Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The State Retirement Commission (Commission) denied Caldwell's claim for "disability in line of duty" benefits, costs, and attorney's fee. Caldwell, a fireman, suffered a heart attack. The district court of appeal held that the Commission erred in refusing to apply section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), which provided that any impairment of health of a fireman caused by heart disease resulting in total disability is presumed to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary, is shown by competent evidence....

...ormance of duty required by a member's employment during his regularly scheduled working hours or irregular working hours as required by the employer. § 121.021(13), Fla. Stat. (1975). The district court of appeal in its opinion correctly held that section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), was applicable....

...It is not overcome until the trier of fact believes that the presumed fact has been overcome by whatever degree of persuasion is required by the substantive law of the case. This may be by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, as the case may be. The presumption contained in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), affects the burden of persuasion....

...Just as this Court developed a general formula for dealing with the difficult problem of proving the occupational causation of heart attacks in workmen's compensation cases ( Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc., v. Beasley, 141 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1971)), so did the legislature establish a general rule for firemen in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The holding of the First District Court of Appeal in the case sub judice that the presumption was overcome where there was conflicting evidence of causation is in error and should be quashed. The portion of the opinion of the district court of appeal holding that section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), should be applied in these proceedings and the holding that Caldwell is not entitled to attorney's fee and costs are approved....

the Court held: The presumption contained in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), affects the burden

...The City defended on several grounds urging, among other things, that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and that since claimant's heart disease was a preexisting condition, he was not entitled to the statutory presumption afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...general public." § 440.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1985). Although heart disease is not ordinarily compensable as an occupational disease, Russell v. State, Department of Corrections, 464 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the Florida Legislature has enacted section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1985), which establishes a statutory presumption that heart disease suffered by a fireman is connected with the exertions of his work so long as the fireman passes a preemployment physical examination without evidence of such disease. Section 112.18(1) applies to chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...to run. Upon remand, the City will be permitted to raise its other defenses, not yet ruled upon by the deputy, including its contention that claimant's heart disease was a preexisting condition and that claimant is not entitled to the presumption of section 112.18(1)....

...In this workers’ compensation appeal, the Employer challenges the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) determination that it failed to sufficiently rebut the presumption of occupational causation afforded Claimant, a law enforcement officer, under section 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...demonstrating a non-occupational cause for the SVT. See Fuller v. Okaloosa Corr. Inst., 22 So. 3d 803, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“Because a claimant’s burden of proving major contributing cause (MCC) by medical evidence, is fully met where the presumption contained in section 112.18(1) is applied, the Employer, in rebutting the presumption must likewise disprove occupational causation by medical evidence.”). The JCC found, as supported by the medical testimony, that the SVT was caused by a slow pathway...

...1st DCA July 21, 2008), and substitute the following opinion. Appellant, Robert Punsky, the claimant below, seeks review of an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying workers' compensation benefits. We affirm the order, because, although the presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2005), applies, competent substantial evidence of record supports the JCC's alternative ruling that the presumption was rebutted by the medical evidence introduced by appellees....

...then employed as a deputy sheriff, suffered a heart attack on June 24, 2005, while asleep. He sought workers' compensation benefits, alleging that stress from his job as a police officer had caused the heart attack and that he was entitled to invoke section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, often referred to as the "firefighter's presumption." At the hearing, the medical evidence presented unanimously supported a conclusion that claimant's heart attack was facilitated and, more likely than not, caused by a genetic condition known as combined familial hyperlipidemia (CFL)....

...he evidence of non-industrial causation. ANALYSIS As to the threshold question, whether the statutory presumption applies, the JCC determined that Punsky did not merit application of the presumption because he failed his pre-employment physical. See § 112.18(1), Fla....

...physical examination. Turning to the more salient issue, however, we conclude that appellees rebutted the presumption sufficiently under the statute and the controlling case law, as the JCC here properly found as an alternative basis for her order. Section 112.18(1) establishes a presumption that certain health conditions incurred by any designated firefighter or law enforcement officer are accidental and "have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence." Thus, section 112.18(1) expressly provides that the presumption can be rebutted by "competent evidence." Nothing in this statute indicates that the legislature required an elevated burden of proof to rebut the presumption....

...d by the substantive law of the case. This may be by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, as the case may be. Caldwell, 372 So.2d at 440 (citations omitted). As the supreme court concluded, the presumption embodied in section 112.18(1) affects the burden of persuasion and, accordingly, it is not in the nature of a vanishing presumption which, as the court discussed in the passage quoted above, dissolves upon the introduction of conflicting evidence....

...There was evidence that the disease was caused by arteriosclerosis unrelated to the claimant's employment and there was also evidence that the stress of the claimant's employment over a period of time caused in whole or in part the heart attack. In Caldwell the court held that the statutory presumption of § 112.18(1) prevails in cases where the medical evidence is conflicting and the quantum of proof is balanced....

...We note that City of Temple Terrace is one case in which this court has ruled on the merits of the case by reweighing the evidence and reversing the deputy. To that extent, we recede from City of Temple Terrace. In summary, there is a clear path for the application of the section 112.18(1) presumption....

...e clear and convincing evidence standard. Even though we are bound to follow Caldwell, see Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 440 (Fla.1973), which we do here, we are concerned that the court in Caldwell added a clear and convincing burden of proof to section 112.18(1) where the legislature provided for rebuttal of the "firefighter's presumption" by the introduction of "competent evidence." Accordingly, we certify the following question of great public importance: SHOULD CALDWELL V. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, 372 So.2d 438 (Fla.1979), BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE HEIGHTENED BURDEN OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED TO REBUT THE "FIREFIGHTER'S PRESUMPTION" IN SECTION 112.18(1) WHEN THAT STATUTE EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT THE PRESUMPTION MAY BE *585 REBUTTED BY THE LESSER BURDEN OF "COMPETENT EVIDENCE?" Because the challenged ruling here is supported by competent, substantial evidence, the appealed order is AFFIRMED....

...d ROBERTS, JJ., concur. BENTON, J., concurring in the judgment. Until and unless the supreme court modifies its decision in Caldwell v. Division of Retirement, Florida Department of Administration, 372 So.2d 438 (Fla.1979), or the Legislature amends section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, we are bound to follow Caldwell....

...Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 440 (Fla.1973). While suggesting that Caldwell was wrongly decided to begin with, the per curiam opinion purports to accept this proposition. In at least one respect, however, the per curiam opinion misreads Caldwell: The view that a claimant entitled to the section 112.18(1) presumption must buttress the presumption with medical evidence linking the tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension to his or her employment before the employer must shoulder the burden to present clear and convincing evidence...

...The majority opinion seems to say that the employer can rebut the statutory presumption by a mere preponderance of the evidence, where there is no medical evidence (which the judge of compensation claims finds credible) that a claimant's disabling disease or condition was in fact "suffered in the line of duty." § 112.18(1), Fla....

...or hypertension which resulted in disability or death, and that he had passed a physical examination upon entering into service as a law enforcement officer or other covered position, which failed to reveal any evidence of the disabling disease. See § 112.18(1), Fla....

...The statute cast[s] on the employer the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the disease was caused by a non-occupationally related agent."); Bivens v. City of Lakeland, 993 So.2d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Caldwell establishes the quantum of evidence an employer must adduce in order to rebut the section 112.18(1) presumption—something the statute itself concededly does not specify....

...Kalinoski, of Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, Orlando, for Appellants. Jason L. Fox, of the Law Offices of Carlson & Meissner, Clearwater, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant seeks review of an award of benefits to Appellee/Claimant via application of the "firefighter's presumption," section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...His initial employment physical was partially administered ten days before he began working, and the remainder of the physical was completed fifteen days after he began working. On February 14, 2005, Claimant suffered a heart attack. In seeking workers' compensation benefits, he sought to *599 take advantage of section 112.18, which provides as follows: Any condition or impairment of health of any ....

...ontrary be shown by competent evidence. However, any such firefighter . . . shall have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service . . ., which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition. . . . § 112.18, Fla....

...lishing each of the statutory requirements. Here, Claimant's ability to satisfy the "four prong test" [1] that comprises part of the statutory requirements is not at issue, because the parties stipulated to the applicability of the presumption under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

...(2003) (requiring that "the disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease . . . be treated as the happening of an injury by accident"). WEBSTER, J., dissenting. The majority concludes that a permanent impairment for hypertension does not constitute a "disability" for purposes of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2002), unless there is evidence of actual wage loss....

...It is the presumption of disability created by a section 440.15(3) permanent impairment that satisfies the "disablement" requirement of the occupational disease provisions of section 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), and the "disability" requirement of the compensability presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2003). The majority's conclusion that a permanent impairment is not a disability for purposes of either section 440.151(1)(a) or section 112.18(1) without a showing of an actual loss of earning capacity makes sense only under the old wage-loss system which no longer exists....

...in this case must prove a loss of earning capacity to receive permanent impairment benefits. This is simply not required by section 440.15(3). In concluding that a permanent impairment for hypertension does constitute a "disability" for purposes of section 112.18(1), I have relied on the doctrine of in pari materia which "requires that statutes relating to the same subject or object be construed together to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature's intent." Fla....

...Balentine and Barbie Feldman of Ross Vecchio, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. HAWKES, J. Claimant filed petitions seeking workers' compensation benefits for hypertension and microvascular angina (MVA). Claimant argued that the statutory presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, was applicable for both conditions....

...and, potentially, MVA. Claimant petitioned for workers' compensation benefits. The petitions were denied and the matter proceeded to trial. The issue before the JCC turned on whether Claimant's conditions were covered by the statutory presumption of section 112.18(1)....

...Medical Advisor (EMA). The EMA diagnosed Claimant with essential hypertension. Based on the expert's testimony, the JCC concluded that this type of hypertension was not arterial or cardiovascular, and therefore was not covered by the presumption of section 112.18(1). The EMA also diagnosed Claimant with MVA. The JCC applied the presumption of section 112.18(1) to this condition, finding it qualified as a heart disease which had caused temporary disablement....

...Noting that the E/C had failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption, the JCC concluded that Claimant's MVA was compensable. ESSENTIAL HYPERTENSION Appellant argues the JCC's should have found essential hypertension compensable under section 112.18(1)....

...This is a question of law concerning the interpretation of a workers' compensation statute, and as such is subject to de novo review. See Stubbs v. Bob Dale Constr., 977 So.2d 718, 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Mylock v. Champion Int'l, 906 So.2d 363, 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The Supreme Court has emphasized that section 112.18(1) only relieves a claimant "from the necessity of proving an occupational causation." Caldwell v....

...e scope of the presumption (i.e., "tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension"), and that the condition has caused disablement. In City of Miami v. Thomas, 657 So.2d 927, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we clarified the types of "hypertension" covered by section 112.18(1). In that case, we overruled a JCC's finding that "the term `hypertension,' as used in section 112.18(1), was meant to include `any kind of hypertension,' i.e., hypertensive conditions other than arterial or cardiovascular hypertension." Id....

...Therefore, there is no record evidence that the JCC could rely on demonstrating essential hypertension is arterial or cardiovascular in nature. Consequently, the JCC properly found the condition was not a form of hypertension covered by the presumption of section 112.18(1)....

...led upon their first visit to a doctor's office. Claimant's MVA did not cause an incapacity resulting in wage loss. Without such incapacity, Claimant cannot demonstrate disablement. Without disablement, Claimant cannot qualify for the presumption of section 112.18(1). The JCC's finding that Claimant's MVA was compensable is reversed. CONCLUSION In summary, we affirm the portion of the JCC's order finding that "essential *1104 hypertension" is not a form of hypertension covered by the presumption of section 112.18(1). However, we reverse the portion of the order finding that Claimant's MVA was compensable under section 112.18(1)....

...It is of no consequence that the claimant's first heart attack occurred in 1991 while E/C 1 provided workers' compensation coverage. At that time, the claimant was, and continues to be, a city firefighter entitled to the statutory presumption of compensability for coronary artery disease provided by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. Coronary artery disease is an occupational illness when suffered by a firefighter meeting the requirements of section 112.18(1)....

...(JCC) denying his claim for benefits resulting from a July 27, 2005, date of accident. The claimant argues that he was entitled to the presumption that his coronary artery disease was caused by his occupation as a firefighter. We agree and reverse. Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2005), also referred to as the "Heart/Lung Bill," provides in pertinent part: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida ......

...City Attys., Miami, for appellant. Richard A. Sicking, Miami, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The City of Miami appeals an order in which the judge of compensation claims found the claimant's condition compensable by operation of the rebuttable presumption in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1991), that for a firefighter, "any condition or impairment of health" caused by "tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension" resulting in "total or partial disability or death" was accidental and was suffered i...

...of duty, so long as the firefighter had passed a pre-employment physical examination which "failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition." We affirm the order, with the exception of the judge's finding that the term "hypertension," as used in section 112.18, was meant to include "any kind of hypertension," i.e., hypertensive conditions other than arterial or cardiovascular hypertension. We reject the City's contention that the 1990 enactment of section 440.015 repealed section 112.18 by implication, to the extent that it has been construed to extend to chapter 440 proceedings. We find that this presumption remains viable in the worker's compensation context. We also reject the City's argument that the phrase "total or partial disability," as used in section 112.18, was intended to be limited to permanent disability, so that the presumption would not apply to a temporary disability, as experienced by this claimant....

...Northcutt, of Levine, Freedman, Hirsch & Levinson, Tampa, for appellee. THOMPSON, Judge. The employer/carrier (E/C) appeal an order finding that the claimant, a 56-year-old fire chief, suffered from a compensable heart disease. The E/C urge that the deputy misapplied the presumption established by § 112.18(1), Fla....

...Clay Hyder Trucking Lines, 397 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for rev. den. 402 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1981). The deputy correctly determined that claimant, as a fire fighter disabled by heart disease, was entitled to the statutory presumption afforded by § 112.18(1)....

...There was evidence that the disease was caused by arteriosclerosis unrelated to the claimant's employment and there was also evidence that the stress of the claimant's employment over a period of time caused in whole or in part the heart attack. In Caldwell the court held that the statutory presumption of § 112.18(1) prevails in cases where the medical evidence is conflicting and the quantum of proof is balanced....

...re." On the basis of Caldwell the deputy concluded that these two negative replies were dispositive, and found that the E/C had failed to present clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of occupational causation supplied by § 112.18(1)....

...-work related causation existed in the congenital and progressive nature of claimant's disease. The medical evidence constituted clear and convincing proof of non-work related causation and the deputy erred in failing to find that the presumption of § 112.18(1) had been rebutted. The E/C urge this court to find that the legislature did not intend § 112.18(1) to apply in any case where the protected employee suffers from a congenital heart disease. They also argue that the obvious *51 intent of the legislature was to provide a presumption only in favor of employees who suffer heart attacks. Section 112.18(1) specifically applies to " Any condition or impairment of health......

statutory presumption in the Heart-Lung Statute, section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2015). According to the

...Sicking, Coral Gables, for Appellee. BENTON, J. Miami-Dade County appeals an order of the judge of compensation claims finding the County responsible for workers' compensation benefits on account of William A. Davis's heart disease, on the purported authority of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...ion of compensability. But the presumption only arises if the firefighter has "successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a firefighter... which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition." § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). See City of Mary Esther v. McArtor, 902 So.2d 942, 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) ("Coronary artery disease is an occupational illness when suffered by a firefighter meeting the requirements of section 112.18(1)."); Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So.2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ("Although heart disease is not ordinarily compensable as an occupational disease, the Florida Legislature has enacted section 112.18(1) ..., which establishes a statutory presumption that heart disease suffered by a fireman is connected with the exertions of his work so long as the fireman passes a preemployment physical examination without evidence of such disease....

...Proceedings Below Following the surfing incident, Mr. Davis filed petitions for benefits against Miami-Dade County [1] seeking a determination that the cardiac incident while he was surfing on February 26, 2002, was compensable by virtue of the presumption that arises under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, whenever a "firefighter or state law enforcement officer shall have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a firefighter......

...which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition." The County argued that mere certification as a firefighter (including passing the physical then required) did not entitle Mr. *16 Davis to the benefit of the presumption set forth in section 112.18(1), because his subsequent, preemployment physical examination for Miami-Dade County revealed that he suffered from heart disease....

...Jaimy Bensimon, claimant's independent medical examiner, agreed that claimant had preexisting heart disease when Miami-Dade County hired him. The County denied compensability on the ground that the claimant's heart disease antedated his employment with Miami-Dade County. Claimant argued that sections 112.18, 633.34 [2] , and 633.35 [3] , Florida Statutes, should be read in pari materia so that the only physical examination a firefighter needs to take and pass, for purposes of determining whether the presumption set forth in section 112.18 applies, is the initial medical examination described in section 633.34 that a firefighter once had to undergo in order to become certified pursuant to section 633.35. The judge of compensation claims accepted this argument. In ruling that the 1972 certification examination was the only relevant examination for purposes of section 112.18(1), the judge of compensation claims stated: The claimant ......

...The judge of compensation claims acknowledged that the claimant had a history of heart disease at the time of his preemployment physical examination for Miami-Dade County, but ruled this was irrelevant, on grounds that the preemployment physical is "not the one referred to in § 112.18(1)," stating: *17 The only medical examination required by law for firefighters is the pre-certification medical examination. Section 633.34, Fla. Stat., and Section 633.35, Fla. Stat., should be read in pari materia with Section 112.18, Fla....

...mi-Dade County responsible for medical benefits. Preemployment Physical Precluded Presumption We cannot agree with the judge of compensation claims that "Section 633.34, Fla. Stat., and Section 633.35, Fla. Stat., should be read in pari materia with Section 112.18, Fla....

...Stat., because the medical examination required by law referred to in Chapter 633 is the one required for certification, which is upon entering into service as a firefighter." The judge of compensation claims erred in relying on sections 633.34 and 633.35 for the proposition that the physical examination referred to in section 112.18(1) was the 1972 certification exam....

...Davis to submit to a preemployment physical examination, even though he was already a certified firefighter when he applied for employment with the County. The preemployment examination revealed that he had heart disease before he began work for Miami-Dade County. Section 112.18(1) did not, therefore, give rise to a presumption of occupational causation when, after he took the job, heart disease manifested itself while he was surfing....

...4, Fla. Stat. (1995)—not just a person "initially employed as a fire fighter," § 163.490, Fla. Stat. (1971)—must "[b]e in good physical condition as determined by a medical examination." Reading sections *18 633.34 and 633.35 in pari materia with section 112.18 lends no support to, and, indeed, rules out, the inference the judge of compensation claims erroneously drew, namely, that the only medical examination required by law for firefighters is the pre-certification medical examination. Section 112.18(1) draws no distinction between firefighters and law enforcement officers with regard to the presumption the statute authorizes. Section 112.18(1), the statute that controls here, speaks equally of a "firefighter or state law enforcement officer" and confers precisely the same rights and obligations on firefighters as it confers on state law enforcement officers, no more and no less. § 112.18(1), Fla....

...ably suggest that firefighters, who are outside the purview of the Department of Law Enforcement Act altogether, should be treated differently. As amended, the Act provides, in pertinent part: In order to be eligible for the presumption set forth in s. 112.18 while employed with an employing agency, a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer must have successfully passed the physical examination required by this subsection upon entering into service as a l...

...tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension. A law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer may not use a physical examination from a former employing agency for purposes of claiming the presumption set forth in s. 112.18 against the current employing agency. § 943.13(6), Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 943.13 makes unmistakably clear that the Legislature reads section 112.18, exactly the same way Miami-Dade County does, as forbidding the use of "a physical examination from a former employing agency for purposes of claiming the presumption set forth in s. 112.18 against the current employing agency." § 943.13(6), Fla. Stat. (2008). No examination in 1972 gave rise to the presumption set forth in section 112.18 so as to make Miami-Dade County responsible for workers' compensation benefits on account of the off-duty cardiac event Mr....

...e and cholesterol, semi-annual physical examinations, and annual stress tests. He filed a petition for benefits in January 2009 when the employer/carrier ("E/C"), after paying medical benefits for three years, terminated benefits claiming that under section 112.18, Florida Statutes, he became ineligible for workers' compensation benefits once he returned to normal duty....

...40.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). The occupational disease must have caused a disability to be "treated as the happening of an injury by accident," and thus, compensable. Id. See City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So.2d 727, 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Section 112.18, Florida Statutes, creates a presumption of compensability for certain conditions suffered by firefighters and law enforcement and correctional officers....

...firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer ... caused by ... tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability ... shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence. § 112.18(1), Fla....

...Inst., 22 So.3d 803, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). The E/C here accepted compensability of the claimant's hypertension and paid for his medical treatment for more than three years. But now they assert the claimant was only entitled to the presumption in section 112.18, and thus medical benefits, during the week-long period his hypertension resulted in "total or partial disability." In other words, now that the claimant's job-related hypertension is successfully controlled by medication such that he is back to normal duty, the E/C need no longer pay for ongoing treatment of the condition. To be sure, under section 112.18 disability is necessary to establish compensability of any condition or impairment of health "caused by ......

...cal benefits on continued disability, or limits payment of medical benefits to only the period of disability. See City of Miami v. Thomas, 657 So.2d 927, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (rejecting assertion by employer/carrier that disability giving rise to section 112.18 presumption must be permanent)....

...Keller, Esquire, Winter Park and Bill McCabe, Esquire, Longwood, for Appellee. ON MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY PER CURIAM. We withdraw our previous opinion in this cause issued March 24, 2005, and substitute the following therefor. Appellants argue that the Judge of Compensation Claims (the "JCC") erred by interpreting section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1999), providing a rebuttable presumption for specified firefighters and state law enforcement officers, to include county sheriff's deputies. The JCC found that claimant suffered a stroke caused by hypertension and that claimant's hypertension was statutorily presumed to have been accidental and suffered in the line of duty pursuant to section 112.18(1)....

...1st DCA 1997) (discussing section *344 440.15(13), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which changed a rebuttable presumption, and affirming the JCC's ruling that the change in the law was a procedural enactment because it affected the burden of proof). As in Brown, the 2002 amendment to section 112.18(1) changed only the procedure of establishing entitlement to workers' compensation benefits....

...these issues pursuant to the amended statute. REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions. VAN NORTWICK, POLSTON and THOMAS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We reject appellants' evidentiary argument relating to claimant's prerequisite physical examination under section 112.18(1) without further comment.

...e. No. AU-52. District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. May 3, 1984. Keith A. Mann, of Dickinson, O'Riorden, Gibbons, Quale, Shields & Carlton, Sarasota, for appellants. Ivan Matusek, St. Petersburg, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We hold that section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1981), applies to chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Sicking, Coral Gables, for Appellant. R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Lynda S. Slade, Assistant County Attorney, Miami, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See City of Tarpon Springs v. Vaporis, 953 So.2d 597, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ("All that [section 112.18, Florida Statutes] requires to overcome the presumption is competent substantial evidence that convinces a JCC that *824 the disease was caused by some non-work-related factor, not that it was caused by any sort of `specific hazard or non-occupational hazard'....

...In Potter, a claimant challenged an order denying, in part, her claim for impairment benefits arguing that the JCC erred in *37 apportioning an EMA's impairment rating since the employer/carrier had previously accepted the condition, ventricular ectopy, as compensable pursuant to section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2001) (creating a statutory presumption that a firefighter's tuberculosis, heart disease or hypertension is causally connected to employment)....

...t (E/SA), to pay claimant's medical costs, reimburse claimant's sick leave benefits, and pay penalties. First, the E/SA claim the JCC erred in determining that they failed to overcome the presumption relative to the disability of fire fighters under section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1991)....

entitled to benefits under the heart-lung statute, section 112.18 of the Florida Statutes. We reverse. Claimant’s

...Claimant appeals an order denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits. We affirm. Claimant contends the deputy commissioner erred in finding that because he did not undergo a physical examination upon entering his employment as a fireman, he was not entitled to the statutory presumption of § 112.18, Fla. Stat. Section 112.18 provides that any condition or impairment of health of any fireman caused by tuberculosis, heart disease or hypertension and resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent *924 evidence....

...As an apparent quid pro quo for granting this presumption to firemen the legislature further provided, "However, any such fireman shall have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a fireman, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition." § 112.18(1), Fla....

...In November 1984, following the recommendation of claimant's treating physician that claimant's hypertension and arteriosclerotic heart disease prevented him from carrying out his duties as fire chief of the City of Milton, claimant retired, and brought his claim for compensation benefits pursuant to section 112.18(1). The parties agree that without the presumption contained in the statute, claimant would not be entitled to benefits. Section 112.18 [1] states in part: (1) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firemen caused by tuberculosis, heart disease or hypertension resulting in t...

...However, any such fireman shall have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a fireman, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition. (e.s.) The deputy, relying upon the literal language of the proviso or exception to the preceding statutory presumption of section 112.18(1), held that because claimant had failed to take a physical examination immediately upon entering into service as a fireman with the city in 1964, he was thereby barred from the presumptive effect of the statute....

...the operative effect of statutory language are strictly construed against one who attempts to take advantage of such exceptions. See State v. Nourse, 340 So.2d 966, 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). This rule is particularly applicable to statutes — such as section 112.18(1) — that are remedial in nature. See 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 313 (1974). The legislative policy behind the enactment of section 112.18(1) recognizes that firemen are subjected during their career to the hazard of smoke, heat, and nauseous fumes from all kinds of toxic chemicals as well as extreme anxiety derived from the necessity of being constantly faced with the possibility of extreme danger......

presumption of compensability provided for in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2007), by showing a non-occupational

...The claimant argues that he was entitled to the presumption that his peripheral vascular disease (PVD) was caused by his occupation as a firefighter. The claimant also argues that he was entitled to PTD benefits because his PVD met or equaled a listed impairment. We agree and reverse. Presumption Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1996), also referred to as the "Heart/Lung Bill," provides in pertinent part: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal ....

...Therefore, the JCC erred in denying the claim for PTD benefits. REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to the JCC to award the claimant PTD benefits. BROWNING, C.J., concurs; KAHN, J., concurs with opinion. KAHN, J., concurring. As observed by the majority, this court holds that the presumption created by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, applies in workers' compensation cases....

...mpetent substantial evidence that convinces a JCC that the disease was caused by some non-work-related factor. . . ." See also Saldana v. Miami-Dade County and Div. of Risk Mgmt., 978 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Our holding in Vaporis was true to section 112.18(1), which, in pertinent part, provides that the presumption of industrial causation set up by that statute prevails, "unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence." I recognize that the supreme court, in Caldwell v....

...Schwartz, West Palm Beach, for Appellant. Micheal A. Edwards of Edwards and Clarke, P.A., North Palm Beach, for Appellees. *1233 HAWKES, J. We write only to address the proper standard for determining whether an employer/carrier has rebutted the "firefighter's presumption" of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Division of Retirement, Florida Department of Administration, 372 So.2d 438, 439 (Fla.1979), provides a useful analytic framework. In Caldwell the supreme court analyzed presumptions where the relevant statute did not expressly create a burden-shifting presumption. The case involved section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), which provided that a fireman's disability or death caused by heart disease was presumed to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary was shown by competent evidence....

the presumption of compensability found in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and certifying

presumption of occupational causation available via section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2010). We reverse. The E/C

...officer for the Florida Department of Corrections, that, as a matter of fact and law, the date of his accident was October 24, 2002. Therefore, the claimant is entitled to the statutory presumption of compensability of his heart disease afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...Caldwell seeks review of an order of the State Retirement Commission (Commission) denying Caldwell's claim for in line of duty disability benefits, costs and attorney's fees. Caldwell contends the Commission erred in the following respects: 1. by refusing to apply the presumption of in line of duty set forth in Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), 2....

...Section 121.021(13), Florida Statutes (1975), provides in pertinent part: "`Disability in line of duty' means an injury or illness arising out of and in the actual performance of duty required by a member's employment during his regularly scheduled working hours or irregular working hours as required by the employer." Section 112.18(1) provides in pertinent part: "Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida......

...ial disability shall be presumed to have been suffered in the actual performance of duty required by his employment during working hours unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence. The Commission erred in refusing to apply the presumption of Section 112.18(1) to this case but it was harmless because there was competent substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's finding that Caldwell's heart attack did not arise out of and in the actual performance of duty required by his employment during working hours....

...During his twenty-three years of active service with the city, claimant contributed eleven percent of his wages to his pension benefit plan with the city. Upon his retirement in February 1988, claimant began receiving in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. See § 112.18(1), Fla....

...fireman caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the *1275 contrary be shown by competent evidence... . § 112.18(1), Fla....

...McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The Division's order does not overcome the effect of those findings and the statutory presumption that a fireman's death due to heart disease was suffered in the line of duty. Section 112.18(1)....

...rcent impairment rating. Claimant first argues that the JCC erred in apportioning the eight percent impairment rating for the ventricular ectopy because appellee, the City of Ormond Beach, previously accepted the condition as compensable pursuant to section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

...percent. This appeal followed. Claimant correctly contends on appeal that the JCC erred in apportioning the eight percent impairment rating for her ventricular ectopy because appellee had previously accepted the condition as compensable pursuant to section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2001), which the parties and the JCC term the "Heart/Lung Bill." This statute, which applies to workers' compensation proceedings, provides: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, c...

...Such presumption shall not apply to benefits payable under or granted in a policy of life insurance or disability insurance, unless the insurer and insured have negotiated *712 for such additional benefits to be included in the policy contract. The supreme court has explained: The presumption contained in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), affects the burden of persuasion....

...The legislature recognized that this exposure could cause a fireman to become the victim of tuberculosis, hypertension, or heart disease. Caldwell v. Div. of Retirement, Fla. Dep't of Admin., 372 So.2d 438, 440-41 (Fla.1979). Contrary to appellee's argument, it did not rebut the presumption found in section 112.18(1) through Dr....

...As claimant contends, it is unreasonable to apportion a part of her impairment rating for the ventricular ectopy as being work-related and a part as being non-work-related when appellee had previously accepted the entire condition as compensable by virtue of section 112.18(1)....

entitled to on account of his heart disease. Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009) — variously known

...Kelli K. Biferie, Winter Park, and Bill McCabe, Longwood, for Appellee. ALLEN, J. The employer challenges a workers' compensation order by which the judge of compensation claims (1) applied the statutory presumption specified in the "Heart-Lung" statute, section 112.18, Florida Statutes, in determining that the claimant/correctional officer's hypertension and heart disease were compensable, (2) awarded medical benefits for treatment of these conditions, and (3) assigned a date of accident....

...isabling or fatal heart or lung condition, we reject the employer's argument that the judge erred by applying the presumption in the absence of such proof. We also reject the employer's argument that the judge assigned an incorrect date of accident. Section 112.18(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows: (1) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer as defined in s....

...sabling or fatal condition, the plain language of the statute does not require a correctional officer to satisfy this condition precedent. This distinction in requisite proofs is not due to mere legislative oversight. The text of a 2002 amendment to section 112.18 plainly revealed to members of the legislature that the amendment would, for the first time, entitle correctional officers to the presumption specified in the first sentence of section 112.18(1), but would not subject correctional officers to the condition precedent specified in the second sentence of the subsection....

...ccidental and suffered in the line of duty, unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence. Ch. 2002-236, § 3, at 1720, Laws of Fla. The order under review is affirmed. [1] ERVIN and POLSTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Because the 2002 amendment of section 112.18(1), adding correctional officers to the list of employees entitled to the statutory presumption, was a procedural enactment, a pre-2002 date of accident did not preclude the claimant's entitlement to the statutory presumption in a post-2002 proceeding....

the presumption of occupational causation in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009). The JCC found, and

...Appellant seeks review of an order from the State Retirement Commission ("Commission") that denied his claim for disability retirement. Appellant claimed that his total and permanent disability due to hypertension was presumed to be by accident suffered in-line-of-duty under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...As the sole reason for denying Appellant's disability claim, the Commission found that Appellant's position as a "classification officer" was not a special risk position under section 121.0515. Under such reasoning, Appellant could not claim the statutory presumption in section 112.18(1)....

...However, a member who becomes totally and permanently disabled in the line of duty can receive disability benefits regardless of the years of service or his or her risk class. § 121.091(4)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2006). Appellant relies on the presumption in section 112.18(1) to support his argument that his hypertension was in the line of duty, which would entitle him to disability benefits regardless of his years of service. Section 112.18(1) provides, in pertinent part, that: *136 Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer as defined in s....

...on. Therefore, Appellant needed to hold a special-risk position in order to obtain disability benefits in the line of duty. By doing so, Appellee and the Commission erred by ignoring the controlling definition of correctional officer as contained in section 112.18(1). Section 112.18(1) refers to section 943.10(2), not section 121.0515 or any other statute, for the definition of correctional officer. Neither section 112.18(1) nor section 943.10(2) delineates between regular and special-risk classes....

...ction 943.10(2). The Commission erred in imposing an additional requirement that the position be special-risk to invoke the in-line-of-duty presumption. In the proceedings below, the parties stipulated that Appellant met the medical requirements for section 112.18(1). Appellee did not dispute the medical evidence. Based on the parties' stipulation, the Commission erred in determining that Appellant failed to meet the medical requirements of section 112.18(1)....

...Accordingly, we hold that the Commission incorrectly concluded that the definition of correctional officer required that the employment position be a special-risk position. Appellant is entitled to the presumption of in-line-of-duty disability under section 112.18(1) and, therefore, to disability retirement benefits pursuant to section 121.091(4)(a)1.a....

extend the firefighter’s presumption statute, section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1987), to his claim.

failed to satisfy the disability requirement of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2008), with respect to

...1st DCA 2005), this court acknowledged the possibility of multiple dates of accident in occupational disease cases. In Mary Esther, the claimant was a firefighter who suffered his first heart attack in 1991, which was found to be compensable because of the statutory presumption in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, presuming that coronary artery disease was an occupational illness when suffered by a firefighter meeting certain requirements....

presumption of compensability set forth in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1991)1. We affirm. The

...Patrick John McGinley, P.A., Winter Park, and Arthur U. Graham, DeLand, for Appellees. BENTON, J. In this workers’ compensation case, a correctional officer appeals an order of a judge of compensation claims ruling him ineligible under section 112.18(1)(b)4., Florida Statutes (2013), for the presumption of occupational causation set out in section 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), and denying the compensability of his heart condition for that reason. Persuaded section 112.18(1)(b)4....

...d by heart disease resulting in “disablement” before July 1, 2010, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. “Although heart disease is not ordinarily compensable as an occupational disease, the Florida Legislature . . . enacted section 112.18(1) ....

..., which establishe[d] a statutory presumption that heart disease suffered by a fireman [or certain others including correctional officers] is connected with the exertions of his work . . . .” Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (citation omitted). “Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009)—variously known as the ‘Firefighter’s Presumption,’ the ‘Heart and Lung Bill’ or the ‘Heart– Lung Statute,’ see 9 Patrick John McGinley, Fla....

...In March of 2013, he had a heart transplant. In June and September of 2013, he filed a total of five petitions for workers’ compensation benefits alleging a compensable heart condition under two dates of accident (disablement): October 29, 2009, and January 27, 2012. All petitions— each of which relied on section 112.18—were consolidated. Volusia County defended, in part, on grounds that the section 112.18 presumption was not available because appellant did not file any petition within 180 days of leaving employment. Without the presumption, appellant concedes, his claims fail. This is not a statute of limitations case—no stat...

...1st DCA 1997) 3 (quoting Am. Beryllium Co. v. Stringer, 392 So. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (Fla.1980)). “In occupational disease cases, . . . it is the disability and not the disease which determines the compensability of a claim.” Id. at 587. Section 112.18(1)(b), which became effective on January 1, 2011, see Chapter 2010-175, section 2, at 2184-85, 2216, Laws of Florida, reads as follows: (b)1....

...ruled, as to both dates of accident, that appellant had not made a claim prior to or within 180 days after leaving his employment with the Volusia County Department of Corrections, and in the final compensation order deemed him ineligible for the section 112.18(1)(a) presumption on that basis: 8....

...involving dates of accident/disablement on or after July 1, 2010. Does the sentence mean any petition for benefits, regardless of the date of accident, filed on or after July 1, 2010, is subject to section 112.18(1)(b)? Or does it mean, as Claimant argues, that the amendment does not apply to dates of accident/disablement before July 1, 2010, regardless of when the petition for benefits is filed? 9....

...All subparagraphs (also referred to as sub-subsections) of paragraph (1)(b) should be read in pari materia, not only because of the structure of the text, but also because the subparagraphs of paragraph (1)(b) were all enacted together, as part of the same amendment to section 112.18, and all took effect together on January 1, 2011....

...date for purposes of the statute was not the date of accident or disablement but the date on which a worker filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The final compensation order explains his reasoning: Alternatively, if the date reference[d] in section 112.18(1)(b)1. applies to section 112.18(1)(b)4., it pertains to all claims filed on or after July 1, 2010, regardless of the date of accident 10. If the first sentence of section 112.18(1)(b)1. does apply to section 112[.18](1)(b)4., I construe the sentence to mean the amended statute applies to all claims filed on or after July 1, 2010, regardless of the date of accident....

...The dissent unjustifiably assumes that the terms “petition for benefits” and “claim” can be used interchangeably in the context of the present case. 11 RAY, J., dissenting. Because I conclude that subparagraph 112.18(1)(b)4 renders Appellant ineligible for the presumption of occupational causation for both dates of accident, I respectfully dissent. To be entitled to the rebuttable presumption of occupational causation in paragraph 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), which provides that a heart condition like Appellant’s is presumed to be the result of an accident in the line of duty, a claimant * is required under subparagraph 112.18(1)(b)4 to “make” a claim for benefits prior to or within 180 days after leaving the employment of the employing agency....

...Judge of Compensation Claims found that Appellant failed to take any action that constituted a claim for benefits within the applicable time frame. To challenge this ruling, Appellant argues, and the majority agrees, that the date reference in subparagraph 112.18(1)(b)1 qualifies subparagraph (b)4, such that the 180-day limitation period applies only to cases with dates of accident on or after * The 180-day limitation period applies to law enforcement officers, correctional officers, and correctional probation officers. § 112.18(1)(b)4. 12 July 1, 2010....

...as this court’s precedent has upheld the constitutionality of retroactive application of substantially similar provisions. In Seminole County Sheriff’s Office v. Johnson, 901 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), we held that a 2002 amendment to subsection 112.18(1), which expanded the class of workers entitled to the presumption, was a procedural enactment that applies retroactively without regard to the date of accident and injury....

...[It] changed only the procedural means and methods of establishing entitlement to benefits or offsets which flow from substantive rights that have remained unchanged since the date of [the accident].” Id. at 333. Similarly here, nothing in subparagraph 112.18(1)(b)4 prohibits Appellant from pursuing workers’ compensation benefits for his heart condition....

...dure “unless a claim for benefits is made prior to or within 180 days after leaving the employment of the employing agency.” For these reasons, I would affirm the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims and conclude that subparagraph 112.18(1)(b)4 bars reliance on the presumption for both of Appellant’s dates of accident. 16 

presumption of occupational causation available in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2010). The E/C acknowledges

...The employer/carrier (E/C), Volusia County Fire Services and County Risk Management, raises one dispositive issue on appeal, whether the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred by determining Claimant's hypertension was compensable under the presumption created by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...rization for treatment with a cardiologist, and reimbursement for medical care. The E/C denied compensability based, in part, on the ground that Claimant's hypertension was pre-existing; therefore, he was not entitled to the presumption set forth in section 112.18. Section 112.18(1) provides: (1) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer as defined in s....

...ion.. . . (Emphasis added). The JCC ruled for Claimant, finding in relevant part: Claimant successfully passed a pre-employment physical before entering into service as a firefighter with Cedar Hammock; the phrase "entering into any such service" in section 112.18(1), "clearly refers to a physical examination at the beginning of a firefighters' career;" and it is immaterial that Claimant's pre-employment physical with the Employer revealed hypertension....

presumption of occupational causation set forth in section 112.18, Florida Statutes, which does not apply if

medical treatment under the “heart-lung” statute, section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2014). The Claimant did

...The claimant, William Heric, is employed by the City of Ormond Beach as a firefighter. He suffered a heart attack on August 8, 1996, while on vacation. The employer and carrier accepted the compensability of the claimant's heart condition pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes, and began paying medical and indemnity benefits....

...1 Appellee/Claimant’s hypertension and coronary artery disease (CAD), and awarding authorization of Dr. Castello to treat these conditions. We affirm. The City argues that the JCC should not have found Claimant was entitled to rely on section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2012), which reads: (1)(a) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer as defined in s....

...enforcement officer must have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a firefighter or law enforcement officer, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition. . . . Section 112.18 creates a presumption of occupational causation for “any condition or impairment of health” for a claimant who meets the statutory prerequisites....

...To the extent the City challenges any inferences the JCC drew to make these findings, we see no error. The City also challenges, however, the JCC’s ruling that the time during which Claimant could not work (during and after the catheterization) constitutes disability for the purposes of section 112.18....

...2d 1100, 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), wherein Mr. Bivens had not produced any evidence that his heart disease affected his ability to perform his job duties. In Bivens, this court concluded that there was no disability – and thus no entitlement to the section 112.18 presumption – despite “that [Mr....

...theterization, and that the catheterization was because of his hypertension and CAD, which is analogous to the facts in Rocha. 4  The JCC’s finding in this case comports with the plain language of section 112.18, which is evidence of legislative intent to include recovery from invasive treatment and testing such as this: specifically, the statute’s first words broadly describe “[a]ny condition or impairment of health . . . caused by” heart disease or hypertension (or tuberculosis) and “resulting in total or partial disability or death.” § 112.18(1)(a), Fla....

applying the statutory presumption provided by section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2002), and entered a final

presumption of occupational causation provided by section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2018). For the foregoing

Claimant’s thoracic aortic disease compensable under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007), because the condition

DCA 2019) (holding that the presumption in section 112.18, Florida Statutes, only applies if a preemployment

statutory presumption in the Heart-Lung Statute, section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2015). According to

duties, can be considered disabled pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes. It is argued that because

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2002) (“Any condition ... of any ... law enforcement

physical revealed evidence of heart disease. See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). This court has recently

causation afforded law enforcement officers under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2006). The JCC also noted

PER CURIAM. We hold that section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1981), applies to chapter 440, Florida Statutes

...However, because this issue, as re-framed by the E/C in its reply brief, does not present a basis for reversal, I agree that the issue should be affirmed. NOTES [*] The initial brief framed the first issue as whether "[t]he JCC erred in determining that Claimant's heart condition and hypertension were compensable under § 112.18, Fla....

...Punsky v. Clay County Sheriff's Office, 18 So.3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), in determining that the E/C failed to rebut the presumption as to both the hypertension and heart condition. The reply brief clarified that "it is only the application of the [section 112.18] presumption to Claimant's hypertension that is at issue in the present appeal." The E/C argues in its motion for rehearing that the panel misconstrued this "inarticulately phrased" statement because "[i]n making the statement that the...

...eart condition." However, this argument overlooks the fact that, in addition to this statement, the reply brief also specifically re-framed the first issue as whether "[t]he JCC erred in determining that Claimant's hypertension was compensable under § 112.18, Fla....

arising out of his employment, relying upon section 112.18, Florida Statutes. Claimant, a twenty-six-year

of the firefighter’s presumption pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2005). We also find no merit

the contrary be shown by competent evidence." § 112.18(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013);

correctional officer since 1995, relied on section 112.18, Florida Statutes, which provides a presumption

compensable by his Employer/Carrier (E/C) under section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2013) (providing rebuttable

firefighters, and certain other employees, set out in section 112.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2011). Nevertheless

not entitled to the presumption set forth in Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1983). We affirm. Lansford

pre-ventri-cular contraction condition, pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes. The E/C raises two points

to an accident accepted as compensable under section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2021), also known as the

...denied the petition on grounds that the statute of limitations had expired, and alternatively, that the Employer/Carrier (E/C) had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of compensability afforded law enforcement officers under 2 section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

...Claimant’s heart disease is claimed to be compensable under the occupational disease theory of recovery. See Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (finding heart disease compensable as occupational disease in cases where section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, applies). An essential element of a claim based on an occupational disease is that the disease results in disability. See § 440.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012) (“[T]he disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease . . . shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident . . . .”); § 112.18(1), Fla....

...Arrington, Assistant General Counsel, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Jonathan Israel, Jacksonville, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. In this appeal, the Employer challenges the finding of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that Claimant was entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...The JCC found the parties stipulated that the Employer had no evidence Claimant had hypertension before commencing his employment with the Employer, and that Claimant "now has hypertension." Based on the foregoing, the JCC found the remaining issue for resolution was whether Claimant satisfied the disability requirement of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...ties." Thus, the JCC found, Claimant "met his burden by satisfying the three prong test sufficiently to invoke the presumption," and that the Employer "failed to present any evidence of a non-work related cause." Analysis The presumption afforded by section 112.18 is "only available when a claimant's......

...estrictions, the most that can reasonably be said of Claimant's no-work status pending a cardiac evaluation is that it was for purely precautionary reasons unrelated to his hypertension. This is not sufficient to establish disability for purposes of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007). CONCLUSION Because no competent substantial evidence supports the JCC's finding that Claimant was disabled by his hypertension as required by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007), the JCC erred in finding Claimant was entitled to operation of the presumption afforded by the statute....

evidence to rebut the statutory presumption [in section 112.18, Florida Statutes,] and establish non-industrial

heart disease and hypertension by operation of section 112.18, Florida Statutes. For the following reasons

firefighter for another governmental entity. Section 112.18(1), F.S., provides: Any condition or impairment

appropriate effect to the presumption accorded by Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975). Caldwell v. Division

compensation order by which the presumption in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, was applied and the claimant

of the presumption afforded Claimant under section 112.18 and how it is applied to the facts in this

...Demarsh, County Attorney, and Maria D. Korn, Assistant County Attorney, Sarasota, for Appellees. WEBSTER, J. In this workers' compensation case, the judge of compensation claims held that claimant law enforcement officer was not entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007), because his overnight stay in the hospital for treatment of his heart disease did not satisfy the statute's disability requirement....

...1st DCA 2008), "claimant has not established his loss of time for hospitalization for medication to control his heartbeat establishes a disability entitling him to the statutory presumption." As a result, the judge determined that claimant was not entitled to the section 112.18(1) presumption, and denied compensability of the claim. Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, creates a rebuttable presumption of compensability for heart disease suffered by firefighters and law enforcement or corrections officers who satisfy the statute's prerequisites....

...Because claimant, while hospitalized for treatment of his heart disease, was actually incapacitated, at least partially and temporarily, from earning "in the same or any other employment the wages which [he] was receiving at the time of the injury," he satisfied the disability requirement of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

attack and subsequent heart transplant 1 § 112.18, Fla. Stat. (2021). which occurred after his diagnosis

for the operation of the presumption found in section 112.18(1), rendering his cardiac arrhythmia work-related