Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The State Retirement Commission (Commission) denied Caldwell's claim for "disability in line of duty" benefits, costs, and attorney's fee. Caldwell, a fireman, suffered a heart attack. The district court of appeal held that the Commission erred in refusing to apply section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), which provided that any impairment of health of a fireman caused by heart disease resulting in total disability is presumed to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary, is shown by competent evidence....

...ormance of duty required by a member's employment during his regularly scheduled working hours or irregular working hours as required by the employer. § 121.021(13), Fla. Stat. (1975). The district court of appeal in its opinion correctly held that section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), was applicable....

...It is not overcome until the trier of fact believes that the presumed fact has been overcome by whatever degree of persuasion is required by the substantive law of the case. This may be by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, as the case may be. The presumption contained in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), affects the burden of persuasion....

...Just as this Court developed a general formula for dealing with the difficult problem of proving the occupational causation of heart attacks in workmen's compensation cases ( Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc., v. Beasley, 141 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1971)), so did the legislature establish a general rule for firemen in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The holding of the First District Court of Appeal in the case sub judice that the presumption was overcome where there was conflicting evidence of causation is in error and should be quashed. The portion of the opinion of the district court of appeal holding that section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), should be applied in these proceedings and the holding that Caldwell is not entitled to attorney's fee and costs are approved....

...This may be by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, as the case may be. Id. at 440-41 . Applying this standard to a statute that governed a presumption in favor of firefighters, the Court held: The presumption contained in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), affects the burden of persuasion....

...any indication that the Legislature intended for that evidentiary provision to apply. Both of those decisions, however, interpret statutes that were in effect before the Florida Evidence Code was enacted. See Caldwell, 372 So.2d at 439 (interpreting section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975)); Brasher, 132 So.2d at 443 (interpreting section 185.34, Florida Statutes (1957))....

...The City defended on several grounds urging, among other things, that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and that since claimant's heart disease was a preexisting condition, he was not entitled to the statutory presumption afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...general public." § 440.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1985). Although heart disease is not ordinarily compensable as an occupational disease, Russell v. State, Department of Corrections, 464 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the Florida Legislature has enacted section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1985), which establishes a statutory presumption that heart disease suffered by a fireman is connected with the exertions of his work so long as the fireman passes a preemployment physical examination without evidence of such disease. Section 112.18(1) applies to chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...to run. Upon remand, the City will be permitted to raise its other defenses, not yet ruled upon by the deputy, including its contention that claimant's heart disease was a preexisting condition and that claimant is not entitled to the presumption of section 112.18(1)....

...In this workers’ compensation appeal, the Employer challenges the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) determination that it failed to sufficiently rebut the presumption of occupational causation afforded Claimant, a law enforcement officer, under section 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...demonstrating a non-occupational cause for the SVT. See Fuller v. Okaloosa Corr. Inst., 22 So. 3d 803, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“Because a claimant’s burden of proving major contributing cause (MCC) by medical evidence, is fully met where the presumption contained in section 112.18(1) is applied, the Employer, in rebutting the presumption must likewise disprove occupational causation by medical evidence.”). The JCC found, as supported by the medical testimony, that the SVT was caused by a slow pathway...

...1st DCA July 21, 2008), and substitute the following opinion. Appellant, Robert Punsky, the claimant below, seeks review of an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying workers' compensation benefits. We affirm the order, because, although the presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2005), applies, competent substantial evidence of record supports the JCC's alternative ruling that the presumption was rebutted by the medical evidence introduced by appellees....

...then employed as a deputy sheriff, suffered a heart attack on June 24, 2005, while asleep. He sought workers' compensation benefits, alleging that stress from his job as a police officer had caused the heart attack and that he was entitled to invoke section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, often referred to as the "firefighter's presumption." At the hearing, the medical evidence presented unanimously supported a conclusion that claimant's heart attack was facilitated and, more likely than not, caused by a genetic condition known as combined familial hyperlipidemia (CFL)....

...he evidence of non-industrial causation. ANALYSIS As to the threshold question, whether the statutory presumption applies, the JCC determined that Punsky did not merit application of the presumption because he failed his pre-employment physical. See § 112.18(1), Fla....

...physical examination. Turning to the more salient issue, however, we conclude that appellees rebutted the presumption sufficiently under the statute and the controlling case law, as the JCC here properly found as an alternative basis for her order. Section 112.18(1) establishes a presumption that certain health conditions incurred by any designated firefighter or law enforcement officer are accidental and "have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence." Thus, section 112.18(1) expressly provides that the presumption can be rebutted by "competent evidence." Nothing in this statute indicates that the legislature required an elevated burden of proof to rebut the presumption....

...d by the substantive law of the case. This may be by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, as the case may be. Caldwell, 372 So.2d at 440 (citations omitted). As the supreme court concluded, the presumption embodied in section 112.18(1) affects the burden of persuasion and, accordingly, it is not in the nature of a vanishing presumption which, as the court discussed in the passage quoted above, dissolves upon the introduction of conflicting evidence....

...There was evidence that the disease was caused by arteriosclerosis unrelated to the claimant's employment and there was also evidence that the stress of the claimant's employment over a period of time caused in whole or in part the heart attack. In Caldwell the court held that the statutory presumption of § 112.18(1) prevails in cases where the medical evidence is conflicting and the quantum of proof is balanced....

...We note that City of Temple Terrace is one case in which this court has ruled on the merits of the case by reweighing the evidence and reversing the deputy. To that extent, we recede from City of Temple Terrace. In summary, there is a clear path for the application of the section 112.18(1) presumption....

...e clear and convincing evidence standard. Even though we are bound to follow Caldwell, see Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 440 (Fla.1973), which we do here, we are concerned that the court in Caldwell added a clear and convincing burden of proof to section 112.18(1) where the legislature provided for rebuttal of the "firefighter's presumption" by the introduction of "competent evidence." Accordingly, we certify the following question of great public importance: SHOULD CALDWELL V. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, 372 So.2d 438 (Fla.1979), BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE HEIGHTENED BURDEN OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED TO REBUT THE "FIREFIGHTER'S PRESUMPTION" IN SECTION 112.18(1) WHEN THAT STATUTE EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT THE PRESUMPTION MAY BE *585 REBUTTED BY THE LESSER BURDEN OF "COMPETENT EVIDENCE?" Because the challenged ruling here is supported by competent, substantial evidence, the appealed order is AFFIRMED....

...d ROBERTS, JJ., concur. BENTON, J., concurring in the judgment. Until and unless the supreme court modifies its decision in Caldwell v. Division of Retirement, Florida Department of Administration, 372 So.2d 438 (Fla.1979), or the Legislature amends section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, we are bound to follow Caldwell....

...Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 440 (Fla.1973). While suggesting that Caldwell was wrongly decided to begin with, the per curiam opinion purports to accept this proposition. In at least one respect, however, the per curiam opinion misreads Caldwell: The view that a claimant entitled to the section 112.18(1) presumption must buttress the presumption with medical evidence linking the tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension to his or her employment before the employer must shoulder the burden to present clear and convincing evidence...

...The majority opinion seems to say that the employer can rebut the statutory presumption by a mere preponderance of the evidence, where there is no medical evidence (which the judge of compensation claims finds credible) that a claimant's disabling disease or condition was in fact "suffered in the line of duty." § 112.18(1), Fla....

...or hypertension which resulted in disability or death, and that he had passed a physical examination upon entering into service as a law enforcement officer or other covered position, which failed to reveal any evidence of the disabling disease. See § 112.18(1), Fla....

...The statute cast[s] on the employer the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the disease was caused by a non-occupationally related agent."); Bivens v. City of Lakeland, 993 So.2d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Caldwell establishes the quantum of evidence an employer must adduce in order to rebut the section 112.18(1) presumption—something the statute itself concededly does not specify....

...Kalinoski, of Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, Orlando, for Appellants. Jason L. Fox, of the Law Offices of Carlson & Meissner, Clearwater, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant seeks review of an award of benefits to Appellee/Claimant via application of the "firefighter's presumption," section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...His initial employment physical was partially administered ten days before he began working, and the remainder of the physical was completed fifteen days after he began working. On February 14, 2005, Claimant suffered a heart attack. In seeking workers' compensation benefits, he sought to *599 take advantage of section 112.18, which provides as follows: Any condition or impairment of health of any ....

...ontrary be shown by competent evidence. However, any such firefighter . . . shall have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service . . ., which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition. . . . § 112.18, Fla....

...lishing each of the statutory requirements. Here, Claimant's ability to satisfy the "four prong test" [1] that comprises part of the statutory requirements is not at issue, because the parties stipulated to the applicability of the presumption under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

...(2003) (requiring that "the disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease . . . be treated as the happening of an injury by accident"). WEBSTER, J., dissenting. The majority concludes that a permanent impairment for hypertension does not constitute a "disability" for purposes of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2002), unless there is evidence of actual wage loss....

...It is the presumption of disability created by a section 440.15(3) permanent impairment that satisfies the "disablement" requirement of the occupational disease provisions of section 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), and the "disability" requirement of the compensability presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2003). The majority's conclusion that a permanent impairment is not a disability for purposes of either section 440.151(1)(a) or section 112.18(1) without a showing of an actual loss of earning capacity makes sense only under the old wage-loss system which no longer exists....

...in this case must prove a loss of earning capacity to receive permanent impairment benefits. This is simply not required by section 440.15(3). In concluding that a permanent impairment for hypertension does constitute a "disability" for purposes of section 112.18(1), I have relied on the doctrine of in pari materia which "requires that statutes relating to the same subject or object be construed together to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature's intent." Fla....

...Balentine and Barbie Feldman of Ross Vecchio, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. HAWKES, J. Claimant filed petitions seeking workers' compensation benefits for hypertension and microvascular angina (MVA). Claimant argued that the statutory presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, was applicable for both conditions....

...and, potentially, MVA. Claimant petitioned for workers' compensation benefits. The petitions were denied and the matter proceeded to trial. The issue before the JCC turned on whether Claimant's conditions were covered by the statutory presumption of section 112.18(1)....

...Medical Advisor (EMA). The EMA diagnosed Claimant with essential hypertension. Based on the expert's testimony, the JCC concluded that this type of hypertension was not arterial or cardiovascular, and therefore was not covered by the presumption of section 112.18(1). The EMA also diagnosed Claimant with MVA. The JCC applied the presumption of section 112.18(1) to this condition, finding it qualified as a heart disease which had caused temporary disablement....

...Noting that the E/C had failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption, the JCC concluded that Claimant's MVA was compensable. ESSENTIAL HYPERTENSION Appellant argues the JCC's should have found essential hypertension compensable under section 112.18(1)....

...This is a question of law concerning the interpretation of a workers' compensation statute, and as such is subject to de novo review. See Stubbs v. Bob Dale Constr., 977 So.2d 718, 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Mylock v. Champion Int'l, 906 So.2d 363, 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The Supreme Court has emphasized that section 112.18(1) only relieves a claimant "from the necessity of proving an occupational causation." Caldwell v....

...e scope of the presumption (i.e., "tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension"), and that the condition has caused disablement. In City of Miami v. Thomas, 657 So.2d 927, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we clarified the types of "hypertension" covered by section 112.18(1). In that case, we overruled a JCC's finding that "the term `hypertension,' as used in section 112.18(1), was meant to include `any kind of hypertension,' i.e., hypertensive conditions other than arterial or cardiovascular hypertension." Id....

...Therefore, there is no record evidence that the JCC could rely on demonstrating essential hypertension is arterial or cardiovascular in nature. Consequently, the JCC properly found the condition was not a form of hypertension covered by the presumption of section 112.18(1)....

...led upon their first visit to a doctor's office. Claimant's MVA did not cause an incapacity resulting in wage loss. Without such incapacity, Claimant cannot demonstrate disablement. Without disablement, Claimant cannot qualify for the presumption of section 112.18(1). The JCC's finding that Claimant's MVA was compensable is reversed. CONCLUSION In summary, we affirm the portion of the JCC's order finding that "essential *1104 hypertension" is not a form of hypertension covered by the presumption of section 112.18(1). However, we reverse the portion of the order finding that Claimant's MVA was compensable under section 112.18(1)....

...It is of no consequence that the claimant's first heart attack occurred in 1991 while E/C 1 provided workers' compensation coverage. At that time, the claimant was, and continues to be, a city firefighter entitled to the statutory presumption of compensability for coronary artery disease provided by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. Coronary artery disease is an occupational illness when suffered by a firefighter meeting the requirements of section 112.18(1)....

...(JCC) denying his claim for benefits resulting from a July 27, 2005, date of accident. The claimant argues that he was entitled to the presumption that his coronary artery disease was caused by his occupation as a firefighter. We agree and reverse. Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2005), also referred to as the "Heart/Lung Bill," provides in pertinent part: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida ......

...City Attys., Miami, for appellant. Richard A. Sicking, Miami, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The City of Miami appeals an order in which the judge of compensation claims found the claimant's condition compensable by operation of the rebuttable presumption in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1991), that for a firefighter, "any condition or impairment of health" caused by "tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension" resulting in "total or partial disability or death" was accidental and was suffered i...

...of duty, so long as the firefighter had passed a pre-employment physical examination which "failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition." We affirm the order, with the exception of the judge's finding that the term "hypertension," as used in section 112.18, was meant to include "any kind of hypertension," i.e., hypertensive conditions other than arterial or cardiovascular hypertension. We reject the City's contention that the 1990 enactment of section 440.015 repealed section 112.18 by implication, to the extent that it has been construed to extend to chapter 440 proceedings. We find that this presumption remains viable in the worker's compensation context. We also reject the City's argument that the phrase "total or partial disability," as used in section 112.18, was intended to be limited to permanent disability, so that the presumption would not apply to a temporary disability, as experienced by this claimant....

...Northcutt, of Levine, Freedman, Hirsch & Levinson, Tampa, for appellee. THOMPSON, Judge. The employer/carrier (E/C) appeal an order finding that the claimant, a 56-year-old fire chief, suffered from a compensable heart disease. The E/C urge that the deputy misapplied the presumption established by § 112.18(1), Fla....

...Clay Hyder Trucking Lines, 397 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for rev. den. 402 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1981). The deputy correctly determined that claimant, as a fire fighter disabled by heart disease, was entitled to the statutory presumption afforded by § 112.18(1)....

...There was evidence that the disease was caused by arteriosclerosis unrelated to the claimant's employment and there was also evidence that the stress of the claimant's employment over a period of time caused in whole or in part the heart attack. In Caldwell the court held that the statutory presumption of § 112.18(1) prevails in cases where the medical evidence is conflicting and the quantum of proof is balanced....

...re." On the basis of Caldwell the deputy concluded that these two negative replies were dispositive, and found that the E/C had failed to present clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of occupational causation supplied by § 112.18(1)....

...-work related causation existed in the congenital and progressive nature of claimant's disease. The medical evidence constituted clear and convincing proof of non-work related causation and the deputy erred in failing to find that the presumption of § 112.18(1) had been rebutted. The E/C urge this court to find that the legislature did not intend § 112.18(1) to apply in any case where the protected employee suffers from a congenital heart disease. They also argue that the obvious *51 intent of the legislature was to provide a presumption only in favor of employees who suffer heart attacks. Section 112.18(1) specifically applies to " Any condition or impairment of health......

...rvicihg Agent (E/ SA) seek review of the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) order finding that Claimant, a law enforcement officer, established the compensability of his hypertension' under the statutory presumption in the Heart-Lung Statute, section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...f of work. He was subsequently diagnosed with hypertension which eventually came under good control with medication. Claimant then, sought a determination of compensa-bility of his hypertensive condition' as a workplace injury in accordance'with the section 112.18(1) statutory presumption....

...This statute provides, in pertinent part, that any health condition or impairment of a law enforcement officer caused by hypertension and resulting in disability “shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be,shown by competent evidence.” § 112.18(l)(a), Fla....

...usia Cty. Fire Servs. v. Taaffe, 27 So.3d 81, 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that pre-employment physical examination finding claimant fit for duty but noting a diagnosis of hypertension precluded presumption of compensability of hypertension under section 112.18(1)); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Davis, 26 So.3d 13, 17-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that section 112.18(1) presumption was precluded where relevant pre-employment physical revealed claimant suffered from heart disease)....

...y to the population at large. Our reading pf the plain language here is consistent with this court’s opinion in Talpesh v. Village of Royal Palm Beach, 994 So.2d 353, 354-55 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). In Talpesh, the JCC ruled that the presumption under section 112.18(1) did not apply to that claimant’s coronary artery disease because the pre-employment examination revealed high blood pressure....

...Claimant’s medical history was more likely than not an indication of “white coat” syndrome at; the pre-em-ployment physical. Accordingly, because the JCC did not err when he determined that Claimant is entitled to the statutory presumption in section 112.18(1), we affirm the order on appeal....

...Sicking, Coral Gables, for Appellee. BENTON, J. Miami-Dade County appeals an order of the judge of compensation claims finding the County responsible for workers' compensation benefits on account of William A. Davis's heart disease, on the purported authority of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...ion of compensability. But the presumption only arises if the firefighter has "successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a firefighter... which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition." § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). See City of Mary Esther v. McArtor, 902 So.2d 942, 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) ("Coronary artery disease is an occupational illness when suffered by a firefighter meeting the requirements of section 112.18(1)."); Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So.2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ("Although heart disease is not ordinarily compensable as an occupational disease, the Florida Legislature has enacted section 112.18(1) ..., which establishes a statutory presumption that heart disease suffered by a fireman is connected with the exertions of his work so long as the fireman passes a preemployment physical examination without evidence of such disease....

...Proceedings Below Following the surfing incident, Mr. Davis filed petitions for benefits against Miami-Dade County [1] seeking a determination that the cardiac incident while he was surfing on February 26, 2002, was compensable by virtue of the presumption that arises under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, whenever a "firefighter or state law enforcement officer shall have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a firefighter......

...which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition." The County argued that mere certification as a firefighter (including passing the physical then required) did not entitle Mr. *16 Davis to the benefit of the presumption set forth in section 112.18(1), because his subsequent, preemployment physical examination for Miami-Dade County revealed that he suffered from heart disease....

...Jaimy Bensimon, claimant's independent medical examiner, agreed that claimant had preexisting heart disease when Miami-Dade County hired him. The County denied compensability on the ground that the claimant's heart disease antedated his employment with Miami-Dade County. Claimant argued that sections 112.18, 633.34 [2] , and 633.35 [3] , Florida Statutes, should be read in pari materia so that the only physical examination a firefighter needs to take and pass, for purposes of determining whether the presumption set forth in section 112.18 applies, is the initial medical examination described in section 633.34 that a firefighter once had to undergo in order to become certified pursuant to section 633.35. The judge of compensation claims accepted this argument. In ruling that the 1972 certification examination was the only relevant examination for purposes of section 112.18(1), the judge of compensation claims stated: The claimant ......

...The judge of compensation claims acknowledged that the claimant had a history of heart disease at the time of his preemployment physical examination for Miami-Dade County, but ruled this was irrelevant, on grounds that the preemployment physical is "not the one referred to in § 112.18(1)," stating: *17 The only medical examination required by law for firefighters is the pre-certification medical examination. Section 633.34, Fla. Stat., and Section 633.35, Fla. Stat., should be read in pari materia with Section 112.18, Fla....

...mi-Dade County responsible for medical benefits. Preemployment Physical Precluded Presumption We cannot agree with the judge of compensation claims that "Section 633.34, Fla. Stat., and Section 633.35, Fla. Stat., should be read in pari materia with Section 112.18, Fla....

...Stat., because the medical examination required by law referred to in Chapter 633 is the one required for certification, which is upon entering into service as a firefighter." The judge of compensation claims erred in relying on sections 633.34 and 633.35 for the proposition that the physical examination referred to in section 112.18(1) was the 1972 certification exam....

...Davis to submit to a preemployment physical examination, even though he was already a certified firefighter when he applied for employment with the County. The preemployment examination revealed that he had heart disease before he began work for Miami-Dade County. Section 112.18(1) did not, therefore, give rise to a presumption of occupational causation when, after he took the job, heart disease manifested itself while he was surfing....

...4, Fla. Stat. (1995)—not just a person "initially employed as a fire fighter," § 163.490, Fla. Stat. (1971)—must "[b]e in good physical condition as determined by a medical examination." Reading sections *18 633.34 and 633.35 in pari materia with section 112.18 lends no support to, and, indeed, rules out, the inference the judge of compensation claims erroneously drew, namely, that the only medical examination required by law for firefighters is the pre-certification medical examination. Section 112.18(1) draws no distinction between firefighters and law enforcement officers with regard to the presumption the statute authorizes. Section 112.18(1), the statute that controls here, speaks equally of a "firefighter or state law enforcement officer" and confers precisely the same rights and obligations on firefighters as it confers on state law enforcement officers, no more and no less. § 112.18(1), Fla....

...ably suggest that firefighters, who are outside the purview of the Department of Law Enforcement Act altogether, should be treated differently. As amended, the Act provides, in pertinent part: In order to be eligible for the presumption set forth in s. 112.18 while employed with an employing agency, a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer must have successfully passed the physical examination required by this subsection upon entering into service as a l...

...tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension. A law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer may not use a physical examination from a former employing agency for purposes of claiming the presumption set forth in s. 112.18 against the current employing agency. § 943.13(6), Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 943.13 makes unmistakably clear that the Legislature reads section 112.18, exactly the same way Miami-Dade County does, as forbidding the use of "a physical examination from a former employing agency for purposes of claiming the presumption set forth in s. 112.18 against the current employing agency." § 943.13(6), Fla. Stat. (2008). No examination in 1972 gave rise to the presumption set forth in section 112.18 so as to make Miami-Dade County responsible for workers' compensation benefits on account of the off-duty cardiac event Mr....

...e and cholesterol, semi-annual physical examinations, and annual stress tests. He filed a petition for benefits in January 2009 when the employer/carrier ("E/C"), after paying medical benefits for three years, terminated benefits claiming that under section 112.18, Florida Statutes, he became ineligible for workers' compensation benefits once he returned to normal duty....

...40.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). The occupational disease must have caused a disability to be "treated as the happening of an injury by accident," and thus, compensable. Id. See City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So.2d 727, 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Section 112.18, Florida Statutes, creates a presumption of compensability for certain conditions suffered by firefighters and law enforcement and correctional officers....

...firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer ... caused by ... tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability ... shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence. § 112.18(1), Fla....

...Inst., 22 So.3d 803, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). The E/C here accepted compensability of the claimant's hypertension and paid for his medical treatment for more than three years. But now they assert the claimant was only entitled to the presumption in section 112.18, and thus medical benefits, during the week-long period his hypertension resulted in "total or partial disability." In other words, now that the claimant's job-related hypertension is successfully controlled by medication such that he is back to normal duty, the E/C need no longer pay for ongoing treatment of the condition. To be sure, under section 112.18 disability is necessary to establish compensability of any condition or impairment of health "caused by ......

...cal benefits on continued disability, or limits payment of medical benefits to only the period of disability. See City of Miami v. Thomas, 657 So.2d 927, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (rejecting assertion by employer/carrier that disability giving rise to section 112.18 presumption must be permanent)....

...Keller, Esquire, Winter Park and Bill McCabe, Esquire, Longwood, for Appellee. ON MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY PER CURIAM. We withdraw our previous opinion in this cause issued March 24, 2005, and substitute the following therefor. Appellants argue that the Judge of Compensation Claims (the "JCC") erred by interpreting section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1999), providing a rebuttable presumption for specified firefighters and state law enforcement officers, to include county sheriff's deputies. The JCC found that claimant suffered a stroke caused by hypertension and that claimant's hypertension was statutorily presumed to have been accidental and suffered in the line of duty pursuant to section 112.18(1)....

...1st DCA 1997) (discussing section *344 440.15(13), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which changed a rebuttable presumption, and affirming the JCC's ruling that the change in the law was a procedural enactment because it affected the burden of proof). As in Brown, the 2002 amendment to section 112.18(1) changed only the procedure of establishing entitlement to workers' compensation benefits....

...these issues pursuant to the amended statute. REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions. VAN NORTWICK, POLSTON and THOMAS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We reject appellants' evidentiary argument relating to claimant's prerequisite physical examination under section 112.18(1) without further comment.

...e. No. AU-52. District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. May 3, 1984. Keith A. Mann, of Dickinson, O'Riorden, Gibbons, Quale, Shields & Carlton, Sarasota, for appellants. Ivan Matusek, St. Petersburg, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We hold that section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1981), applies to chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Sicking, Coral Gables, for Appellant. R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Lynda S. Slade, Assistant County Attorney, Miami, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See City of Tarpon Springs v. Vaporis, 953 So.2d 597, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ("All that [section 112.18, Florida Statutes] requires to overcome the presumption is competent substantial evidence that convinces a JCC that *824 the disease was caused by some non-work-related factor, not that it was caused by any sort of `specific hazard or non-occupational hazard'....

...In Potter, a claimant challenged an order denying, in part, her claim for impairment benefits arguing that the JCC erred in *37 apportioning an EMA's impairment rating since the employer/carrier had previously accepted the condition, ventricular ectopy, as compensable pursuant to section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2001) (creating a statutory presumption that a firefighter's tuberculosis, heart disease or hypertension is causally connected to employment)....

...t (E/SA), to pay claimant's medical costs, reimburse claimant's sick leave benefits, and pay penalties. First, the E/SA claim the JCC erred in determining that they failed to overcome the presumption relative to the disability of fire fighters under section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee. KELSEY, J. The Employer/Carrier appeals a final order of the Judge of Compensation Claims holding that Claimant is entitled to benefits under the heart-lung statute, section 112.18 of the Florida Statutes....

...Before correctional officers were added to the heart-lung statute in 2002, the law required firefighters and law enforcement officers to successfully pass a physical examination upon entering service, before being entitled to benefits under the statute. § 112.18(1)(a), Fla....

...ctional facility in December of 2012. 2 Under an amendment to the statute enacted in 2010, the presumption does not apply if a claim for benefits is not made “prior to or within 180 days after leaving the employment of the employing agency.” § 112.18(1)(b)4., Fla....

...and cases involving careers of up to 33 years. See Fuller v. Okaloosa Corr. Inst., 22 So. 3d 803, 804-05 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (10 years); City of Jacksonville Fire & Rescue Dep’t v. Battle, 148 So. 3d 795, 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (33 years). Nevertheless, section 112.18 on its face does not impose an express tenure requirement....

...State, __ 7 request a pre-trial ruling on the Daubert objection, and did not request the assignment of an alternate EMA. The Heart-Lung Statute. Florida’s heart-lung statute was enacted in 1965, covering firemen only. § 112.18, Fla....

...Such presumption shall not apply to benefits payable under or granted in a policy of life insurance or disability insurance, unless the insurer and insured have negotiated for such additional benefits to be included in the policy contract. § 112.18(1), Fla....

...The heart-lung statute provides that the E/C can rebut the statutory presumption with competent evidence of non-occupational causation. Id. (“unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence”). The Florida Supreme Court in Caldwell described the presumption created in section 112.18 as an expression of social policy, and thus held that it affects the burden of proof....

...inion incompetent and not a valid evidentiary basis for the JCC’s finding in favor of Claimant. Punsky, 18 So. 3d at 584. Conclusion. Because the E/C successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of section 112.18, and the EMA’s opinion was not competent, substantial evidence of occupational causation, Claimant was not entitled to benefits under the heart-lung statute. REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of judgment in favor of the E/C....

...Claimant appeals an order denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits. We affirm. Claimant contends the deputy commissioner erred in finding that because he did not undergo a physical examination upon entering his employment as a fireman, he was not entitled to the statutory presumption of § 112.18, Fla. Stat. Section 112.18 provides that any condition or impairment of health of any fireman caused by tuberculosis, heart disease or hypertension and resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent *924 evidence....

...As an apparent quid pro quo for granting this presumption to firemen the legislature further provided, "However, any such fireman shall have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a fireman, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition." § 112.18(1), Fla....

...In November 1984, following the recommendation of claimant's treating physician that claimant's hypertension and arteriosclerotic heart disease prevented him from carrying out his duties as fire chief of the City of Milton, claimant retired, and brought his claim for compensation benefits pursuant to section 112.18(1). The parties agree that without the presumption contained in the statute, claimant would not be entitled to benefits. Section 112.18 [1] states in part: (1) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firemen caused by tuberculosis, heart disease or hypertension resulting in t...

...However, any such fireman shall have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a fireman, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition. (e.s.) The deputy, relying upon the literal language of the proviso or exception to the preceding statutory presumption of section 112.18(1), held that because claimant had failed to take a physical examination immediately upon entering into service as a fireman with the city in 1964, he was thereby barred from the presumptive effect of the statute....

...the operative effect of statutory language are strictly construed against one who attempts to take advantage of such exceptions. See State v. Nourse, 340 So.2d 966, 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). This rule is particularly applicable to statutes — such as section 112.18(1) — that are remedial in nature. See 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 313 (1974). The legislative policy behind the enactment of section 112.18(1) recognizes that firemen are subjected during their career to the hazard of smoke, heat, and nauseous fumes from all kinds of toxic chemicals as well as extreme anxiety derived from the necessity of being constantly faced with the possibility of extreme danger......

...Claimant, a corrections officer, challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying compensation for a cardiac condition. Claimant argues competent substantial evidence (CSE) does not support the JCC’s finding that the Employer rebutted the presumption of compensability provided for in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2007), by showing a non-occupational cause of the condition....

...Claimant filed a claim for compensation for this condition, and the JCC found that whether Claimant was suffering from sick *805 sinus syndrome or vasovagal syncope, both were cardiac conditions and thus, Claimant was entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

...Claimant filed a claim for compensability of the RVOT tachycardia. The JCC found RVOT tachycardia was the only suggested diagnosis which would explain why Claimant suffered the 2007 syncope. The JCC found Claimant established entitlement to the presumption of compensability afforded by section 112.18(1)....

...d logical to conclude RVOT tachycardia caused not only the 2007 episode, but the 1995 and 2003 episodes as well. On appeal, Claimant argues CSE does not support the JCC’s finding the Employer rebutted the presumption of compensa-bility afforded by section 112.18(1), because no medical evidence established Claimant had a cardiac condition or disease, most notably RVOT tachycardia, pri- or to entering service as a corrections officer....

...Here, the JCC found Claimant, a corrections officer, had disabling RVOT tachycardia, a cardiac condition, which was undetected on Claimant’s pre-employment physical. Accordingly, the JCC concluded Claimant was entitled to the presumption of compensability found in section 112.18(1)....

...These findings and *806 conclusions are not challenged on appeal and thus, the foundation of our opinion is predicated on a presumed, but rebuttable, finding that Claimant’s 2007 episode was caused by RVOT tachycardia which was accidental and suffered in the line of duty pursuant to section 112.18(1)....

...of the presumption, the 1995 fainting episode becomes relevant only to the extent, if any, that it supports the Employer’s burden in rebutting the presumption of occupational causation relative to the RVOT tachycardia. The presumption afforded by section 112.18(1)(2007) relieves a qualifying claimant from the necessity of proving occupational causation of the heart disease resulting in disability or death....

...See Talpesh v. Village of Royal Palm Beach, 994 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). In Punsky v. Clay County Sheriff’s Office, 18 So.3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), this court stated as follows: In summary, there is a clear path for the application of the section 112.18(1) presumption....

...not the mere existence of risk factors or conditions. Punsky, 18 So.3d at 583 (internal citations omitted). Because a claimant’s burden of proving major contributing cause (MCC) by medical evidence, is fully met where the presumption contained in section 112.18(1) is applied, the Employer, in rebutting the presumption must likewise disprove occupational causation by medical evidence. See § 440.151(1), Fla. Stat. (2007) (requiring claimant to prove causation of occupational disease by presenting medical evidence establishing major contributing cause of disease is nature of employment); § 112.18(1), Fla....

...Videau, whose medical diagnosis of vasovagal syncope was rejected by the JCC, testified within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Claimant did not have RVOT tachycardia — ever. Because the JCC found RVOT tachycardia is the cardiac condition to which the section 112.18(1) presumption applies, it was incumbent on the E/C to demonstrate by medical testimony established within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the RVOT tachycardia was caused by some non-work-related factor....

...Be *807 cause no medical evidence established a non-occupational cause of Claimant’s RVOT tachycardia within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, we are constrained to reverse because CSE does not support the JCC’s finding that the E/C rebutted the statutory presumption of compensability afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...The claimant argues that he was entitled to the presumption that his peripheral vascular disease (PVD) was caused by his occupation as a firefighter. The claimant also argues that he was entitled to PTD benefits because his PVD met or equaled a listed impairment. We agree and reverse. Presumption Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1996), also referred to as the "Heart/Lung Bill," provides in pertinent part: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal ....

...Therefore, the JCC erred in denying the claim for PTD benefits. REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to the JCC to award the claimant PTD benefits. BROWNING, C.J., concurs; KAHN, J., concurs with opinion. KAHN, J., concurring. As observed by the majority, this court holds that the presumption created by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, applies in workers' compensation cases....

...mpetent substantial evidence that convinces a JCC that the disease was caused by some non-work-related factor. . . ." See also Saldana v. Miami-Dade County and Div. of Risk Mgmt., 978 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Our holding in Vaporis was true to section 112.18(1), which, in pertinent part, provides that the presumption of industrial causation set up by that statute prevails, "unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence." I recognize that the supreme court, in Caldwell v....

...Schwartz, West Palm Beach, for Appellant. Micheal A. Edwards of Edwards and Clarke, P.A., North Palm Beach, for Appellees. *1233 HAWKES, J. We write only to address the proper standard for determining whether an employer/carrier has rebutted the "firefighter's presumption" of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Division of Retirement, Florida Department of Administration, 372 So.2d 438, 439 (Fla.1979), provides a useful analytic framework. In Caldwell the supreme court analyzed presumptions where the relevant statute did not expressly create a burden-shifting presumption. The case involved section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), which provided that a fireman's disability or death caused by heart disease was presumed to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary was shown by competent evidence....

...Sitting en banc, we affirmed the order of the judge of compensation claims. See Punsky v. Clay County Sheriff’s Office, 18 So.3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA) (en banc) (affirming the finding that the employer and carrier had rebutted the presumption of compensability found in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and certifying a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court), review denied, 22 So.3d 539 (Fla.2009)....

...In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying com-pensability of her hypertension on the ground she failed to establish eligibility to rely on the statutory presumption of occupational causation available via section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2010). We reverse. The E/C conceded Claimant met three of the four requirements of section 112.18 by being a police officer whose condition resulted in disability and who “successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into” service. The fourth statutory requirement is that the condition itself be *303 one of those listed in section 112.18: “tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension.” This court has held such hypertension must be “arterial or cardiovascular.” See Bivens v....

...Thomas . Because the JCC’s understanding of that case law is inaccurate, the JCC’s rejection of the unrefuted medical opinion testimony was unfounded. Bivens does not hold that, as a matter of law, “essential” hypertension is not covered by section 112.18....

...vascular. Bivens does not preclude a claimant from attempting to meet his burden to prove that whatever form of hypertension he may have is in fact “arterial or cardiovascular.” Bivens is limited to its facts: where a claimant seeking to rely on section 112.18 produces no evidence that his hypertension is arterial or cardiovascular, a JCC’s denial of com-pensability on that ground will be affirmed....

...officer for the Florida Department of Corrections, that, as a matter of fact and law, the date of his accident was October 24, 2002. Therefore, the claimant is entitled to the statutory presumption of compensability of his heart disease afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...Caldwell seeks review of an order of the State Retirement Commission (Commission) denying Caldwell's claim for in line of duty disability benefits, costs and attorney's fees. Caldwell contends the Commission erred in the following respects: 1. by refusing to apply the presumption of in line of duty set forth in Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), 2....

...Section 121.021(13), Florida Statutes (1975), provides in pertinent part: "`Disability in line of duty' means an injury or illness arising out of and in the actual performance of duty required by a member's employment during his regularly scheduled working hours or irregular working hours as required by the employer." Section 112.18(1) provides in pertinent part: "Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida......

...ial disability shall be presumed to have been suffered in the actual performance of duty required by his employment during working hours unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence. The Commission erred in refusing to apply the presumption of Section 112.18(1) to this case but it was harmless because there was competent substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's finding that Caldwell's heart attack did not arise out of and in the actual performance of duty required by his employment during working hours....

...During his twenty-three years of active service with the city, claimant contributed eleven percent of his wages to his pension benefit plan with the city. Upon his retirement in February 1988, claimant began receiving in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. See § 112.18(1), Fla....

...fireman caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the *1275 contrary be shown by competent evidence... . § 112.18(1), Fla....

...McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The Division's order does not overcome the effect of those findings and the statutory presumption that a fireman's death due to heart disease was suffered in the line of duty. Section 112.18(1)....

...rcent impairment rating. Claimant first argues that the JCC erred in apportioning the eight percent impairment rating for the ventricular ectopy because appellee, the City of Ormond Beach, previously accepted the condition as compensable pursuant to section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

...percent. This appeal followed. Claimant correctly contends on appeal that the JCC erred in apportioning the eight percent impairment rating for her ventricular ectopy because appellee had previously accepted the condition as compensable pursuant to section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2001), which the parties and the JCC term the "Heart/Lung Bill." This statute, which applies to workers' compensation proceedings, provides: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, c...

...Such presumption shall not apply to benefits payable under or granted in a policy of life insurance or disability insurance, unless the insurer and insured have negotiated *712 for such additional benefits to be included in the policy contract. The supreme court has explained: The presumption contained in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), affects the burden of persuasion....

...The legislature recognized that this exposure could cause a fireman to become the victim of tuberculosis, hypertension, or heart disease. Caldwell v. Div. of Retirement, Fla. Dep't of Admin., 372 So.2d 438, 440-41 (Fla.1979). Contrary to appellee's argument, it did not rebut the presumption found in section 112.18(1) through Dr....

...As claimant contends, it is unreasonable to apportion a part of her impairment rating for the ventricular ectopy as being work-related and a part as being non-work-related when appellee had previously accepted the entire condition as compensable by virtue of section 112.18(1)....

...ount of Jimmy Walters’s heart disease, we reverse and remand for the award of medical benefits for the care and treatment of his heart disease and of any other workers’ compensation benefits he may be entitled to on account of his heart disease. Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009) — variously known as the “Firefighter’s Presumption,” the “Heart and Lung Bill” or the “Heart-Lung Statute,” see 9 Patrick John McGinley, Fla....

...symptoms.” From there he was then taken by ambulance to Bay Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with myoperiearditis and cardiomyopathy, and remained hospitalized for several days. Relying on the presumption of occupational causation set out in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009), he later filed a workers’ compensation claim asserting the heart disease was compensable....

...The same order also said that the appellant had not proven that viral gastroenteritis was an occupational disease in the manner contemplated by section 440.151, Florida Statutes (2009). In his single point on appeal, the appellant relies, as he did as claimant below, on the section 112.18 presumption. He contends the order under review erred both in finding that the State had rebutted the section 112.18 presumption and in shifting the burden of proof back to him, requiring him to establish that the stomach virus was an occupational disease....

...a stomach virus, but argues that, because the etiology of his viral gastroenteritis — the source of the stomach virus — is unknown, the State failed to prove that the cause of his heart disease was non-occupational, and thus failed to rebut the section 112.18 presumption....

...Unless the statutory presumption is rebutted, the presumption is an adequate substitute for evidence of occupational causation, and compels the legal result that a claimant has proven occupational causation. See Pun-sky, 18 So.3d at 582-84 . The presumption controls “unless the contrary be shown.” § 112.18(2), Fla....

...was necessary to give rise to the presumption in the first place. Specifically, there is no requirement to put on proof meeting the requirements of section 440.151, Florida Statutes (2009), (titled “Occupational diseases”), unless and until the section 112.18 presumption is rebutted. “[A] claimant’s burden of proving major contributing cause (MCC) by medical evidence, is fully met where the presumption contained in section 112.18(1) is applied-” Fuller, 22 So.3d at 806 ....

...Walters sought to establish, not an occupational disease, but a “condition or impairment of ... any ... correctional officer ... caused by ... heart disease ... resulting in total or partial disability ... presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty.” § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). In shifting the burden to the claimant to prove that the offending virus was work-related, the judge of compensation claims failed to give proper effect to the section 112.18 presumption....

...Reversed and remanded, with directions. MARSTILLER and RAY, JJ., concur. . The claimant must have passed a physical examination upon entering into service as a correctional officer (or other covered position), which failed to reveal any evidence of the disabling disease. § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). . Our supreme court discussed what section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009), requires in Caldwell v....

...or hypertension which resulted in disability or death, and that he had passed a physical examination upon entering into service as a law enforcement officer or other covered position, which failed to reveal any evidence of the disabling disease. See § 112.18(1), Fla....

...Kelli K. Biferie, Winter Park, and Bill McCabe, Longwood, for Appellee. ALLEN, J. The employer challenges a workers' compensation order by which the judge of compensation claims (1) applied the statutory presumption specified in the "Heart-Lung" statute, section 112.18, Florida Statutes, in determining that the claimant/correctional officer's hypertension and heart disease were compensable, (2) awarded medical benefits for treatment of these conditions, and (3) assigned a date of accident....

...isabling or fatal heart or lung condition, we reject the employer's argument that the judge erred by applying the presumption in the absence of such proof. We also reject the employer's argument that the judge assigned an incorrect date of accident. Section 112.18(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows: (1) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer as defined in s....

...sabling or fatal condition, the plain language of the statute does not require a correctional officer to satisfy this condition precedent. This distinction in requisite proofs is not due to mere legislative oversight. The text of a 2002 amendment to section 112.18 plainly revealed to members of the legislature that the amendment would, for the first time, entitle correctional officers to the presumption specified in the first sentence of section 112.18(1), but would not subject correctional officers to the condition precedent specified in the second sentence of the subsection....

...ccidental and suffered in the line of duty, unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence. Ch. 2002-236, § 3, at 1720, Laws of Fla. The order under review is affirmed. [1] ERVIN and POLSTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Because the 2002 amendment of section 112.18(1), adding correctional officers to the list of employees entitled to the statutory presumption, was a procedural enactment, a pre-2002 date of accident did not preclude the claimant's entitlement to the statutory presumption in a post-2002 proceeding....

...We hold the JCC erred as a *140 matter of law, reverse the ruling, and remand the case, for the following reasons. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Claimant, in seeking workers’ compensation benefits for his hypertension, relies on the presumption of occupational causation in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...The E/C argues that Claimant did not prove the final statutory prerequisite for the presumption: he did not show that the hypertension “result[ed] in total or partial disability or death.” Claimant argues that he was “disabled,” for purposes of section 112.18, while he was medically restricted from working as a firefighter....

...Claimant was incapable of performing his duties due to his hypertension.” The JCC found that the work restriction “was precautionary, only,” and concluded Claimant had not established a period of disability so as to entitle him to rely on the section 112.18 presumption of occupational causation. This ruling was error as a matter of law. LEGAL BACKGROUND Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009), provides as follows: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer as defined in s....

...Disability “requires a claimant actually be incapable of performing his work.” City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Further, disability is not established by medical work restrictions imposed “for purely precautionary reasons unrelated to” the condition covered by section 112.18. Jacksonville Sheriff's Office v. Shacklett, 15 So.3d 859, 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). ANALYSIS The question of whether a claimant can rely solely on a medical work restriction to prove disability for purposes of section 112.18 has never, until now, been squarely before this court....

...Appellant seeks review of an order from the State Retirement Commission ("Commission") that denied his claim for disability retirement. Appellant claimed that his total and permanent disability due to hypertension was presumed to be by accident suffered in-line-of-duty under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...As the sole reason for denying Appellant's disability claim, the Commission found that Appellant's position as a "classification officer" was not a special risk position under section 121.0515. Under such reasoning, Appellant could not claim the statutory presumption in section 112.18(1)....

...However, a member who becomes totally and permanently disabled in the line of duty can receive disability benefits regardless of the years of service or his or her risk class. § 121.091(4)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2006). Appellant relies on the presumption in section 112.18(1) to support his argument that his hypertension was in the line of duty, which would entitle him to disability benefits regardless of his years of service. Section 112.18(1) provides, in pertinent part, that: *136 Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer as defined in s....

...on. Therefore, Appellant needed to hold a special-risk position in order to obtain disability benefits in the line of duty. By doing so, Appellee and the Commission erred by ignoring the controlling definition of correctional officer as contained in section 112.18(1). Section 112.18(1) refers to section 943.10(2), not section 121.0515 or any other statute, for the definition of correctional officer. Neither section 112.18(1) nor section 943.10(2) delineates between regular and special-risk classes....

...ction 943.10(2). The Commission erred in imposing an additional requirement that the position be special-risk to invoke the in-line-of-duty presumption. In the proceedings below, the parties stipulated that Appellant met the medical requirements for section 112.18(1). Appellee did not dispute the medical evidence. Based on the parties' stipulation, the Commission erred in determining that Appellant failed to meet the medical requirements of section 112.18(1)....

...Accordingly, we hold that the Commission incorrectly concluded that the definition of correctional officer required that the employment position be a special-risk position. Appellant is entitled to the presumption of in-line-of-duty disability under section 112.18(1) and, therefore, to disability retirement benefits pursuant to section 121.091(4)(a)1.a....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, the claimant contends that te deputy erred in refusing to extend the firefighter’s presumption statute, section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1987), to his claim....

...became disabled with heart disease after retirement could invoke the firefighter’s presumption statute. The deputy concluded that the Legislature did not intend to create a presumption applicable to anyone other than a presently employed fireman. Section 112.18(1) provides: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal ......

...In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying compensability of his heart condition and hypertension. Specifically, Claimant asserts the JCC erred by: 1) finding Claimant failed to satisfy the disability requirement of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2008), with respect to his heart disease; 2) finding Claimant was not entitled to compensation for treatment of his hypertension under the “hindrance-to-recovery doctrine;” and 3) denying his claim for attorney’s fees and costs....

...Both doctors are cardiologists. At hearing, Dr. Mathias testified it was reasonable for Claimant to be hospitalized and kept out of work for a period after being diagnosed with AF and Dr. Kakkar testified Claimant was disabled while hospitalized as a result of his AF. Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, affords certain categories of public employees totally or partially disabled by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension a rebuttable presumption that the condition was suffered in the line of duty....

...his court’s opinion in Bivens v. City of Lakeland, 993 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), the JCC reasoned that Claimant’s hospitalization for evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment for AF did not equate to total or partial disability, as required by section 112.18(1)....

...There was medical testimony that the claimant was unable to perform his job duties as a result of his AF and while in the hospital undergoing treatment to bring his heart rate within acceptable limits. Id. In Bivens , we had held the claimant failed to establish disability under section 112.18(1) where, although he had missed several days’ work for a doctor’s appointment, heart catheterization, and stress test, his heart condition did not prevent him from working....

...He required hospitalization and treatment due to his AF condition, and medical testimony established he was disabled from performing his firefighting duties while hospitalized due to his condition. Consequently, Claimant was temporarily disabled as a result of his AF and has satisfied the disability requirement of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

...Conclusion As stated previously, we affirm the JCC’s denial of compensation for treatment of Claimant’s hypertension under the “hindrance-to-recovery doctrine.” However, based upon our holding in Carney , we reverse the JCC’s finding that Claimant failed to satisfy the disability requirement of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

...1st DCA 2005), this court acknowledged the possibility of multiple dates of accident in occupational disease cases. In Mary Esther, the claimant was a firefighter who suffered his first heart attack in 1991, which was found to be compensable because of the statutory presumption in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, presuming that coronary artery disease was an occupational illness when suffered by a firefighter meeting certain requirements....

...Judge. In this appeal, the employer/carrier (E/C) seek reversal of a workers’ compensation order in which the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found that the claimant, a firefighter, is entitled to the presumption of compensability set forth in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1991) 1 ....

...Carpentieri’s claim for benefits was defended by the E/C on grounds, among others, that his heart attack was not work-related. After an evidentiary hearing, the JCC entered an order finding that at the time of his heart attack Carpentieri was an employee of the City entitled to the presumption of the statute, section 112.18(1)....

...the result urged by the E/C. Accordingly, the order appealed is affirmed, and this cause is remanded for an award of workers’ compensation benefits in such amounts and to the extent as may be determined by the JCC. ALLEN and DAVIS, JJ., concur. . Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal ......

...Patrick John McGinley, P.A., Winter Park, and Arthur U. Graham, DeLand, for Appellees. BENTON, J. In this workers’ compensation case, a correctional officer appeals an order of a judge of compensation claims ruling him ineligible under section 112.18(1)(b)4., Florida Statutes (2013), for the presumption of occupational causation set out in section 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), and denying the compensability of his heart condition for that reason. Persuaded section 112.18(1)(b)4....

...d by heart disease resulting in “disablement” before July 1, 2010, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. “Although heart disease is not ordinarily compensable as an occupational disease, the Florida Legislature . . . enacted section 112.18(1) ....

..., which establishe[d] a statutory presumption that heart disease suffered by a fireman [or certain others including correctional officers] is connected with the exertions of his work . . . .” Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (citation omitted). “Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009)—variously known as the ‘Firefighter’s Presumption,’ the ‘Heart and Lung Bill’ or the ‘Heart– Lung Statute,’ see 9 Patrick John McGinley, Fla....

...In March of 2013, he had a heart transplant. In June and September of 2013, he filed a total of five petitions for workers’ compensation benefits alleging a compensable heart condition under two dates of accident (disablement): October 29, 2009, and January 27, 2012. All petitions— each of which relied on section 112.18—were consolidated. Volusia County defended, in part, on grounds that the section 112.18 presumption was not available because appellant did not file any petition within 180 days of leaving employment. Without the presumption, appellant concedes, his claims fail. This is not a statute of limitations case—no stat...

...1st DCA 1997) 3 (quoting Am. Beryllium Co. v. Stringer, 392 So. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (Fla.1980)). “In occupational disease cases, . . . it is the disability and not the disease which determines the compensability of a claim.” Id. at 587. Section 112.18(1)(b), which became effective on January 1, 2011, see Chapter 2010-175, section 2, at 2184-85, 2216, Laws of Florida, reads as follows: (b)1....

...ruled, as to both dates of accident, that appellant had not made a claim prior to or within 180 days after leaving his employment with the Volusia County Department of Corrections, and in the final compensation order deemed him ineligible for the section 112.18(1)(a) presumption on that basis: 8....

...involving dates of accident/disablement on or after July 1, 2010. Does the sentence mean any petition for benefits, regardless of the date of accident, filed on or after July 1, 2010, is subject to section 112.18(1)(b)? Or does it mean, as Claimant argues, that the amendment does not apply to dates of accident/disablement before July 1, 2010, regardless of when the petition for benefits is filed? 9....

...All subparagraphs (also referred to as sub-subsections) of paragraph (1)(b) should be read in pari materia, not only because of the structure of the text, but also because the subparagraphs of paragraph (1)(b) were all enacted together, as part of the same amendment to section 112.18, and all took effect together on January 1, 2011....

...date for purposes of the statute was not the date of accident or disablement but the date on which a worker filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The final compensation order explains his reasoning: Alternatively, if the date reference[d] in section 112.18(1)(b)1. applies to section 112.18(1)(b)4., it pertains to all claims filed on or after July 1, 2010, regardless of the date of accident 10. If the first sentence of section 112.18(1)(b)1. does apply to section 112[.18](1)(b)4., I construe the sentence to mean the amended statute applies to all claims filed on or after July 1, 2010, regardless of the date of accident....

...The dissent unjustifiably assumes that the terms “petition for benefits” and “claim” can be used interchangeably in the context of the present case. 11 RAY, J., dissenting. Because I conclude that subparagraph 112.18(1)(b)4 renders Appellant ineligible for the presumption of occupational causation for both dates of accident, I respectfully dissent. To be entitled to the rebuttable presumption of occupational causation in paragraph 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), which provides that a heart condition like Appellant’s is presumed to be the result of an accident in the line of duty, a claimant * is required under subparagraph 112.18(1)(b)4 to “make” a claim for benefits prior to or within 180 days after leaving the employment of the employing agency....

...Judge of Compensation Claims found that Appellant failed to take any action that constituted a claim for benefits within the applicable time frame. To challenge this ruling, Appellant argues, and the majority agrees, that the date reference in subparagraph 112.18(1)(b)1 qualifies subparagraph (b)4, such that the 180-day limitation period applies only to cases with dates of accident on or after * The 180-day limitation period applies to law enforcement officers, correctional officers, and correctional probation officers. § 112.18(1)(b)4. 12 July 1, 2010....

...as this court’s precedent has upheld the constitutionality of retroactive application of substantially similar provisions. In Seminole County Sheriff’s Office v. Johnson, 901 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), we held that a 2002 amendment to subsection 112.18(1), which expanded the class of workers entitled to the presumption, was a procedural enactment that applies retroactively without regard to the date of accident and injury....

...[It] changed only the procedural means and methods of establishing entitlement to benefits or offsets which flow from substantive rights that have remained unchanged since the date of [the accident].” Id. at 333. Similarly here, nothing in subparagraph 112.18(1)(b)4 prohibits Appellant from pursuing workers’ compensation benefits for his heart condition....

...dure “unless a claim for benefits is made prior to or within 180 days after leaving the employment of the employing agency.” For these reasons, I would affirm the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims and conclude that subparagraph 112.18(1)(b)4 bars reliance on the presumption for both of Appellant’s dates of accident. 16 

...In this workers’ compensation appeal, Orange County and Alternative Service Concepts, the Employer/Carrier (E/C), challenge an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarding Claimant, Lavonda Wilder, appellee, benefits for her heart disease based upon the presumption of occupational causation available in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2010). The E/C acknowledges that Claimant met the prerequisites of proof for application of the presumption, including that her viral cardiomyopathy constitutes “heart disease” as that term is used in section 112.18....

...Anthony, Judge. Dates of Accident: April 28, 2023, May 1, 2023, and May 15, 2023. February 18, 2026 RAY, J. Kenneth Lakatis, a longtime law enforcement officer, appeals a final order of the Judge of Compensation Claims denying his workers’ compensation claim for disabling heart disease. Section 112.18 of the Florida Statutes, often referred to as the Heart-Lung statute, provides that when a qualifying officer becomes disabled by heart disease, the condition is presumed to have arisen out of the employment unless the employer/carrier (E/C) rebuts that presumption with competent evidence....

...Relevant here, it provides that when an officer becomes disabled by a “condition or impairment of health” caused by heart disease, that disabling impairment “shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty,” unless the E/C establishes the contrary “by competent evidence.” § 112.18(1)(a), Fla....

...Lung statute to exclude occupational causation, the statutory presumption remains unrebutted. The JCC therefore erred in denying compensability. We set aside the final order and remand for entry of an order finding Lakatis’s cardiac condition compensable under section 112.18(1) and for any further proceedings consistent with this opinion. SET ASIDE and REMANDED. ROBERTS and TREADWELL, * JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla....

...The employer/carrier (E/C), Volusia County Fire Services and County Risk Management, raises one dispositive issue on appeal, whether the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred by determining Claimant's hypertension was compensable under the presumption created by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...rization for treatment with a cardiologist, and reimbursement for medical care. The E/C denied compensability based, in part, on the ground that Claimant's hypertension was pre-existing; therefore, he was not entitled to the presumption set forth in section 112.18. Section 112.18(1) provides: (1) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer as defined in s....

...ion.. . . (Emphasis added). The JCC ruled for Claimant, finding in relevant part: Claimant successfully passed a pre-employment physical before entering into service as a firefighter with Cedar Hammock; the phrase "entering into any such service" in section 112.18(1), "clearly refers to a physical examination at the beginning of a firefighters' career;" and it is immaterial that Claimant's pre-employment physical with the Employer revealed hypertension....

...Florida Workers’ Compensation Law, section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes. PGCS later (within 120 days) denied compensability, arguing that the 2016 injury was not compensable because its compensability hinges on application of the presumption of occupational causation set forth in section 112.18, Florida Statutes, which does not apply if the employee was not a firefighter on the date of accident. Appellants filed a motion for indemnification, seeking reimbursement from FMIT on the theory that Williams did not qualify as a firefighter for purposes of section 112.18 because he was not on “active duty status” on the 2016 date of accident....

...., J. In this workers’ compensation appeal, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) challenges an order awarding the Claimant, a firefighter, entitlement to compensability of his heart condition and related medical treatment under the “heart-lung” statute, section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2014). The Claimant did not appeal the JCC’s denial of compensability of an alleged hypertension condition. We affirm in result because we find the E/C failed to sustain its burden of proof in one respect, but write to clarify application of section 112.18(1) regarding the shifting burdens of proof and required quantum of evidence....

...with Dr. Dietzius upon Claimant’s release from the hospital. See § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. However, the E/C later denied compensability of the “accident” and cardiac conditions. The Claimant qualified for the “heart-lung” presumption under section 112.18(1), having no evidence of heart disease on his pre-employment physical, among other prerequisites....

...Further, he advised that stress or increase in blood pressure from the business meeting could have “triggered” the plaque rupture on the day of this alleged “accident.” However,'he also agreed the cause or “trigger” of the rupture/thrombosis is unknown. 2 II. Firefighter’s Presumption Section 112.18(1), also known as the “firefighter’s presumption” or the “heart-lung” statute, creates a rebuttable presumption of occupational causation for disabling heart disease suffered by firefighters, among other protected classes, who meet certain prerequisites....

...Under section 440.151, a claimant was under the obligation to produce medical testimony to support the ultimate conclusion that the disease was related to employment, and could not prevail on an argument based '■ on facts or inference alone. The enactment of section 112.18 offered a claim option that allowed qualifying employees to bridge this causation gap....

...6 Of interest, section 440.151 specifically excluded the presumption of section 440.26 from application in occupational disease cases. The evidentiary standard set by the Legislature for the presumption of section 440.26 was likely influential in later assignment of the quantum of proof required under section 112.18. In 1979, the Florida Supreme Court in Caldwell v. Division of Retirement, Florida Department of Administration, 372 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1979), addressed for the first time the presumption of sections 112.18 (firefighters) and 185.34 (police officers) and application of the presumptions in “disability in-line-of-duty benefit” claims. Two issues were addressed: 1) whether the State Retirement Commission erred in refusing to apply the “heart-lung presumption” of section 112.18(1) in evaluating firefighter Caldwell’s claim for disability inline-of-duty benefits; and 2) if the presumption of section 112.18(1) applied, whether the E/C met the burden of proof with respect to its rebuttal threshold. Caldwell, 372 So.2d at 439 . The Florida Supreme Court interpreted the burdens of proof and quantum of evidence required of the section 112.18 presumption. Id. at 440-42 .' Caldwell argued that the presumption of section 112.18 required a high rebuttal standard, typically required of social policy presumptions, to maintain the legislative intent of the statute....

...Caldwell proclaimed that the “heart-lung” statute was one of critical social policy affecting the burden of proof or persuasion and was not a “vanishing presumption.” Id. at 440-41 . In accepting Caldwell’s arguments, the court explained, “the [section 112.18] presumption would be meaningless if the only evidence necessary to overcome it is evidence that there has been no specific occupational-related event that caused the disease.” 7 Id....

...prevail. This does not foreclose the employer from overcoming the presumption. However, if there is .evidence supporting the presumption the employer can overcome the presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 440-41 (emphasis added). Section 112.18 did not explicitly recognize that it was a public policy measure and did not articulate the burden of persuasion applied to all possible levels of rebuttal....

...ng the substantive law of the case to determine whether the presumption was one of burden of proof or a “vanishing” or “bursting bubble” presumption. Universal Ins. Co. of N.A. v. Warfel, 82 So.3d 47, 58 (Fla. 2012). After determination that section 112.18 embodied strong public policy, the court assigned to the E/C the higher burden of persuasion of clear and convincing evidence, where a claimant introduced evidence of work-relatedness. Caldwell, 372 So.2d at 440 . The etiology of the clear and convincing evidence burden of persuasion for section 112.18 presumption rebuttal, has been a matter of speculation and debate....

...However, the Florida Supreme Court’s application of a higher quantum of proof on rebuttal where evidence is submitted by the claimant in support of causation is logically supported by the court’s recognition of the “heart-lung” statute as a matter of strong public policy, and section 112.18 as a presumption of “burden of proof.” III....

...on, so the JCC was in no better place than this Court to rule on credibility. Frederick v. United Airlines, 688 So.2d 412, 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Burdens of Proof/Quantum of Evidence The Claimant asserted a “presumption only” claim pursuant to section 112.18....

...Improperly, the JCC imposed upon the E/C the burden of rebuttal by clear and convincing evidence and that MCC be addressed by its medical expert. Major Contributing Cause A claimant’s burden of proving MCC by medical evidence is fully met where the presumption contained in section 112.18(1) is applied....

...employment, only acceleration of death or acceleration or aggravation of the preexisting condition reasonably attributable to the accident is compensa-ble.... By definition, MCC is inapplicable to satisfaction of the E/C’s rebuttal threshold under section 112.18 (whether requiring competent evidence or clear and convincing evidence)....

...ident combining with a preexisting injury or condition that is non-work-related. Pizza Hut v. Proctor, 955 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Pearson v. Paradise Ford, 951 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). If, in order to satisfy its rebuttal burden under a section 112.18 claim, the E/C must submit medical evidence that “the” or “all” causation factors are non-industrial in order, MCC is extraneous....

...The E/C’s rebuttal threshold cannot be satisfied by eliciting testimony from a doctor that all are causative factors (work and non-work related), to some degree, including stress from work, but the MCC of the heart disease is the pre-existing, genetic factor. In practical application, section 112.18 requires the E/C, on rebuttal of the presumption, to satisfy a more stringent burden of proof than MCC....

...istence of risk factors or conditions.” 18 So.3d at 583 . Satisfaction of the prerequisites for MCC application, causative factors that are both work-related and non-work-related, is mutually exclusive to the viability of an E/C’s rebuttal under section 112.18....

...did not result in the E/C’s failure to meet its burden of proof. In Fuller, this Court announced, “Because a claimant’s burden of proving major contributing cause (MCC) by medical evi *191 dence, is fully met where the presumption contained in section 112.18(1) is applied, the Employer, in rebutting the presumption must likewise disprove occupational causation by medical evidence.” 22 So.3d at 806 . To the extent that Fuller, or any language in Punsky, has been interpreted as requiring the E/C to also satisfy MCC as a part of the burden of proof shifting under section 112.18, we clarify to the contrary....

...The Claimant was later diagnosed with a congenital abnormality (AVNRT), “characterized by an extra electrical pathway which causes tachycardia when there is a triggering event.” Id. at 1107 . The JCC found that the E/C had successfully rebutted the presumption of section 112.18 as it relates to the congenital condition....

...ausative factors of the Claimant’s CAD were non-work-related. However, under these facts, the E/C was also required to overcome the presumption of the “trigger.” Once a claimant gives rise to the presumption by satisfying the pre-requisites of section 112.18, occupational causation is established; therefore, there is no requirement on the part of the claimant to put on further proof meeting the requirements of section 440.151, Florida Statutes, as it relates to a “trigger.” See Walters v....

...1st DCA) (on rehearing en banc), review denied, 22 So.3d 539 (Fla. 2009), . Neither party raised a' Daubert objection to the expert medical testimony, or requested an EMA pursuant to section 44Q.13(9)(c), Florida Statute. The JCC did not, sua sponte, appoint an EMA. .Section 112.18 claims are considered de facto occupational disease claims and are, thus, governed by legal standards of section 440.151, Florida Statutes; e.g. statute of limitations. See City of Pembroke Pines v. Ortagus, 50 So.3d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). . Although section 112.18, Florida Statutes, provides minimal instruction on required burdens of proof and burden of evidentiary persuasion (i.e....

....A "burden of proof” presumption was later codified in the Florida Evidence Code, as section 90,304, Florida Statutes. . If a claimant has evidence of work-relatedness, the E/C’s rebuttal standard is by clear *189 and convincing evidence. Here, the Claimant had no evidence of causation other than the presumption of section 112.18....

...The claimant, William Heric, is employed by the City of Ormond Beach as a firefighter. He suffered a heart attack on August 8, 1996, while on vacation. The employer and carrier accepted the compensability of the claimant's heart condition pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes, and began paying medical and indemnity benefits....

...1 Appellee/Claimant’s hypertension and coronary artery disease (CAD), and awarding authorization of Dr. Castello to treat these conditions. We affirm. The City argues that the JCC should not have found Claimant was entitled to rely on section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2012), which reads: (1)(a) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer as defined in s....

...enforcement officer must have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a firefighter or law enforcement officer, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition. . . . Section 112.18 creates a presumption of occupational causation for “any condition or impairment of health” for a claimant who meets the statutory prerequisites....

...To the extent the City challenges any inferences the JCC drew to make these findings, we see no error. The City also challenges, however, the JCC’s ruling that the time during which Claimant could not work (during and after the catheterization) constitutes disability for the purposes of section 112.18....

...2d 1100, 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), wherein Mr. Bivens had not produced any evidence that his heart disease affected his ability to perform his job duties. In Bivens, this court concluded that there was no disability – and thus no entitlement to the section 112.18 presumption – despite “that [Mr....

...theterization, and that the catheterization was because of his hypertension and CAD, which is analogous to the facts in Rocha. 4  The JCC’s finding in this case comports with the plain language of section 112.18, which is evidence of legislative intent to include recovery from invasive treatment and testing such as this: specifically, the statute’s first words broadly describe “[a]ny condition or impairment of health . . . caused by” heart disease or hypertension (or tuberculosis) and “resulting in total or partial disability or death.” § 112.18(1)(a), Fla....

...from hypertension, and the E/C moved for appointment of an expert medical advisor. The JCC denied such motion and, after a hearing, resolved this case without the benefit of an expert medical advisor by applying the statutory presumption provided by section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2002), and entered a final order in favor of Claimant....

...he existence of a heart disease requires appointment of an expert medical advisor. Because of the conflicting medical testimony, section 440.13(9)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), mandated the appointment of an expert medical advisor before applying the section 112.18 presumption, and the JCC erred in denying the E/C’s motion for the appointment of an expert medical advisor....

...He argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred by finding evidence of hypertension in the pre- employment physical examination that he underwent upon entering service as a law enforcement officer, so as to preclude his reliance on the presumption of occupational causation provided by section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2018)....

...��pre- employment’ is mere dicta.” City of Tarpon Springs v. Vaporis, 953 So. 2d 597, 598–99 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that examination begun ten days before claimant began working and completed fifteen days after he began working satisfied section 112.18); see also City of Homestead v....

...3 Essential hypertension is “hypertension without known cause”; its synonyms are “idiopathic hypertension” and “primary 2 obtain workers’ compensation benefits, he asserted entitlement to the presumption in section 112.18 that hypertension is occupationally caused....

...Essential hypertension is not the same as secondary hypertension. 11. The sole issue for determination by the JCC is whether evidence of secondary hypertension as explained in paragraph number [7] above on the [PEP] prevents application of Section 112.18, F.S. to essential hypertension. Claimant argued: 1) the evidence of secondary hypertension on the PEP does not preclude reliance on the presumption of section 112.18 because the statute’s prerequisite that the PEP not contain evidence of “any such condition” clearly means the condition for which Claimant seeks compensability; 2) the medical testimony establishes that essential and secondary h...

...Thus, a prior medical history does not constitute “evidence” and is not a meaningful component. The E/C defended the claims arguing that the sole issue for determination was whether evidence of secondary hypertension on the PEP precludes reliance on the presumption of section 112.18 for an essential hypertension claim. It asserted that the plain language of section 112.18 and the testimony of both medical experts that “secondary” and “essential” hypertension are both “hypertension,” foreclosed Claimant’s enjoyment of the presumption. The JCC denied compensability of Claimant’s essential hypertension, accepting the opinions of both IMEs that “hypertension is hypertension.” The JCC concluded that, because the PEP contained evidence of hypertension, Claimant’s reliance on section 112.18 was precluded....

...ns evidence of essential hypertension—only that it documents evidence of secondary hypertension. He argued that the doctors’ opinions were medical but not legal opinions and that, because his secondary hypertension could not be compensable under section 112.18, its past existence could not preclude the presumption of section 112.18 regarding essential hypertension. The JCC denied rehearing and detailed that the denial of compensability was based on his acceptance of the parties’ stipulation that the PEP contained evidence of secondary hypertension combine...

...II. Analysis Because the JCC’s ruling is based on the interpretation of a statute and a stipulation, we review the issue de novo. See, e.g., City of Tavares v. Harper, 230 So. 3d 918, 920 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (interpreting de novo section 112.18’s phrase “any evidence”); Klatt v....

...limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.” McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219). 6  Section 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), which establishes the presumption at issue, provides: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida ....

...However, any such . . . law enforcement officer must have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service . . . which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition. The companion statute to section 112.18 is section 943.13, Florida Statutes (2018). It establishes law enforcement officers’ minimum qualifications for employment, and states: In order to be eligible for the presumption set forth in s. 112.18 while employed with an employing agency, a law enforcement officer ....

...with the employing agency, which examination must have failed to reveal any evidence of tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension. § 943.13(6), Fla. Stat. (2018). We find that the question of whether evidence of secondary hypertension on a PEP precludes a claimant’s use of the presumption of section 112.18 for essential hypertension, is answered by a straightforward application of the plain and unambiguous language of the relevant statutes. Neither section 112.18(1) nor section 943.13(6) incorporate any qualifying or restricting language for the terms “tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension”; instead, the statutes require “any evidence of the conditions of “tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension” without qualification. §§ 112.18(1)(a), 943.13(6), Fla....

...The Legislature chose to use broad terms and we will not second guess their selection. Thus, we find that under the plain language of the 7 statute, evidence of secondary hypertension on a PEP may preclude a claimant’s use of the presumption of section 112.18 for essential hypertension. Claimant argues that Harper compels a finding of compensability....

...at 920. For a definitive diagnosis of hypertension, the medical experts in that case opined that two or three abnormal readings within a certain period of time are required. Id. The majority declined to accept the Employer/Carrier’s proposed interpretation of section 112.18 that “any evidence” of a condition precludes the presumption—as such an application would permit any possible symptoms of a condition, without a diagnosis of the condition, to preclude the presumption provided by section 112.18....

...2d 508, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (quoting Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 252 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1971)). III. Conclusion Finding that evidence of secondary hypertension on Claimant’s PEP precludes his use of the presumption of section 112.18 for essential hypertension, we affirm the final order on appeal. AFFIRMED. ROWE, CJ., and B.L....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, the employer/carrier (E/C) argues the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in finding Claimant’s thoracic aortic disease compensable under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007), because the condition is not “heart disease.” Contrary to the E/C’s assertions and arguments, the evidence in this case demonstrates that Claimant, as a result of his aortic disease, underwent open he...

...n Claims. Jack Adam Weiss, Judge. Date of Accident: June 8, 2021 October 30, 2024 PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See City of Homestead v. Foust, 242 So. 3d 1169, 1171 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (holding that the presumption in section 112.18, Florida Statutes, only applies if a preemployment physical has been completed “upon entry into such service” meaning entry into the same category of service as is entitled to the presumption in the statute); see also City of Tavares v....

...vicing Agent (E/SA) seek review of the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) order finding that Claimant, a law enforcement officer, established the compensability of his hypertension under the statutory presumption in the Heart-Lung Statute, section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...pressure and was temporarily taken off of work. He was subsequently diagnosed with hypertension which eventually came under good control with medication. Claimant then sought a determination of compensability of his hypertensive condition as a workplace injury in accordance with the section 112.18(1) statutory presumption....

...This statute provides, in pertinent part, that any health condition or impairment of a law enforcement officer caused by hypertension and resulting in disability “shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence.” § 112.18(1)(a), Fla....

...see also Volusia Cty. Fire Servs. v. Taaffe, 27 So. 3d 81, 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that pre-employment physical examination finding claimant fit for duty but noting a diagnosis of hypertension precluded presumption of compensability of hypertension under section 112.18(1)); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Davis, 26 So. 3d 13, 17- 18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that section 112.18(1) presumption was precluded where relevant pre-employment physical revealed claimant suffered from heart disease). Here, Claimant’s 2007 pre-employment physical examination report listed a single blood pressure reading of...

...apply to the population at large. Our reading of the plain language here is consistent with this court’s opinion in Talpesh v. Village of Royal Palm Beach, 994 So. 2d 353, 354-55 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). In Talpesh, the JCC ruled that the presumption under section 112.18(1) did not apply to that claimant’s coronary artery disease because the pre-employment examination revealed high blood pressure....

...nt’s medical history was more likely than not an indication of “white coat” syndrome at the pre-employment physical. Accordingly, because the JCC did not err when he determined that Claimant is entitled to the statutory presumption in section 112.18(1), we affirm the order on appeal. AFFIRMED. B.L....

duties, can be considered disabled pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes. It is argued that because

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 112.18(1), Fla....

...City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), requires permanent disability or termination for the presumption to arise); City of Miami v. Thomas, 657 So.2d 927, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“We ... reject the *458 City’s argument that ... section 112.18[ ] was intended to be limited to permanent disability, so that the presumption would not apply to a temporary disability, as experienced by this claimant.”)....

...The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) concluded that claimant was not entitled to the statutory presumption of compensability provided to law enforcement officers for disabling heart disease because claimant’s pre-employment physical revealed evidence of heart disease. See § 112.18(1), Fla....

...the claim packet sent to Claimant by the E/C was so generic as to not provide meaningful information to Claimant, and the packet did not contain any information regarding the statutory presumption of causation afforded law enforcement officers under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...imitations defense provided in section 440.19(1). The JCC erred both in finding the E/C failed to meet the requirements of section 440.185(4) and in finding that the E/C was otherwise estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense. Neither section 112.18(1) nor section 440.185(4), nor any other portion of chapter 440, requires the E/C to provide an injured worker any details regarding the presumption found in section 112.18(1)....

PER CURIAM. We hold that section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1981), applies to chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...However, because this issue, as re-framed by the E/C in its reply brief, does not present a basis for reversal, I agree that the issue should be affirmed. NOTES [*] The initial brief framed the first issue as whether "[t]he JCC erred in determining that Claimant's heart condition and hypertension were compensable under § 112.18, Fla....

...Punsky v. Clay County Sheriff's Office, 18 So.3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), in determining that the E/C failed to rebut the presumption as to both the hypertension and heart condition. The reply brief clarified that "it is only the application of the [section 112.18] presumption to Claimant's hypertension that is at issue in the present appeal." The E/C argues in its motion for rehearing that the panel misconstrued this "inarticulately phrased" statement because "[i]n making the statement that the...

...eart condition." However, this argument overlooks the fact that, in addition to this statement, the reply brief also specifically re-framed the first issue as whether "[t]he JCC erred in determining that Claimant's hypertension was compensable under § 112.18, Fla....

...Employer, City of Gainesville, and the insurance carrier, Crawford and Co., appeal a workers’ compensation order in which the deputy commissioner found that claimant’s heart attack was an injury by an accident arising out of his employment, relying upon section 112.18, Florida Statutes....

...His use of accumulated sick time for his back injury lowered claimant’s retirement benefits. Claimant filed a claim for temporary total disability and permanent partial disability benefits under the “Firefighters’ Heart and Lung Provision” of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, to recover the sick leave used during his convalescence from his heart attack. He had passed a physical examination upon entering fireman service and had undergone physicals each year thereafter with stress tests and cardiograms given after claimant reached forty years of age. Claimant also sought medical costs and mileage. Section 112.18(1) provides that heart attacks suffered by firemen are presumed to *310 be accidental and suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary is shown by competent evidence....

PER CURIAM. We find no error in the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC) application of the firefighter’s presumption pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2005). We also find no merit to the employer/carrier’s contention that the JCC required the employer to identify one single risk factor solely causative of claimant’s condition in order to rebut the presumption of section 112.18....

...Oxford of Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, Orlando, for Appellee. PER CURIAM.  In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant, a safety officer with the fire department, appeals the denial of his claim for a determination of compensable heart disease under paragraph 112.18, Florida Statutes (2013).∗ In the final order denying the claim, the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found that the Employer/Carrier (E/C) successfully rebutted the presumption of occupational causation afforded Claimant under the statute....

.... firefighter . . . caused by . . . heart disease . . . resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence.” § 112.18(1)(a), Fla....

...Here, although the JCC afforded Claimant the statutory presumption of compensability of his heart disease, he ultimately found that the E/C successfully rebutted the presumption. Our review of the JCC’s findings as to the rebuttal of the presumption under paragraph 112.18(1)(a) is to determine whether CSE supports whatever decision is reached by the JCC as the finder of fact....

...The E/C challenges only the ruling of compensability and award of benefits for heart disease with a date of accident of June 26, 2002 (no statute of limitations defense is asserted). As to this ruling, we reverse in part, and remand for additional findings of fact. Claimant, a correctional officer since 1995, relied on section 112.18, Florida Statutes, which provides a presumption of occupational causation for heart disease in correctional officers. § 112.18, Fla....

...Mr. Rodriguez requires drugs to prevent arrhythmia-related symptoms. I. Mr. Rodriguez was a firefighter who developed cardiac arrhythmias, which were accepted as compensable by his Employer/Carrier (E/C) under section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2013) (providing rebuttable presumption of occupational causation for certain conditions, including heart disease, for certain professions such as firefighting)....

...tension and premature ventricular contractions. We affirm without further comment the JCC’s finding that Claimant satisfied the prerequisites for the occupational causation presumption afforded firefighters, and certain other employees, set out in section 112.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...remand. In Punsky v. Clay County Sheriff’s Office, 18 So.3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (en banc), we addressed the very issue presented in this appeal — the burden of persuasion required of an employer who seeks to rebut the presumption afforded by section 112.18....

...Lansford appeals from an order of the deputy commissioner denying his claim for TTD and medical benefits on the ground that he was not a “fireman” as defined in Section 112.191(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1983) and therefore not entitled to the presumption set forth in Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The original theory of the claim was that the attack was caused by “unusual physical and emotional work activity” but at the hearing Lansford conceded that it was not compensable under this theory and propounded the sole factual issue of his identity or not as a “fireman.” Section 112.18(1) provides that “any condition or impairment of health of any Florida ......

...He found that, because a “fireman” was statutorily defined as having the primary duty of extinguishing fires and protecting life and property therefrom and Lansford’s principal duty was medical care, he was not a fireman entitled to the presumption of Section 112.18(1)....

...It was not contended in Kanarr, and is not contended here, that a paramedic shares with firemen the numerous other duties enumerated in the statute which are not concerned with the protection of life. Therefore, the deputy was correct in his conclusion that Lans-ford was not a fireman entitled to the presumption of Section 112.18(1)....

...HOMAS, J. The Employer/Carrier (E/C) appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarding benefits, based on a finding that Claimant, a firefighter, established compensability of his pre-ventri-cular contraction condition, pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes....

to an accident accepted as compensable under section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2021), also known as the

...denied the petition on grounds that the statute of limitations had expired, and alternatively, that the Employer/Carrier (E/C) had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of compensability afforded law enforcement officers under 2 section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

...Claimant’s heart disease is claimed to be compensable under the occupational disease theory of recovery. See Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (finding heart disease compensable as occupational disease in cases where section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, applies). An essential element of a claim based on an occupational disease is that the disease results in disability. See § 440.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012) (“[T]he disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease . . . shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident . . . .”); § 112.18(1), Fla....

...Arrington, Assistant General Counsel, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Jonathan Israel, Jacksonville, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. In this appeal, the Employer challenges the finding of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that Claimant was entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...The JCC found the parties stipulated that the Employer had no evidence Claimant had hypertension before commencing his employment with the Employer, and that Claimant "now has hypertension." Based on the foregoing, the JCC found the remaining issue for resolution was whether Claimant satisfied the disability requirement of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...ties." Thus, the JCC found, Claimant "met his burden by satisfying the three prong test sufficiently to invoke the presumption," and that the Employer "failed to present any evidence of a non-work related cause." Analysis The presumption afforded by section 112.18 is "only available when a claimant's......

...estrictions, the most that can reasonably be said of Claimant's no-work status pending a cardiac evaluation is that it was for purely precautionary reasons unrelated to his hypertension. This is not sufficient to establish disability for purposes of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007). CONCLUSION Because no competent substantial evidence supports the JCC's finding that Claimant was disabled by his hypertension as required by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007), the JCC erred in finding Claimant was entitled to operation of the presumption afforded by the statute....

...ork related factors or conditions are the cause of a heart attack, and such evidence is accepted and credited by the trier of fact, such testimony could be found sufficient as competent and substantial evidence to rebut the statutory presumption [in section 112.18, Florida Statutes,] and establish non-industrial causation”)....

...*1170 The City of Homestead and Preferred Government Claims Solutions (E/C) appeal an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) finding compensability of, and awarding benefits for, Claimant Harley Foust's heart disease and hypertension by operation of section 112.18, Florida Statutes....

...In May 2015, he had a disabling event due to both conditions, and sought compensability of both, as well as medical and indemnity benefits, claiming that he was entitled to the presumption of occupational causation of heart disease and hypertension for LEOs available under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

...ering into any such service" as a full-time LEO. Instead, noting that the form for the 1983 physical indicates that it is for "PROPOSED JOB TITLE: Aux. Police Officer," the E/C argues that the physical related to his service as an auxiliary LEO, and section 112.18 does not include auxiliary LEOs. Specifically, section 112.18 refers to subsection 943.10(1), Florida Statutes, which includes only full-time LEOs (auxiliary LEOs are defined in subsection 943.10(8) ). The E/C also noted that the section 112.18 presumption did not apply to local LEOs until 2002. 2 The JCC found that Claimant satisfied the physical-examination requirement of section 112.18 on three alternative grounds: 1) the statutory presumption of section 112.18 did not apply to local LEOs *1171 at the time of Claimant's hire, so the pre-employment requirements of section 112.18 are not retroactive; 2) the employer waived or acquiesced to use of the 1983 physical for the 1984 hire as a full-time LEO; and 3) the 1983 physical was conducted at or near the time of entering full-duty status. We disagree with each of these rationales. Regarding the first ground, both parties agree that the 2002 amendments to section 112.18, which extended the statutory presumption to local LEOs, were procedural and, therefore, the prerequisites to the presumption are retroactive and apply to Claimant. However, regardless of whether section 112.18 (or the 2002 amendment) is substantive or procedural, the earliest version of the statute that could apply to Claimant is the 2014 version-which already included LEOs-because Claimant's date of accident was his date of disability, May 12, 2015....

...shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident' " (quoting Hoppe v. City of Lakeland , 691 So.2d 585 , 586-87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) ) ). To the extent the JCC's ruling suggests that Claimant could rely on the presumption without meeting all of its prerequisites, we reject that interpretation of section 112.18 because section 112.18 has included all of its prerequisites since its enactment in 1965....

...Morsani , 790 So.2d 1071 , 1077 n.12 (Fla. 2001) ( citing Kissimmee Util. Auth. v. Better Plastics, Inc. , 526 So. 2d 46 , 48 (Fla. 1988) ). To the extent that an E/C has a "right" to object to the validity of a pre-employment physical for purposes of the section 112.18 presumption (a question we do not answer here), certainly in this case the E/C could not have voluntarily and intentionally relinquished that right at the time of the hire (in the early 1980s) because neither the physical-examination requirement, nor the presumption itself, applied to LEOs at that time....

...Finally, the JCC found that Claimant met the statutory physical-examination requirement because his physical was given " 'at or near' the time of entering full duty status." The statute requires the physical examination "upon entering into any such service as a ... law enforcement officer." § 112.18(1)(a), Fla....

...rs after claimant's entry into service"). Because Claimant did not pass a physical examination upon entering into service as a full-time LEO, he is not entitled to the presumption of occupational causation of his heart disease and hypertension under section 112.18(1). REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Makar, J., concur. Section 112.18(1)(a) reads in pertinent part as follows: Any condition or impairment of health of ......

...evidence. However, any such ... law enforcement officer must have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a ... law enforcement officer, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition. Section 112.18 was enacted in 1965, but applied only to firemen....

...The statutory presumption was extended to state LEOs in 1999, and to all LEOs in 2002. Ch. 99-392, § 21, at 4000, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 2002-236, § 3, at 1720, Laws of Fla. We reject Claimant's argument that a physical examination prior to hire or appointment to any category of LEO, including auxiliary LEO, qualifies for the section 112.18 presumption....

firefighter for another governmental entity. Section 112.18(1), F.S., provides: Any condition or impairment

PER CURIAM. The petition for review is GRANTED, the order of the Retirement Commission is QUASHED, and the case is REMANDED to the Commission for further proceedings giving appropriate effect to the presumption accorded by Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975)....

ALLEN, Judge. The employer appeals a workers’ compensation order by which the presumption in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, was applied and the claimant was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. Because the claimant did not demonstrate that he is one of the specified firemen within the ambit of section 112.18(1), the statutory presumption should not have been applied....

...He terminated this employment upon the advice of his physician and sought workers’ compensation benefits after developing severe cardiovascular problems. The matter proceeded to a hearing and the claimant asserted that he is entitled to the presumption in section 112.18(1), which provides: Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal, county, port authority, special tax district or fire control district fireman caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total...

...sion in State of Florida, Department of Agriculture, Division of Forestry v. Stanford, Cl. No. 266-48-6438 (October 10, 1978), cert. denied 375 So.2d 912 (Fla.1979), and suggested that the entire state may be considered a fire control district under section 112.18(1). Stanford involved an application of section 112.18(1), but the opinion merely recites several issues and notes that the appellants “failed to demonstrate reversible error.” The Stanford decision does not establish that the entire state is a fire control district. The legislature has used the term “fire control district” in various enactments. Chapter 379, Florida Statutes (1965), identified one fire control district when section 112.18(1) was first adopted....

...ch provisions. These acts generally confer power and authority in furtherance of fire control activities within defined geographical boundaries. See e.g., ch. 90-459, Laws of Fla.; ch. 65-1342, Laws of Fla. The reference to fire control districts in section 112.18(1) should be construed in connection with these enactments....

...2 Mitchell I Previously, the Employer challenged the JCC’s determination that it had not defeated the presumption of occupational causation to which the parties agreed Claimant, a law enforcement officer, was entitled under paragraph 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...Borzak and Pianko, which was the evidence considered by the JCC. Thus, the JCC did not exceed the scope of the remand. Nature of the Presumption Central to this matter, and to the JCC’s error, is an understanding of the nature of the presumption afforded Claimant under section 112.18 and how it is applied to the facts in this case....

...Section 90.304, Florida Statutes, provides “[i]n civil actions, all rebuttable presumptions which are not defined in section 90.303 are presumptions affecting the burden of proof.” As recognized in Punsky, this latter type is the nature of the presumption provided by section 112.18....

...See City of Temple Terrace v. Bailey, 481 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The evidence necessary to overcome the presumption must 3 The Employer’s burden was to submit competent evidence to rebut the presumption because Claimant relied solely on the section 112.18 presumption to establish compensability....

...Demarsh, County Attorney, and Maria D. Korn, Assistant County Attorney, Sarasota, for Appellees. WEBSTER, J. In this workers' compensation case, the judge of compensation claims held that claimant law enforcement officer was not entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007), because his overnight stay in the hospital for treatment of his heart disease did not satisfy the statute's disability requirement....

...1st DCA 2008), "claimant has not established his loss of time for hospitalization for medication to control his heartbeat establishes a disability entitling him to the statutory presumption." As a result, the judge determined that claimant was not entitled to the section 112.18(1) presumption, and denied compensability of the claim. Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, creates a rebuttable presumption of compensability for heart disease suffered by firefighters and law enforcement or corrections officers who satisfy the statute's prerequisites....

...Because claimant, while hospitalized for treatment of his heart disease, was actually incapacitated, at least partially and temporarily, from earning "in the same or any other employment the wages which [he] was receiving at the time of the injury," he satisfied the disability requirement of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes....

attack and subsequent heart transplant 1 § 112.18, Fla. Stat. (2021). which occurred after his diagnosis

...Claimant argues that testimony establishing that the cause of Claimant’s condition was unknown was insufficient to demonstrate that the condition, in fact, had a non-industrial cause. We agree and reverse. Here, there is no dispute that Claimant established the legal conditions for the operation of the presumption found in section 112.18(1), rendering his cardiac arrhythmia work-related and, thus, compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law — unless sufficiently rebutted by the introduction of evidence establishing a non-industrial cause....

...By finding that Claimant’s condition, which, by definition, is an electrical defect of the heart, was caused by a defect of the heart — the cause of which is unknown — the JCC devalued and eviscerated the legal presumption of com-pensability afforded by section 112.18(1)....

...the sufficient cause of Claimant’s condition was unknown, based on the evidence presented, — an empty set that precludes a contrary postulate. See generally Fuller v. Okaloosa Corr. Inst., 22 So.3d 803, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (stating, to rebut 112.18 presumption, E/C required to affirmatively demonstrate non-work-related cause, not prove that there is no known cause)....