Cases from cite.case.law:

ST. LUCIE FCRD PGCS, v. FMIT,, 259 So. 3d 992 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . compensability hinges on application of the presumption of occupational causation set forth in section 112.18 . . . reimbursement from FMIT on the theory that Williams did not qualify as a firefighter for purposes of section 112.18 . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. TALLAHASSEE FIRE DEPARTMENT CITY OF TALLAHASSEE,, 240 So. 3d 788 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . cardiac arrhythmias, which were accepted as compensable by his Employer/Carrier (E/C) under section 112.18 . . .

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE v. O NEAL,, 240 So. 3d 861 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Claimant, a correctional officer since 1995, relied on section 112.18, Florida Statutes, which provides . . . a presumption of occupational causation for heart disease in correctional officers. § 112.18, Fla. . . .

CITY OF HOMESTEAD v. FOUST,, 242 So. 3d 1169 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . awarding benefits for, Claimant Harley Foust's heart disease and hypertension by operation of section 112.18 . . . The E/C also noted that the section 112.18 presumption did not apply to local LEOs until 2002. . . . The JCC found that Claimant satisfied the physical-examination requirement of section 112.18 on three . . . because section 112.18 has included all of its prerequisites since its enactment in 1965. . . . Section 112.18 was enacted in 1965, but applied only to firemen. . . .

CITY OF TAVARES v. HARPER,, 230 So. 3d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . compensability of his hypertension' under the statutory presumption in the Heart-Lung Statute, section 112.18 . . . compensa-bility of his hypertensive condition' as a workplace injury in accordance'with the section 112.18 . . . and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be,shown by competent evidence.” § 112.18 . . . Davis, 26 So.3d 13, 17-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that section 112.18(1) presumption was precluded . . . In Talpesh, the JCC ruled that the presumption under section 112.18(1) did not apply to that claimant . . . Section 112.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes, states: Any condition or impairment of health of any ... law . . . a reading of high blood pressure is, at the very least, an indication of hypertension under section 112.18 . . . to confirm the condition of hypertension is not the criteria provided by the legislature in section 112.18 . . .

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE v. RATLIFF,, 217 So. 3d 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . compensability of his heart condition and related medical treatment under the “heart-lung” statute, section 112.18 . . . C failed to sustain its burden of proof in one respect, but write to clarify application of section 112.18 . . . The Claimant qualified for the “heart-lung” presumption under section 112.18(1), having no evidence of . . . After determination that section 112.18 embodied strong public policy, the court assigned to the E/C . . . Here, the Claimant had no evidence of causation other than the presumption of section 112.18. . . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, v. JUNOD,, 217 So. 3d 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Compensation Claims holding that Claimant is entitled to benefits under the heart-lung statute, section 112.18 . . . Florida’s heart-lung statute was enacted in 1965, covering firemen only. § 112.18, Fla. . . . The Florida Supreme Court in Caldwell described the presumption created in section 112.18 as an expression . . . Because the E/C successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of section 112.18, and the EMA’s opinion . . . Nevertheless, section 112.18 on its face does not impose an express tenure requirement. . . .

GONZALEZ, v. ST. LUCIE COUNTY- FIRE DISTRICT FLORIDA MUNICIPAL INSURANCE TRUST- FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES, INC., 186 So. 3d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . department, appeals the denial of his claim for a determination of compensable heart disease under paragraph 112.18 . . . Our review of the JCC’s findings as to the rebuttal of the presumption under paragraph 112.18(1)(a) is . . . and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence." § 112.18 . . .

MITCHELL, v. MIAMI DADE COUNTY MDPD, 186 So. 3d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . causation to which the parties agreed Claimant, a law enforcement officer, was entitled under paragraph 112.18 . . . the JCC’s error, is-an understanding of the nature of the presumption afforded Claimant under section 112.18 . . . As recognized in Punsky, this latter type is the nature of the presumption provided by section 112.18 . . . to submit competent evidence to rebut the presumption because Claimant relied solely on the section 112.18 . . .

SCHERER, v. VOLUSIA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 171 So. 3d 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Because I conclude that subparagraph 112.18(l)(b)4 renders Appellant ineligible for the presumption of . . . To be entitled to the rebuttable presumption of occupational causation in paragraph 112.18(l)(a), Florida . . . presumed to be the result of an accident in the line of duty, a claimant is required under subparagraph 112.18 . . . Johnson, 901 So.2d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), we held that a 2002 amendment to subsection 112.18(1), which . . . applies to law enforcement officers, correctional officers, and correctional probation officers. § 112.18 . . . correctional officer appeals an order of a judge of compensation claims ruling him ineligible under section 112.18 . . . )(b)4., Florida Statutes (2013), for the presumption of occupational causation set out in section , 112.18 . . . Persuaded section 112.18(1)(b)4. did not strip him of the presumption available to correctional officers . . . not ordinarily compensable as an occupational disease, the Florida Legislature ... enacted section 112.18 . . . All petitions — each of which relied on section 112.18 — were consolidated. . . .

MIAMI- DADE COUNTY, v. MITCHELL,, 159 So. 3d 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . the presumption of occupational causation afforded Claimant, a law enforcement officer, under section 112.18 . . . contributing cause (MCC) by medical evidence, is fully met where the presumption contained in section 112.18 . . .

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE FIRE AND RESCUE DEPARTMENT v. BATTLE,, 148 So. 3d 795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . The City argues that the JCC should not have found Claimant was entitled to rely on section 112.18, Florida . . . Section 112.18 creates a presumption of occupational causation for “any condition or impairment of health . . . not work (during and after the catheterization) constitutes disability for the purposes of section 112.18 . . . In Bivens, this court concluded that there was no disability— and thus no entitlement to the section 112.18 . . . The JCC’s finding in this case comports with the plain language of section 112.18, which is evidence . . .

SMITH, v. CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH POLICE DEPT., 143 So. 3d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . rebutted the statutory presumption of compensability afforded law enforcement officers under section 112.18 . . . Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (finding heart disease compensable as occupational disease in cases where section 112.18 . . . from an occupational disease ... shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident ....”); § 112.18 . . .

JOHNS EASTERN COMPANY BCC, v. BELLAMY,, 137 So. 3d 1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . occupational causation presumption afforded firefighters, and certain other employees, set out in section 112.18 . . . burden of persuasion required of an employer who seeks to rebut the presumption afforded by section 112.18 . . .

CITY OF NORTH BAY VILLAGE v. GUEVARA,, 129 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . information regarding the statutory presumption of causation afforded law enforcement officers under section 112.18 . . . Neither section 112.18(1) nor section 440.185(4), nor any other portion of chapter 440, requires the . . . E/C to provide an injured worker any details regarding the presumption found in section 112.18(1). . . .

PASCO COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE v. SHAFFER,, 125 So. 3d 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . substantial and significant portion of her job duties, can be considered disabled pursuant to section 112.18 . . . previously held that a person restricted to light duty work may be considered disabled pursuant to section 112.18 . . . Based upon these findings, the JCC found Claimant had suffered a disability pursuant to section 112.18 . . . In pertinent part, section 112.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), provides: Any condition or impairment . . . It should be noted, however, that in cases involving application of section 112.18, Florida Statutes, . . .

JOHNS EASTERN COMPANY BCC, v. SCHRAW,, 115 So. 3d 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . firefighter, established compensability of his pre-ventri-cular contraction condition, pursuant to section 112.18 . . .

ORANGE COUNTY AND ALTERNATIVE SERVICE CONCEPTS, v. WILDER,, 107 So. 3d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . benefits for her heart disease based upon the presumption of occupational causation available in section 112.18 . . . including that her viral cardiomyopathy constitutes “heart disease” as that term is used in section 112.18 . . .

WALTERS, v. STATE DOC DIVISION OF RISK MANAGEMENT,, 100 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009) — variously known as the “Firefighter’s Presumption,” the “Heart . . . Relying on the presumption of occupational causation set out in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009 . . . The presumption controls “unless the contrary be shown.” § 112.18(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . Our supreme court discussed what section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009), requires in Caldwell v. . . . See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

ROCHA, v. CITY OF TAMPA, 100 So. 3d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . compensation benefits for his hypertension, relies on the presumption of occupational causation in section 112.18 . . . Claimant argues that he was “disabled,” for purposes of section 112.18, while he was medically restricted . . . LEGAL BACKGROUND Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009), provides as follows: Any condition or impairment . . . restrictions imposed “for purely precautionary reasons unrelated to” the condition covered by section 112.18 . . . claimant can rely solely on a medical work restriction to prove disability for purposes of section 112.18 . . .

JOHNS, v. CITY OF SANFORD, 96 So. 3d 949 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . found sufficient as competent and substantial evidence to rebut the statutory presumption [in section 112.18 . . .

WILLIAMS, v. CITY OF ORLANDO, 89 So. 3d 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . establish eligibility to rely on the statutory presumption of occupational causation available via section 112.18 . . . The E/C conceded Claimant met three of the four requirements of section 112.18 by being a police officer . . . The fourth statutory requirement is that the condition itself be one of those listed in section 112.18 . . . Bivens does not hold that, as a matter of law, “essential” hypertension is not covered by section 112.18 . . . Bivens is limited to its facts: where a claimant seeking to rely on section 112.18 produces no evidence . . .

UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, v. WARFEL,, 82 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2012)

. . . governed a presumption in favor of firefighters, the Court held: The presumption contained in section 112.18 . . . See Caldwell, 372 So.2d at 439 (interpreting section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975)); Brasher, 132 . . .

LeBLANC, v. CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH, 72 So. 3d 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . that Claimant established the legal conditions for the operation of the presumption found in section 112.18 . . . unknown — the JCC devalued and eviscerated the legal presumption of com-pensability afforded by section 112.18 . . . Inst., 22 So.3d 803, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (stating, to rebut 112.18 presumption, E/C required to affirmatively . . .

CLAY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS SCIBAL ASSOCIATES, v. A. BRAMLITT,, 61 So. 3d 1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . JCC erred in determining that Claimant's heart condition and hypertension were compensable under § 112.18 . . . The reply brief clarified that "it is only the application of the [section 112.18] presumption to Claimant's . . . issue as whether ”[t]he JCC erred in determining that Claimant’s hypertension was compensable under § 112.18 . . .

PUNSKY, v. CLAY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 60 So. 3d 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . finding that the employer and carrier had rebutted the presumption of compensability found in section 112.18 . . .

CITY OF PEMBROKE PINES v. ORTAGUS, Jr., 50 So. 3d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . C”), after paying medical benefits for three years, terminated benefits claiming that under section 112.18 . . . Section 112.18, Florida Statutes, creates a presumption of compensability for certain conditions suffered . . . and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence. § 112.18 . . . But now they assert the claimant was only entitled to the presumption in section 112.18, and thus medical . . . To be sure, under section 112.18 disability is necessary to establish compensability of any condition . . .

CITY OF VENICE PGCS, v. VAN DYKE,, 46 So. 3d 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in finding Claimant’s thoracic aortic disease compensable under section 112.18 . . .

WARFEL, v. UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,, 36 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . The ease involved section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), which provided that a fireman’s disability . . .

MARTZ, v. VOLUSIA COUNTY FIRE SERVICES, 30 So. 3d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . asserts the JCC erred by: 1) finding Claimant failed to satisfy the disability requirement of section 112.18 . . . Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, affords certain categories of public employees totally or partially . . . diagnosis, and treatment for AF did not equate to total or partial disability, as required by section 112.18 . . . In Bivens, we had held the claimant failed to establish disability under section 112.18(1) where, although . . . temporarily disabled as a result of his AF and has satisfied the disability requirement of section 112.18 . . .

VOLUSIA COUNTY FIRE SERVICES v. TAAFFE,, 27 So. 3d 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . erred by determining Claimant’s hypertension was compensable under the presumption created by section 112.18 . . . hypertension was pre-existing; therefore, he was not entitled to the presumption set forth in section 112.18 . . . Section 112.18(1) provides: (1) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal . . . service as a firefighter with Cedar Hammock; the phrase “entering into any such sendee” in section 112.18 . . .

CARNEY, v. SARASOTA COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE, 26 So. 3d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . held that claimant law enforcement officer was not entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18 . . . As a result, the judge determined that claimant was not entitled to the section 112.18(1) presumption . . . Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, creates a rebuttable presumption of com-pensability for heart disease . . . which [he] was receiving at the time of the injury,” he satisfied the disability requirement of section 112.18 . . .

FULLER, v. OKALOOSA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, 22 So. 3d 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . JCC’s finding that the Employer rebutted the presumption of compensability provided for in section 112.18 . . . both were cardiac conditions and thus, Claimant was entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18 . . . JCC found Claimant established entitlement to the presumption of compensability afforded by section 112.18 . . . The presumption afforded by section 112.18(1)(2007) relieves a qualifying claimant from the necessity . . . this court stated as follows: In summary, there is a clear path for the application of the section 112.18 . . .

MIAMI- DADE COUNTY, v. A. DAVIS,, 26 So. 3d 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Davis’s heart disease, on the purported authority of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2001). . . . not ordinarily compensable as an occupational disease, the Florida Legislature has enacted section 112.18 . . . Stat., should be read in pari mate-ria with Section 112.18, Fla. . . . Stat., should be read in pari materia with Section 112.18, Fla. . . . Section 112.18(1) draws no distinction between firefighters and law enforcement officers with regard . . .

H. CRYSTAL, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT,, 21 So. 3d 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . disability due to hypertension was presumed to be by accident suffered in-line-of-duty under section 112.18 . . . Under such reasoning, Appellant could not claim the statutory presumption in section 112.18(1). . . . Appellant relies on the presumption in section 112.18(1) to support his argument that his hypertension . . . Section 112.18(1) provides, in pertinent part, that: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida . . . Neither section 112.18(1) nor section 943.10(2) delineates between regular and special-risk classes. . . .

JACKSONVILLE SHERIFF S OFFICE, v. SHACKLETT,, 15 So. 3d 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that Claimant was entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18 . . . remaining issue for resolution was whether Claimant satisfied the disability requirement of section 112.18 . . . Analysis The presumption afforded by section 112.18 is “only available when a claimant’s ... hypertension . . . This is not sufficient to establish disability for purposes of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007 . . . evidence supports the JCC’s finding that Claimant was disabled by his hypertension as required by section 112.18 . . .

PUNSKY, v. CLAY COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE, 18 So. 3d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . , Florida Department of Administration, 372 So.2d 438 (Fla.1979), or the Legislature amends section 112.18 . . . however, the per curiam opinion misreads Caldwell: The view that a claimant entitled to the section 112.18 . . . credible) that a claimant’s disabling disease or condition was in fact “suffered in the line of duty.” § 112.18 . . . See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . Caldwell establishes the quantum of evidence an employer must adduce in order to rebut the section 112.18 . . . We affirm the order, because, although the presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2005), . . . his job as a police officer had caused the heart attack and that he was entitled to invoke section 112.18 . . . See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The record does not support such a finding. . . . Section 112.18(1) establishes a presumption that certain health conditions incurred by any designated . . . In summary, there is a clear path for the application of the section 112.18(1) presumption. . . .

BIVENS, v. CITY OF LAKELAND,, 993 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Claimant argued that the statutory presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, was applicable . . . The JCC applied the presumption of section 112.18(1) to this condition, finding it qualified as a heart . . . The Supreme Court has emphasized that section 112.18(1) only relieves a claimant “from the necessity . . . In that case, we overruled a JCC’s finding that “the term ‘hypertension,’ as used in section 112.18(1 . . . Without disablement, Claimant cannot qualify for the presumption of section 112.18(1). . . .

B. TALPESH, v. VILLAGE OF ROYAL PALM BEACH, 994 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2005), also referred to as the “Heart/Lung Bill,” provides in pertinent . . .

In KIMBRO, Jr. E. III, v. Jr., 389 B.R. 518 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008)

. . . This figure was calculated by subtracting their car payment of $112.18 from the Local Standard of $471.18 . . .

MOBILE MEDICAL INDUSTRIES v. QUINN,, 985 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . carrier had previously accepted the condition, ventricular ectopy, as compensable pursuant to section 112.18 . . .

BUTLER, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,, 980 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . As observed by the majority, this court holds that the presumption created by section 112.18(1), Florida . . . Our holding in Vaporis was true to section 112.18(1), which, in pertinent part, provides that the presumption . . . Presumption Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1996), also referred to as the “Heart/Lung Bill,” provides . . .

LENTINI, v. CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH,, 980 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . for determining whether an employer/carrier has rebutted the “firefighter’s presumption” of section 112.18 . . .

SALDANA, v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY, 978 So. 2d 823 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Vaporis, 953 So.2d 597, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“All that [section 112.18, Florida Statutes] requires . . .

PALM BEACH COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE v. C. BAIR,, 965 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . the benefit of an expert medical advisor by applying the statutory presumption provided by section 112.18 . . . Statutes (2002), mandated the appointment of an expert medical advisor before applying the section 112.18 . . .

ORANGE COUNTY FIRE RESCUE v. JONES,, 959 So. 2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . heart attack in 1991, which was found to be compensable because of the statutory presumption in section 112.18 . . .

CITY OF DELRAY BEACH v. WELLS,, 957 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC) application of the firefighter’s presumption pursuant to section 112.18 . . . single risk factor solely causative of claimant’s condition in order to rebut the presumption of section 112.18 . . .

CITY OF PORT ORANGE PGCS, v. SEDACCA,, 953 So. 2d 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . a permanent impairment for hypertension does not constitute a “disability” for purposes of section 112.18 . . . Florida Statutes (2003), and the “disability” requirement of the compensability presumption of section 112.18 . . . a permanent impairment is not a disability for purposes of either section 440.151(l)(a) or section 112.18 . . . that a permanent impairment for hypertension does constitute a “disability” for purposes of section 112.18 . . . not at issue, because the parties stipulated to the applicability of the presumption under section 112.18 . . .

CITY OF TARPON SPRINGS v. VAPORIS,, 953 So. 2d 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . award of benefits to Appellee/Claimant via application of the “firefighter’s presumption,” section 112.18 . . . In seeking workers’ compensation benefits, he sought to take advantage of section 112.18, which provides . . . into any such service ..., which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition.... § 112.18 . . .

GRAY, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 918 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

POTTER, v. CITY OF ORMOND BEACH, 913 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . appellee, the City of Ormond Beach, previously accepted the condition as com-pensable pursuant to section 112.18 . . . ventricular ectopy because appellee had previously accepted the condition as com-pensable pursuant to section 112.18 . . . The supreme court has explained: The presumption contained in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975 . . . Contrary to appellee’s argument, it did not rebut the presumption found in section 112.18(1) through . . . non-work-related when ap-pellee had previously accepted the entire condition as compensable by virtue of section 112.18 . . .

UNISOURCE ADMINISTRATORS s v. BRIDGES,, 914 So. 2d 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 112.18(1), Fla. . . . Thomas, 657 So.2d 927, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“We ... reject the City’s argument that ... section 112.18 . . .

STATE v. N. REESE,, 911 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . compensation claims (1) applied'the statutory presumption specified in the “Heart-Lung” statute, section 112.18 . . . Section 112.18(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows: (1) Any condition or impairment of health of . . . The text of a 2002 amendment to section 112.18 plainly revealed to members of the legislature that the . . . first time, entitle correctional officers to the presumption specified in the first sentence of section 112.18 . . . Because the 2002 amendment of section 112.18(1), adding correctional officers to the list of employees . . .

CITY OF MARY ESTHER v. McARTOR,, 902 So. 2d 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . entitled to the statutory presumption of compensability for coronary artery disease provided by section 112.18 . . . disease is an occupational illness when suffered by a firefighter meeting the requirements of section 112.18 . . .

SEMINOLE COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE v. JOHNSON,, 901 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Appellants argue that the Judge of Compensation Claims (the “JCC”) erred by interpreting section 112.18 . . . was statutorily presumed to have been accidental and suffered in the line of duty pursuant to section 112.18 . . . As in Brown, the 2002 amendment to section 112.18(1) changed only the procedure of establishing entitlement . . . appellants evidentiary argument relating to claimant’s prerequisite physical examination under section 112.18 . . .

MARTIN, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Of, 890 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . is entitled to the statutory presumption of compensability of his heart disease afforded by section 112.18 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ALCORN,, 93 F. App'x 37 (6th Cir. 2004)

. . . Alcorn’s offense involved quantities of methamphetamine, hydromorphone, and morphine equivalent to 2, 112.18 . . .

HERIC, v. CITY OF ORMOND BEACH, 728 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . employer and carrier accepted the compensability of the claimant’s heart condition pursuant to section 112.18 . . .

NEWFOUND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, GENERAL PARTNER OF NEWFOUND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, v. A. SEWER,, 34 F. Supp. 2d 305 (D.V.I. 1999)

. . . See Hearing on Motions, Tr. 112.18-118.24. . . .

CITY OF MIAMI, v. THOMAS,, 657 So. 2d 927 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . claims found the claimant’s condition compensable by operation of the rebuttable presumption in section 112.18 . . . the order, with the exception of the judge’s finding that the term “hypertension,” as used in section 112.18 . . . We reject the City’s contention that the 1990 enactment of section 440.015 repealed section 112.18 by . . . We also reject the City’s argument that the phrase “total or partial disability,” as used in section 112.18 . . .

CITY OF CLEARWATER v. F. CARPENTIERI,, 659 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . the claimant, a firefighter, is entitled to the presumption of compensability set forth in section 112.18 . . . attack Carpentieri was an employee of the City entitled to the presumption of the statute, section 112.18 . . . Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida . . .

CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH v. BURBAUM,, 632 So. 2d 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . that they failed to overcome the presumption relative to the disability of fire fighters under section 112.18 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. CLARK,, 593 So. 2d 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . The employer appeals a workers’ compensation order by which the presumption in section 112.18(1), Florida . . . the claimant did not demonstrate that he is one of the specified firemen within the ambit of section 112.18 . . . proceeded to a hearing and the claimant asserted that he is entitled to the presumption in section 112.18 . . . Stanford involved an application of section 112.18(1), but the opinion merely recites several issues . . . Chapter 379, Florida Statutes (1965), identified one fire control district when section 112.18(1) was . . . because it appears to be compelled by the enumeration of certain classes of firemen designated in Section 112.18 . . . additional benefits are payable, it continues to restrict the categories of employers under section 112.18 . . . examined the above provisions, it appears to me that the legislative omission of state agencies in section 112.18 . . .

CITY OF PENSACOLA v. WINCHESTER,, 560 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . See § 112.18(1), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence .... .§ 112.18 . . .

SMITH, v. CITY OF MIAMI,, 552 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . contends that te deputy erred in refusing to extend the firefighter’s presumption statute, section 112.18 . . . Section 112.18(1) provides: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal ... fireman . . .

J. D. CUMBIE, v. CITY OF MILTON, 496 So. 2d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . examination upon entering his employment as a fireman, he was not entitled to the statutory presumption of § 112.18 . . . Section 112.18 provides that any condition or impairment of health of any fireman caused by tuberculosis . . . such service as a fireman, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition.” § 112.18 . . . City of Milton, claimant retired, and brought his claim for compensation benefits pursuant to section 112.18 . . . Section 112.18 states in part: (1) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal, county . . . the literal language of the proviso or exception to the preceding statutory presumption of section 112.18 . . . This rule is particularly applicable to statutes — such as section 112.18(1) —that are remedial in nature . . . The legislative policy behind the enactment of section 112.18(1) recognizes that firemen are subjected . . .

H. SLEDGE, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, 497 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . disease was a preexisting condition, he was not entitled to the statutory presumption afforded by section 112.18 . . . Department of Corrections, 464 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the Florida Legislature has enacted section 112.18 . . . Section 112.18(1) applies to chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1985). . . . disease was a preexisting condition and that claimant is not entitled to the presumption of section 112.18 . . .

R. LANSFORD, v. BROWARD COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,, 485 So. 2d 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . 112.191(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1983) and therefore not entitled to the presumption set forth in Section 112.18 . . . Section 112.18(1) provides that “any condition or impairment of health of any Florida ... fireman caused . . . Lansford’s principal duty was medical care, he was not a fireman entitled to the presumption of Section 112.18 . . . was correct in his conclusion that Lans-ford was not a fireman entitled to the presumption of Section 112.18 . . .

CITY OF TEMPLE TERRACE v. BAILEY,, 481 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . The E/C urge that the deputy misapplied the presumption established by § 112.18(1), Fla.Stat. . . . In Caldwell the court held that the statutory presumption of § 112.18(1) prevails in cases where the . . . and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of occupational causation supplied by § 112.18 . . . proof of non-work related causation and the deputy erred in failing to find that the presumption of § 112.18 . . . The E/C urge this court to find that the legislature did not intend § 112.18(1) to apply in any case . . .

CITY OF GAINESVILLE v. B. BECK,, 450 So. 2d 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . claimant’s heart attack was an injury by an accident arising out of his employment, relying upon section 112.18 . . . permanent partial disability benefits under the “Firefighters’ Heart and Lung Provision” of section 112.18 . . . Section 112.18(1) provides that heart attacks suffered by firemen are presumed to be accidental and suffered . . .

SOUTH TRAIL FIRE CONTROL DISTRICT v. C. JOHNSON, Jr., 449 So. 2d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . We hold that section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1981), applies to chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1981) . . .

A. DANIELS, v. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT,, 389 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . Section 112.18(1). . . .

E. CALDWELL, v. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION,, 372 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1979)

. . . The district court of appeal held that the Commission erred in refusing to apply section 112.18(1), Florida . . . The district court of appeal in its opinion correctly held that section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes ( . . . The presumption contained in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), affects the burden of persuasion . . . , 141 So.2d 581 (Fla.1971)), so did the legislature establish a general rule for firemen in section 112.18 . . .

G. CUNDY, Sr. v. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION,, 353 So. 2d 967 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . Commission for further proceedings giving appropriate effect to the presumption accorded by Section 112.18 . . .

E. CALDWELL, v. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION,, 344 So. 2d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . Section 112.18(1) provides in pertinent part: “Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida . . . . The Commission erred in refusing to apply the presumption of Section 112.18(1) to this case but it was . . .

H. v., 63 T.C. 642 (T.C. 1975)

. . . OPINION Dawson, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of $112.18 in petitioners’ Federal income tax . . .

MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES, 63 F. Supp. 629 (D. Md. 1945)

. . . In 1926 the General Accounting Office made claim against Captain Marshall in the amount of $49,-112.18 . . .