claimants' attorneys to a reasonable fee....

...In this connection, the minority of the Commission contended that if the legislature had intended that if failure to pay a claim within 20 days after the carrier had notice thereof, would obligate the carrier to pay an attorney's fee, regardless of the circumstances, it would have been extremely simple for Sec. 440.34(1), F.S., F.S.A., to have used the word "fail" rather than "decline." The sole question raised in this court is the same as that which confronted the full Commission, that is to say, are the successful claimants under Sec. 440.34(1), F.S., F.S.A., entitled to an award of attorneys fees to be paid by the carrier? The answer to this question turns in the main on the interpretation of Sec. 440.34(1), F.S., F.S.A., as follows: "If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 of this chapter, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of same, or shall oth...

...investigation to determine these questions and that the claimants were entitled to representation at the investigation. This may not be true in all cases but when as here it is found to be true, attorneys fees may be imposed under the statute, Sec. 440.34(1), F.S., F.S.A....

...Weathers for Use and Benefit of Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Cauthen, 152 Fla. 420, 12 So.2d 294. Moreover we are inclined to the view that the carrier was, as the Deputy Commissioner found, such an interested party in the proceedings as to justify imposition of attorneys fees under Sec. 440.34, F.S., F.S.A....

...Ohio Casualty appealed this order to the District Court of Appeal, Third District. In addition, James C. Parrish, Jr. filed a motion in the District Court of Appeal, Third District, for award of attorney's fees pursuant to Fla.App. Rule 3.16(e) and Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...e appellate court. Without specific permission by the appellate court, that judgment cannot be interfered with by the trial court. *468 The district court also held that respondents' attorney's fees should be assessed against petitioner, pursuant to Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Waites, supra, which court found that leave of the appellate court was not required for the trial court to entertain a timely motion filed pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b), and (2) to reverse the order of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, awarding respondent attorney's fees pursuant to Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...on to modify the equitable distribution order, petitioner was essentially resisting payment of compensation by attempting to both deprive respondent of prospective payments and recover half of all benefits paid after October 1, 1974. The language of Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975), articulates the policy that the claimant should not be required to pay his own legal fees in attempting to retain past benefits paid or future benefits already determined to be forthcoming. Furthermore, the proceedings in the district court involved review of the equitable distribution award. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975), was enacted to enable an injured employee who has not received an equitable compensation award to engage competent legal assistance and, in addition, to penalize a recalcitrant employer....

...stitute a net recovery. See Alpert, Florida Workmen's Compensation Law, § 15:10, p. 445 (1966). Cf., Steele v. A.D.H. Building Contractors, Inc., 196 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1967). Thus, in adding attorney's fees to the injured worker's compensation award, Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975), discourages the carrier from unnecessarily resisting claims in an attempt to force a settlement upon an injured worker....

...modest benefit due the claimant. Conversely, if the attorney believes the claim is frivolous, he would be inclined to decline representation. The conduct of the petitioner in the instant cause falls squarely within both the policy considerations of Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1975), calling upon it to pay respondents' attorney's fees and the express language of that statutory provision....

...[3] See also the Report of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts (1955), prepared by Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, wherein the Advisory Committee recommended the position later adopted by the Court in Standard Oil. [4] § 440.34(1), Fla....

...tolled during appellate review. In the first place, the Workmen's Compensation Act does authorize attorneys' fees to claimants' attorneys under certain conditions and circumstances. The fees awarded in this case were specifically authorized by F.S. Section 440.34(1), F.S.A., since the claim was controverted and the Claimant's attorney was successful in prosecuting the claim to an award....

...in situations which could work hardships upon persons ordinarily least able to be burdened by any delays in compensation cases. The argument that penalty provisions and rule nisi enforcement procedures of the Act (see F.S. §§ 440.20(6), 440.24 and 440.34, F.S.A.) are legislative alternatives to allowance of interest on attorneys' fees lacks both logic and merit and overlooks such penalties and procedures are not applicable until after reviews and appeals are final, and are no more justificatio...

...Watson, 397 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Therefore the D.C. should have only used the contract of employment method. Appellant next argues that the D.C. incorrectly assessed a reasonable attorney fee in favor of claimant's counsel since the new statute, Section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1979), permits fees in only the following situations: (a) in cases where the claimant asserts a claim for medical benefits only, (b) in cases where the deputy makes a specific finding that the e/c acted in bad fai...

...e claimant suffered a compensable injury, but controverted only the right to TTD benefits after March 5, 1980. Once an e/c admits an accident and pays some disability benefits, but denies that others are due, an attorney's fee is not awardable under § 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...It should be noted that Dolphin construed the e/c's controversion of the claim for catastrophic loss, provided in Section 440.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), as a denial of a catastrophic injury, thereby authorizing an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c)....

...representing a claimant before an appellate tribunal. An award of an attorney fee to any litigant is in derogation of the common law, and it is allowed only when provided for by contract or statute. Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1968). F.S. Section 440.34(1), F.S.A., does permit an award of attorney fees in connection with proceedings for review of any claim, award, or compensation order, but it allows only the reviewing court to make the award, in its discretion....

...enses should not have been considered by the deputy commissioner when computing the claimant's average weekly wage and the concomitant compensation rate. The appellants also argue that the deputy erred in awarding Scott an attorney's fee pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...it. We reject the carrier's argument in its second point on appeal that the deputy erred in awarding an attorney's fee upon a finding that the carrier had demonstrated bad faith in its handling of the claimant's catastrophic disability benefits. See § 440.34(2)(b) (1979)....

...Claimant also seeks an award of attorney's fees for appellate representation. Unfortunately, this court is without authority or jurisdiction to award such fees in the instant case since the accident occurred after the effective date of the 1979 amendments and before the 1980 amendments to § 440.34, Fla....

...for submission of proper proof of the amount of the bills. The third issue concerns the E/C's assertion that the deputy commissioner erred as a matter of law in awarding an attorney's fee of $30,000 for the services provided by claimant's attorney. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, embodies legislative intent to standardize attorney's fee awards in the workers' compensation area, unless exceptional circumstances warrant a departure from the recommended fee schedule....

...1st DCA 1985), pet. for review denied, 475 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1985). Furthermore, an attorney's fee award will not be set aside merely because it exceeds the statutory rate, when the deputy commissioner's order reflects an appropriate consideration of the section 440.34(1) factors....

...Adams, 431 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In keeping with legislative intent, when reviewing the propriety of an attorney's fee award, this court will examine the findings of fact rendered by the deputy commissioner pursuant to the statutory criteria set forth in section 440.34(1)....

...es. Rivers v. SCA Services of Florida, Inc., 488 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Our review of the findings set forth in the order regarding the attorney's fee award in this case reveals that the deputy commissioner gave a proper consideration to the section 440.34(1) criteria....

...cated that INA assumed coverage prior to the accident and then subsequently attempted to revoke same. The award of reimbursement is affirmed. However, the award of attorney fees in favor of Risk from INA must be reversed, as this court has held that Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, does not permit an award of fees to anyone other than claimant's attorney. Aetna Insurance Company v. Houck, 411 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Risk's contention that it stood in the shoes of claimant is without merit, as Section 440.34 was intended to enable injured employees who had not received equitable compensation to engage competent legal assistance....

...We reject this argument, since the jury may have found no agency and no duty (therefore, no negligence) by being told that a finding of compensation or other benefit was a predicate. [5] The attorneys' fees section of the Workmen's Compensation Act, § 440.34, Fla....

...s, including in that determination the period in December, 1979, regarding which some wage loss benefits have been paid. On cross appeal it is argued that it was error to hold claimant responsible for her own attorney's fees. It is argued that under Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), claimant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees because she prevailed on the issue of entitlement to additional benefits. Even if the basis for the TTD award had not been reversed, claimant would not be entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...One basis for an award of attorney’s fees was available to the claimants in Old Republic that was not available to the Con-nollys: those to a successful claimant where a “carrier has acted in bad faith” in handling a claim. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 440.34(3)(b)....

...ereof together with statutory penalty, interest, and attorney’s fees); Florida ex rel. Iowa Nat’l Mut’l Ins. Co. v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 151 So.2d 636, 641 (Fla.1963) (attorney’s fees denied to unsuccessful claimant). Florida Statute § 440.34(1) (1969) entitled a claimant to attorney’s fees under the 1969 version of the Act where a carrier unsuccessfully resisted payment of compensation, regardless of “bad faith.” See Fla.Stat. § 440.34(1) (1969)....

...As indicated in Wuelling, 683 So.2d at 1092 n. 1, the carrier that takes no action can be subjected to the monetary penalties provided in section 440.20, the penalty assessed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-24.0231 for untimely filing practices, and attorney's fees under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), particularly under subsection (b) thereof, making the E/C responsible for the payment of claimant's attorney's fees in a case in which the E/C has filed a notice of denial and the claimant's attorney has successfully prosecuted the claim....

...d of attorney's fees for appellate representation. That petition must be denied, because this court has no authority or jurisdiction to award such fees herein, since the claimant's accident occurred after the effective date of the 1979 amendments to § 440.34, Fla....

...ew of any claim, award or compensation order before any court, the court may allow or increase the attorney's fees, in its discretion, which fees shall be in addition to the compensation paid the claimant, and shall be paid as the court may direct." § 440.34(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1978). This language was deleted entirely by the 1979 amendments to § 440.34, Fla. Stat. [*] *1205 Section 440.34(2), Fla. Stat. (1979), states that "[a] claimant shall be responsible for the payment of his own attorney's fees... ." There are three exceptions to this statutory pronouncement, see § 440.34(2)(a)-(c), Fla....

...uation of all the evidence, including that evidence pointing to the fact that claimant was still undergoing treatment of sorts during a substantial portion of that time. NOTES [*] While this language was essentially reinserted into the statutes, via § 440.34(5), Fla....

...1st DCA 1994), wherein this court concluded that because the carrier had not notified a physician of claimant's request for medical services within 21 days after the filing of same, the carrier was required to pay claimant's attorney fees, pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), [3] despite its direct notification to the attorney of the authorization within 21 days after its receipt of the notice of claim....

...Gold Coast Aerial Lift, 705 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); see also, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Schiffman, 144 So.2d 799 (Fla.1962); Smith v. General Parcel Service, 699 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). REVERSED and REMANDED. PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes, authorizes an award of fees to claimant if he or she prevails on a claim for medical benefits....

...Michael Matthews of Fisher & Matthews, P.A., Altamonte Springs, for appellee. ERVIN, Judge. Under the 1979 workers' compensation law, claimant and appellee, William T. Morris was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, remedial care, and attorney's fees pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...are must also be reversed. See Lake County Commissioners v. Walburn, 409 So.2d 153, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Killebrew Manufacturing Co. v. Dawson, 401 So.2d 876, 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The claimant also sought attorney's fees pursuant to Sections 440.34(2)(a), (b), (c), Florida Statutes (1979). The deputy commissioner did not rule on the possibility of a fee award based on the first and second sub-sections, because he found that a fee award was justified pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c)....

...May, 397 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Ardmore Farms, supra, at 270. The e/c, having paid medical and temporary benefits until September 2, 1980, has obviously removed itself from the type of situation allowing the imposition of sanctions implicit in the award of Section 440.34(2)(c) fees. The fee award is reversed. However, we remand this case so that the deputy may address the issue of the propriety of a fee award based on Sections 440.34(2)(a), (b), and for the determination of the precise date of MMI....

...The law did not restrict the claimant's ability to obtain medical examinations of his own choice. A testifying expert's witness fee might be assessed as costs, should the claimant prevail in a proceeding at which the expert testified. See Raska v. Glasgow Contracting, 588 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); § 440.34(3), Fla....

...ttorney's fees. We have determined that in the present case, this court has no authority or jurisdiction to award attorney's fees to be paid by the employer/carrier. The claimant's accident occurred after the effective date of the 1979 amendments to § 440.34, Fla....

...ew of any claim, award or compensation order before any court, the court may allow or increase the attorney's fees, in its discretion, which fees shall be in addition to the compensation paid the claimant, and shall be paid as the court may direct." § 440.34(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1978). This language was deleted entirely by the 1979 amendments to § 440.34, Fla. Stat. Section 440.34(2), Fla. Stat. (1979), states that "[a] claimant shall be responsible for the payment of his own attorney's fees... ." There are three exceptions to this statutory pronouncement, see § 440.34(2)(a)-(c), Fla....

...ate level, then this court would be authorized to award appellate attorney's fees. See § 59.46(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). However, we have determined, and the parties have agreed, that none of these conditions exist herein. The claimant points out that § 440.34(5), Fla....

...hether the appeal was instituted prior to the effective date of the statute — not whether the statute was in effect at the time of the appellate disposition of the cause. In the present case, the appeal was instituted prior to the effective date of § 440.34(5), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1980), and therefore, that statute does not apply to this cause. Even if this appeal had been instituted after the effective date of § 440.34(5), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1980), the claimant would not be entitled to an award of appellate attorney's fees payable by the employer/carrier. Section 440.34(5), Fla....

...oyee." (emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, the claimant's injury occurred in August, 1979, and at that time, there was no applicable statute which could have been used to award appellate attorney's fees, to be paid by the employer/carrier. While § 440.34(5), Fla....

...This rule applies to statutes that substantially change the liability of the employer/carrier as to awards of attorney's fees, see Duff Hotel Co. v. Ficara, 9 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1942); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Carlton, 151 Fla. 238, 9 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1942); and § 440.34(5), Fla....

...ttorney's fees was denied. 9 So.2d at 359-60. Here, just as in Carlton, at the time of the claimant's injury, there was no basis for an award of attorney's fees against the employer/carrier. While this situation has been changed with the addition of § 440.34(5), Fla....

...1980), this statute, just as in the 1941 statute in Carlton, "substantially changed the liability of the employer and the insurance carrier from what it was when the injury occurred." 9 So.2d at 359. Therefore, this court could not retroactively apply § 440.34(5) (Supp....

...ier. However, we point out that our decision is without prejudice to the claimant's attorneys' right to a fee, to be paid by the claimant, for services rendered on appeal, after the Deputy Commissioner has approved the reasonableness of the fee. See § 440.34(1) and (2), Fla. Stat. (1979). SHIVERS and SHAW, JJ., concur. NOTES [*] This law, which was codified at § 440.34, Fla....

...rder before any Court, the Court may allow or increase the attorney's fees, in its discretion, which fees shall be in addition to the compensation paid the claimant, and shall be paid as the Court may direct." This language is virtually identical to § 440.34(5), Fla....

...They also argue that "contingency" fees are inappropriate in workers' compensation cases, citing Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Rollins, 390 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In addition, the E/C assert that the deputy commissioner erred in his finding that the "fee customarily charged" in the locality (section 440.34(1)(c), Florida Statutes) is the statutorily scheduled amount, and that it was error for the deputy to reject the appellants' contention that this component of the statutory formula must be reduced to an hourly rate....

...Shulenberger's testimony and opinions over those of Dr. Fishe. "Also admitted into evidence was a packet of information including a statement of Jerold Feuer, his hours and some memos produced for the case. A sheet showing comparisons for the various elements found in Section 440.34, Florida Statutes involving both the Sitko case and the case of Florida Medical Center v....

...aking inflation into account and is, indeed, the present value of the benefits secured through the efforts of Mr. Feuer. * * * * * * *500 "4. I find that the 25%/20%/15% numerical schedule gives a starting point attorney's fees of $2,640,000.00. "5. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, requires a Deputy Commissioner to consider numerous other criteria in a determination of whether the fee schedule initial amount should be raised or lowered....

...r difficulty, novelty and complexity standards to be applied. One position of the Employer/Carrier in this case was that this particular case was so exceptional in the size of the present value of the award so as to remove it from the purview of the 440.34 schedule....

...of law that I have seen in my 10 years on the bench and time in practice before that. It was also the most difficult, complex and novel case that I have seen in that period of time. The standard for determination of the various factors contained in Section 440.34(1)(a) through (h) is not based on the particular lawyer involved, other than that factor dealing with experience, ability and reputation of the lawyer involved, but is based on the average attorney practicing in the State of Florida an...

...I find that Von Stetina, while it is relevant and material, is not controlling here as Workers' Compensation attorney's fees start with a statutory fee schedule set by the legislature to standardize fees. That schedule is presumed correct until one or a combination of the eight factors and sets of factors in Section 440.34 shows that that figure should be raised or lowered....

...I find that the factor involving the amount in controversy and the fact that the benefits resulting to the Claimant are the same tends to raise the fee above the statutory schedulor, at worst, is a neutral element. I find that the consideration found in Section 440.34(b) is a neutral element....

...t or above the statutory schedule. "12. First District Court decisions show that to judge the excessiveness of an attorney's fee award or to award one solely on the basis of its per hour rate is not proper and ignores the sliding scale provisions of Section 440.34 as well as legislative intent....

...Were I to accept Dr. Fishe's opinions from tables 7, 8 and 10 of his exhibit, giving a total present benefit value of $11.71 million, the fee would be the same. There the hourly rate factor would be the same as the present result and the other factors of 440.34(1) (a-h) would be comparable except for the amount in controversy." [1] The depth of consideration given to the statutory factors by the deputy commissioner is apparent from the portions of his order above reproduced....

...A claimant has a number of remedies if a workers' compensation carrier wrongfully attempts to, or deprives or ignores, a request for medical treatment. Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (2000), sets a deadline for the timely payment of compensation claims and establishes penalties for late payments. Pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2000), a claimant can recover attorneys' fees from the carrier in a claim for medical benefits....

...to award a further fee; and whether the additional fee awarded was excessive. To this petition the respondent-claimant filed his motion to quash. The motion was predicated upon the argument it was clear that an attorney's fee should be allowed under Section 440.34(1), F.S.A....

...warranted a further award of attorneys' fees even though it was an award of a penalty rather than one for disability compensation. Subsequently, this Court has further broadened its construction of the word "compensation" as related to the statute, Section 440.34(1)....

...In Ringling Bros., 134 So.2d 244, supra, "compensation" was construed to include the payment of medical benefits. We concluded that an award of attorneys' fees was proper when there had been an award benefiting the claimant. Our position therein is substantiated by the statute, Section 440.34(1), which reads as follows: "(1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 * * *, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of same, or shall oth...

...counsel at this stage, or to call again upon counsel already retained, to enforce his rights. He should not be impeded by the thought of counsel fees which may render the enterprise an empty gesture so far as he is concerned. The salutary purpose of Section 440.34(1), which is one of the few provisions of its kind in the United States, should not be nullified by restrictive interpretation....

...ediately paid compensation benefits to the claimant based thereon does not remove its liability for attorneys' fees. The City unsuccessfully resisted the payment of the claim for additional benefits beyond the 21-day period specified in the statute, Section 440.34(1)....

...aim since the employer's prior refusal to pay benefits to him necessitated his employing *805 counsel to obtain such benefits. In support thereof he referred to our statements in Taff. This Court ruled, as it was compelled to do by the provisions of Section 440.34(1), that since the compensation was paid within 21 days of the filing of the claim the employer was not responsible for the attorneys' fees....

...In addition to the above two issues, the E/C raise a third issue for the first time on appeal. They contend that they are not responsible for paying the entire amount awarded for attorney's fees, but rather they are responsible for paying only seventy-five percent (75%) of that amount pursuant to the provisions of section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978), in effect when claimant was injured, which provided in part as follows: With respect to attorney's fees on claims for benefits other than medical benefits, 75 percent shall be paid by the employer or carrie...

...1951, 55 So.2d 741." It is seen, therefore, that the issue here is precisely limited to the question, in the light of the facts and circumstances recited in the stipulation, of whether there is any basis in law or in fact for the award of the mentioned attorney's fees. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides: "If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 of this chapter, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they had notice of s...

...rst aid' or proper medical treatment during such delay, and every presumption shall be against the validity of the claim." It is evident that the notice contemplated by Section 440.18, supra, is separate and distinct from a "claim" as referred to in Section 440.34(1), supra, and from a "claim" as referred to in Section 440.19(1) (a), (c), also to be considered in pari materia and upon which the employer relies, providing as follows: "(1) (a) The right to compensation for disability under this ch...

...e cases where voluntary payment of compensation is made or remedial treatment furnished until the date *433 of the last payment of compensation or the date of the last remedial treatment. Considering this provision in the light of its application to Section 440.34(1), it is clear that no attorney's fee is payable by the employer or its carrier in the case on review because by the latter section the obligation of the employer to pay for the services of the employee's attorney is limited to those...

...Kupfer of Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Hazouri & Roth, West Palm Beach, for appellee. LILES, WOODIE A., Associate Judge (Retired). The employer/carrier appeals from a deputy commissioner's order awarding to the claimant a reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Since they did not deny that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits were payable and in fact stipulated to the contrary, the employer/carrier argues that this case does not involve the denial of a compensable accident within the purview of Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ch compensation benefits were payable, and the claimant prevailed in obtaining these compensable benefits. In light of the self-executing tenor of the Act and the principles enunciated above, we conclude that this factual situation is encompassed by Section 440.34(2)(c) and that the claimant was entitled to an attorney's fee. It is arguable, of course, that the legislature intended that attorney's fees only be awarded where the employer/carrier denies any right to compensability. However, such a narrow interpretation of Section 440.34(2)(c) is contrary to the underlying policy to construe doubtful provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act in favor of the claimant....

...t on the amount dating from 21 days after a joint stipulation was approved by order. We reverse only the second point. On August 21, 1978 the deputy originally awarded a fee of $10,000, deviating only slightly from the statutory formula set forth in Section 440.34, [1] Florida Statutes (1977) because there was nothing particularly unique or novel about the issues in the *454 case and attorney time should not have exceeded 40 hours....

...On remand, the deputy reduced the award to $7,950.00. Under the sliding scale provisions of the statute an award would initially have been set at $11,025.00. In affirming the first point, we have considered the percentage fee schedule and Lee Engineering [2] factors codified in Section 440.34, effective here after the accident date, but before the time of the deputy's award....

...le fee. Therefore, the interest in this case should run from the date of January 15, 1980, the date of the appealed order. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. McCORD, SHIVERS and JOANOS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The statute in relevant part states: 440.34 (1) [T]here shall, in addition to the award for compensation, be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee of 25 percent of the first $5,000 of the amount of the benefits secured, 20 percent of the next $5,000 of the amount of the benefits secured,...

...to permit the accrual of prejudgment interest on attorney's fees in worker's compensation cases from the date entitlement to the fee is determined even though the amount of the award has not yet been determined. We held in the negative, finding that section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1997), precluded the payment of attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases until the amount of the fees was established by final order. We reached that conclusion because section 440.34(1) provided that no fee could be paid in workers' compensation cases for services rendered until approved by the workers' compensation claims judge....

...l benefits were due, and commenced payment. The employer resisted payment of attorneys' fees to claimant's counsel for the additional benefits, contending that the additional payments were voluntarily made, and no fees were entitled under Fla. Stat. § 440.34(1), F.S.A....

...4, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A., and requested briefs on the question, presented for the first time by a motion in this cause, of awarding a claimant's attorney's fees for services in successfully resisting the application for the writ in such circumstances. F.S. § 440.34, F.S.A., reads in part as follows: "(1) * * * If any proceedings are had for review of any claim, award or compensation order before any court, the court may allow or increase the attorney's fees, in its discretion, which fees shall be in a...

...Although the amount of benefits obtained was found to be $544.88, the time expended was 39.1 hours, so the deputy concluded that "the primary factor to be considered is the time involved." He then found that a fee is justified in excess of the fee schedule contained in section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1983), and awarded $1,500....

...ned. Claimant also argues that the amount of the fee should be determined in accordance with the factors discussed in Florida Patients' Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), which focuses on the time expended as the beginning point. Section 440.34 governs the award of a reasonable fee to be received by claimant's attorney, whether paid by the carrier or by the claimant. Subsection 440.34(1) provides that any attorney's fee approved by the deputy commissioner shall be equal to a *875 certain percentage "of the amount of the benefits secured," but further states: However, the deputy commissioner shall consider the follow...

...(e) The time limitation imposed by the claimant or the circumstances. (f) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant. (g) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing services. (h) The contingency or certainty of a fee. Subsections 440.34(1) and (6) prohibit an attorney from receiving a fee in any amount not approved by the deputy commissioner or the court....

...at the time and labor required was the primary basis for the fee. The record contains no evidentiary support for finding that a rate of $38 per hour is a reasonable amount of compensation for the claimant's attorney's services in this case. Although section 440.34 sets a percentage of the amount of benefits obtained for the claimant as the starting point in the analysis of a reasonable fee in every case, we agree with the deputy that after considering all the statutory factors, the time and labor required is the major factor that should be applied under the circumstances shown in this case. We do so for the following reasons. In recognition of the dominant self-executing theme of the Workers' Compensation Act, section 440.34 places primary responsibility upon the claimant for payment of his own attorney's fees, and limits the carrier's obligation to pay claimant's attorney's fees to three situations. The fee was awarded in this case because the carrier "has acted in bad faith with regard to handling an injured worker's claim and the injured worker has suffered economic loss" as a result. § 440.34(3)(b), Fla....

...reasonable value of legal services required to vindicate the claimant's rights under the act but also to punish the carrier for its bad faith denial of benefits which defeat the self-executing purpose of the act is made manifest by the provision in section 440.34(3) requiring that the payment of bad faith fees "may not be recouped, directly or indirectly, by any *876 carrier in the rate base, the premium, or any rate filing." The other two provisions in subsections 440.34(3)(a) and (c) shift the responsibility for claimant's attorneys fees to the carrier or employer for the unsuccessful denial of medical benefits or compensability of the injury, and in those instances the full amount of such benefits paid to the claimant are usually included in the calculation of the percentage schedule set forth in section 440.34(1)....

...as the dominant consideration in such bad faith cases will tend to deter attorneys from accepting employment and impede the claimant's ability to obtain legal representation and assistance in obtaining such benefits. Application of the provisions of section 440.34(1) in a manner that promotes such a chilling effect on the claimant's right to obtain legal services in the face of bad faith denial of benefits is inconsistent with the benevolent purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act....

...BARFIELD, J., concurs. NIMMONS, J., dissents. NOTES [1] Bad faith is defined as "conduct by the carrier in the handling of a claim which amounts to fraud; malice; oppression; or willful, wanton, or reckless disregard of the rights of the claimant." § 440.34(3)(b), Fla....

...The details about the investigations are stated by the attorney for appellees in the record of the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner, January 31, 1946. The question is: Should the attorneys' fees, under the circumstances, be assessed against the carrier under Section 440.34, F....

...1968), we said: "[T]he nature of the Workmen's Compensation Law is such that the contingent percentage basis is not appropriate." [7] Fla. Bar Code Prof. Resp., D.R. 2-106(B)(4). [8] Attorney's fees awarded in workmen's compensation cases are, of course, required to be "reasonable". § 440.34(1), Fla....

...[9] This is not the first case in which we have remanded a case to the Commission on the ground of an excessive fee award. See R.H. Coody & Assoc., Inc. v. Shelton, 352 So.2d 852, No. 50,806 (Fla., filed Sept. 29, 1977). The Legislature's recent amendment of § 440.34, Fla....

...that the plain language of section 440.192(7), Florida Statutes (2001), precluded the consideration of same. Because the JCC's interpretation is one of law, our review standard is de novo. Section 440.192(7) states: Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 440.34, a judge of compensation claims may not award attorney's fees payable by the carrier for services expended or costs incurred prior to the filing of a petition that does not meet the requirements of this section....

...preclusion of fees to a petition that fails to satisfy the statute's requirements. Under the circumstances, the provisions of subsection (7) obviously cannot be considered in isolation from other pertinent statutory specifications, namely, those in section 440.34, relating to the factors to be considered in awarding claimant's attorney fees, and those in section 440.192(2), setting out the requisites of a petition for benefits....

...JFK Mem'l Hosp., 624 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Smith v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 624 So.2d 315, 319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Accordingly, once the JCC decides, as he did here, that the application of the statutory factors for assessing a presumptive fee, as provided in section 440.34(1), is "manifestly unfair," the JCC may depart upward or downward, and, in deciding what is a reasonable hourly rate, he or she may consider the fee customarily charged in the area for similar legal work....

...Skidmore, 720 So.2d 1125, 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). We consider that the JCC's reference to the Guidelines was misplaced. Although no provision under chapter 440 explicitly approves the taxing as costs of pleadings required to be served by certified mail, section 440.34(3) permits a prevailing claimant to tax against the employer "the reasonable costs of such proceedings." We cannot conceive it to be the legislative intent that an injured worker who successfully prosecutes a claim against his or her employer should not be made whole for all costs necessary to maintain the claim....

...For example, this court has observed that the Rowe ( Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1985)) lodestar approach, with its contingency factors, used for assessing a reasonable attorney fee, has no applicability to fee awards in which a statute, such as section 440.34, sets out its own criteria....

...crease of a fee for the attorneys for the claimant when a Workmen's Compensation matter is heard on appeal. They advance the point that the statute does not make the appellate fee contingent on success at the appellate level. The statute involved is Section 440.34 (1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which reads as follows: "(1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 of this chapter, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after t...

...The claim did not give the employer adequate notice and the question directed to Dr. Miller did not overcome the deficiency. The order also finds that claimant's attorney is entitled to a fee and that the parties have stipulated to the application of the numerical schedule in Section 440.34, Fla....

...o construed, the strict use of the formula is comparable to the use of minimum fee schedules condemned as contingency fees in Heavy Constructors, Inc. v. Dericho, 259 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1972) and Galarneau v. Caroly of Miami, 299 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1974). Section 440.34(1) Fla....

...In his brief, appellee's attorney agrees that the fee is in excess of the approximately $15,000 statutory fee and states that he would not be adverse to a reduction if warranted by the facts and the law. In his order the deputy commissioner states that he has taken into consideration all the factors set forth in § 440.34, Fla....

...KAHN, DAVIS and BENTON, JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., concurs with result. NOTES [1] Sections 440.20(6), 440.20(7), and 440.20(8) provide sanctions (penalties and interest) for the carrier's failure to timely pay compensation within seven days after it becomes due. Section 440.34(3) provides for payment of the claimant's attorney fees by the carrier or employer under certain conditions, including denial of compensability....

...After hearing the evidence with respect to this claim, the Deputy Commissioner awarded the claimant twenty percent of the amount of the previous award then delinquent, pursuant to Section 440.20 (6), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., but refused to grant an attorney's fee under Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., for services rendered by claimant's attorney at the hearing above mentioned....

...added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to twenty per cent thereof, which shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to such compensation, unless review of the compensation order making such award is had as provided in § 440.27." "440.34 Attorney's fees; costs; penalty for violations *818 "(1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 of this chapter, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have no...

...eys fee, * * *." (Emphasis added.) Petitioner contends that it was error to deny him a reasonable attorney's fee because the award of the additional twenty percent under Section 440.20 was an award of additional compensation and therefore covered by Section 440.34. Respondent contends just as vigorously that the Deputy was correct in holding this additional award to be a penalty, as to which no provision is made in Section 440.34 for payment of fees to counsel....

...counsel at this stage, or to call again upon counsel already retained, to enforce his rights. He should not be impeded by the thought of counsel fees which may render the enterprise an empty gesture so far as he is concerned. The salutary purpose of Section 440.34(1), which is one of the few provisions of its kind in the United States, should not be nullified by restrictive interpretation....

...Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Driggers, Fla., 65 So.2d 723; Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Pittman, Fla., 49 So.2d 600. We hold that the twenty percent additional amount here recovered under Section 440.20(6) was "compensation" within the meaning of Section 440.34(1)....

...rounded figures the trial judge awarded $540 as follows: $ 6,000 _______ x $9,000 = 1080 x ½ = $540. 50,000 Considering the subjective nature of several factors involved, the trial judge's award is affirmed. However, neither section 440.39(3)(a) or section 440.34(1) authorize attorney's *27 fees for work done in equitable distribution proceedings....

...ted or offer for attendance made. As to the E/C's last contention, because the request for treatment at the Head Injury Rehabilitation Center was a "medical only" claim, we must affirm the deputy's award of attorney's fees on its authorization. See, Section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Taylor of Stiles, Taylor & Grace, P.A., Atlanta, for Amicus Curiae/Florida Insurance Council. PER CURIAM. The claimant seeks review of a final order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC), denying stipulated attorney's fees as being in excess of the fees permitted by section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and approving a fee permitted by section 440.34(1). On appeal, the claimant contends that: (1) section 440.34(1) should be construed to allow the payment of a reasonable fee that exceeds the mandated percentage of benefits secured; (2) the JCC should have approved the parties' joint stipulation agreement providing for fees in excess of that allowed by statute pursuant to Spitzer v. Bartlett Bros. Roofing, 437 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); and (3) section 440.34(1) violates the separation of powers doctrine, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, the right to counsel, and the right to freely contract as provided by the Florida Constitution....

...t $1,700 in past indemnity benefits and pay counsel for the claimant $1,900 for securing the benefits. The JCC denied approval of the stipulated fees, reasoning that she was without authority to approve a fee in excess of $340, the amount allowed by section 440.34(1). *509 The JCC entered an order approving the statutory fee of $340, and this appeal followed. The JCC properly construed section 440.34(1). In Wood v. Fla. Rock Indus., 929 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)(amended May 25, 2006, to certify a question of great public importance), this court explained that "the court must presume that the legislature intended the amended statute [section 440.34(1)] to mean what it clearly says." The statute begins by generally providing that no fee may be paid under chapter 440 unless approved as reasonable, and then specifically addresses the approval of fees "for benefits secured" by setting forth the formula for determining the amount of fees to be paid. A JCC may approve a fee as reasonable under section 440.34(1) when the fee equals the statutory percentage of benefits secured....

...2d DCA 1986)("Where there is in the same statute a specific provision, and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include matters embraced in the former, the particular provision must control."). Spitzer does not serve as an exception to the provisions set forth in section 440.34(1)....

...Reversing, this court noted that "[i]t is the policy of the law to encourage and uphold stipulations in order to minimize litigation and expedite the resolution of disputes." Id. at 760. Though Spitzer is still good law, it is not controlling in this case because section 440.34(1) expressly prohibits a JCC from approving a fee in excess of the statutory percentage....

...The party challenging a statute has the burden to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the statute by negating every conceivable basis for upholding the law. Burley, 707 So.2d at 839. The claimant in this case has not met that burden. The legislature did not encroach upon the powers of the judiciary by amending section 440.34(1) to restrict the payment of fees to a percentage of the benefits secured....

...Furthermore, the legislature is charged with setting forth the criteria it deems will further the purpose of workers' compensation law and will result in a reasonable fee. See id.; see also Schick v. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 599 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla.1992). Therefore, section 440.34(1) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Nor does section 440.34(1) violate the equal protection clause or the due process clause, which, inter alia, protects the *510 right to be represented by counsel. In limiting fees to a percentage of the benefits secured, section 440.34(1) bears a reasonable relationship to the state's interest in regulating fees so as to preserve the benefits awarded to the claimant. See Samaha, 389 So.2d at 640. Section 440.34(1) is not discriminatory, arbitrary or oppressive because it applies to all claimants in a workers' compensation proceeding, and sets forth a definite formula for determining attorney's fees so as to protect the claimant's interest in retaining a substantial portion of the benefits secured. Therefore, section 440.34(1) does not deny a claimant equal protection, due process, or the right to be represented by counsel. The claimant has also failed to demonstrate that section 440.34(1) impermissibly restricts the right to freely contract....

...A statute restricting the right to contract will not be invalidated if the restriction was enacted to protect the public's health, safety, or welfare. Khoury v. Carvel Homes S., Inc., 403 So.2d 1043, 1046 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The restrictions set forth in section 440.34(1) were enacted to protect the public's welfare by ensuring that a worker is able to retain a substantial portion of awarded benefits so as to prevent the burden of support for that worker from being cast upon society. Therefore, the statute does not offend the right to freely contract. Although the claimant abandoned the issue of whether section 440.34(1) denies access to courts during oral argument, we note that the statute has not been shown to deny access....

...The claimant has failed to demonstrate that the statute has unduly burdened a claimant's ability to retain counsel in order to secure benefits, or that the statute limits the types of benefits a claimant is authorized to pursue under chapter 440. Because the claimant has not demonstrated that section 440.34(1) has abolished or unduly burdened a claimant's right to obtain benefits under chapter 440, we cannot conclude that the statute denies access to courts. See Burley, 707 So.2d at 839; Strohm v. Hertz Corp., 685 So.2d 37, 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). In conclusion, the claimant has not demonstrated that section 440.34(1) is constitutionally infirm or that the JCC otherwise erred in declining to approve a fee in excess of the fee permitted by section 440.34(1). Therefore, we affirm the order of the JCC. As in Wood, however, we certify the following question of great public importance: DO THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 440.34(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2003), CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY ESTABLISH THE PERCENTAGE FEE FORMULA PROVIDED THEREIN AS THE SOLE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE TO BE AWARDED A CLAIMANT? AFFIRMED....

...ERVIN, J., concurring. I concur with the majority's disposition of the constitutional issues that it has specifically addressed. I also concur with the question certified. In addition, I strongly doubt that the Florida worker's compensation attorney-fee statute, section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2003), could be subjected to a successful facial constitutional challenge, *511 which requires the challenger to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute could be determined valid in t...

...At the time of the adoption of the Florida Constitution an employee had a common-law right of action for damages against his or her employer resulting from an employment-related injury. I strongly question whether a challenger to the constitutional validity of section 440.34(1), as applied to any set of facts, could satisfy the Kluger test, because the legislature still provides the employee the right to pursue a workers' compensation claim against his or her employer, despite the modification of the employee's right to recover fees from the employer....

...obviated by simply interpreting the statute as ambiguous, thereby allowing a judge of compensation claims (JCC) the discretion to award a fee as reasonable, notwithstanding that such amount might exceed that permitted by the fee schedule provided in section 440.34(1)....

...ee with that authorized by the statutory percentage formula, which is the construction I would place on the statute were it not for the recent decision of this court in Wood v. Florida Rock Industries, 929 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), interpreting section 440.34(1) as requiring a JCC to "approve a fee as `reasonable' only when it equals a statutorily established percentage of the value of benefits secured on behalf of the Claimant." Id. at 545. Unlike the panel in Wood, I am unable to find in the statute such clarity of legislative purpose. Section 440.34(1) was amended by chapter 2003-412, section 26, Laws of Florida, to provide as follows: (1) A fee, gratuity, or other consideration may not be paid for services rendered for a claimant in connection with any proceedings arising under t...

...rate of $13.08. The JCC clearly found herself in a dilemma. She made no finding that a fee of $340 was, under the facts, reasonable, but she felt constrained by the statute to award a fee consistent with the statutory formula. Nowhere, however, does section 440.34 define the term "reasonable," nor have I found any language in it suggesting that the legislature intended to replace the ordinary definition given it, meaning "fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances," or "[a]ccording to reason." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (8th ed.2004)....

...t, if such were its intent, this legislation does not display it. As stated, I find nothing in the statute restricting a judge's determination of a fee's reasonableness to the percentage formula, and my conclusion is supported by other provisions of section 440.34....

...yer's cost of workers' compensation insurance premiums, particularly in circumstances where the fee authorized by the formula is substantial, and the attorney's involvement minimal. In my judgment, the legislature, in drafting the 2003 amendments to section 440.34, could not have reasonably contemplated such bizarre results. NOTES [1] Section 440.34(7) explicitly, unlike other provisions authorizing recovery of fees for the successful prosecution of certain types of claims, limits recovery of a fee from the employer in a medical-benefits-only claim to $1500 per accident.

...McKnight of William H. McKnight, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. Joey D. Oquist of Joey D. Oquist & Associates, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellees. ALLEN, J. The claimant appeals a workers' compensation order denying his request for an attorney's fee award under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes. As the claimant asserts, he established the necessary predicate for a fee award under the statute and thus should have been found entitled to payment of his attorney's fee. *633 Section 440.34(3)(b), as effective when the claimant was injured in 1996, provided for the recovery of an attorney's fee when the employer or carrier files a notice of denial and the claimant has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of a claim for benefits....

...Gold Coast Aerial Lift, 705 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); see also, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Schiffman, 144 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1962); Smith v. General Parcel Service, 699 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The claimant thus met both of the necessary criteria under section 440.34(3)(b), so as to establish entitlement to an attorney's fee award....

...ution being achieved on acceptance and payment of the claim. Insofar as the employer/carrier denied the claim which the claimant's attorney thereafter successfully prosecuted, the claimant established his entitlement to an attorney's fee award under section 440.34(3)(b)....

...Lindenfeld even though they were in receipt of his psychological report that clearly sets out that as a result of her industrial accident, Claimant was in need of psychological care and treatment. Entitlement to attorney's fees based on bad faith under Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1983) [2] must be specifically litigated as a separate issue at the hearing with factual evidence presented going directly to that issue....

...However, the amount of the fee is at least unusual. We therefore deem it appropriate to employ the instant order as a basis for announcing certain minimum rules which we think should be used as guides in fixing attorneys' fees in matters of this kind. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...We have held that the burden to establish attorneys' fees is always on the claimant. Balatsos v. Nebraska Ave. Cafe and Liquor Store, 159 Fla. 71, 30 So.2d 633. The statute, of course, authorizes the award of a fee under circumstances thereby defined. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...A claimant has a number of remedies if a workers' compensation carrier wrongfully attempts to, or deprives or ignores, a request for medical treatment. Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (2000), sets a deadline for the timely payment of compensation claims and establishes penalties for late payments. Pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2000), a claimant can recover attorneys' fees from the carrier in a claim for medical benefits....

...In this workers' compensation appeal, the employer/carrier challenges the deputy commissioner's order which found that the employer's bad faith refusal to notify the carrier of the claim imputed bad faith to the carrier. As a result, the carrier was ordered to pay the claimant's attorney's fees pursuant to § 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979). [1] The employer/carrier asserts that the deputy erred in two respects: first, § 440.34(2)(b) applies only to acts of bad faith attributable solely to the carrier; and second, even if the employer's acts can be imputed to the carrier, those acts did not meet the definition of "bad faith" provided for in the statute....

...yer until November 26, 1979. The carrier proceeded to pay compensation benefits to claimant on November 30th. The deputy commissioner found that the employer's actions in this case were in bad faith and caused economic loss to the claimant. Although § 440.34(2)(b) refers only to the carrier's bad faith in the handling of the claim, the deputy imputed bad faith to the carrier through § 440.41(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: In any case where the employer is not a self-insurer, in o...

...chapter. For such purposes: (1) Notice to or knowledge of an employer of the occurrence of the injury shall be notice to or knowledge of the carrier. The deputy reasoned that under § 440.41, the employer was the carrier's alter ego for purposes of § 440.34(2)(b) and the manner in which the claim was handled....

...eceived actual notice of the injury, § 440.41(1) imputes the employer's knowledge of the injury and its dilatory tactics in handling the claim to the carrier. The employer/carrier disagrees with the deputy's statutory interpretation and argues that § 440.34(2)(b) was not intended to apply to an employer's wrongful acts. In oral argument, the employer/carrier referred to several statutory provisions in an effort to shed light on the legislative intent of § 440.34(2)(b). Under § 440.34(2), any payment of attorney's fees that is required by subsection (b) may not "be recouped, directly or indirectly, by any carrier in the rate base, premium, or any rate filing." This provision, in effect, makes the carrier fully responsibl...

...In conjunction with this argument, the employer/carrier also contends that § 440.41's provision imputing the employer's knowledge or notice to the carrier applies only to impute an employer's liability for "compensation" to the carrier and does not operate to impute liability for a "penalty" provision such as § 440.34(2). In response to the claimant's contention that § 440.34(2)(b) was clearly intended to prevent exactly the type of recalcitrant conduct engaged in by the employer in this case, the employer/carrier points to § 440.185(2) and (9)....

...dge of the injury. The employer/carrier argues that the civil penalty is the counterpart to the attorney's fees "penalty" assessed against the carrier for bad faith. A common thread in each of the employer/carrier's arguments is the proposition that § 440.34(2)(b) is a penalty provision....

...Under this rationale § 440.41(1) would operate to impute notice to the carrier since that section was intended to assist in the effective administration and discharge of "liability for compensation." Claimant's analysis of the purpose and effect of § 440.34(2)(b) coincides nicely with this Court's recent decision in Florida Erection Services, Inc. v. McDonald, 395 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In that case, the carrier argued that "bad faith" under § 440.34(2)(b) should be defined by the strict interpretation given that term in cases dealing with punitive damages. As in the case before us, the carrier's basic assumption was that § 440.34(2)(b) was primarily intended to be a penalty provision....

...For this reason, a claimant is now generally required to pay his or her own attorney's fees. The limited instances where attorney's fees are awardable, however, involve occasions where the employer/carrier's actions in totally rejecting the claim for disability (§ 440.34(2)(c)) or medial benefits (§ 440.34(2)(a)) or, as in this case, in ignoring and mishandling the claim (§ 440.34(2)(b)) necessitated the claimant's use of legal assistance to recover payment of benefits....

...Therefore, the court in McDonald concluded that the "award of attorney's fees under the bad faith provision of the new act does no more than reimburse the claimant for expenses incurred in the assertion of his right to benefits." 395 So.2d at 208. Despite the obvious deterrent effect, the attorney's fee award of § 440.34(2)(b) was clearly intended to compensate the claimant for the monetary losses sustained in trying to force some action on the claim. Admittedly, § 440.34(2)(b) refers only to the carrier's bad faith in handling the claim....

...By the same token, liability for the monetary damages suffered by the claimant as a result of delayed notice would certainly not be "effectively discharged" if the employer's notice could not be imputed to the carrier under § 440.41(1). In reaching this result, we have not neglected or ignored § 440.34(2), which prevents the carrier from recovering the attorney's fees payment from the dilatory employer....

...Where, as in this case, the carrier has acted diligently, this provision does seem to result in an unfair burden on the carrier. Unfortunately, the legislature has left us with a situation where any decision we make will result in an inconsistency. We have chosen to construe § 440.34(2)(b) consistently with § 440.41 and the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act....

...This interpretation is in keeping with our obligation to construe remedial legislation "in such a manner as to effectuate the purpose for which it was enacted." McDonald, 395 So.2d at 210, citing Gillespie v. Anderson, 123 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1960). AFFIRMED. MILLS and SHAW, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.34(2)(b) entitled a claimant to recover attorney's fees from a carrier or employer: "In cases where the deputy commissioner issues an order finding that a carrier has acted in bad faith with regard to handling an injured worker's claim and the injured worker has suffered economic loss....

...were correctly and voluntarily paid by Appellees based, in part, on his AWW at that time. This determination requires the JCC to recompute Appellant's entitlement to attorney's fees, which is based upon the benefits secured *161 by his attorney. See § 440.34(2), Fla. Stat. (1997); see also Wiseman v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 569 So.2d 508, 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (holding § 440.34(2) is construed to mean fee should be based on the total benefits secured as a result of the attorney's intervention); Monterey Builders v....

...r. Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1968). We reduce the fee award to $25,000. The fee payable to claimant's counsel in this case is properly assessed at an amount greater than the $8,250 indicated by the percentage-of-benefits formula enacted in Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...e issue of the fee to be awarded claimant's attorneys for prosecuting the merits claim. The undersigned has considered the factors set forth in the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Lee Engineering as well as the schedule provided in Chapter 440.34, Florida Statutes......

...better than even chance of successfully prosecuting their particular claim. But, as stated by the First DCA in [ What an Idea, Inc. v. ] Sitko [505 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)], Rowe is not applicable because we have the guideline fee schedule in Section 440.34, F.S....

...fee is awarded may have no potential for collateral consequences. On that basis we distinguish the cited decisions and decline to compel a determination of the bad faith issue by the deputy. For purposes of determining an attorney's fee award under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, a starting point in the analysis is the amount of benefits obtained for the claimant by his attorney. Prestressed Decking, supra, at 405. Section 440.34 embodies a legislative intent to standardize the method for assessing fees absent special circumstances, and when a deputy departs from the statutory schedule, his order should reflect that he considered all of the relevant, prescribed factors to the extent that circumstances permit....

...An attorney's fee award will not be set aside merely because it varies from the statutory rate, when the deputy commissioner's order reflects an appropriate consideration of the statutory factors. Id. In this case, the order contains very specific findings as to each of the criteria enumerated in section 440.34(1)....

...NIMMONS, J., CONCURS; ZEHMER, J., DISSENTS W/WRITTEN OPINION. ZEHMER, Judge (dissenting). While I agree, for the reasons stated in the court's opinion, that there is no need for a bad faith determination, I would reverse and remand for a redetermination of the amount of the fee. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, governs the determination of the amount of the fee in this case....

...The deputy commissioner found on the evidence presented to him that the present value of the benefits recovered by claimant's attorneys was $5,085,362. The fee calculated under the statutory formula is $763,554. Although the deputy commissioner analyzed each of the factors in Lee Engineering and section 440.34(1), the order contains no explanation showing why the statutory formula fee should be reduced so drastically....

...1st DCA 1989), we explained: In establishing the amount of the fee the deputy noted the number of hours expended by claimant's attorney, and determined the resulting fee in accordance with an hourly rate. The deputy's order does not adequately address the other criteria described in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes....

...mula when based solely upon the number of hours expended. See e.g., Brevard County Mental Health Center v. Kelly, 420 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In the context here presented, the deputy's order does not reflect a sufficient consideration of the section 440.34(1) attorney's fee criteria, nor does it delineate an adequate basis for exceeding the amount which would result from the statutory percentage formula....

...." This manipulation of the present value figures was plain error. If the previously found amount for "benefits secured" was not supported by the evidence, and thus was believed to be unreliable, the deputy commissioner should not have found it as a fact in the first place. Under section 440.34(1), it was his duty to determine the dollar value of the benefits secured, make a finding of fact thereon, and then apply the statutory formula to determine the amount of the statutory fee....

...enhance the fee. Finally, the deputy commissioner recognized that the fee was contingent, and that the multipliers suggested in Florida Patients Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), do not apply because the statutory fee formula in section 440.34(1) is applicable, citing What an Idea v....

...ad faith as a part of the over all program," citing Florida Erection Services, Inc. v. McDonald, 395 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In Sam Rogers Enterprises v. Williams, 401 So.2d 1388, 1391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), this court rejected an argument that section 440.34(3)(b) (formerly 440.34(2)(b)) was primarily intended to be a penalty provision, and noted that section 440.34(3)(b) "does no more than reimburse the claimant for expenses incurred in the assertion of his right *594 to benefits," citing McDonald at 208. Section 440.34(3)(b) is therefore unlike the punitive provisions contained in sections 440.20(7)(9) and (16) which provide for penalties, interest and suspension or revocation of an operating license in cases where the employer or carrier either dela...

...techniques. A clear collateral consequence of a bad faith finding by a judge of compensation claims is that a carrier may not recoup (either directly or indirectly) the payment of the attorney's fee in the rate base, the premium, or any rate filing. Section 440.34(3)....

...For reasons pointed out in the motion for rehearing, I now conclude that this holding is erroneous. The employer in this case is a self-insurer who administered this claim through its authorized servicing agent. Section 440.02(3) defines "carrier" as including "a self-insurer." Section 440.34(3)(b) authorizes the award of an attorney's fee upon a finding that the carrier has acted in bad faith....

...The word "carrier" as used in this section necessarily includes an employer/self-insurer acting through its authorized servicing agent. When a fee is awarded for bad faith, the payment thereof "may not be recouped, directly or indirectly, by any carrier in the rate base, the premium, or any rate filing." § 440.34(3)(c), Fla....

...the cited decisions on page 6 of the majority opinion, thus requiring a determination of the employer/carrier's bad faith on remand. The holding in the majority opinion, as the motion for rehearing so aptly points out, is based on a construction of section 440.34 that the self-insured employer should not be treated as a carrier under this section, and thus would excuse all self-insured employers and their servicing agents from liability for bad faith attorney's fees....

...The City of Tampa, employer in this workers' compensation case, appeals three orders of the deputy commissioner. The first, entered on September 3, 1981, awarded temporary total disability (TTD) and wage loss benefits; the second, entered on July 29, 1982, found that Fein was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1981); the third, entered on December 1, 1982, set the amount of attorney's fees at $10,500....

...you know —, you have a right to fight claims if you want to and certainly you fought this claim all the way down to the client [sic]. But when you fight it in the face of all odds being against you, then I think you're going to have to pay a fee under 440.34(3)(b)." The record before the deputy commissioner disclosed the depositions of both Dr....

...erent question than whether the City "arguably" acted in bad faith. On this record, I cannot say that the City's conduct, even arguably, amounted to "fraud, malice, oppression, or willful, wanton or reckless disregard of the rights of the claimant." Section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...d encouraging the usual binding effect of stipulations. The deputy erred in rejecting the stipulation in this case. Under the peculiar circumstances here involved, we find no reason to disturb the deputy's denial of attorney's fees to claimant under § 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), on grounds of the employer's bad faith....

...ore the Commission and to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. The respondent Hospital contends that since it recognized responsibility for a permanent partial disability, it was merely awaiting the findings of the doctor as to the extent thereof. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., authorizes the award of a reasonable attorney's fee to a compensation claimant when the employer files a notice of controversy, or declines to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after notice, or when the employer otherwise resists payment unsuccessfully....

...The petitioner seeks reversal of the Full Commission order on the authority of Great American Indemnity Company v. Williams, Fla., 85 So.2d 619, and City of Miami Beach v. Schiffman, Fla., 144 So.2d 799. The four cited cases present a comprehensive statement of our views regarding Section 440.34(1) supra, and little could be accomplished by further elaboration....

...ed by the state or its political subdivisions." Clearly, the state has the power by statute to authorize an award of attorney's fees and costs in legal proceedings. See, e.g., § 60.05(5) (actions to abate nuisances); § 61.16 (divorce proceedings); § 440.34 (workers' compensation proceedings); § 627.428 (action on insurance contract); Fla....

...Rissman of Cooper & Rissman, P.A., Orlando, for appellants. Paul Smalbein of Smalbein, Eubank, Johnson, Rosier & Bussey, Rockledge, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Employer/carrier appeal the order of the Deputy Commissioner finding claimant temporarily totally disabled and awarding her attorney's fees under 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...[Claimant]: This is part of the claimant's — Deputy Commissioner: All right. I'll allow it. Overruled. [Claimant]: We can have an attorney's fee hearing later, whether or not the facts justify — Deputy Commissioner: This is for entitlement. All right. Continue. On appeal, appellant urges that under Section 440.34(2)(b) entitlement to attorney's fees based on bad faith may only be determined at a hearing separate and apart from the hearing on other matters....

...ar hearing and to hold a later hearing or submit affidavits to prove amounts. Appellant failed to claim prejudice at the hearing below and has demonstrated no prejudice in his brief on appeal. Farm Stores v. Dyrda, 384 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Section 440.34(2)(b) in pertinent part provides: "Any determination of bad faith shall be made by the deputy commissioner through a separate fact-finding proceeding." We do not read this language as requiring the deputy commissioner to hold a completely separate hearing on the question of bad faith....

...f the claimant's condition which are consistent with this opinion. Attorney's Fees As the JCC did not err in finding that the claimant prevailed on his compensation claims, the JCC properly awarded the claimant an entitlement to attorney's fees. See § 440.34, Fla....

...They argue that there is no statutory basis for such attorney's fee and that bad faith was neither litigated nor found. We conclude there is statutory basis for the services of claimant's attorney not only for adjudicating compensability but also for his services in securing the permanent total disability benefits. Section 440.34(3)(c), *517 Florida Statutes (1981) provided that a claimant shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee from a carrier or employer [i]n a proceeding where a carrier or employer denies that an injury occurred for which com...

...laim. No similar provision is made for attorney’s fees. . In contrast, Florida’s Workers' Compensation Law requires every workers’ compensation insurance policy to include coverage for attorney's fees entered against the insured employer under section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2008)....

...that the insurance carrier is liable for the obligations and duties that chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2008), imposes upon the employer. One such obligation and duty that, therefore, must be included in the insurance policy is attorney's fees under section 440.34. See Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Gustinger, 390 So.2d 420, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (stating that a section 440.34 attorney’s fee award was a covered claim ”[s]ince the workmen’s compensation policy issued by [the carrier] to [the employer] obviously insured against the employer’s responsibility to pay the claimant’s attorney’s fees”); Dilme v. SBP Service, Inc., 649 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding a section 440.34 fee award to be within the coverage of the employer’s workers' compensation insurance policy); What An Idea, Inc....

...1st DCA 1982) (Appellate court will not reverse on a point not presented in the tribunal of first resort). This decision does not preclude the carrier from administratively asserting this off-set if appropriate under the circumstances. Claimant's motion for appellate attorney's fees pursuant to section 440.34(5) is granted, and we remand to the deputy commissioner for determination of the appropriate amount....

...When the appellant/claimant prevailed on the merits of his workers' compensation claim, the deputy's order required that all attorney's fees payable to appellant's attorney, Mr. Keyfetz, be placed in a trust account and that Mr. Keyfetz seek the deputy's approval as required by § 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1979), [1] before reimbursement of his fees. Arguing that § 440.34(1) is constitutionally invalid, appellant moved that this portion of the order be vacated. Although the deputy refused to decide the constitutional issues, he did enter brief "findings of fact." On this record, appellant now seeks review before this Court asking generally that we find § 440.34(1) violative of equal protection, due process or the "contract clause." Relying on the arguments and authority presented to us, [2] we have not been persuaded that § 440.34's requirement of obtaining deputy approval before disbursement of a claimant's attorney's fees is unconstitutional....

...ional time required in connection with seeking approval and may provide useful information to the employer-carrier in defending against the claim and making decisions in connection with their position as to any claim... . Appellant first argues that § 440.34(1) unconstitutionally violates equal protection in that it discriminates against claimants as a class....

...generally." Id. at 640. As additional support for its decision, the court in Samaha cited Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540, 45 S.Ct. 399, 69 L.Ed. 775 (1925), involving a workers' compensation statute which sought to regulate attorney's fees much like § 440.34(1)....

...sation the State may attach such contentions on the license to practice law as it deems necessary for the public good. The Yeiser Court's rejection of the "liberty to contract" argument applies with equal weight to appellant's second contention that § 440.34(1) violates what appellant loosely describes as his constitutional "right to contract." [3] Merely because legislation places some restriction on the right to freely contract will not invalidate the legislation if the restriction was intended to protect the public's health, safety or welfare....

...olly inadequate to achieve the legitimate state interest recognized in Samaha. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the deputy's denial of the motion to vacate. ERVIN, J., concurs. BOOTH, J., dissents. BOOTH, Judge, dissenting: I am of the view that Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1979), as interpreted by the majority, restrains and impairs the rights of claimants to contract and to engage the services of an attorney of their choice....

...s intended by the legislature. Ohio Casualty Group v. Parrish, 350 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1977). Under the present act, a claimant's right to recover attorney's fees from the employer/carrier *1047 has been narrowly proscribed to certain limited instances. Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes....

...en to recover in tort against employers for on-the-job injuries. So long as the statutory remedy afforded is substantially equivalent to the common law remedy relinquished, certain constitutional objections can be overcome. The restraints imposed by Section 440.34(1) result in deprivation of fundamental rights of injured workers and impose a limitation not applicable to parties injured in non-job-related accidents....

...not contend the fee contracted for was excessive or improper in any way. No claim is being made by claimant or his counsel that the agreed upon fee be paid by the employer/carrier or be a lien against compensation benefits. [1] The interpretation of Section 440.34(1) which precludes freedom to contract and restricts the ability to obtain needed services seriously impairs the right of claimants to obtain compensation benefits due to them in what has become a complex area of the law, thereby penalizing, rather than protecting, the injured worker. I respectfully dissent. NOTES [1] Section 440.34(1) provides: No fee, gratuity, or other consideration shall be paid for services rendered for a claimant in connection with any proceedings arising under this chapter, unless approved as reasonable by the deputy commissioner, commission, or court having jurisdiction over such proceedings....

...(g) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing services. (h) The contingency or certainty of a fee. [2] Neither appellant's initial brief nor his reply brief included any cited case authority in support of or in opposition to his position. [3] Assuming that appellant was arguing that § 440.34 (1979) operated to impair a contract obligation as prohibited by Art. I, § 10 of the federal and Florida constitutions, we note that § 440.34(1) (1979) was in effect prior to the date of the accident in this case. Since the contract for attorney representation on the claim was entered into after the effective date of the statute, it cannot be said that § 440.34 impaired any existing contract obligation....

...Supreme Court of Florida. October 16, 1980. B. Robert Ohle, St. Petersburg, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and James S. Purdy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. *640 McDONALD, Justice. John N. Samaha, an attorney, assails the constitutionality of section 440.34(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...County of Sarasota, 177 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1965), and Husband v. Cassel, 130 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1961). Utilizing the guidelines set forth in those cases, we can discern no merit to the appellant's argument on this issue either. This Court upholds the constitutionality of section 440.34(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), and affirms the conviction. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Former § 440.34(5), Fla....

...for a lawyer or for himself or herself in respect of any claim or award for compensation, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Similar provisions are now contained in § 440.34(4), Fla. Stat. (1979). [2] § 440.34, Fla....

...constituted the "deni[al] by affirmative action, other than delay, [of] a covered claim," within the meaning of the exception provided by Sec. 631.70. Furthermore, the trial court was authorized to assess fees in the rule nisi proceeding pursuant to Section 440.34(1), Fla....

...ke the allowance of interest on the compensation fee awards from the dates of their entry to the date of the final judgment, March 26, 1980. [2] Otherwise, *422 the judgment under review is affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. [3] NOTES [1] § 440.34, Fla....

...Edward McClellan, Jr., of Pattillo, MacKay & McKeever, Ocala, for appellee. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from a workers' compensation order awarding claimant temporary total disability benefits for the period January 4, 1980 to March 18, 1980 and an attorney's fee pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Nevertheless, this does not mandate an attorney's fee award under the language of the new 1979 statute. When an employer/carrier admits an accident and pays some disability benefits but denies others are due, an attorney's fee is not awardable under Section 440.34(2)(c) Florida Statutes (1979)....

...er agreement between the claimant and his attorney. Standing to appeal is based on the fact that the appellant carrier is required to control the method of payment. The appeal presents issues of first impression and requires judicial construction of § 440.34, Fla....

...carrier to retain and pay periodically to claimant's attorney a percentage of "all monies paid to the claimant." Appellants contend that the order imposing that burden on them should be reversed on several grounds: (1) it is premature and void under § 440.34(1), Fla....

...age fee is based; and (4) the statute does not provide or permit the order's provision for continuing administrative duties by the appellant carrier in remitting fees to the attorney. We reverse on grounds 2 and 4, and on point 1 our construction of § 440.34(1) rejects both appellee's contention that it is inapplicable and appellants' contention that it forbids approval *338 of any fee agreement before successful prosecution of a claim. We find no necessity for treatment of the policy argument on point 3, and remand for further proceedings in compliance with our construction of the statute. Section 440.34(2), Fla....

...'s fees" except in three specific instances not affecting the issue in this case. Another subsection also provides a misdemeanor penalty for any person who "receives any fees ... unless such consideration ... is approved by the deputy commissioner." § 440.34(4). The 1979 legislative act repealed the former provision of § 440.34(2) that "in awarding a reasonable attorney's fee, the judge ... shall consider only that portion of the award to the claimant that the attorney is responsible for securing. " It also repealed the specific requirement for "the successful prosecution of the claim" by an attorney claiming a fee. Section 440.34(1) now states: No fee ......

...(e) The time limitation imposed by the claimant or the circumstances. (f) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant. (g) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing services. (h) The contingency or certainty of a fee. (emphasis supplied) Prior to 1977, § 440.34(1), Fla....

...And as to the benefits considered, the percentage fee was to be predicated only on those benefits obtained through the efforts of the claimant's attorney. C.E. Domes Construction Co. v. Hilaire, IRC Order 2-3096 (Jan. 27, 1977). In 1977 the legislature amended § 440.34(1) so as to codify the various Lee Engineering criteria, followed by amendment in 1978 to visit 25% of the fee upon claimant, and amendment in 1979 as above set forth. The claimant and attorney are now clearly free to enter into a fee agreement at *339 any time; § 440.34(1), Fla. Stat. (1979), merely requires approval of the agreement upon payment. Unlike the prior statute, § 440.34(1), Fla....

...(1979) relates to "any attorney's fee approved" and omits the former restriction to fees awarded upon the "successful prosecution of the claim." Such a substantive omission is presumed intended to alter the statutory meaning. See Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977). While § 440.34(2), Fla....

...es and the Lee Engineering [Lee Engineering & Construction v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1968)] factors, in my mind that pertains to a contingent fee basis rather than a contractual fee basis and would apply only where the exceptions under (2) ... 440.34(2) are applicable [to require a fee payable by carrier]." That is also the position argued by appellee in defense of the order....

...in excess of $10,000.00." Even under the former law, an interim fee could be awarded before all the "benefits secured" were ascertainable. Perez v. Carillon Hotel, 272 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1972); Tampa Aluminum Products Co. v. Watts, 132 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1960). However, consideration of the various § 440.34(1), Fla....

...We also note the apparent impropriety of the agreement's measurement of the fee by a share of "any and all compensation benefits" paid, rather than those in connection with which the attorney's services had been or would be rendered. The language from the former statute remaining in § 440.34(1) with respect to the presumptive scale for percentage fees, based on the "amount of the benefits secured, " is now preceded by the words "Except as provided by this subsection, ..." The exceptions are the prescribed factors designated (a)...

...of that duty by the deputy. Neither is the amount of the agreed fee substantiated by the Code of Professional Responsibility for attorneys in Florida EC2-19, cited by appellee, even if we assume its applicability. But implicit in our application of § 440.34(1), supra, is a rejection of appellee's argument that the revision was intended to require resort to the Code to determine a reasonable claimant's contract attorney fee, while retaining the statutory framework solely for fees paid by carriers....

...Small Claims Court of City and County of San Francisco, 76 Cal. App.2d 376, 173 P.2d 38 (1946); Cline v. Warrenberg, 109 Colo. 497, 126 P.2d 1030 (1942). However inconvenient the results may be, we are unable to read into the provision for a lien "upon compensation payable to the claimant," § 440.34(3), Fla....

...a retainer agreement, obligating claimant to pay an attorney's fee based upon a percentage amount of certain compensation benefits paid claimant, is not supported by evidence showing the fee reasonable. I agree also with the majority's opinion that Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1979), does not require, as did its predecessor, that a fee award be conditioned upon the claim's successful prosecution....

...rder which finds that the employer/carrier's handling of the claim constituted bad faith and awards attorney's fees. We affirm that portion of the order which finds bad faith, but reverse and remand on the issue of the amount of the attorney's fees. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1979), contains a sliding fee schedule....

...of claimant's employment. Popiel v. Broward County School Board, 432 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The more significant issue before us is that of the carrier's liability for attorneys' fees payable to claimant's counsel, as awarded by the deputy. Section 440.34(3)(c) provides: "In a proceeding where a carrier or employer denies that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable, and the claimant prevails on the issue of compensability," the claimant "shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee from a carrier or employer... ." The employer and carrier indisputably denied that claimant's heart injury was one "for which compensation benefits are payable," § 440.34(3)(c)....

...incurs a fee obligation by unsuccessfully denying the compensability of any bodily injury, such as this heart injury, which is found on substantial competent evidence to be compensable under chapter 440. Our decision rests both upon the language of section 440.34(3)(c) and upon its evident purpose....

...ately and obviously "injured." The statute does not limit fee awards to "a proceeding where a carrier or employer denies that [any] injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable... ." Nor can we discern any justification for construing section 440.34(3)(c) as though it were cast so narrowly....

...ver have been demonstrated without the intervention of an attorney in claimant's behalf, the purpose of securing claimant deserved benefits under chapter 440 compels our choice of the more liberal, rather than the more restrictive, interpretation of section 440.34(3)(c)....

...This court has often alluded to the necessity for the keeping of adequate time records by counsel, and the need for evidence on this factor, in keeping with the legislative mandate requiring consideration, among other factors, of the "time and labor required," in performing the legal service for the claimant. Section 440.34(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981); Brevard County School Board v....

...In the October 11, 2001, order, the JCC found that Claimant has reached statutory MMI, that her psychiatric injury is permanent, and that she is entitled to PTD benefits. Her condition was found to satisfy the section 12.04 impairment listings. Claimant was awarded attorney's fees under section 440.34(c), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Galen of Eraclides, Johns, Hall, Gelman, Johannessen & Kempner, L.L.P., Sarasota, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. At issue in this workers' compensation case is whether claimant's attorney is entitled to be paid an attorney fee and costs by the employer/servicing agent (e/sa) under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...de, not when forms indicating the acceptance of PTD were completed. See Amerimark, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 882 So.2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). *710 The JCC then addressed whether claimant's attorney met the burden of establishing entitlement under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2006), which provides that a fee is due when the following circumstances exist: the "carrier files a response to petition denying benefits;" there is a "successful prosecution of the petition;" and a period of 30 days elapses from "the date the carrier ....

...Palm Beach County School District, 901 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), to find the claim was never controverted and claimant's attorney did not successfully prosecute the petition because "more than minimal effort to procure benefits for the claimant" was necessary. The JCC's reliance is misplaced. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, has been amended since 2000 when Zabik's accident occurred. The 2003 amendments removed the discretionary factors in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...The parties agreed payment was made on the 31st day following the e/sa's receipt of the petition. Because more than 30 days elapsed from the date the e/sa received the petition and claimant successfully achieved acceptance and payment of the claim, all of the statutory requirements of section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2006), have been met....

...1977), where the Commission cautioned against annualization of fees. It has been held that the contingent percentage basis for determining fees is inappropriate due to the nature of worker's compensation law. Lee Engineering and Construction Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1968). Although Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1977) sets forth a percentage fee schedule based on the amount of benefits secured, an award based solely on a contingent percentage basis remains improper since the statute, applicable here because effective before the time of the deputy's award, Okaloosa County Gas District v....

...ad faith). Appellants next complain that the evidence fails to support an award of an attorney's fee in the amount of $58,000, because that sum is based upon an erroneous assessment of benefits obtained, as well as other relevant factors required by Section 440.34, Florida Statutes....

...It also contends that because there is testimony that claimant should be able to achieve independent living status within two to five years, the evidence does not support a finding that claimant should be in need of attendant care for the remainder of his life. We cannot accept the argument that section 440.34(1) requires a fee to be based on only accrued benefits actually awarded....

...hed by the National Office of Vital Statistics of the United States Department of Health and Human Services." Notwithstanding the fact that the claimant achieved no permanency rating, we do not consider that the "benefits secured" *1383 provision of section 440.34(1) contemplates in every circumstance a determination of accrued permanent benefits when a deputy is asked to decide the value of all benefits secured....

...In fact, if the statutory fee formula had been used exclusively, it would have netted claimant's attorney a fee of $71,550. Instead, the deputy took into consideration the criteria delineated in Lee Engineering & Construction Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1968), codified in section 440.34, and, in calculating the fee, considered not only the value of all reasonably predictable benefits secured to claimant, but also the time and labor involved, the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the nature and length of the relati...

...It the Deputy intended for the appellants to bear these expenses, the Deputy was in error. The accident herein occurred in January 1980, and we find that as a matter of law, *178 there is no applicable statutory provision which would allow for the assessment of an attorney's fees or costs to be borne by the appellants. See § 440.34(2)(a)-(c), Fla....

...Bergh of Walker, Buckmaster, Miller & Ketcham, P.A., Orlando, for appellants. *473 Thomas R. Mooney and Sherry L. Davis of Meyers & Mooney, P.A., Orlando, for appellee. MILLS, Judge. In this workers' compensation action, the employer/carrier appeal an order awarding claimant attorney's fees pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...After a hearing on attorney's fees, the deputy issued an order finding that the employer/carrier acted in bad faith by not accepting permanent total disability earlier. The deputy awarded $10,000 as a reasonable attorney's fee. The employer/carrier contend that the claimant did not suffer an economic loss as required by Section 440.34(2)(b). The fact that the claimant received wage loss benefits limited in duration when she should have been getting permanent disability not so limited does not amount to economic loss when the amount of each payment is the same. Recovery under Section 440.34(2)(b) requires a showing of present economic loss....

...ss of supplemental benefits is de minimis. The claimant's obligation to pay for the services of her attorney was not a present economic loss but merely an obligation contingent on the employer/carrier's liability for claimant's attorney's fees under Section 440.34(2)(b)....

...Claimant was accepted as permanently and totally disabled on January 6, 1982, retroactive to January 27, 1981, the date of MMI. Although sustaining the deputy's finding of bad faith, the majority reverses the bad faith attorney fee award on the theory that claimant suffered no economic loss as required by Section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), first, because it considers there was only a de minimus deprivation of the supplemental benefits to which a worker permanently totally disabled is entitled by section 440.15(1), and second, because it determines an employee's obligation to pay attorney's fees does not constitute economic loss as contemplated by section 440.34(2)(b)....

...After a deputy has determined that an employer/carrier acted in bad faith, I am of the view that any economic loss, whether relating to deprivation caused by failure to pay compensation benefits or medical expenses, or legal fees and costs incidental to a claim filed, may constitute economic loss. Although section 440.34(2)(b) extracts a penalty, this court has consistently placed a liberal interpretation upon the statute favoring the worker....

...fee is appropriate." Id. at 401 (e.s.). That the statute contemplates the carrier's obligation to pay attorney's fees was implicitly recognized by us in Sam Rogers Enterprises: "Despite the obvious deterrent effect, the attorney's fee award of [s.] 440.34(2)(b) was clearly intended to compensate the claimant for the monetary losses sustained in trying to force some action on the claim....

...And, "[r]equiring the claimant to pay for attorney's fees which were necessitated by the employer's action would be inconsistent with the purpose of placing the burden of work-related injuries on the industry." Id. Moreover, for the purpose of the economic loss provision of section 440.34(2)(b), it is not necessary that the employee establish *476 he or she actually incurred "out-of-pocket" expenses....

...k) Neither party will be permitted to be represented by legal counsel at mediation. All communication between the mediator and the parties shall be directly with the parties, and not through legal counsel. l) Claimants' attorneys' fees shall be paid in the same amounts and in the same manner as provided for in Section 440.34 of the Florida Statutes, subject to the approval of either the arbitrator or a judge of industrial claims....

...Gassner refused to participate in mediation without counsel present. The only relief not obtained was an award of costs and an attorney's fee for Mr. Gassner's lawyer. The petition for benefits had predicated a claim for costs and an employer-paid attorney's fee on section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1995), subsection (3)(c) of which authorizes such awards in proceedings "in which a[n] ......

...See, e.g., Tampa Bay Area NFL Football, Inc. v. Jarvis, 668 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). [4] To the extent attorney's fees questions are relegated to alternative dispute resolution procedures in which judges of compensation play no part, the requirement in section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1995), that judges of compensation claims award all fees is necessarily obviated....

...in the amount of $1,148.50. Claimant accepted this amount. However, the issue of attorney's fees remained in controversy. Claimant's counsel argued to the JCC that he was entitled to the two separate fee awards. The first entitlement was pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes, which requires a "reasonable" attorney's fee be paid by the E/C upon the successful prosecution of a PFB....

...The second entitlement to fees arose as a sanction for the E/C's failure to timely comply with the discovery request. The E/C acknowledged Claimant was entitled to attorney's fees for successfully prosecuting the PFB, but argued that a "reasonable" fee pursuant to section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2003), must be equal to a percentage of the value of the benefits secured for the claimant....

...The JCC concluded a sanction was appropriate, and found a $100.00 attorney's fee award was sufficient to deter repetition of the violation. We decline to disturb the JCC's finding, and affirm this issue without further discussion. The Meaning of "Reasonable" Pursuant to Section 440.34, Florida Statutes Because the remaining issue presented on appeal is one of statutory construction, review is de novo....

...objective or alteration of law, unless a contrary indication is clear." Mangold v. Rainforest Golf Sports Ctr., 675 So.2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also Sam's Club v. Bair, 678 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). In 2003, the legislature amended section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, effecting three material changes....

...judgment, the circumstances warrant such action, was deleted. Third, the legislature added language specifically prohibiting a JCC from awarding a fee in excess of the percentage fee, but did not, with the same specificity, prohibit a lower fee. See § 440.34(1), Fla. Stat. (2002); cf. § 440.34(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). *544 The amended section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2003), in relevant part, now provides: (1) A fee, gratuity, or other consideration may not be paid for a claimant in connection with any proceedings arising under this chapter, unless approved as reasonable by the [JCC].......

...The first stipulation is that Claimant's counsel reasonably spent 16.7 hours rendering services to Claimant. The second stipulation is that an attorney could reasonably charge $200.00 per hour in this type of case. Claimants' counsel concludes these stipulations between the parties show that the legislature, in amending section 440.34(1), must have intended that a "reasonable" attorney's fee could dramatically exceed the value of the benefits counsel secured for a claimant (here, $3,340.00 (16.7 hours multiplied by $200.00))....

...The Rules of Professional Conduct relate only to an evaluation of the maximum fee an attorney may collect as reasonable without facing possible discipline. They do not trump substantive rights created by the legislature. Acceptance of counsel's arguments would render the legislative amendments to section 440.34 meaningless. Florida Statutes govern counsel's entitlement to fees, and the Rules of Professional Conduct cannot change the result. In the amended section 440.34, the legislature defined a "reasonable" fee....

...In worker's compensation cases, a fee award must be based on the value of the benefits actually obtained on behalf of the Claimant. It expressly prohibits the JCC from awarding an attorney's fee greater than that provided by the statute, except under certain conditions in medical only cases. [2] The JCC correctly concluded section 440.34, as amended, required him to award an attorney's fee of $229.70, 20% of the $1,148.50 benefit counsel secured on behalf of his client....

...Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330(a), we grant Appellant's motion for certification and, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), amend our previous opinion to include certification of the following question of great public importance: DO THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 440.34(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2003), CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY ESTABLISH THE PERCENTAGE FEE FORMULA PROVIDED THEREIN AS THE SOLE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE TO BE AWARDED A CLAIMANT? All other pending motions are denied....

...rtions made by amici. I, therefore, concur *546 in the denial of the motions to appear filed by the amici. NOTES [1] Not urged by claimant's counsel is that the rule would also allow consideration of the results obtained on behalf of the client. [2] Section 440.34(7), Florida Statutes (2003), permits the JCC to "approve an alternative attorney's fee not to exceed $1,500 only once per accident, based on a maximum hourly rate of $150 per hour, if the [JCC] expressly finds that the attorney's fee a...

...ion for modification. A Motion to Tax Costs was heard on February 25, 1983. Costs were denied by the deputy commissioner on the grounds that all benefits claimed were ultimately denied and the claimant was not the prevailing party as contemplated by Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes....

...Costs are to be taxed to the prevailing party unless the court orders otherwise under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a). If a claimant in a workers' compensation proceeding "should prevail in any proceeding before a deputy commissioner or court," costs are to be taxed against the employer. Section 440.34(3)....

...of Panama City, Inc., 589 So.2d 917, 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (applying Rowe where statute, section 57.105, authorizes fee but does not give guidelines for setting the fee) with Mirlisena v. Chemlawn Corp., 567 So.2d 986, 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (declining to apply Rowe where statute, section 440.34(1), enumerates guidelines for setting the fee)....

...hysician. "(4) I find that the employer/carrier has resisted this claim and I therefore find that it was necesary for the claimant to employ counsel to represent his interests in this cause and that the claimant's attorney is entitled to a fee under Section 440.34....

...McKnight, Tampa, for Appellant. Elizabeth P. Lynch and David K. Beach of Rissman, Weisberg, Barrett, Hurt, Donahue & McLain, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. Dean Stolzer, claimant below, appeals a final order of the Judge of Compensation Claims determining that section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2002) [1] retroactively applied to the petition for permanent total disability benefits filed as a result of his compensable motor vehicle accident on *438 April 11, 2000, and therefore an award of attorney's fees was precluded....

...Russell Corp. v. Brooks, 698 So.2d 1334 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The E/C did not deny or commence payments within 14 days of receiving claimant's April 4, 1995, petition for benefits, but instead did not respond, which operated as a denial. Therefore, pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), which authorizes fees to a claimant who successfully prosecutes a claim following notice of denial, Montes is entitled to fees for securing these benefits. The E/C relies upon Indian River County School Board v. Baker, 695 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 703 So.2d 475 (Fla.1997), which is inapposite. This case involved the former 21-day rule provided by section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), which stated that a claimant was entitled to fees in cases wherein the E/C failed or refused to pay a claim "on or before the 21st day after receiving notice of the claim." The JCC in that case acknowled...

...Flynn's office that claimant's 1984 injury was the result of a "new accident" was per se reasonable, and thus constitutes sufficiently prompt investigation of claimant's claim. The E/C also maintain that its liability for attorney's fees could not be established under section 440.34(3)(c) since, they assert, the E/C never denied liability on the 1983 injury, but, instead, merely sought to show that the second carrier, Mission Insurance Company, was liable on the 1984 injury....

...City of Winter Springs v. Lane, 386 So.2d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). It follows that appellants' denial that an "injury" occurred which would subject them to liability for compensation could result in assessment of attorney's fees against them under section 440.34(3)(c)....

...ical evaluation with Dr. Berry Kaplan to explore the need for surgery, and would authorize Dr. Oregon Hunter, a physiatrist, to serve as Soriano's principal treating physician instead of Dr. Medero. Subsequently, Soriano sought attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), [1] which the JCC denied....

...re requested within a reasonable time. Because the record establishes that Soriano's attorney successfully obtained a neurosurgical evaluation for his client after the E/C's denial, Soriano is entitled to an attorney's fee for this obtained benefit. § 440.34(3)(b), Fla....

...However, the undersigned Deputy Commissioner is of the view that appropriate weight should be given to the amount of the benefits involved in the controversy and to the statutory fee schedule in connection therewith, as well as to all other factors enumerated in Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, and that this determination should be tempered against the amount of time spent in handling the claim....

...claims would be virtually uncollectable. In determining the amount of the fee, the deputy thoroughly dealt with the factors required to be considered under Lee Engineering and Construction Company v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1968), and Sections 440.34(1)(a-h), Florida Statutes, but incorrectly applied a "cap" not required by the law of this State....

...PADOVANO, J. This is an appeal from a final order awarding attorney's fees in a workers' compensation case. The claimant contends that the judge of compensation claims erred in departing downward from the presumptive fee computed by the formula in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes....

...Alderman, 755 So.2d 604 (Fla.2000). After the decision by the supreme court, the claimant petitioned the judge of compensation claims for an award of attorney's fees. He requested a fee based on the amount of the benefits obtained. The petition was filed pursuant to section 440.34(1), *1099 Florida Statutes (1989), [1] which states in material part: ......

...ure benefits, and that the statutory fee for his services would be $65,002.87. However, the judge departed downward from the statutory formula and awarded the claimant $23,010.00 in attorney's fees. The judge assigned two of the statutory factors in section 440.34(1) as the reason for the downward departure....

...justify a departure, the abuse of discretion standard applies. We conclude that the judge of compensation claims placed undue reliance on the customary hourly rate in departing from the statutory formula. The presumptive attorney's fee authorized by section 440.34(1) is a contingent fee based on the value of the benefits obtained....

...ncrease, it is possible that the award in a given case might be higher than the amount that would be obtained by applying an hourly rate. That is the essential feature of a contingent fee arrangement, and it is inherent in the design of the statute. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes reflects a legislative intent to standardize attorney's fee awards in workers' compensation cases....

...r did not play a significant role in the judge's analysis. In any event, we do not think that the attorney-client relationship was so brief or insignificant that it would warrant a reduction in the presumptive attorney's fee. Of the eight factors in section 440.34(1), the judge found three to be positive in the sense that they would support a fee at or above the statutory amount....

...She found that three other factors had no impact on the departure and characterized them as neutral. These were (a) the novelty and difficulty of the issues, (b) the likelihood the case would preclude other legal employment, and (e) the time limitations imposed by the claimant. Although the task of weighing the factors in section 440.34(1) is not a simple numerical process, we conclude that the two factors assigned as the reason for the departure were not sufficient to outweigh the three neutral factors that could be used to justify the presumptive fee and the three positive factors that could be used to support an even greater fee....

...efits for his client. Under the circumstances, it was unreasonable to depart from the contingency arrangement in the statute and limit the fee to an hourly rate. For these reasons, we conclude that the order departing from the presumptive fee set by section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes was an abuse of discretion....

...of $65,002.87, the presumptive amount according to the statute. Reversed. BROWNING and LEWIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The current version of the statute is substantially the same as the 1989 version, except that the percentages have been reduced. See § 440.34(1), Fla....

...resentation before the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in securing the affirmance of the rule nisi and the 20% penalty. The deputy denied the claim for attorney's fees on the ground that as he determined the legislative intent of F.S. Sec. 440.34(1), F.S.A., the Florida Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction to award an attorney's fee for collateral representation of the claimant (even if successful) for any legal work done before any court, that is, outside of the Commission, notwithstanding that the Third District Court of Appeal had held in reversing the Circuit Court's award of an attorney's fee that the legislative intent of Sec. 440.34(1) did not give such jurisdiction to the Circuit Court either. The full Commission affirmed the deputy's order refusing an award of an attorney's fee and claimant brings certiorari here to review said order. We grant the petition and quash the order of the full Commission. *432 F.S. Section 440.34(1), F.S.A., provides in part: "(1) If the employer * * * shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation, and the injured person shall have employed an attorney at law in the successful prosecution of his claim, there...

...This Court reversed, holding that the attorney's fee statute was not to be nullified by restrictive interpretation, saying: "[2] We hold that the twenty percent additional amount here recovered under Section 440.20(6) was `compensation' within the meaning of Section 440.34(1)....

...counsel at this stage, or to call again upon counsel already retained, to enforce his rights. He should not be impeded by the thought of counsel fees which may render the enterprise an empty gesture so far as he is concerned. The salutary purpose of Section 440.34 (1), which is one of the few provisions *433 of its kind in the United States, should not be nullified by restrictive interpretation. If doubt exists, it will be resolved in favor of the working man. * * *'" (emphasis in text) The foregoing considered, it is our view the Full Commission is authorized to fix and approve an attorney's fee for claimant pursuant to said Section 440.34(1), for the reasonable value of his attorney's services in the successful prosecution of his claims in the Circuit Court and the District Court of Appeal, Third District. Section 440.34(1) should be read in connection with Section 440.24(1), which latter section authorizes enforcement of compensation orders by rule nisi proceedings in the circuit court directing the defaulting employer or carrier to show cause why a writ of execution or other process should not be issued. Such a rule nisi action requires a review of the compensation order by the circuit court to determine whether it has a sufficiently valid basis to support a writ of execution or other process. This brings into play Section 440.34 (1), which authorizes any court to allow or increase the attorney's fees in any proceeding "had for the review of any claim, award or compensation order". Furthermore, Section 440.34(1) provides that if any employer or carrier is unsuccessful in resisting payment of compensation an attorney's fee should be awarded claimant. Thus Section 440.34(1) in its broad terms read in connection with Section 440.24(1) authorizes a circuit judge to award an attorney's fee to claimant when a rule nisiorder is made absolute to enforce payment of compensation....

...before the Commission for award of an attorney's fee for the successful prosecution of the rule nisi action. Appeals from rule nisi orders may be taken to the District Courts of Appeal under the constitutional appellate jurisdiction of such courts. Section 440.34(1) undoubtedly allows awarding of attorney's fees by such courts for successful representation of claimants in rule nisi appeals therein....

...t $150 per hour. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. Initially, we affirm the JCC's finding that the E/C did not act in bad faith in not earlier accepting claimant as PTD. A finding of bad faith is warranted under Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), if the claimant shows that the carrier passively delayed paying benefits without making any effort to place benefits in the hands of the claimant....

...Without detailing the testimony, which referenced the time log claimant's attorney submitted into evidence, suffice it to say that we cannot discern why the JCC accepted some entries and not others as having contributed to "the time reasonably spent in obtaining" benefits under section 440.34(3)(b)....

...In the interest of uniformity in the law and the avoidance of confusion in the decisions on the general subject treated, such language is disapproved. [5] Fla. Stat. §§ 73.091, 73.131 (1967), F.S.A. [6] Fla. Stat. §§ 61.071, 61.16 (1967), F.S.A. [7] Fla. Stat. § 627.0127 (1967), F.S.A. [8] Fla. Stat. § 440.34 (1967), F.S.A....

...Katzen, 568 So.2d 960 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990). The same rule is applicable to prevailing parties in workers' compensation cases. G.W. Wood Products v. Parrott, 447 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Houck v. Guettler & Sons, 450 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); § 440.34(3), Fla. Stat. The general rule prevails notwithstanding the fact that neither section 57.041, Florida Statutes, nor section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, is limited by its specific terms to taxable costs....

...s unclear, the amount of the attorney's fee is also ambiguous. Certainty in the amount of attorney's fees awarded is essential in workers' compensation cases since it is a crime to accept fees which have not been approved by the deputy commissioner. Section 440.34(6), Florida Statutes (1981)....

BENTON, J. Constrained by the statutory formula set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2009), the judge of compensation claims awarded claimant’s counsel an attorney’s fee of only $164.54 for 107.2 hours of legal work reasonably necessary to secure the claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits....

...We do not disagree with the learned judge of compensation claims that the statute required this result, and are ourselves bound by precedent to uphold the award, however inadequate it may be as a practical matter. The judge of compensation claims, as an executive branch adjudicator, was without authority to declare section 440.34 unconstitutional....

...2d DCA 1996) (holding that appellees should have raised their due process claims on direct appeal of the administrative order rather than filing a subsequent action in circuit court). In reaching our decision today, we have therefore considered claimant’s arguments that section 440.34 should be deemed in violation of several constitutional provisions....

...1st DCA 2006), disapproved on other grounds by Murray, 994 So.2d at 1062 ; Wood v. Fla. Rock Indus. & Crawford & Co., 929 So.2d 542, 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), disapproved on other grounds by Murray, 994 So.2d at 1062 . In Kauffman , we recognized that section 440.34 was amended in 2009 in response to the supreme court’s decision in Murray and noted that although Murray disapproved of this court’s decisions in Lundy, Campbell, and Wood , the supreme court did not address any constitutional issu...

...s reversed, without prejudice to claimant's right to seek wage-loss benefits subsequent to that date based upon an adequate work search. The parties stipulated that a reasonable attorney fee would be one assessed according to the schedule set out in Section 440.34(1), providing a fee which is a percentage of the total amount of benefits secured; the parties disagree, however, on which benefits should be included in this determination....

...See § 440.20(11)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004); Eshlibi v. Consol. Box Mfg., 962 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Rodriguez v. Graduate Plastics, Inc., 954 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The attorney's fee is limited to a percentage of the benefits secured. See § 440.34(1), Fla....

...[2] The attorneys' argument that the question of costs is controlled by a retainer agreement envisioned by the rules regulating the Florida Bar is without merit. Rules "cannot alter, amend or eliminate" a substantive right. See Heymann v. Free, 913 So.2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, mandates that the retainer agreement not provide "for compensation [as to fees and costs] in excess of the amount allowed under this section." Thus, a retainer agreement in a workers' compensation matter must comply with both sections 440.34 and 57.104, Florida Statutes. Here, the JCC reviewed sections 57.104 and 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, Loper, and Dayco Products, and concluded paralegal time was included with attorney time. The change in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2003), as it relates to attorney's fees to be paid pursuant to a joint stipulation for lump sum settlement, altered the basis for determining the fee amount, requiring all fees be based solely upon benefits secured....

...KAHN, BENTON, and BROWNING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008), is not applicable here. Murray determined that when a claimant is entitled to recover attorney fees from an employer/carrier "as provided by section 440.34(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d), the claimant is entitled to recover `a reasonable attorney's fee,'" and that employer/carrier paid fee is not limited by the formula set out in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes. Id. at 1053. Here, claimant is paying a fee to his attorney pursuant to a lump sum settlement, a situation which is governed by section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes....

...This shortcoming prevails notwithstanding nine years of explanation and warning issued by this court. Southern Erectors, Inc. v. Gay, 558 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Lehigh Corp. v. Byrd, 397 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The motion before this court cites as authority for attorney fees section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes (1980), although the date of accident was May 31, 1975....

...is the law in effect on the date of the accident. On May 31, 1975, the law in effect providing for the award of attorney fees against the employer was substantially the same as in the authority cited in claimant's motion and as the law exists today. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...Cook & Pruitt Masonry, Inc., 126 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1961); Florida Silica Sand Co. v. Parker, 118 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1960). Accordingly, the employer and carrier had no obligation to assert, as a defense, that claimant was not entitled to a fee award. The fee statute applicable to this case is section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1981). The judge of compensation claims *722 correctly concluded that, to establish his entitlement to a fee award, claimant was required to prove both that the carrier had "acted in bad faith" and that he had "suffered economic loss." § 440.34(3)(b), Fla....

...s" for purposes of the statute. Swift & Co.; Winter Garden Citrus v. Parrish, 438 So.2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Claimant offered no other evidence of "economic loss." Claimant failed to establish his entitlement to an attorney fee award pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...The claimant has not applied for a rehabilitation evaluation and his claim for these services was properly denied by the deputy. The deputy correctly determined that claimant's attorney was not entitled to a fee for his recovery of additional medical benefits. Section 440.34(2)(a), Fla....

...asserted a claim for medical benefits only, if the claimant has not filed or is not entitled to file a claim for disability or certain other benefits. Here, the claimant filed a claim for disability in addition to the claim for medical benefits and § 440.34(2)(a) is not applicable....

...the JIC, it would then be a departure from the essential requirements of law contemplated under certiorari (as distinguished from "appellate") review here, and we must take jurisdiction and reverse the IRC. Now as to the facts sub judice. Fla. Stat. § 440.34(1) makes the employer liable for attorney's fees where "he shall decline to pay a claim on or before the 21st day after they have notice of same, or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation and the injured person sh...

...with directions that it affirm and reinstate the award of attorney's fees by the able trial judge. It is so ordered. ADKINS, C.J., ROBERTS and McCAIN, JJ., and FERRIS, Circuit Court Judge, concur. BOYD and OVERTON, JJ., dissent. NOTES [1] Fla. Stat. § 440.34(1), 1973, F.S.A....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. June 8, 1982. H. George Kagan, Miller, Hodges & Kagan, Miami, for appellants. Mark J. Feldman, Miami, for appellee. LARRY G. SMITH, Judge. The employer/carrier appeal an order awarding claimant attorney's fees pursuant to Section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...independent investigation, was the result of an honest error based upon documentary evidence capable of disparate interpretations. We agree and reverse. Initially, we would point out that the deputy's order does not indicate under which provision of Section 440.34(2) the attorney's fees were awarded in the first three instances. Clearly they were not awarded under Section 440.34(2)(c) since the carrier admitted compensability and paid some benefits. Four Quarters Habitat, Inc. v. Miller, 405 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Claimant's lawyer argued below that fees were awardable under either Section 440.34(2)(a) or (b). However, on appeal he appears to have retreated from the position that the award of fees with respect to items (2) and (3) above was based on the bad faith provision, Section 440.34(2)(b), and insists that Section 440.34(2)(a) is the basis for the award in these instances. This position is untenable. Under Section 440.34(2)(a), a claimant can recover a reasonable attorney's fee from a carrier or employer against whom he has successfully asserted a claim for medical benefits only, if the claimant has not filed or is not entitled to file a claim for disability or certain other benefits....

...9, 1979, claimant claimed temporary total disability benefits were due from September 4, 1979 to date. Although the record indicates these benefits were paid, this claim was never withdrawn. Thus, claimant is not entitled to an attorney's fee under Section 440.34(2)(a)....

...of alleged improper handling in isolation, as well as in relation to each other, to determine whether the record justifies a finding of bad faith. We conclude that it does not. We first revert briefly to this court's view of the bad faith provision, Section 440.34(2)(b), as explicated in Florida Erection Services, Inc....

...*360 Mily Rodriquez, of Law Offices of Edward Almeyda, Miami, for appellants. Marvin J. Kristal, of Ira J. Druckman, P.A., Miami, for appellee. MILLS, Judge. Samurai of the Falls, Inc. and Hewitt, Coleman & Associates (E/C) appeal from an order of the deputy commissioner awarding bad faith attorney's fees pursuant to Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Based on the testimony of the rehabilitation counselor, he found it reasonably predictable that the E/C would be responsible for wage-loss benefits of $253.00 weekly through the end of Sul's entitlement thereto in May 1994. Based on total benefits acquired of $140,679, and using the formula found in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, the deputy computed a fee of $21,851....

...The E/C first argues on appeal that the deputy erred in finding bad faith. We disagree. "Bad faith" means conduct by the carrier in the handling of a claim which amounts to fraud; malice; oppression; or willful, wanton or reckless disregard of the rights of the claimant. Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes....

...ntarily and timely pays the additional benefits." International at 648. In Polote Corp. v. Meredith, 482 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), the claimant obtained an award of compensability and TTD in August 1982, and became entitled to a fee pursuant to 440.34(3)(c) (compensability disputed and determined in claimant's favor); before the fee hearing, claimant filed a contested claim for PTD in October 1983 which was awarded in January 1984....

...Ty Hodges, of Miller, Hodges, Kagan & Chait, Miami, for appellants/cross-appellees. Edward Schroll, Miami, for appellee/cross-appellant. BARFIELD, Judge. In this appeal and cross-appeal from a workers' compensation order awarding attorney fees under section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1983), the employer and carrier assert that the award is patently excessive and in excess of the amount claimed, and that it is unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record....

...rmining a reasonable fee. He also found, based on his own experience, that $300/hour was a reasonable rate for an attorney of this attorney's caliber, but reduced the rate to $265/hour without explanation. He found that the fee schedule contained in section 440.34 could not be reasonably and fairly applied in this case, considering the fact that the value of future medical care could not be ascertained, and that application of the fee schedule would result in an unjust and inadequate fee for the claimant's attorney. He awarded a fee of $9,275. In a legislative attempt to standardize attorney fees absent exceptional circumstances, section 440.34 sets out a formula to be used in determining a reasonable attorney fee....

...The employer in this workers' compensation case asserts that the deputy commissioner erred in finding that the claimant's attorney was entitled to a fee based upon "all benefits to which the claimant has or *1296 may become entitled" because the claim was not timely accepted within 21 days pursuant to § 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...yer/carrier ... denied claimant's need for psychiatric care ..." as a result of his compensable accident. In those circumstances the rationale of Great Dane Trailers v. Flis, 435 So.2d 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), permits an award under the provision of § 440.34, Florida Statutes, for a fee when employer/carrier denies compensability of one of several distinct injuries, as opposed to denying a claimed benefit on other grounds....

...The appealed order is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. The denial of claimant's motion for attorney's fees is also reversed, the employer and servicing agent having controverted the claim and claimant having prevailed thereon on this appeal. Section 440.34(3)(c), Fla....

...f workers' compensation law and are consistent with our holding. *56 In Clay Hyder Truck Lines v. Atherton, 400 So.2d 1295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), this Court was presented with an issue involving the date of payment in a claim for attorney's fees under Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Owens, the chiropractor, was authorized. Since an authorized chiropractor referred claimant to Dr. Batson for treatment, the employer/carrier are responsible for Dr. Batson's bill. Sloan v. Concrete Sciences, 382 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The award of attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes *927 (Supp....

...1st DCA 1982), relied upon by the employer/carrier, is distinguishable. Although the opinion is unclear, the briefs in that case [1] reveal that the employer/carrier had paid temporary total disability benefits for a period. Therefore this court concluded that section 440.34(3)(c) was not applicable since the E/C had not denied that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits were payable....

...Neither in the application for hearing nor at the hearing itself did claimant's attorney assert that the carrier's bad faith handling of the claim was the basis for his claim for attorney's fees. Although this court has interpreted the language contained in section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1980), as not requiring the deputy to conduct a completely separate hearing on the question of entitlement to attorney's *390 fees on the basis of bad faith, but only that the question of bad faith be specifica...

...Rogers did not appear at the hearing held on the claim, subsequent to which the deputy issued his order, dated January 13, 1983, finding claimant entitled to TTD benefits, PTD benefits, and medical expenses, and awarding claimant's attorney a fee under the "bad faith" provision of Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. December 30, 1985. *234 Jonathan L. Gaines of Fleming, O'Bryan & Fleming, Ft. Lauderdale, for appellants. Thomas J. Tansey, Ft. Lauderdale, for appellee. WENTWORTH, Judge. Employer/carrier seek review of an attorney's fee awarded pursuant to § 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978)....

..., 1982, with benefits deemed "retroactive" to November 9. Claimant's attorney *235 was subsequently awarded an additional attorney's fee. Employer/carrier argue that "bad faith" has not been shown so as to justify an attorney's fee award pursuant to § 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1982). But claimant's injury occurred when the effective attorney's fee statute was § 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978), which did not require that a fee be predicated upon "bad faith." We find that the "bad faith" amendment was a substantive enactment, and as such the applicable attorney's fee statute is that which was in effect on the date of claimant's accident. See Sullivan v. Mayo, 121 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1960). We further find that an additional attorney's fee was properly awarded pursuant to § 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978), in that employer/carrier did "decline to pay a claim on or before the 21st day after ......

...While an initial fee had already been awarded "in full discharge of any attorney's fee earned," the additional fee which we now approve encompasses additional services rendered subsequent to the initial award. In these circumstances the deputy did not err in concluding that in accordance with § 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978), employer/carrier's resistance and untimely acceptance of the additional claim and petition for modification should serve as a basis for an additional attorney's fee....

...ed upon the evidence and arguments duly presented. We simply hold that the defects and irregularities shown thus far cannot be held as a matter of law to preclude claimant's recovery of attorney's fees to which she may be entitled under the statute. Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...ndance at the fee hearing. Based on the hours expended, at an asserted reasonable hourly rate of $150, Mr. Sicking represented that his fee would amount to $27,750. In the alternative, a fee was sought based on the statutory guideline fee formula in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1985), [1] by determining the monetary value of all benefits achieved by Mr....

...and no indication as to how many of the 185 hours were devoted to the benefits that he ultimately obtained for his client. Based on the foregoing, the chief commissioner applied the total amount of benefits obtained to the "25/20/15" fee formula in section 440.34(1) to arrive at an attorney's fee of $2,291.40....

...Neither is claimant due a fee based on the fact that the E/C paid TTD benefits beyond the period to which she was entitled to those benefits, and thereafter began voluntarily paying PTD benefits, on the theory that the benefits were untimely paid. Under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1973), three conditions are set forth upon which the employer may be compelled to pay attorney's fees, one most significantly being when the employer shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after notice thereof....

...Johnson Properties, Inc./Holiday Inn, 481 So.2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), wherein the claimant prevailed on the issue of compensability. Thereafter, the deputy commissioner awarded benefits and ordered the E/C to pay a reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes....

...litation counselor, he found it reasonably predictable that the E/C would be responsible for wage-loss benefits of $253 weekly through the end of Sul's entitlement thereto. Based on total benefits acquired of $140,679, and using the formula found in section 440.34(1), the deputy computed a fee of $21,851....

...e carrier. We agree with the chief commissioner that the stipulation was of no force and effect due to its not having been approved by a deputy commissioner. Apart from the fact that the stipulation itself required approval by a deputy commissioner, section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1985), also requires such approval....

...ANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BOOTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The parties and the chief commissioner properly considered this percentage fee schedule although the date of injury preceded the 1977 amendment to section 440.34(1)....

...Carpenter defense and it turned out that the facts would not support such a defense, or that the judge of compensation claims did not accept it, the employer and carrier might well be required to pay penalties, interest and attorney fees in addition to the benefits at issue. See § 440.20, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988); § 440.34, Fla....

...Nolan of Nolan & Usdan, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. SHAW, Judge. Claimant's counsel secured benefits for the claimant worth $17,104.98 and was awarded an attorney's fee of $7,710.00. The employer/carrier argues that the fee is excessive and violates Florida Statute 440.34 (1980). We agree and REVERSE. Section 440.34 provides the deputy with a sliding fee schedule to be followed....

...She filed a claim on February 4, 1985 for PTD. In an order dated May 21, 1985, from which the e/c did not appeal, the dc found the claimant PTD as of June 9, 1983. [1] The dc then reserved jurisdiction to consider an application for attorney's fees under the bad faith provision of Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes. In an order dated January 31, 1986, the dc denied the claim for bad faith attorney's fees, hence the instant appeal. Attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(b) are recoverable from the e/c if the e/c acts in bad faith in regard to an injured worker's claim, and if the worker suffers economic loss....

...n February 9, 1981. Nationwide Insurance Company was the workers' compensation carrier for the employer from the date of the accident to February 1984, at which time Royal Insurance Company of America succeeded Nationwide as the carrier. Pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), the deputy commissioner ordered "the employer/carrier" to pay a $35,000 fee to White's attorney....

...Hurt, testified to these facts and submitted an affidavit scheduling the time expended in representing the claimant. He expended 41.2 hours on the claim. Hurt further explained that the expected future benefits amount to $362,667, and that the statutory fee calculated under the formula in section 440.34(1) equals $55,150....

...rney, claimant would not have recovered any of these benefits, "and, therefore, claimant's attorney is entitled to have his fee, based on the amount of benefits set out in Finding # 3 above"; and (5) the statutory fee calculated under the formula in section 440.34(1) is $55,149....

...ce of this case precluded him from representing insurance companies generally, the amount of benefits involved, the attorney's reputation and experience, and that the case was taken on a contingent fee basis. After applying these factors pursuant to section 440.34(1) and Lee Engineering Construction Co....

...law. Royal also contends that the deputy commissioner's finding that Royal had acted in bad faith was erroneous because not supported by competent, substantial evidence, and no factual basis for such finding was set forth in the order as required by section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...case. We agree with Royal, however, that the deputy commissioner erred in finding Royal guilty of bad faith. Neither the evidence in the record before us nor the findings of fact in the order are legally sufficient to support a finding of bad faith. Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that bad faith means "conduct by the carrier in the handling of a claim which amounts to fraud; malice; oppression; or willful, wanton, or reckless disregard of the rights of the claimant." [1]...

...Royal's acts in this case simply do not meet the statutory definition of bad faith. See Celtics Mobile Home Manufacturing v. Butler, 460 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Furthermore, the appealed order fails to contain a sufficient statement of the specific facts to support the finding of bad faith. In 1983, section 440.34(3)(b) was amended to require the deputy commissioner to "issue a separate order which shall expressly state the specific findings of fact upon which the determination of bad faith is based." We recognize that the accident in this case...

...ement. Both Royal and Nationwide contend that the deputy commissioner erred in considering the value of PTD benefits in determining the attorney fee award because the record does not support a finding that claimant's attorney secured these benefits. Section 440.34(2) requires that, in awarding a reasonable attorney's fee, the deputy commissioner consider "only those benefits to the claimant that the attorney is responsible for securing." The record reveals that on September 8, 1983, claimant's attorney filed the first claim for PTD benefits....

...In summary, we find it necessary to reverse the order awarding attorney's fees to claimant's attorney. The evidence does not support a finding of bad faith on the part of Royal, and claimant's claim for attorney's fees against that carrier pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b) must be denied....

...In view of this disposition of the appeal, we find it unnecessary to address the issue raised on appellee's cross-appeal. The cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WENTWORTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This language also appeared in section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979). This language was moved to section 440.34(3)(b) in 1980, and has remained so since that time.

...usly disabled on a temporary total basis to June 3, 1959. Payments for such disability were made after the entry of the attorney into the case. We now come to the sole issue, i.e. the correctness of the award of attorney's fees under Florida Statute Section 440.34, F.S.A....

...the benefits to the injured employee." The full commission erred in this regard. We prescribe the law to be that in the Taff case insofar as it relates to the necessity of filing a written claim with the commission before the appropriate portion of Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., may be invoked....

...[5] In the instant case, the claim having been filed on February 26, 1959 and the payment by the carrier having been made the day following, clearly would indicate the award of attorney's fees was unjustified. In sum, we repeat, notice of injury or injury alone under Section 440.34, *8 Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is not sufficient or equivalent to actually filing a written "claim"....

...Unless shown by the respondent or his attorney to be necessary, no other record shall be required. The petition shall contain a concise statement of the cause and the reasons relied on for granting the writ. It shall be accompanied by a supporting brief prepared as provided by Rule 3.7." [4] "440.34 Attorney's fees; costs; penalty for violations "(1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 * * *, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of same, o...

...those cases where voluntary payment of compensation is made or remedial treatment furnished until the date of the last payment of compensation or the date of the last remedial treatment. Considering this provision in the light of its application to Section 440.34(1), it is clear that no attorney's fee is payable by the employer or its carrier in the case on review because by the latter section the obligation of the employer to pay for the services of the employee's attorney is limited to those...

...The petitioners first contend that attorneys' fees may not be allowed the claimant in workmen's compensation cases when payment for medical treatment only is awarded. To support this contention petitioners direct our attention to the fact that attorneys' fees in workmen's compensation cases are awarded under § 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which they construe to mean that an award of compensation is a prerequisite to an award of attorneys' fees....

...an award of attorneys' fees. To hold that payment of compensation benefits was a prerequisite to an award of attorneys' fees in the face of the entry of an award benefitting the claimant, such as was entered herein, would amount to nullification of § 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., despite the requirement that we are required to resolve any doubts that may be shown to exist in favor of the working man....

...The Department and the Division also appeal the order insofar as it found Ms. Monroe entitled to attorney's fees. They argue that the judge of compensation claims could not award attorney's fees without specific findings of bad faith at a separate hearing. See § 440.34, Fla....

...ion claims (JCC) directing the employer/carrier (E/C) to pay to Campbell's attorney a fee in the amount of $1,111.13 for securing temporary partial disability benefits with a total value of $5,740.89. Campbell challenges the JCC's determination that section 440.34, Florida Statutes, as amended in 2003, precludes the JCC from approving an attorney's fee greater than the statutorily enumerated percentage based on the value of the benefits secured on the claimant's behalf....

...This interpretation of the post-amendment attorney's fee statute was expressly rejected in Wood v. Fla. Rock Indus., 929 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), mot. for certif. granted, 929 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), in which the following question of great public importance was certified: DO THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 440.34(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2003), CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY ESTABLISH THE PERCENTAGE FEE FORMULA PROVIDED THEREIN AS THE SOLE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE TO BE AWARDED A CLAIMANT? 929 So.2d at 545; see also Lundy v. Four Seasons Ocean Grand Palm Beach, 932 So.2d 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Accordingly, even without the benefit of Wood and Lundy, the JCC correctly construed the section 440.34 by following the strict statutory percentage formula....

...At the hearing before the JCC, there was no live testimony. The JCC received affidavits and other documents, and heard argument of counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge awarded attorney's fees which he described as a "statutory guidelines" fee under section 440.34(1)(a)-(h), in the amount of $54,722.34....

...I would therefore conclude that the judge correctly included reasonably predictable future benefits in computing the quantum of benefits obtained by the claimant's attorney in this proceeding, and would affirm the order as a proper statutory guideline attorney's fee under section 440.34, Florida Statutes....

...*725 David L. Kahn, Ft. Lauderdale, for appellant. Albert P. Massey, III, of Pyszka, Kessler, Massey, Weldon, Catri, Holton & Douberley, Ft. Lauderdale, for appellees. ZEHMER, Judge. We review an order of the deputy commissioner which awarded, pursuant to section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), an attorney's fee for claimant's successful prosecution of a claim for medical benefits only....

...'s decision to allow a fee for those services. The dollar amount of benefits obtained were minimal and, according to the deputy's order, would not exceed $2,000. In setting the award, the deputy undertook to evaluate each of the factors set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...existent," citing the decision in Celtics Mobile Home Mfg. v. Butler, 460 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The deputy commissioner's reliance on Celtics Mobile Home Mfg. v. Butler is misplaced because that decision involved the bad faith provisions in section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). The employer and carrier's resistance to the claim, as characterized in that case, may be relevant when determining whether or not the employer and carrier's conduct amounts to bad faith, but the claim in the instant case is based on section 440.34(3)(a), relating to claims for medical benefits only, so no issue of bad faith is present or relevant....

...Once it is established that a claimant has prevailed on a claim for medical benefits only, the employer and carrier become liable for an attorney's fee without reference to the extent of fault or any other reason for denying payment attributable to the employer and carrier. The fee under section 440.34(3)(a) becomes due because the employer and carrier, in denying the well-taken claim, defeat the self-executing purpose of the statute and compel the claimant to employ an attorney to prosecute the claim for medical benefits....

...On that issue the deputy commissioner concluded that there was no basis for imposition of attorney's fees against the carrier because the carrier had accepted in a timely manner and without resistance the permanency rating given by the authorized physician. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provided, in part, as follows: *109 "......

...Harhalos, 377 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). As to the portion of the attorney's fee award which is based upon the increase in degree of permanency, however, Latt Maxcy argues no award should have been made since it complied with the provisions of Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977) by accepting the claim for permanent total disability benefits within 21 days of receiving "notice" of the claim. We agree and reverse that part of the order from which the employer appealed. The central question in this case is, when did "notice" of a claim under Section 440.34(1) occur? The facts are somewhat unusual and complicated, but it is necessary to review them in order to evaluate when and why notice became sufficient in the statutory sense....

...July of 1979 or when either the first claim or the amended claim was filed. In addition, the claimant argues that since the employer asserted defenses to the claim in the pre-trial stipulation, it is precluded from relying on the 21 day provision of Section 440.34(1). On the date of the claimant's injury, Section 440.34(1) provided that "if the employer or carrier ......

...d disabilities resulting from the claimant's aneurysm. Even claimant's attorney later admitted that he could not prove a connection between the accident and the aneurysm: "When I get 4 letters saying it's [the aneurysm] not related I know I'm beat." Section 440.34(1) was enacted in order to expedite payments of benefits by allowing for attorney's fees when an employer unjustifiably resists payment of compensation....

...City of Miami, 241 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1970). Since reluctance by the employer to accept the first claim was justifiable, the employer should not be penalized for its resistance to the claim. Having resolved that the first claim did not trigger the 21 day provision of Section 440.34(1), we must now determine which of the other dates suggested by the parties operated as notice of a claim....

...the amended claim) has been filed. For example, in Sue Ann's Capri Lounge v. Harhalos, 377 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), this Court restated the proposition that even if an employer's refusal to pay compensation forces the employee to file a claim, Section 440.34(1) still allows the employer to avoid payment of attorney's fees by accepting the claim within 21 days of its filing....

...ity of the claim. Davis v. Edwin M. Green, Inc., 240 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1970); Thompson v. W.T. Edwards Tuberculosis Hospital, 164 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1964); Smith v. Dixie Packers, Inc., 384 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Under a reasonable interpretation of Section 440.34(1), the right to investigate must be read in conjunction with the statutory requirement that the employer receive "notice" of a claim....

...rier's untimely acceptance of claimant as permanently totally disabled, and that even if this court disagrees with this premise, the deputy's order is reversible because the deputy failed to appropriately consider the statutory factors enumerated in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977), and failed to state the basis of his findings in his order....

...In the order on appeal, the judge of compensation claims (JCC) found that Burnham sustained a catastrophic injury as defined in sections 440.15(1) and 444.20(34), Florida Statutes (1994). In finding that Burnham was entitled to PTD benefits, pursuant to section 440.34(f), Florida Statutes (1994), see City of Pensacola Firefighters v....

...liable for workers' compensation benefits, we also conclude that the deputy appropriately awarded attorney's fees. We find that the amount of the award was supported by competent substantial evidence, however, we must remand for reconsideration of the award under § 440.34(1), Fla. Stat. (1978). The 1978 version of § 440.34(1), which applies to the accident in this case, requires that the claimant pay 25% of the fee award unless it is proved that the claim was handled in a "negligent, arbitrary, or capricious manner." There is no indication in the order that t...

...We review a workers' compensation order denying, in part, claimant's claim for benefits pursuant to section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes (1983), for attendant-care services performed by his wife, and denying his claim for attorney's fees for successful prosecution of his claim for medical benefits only, pursuant to section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Accordingly, since the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the deputy's determination of the value of the services claimant's wife is providing, we do not disturb his ruling. Finally, we address the deputy's denial of claimant's attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(a)....

...The First District affirmed the amount of the award, holding that it was supported by competent, substantial evidence. Wells Fargo, 692 So.2d at 285. However, the court reversed the imposition of prejudgment interest dating from June 13, 1995. Id. The district court concluded that in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1993), [1] the legislature intended to preclude the payment of attorney fees in workers' compensation cases until the amount for the fees is established by final order....

...ehind an *702 award of attorney's fees to a prevailing workers' compensation claimant appears indistinguishable from that authorizing fees against an insurer which denied uninsured motorist benefits to its insured." Id. at 287. However, we find that section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1993), distinguishes it....

...ponsibilities and also give workers swift and certain payment for workplace accidents. De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 543 So.2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1989); Travieso v. Travieso, 474 So.2d 1184, 1186 (Fla.1985). We give plain meaning to section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides that an attorney fee cannot be paid until it is approved as reasonable by the JCC or court having jurisdiction over the proceeding....

...Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and approve the decision of the First District Court of Appeal. It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.34(1) provides in pertinent part: No fee, gratuity, or other consideration shall be paid for services rendered for a claimant in connection with any proceedings arising under this chapter, unless approved as reasonable by the judge of com...

...Such an opinion will suffice without reliance on a medical manual or guide. In Martin, as in this case, the physician's opinion was particularly compelling due to the length of time spent in evaluating and monitoring the pattern of subjective symptoms. Turning to the award of attorney's fees, Section 440.34(3), Fla.Statutes, presents a threshold which the claimant must affirmatively cross in order to recover attorney's fees....

awarded attorneys' fees inasmuch as the law (Section 440.34) was not then in existence and could not have

...Crooke of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellants. Richard I. Cervelli, Naples, for appellee. ERVIN, Chief Judge. The employer/carrier (E/C) seeks review of a workers' compensation order awarding the claimant attorney's fees pursuant to the bad faith sanctions of Section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...Determining whether the JCC correctly denied E/C's motion presents an issue of statutory interpretation; therefore, we review the JCC's ruling under the de novo standard of review. See Lakeland Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, Agency for Healthcare Admin., 917 So.2d 1024, 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2006), states, "If any party should prevail in any proceedings before a judge of compensation *15 claims or court, there shall be taxed against the nonprevailing party the reasonable costs of such proceedings, not to include attorney's fees." One of the first rules of statutory construction is that the plain meaning of the statute is controlling. Jackson County Hosp. Corp. v. Aldrich, 835 So.2d 318, 328-29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Based on the plain meaning of section 440.34(3), the prevailing party is entitled to the reasonable costs it incurred in the proceedings before the JCC....

...appellate attorney's fees at the time that the injury occurred. However, this Court has previously determined that a fee is awardable pursuant to Section 59.46, Florida Statutes (1979) where an attorney's fee was awardable at the hearing level under Section 440.34(2)(a)-(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...to the statutory schedule and (2) denied her a full award of costs. As to the first issue, claimant argues the JCC's award of a fee based upon the fee schedule was manifestly unfair. Our standard of review when deciding whether the factors listed in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1994), were sufficient to justify a departure from the statutory fee is abuse of discretion....

...Barosy appeals a workers' compensation order granting the claimant benefits for temporary partial disability benefits but denying an attorney's fee. Although the deputy commissioner determined the carrier handled Barosy's claim in bad faith, he found Barosy suffered no economic loss as required by section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...This loss of use of the money (TPD benefits), is a sufficient economic loss to justify an attorney's fee. Accordingly, the order is reversed to the extent it denied an award of an attorney's fee. The deputy commissioner is further cautioned to apply the attorney's fees provisions found in section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...surance Service, appeal a final order entered June 28, 1984, awarding claimant an attorney's fee upon a finding that the carrier acted in bad faith regarding the handling of claimant's claim and that, as a result, claimant suffered an economic loss. § 440.34(3)(b), Fla....

...and totally disabled from September 1, 1983, and granted all relief requested by claimant. This order was not appealed. No benefits had been paid by the employer and servicing agent between August 31, 1983, and the date of this order. As required by section 440.34(3)(b), a separate hearing on claimant's request for attorney's fees was set for May 9, 1984....

...rance contract. Since he stands in the shoes of the insured, the initial party plaintiff may compel disclosure of the insurer's entire case file. Claimant in the present case asks this court to extend this theory to bad faith proceedings pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes....

...tionale underlying the inapplicability of the attorney-client privilege. Absent facts showing any basis for applying an exception to the general rules, [1] we hold that the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine are both applicable in a section 440.34(3)(b) proceeding....

...of services rendered and *99 time expended in prosecuting the claimant's case to aid the deputy commissioner in adequately considering the statutory factors. Finally, we do not find the $20,000 fee excessive under the statutory formula contained in section 440.34(1)(a)-(h), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...ty, if any, based on the claimant's testing of her ability in the job market. Lehigh Corp. v. Byrd, 397 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The existing record shall be used. The claimant argues that the award of her attorney's fees was authorized under Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Orlow, 300 So.2d 36 (Fla.3d DCA 1974). [7] Central National Insurance Group v. Hotte, 312 So.2d 235 (Fla.1st DCA 1975). [8] Travelers Indemnity Company v. Causey, 381 So.2d 1200 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). [9] See § 627.7372(3), Fla. Stat. (1979). [10] See § 440.34, Fla. Stat. (1979). [11] Lobry did not contend in this appeal that the deputy commissioner improperly applied the "sliding scale" set of guidelines for computing fees found in § 440.34(1), Fla....

...1968) ("[t]he nature of the Workmen's Compensation Law is such that the contingent percentage basis is not appropriate"). The validity of this view remains because the legislature also requires consideration of the Lee Engineering factors in addition to the modest contingent formula set out in § 440.34(1)(a)-(h), Fla....

...Thus, Rolle, unlike the case at bar, involved a situation wherein both entitlement and the amount of the fee had been determined in the same order. We also find Quality Engineered Installation distinguishable, because it did not involve the assessment of a fee under the workers' compensation statute, section 440.34, Florida Statutes, but instead appears to pertain to a fee arising from a contract....

...ion which was not similar to that before the supreme court. In so concluding, we are of the view that the legislature has manifested an intent precluding the payment of attorney's fees until the amount for same has been finally established by order. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1993), provides that no fee shall be paid for services rendered for a claimant "unless approved as reasonable by the judge of compensation claims," and the JCC below did not approve the fee until he entered the order setting the amount. Moreover, the statute clearly expresses a preference for a claimant's responsibility for payment of his or her own attorney fees, except under the narrow circumstances specified. See § 440.34(3)(a)(d), Fla....

...Errol Cornell testified on behalf of the employer and carrier that the range should be between $20,000.00 and $25,000.00 for services rendered. After considering the evidence and taking into consideration all of the variables, the attorneys fee schedule under F.S. 440.34, and the Lee Engineering Case it is found that a reasonable fee to be paid Sam Bloom for services rendered claimant is $40,000.00....

...In reviewing the affidavits as to the time expended by Claimant's attorney, I find that the time noted and claimed was duplicated and, in my opinion, unnecessary. I believe that the fee should be established by the factors listed in the Florida Statute, Section 440.34(1)(a) through (h) and conclude that only minimal time and expertise were necessary in order to perfect an appeal from my original Order....

...of the award. Since the parties could not agree on a reasonable fee and thus submitted the issue to litigation, it was incumbent on the judge to receive the evidence offered by the parties and to set forth findings on all the factors referred to in section 440.34(1)(a)-(h). It was also incumbent on the judge to consider the contingent nature of the fee contract in arriving at the award amount, as that factor is a specific consideration in determining a reasonable fee. § 440.34(1)(h)....

...The claimant has suggested that the judge of compensation claims should apply the lodestar approach and contingency factor discussed in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), and its progeny. We decline to so direct. The workers' compensation attorneys' fee statute, section 440.34, is sufficiently explicit to not warrant further reference to any common law principles adopted in Rowe....

...§ 440.20(10), F.S.A., and shall not be construed to be generally applicable to the power of the commission under other sections of the Act to either perform or delegate to its subordinate agents or other duly authorized representatives the performance of functions required of it. The commission properly concluded that F.S. § 440.34, F.S.A., relative to allowance of attorney's fees, is by its literal terms applicable only to proceedings in which a carrier contests "payment of compensation" as opposed to manner of payment, and its rationale would not nor should it impose such additional burden upon a carrier in this proceeding....

...The employer/carrier would have claimant purposefully and continuously expose herself to the very environment which caused her injury in order to be eligible for temporary total disability benefits. Affirmed. ISSUE III: The attorney's fee awarded in this case is grossly out of proportion with the schedule established by Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...There being no contention of bad faith nor meaningful hearing on this issue, the attorney's fee awarded claimant on this basis is error. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University v. Vestal, 399 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). However, there is competent substantial evidence to support the award on the basis of Section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes....

...nd attaining PTD status. With respect to the appeal, the E/C raise three issues. First, they argue that there is no competent substantial evidence which would support the Judge of Compensation Claims' (JCC's) award of bad faith attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes....

...due indemnity and payment of PTD benefits commencing 6/24/03. In order to avoid the cost and uncertainties of further litigation on this issue, the parties have reached a compromised agreement. 2. Based upon the criteria outlined in Florida Statute 440.34(1), the parties agree that the Employer/Carrier shall pay to Claimant's attorney, an attorney's fee in the amount of $27,744.76 inclusive *81 of costs....

...Because Brown has not suffered an injury by accident as that term is defined by Florida law, the JCC's award of medical monitoring is reversed. Additionally, because Brown was not entitled to the benefits awarded, the JCC's award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (2000), which was based solely on benefits secured, is reversed as well....

...of substantial evidence to the contrary... that the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to injure or kill himself or another." (e.s.) We also reverse that portion of the order denying appellant attorney's fees. Section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes, provides for attorney's fees in a proceeding in which a carrier or employer denies that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits were payable and the claimant prevails on the issue of compensability....

...Sweitzer, 420 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Dade American Hospital Supply v. Perez, 417 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Acosta Roofing Co. v. Gillyard, 402 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). AFFIRMED. Appellee's motion for an appellate attorney's fee is DENIED. § 440.34, Fla....

...The City of Miami urges that the Deputy Commissioner erred in awarding to the claimant attorney's fees. We agree. Since the City of Miami admitted that the claimant, now deceased, suffered a compensable injury and paid to him certain Workers' Compensation benefits, there is no basis for assessing attorney's fees pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...nts of pain to her physician. We affirm, and also set out the proper method for awarding appellate attorney's fees when the deputy has reserved jurisdiction to determine the propriety of a fee award but has not reached a determination as required by § 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...of the Guides, it was required. In rendering his order, the deputy commissioner noted that the claimant requested payment of attorney's fees based on a bad faith refusal by the employer/carrier to properly pay benefits to which she was entitled. See § 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...FACTS After a hearing, the referee made the following findings: Count I —Kelly entered into a contingency fee agreement to represent Gregory Halderman in a workers' compensation suit involving an eye injury. The agreement provided that Kelly would receive 33 1/3% of the gross amount recovered in the case. Pursuant to section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1995), Kelly was required to file a workers' compensation agreement regarding his fee with the workers' compensation court or file a notice of appearance, and to obtain prior approval from the workers' compensation judge....

...Brown, 902 So.2d 838, 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). In Anderson Columbia , the plaintiff asserted that á workers’ compensation statute that limited an award of attorney’s fees based on prevailing in a elaim for medical benefits to $1500 was unconstitutional. Id. (citing § 440.34(7), Fla....

...1st DCA 1965). Although we determine the coverage question adversely to appellant, Aetna, we find merit in Aetna's contention that the deputy erred in retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of determining and awarding a fee to the employer's attorney. Section 440.34, Fla....

...and his associates. He testified that the temporary partial disability benefits secured were approximately $1,000, and the adjuster testified that the figure was $1,058.71. The JCC awarded McLane $11,750 in fees. In his analysis of the factors under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1991), the JCC concluded that claimant's attorney spent 46.75 hours securing the benefits at issue; the customary hourly rate in the area was between $125 and $175; the experience and ability of claimant's counsel...

...zing Gardner for seeking medical help through the channels both he and Citrus thought appropriate at the time. The deputy commissioner properly awarded attorney's fees, costs and interest, given the finding of compensability on a controverted claim. Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes....

...for in the statute. There is no ambiguity in the statute upon which a claim for attorney fees for such service might be resolved in favor of the appellee. Insurance Company of Texas v. Rainey, 86 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1956) at p. 450. Appellee argues that Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1973), authorizes the award....

...He contends that a claimant should not be required to pay his own legal fees in attempting to retain past benefits paid, citing Ohio Casualty Group v. Parrish, 350 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1977) for the proposition. Parrish, supra, involved successful opposition to the modification of an equitable distribution order. It dealt with Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, as the basis for an award of attorney's fees on review of an equitable distribution award, and is therefore distinguishable from the case before this court. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1973), states: If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of same, or shall other...

...to the claimant's thumb. This order is challenged in two respects. First, the claimant argues that he is entitled to an attorney's fee award because the employer did not pay compensation benefits within 21 days of notice of the claim, as required by § 440.34(1) Florida Statutes (1977)....

...disability either when it received the reports filed by Dr. Martin in July and October of 1977 or when the claim was filed on October 21, 1977. In either case the employer's acceptance on December 19, 1977 was well past the 21 day limit provided in § 440.34(1)....

...sician. Under this rationale, the employer contends that its first "notice of the claim" occurred when it received Dr. Freed's rating of permanency on December 7, 1977. The employer in its argument misconceives the purpose of the 21 day provision in § 440.34(1)....

...re for eight hours a day, rather than for a longer period as sought by claimant. Finally, in view of our disposition of the issues as above, we find it unnecessary to address claimant's contentions regarding the constitutionality of the amendment to § 440.34. AFFIRMED. NIMMONS and MINER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1989), as amended, effective October 1, 1989, provides that in computing attorney's fees "benefits secured" shall not include future medical or rehabilitation benefits to be provided on any date more than five yea...

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. June 25, 1985. Thomas E. Stone, Madison, for appellant. James N. McConnaughhay, Tallahassee, for appellees. *636 ZEHMER, Judge. Claimant has appealed the deputy commissioner's order denying payment of attorney's fees under section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Mangham Construction Co., 418 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Claimant then requested payment of his attorney's fees for securing benefits incident to the 1981 episode on the ground that the employer and carrier had unsuccessfully controverted the compensability of the injury in January 1981. § 440.34(2)(c), Fla....

...Ginsburg, Dade County Attorney, and Edward Z. Shafer, Assistant County Attorney, Miami, for Appellees. POLSTON, J. We find a lack of support in the record for the JCC's award of attorney's fees. Although the JCC considered the various statutory factors of section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1997), there is no indication of how the award of $13,440.00 was derived....

...compensable and medically necessary treatment). Because the JCC erred in denying appellant's request for a one time change in physician, the JCC has also erred in denying appellant's claim for attorney's fees and costs for securing that benefit. See § 440.34, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...ity, excusing work search, and finding claimant is not a candidate for rehabilitation, based on psychiatric evidence which appellant contends is not competent, substantial, or medically demonstrable; and (4) in awarding an attorney's fee pursuant to § 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, when claimant had continued to receive temporary total disability benefits....

...Because the award is adequately supported by evidence other than that to which the first above stated question is directed, we need not resolve that issue. The remaining controversy relates to the award of attorney's fees because "the Employer/carrier denied the occurrence of injuries for which compensation is payable under Section 440.34(3)(c)," Florida Statutes (e.s.) We conclude that the award is supported by the rationale of Great Dane Trailers v....

...By petition for writ of certiorari we are asked to review a decision of the Industrial Relations Commission awarding attorneys' fees. We have jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution (1972). The sole issue to be determined is whether petitioner is liable for attorneys' fees under Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1973), which requires the award of fees where an employer fails to pay benefits on or before the twenty-first day after notice of a claim....

...The Judge of Industrial Claims approved the physician's rating and denied respondent any attorneys' fees. The Industrial Relations Commission reversed as to attorneys' fees, holding that the employer failed to provide benefits within 21 days of the physician's examination. The Commission erred. Section 440.34(1) unambiguously states that the 21-day period begins to run from the date on which the employer and carrier "have notice of (a claim)"....

...The order below is modified to grant appellee *903 $1,200 for nursing services reflecting costs of these services at the rate accepted by the deputy commissioner. The award of an attorney's fee is justified by the record [ Landers Construction v. Delauder, 417 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Section 440.34(2) (a), Fla....

...E/C accepted claimant as permanently and totally disabled on July 20, 1994, and mailed checks for accrued benefits on July 21, 1994. Only claimant's entitlement to attorney's fees remained for adjudication. At the hearing, E/C argued that the substantive law in force at the time of claimant's injury was section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), allowing a 21-day grace period to provide the requested benefits without being subject to liability for claimant's attorney's fees....

...E/C argued that it mailed the checks on July 21, 1994, within 21 days of receiving the July 1, 1994 letter indicating MMI. Accordingly, no attorney's fees could be assessed under the 1989 statute. Claimant argued, however, that the 1989 version of section 440.34(3)(b) did not control....

...s had been provided within 14 days of July 1, 1994. During the November 1993 Special Session, the legislature made extensive revisions to Florida workers' compensation law. By chapter 93-415, section 33, Laws of Florida, the so-called 21-day rule of section 440.34(3)(b) was repealed....

...that a claimant shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee from a carrier or employer in any case in which the carrier or employer fails or refuses to pay a proper claim "on or before the 21st day after receiving notice of the claim." § 440.34(3)(b), Fla....

...Under the statute as amended, a carrier or employer is responsible to pay the fee where "the employer or carrier files a notice of denial with the Division and the injured person has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of his claim." Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...blish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that could not have been discovered in the reasonable investigation... ." § 440.192(8), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994). We hold that legislative repeal of the 21-day rule previously contained in section 440.34(3)(b) is substantive and, therefore, the statute, as it existed in 1989, applies to this claim for attorney's fees....

...nc. v. Fernandez, 589 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (amendment to attorney's fee statute which precludes consideration of future medical benefits in computing attorney's fee award is substantive). At the time of claimant's December 1, 1989 accident, section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), controlled and provided a 21-day grace period within which the carrier could pay benefits without suffering liability for attorney's fees....

...Rather, a carrier that neither pays nor timely denies compensability "is deemed to have accepted the employee's injuries as compensable... ." Section 440.192(8) does not include the additional "stick" of attorney's fees comparable to those provided by section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989). REVERSED. BARFIELD and DAVIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [*] In supplemental briefing ordered by this court on the question of whether legislative repeal of the 21-day rule contained in section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), could be retroactive to a date of accident prior to January 1, 1994, appellee conceded that the repeal is substantive legislation.

...e deputy awarded temporary total disability benefits beginning February 5, 1983, and continuing, and psychiatric care by a physician. The deputy also ordered the employer/carrier, pursuant to the stipulation, to pay a reasonable attorney's fee under Section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes, which allows recovery of a fee from the carrier or employer: (c) In a proceeding in which a carrier or employer denies that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable, and the claimant prevails on the issue....

...enominated "final." It is from that determination that claimant appeals. Claimant asserts that since she has not yet reached maximum medical improvement, the fee must be awarded as an interim instead of final fee in order to meet the requirements of Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...an award of subsequent *91 benefits. However, it is critical that the reason for the employer/carrier's fee liability for subsequent benefits was because of the then provisions of the fee statute applicable in the International Paper case, which was Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...ly the court's acknowledgment of the operation and effect of the fee statute as then worded. The fee statute is now more restrictive in that it makes the claimant responsible for his own attorney's fees except in the three circumstances specified in Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The fact that the employer and carrier in the instant case initially unsuccessfully contested the compensability of the claimant's injury and are therefore liable for attorney's fees under the provisions of Section 440.34(3)(c) does not mean that the claimant will be entitled to fees on subsequent benefits. See International Paper, supra, at p. 648. Entitlement to fees for services in the prosecution of any such subsequent claim will depend upon whether the claimant is able to establish anew any of the requisite grounds under Section 440.34(3) in connection with such claim....

...ty should use the same recalculated average wage. On cross-appeal, we find that the deputy's finding that the carrier did not act in bad faith was premature. It is not entirely clear from this record whether the claimant sought attorney's fees under § 440.34(2)(b) (1979) by alleging the carrier's bad faith handling of her claim....

...In so doing, the JCC began with an uncontested statutory guideline fee of $45,610.53 calculated according to the present value of benefits claimant's attorney obtained for him, which amounted to $299,070.19. The JCC then considered all of the factors delineated in section 440.34(1)(a)-(h), Florida Statutes (1991), and found that none of them warranted a departure from the guidelines....

...However, after considering the totality of the circumstances, each of the factors addressed above, and being fully aware of the circumstances of this case, I have arrived at the amount of $35,000, which is reasonable. The starting point in determining a fee award under section 440.34 is the amount of benefits the attorney obtained for the claimant....

...Broward Employment *126 & Training Admin., 501 So.2d 724, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), dismissed, 509 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 1987). In light of the general rule vesting the JCC with considerable discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and the legislature's intent that section 440.34 standardize fees, we conclude that the JCC's award should be affirmed....

...The majority opinion concludes that a fee of $1,699.03 per hour must be affirmed as a "reasonable fee" because of the "considerable discretion" vested in the judges of compensation claims to determine attorney's fees, and because of the "legislature's intent that section 440.34 standardize fees." But section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1991), requires the judge of compensation claims to consider statutorily enumerated factors in each case, to determine if "the circumstances of the particular case warrant" an upward or downward adjustment....

...Petersburg, for appellees. SMITH, Judge. Claimant appeals an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) determining an amount of appellate attorney's fees. She contends, and we agree, that the JCC was under the mistaken impression that the statutory guideline fee of section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1989) is the appropriate starting place for the determination of appellate attorney's fees....

...this case. He offered an expert who testified that the hourly rate in this case should be adjusted downward to $130 per hour based upon the amount of benefits at stake. The JCC's order on appellate attorney's fees discusses the factors enumerated in section 440.34(1)(a)-(h)....

...appeal, and $1,132 interest on the amount of attorney's fees due as the result of the second appeal. The court denied the request for interest. In Cohen v. T & M Auto Service, 542 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), this court rejected the assertion that section 440.34(1) mandates calculation of appellate attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases based upon the statutory percentage-based "starting place" for fees. In Cohen, the deputy calculated a "starting place" fee based upon the hours expended by the appellate attorneys multiplied by an appropriate hourly rate. He then considered section 440.34(1)(a)-(h) and, based on these factors, increased the hourly rate and arrived at an $11,000 fee....

...The employer/carrier appeals a worker's compensation order which we hereby affirm, except as to the Judge's determination of entitlement to attorney's fees. Although the employer/carrier appears to have unsuccessfully resisted the payment of compensation, § 440.34(1), Fla....

...ereof the following qualification: However, the claimant's attorney was responsible for securing an increased compensation rate, which was not accepted by the employer/carrier within the 21 day period, and is thus entitled to a fee for this benefit. § 440.34(1), Fla....

...Myers, and Bill McCabe of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. BOOTH, Judge. This appeal and cross-appeal arise from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarding Claimant attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes, based upon the filing of a notice of denial in response to a request for assistance....

...Claimant subsequently filed a Petition for Benefits, and E/C accepted Claimant as permanently and totally disabled within the 14-day statutory time frame. See § 440.192(8), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). Claimant sought attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes, which provides that a prevailing claimant is generally responsible for payment of his own attorney's fees, with the following exception: [A] claimant shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee from a carrier or employer: ........

...Thomas, 117 Fla. 127, 157 So. 337 (1934). Claimants have filed a motion for attorney's fee and amended motion. The proper remedy in this case is a petition for writ of mandamus, an original proceeding. Accordingly, the motion for attorney's fee pursuant to Section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes, is denied....

...Darin, II, of Wicker, Smith, O'Hara, McCoy, Graham & Ford, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. PER CURIAM. The claimant, Emma Murray, appeals the Judge of Compensation Claims' (JCC) order awarding an attorney's fee in strict accordance with the guideline formula set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Fla. Rock Indus., 929 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), granting motion for certification, 929 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). As in Wood, Lundy, and Campbell, we certify the following as a question of great public importance: DO THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 440.34(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2003), CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY ESTABLISH THE PERCENTAGE FEE FORMULA PROVIDED THEREIN AS THE SOLE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE TO BE AWARDED A CLAIMANT? We AFFIRM the JCC's ord...

...The JCC's finding of $223,434 appears to be a compromise between these representations and we see no basis, as a result, for finding an abuse of discretion. In addition, the order properly excludes all paid hospital visits as well as the period the E/C paid attendant care. In determining the appropriate attorney's fee, section 440.34, Fla....

...on Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454, 458-59 (Fla. 1968) factors, as set out in the statute, and it states he "may increase or decrease the attorney's fee if, in his judgment, the circumstances of the particular case warrant such action... ." Fla. Stat. § 440.34(1) (1983)....

...NOTES [1] Twenty-five percent of the first $5,000 of the amount of the benefits that the claimant's attorney is responsible for securing, twenty percent of the next $5,000 of the amount of the benefits secured, and fifteen percent of the remaining amount of the benefits secured. Section 440.34(1)....

...Appellee/cross-appellant, Willie Belle Rolle, the claimant below, was awarded 24hour attendant care by a licensed practical nurse and $210,000 in attorney's fees. The attorney's fee award was reversed on appeal and the case remanded for recalculation of the fee under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...They contend that the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence supporting a denial of compensability of an injury later found to be compensable. We reverse, holding that although a fee should have been awarded for bad faith pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), the fee award was excessive because the evidence and findings of fact in the appealed order do not warrant exceeding the statutory formula amount of $76,793. At the hearing on the issue of the attorney's fee award, the judge of compensation claims found that the benefits secured for the claimant amounted to $508,088. The fee on this amount of benefits calculated pursuant to the formula in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1987), equals $76,793....

...The claimant's attorney testified that a reasonable fee would be $100,000. An attorney testifying for the employer and servicing agent opined that $30,000 would be a reasonable fee. The judge found $95,000 to be a reasonable fee, and entered an order awarding that amount. Section 440.34 sets the percentage formula amount as the customary or presumptively fair fee for legal services rendered pursuant to a contingency fee arrangement; it further specifies that the judge shall consider the several factors in subparagraph...

...Regarding the second factor, [2] he found that there was no indication that this employment precluded claimant's counsel from "providing legal services to other clients." As to the third factor, [3] the judge found that the percentage fee schedule set by the formula in section 440.34 is the customary fee, and rejected testimony of appellants' expert that an hourly rate is the customary basis for determining a reasonable fee....

...However, the explicit findings regarding each factor do not contain any basis for exceeding the formula fee. Indeed, the judge explicitly found that the customary fee in the locality for similar legal services was the percentage formula fee set by section 440.34....

...While attorneys' fees are not expected to be determined with precise exactitude, it is the function of the statutory formula to achieve this purpose in all cases except those in which consideration of the other factors demonstrates that the formula amount is manifestly unfair. § 440.34, Fla. Stat. (1987). Finally, we hold that the fee award should be predicated on section 440.34(3)(b), *327 which governs bad faith fees. A portion of the fee award for the benefits secured pursuant to the employer's and servicing agent's initial controversion of the injury is payable pursuant to section 440.34(3)(c), and the initial order of May 20, 1987, awarding temporary total disability and other benefits so found....

...See Hillsborough County School Board v. Hilburn, 472 So.2d 1309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The evidence supports the judge's finding that appellants acted in bad faith in handling the claims in this case, and that finding clearly supports a fee award pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b)....

...Barry Silber of Myrick, Silber & Davis, Pensacola, for appellee. DAVIS, Judge. Baptist Manor Nursing Home and Sedgwick James of Florida, Inc. ("E/C") appeal an order entered by the judge of compensation claims ("JCC") awarding claimant's attorney a fee pursuant to the 21-day provision of section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990). The E/C argue on appeal that the JCC erred (1) in holding that the procedural provisions of section 440.191, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), did not preclude claimant's entitlement to an attorney's fee pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1990); and (2) in determining that the docketing judge's dismissal of the claimant's claim for benefits based upon noncompliance with the procedural provisions of section 440.191, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), and section 440.192, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), did not preclude an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990). Because the 21-day rule providing for entitlement to attorney's fees in section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...e informal dispute resolution process, while at the same time filing a claim for benefits, so as to invoke and commence the running of the 21-day period in which the E/C must accept the claim for benefits or be liable for attorney's fees pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b) upon successful prosecution of the claim....

...claimant had been accepted as PTD on July 1, 1994, 13 days after the E/C had been contacted by the Employee Assistance Office. At the final hearing held on November 30, 1994, the claimant argued that the entitlement to an attorney's fee award under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The JCC determined that because the E/C failed to accept the claimant as PTD within 21 days of service of a claim, which claim the JCC held met the specificity requirements of section 440.19(1)(e), claimant's attorney was entitled to recover an attorney's fee pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990). We hold that the JCC correctly concluded that the legislative repeal of the 21-day rule set forth in section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990) affects a party's substantive rights and, therefore, the statute as it existed in 1990 applies to this claim for attorney's fees. See City of Crestview v. Howard, 657 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (wherein this court held that, because section 440.34(3)(b) is a fee statute impacting the respective rights and responsibilities of the parties, the statute is substantive and amendments to the statute occurring after a claimant's injury cannot be retroactively applied)....

...The JCC correctly decided that the docketing judge's dismissal of a claim that the docketing judge treated as a petition which, in fact, met the specificity requirements of section 440.19(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), did not preclude an award of attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1994), by filing a request for assistance initiating the EAOO process. At the same time, the claimant filed a claim for benefits which met the specificity requirements of section 440.19(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), to preserve her right to recover an attorney's fee under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...sult, complicating the procedures for filing a claim, the JCC correctly concluded that the E/C had actual notice of its obligation to make a decision regarding the acceptance of the claimant as PTD within 21 days of receipt of the claim, pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Finally, the JCC's order states that Watkins' claim for attorney's fees was reserved for a later determination of the existence of bad faith. However, as of the time of claimant's accident, the necessity of a claimant's showing bad faith had been eliminated from Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...rney. The DC found that approximately 61 hours were spent by Garcia's attorney in the successful prosecution of the claim, yielding approximately $85,000 in compensation plus supplemental benefits, and upon consideration of the statutory criteria in Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1979), the DC noted that the facts and circumstances of the case did not warrant any departure from the statutory guidelines of 15% of the benefits secured....

...benefits were resumed as of September 8, 1980, retroactive to the date they were suspended. The situation here is similar to that in City of Tampa v. Kopkau, 429 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), in which we reversed an attorney's fee award pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...injury. We determined in Kopkau that the E/C did not deny that a compensable injury occurred, stating: "When an employer/carrier admits an accident and pays some disability benefits but denies others are due, an attorney's fee is not awardable under Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)." See also Ardmore Farms, Inc....

...*758 The fee award entered is REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED to the deputy to compute the fee amount on the basis of the effort expended by claimant's attorney in securing the proper amount of AWW. THOMPSON and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) provides that claimant is entitled to attorney fees: (c) In a proceeding where a carrier or employer denies that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable, and the claimant prevails o...

...All parties agree that nothing in section 440.39, Florida Statutes (1975), permits the trial court to award claimant attorney's fees. See Insurance Company of Texas v. Rainey, 86 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1956). Thus, if authorization for the award of attorney's fees is to be found, it must be in section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The JCC denied Rosenthal's entitlement to fees under a quantum meruit theory, concluding that because Rosenthal did not "secure" any benefits, no fees were due under the statute. In reaching this conclusion, the JCC determined that in the 2003 revision of the workers' compensation fee statute, particularly section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2003), the Legislature restricted fee entitlement to only the attorney responsible for "securing" benefits, and thus implicitly overruled this court's holding in The Law Office of James E....

...Brockington, 371 So.2d 1089, 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (explaining procedure to be used to quantify charging lien where contingency fee is apportioned between lawyers). Quantum meruit fee liens are applicable to workers' compensation settlements. See Dusek, 644 So.2d at 510 (citing section 440.34(4), Florida Statutes (1991), and Sohn ); see also Zaldivar v....

...ges to the attorney's fee statute. We disagree. *875 Although the Legislature changed the attorney's fee statute in 2003, the changes affected only the maximum amount of attorney's fee a claimant can be required to pay based on benefits secured. See § 440.34(1), Fla....

...Nothing in the 2003 statute suggests that the Legislature, in limiting the amount of fees a claimant must pay for benefits secured, intended to alter or overrule the Dusek holding relative to a discharged attorney's entitlement to a charging lien. To the contrary, the 2003 revisions did not alter, in any material way, section 440.34(4), Florida Statutes (1991), the provision of the fee statute cited by the Dusek court as the basis for its decision. See § 440.34(4), Fla....

...Furthermore, the Legislature is presumed to have adopted prior judicial constructions of a law unless a contrary intention is expressed in the new version. Id. Had the Legislature intended to overturn Dusek in its 2003 revision of the statute, the appropriate and logical place to express such an intention would be in section 440.34(4)....

...cation, suggests that the Legislature intended to abolish a discharged attorney's right to obtain an equitable quantum meruit share of the recovery. Here, the JCC attempted to distinguish Dusek on the basis that this court has "repeatedly held" that section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2003), is to be strictly applied and, therefore, allows the grant of fees only on benefits actually obtained by the attorney seeking a fee. We note that the operative fee statute in Dusek also limited the JCC to considering "only those benefits to the claimant that the attorney is responsible for securing." See § 440.34(2), Fla. Stat. (1991); cf. § 440.34(2), Fla....

...First, the client's need to have confidence in his attorney's integrity and ability, and, therefore, the ability to discharge his attorney; secondly, the attorney's right to compensation for work performed. Rosenberg, 409 So.2d at 1019. By enacting section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2003), the Legislature expressed a clear intent to limit the amount of claimant-paid attorney's fees based on benefits secured to a fixed and invariable statutory formula....

...The modified quantum meruit rule does contemplate the possibility that a client might have to pay a fee greater than that provided for by contract (or the rules of professional responsibility). See Adams, 390 So.2d at 1251. However, the Legislature's prohibition of fee payments which exceed the percentages set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2003), eliminates such a possibility in a workers' compensation case. See 440.34(1), Fla....

...Finally, the judge determined that claimant's counsel should be awarded $7,000.00, as a reasonable fee. The first issue in this appeal is directed to the judge's determination that claimant's counsel secured benefits for claimant in the sum certain of only $10,590.35. Section 440.34(2), Fla....

...That being so, I do not read the supreme court's opinion in Crittenden as requiring the judge of compensation claims to exclude the time expended to prove that element of the attorney's fee. Although the supreme court's opinion in Crittenden is somewhat confusing as to the operation of section 440.34, and does not directly address the time and cost to prove the value of benefits obtained by the claimant's attorney, in view of this omission it is clear to me that the court's opinion was only dealing with the time and cost of presenting an attorney's opinion testimony regarding the amount of a reasonable fee based on a description of the services rendered and hours expended. I reach this conclusion on the following reasoning. Under section 440.34 it is essential that the extent and value of benefits obtained through the lawyer's efforts must be established before any attorney can express an opinion on the value of the services....

...Absolutely nothing in the Crittenden opinion refers to the matter of proving the extent and value of benefits obtained due to counsel's efforts although the fact that the dollar amount so determined is the essential predicate and starting point in determining the right to and amount of any attorney's fee under section 440.34....

...GENERAL ANALYSIS The award of specific costs is reviewed by this court for abuse of discretion. See Punsky v. Clay County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 60 So.3d 1088,1093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). To the extent resolution of an issue requires statutory interpretation, this court’s review is de novo. Id. at 1091 . Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that “[i]f any party should prevail in any proceedings before a [JCC] or court, there shall be taxed against the nonprevailing party the reasonable costs of such proceedings, not to include attorney’s fees.” It was undisputed that the E/C was the prevailing party....

...This court has previously addressed the overarching guide for the assessment of costs. In Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, 869 So.2d 704, 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), the question was whether the cost of certified mail should be taxed. Relying on the language of section 440.34(3), permitting a prevailing claimant to tax against the employer “the reasonable costs of such proceedings,” the Morris court concluded that “[w]e cannot conceive it to be the legisla *757 tive intent that an injured worker who s...

...rved in the JCC's modification order. Counsel submitted a detailed time sheet, and the JCC entered an order awarding a fee. In the fee order the JCC recited his consideration of Lee Engineering & Const. Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1968), and section 440.34, Florida Statutes, as well as Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), stating that he "utilized the Federal Lode Stare" [sic] approach in determining entitlement to and the amount of the attorney's fee. However, the JCC thereafter detailed the specific Lee Engineering and 440.34 criteria, without any apparent application of the lodestar approach....

.../law of the case doctrines to now preclude the claim. In accordance with deCancino the JCC was entitled to exercise jurisdiction in this case to award an attorney's fee. We also affirm as to the amount awarded. The applicable attorney's fee statute, section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1975), requires as a predicate for a fee award that the claimant "have employed an attorney at law in the successful prosecution of the claim." The employer argues that claimant did not successfully prosecute the claim....

...Building Contractors Inc., 196 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1967), the court cautioned that Johnson did not present the issue of whether a fee could be awarded below for the rule nisi action. Steele indicated that such a fee could be awarded below, pursuant to section 440.34, Florida Statutes, by either the circuit court or the Industrial Relations Commission....

...attorney's fees. See What an Idea Inc. v. Sitko, 505 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). But while the JCC made reference to the lodestar approach, he also expressed consideration of Lee Engineering & Const. Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1968), and section 440.34....

...Cooley, Orlando, for appellee. MILLS, Judge. Wilhoit International and Aetna Life & Casualty Co. (E/C) appeal from an order of the deputy commissioner (D/C) awarding Tidwell permanent total disability (PTD) benefits and an attorney's fee pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...impaired. The D/C rejected this argument, finding no evidence either of impairment before the accident or of natural progression of the pre-existing condition. Based on the apportionment defense, the D/C awarded Tidwell an attorney's fee pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) (awardable when the E/C denies that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable, and the claimant prevails on compensability)....

...Neither was there any evidence of natural progression of the condition at the time of the hearing. Therefore, the D/C was correct in his rejection of the apportionment defense herein. However, we must reverse the award below of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...In Dolphin Tire Co. v. Ellison, 402 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the E/C stipulated that the claimant's injury was compensable, but denied that it was "catastrophic." The D/C determined that the injury was catastrophic and awarded an attorney's fee pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c)....

...Here, the E/C accepted Tidwell's back injury as compensable and paid him temporary benefits for four years; it simply denied his claim for further benefits based on that original compensable injury. Therefore, the D/C erred in awarding a fee based on 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), and that portion of the order below is reversed....

...ee in the amount of $1,854.58 based on total benefits secured for Lowry in the amount of $11,045.75. In this as-applied "constitutional" challenge, Lowry contends that the JCC's application of the percentage formula for calculating fees set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2003), denies access to counsel, denies access to courts, and "confiscates" legal time and services because the amount of the fees awarded equates to little more than $16.00 an hour....

...Although the judge of compensation claims found the claim for interest to be without merit because he determined that the hearing date was the appropriate date to commence the award of permanent total disability benefits, he awarded attorney's fees based on the "21-day rule." Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that a claimant shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fees from a carrier or employer "[i]n any case in which the employer or carrier fails or refuses to pay a claim filed with the division which meets the requirements of s....

...a claim for both past benefits and continuing benefits in any benefit category, but is limited to those in default and ripe, due, and owing on the date the claim is filed." Section 440.19(1)(e) also provides that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of s. 440.34, a judge of compensation claims shall not award an attorney's fee or penalties based on a claim for benefits that does not satisfy the requirements of this subsection." As noted above, the July 21, 1994, petition alleged that claimant was permanently and totally disabled as of September 15, 1993....

...of the July 13, 1995 hearing, twelve months after the petition was filed and twenty-one months later than the date alleged in the petition. We conclude that an award of attorney's fees in this situation does not comply with sections 440.19(1)(e) and 440.34....

...According to the pretrial stipulation, a timely Notice to Controvert was filed. For that reason, no penalties are due. However, the claimant is entitled to recover interest and taxable costs. In this case, the e/sa did accept compensability of the claim and paid benefits. For that reason, attorney's fees are not due under F.S. 440.34(3)(c)....

...ew hours of video tapes showing the claimant doing some gardening. This was obtained after some 400 hours of surveillance of the claimant. Requiring a claimant to go to trial to prove the obvious has been held to be bad faith as contemplated under F.S. 440.34(3)(b)....

...legally entitled to such benefits. B. Pay to the claimant interest on all past due benefits awarded herein. C. Reimburse the claimant or her attorney for taxable costs. D. Jurisdiction is hereby reserved to consider an application for a fee under F.S. 440.34(3)(b)....

...2.18(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and certifying a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court), review denied, 22 So.3d 539 (Fla.2009). Thereafter, the employer and carrier, as the prevailing parties, filed a motion pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2004), seeking to tax costs, representing that they had incurred $10,622.87 in defending against claimant’s petition for benefits....

...il the employee complies with such order.” In looking to section 440.24(4), claimant misapprehends the issue here, which concerns a claimant’s responsibility for, and the employer’s and carrier’s entitlement to, an award of costs pursuant to section 440.34(3)....

...The legislature’s significant amendment in 2003 to the established law of seventy years, which previously immunized unsuccessful claimants from the payment of an employer’s or carrier’s costs in non-frivolous cases, leads us to conclude that the legislature intended its amendment of section 440.34(3) to include the taxation of all reasonable costs, with the express exclusion of attorney’s fees, equally to both parties....

...ication is clear.” Mangold v. Rainforest Golf Sports Ctr., 675 So.2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). *1093 Claimant contends that sections 440.13(5) and 440.30, Florida Statutes (2004), control the disposition of this dispute, and that they override section 440.34(3)....

...However, section 440.13(5)(a) addresses only independent medical examinations and sets out the circumstances under which a claimant may obtain reimbursement should the opinion of the claimant’s independent medical examiner be relied on in determining the claimant’s course of treatment. Section 440.34(3), on the other hand, directs the judge of compensation claims to award “reasonable costs” to the prevailing party. When read in conjunction with section 440.34(3), section 440.13(5) may broaden the circumstances under which a claimant may obtain reimbursement for the costs of an independent medical examination, but it in no way impacts an employer’s or carrier’s entitlement to reimbursement of reasonable costs when the employer or carrier is the prevailing party....

...workers’ compensation proceedings.” Claimant’s argument that the language of section 440.30 “expressly limits” the award of costs for depositions to claimants only is not borne out by a plain reading of the section. It is permissive (“may be taxed”), and relates only to depositions. On the other hand, section 440.34(3) is mandatory (“shall be taxed”), and includes all “reasonable costs,” not just deposition costs. We conclude that, in enacting section 440.34(3), the legislature opted to make the award of costs mandatory and to expand it to allow the prevailing party, not just the claimant, to recover reasonable costs....

...blic policy to reimburse the costs of litigation, regardless of who the prevailing party might be. IV. Based on the foregoing, we reject claimant’s first point on appeal, that sections 440.19(6) and 440.24(4), Florida Statutes (2004), prevail over section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2004), the statutory basis for the award of costs to a prevailing party in workers’ compensation matters....

...Neither section 440.19(6) nor section 440.24(4) restricts an employer’s or carrier’s entitlement to prevailing party costs when it successfully defends against compensability of a claim. We also reject claimant’s second point, because we conclude that, by enacting section 440.34(3), the legislature intended to allow the prevailing party to be reimbursed all reasonable costs of litigation....

...Since a change in the label of the disability benefits awarded from TTD to TPD benefits would not change the monetary value of the award, it is unnecessary for us to reverse the award of benefits. We must, however, reverse that portion of the order awarding claimant's counsel a reasonable attorney's fee. Section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), provides for an award of attorney's fees for bad faith on the part of the E/C and requires that any determination of bad faith shall be made by the D/C through a separate fact-finding proceeding. In Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University v. Vestal, 399 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), this court interpreted section 440.34(2)(b), holding that, although the D/C need not conduct a completely separate hearing on the question of bad faith, "the question of entitlement to attorney's fees on the basis of bad faith [must] be specifically litigated as a separate issue with factual evidence presented going directly to that issue." Id....

...The employer/carrier received the petition on July 17, 2002, and began paying PTD benefits on August 13, 2002. Thereafter, counsel for the claimant filed an attorney fee affidavit and verified petition, contending that the claimant is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), because the employer/carrier failed to pay the requested benefits within fourteen days of receiving the petition for benefits....

...I find that this evidence supports the conclusion that the Employer/Servicing [Agent] never intended to deny Permanent Total Disability Benefits to Ms. Zabik. Rather, the evidence reflects that the Employer/Servicing Agent operated under their interpretation of Section 440.34(3) F.S., as recently amended, that they had 30 days in which to accept or deny the Petition for Permanent Total Disability Benefits,......

...and began timely paying said benefits, within that period of time. I also find that this apparently timely and voluntary acceptance of PTD benefits to the Claimant vitiates the argument that the Claimant attorney successfully prosecuted a petition pursuant to section 440.34(a) F.S....

...attorneys fees for denying a petition for benefits. Ostensibly, the legislature intended to replace the time frames for previous combined informal dispute resolution/petition for benefits process with the following language contained in the revised 440.34(3) F.S....

...relative to PTD benefits. In this regard, I find that the Claimant's attorney has not successfully prosecuted the July 15, 2002 Petition for Benefits as it pertains to the Permanent Total Disability Benefits. This timely appeal followed. Pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), a claimant recovers attorney's fees if the employer/carrier files a notice of denial and the claimant is successful in the prosecution of the claim....

...e resolution and the employer/carrier was not entitled to the thirty-day grace period of section 440.191(2)(d). While the thirty-day pre-petition process under section 440.191(2) is procedural, this court has recently held that the 2002 amendment to section 440.34(3), permitting the employer/carrier thirty days within which to provide benefits before being responsible for payment of attorney's fees, is a substantive change to the statute and cannot be retroactively applied. See Stolzer v. Magic Tilt Trailer, Inc., 878 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Thus, the attorney's fee statute in effect on the date of the accident, section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), applies in this case. Because we are unable to discern the weight the JCC gave to each factor in denying attorney's fees, we reverse. On remand, the JCC should reconsider whether the claimant is entitled to attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(b)....

...In doing so, the JCC should determine whether counsel for the claimant employed more than minimal effort to procure the requested PTD benefits. If the JCC determines a fee should be awarded, the JCC shall determine an appropriate fee based upon the statutory factors in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1999), including the time reasonably spent by the claimant's attorney in obtaining the requested PTD benefits....

...n denying such psychiatric evaluation. As the second point on appeal, claimant alleges that employer and carrier acted in bad faith in refusing to authorize a psychiatric evaluation, and seeks an attorney's fee pursuant to the bad faith provision of Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), if this court requires such an evaluation. This allegation is without merit. The record reflects that no evidence was offered on the issue of bad faith on the part of the carrier, nor did claimant request the deputy to make a determination of bad faith as required by Section 440.34(3)(b) as a condition precedent to an award of an attorney's fee....

...Rivers' claim for attorney's fees was denied based on the deputy's finding that the employer/carrier did not act in bad faith. Among other things, Rivers contends the denial was premature because the deputy did not conduct a separate factfinding proceeding before deciding the issue. Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), does not require a separate hearing on entitlement to attorney's fees based on bad faith, but only that entitlement be specifically litigated as a separate issue with factual evidence presented going directly to that issue....

...Viewing these facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the deputy's order, as we must, we approve the deputy's award of vocational rehabilitation to train claimant in other work. Appellants also contend that the deputy erred in assessing attorney's fees pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1980)....

...Appellants contend that this was simply the product of legislative oversight. They explain that, when section 440.24(1) was first enacted, only employees could recover costs, so it was not necessary that the enforcement remedy be reciprocal. It was not until section 440.34(3) was amended in *425 2003 that "any prevailing party" in a workers' compensation claim became entitled to recover reasonable costs....

...Nor has it done so since that time. Appellants contend that we can cure this ostensible oversight by application of statutory construction principles. Specifically, they urge that we should infer a reciprocal remedy by reading section 440.24(1) in pari materia with section 440.34(3)....

...Applying the rule set forth in the Herndon case, we affirm. In his brief, counsel for appellant also questions the deputy commissioner's authority to limit counsel to withholding only 25 percent of the claimant's monthly benefits until the entire fee is paid. [2] Citing to Section 440.34(4), Florida Statutes, which provides that "in such cases where the claimant is responsible for the payment of his own attorney's fees, such fees shall be a lien upon compensation payable to the claimant," counsel for claimant contends...

...y generally." See, Samaha v. State, 389 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1980). In order to enforce his right to the statutory lien, it is incumbent upon counsel to obtain an order from the deputy commissioner approving the fee or fee arrangement as reasonable under Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, and directing the manner of enforcing the lien....

...The delay in the payment of benefits to claimant constitutes sufficient economic loss so as to justify a bad faith attorney's fee. Barosy v. Landscape Crane, 418 So.2d 400, 401 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). As for the amount of the fee, the JCC determined that strict application of the statutory fee formula set out in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1979), would result in an inequitable fee to claimant's attorney, and, after considering the factors set out in subsections 440.34(1)(a)-(h), concluded that a fee of $27,500 was reasonable....

...In so saying, we do not preclude the JCC from awarding a fee in excess of the statutory amount, but merely caution that such award must be supported by the evidence. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings. SMITH and KAHN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 440.34(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979). [2] § 440.34(1)(e), Fla....

...1st DCA 1982). No abuse of discretion has been shown. There was also competent and substantial evidence to support the deputy's award of a $25,000 attorney's fee. Proper findings of fact were made by the deputy pursuant to the criteria set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...the expenses of a psychiatrist. [1] Finally, the deputy commissioner awarded claimant attorney's fees based upon a finding that the employer and carrier unsuccessfully denied that an injury for which compensation benefits were payable had occurred. § 440.34(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1979). The employer and carrier bring this appeal. The deputy erred in awarding attorney's fees under subsection 440.34(2)(c) on the ground that the employer and carrier had unsuccessfully denied that a compensable injury occurred....

...ENIED. However, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), we GRANT the motion for certification and certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the following as a question of great public importance: DO THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 440.34(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2003), CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY ESTABLISH THE PERCENTAGE FEE FORMULA PROVIDED THEREIN AS THE SOLE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE TO BE AWARDED A CLAIMANT? VAN NORTWICK and ROBERT...

...Finally, we address the e/c's contention that the award of attorney's fees was improper. E/c correctly note that the deputy did not make an express finding that the carrier acted in bad faith with regard to the handling of the claim, and contend that the award could be permitted under § 440.34, Florida Statutes, only if such a finding was made. The deputy should, of course, always make an express determination of bad faith when awarding attorney's fees under § 440.34(3)(b), but we find that conclusion to be implicit in paragraph 11 of the order which states: 11....

...Petersburg, for Appellant. Alexandra M. DeMaio of Boehm, Brown, Seacrest, Fischer and LeFever, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees. VAN NORTWICK, J. In this workers' compensation appeal, Andrew Smith challenges an order denying his claim for an award of attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...ith the prior employer, and will adjust the AWW if appropriate. The day after the Notice of Denial was filed, the carrier issued Smith an indemnity check reflecting the requested increase in AWW. Smith then sought attorney's fees on the authority of section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1995). Following a hearing, the JCC denied the claim for attorney's fees. Section 440.34(3)(b) provides that attorney's fees can be awarded against the employer and carrier "[i]n any case in which the employer or carrier files a notice of denial with the division and the injured person has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of his claim....

...1st DCA 1999)(when a claimant is administratively accepted as permanently and totally disabled within two weeks of the employer/carrier first learning that a claimant is at MMI, a "successful prosecution" of a claim was not undertaken within the meaning of section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)). Thus, in Integrated Health, because "the claim was never controverted" attorney's fees were not owing under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...As in Integrated Health, in the present case the claim was never controverted. Despite the carrier styling its communication a denial, the carrier granted Smith the benefits which he sought. Accordingly, the order under review is AFFIRMED. BENTON AND PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR. NOTES [1] The 1995 version of section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statute (1995), applicable here, is identical to the version in the 1994 supplement to Florida Statutes.

...dings that Galco Construction and its insurance carrier (GAB) instituted under section 440.28, Florida Statutes (1999). Mr. Valdes contends the award is inadequate. We vacate the amended order on attorney's fees, and remand for reconsideration under section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1983). *254 I. "The starting point in determining a fee award under section 440.34 is the amount of benefits the attorney obtained for the claimant." Trans World Tire Co. v. Hagness, 651 So.2d 124, 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). "In awarding a reasonable attorney's fee, . . . only those benefits to the claimant that the attorney is responsible for securing" should be considered. § 440.34(2), Fla....

...The judge of compensation claims determined that claimant's counsel secured $56,009.73 for Mr. Valdes in past permanent total disability indemnity benefits, $200,737.75 in future permanent total disability indemnity benefits, and $111,463.71 in future attendant care benefits. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that any attorney's fee approved ....

...e. But, based on statutory — and other — factors, the judge of compensation claims departed downward from the (uncalculated) "presumptively fair fee." See Marsh v. Benedetto, 566 So.2d 324, 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (explaining that while "[s]ection 440.34 sets [a] percentage formula amount as the customary or presumptively fair fee for legal services rendered pursuant to a contingency fee arrangement[,] it further specifies that the judge shall consider the several factors in subparagraphs [ (1...

...Markus's work in the criminal case, the judge of compensation claims was eminently correct. Mr. Markus did not file a petition for benefits in the workers' compensation proceedings, did not participate in the case (prior to the fee hearing), and did not actually secure any workers' compensation benefits for Mr. Valdes. See § 440.34(2), Fla....

...The judge of compensation claims also correctly denied prejudgment interest. Where the amount of the fee is disputed, an order setting the amount is a condition precedent to lawful payment. Not unlike predecessor statutes dating back to well before 1985, section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2005), forbids, insofar as pertinent here, payment of any "fee ....

...on claims sets and thus (or otherwise) approves the amount of the fee, the dispute concerning the amount of the fee makes the fee not only uncollectible, but unpayable. See Boulis v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 733 So.2d 959, 962 (Fla.1999) (holding that section 440.34(1) "precluded the payment of attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases until the amount of the fees was established by final order . . . because section 440.34(1) provided that no fee could be paid in workers' compensation cases for services rendered until approved *256 by the workers' compensation claims judge"); Mims v....

...ion case." To the extent attorney hours were reasonably spent in advancing Mr. Valdes's interests in the workers' compensation proceeding [2] they should have been taken into account, even if they also helped in preparation of the criminal case. See § 440.34(1), Fla....

...In this workers' compensation case, claimant seeks review of a final order awarding attorney's fees for services rendered by his attorney. The judge of compensation claims determined that claimant's attorney was entitled to a greater fee than that which would result from application of the statutory formula found in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...tion Adjudications." He concluded that, "[w]ithout specific authority granted by rule or statute, [he] ha[d] no authority to reject the Employer/Carrier's Motion to Tax Costs." The judge of compensation claims was correct. There is nothing in either section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2007) (which directs the assessment of costs against the nonprevailing party), or in Florida Administrative Code Rule 60Q-6.124 (2007) (which implements that provision) that purports to place a time limit on the filing of a motion seeking to tax costs....

...Breslow, Miami, for appellant. Jeffrey C. Fox, North Miami, for appellee. *648 SMITH, Judge. The employer/carrier (E/C) appeal an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarding attorney's fees under the amended statute on attorney's fees, section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), [1] which eliminated the bad faith award of attorney's fees and substituted a rule permitting a fee if the E/C fails to pay a claim on or before the 21st day after receiving notice of the claim....

...he previously filed claims. However, it is our view that when a claim for benefits is filed, and the E/C thereafter pay benefits for certain periods, but decline to pay benefits for other periods, [2] that for purposes of applying the 21-day rule of section 440.34(3)(b), the 21 days should begin to run from the time the claim for benefits matures. In this case, after the first bi-weekly period in August passed for which benefits were payable but were not paid, the E/C had 21 days from the end of that period to pay or be liable for an attorney's fee. We believe that this interpretation of section 440.34(3)(b) is fair to both the E/C and the claimant....

...Sa'id of Law Office of Amy L. Warpinski, Jacksonville, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. In these consolidated appeals, Claimant raises two issues. The first concerns the Judge of Compensation Claims' (JCC) award of costs to the Employer/Carrier (E/C) pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes....

...Claimant filed two petitions for benefits (PFBs), one of which requested, inter alia, an orthopedic IME. Both PFBs pertained to the same August 15, 2003, date of accident. In response to these PFBs, the E/C filed two motions for summary final order, and in both motions asserted entitlement to costs pursuant to section 440.34, Florida Statutes. The JCC granted both summary final order motions, and awarded the E/C costs payable by Claimant pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes. On appeal, the E/C concedes the award of prevailing party costs was error, because Claimant's date of accident pre-dates the October 1, 2003, version of section 440.34(3), which permits such an award....

...ection). Consequently, to the extent, if any, the JCC erred in not awarding costs pursuant to section 440.32, Florida Statutes, the error was invited by the E/C. Thus, they cannot argue on appeal that the JCC was mistaken in basing her cost award on section 440.34, Florida Statutes....

...See Muina v. Canning, 717 So.2d 550, 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that, under the "invited error" rule, a party cannot successfully complain about error for which it is responsible). Because the JCC incorrectly applied the post-October 1, 2003 version of section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, to a claim with a pre-October 1, 2003, date of accident, the JCC's award of costs to the E/C pursuant to that statute was reversible error....

...ted his claim. He reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount at a subsequent proceeding. In his answer brief, Brown's only argument is that he is entitled to an attorney's fee because his claim was unsuccessfully controverted. This was error. See Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) and (1980)....

...We have, therefore, considered the matters addressed in appellants' reply brief and, having done so, adhere to our original opinion. The sole question presented on this appeal is the award of a $721.81 attorney's fee. Appellants contend that no award of attorney's fee was proper under Florida Statutes, Section 440.34(2)(a), because the claim was not one for medical benefits only and because, in any event, the employer/carrier authorized claimant's surgery timely....

...tion of claimant's receipt of medical care was untimely is correct. The inclusion of a claim for "continuing temporary total disability benefits after said surgery" is part of claimant's essential medical care and does not disqualify the claim under Section 440.34(2)(a)....

...Nor does the claim for interest, penalties, attorney's fees and costs disqualify the claim as being one for "medical expenses" only, since these items are statutorily provided once the Deputy has determined that medical benefits due claimant have not been properly paid. The Deputy's order correctly interprets and applies Section 440.34(2)(a), following the intent of the Legislature to encourage prompt authorization by the employer/carrier of needed medical care....

...Rehearing Denied February 1, 1983. *74 Marjorie D. Gadarian, Jones & Foster, West Palm Beach, for appellants. Harry Goodmark, Goodmark & Goodmark, West Palm Beach, for appellee. LARRY G. SMITH, Judge. The employer/carrier appeal an order awarding attorney's fees under Section 440.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ation. A second hearing was held on claimant's request for attorney's fees and costs. The *75 deputy commissioner determined, and we agree, that there was no evidence establishing bad faith on the part of the employer/carrier within the framework of Section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979). Further, he correctly determined that fees were not awardable under Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), as claimant was paid temporary total disability benefits and so it cannot be said the employer/carrier denied that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable. Four Quarters Habitat, Inc. v. Miller, 405 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). However, with respect to the award of a fee under Section 440.34(2)(a), the deputy stated as follows: 6. The remaining question is whether the claimant is entitled to have his attorney's fee paid by the employer/carrier under 440.34(2)(a), the so called "medical benefits only" section....

...Finally, the employer/carrier's timely acceptance of temporary disability benefits vitiated any pending claim for disability benefits. At the time of the hearing in question, there were no litigable issues of disability. Realistically, the only issue in controversy was medical. My interpretation of sec. 440.34(2)(a) leads me to conclude that an attorney's fee must be allowed against the employer/carrier under the circumstances of this case....

...Our interpretation of the statute, considered in the light of its recent legislative history, convinces us that the claim in this case was not one "for medical benefits only." [2] Until 1978, a successful claimant could recover 100% of his attorney's fees. Then the legislature enacted Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...e carrier or employer. In the hopes of reducing the large amount of *76 workers' compensation litigation, the 1979 Legislature addressed the issue of attorney's fees once more in its major overhaul of the workers' compensation law. [3] The 1979 law, Section 440.34(2), requires the claimant to pay 100% of his attorney's fees except for those limited situations set forth in paragraphs (a) through (c), and evidences the Legislature's intention to severely curtail those circumstances in which the employer/carrier shall be responsible for the claimant's attorney's fees. [4] Although we find Section 440.34(2)(a) somewhat ambiguous, we are unable to read the statute as expansively as did the deputy commissioner so as to permit an award of fees in this instance....

....." appears to have been added by the Legislature to make it clear that the employer/carrier is responsible for attorneys fees when there is no matter in controversy when the claim is filed other than medical benefits. [5] The legislative history of Section 440.34(2)(a) buttresses this conclusion....

...1st DCA 1982). [7] The special circumstances present in Landers Construction v. Delauder, 417 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), are not present here. Accordingly, the order of the deputy commissioner is REVERSED. MILLS and ERVIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.34(2)(a) provides, in part: (2) ......

...a claim for medical benefits only, if the claimant has not filed or is not entitled to file at such time a claim for disability, permanent impairment, wage-loss, or death benefits, arising out of the same accident; ... [2] We regard the "claim," for Section 440.34(2)(a) purposes, as the one filed with the division on September 7, 1979, which included compensation as well as medical benefits....

...' Compensation Law. [3] Sadowski, et al., "The 1979 Florida Workers' Compensation Reform: Back to Basics," 7 Fla. St.L.Rev. 641, 670-671. [4] Although we have been unable to document the specific reasoning employed by the Legislature with respect to Section 440.34(2)(a) (now Section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)), we can readily appreciate reasons why recovery of attorney's fees would be provided for in the case of medical benefits, but not for compensation benefits....

...e successfully asserts a claim for medical benefits. In all other combination of claims the claimant was to be responsible for paying his own attorney's fees. 1979 House Journal 210. The House and Senate then adopted the following language, amending Section 440.34 to read in part: (2) If the claimant should prevail in any proceedings before a deputy commissioner, commission, or court, there shall be taxed against the employer the reasonable costs of such proceedings, not to include the claimant's attorney's fees....

...remium, or any rate filing. (emphasis supplied) 1979 Senate Journal 296, 1979 House Journal 351, Ch. 79-40 § 27, 1979 Fla.Laws 215. However, in SB 669, the 1979 legislature again addressed the newly revised workers' compensation law. SB 669 amended Section 440.34 (see above) still further by adding the language "if the claimant has not filed or is not entitled to file at such time" apparently to make it "perfectly clear," according to Sadowski, that the employer/carrier would have to pay 100% of the attorney's fees "on medical benefits only." Sadowski at 671. As changed by SB 669, which passed both the House and Senate, Section 440.34(2)(a) was amended to read: (2) ......

...e temporary partial disability benefits for the claimant. Because claimant's evidence that 128.6 hours were reasonably expended in securing these benefits was uncontroverted, we hold the JCC abused her discretion in weighing the statutory factors of section 440.34(1), Florida *517 Statutes (1999) [1] by placing too much emphasis on the contingency nature of the attorney's fee contract. As this court recognized in Alderman v. Florida Plastering, 805 So.2d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), section 440.34(1) sets forth a sliding scale for an award of fees based upon the amount of benefits recovered. "The presumptive attorney's fee authorized by section 440.34(1) is a contingent fee based on the value of benefits obtained." Id. The statutory factors set forth in the applicable version of section 440.34(1) [2] may be considered to determine whether there should be an increase or reduction in the presumptive fee, but that should occur only in exceptional circumstances....

...48 an hour is "manifestly unfair." Accordingly, the cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED. VAN NORTWICK and PADOVANO, JJ., and JULIAN E. COLLINS, Associate Judge, Concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.34(1) provides: (1) A fee, gratuity, or other consideration may not be paid for services rendered for a claimant in connection with any proceedings arising under this chapter, unless approved as reasonable by the judge of compensation claims or court having jurisdiction over such proceedings....

...(c) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the claimant. (d) The time limitation imposed by the claimant or the circumstances. (e) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing services. (f) The contingency or certainty of a fee. [2] Section 440.34(1) was amended by Chapter 2003-412, Laws of Florida, § 12 at p....

...Sunland Hospital/State of Florida v. Garrett, 415 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The deputy erred in awarding claimant an attorney's fee. None of the statutory criteria for an award of fees is present in this case. Appellee contends the fee was properly awarded under either Section 440.34(2)(b) or Section 440.34(2)(c). Section 440.34(2)(b) is clearly inapplicable since the order contains no findings of bad faith; in fact bad faith is not mentioned at all in the order. Neither does Section 440.34(2)(c) apply, under the circumstances of this case, in which TTD benefits were paid from November 14, 1980, up to the date of MMI. "[W]hen an employer/carrier admits an accident and pays some disability benefits but denies others are due, an attorney's fee is not awardable under Section 440.34(2)(c) Florida Statutes (1979)." Four Quarters Habitat, Inc....

...mant's request for authorization of Dr. Rosenberg. Our disposition of the above two issues also requires reversal and remand as to the final point on appeal, urging that the JCC erred in denying the claim for attorney's fees. This claim was based on section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), which authorizes an award of fees "[i]n any case in which the employer or carrier fails or refuses to pay a claim filed with the division ......

...on or before the 21st day after receiving notice of the claim, and the injured person has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of his [or her] claim." Claimant correctly states that the only avenues available to the E/C to avoid liability for payment of attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(b) are for it either to accept the claim within 21 days of its filing, or to defend the claim successfully....

...Berry, but directs the appellate court to "fix" the award. In its analysis of this statute, the Third District has observed that section 443.041(2)(b) offers no criteria for determining such an award. See Cheung v. Executive China Doral, Inc., 638 So.2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Cf. § 440.34(1), Fla....

...Mooney of Meyers, Mooney & Adler, P.A., Orlando, for appellee. PER CURIAM. In this worker's compensation appeal, appellants contend the deputy commissioner erred in finding them liable to claimant's attorney for a reasonable fee because of their failure to protect the attorney's statutory lien under Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...On November 20, 1979, claimant's attorney notified the carrier that he had been retained to represent the claimant and requested the carrier to send all compensation checks to his office, payable to the claimant and the firm, pursuant to his lien rights under Section 440.34(3)....

...ruary 15, 1980. The carrier's major contention, and the one with which we agree, is that it had no obligation to make checks payable to the claimant and the attorney until the deputy commissioner entered an order approving of the retainer agreement. Section 440.34(3) does not outline a procedure for enforcing the lien, but rather, provides that: In such cases where the claimant is responsible for the payment of his attorney's fees, such fees shall be a lien upon compensation payable to the claimant, notwithstanding the provisions of s....

...Plainly, it is a prerequisite for a lien that the case be one where the claimant is responsible for paying his own attorney's fees. Although in most cases a claimant will be responsible for payment, some exceptions cannot be determined until after a claimant prevails on a designated claim. Section 440.34(2)(a), (c) Fla. Stat. (1979). However, in a "bad faith" case, this may involve any type of claim. Section 440.34(2)(b) Fla....

...aimant. In this regard, the statutory scheme of Chapter 440 protects the claimant from unreasonable retainer agreements or fees by providing that at the hearing level, no fee may be paid until it is approved by the deputy commissioner as reasonable. Section 440.34(1), Fla....

...Finally, as noted by appellants, the retainer agreement appears to be improper in that it allows the attorney a percentage of "any and all compensation" paid to the claimant. The fee award should be based upon a percentage of the benefits secured adjusted by consideration of the factors as provided in Section 440.34(1)....

...remanded for proceedings to reconsider the approval of the retainer agreement in light of the aforementioned cases. SHIVERS, SHAW and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See Samaha v. State, 389 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1980), upholding the constitutionality of Section 440.34(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1977) (now Section 440.34(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)) and explaining the policy exemplified by making it unlawful for an attorney to receive a fee until it is approved....

...art the public policy of affording the claimant necessary minimum living funds and cast the burden of support for that person on society generally. There are other statutes which seem geared to protect claimant's right to compensation. Not only does Section 440.34(4)(a) make it a crime for an attorney to receive a fee without approval, but the carrier/employer is required by Section 440.20(1), Florida Statutes (1979) to make payment of compensation directly to the person entitled thereto....

...At hearing, all issues were settled by stipulation except entitlement to attorney's fees, and on that issue the deputy determined that there existed no basis for the imposition of attorney's fees against the carrier. At that time the applicable statute, Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provided, in relevant part, as follows: "......

...f the claim. Davis v. Edwin M. Green, Inc., 240 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1970); Thompson v. W.T. Edwards Tuberculosis Hospital, 164 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1964); Smith v. Dixie Packers, Inc., 384 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Under a reasonable interpretation of Sec. 440.34(1), the right to investigate must be read in conjunction with the statutory requirement that the employer receive "notice" of a claim....

...e-time flat fee of $100 for ongoing advice concerning his workers’ compensation case in exchange for Appel not charging an employee-paid fee on any benefits secured during the course of the representation. The JCC denied the motion, reasoning that section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2011), effectively prohibits the approval of such an agreement and fee where the attorney has not secured any benefits. Elms timely filed a petition for certiorari with this Court seeking review of the JCC’s order, in which he argues that the JCC misinterpreted section 440.34(1) or, if the JCC properly construed the statute, it is unconstitutional on Equal Protection and First Amendment grounds....

...fees. This claim is based on the contention that the Debtor handled the claim of Genevish by miscalculating his average weekly earnings; by seeking protection of Chapter 11 in this Court; and by challenging his claim in this Court. § 440.20(9) and § 440.34(3) of Florida Statutes mandates an allowance of interest and costs to the prevailing injured employee....

...However, interest cannot be allowed on his claim or any item which was due and unpaid on the date of the commencement of this case. This is so because § 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code does not permit the allowance of unmatured interest on unsecured claims. § 440.34 of the Florida Statutes authorizes allowance of attorney fees to the prevailing employee upon showing of bad faith of the employer....

...e sets out specific criteria to be considered in awarding fees. Id. at 834. See also What An Idea, Inc. v. Sitko, 505 So.2d 497, 498 (Fla. 1st DCA) ( Rowe lodestar approach inapplicable to attorney fee awards under workers' compensation act, because section 440.34 sets forth specific factors that must be considered in assessing such awards), review denied, 513 So.2d 1064 (Fla....

...ntitled to supplemental benefits for any period of time prior to then. Marvin. The third issue, regarding claimant's entitlement to penalties and interest under Sections 440.20(7) and (9), Florida Statutes (1981), and costs and attorney's fees under Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1981), is premature and cannot at this juncture be decided....

...tness fees for the two attorneys who testified on the issue of attorney's fees. We reverse both awards. We reverse the award of the attorney's fee because the deputy, in his order, failed to expressly consider the guidelines and factors set forth in Section 440.34(1)(a)-(h), Florida Statutes (1983) and Lee Engineering & Construction Co....

...Walton and Deanna A. Tedone, of Barr, Murman & Tonelli, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. The claimant, Maria Buitrago, appeals the Judge of Compensation Claims' (JCC) order awarding an attorney's fee in strict accordance with the guideline formula set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...s fee based on the statutory guideline formula. See Wood v. Fla. Rock Indus., 929 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), granting motion for certification, 929 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The claimant has moved for an appellate attorney's fee pursuant to section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...eal satisfies the "heavy burden" under Wick Roofing to justify the discretionary allowance of appellate attorney's fees. As in Wood, Lundy, and Campbell, we certify the following as a question of great public importance: DO THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 440.34(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2003), CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY ESTABLISH THE PERCENTAGE FEE FORMULA PROVIDED THEREIN AS THE SOLE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE TO BE AWARDED A CLAIMANT? We AFFIRM the JCC's ord...

...The claimant has not been afforded the opportunity to demonstrate how this appeal satisfies the "heavy burden" under Wick Roofing and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400, which does not require an allegation in a motion for attorney's fees beyond a statutory reference to section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes.

...Rogers Turner, Jr., Esquire of Hurley, Rogner, Miller, Cox & Waranch, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. Judy Spinelli appeals denial of all the costs she listed in her Verified Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs (Petition). Entitled to costs as a prevailing party, see § 440.34(3), Fla....

...statute or rule, to set a time limitation for filing the verified petition for fees"). The amount of a claimant's attorney's fee can be, and/or is, depending on the date the claimant is injured, calculated based on "benefits secured." See generally § 440.34, Fla....

...t of an industrial injury by accident occurring June 30, 1981. We do not find this fee to be excessive; however, we are constrained to remand the cause because the deputy, in his order, failed to evaluate the statutory factors enumerated in Sections 440.34(1)(a-h), Florida Statutes, and to indicate how each factor was operative in determining the fee....

...Aetna Maintenance Corp. v. La Baff, 377 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The order of the deputy is, in pertinent part, as follows: I considered, weighed, and evaluated the testimony presented to me by the witnesses concerning each of the relevant factors set forth in FS 440.34(a) (a)-(h). A guidesline [sic] attorney fee on the benefits secured would be approximately $49,000.00. I have decreased the guidelines fee by approximately $9,000.00 due to the time of 62 hours. The Court in considering factor 440.34(1)(a) recognizes the claimant's attorney is outstanding in his abilities as a workers' compensation specialist attorney and has specialized in the area of law for many years and has a breadth of experience that few workers' compensation attorneys can approach....

...claim. Factor (g) played a most important part in my consideration of the fee due to the amount of the benefits secured by claimant's attorney for his client. The foregoing order fails to evaluate in full the statutory factors required, specifically Section 440.34(1)(a), the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; factors of Sections 440.34(1)(b), (c), (e), and (f) are not evaluated at all, and factor (h) is mentioned but without explanation....

...on only half the undisputed attorney time (14.6 of the 29.2 undisputed hours) on the reasoning that the total time was divided equally between work on the psychiatric evaluation and work on another benefit. Because Claimant meets the requirements of section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2007), we reverse the order, and remand....

...via a petition for benefits (PFB), the Employer/Carrier (E/C) files a response thereto, and the claimant has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of the PFB; the fee does not attach until thirty days after the E/C receives the PFB. See § 440.34(3), Fla....

...The E/C had declined to provide the benefit for other reasons, however, which did not implicate Claimant's state of mind. Claimant had to employ an attorney to obtain the benefit, and was awarded the benefit more than thirty days after the E/C received the PFB. Consequently, she is entitled to attorney's fees under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, for the full 29.2 hours submitted, at the hourly fee found reasonable by the JCC and undisputed by the E/C....

...nt and appellee. We treat the petition for writ of certiorari as an appeal from a final order, see Corbin v. Bayles, 903 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); see also Fla. R.App. P. 9.040(c), and reverse. As this court recently held, the plain meaning of section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, entitles the prevailing party to reasonable costs....

...A number of Appellant's other claims either were withdrawn by the commencement of the November 2003 merits hearing or were denied by the JCC. Because Appellant prevailed on the one claim, the JCC found that Appellant's counsel was entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a) addresses costs and states that "[c]osts shall be taxed in favor of the prevailing party unless the court orders otherwise," and "[t]axable costs shall include ... charges for preparation of the record ... and other costs permitted by law." See also § 440.34(3), Fla....

...Oolite Rock Company, IRC Order 2-1045 (1961), affirmed, 134 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1961), which requires the present value of claimant's compensation payments to be determined and used for purposes of calculating the statutory schedule amount of attorney's fees due under Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...DeLaura of Smalbein, Eubank, Johnson, Rosier & Bussey, Rockledge, for appellants. Edward J. Richardson of Saxon & Richardson, Melbourne, for appellee. THOMPSON, Judge. This is an appeal from a compensation order awarding attorney's fees pursuant to § 440.34(2)(b), Fla....

...that the E/C controvert a claim or assert defenses thereto cannot, without more, support a finding of bad faith. Pam Am Tobacco Corp. v. Brown, 416 So.2d 1211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Harper Plumbing & Heating v. Boyd, 418 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Section 440.34(2)(b), Fla....

...timely commenced making PTD payments and thus these benefits did not flow from the *427 attorney's efforts; and (4) that the JCC was arbitrary and unreasonable by determining that claimant's attorney expended 176 hours, once the factors set forth in section 440.34(1)(a)-(f), Florida Statutes, are considered....

...rs from the date claimant's counsel filed his claim for attorney's fees, rather from the date he filed the original claim for benefits. The five-year limitation on the inclusion of future medical benefits in an attorney's fee calculation is found in section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...That statute provides, for the purpose of determining the amount of "benefits secured" by claimant's attorney, that the "term [benefits secured] does not include future medical benefits to be provided on any date more than 5 years after the date the claim is filed." A review of the history of section 440.34(2) shows that before 1987, all reasonably predictable future medical benefits could be considered when awarding an attorney's fee. § 440.34(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). In 1989, the statute was amended to exclude future medical benefits provided more than five years "after the date a hearing is held to determine the value of the attorney's fee claimed." § 440.34(2), Fla....

...ccordance with a local rule, he later filed a claim for attorney's fees on June 6, 1996. The JCC accepted claimant's argument that the operative date for the five-year cap is the date he filed the claim for attorney's fees. We disagree and hold that section 440.34(2), by employing the term "claim" in connection with the five-year cap, refers to the petition for benefits, not a separate claim for attorney's fees filed in accordance with a local rule. In so deciding, we have found no authority, in either the statutes, particularly section 440.34, or the Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation Procedure, authorizing a claimant to file a separate or independent claim for attorney's fees against an employer....

...Consequently, the JCC's inclusion of PTD benefits in the amount secured by claimant's lawyer is affirmed. Finally, the E/SA argues that although the JCC awarded a statutory fee based on the amount of benefits obtained, she erred in utilizing 176 hours when she considered the hours claimant's attorney expended, as required by section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...d to pay for the services of a "disinterested doctor" designated by the judge of compensation claims under that subsection. Here costs were assessed against appellants. Costs were awarded below to the claimant as prevailing party, in accordance with section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991), and this award has not been questioned....

...A JCC's decision to deny costs is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Morris v. Dollar Tree Store, 869 So.2d 704, 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). We review the JCC's interpretation and application of the law de novo. See Palm Beach County Sch. Dist. v. Ferrer, 990 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2004), mandates that "[i]f any party should prevail in any proceeding before a [JCC], there shall be taxed against the non-prevailing party the reasonable costs of such proceedings." A motion for disputed costs shall include "a detailed list of all taxable costs advanced or incurred." Fla....

...Grover, 471 So.2d 118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Next, we agree with the e/c that the deputy erred in awarding an attorney's fee in the present case. Since the deputy did not state his grounds for awarding a fee, we must examine the various available statutory grounds. Under Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, a claimant is entitled to an order requiring the e/c to pay claimant's attorney fee if: (1) the claimant successfully asserts a claim for medical benefits only; (2) the deputy finds that the e/c has acted in bad f...

...motions and can be condensed into two main points: (1) whether an assessment against a self insurer and the payment of attorneys’ fees in connection with the collection thereof may be enforced pursuant to the provisions of Sections 440.-24(1) and 440.34(1); and (2) whether the payment of such assessment and attorneys’ fees may be imposed upon a defendant who is not a party to the proceedings giving rise to the assessment. As to the first point, a review of Sections 440.24(1) and 440.34(1) reflects that the provisions thereof are concerned with the enforcement of “any compensation order”, “payment of compensation”, or “award for compensation”....

...fee for collecting said interest. In Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Carlton, Fla. [ 151 Fla. 238 ], 9 So.2d 359 , the Supreme Court pointed out that liability of the employer and carrier for any fee for claimant’s attorney is solely by virtue of Section 440.34(1), added by amendment in 1941; and in Virginian, Inc....

...We therefore conclude that delinquent assessments may be enforced retroactively against members of self-insurers funds either by the Florida Department of Commerce or by the Trustees of such fund; that such assessments are not “payments of compensation” within the meaning of Section 440.24 or Section 440.34 so as to authorize an award of attorneys’ fees; that questions of fact remain unresolved so as to preclude entry of a judgment at this stage of the proceedings against the defendant, Colonial Restaurant Corporation....

...King appeals the decision of the JCC not to award attorney's fees below. E/C has disputed Mr. King's entitlement to attorney's fees on the ground that the statute in effect at the time of Mr. King's *69 injury did not permit attorney's fees in modification proceedings. Fla. Stat. § 440.34 (1988) imposed upon E/C the obligation to pay claimant's attorney's fees when (1) claimant successfully asserted a claim for medical benefits only; (2) carrier acted in bad faith; or (3) claimant prevailed on the issue of compensability....

...The deputy commissioner properly denied the petition for modification. Wooten has shown no change in condition or mistake of fact which would alter the prior finding that he had yet to reach MMI at the time that the original claim was filed. The award of attorney's fees has no basis. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1980) allows recovery of attorney's fees when the claimant successfully asserts a claim for medical benefits only, when the employer and carrier act in bad faith or when the claimant prevails on a controverted claim....

...The amount of future care to be authorized shall be redetermined by the judge, but in no event shall it be less than four hours per day. The denial of attorney's fees and costs to claimant is reversed, as she is entitled to such fees and costs under section 440.34(3) and 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Hyde of McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod, Pope & Weaver, P.A., Panama City, for Appellees. WEBSTER, J. In this workers' compensation appeal, claimant seeks review of an order awarding her attorney fees based on the customary hourly rate in the area, rather than the fee schedule set out in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Because we conclude the judge of compensation claims abused her discretion by doing so, we reverse, and remand with directions that the judge award claimant's attorney a fee in the amount established by applying the statutory fee schedule. The judge of compensation claims considered the factors listed in section 440.34(1), concluding that two—the amount involved and benefits obtained, and the contingent nature of the fee—were positive; that only one—the fee customarily charged in the area—was negative; and that the rest were neutral....

...ion that the presumptive fee (which worked out to $847.00 per hour) was excessive given the customary hourly rates in the area, which were between $150.00 and $300.00. We reversed, noting that, because "[t]he presumptive attorney's fee authorized by section 440.34(1) is a contingent fee based on the value of the benefits obtained," "the judge of compensation claims placed undue reliance on the customary hourly rate in departing from the statutory formula." Id....

...Any other holding would amount to judicial nullification of the declared policy of the Legislature as expressed in those sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Law which provide for the taxing against the employer of witness fees as costs. F.S. Sections 440.31, 440.34(2) F.S....

...ased upon our holding in Carney , we reverse the JCC’s finding that Claimant failed to satisfy the disability requirement of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. In addition, we reverse the JCC’s denial of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, because Claimant has prevailed on the issue of compensability of his AF condition....

...We affirm the order striking Flores' claim for attorney's fees. We agree with the Fourth District that chapter 440 does not provide for attorney's fees to be awarded against an employer in an action for retaliatory discharge. See Nicholson v. Ross Products, Inc., 506 So.2d 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); § 440.34, Fla....

...Kiser, of Zimmerman, Shuffield, Kiser & Sutcliffe, Orlando, for appellants. George J. Adler, Orlando, for appellee. SHIVERS, Judge. In this workers' compensation case, the employer/carrier appeal an order of the deputy commissioner which establishes entitlement to attorney's fees pursuant to section 440.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...fee to be paid by the employer/carrier. The deputy commissioner stated, "I base this conclusion on the fact that claim was made for a change of physicians, and I consider this to be a claim for medical benefits only pursuant to Florida Statute *940 section 440.34(3)(c)." [1] On appeal, the employer/carrier contend that the deputy commissioner erred in finding appellee's claim for change of treating physician to be a "claim for medical benefits only." In Gunn's Quality Glass & Mirrors v. Strode, 425 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), this court discussed the legislative intent underlying section 440.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979): Although we have been unable to document the specific reasoning employed by the Legislature with respect to section 440.34(2)(a) (now section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)), we can readily appreciate reasons why recovery of attorney's fees would be provided for in the case of medical benefits, but not for compensation benefits....

...pay her attorney but will result only in payments to a medical care provider. We hold that the deputy commissioner correctly found this claim to be one for medical benefits only. AFFIRMED. MILLS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The reference to section 440.34(3)(c) appears to be a scrivener's error. Since the date of accident in the instant case is September 5, 1979, the reference should be to section 440.34(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979) (current version at section 440.34(3)(a), Fla....

...In the order, the JCC found that he could not “in good conscience” approve the requested fee amount, which was based on the hours expended by Claimant’s attorney, and he reduced the fee to $4,293.80, representing a statutory guideline fee under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes....

...ject of this appeal. Under Chapter 440, attorney’s fees “may not be paid for a claimant in connection with any proceedings arising under this chapter, unless approved by the [JCC] or court having jurisdiction over such proceedings.” § 440.34(1), Fla....

...process with entry of the final order here.1 We, therefore, REVERSE and REMAND for a properly noticed evidentiary hearing. 1 Our holding should not be construed as limiting the power of a JCC to approve or disapprove an attorney’s fee under section 440.34(1)....

...George Kagan of Miller, Hodges & Kagan, Miami, for appellants. Joseph C. Segor, Miami, for appellee. ZEHMER, Judge. The employer and carrier appeal the deputy commissioner's order separately assessing two fees for the services of claimant's attorney under section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...The deputy predicated the first fee awarded, $2,154, on a finding that the carrier did not timely begin payment of permanent disability benefits "within twenty-one (21) days after the Claimant reached maximum medical improvement." The deputy was undoubtedly relying upon section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977), which states: If the employer or carrier ......

...Moreover, that claim form was filed sometime in 1978, two years before claimant conceivably became entitled to the permanent disability benefits which the carrier began paying July 28, 1980, retroactively to June 7, 1980. Nor is there an issue here of whether, in the language of section 440.34(1), "claimant ......

...m. Davis v. Edwin M. Green, Inc., 240 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1970); Thompson v. W.T. Edwards Tuberculosis Hospital, 164 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1964); Smith v. Dixie Packers, Inc., 384 So.2d 709, 1980 FLW 1067 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Under a reasonable interpretation of Section 440.34(1), the right to investigate must be read in conjunction with the statutory requirement that the employer receive "notice" of a claim....

...For this additional benefit to claimant, the deputy reasoned, an additional fee of $5,462 was payable by Travelers to claimant's attorney. Though the deputy's order is devoid of citations to authority for this award, claimant defends the award as having been made under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977), for the carrier's having "unsuccessfully resist[ed] the payment of compensation." This view of the statute, however, is inconsistent with pertinent appellate decisions....

...*912 Whatever may be a claimant's chapter 440 entitlement to attorney's fees for defeating a carrier's motion to modify a circuit court's equitable distribution order and successfully defending against the carrier's subsequent appeal, Ohio Casualty Group v. Parrish, 350 So.2d 466, 469-70 (Fla. 1977), nothing in section 440.34(1) can be read as deterring a carrier from filing a legitimate statutory claim of lien in a pending third-party damage suit pursuant to section 440.39, Florida Statutes (1977), let alone as penalizing the carrier for waiving part or al...

...Capeletti Bros., 384 So.2d 1302, 1303 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (a fee conceded). For the reasons discussed below, we decline to extend Parrish further than it requires, certainly not to the circumstances here; and claimant has offered no other pertinent authority. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1977), the statutory authority for awarding attorney's fees, provides in relevant part: (1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in s....

...e for the services of his attorney in the appellate court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and quashed the district court's opinion on the jurisdictional issue, but affirmed the appellate court's attorney's fee award. Construing the language of section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975), which is substantially similar to that quoted above from the 1977 version of that section, the opinion states: The statute specifically authorizes an award of attorney's fees if the employer or carrier "shall...

...on to modify the equitable distribution order, petitioner was essentially resisting payment of compensation by attempting to both deprive respondent of prospective payments and recover half of all benefits paid after October 1, 1974. The language of Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975), articulates the policy that the claimant should not be required to pay his own legal fees in attempting to retain past benefits paid or future benefits already determined to *913 be forthcoming....

...rrier reimbursement for penalties and interest and granted claimant's counsel an appellate fee under the authority of Ohio Casualty Group v. Parrish, supra . The Supreme Court, reviewing the district court's decision, again construed the language of section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975), stating: The plain language of the statute provides for an award of attorney's fees in two, and only two, situations: (1) In an original proceeding to compel carrier to render benefits due on a valid claim, the judge of industrial claims has power to award attorney's fees....

...er. It is equally clear that, under the statute, she is not entitled to attorney's *914 fees for the original proceedings in the trial court. 441 So.2d at 1071-72. The Supreme Court's decisions make it abundantly clear that the statutory language of section 440.34 authorizes an award of attorney's fees only in the two situations described....

...ts based on the pursuit of interest, and may have erred in denying attorney’s fees based on the pursuit of interest. A prevailing claimant “shall” be awarded costs, and may in certain circumstances be entitled to attorney’s fees as well. See § 440.34(3), Fla....

...he above criteria. The E/C also appeals the JCC's award of attorney's fees to the claimant on the basis that the E/C controverted the claim for guardianship fees and attorney's fees related to the guardianship, the JCC relying upon the provisions of Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Though the institution of guardianship proceedings and the attendant costs incurred are causally related to the claimant's industrial injury in the case at bar, it cannot be construed as the occurrence of an injury which was denied by the E/C. For that reason, we reverse the JCC's award of attorney's fees under Section 440.34(3)(c)....

...URIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals a ruling of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) declining to approve a stipulation for a $1,500 attorney’s fee to be paid by the Employer/Carrier (E/C) to Claimant’s attorney under section 440.34(3)(a) and (7), Florida Statutes (2013)....

...cluded claimant-paid attorney’s fees; the parties also entered a stipulation whereby the E/C would pay both Dr. Ellowitz’s bill and, as the associated attorney’s fee, the “alternative” $1,500 “medical benefits only” fee permitted under section 440.34(3)(a) and (7)....

...Reeves, Zimmerman, Shuffield, Kiser & Sutcliffe, P.A., Orlando, for appellees. ALLEN, Judge. The claimant appeals a workers' compensation order denying a claim for an attorney's fee. We conclude that the judge should not have limited the application of section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), to the period of time following the employer/carrier's receipt of the acknowledged claim from the Division of Workers' Compensation....

...plied with the request for orthopedic authorization. Such authorization was provided within 21 days after receipt of the acknowledged claim, but more than 21 days after receipt of the copy of the filed claim, as furnished by the claimant's attorney. Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that a claimant may recover an attorney's fee: In any case in which the employer or carrier fails or refuses to pay a claim filed with the division which meets the requirements of s. 440.19(1)(e) on or before the 21st day after receiving notice of the claim... . The judge construed this provision to apply only after receipt of an acknowledged claim from the Division of Workers' Compensation. However, section 440.34(3)(b) does not refer to an acknowledged claim, and the statute should not have been given such limited effect. While section 440.34(3)(b) does refer to a claim which meets the requirements of section 440.19(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and that statute identifies the specific information which a claim should contain, the present claim was sufficient in this regard....

...pt of an acknowledged claim, liability for a penalty is a matter separate and apart from liability for an attorney's fee. This penalty provision is not a part of the requirements of a claim as identified in section 440.19(1)(e), and as referenced in section 440.34(3)(b). Indeed, when the pertinent language in section 440.34(3)(b) was first enacted, section 440.19(1)(e) did not even mention an acknowledged claim....

...nsation Law, as expressed in cases such as Turner v. Rinker Materials, 622 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), as a self-executing employer/carrier monitored system. Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history would limit the application of section 440.34(3)(b) to receipt of an acknowledged claim, and the statute thus should have been applied in this case upon the carrier's actual notice of the filed claim....

...st, in the circumstances of this case, involving a potential musculoskeletal injury and the apparent absence of any other orthopedic care, the claim contains sufficiently detailed information to comply with section 440.19(1)(e). [2] The reference in section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), to section 440.19(1)(e) is the result of an editor's revision which changed a paragraph (d) reference to (e) after various amendments were made to section 440.19(1) by chapter 90-201, section 23, Laws of Florida. When the section 440.34(3)(b) attorney's fee provision was created in chapter 89-289, section 19, Laws of Florida, neither section 440.19(1)(d) nor (e) made any mention of an acknowledged claim....

...Section 440.19(1) was revised the following year, with the necessary contents of a claim being moved from paragraph (d) to (e), and the penalty provision being created at paragraph (e)7. See chapter 90-201, section 23, Laws of Florida. The absence of any corresponding legislative action to alter the reference in section 440.34(3)(b) in connection with the amendment to section 440.19(1) in chapter 90-201 suggests that the legislature did not thereby contemplate that such changes would be entirely incorporated in section 440.34(3)(b).

...Alex Lancaster of Lancaster & Eure, Sarasota, for Appellant. Timothy D. Wolf of Fowler White Boggs Banker, Tampa, for Appellees. HAWKES, C.J. Claimant challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarding a fee in accordance with the statutory fee guideline set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes....

...obtained, in accordance with the statutory guideline. At that time, the JCC did not have the benefit of the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008). Murray teaches that the word "reasonable," as used in section 440.34, means a fee amount must be determined subject to the factors set forth in Lee Engineering & Construction Co....

...The award of additional temporary total disability benefits was never questioned by the petitioners in any way. As far as the commission was concerned, the claimant’s attorneys were successful in upholding before it the award for permanent partial disability and hence under F.S. § 440.34 F.S.A., the commission was authorized to award an attorney’s fee as it did....

...versing the order in part. We affirm the order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) insofar as it disapproved the parties’ settlement stipulation regarding $1,500 in attorney’s fees payable by the Employer/Carrier, purportedly authorized by section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2009). Section 440.34(3)(a) provides for the award of an attorney’s fee from an employer “[ajgainst whom [a claimant] successfully asserts a petition for medical benefits only, if the claimant has not filed or is not entitled to file at such time a clai...

...or disability, permanent impairment, wage-loss, or death benefits, arising out of the same accident.” (Emphasis added). The JCC ruled that counsel did not secure only (or perhaps any) medical benefits for Claimant, so that, inter alia, the caps in section 440.34(1) apply, not the “alternative attorney’s fee” (of up to $1,500) applicable where an attorney’s fee is owed on a medical benefits-only theory per paragraph (3)(a). § 440.34(7), Fla....

...dditional evidence supporting *1000 the alleged medical benefit only claim. But Claimant’s counsel filed only a motion for rehearing that again lacked a meaningful legal or factual basis for approving a medical benefits only attorney’s fee under section 440.34(3)(a)....

...The JCC was without authority to redirect the attorney’s fee from counsel to claimant as an exercise of plenary equitable jurisdiction. On remand, the parties may petition for the approval of attorney’s fees payable to Claimant’s counsel under section 440.34(3)(b) — not paragraph (3)(a), for the reasons described above — -in discharge of any obligation that the Employer/Carrier may have to Claimant’s counsel for attorney’s fees....

...Weiss’ $450 bill for an independent medical examination of the claimant was properly taxed. But we cannot agree that monies which might have come to Dr. Weiss if he had not planned to appear as an expert witness are “reasonable costs of such proceedings” within the meaning of section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...In this workers' compensation case, we reverse the denial of Mark Allen's petition for attorney's fees. Authorizing medical benefits within fourteen days of the filing of a petition for medical benefits only does not preclude an award of attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The Petition was received by the carrier on September 3, 1997, and on September 12, 1997, within fourteen days of receipt of the Petition, a DWC-12 Notice of Denial was filed indicating that medical treatment had been authorized. Attorney's fees were denied as being not due or owing. . . . . 5. § 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides for the payment of a fee by the employer or carrier if the claimant successfully asserts a claim for medical benefits only and he has not filed or is not entitled to file a claim for disability, permanent impairment, wage loss or death benefits arising out of the same accident....

...this nature. 6. However, § 440.192(8) provides that a carrier, within fourteen days after receipt of a Petition for Benefits by certified mail, must either pay the requested benefits or file a Notice of Denial. This section appears to conflict with § 440.34(3)(a), as it seemingly gives a carrier fourteen days to act on a Petition....

...Under this theory, an employer may ignore a request for medical benefits with impunity until fourteen days after a petition for medical benefits only has been filed. Such a result undermines important objectives of the Workers' Compensation Law. Substantially unchanged since 1979, language now found in section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), authorizes requiring payment of the claimant's attorney's fees by an employer [a]gainst whom she or he successfully asserts a claim for medical benefits only, if the claimant has not filed or is not enti...

...[within fourteen days] operated not as an admission ... but as a denial of every allegation in the petition for benefits. See also id. at 1337 (Ervin, J., concurring) ("[T]he carrier that takes no action can be subjected to ... attorney's fees under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...or care." In this connection, see section 440.13(3)(d) and (i), Florida Statutes (1997). Unless medical benefits are furnished within a reasonable time after being specifically requested, an award of a claimant's attorney's fees is authorized under section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), against any employer or carrier "[a]gainst whom she or he successfully asserts a claim for medical benefits only." § 440.34(3)(a), Fla....

...Even though Travelers authorized the benefits within fourteen days of the petitions for benefits that sought them, it did not provide treatment within "a reasonable time period" following the initial request. It is therefore responsible for the claimant's attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). Reversed and remanded. BOOTH and PADOVANO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The verified fee petition seeks a fee of $1720. The amount of the fee sought was not called into question. [2] Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1997), provides, in pertinent part (3) If the claimant should prevail in any proceedings before a judge of compensation claims or court, there shall be taxed against the employer the reasonable costs of such proceedings, not to include the attorney's fees of the claimant....

...1st DCA 2010) (reversing award of costs to prevailing employer and carrier in case involving an accident that took place before October 1, 2003); Kaloustian v. Tampa Armature Works, Inc., 5 So.3d 753, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (concluding judge of compensation claims erred in applying after-enacted version of section 440.34(3) to pre-2003 accident as basis for awarding costs against claimant). The judge of compensation claims also refused to award attorney’s fees to the claimant, even though (without identifying any subsection of 440.34) the petition for benefits had included a claim for attorney’s fees based on the statute. The parties’ prehearing stipulation specified section “440.34(3)(b)(c),” as the basis for the attorney’s fees claim, a stated basis that did not change when Case Engineering, Inc., and The Claims Center were granted leave to amend the prehearing stipulation to raise the defense under sections 440.09 and 440.105 that the claimant eventually defeated. The rehearing motion again urged entitlement on the basis of section 440.34(3)(c). Asserting entitlement to attorney’s fees on the basis of section 440.34(3)(e) adequately preserved for appeal denial of the attorney’s fees claimant sought for successfully defending against the fraud defense predicated on sections 440.09 and 440.105. Case Engineering, Inc., and The Claims Center argue unpersuasively otherwise, citing discussion of section 440.34(2) and (3) in the concurring opinion in Chandler v....

...3d DCA 1960) (“A concurring opinion has no binding effect as precedent; such an opinion represents only the personal view of the concurring judge and does not constitute the law of the case.”) — differs from the petition for benefits in the present case, in that the petition here relied on section *1216 440.34 without limitation, although the parties’ later stipulation concededly narrowed the statutory basis originally set forth. Section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that “a claimant shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee from a carrier or employer ......

...Because the JCC erred in finding that the E/C overpaid TPD benefits, the JCC erred in reducing the overpayment by the amount owed in penalties. The JCC also erred in denying Claimant an attorney's fee and costs for the successful prosecution of the claim for penalties on the late payment of interest. See § 440.34(3)(b), Fla....

...1st DCA 1989) (reversed and remanded for the JCC to hear more evidence on issue of TTD where the record was inconclusive regarding whether or not claimant was TTD throughout the period award by the JCC). The JCC did not err in awarding costs pursuant to section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes; however, the amount of the award should reflect only those benefits allowed by this court and those benefits retained on remand after the JCC has made further findings....

...The deputy did err in finding that claimant's attorney was entitled to a fee and reserving jurisdiction to set the amount of the fee only. Claimant was injured in an accident occurring on 20 July 1980. The award of an attorney's fee is controlled by Section 440.34(3)(a), (b), (c), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...ts following the importuned surgery. A claim for temporary total disability benefits following certain requested surgery has been held to be part of a claimant's essential medical care, and as such not to disqualify an award of attorney's fees under Section 440.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...[1] As we stated in Landers Construction v. Delauder, 417 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981): The inclusion of a claim for "continuing temporary total disability benefits after said surgery" is part of claimant's essential medical care and does not disqualify the claim under Section 440.34(2)(a)....

...he accident occurred on July 21, 1980, is identical to that portion of its predecessor in permitting a claimant to recover an attorney's fee from a carrier or employer "[a]gainst whom he successfully asserts a claim for medical benefits only, ... ." Section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...We do not disturb the JCC’s conclusion that Claimant failed *340 to prove the therapy was medically necessary. Although the Judge of Compensation Claims stated in the order that Claimant was seeking attorney’s fees under the “medical only” provision of section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes, he awarded Claimant attorney’s fees and costs from the Employer/Carrier for “establishing jurisdiction.” This was clearly erroneous because Claimant did not.successfully assert a claim for medical benefits only....

...petition. We agree and reverse the order on appeal. Appellant filed a workers' compensation claim against Appellees. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denied compensability of the claim and taxed $8,683.76 in costs against Appellant pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes....

...i procedure to employers when an employee defaults on an award. Id. at 423. The E/C urged the court to correct the oversight and apply the rules of statutory construction to infer a reciprocal remedy by reading section 440.24(1) in pari materia with section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, which allows for "the prevailing party" in workers' compensation cases to recover reasonable costs....

...fees because our opinion reversing the appealed order did not result in any benefits for the claimant, but merely resulted in additional attorney's fees for the claimant's counsel. We deny the petition for rehearing with the following observations. Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1989), states that the claimant is solely responsible for paying his own attorney's fees; however, in certain situations the claimant is entitled to reimbursement by the employer or carrier for payment of such fees. Section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes (1989), states that if any proceedings are had for review of a compensation order, the court may award the injured employee or dependent and attorney's fee to be paid by the employer or carrier....

...PER CURIAM. In this workers' compensation case, Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarding prevailing party costs to the Employer/Carrier (E/C). Claimant is entitled to relief. Specifically, prior to the 2003 amendment to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, only a prevailing claimant was permitted to tax "reasonable costs" against an E/C, whereas since that time any prevailing party may recover costs....

MARSTILLER, J. At issue in this workers’ compensation appeal is whether Claimant may recover attorney’s fees from the Employer/Carrier (“E/C”) under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), when the E/C made a *925 $2,000 advance compensation payment pursuant to section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), 20 days after receiving Claimant’s petition for benefits (“PFB”), but failed...

...Finally, on March 10, 2011, 41 days after receiving the PFB, the E/C issued a check paying Claimant PTD benefits for the period June 4, 2010, through March 10, 2011, less the $2,000 advance, and instituted bi-weekly payments thereafter. Claimant subsequently filed a petition seeking an award of attorney’s fees under section 440.34, asserting as grounds that the E/C initially denied her PFB but ultimately initiated benefit payments, including back benefits, penalties, and interest, due to the efforts of Claimant’s attorney....

...Because the issue on appeal is solely one of statutory interpretation, appellate review is de novo. See Airey v. Wal-Mart, 24 So.3d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). We begin our analysis with the provision under which Claimant asserts entitlement to attorney’s fees. Under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), a successful claimant may recover a reasonable attorney’s fee from the E/C “[i]n any case in which the employer or carrier files a response to petition denying benefits with the Office of the Judges...

...Here, the first check sent to Claimant that specifically paid her PTD benefits was the check sent on March 10, 2011, 41 days from the date the E/C received the PFB. Because more than 30 days elapsed between the time Claimant submitted her PFB and received payment of the claim, the requirements of section 440.34(3) are met, and Claimant is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee from the E/C....

entitlement to prevailing party costs under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2007). For the reasons

...We affirm the issue on appeal, as well as the denial of a separate attorney’s fee challenged in the cross-appeal. However, we reverse and remand for a re-calculation of the fee amount because the JCC erred by calculating it using a discount factor based on evidence outside of the record. See § 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...Kimberly A. Hill of Conroy, Simberg & Lewis, P.A., Hollywood, for appellees. ZEHMER, Judge. William Gulledge appeals a workers' compensation order denying his request for attorney's fees from Dion Oil Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company pursuant to section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...e on September 20, 1990. The claim sought temporary total disability (TTD) benefits from July 18, 1990, and continuing, payment of medical bills relating to the July 18, 1990, surgery, penalties, interest, costs and attorney's fees "pursuant to F.S. § 440.34(3)(c)." Carrier began paying compensation benefits to Claimant on September 21st and the medical bills on September 24th....

...It never served nor filed a written notice to controvert the claim for benefits based on a compensable injury. On February 6, 1991, the judge entered an "Agreed Order" on Employer and Carrier's motion to dismiss, dismissing the claim "except for count five for Attorney's Fees pursuant to Florida Statute 440.34(3)(b)." The foregoing facts are established by the record without substantial dispute. At the hearing held on the sole issue of Carrier's liability for claimant's attorney's fees, Claimant's attorney relied on section 440.34(3)(c). On July 31, 1991, the judge ordered that Claimant's attorney was not entitled to a fee from Carrier pursuant to section 440.34(3)(c)....

...in benefits for the Claimant, I find that the benefits paid on this claim were paid voluntarily, and within a reasonable period of time. Claimant contends that the judge of compensation claims erred in denying an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 440.34(3)(c) for the recited reasons....

...ormal claim and then relied upon her to gather necessary medical information, obtain a release from Claimant, and set up a telephone conference with the surgeon. Employer and Carrier respond that the judge properly denied attorney's fees pursuant to section 440.34(3)(c), arguing that, first, Carrier did not deny the compensability of the injury, as required by section 440.34(3)(c), but simply denied responsibility for the latest surgery based upon the mistaken belief that both of Claimant's cases had been washed out....

...Also, the claim for benefits was not filed with the Division until September 20, 1990, after Carrier had already decided to accept responsibility for the surgery, as evidenced by the fact that Carrier had paid the medical and compensation benefits prior to receiving a copy of the formal claim. They argue that section 440.34(3)(c) does not provide for attorney's fees based solely on an attorney's informal request for benefits, such as the initial letter from Claimant's attorney to Carrier. Section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), provides in pertinent part: (3) ......

...that a proceeding has been initiated, and (3) that the claimant has ultimately prevailed on the issue of compensability asserted in that proceeding. Carrier's conduct in this case constituted a denial of compensability within *486 the meaning of subsection 440.34(3)(c)....

...Carrier's refusal to timely accept any financial responsibility regarding the hernia injury for which Claimant was treated in July was sufficiently broad to constitute a denial that "an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable" within the meaning of subsection 440.34(3)(c). See Dolphin Tire Co. v. Ellison, 402 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). We reject Employer and Carrier's contention that they only denied the surgery and did not deny that a compensable injury was involved. The second and third elements of subsection 440.34(3)(c) are also satisfied on this record....

...(September 20, 1990) the claim could be adjudicated or dismissed only by order of the judge of compensation claims or a court. Rule 4.050, Fla.W.C.R.P. Thus, from that point forward this claim was the subject of a proceeding within the meaning of subsection 440.34(3)(c) and it could only be disposed of by the judge, even though the parties should reach agreement on a settlement and dismissal....

...ccept compensability, were decisive of the issue in this case. Once an employer or carrier has denied compensability of an injury and failed to make timely payment of benefits, the employer and carrier may be held liable for attorney's fees under subsection 440.34(3)(c) if the claimant employs an attorney to prosecute the claim, a proceeding is initiated by filing a claim invoking the jurisdiction of a judge of compensation claims before notice of acceptance of the claim is communicated to the c...

...imant, and the claimant prevails on the claim through a favorable settlement with the carrier. See Chesney v. National Property Management, 414 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). *487 As the appealed order is based on a construction and application of subsection 440.34(3)(c) that conflicts with this opinion, the order is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. BARFIELD and WOLF, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Since Claimant sought attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(c) before the judge of compensation claims and the order ruled on the basis of that section, we reject Claimant's argument on appeal that he was entitled to fees from the Carrier based on bad faith under section 440.34(3)(b)....

...he judge of compensation (JCC's) award of costs to the employer/carrier (E/C). Following a final hearing on Claimant's petitions for benefits, the JCC ruled in favor of the E/C on all issues, and awarded the E/C costs payable by Claimant pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes. On appeal, the E/C properly concedes the award of prevailing party costs was error because Claimant's date of accident pre-dates the October 1, 2003, version of section 440.34(3), which permits such an award. See Kaloustian v. Tampa Armature Works, Inc., 5 So.3d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding the JCC reversibly erred in applying the post October 1, 2003, version of section 440.34(3) to a claim with a pre-October 1, 2003, date of accident)....

...2)(c)2. The JCC denied the request, however, based on the nature of the money’s intended use — to pay for a cost of litigation. The JCC reasoned that monies for costs can be awarded only after a prevailing party is determined. By concluding that section 440.34(3) was implicated in determining Claimant’s entitlement to the advance payment of compensation, the JCC brought to the analysis a provision that has no meaningful relationship to the question at hand — which is whether the request for the advance of compensation has some nexus to the workplace injury....

...Dunkin Donuts, 728 So.2d 772, 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)). However, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, does expressly confer on the Judges of Compensation Claims jurisdiction to award costs to the prevailing party in any workers' compensation proceeding. Subsection 440.34(3) states, "[i]f any party should prevail in any proceedings before a judge of compensation claims or court, there shall be taxed against the nonprevailing party the reasonable costs of such proceedings, not to include attorney's fees." See § 440.34(3), Fla....

...Similarly, we hold the JCC had jurisdiction to decide the E/SA's motion for costs. Alternatively, appellant asserts that the JCC's award of costs to the E/SA taxed against the appellant, where appellant's petition for benefits was not fraudulent or frivolous, is against public policy. However, we note that section 440.34(3) is clear on its face that the JCC may tax the costs of the proceedings "against the nonprevailing party. " See § 440.34(3), Fla....

...(2005) (emphasis added). The statute does not distinguish between the claimant and the employer. Indeed, if the legislature had intended that only the claimant be awarded costs, it could have written the statute to reflect that intent. For example, section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes (2005), limits the JCC to award attorney's fees only to the claimant. See e.g. § 440.34(5), Fla....

...Claimant would pay her attorney an hourly fee once the $1,500 is exhausted – and the other order on appeal determined that Claimant failed to establish she sustained a compensable injury. Claimant challenges the constitutionality of sections 440.105 and 440.34, Florida Statutes, which limit attorney’s fees as applied to her....

...Claimant’s attorney alleged that because of the extensive litigation necessary to pursue an exposure claim, “it would not be economically feasible for the undersigned to continue on a purely contingent basis with fee restrictions as contained in Florida Statute § 440.34.” The attorney certified that if the JCC denied the retainer fee, the Firm may have no choice but to withdraw. An evidentiary hearing on the motion took place in July 2014....

...Paragraph 440.105(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2011), provides that an attorney receiving a fee for services rendered in connection with proceedings under chapter 440 commits a first-degree misdemeanor, unless the fee is approved by a JCC. Subsection 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2011), provides the JCC with the following limits on his or her ability to approve an attorney’s fee: A fee, gratuity, or other consideration may not be paid for a claimant in connection with any p...

...The [JCC] is not required to approve any retainer agreement between the claimant and his or her attorney. The retainer agreement as to fees and costs may not be for compensation in excess of the amount allowed under this subsection or subsection (7). 9 Subsection 440.34(2) instructs the JCC to “consider only those benefits secured by the attorney” when awarding a fee....

...without having been preserved below.”). Furthermore, the applicable legal test by which to review the legislation itself depends upon the particular claim. Because First Amendment rights are fundamental, “we apply strict scrutiny to section 440.34, regarding its effect on these First Amendment rights when taken in conjunction with section 440.105(3)(c).” Jacobson v....

...result of the cost hearing, even upon a successful defense against the E/C’s motion to tax costs. Id. at 1048-49. Because section 440.105(3)(c), Florida Statutes, makes it a crime for an attorney to accept a fee that is not approved by a JCC, and section 440.34, Florida Statutes, prohibits a JCC from approving a fee that is not tied to the amount of benefits secured, the two statutes operated as an unconstitutional infringement on the claimant’s right to hire an attorney. Addressi...

..., where a fee is paid only if the prosecution of the claim is successful. The evidence is direct, unlike the evidence rejected in Triplett, 494 U.S. at 723-24, and the evidence persuasively supports Claimant’s argument that sections 440.105 and 440.34 thwart her First Amendment rights, which can be adequately exercised only by obtaining legal representation. Thus, because Claimant, a layperson, required legal counsel to pursue her claim for benefits, and without counsel she was in...

...union would have no impact on workers’ compensation premiums, because Claimant and her union are the ones paying the fee, not the E/C. If Claimant prevailed, the E/C still could not be required to pay more in fees that the Legislature allows under section 440.34, Florida Statutes, regardless of Claimant obtaining legal counsel not authorized under chapter 440, as Claimant would pay the excess fee. 17  Nor are we persuaded that the exception...

...than “compelling”) governmental interest, and (c) leave open alternative channels of communication.” 113 So. 3d at 1049 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non– Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). Applying this test here, sections 440.105(3)(c) and 440.34 fail, because [t]here is no significant governmental interest being served, because there is no “benefit secured” associated with the fees at issue in this case and, thus, no need to protect such from depletion....

...e fee provisions precluded entirely the claimant’s ability to obtain legal representation. Id. at 1051. The Jacobson court distinguished the determination in Lundy v. Four Seasons Ocean Grand Palm Beach, 932 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), that section 440.34 “‘does not offend the right to freely contract,’” on grounds that Lundy addressed E/C-paid fees as opposed to claimant-paid fees....

...statutes prevented Claimant from retaining and paying an attorney with her own funds (or those of her union) in an amount not based on the mandated statutory fee 20 schedule. The issue, therefore, is whether sections 440.105 and 440.34 are constitutionally permissible restrictions on claimant-paid fees based on the State’s police power. “There is no settled formula for determining when the valid exercise of police power stops and an impermissible encroachment on private property rights begins.” Graham v....

...her, the restrictions on her right to contract for legal work in workers’ compensation cases do not adequately prevent public harm, no longer promote the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the public, and are being arbitrarily and capriciously applied, sections 440.105 and 440.34 are not a valid exercise of the State’s police power, and thus are unconstitutional violations of the right to contract. 23  Waiver Florida case law ha...

...1st DCA 2009); and the right to a jury or speedy trial, see Torres v. State, 43 So. 3d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), and State v. Burgess, 153 So. 3d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Logically, then, if a person can waive constitutional rights, a person can also waive statutory rights such as those in section 440.34, Florida Statutes....

...attorney’s fees and agree to pay her attorney with her own (or someone else’s) funds, subject to a JCC’s finding that the fee is reasonable. Conclusion In conclusion, the restrictions in sections 440.105 and 440.34, when applied to a claimant’s ability to retain counsel under a contract that calls for the payment of a reasonable fee by a claimant (or someone on his or her behalf), are unconstitutional violations of a claimant’s rights to free spee...

...ee which may be due. As to the question of attorney's fees, an award of fees under the statute applicable to this claim is warranted if the employer/carrier "shall decline to pay a claim on or before the 21st day after they have notice of same... ." § 440.34(1), Fla....

...In this case, the challenged order does not depart from the essential requirements of law. Accordingly, we deny the petition. The respondent/claimant, James Brown, successfully argued below that he needed the requested information to support a constitutional challenge on appeal to section 440.34(7), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...ocess must be “relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1). The JCC found, and we agree, that defense counsel’s billing information was relevant to the claimant’s anticipated constitutional challenge to section 440.34(7)....

...tion. The hours expended and rate charged by defense counsel is not information protected by either the attorney-client or work product *842 privilege. Moreover, the information is relevant to the claimant’s anticipated constitutional challenge to section 440.34(7), Florida Statutes....

pending, Souza withdrew a pending claim under section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2002), for attorney’s fees

So.2d 454 (Fla.1968), as later codified in section 440.34(l)(a)-(h), Florida Statutes (1977); (2) for

...der directing them to pay attorney’s fees of $25,000.00 to claimant’s counsel. The E/C argue that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in departing from the statutory fee schedule without including an analysis of each factor set forth in section 440.34(l)(a)-(h), Florida Statutes (1987). We reverse and remand. When the JCC departs from the statutory fee schedule contained in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, the order should reflect that the JCC considered “all relevant prescribed factors to the extent the circumstances permit.” Dobbs v....

...The JCC should also determine whether a departure is justified by considering the overall effect of the factors in section 440.-34(l)(a)-(h). Marsh v. Benedetto, 566 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The order in the instant case does not set forth a sufficient analysis of the factors in section 440.34(l)(a)-(h) and does not indicate whether the JCC considered all of the factors before imposing a fee in excess of the statutory amount. Accordingly, the order must be reversed and remanded for the JCC to make specific findings in accordance with section 440.34(l)(a)-(h) and to determine whether these factors justify an increase in the statutory fee award....

...s in the voluntary dismissal of the January 11, 2017, PFB kept that PFB pending. An employee’s entitlement to attorney’s fees, however, is merely derivative of his successful prosecution of a claim for benefits set out in a PFB before a JCC. See § 440.34(3), Fla....

...3d 565, 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (explaining that it must be the attorney’s “successful prosecution” of the employee’s PFBs “that achieved the [employer’s] acceptance and payment of her claims” for there to be an entitlement to fees under section 440.34, Florida Statutes); Franco v....

...1st DCA 2008) (“Successful prosecution is achieving ‘acceptance and payment of the claim.’” (quoting Mitchell v. Sunshine Cos., 850 So. 2d 632, 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003))). 9  As with a prevailing-party fee provision in civil litigation, a demand for fees under section 440.34 is “ancillary to the claim” for benefits. Cheek v. McGowan Elec. Supply Co., 511 So. 2d 977, 979 (Fla. 1987). Put another way, a demand for fees under section 440.34 is “collateral” to a PFB’s claim for benefits and fee entitlement cannot be “determined until the main claims have been tried and resolved.” Finkelstein v....

...indemnity or medical benefits were provided. The JCC correctly held that the SOL barred the subject fourth PFB, because the SOL had run at the time of the filing of the second PFB. I also respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s comparison of fees under section 440.34, Florida Statutes, to civil litigation fees as “ancillary to the claim.” Further, the “inchoate” or “no-longer-extant” nature or label of a fee demand is inapposite to the SOL review....

BARFIELD, Judge. In this appeal of a workers’ compensation order awarding attorney fees under section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1978), the employer and carrier assert that the deputy commissioner improperly based the award in part on undiscounted supplemental benefits, and that he abused his discretion by not reducing the fee award from the s...

...s of the claimant,” Exceptional Children’s Home & Nursery, Inc. v. Fortuna, 414 So.2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), the self-insured employer urges that we reverse the deputy’s order awarding “bad faith” attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...After a review of the record in this cause, we conclude that attorney’s fees should have been awarded to petitioner’s counsel. An attorney representing a claimant is entitled to a fee when he has secured additional benefits or compensation for the claimant. See Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1975); Basford v....

...He ultimately received authorization for the PRP injections, and immediately dismissed his petition for benefits seeking the additional surgery; he later also received the requested surgery. Coto, who appears to have acted in good faith throughout the process, was nonetheless assessed $1,074.34 in costs under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, which says: “If any party should prevail in any proceedings before a judge of compensation claims or court, there shall be taxed against the nonprevailing party the reasonable costs of such proceedings, not to i...

...he sought surgery, but dismissed his petition before he actually received the requested surgery, the employer/carrier was entitled to statutory costs (though not compelled to seek them). Under these types of circumstances, this Court has held that an award of costs under section 440.34(3) is mandatory, even if manifestly unfair to the claimant....

...ts claimed. An attorney’s fee of $2,500 for services rendered on appeal is provisionally granted, subject to a finding by the deputy commissioner that claimant is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee from the employer or carrier under Section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

Legislature’s deletion of the word "reasonable” in section 440.34 was a direct response to the supreme court’s

order denying a claim for attorney fees under section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), is whether

...In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in failing to approve a stipulation whereby the Employer/Carrier (E/C) would pay Claimant’s attorney a $1,500 attorney’s fee, under section 440.34(3)(a) and (7), Florida Statutes (2013), and reimburse costs in the amount of $275....

...A JCC’s finding of facts will be upheld on appeal if it is supported by the record and if it appears that the JCC did not overlook or ignore any facts. See Chavarria v. Selugal Clothing, Inc., 840 So. 2d 1071, 1078-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Section 440.34(3)(a) provides for the payment of an E/C-paid fee if a claimant successfully asserts a PFB for medical benefits only and has not filed, nor is entitled to file, a claim for indemnity benefits at that point in time. Section 4 440.34(7) provides that “[i]f an attorney’s fee is owed under paragraph (3)(a), the [JCC] may approve an alternative attorney’s fee not to exceed $1,500 only once per accident, based on a maximum hourly rate of $150 per hour.” Here, both pa...

...filed by Appellant. Jurisdiction was relinquished to the JCC to determine the amount of the fee and the JCC complied with the court's instruction. This court clearly has discretionary jurisdiction to award appellate attorney's fees to claimants. See § 440.34(5), Fla....

...did not apply to it, does not affect this court's decision to award a fee for Appellee's attorney's efforts in the earlier appeal. Appellant chose to appeal the JCC's *653 non-final, appealable order, requiring Appellee to defend the same. Based on section 440.34(5), this court chose to reward Appellee's attorney for successfully defending the JCC's order....

prayed for an allowance of attorney fees under § 440.34 Fla.Stat., F.S.A. A rule nisi as applied for by

...ata sheet; child support information; and (7)--an-attoEney^s-a£Bdawt seeMag approval of an attorney fee and specifying the^ statutory factors forming the-basis for a variance, if the requested fee exceeds the statutory — guidelines-under-sections 440.34(l)(a)-(l)(h), Florida Statutes; — and (87) the notice(s) of denial and the report to the deputy chief judge for settlements under section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes....

...y’s fee, setting forth sufficient information to justify the amount of the fee and setting forth the benefits obtained by the claimant’s attorney. If the claimant’s attorney seeks an attorney’s fee in excess of the statutory guidelines under section 440.34, Florida Statutes, the attorney shall file an affidavit that shall specify the statutory factors forming the basis for the variance....

...$_(see attached mileage statement). _Rehabilitative Temporary Total Compensation under Ssection 440.491(6)(b), Florida Statutes, from_to_at a rate of $-per week. _Interest and Penalties on unpaid benefits _Costs and attorney’s fees from E/C under Ssection 440.34(3)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes....

...er attorney a fee for services rendered in obtaining this settlement. 3. The total amount of the settlement is $ . _ ^.— The employee agrees to pay and counsel agrees to accept the sum of $ .. which is within the statutory percentages set forth in section 440.34, Florida Statutes....

...reversed the JCC’s summary denial of costs and remanded for reconsideration of the issue of costs. See Nash v. AMR Corp., 913 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). In -that original appeal,. the claimant moved for appellate attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(b)....

...e of the attorney performing the services, and “an opinion as to what amount or range of dollar values would constitute a reasonable hourly rate in the particular case”; “any special circumstances relevant under any of the factors set forth in Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2003)”; a list of each issue the claimant believes was argued successfully on appeal; a list of all exhibits to be offered to support the amount of the fee award; and “[a] list of all witnesses to be called and a...

...in a contingency matter is in the range of $275.00-$350.00 an hour and is reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Counsel has been practicing workers’ compensation law since 1984. The claimant’s counsel addressed the specific factors in section 440.34(l)(a)-(f), Florida Statutes (2000), for determining a fee award....

...that the case was not novel, “because the result of the change was so important to the claimant and considering his experience, I find that a reasonable fee for services rendered to be paid by the employer/carrier is $4,000 together with costs.” Section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes, states that “[i]n awarding a reasonable attorney’s fee, the judge of compensation claims shall consider only those benefits to the claimant that the attorney is responsible for securing....

...low reauthorization of Dr. Grossman. Nevertheless, the deputy granted Dr. Grossman’s request for payment of the disputed medical bills, and also granted Dr. Grossman’s requests for attorney’s fees and costs filed pursuant to Section 440.32 and 440.34, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Since the award of attorney’s fees by statute is in derogation of the common law, such statutes must be strictly construed. Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, 410 So.2d 501, 505 (Fla.1982). Here, a plain reading of the statute upon which Dr. Grossman relies, Sections 440.34(3), (5), Florida Statutes (1981), reveals that attorney’s fees may be awarded only to a “claimant, injured worker,” or “injured employee.” Dr. Grossman makes no claim to fall within any of these terms. 4 Even assuming, ar-guendo, that Dr. Grossman may bring himself within Section 440.34, the fact that we find the deputy’s award of Dr....

...ployer, the reasonableness and the necessity to be proved by a deputy commissioner.... (emphasis supplied) . Dr. Grossman contends that since claimant was injured in 1975, he is entitled to the award of attorney’s fees as an "injured person" under Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Since Dr. Grossman seeks an award on his own behalf, he must be governed by the law in effect at the time his claim arose. Whether a health care provider may be considered an “injured person” for the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees under Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975), is therefore immaterial.

must be limited to the percentage formula in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1989). However, in departing

to pay claimant’s attorney’s fees pursuant to § 440.34(3)(b), Fla.Stat. We agree and reverse as to these

PER CURIAM. There was no legal basis under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1973) for the assessment of attorney’s fees against the employer and carrier....

ALLEN, Judge. The claimant appeals a workers’ compensation order by which a section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), attorney’s fee claim was denied....

...ecome effective under the statute until the date of filing. Because the permanent total claim was accepted and paid within 21 days after that date, the judge properly determined that the claimant was not entitled to recover an attorney’s fee under section 440.34(3)(b)....

fees, costs, interest, and penalties under Section 440.34, Florida Statutes. REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED

WENTWORTH, Judge. Claimant seeks review of a workers’ compensation order by which his claim for attorney’s fees made pursuant to section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977), was denied....

...and had not been intended to further improve claimant’s physical condition. Twenty-one days after the physician’s deposition, the employer/carrier finally accepted claimant as permanently and totally disabled. On the date of claimant’s injury, section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provided that: If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy ......

days after notice of the claim as provided in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977). Mr. Lloyd, attorney

...The record shows that appellant prevailed in proceedings in which he sought medical benefits only and at the time he sought those benefits, he had not filed and was not entitled to file a claim for other benefits. Consequently, he is entitled to recover from appellees a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes. As a result of the above holding, we need not reach the question of whether appellant is entitled to recover an attorney’s fee from appellees pursuant to section 440.34(3)(c)....

...'No award was made under Section 440.54 for double benefits at that time. Thereafter, on May 21, 1952, a- deputy commissioner ordered the employer to pay claimant the double benefits provided by *894 Section 440.54, and denied the claim for additional attorneys fees as provided by Section 440.34, on the ground that payment under Section 440.54 was a penalty and not compensation, and the law providing therefor should be strictly construed....

...ble under 440.20(6) (where carrier is delinquent in payment of the award). The case turned on the determination of whether the 20% “in addition to such compensation” that the claimant was entitled to, was “compensation” within the meaning of 440.34(1). A study of 440.34(1) indicates that the term “compensation” is used in conjunction with the word “claim”, although the court emphasized other provisions of the statute in the opinion....

PER CURIAM. Appellant seeks reversal of the deputy commissioner’s order awarding $2,000 attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...isabled, Claimant, somewhat belatedly, filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, and the final hearing was cancelled. As the prevailing party, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) filed its verified motion seeking recovery of $16,044.10 in litigation costs under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes....

...The E/C argued that its right to prevailing party costs was established by statute, and that good faith is not a consideration when it comes to taxation of prevailing party costs. Ultimately, Claimant was ordered to pay $11,834.35 in costs to her employer. We are constrained to affirm the imposition of costs under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes....

...They point out that, first, they had previously stipulated to the compensability of the injury, and second, the deputy did not conduct a separate hearing on the specific issue of bad faith. The record before us supports the award of attorney’s fees for bad faith under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), and the award appears to be sustainable under, our decision in O.T. Sims & Associates v. Merchant, 435 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). However, section 440.34(3)(b) explicitly provides for a separate fact-finding proceeding on the issue of bad faith, and we have repeatedly enforced that provision....

...We note as language apropos to the case sub judice our statement in Lockett v. Smith, 72 So.2d 817 , to thqe effect that a claimant “ * * * should not be impeded by the thought of counsel fees which may render the enterprise an empty gesture so far as he is concerned. The statutory purpose of Section 440.34(1), which is one of the few provisions of its kind in the United States, should not be nullified by restrictive interpretation....

...y 27, 2012, both Attorney Villaverde and Attorney Buechele were counsel of record for the claimant when the petition for medical mileage was filed.” The JCC found further: Upon consideration of all the evidence and evaluation of the variables of F.S. 440.34(1)(3)(7) above, I find that a reasonable fee to claimant’s attorney in case number 10-005218 is in the amount of $1,500.00 based on a combined 10 hours of work between two attorneys of record for the claimant, at the same time, at $150 per hour, the statutory maximum for this date of accident....

...hours of work represented “hours of work between two attorneys of record.” 1 Further, there is no record evidence that Mr. Buechele secured any benefit for Claimant related to the February 10, 2012, PFB. As such, no fee entitlement attached. See § 440.34(2), Fla....

...General Kinetics and Travelers Insurance Company have appealed an order of *1332 the judge of compensation claims awarding counsel for appellee Charles Butts an attorney’s fee in excess of the fee resulting from application of the statutory formula set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes....

...Appellee’s fee petition sought a total fee of $24,240 ($150 per hour for 161.6 hours); two supporting affidavits averred that fees of $24,000 and $24,420 were warranted. Appellants filed a single affidavit in opposition, suggesting a fee of $12,500. Section 440.34(l)(a)-(h) sets forth the factors to be considered by the judge in increasing or decreasing the statutory fee: (a) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly....

...In his order awarding a $24,000 fee, the judge listed these factors individually and stated that he had considered them, but did not analyze the factors with respect to the facts of the case. The requirement that the judge consider the factors set forth in section 440.34(l)(a)~ (h) “requires analysis of each factor to determine whether, when considered as a whole, the overall effect of these factors demonstrably justifies an increase or decrease in the formula fee.” Marsh v....

...We conclude that the judge of compensation claims correctly based the amount of attorney’s fees on Serrano’s medical bills paid by the City of Tampa, the employer/servicing agent, which represented the “benefits secured” to Serrano pursuant to section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...However, the judge of compensation claims miscalculated the total amount of fees paid by the City of Tampa. We remand with instructions to the judge of compensation claims to award Serrano attorney’s fees totaling $9,433.13, based on the application of the formula provided in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2003)....

City of Vero Beach, 365 So.2d 133 (Fla.1979); Section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1979). Here counsel failed

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, the employer seeks review of an order awarding an attorney fee to the claimant’s attorney pursuant to section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...enefits are payable, and the claimant prevails on th[at] issue,” and in this case the employer never denied compensability. See e.g., Teitelbaum Concrete v. Sandelier, 506 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (attorney fees are not available pursuant to section 440.34(3)(c) when the employer and carrier have accepted an accident as com-pensable and voluntarily paid some benefits). The claimant concedes that an award may not be sustained pursuant to section 440.34(3)(c). However, she argues that an award may be sustained pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b)....

...There is some support in the hearing transcript for such a position. Nevertheless, we must still reverse because the order was not preceded by a separate hearing addressing the issue of bad faith and does not contain “specific findings of fact” on the issue of bad faith, as required by section 440.34(3)(b). See, e.g., Shop & Go, Inc. v. Copeland, 549 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (reversing an attorney fee award because section 440.34(3)(b) requires that a separate fact-finding hearing on the issue of bad faith be held before an award may be made); Baron Transport v. Riley, 526 So.2d 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (reversing an attorney fee award because section 440.34(3)(b) requires that the order awarding a fee contain findings of fact on the issue of bad faith)....

...his issue without merit and affirm. Cross-appellants also complain that this was a claim for medical benefits only and the award of attorney’s fees on that basis was error. Appellant concedes error and *126 agrees that a fee is not due pursuant to section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes, but urges that the cause should be remanded for a determination of the entitlement to and amount of a fee under other provisions of the statute....

...e of a wash-out settlement, a claimant’s attorney performs no legal services worthy of remuneration. Neither do we find applicable Sullivan v. Mayo, 106 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), a case dealing with the statutory obligation of the carrier under Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1957) to pay claimant’s attorney’s fees in a lump sum settlement proceeding....

is not due under the criteria enunciated in section 440.34, Florida Statutes. We do not interpret paragraph

...We affirm the order in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions. We address the issue raised in the cross-appeal first. Claimant challenges the JCC’s finding that Oliver “secured” the benefits on which she seeks attorney’s fees, as required by section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...lity through the attorney/client relationship in order for continuing fees to be paid,” and that to rule otherwise “would result in a windfall to the former attorney.” We hold this reasoning to be error as a matter of law, under the mandate of section 440.34(3) that a claimant is “responsible” for her own attorney’s fees except in narrow and enumerated situations that shift the fee liability to the employer or its carrier (E/C), and under case law holding that even E/C-paid fees for...

PER CURIAM. Claimant Amitton Chery appeals a workers’ compensation order that denies his request for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34, Florida Statutes (Supp.1990)....

...According to a letter from the carrier’s attorney to Claimant’s attorney, the carrier’s authorization for claimant to obtain such an evaluation remained in effect as of the hearing on this request. We hold that Claimant’s attorney did in fact obtain a benefit for Claimant that meets the requirements of section 440.34....

...Because the record reflects that claimant’s attorney successfully asserted a claim for medical benefits only, we reverse, and remand with directions that the judge of compensation claims grant the request and award a reasonable fee for the services of claimant’s attorney pursuant to section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Moll had concluded that the claimant was permanently totally disabled.” (The claim for permanent total disability benefits was not accepted by the carrier until May 17, 1991.) The employer and carrier argue that this finding is not supported by the evidence. Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986), which is applicable to the claim for attorney fees, reads, in relevant part: A claimant shall be responsible for the payment of his own attorney’s fees, except that a claimant shall be entitled to...

...asota v. Taylor, 576 So.2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Rather, “[entitlement to fees for services in the prosecution of any ... subsequent claim will depend upon whether the claimant is able to establish anew any of the requisite grounds under Section 440.34(3) in connection with such claim.” Samper v....

...George Kagan of Miller, Kagan, Rodriguez & Silver, P.L., West Palm Beach, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals the award of a $267.12 attorney’s fee payable to Claimant’s attorney by the Employer/Carrier (E/C). Under the provisions of section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2012), the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarded the attorney’s fee based on Claimant’s successful prosecution of a petition for benefits (PFB) resulting in the payment of $1,335.58 in temporary disability benefits....

...Claimant’s counsel for establishing entitlement to an attorney’s fee. With regard to Issue II, Claimant argues that the JCC erred by failing to award a reasonable attorney’s fee for his efforts necessary to establish entitlement to the attorney’s fees awarded under section 440.34 (often referred to as “fees on fees”). The E/C disputes Claimant’s entitlement to “fees on fees” as well as the amount of any such fee....

...expressly rule on the issue. Without a ruling, this Court is unable to determine if the 2 JCC considered the claim for additional fees when he awarded a carrier-paid fee based on a percentage of the benefits secured under section 440.34....

exception of the award of an attorney fee under section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). This statutory

MILLS, Judge. Florida Frozen Foods and Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York (E/C) appeal from an order of the deputy commissioner (D/C) awarding attorney’s fees to claimant Parks on the ground of bad faith, pursuant to Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The D/C did not specifically refer to the attorney’s fee claim, but held that “the pending claims arising out of this accident ... are hereby denied.” The order was not appealed. Approximately two years after this disposition, Parks sought an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1983), based on the alleged bad faith conduct of the E/C between 15 December 1981 (the date to which Parks’ reinstated benefits were backdated) and 2 March 1982 (the date on which the benefits were recommenced)....

may be properly awarded in this case under section 440.-34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), since the employer/servicing

BENTON, Judge. In awarding claimant’s counsel an attorney’s fee under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1985), the judge of compensation claims concluded that the parties’ stipulation as to entitlement, approved by order entered August 31, 1995, limited consideration of “benefits secured” to moneys that had already been paid to the claimant or on her behalf....

...d in a medical-only claim for psychiatric care. In his order of November 25, 1987, the deputy awarded certain costs and a fee of $3,500 to claimant’s attorney. Although the deputy stated that he considered the evidence presented, the provisions of Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, and the criteria outlined in Lee Engineering & Construction Co....

...operated not as an admission of compensability but as a denial of every allegation [and demand for benefits] in the petition for benefits.”). 2  Under the version extant both in 2006 and in 2008, section 440.34 provided “that a claimant shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee from a carrier or employer: ....

.... [i]n any case in which the employer or carrier files a response to petition denying benefits with the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims and the injured person has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of the petition,” § 440.34(3)(b), Fla....

...Any grounds for dismissal for lack of specificity under this section which are not asserted within 30 days after receipt of the [PFB] are thereby waived. .... (7) Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 440.34, a [JCC] may not award attorney’s fees payable by the carrier for services expended or costs incurred prior to the filing of a petition that does not meet the requirements of this section. § 440.192, Fla....

...At least for fee purposes, this capitulation established, if not that the benefit requested was ripe, due and owing at the time that the petition for benefits was filed, then at a minimum that “the injured employee ha[d] employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of the petition.” § 440.34(3)(b), Fla....

...a Statutes; (6) an attorney-fee data sheet; (7) an attorney’s affidavit seeking approval of an attorney fee and specifying the statutory factors forming the basis for a variance, if the requested fee exceeds the statutory guidelines under sections 440.34(l)(a)-(l)(h), Florida Statutes; and (8) the notice(s) of denial and the report to the chief judge for settlements under section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes....

...*880 (2) Unless otherwise ordered at the pretrial hearing, the verified petition shall be served on all parties 30 days before the scheduled fee hearing and shall include: (A)a statement of the facts relied upon in support of the petition pursuant' founder section 440.34, Florida Statutes, including an opinion as to a reasonable fee amount; (B)the statutory and legal basis relied upon in support of the petition; (C) except for hearings to determine the value of appellate services, a recitation of all b...

...ployee-also required temporary-residence at or near the facility or institution(s)-providing training - and education which is located more than-50- miles away from -the employee’s customary residence. ^=(M) Attorney-fees and costs under-sec-tion- 440.34(3)(a)B(3)(d-)-, Florida Statutes....

...njured employee also required temporary^-residence at-or near the facility or instifution(s).providing-training and education-which--is-located more than 50 mi-les-away~from the employee’s customary-residence-.- = 4M) Attorney-fees and costs under section 440.34(3)(a)B(3)(d),-Florida Statutes....

...tached mileage statement). ___ Rehabilitative Temporary Total Compensation under Section 440.491(6) (b), Florida Statutes, from_to_ at a rate of $_per week. _Interest and Penalties on unpaid benefits *899 _ Costs and attorney’s fees from E/C under Section 440.34(3) (a)X(d), Florida Statutes....

attorneys’ fees in workers’ compensation cases. Section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes (1981), gives this Court

not proper and is quashed. Florida Statutes Section 440.34 (1), F.S.A. provides only for payment of attorney’s

...We find no error in the award of chiropractic fees. The deputy’s award of attorney’s fees was wholly unwarranted, there being no claim and no evidence of bad faith handling of the claim by the carrier. Nor was there any other basis for a fee award under section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...t time in the December letter. They assert that because they accepted the permanent disability rating within 21 days after receipt of the December letter, acceptance was timely and, therefore, appellee’s lawyer is not entitled to a fee pursuant to § 440.34, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...The fees in question were awarded by the deputy commissioner in compliance with an order of the First District Court of Appeal which accompanied its opinion in an earlier appeal of this case, State Department of Public Health v. Wilcox, 458 So.2d 1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and which provided: Pursuant to Section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes (1983), and Rule 9.400(b), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appel-lee’s Petition for Attorney’s Fees on appeal is provisionally granted in the amount of $1,500.00, and shall be awarded only if the Appellee prevails on the merits before the deputy commissioner on remand....

...benefits. Following rehearing, the JCC entered an amended order reducing the fee to $40,237.45, based on the statutory provision that a fee based on benefits obtained should include an amount equal to only 5% of benefits secured after 10 years. See § 440.34(1), Fla....

...Distinguishing this court's opinion in Slovak, the JCC then concluded that future PTD and PTD supplemental benefits should be considered in determining the value of benefits obtained because Claimant's counsel was responsible for reinstatement of the PTD and PTD supplemental benefits. Analysis Under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), the paragraph of the attorney fee statute applicable to this May 5, 1997, date of accident, a claimant is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee from an employer or carrier "in any case in which...

...oyer or carrier's failure to pay the requested benefits, file a notice of denial, or invoke the "pay and investigate" provisions of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1995), results in the E/C being responsible for Claimant's attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(b)....

...tal benefits, but later paid those benefits, the JCC properly determined Claimant's counsel was entitled to attorney's fees from the E/C. Cf. Stolzer v. Magic Tilt Trailer, Inc., 878 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that 2002 amendment to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, providing that attorney's fees shall not attach under that subsection until 30 days after the date the carrier or employer receives the petition for benefits, was substantive change and thus could not be applied retroactively)....

...The employer and carrier submitted an affidavit evaluating the fee between $1,531.60 and $1,750.00. Claimant contends the order is legally insufficient because it fails to set forth the nature or value of the benefits secured and an explanation of the basis of the award, as required by section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...e in the amount of $1,531.60 for his efforts thus far. As this order is patently insufficient to comply with the requirements of law, we summarily reverse and remand for entry of *558 an order that contains an explanation of the factors listed in subsection 440.34(1) and describes the benefits obtained in accordance with subsection 440.34(2) (“The amount, statutory basis, and type of benefits obtained through legal representation shall be listed on all attorney’s fees awarded by the judge of compensation claims.”)....

...18.74 in taxable costs against employer/carrier. Because of the parties’ stipulations pertaining to the taxability of other costs, the only item in dispute before this court concerns the award of travel expenses to reimburse claimant’s attorney. Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provides in relevant part: If the claimant should prevail in any proceedings before a deputy commissioner or court, there shall be taxed against the employer the reasonable costs of such proceedings, .......

...The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) ruled that the claimant’s Request for Assistance constituted a “claim,” and therefore, the claimant was not entitled to attorney’s fees under section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1993). The claimant argues on appeal that reference to “filing of a claim” in section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.) should properly be construed as the filing of a Petition for Benefits, and therefore, the claimant’s deposition was taken prior to the filing of a “claim” as the term is used in section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1993), entitling the claimant’s counsel to attorney’s fees....

constituted improperly stressed the fact F.S. Section 440.34(1), F.S.A., only allows a single fee, regardless

...In interlocutory proceedings of this kind which are ancillary to the right of a claimant to an award of compensation benefits, we believe an award for attorney’s fees should be held in abeyance pending disposition of the merits of the claim. This is so because F.S. Section 440.34, F.S.A....

...n additional lump sum settlement for $2,664.50. The Deputy later entered his Order, finding inter alia that the benefits obtained for the appellant amounted to $2,664.50, and that all other benefits were voluntarily provided by the employer/carrier. Section 440.34(1), Fla.Stat....

pay claimant’s attorneys’ fees under Fla.Stat. § 440.34(1), F.S.A., where it originally controverts the

SHIVERS, Judge. The claimant in this workers’ compensation case appeals an order finding the employer/carrier (E/C) did not act in bad faith pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes, finding $1,224.61 to be a reasonable attorney’s fee, and ordering that that amount be paid by the claimant to her attorney....

PER CURIAM. Appellant appeals the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (“JCC”) denial of his motion requesting employer/carrier’s payment of his attorney’s fees, pursuant to sections 440.34(3)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1993). We affirm the JCC’s denial of appellant’s petition for attorney’s fees under section 440.34(3)(a) without further comment....

...Sears Roebuck & Co., 693 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (en banc); see also City of West Palm Beach Fire Dep’t v. Norman, 711 So.2d 628, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). We remand to the JCC for a determination of appellant’s entitlement to attorney’s fees under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1993). AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED with directions. ALLEN, VAN NORTWICK and POLSTON, JJ., concur. . Section 440.34(3)(b) allows a claimant to recover attorney's fees from the employer/carrier ''[i]n any case in which the employer or carrier fails or refuses to pay a claim filed with the division which meets the require-merits of s....

...e ground of bad faith in connection with his claim for permanent total disability benefits. Claimant contends that the judge of compensation claims (JCC) should have awarded $65,850 in attorney's fees pursuant to the guideline formula established in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1987), and that the JCC erred by reducing the guideline fee without considering all of the *8 factors set forth in sections 440.34(1)(a)-(h), and by reducing the hours used to calculate the fee. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part. Section 440.34(1) sets forth the criteria for calculating attorney fee awards in workers' compensation cases....

...ant, prescribed factors to the extent the circumstances permit. Fumigation Dep't, 559 So.2d at 590; Fiesta Fashions, 450 So.2d at 1129. The order here, unlike that contained in Fumigation Department, fails to set out each factor provided in sections 440.34(1)(a)-(h) and fails to relate those factors to the circumstances of the case....

...d in determining the existence of bad faith. Consequently, the JCC is directed to make more specific findings in this regard on remand. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for clarification. SHIVERS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.34(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: [A]ny attorney's fee approved by a deputy commissioner shall be equal of 25 percent of the first $5,000 of the amount of the benefits secured, 20 percent of the next $5,000 of the amount of t...

...D’Ambrosio, Judge. Date of Accident: January 14, 2015. Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant. William H. Rogner and Paul L. Luger, Winter Park, for Appellees. WINSOR, J. This appeal is about attorney’s fees. Under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), successful claimants can recover attorney’s fees from a carrier or employer in certain circumstances....

...xpenses within thirty days but does not actually pay the medical bills until after thirty days. We hold that so long as the carrier or employer accepts responsibility for medical expenses within the thirty-day grace period, it is not liable under section 440.34(3)(b) for fees associated with those benefits....

...the fee petition, and Sansone appeals. Because this appeal turns on pure issues of law, our review is de novo. See Airey v. Wal-Mart/Sedgwick, 24 So. 3d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Analysis Attorney’s fees under section 440.34(3)(b) require the “successful prosecution of the petition,” but fees cannot attach until thirty days after the employer receives the petition. § 440.34, Fla. Stat.; see also Neville v. JC Penney Corp., 130 So. 3d 235, 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Franco v. SCI at Palmer Club at Prestancia, 989 So. 2d 709, 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Therefore, an award under section 440.34(3)(b) requires some part of the “successful prosecution” to occur after thirty days....

...In other words, if the petition fully succeeds before the thirty days run, fees do not attach. Cf. Franco, 989 So. 2d at 710 (“Because more than 30 days elapsed from the date the e/sa received the petition and claimant successfully achieved acceptance and payment of the claim, all of the statutory requirements of section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2006), have been met.”)....

...bill (which was before the thirty days ran) or when the employer actually paid the hospital bill (which was after). 3  Sansone relies on this court’s decisions holding that “successful prosecution” under section 440.34(3) is not achieved until there has been acceptance and payment. See, e.g., Franco, 989 So....

of appellees’ attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440.-34(1), Florida Statutes (1975). Affirmed and remanded

...circumstances that justify the award, as well as to prove the reasonableness of the fee to be awarded.” Also, see Le Forgeais v. Erwin-Newman Company, Fla., 139 So.2d 401 . An attorney’s fee should be determined and awarded in a lump sum. F.S., § 440.34 F.S.A., Matera v....

greater fee may reasonably be awarded under the Section 440.34(1) when a lawyer necessarily has devoted extraordinary

LAWRENCE, Judge. Jairo Cardona appeals the decision of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) denying him attorney’s fees and costs. Cardona asserted entitlement to attorney’s fees based on sections 440.34(3)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1989). The standard of review of a JCC’s award or denial of attorney’s fees under section 440.34(3), is whether the findings on which the award or denial is based, are supported by competent, substantial evidence....

the order states that all criteria set forth in § 440.34 and Lee Engineering were considered, there is

...ny additional basis for entitlement over and above that established 10 years previously; that a reasonable fee should be $21,000 for all past and reasonably predictable future benefits, after taking into consideration all of the factors set forth in section 440.34, Florida Statutes; and that Employer and Carrier are entitled to an offset of $1,920.38 for the “interim fee” already paid....

...that Claimant’s attorney was entitled to fees in addition to that paid pursuant to the parties’ agreement entered into after the 1981 hearing. Employer and Carrier correctly note that this court has held that a judge has no authority pursuant to section 440.34, Florida Statutes, 4 to award an “interim” fee and then to reserve jurisdiction to award additional fees merely to take into account the continuing dispersal of benefits to a claimant, Samper v....

...ert entitlement to additional fees for benefits paid to or on behalf of Mr. Griffin in the future.” .This court dismissed Employer and Carrier's appeal of that order without prejudice to their right to seek review upon entry of a final order. . Subsection 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Additionally, according to the adjuster, a third check, for the period of January 28 to February 10, had also been returned as undeliverable, was re- mailed, and had been received and cashed by Claimant. 3 Club at Prestancia, 989 So. 2d 709, 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see generally § 440.34, Fla....

...idering the presumption of mailing or when determining whether attorney’s fees have attached. The JCC found that Claimant had not established the benefits were “secured” by Claimant’s attorney as is required for fee entitlement. See § 440.34(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). The JCC also implicitly found that Claimant was not the prevailing party on the petition for benefits as is required for cost entitlement. See § 440.34(3), Fla. Stat....

DAVIS, Judge. Department of Transportation/Division of Risk Management appeal an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC), awarding a $15,000 attorney’s fee to claimant’s counsel, pursuant to section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1987), for time expended in obtaining an increase in claimant’s average weekly wage (AWW) and in obtaining authorization for an Optifast program before claimant could undergo surgery....

...lack of competent substantial evidence to support the JCC’s departure from the statutory fee schedule. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We hold that the JCC’s award of an attorney’s fee in excess of the statutory fee schedule pursuant to section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, is supported by competent substantial evidence....

...See Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Ozment, 440 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Layne Atlantic Co. v. Scott, 415 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). As to the amount of the fee awarded, it is clear that the deputy failed to expressly consider the guidelines and factors set forth in § 440.34(l)(a)-(h), Fla.Stat....

...of compensation claims." Id. Consequently, the circuit court correctly declined to enter an enforcement order if such were the facts before it. However, I do not think this resolution answers Mr. Smith's request for attorney's fees and costs. Under section 440.34(3) and (3)(d), costs and attorney's fees shall be taxed and awarded to the claimant if he "successfully prevails in proceedings filed under [section] 440.24." The plain language of this statute suggests that Mr....

...One day before the scheduled final hearing on Claimant’s petition, Claimant and the E/C entered into a stipulation whereby the E/C accepted compensability of the claim. As a part of the stipulation, the E/C agreed to the payment of litigation costs and a statutory guideline attorney’s fee under section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2011)....

...4 conclude, therefore, that the JCC properly denied Claimant an award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105. The JCC, however, improperly denied Claimant reimbursement for any and all of the costs for the two videotaped depositions. Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2011), provides that “[i]f any party should prevail in any proceedings before a [JCC] or court, there shall be taxed against the non-prevailing party the reasonable costs of such proceedings.” In the final...

... In summary, we AFFIRM that portion of the final order denying attorney’s fees under section 57.105. We REVERSE, however, the denial of costs associated with the videotaped depositions, and REMAND for application of the reasonableness standard set forth in section 440.34(3). LEWIS, C.J., CLARK and MARSTILLER, JJ., CONCUR. 7 

...In the alternative, appellants contended that an hourly fee of $100 to $125 was appropriate, and calculated on that basis, the fee should have been between $13,900 and $17,375. At the conclusion of the hearing, the JCC issued an order which, in pertinent part, found as follows: [A]s a starting point under F.S. 440.34, I have considered Mr....

...Harum is entitled to a fee of slightly less than $250.00 per hour based on the 139 hours spent in behalf of Mr. Villalonga. That fee amount is $34,-000.00. The order never made a finding concerning the amount of benefits which were actually obtained by claimant’s attorney. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, in pertinent part, states that any fee, except as provided for in that subsection shall be equal to 25 percent of the first $5,000 of the amount of the benefits secured, 20 percent of the next $5,000 of the amount...

claimant’s attorney fees, apparently under Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1986), though the

...for proceedings in accordance with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and WENTWORTH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . Such an award is provided for services rendered in workers’ compensation cases when the criteria set out in § 440.34, Florida Statutes, are present....

...The employer and servicing agent challenge the amount of an attorney’s fee awarded in the workers’ compensation proceeding below, and assert that the fee award should not encompass services provided and benefits obtained after March 1995, when payments were made current. In departing from the statutory fee schedule under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1991), the judge considered and relied on the attorney’s subsequent time and services which ultimately led to a lump sum settlement of any and all potential claims....

...as acted in bad faith with regard to handling an injured worker’s claim [conduct amounting to fraud; malice; oppression; or willful, wanton, or reckless disregard of the rights of the claimant] and the injured worker has suffered economic loss.” § 440.34(3)(b), Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case we reverse the award of attorney’s fees made by the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC). The JCC awarded fees pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ttorney in the successful prosecution of the claim. The only adjudication of any pending claim in this case was a denial of permanent total disability benefits. Accordingly, claimant was not entitled to a fee payable by the employer or carrier under section 440.34(3) (b)....

...rney’s fee for his attendance at the depositions, pursuant to Section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1978). A fee of $400 was awarded. The employer-carrier urges that the factors considered in the order imply that the Judge awarded the fees pursuant to Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1978), and that if the award was made pursuant to Section 440.30, the Judge erred in interpreting and applying the statute....

ZEHMER, Judge. Mary Frances Brown appeals an order of the deputy commissioner denying her request for attorney’s fees. She argues that the deputy commissioner misapplied section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1978), which governs the grant of attorney’s fees in this case....

...ll of ignorance in view of all of the facts and circumstances.” Claimant appeals, arguing that because the carrier did not accept the claim for PTD benefits within twenty-one days, she is entitled to attorney’s fees under the applicable statute. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978), provides: If the employer or carrier ......

...e statute. The deputy commissioner erred in denying the fee award. The appealed decision is REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED for determination of the amount of attorney's fees due claimant. SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . The 1979 amendment to section 440.34 became effective on August 1, 1979....

of an appellate attorney’s fee, pursuant to section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes (1983). In support of

...“may not award attorney’s fees payable by the carrier for services expended or costs incurred prior to the filing of a petition that does not meet the requirements of this section”; and that fees based on the November PFB never attached under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2008), which provides, “attorney’s fees shall not attach under this subsection until 30 days after the date the carrier or employer, if self-insured, receives the petition.” On cross-appeal, Claimant present...

...$7,000 attorney’s fee. We affirm the deputy commissioner’s finding of bad faith. While we express no opinion as to the reasonableness of the $7,000 fee, we must remand the cause to the deputy with directions to evaluate the factors enumerated in Section 440.34(l)(a-h), Florida Statutes (1983), and indicate how each factor is operative in determining the fee as required by Central Truck Lines v....

...arding her prior utilization of attendant care benefits is allowed. Because we overturn the order denying the petition for modification, we also reverse the award of attorney’s fees. In case the question of fees recurs on remand, we point out that section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1973), would govern any award, and that this version of the statute does not contain statutory “guidelines.” See Lee Eng’g & Constr....

whether an attorney’s fee is awardable under Section 440.34(2)(a-c), Florida Statutes (1979). Acevedo v

PER CURIAM. Finding that competent substantial evidence does not support the statutory award of attorney’s fees under section 440.34(3)(c) Florida Statutes, [see Chesney v. National Property Management, 414 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) ] we reverse and remand to the deputy commissioner to consider, in a separate hearing, whether competent, substantial evidence would support such an award under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes....

concluded that she could not award costs under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2016), because the E/C

...From two previous petitions for benefits (PFBs) filed July 24, 2020, the issue of entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs remained pending, but was resolved in a stipulation dated April 28, 2021. The JCC approved the stipulation as to fees and costs in a final order dated May 3, 2021. See § 440.34(1), Fla. Stat....

$70,800 in attorney’s fees in accordance with section 440.34, Florida Statutes. They appeal the amount of

attorney’s fee on appeal is granted pursuant to section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes, in the sum of $2,000

...The deputy denied approval after determining that “the Workmen’s [sic] Compensation Rules do not provide for payment of an attorney’s fee” in these circumstances. We disagree with the deputy’s apparent conclusion that the absence of any express provision in the rules precludes the approval of a fee. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, is a substantive provision insofar as it relates to entitlement to, and the source of payment of, a claimant’s attorney’s fee. Therefore, the present case is governed, in this regard, by § 440.34, Flori *263 da Statutes (1976) — the statutory provision in effect at the time of the compensable accident. Cf., Sullivan v. Mayo, 121 So.2d 424 (Fla.1960). Since in the present case claimant has by contractual arrangement agreed to pay her own attorney’s fee, § 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1976), is inapplicable inasmuch as that provision relates only to deputy approval of attorney’s fee awards payable by an employer/carrier, upon the “successful prosecution of the claim.” However, § 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1976), further requires deputy approval of “any fees, other consideration, or any gratuity on account of services so rendered ....

...We find no clear legislative intent to prohibit such a fee arrangement, and we therefore conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, the contractual fee arrangement between claimant and her attorney is not prohibited and is subject to deputy approval pursuant to § 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1976)....

...By statute, a hen for attorney’s fees attaches to a claimant’s benefits whenever a judge of compensation claims determines that the claimant is responsible for attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining compensation benefits for the claimant. See § 440.34(4), Fla. Stat. (2002) (“In such cases in which the claimant is responsible for the payment of her or his own attorney’s fees, such fees are a hen upon compensation payable to the claimant ... ”). Since originally enacted as section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1979), the statutory language providing for creation of such hens has remained virtually unchanged....

PER CURIAM. This cause is before us on appeal from a workers’ compensation order in which attorney fees were awarded appellant’s counsel in the amount prescribed by the sliding fee schedule contained in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes....

...More specifically, appellant contends that the deputy commissioner’s order must state that he considered all the relevant, prescribed factors in determining the appropriate fee. The deputy awarded the amount due under the sliding fee schedule contained in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, and stated in his order that he “[saw] no reason to depart from the statutory guideline.” Counsel had waived expert testimony and stipulated that the hearing on attorney fees be based on affidavits....

PER CURIAM. At issue in this workers’ compensation appeal is whether Claimant’s attorney is entitled to be paid an attorney fee by the Employer/Carrier (E/C) under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), based on petitions for benefits filed on July 20, 2009, and November 17, 2009....

...without further comment. As to Claimant’s November 2009 petition, we find the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred by denying entitlement to a fee, and reverse and remand. In order to establish entitlement to an E/C-paid attorney’s fee under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2008), the following circumstances must exist: the “carrier files a response to the petition denying benefits,” there is a “successful prosecution of the petition,” and a period of thirty days elapses from “the date the carrier receives the petition.” Franco v....

...m”). In Franco , this Court held that because more than thirty days had elapsed from the date the E/C received the petition and claimant had thereafter successfully achieved acceptance and payment of the claim, all of the statutory requirements of section 440.34(3) had been met for entitlement to attorney’s fees....

BENTON, J. Florida Hospital appeals the order awarding attorney’s fees to Desiree Taylor, now known as Desiree Boen, under section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...In the final order, the judge of compensation claims found, in accordance with the evaluation that he had ordered, that Ms. Boen had reached maximum medical improvement, and that physical therapy was no longer medically necessary. The final order also awarded attorney’s fees under section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides that attorney’s fees may be awarded “[i]n a proceeding in which a carrier or employer denies that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable, and the claimant prevails on the issue of compensability.” Ms....

...by the Employer/Carrier’s wrongful denial of benefits just because during the delay the Claimant found alternative means by which to improve her condition through bike riding.” The medical evaluation she received was itself “a benefit for Claimant that meets the requirements of section 440.34.” Chery v....

...1st DCA 1992) (“Carrier’s refusal to timely accept any financial responsibility regarding the hernia injury for which Claimant was treated ... was sufficiently broad to constitute a denial that ‘an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable’ within the meaning of subsection 440.34(3)(e).”)....

...Boen sought was whether they were medically necessary. Contesting compensability significantly increased the complexity of the case. Because Florida Hospital then lost on the issue of compens-ability, the judge of compensation claims did not err in awarding attorney’s fees *604 under section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...— Prior to hearing-any issue as to-the amount of-disputed attorney fees or costSj-the attorney shall file a verified-petition-setting-forth-with specificity the amount of time expended — costs—advanced or incurred, and -the benefits-obtained together with all other allegations -of fact-pursuant to section 440.34, Florida Statutes....

...a Statutes; (6) an attorney-fee data sheet; (7) an attorney’s affidavit seeking approval of an attorney fee and specifying the statutory factors forming the basis for a variance, if the requested fee exceeds the statutory guidelines under sections 440.34(l)(a)-(l)(h), Florida Statutes; (8) the notice(s) of denial and the report to the chief judge for settlements under section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes....

...(2) Unless otherwise ordered at the pretrial hearing, the verified petition shall be served on all par-ties 30 days before the scheduled fee hearing and shall include: (A) a statement of the facts relied upon in support of the petition pursuant to section 440.34, Florida Statutes, including an opinion as to a reasonable fee amount; (B) the statutory and legal basis relied upon in support of the petition; (C) except for hearings to determine the value of appellate services, a recitation of all...

...e, the injured employee also required temporary residence at or near the facility or institution(s) providing training and education which is located more than 50 miles away from the employee’s customary residence. (M)Attorney fees and costs under section 440.34(3)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes....

..., the injured employee also required temporary residence at or near the facility or institution(s) providing training and education which is located more than 50 miles away from the employee’s customary residence. (M) Attorney fees and costs under section 440.34(3)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes....

issues. The claimant alleged bad faith under Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes, (1980 Supp.)1 as the

...Appellee’s motion for rehearing is granted. For this reason, we have, by separate order, vacated this Court’s April 21, 2014, order denying fees. Upon review of the motion, we provisionally grant Appel-lee/Claimant’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees under section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes (2011), conditioned on Claimant’s success before the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC)....

E/C), to pay them attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1989). Levine, Busch contends

[consideration of the statutory factors found in section 440.34(1) ], this court has considered the action

obtained in the successful prosecution of a claim. § 440.34(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990); Chevy v. Southeast

is due claimant’s counsel in this instance. Section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), unambiguously

...996, the JCC did not determine entitlement or amount of fees, and did not reserve jurisdiction to make such a determination. We, therefore, remand for a determination of whether the claimant is entitled to attorney’s fees payable by the e/sa under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), and if so, the amount of the fee....

entitled to a *1057$300.00 fee pursuant to Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes. Employer/carrier urges

MILLS, Judge. McDonalds appeals a compensation order finding it responsible for attorney’s fees. We reverse. The record supports the conclusion that the employer failed to promptly investigate the claim for payment of a hospital bill. However, § 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977), conditions entitlement to a fee upon the successful prosecution of a claim. Section 440.34(2) limits the statutory percentage schedule to that portion of the award which the attorney is responsible for securing....

...without an appellate remedy because the improperly charged fee—which here is expressly prohibited by section 440.13(10) and more than three times the amount permitted by statute—could not be taxed as a cost since Claimant would not be the prevailing party. See § 440.34(3), Fla....

...Appellant, City of Miami, appeals the Deputy Commissioner’s order awarding a fee of $1,500 to claimant’s attorney for securing a lump sum advance of benefits. Appellant complains that there is no reasonable basis for the amount of the fee, that it may only be responsible for 75 percent, not 100 percent of the fee under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, and that there is no statutory basis for the award....

...We reverse, based on appellant’s final point, and therefore need not discuss the other two contentions. On March 14, 1979, claimant suffered a compensable industrial injury, and as a result, was awarded permanent partial disability benefits of $15,925 by order dated February 4, 1982. Pursuant to section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), the deputy commissioner awarded claimant’s attorney $4,000 in fees based on the $15,-925 in benefits he secured for the claimant....

...We find the above-quoted record objection sufficient to preserve for review the issue of whether there is a statutory basis for the award. Although claimant’s attorney sought fees “pursuant to the statute based upon the benefits obtained,” it is unclear whether he was relying on section 440.34(1) or section 440.20....

...statute provides that lump sum payment shall be made “whenever the commission determines that it is for the best interests of a person entitled to compensation.” F.S. § 440.20(10), F.S.A. 106 So.2d at 6 . The court went on to conclude that F.S. § 440.34, F.S.A., relative to allowance of attorney’s fees, is by its literal terms applicable only to proceedings in which a carrier contests “payment of compensation” as opposed to manner of payment, and its rationale would not nor should it impose such additional burden upon a carrier in this proceeding....

...See Kauffman v. Community Inclusions, Inc./Guarantee Ins. Co., 57 So.3d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (rejecting equal protection, due process, separation of powers, and access to courts challenges to statutory limitation on award of attorney’s fees found in section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2009))....

...Sarasota, and Ya'sheaka S. Campbell of Eraclides, Gelman, Hall, Indek, Goodman & Waters, LLC, Tampa, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant argues the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in her interpretation of section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2009). Because we agree the JCC erred in her interpretation of that section, we reverse the order. In this case of first impression, we address the formula for computing an attorney’s fee under section 440.34(1): A fee, gratuity, or other consideration may not be paid for a claimant in connection with any proceedings arising under this chapter, unless approved by the judge of compensation claims or court having jurisdiction over such proceedings....

...Once the $10,000 threshold is reached in the life of the case, any additional fee would be limited to 10% of the benefits secured. In construing a statute, courts must first look to its plain language. See Perez v. Rooms To Go, 997 So. 2d 511, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The plain language of section 440.34 does not support the JCC’s interpretation....

...years after the first claim is filed would not result in the payment of any fee because there would be no “benefits secured” upon which the formula could be applied. Such 3 a reading would vitiate the guarantees in section 440.34(3)(a),(b),&(c), which provide that a “claimant is entitled to recover an attorney’s fee” in proceedings where he or she successfully asserts a petition for medical benefits only or where the injured person has employed an atto...

...The inability to obtain a fee raises constitutional issues. See Jacobson v. Se. Pers. Leasing, 113 So. 3d 1042, 1049, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (holding “that the prohibition on claimant-paid attorney’s fees in section 440.105(3)(c) and 440.34 [is] unconstitutional, and thus unenforceable, as they apply to cases where the fee is for legal services performed in defense against an E/C’s motion to tax costs,” because such services would not result in securing any benefits)....

...2d 1051, 1057 (Fla. 2008) (“‘[W]herever possible, statutes should be construed in such a manner so as to avoid an unconstitutional result.’”) (quoting State v. Jefferson, 758 So. 2d 661, 664 (Fla. 2000)). Because the JCC erred in interpreting section 440.34(1), the JCC erred in denying the requested E/C-paid fee....

...1st DCA 1985), the employer/carrier may not avoid the assessment of penalties and interest by awaiting the submission of wage loss forms after they have failed to furnish the claimant with the necessary forms and information. The claimant sought a bad faith attorney's fee under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...On remand, the judge should reconsider this matter and provide new findings. The judge should either award an attorney's fee or explain why the fee claim is denied. Because she prevailed upon various claims in the proceedings below, the claimant is also entitled to an award of costs in accordance with section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes....

...of the EC that he is an attorney with 21 years experience in workers’ compensation cases and that he has reviewed the record. Considering Lee Engineering & Construction Company v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla.1968), and the statutory factors in § 440.34, Fla.Stat., he determined that a reasonable fee would be $50,000.00....

...Brown also took into consideration the fact that the EC initially offered claimant full benefits. Based on the evidence at final hearing the JCC entered his order. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. The JCC awarded a $75,000.00 fee, discussing in detail each of the elements of § 440.34 and Lee Engineering....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) finding both Claimant and the Employer/Carrier (E/C) are prevailing parties, determining the amount of each party’s costs under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2009), and offsetting the two cost amounts, resulting in only one award of prevailing party costs to the E/C....

...Claimant’s argument is that the JCC erred in offsetting the two cost amounts because doing so was beyond his statutory authority. We agree. No party challenges the JCC’s finding that each party prevailed on at least one claim in this proceeding. Section 440.34(3) states that “there shall be taxed against the nonprevailing party the reasonable costs of such proceedings.” Matters of enforcement of compensation orders are appropriately resolved in circuit court....

...We read the statute as forgiving penalties and interest only when neither the employer nor the carrier could have prevented the untimeliness. Because Ms. Corkery should have prevailed as to penalty and interest, she is entitled to an award of costs on remand. § 440.34(3), Fla. Stat. (1995). Ms. Corkery is also entitled to an award of attorney’s fees on remand, § 440.34(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995), but “the judge of compensation claims must ... consider only such benefits and the time reasonably spent in obtaining them as were secured for the claimant.” § 440.34(3), Fla....

...Background Claimant filed several PFBs while she was represented by her former attorney, Richard Zaldivar. The PFBs were voluntarily dismissed, but then re-filed shortly thereafter. In June 2009, the JCC ordered Claimant to pay $3,647.86 in costs to the employer/carrier (E/C) pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, related to the voluntarily dismissed PFBs....

...through December 22, 2008—because the evidence showed the Claimant voluntarily reduced his income during that time. The E/C argues that because it prevailed on its affirmative defense as to those five days, it is entitled to an award of costs under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes....

...Indeed, the E/C wholly failed to prove that the Claimant did not seek appropriate employment during the claimed period. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the JCC abused her discretion in denying the E/C's claim for prevailing party costs under section 440.34, Florida Statutes....

...ss and necessity of the treatment rendered by Dr. Hooshmand. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of payment for Dr. Hooshmand's bills and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellant seeks an award of appellate attorney's fees under section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes (1991)....

claimant’s attorney is not entitled to a fee under section 440.34(1), Fla.Stat. (1977), because the 21 day period

...The JCC erred, however, in finding that the employer/carrier’s attorney testified that the customary hourly rate in the locality for similar services was $200. The employer/carrier’s attorney did not testify; he only offered argument to that effect. Section 440.34(l)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), requires the JCC to determine, when awarding a fee based on an hourly rate, “[t]he fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.” The JCC must rely on evidence properly sub...

...Otherwise, claimant will receive double benefits for that period. We also disagree with the deputy’s finding that the employer acted in bad faith in accepting claimant as permanently and totally disabled on June 29, 1982, rather than May 12, 1982. Section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), requires a deputy to find both bad faith in handling an injured worker’s claim, and that the injured worker suffered “economic loss.” Claimant asserts that he suffered two instances of economic los...

...1st DCA 1983). There we stated that “claimant’s obligation to pay for the services of her attorney was not a present economic loss but merely an obligation contingent on the employer/carrier’s liability for claimant’s attorney's fees under Section 440.34(2)(b) [1979].” Id....

...While the litigation costs paid by claimant in the case at bar arguably constitute a present economic loss, Parrish prevents such a conclusion. In the absence of an economic loss to claimant, the deputy erred in ordering the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34(2)(b) (1979), regardless of whether employer acted in bad faith....

...tled to temporary total disability benefits, costs, and attorney’s fees. In this appeal, the carrier challenges only the award of attorney’s fees. We reverse that portion of the order. The deputy determined Gray was entitled to a fee pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), which permits assessment of a claimant’s attorney’s fee “(i)n a proceeding where a carrier or employer denies that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable.” This was not such a proceeding....

...usally related to the accident. In essence, as did the employer/carrier in Flis , the employer/carrier here have assumed the position of denying the occurrence of an injury for which compensation is payable, thereby entitling claimant to a fee under section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...1984, and was awarded compensation of $186.16 per week. The deputy, finding no statutory basis on which to award fees against the e/c, approved as reasonable, attorney’s fees in the amount of $13,050.00, payable on the statutory percentage basis (Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1981).) 1 by the claimant from his weekly compensation benefits....

...y may approve, we caution the deputy that upon the entry of a future order awarding attorney fees, the order should not calculate fees based upon the same benefits formerly secured by claimant’s lawyer, on which a previous fee had been determined. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, requires that counsel must secure a benefit for his client before he may be awarded a fee....

...en awarded claimant. This court held that the statute does not provide “authority for awarding attorney’s fees for securing in lump sum form benefits previously obtained.” 449 So.2d at 987 . Although the present case involves a construction of Section 440.34(1), Florida Stat *53 utes (1981) — not Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), which was before the court in Mazur —and applies to the claimant’s responsibility for fees, not the carrier’s, we are of the view that the Mazur rationale is applicable to the case at bar....

...In reaction to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Murray v. Manner Health, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008), the Legislature enacted Council Substitute for House Bill 903, which took effect on July 1, 2009. Ch. 2009-94, § 1, at 1351-52, Laws of Fla. The new law amended section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2008), by deleting “reasonable” before “attorney’s fees” in subsections (1) and (3), and by inserting in subsection (3) the phrase “in an amount equal to the amount provided for in subsection (1) or subsection (7).” Id. In this case, the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found the Employer/Carrier responsible for Claimant’s attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2009), and found a reasonable attorney’s fee to be $25,075.00....

...The JCC nevertheless concluded that the amended statute limited the fee to a percentage of benefits obtained, and awarded Claimant’s attorney a fee of $684.41 for obtaining $3,417.03 in benefits. Claimant has appealed, arguing the JCC misinterpreted section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2009), and that, if he interpreted the amended statute correctly, the law is now unconstitutional. We reject Claimant’s argument that section 440.34 allows attorney’s fees exceeding an amount resulting from application of the formula set forth in section 440.34(1) when the fee is “awarded” rather than merely “approved” by the JCC. Although section 440.34(1) provides that a fee may not be paid for a claimant unless approved by the JCC, section 440.34(3) provides that a claimant is entitled to recover a fee from an Employer/Carrier “in an amount equal to the amount provided for in subsection (1) or subsection (7).” Except in cases where section 440.34(7) applies, 1 the statute limits claimants’ attorney’s fees to a percentage of benefits obtained, based on the formula set forth in subsection (1), and does so regardless of whether the fee is awarded, or simply approved, by the JCC. We reject Claimant’s equal protection, due process, separation of powers, and access to courts challenges to the amended *921 statute for the same reasons we rejected similar challenges to section 440.34, as previously amended in 2003, in Lundy v....

...ounsel, does not for that reason have standing to raise these constitutional arguments, our supreme court at least implicitly concluded in Murray that a workers’ compensation claimant has standing to challenge the validity of the fee provisions in section 440.34, even though she herself is adequately represented by counsel., See Murray, 994 So.2d at 1053 . Affirmed. BENTON, C.J., DAVIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur. . Section 440.34(7) pertains to attorney's fees in disputed medical-only claims and does not apply in this case.

...In this workers’ compensation case, the employer and carrier seek review of an order directing them to pay a fee to the claimant’s attorney. The judge of compensation claims found that the claimant’s attorney was entitled to a fee award pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), because he had secured permanent total disability benefits....

...s benefits paid to Claimant. [2] (b) The Special Disability Trust Fund agrees that Claimant is responsible for payment of his own attorney's fees and that Petitioner has no obligation to pay Claimant's attorney's fees under the provisions of Chapter 440.34(3), Florida Statutes....

...mphasis in original). The Division went on to opine that because of this prohibition, it made no difference whether the claimant alone is responsible for payment of attorney's fees and the insurance company would have no obligation to pay fees under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ng a separate check to the order of claimant's attorney apparently derives from a desire to cleanly resolve the settlement by disbursing a lump sum payment, while at the same time extinguishing any potential statutory attorney's fee lien pursuant to section 440.34(4), Florida Statutes (1991)....

MILLS, Judge. Palumbo appeals from a workers’ compensation order denying him employer/carrier paid attorney’s fees. He asserts entitlement to a fee pursuant to Section 440.-34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), or Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Coster’s attorney testified he spent 80 hours on the ease, including time spent before the order of 9 December 1980. He could not, however, provide a specific breakdown of the time. He testified a $12,000 fee would be reasonable. The fee, strictly calculated pursuant to the formula provided in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977), would have been $2,674.50....

...1st DCA 1981), they contend Coster’s attorney’s failure to introduce his time records into evidence precludes a fee greater than $2,674.50. Failure to keep time records does not automatically preclude a fee award greater than that called for by the contingent fee formula of Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977)....

appellee contends the award was proper under Section 440.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), which permits

PER CURIAM. The appellant challenges an order of the judge of compensation claims by which she was awarded attorney’s fees in an amount below the statutory percentages specified in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes....

...Although we conclude that the fee award is reasonable and supported by the evidence, see Trans World Tire Co. v. Hagness, 651 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we are nonetheless constrained to reverse the order because the judge failed to make adequate factual findings on each of the statutory factors enumerated in section 440.34(1)....

formula amount established by the legislature in section 440.-34(1), Florida Statutes (1989). The order under

reasonable costs of the proceedings as provided in section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes. The deputy commissioner’s

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Appellant challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarding a statutory guideline attorney’s fee as set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...Greene of Janet M. Greene, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Appellant challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarding a statutory guideline attorney’s fee as set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2010)....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying his motion for “medical-only” attorney’s fees, payable by the Employer/Carrier (E/C) as provided for in section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2012). We affirm. The parties agree that the E/C conceded Claimant’s entitlement to the benefits claimed in Claimant’s petition for benefits, eight days after it received the petition. Section 440.34(3)(a) allows for E/C-paid attorney’s fees where a claimant “successfully asserts a petition for medical benefits only.” Claimant argues that he is due E/C-paid fees under Allen v. Tyrone Square 6 AMC Theaters, 731 So.2d 699, 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), wherein this court considered section 440.34(3)(a), and held that “[w]hen a specific request for reasonable and necessary medical care is made, the employer is under an obligation to provide the benefits within a reasonable time-whether a petition for medical benefits is ever filed, or not.” Allen was decided before a 2002 amendment to section 440.34(3), which added the language that, “[r]egardless of the date benefits were initially requested, attorney’s fees shall not attach under this subsection until 30 days after the date the carrier or employer, if self-insured, receives the petition.” See Ch....

...1st DCA 1992). To be clear, the amendment supersedes the rule announced in Allen , for dates of accident since the amendment went into effect; it creates a bright-line rule for the attachment of E/C-paid attorney’s fees under every sub-subsection of 440.34(3)....

PER CURIAM. Claimant Diane Cheney appeals the Judge of Compensation Claim’s (“JCC”) order awarding her attorney’s fees. She argues that the JCC erred in downwardly departing from the presumptively fair fee determined in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...The findings the JCC made in support of the downward departure are not supported by competent substantial evidence. See Alderman v. Fla. Plastering, 805 So.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (stating that a JCC’s determination that a particular section 440.34(1) factor exists and should be applied to support a downward departure must be supported by competent substantial evidence)....

WIGGINTON, Judge. This is a workers’ compensation appeal from the order of the deputy commissioner awarding claimant’s attorney a fee of $12,-500 pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The first hearing, held on February 19, 1982, addressed the issue whether the employer was responsible for the payment of claimant’s attorney’s fees in accordance with the provisions of either Section 440.-34(2)(b) or (2)(c). The deputy commissioner held the E/C to be liable for the fee under 440.34(2)(c), because the E/C had “controverted” the compensability of the 1979 accident by suspending payment of benefits. Although the “bad faith” issue was raised, the deputy expressly declined to rule thereon, holding that in light of his finding on the issue of 440.34(2)(c), any arguments under 440.34(2)(b) were mooted....

...umed payment of benefits upon claimant’s release from the hospital, although at the lesser rate. “When an employer/carrier admits an accident and pays some disability benefits but denies others are due, an attorney’s fee is not awardable under Section 440.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...It involved a Martin v. Carpenter, 132 So.2d 400 (Fla.1961), defense which has the practical effect of denying that the injury suffered was a compensable injury. 417 So.2d at 287 . Accordingly, the deputy commissioner’s award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(c) is reversed; however, we do so without prejudice to the claimant to pursue a similar award under Section 440.-34(2)(b), as that issue was never determined by the deputy commissioner....

...Section 627.428, Florida Statutes (1991), authorizes an award of attorney's fees for insureds who successfully sue their insurers. See § 627.428, Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 627.428, however, does not authorize attorney's fees in worker's compensation cases because worker's compensation cases are governed by section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1991). See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Houck, 411 So.2d 936, 938 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); see also § 430.34, Fla. Stat. (1991). Under section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1991), compensation claims judges, not circuit court judges, are authorized to award attorney's fees in worker's compensation cases. See § 440.34, Fla. Stat. (1991). However, when section 440.34(1) is read in connection with section 440.24(1), it allows circuit court judges to award attorney's fees in proceedings such as a rule nisi action to enforce payments of compensation....

MILLS, Judge. Tillman appeals a compensation order that awarded benefits but denied an attorney’s fee. We affirm. We do not decide the issues interpreting Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1979), raised by this appeal....

faith attorney’s fees to appellee Ussery under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987): “For the purposes

..., until the date of maximum medical improvement, 1 November. Appellant also contests the award of attorneys fees based on the date of the initial claim, urging that since the first claim was voluntarily dismissed, it was not successfully prosecuted. Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1977), provides that the attorney’s fee is due when the claimant has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of a claim and only the second claim was successfully prosecuted....

...strial Commission affirming an order of a deputy commissioner awarding attorney’s fees to the respondent, Ford, who was the employee-claimant. The only point to determine is the correctness of the award of attorney’s fees under Florida Statutes, § 440.34, F.S.A....

...We do not feel, however, that the liberal construction to be placed upon the Act justifies expanding it to the point where it becomes unreasonably burdensome to industry or actually stultifies the accomplishment of its objectives. Flor-ida Statutes, § 440.34, F.S.A., governs the allowance of attorneys’ fees in Workmen’s Compensation cases....

...M. We affirm the award of attorney’s fees since there is competent substantial evidence to support the finding that the employer/carrier did not undertake within 21 days a reasonable investigation regarding the validity of the claim as required by Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978). However, because the deputy commissioner has failed to consider and evaluate all of the enumerated factors in Section *1301 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978) in his order, we reverse and remand the cause for a proper determination of the amount of attorney’s fees....

...1st DCA 1986), to award an “interim” fee. Should the claimant seek permanent benefits after reaching maximum medical improvement, her entitlement to further attorney’s fees will depend upon whether she is able to “establish anew any of the requisite grounds under section 440.34(3) in connection with such claim.” Samper, 481 So.2d at 91 ....

...not constitute an intervening cause which would cut off the chain of causation. Singletary v. Mangham Construction Company, Inc., 418 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the provisions of section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Richard and Associates and Palm Beach County School Board, employer/carrier (E/C), appeal an order denying the E/C’s Motion to Tax Costs after prevailing in the proceedings before the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC). The issue before us is whether the JCC erroneously denied the E/C’s Motion to Tax Costs pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2005), where the E/C failed to plead entitlement to such costs....

...The E/C denied compensability, and the dispute proceeded to a hearing. Following the final hearing on January 22, 2007, the JCC entered an order denying compensability of the claim and concomitant benefits. Subsequently, on March 19, 2007, the E/C filed a Motion to Tax Costs pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Specifically, the JCC held that “[c]laimant is entitled to notice, prior to proceeding to Final Hearing, of the opposing party’s intent to request the payment of costs if the opposing party prevails at Hearing.” On appeal, the E/C contends they are entitled to costs pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2006), which provides in pertinent part: (3) If any party should prevail in any proceedings before a judge of compensation claims or court, there shall be taxed against the nonpre-vailing party the reasonable costs of such proceedings, not to include attorney’s fees.... (Emphasis added). In the instant case, the JCC acknowledged section 440.34(3), but denied the request for costs because: The Employer/Carrier’s timely assertion of a 440.34(3) claim for costs may play an important role in a Claimant’s decision affecting a case, and may be determinative in a decision on whether to pursue a claim, dismiss it, or settle. The Employer/Carrier’s failure to plead its claim of costs constitutes waiver of that claim. Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes, came into effect pursuant to the October 2003 statutory amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Laws. § 440.34(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). Prior to this amendment, only claimants were automatically entitled to costs against the E/C, not to include attorney’s fees; the E/C had no similar entitlement. § 440.34(3), Fla. Stat. (2002). A plain reading of section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2005), dictates that the JCC shall tax costs against the non-prevailing party regardless of whether that party is the claimant or the E/C....

...Given this reality, it is unnecessary to require that litigants assert a claim for costs in the pleadings. First Protective, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at 273 (emphasis added). Likewise, just as every party in civil litigation is on notice that costs are at issue, in light of the mandatory language in section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2005), all parties to workers’ compensation cases are on notice that costs are at issue....

bad faith existed, despite the admonition of Section 440.-34(3)(b), Florida Statutes, that “[a]ny determination

in attorney’s fee was contemplated. Fla.Stat. § 440.34, F.S.A., provides for the award of attorney’s

...the reasonableness thereof the ultimate change in the rating from 35% to total permanent disability. The deputy held that he was, and the full commission affirmed. The correctness of the latter order is here for review. The applicable statute, F.S. § 440.34(1), F.S.A., does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees when the employer pays a claim within 21 days after notice of the same....

...ct. CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and HORTON, J., concur. . Balatsos v. Nebraska Avenue Cafe & Liquor Store, 159 Fla. 71 , 30 So.2d 633, 634 ; Paul Smith Construction Company v. Florida Industrial Commission, Fla., 93 So.2d 735 . . The language of F.S. § 440.34(1), F.S.A.

denominated a bad faith *404award pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes, so as to be entirely

...After evidence was presented at the hearing the deputy awarded the requested wheelchair and attendant care, and reserved jurisdiction as to claimant’s attorney’s fee. An attorney’s fee hearing was thereafter held, and the deputy awarded a fee in accordance with section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes, for employer/carrier’s unsuccessful resistance of the claim for medi *1100 cal benefits....

...In establishing the amount of the fee the deputy noted the number of hours expended by claimant’s attorney, and determined the resulting fee in accordance with an hourly rate. The deputy’s order does not adequately address the other criteria described in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes....

...la when based solely upon the number of hours expended. See e.g., Brevard County Mental Health Center v. Kelly, 420 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In the context here presented, the deputy’s order does not reflect a sufficient consideration of the section 440.34(1) attorney’s fee criteria, nor does it delineate an adequate basis for exceeding the amount which would result from the statutory percentage formula....

...to wage loss benefits for the time period from 11-4-89 to 9-20-91 pursuant to forms previously submitted, including interest thereon. Further, claimant claims entitlement to costs and attorney’s fees, with the latter being based on Florida Statute 440.34(3)(b)....

...We affirm the deputy’s order awarding claimant wage loss benefits, increasing claimant’s average weekly wage, allowing additional temporary total disability benefits, and penalties. However, the award of a fee to claimant’s attorney would be proper only pursuant to Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Further, we note that the E/C failed to raise as an issue on appeal the JCC’s finding of the nature of the emergency. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the JCC’s order denying payment of Dr. Sommerville’s bills prior to July 20, 1990. Finally, we reverse and remand for the JCC to grant attorney fees pursuant to § 440.34(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1989), and costs pursuant to § 440.34(3), Fla.Stat....

...Therefore, the order of November 14, 1983, awarding, inter alia, PTD benefits, is affirmed. We agree with appellants, however, that the question of entitlement to attorney’s fees on the basis of bad faith was not specifically litigated as a separate issue as required by section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1983)....

VAN NORTWICK, J. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant Eugene Jacobson appeals orders of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that grant, in part, the Employer/Carrier’s (E/C’s) motion to tax costs against him under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2007), and deny Claimant’s motion to approve a retainer agreement between him and Michael J. Winer, under which Winer would have provided legal services to Claimant limited to representation in the defense to oppose the E/C’s motion to tax costs. Claimant challenges the constitutionality of sections 440.105(3) (c) and 440.34 insofar as these sections preclude him from contracting for legal services to defend against the E/C’s motion to tax costs. We conclude to the extent that sections 440.34 and 440.105(3)(c), Florida Statutes, prohibit Claimant from retaining counsel to defend a motion to tax costs against him, those statutes infringe upon Claimant’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution. Accordingly, as applied here, sections 440.34 and 440.105(3)(c) are unconstitutional....

...1st DCA 2009) (“We find it unnecessary to decide whether the legislature intended section 440.105(3)(c) to apply to requests for payments made by attorneys representing employers, carriers and servicing agents, as well as to those made by attorneys representing claimants.”). Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2007), generally governs attorney’s fees and costs in the workers’ compensation context. Notably, section 440.34(1) limits a JCC’s ability to approve a fee, as follows: A fee, gratuity, or other consideration may not be paid for a claimant in connection with any proceedings arising under this chapter, unless approved as reasonable by the [JCC] or court having jurisdiction over such proceedings....

...ed by this section. The [JCC] is not required to approve any retainer agreement between the claimant and his or her attorney. The retainer agreement as to fees and costs may not be for compensation in excess of the amount allowed under this section. Section 440.34(2) begins, “[i]n awarding a claimant’s attorney’s fee, the judge of compensation claims shall consider only those benefits secured by the attorney.” In Kauffman v. Community Inclusions, Inc., 57 So.3d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), this court held there is no significant difference between fees “awarded” and fees “approved.” Further, section 440.34(3), which once permitted only prevailing claimants (not E/Cs) to tax costs against the nonpre-vailing party, was amended as of October 1, 2003, to permit “any party” that had prevailed in a workers’ compensation matter to tax costs against the nonprevailing party. Thus, for the first time in the history of the Workers’ Compensation Law, chapter 440 exposes claimants to liability for prevailing-party costs for routine claims. See § 440.34(3), Fla....

...ing *1047 cause of his current back condition or need for treatment and (ii) did not prove he cannot perform at least sedentary employment within fifty miles of his home. Subsequently, the E/C filed a motion to tax costs against Claimant pursuant to section 440.34(3), alleging it had prevailed on every issue addressed in the 2010 order denying benefits....

...ate of $175 per hour. In his motion, Claimant argued that there is a genuine question as to whether a reduction in costs and representation at a cost hearing is a “benefit secured” to Claimant under chapter 440; that such a fee would not violate section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, because it is being paid “by the claimant and not for the claimant”; and that denying approval would violate Claimant’s constitutional rights....

...Winer then withdrew as Claimant’s counsel of record. Claimant appeared at the cost hearing pro se and, after the hearing, the JCC awarded the E/C $17,145.76 in costs. On appeal, Claimant argues (1) there is reversible error in the cost award; (2) the JCC erred in reading section 440.34 to preclude, as a matter of law, approval of the retainer agreement at issue; (3) the JCC’s ruling violates Claimant’s First Amendment rights to free speech, freedom of association, and the right to petition the government for redr...

...Florida Hospital Ormond Beach, 98 So.3d 754, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), published only after the JCC entered her final order on the motion to tax costs. Statutory Interpretation As an alternative to his constitutional argument, Claimant suggests that this court read section 440.34(1) in such a way as to avoid reaching constitutional questions....

...to avoid an unconstitutional result.’ ”) (quoting State v. Jefferson, 758 *1048 So.2d 661, 664 (Fla.2000)). We find, however, that no reading of the applicable statutes will satisfy this goal. Claimant suggests that we read the first sentence of section 440.34(1) — specifically the phrase indicating a ,fee may not be paid “for a claimant” — as applying only to E/C-paid claimant-attorney fees. We reject this reading for. three reasons. First, the phrase does not inherently exclude a claimant’s paying a fee “for himself,” that is, on his own behalf. Second, the phrase seems to be a mere artifact of the prior version of section 440.34(1), which read, “[a] fee, ... may not be paid for services rendered for a claimant....” Third, the Florida Supreme Court seemingly foreclosed any argument that section 440.34(1) is limited to E/C-paid fees when it stated in Murray that “subsection (3) pertains specifically to attorney fees which a claimant is entitled to be awarded against the E/C” and “[sjubsection (1), on the other hand, covers atto...

...First Amendment rights are undoubtedly fundamental. State v. J.P., 907 So.2d 1101, 1109 (Fla.2004) (holding right is fundamental if it “has its source in and is explicitly guaranteed by the federal or Florida Constitution”). Therefore, we apply strict scrutiny to section 440.34, regarding its effect on these First Amendment rights when taken in conjunction with section 440.105(3)(e)....

...Regarding the third suggested governmental interest, protecting the body of workers’ compensation benefits from depletion, there can be no depletion of benefits where there are no benefits. A successful defense against an E/C’s motion to tax costs does not constitute “benefits secured.” After the 2003 amendment to section 440.34(3), where a claimant who loses all claims is liable for the E/C’s costs, the ultimate source of any claimant-paid attorney’s fee is never the E/C and the legal work done is paid for by a claimant from a source other than “benefits secured.” Consequently, these statutes do not survive strict scrutiny....

...terest and leaves open alternative channels of communication); DA Mortgage, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 486 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir.2007) (same); Montgomery v. State, 69 So.3d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (same). We conclude that sections 440.105(3)(c) and 440.34 do not constitute reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on Claimant’s First Amendment rights to free speech, free association, and petition for redress....

...ublic harm is prevented it is more likely an exercise of the police power.” Id. at 1381 . Factors 4 and 5, however, easily extend to consideration of intangible property such as the contract rights here. We conclude that sections 440.105(3)(c) and 440.34 are not a permissible exercise of the State’s police power to restrict Claimant’s First Amendment right to contract for legal services to defend against an E/C’s motion to tax costs....

...Dysart is distinguishable, however, because the statute at issue there did not preclude fees entirely for legal work that could never result in “benefits secured,” as do the statutes at issue in the case before us. See id. at 954. Further, Lundy, 932 So.2d at 510 , wherein this court held the 2004 version of section 440.34 (having the same wording as the version of section 440.34 at issue here) “does not offend the right to freely contract,” is distinguishable because it concerned fees payable by the E/C to a claimant rather than claimant-paid fees. Conclusion For the above reasons, we conclude that the prohibition on claimant-paid attorney’s fees in sections 440.105(3)(c) and 440.34are unconstitutional, and thus unenforceable, as they apply to cases where the fee is for legal services performed in defense against an E/C’s motion to tax costs....

...to homestead exemption, in section 196.031(1), Florida Statutes, is unenforceable to the extent it limits class of individuals eligible for homestead exemption). Although section 440.105(3)(c) prohibits such attorneys from receiving unapproved fees, section 440.34 does not, under our holding today, preclude a JCC’s approving a fee agreement when a claimant chooses to obtain legal representation to aid in defense against an E/C’s motion to tax costs....

BARFIELD, Judge. Following his withdrawal as counsel, the claimant’s attorney independently pursued a claim for attorney’s fees under section 440.34, Florida Statutes....

...lue to him. No party urges decision on the basis of any express contract for fees. Appellant is entitled to a lien upon compensation payable to the claimant in the amount of the reasonable value of the services which he performed prior to discharge. § 440.34(4), Fla.Stat....

...In this case, which is now making its second appearance here, the deputy commissioner entered an order finding that the E/C had handled Barosy’s claim in bad faith. However, because he found that Barosy had suffered no economic loss as required by Section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), the deputy commissioner refused to assess an attorney’s fee against the E/C....

...nable fee and assessed a $1,500 fee against the E/C in accordance with those findings. Barosy now contends that the amount of the fee was inadequate. We disagree. The order clearly shows that the deputy commissioner considered the factors set out in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1979), and in Lee Engineering & Construction Co....

to provide medical attention for claimant. Section 440.-34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), pro*1336vides

...their stipulation for E/C paid Claimant’s attorney fees of $60,308.72 and E/C paid Claimant’s costs of $24,691.28. The JCC declined to approve the stipulation. Claimant then brought this appeal. JCCs have subject matter jurisdiction over E/C paid fees because section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, states that attorney’s fees “may not be paid for a claimant in connection with any proceedings arising under this chapter, unless approved by the [JCC] or court having jurisdiction over such proceedings.” See Delgado v. City Concrete Sys., Inc., 220 So. 3d 529, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (applying § 440.34(1) where E/C stipulated to pay the fees for the claimant’s attorney)....

...legal services not related to proceedings over which the JCC has jurisdiction. *40 Under the Workers' Compensation Law, the JCC is required to approve all fees paid for a "claimant in connection with any proceedings arising under this chapter." See § 440.34(1), Fla....

...” As we stated at the beginning of this opinion, we are not creating a new rule by which to judge an employer’s conduct in distributing its benefits; whether an employer is to be penalized for alleged misconduct in that regard is a question to be determined under the bad faith provi *1332 sion of section 440.34, and the guidelines set forth in McDonald ....

an order awarding attorneys’ fee pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991). This statute

...1st DCA 1982), this *1256 court affirmed the award of workers’ compensation benefits to appellants, affirmed the amount of attorney’s fees awarded by the deputy commissioner, but reversed and remanded the case to the deputy commissioner for a determination of who should pay the attorney’s fees awarded under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978)....

...The deputy commissioner denied the claim for additional fees, finding that attorneys for claimants failed to establish by evidence or by law that they are entitled to an additional fee. We first note that a literal reading of the applicable statute supports appellants’ claim. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978), reads in pertinent part: (1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in s....

...awarded a reasonable attorney’s fee .... Id. (emphasis added). Section 440.02(11), Florida Statutes (1978), defines “compensation” as “the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter.” Since section 440.34 does not require an attorney’s fee award to be paid directly to the attorney for the claimant, an attorney’s fee award under this statute could be considered a money allowance payable to an employee....

...Our decision here, however, need not rest on a literal interpretation of the statute. The Florida Supreme Court has provided guidance in the form of a closely analogous decision. In Lockett v. Smith, 72 So.2d 817 (Fla.1954), the court faced the question of whether an additional attorney’s fee was due under section 440.34 for services rendered by claimant’s attorney at a hearing which resulted in an additional award of 20% of delinquent compensation payments under section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes....

and acted in bad faith in handling the claim. § 440.-34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979). The record reflects

...Claimant filed a petition for benefits, requesting authorization of an independent medical examination with Dr. Antonio Aldrete for continuing symptoms associated with her work-related injury of May 3, 1994. Claimant also sought attorney’s fees and costs based on a medical-only claim under section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...1st DCA 1998), E/C denied the claimant’s request for evaluation and treatment by a neurosurgeon, but acceded to the claimant’s request for treatment by an orthopedist. At a subsequent court-ordered mediation, the parties agreed the E/C would authorize a neurosurgical evaluation. Soriano sought attorney’s fees under section 440.34(3)(b) for successful prosecution of a claim which the E/C denied....

...Because E/C forced claimant to incur attorney’s fees in litigation of the independent medical examination issue, section 440.13(5)(f) may not be construed to preclude an attorney’s fee to claimant’s attorney. In accordance with the decisions in Soriano and Washington , claimant is entitled to an attorney’s fee under section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), for successfully obtaining an independent medical examination for the injured employee, which examination E/C affirmatively opposed and delayed....

...Accordingly, the order denying an attorney’s fee to claimant’s attorney in connection with the independent medical examination is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings to determine a reasonable attorney’s fee for claimant’s attorney. ALLEN and KAHN, JJ., CONCUR. . Section 440.34(3)(a), provides: (3) If the claimant should prevail in any proceedings before a judge of compensation claims or court, there shall be taxed against the employer the reasonable costs of such proceedings, not to include the attorney’s fees of the claimant....

...arguments of counsel, the Employer, Clay Hyder Trucking Lines, Inc., by and through its Servicing Agent, Comear Industries, is hereby ordered as follows: A. Pay to the claimant’s attorney, Karen O. Emmanuel, a reasonable fee under Florida Statute 440.34(3)(b) for services to her client in this cause....

obtained, costs were assessable against the E/C. Section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1979). The E/C contend

entitled to an award of bad faith attorney’s fees, section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), because appellee

...The second deposition was conducted solely for the purpose of determining the value of treatments the physician previously recommended. The value of the recommended treatment was necessary to determine the attorney’s fee to *223 which Claimant was entitled. See § 440.34(2), Fla....

notice of the accident, as required by Fla.Stat. § 440.34(1), F.S.A., the Judge of Industrial Claims erred

merits of the claim. This is so because Fla.Stat. § 440.34, F.S.A., only authorizes an attorney’s fee contingent

...failed to support the award of further treatment benefits related to Appellee’s work accident. For these reasons, we vacate the award of further treatment benefits granted in the Final Compensation Order, as well as the corresponding award of attorney’s fees and costs. See § 440.34(3), Fla....

LARRY G. SMITH, Judge. On this appeal by the employer/carrier we affirm the deputy commissioner’s award of attorney’s fees to the claimant’s attorney based upon the “bad faith” provision, Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...For that reason, I do not believe that he should be considered permanently disabled without any chance of recovery in the future. At this point in time, he is totally disabled, but this should be considered temporary in that some improvement may occur in the future. Section 440.34, Fla.Stat....

entitled to recover an attorney’s fee under section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides:

...EMA’s opinion). Because the JCC failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the EMA’s opinion testimony, the JCC erred in awarding the requested sur *867 gery. Likewise, the JCC erred in awarding attorney’s fees and costs. § 440.34(2), Fla....

...Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Ozment, 440 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). However, we reverse that portion of the order determining the amount of attorney’s fees, based on the deputy’s failure to determine the amount of benefits secured by the claimant’s attorney, section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes; School Board of Collier County v. Salter, 457 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and his failure to expressly consider the guidelines and factors set out in section 440.34(l)(a)-(h), Florida Statutes....

...to a reasonable attorney’s fee in this case. The claim was for temporary total disability benefits only, the carrier accepted the accident as compensable, and no evidence was introduced which would tend to show that the carrier acted in bad faith. Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (1980); Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University v....

carrier had acted in bad faith. Pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which applies

entitled to an attorney’s fee pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 440.34, F.S.A. Accordingly, the petition for writ of

...and Claims Management, Inc., appellees, to provide specified benefits to appellant. Appellant argues that interest on attorney’s fees is payable under section 55.03, Florida Statutes (2006), from the date the JCC enters a compensation order. Appellant reasons that, under the 2003 amendments to section 440.34, Florida Statutes, the amount of the attorney’s fees is set as a statutorily established percentage of the benefits awarded....

...Thus, appellant asserts the amount of fees is, in effect, determined by the compensation order and, if, as here, the amount and entitlement of fees is not in dispute, there is no need for a further order of the JCC to establish the amount of the fees. Although section 440.34 restricts the discretion of the JCC in setting a “reasonable” fee, see Wood v....

...of the amount is approved by the JCC. It naturally follows that there is no entitlement to interest on attorney fees in a workers’ compensation case until the amount of the fee has been approved by the JCC. Although Lee predates the amendments to section 440.34, appellant has cited no authority which would give the JCC the authority, power, or jurisdiction to award interest from the date of the compensation order....

...It must be noted that the request for fees is for a period of time after settlement was reached and all fees to that date had been paid. There is no allegation by the claimant that the employer/carrier unsuccessfully resisted payment of compensation as required by section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1975)....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant challenges the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) award of an employer/carrier-paid attorney’s fee without reference to the formula mandate set out in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...Mariner Health, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008), we affirm. The relevant statutory provision was in effect between October 1, 2003, and June *267 30, 2009. See Ch. 03-412, § 26, at 3943, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 09-94, § 1, at 1351, Laws of Fla. In Murray , the supreme court resolved the ambiguity between section 440.34(1) and section 440.34(3)....

...the circumstances set forth in subsection (3).” Id. at 1061 . Accordingly, the supreme court held: (B)ased upon the plain language of the statute, that when a claimant is entitled to recover attorney fees from a carrier or employer as provided by section 440.34(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d), the claimant is entitled to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” See § 440.34(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 440.34(3), does not define “reasonable attorney’s fee,” and an ambiguity results when subsection (1) and subsection (3) are read together....

...D benefits from 26 May 1983 until Collins reaches MMI. The deputy commissioner also found the employer/servicing agent acted in bad faith in cutting off wage loss benefits and ordered the employer/servicing agent to pay attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...rkers’ compensation indemnity benefits for her, together with timely furnished medical benefits. We find no entitlement to a fee award and reverse. At issue is whether Ms. Mitchell’s lawyer is entitled to a fee at the appellants’ expense under section 440.34(3)(a) or (b), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Mitchell requested in the petition for benefits — an orthopedic evaluation — was furnished by the employer within a reasonable time, never having been denied. No independent medical evaluation was sought or obtained: A prerequisite dispute never arose. Nor did the petition for benefits claim “medical benefits only.” § 440.34(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). Subsubsection (a) provides no basis for a fee award. As for subsubseetion (b), Ms. Mitchell did not prevail as to any benefits as to which “the employer or carrier file[d] a notice of denial with the division.” § 440.34(3)(b), Fla....

ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Judge. The deputy’s order awarding attorneys’ fees for the carrier’s “bad faith” handling of this claim, § 440.34(2)(b), Fla-Stat....

1982, the deputy using the statutory schedule, section 440.34(1), set that fee at $77,400, based on evidence

attorney’s fee or reimbursable taxable costs under section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes, permitting fees be

...ntitled to fees for successfully defeating employer/carrier's (e/c's) misrepresentation defense. Claimant filed a petition for benefits seeking for both temporary and permanent total disability benefits. He also requested attorneys' fees pursuant to section 440.34(3)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...properly raised that jeopardizes the claimant's entitlement to future benefits, even if the court has not specifically addressed how to measure the value of those benefits in determining the fee amount. Here, Claimant's request for fees was based on section 440.34(3)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...r benefits, prevails on the issue of compensability when the e/c denies that a compensable accident occurred, or prevails in proceedings filed under sections 440.24 or 440.28, Florida Statutes. None of these grounds exists here. Conversely, sections 440.34(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (2002), do provide the appropriate statutory source for fee entitlement under these circumstances....

...mant that the attorney is responsible for securing." The term "benefits secured" is defined, however, as "benefits obtained as a result of the ... attorneys' legal services rendered in connection with the claim for benefits." (emphasis added). Thus, section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (2002), could allow for a fee even if the attorney does not obtain the requested benefits because the services he renders in defending a misrepresentation defense are rendered "in connection" with the claim for benefits, and preserve the claimant's entitlement to future benefits. By requesting attorneys' fees pursuant to section 440.34(3)(a)-(d), Claimant failed to put e/c on notice that he was claiming fee entitlement in the event Claimant successfully defeated e/c's misrepresentation defense....

Employer/Carrier (E/C) as a prevailing party under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2011). Claimant does

deputy commissioner the award of costs is proper. § 440.34, Florida Statutes (1979). With respect to attorney’s

...1st DCA 1989), is materially distinguishable on its facts. We note that no fee shall be paid, whether by the servicing agent or the claimant, unless it is approved as reasonable by the judge of compensation claims or court having jurisdiction over the proceedings. § 440.34(1), Fla.Stat....

...to remand to the JIC for disposition in accordance with this opinion. It is so ordered. ADKINS, Acting C. J., and BOYD, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. . In 1977, the legislature enacted chapter 77-290, section 9, Laws of Florida, which amended section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1975), to provide that the JIC shall consider criteria similar to that enumerated in Lee Engineering and may increase or decrease the statutorily allowed attorney’s fee if in his judgment the circumstances of the p...

...ainst the claimant, except those costs incurred if the claimant fails to appear for the IME without good cause and fails to advise the physician at least 24 hours before the examination that he cannot appear. See § 440.13(5)(d), Fla. Stat.; compare § 440.34(3), Fla....

disability was involved. We find that Fla.Stat. § 440.34(1), F.S.A. is applicable because the carrier did

governed by the attorney’s fees provisions of Section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1979). Since this case

WOLF, J. The claimant in this workers’ compensation case appeals an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) denying an award of attorney’s fees at the expense of the employer/servicing agent (E/SA) pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990) for fees incurred in obtaining permanent and total disability (PTD) benefits and PTD supplemental benefits....

...one of which requires brief discussion: Whether the JCC erred in determining that claimant’s “Request for Assistance,” seeking PTD and PTD supplemental benefits, did not trigger his right to attorney’s fees under the 21-day rule set forth in section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990)....

...Claimant’s attorney thereafter sought attorney’s fees at the expense of the E/SA for obtaining the PTD and PTD supplemental benefits on behalf of the claimant. Claimant’s attorney argued in her petition for attorney’s fees that her fees should be paid by the E/SA under the 21-day rule set forth in section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), because the E/SA had failed or refused to pay the benefits claimed before the 21st day after receiving notice of the PTD claims and claimant had ultimately been successful in obtaining the claimed benefits....

...nder the law in effect on the date of claimant’s industrial accident, the “Request for Assistance” could not legally constitute a “claim” for purposes of triggering claimant’s right to attorney’s fees under the 21-day rule set forth in section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990)....

...See Baptist Manor Nursing Home, 658 So.2d at 1229-30 . In affirming the JCC’s award of attorney’s fees in that case, this court held that the claimant was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under the 21-day rule because the E/C had clearly been on notice of their obligation under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), to make a decision regarding the acceptance of the claimant as PTD more than 21 days before they accepted her as PTD....

...It is clear from the facts in Baptist Manor Nursing Home that the claimant in that case had preserved her right to attorney’s fees under the 21-day rule by filing an actual “claim” with the Division, in the form of a “Claim for Benefits,” which put the E/C on notice of their obligation under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), to make a decision regarding the acceptance of her as PTD more than 21 days before they actually accepted her as PTD. In contrast, the claimant in the subject case never filed a “claim” which could have put the E/SA on notice of their obligation under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990) to make a decision regarding the acceptance of him as PTD until he filed the “Petition for Benefits” on December 16,1996....

...gnize, as did the court in Baptist Manor Nursing Home , the “legislatively created anomaly” caused by the concurrent applicability of the new procedure for initiating claims set forth in the 1994 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Act and section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990)....

...sion regarding the acceptance of a “claim” within 21 days. We conclude, as the JCC did, that the “Request for Assistance” in this case could not by itself trigger the claimant’s right to attorney’s fees under the 21-day rule set forth in section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990)....

...to claimant on the ground that appellants acted in bad faith in the handling of the claim. Appellants raise three points: (1) Because claimant’s attorney never presented any evidence of bad faith at the hearing on attorney’s fees, as required by section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), the evidence is insufficient to support the award; (2) the deputy abused his discretion in awarding an excessive attorney’s fee; and (3) the deputy erred in awarding costs when no items of cost were received in evidence....

...tated a claim for “attorneys fee” without elaboration of the statutory ground. These two documents contain the only recitations of the claim prior to the attorney’s fee hearing. The employer and carrier denied any responsibility for fees under section 440.34....

...As a result of the hearing, the deputy commissioner entered an order on December 13, 1985, which required the employer and carrier to pay Mr. Rubin a $15,000 fee, but stated no statutory basis for the award. The employer and carrier alleged in a petition for rehearing that the order did not meet the requirements of section 440.34(3)(b) regarding proof of bad faith, and the December 13 order was thereupon vacated by the deputy commissioner. At a hearing on this petition held March 13, 1985, the employer and carrier argued that the order did not make the necessary specific findings of fact regarding the statutory criteria of section 440.34(3)(b), and requested that a new order be entered which would comply with the essential requirements of law....

...In determining the fee, the deputy found that Rubin’s legal services produced benefits to claimant amounting to $29,991.62, but that strict application of the statutory formula would result in an inequitable fee; thus, he also considered the guidelines set forth in section 440.34(1) and the case of Lee Engineering Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla.1968), and allowed a fee of $15,-000. The deputy reinstated the order of December 13 and also ordered payment of $1,617.91 in costs. Section 440.34(3)(b) states that a claimant shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee from the carrier when the deputy commissioner issues an order finding that a carrier has acted in bad faith with regard to handling an injured worker’s claim and the injured worker has suffered economic loss....

...eft with no reasonable opportunity to present a case in rebuttal, we find it necessary to reverse and remand for redetermination of the issue of bad faith. We find no merit to the employer and carrier’s second point, challenging the amount of fee. Section 440.34(1) provides that a deputy may, after considering the factors enumerated therein, award an attorney’s fee in excess of the statutory amount....

SHIVERS, Judge. The claimant in this workers’ compensation case appeals an order entered by the deputy commissioner (DC) denying her claim for bad faith attorney’s fees, pursuant to section 440.34, Florida Statutes....

...the instant case occurred in 1983. The issue in this case, however, is not whether the E/C’s failure to furnish the claimant with information and forms excused the job search requirement, but whether the E/C’s failure constituted bad faith under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes....

...f forms. Therefore, there is neither a finding by the DC nor any evidence in the record of an adequate excuse for the carrier’s failure to timely pay benefits. Accordingly, we reverse the deputy’s 1987 order denying attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes, and remand for further proceedings....

...ng record was sufficient to support the order. Jackson v. Dade County School Bd., 411 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The order of the DC was affirmed in all other respects, and this court denied claimant’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34, Fla.Stat....

...*1369 We now consider the question of whether statutory authority exists, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, permitting the DC to award costs in favor of the Division for record costs expended by it on behalf of an indigent claimant who prevails on appeal. Section 440.34(2), Fla.Stat....

...laimant wage loss benefits. Further, the deputy was not in error by reserving jurisdiction for entry of an order for attorney’s fees and costs. However, the award of a fee to claimant’s attorney would be proper only pursuant to the provisions of Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...he Port Everglades case first above cited, including the absence of a reasonably stable market for any services claimant might be able to perform. Medical costs, so far as can be determined from the record before us, were properly allowed under F.S. Section 440.34(2), F.S.A....

...ered as a result of a delinquency. Lockett v. Smith, 72 So.2d 817 (Fla.1954). In Lockett , the Supreme Court held that the sum recovered under Section 440.20(6) [the predecessor of Section 440.20(8) ] is “compensation” *943 within the meaning of Section 440.34(1), and that the claimant was entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee for his successful prosecution of a claim for the additional 20% delinquency payment....

this Court as authorized by Subsection (1) of Section 440.34 Fla. Stats. 1941. The record reflects that

...This provided ample opportunity for preparation of defense on this issue, the need for which was not explicitly negated by the stipulated statement at time of trial. As to the final point on appeal, we find no statutory predicate for the award of an attorney’s fee to claimant. Section 440.34(3)(c), Florida Statutes provides that a claimant is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee in a proceeding in which the employer and carrier deny that an injury has occurred for which compensation benefits are payable, and the claimant prevails on the issue of compensability....

in light of the increase in Pate’s benefits. Section 440.34. Accordingly, this cause is remanded for proceedings

proceeding conducted under the auspices of section 440.34, Florida Statutes; accordingly, the fees are

...maximum medical improvement more than twenty-one days before the carrier voluntarily accepted him as permanently totally disabled. This evidence was required before the employer and carrier were liable for Blacker’s attorney’s fee as provided in Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes....

...its was error. We agree and reverse. The claim for permanent total disability (PTD) was not controverted by the E/C and PTD benefits have been timely paid. Since there was no basis for the assessment of the attorney's fee against the E/C pursuant to § 440.34(3), Fla....

..., reduced to present value, in order to pay attorney's fees. This is because the discounting of the advance payment would have the effect of requiring him to pay interest on the advance obtained to pay his attorney's fee, when he has the right under § 440.34(4), Fla....

...And the claimant expressly waived his right to a hearing to contest the reasonableness of the fee. In a separate filing, the attorneys with a stake in the fee award stipulated to a division of the fees. At the outset, the stipulation noted that the presumptively reasonable fee under section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1993), is $2,025,750....

...two orders. The first awarded fees in the predetermined amounts to the claimant’s prior attorneys. The second order, which is challenged here, reduced Rudolph’s fee from $805,000 to $123,000. After considering the statutory factors set forth in section 440.34(1)(a)–(h), Florida Statutes, the JCC found that the stipulated amount “shocks [his] conscience,” noting that it was “about $4,000 hourly” and “it is coming from a quadriplegic on a ventilator, and the settlement must last h...

...3 an amount “equal to 25 percent of the first $5,000 of the amount of the benefits secured, 20 percent of the next $5,000 of the amount of the benefits secured, and 15 percent of the remaining amount of the benefits secured.” § 440.34(1), Fla....

...(f) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant. (g) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing services. (h) The contingency or certainty of a fee. 440.34(1)(a)–(h), Fla....

...We now turn to a discussion of the award of attorney’s fees. Neither party has furnished us with any appellate cases in Florida passing upon the question now under discussion, nor have we by independent research been able to uncover any. In that regard see State v. Johnson, Fla.1960, 118 So.2d 223 . Section 440.34(1), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., provides in substance that where an employer-carrier shall controvert or decline to pay a claim on or before the 21st day after notice of same or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation,...

...2 Section 440.27(1), Fla.Stat, F.S.A., 3 provides that orders of the full commission entered pursuant to § 440.24, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., shall be subject to review only by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as the pro *186 visions of § 440.34(1), supra, provide that attorney’s fees may be awarded by any court in a proceeding for review of any claim, and the statute makes the Supreme Court of Florida the only reviewing court, it becomes obvious that the circuit court could not...

...tion, and the injured person shall have employed an attorney at law in the successful prosecution of his claim, there shall, in addition to the award for compensation be awarded reasonable attorneys fee, to be approved by the commission =» * *_» . Section 440.34(1)....

...The JCC’s finding that Appellant’s date of accident was March 29, 1992, is reversed. Also, this determination requires that the JCC recompute Appellant’s entitlement to attorney’s fees, which is based upon the benefits secured by his attorney. See § 440.34(2), Fla. Stat. (1997); see also Wiseman v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 569 So.2d 508, 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (holding § 440.34(2) is construed to mean fee should be based on the total benefits secured as a result of the attorney’s intervention); Monterey Builders v....

PER CURIAM. The order appealed is AFFIRMED. Claimant, who suffered a compen-sable accident on July 7, 1980, petitions for appellate attorney’s fees on authority of Section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.)....

...As we pointed out in Ship Shape v. Taylor, 397 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), appellate fees are not available in connection with claims governed by the 1979 amendments to Chapter 440, except in narrow instances. However, through the restoration of pre-1979 fee language in Section 440.34(5), the 1980 Legislature has allowed a reviewing court to award an appellate attorney’s fee in its discretion for accidents occurring on or after July 1, 1980, though no fee was awardable by the deputy commissioner....

ALLEN, Judge. The employer/servicing agent appeal a workers’ compensation order by which the claimant was awarded an attorney’s fee under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989). We conclude that in applying the section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1989) criteria as to the amount of the fee, the judge erred by failing to limit the application of those factors to the benefits which were untimely under section 440.34(3)(b). The statutory criteria should not be applied to payments which were voluntarily made, or which were otherwise timely provided after being claimed, because section 440.34(3)(b) does not authorize a fee in such circumstances. See National Distributing v. Campbell, 632 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Furthermore, in applying the section 440.34(1) criteria the judge should consider only those attorney hours and other factors pertaining to the underlying benefits upon which fee entitlement is properly predicated....

...The issue is whether the judge of compensation claims erred in failing to award an attorney’s fee on the total stipulated amount of permanent total disability benefits and supplemental benefits obtained for claimant, in accordance with the statutory formula set forth in section 440.34, Florida Statutes....

...See § 440.15(3)(b)3.c, Fla.Stat. (1987). Based on these calculations, the judge awarded an attorney’s fee of $9,245.81, *281 concluding that this amount represented the statutory fee based on the benefits obtained for the claimant through the efforts of his attorney. Section 440.34(2), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: In awarding a reasonable attorney’s fee, the deputy commissioner shall consider only those benefits to the claimant that the attorney is responsible for securing....

...to retain and hold those amounts from “any and all monies paid to the claimant” for the benefit of claimant’s attorney. We reverse on the authority of East Coast Tire Co. v. Denmark, 381 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In Denmark , this Court disapproved an identical retainer agreement. Although we stated that § 440.34, Florida Statutes, does not require successful prosecution of a claim or performance of legal services before a fee is approved, the deputy commissioner is not relieved from considering the statutory standards in determining the amount of the award....

...ich legal services had been or would be rendered. Finally, the Order’s provision requiring the appellant/employer to retain and pay to the claimant’s attorney a certain percentage from “all monies paid to claimant” is invalid under Denmark . Section 440.34(3) does not authorize such continuing duties upon the employer or its carrier....

...Following the accident, appellant entered into a contract to retain an attorney. On September 20, 1979, appellant filed a standard form application for hearing, stating that the purpose for requesting a hearing was to obtain approval of a contract to employ an attorney pursuant to Section 440.34, Fla.Stat....

...The application fails to claim any specific compensation benefit, as required under Section 440.19(2)(d), which is due but has not been paid or is not being provided. The sole purpose of appellant’s application for hearing was to obtain the deputy commissioner’s approval of a contract to employ an attorney pursuant to Section 440.34(1), Fla.Stat....

...Volusia County Fire Services and County Risk Management, respectively the employer and carrier, seek reversal of a order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarding attorney’s fees to the claimant, Alan Eaby, appellee, on the authority of sections 440.34(3)(b) and 440.192(8), Florida Statutes (1995)....