Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...[*], 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). [6] The United States Supreme Court has recognized that different categories exist concerning attorney's fees. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). [7] See § 440.34, Fla. Stat. (1987). [8] § 73.091, Fla....

...minated by the 2006 amendment clarifying that the rule dictates only the latest date for service of the motion and did not intend for there to be only a narrow window of thirty days following the judgment. [2] These fees are not at issue here. Under section 73.091(1), Florida Statutes (2004), the condemning authority was required to pay attorneys' fees and reasonable costs incurred in the circuit court eminent domain proceedings....

...by an attorney in creating or bringing into the court a fund or other property. Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1967) (on rehearing 1968) (citation omitted) There is no contract here nor any equitable fund or estate, but appellee argues that Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1975), authorizes the award of attorneys' fees in proceedings to establish statutory ways of necessity. Section 73.091 directs the award of a reasonable attorney's fee in eminent domain cases brought under the provisions of Chapter 73, Florida Statutes, but does not purport to authorize the award of attorneys' fees in litigation brought under statutes in other chapters....

...cept for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner "(b) Provision may be made by law for the taking of easements, by like proceedings, for the drainage of land of one person over or through the land of another." Chapter 73.091, Florida Statutes (which is the Eminent Domain Statute) provides: "Petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceeding in Circuit Court, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by the Court." In Stein v....

...rse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties." Additionally, under Florida law the condemnee is protected from financial harassment since the court may tax the costs of discovery against the condemnor. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.280(b)(3)(C). See also, Section 73.091, Florida Statutes, which requires the condemning authority to pay all reasonable costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred by a land owner in these court proceedings....

...Because the contamination rendered their well water useless, one of the Schicks' legal theories and the claim on which they ultimately prevailed [2] was inverse condemnation. In their complaint, the Schicks requested that costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, be assessed against the Department pursuant to section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...indings to support application of the multiplier. Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Schick, 553 So.2d 361, 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ( Schick III ). However, although the district court recognized that "[f]requently a fee awardable pursuant to section 73.091 would not appropriately include a contingency risk factor," it rejected the contention that the trial court erred in applying a risk multiplier to the fees awarded in this case. Id. It concluded that under circumstances such as this, where entitlement to a fee under section 73.091 does not vest until the land-owner overcomes the hurdle of showing inverse condemnation, application of a contingency risk factor can be upheld if adequate reasons for the award are set forth by the trial court....

...easonable attorney's fee, utilization of the lodestar method, with its contingency risk factors, is "unnecessary." Id. at 834-35. While discussing the third category, which includes eminent domain actions where the attorney is assured of a fee under section 73.091, we noted: Under ordinary circumstances, a contingency fee multiplier is not justified in this category, although the basic lodestar method of computing a reasonable attorney's fee may be an appropriate starting point....

...The district court properly construed our decision in Quanstrom as effectively overruling Schick III. This is because the legislature has specifically included in section 73.092 the criteria to be considered in awarding attorney's fees pursuant to section 73.091, and neither the contingent nature of the fee arrangement nor the risk of nonpayment of fees is an authorized consideration. We therefore answer the certified question in the negative and hold that in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee award, made pursuant to section 73.091 in an inverse condemnation action, a Rowe contingency risk multiplier should not be utilized....

...*645 I also agree with Judge Wolf that if an inverse condemnation action is considered a category three proceeding, the findings in the instant case justify application of the risk multipliers. See Schick IV, 580 So.2d at 652 (Wolf, J., dissenting). Although section 73.091 has been construed as providing for attorney's fees in successful inverse condemnation actions, the statutory criteria for determining a reasonable fee do not adequately provide guidance in a case such as this....

...e of a multiplier). The polestar for determining the criteria and principles to be utilized in arriving at a reasonable attorney's fee must be the underlying purpose of the fee-authorizing statute or rule. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d at 835. The purpose of section 73.091 is to "assure that the property owner is made whole when the condemning authority takes the owner's property." Id....

...sing a reasonable fee following a successful determination that a taking had occurred in an inverse condemnation claim. Schick IV, 580 So.2d at 651. To assure that the property owner is made whole, the principles employed in making a fee award under section 73.091 must be flexible enough to allow for application of a contingency risk factor where special circumstances warrant such application....

...on. Schick v. Florida Dept. of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 504 So.2d 1318, 1320 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 513 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 1987). [3] The Department concedes that attorney's fees in a successful inverse condemnation action are awardable under section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...The statute, as enacted in 1963 and renumbered in 1965, provides: "The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by that court." Laws of 1965, Ch. 65-369. The provision is now Fla. Stat. § 73.091, F.S.A....

...We conclude that in light of the statute enacted by the 1963 Legislature, which changed the law from that established in our decisions cited for conflict, any conflict which does exist is purely illusory, and the order of the trial judge granting attorneys' fees is within the purview of Fla. Stat. § 73.091, F.S.A....

...ses the Hodges' intended to use to prove business damages and the Hodges' contention that the court improperly reduced the award of their attorneys' fees to the extent that the attorneys had expended time on the issue of business damages. Fla. Stat. § 73.091 (1973) requires the condemning authority to pay all reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the property owner....

...We are still under a mandate to acquire this property and as I publicly stated in the presence of these gentlemen before the County Commission, because we dismissed this suit, that didn't mean we are walking away from the acquisition program." [4] The requirement for the payment thereof is fixed by § 73.091 Fla....

...The Fourth District has also found Rowe inapplicable in instances in which the Legislature has provided specific guidelines for determination of attorney's fee awards. Division of Administration, et al. v. Ruslan, Inc., et al., 497 So.2d 1348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (award of attorney's fees in condemnation cases is governed by section 73.091-.092, Florida Statutes, rather than Rowe )....

...However, that principle would also include liability for interest where the constitution requires it. Here, the constitution provides for full compensation, which requires that the property owner be made whole. See Orange County. Further, the governing statute, section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1997), provides for the payment of all "reasonable" expenses; it does not prohibit the payment of interest within the meaning of "reasonable." Accordingly, we hold that prejudgment interest is to be awarded on reason...

...ny (collectively "the condemnee"), $110,000 for attorneys' fees and $1,950.50 for expert witness fees in this condemnation case. The DOT argues that the trial court erred because it failed to calculate the attorneys' fees in conformity with sections 73.091 and 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993) [1] , and this court's rulings....

...* * * * * * (4) In determining the amount of attorney's fees to be paid by the petitioner, the court shall be guided by the fees the defendant would ordinarily be expected to pay if the petitioner were not responsible for the payment of fees and costs. [2] The eminent domain case was filed on June 30, 1994. Therefore, section 73.091(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), does not apply....

...s." The first portion of the phrase uses both terms, while the modifying clause refers only to "costs." This omission *893 of "attorney's fees" is significant. We reject the LaPointe's argument that the parties used the term "costs" as it is used in section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1989), to include attorney's fees....

...reasonable fees would have been $50,000, $52,650 and $63,600, the award of $15,000 attorney's fee after the parcel was dismissed from the proceeding was grossly inadequate. [2] Art. X, § 6, Fla. Const.; Fla. Stat. §§ 374.071-.161. [3] Fla. Stat. § 73.091.

...McIntosh $35,582.50 in fees, a sum which results in a rate of approximately $847 per hour. The County raises several challenges to this fee award. First, the County maintains that the trial court erred in awarding Mr. McIntosh fees for the hours he spent pursuing Butler's claim for rent. We agree. Section 73.091 of the Florida Statutes (1993), does not specify the type of legal work which is compensable in eminent domain proceedings....

...1st DCA 1962), an award of fees for work performed in an ancillary proceeding was proper because the proceeding was necessary to apportion the respective interests of the landowner and the tenant, and the compensation was paid from public funds. This case law is consistent with the amended version of section 73.091, which narrows the language of the attorney's fee statute to authorize the condemning authority to pay only those attorney's fees "incurred in the defense" of the eminent domain proceeding. See § 73.091, Fla.Stat....

...Foerster, of Foerster, Isaac & Yerkes, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee Pauline Arndt. No Appearance for Appellees Charles W. Clayton, Jr. and W. Malcolm Clayton. COBB, Judge. This appeal challenges the validity of an attorney's fees award in an eminent domain action. Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1993), applicable to this case, provides: Costs of the proceedings....

...1990); Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1985). In certain types of cases, however, the legislature has, by statute, altered the case law criteria for calculating an attorney's fee. In the case of eminent domain, for example, the legislature has provided in section 73.091 that the condemning authority will pay a "reasonable fee" except as provided in 73.092....

...The high court has never said that a fee for work performed by a Florida lawyer which would be excessive under these criteria would nevertheless be a "reasonable" fee properly awardable by a Florida court and collectible by a Florida attorney simply because it was authorized by statute. Based on the language of section 73.091, and to avoid any constitutional issue, we interpret section 73.092 to make fee awards subject to the overarching requirement that the fee be reasonable....

...All property is owned subject to the power of eminent domain. Where that power is exercised in good faith, damages will not be assessed against the unsuccessful exercise of that legal right, although the landowner is entitled to costs and attorney's fees. § 73.091, Fla....

...All property is owned subject to the power of eminent domain. Where that power is exercised in good faith, damages will not be assessed against the unsuccessful exercise of that legal right, although the landowner is entitled to costs and attorney's fees. § 73.091, Fla....

...The owner was made a defendant in the condemnation action. The question of the value of the property or rights therein which were taken by the city on condemnation was the subject of extensive litigation in the cause. In Chapter 73 Fla. Stat., F.S.A., relating to eminent domain, § 73.091 provides: "The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by that court." Allowance of such costs and attorney fees was proper and in accordance with the statute, notwithstanding the jury awarded zero compensation....

...ether. To begin with, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees in eminent domain cases involving dismissal before trial. City of Hallandale v. Chatlos, Fla. 1970, 236 So.2d 761 and City of Miami Beach v. Cummings, Fla.App. 1970, 239 So.2d 501; § 73.091, Fla....

...Moreover, the trial court was authorized, under the circumstances of a termination of the case before trial, to take expert testimony as to the value of the property involved for the purposes of establishing the reasonable attorney's fees to be assessed. § 73.091, Fla....

...Since the element of damages defendant sought in the administrative appeal was not created by the constitution, costs of the appeal of the denial of that item will be awarded only where they are provided for by contract or by statute. E.g., Conner v. State Road Department, 66 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1953). Although Section 73.091, Florida Statutes, applies regardless of whether the damages sought are awarded, the item must be sought in the circuit court proceedings....

...at this time but was seeking only the alternate § 4622(c) payment. [2] The federal statutory scheme does not provide for an award of expenses for relief sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4622 (1971). [3] Defendant does not attack this award. [4] Sec. 73.091, Fla....

...r recoveries in tort cases where liability has been admitted. Thus, the fee was arrived at as follows: $ 414,750 Lodestar $ 200,000 20% of the first $1,000,000 of benefit $1,170,000 15% of the benefit exceeding the first million $1,784,750 Total fee Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1989), the statute applicable to this case, requires the court to assess an attorney's fee in a condemnation proceeding using the following factors: (1) Benefits resulting to the client from the services rendered....

...However, the court noted that the basic lodestar method of computing a reasonable attorney's fee may be an appropriate starting point. Finally, in Schick v. Dept. of Agric. & Cons. Services, 599 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1992), the court held that a Rowe contingency risk multiplier should not be utilized because section 73.091 criteria did not include consideration of either the contingent nature of the fee arrangement nor the risk of nonpayment of the fee....

...as costs in an action unless authorized by contract or statute. [2] Accordingly, the case is remanded to the lower court for entry of an amended cost judgment excluding attorneys' fees. BOARDMAN, Acting C.J., and GRIMES, J., concur. NOTES [1] See F.S. 73.091 which requires a petitioner in a condemnation action to pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including a reasonable attorneys' fee to be assessed by that court....

...ma for not allowing fees for litigating fees, i.e. that the party entitled to recover attorney's fees has no stake in the amount of the fee awarded by the court, does not apply under a statutory scheme like the one applicable in Delco and this case. Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1993), provides that: "[T]he petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including, but not limited to, a reasonable attorney's fee ...." (emphasis supplied)....

...have a care, or the lawmakers will expressly limit the amount of fruit which can be harvested from those trees. 354 So.2d at 103. As to the appraiser's fees we reach a different result. Reasonable appraiser fees are clearly allowable as costs under section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...ut recovery for intangible damages is governed by legislative largesse. The legislature has seen fit to require compensation for business damages under section 73.071, Florida Statutes (1991), and for costs, attorney's fees, and appraisal fees under section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The proceeding below, and this appeal, arise out of and are incident to the initial eminent domain proceeding. Shaws are entitled to be paid by DOT all reasonable costs incurred in the proceeding below and incident to this appeal, including a reasonable attorneys' fee to be assessed by the court. (F.S. 73.091) The trial court is better equipped to hear evidence and make such a determination than are we....

...The Department of Transportation claims that the $50,000.00 fee was excessive and not in accord with the holding in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). The award of attorneys' fees in condemnation proceedings is governed by the provisions of Section 73.091-.092, Florida Statutes (1985) rather than Rowe....

...Sarasota County initiated an eminent domain proceeding seeking to acquire title to portions of twenty-three parcels of land with frontage along the Bee Ridge Road for the purpose of widening the road. Following the trial a hearing was conducted in connection with fees and costs. See § 73.091, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...The County also challenges the award of costs for certain exhibits. Such costs include copies of depositions and photographs. The costs totalled $793.86 for parcel 3 and $444.72 for parcel 17. The County claims, inter alia, that reimbursement for the costs of depositions not used at trial was error. Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1985), states that: "The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by that court." In resolving the questioned costs for depositions, we rely on our sister court's statement in Plante v....

...Although the appeal of an eminent domain award automatically operated as a stay of the proceedings, the trial court may retain jurisdiction to decide matters collateral to the appeal. See Sunrise Beach, Inc. v. Phillips, 181 So.2d 169, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). Affirmed. NOTES [1] Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1979) has placed the entire responsibility for costs of a condemnation proceeding on the petitioner....

...The [condemning authority as] petitioner shall pay attorney's fees ... as well as all reasonable costs incurred in the defense of the proceedings in the circuit court, including, but not limited to, reasonable appraisal fees and, when business damages are compensable, a reasonable accountant's fee. § 73.091(1), Fla.Stat....

...the Woods case, and that the trial court erred in categorically rejecting his fee as a cost on the authority of Woods. (In doing so, we do not reach the question the Woods court decided.) On appeal, DOT maintains that, even if Woods is not apposite, section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1993), does not authorize awards of marketing experts' fees as costs....

...In addition, the condemning authority is required to pay all reasonable and necessary costs incurred in the defense of an eminent domain proceeding, including experts fees. Dep't of Transp. v. Jack's Quick Cash, Inc., 748 So.2d 1049, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1998) governs the award of fees and costs in eminent domain proceedings, and provides: (1) The petitioner shall pay attorney's fees as provided in s....

...Upsala's agreement with its attorney provided the following with regard to the retention of experts: 3. Client authorizes attorney to hire as experts on client's behalf only those experts who will accept employment for the fees and costs awarded by the court pursuant to Florida Statute, section 73.091(1991)....

...The fees to which Zook and Morris are entitled are not dependent under the contract on the outcome of the case. Zook and Morris simply agreed to accept whatever fee the court determined to be reasonable for any necessary services rendered. This is a statutory prerequisite to the assessment of any such fee in all cases. See § 73.091(1), Fla....

...Accordingly, any work performed by Morris was unrelated to the eminent domain proceedings, and cannot be taxed against Seminole County. Next, we consider the fees awarded to Zook and Morris for time their employees spent in depositions taken by Seminole County regarding their fees. Section 73.091(1) addresses costs of eminent domain proceedings and provides for payment of attorney's fees and "all reasonable costs incurred in the defense of the proceedings." The expenses associated with expert depositions are included in these costs. See Sarasota County v. Burdette, 524 So.2d 1064, 1066-67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (condemnees were entitled to reimbursement for costs of depositions in eminent domain proceeding, although depositions were not used at trial). But section 73.091 speaks to fees incurred in defending the eminent domain proceedings, not the award of expert fees for litigating either the entitlement to, or amount of, such fees....

...Florida courts have long recognized that a condemning authority cannot acquire property at a depressed value because of the threat of condemnation. State Road Dept. v. Chicone, 158 So.2d 753 (Fla.1963). See also Dade County v. Still, 377 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1979); City of Miami v. Romer, 73 So.2d 285 (Fla.1954). Section 73.091, Fla....

...s, because trial counsel was admittedly a novice in such cases and unfamiliar with the procedures. After successfully litigating the matter, the landowner requested and received an award of costs for the consultant, which we must now consider. Under section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1993), the landowner is entitled to just compensation from the condemning authority, including the payment of expenses which aid in a determination of just valuation....

...City of Homestead, 407 So.2d 920 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The consultant in this case was not hired as an expert witness, but to assist the landowner's attorney in the litigation. His function was not to render an opinion on just valuation. Therefore, there is no basis under section 73.091 for an award of his fees....

...ering witnesses and real estate appraisers, interviewing witnesses, evaluating the real estate appraisals on both sides and attending meetings at the site. The trial court determined that the consultant's services were both reasonable and necessary. Section 73.091 mandates that the condemning authority shall pay the landowner all reasonable costs of the proceedings....

...It might be worthwhile to recall that the Florida Constitution, Article X, Section 6(a), reads: "No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit on the registry of the court and available to the owner." Further, Fla. Stat. § 73.091, F.S.A....

...rogram conducted by appellant. After numerous court proceedings, including dismissals and appeals, appellees finally prevailed when a judgment was entered in their favor in the amount of approximately $326,000. Their attorney sought fees pursuant to Section 73.091, Florida Statutes, representing that she had invested 857.25 hours in the case, plus 21 hours obtaining a reversal on appeal [1] from the original dismissal of the action by the trial judge....

...On remand, the trial court may determine that a contingency risk factor should be applied in the award of attorney fees in this case even though the fees are awarded pursuant to a statute. See Inacio v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 550 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Frequently a fee awardable pursuant to section 73.091 would not appropriately include a contingency risk factor. However, under certain circumstances, such as perhaps in the instant case where entitlement to a fee under 73.091 did not vest until appellees overcame the hurdle of showing inverse condemnation, application of a contingency risk factor can be upheld if adequate reasons for such an award are set forth....

...or establishing business damages on parcel 114. Because no other issue remained to be tried, the court also entered final judgment in favor of the DOT. However, the court retained jurisdiction to determine the costs to be awarded to Bill Brown under section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...e experts retained by Bill Brown in relation to parcel 114. The DOT filed a motion asking the court to disallow the costs, arguing that they were not recoverable by Bill Brown because its business damages were not "compensable" within the meaning of section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...State of Florida, Department of Transportation, 714 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). 3. The fees of the experts were reasonable and based upon the time necessary to complete their individual work efforts. The entitlement to recovery of fees and costs is controlled by section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1991): Except as provided in s....

...titutional guarantee. Texaco, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 537 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1989). Business damages are allowed only as a matter of legislative grace. Id.; Jamesson v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 322 So.2d 510, 511 (Fla.1975). Prior to the amendment to section 73.091, only one Florida court appears to *1053 have held that "expert" witness fees incurred by condemnees in an unsuccessful attempt to establish business damages were recoverable by the condemnees as part of the "reasonable costs" incurred in a condemnation proceeding....

...d in attempting to establish this claim and to reasonable expert witness fees related to their attempt to establish their right to business damages. The court found that these expenses should be considered as "reasonable costs" within the meaning of section 73.091....

...usiness. The DOT had apparently conceded, in settling with the landowner, that the landowner had a "compensable" claim for business damages. The DOT nonetheless asserted that it was not required to pay the landowner's business damages expert because section 73.091 required it to pay only a reasonable accountant's fee in connection with a claim for business damages....

...depends on the type and volume of business that can be conducted there. Id. at 4. Bill Brown urges that Garber stands for the proposition that "business damage" costs are included in the costs that the condemning authority "shall pay." We disagree. Section 73.091 is a badly written statute but appears to authorize compensation for business damage experts only when the business damage claim is compensable....

...tional right to full compensation and the statutory right to business damages. Recovery of attorney's fees, expert witness fees, or any other cost by the losing party, is an anomaly of Florida's broad constitutional right to full compensation. Under section 73.091, business damage expert fees are to be recovered only when business damages are compensable....

...73.092 as well as all reasonable costs incurred in the defense of the proceedings in the circuit court, including, but not limited to, reasonable appraisal fees and, when business damages, are compensable, a reasonable accountant's fees, to be assessed by that court. § 73.091(1), Fla....

...1970, 233 So.2d 842, 844, we ruled: "The city also argues that since there was no actual taking of the land of these defendants (appellees), it is not liable to them for attorneys' fees which their attorneys have performed for them in this suit. We find no merit in this argument. See § 73.091, Fla....

...On 30 January 1995, DEP moved to voluntarily dismiss its petition, alleging that access to Gibbins' property was no longer necessary. The trial court granted the motion. On the same day, Gibbins filed a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to sections 73.091 and 73.092, Florida Statutes, asserting that he had defeated "an order of taking." On 6 July 1995, the court ruled that DEP's administrative order for site access and petition for injunctive relief constituted a taking....

...The court finds that the administrative proceedings and the complaint filed herein constitute a "taking" of [Gibbins'] property as defined by Art. X, § 6, Fla. Const. (1968). [2] 2. [Gibbins] is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees incurred in the defense of the "taking" pursuant to § 73.091 and § 73.092, Fla....

...itute a taking. At most, DEP's actions could have resulted in an inverse condemnation. The pleadings before the trial court were insufficient to commence condemnation proceedings, and Gibbins was therefore not entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to section 73.091....

...[3] Gibbins' concession is well-taken since the record does not reveal any physical appropriation or substantial loss of access to his property. Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1989). [4] Entitlement to costs and attorney's fees under section 73.091 survives voluntary dismissal of a petition....

litigation consultant were not recoverable under section 73.091, which authorizes an award of costs in eminent

...at argument, stating: On remand, the trial court may determine that a contingency risk factor should be applied in the award of attorney fees in this case even though the fees are awarded pursuant to a statute. Frequently a fee awardable pursuant to section 73.091 would not appropriately include a contingency risk factor. However, under certain circumstances, such as perhaps in the instant case where entitlement to a fee under 73.091 did not vest until appellees overcame the hurdle of showing inverse condemnation, application of a contingency risk factor can be upheld if adequate reasons for such an award are set forth. Id. at 362 (citation omitted). Pursuant to our directive, the trial court entered a final order awarding appellees attorney's fees pursuant to Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Those six factors do not include consideration of the contingent or fixed nature of a fee arrangement between the client and his attorney. It appears, therefore, that any *651 such consideration is irrelevant when determining an award under sections 73.091 and .092....

...injustice would result in not applying Quanstrom to this case. I disagree. The decision in Quanstrom is not contrary to the result reached in Schick III. This court in Schick III specifically recognized that [f]requently, a fee awardable pursuant to section 73.091 [the eminent domain fee statute] would not appropriately include a contingency risk factor. However, under certain circumstances, such as perhaps in the instant case where entitlement to a fee under 73.091 did not vest until appellees overcame the hurdle of showing inverse condemnation, application of a contingency risk factor can be upheld if adequate reasons for such an award are set forth....

...I believe that these findings are supported by competent substantial evidence and comply with the previous mandate of this court in Schick III and the requirement of Quanstrom, as explained in Platt, for elucidation of adequate reasons which justify application of a contingency risk factor to a fee award pursuant to section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1987)....

two sections which discuss attorney’s fees. Section 73.091 sets forth the parameters within which to award

inverse condemnation action is governed by section 73.091, Florida Statutes (2010). That section provides

eminent domain *1208proceeding.1 Pursuant to section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1987), the property owner

...it considered that count to no longer be a part of the complaint. And, as noted previously, the parties agreed that count III was the only count pursuant to which the appellants would have been entitled to attorney's fees. Although we recognize that section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1987), provides for a petitioner to pay attorney's fees as part of the costs incurred in an eminent domain proceeding, we do not feel that this statute is applicable in the instant case....

...e offer and acceptance are silent as to attorney's fees, an award of such fees is not allowable. *124 River Road; George v. Northcraft, 476 So.2d 758 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). The McDermotts are entitled to attorney's fees as the "prevailing party" under section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1987) [3] , pursuant to their claim for inverse condemnation....

...to writing, signed and made a matter of record." Florida Citrus Commission v. Griffin, 249 So.2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) (quoting Egantoff v. Herring, 177 So.2d 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)). See also Matthews v. Stein, 362 So.2d 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). [3] Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1987) provides in pertinent part: [T]he petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including, but not limited to, a reasonable attorney's fee......

litigation consultant were not recoverable under section 73.091, which authorizes an award of costs in eminent

...We affirm the first two issues relating to Nassau's entitlement to fees and costs, but reverse and remand the order granting its motion to tax reasonable costs as to parcels 209/805, with directions to the lower court to make explicit findings justifying the awards therein entered, as required by section 73.091(5), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...In regard to the second motion, DOT disputed its responsibility to pay attorney fees and expert witness fees incurred in litigating the motion for costs, on the ground that the owner had no contractual obligation to pay its experts for their efforts, because section 73.091 required the condemning authority to pay, and thus the owner had no legal interest in the amount of fees....

...We also note that the Second District has expressly followed Amoco in Enterprising Professional Investment Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D555 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar.5, 2004) (holding that a post-trial proceeding to recover attorney's fees and costs under section 73.091(1) is a "supplemental proceeding" under section 73.092(2))....

...Accordingly, these expenses were recoverable as costs. See Seminole County v. Chandrinos, 816 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Dep't of Transp. v. Patel, 768 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). We do agree with DOT that the lower court erred by failing to make the findings required by section 73.091(5), when it entered the order granting the motion to tax reasonable costs as to parcels 209/805. Section 73.091(5) specifically states: "The court shall make specific findings that justify each sum awarded as an expert witness fee." (Emphasis added.) *1288 What "specific findings" means is an issue of first impression....

...In contrast, in the Order Taxing Supplemental Attorney's Fees And Costs, the court listed the hours, rate, and total fee owed to each expert. DOT does not challenge the sufficiency of the findings in the latter order, and it appears from subsections (2), (3), and (4) of section 73.091 that these are the findings necessary for an award of expert witness fees....

judgment for their attorney’s fees as costs. See Section 73.091, Fla.Stat.1 F.S.A. The trial court took testimony

Statutes pertains to eminent domain proceedings. Section 73.091(1) of the Florida Statutes authorizes Florida’s

...a question of law subject to de novo review. Pompano Beach Cmty. Redevelopment Agency v. Holland, 82 So. 3d 1034, 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). As part of full compensation for a taking, the condemning authority must pay the property owner’s attorney’s fees. § 73.091, Fla....

consideration the factors discussed above. Reading F.S. § 73.091, F.S.A., in pari materia with F.S. § 73.131, F

not using the “benefits achieved” standard of section 73.091, Florida Statutes (2009), when the Department

...Manilow, 253 So.2d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), the court determined that Griffin was entitled to have its attorney's fees paid even though it was dismissed from the lawsuit prior to trial. The court awarded Griffin fees for 8.9 hours for a total of $1,330. Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1993), provides for the award of attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings....

...award of attorney's fees. Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1954); Grieser v. Division of Admin., State Dep't of Transp., 371 So.2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). We conclude an ownership interest in the property is required for a fee award under section 73.091, even when a party is dismissed from the suit prior to trial....

...bly correct but legally erroneous. Attorney's fees cannot be taxed as costs in any cause unless provided for by contract or by statute or where a fund has been created or brought into court. Colvin v. Homan, 442 So.2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Because section 73.091 authorizes the award of fees only to a party with an ownership interest in the property, there was no authority for the award of fees....

basis. We find merit to the DOT's contentions. Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that the

the motions to tax attorney’s fees and costs, section 73.091, Florida Statutes (2000), obligates the Department

subsequently sought payment for costs and fees under section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1987) for both proceedings

proceedings to recover the cost of its experts under section 73.091(1), Florida Statutes (2001). We conclude that

recover the cost of her experts pursuant to section 73.091(1), Florida Statutes (2001). For the reasons

attorney’s fees to appellant’s attorney. Fla.Stat. § 73.091, F.S.A., provides: “The petitioner shall pay all

judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Daystar under section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1989), which provides that

including a reasonable attorney’s fee * * * ”, Section 73.091, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. and “ * * * all'

recover the costs of their experts pursuant to section 73.091(1), Florida Statutes (2001). For the reasons

interest in the property. The court reasoned: Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1993), provides for the

eminent domain proceeding instituted pursuant to section 73.091, Florida Statutes (2008). A portion of the

herein. JOHNSON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur. . F.S. § 73.091, F.S.A. “The petitioner shall pay all reasonable

...ressly authorized by a statute, rule or contract. Hubbel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 758 So.2d 94, 97 (Fla. 2000). Chapter 73, Florida Statutes, governing eminent domain actions in Florida, provides for attorney's fee awards in three sections: 73.015, 73.091 and 73.092....

...Section 73.015(4) states, in pertinent part: If a settlement is reached between the condemning authority and a property or business owner prior to a lawsuit being filed, the property or business owner who settles compensation claims in lieu of condemnation shall be entitled to recover costs in the same manner as provided in s. 73.091 and attorney's fees in the same manner as provided in s....

...the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning."); see also Deen v. Wilson, 1 So.3d 1179, 1182 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (discussing the principle of statutory construction "expression unius est exclusion alterius," which means the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another). Section 73.091(1) states in pertinent part that: "The petitioner shall pay attorney's fees as provided in s....

...For example, this second method of determining fees has been used where the condemnor files suit and later voluntarily dismisses the action, see Department of Transportation v. ABS Properties Partnership, 693 So.2d 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), a situation for which entitlement to fees is established by section 73.091(1)—but no method for determining the amount of the fee award is otherwise provided for in chapter 73....

appellees attorney’s fees and costs under Section 73.-091, Florida Statutes (1983), including fees and

were not “compensable” within the meaning of section 73.091(1), Florida Statutes (1995), which provided

...tment of Transportation v. Jack's Quick Cash, Inc., 748 So.2d 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), to conclude that a defendant in an eminent domain proceeding is not entitled to recover the costs of expert witnesses in support of a business damage claim under section 73.091, Florida Statutes (2004), unless the defendant actually recovers business damages....

...Pinnacle argued that it was entitled to recover reasonable experts' fees incurred in litigating the business damages claim even though it did not recover any money from the jury. The issue at the hearing and on appeal involves the interpretation of section 73.091(1), which states: The petitioner shall pay attorney's fees as provided in s....

...As the Fifth District pointed out in Jack's Quick Cash, an award of business damages in an eminent domain proceeding is not a constitutional right. Business damages are merely a remedy authorized by statute. [1] The statute must be strictly construed in favor of the state. 748 So.2d at 1052. Although section 73.091 could be better drafted, strictly construed, it establishes a condition precedent to the award of experts' fees [2] in a business damages claim. The condition precedent is satisfied when "business damages are compensable." § 73.091(1)....

...LaROSE, J., and DAKAN, STEPHEN L., Associate Senior Judge, Concur. NOTES [1] For a recent discussion of the nature of business damages claims, see System Components Corp. v. Florida Department of Transportation, 14 So.3d 967 (Fla.2009). [2] The express language of section 73.091 appears to require the condemning authority to pay only for "a reasonable accountant's fee" on business damages claims....

landowner filed a motion to tax costs pursuant to section 73.091, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), and Judge McDonald

...In re Amendments to Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs, 915 So. 2d [612, 616-17 (Fla. 2005)]; see also Broward Cnty. v. LaPointe, 685 So. 2d 889, 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (fees attributable to services as a litigation consultant were not recoverable under section 73.091, which authorizes an award of costs in eminent domain cases)....

any reference to attorney’s fees. Instead, Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1977), simply provides:

this suit. We find no merit in this argument. See § 73.091, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.; Jacksonville Expressway Auth