Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...a Dry Bottling Co. v. White, supra, we are not convinced that we should "dance the back step" in connection with our opinion therein. Indeed, upon a careful reconsideration of said case and a restudy of Chapter 440, F.S.A., and particularly Sections 440.02(18) and 440.19(1), we are firmly convinced that we should not recede from our opinion and judgment in the case of Canada Dry Bottling Co....

...We fail to find in any one of the cases cited by counsel for appellant that the court of the foreign jurisdiction was dealing with a statute such as ours which by its own terms, in clear and unambiguous language, defines the phrase "time of injury" Section 440.02(18) reads as follows: "The term `time of injury' means the time of the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury." Section 440.19(1) reads as follows: "The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barre...

...However, if the liability arises from something other than "injury or death," the other potential bases of liability remain viable. Thus, the definition of the word "injury" is crucial to the determination of this case. [2] That definition is provided in the statute itself. Section 440.02(14), Florida Statutes (1987), states that "injury" means " personal injury ... by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury" (emphasis added). Moreover, section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1987), defines "accident" as "only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." It is apparent, however, that the term "accident arising out of......

...Hillsborough County School Bd., 389 So.2d 1218, 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), review denied, 397 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1981). Indeed, the statute expressly prohibits a workers' compensation award for "[a] mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only." § 440.02(1), Fla....

...the workplace are within the letter, spirit, or purview of the Workers' Compensation Law, chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1987). The specific acts complained of do not result in an injury "by accident arising out of and in the course of employment," section 440.02(14), Florida Statutes, for which compensation benefits would be payable....

...the safeguards of section 440.11 when, as per the parties' contract, it procures workers' compensation coverage for the benefit of an independent contractor by deducting the coverage premiums from payments due the independent contractor. Pursuant to section 440.02(11)(d)1, Florida Statutes (1983), [3] an independent contractor is ordinarily excluded from the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law....

...o the benefits of the chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor. See Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1989). However, as noted above, an independent contractor is specifically excluded from the definition of "employee" as used in chapter 440. § 440.02(11)(d)1....

...ployer's business and the injured employee is entitled to receive benefits under this chapter.... [2] Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 does not provide for an appeal of an interlocutory order denying a motion for summary judgment. [3] Under section 440.02(11)(d)1, Florida Statutes (1983), an independent contractor is excluded from the definition of an "employee" for whom an employer must secure the payment of compensation payable under chapter 440....

...sation for injury by accident: "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." Injury is defined in section 440.02(17), Florida Statutes (1991) as "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." Accident is further defined in section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1991) as "only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." Conversely, therefore, under the plain language of the statute, it would appear logical to conclude that if a circumstance is substanti...

...Rules 9.200(a)(3), (c), and (f) shall apply to preparation of the record in appeals under this rule. (g) Relief From Filing Fee and Costs: Indigency. (1) Indigency Defined. Indigency for the purpose of this rule is synonymous with insolvency as defined by section 440.02, Florida Statutes....

...Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1983) provides in pertinent part: Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. (Emphasis supplied). Injury is defined in section 440.02(14) as follows: [P]ersonal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment....

...f the State of Florida for recognition and support of illegitimate children by the natural father (regardless of the marital status of the mother) has been expressed in other statutes and decisional law, notwithstanding such legislative enunciation. Section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes, a part of the Workmen's Compensation Act passed in 1935, provides for support under that Act of an "acknowledged" dependent illegitimate child....

...een adjudicated in a foreign jurisdiction, by whatever procedure or whatever evidence may be proper there, without regard to the restrictions on such procedure in Florida, pursuant to sub-section 856.04(2), Florida Statutes; d) vicariously under sub-section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes, the Workmen's Compensation Act, where the child has been "acknowledged" even by circumstantial evidence, by the father; e) vicariously through damages for wrongful death where the natural father "has recognized a...

...oe, respectively, and having specifically provided in each contract that the construction contractor *287 should carry workmen's compensation to protect all employees, must be considered an employer under the meaning of the word `employer' stated in Section 440.02, of F.S.A....

...te, to exclude corporate officers who are performing the employer's nondelegable duty to maintain a safe work-place. In defining the term "employee," as used in section 440.11(1), we turn to the definitional section of the Worker's Compensation Act, section 440.02....

...sation for injury by accident: "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." Injury is defined in section 440.02(17), Florida Statutes (1991) as "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." Accident is further defined in section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1991) as "only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." Conversely, therefore, under the plain language of the statute, it would appear logical to conclude that if a circumstance is substanti...

...Rules 9.200(a)(3), (c), and (f) shall apply to preparation of the record in appeals under this rule. (g) Relief From Filing Fee and Costs: Indigency. (1) Indigency Defined. Indigency for the purpose of this rule is synonymous with insolvency as defined by section 440.02, Florida Statutes....

...1096, 105 S.Ct. 2315, 85 L.Ed.2d 835 (1985). There can be no doubt that chapter 440 has preempted local regulation on the subject of workers' compensation. Section 440.03, Florida Statutes (1987), states that every "employer" and "employee" as defined in section 440.02 shall be bound by the provisions of chapter 440. The definition of "employer" in section 440.02(12), Florida Statutes (1987), includes all political subdivisions of the state....

...testimony of the claimant Canady. We have held that the findings of fact on conflicting testimony in the court below will usually be sustained if suported by substantial evidence. Cone Brothers Contracting Co. v. Massey, 145 Fla. 56 , 198 So. 802 . Section 440.02 (19), Fla....

...of the employee's average weekly wage is to be paid "for such number of weeks as the injured employee's percentage of disability is of three hundred fifty weeks." Section 440.15(3) (u). The last quoted sub-paragraph must be read in pari materia with Section 440.02(9), F.S....

...such injury... . This exclusive remedy provision applies to accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (1977). An accident is defined as "an unexpected or unusual event or result happening suddenly." § 440.02(18), Fla....

...g this finding of the deputy. We shall consider these points in order. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the claimant in any way suffered "an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly" as accident is defined in F.S. § 440.02(19), F.S.A....

...First, this Court, and others, have in construing the Act determined that there is a presumption that the "employer takes the employee as he finds him." Davis v. Artley Const. Co., 1944, 154 Fla. 481, 18 So.2d 255, and Borden's Dairy v. Zanders, Fla. 1949, 42 So.2d 539. Except as limited by Sec. 440.151(1) (b) and Sec. 440.02(19) F.S.A....

...Where a pre-existing disease is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, only acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of disability reasonably attributable to the accident shall be compensable." Section 440.02, Florida Statutes [1959] F.S.A....

...Liability Ins. Co., supra. Following this decision, the Legislature, then in session, promptly confirmed our interpretation of the Act by amending the definition of "accident" to read "an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." Sec. 440.02(19), Fla....

...rd according to the contribution to the disability made by the pre-existing disease and that attributable to the work-connected injury, even though the medical testimony showed that the pre-existing disease contributed to the disabling heart attack. Section 440.02(19), Fla....

...ituted an "accident arising out of and during the course of employment", and awarded benefits. On review the Commission affirmed the award in a form order. The only legal issue in this case is whether McCook suffered an "injury", which is defined by Section 440.02(6), Florida Statutes (1975), as "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment......

...The petition for the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of the Commission is quashed. This case is remanded with directions to dismiss the claim. OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents. NOTES [1] The term "accident" is defined by Section 440.02(18) as any "unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." The leading decision of this Court explaining the definition of "accident" is Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc....

...g that he is totally permanently disabled is unauthorized under our statute defining "disability" as "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury," § 440.02(9), Fla....

...1977), and recite that to be compensable, the assault must not only have arisen out of Strother's employment but also must have occurred within the time and space limits of her employment. Respondents further contend that this case does not fall within the special hazard exception to the going and coming rule. Section 440.02(6), Florida Statutes (1977), defines injury, for purposes of the workers' compensation act, as "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury." Our early decision of Bituminous Casualty Corp....

...The basic issue in petitioner's cause, which he now asks this appellate body to review and decide, is: Whether the service performed by the claimant for the respondent amounted to an implied contract of employment within the contemplation of, F.S., § 440.02(2), F.S.A. F.S., Section 440.02(2)(a), F.S.A....

...However, the basic issue in petitioner's cause is the same as if he were suing for the value of the services which he performed, to wit: Whether or not there existed an implied contract of employment. We find that such an implied contract existed within the purview of F.S., § 440.02(2) F.S.A....

...At that point she was a worker without a job, still short of maximum medical improvement, still injured and recovering, and in that condition still partially disabled both physically and economically due to "personal injury ... by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." Sec. 440.02(6)....

..., we assess the fee at $3,000 based on the documentation furnished after oral argument, and we direct that this fee, like the fee to be awarded by the deputy on remand, "not be recouped, directly or indirectly, by any carrier [or group self-insurer, section 440.02(7)] in the rate base, the premium or any rate filing." Sec....

...NOTES [*] From the manner in which counsel have presented this appeal we do not know whether Holiday Care Center is self-insured, assisted by a servicing agent, or is insured by Peninsular Fire Insurance Company. In any case the term "carrier" is all-encompassing, section 440.02(7)(a), though there is some difficulty in speaking of a self-insured as a "carrier" for purposes of section 440.34(3), which directs that attorney fees assessed for carrier bad faith "shall not be recouped, directly or indirectly, by a...

...not covered by the immunity provisions of the section. The trial court disagreed and granted Weber's motion for summary judgment on the second amended complaint. On appeal, the district court strictly construed section 440.11(1) in conjunction with section 440.02(11)(d)(4), Florida Statutes (1983), which specifically excludes from the definition of "employee" "[a]ny officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from coverage under this chapter." Applying this definition of "employee" to sect...

...n extended the immunity of section 440.11 to Weber. Therefore, the district court reversed the trial court and certified the question to this Court. The issue here is whether the district court erred in applying the definition of "employee" found in section 440.02(11)(d)(4), to section 440.11(1), which grants statutory immunities under the Workers' Compensation Laws....

...[of the law] does not accurately disclose the [legislative] intent." Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (citation omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Hanbury v. Tunnicliffe, 98 Fla. 731, 735, 124 So. 279, 281 (1929)). Section 440.02, which defines the terms used in chapter 440, begins with the following predicate: "[w]hen used in this chapter, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following terms shall have the following meaning." The section then pro...

...within this state, whether or not such services are continuous. However, any officer of a corporation may elect to be exempt from coverage under this chapter by filing written certification of the election with the division as provided in s. 440.05. § 440.02(11)(b), Fla. Stat. (1983). Further, the statute expressly excludes from the definition of employee, "[a]ny officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from coverage under this chapter." § 440.02(11)(d)(4)....

...red employee is entitled to receive benefits under this chapter. Although the language of both these sections is clear, the word "employee" in section 440.11(1) is used in a different context than that contemplated by the definition of "employee" in section 440.02(11). Section 440.02 defines the term "employee" in the context of those persons who are entitled to file claims under the Worker's Compensation Law....

...In order for a court to ignore the plain meaning of statutory language, the result reached by the literal interpretation must be unreasonable or ridiculous, Holly, 450 So.2d at 219, or there must be overwhelming evidence of contrary legislative intent. Hamm, 414 So.2d at 1073. This case does not satisfy those tests. Section 440.02(11)(d)(4) expressly excludes from the definition of "employee" "[a]ny officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from coverage under this chapter." Section 440.11(1) extends immunity from liability to an "employee." Weber's rejec...

...In Allen, the Court addressed the section 440.05 notice [3] requirement contained in the 1967 version of Florida's Worker's Compensation Act. The employer in Allen, who had fewer than three employees, was not required to have worker's compensation coverage under the then existing law. Allen, 281 So.2d at 320 (citing § 440.02(1)(b)(2), Fla....

...on Act. This case is somewhat unusual in that appellant admits that under the wording of the applicable sections of Chapter 440, and prior decisions of this Court, the employer was entitled to summary judgment. The applicable statutory sections are: § 440.02(2)(a), defining a minor child as an "employee"; §§ 440.03 [1969], 440.05 [1969] and 440.07 [1969], giving the employee opportunity to accept or reject the Act as part of the work contract; § 440.11, making the Act the exclusive source of...

...i.e., in terms of the normal progress of his disease or disability, similarly as in cases where there is no death of the employee. "* * * [O]nly acceleration of death * * * attributable to the accident * * * shall be compensable," according to F.S. Section 440.02(19), F.S.A....

...and thereafter, constituted notice to the employer of claimant's pre-existing condition. He therefore held that under the rule of Dorsey v. L & A Contracting Co., Fla. 1963, 155 So.2d 357, there should be no apportionment of the benefits under Sec. 440.02(19). The full commission reversed, holding (1) that there was not competent substantial evidence to support the deputy's finding of total permanent disability; (2) that Sec. 440.02(19) required apportionment of the benefits under the authority of Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc....

...showed that claimant had a pre-existing diseased condition and that the accidents involved only accelerated or aggravated the pre-existing condition. On this basis the commission held that an apportionment should be made under the provisions of Sec. 440.02(19). At the time of petitioner's accidents, Sec. 440.02(19) read as follows: "(19) `Accident' shall mean only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly....

...Zanders, Fla. 1949, 42 So.2d 539; Andrews v. C.B.S. Division, Maule Industries, Fla. 1960, 118 So.2d 206; Standard Oil Co. v. Gay, Fla. 1960, 118 So.2d 212. The broad difference between our earlier and later opinions involving apportionment under Sec. 440.02(19), as well as the interpretation given the section by the commission in this case, has convinced us that we should re-examine the statute and its application. Section 440.02(19), as well as the other apportionment provisions, Sec....

...Since this maxim is a part of the basic philosophy of our workmen's compensation act, it follows that the apportionment provisions should be construed so as to minimize their inconsistency with it. The obvious purpose of the apportionment provision of Sec. 440.02(19) is to relieve the employer of the obligation for that portion of his disability which is not the result of an industrial accident, but which is in some way attributable to a pre-existing disease or condition....

...ition to the final disability." Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, p. 56. Larson lists only California, Kentucky, Mississippi and North Dakota as having comparable statutory provisions. Specifically, we are concerned here with the sentence in Sec. 440.02(19) F.S....

...; and (3) that which resulted from the normal progress of the disease and would have existed had the accident never occurred. Disability falling within the first two categories is compensable under the terms of the statute. It is the purpose of Sec. 440.02(19) to relieve the employer of disability within the third category by apportioning it out of an award. We so hold. Although it does not appear that the results reached were inconsistent with our holding herein, some of our earlier opinions apparently ignored Sec. 440.02(19) entirely and gave full effect to the maxim that the employer takes the employee as he finds him....

...It recognizes the maxim that the employer takes the employee as he finds him, in that it does not charge against the employee diseased or weakened conditions which were not and would not have been disabling without the accident. On the other hand, it gives the intended effect to Sec. 440.02(19) by relieving the employer of the burden of paying for disability which occurred through the normal progress of the disease and was unrelated to the accident....

...ty found to exist, independently of the accident. It follows, therefore, that the statute does not require any apportionment *754 of disability to the pre-existing condition. The effect of this opinion is simply to hold that apportionment under Sec. 440.02 (19) is proper only when and to the extent that a pre-existing disease produces disability independently of the accelerating or aggravating effect of an industrial accident....

...e of Lombardy." We do not find merit in this contention. It is true that there must be consensual relationship to effect the status of employer-employee under the workmen's compensation law. This requirement is derived from the act itself, which, in section 440.02(2), F.S....

...Bell, suffered a non-scheduled injury to his back, compensable under § 440.15(3) (u), F.S.A. The injury resulted in a functional disability of 20% of the body as a whole. The question before the deputy was whether the claimant had suffered a disability or diminution of earning capacity as defined in § 440.02(9), F.S.A., and if so the extent thereof....

...the claimant suffered any reduced capacity to earn in the same or other employment the wages which the claimant was receiving at the time of the injury * * *." (Emphasis added.) This statement clearly tracks the definition of disability set forth in § 440.02(9) F.S.A....

...and testifying as witnesses in the case. Counsel for the parties are about in accord on the facts involved, but in the application of the controlling principles of law to the facts in the record different conclusions are reached. Sub-section (19) of Section 440.02, Fla....

...School Board of Liberty County, 415 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) and Metropolitan Dade County v. Stein, 384 So.2d 167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Neither case is relevant to the case sub judice, and neither offers a definition of "wages." Westfall refers us to section 440.02(12), Florida Statutes (1981), and section 443.036(31)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

..."These factors are not coequal. The first factor, that is the existence of a contract for hire, either express or implied, is a statutory prerequisite to the existence of an employer-employee relationship for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Law because F.S. 1967, Section 440.02(2) (a), F.S.A., defines `employee' as: `* * * every person engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract of hire * * * express or implied, oral or written * * *.' (Emphasis added.) "The other factors outlined in Rainbow Poultry Co....

in the law, Section 2, paragraph (12), now Section 440.02, paragraph 13, Florida Statutes, 1941, that

...Moreover, where the Act is susceptible of disparate interpretations, the court will adopt that construction which is more favorable to the employee. Wick Roofing Co. v. Curtis, Fla., 110 So.2d 385. The remaining point to be determined is whether the deputy erred in failing to apply the provisions of Section 440.02(9), F.S.A....

...Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner's disease was dormant at the time of his injury, it is apparent from the evidence that the pre-existing disease and the compensable accident merged to produce the disabling injury. In such a case the employer is entitled to assert the benefits of Section 440.02(19), F.S.A., even though it may be difficult to determine the amount of aggravation and acceleration of disability....

...Rules 9.200(a)(3), (c), and (f) shall apply to preparation of the record in appeals under this rule. (g) Relief From Filing Fee and Costs: Indigency. (1) Indigency Defined. Indigency for the purpose of this rule is synonymous with insolvency as defined by section 440.02, Florida Statutes....

...Stat. § 742.091, F.S.A. A judgment of adoption makes the child a legal heir. Fla. Stat. § 72.22, F.S.A. Additionally, an acknowledged illegitimate child is the equal to a legitimate child under certain specialized legislation; see, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 440.02(13), F.S.A., involving workmen's compensation....

...thority to hire additional labor. Pearson was paid at the conclusion of each job, but his pay was not pre-negotiated on a job-by-job basis. Although Pearson argues that there is a difference between an "employee" under the workers' compensation law, Section 440.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and an "employee" for the purposes of determining coverage under a liability insurance policy, we conclude that any discussion of such differences as might be *342 pointed out with respect to specific categories of employment would be largely academic....

...The appellants also argue that the deputy erred in awarding Scott an attorney's fee pursuant to Section 440.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979). We agree in part. The term "wages" is defined by statute as "the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging or similar advantage received from the employer." § 440.02(12), Fla....

...We reverse the award for want of substantial competent evidence that Mr. Oswald suffered a permanent impairment "of a nature and severity that would qualify an employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II or supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the federal Social Security Act." § 440.02(34)(f), Fla....

...Godwin, 394 So.2d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). "Date of maximum medical improvement" means the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability. § 440.02(8), Fla....

...urred earlier—that any permanent impairment be assigned a rating "6 weeks before the expiration of temporary benefits." Ch. 93-415, § 20, at 122, Laws of Fla., amending section 440.15(3)(a)4., Fla. Stat. The definition of "permanent impairment" in section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes, although amended effective January 1, 1994, chapter 93-415, § 2, at 72, Laws of Florida, still requires a determination of the status quo once maximum medical improvement is reached: any anatomic or functional a...

...rary benefits have run out—or are expected to do so imminently—must be able to show not only total disability upon the cessation of temporary benefits but also that total disability will be "existing after the date of maximum medical improvement." § 440.02(19), Fla....

...ter temporary benefits must end. Here, however, the requisite permanency was not proven. II. Mr. Oswald, who hurt his back at work on January 26, 1995, claims a catastrophic injury entitling him to permanent total disability benefits on the basis of section 440.02(34)(f), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...The judge of compensation claims concluded that the "gist of the case turns on an interpretation of the deposition testimony of Dr. Iserman," a psychiatrist. Nobody now contends that any current physical impairment, considered apart from psychiatric sequelae, could support an award of permanent total disability benefits. Section 440.02(34), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), defines a "catastrophic injury" as a permanent impairment constituted by: .......

...Here the strongest claim is that a pain disorder and other psychiatric problems attributable to the industrial accident result in an impairment "that has lasted or can be expected to last for a period of 12 months," 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), so qualifying Mr. Oswald for federal benefits of the kind described in section 440.02(34), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...d in fact be entitled to a finding of disabled pursuant to the Social Security Disability regulations and guidelines. In this instance, he would therefor be entitled to an adjudication of permanent total disability pursuant to §§ 440.15(1)(b), and 440.02(34)(f), F.S....

...ts for "the twelve months prior to filing an application." Tusson v. Bowen, 675 F.Supp. 1032, 1034 (E.D.La.1987). See Tingus v. Heckler, 569 F.Supp. 1499, 1502 n. 3 (D.Mass.1983). Whether or not Mr. Oswald would qualify for federal benefits to which section 440.02(34)(f), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), makes reference should not, therefore, be dispositive here....

...ally entitles a workers' compensation claimant to permanent total disability benefits, adopting the following argument: Realizing that the vast majority of socalled "catastrophic injuries" eligible for PTD benefits would fall under the provisions of § 440.02(34)(f), as opposed to the individual scheduled injuries set forth within §§ 440.02(34)(a)-(e), the Legislature also revised § 440.15(1)(f)2.b, F.S....

...disability indemnity benefits in Florida. To establish entitlement to such benefits, the Workers' Compensation Law requires that a claimant prove total disability on account of an impairment "existing after the date of maximum medical improvement." § 440.02(19), Fla....

...ation of Chapter 440, may accomplish a waiver of such exemption and elect to come within the coverage of the statute. We disagree. Clearly, an employer with one employee is normally outside the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Law. [1] Fla. Stat. § 440.02(1)(b)(2) F.S.A....

...§ 440.11, F.S.A. Precedent supports this position. In Strickland v. Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc., 170 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1965), claimant was an independent contractor and therefore normally excluded from the operation of the Workmen's Compensation Act by Fla. Stat. § 440.02(2)(c)(1), F.S.A....

...Having thus responded, we dispatch with this opinion, and with our profound respects, the entire file in the cause to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit of these United States. CARLTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN, ADKINS, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In 1973, the Legislature of Florida amended Fla. Stat. § 440.02(1)(b)(2), to cover all private employments in which one or more employees are employed by the same employer....

...There is no dispute between the parties that the alleged assaults and batteries occurred during the course and scope of appellants' employment with Zippy Mart. Appellants argue that a mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment. This is true, and Section 440.02, Florida Statutes (1979), so provides....

...ny's benefit; or (3) the other facts urged by La Grande, are sufficient to overcome the other evidence belying the kind of control requisite to an employment relationship. The deputy's order finding that La Grande was an independent contractor under § 440.02(2)(d)1, Florida Statutes, is supported by competent, substantial evidence....

...The rule is well established that the JCC cannot, as a matter of law, accept two conflicting MMI dates. MMI is defined as "the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability." § 440.02(8), Fla....

...As a result, this court owes no deference to the JCC's conflicting findings, but may conduct its own independent de novo review. [6] See Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice, § 9.4, at 128 (2001-02 ed.) Similarly, a PI rating based upon a premature MMI date is legally erroneous. Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (1995), defines PI as "any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss determined as a percentage of the body as a whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury." (Emp...

...t. We also note that in determining a claimant's loss of wage-earning capacity, his ability, after the accident, to earn in either or both of his concurrent employments will be considered as bearing on the extent of disability under Florida Statutes § 440.02(9), F.S.A., which provides: "(9) `Disability' means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." (e.s.) Thus, a claimant who injured his...

...— "Other cases: In all other cases in this class of disability the compensation shall be sixty per cent of the injured employee's average weekly wage for such number of weeks as the injured employee's percentage of disability is of three hundred fifty weeks." [7] F.S. § 440.02(9), F.S.A....

...ent of permanent total disability benefits, to apportion any part of the permanent total disability award to the preexisting condition. This court reversed, holding that permanent total disability benefits are subject to apportionment under sections 440.02(18) and 440.15(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), and remanded with directions "for the deputy to apportion out of the permanent total disability award that percentage of the award for permanent impairment caused by the natural progression of pre-existing conditions." 465 So.2d at 658....

...he preexisting condition, because the preexisting condition had not disabled claimant from working prior to the injury. The deputy encountered considerable difficulty in directly equating the statutory concept of "permanent impairment" as defined in section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes (1981), to the concept of "disability" as defined in section 440.02(9)....

...age." 490 So.2d at 1256. In Evans v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 196 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1967), the supreme court's landmark decision on apportionment of permanent disability benefits under the Florida Worker's Compensation Act, the court plainly stated: Section 440.02(19), [2] as well as the other apportionment provisions, Sec....

...Since this maxim is a part of the basic philosophy of our workmen's compensation act, it follows that the apportionment provisions should be construed so as to minimize their inconsistency with it. The obvious purpose of the apportionment provision of Sec. 440.02(19) is to relieve the employer of the obligation for that portion of his disability which is not the result of an industrial accident, but which is in some way attributable to a pre-existing disease or condition....

...ident; and (3) that which resulted from the normal progress of the disease and would have existed had the accident never occurred. Disability falling within the first two categories is compensable under the terms of the statute. It is the purpose of section 440.02(19) to relieve the employer of disability within the third category by apportioning it out of an award....

...It recognizes the maxim that the employer takes the employee as he finds him, in that it does not charge against the employee diseased or weakened conditions which were not and would not have been disabling without the accident. On the other hand, it gives the intended effect to Sec. 440.02(19) by relieving the employer of the burden of paying for disability which occurred through the normal progress of the disease and was unrelated to the accident....

...dental injury, either as a direct result thereof or as a result of the acceleration or aggravation of the pre-existing condition. 196 So.2d at 752-53. The court then stated, "The effect of this opinion is simply to hold that apportionment under Sec. 440.02(19) is proper only when and to the extent that a pre-existing disease produces disability independently of the accelerating or aggravating effect of an industrial accident." 196 So.2d at 754 (emphasis added)....

...1st DCA 1985). The critical issue in this case is the extent to which these amendments evidence a clear and unambiguous legislative intent to substantially alter the doctrine of apportionment of disability benefits as construed in Evans. The 1979 amendment to section 440.02(18) changed the definition of "accident" by eliminating all reference to the phrase "acceleration or aggravation of disability" and referring only to "acceleration of death reasonably attributable to the accident." Ch....

...te to limit the application of apportionment to death cases only, leaving all disability cases beyond the reach of the apportionment doctrine and making the employer liable for the whole disability. The following year the definition of "accident" in section 440.02(18) was amended by adding the following underscored language: "[O]nly acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of the preexisting condition reasonably attributable to the accident shall be compensable, with respect to permanent impairment or death." Ch....

...ning and application. Prior to and after 1979 the term "disability" has been consistently defined as "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." § 440.02(9), Fla....

...such physical impairment. The term "permanent impairment" in the 1979 amendments to the act was defined to mean "any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury." § 440.02(21), Fla....

...There is, therefore, no basis for construing the statutory provisions, expressly or by implication, as directly equating permanent impairment to permanent total disability due to a permanent loss of wage-earning capacity, as we did in Goldsmith I. To this extent, therefore, we recede from Goldsmith I. *635 Since section 440.02(18), as amended in 1980, provides that "only acceleration of death or acceleration or aggravation of the preexisting condition reasonably attributable to the accident shall be compensable, with respect to death or permanent impairment,...

...[2] That section then read in part: "Where a preexisting disease is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, only acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of disability reasonably attributable to the accident shall be compensable." § 440.02(19), Fla....

...er injury in excess of the compensation allowed for such injury when considered by itself and not in conjunction with the previous disability except as hereinafter provided in paragraph (d) of this subsection. § 440.15(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (1961). [4] Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1979) specifically states: "Where a preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by an accident arising out of, and in the course of, employment and resulting in death, only acceleration of death r...

...Claimant first contends that the deputy's finding of MMI is not supported by CSE. Our review of the record reveals that this contention is well taken. The date of MMI marks the point after which no further recovery or improvement from an injury or disease can be reasonably anticipated. Section 440.02(7), Florida Statutes (1985); Hall v....

...t of temporary disability compensation attributable solely to the non-compensable accident. Reedy Creek Improvement District Fire Department v. LaCorte, IRC Order 2-3696 (February 9, 1979). We conclude there is error with regard to Point 5. Although Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes, prohibits apportionment of temporary disability and medical benefits between the employer and the employee in the case of compensable aggravation of a prior condition, its specific terms do not control this case in which the compensable condition is affected by a later injury....

...om strictures. Because of the hand, Dr. Carducci rated the claimant with a 22% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. His report was considered in arriving at this Order. 12. I find the claimant is permanently and totally disabled. [2] Section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes....

...While it is clear that the claimant's illnesses are not occupational diseases within the highly restrictive terms of § 440.151, Fla. Stat., the record does suggest the possibility that the claimant has suffered an aggravation of a pre-existing asthmatic condition, which would be governed by § 440.02(18), Fla....

...hild Labor Act. Relators also contend that the "Waiver" provision of Section 450.111(4), F.S., Child Labor Act, 1953, F.S.A., made the minor in the case at bar employable. Response to this contention requires consideration of the following statutes: Section 440.02(2), Workmen's Compensation Act, defining employees: "* * * every person engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written * * * including minors whether lawfully o...

...equired by Section 450.111(4), 1953 amendment to Child Labor Laws. He was therefore "unlawfully employed." If injured, can such a minor sue at law for personal injury or is he limited to Workmen's Compensation Act to seek recovery? An examination of Section 440.02(2) defining employee, Section 440.11 limiting liability of the employer, and Section 440.54 providing additional compensation to minors employed in violation of the Child Labor Law, forces the conclusion that the minor is limited to his remedy under Workmen's Compensation....

...sued a 15 year old boy a permit to work with power driven machinery. There may be substance to this, but the fact remains that when the quoted acts are read and interpreted in sum, any other interpretation than the one given would render meaningless Section 440.02(2) defining employees as including unlawfully employed minors 440.54, relating to additional compensation for minors employed in violation of the Child Labor Law....

...In fact, the Florida Workers' Compensation Act defines the term employee as "any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance of any work or service ... whether lawfully or unlawfully employed" including, but not limited to, " aliens... " Fla. Stat. § 440.02(15)(a) (emphasis added)....

...W; that claimant has a permanent physical impairment; and that claimant is entitled to wage loss benefits pursuant to his corrected AWW. Regarding the retroactive pay increase issue, the arguments raised suggest a potential conflict between sections 440.02(21) and 440.14(1)....

...The deputy relied upon City of Titusville v. Taylor, IRC Order 2-2378 (August 23, 1973), cert. den., 287 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1973), as support for this conclusion. Appellant, on the other hand, argues that because the claimant's later retroactive pay increase was not, as required by section 440.02(21), "the money rate at which the service rendered ......

...Therefore, he ruled that a subsequent retroactive pay raise should be included in the determination of claimant's AWW. The majority agrees that the retroactive pay raise should be included in the AWW determination because there is some ambiguity as a result of a possible conflict between § 440.02(21) defining wages and § 440.14(1) relating to the determination of the AWW. Section 440.02(21) defines wages as "the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury ..." (emphasis supplied), whereas § 440.14(1)(a) provides that the AWW is to be based on...

...In 1979, however, the legislature abolished permanent partial disability as provided for in section 440.15(3)(u), Florida Statutes (1974 Supp.), and replaced it with the concept of "wage-loss". See generally Ch. 440, Fla. Stat. (1979). [2] This case does not involve seasonal, agricultural labor, referred to in section 440.02(1)(c)2, Florida Statutes (1974 Supp.)....

...Orange County Board of County Commissioners v. Davis, 440 So.2d 462 (1983). *52 However, we reverse the portion of the deputy's order increasing claimant's average weekly wage by the amount of tips conceded by claimant to have been received without the knowledge of the employer. Section 440.02(12), Florida Statutes (1981), defines "wages" as including "gratuities received in the course of employment from others than the employer, only when such gratuities are received with the knowledge of the employer. " (e.s.) "Knowledge" as used in section 440.02(12) was defined by the Industrial Relations Commission as being actual knowledge of not only the fact that gratuities are received, but also the amount of the gratuities, except where the employer closes his eyes to the obvious, or fai...

...nd remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment. With respect to an interlocking statutory provision, we recently said in Hunt v. Exxon Co. USA, 747 So.2d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999): The relationship factor is defined in section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (1995), which states: (32) "Arising out of" pertains to occupational causation....

...cause of a disability or need for treatment—and see no need to comment further on this issue. For these reasons, I would affirm the JCC's award of benefits to Mr. Sykes without remand. NOTES [1] The phrase "major contributing cause" is also used in section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes....

...ury under the Workmen's Compensation Law. We agree. Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, Section 440.09, Florida Statutes, limits compensation coverage to disability or death resulting from an "injury arising out of and in the course of employment". Section 440.02(6) defines "injury" as "... personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment... . The term "accident" is defined in Section 440.02(18) as "......

...red on the employer's premises in a parking garage. In sum, of the materials cited by the deputy commissioner, only Larson's treatise supports the result in this case. To be compensable an injury must arise out of and be in the course of employment. Section 440.02(14), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...nts. Jerold Feuer, Miami, for appellees. WENTWORTH, Judge. Employer/carrier appeal a workers' compensation order which found that claimant sustained a compensable injury and awarded temporary disability benefits to her. Employer/carrier contend that § 440.02(18), Florida Statutes, precludes an award of benefits in the circumstances of the present case....

...Testimony of claimant's treating physician clearly established that this psychiatric impairment was precipitated by the employment-related robbery, and that a gun being placed to her head and a ring being physically removed from her finger were significant circumstances in the causal etiology of claimant's mental injury. Section 440.02(18) provides, in pertinent part, that: A mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only ......

...As in Watson, in the present case the non-disabling physical trauma was a significant causative factor in the claimant's ensuing psychiatric impairment. As the deputy in the present case determined, in such circumstances the disability is not due to fright or excitement only, and § 440.02(18) therefore does not preclude compensability for the ensuing mental or nervous injury....

...kers' compensation coverage for an independent contractor under section 440.04(2). The record below is silent as to why the workers' compensation carrier, who is not a party to these proceedings, accepted compensability of this accident. Ordinarily, section 440.02(13)(d)1 excludes an independent contractor from the definition of an "employee" under the Workers' Compensation Act....

...Claimant argues that it is normal and proper for traveling employees to participate in reasonable recreational activities, that no express restrictions had been imposed in this case; and that such activities are not a substantial deviation or noncompensable personal errand beyond the course of employment. § 440.02(6), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Where the injury produces such result, and the injured person is so incapacitated that he cannot engage in any kind of employment and is thereby prevented from earning a livelihood, he is entitled to temporary total disability compensation. Under Workmen’s Compensation, Section 440.02, sub-section 9, F....

...The Statute Under the current TPD statute, benefits are payable "if overall MMI has not been reached" and the medical conditions resulting from the accident create restrictions not an absolute prohibition, on the injured employee's ability to return to work, as argued by the E/SA. § 440.15(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also § 440.02(13) (defining "disability" as the "incapacity to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.")....

accident as defined by our statute. Paragraph 19, Section 440.02, Florida Statutes 1941, and construed by our

...Recovery would be allowed only for the latter. It is asserted that the respondent waived the impact of the limitations bar by making disability payments subsequent to the order of August 24, 1960. Inasmuch as state agencies are expressly made subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 440.02, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., it logically follows that such agencies would be subject to the same rules that would apply to private employers similarly conditioned....

...The point for determination is whether or not the claimant sustained such an injury by accident as entitles him to compensation within the contemplation of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The answer to this question turns on the application of subsection (19) of Section 440.02, Florida Statutes 1949, F.S.A., to the evidence adduced....

...Accordingly, we hold that the judge did not err in holding that the claimant gave sufficient and satisfactory notice of injury to the employer. II. Appellants next assert that the judge erred in holding that claimant was an employee of HJR and not an independent contractor. Section 440.02(11)(d)1....

...However, in 1977, the Legislature attempted to statutorily define the term "independent contractor." At that time, while cognizant of the tests which had been traditionally applied by the courts in determining independent contractor status [3] , the Legislature amended Section 440.02(11)(d)1. (then Section 440.02(2)(d)(1.) to include within the term "independent contractor" real estate salesmen or agents who are paid solely by commission and work without supervision or control. Section 440.02(11)(d)1., which has remained unchanged, provides as follows: (d) "Employee" does not include: 1....

...Likewise, in the instant case, there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the judge's conclusion that claimant was an employee of HJR. Rather, the evidence only supports the conclusion that claimant was an independent contractor within the meaning of Section 440.02(11)(d)1., Fla....

...Nothing in this case suggests that claimant was subject to any more control than that which exists in the typical real estate agent/broker relationship, a relationship which is recognized by statutory and case law as involving independent contractor status. See § 440.02(11)(d)1., Fla....

...iscussed, but could have been decided on the same premise. We wish to make clear, however, that we do not interpret the Workmen's Compensation Law, F.S.A. § 440.01 et seq., as requiring that an injury "by accident" proceed from an unexpected cause. Section 440.02(19) of the law defines "accident" as "an unexpected or unusual event, happening suddenly." The Thorndike-Barnhart Dictionary defines "event" as "1....

...THOMAS, MATHEWS and DREW, JJ., dissent. HOBSON, Justice (concurring specially). I am constrained to agree with and to concur in the original opinion by Mr. Chief Justice ROBERTS because the interpretation which he places upon the legislative definition of an "accident" contained in Section 440.02(19) cannot be characterized as a strained construction when considered in the light of the purposes to be accomplished by the Workmen's Compensation Act; the presumption declared in Section 440.26(1) that, absent substantial evidence to the contrary, "the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter"; and our repeated pronouncements that the Act should be construed liberally and all doubts resolved in favor of the claimant. Moreover, it is my view that a careful analysis of Section 440.02(19) discloses a legislative intent that every injury arising out of and in the course of employment should be held compensable if the injury was preceded by or simultaneous with an "event" which happened suddenly and was unexpected or...

...That's the bus boy's duty, if he's there, and I couldn't find him that morning. "Q. You have lifted that can of waffle batter many, many times, haven't you? A. I have lifted it many times, sir, during four and a half years." Subsection (6) of F.S. § 440.02, F.S.A., defines the term "injury" as follows: "The term `injury' means personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury." If the Act stopped there, we would be left to determine the meaning of the word "accident", but the Legislature left no room for doubt, and in F.S. § 440.02(19), F.S.A., defined the word "accident" as: "`Accident' shall mean only an unexpected or unusual event, happening suddenly." (Emphasis supplied.) It is seriously contended that the claimant received an injury to her arm as the "unexpected...

...On remand, the JCC must determine whether the claimant's conditions of employment created an increased risk of the injuries he sustained. In doing so, the JCC must resolve the apparent conflict between his finding that the major contributing cause of the claimant's injuries was his osteoporosis and the test now required by section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...These factors are not coequal. The first factor, that is the existence of a contract for hire, either express or implied, is a statutory prerequisite to the existence of an employer-employee relationship for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Law because F.S. 1967, Section 440.02(2) (a), F.S.A., defines "employee" as: "* * * every person engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract of hire * * * express or implied, oral or written * * *." (Emphasis added.) The other factors outlined in Rainbow Poultry Co....

...yee's vehicle. An employee driving his own truck and carrying materials was paid extra for the use of the truck. We conclude that the deputy commissioner's treatment of the expense allowance comports with the statutory definition of "wages" found in Section 440.02(12), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Vigliotti sought payment for medical bills incurred as a result of her accident as well as indemnity benefits. The employer and carrier, KM Administrative Service, controverted the claim, and a hearing took place before the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC). In the order entered April 18, 1995, the JCC construed section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), a new statute defining "arising out of," and denied the claim based on his determination that Vigliotti was not performing work at the time of her accident. Because the JCC misapplied the statute, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...the major contributing cause of the claimant's accident or injury. If both elements are present, then the accident or injury arose out of the claimant's employment, referring, as the new statutory definition indicates, to occupational causation. See § 440.02(32) Fla.Stat.; see also § 440.09(1), Fla.Stat....

...lishing "in the course and scope of employment," i.e., time, space, and circumstances, as an element of occupational causation. Additionally, as appellant points out, the Legislature did not change the definition of "employment" or "injury." Compare § 440.02(15)(a), (17), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994), with § 440.02(15)(a), (17), Fla.Stat. (1993). Nor did the Legislature significantly change the definition of "accident," at least for the purposes of this analysis. Compare § 440.02(1), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994) with § 440.02(1), Fla....

...It has expressly provided for the proportionate liability of an employer and its carrier in occupational disease cases. §§ 440.151(1) (c) and 440.151(5), Fla. Stat., F.S.A., and in cases involving the acceleration or aggravation of a preexisting disease, § 440.02 (19), Fla....

...Mooney of Meyers, Mooney, Adler & Hammond, P.A., Orlando, for appellee. ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Chief Judge. We affirm the deputy's order finding that appellee, an alien illegally in this country, is entitled to Chapter 440 benefits for a work-related injury notwithstanding his immigration status. Section 440.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.), specifically included aliens among those "employees" entitled to benefits, and nothing in the statute suggests that workers not lawfully immigrated are excluded....

...Vegas, formerly employed as a security guard at Miami International Airport, has challenged one aspect of the 1990 amendments to chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Ch. 90-201, Laws of Fla. See also, Ch. 91-1, Laws of Fla. [1] Specifically, Ms. Vegas takes issue with that portion of the act which amended section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes, the definition of "wages." Ch....

...tute is unconstitutional as a denial of due process, access to courts, and equal protection. [2] Today we hold that on the facts presented in this case, the calculation of Vegas' AWW under section 440.14(1) has not been altered by the new wording of 440.02(24), and accordingly we reverse and remand. Since the concurrent earning provisions of section 440.02(24) will not apply to the calculation of AWW in this case, we do not reach the constitutional issues raised....

...By stipulation, claimant and Globe Security agreed that claimant's AWW with Globe Security is $156.38. They further stipulated that the AWW with Argenbright & Associates is $92.66. In the order now under review, the JCC found that the definition of wages contained in section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1990), controls the computation of AWW under section 440.14(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). He thus entered an order finding that claimant's concurrent employment earnings from Argenbright & Associates could not be included in the calculation of her AWW, under the dictates of section 440.02(24)....

...the definitional section of chapter 440 a definition of AWW. It is clear from a review of the language of section 440.14(1)(a) that the term "average weekly wages" is not synonymous with the term "wages." Section 9 of chapter 90-201, as codified at section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...section 440.14(1)(a). At the outset of our analysis, we note that the term "wages," defined in the 1990 amendments, does not, within the literal language of section 440.14(1)(a), stand alone so that its definition may be derived simply by resort to section 440.02(24)....

...s but one other time in the statute, namely at the end of the first sentence of subsection (1)(a). The reference at this point, however, is not simply to wages. It is specifically and exclusively to "wages earned in such employment." To look only to section 440.02(24) for enlightenment as to the meaning of wages would require us to ignore the phrase "earned in such employment." This phrase, however, refers back to the most significant part of the sentence which provides: "If the injured employee...

...137 So.2d at 559. Thus, although the J.J. Murphy court required similar jobs in order to qualify the claimant for concurrent wages, the court focused on the statutory use of the term "employment" and paid no mind whatever to the definition of wages contained in section 440.02(12), Florida Statutes (1957)....

...Murphy, requiring concurrent similar employment, should give way to a new rule allowing combination of wages from concurrent dissimilar employment. Once again the court confined its analysis to section 440.14, and made no mention whatever of the definition of wages contained in section 440.02....

...jured workers, the Legislature did not amend the longstanding definition of disability. Disability, under the Workers' Compensation Act, continues to mean a reduction of the injured worker's ability to earn wages in the same or any other employment. § 440.02(11), Fla....

...10-564 (1986). We now turn to the contention of Globe Security and of amicus that the language "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter," which introduces section 440.14, serves *83 to trigger reliance upon the definition of wages contained in section 440.02(24), and compels the court to ignore the longstanding statutory scheme for computing AWW contained in section 440.14(1)....

...Rather, Globe Security asks us to ignore the provisions of section 440.14(1) in computing AWW. [6] As we have previously determined, nothing in the statute indicates that AWW is synonymous with wages. This is not to say that the statutory definition in section 440.02(24) could never be considered in calculating the AWW under section 440.14(1)....

...other guide to calculation, whether more restrictive or more liberal, is provided at some other place in the act. [8] Our close attention to the AWW concept contained in section 440.14, and our ultimate conclusion that the new definition of wages in section 440.02(24) does not impact the calculation of AWW in the present case, is made with full appreciation that the concept of AWW means nothing until it is applied to actually determine compensation benefits under section 440.15, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...changed by virtue of chapter 90-201, Laws of Florida. The Legislature has clearly provided that wage loss benefits, both temporary and permanent, shall be based on actual wage loss. If claimant's AWW must be computed, as appellees urge, by utilizing section 440.02(24), the JCC would be required to ignore the specific dictates of sections 440.15(3)(b) and 440.15(4), which refer not merely to wages or wage loss, but to actual wage loss....

...3, should persuade us that the Legislature intended to correct "a longstanding judicial misinterpretation of the Act," directly referring to the decision in American Uniform & Rental Service v. Trainer, supra . In Ciancio v. North Dunedin Baptist Church, supra, n. 2, we observed that the 1990 amendment to section 440.02(24) acted "to depart from the existing law regarding concurrent earnings as delineated in cases such as American Uniform and Rental Service v....

...In reaching this result, we do not ignore the contention that we should construe section 440.14(1)(a) with reference to the legislative intent so eloquently set out in the preface of chapter 90-201, Laws of Florida. Globe Security argues that the Legislature clearly intended, by amending section 440.02(24), to eradicate the longstanding requirement that employers must pay disability benefits based on the worker's concurrent earnings....

...I write only to explain my concurrence in that opinion and my concurrence in Ciancio v. North Dunedin Baptist Church, 616 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In Ciancio the only argument made to us was that discussed in the opinion, i.e., the unconstitutionality of section 440.02(24) on equal protection grounds. The parties' arguments and the opinion in that case assumed without further analysis that the new definition in section 440.02(24) operated to exclude concurrent earnings in determining the claimant Ciancio's wages, and that case was decided without benefit of the argument made in this case upon which Judge Kahn's opinion is based....

...r deeper scrutiny, may be found to be erroneous. That is what happened in Ciancio. Hence, the holding of that case does not reach the issue presented by the arguments in this case because no such argument was made. I continue to agree that, assuming section 440.02(24) was intended to exclude concurrent wages from the determination of all benefits under chapter 440, such a provision would not violate constitutional guarantees to equal protection of the law, as we held in Ciancio....

...opinion. ALLEN, Judge, dissenting. Despite the cogent and dexterous reasoning of the majority opinion, I cannot agree to an average weekly wage determination under section 440.14(1)(a), Florida Statutes, without resort to the definition of wages in section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes. The majority's concern as to the practical effect of applying section 440.02(24), in light of the broad philosophical purposes underlying the Workers' Compensation Law, is more properly a matter of legislative policy than judicial imprimatur. In construing section 440.14(1)(a) in isolation, the majority disregard the acknowledged legislative intent reflected in section 440.02(24) to alter the existing law regarding concurrent earnings, as indicated in Ciancio v. North Dunedin Baptist Church, 616 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). As a term of art used in chapter 440, "average weekly wages" under section 440.14 are obviously not synonymous with the definition of "wages" provided in section 440.02(24). However, wages are a component of the average weekly wage computation, and the statutory definition of wages should thus apply in connection therewith. Indeed, the majority recognizes that the section 440.02(24) definition of wages applies to the average weekly wage computation in other contexts (fringe benefits). Characterizing the historical evolution of the concurrent earnings doctrine as a "legal concept" does not justify a different approach as to this aspect of section 440.02(24), as it is clearly within the legislature's power to delineate the wage standard upon which an injured worker may be compensated. I would thus accord section 440.02(24) its plain meaning and intended effect, so as to limit the concurrent earnings which are includable in a claimant's wages under chapter 440....

...xtrinsic expression of intent. Rather, I would adhere to the primary consideration of statutory construction as expressed in Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Smith, 556 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1990), — the plain meaning of the statutory language. Giving effect to section 440.02(24) does not conflict with the references to actual wage loss in *87 section 440.15, Florida Statutes, as such wage loss is circumscribed by the definition of wages, and even under the prior law not all lost earnings were compensated (e.g., noncovered earnings). Nor does section 440.02(24) present any necessary conflict with the average weekly wage concept under section 440.14(1)(a)....

...employer," such language may still be given effect with regard to a claimant who continues to work at one job with a change in the employing entity. This language does not compel the inclusion of earnings from concurrent employment, and inasmuch as section 440.02(24) generally excludes concurrent employment earnings from the definition of wages, these earnings should be excluded from the average weekly wage computation....

...rned on the job where the employee is injured" may lead to distasteful and unsuitable results in some cases, I must agree with the reasoning expressed in Judge Allen's dissent. The Legislature did, in fact, accomplish its purpose by the amendment to section 440.02, which was to base the calculation of compensation benefits only on the wages earned in employment where the worker was injured....

...v. Gibbs, 137 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1962); and American Uniform Rental Service v. Trainer, 262 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1972), which construe what wages were to be considered in calculating AWW pursuant to 440.14(1), have not mentioned the definition of wages in section 440.02, then any amendment to the definition of wages contained in section 440.02 would be ineffective in determining how average weekly wage is to be calculated....

...ee, and gratuities to the extent reported to the employer in writing as taxable income received in the course of employment from others than the employer and employer contributions for health insurance for the employee or the employee's dependents." 440.02(24), Fla. Stat. (1991). [8] The dissenters urge that the legislative change to section 440.02(24) controls over the unchanged characterization of AWW. At least since 1941, chapter 440 has defined wages as "the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury... ." See e.g., 440.02(12), Fla....

...It must do so, however, by playing a card, and not by merely suggesting which card would be played should the occasion arise. [9] Cf., Waldorf v. Jefferson County School Bd., 622 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (in which claimant's counsel stipulated that section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Brown arose out of her employment. Appellants also argue that because of the nature of the act by Blaich and the type of injuries claimed by Mrs. Brown, there can be no workers compensation coverage and exclusivity does not therefore apply. Appellants point to Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1979): "Accident" means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly....

...Appellants never asserted nor claimed any such damages in their common law action. Their injury was one involving only nondisabling mental distress. As such, the injury falls beyond the parameters of the act. The definition of injury itself supports this conclusion. Section 440.02(6) states in part: "The term `injury' means personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment....

...The definition of accident convincingly demonstrates that it is not. "`Accident' means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly. A mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only, ..., shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment." Section 440.02(18) (e.s.)....

...1st DCA 1996) (upholding award of compensation at federal minimum wage to claimant's adult son who provided assistant care as a family member). Cf. Walt Disney World Co. v. McCrea, 754 So.2d 196, 198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (noting that the definition of "child" provided in section 440.02(5) applies to the provision of death benefits only)....

...In all other cases, not statutorily excepted, the Act remains the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. One exception from the Act, by definition, is mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only, as this is deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of employment. Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Cooper's testimony, he will need to apportion out any permanent disability not reasonably attributable to McCall's accident. Compare Victor Wine, supra, at 589. Compensability for temporary disability and medical benefits is, of course, not subject to the apportionment statute. § 440.02(18), Fla....

...ing stroke to job over-exertion); Richards Dept. Store v. Donin, 365 So.2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1978) (citing rule of law in Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, infra ); and Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So.2d 581, 588-589 (Fla. 1962). [5] Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...STANDARD OF REVIEW We accept the facts as found by the JCC and stipulated to by the parties. To the extent this issue involves the JCC's interpretation and application of a statute, it is a question of law and subject to a de novo standard of review. "Arising out of" pertains to occupational causation. § 440.02(36), Fla....

...However, the record demonstrates that the E/C did not raise apportionment as a defense to Sallee's PTD claim. The E/C concedes this, but argues that either the defense was implicitly raised by testimony concerning the pre-existing disability or that the provisions of Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.), limiting compensation for aggravation of a pre-existing disease by an industrial accident to that aggravation reasonably attributable to the accident obviated its responsibility to explicitly assert apportionment, as a defense....

...The statute under which the claimant was allowed recovery provides that "Where a preexisting disease is accelerated or aggravated by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, only * * * the acceleration or aggravation of disability reasonably attributable to the accident shall be compensable." Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A....

...bsequent accident. All that the statute does is prevent an employee with a preexisting hernia from claiming, in event of accident, full compensation as for a "hernia resulting from injury by an accident," and leaves such employee to his remedy under section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., which excludes any recovery for disability attributable in fact to the preexisting condition and limits recovery solely to injury from the aggravation....

...n the ruling of the deputy commissioner respecting the amount allowable for the injury sustained. As we understand the record, the deputy allowed the claimant to recover as for an aggravation of a preexisting condition, pursuant to the provisions of section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., but based the amount of recovery upon the provisions of section 440.15(6), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., which deals specifically with hernia claims resulting initially from injury by accident. In this he committed error. Consequently the order should be quashed and the cause remanded for a computation of compensation allowable, under the terms of section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., because claimant's rights must be determined solely by this provision....

...§ 1324(a) specifically excludes employment of illegal aliens from the offenses punishable in connection with harboring such aliens. See, also, NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.1979) (reinstating illegal aliens with their employer where the firing constituted an unfair labor practice). [4] Section 440.02(11)(a), Florida Statutes....

...In this connection, we observe that the deputy commissioner's inability to determine precisely, from a medical standpoint, the percentage of physical impairment attributable to each of the two accidents does not prevent or relieve the deputy from determining the extent of "disability," under Section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes, since the injured employee is compensated for loss of wage earning capacity, not mere functional impairment....

...See 11 Workmen's Compensation Text, Schnieder, Section 2190, page 21 and 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 294, at page 1022. The remaining issue to be disposed of is whether the deputy and the full commission erred in not finding that the 1957 attack of the deceased was an aggravation of his pre-existing heart disease. Section 440.02(19) provides in part: "Where a pre-existing disease is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, only acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of disability reasonably att...

...to the doctrine that "the employer takes an employee as he finds him". While we recognize as a general proposition that an employee need not enjoy perfect health in order to receive workmen's compensation benefits, nevertheless, the plain mandate of Section 440.02(19) may not be ignored or its purposes be defeated. If the doctrine employed by the commission were used in all cases of aggravation or acceleration of death or disability, then it is clear that the provisions of Section 440.02(19) would be rendered meaningless in every such case....

...919, where the word "penalty" is used to describe the increased payment for delinquency, but without analysis. Under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law, "compensation" is defined as "the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter." F.S. § 440.02(11), F.S.A....

...Thunderbird and Aetna admit that Sothern is an independent contractor, thus, the issue before us is limited to whether her exclusive remedy is provided by Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. An independent contractor is exempt from the provisions of Chapter 440. Section 440.02(2)(d)1, Florida Statutes (1973)....

...Alford, 727 So.2d 388, 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), that the legislature has adopted the social security disability standard for catastrophic injury as a prerequisite for obtaining PTD benefits in those cases where a claimant does not have one of the permanent impairments listed in section 440.02(34), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...Robles decided to hospitalize him, resulting in his blood pressure and weight rapidly dropping to more reasonable levels. The record then reveals a marked change in both claimant's condition and treatment following the accident, and, as such, indicates an aggravation of a preexisting disease within the ambit of Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...*1283 The deputy, in arriving at his conclusion of no causal connection, appears to have implicitly placed a stricter standard of proof on the claimant to establish a causal connection in an "aggravation" case. In providing compensation for aggravation of preexisting conditions under Section 440.02(18), the legislature has not imposed upon claimants seeking compensation for such conditions the same strictures it has upon claimants asserting disability caused by occupational diseases....

...not to accept the law and ruled on the necessity of an affirmative act. However, a proper construction requires the interpretation of the effect of the modification as to "every employer, as defined in the workmen's compensation law," together with Section 440.02(4) (5), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which states: "(4) The term `employer' means * * * every person carrying on any employment, * * *....

...occupation presented a particular hazard of such disease. The E/C challenges the JCC's rejection of its argument that Wise's injury must not only satisfy the criteria of section 440.151(1)(a), but must also satisfy the "arising out of" definition in section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which the E/C contends applies to all compensation cases. The definition in section 440.02(32) provides that an injury arises out of employment if the claimant's work is "the major contributing cause of the injury." Dr....

...1962] at p. 588, Opinion on rehearing construing Workmen's Compensation law.) These results are consistent with the present Workmen's Compensation statutory definition: "`Accident' means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." Section 440.02, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...on this appeal is whether or not the appellant, Joseph E. Allen, the employee, sustained a compensatory injury within the scope of his employment. The relationship of employer and employee is *341 admitted on the record by counsel. Sub-section 6 of Section 440.02, Florida Statutes 1941, defines the term “Injury” as meaning personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infections as naturally or unavoidably result from such an injury. Sub-section 18 of Section 440.02, supra, defines the “time of injury” as meaning the time of the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury....

...The motion to dismiss was granted with prejudice. We AFFIRM. The first question we consider is whether an employee has a common law action for the alleged negligence of an employer causing an injury which was not an "injury arising out of the employment," as defined in Florida Statute 440.02(18), and hence is not compensable under chapter 440, the Florida Workers' Compensation Law....

...under this chapter or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for damages on account of such injury or death. (emphasis added) The term "injury" is defined as personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. § 440.02(6), Fla. Stat. (1979). Thus, to be compensable under the act, the injury must not only arise out of and in the course of employment but must also be "by accident." Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1979) defines "accident" as follows: `Accident' means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly....

...Although the distinction between "labor" and "engineering services" is important in the Mechanics' Lien Law, it is relatively immaterial in the Workmen's Compensation Act where emphasis is placed on "employees". Therefore, we conclude that services which are not listed among the types of employment exempted in F.S. § 440.02(1) (c), F.S.A....

...ute earnings to an employee terminated for misconduct. However, the 1994 revision did not change the fact that temporary partial disability benefits are "compensation for disability. " Section 440.15, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)(emphasis supplied). Section 440.02(11), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), defines the term "disability" as the "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." Consequently,...

...n employee even though he was a member of the partnership. By the definitions in the Compensation Act, Section 440, Florida Statutes 1951 and F.S.A., an employee is a "person engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire * * *," Section 440.02(2), and an employer, any "person carrying on any employment, * * *" Section 440.02(4). A "person" is an "individual, partnership, association or corporation * * *." Section 440.02 (5)....

...r's compensation claim. In order to be compensated under the worker's compensation law, one must be an employee. § 440.03, Fla. Stat. (1993). The legislature has specifically provided that an employee does not include an independent contractor. Id. § 440.02(13)(d). The determination as to whether a newspaper delivery person is an independent contractor for worker's compensation purposes is governed by common law principles, giving due consideration to the business activity of the individual. § 440.02(13)(d), Fla....

...A clear collateral consequence of a bad faith finding by a judge of compensation claims is that a carrier may not recoup (either directly or indirectly) the payment of the attorney's fee in the rate base, the premium, or any rate filing. Section 440.34(3). We recognize that the definition of "carrier" in section 440.02(3) includes a self-insurer, and therefore any carrier provision may facially apply to self-insurers....

...otential for collateral consequences. For reasons pointed out in the motion for rehearing, I now conclude that this holding is erroneous. The employer in this case is a self-insurer who administered this claim through its authorized servicing agent. Section 440.02(3) defines "carrier" as including "a self-insurer." Section 440.34(3)(b) authorizes the award of an attorney's fee upon a finding that the carrier has acted in bad faith....

...to performing. In determining whether a particular activity is not routine, we must look to the duty performed by the employee himself rather than by his fellow workers. Yates v. Gabrio Electric Co., 167 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1964). "Injury" is defined by Section 440.02(6), Florida Statutes, to mean "... personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and *387 such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury..." Section 440.02(18) describes "accident" to mean "......

...uries on each other. The second construction, which would deduct only the disability already compensated for, does permit recognition of the merger of the two injuries. Although its choice of language suggests some confusion with apportionment under 440.02(19), the commission appears to be arguing for the second construction in the present case....

...ould have been inconsistent with the new 440.15(5) (c) enacted at that time. The last reason in support of the third construction of Sec. 440.15(5) (c), which construction we adopt, is that it is most consistent with the other apportionment section, 440.02(19), relating to pre-existing disease, which has been in the statute from its enactment in 1935. From that time up through and beyond the adoption of 440.15(5) (c) now under consideration, Sec. 440.02(19) had been construed as requiring apportionment of only that portion of disability that existed at the time of the accident....

...ed to relate to the inter-relationship between Sec. 440.15(5) (c) and the provisions relating to the Fund. It is true that the commission made a confused reference containing the "aggravation" language of the other apportionment provision. F.S. Sec. 440.02(19) F.S.A....

...440.15(5) (c) and the Fund sections, and the continued vitality of the Sharer case was the principal question before us here. In any event, we think that our decision in Young v. Dreamland Bedding Co., Fla. 1961, 133 So.2d 414 established for all time the distinction between the two apportionment provisions. Secs. 440.02(19) and 440.15(5) (c)....

...However, the Fund relieves the employer of the added financial burden. In its petition, the Fund seizes upon our admission in Evans v. Florida Industrial Comm. (Davis Grove Service) Fla., 196 So.2d 748, opinion filed on February 1, 1967, that there was some difference in wording between our Sec. 440.02(19) and the corresponding section of the California statute....

...ble, the instant case would fall within the unrelated works exception to coemployee immunity pursuant to § 440.11(1), Fla. Stat. We affirm the trial court's order holding DOC liable. We find that the workers' compensation act is applicable based on § 440.02(12), Florida Statutes (1987), [2] which defines "employer" as "the state and all political subdivisions thereof......

...n state roads pursuant to a contract between DOT and DOC. As Tyre was leaving, he steered the vehicle to the left of the center line and fatally struck Robert Graham Koch, a DOT employee who was crossing the street on his way to work. [2] Renumbered § 440.02(13), Fla....

...In support of this finding, the dc gave as one of her reasons: "There was no unusual event such as a slip, trip, twist, or even the onset of pain while working which would be indicative of such an accident." The deputy applied an incorrect standard for determining a compensable injury. Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes, defines an "accident" as an "unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." (e.s.) In construing the term accident, the case law recognizes that an unexpected result is sufficient to constitute an accident, even though there was no unexpected slip, fall or misstep....

...On appeal the order of the Commission was affirmed by the circuit court, and the carrier appealed. The crux of this controversy is whether or not the claimant, Wolfe, was an employee of the Claude ,H. Wolfe, Inc., on May 29, 1942, within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 440.02, Fla....

...on an uninterrupted basis due to a physical limitation. Under the law as amended in 1994, these findings are insufficient to establish PTD. Section 440.15(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), provides that "[o]nly a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02 shall, *876 in the absence of conclusive proof of a substantial earning capacity, constitute permanent total disability." Claimant has the burden of proving entitlement to PTD benefits....

...The JCC simply "noted that the claimant has applied, qualified and presently receives social security disability benefits." While receipt of social security disability benefits may be relevant to a determination of entitlement to PTD benefits under the definition of catastrophic injury contained in section 440.02(34)(f), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...n employee killed in a compensable accident is, under all circumstances and without regard to actual dependency, entitled to compensation because she was living apart from her husband for justifiable cause. The applicable statute is Subsection 15 of Section 440.02, Fla....

...relieves the second employer of responsibility. If Mr. Guzman had sought benefits directly from the second employer in a separate proceeding, he would have recovered nothing. The same result should obtain here. "Significantly, sections 440.09(1) and 440.02(32) use the definite article `the,' and not `a,' before the term `major contributing cause.'" Orange County MIS Dep't....

..."An accidental injury or death arises out of employment if work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death." Hernando County Sch. Bd. v. Dokoupil, 667 So.2d 275, 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (quoting § 440.02(32), Fla....

...In affirming an award of compensation, the court said: Claimant clearly suffers from permanent impairment which has resulted in his "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." (emphasis added). Section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes....

...1984); Cepcot Corp. v. Department of Business & Professional Reg., 658 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Under the Worker's Compensation Act, "wages" is defined, in part, as "the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring." § 440.02(24), Fla....

...Beaty, 576 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Civ.App. 1979). The Texas court concluded under statutory provisions differing somewhat from Florida's, that remuneration for holidays and vacations should be included in determining the employee's "average daily wage." [5] Section 440.02(12), Florida Statutes (1978) provides, in part: (12) "Wages" means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury, including the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging, or similar advantage received from the employer......

...o permanent impairment following his 1983 accident. Further, after the December 1983 accident, it is undisputed that claimant was determined to be totally disabled with respect to his employment, had reached MMI, and was denied certification to fly. Section 440.02(16), Florida Statutes, provides: "Permanent Impairment means any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury." Claimant testified that at the time of...

...s were either burned or given to the claimant because it was "too much of a hassle" for the employer to send them back to the wholesaler. On that basis alone, the materials would not be encompassed within the statutory definition of "wages" found in section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...erms are used in Chapter 440. The order appealed in this case is likewise not properly entered by a deputy commissioner under Chapter 120. Section 120.565 provides for declaratory statements by way of agency opinion and final agency action; however, § 440.021 establishes that deputy commissioners are exempt from Chapter 120 and shall not be considered an agency or a part thereof....

...nor a "claim for benefits", see Section 440.19. Indeed, Section 440.205 does not provide for any compensation or benefits. Compensation is defined as "the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter." Section 440.02(11). Additionally, compensation or benefits allowable under Chapter 440 are generally predicated upon accidental injuries. See Section 440.02(18)....

...Article I, Section 21, Florida Constitution (1968). See also Baxter's Asphalt, etc. v. Liberty County, 406 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). I think it necessary to look, then, to the Administrative Procedure Act (Chapter 120) as a means of resolving the question of jurisdiction. Section 440.021, Florida Statutes (1979), does not expressly exclude determinations made under Section 440.205 from Chapter 120 proceedings. Section 440.021 provides: Workers' compensation adjudications by deputy commissioners and the Industrial Relations Commission are exempt from chapter 120, and neither the deputy commissioners nor the Industrial Relations Commission shall be considered an agency or a part thereof....

...n of agency, applies only to "adjudication of workers' compensation claims, ... ." I therefore conclude that a proceeding brought by an employee wrongfully discharged is not one that is barred under Chapter 120 by the proscriptive language of either Section 440.021 or 120.52(1)(c)....

...remedy provided by statute; any combination of the foregoing; or, in the absence of any other specific statutory authority, a fine not to exceed $1,000. To summarize, in my judgment a claimant is not precluded by the exclusionary language of either Section 440.021 or 120.52(1)(c) from requesting an administrative declaratory statement on the question of whether he or she was wrongfully discharged....

...of the nature of the injury. In contrast, section 440.15(3), Florida Statutes, (Supp.1994), creates an entitlement to impairment benefits for an injured worker who has suffered a permanent impairment. The phrase "permanent impairment" is defined in section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes, (Supp.1994) as: ......

...Because there is competent and substantial evidence to support these findings, we affirm the deputy commissioner's determination. Redding v. Cobia Boat Co., 389 So.2d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 1980). *798 The appellants argue that the claimant's injury was not one "arising out of and in the course of employment", as required by Section 440.02(6), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...sum of $12,625.07. Section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A., provides that "If the employer has made advance payments of compensation, he shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of any unpaid installment or installments of compensation due." Section 440.02(11), Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A., defines "compensation" as "the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter." Although the language of section 440.20(11) has not been definitively cons...

...1972); Jones v. Florida Power Corp., 72 So.2d 285, 287 (Fla. 1954). [2] § 440.10, Fla. Stat. (1979). That section was amended by chapter 80-236, section 2, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1980, but such amendment is not applicable in this case. [3] See § 440.02(4), Fla....

...The broker exercises no control over the manner, method and performances of their services and he does not concern himself with the details of their work, but only in the results thereof. The term "employee" is defined in the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law (§ 440.02(2), Fla....

...ved by citing particular cases involving different factual conditions." In Baya's Bar & Grill v. Alcorn, Fla. 1949, 40 So.2d 468, 469, it was said: "Of course independent contractors are excluded from the operation of the Workmen's Compensation Law. Section 440.02(2), Florida Statutes 1941, and F.S.A....

...The plaintiff has failed to secure the payment of compensation under the provisions of F.S. 440 entitled Workmen's Compensation Law on behalf of the aforesaid nine persons `employed' by him in connection with his real estate business. "6. The defendant has notified the plaintiff that he is in violation of the provisions of F.S. 440.02 and 440.03 by virtue of his failure to secure the payment of compensation for the aforesaid nine persons....

...The issue with which we are presented then is whether there was competent, substantial evidence to support the deputy's finding that the petitioner had suffered a compensable injury by accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Section 440.02(6) defines injury as follows "The term `injury' means personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury." Section 440.02(19) provides in pertinent part: "`Accident' shall mean only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly....

...ensation order of the deputy commissioner. It is so ordered. TERRELL, Acting C.J., DREW and O'CONNELL, JJ., and SCOTT, Circuit Judge, concur. NOTES [1] At the time of the decision in the Gray case the statutory definition of accident as contained in Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes, 1951, F.S.A., was "`accident shall mean only an unexpected or unusual event, happening suddenly'"....

...The next session of the Legislature enacted Chapter 28238, Laws of 1953, which redefined "accident" to conform to the holding in the Gray case. The present statutory definition of accident is "an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." Section 440.02(19) F.S.A. [2] Section 440.02(19), F.S.A.

...Michael Joseph O'Day, pro se. PER CURIAM. The employer/carrier appeals a worker's compensation order wherein the judge divided the responsibility for medical benefits between two carriers. The claimant had sustained multiple accidents, with different carriers "on risk." While § 440.02(18), Fla....

...mandatory, only discretionary, for a JCC to consider a decision by an ALJ. Therefore the outcome of Scott’s federal case was not legally binding, nor 6 In defining PTD benefits, Florida law provides that “[o]nly a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02 shall, in the absence of conclusive proof of a substantial earning capacity, constitute permanent total disability. Only claimants with catastrophic injuries are eligible for permanent total benefits. In no other case may permanent total disability be awarded.” Fla. Stats. § 440.15(b)(1994)(emphasis added). Turning to § 440.02 (37)(f), applicable for purposes of this appeal, “Catastrophic injury” means “[a]ny other injury that would otherwise qualify under this chapter of a nature and severity that would qualify an employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II [42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.] . . . of the federal Social Security Act as the Social Security Act existed on July 1, 1992, without regard to any time limitations provided under that act.” Fla. Stats. § 440.02(37)(f)(1994) (emphasis added). 7 Other reasons offered by the ALJ were: that Fleetwood and Crawford had no interest in Scott’s federal case; that there was no question of law or fact in common between them and Scott’s fe...

...changed the standard for awarding PTD benefits to include “any [catastrophic] injury that would otherwise qualify . . . of a nature and severity that would qualify an employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II,” Fla. Stats. § 440.02(37)(f), employers and insurance carriers alike recognized the importance of the claimant’s award or denial of social security benefits by an ALJ....

...SSA); Union Camp Corp. v. Hurst, 696 So.2d 873, 876 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“[while receipt of social security disability benefits may be relevant to a determination of entitlement to PTD benefits under the definition of catastrophic injury . . . in section 440.02(34)(f)[sic] ....

...*830 1st DCA 1985), for the proposition that the deputy is prohibited by section 440.15(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), from apportioning medical benefits between the two employers and their carriers. Numerous decisions of this court construing sections 440.02(18) and 440.42(3) of the workers' compensation statutes as they existed prior to the 1979 amendments have held that a deputy is authorized to apportion medical benefits between carriers....

...Rodgers, 378 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); The Seasons from Sarasota v. O'Day, 379 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Neff v. Britto, 404 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Bell Rentals & Sales v. Harvey, 405 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Prior to 1979, section 440.02(18), defining "accident," provided in part that compensation for temporary disability and medical benefits was not subject to apportionment....

...rriers concerning the proper allocation of disability and medical benefits. This provision remained intact following the 1979 amendments. Each of the above cases construed this statutory language to mean that the prohibition against apportionment in section 440.02(18) was limited to disputes between an employee and his employer and carrier and that in situations involving a dispute between two carriers the deputy was empowered by section 440.42(3) to apportion benefits between the carriers according to each one's responsibility....

...ch prohibit apportionment between carriers. We do not consider that entire discussion to have been essential to the result reached. *831 Accordingly, we hold that the 1979 amendments transferring the statutory language prohibiting apportionment from section 440.02(18) to section 440.15(5) did not alter the prior substantive law with respect to the authority of a deputy commissioner to apportion medical benefits between carriers under section 440.42(3), and that the statutory provisions as construed in Rowe & Mitchell v....

...on any legislative change in the substance of apportionment law. But I would note that, in other contexts, judicial reconsideration of prior judicial construction of statutes may be dictated by many factors other than statutory amendment. NOTES [1] Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1977), reads: `Accident' means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly....

...Alex Lancaster of Alex Lancaster, P.A., Sarasota, for respondent. GRIMES, Justice. We review City of Holmes Beach v. Grace, 570 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), in which the district court of appeal certified the following question as one of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 440.02(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), DEFINING "ACCIDENT" EXCLUDES A MENTAL OR NERVOUS INJURY WHERE THE INJURY SUFFERED BY THE CLAIMANT RESULTS IN ONLY MINOR PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES? Id....

...Where there has been a physical accident or trauma and the claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis, the full disability, including the effects of the neurosis, is compensable under the workers' compensation law. Superior Mill Work v. Gabel, 89 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1956). However, pursuant to section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1985), a "mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only ......

...to avoid standing up to the true issue [of compensating for mental injury in the absence of actual physical injury] is wearing thin." Id. at 7-911. While there appears to be some merit to Professor Larson's view, we are limited by the strictures of section 440.02(1), Florida's "unique amendment" which bars compensation for mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only....

...The court upheld the compensation award for the "traumatic neurosis" which resulted from the incident. Id. at 435. While fright or excitement played a large role in Watson, the claimant's psychiatric problems would not have occurred without the physical injury caused by being hit on the head with a spool. Because section 440.02(1) speaks in terms of causation, we have chosen to reword the certified question as follows: WHETHER SECTION 440.02(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), DEFINING "ACCIDENT," EXCLUDES A MENTAL OR NERVOUS INJURY WHERE THE PHYSICAL INJURY SUFFERED BY THE CLAIMANT WAS NOT A CAUSE OF THE MENTAL OR NERVOUS INJURY? As reworded, we answer the question in the affirmative....

...as he attempted to put on the handcuffs. Furthermore, there was no medical testimony which remotely implied that the striking of Grace was a cause of his psychiatric illness. Therefore, Grace's disability was not caused by an accident as defined by section 440.02(1)....

...In this case, the claimant's "employment" by Conway Construction Company and Ms. Painter was not covered by the Act, and the wages earned from the employment should not have been used to compute the claimant's AWW. The claimant's "employment" by the construction company was excluded from the Act's coverage by virtue of § 440.02(2)(d)1, Fla....

...1949). See also Collins v. Federated Mut., 247 So.2d 461, 463-64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), cert. den. 249 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1971). Accordingly, since the claimant was not an employee of the construction company, his "employment" was not covered by the Act, see § 440.02(1)(a), Fla....

...Stat., and his earnings as an independent contractor should not have been used in determining his AWW. Jay Livestock Market v. Hill, 247 So.2d 291, 292 (Fla. 1971). The claimant's "employment" by Ms. Painter was excluded from the Act's coverage by virtue of § 440.02(1)(b)2, Fla. Stat., which states that "[t]he term `employment' shall include: [a]ll private employments in which three or more employees are employed by the same employer." This language, which implicitly limits the definition of "employment" in § 440.02(1)(a), Fla....

...(Tr. 3. 4.) In the opening paragraph of his order the deputy recited that the claimant contended that there should be no apportionment and that the carrier contended that claimant's disability should be apportioned as set forth in Florida Statutes § 440.02(19), F.S.A. Section 440.02(19) as amended at the 1965 session of the legislature provides that medical benefits are not subject to apportionment but this provision did not apply at the time of the accident involved in this claim....

...ment to produce death or disability prematurely, the death or disability is compensable to the extent to which it was produced by the non-routine activity. When such activity combines with a pre-existing ailment, there must be an apportionment under Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...er the date of MMI. Id. at 98. The date of MMI is statutorily defined as "the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability" § 440.02(10), Fla....

...ll have a permanent impairment after reaching MMI. The test is whether a claimant is totally disabled upon the expiration of temporary benefit eligibility, and will remain totally disabled after the date of MMI as that phrase is statutorily defined. § 440.02(10)....

..."Permanent impairment" and "disability" are not synonymous. Permanent impairment is defined as "any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss determined as a percentage of the body as a whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury." § 440.02(22), Fla. Stat. (2006). Disability is defined as "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." § 440.02(13), Fla....

...Therefore, the deputy commissioner found her average weekly wage to be $119.35. Appellants urge that inclusion of the insurance benefits in the average weekly wage determination was error because such benefits *1202 are not covered by the following description of "wages," as provided by § 440.02(12), Florida Statutes: Wages means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury, including the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging, or similar adva...

...She complains of an order of the Florida Industrial Commission which set aside the deputy commissioner's order allowing her claim and directed that her claim be denied. The burden of the petition is that the full commission in its order, reversing the order of the deputy commissioner, misapplied section 440.02(19), Fla....

...is.' The finding the Deputy made with respect to claimant's suffering from no `organic disability' is supported by competent substantial evidence; however, we are of the opinion that the Deputy has misconstrued the law in respect thereto. Apparently Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes [F.S.A.], which states, in part, `A mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only * * * shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment,' has been unintentionally overlook...

...in that fright alone does not constitute an injury by accident." There is no doubt that the claimant sustained "an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment." The only question is whether compensation is barred by the provisions of section 440.02 (19), Fla....

...ury ". Disability is defined by the Workmen's Compensation Act: "`Disability' means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." (Emphasis added.) Section 440.02(9), Fla....

...A mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only or disability or death due to the accidental acceleration or aggravation of a venereal disease or of a disease due to the habitual use of alcohol or narcotic drugs, shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment. * * *." Section 440.02(19), Fla....

...ected to do so imminently—must be able to show not only total disability upon the cessation of temporary benefits but also that total disability will be `existing after the date of [MMI].'" Id. at 98 (quoting definition of "permanent impairment" in section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.), which is now codified in section 440.02(22))....

...fits shall cease and the injured worker's permanent impairment shall be determined. § 440.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The use of the term "permanent impairment" signifies that the disabled worker has attained maximum medical improvement. Section 440.02(22), Florida Statutes (2006) defines "permanent impairment" as "any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss determined as a percentage of the body as a whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury" (emphasis added)....

...Cooper, 659 So.2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). [4] "Permanent impairment" is defined as "any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss determined as a percentage of the body as whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from an injury." § 440.02(22), Fla....

...." The main problem with this interpretation is that "date of maximum medical improvement" is statutorily-defined as the date after which the employee is not reasonably anticipated to have further medical recovery or improvement from the injury, see § 440.02(10), Fla....

...Ordinarily one would assume that an employee such as appellant, hired to train thoroughbred horses, would be provided with workers' compensation benefits if he suffered any injuries resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The exclusion of employment for agricultural labor, provided in Section 440.02(13)(c)2, Florida Statutes (1983), probably would not apply to employment services such as those furnished by appellant....

operation of the Workmen's Compensation Law. Section 440.02(2), Florida Statutes 1941, and F.S.A. In the

...tionment should not be made of the benefits awarded herein. That is, we conclude compensation *863 for temporary disability and medical benefits are not apportionable under the general scheme and intent of our workmen's compensation law. F.S.A. Sec. 440.02(19)....

...are guided by several considerations. In the first instance, we have attempted to ascertain controlling expressions of legislative intent. There are two apportionment provisions in our present workmen's compensation law. One provision is set out in Section 440.02(19), F.S. and the other is contained in Section 440.15(5) (c). Section 440.02(19) provides in part: "* * * Where a pre-existing disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of disability r...

...Compensation for temporary disability and medical benefits provided by this chapter shall not be subject to apportionment under this subsection. " (Emphasis supplied.) The italicized portion of this section was added by the Legislature in 1965. Prior to this addition, this Court had construed Section 440.02(19) as requiring apportionment for temporary disability and medical benefits. See Shores Development, Inc. v. Carver, 164 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1964). As a result of the 1965 amendment, it is quite clear that the Legislature intended to exclude temporary disability and medical benefits from any form of apportionment under Section 440.02(19)....

...ion for a later injury in excess of the compensation allowed for such injury when considered by itself and not in conjunction with the previous disability." It is noted this subsection reveals the absence of a limitation such as the one contained in Section 440.02(19), F.S. We are fully cognizant of the legislative intent suggested by the absence of such a limitation; that is, by omitting from Section 440.15(5) (c) the limitations set out in Section 440.02(19), it is arguable that the Legislature intended Section 440.15(5) (c) to apportion compensation for temporary disability and medical benefits. On the other hand, it is equally arguable that the affirmative expression set out in the later enacted Section 440.02(19) should control the scope of Section 440.15(5) (c) in the absence of underlying differences in the two sections suggestive of a meaningful basis for distinguishing their operative effects....

...disability resulting from disease or other congenital defect. In view of the interpretation placed on these two apportionment sections in Stephens, the argument that Section 440.15(5) (c) should be construed to conform to the limitation contained in Section 440.02(19) is particularly persuasive....

...osts. The Industrial Relations Commission affirmed and claimant seeks review of this order. We conclude the Judge of Industrial Claims and the Commission erred in finding that claimant suffered no accident within the contemplation of Florida Statute § 440.02(19), F.S.A....

...The E/C concede the record contains no evidence that Goldsmith was suffering from disability either at the time of the accident or at the time of the hearing. Goldsmith's substantive rights are governed by Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1981). We must construe Sections 440.02(18) and 440.15(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) to determine whether PTD benefits may be apportioned between a compensable injury and pre-existing conditions....

...1st DCA 1981), the enumeration of several items upon which a statute either operates or forbids operation excludes from operation all things not expressly mentioned by it. Therefore, because the legislature did not include PTD benefits in the emphasized list, apportionment of those benefits is permissible. Section 440.02(18) reads in pertinent part Where a pre-existing disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only acceleration of death or acceleration or aggravation of the pre-existi...

...(e.s.) Before 1979, acceleration or aggravation of "disability" was compensable with respect to "permanent disability." 1980 amendments stated that only acceleration or aggravation of the "pre-existing condition" is compensable with respect to "permanent impairment." Before these amendments, the courts construed Section 440.02(18) to require, before apportionment, that a pre-existing condition be causing "disability" either on the date of the accident or, because of natural progression, at the hearing....

...Evans v. Florida Industrial Commission, 196 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1967). The differing language in the amended statute indicates a different meaning was intended. Carlile v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977). The deputy equated 440.02(18)'s "permanent impairment" with "impairment benefits" under Section 440.15(3)(a), holding that it means that the Legislature intended to apportion impairment benefits where Section 440.15(3)(a) permanent impairment is found, that is, permane...

...of either eye or serious head or facial disfigurement. This construction would indicate that apportionment of PTD benefits is not authorized. But Section 440.15(5)(a) by statutory construction indicates they are. "Permanent impairment" is defined in Section 440.02(21) as "any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss, existing after the date of MMI, which results from the injury." This is the definition intended when "permanent impairment" is used in Section 440.02(18)....

..."Any anatomic or functional loss" would include permanent, total loss of wage earning capacity. Further, "impairment benefits" under Section 440.15(3)(a) are benefits for limited types of permanent impairment. The legislature knew this difference yet used the broader "permanent impairment" in Section 440.02(18). Reading Sections 440.02(18) and 440.15(5)(a) in pari materia, PTD benefits can be apportioned, and the deputy erred in holding that they could not. Before 1979, Section 440.02(18) was construed to require that before a disability award could be apportioned, the pre-existing condition had to be causing disability either at the time of the accident or, because of natural progression, at the time of the hearing....

...* * * * b. The permanent disability resulting from the subsequent accident or occupational disease is materially and substantially greater than that which would have resulted had the permanent physical impairment not existed ... (Emphasis supplied.) Section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: "Disability" means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury....

...t poisoning. Although the evidence presented establishes that Riley and Lord suffered anxiety and depression as a result of their belief that they had been poisoned, a neurotic disability is not compensable unless there is an actual physical injury. Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (previously Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes); City Ice & Fuel Division v....

...Carver, 145 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1962); Prahl Brothers, Inc. v. Phillips, 429 So.2d 386 (1st DCA, 1983). The record in this case does not support a finding of compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment within the meaning of Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes, since no physical injury has been shown by the evidence, but only a psychological trauma caused by fear and excitement which in turn produced physical symptoms consistent with a hysterical reaction....

...Analogous situations might include work-connected exposure to disease germs, without physical consequences, and subsequent psychological distress upon being made aware of the exposure, with accompanying physical symptoms. Absent a causal link between a physical trauma, however slight, and subsequent nervous or mental injury, Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes, excludes such injuries, due to fright or excitement only, from those injuries compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law....

...However, we cannot say from our vantage point that the Deputy erred in resolving these conflicts in favor of the claimant. Petitioner's second contention is that the Deputy erred in failing to determine the degree of aggravation or acceleration of the pre-existing disease as required by F.S. § 440.02(19), F.S.A. The pertinent portion of F.S. § 440.02 (19), F.S.A....

...This Court has recognized the difficulties encountered in arriving at the degree of acceleration or aggravation, Hampton v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 140 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1962), but has nonetheless consistently upheld the statutory requirement. Respondent contends that the Legislature, in enacting F.S. § 440.02(19), F.S.A., never intended that awards for temporary disability and medical benefits would be apportioned....

...the very terms of the act render the husband liable for her support so the case relied on is not in point and dependency is not the governing criterion. As to the minor step child, it appears that the law Section 2(12) Workmen’s Compensation Act, Section 440.02(13) Florida Statutes, 1941, places the step child in the same category as the natural child and as with the wife makes the husband responsible for its support....

...tant absence of any medical whatsoever between October 22, 1984 and November 28, 1984"; that claimant was instructed only not to return to his old type of job; and that claimant did not look for work during the claim period. Disability is defined by section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes (1983), as "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." The deputy commissioner found no medical evidence that...

...If the legislature intended to exclude employees covered by FECA, presumably it would have included that Act among the other federal acts listed in Section 440.09(2). The claimant was disabled in the course of state employment and was entitled to compensation. [2] See Section 440.02(1)(b)1, Florida Statutes....

...Not one of the doctors who examined her was of the opinion that she was unable to work, once she reached maximum medical improvement on September 16, 1996. For purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law, permanent, total disability entails catastrophic injury as defined in section 440.02, Florida Statutes (1995). See § 440.15(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). In the absence of one of the permanent impairments listed in section 440.02, the Legislature has adopted the social security disability standard for catastrophic injury. See § 440.02(34)(f), Fla....

...First, the E/C here does not concede the contested injury was a "manifestation." Second, Claimant's ulcer condition is not a "manifestation," as that term is defined in the workers' compensation statute. A. Definition of Manifestation The definition of "manifestation" can be found within the definition of "injury" in section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...." We reject both arguments. The E/C's argument is patently without merit because Lavin was receiving TTD benefits during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth weeks preceding the injury. These benefits clearly are not "wages" within the meaning of Section 440.02(12), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Medical testimony was elicited to this effect. The remaining requirements of the statute are met because the disability of the claimant was sudden and unexpected and resulted in a disappointing and distressing disability to the young trainee. F.S. § 440.02(6); § 440.02(19)....

...st prevail. The respondents in their application for review before the full commission contended the deputy "* * * erred, a a matter of law, in failing to apportion the extent of the claimant's pre-existing disability as provided in Florida Statutes § 440.02(19) and § 440.15(5) [F.S.A.], in his award for permanent partial disability benefits, temporary total disability benefits, and remedial medical treatment, care and hospitalization." The record shows that claimant had a pre-existing conditi...

...." § 440.151(3), Fla. Stat. (2002); or, since October 1, 2003, a "disability," statutorily defined as "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." § 440.02(13), Fla....

...a permanent physical impairment. Accordingly, this case is governed by the 2003 version of section 440.151 (effective October 1, 2003), which does not contain the definition of "disablement" relied upon by the majority but, rather, merely refers to section 440.02(13) which provides that "`[d]isability' means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." As I shall explain, pursuant to the "perm...

...There is absolutely no legal support for a finding that the date of MMI is synonymous with the date of accident or, in the occupational disease context, the date of disability. [4] Effective October 1, 2003, the Legislature amended the statute to define "disablement" to mean "disability" as set forth in section 440.02(13). See § 440.151(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). The definition in section 440.02(13), expressly requires wage loss for disability....

...Guides for determining dermatological impairment. Claimant clearly suffers from permanent impairment which has resulted in his "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." (emphasis added). Section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes....

...Turning to the workers' compensation statutes, an employer is only required to pay compensation or furnish benefits "if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (2005) defines "injury" in pertinent part as "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." On appeal, the Schroeders argue that the effect of the notice of denial stating t...

...exemption as permitted by this chapter, or has otherwise secured the payment of compensation coverage as a subcontractor, consistent with s. 440.10, for work performed by or as a subcontractor. 7 § 440.02 (15)(c)2, Fla....

...ions from claims by the employees of the contractor or of other subcontractors, if it secured compensation for its employees and the injury was not caused by the subcontractor’s gross negligence. Ch. 2003-412, § 1 & 8, Laws of Fla. (amending §§ 440.02 (15)(c) & 440.10 (e)). After the 2003 amendment, section 440.10(e) now reads: (e) A subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work is not liable for the paym...

...r immunity indicates that the Legislature did not intended to provide an unrelated works exception from immunity to subcontractors who had secured compensation for their employees. Accordingly, we hold that the current versions of sections 440.02 (15)(c), 440.10 (e), and 440.11, when read together, provide that the “unrelated works” exception to immunity does not apply to a claim by an employee of the contractor, like Mr....

...ted income to the Internal Revenue Service is included in the definition of wages when calculating average weekly wage. We agree with Appellants that the legislature did not intend to include unreported income in its definition of wages contained in section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...compensation rate, payment of all medical bills, authorization for further medical treatment, penalties, interest, costs and attorneys' fees. Fast Tract raised numerous defenses, including its argument that Claimant had earned no wages as defined by section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes; therefore, no benefits were due....

...a debate for the legislature and not a factor in our analysis. Claimant further asserts that Fast Tract and Maronda Homes provide no legal authority to support their argument that Claimant earned no wages and therefore no benefits were due; however, section 440.02 is the paramount legal authority on which we must rely in deciding workers' compensation cases....

...includes only the wages earned and reported for federal income tax purposes on the job where the employee is injured ... and gratuities to the extent reported to the employer in writing as taxable income received in the course of employment from others than the employer.... § 440.02(28), Fla....

...(emphasis added). Claimant asserts that the phrase "reported for federal income tax purposes" simply means that a worker must ensure that his employer, not the Internal Revenue Service, is informed of his income. Thus, Claimant would have us read the first part of section 440.02(28) as "`Wages'......

...includes only the wages earned and reported [to the employer] for federal income tax purposes." We cannot accept Claimant's invitation to rewrite the statute in this manner, as this would be a violation of the separation of powers. It is simply a matter of common sense that persuades us that it is unreasonable to read section 440.02(28) as addressing wages reported only to the employer and not the IRS....

...ps notify their employer of taxable income, not simply the money itself: "`Wages' ... includes ... gratuities to the extent reported to the employer in writing as taxable income received in the course of employment from others than the employer...." § 440.02(28), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Claimant also argues that section 440.02(28) has no impact on the proper interpretation of section 440.14. Relying on Vegas v. Globe Security, 627 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), Claimant asserts that it is debatable whether section 440.02(28) modifies section 440.14....

...nge the prior substantive law contained in section 440.14. By contrast, here we confront the question of whether "wages" includes income which has been unreported for federal income tax purposes. We find that the more specific definition of wages in section 440.02(28) requires the conclusion that Claimant received no wages for calculating his average weekly wage; thus, the definition of average weekly wage contained in section 440.14 is irrelevant and certainly not dispositive. In other words, we do not face a decision of how much income Claimant earned and over what period of time; we must simply determine whether Claimant earned any wage, as defined in section 440.02(28)....

...." In the circumstances, we need not decide whether Ms. Corkery proved that she met the additional requirement of reporting gratuities "to the employer in writing as taxable income received in the course of employment from others than the employer." § 440.02(24), Fla....

...x and social security purposes."). Contrary to Claimant's argument that an employee must report his income to his employer, we find that Liccardo supports our view that, in order to demonstrate that Claimant's income constitutes wages under sections 440.02(28) and 440.14, Claimant is required to show that he reported his wages for federal income tax purposes....

...We leave such determinations to the branch of government authorized to make public policy—the legislature. Conclusion We reverse the JCC's order granting Claimant temporary total disability payments based on an average weekly wage, because we find that Claimant received no wages as defined in section 440.02(28), *359 Florida Statutes....

...e fails to take into account other statutes that have a bearing on the issue. Moreover, I fear that the decision will encourage employers to hire undocumented aliens and to compensate them with unreported cash payments. For these reasons, I dissent. Section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes, defines the term "wages" to include only those wages that are reported for federal income tax purposes....

...this language as if it says that earnings can count as wages only if the employee reports them to the Internal Revenue Service. It appears to me that this conclusion is not supported by the text. The majority's interpretation of the term "wages" in section 440.02(28) is also at odds with other provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act....

...f any work or service while engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract for hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, and includes, but is not limited to, aliens and minors. § 440.02(15)(a), Fla....

...ertension result[s] in total or partial disability or death." See City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So.2d 727, 729-730 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (stating "neither compensation nor benefits are available until the employee suffers disablement or death"). Section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes (2007), defines "disability" as "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." (emphasis added). *1103 We have interpreted section 440.02(13) to mean that disability occurs only when "the employee becomes actually incapacitated, partially or totally, from performing his employment." City of Mary Esther v....

...sion... in accordance with rules prescribed by the division at any time after a specific benefit becomes due and is not paid... . Chapter 79-40, Laws of Florida. [4] Formerly, the "Division" meant the Division of Labor of the Department of Commerce. § 440.02(8)(a)....

...of both under the control of both." I Larson, op. cit. supra at p. 719. The statute controls workmen's compensation in Florida, and the statute requires an employer-employee relationship as a predicate for liability of the particular employer. See §§ 440.02(1) (a), 440.02(2) (a), 440.02(4), 440.09 and 440.10, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. An employee of a particular employer is a "person engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written." § 440.02(2) (a). In other words, "there must be a consensual relationship to effect the status of employer-employee under the workmen's compensation law." Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse, Fla. 1954, 74 So.2d 554, 557. This consent can, of course, be implied. See § 440.02(1) (a)....

...partial disability benefits are not payable as provided for in this section. . . . § 440.15(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (2004) (typeface altered). See Ch.2003-412, § 18, at 3925, 3969, Laws of Fla. (adding the language quoted above to section 440.15(4)(e)). Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (2004), defines "misconduct": "Misconduct" includes, but is not limited to, the following, which shall not be construed in pari materia with each other: (a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an...

...ess or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of an employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. § 440.02(18), Fla....

...Maryland Casualty Company, Fla., 55 So.2d 741. We have recently undertaken to summarize the views of this Court regarding the disposition of so-called "heart cases." Victor Wine and Liquors Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So.2d 581, opinion on rehearing filed April 4, 1962. In Victor Wine we applied Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., to situations involving a pre-existing heart condition which is aggravated by an industrially related accident....

...eks which, obviously, is 30% of the maximum compensable period of 350 weeks. Without benefit of our opinion in Victor Wine the Deputy here has reached a basis for the award consistent with the intendments of that opinion. In other words, in applying Section 440.02(19), when a pre-existing disease combines with an industrial accident to produce death of an employee, evidence should be submitted, on the basis of reasonable medical certainty, apportioning the cause of death between the disease and the industrially related accident....

...on speculation as to the life expectancy of a particular employee suffering from a chronic cardiac ailment. We are also satisfied that the apportionment formula which we have prescribed is the one contemplated by the legislative mandate contained in Section 440.02 (19), supra....

...Farris did not inform her at his January 8, 1985, examination that she should return to work. The E/C argues that the deputy erred in finding claimant suffered a compensable accident because the evidence does not support a finding that claimant experienced "an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." § 440.02(1), Fla....

...The deputy also erred in awarding benefits during substantially all of the month of November 1984 because the record shows that claimant worked during this entire period. AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part. NIMMONS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 440.02(21), 440.14, Fla....

...imum medical improvement (MMI) at the time of the December 1995 hearing *760 and in ruling that the PTD issue was not ripe for adjudication. Contrary to the JCC's finding, the claimant's leg amputation constituted a catastrophic injury as defined in section 440.02(34)(b)....

...ference, and shall be utilized for all drug testing pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. [4] See E.H. v. Temporary Labor Source, Inc., 687 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. den., Temporary Labor Source, Inc. v. E.H., 701 So.2d 868 (Fla.1997). [5] Section 440.02(34)(b) defines "catastrophic injury" as "a permanent impairment constituted by ......

...The JCC should have looked to the alternate definition of "disability" set out in Sledge: "Disablement means the event upon which the employee becomes actually incapacitated, partially or totally, from performing his employment." Id. That definition more closely reflects the statutory concept of "disability." See § 440.02(13), Fla....

...Specifically, section 440.205 provides the following: No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law. Section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), defines "Employer" to include "the state and all political subdivisions thereof [and] all public and quasi-public corporations therein." And section 440.03, Florida Statutes (2004), provides that "[e]very employer and employee as defined in s. 440.02 shall be bound by the provisions of this chapter." Therefore, under the plain language of the Workers' Compensation Law, actions for workers' compensation retaliation are authorized against the State and any of its subdivisions, as employers....

...ary care physician for appellee's benefit. We affirm and address briefly the issue concerning PTD. The parties agree that the standard for PTD is that set out in section 440.15(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995): Only a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02 shall, in the absence of conclusive proof of a substantial earning capacity, constitute permanent total disability....

...claimant's impairment was related to her industrial accident and moreover that the injury was "of a nature and severity that would qualify an employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II ... of the federal Social Security Act ...." § 440.02(34)(f), Fla....

...alized in Florida. We will examine each factor separately. The Contract of Employment In determining whether the contract of employment was made in Florida, we must first examine the relevant employee-employer relationship under these circumstances. Section 440.02(15)(a) defines "employee" in the worker's compensation context as follows: "Employee" means any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance of any work or service while engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed . . . § 440.02(15)(a) Fla....

...ying on any employment, and the legal representative of a deceased person or the receiver or trustees of any person. `Employer' also includes employment agencies, employee leasing companies, and similar agents who provide employees to other persons. § 440.02(16)(a) Fla....

...Mitchell and one-half by Sarasota County. Rodgers' need for that medical treatment was attributed by the judge of industrial claims, by a finding we here sustain, to both industrial accidents. Nevertheless, Rowe & Mitchell and its carrier urge that Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1977), forbids this apportioning of medical costs: Where a preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only acceleration of death or the...

...e, and the judge of industrial claims shall have jurisdiction to order such reimbursement... . Thus the judge of industrial claims was empowered to apportion the medical costs awarded between the employers/carriers according to their responsibility. Section 440.02(18) previously Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (1973), was written and amended for another purpose entirely, to end apportionment of temporary disability and medical benefits from as between employee and employer/carrier....

...le or necessary for the proper disposition of this claim." Our adjudications and statutes must be considered and applied to the facts set out in the above stipulation of counsel of record. These provisions are viz.: Subsections (6), (18) and (19) of Section 440.02, F.S.A.: "(6) The term `injury' means personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury....

...osition when the injury occurs and an attempt to straighten the leg after the injury causes severe pain". The claimant performed this duty on prior occasions to the date of injury and received no injury. We have construed Subsections (6) and (19) of Section 440.02, F.S.A., as the same applies to hernia as defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act....

...See The Duff Hotel Co. v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 442, 7 So.2d 790, and General Properties Co., Inc., v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 18 So.2d 908. In the case of Cleary Bros. Construction Co. v. Nobles, 156 Fla. 408, 23 So.2d 525, we construed Subsection (19) of Section 440.02, supra....

...been, will not defeat the right to compensation. The strain on the knee of the claimant "while squatted to a deep-knee position to clean or change the burner * * * when his left knee snapped", was an accident within the meaning of Subsection (19) of Section 440.02, F.S.A., which is defined to mean something "unexpected or an unusual event, happening suddenly." The claimant's employment supra required the strain on his knee and such exertion, unexpectedly and suddenly, caused the injury....

...labor and exempt and later, in Coleman v. Batholomew, 175 App. Div. 122, 161 N.Y.S. 560 (1960), that the repair of farm buildings was a routine work of a farm laborer. NOTES [1] 1942, 150 Fla. 721, 8 So.2d 661. [2] Fla. 1965, 175 So.2d 36. [3] F.S. § 440.02(1) (c) 3, F.S.A....

...mpensation cases." The Industrial Relations Commission reversed the judge, holding that in occupational disease cases the date of disability commences the running of the statute of limitations. Disputing this holding, the company contends that under section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes, Stringer's claim should have been filed within two years of the time of injury, and, defining time of injury as the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury, it argues that Stringer's injury could not have occurred later than the last date of employment with it....

...yable, and the claimant prevails on the issue of compensability. The employer/carrier paid medical benefits only and refused to pay any compensation or disability benefits. Payment of medical benefits does not constitute the payment of compensation. § 440.02(11), Fla....

...The doctor said he was unaware of the claimant's emotional condition before the accident, and Rodriguez' testimony never addressed the issue of causation. Therefore, Rodriguez did not show that his anxiety was a compensable injury as defined in the Workers' Compensation Act. See Section 440.02(6), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The present condition of the claimant is not the result of an injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of employment. There is no accident or occupational disease. The condition complained of is not the result of an injury, as defined by F.S. 440.02(1)....

...In support of his claim for permanent total disability benefits, Jackson was required to prove that he had reached MMI. MMI is the "date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability." § 440.02(7), Fla....

...They had two daughters, Caroline and Margaret (the mother of Adrienne). Caroline was twenty years old when Jose died and was a full-time student at Palm Beach Junior College. At the time of the hearing, she was a full-time student at the University of Florida. Thus, she qualified as a "child," as defined in section 440.02(5), Florida Statutes, within the Workers' Compensation Act....

...That language indicates that dependency must be proven. Statutory language is not to be assumed superfluous and all words and phrases within a statute are to be given meaning. Terrinoni v. Westward Ho, 418 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Thus, pursuant to the definitions and terms of sections 440.02(5), 440.16(1)(b) and 440.16(2), anyone other than a minor child has a burden to prove actual dependency when seeking death benefits....

...cient to support the deputy commissioner's specific finding that Caroline nevertheless did meet that burden in this case. Caroline established that during the pertinent periods, she was a full-time student under the age of twenty-two, as required by section 440.02(5), Florida Statutes, and that Jose sent her $150 a month....

...iness and the general economy. See Fla. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n v. Driggers, 65 So.2d 723, 725 (Fla.1953). The statute provides that workers' compensation is available only for injury or death "arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.02(19), Fla....

...iff's attorney." Id. With this notice, the insurer is entitled to recover the pro rata share of benefits already paid and future benefits to be paid. Id. The chapter 440 definitions do not specify who will be considered a third party tortfeasor. See § 440.02, Fla....

...that his or her rights may be adversely affected by the hearing, are parties to the hearing." 20 C.F.R. § 404.932(b) (emphasis added); see also note 22 supra for the entire text. 6 In defining PTD benefits, Florida law provides that "[o]nly a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02 shall, in the absence of conclusive proof of a substantial earning capacity, constitute permanent total disability. Only claimants with catastrophic injuries are eligible for permanent total benefits. In no other case may permanent total disability be awarded." Fla. Stats. § 440.15(b)(1994)(emphasis added). Turning to § 440.02(37)(f), applicable for purposes of this appeal, "Catastrophic injury" means "[a]ny other injury that would otherwise qualify under this chapter of a nature and severity that would qualify an employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II [42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.] ... of the federal Social Security Act as the Social Security Act existed on July 1, 1992, without regard to any time limitations provided under that act." Fla. Stats. § 440.02(37)(f)(1994) (emphasis added). 7 Other reasons offered by the ALJ were: that Fleetwood and Crawford had no interest in Scott's federal case; that there was no question of law or fact in common between them and Scott's feder...

...lature changed the standard for awarding PTD benefits to include "any [catastrophic] injury that would otherwise qualify ... of a nature and severity that would qualify an employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II," Fla. Stats. § 440.02(37)(f), employers and insurance carriers alike recognized the importance of the claimant's award or denial of social security benefits by an ALJ....

...JCC to the SSA); Union Camp Corp. v. Hurst, 696 So.2d 873, 876 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) ("[while receipt of social security disability benefits may be relevant to a determination of entitlement to PTD benefits under the definition of catastrophic injury ... in section 440.02(34)(f)[sic] ..., claimant's receipt of SSD benefits alone is not sufficient to qualify him for PTD benefits....

...Although the receipt of such benefits is not by itself sufficient to qualify a claimant for PTD benefits under Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, it "may be relevant to a determination of entitlement to PTD benefits under the definition of catastrophic injury contained in section 440.02(34)(f), Florida Statutes." Union Camp Corp....

...imant did not sustain a compensable accident. In Williams v. Terrazzo Associates, 224 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1969), this Court said: "Under our holding in Gray v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. (Fla. 1953), 64 So.2d 650, and the 1953 amendment to Section 440.02(1) incorporating the holding in Gray, it is incumbent on a claimant, in order to receive compensation, to show only that he sustained injury as an unexpected result flowing from the performance of his employment activities." Based upon the testimony of Dr....

...of Industrial Claims was whether or not the incident was an accident under the workmen's compensation law. In order to bring judicial labor to an end and expedite *643 the payment of compensation, we will consider the propriety of the apportionment. Section 440.02(19), Fla....

...; and (3) that which resulted from the normal progress of the disease and would have existed had the accident never occurred. Disability falling within the first two categories is compensable under the terms of the statute. It is the purpose of Sec. 440.02(19) to relieve the employer of disability within the third category by apportioning it out of an award. We so hold." "* * * "The effect of this opinion is simply to hold that apportionment under Sec. 440.02 (19) is proper only when and to the extent that a pre-existing disease produces disability independently of the accelerating or aggravating effect of an industrial accident....

...Under the applicable statute, the claimant is required to show that the work performed in the course and scope of employment is "the major contributing cause" of the injury. See Hernando County School Board v. Dokoupil, 667 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), provides: "Arising out of" pertains to occupational causation....

...jury and to which the claimant would not normally be exposed during his nonemployment life. Id. (citations omitted); see also Mangold v. Rainforest Golf Sports Center, 675 So.2d 639, 641-642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Significantly, sections 440.09(1) and 440.02(32) use the definite article "the," and not "a," before the term "major contributing cause." By such usage, the legislature is recognizing that there may be numerous contributing causes leading to an injury or disability, but that the claimant...

...1st DCA 1984) (value of employer provided transportation included in AWW); and Layne Atlantic Co. v. Scott, 415 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (employer provided benefit representing a real and reasonably definite economic gain to the employee included in AWW). The E/C argue that under the newly amended section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes (1987) [2] an item must be either specifically listed in the definition of wages or be any other consideration that is gross income under the Internal Revenue Code....

...With regard to the latter, the E/C urges an analysis involving "gross income" defined in section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code and the accompanying deductions from "gross income" set forth in the Code. [3] However, we do not agree with the E/C's interpretation of the language of section 440.02(21). In section 440.02(21), the Legislature included "any other consideration received from the employer that is considered income under the Internal Revenue Code in effect on January 1, 1987." The Legislature did not say "gross income" or reference section...

...oncepts under the workers compensation law should be governed by strict tax concepts of "gross income" under the Code and the Congressionally enacted exclusions from "gross income." [5] Instead, it is our view that by its use of the word "income" in section 440.02(21), the Legislature intended this court to be guided by the broad concept of "income" under the Code in arriving at a determination of what consideration is includable in AWW....

...central location in Belle Glade to the outlying fields in which the workers were needed on a day-to-day basis. On the day of the accident, claimant was being transported from Belle Glade to a field in the Delray Beach area some 40-50 miles away. [2] Section 440.02(21) provides in pertinent part: "Wages" means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury, together with the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodg...

...accident and health plans (section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code); and meals or lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer (section 119 of the Internal Revenue Code), items which are specifically included in the definition of wages by section 440.02(21).

...ul and wanton disregard, unprovoked physical aggression, or gross negligence when such acts result in injury. Id. Although Martin was Oppenheim's supervisor, he is considered a fellow employee for the purposes of workers' compensation. See Fla.Stat. § 440.02(13)(b) (1989 & West Supp....

...Rules 9.200(a)(3), (c), and (f) shall apply to preparation of the record in appeals under this rule. (g) Relief From Filing Fee and Costs: Indigency. (1) Indigency Defined. Indigency for the purpose of this rule is synonymous with insolvency as defined by section 440.02, Florida Statutes....

...appellee shall reimburse the Fund the costs paid within 30 days of the mandate issued by the district court or supreme court under these rules. (3) Indigency Defined. Indigency for the purpose of this rule is synonymous with insolvency as defined by section 440.02(31)(b), Florida Statutes....

...This definition of disability is similar to that in Florida's Worker's Compensation Act, stating that the term "`[d]isability' means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." Section 440.02(9), Fla....

...First, do the circumstances of Massie's case constitute an "accident" for purposes of workers compensation? Second, can a district court, under the circumstances of this case, reverse its prior decision sustaining the deputy commissioner's denial of compensability? Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1989), [4] defines "accident" as follows: "Accident" means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly....

...[3] On June 2, 1988, the district court issued Massie v. University of Florida, no. BN-98 (Fla. 1st DCA June 2, 1988), in which it reversed the order of the deputy commissioner. However, the court withdrew this opinion two weeks later. [4] This subsection was numbered 440.02(18) in 1981, when Massie's employment with the University of Florida terminated....

...[7] The statute requires: "an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). "Injury" means an "accident [which is defined as an "unusual event or result, happening suddenly"] arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.02(1), (16), Fla....

...is survived by spouse or minor child," Art. X, Sec. 4(c), Florida Constitution; and (2) section 222.15 authorizing payment of wages due a deceased employee to a child or children provided they "are over the age of 18 years." Mazzella also refers to section 440.02(5), Florida's Compensation Act, and section 238.07(16)(a)2 of the Florida teacher-retirement statutes, defining child to include those under 22 years of age and enrolled in an accredited educational institution.

...In the order under review, the JCC commented extensively on the changes to chapter 440, Florida Statutes, adopted by chapter 93-415, Laws of Florida. The JCC concluded that "it is doubtful that the Legislature intended to require the determination of PTD under F.S. 440.02(34)(f)(1994) be made after attaining overall MMI or 104 weeks [of temporary disability benefits], whichever occurs first." (Emphasis in original)....

...We deny the petition for certiorari. On January 14, 1995, the claimant, Phillip Jerry Alford, was injured in his employment as a correctional officer. By order rendered September 26, 1997, the JCC found Alford entitled to PTD benefits. Specifically, pursuant to section 440.02(34)(f), Florida Statutes (1995), the JCC determined that Alford was entitled to PTD benefits because he sustained an injury that would qualify him to receive disability income benefits under Title II or supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act....

...of claimant's AWW. Id. at 1362. As in PLM, subsequent to the entry of an order awarding benefits, a different body reached a different conclusion regarding the issue presented to the JCC. The issue of Alford's entitlement to PTD benefits pursuant to section 440.02(34)(f) had been fully litigated before the JCC and appealed to this court....

...To establish entitlement to modification, the E/C have the burden of presenting the JCC with new evidence that could not have been discovered during the earlier proceeding. According to PLM, the mere fact that a different tribunal subsequently reached a different conclusion does not constitute such new evidence. Moreover, section 440.02(34)(f) does not require that the claimant actually receive social security disability; rather, it provides only that, in addition to the specifically described injuries and conditions, a catastrophic injury consists of "[a]ny other inj...

...evidence, i.e., evidence of a quality and character designed to produce in the mind of a JCC a firm belief or conviction, without hesitation, as to the truth of the allegations). In considering causation under section 440.09(1), we must also examine section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes, which, too, was added with the 1994 amendments....

...arising out of work performed in the course and scope of employment." (Emphasis added.) It does not explicitly require the claimant to show additionally that manifestations arise out of work conducted in the course and scope of employment. Moreover, section 440.02(32), which defines "arising out of," makes no reference to manifestations. Rather, it states that " accidental injury or death arises out of employment if work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death." (Emphasis added.) "Injury" is defined in section 440.02(17) as "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury." The latter portion of that definition encompasses resultant diseases and manifestations, mental or otherwise....

...ees TIMCO was also obliged to equip the safety harness with a “rope grab.” But not only was TIMCO under no obligation to furnish the independent contractor or its employees with the equipment necessary to perform the job properly and safely, cf. section 440.02(15)(d)(l)a.(I), Florida Statutes, (providing that one of the factors in determining whether an individual is an employee or an individual contractor is whether the individual has their own equipment); 4139 Mgmt....

...The first point for determination may be stated as follows: When the full commission reversed the order of the deputy commissioner holding that the employee sustained a loss of wage earning capacity equivalent to 35% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole, did it commit error in the contemplation of § 440.02(9), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.? The employer contends that petitioner's injury falls in the non-scheduled class and is governed by § 440.02(9), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which provides that in order to recover therefor the employee must show an "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of...

...The JCC's determination that the claimant's accident was compensable under both the personal comfort doctrine and the bunkhouse rule is also supported by competent substantial evidence. We further hold that the JCC correctly concluded that the claimant's employment was the major contributing cause of her injury under section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...orary disability, medical benefits, and wage-loss benefits shall not be subject to apportionment." (e.s.) Earlier, this precise distinction was made in Rowe & Mitchell v. Rodgers, 378 So.2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), where we observed that then section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1977), "governs issues between the employee and his employer/carrier....

...en already determined under other provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, Ch. 440, F.S.A. (e.s.) 129 So.2d at 136. Both Catinella and Russell House Movers, Inc. v. Nolin, 210 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1968), the case relied on for the inapplicability of section 440.02(18) in Rowe, make it plain that section 440.42(3) can be applied only when each of the contending employer/carriers' liability for the benefits in question has been determined under other provisions of chapter 440. Sections 440.15(5)(a), (440.02(18)) could not, of course, be directly applicable to the allocation independent of liability issues....

...injury could not be fixed before the second, is a proper inference in most of the numerous opinions reciting Rowe's overbroad statement that "[d]isputes between carriers ... are governed rather by Section 440.42(3)"(e.s.), and that "[s]ection *1199 440.02(18) ......

...The reimbursement remedy in that section is purely procedural (see Catinella, note 6 of majority opinion) and requires a prior or contemporaneous determination of liability of each carrier for benefits to claimant. Even after the 1979 change in location of the language from section 440.02(18) to section 440.15(5)(a), and removal of words "under this subsection," Rowe's reliance on Nolin remains appropriate. The latter opinion is clear that, even before the 1979 change in location, the affirmative expression set out in the later enacted Section 440.02(19) should control the scope of Section 440.15(5)(c)......

...NOTES [1] The remainder of the order discusses and rejects a Martin v. Carpenter defense raised by appellee Tire Kingdom. That ruling has not been challenged. [2] Compare Tolvanen v. Eastern Air Lines, 287 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1973), finding in a case where MMI did not intervene that the bar to apportionment in Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (1969), did not prevent equal allocation between carriers of temporary disability compensation....

...rs had his own television repair business, which he considered his principal employment. At the hearing, claimant's counsel agreed that the television repair business was not relevant to the determination of claimant's average weekly wage because of section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...and ... under normal working conditions ... probably would have remained a part-time worker during the period *517 of disability." Section 440.14(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (1989). Moreover, claimant's counsel agreed that, because of the definition of "wages" in section 440.02(24), claimant's concurrent employment in his television repair business was irrelevant....

...th legislative intent. In my judgment, the general, statutory language of subsection (1)(f) must be considered in pari materia with other provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, relating to an employee's wages and the calculation of disability. Section 440.02(13)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), defines "employee" as "every person engaged in any *518 employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship." (Emphasis added.) Section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...rage to claimant or that it should be estopped to deny coverage. It is clear, however, that claimant voluntarily elected not to be considered an employee of his business and, accordingly, was not covered by the Commercial Union policy. See, Sections 440.02(2)(c), 440.05, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Section 440.10(1), Florida Statutes (1981), states that a contractor must provide workers' compensation coverage to all employees of a subcontractor when such employees have not been provided coverage by the subcontractor. This "statutory employee" language is only applicable to "employees" of a subcontractor. Pursuant to Section 440.02(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), a sole proprietor may affirmatively elect to be considered an employee of his business....

...ant to Section 440.10(1), Florida Statutes. Although claimant was not a statutory employee of Boyd-Scarp, we have considered the question whether he nevertheless should be considered an actual employee of Boyd-Scarp pursuant to the broad language of Section 440.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which defines the term "employee," as "every person engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, ... ." Although this language is rather all-encompassing, it must be read in pari materia with subsection (d), paragraph 1, which provides that the term "employee" does not include an "independent contractor." Section 440.02(2)(d)1....

...was supervised by a Boyd-Scarp superintendent; and (3) the work performed by claimant was part of the work of the general contractor *164 and not a distinctly different occupation. This latter finding was apparently made to rule out consideration of Section 440.02(2)(d)2, in determining claimant's employment status....

...e determination of her substantive rights. The term "disability" is defined in those statutes as meaning "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury." § 440.02(9), Fla....

...nvincingly demonstrate that the legal causation requirement is obviated if a claimant can establish the occurrence of an "accident" which, for purposes of Chapter 440, is defined as "... an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." § 440.02(18), Fla....

...Obviously, the occurrence of a compensable injury does not necessarily mean that claimant has suffered a disability, meaning an "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." § 440.02(12), Fla....

...The distinction between a dispute involving two carriers' responsibilities to pay a claim for medical benefits, authorized by section 440.42(3), and a dispute between a claimant and one e/c for benefits was carefully explained by this court in Neff v. Britto , 404 So.2d at 417, as follows: Contrary to appellants' arguments, Section 440.02(18) [which, until its amendment in 1979, precluded apportionment of temporary benefits and medical costs] is not applicable to the present case....

...Rodgers, 378 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The language now found in Section 440.15(5), Florida Statutes, forbidding apportionment of medical and temporary benefits as to claims filed by a worker against an e/c, was included until the 1979 revision, under Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1977), defining accident. This provision was first added to then section 440.02(19) by chapter 65-184, § 1, Laws of Florida. Before the 1965 amendment, the court had construed section 440.02(19) as permitting apportionment of medical and temporary benefits....

...Thus, for nearly twenty years there has existed no authority to apportion medical or temporary benefits in a claim involving only an injured worker and an e/c. See also Russell House Movers, Inc. v. Nolin, 210 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1968). Certainly the transfer of the apportionship bar from section 440.02(18) to section 440.15(5)(a) in 1979 had no more effect on section 440.42(3), permitting apportionment between carriers, than had the preclusion provision before 1979....

...olphins. They filed separate claims for disability compensation under the Florida Workers' Compensation Act. Medical benefits had been provided by the Dolphins and were not claimed. Each deputy commissioner denied benefits on the primary ground that section 440.02(1)(c)3, Florida Statutes, excludes professional football players from coverage under the act....

...In view of the similarity of the orders, the issues, and the factual circumstances, we have consolidated the three cases on appeal. [1] The issue is whether the deputy commissioners erred in finding that appellants were not entitled to *287 benefits under the Florida Workers' Compensation Act. We affirm. Section 440.02(1)(c)3 provides, for purposes of coverage under the act, that the term "employment" does not include "service performed by or as a professional athlete" such as a "football player." Miami Dolphins, Ltd., is a professional football club and a member of the National Football League....

...Until 1971, the Dolphins complied with the requirement of the act as a self-insured and provided worker's compensation benefits for all of its employees, including the players. In 1971, the Dolphins advised the Division of Worker's Compensation that it no longer was waiving the professional athlete exclusion in section 440.02 and that coverage would not be provided to players, although coverage as a self-insured would continue as to all other employees....

...The Dolphins contracted with them to provide statutory worker's compensation benefits; 3. The Dolphins waived the exclusion from coverage for professional athletes; 4. The Dolphins are estopped to deny coverage for appellants; and 5. The professional athlete exclusion provision in section 440.02(1)(c)3 is unconstitutional....

...1st DCA 1981); LaBrecque v. Florida Vocational Rehabilitation & Division of Risk Mgt., 380 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In Miranda v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 229 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1969), the Supreme Court said of the agricultural laborer exclusion in section 440.02, "any doubt as to the claimant's status in `grey' or borderline cases will be resolved in favor of compensation coverage and against exclusion." 229 So.2d at 235....

...ssional contract assigned by the Tampa Bay Buccaneers to the Dolphins. Windauer, playing under his two-year contract, was injured during an intrasquad scrimmage while tackling the quarterback. We believe it would unnecessarily strain the language of section 440.02 to attempt to construe their activities as not falling within the professional football player exclusion....

...We find no record support for appellants' contention that the employer is estopped to deny worker's compensation coverage for the appellants. The requisite elements of estoppel were not proven by the evidence. Finally, appellants argue that the exclusion in section 440.02 is unconstitutional as applied to them because it denies equal protection of the law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2, of the Florida Constitution....

...On August 15, 1990, the claimant fell from a three-story scaffold while working for appellant, B & B Steel Erectors, sustaining severe injuries which eventually resulted in paraplegia. At the January 1991 hearing on the issue of coverage, it was claimant's position that he was entitled to coverage pursuant to section 440.02(13)(d)(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...As a result of his fall, he sustained a severed spinal cord and a neurogenic bowel and bladder, and was left wheelchair-confined and totally disabled. On February 1, 1991, the JCC entered an order finding that B & B's corporate officers were covered as of July 1, 1990, pursuant to section 440.02(13)(d)(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990) and, alternatively, that the carrier was estopped from denying coverage by virtue of Burnsed III's reliance on Burkey's July 6, 1990 form letter. The E/C appeal the finding of coverage, raising two arguments: (1) that section 440.02(13)(d)(4), Florida Statutes (1990) violates the Equal Protection clauses of the Florida and federal Constitutions, since there is no rational basis for the section's disparate treatment of corporate officers in the construction industry; and (2) that the JCC erred in finding the carrier to have been estopped from denying coverage. Section 440.02(12)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), provided, in part, that "any officer *646 of a corporation may elect to be exempt from coverage under this chapter by filing written certification of the election with the division as provided in s. 440.05." Section 440.02(12)(d)(4) of the 1989 Act provided that the term "employee" did not include: Any officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from coverage under this chapter. In 1990, the above section was amended, as section 440.02(13)(d)(4), to provide that the term "employee" did not include: Any officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from coverage under this chapter; however, no officer of a corporation engaged in the construction industry shall be exempted from coverage under this chapter....

...h retroactive application is held by a court of last resort to be unconstitutional, the act shall apply prospectively from the date the act becomes a law." Chapter 91-1 reenacted the workers' compensation portion of Chapter 90-201, but did not amend section 440.02(13)(d)(4). Second, the Legislature enacted Chapter 91-2, which both reenacted and amended certain provisions of the workers' compensation law. Specifically, section 440.02(13)(d)(4) was changed back to its pre-1990 form, to provide that the term "employee" did not include "any officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from the provisions of this chapter." Chapter 91-2 also added section 440.02(13)(d)(5), which provided that the term "employee" did not include: A sole proprietor or officer of a corporation who actively engages in the construction industry, and a partner in a partnership that is actively engaged in the construction industry, who elects to be exempt from the provisions of this chapter. Such sole proprietor, officer, or partner is not an employee for any reason until the notice of revocation of election filed pursuant to s. 440.05 is effective. In addition, Chapter 91-2 added section 440.02(13)(b)(2) and (3), which provided: 2....

...tate's action is without any rational basis. Sasso, supra, at 216. See also The Florida High School *648 Activity Association, Inc. v. Thomas, 434 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1983). Applying the "some reasonable basis" standard to the instant case, we find that section 440.02(13)(d)(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Some employers, with the aid of unscrupulous agents, under report or misclassify risks to effectively reduce premiums. Some carriers/funds realize that these abuses are taking place but refuse to remedy the situation by tighter underwriting and enforcement. Appellant then goes on to state that the purpose of section 440.02(13)(d)(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1st DCA 2007) (holding JCC’s finding of MMI will be affirmed if supported by CSE). The date of MMI is statutorily defined as “the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.” See § 440.02(10), Fla....

...aggravated by Duncan's working conditions. There was no evidence or claim that Duncan had previously been engaged in this nature of employment. Duncan's problems should probably be classified as an aggravation of a preexisting condition governed by § 440.02(18), Florida Statutes....

...nd appeared to have prompted her three hospitalizations. The employer and carrier first challenge the judge's finding that Dr. Handel's testimony causally related claimant's emotional difficulties to her sexual contacts with her supervisor. Although section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1987), expressly proscribes workers' compensation benefits for "[a] mental injury due to fright or excitement only," severe work-related emotional disorders may be compensable where it is shown that the emotional disorder was occasioned by actual physical impact or trauma at the workplace....

...ursements by one carrier to another. However, the application of that statute would clearly require that Mr. Schoch be a "carrier," which is an entity or person who is authorized to insure an employer, or alternatively, a qualified self-insured. See § 440.02(7), Fla....

...or contributing cause (MCC) of his condition, that Claimants condition is the by-product of long-term alcoholism, drug abuse, tobacco use, and other disease processes having nothing to do with his employment, and that the claim is barred pursuant to section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2007), as an accidental acceleration or aggravation of a disease due to the habitual use of alcohol....

...Ross and Dr. Harbison to refute the testimony of Dr. Weiss on causation." Ultimately, the JCC determined the MCC of Claimants April 12 incident and injuries was long-term alcoholism, not heatstroke. She further found Claimants injury barred pursuant to section 440.02, Florida Statutes, due to the accidental acceleration or *108 aggravation due to the habitual use of alcohol....

...They argue that the deputy should not have included in claimant's wage base certain earnings from private employment in which less than three employees were employed by the employer because such employment is not covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. In support of this argument they cite section 440.02(13)(b)2 [1] and Jay Livestock Market v....

...der the act are not includable in determining claimant's compensation base," citing Hill. Id. at 666. The court reasoned that "claimant's work as a domestic servant in private homes is specifically excluded from the definition of employment found in Section 440.02(1)(c), 1977 Florida Statutes." Ibid....

...)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), and held that a construction worker's wages in his covered employment could not be aggregated with earnings as an independent contractor because the act explicitly excluded independent contractors from coverage, citing section 440.02(2)(d)1, Jaquette, and Rollins. The court in Randell also excluded wages from claimant's employment by his girlfriend because it found that she employed only one person, claimant, and such employment was explicitly excluded from coverage by section 440.02(1)(b)2, which defines the term "employment" as including all "private employments in which three or more employees are employed by the same employer." Id. at 177. The rationale for excluding wages from a class of work or industry that may be covered by the Workers' Compensation Act is not explained, and none of the cited cases interpreting section 440.02(1)(b)2 involved whether wages earned in that employment should be included in calculating AWW. In one of the cited cases, Allen v. Estate of Carman, 281 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1973), the court held that while an employer with one employee is normally excluded from coverage under the workers' compensation act by definition in section 440.02(1)(b)2, nevertheless such coverage could be effected by the employer's election to be covered under section 440.04....

...In State, Department of Corrections v. Tharpe, 413 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), this court held that the deputy commissioner erred in including in a claimant's average weekly wage the money he earned as a caretaker for a weekend retreat. Citing sections 440.02(1)(c)2, -(1)(c)1, and -(1)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1979), the court found that the claimant's concurrent wages were earned in employment excluded from coverage under Chapter 440 because the work was either farm work or domestic work (which are...

...Significantly, the court also stated: We also note that in determining a claimant's loss of wage-earning capacity, his ability, after the accident, to earn in either or both of his concurrent employments will be considered as bearing on the extent of disability under Florida Statutes § 440.02(9), F.S.A., which provides: "(9) `Disability' means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." (e.s.) Id....

...workers' compensation act. Finally, we hold the deputy commissioner did not err in awarding taxable costs and in reserving jurisdiction to determine entitlement and amount of attorney's fees. AFFIRMED. WENTWORTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.02(13)(b)2 defines "employment" to include "[a]ll private employments in which three or more employees are employed by the same employer." [2] The full commission distinguished the situation where a voluntary fireman was a carpenter earni...

...ition in order to hold appellee employer/carrier liable for payment of future medical benefits. Appellants contend the deputy commissioner erred in finding them solely liable for the further medical care of the claimant's psychiatric condition since Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1978) has done away with apportionment. Section 440.02(18) states that compensation for temporary disability and medical benefits shall not be subject to apportionment....

...fits even in the absence of evidence that the second injury increased or enhanced claimant's psychiatric condition caused by the first accident because a second employer/carrier takes the claimant as they find him. Contrary to appellants' arguments, Section 440.02(18) is not applicable to the present case....

...Claimant started working for Lewis that same day, and after about four hours on the job, Claimant was injured when he fell from a tree that he was trimming. Claimant concedes that he does not have a traditional employer/employee relationship with either Workforce or Arbor. Instead, he argues that section 440.02(16)(a) defines "employer" to include "employment agencies, employee leasing companies, and similar agents who provide employees to other persons," and that Appellees are his "employer" because they are "similar agents" under the statute....

...." §§ 468.520(4), (5), Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). This definition contemplates the assignment of the company's own employees to another employer. It follows from these definitions that the key features needed to be a "similar agent" under section 440.02(16)(a) include a financial arrangement between the agency and either the end employer/client or the employee, as seen in employment agencies, or the use of the entity's own employees by the end employer/client, as seen in employee leasing companies....

...nstrue workers' compensation laws] liberally in favor of either employee or employer"). [2] We recognize that a report prepared by Senate staff shortly after the 2003 amendments were enacted recommended that the legislature "delete the amendments to s. 440.02(16)(a), F.S." because of concerns that the inclusion of employment agencies and "similar agents" within the definition of employer "may have a broader sweep than intended." See Review of the 2003 Workers' Compensation Act, Senate Interim Project Report No....

...He did not have the power to hire a driver for one of the independent cab owners. This power to' cause a termination of Jenkins’ employment by Goodson would not alone, or in conjunction with the other facts shown in this record, create between Peddie and Jenkins the relationship of employer and employee under F.S.A. § 440.02....

...The petition for writ of certiorari be and the same is hereby Denied. ROBERTS, C. J., and DREW, O’CON-NELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur. . Provided, of course, the aggregate number of the contractor’s and the subcon-contractors’ employees is three or more. Sec, 440.02(1)....

...himself an independent contractor. Carpentry was found to be a distinct occupation requiring some degree of skill. Considering these factors, the deputy concluded the evidence established appellant was an independent contractor, and not an employee. Section 440.02(11)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986) defines an employee as "every person engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written... ." However, section 440.02(11)(d) excludes independent contractors from the definition of employee....

...pensation Law. [1] The trial court agreed and entered final summary judgment in favor of the Magic. Section 440.03, Florida Statutes (1995), provides that every employer and every employee is bound by the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law. Section 440.02(13)(a) defines "employee" as "any person engaged in any employment under any appointment for contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, and includes but is not limited to aliens and minors." *1237 Specifically excluded from the definition of "employee" is the term "volunteer." Section 440.02(13)(d)6 provides that "[a] person who does not receive monetary remuneration for his services is presumed to be a volunteer unless there is substantial evidence that valuable consideration was intended by both employer and employee." Mr....

...An employer is required to pay compensation or furnish benefits only if an employee suffers an injury by accident. See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). Two situations meet the statutory criteria to establish an injury by accident. The first is found in section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2000), where "accident" is defined, in pertinent part, as "an unexpected or unusual event or result that happens suddenly." Id....

...either her initial wrist injury or the injury and traumas that resulted from the robberies. Normally, "[a] mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only ... shall be deemed not to be injury by accident arising out of the employment... ." Section 440.02(1), Fla....

..., 683 So.2d at 1092; see also § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. Thus, an E/C who does not deny compensability has not waived anything beyond the ability to contest that an injury "arose out of, and in the course of employment." See Checkers, at 349; see also § 440.02(19)....

...Section 440.11 of the Florida Statutes grants immunity to employers where the injury or death is covered by workers' compensation. In 1993, the Legislature amended the workers' compensation law to require occupational causation, and provided a new section, 440.02(32) defining "arising out of." The definition provides, "Arising out of" pertains to occupational causation. An accidental injury or death arises out of employment if work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death. § 440.02(32) Fla.Stat....

...e of business, Feltner was involved in a fatal automobile accident. The issue before the Judge of Industrial Claims and, in turn, the Industrial Relations Commission, was whether the accidental death arose out of and in the course of employment. See § 440.02(6), F.S.A....

...Section - 440.11 states that workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy “in place of all other liability, including vicarious liability, of such employer to any third-party tortfea-sor and to the employee ... on account of such injury or death.” Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (2009), defines “injury” as a “personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment....

...and decide cases involving employees' compensation claims for personal injuries incurred in the course and scope of their employment. Admittedly, private employers who do not employ three or more employees at any one time are not subject to the Act. § 440.02(13)(b)2, Fla....

...ith this opinion. OTT, A.C.J., DANAHY, J., and BOARDMAN, EDWARD F. (Ret.), J., concur. NOTES [1] Employment under the Workers' Compensation Law is defined as all private employments in which three or more employees are employed by the same employer. § 440.02(13)(b)2....

...We affirmed the deputy commissioner's finding the second accident compensable. Id. The workers' compensation chapter defines "injury," in pertinent part, as "personal injury ... by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury." § 440.02(18), Fla....

...The relevant question in that situation is whether the heart attack is causally related to the accident. In the case sub judice, we hold that the battery on Ida Popiel constituted an identifiable accident. "Accident" is defined as an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly. Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...order for the heart attack to be compensable. It is enough if there is competent substantial evidence to support the proposition that the heart attack is causally related to the accident. Reynolds, supra . We further note that the second sentence of section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes, is not applicable in this case....

...nt by thirteen, citing Quality Painting. In Vegas, the issue was not which part of section 440.14(1) applied to calculation of AWW in the case of concurrent earnings, but whether chapter 90-201, Laws of Florida, amending the definition of "wages" in section 440.02(24), affected the calculation of AWW under section 440.14(1). We held in that case that the amendment to the definition of "wages" in section 440.02(24) did not affect the calculation of Vegas' AWW under section 440.14(1), and further rejected the argument that chapter 90-201, Laws of Florida, overruled case law interpreting section 440.14(1)....

...nd reasonable," but we conclude that the method used in Quality Painting was contemplated by the legislature under section 440.14(1)(d), not section 440.14(1)(a). Our holding in Vegas that the 1990 amendment to the statutory definition of "wages" in section 440.02(24) did not affect calculation of AWW under section 440.14(1) was not limited to a particular subsection of that statute, but because Vegas referenced the method of calculation used in Quality Painting, we hereby clarify that the term...

...kplace. Because competent substantial evidence does not support the JCC's finding that clear and convincing evidence established that claimant's disease was caused by exposure to specific harmful chemicals at the levels to which she was exposed, see section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2005), we reverse....

...He added that her shortness of breath in October 2005 could also have been the result of prolonged exposure to chemicals so long as the duration of her exposure was increased. Thus, he concluded that it was his opinion that either Taylor 600 or MagnaMax caused the chemical pneumonitis. Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2005), which defines the term "accident" for purposes of the workers' compensation law, provides in pertinent part: An injury or disease caused by exposure to a toxic substance, including, but not limited to, fung...

...is of chemical pneumonitis. As there is no competent medical testimony that her exposure levels were insufficient, I find the evidentiary threshold of clear and convincing evidence is supported by this record. (Emphasis supplied by JCC). Even though section 440.02(1) imposes a heightened standard of proof on the JCC, our standard of review is unchanged....

...ction between his employment and his alleged injuries."). Moreover, Dr. Gilliard's deposition testimony does not constitute competent substantial evidence to support the JCC's finding that the claimant satisfied the evidentiary threshold required by section 440.02(1), because Dr....

...monitis and community acquired pneumonia, was contrary to the claimant's history. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no competent substantial record evidence supports the findings that the claimant satisfied the requirements of section *635 440.02(1)....

...s of workers' compensation coverage is dichotomous with tortious misconduct of the kind for which an employee may bring suit at law. After citing the statutory definition of accident, "an unexpected or unusual event or result that happens suddenly," § 440.02(1), Fla....

...t of Appeal's decision in Vegas v. Globe Security, 627 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In Vegas, the district court held that the calculation of an AWW including concurrent employment wages was not affected by the enactment, effective July 1, 1990, of section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990)....

...c. v. Phillips, 429 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Appellee asserts that the claimant did not actually sustain an "injury" of a physical nature to his arm or shoulder such as would support a claim for resulting psychiatric disability and impairment. Section 440.02(1) of the Workers' Compensation Law excludes from the definition of accident "a mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only" which "shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment." We are instructed in Williams v....

...the common law, can only apply to specific subjects which it seeks to *873 address. Thus, he reasons, since the statute only covers "injury arising out of and in the course of employment" (section 440.09) and further defines "injury" as an accident (section 440.02), intentional torts are excluded because such are never accidental....

...orkcreated, work-related and make-whole reimbursement that would not exist but for the special requirements of the job, then the employee has suffered a "wage loss" and the dc must include its value in calculating the claimant's average weekly wage. § 440.02(21) Fla....

...Sergent of Lancaster & Eure, Sarasota, for Appellant. Gerald W. Pierce of Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., Ft. Myers, for Appellees. KAHN, Judge. Judy Hensley, appellant and claimant in this workers' compensation matter, asks us to rule that section 440.02(1) Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), does not comport with the requirements of Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. [1] We conclude, however, that Hensley has failed to demonstrate her entitlement to the protection of the ADA. Moreover, she has failed to demonstrate that section 440.02(1) is inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the ADA. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims which denied compensability for Hensley's psychiatric injury. For purposes of this appeal, the pertinent provision of section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) provides: A mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright, or excitement ......

...The parties further stipulated that Hensley did not sustain a physical injury resulting in her psychiatric condition. At the hearing below held on November 27, 1995, the only issue presented was whether claimant's psychiatric condition was compensable under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law. Relying upon section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes, and City of Holmes Beach v....

...king either temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits. Disability under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law presupposes that claimant is unable, by reason of her injury, to successfully perform all the functions of her previous job. § 440.02(11), Fla.Stat....

...1280, 1292 (D.Minn.1995) (Claimant's representation that he is "totally disabled" and ADA's definition of "qualified individual with a disability" are "mutually exclusive.") II. ADA Preemption Even if the record allowed Hensley to maintain her challenge, or if we viewed this purely as a challenge to the facial validity of section 440.02(1), we would nonetheless affirm the order on appeal. Section *727 440.02(1) is not preempted by the requirements of Title I of the ADA because the Florida statutory provision at issue does not directly conflict with the provisions of the ADA....

...iscrimination on the basis of disability. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, A Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 9.2 (1992). The statutory section under review today, section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), excludes certain mental or nervous injuries from Florida's definition of "injury by accident arising out of the employment." Contrary to Hensley's argument, she has not suffered discrimination by virtu...

...In crafting an overall plan of workers' compensation, the Florida Legislature has apparently decided, in order to implement the stated intent of section 440.015, that some exclusions from coverage are necessary. The stress, fright, or excitement exclusion now before us, is but one of several. *728 See, e.g., § 440.02(32), Fla.Stat....

...ividuals with disabilities than are afforded by (the ADA)." 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b). Because no provision of Title I of the ADA purports to aid an injured worker such as Hensley in her desire to obtain benefits, we find no conflict between the ADA and section 440.02(1)....

...She has not, however, discretely articulated a Title II violation. Moreover, the point on appeal as set out in appellant's brief is limited to an alleged violation of Title I of the ADA. For these reasons, the inquiry in this appeal is limited to the question of whether section 440.02(1). Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) violates the requirements of Title I of the ADA. [2] In Grace, the supreme court construed section 440.02(1) to limit compensability of psychiatric injuries to those cases in which physical injury suffered by the claimant is a cause of the mental or nervous injury....

...to the payment of compensation benefits. Employer contends that he is exempted from the mandatory provisions of the workers' compensation law since he is a private employer with less than three employees. We agree, and we reverse the order appealed. Section 440.02(1)(b)2, Florida Statutes, defines "employment" under the workers' compensation law as including All private employments in which three or more employees are employed by the same employer....

...Section 440.10(1), Florida Statutes, relating to liability for compensation, provides that only employers who are "within the provisions of [Chapter 440] are liable for the payment of compensation." Since the present case involves a private employer with less than three employees, § 440.10(1) and § 440.02(1)(b)2 establish that claimant is not entitled to the payment of compensation under the workers' compensation law....

...a type of service within the "construction industry." This finding, which was not contested on appeal, eliminates any legal significance in the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor under the Workers' Compensation Law. See §§ 440.02(15)(c)1.-4., Fla....

...kers' compensation coverage through the procurement of an insurance contract (and, only where appropriate, through a well-regulated system of self-insurance), and specifically directs that even unlawful employment be covered under chapter 440. See §§ 440.02(15)(a), 440.38(1)(a)-(b) Fla....

...nt was employed by a separate legal entity other than the Employer. Conclusion Because Claimant was an uninsured independent contractor performing services in the construction industry (and thus was, by definition, an "employee" of the Employer, see section 440.02(15)(c)2.-4., Florida Statutes (2007)), injured in the course and scope of his employment, during the effective period of the policy in question, we QUASH that portion of the JCC's order voiding the policy of workers' compensation *163...

...ployee may elect to sue at law, as was done in this case, and in such action the defendant may not resort to the defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant. The appellees countered with a quotation from paragraph one of Section 440.02 of the act, where the kinds of employment covered by it, and those excepted from it, are detailed....

rehabilitative services furnished by the employer.... Section 440.02(6), Florida Statutes (1985) defines “compensation”

...r the authority of Claude H. Wolfe, Inc., v. Wolfe, [154 Fla. 633], 18 So.2d 535. * * *" In the order of the Deputy it was stated that the sole issue was whether the claimant was an "employee" of Ben-Jay Food Distributors, Inc. within the meaning of Section 440.02(2) of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law, F.S.A....

...*62 Sondra Goldenfarb of Tanney, Forde, Donahey, Eno & Tanney, P.A., Clearwater, for appellant. Bill Shouyun Tong of Matusek, McKnight, & Jaspers, P.A., St. Petersburg, for appellees. ALLEN, Judge. The claimant appeals a workers' compensation order applying section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The claimant was injured while working in a part-time job, and sought to include concurrent earnings from other employment in the average weekly wage determination for workers' compensation benefits. However, the claimant was injured after the effective date of chapter 90-201, Laws of Florida, which amended section 440.02(24), so as to depart from the existing law regarding concurrent earnings as delineated in cases such as American Uniform and Rental Service v....

...We conclude that the claimant has failed to meet the heavy burden which pertains to this constitutional challenge, and which requires that any doubt be resolved in favor of an enactment's constitutionality. See Khoury. Insofar as the favorable treatment which section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ince his employment as a farm laborer was specifically excluded from coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Similarly, claimant's work as a domestic servant in private homes is specifically excluded from the definition of employment found in Section 440.02(1)(c), 1977 Florida Statutes....

...It is the deputy's duty to determine the credibility of witnesses and to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and he may accept the testimony of one physician over that of another. Reynolds v. Neisner Brothers, Inc., 436 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Jefferson Stores, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, 386 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Section 440.02(16), Florida Statutes (1985), defines permanent impairment as follows: [It] means any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury....

...ay to receive authorized medical therapy related to the compensable injury. The question before us is whether the subsequent accident is compensable, i.e., did it arise out of and in the course of claimant's employment within the meaning of sections 440.02(6) and 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1979)? We treat the case as governed by the statutes in effect on the date of the original injury....

...previously existing employment relationship and therefore arose out of and in the course of that employment. We agree with the parties that this precise question appears to be one of first impression under the Florida workers' compensation statute. Section 440.02(6), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: The term `injury' means personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury.......

...1984) (even procedural burden of proof enactments may not be applicable to periods of claimed wage loss occurring prior to enactment's effective date). Similarly, in calculating claimant's AWW, the JCC did not err in refusing to apply the 1987 amendment to section 440.02, regarding evaluation of non-cash compensation, to this 1984 accident....

...1A Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 37.20, at 7-13-14 (1992) [hereinafter: Larson] (emphasis added). Once again we continue to obscure the "by accident" requirement, which is statutorily defined in part as "an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." § 440.02(1), Fla....

...408, 23 So.2d 525 (1945), was decided. In disapproving death benefits sought as a result of the employee's heart attack, and without referring to Ficara, the court observed: The deceased did not fall out of the box car as the result of any accident. See Sec. 440.02(19), Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A....

...(cerebral hemorrhage, etc.). See 1A Larson, § 38.71 at X-XXX-XXX. [15] Compare the provisions of Chapter 17481, Section 2(19), Laws of Florida (1935), defining accident in part as "an unexpected or unusual event, happening suddenly," with those of Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1991), stating that it "means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." As explained in Victor Wine & Liquor v....

...course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury," as provided in Chapter 17481, Section 2(5), Laws of Florida (1935), is identical to the definition of injury found in the current statute. See § 440.02(14), Fla. Stat. (1991). [16] § 440.02(1), Fla....

...se distinctly associated with the employment. 1 Larson, § 6.50 at 3-6-7. [20] The fact that the claimant below suffered a physical injury shortly following the emotional encounter with the student brings his injury outside the exception provided in section 440.02(1), stating that accidental injury does not include "[a] mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only." Cf....

...Although Section 440.15(5)(a) bars apportionment of temporary disability, medical, and wage loss benefits between a claimant and an employer/carrier, it does not apply to liability disputes between carriers. See, Rowe & Mitchell v. Rodgers, 378 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (construing Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1977), similarly)....

ROBERTS, Justice. This is a petition for writ of certiorari to the Florida Industrial Commission to review a compensation order of the Commission affirming an order entered by a deputy commissioner, concluding that under the provisions of Section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., disability is measured by “a diminution of earning capacity” *613 The facts in regard to the original injury are not disputed....

...in salary; that earnings from his private business could not be included in considering his average earnings, citing the holding in Wilson v. City of Haines City, Fla.App., 97 So.2d 208 ; and that the deputy and the Commission erred in interpreting Section 440.02(9) to mean “a diminution in earning capacity.” In this case, as in other disputes under our Act, we recognize the rule of liberal construction in favor of the injured worker, but conclude that the principle cannot be invoked to vary the literal terms of our law. The controlling statute provides a definition for disability as follows: “Sec. 440.02(9): ‘Disability’ means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” Disability, under the statute, then is not merely “a diminution of earning capacity”....

...its. We agree, and reverse. Under the 1994 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, a claimant is not entitled to PTD benefits unless the compensable injury incurred in the course and scope of employment is a "catastrophic" injury, as defined in section 440.02(34), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...had proven that the claimant is capable of substantial gainful employment by means of offering the claimant a job purportedly within his physical restrictions. See 440.15(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) ("Only a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02 shall, in the absence of conclusive proof of a substantial earning capacity, constitute permanent total disability.") (emphasis added)....

...ed evidence that the claimant remains capable of substantial ability to earn, or was, in contrast, sheltered employment. On remand, if the JCC determines that the claimant is eligible for PTD benefits by virtue of a catastrophic injury as defined in section 440.02(34), she must make findings of fact regarding the e/sa's defense that the claimant retains substantial earning capacity....

...MILLS, Judge. The claimant appeals from a workers' compensation order denying her claim for an emotional injury. We affirm. Emotional injuries due to fright or excitement unassociated with physical injury are excluded from the Workers' Compensation Act. Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...given a permanent impairment rating before the programs were considered and recommended. Permanent impairment is defined under the law as any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss, existing after the date of MMI, which results from the injury. § 440.02(16), Fla. Stat. (1985). The definition of the term "date of maximum medical improvement" was added to § 440.02 by a 1979 amendment, and since that date MMI has been defined as "the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability." § 440.02(7), Fla....

...The question is whether, in these circumstances, the provisions of the act could be invoked to the benefit of appellee. *Page 800 As the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act applies only where "three or more employees are employed in the same business or establishment" (Section 440.02 ), the award to appellee can be sustained only if we hold that the employees in Alabama may be taken into account, and that the requirements of the act are satisfied if the foreign corporation employing but two men in Florida has in it...

...ompensation immunity. That motion was denied because the legislature, in its definition of "an accident" for purposes of workers' compensation, has not authorized a claim for "a mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright or excitement only." See § 440.02(1), Fla....

...See, e.g., §§ 489.105(3), 713.01(7), Fla. Stat. (1999). The use of a more specific term is telling. Moving beyond Kone's status, the agreement requires Kone to repair the elevators when necessary. Such maintenance, however, does not equate with construction. See, e.g., § 440.02(7), Fla....

...rk place exposed claimant to a greater risk of injury than he would have necessarily encountered in his non-employment life. Risk, when used in the context employed in the McCook and Levenson cases, and as applied to the definition of accident under Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1983), involves a work-related physical exertion or strain greater than that which an employee would necessarily be exposed outside his or her employment conditions....

...NOTES [1] Section 440.15(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), precludes apportionment of medical and temporary disability benefits. [2] "`Disability' means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." § 440.02(10), Fla....

...Claimant, a left-handed pitcher, contracted with the New York Yankees to play baseball during the regular 1978 season and to participate in spring and exhibition games. Because the Yankees had purchased a workmen's compensation insurance policy, the professional athlete exclusion under § 440.02(1)(c)3, Fla....

...Under the factors articulated in Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1966), Arruda would be appropriately considered an independent contractor, as the JCC concluded. The JCC did not, however, consider the effect of certain 1991 amendments to the definition of "employee" in section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes (1991). [1] The JCC correctly found Arruda's work status to be that of a sole proprietor. Formerly, the definition of "employee" in section 440.02 included only those sole proprietors who had affirmatively elected to be included within such definition....

...The definition of employee was amended in 1991 and now includes sole proprietors actively engaged in the construction industry, "unless they elect to be excluded from the definition of employee by filing written notice of the election with the division." § 440.02(13)(c), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). Moreover, section 440.02(13)(d)(5) states that a sole proprietor actively engaged in the construction industry is not an employee if he or she "elects to be exempt from the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis added.) No evidence was submitted that Arruda had elected to be excluded or exempted from chapter 440. We therefore conclude that Arruda is an employee of Gold Crest, rather than an independent contractor. We reject the assertion of appellee, Casto Homes, Inc., the general contractor, that section 440.02(13)(d)(1), which provides that an independent contractor is not an employee, should apply to Arruda, because it is more specific than section 440.02(13)(c). On the contrary, the more specific language of sections 440.02(13)(c) and 440.02(13)(d)(5) appears to have been added to the definitional statute to ensure that sole proprietors in the construction trade are not considered "independent contractors," unless they make an affirmative decision to come within such category....

...spouse's death or remarriage... ." (Emphasis Supplied). Spouse is defined as "only a spouse ... substantially dependent upon the decedent for financial support and living apart at [the time of the decedent's death or injury] for justifiable cause." Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.)....

...day paper delivered. No social security or federal taxes were withheld from her check. Although wages from concurrent employment are generally included in AWW calculations, the exclusion of independent contractors from the definition of employees in section 440.02(13)(d)1, Florida Statutes (1989), dictates that earnings of an independent contractor are excluded from AWW calculations....

...440.13, of the compensation payable under §§ 440.13, [7] 440.15, [8] and 440.16." [9] This section thus requires a determination of what is meant by employer and employee, and what gives rise to the employee's entitlement to receive the compensation benefits described, i.e., coverage under the act. Section 440.02(12) defines employer as including "every person carrying on any employment......

...This definition of employer is not explicitly restricted to employers in Florida but contemplates that non-Florida employers carrying on business activities in Florida that qualify as "employment" may become subject to the act. Employment is defined in section 440.02(13)(a) as meaning "any service performed by an employee for the person employing him" who is not otherwise explicitly excluded from coverage. Subsections 440.02(13)(b)-(c) describe certain services that are specifically included or excluded from this definition....

...To this extent, a service performed outside the state of Florida may give rise to coverage under the Florida act, but a claim for benefits under the Florida act is enforceable only in a Florida workers' compensation tribunal. Employee is defined in section 440.02(12)(a) as "every person engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, expressed or implied, oral or written... ." Subsections 440.02(12)(b)-(d) describe persons specifically included or excluded from the definition of employee....

...Section 440.09(1) defines coverage under the act in broad, general language: "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." "Injury" is defined in section 440.02(16) as "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment......

...through the language of the workers' compensation act a sufficient interest in a person injured under the circumstances of claimant's injury to accord him the full protection of the Florida act. We believe so. Neither the definitional provisions in section 440.02 nor the sections establishing coverage and liability contain any limitations on the right of a person injured in the course and scope of his employment while performing a service for the employer in Florida to maintain a claim under the Florida act....

...See § 440.15(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1996). A catastrophic injury is defined, inter alia, as any injury that would otherwise qualify a claimant to receive Social Security disability income benefits under the federal Social Security Act as the Act existed on July 1, 1992. See § 440.02(34)(f), Fla....

...The first question is whether Wright was an employee for purposes of the worker's compensation law. The Florida Statute defines "employee" as one "engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written... ." § 440.02(13)(a), Fla....

...ation immunity. We reverse, because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was under a written contract “with a motor carrier,” and whether the plaintiff is thus excluded from the definition of “employee” under section 440.02(15)(d)4., Florida Statutes (2009)....

...ion industry, the plaintiff qualified as Cheatham’s statutory employee. Cheatham further argued that Austin Tupler was a “broker,” not a “motor carrier,” and thus that the plaintiff did not fall within the “owner-operator” exclusion in section 440.02(15)(d)4., Florida Statutes (2009)....

...Because the service contract between the plaintiff and Austin Tupler identified Austin Tupler as a “bro *944 ker” rather than a “motor carrier,” the trial court found that the plaintiff was not transporting property “under a written contract with a motor carrier” as required to qualify for the section 440.02(15)(d)4 exclusion from the definition of employee....

...g remains but questions of law. Moore v. Morris, 475 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla.1985). Under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation statute, the term “employee” includes an independent contractor working or performing sendees in the construction industry. § 440.02(15)(c)3., Fla. Stat. (2009). However, section 440.02(15)(d)4., Florida Statutes (2009), 1 provides that the term “employee” does not include: An owner-operator of a motor vehicle who transports property under a written contract with a motor carrier which evidences a relationship by w...

...horized to transport and which it has accepted and legally bound itself to transport. 49 C.F.R. § 386.2 (2009) (emphasis added). The parties argue over whether federal law is relevant in determining the meaning of the term “motor carrier” under section 440.02(15)(d)4., Florida Statutes (2009)....

...This was, at a minimum, sufficient record evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Austin Tupler was “controlling” or “managing” the trucks used to transport fill from the construction site so as to qualify as a motor carrier within the meaning of section 440.02(15)(d)4., Florida Statutes (2009). In sum, because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was under a written contract “with a motor carrier,” see § 440.02(15)(d)4., Fla. Stat. (2009), we reverse the order on appeal and remand for further proceedings. Reversed. MAY, C.J., and GERBER, J., concur. . The structure of section 440.02(15) suggests that section 440.02(15)(d) excludes individuals from the definition of "employee” even if they would otherwise be included in the definition of "employee” under section 440.02(15)(c). Accordingly, even if an individual is an independent contractor working in the construction industry, the individual is not an "employee” if the requirements of section 440.02(15)(d)4., Florida Statutes (2009), are satisfied.

...On this basis, the judge of compensation claims found it unnecessary to rule on any other question. Because the company was in the construction business, it was required to secure workers' compensation benefits for its employees, if even one (non-exempt) person worked for it. § 440.02(15)(b)(2), Fla.Stat....

...s in calculating the employee's average weekly wage (AWW). Effective July 1, 1990, the statutory definition of "wages" was amended to, among other things, delete the reference to employer contributions for uniforms. See ch. 91-1, § 1, Laws of Fla.; § 440.02(24), Fla....

...mended to mean monetary compensation together with, inter alia, "any other consideration received from the employer that is considered income under the Internal Revenue Code in effect on January 1, 1987... ." Ch. 87-330, § 1, at 2135, Laws of Fla.; § 440.02(21), Fla....

reasons: (1) lack of workplace injury under section 440.02 of the Florida Statutes, and (2) the “Statute

...litate the worker’s return to gainful reemployment at a reasonable cost to the employer.” Nothing -within this statutory provision is unclear or suggests the Legislature’s intent to limit its application to the construction industry. First, in section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), the Legislature defines “employer” and states: “Employer” means the state and all political subdivisions thereof, all public and quasi-public corporations therein, every person carrying on any e...

...yment, and the legal representative of a deceased person or the receiver or trustees of any person. “Employer” also includes employment agencies, employee leasing companies, and similar agents who provide employees to other persons .... Next, in section 440.02(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), the Legislature defines “employee” as follows: “Employee” means any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance of any work or service while engaged in any employment u...

...1st DCA 1988); International House of Pancakes v. Ellis, 492 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Sears, Roebuck and Company v. Viera, 440 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) and Holiday Inn v. Pope, 402 So.2d 1303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Note that, as of 1990, the gratuity question has been addressed in section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes, which contains the definition of "wages" and provides that gratuities may be included in average weekly wage "to the extent reported to the employer in writing as taxable income received in the course of employme...

...Nor are we able to determine whether the forty per cent permanent partial disability is the product of a new accident or change in condition, since the Judge attributed the forty per cent to both. However, if it was in fact a new accident, it is clear that there was not a compensable injury under the terms of F.S. § 440.02(19), inasmuch as there was no physical injury involved....

...Where a preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only acceleration of death or acceleration or aggravation of the preexisting condition reasonably attributable to the accident shall be compensable, with respect to death or permanent impairment. § 440.02(1), Fla....

...Under section 440.15(2)(a), entitlement to temporary total disability benefits ends when a totally disabled injured worker reaches the date of máximum' medical improvement or after 104 weeks, whichever occurs earlier. § 440.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. The “date of maximum medical improvement” is defined in section 440.02(10), Florida Statutes (2009), as “the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.” Westphal did not rea...

...e to show not only total disability upon the cessation of temporary benefits but also that- total disability will be ‘existing after the date of maximum medical improvement.’ ” 710 So.2d at 98 , abrogated by Westphal, 122 So.3d at 448 (quoting § 440.02(19), Fla....

...In 1979, the Legislature added the term “date of maximum medical improvement” to the statute, defining it consistently with this Court’s prior 1969 construction in Corral and requiring that the date be “based upon reasonable medical probability.” § 440.02(22), Fla....

...And I don't see how you can apportion — it is either 100 per cent or nothing here. If I get your question correctly, I don't see how you can apportion that." We are cognizant of the fact that in Victor Wine and Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, Fla., 141 So.2d 581, after quoting Section 440.02 (19), Fla....

...er's disease was dormant at the time of his injury, it is apparent from the evidence that the pre-existing disease and the compensable accident merged to produce the disabling injury. In such a case the employer is entitled to assert the benefits of Section 440.02(19), F.S.A., even though it may be difficult to determine the amount of aggravation and acceleration of disability....

...on speculation as to the life expectancy of a particular employee suffering from a chronic cardiac ailment. We are also satisfied that the apportionment formula which we have prescribed is the one contemplated by the legislative mandate contained in Section 440.02(19), supra." In the cause under consideration the deputy, on conflicting medical evidence, found that the employee's death was causally related to his activity during the fire drill; that all four doctors agreed the employee had severe...

...ack his right coronary artery was 100% occluded and the left coronary artery 95% occluded. Two doctors were of the opinion death could have been accelerated 5%, a third doctor testified 10% at most, by exertion during the fire drill. Florida Statute § 440.02(19), F.S.A., provides in part: "Where a pre-existing disease is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, only acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of disability reasonably...

...He ignored record evidence by three medical experts supporting apportionment in definite percentages and ignored the clear language of Victor Wine: [7] "In heart attack cases where the claimant is entitled to compensation, this statute [Fla. Stat. § 440.02(19), F.S.A.] excludes any recovery for disability attributable in fact to the pre-existing condition and limits recovery solely to injury from the aggravation....

employees are employed by the same employer.” F.S. § 440.-02(1) (b) 2, F.S.A. Unlike those of most states,

...The appellants also contest the determination that the claimant's injury is the major contributing cause of her disability and need for treatment. However, this requirement in section 440.09(1)(b), Fla.Stat., as well as the major contributing cause provision in section 440.02(32), Fla....

...ant temporary total disability benefits, plus interest and penalty, payment of past medical bills and remedial treatment and attention as required. The issue presented is whether claimant was a domestic servant in a private home and thus excluded by Section 440.02(13)(c)1, Florida Statutes, [1] from the Workers' Compensation Law....

...lassifies as a personal service occupation rather than a domestic service occupation under the category of home attendant. The deputy concluded that the claimant's duties as a home attendant afforded her coverage under the Workers' Compensation Law. Section 440.02(13)(c)1, Florida Statutes, provides: "The term `employment' does not include service performed by or as domestic servants in private homes." Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, does not define "domestic servants in a private home," nor does there seem to be any Florida case clearly defining the term....

...abled, or elderly persons are not within the intent *1228 of the act or required under its terms to be covered by workers' compensation insurance. Accordingly, the order below is REVERSED. SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Formerly numbered Section 440.02(1)(c)1, Florida Statutes (1981). [2] The record does not clearly establish that claimant's employment was subject to the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, since there was no determination that her employer had three "employees" as defined in Section 440.02(11)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes....

...OCSB filed a notice of denial, asserting the claimant was not an employee of OCSB at the time of her accident. The Judge of Compensation Claims determined the claimant was an employee of OCSB at the time of her injuries. "Employee," for purposes of workers' compensation coverage, is defined at section 440.02(15)(a), Florida Statute (2003): "Employee" means any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance of any work or service while engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract for hire or apprentices...

...ip because it was required to obtain her degree, the claimant was merely a full-time student of UCF who was participating in a course entitled "Internship II." Education received in exchange for payment of tuition is not remuneration for purposes of section 440.02(15)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Section 1012.69, however, provides in part that nothing in chapter 1012 "shall supersede any of the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law." Section 1012.39(3) does not automatically provide workers' compensation coverage. The claimant must still meet the definition of an employee in section 440.02(15)(a). We also reject the claimant's assertion that if she was not an employee, she was a volunteer eligible for workers' compensation benefits under section 440.02(15)(d)(6), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...e under Chapter 440. Under the Workers’ Compensation Law, a “manifestation” is a disease or infection that “naturally or unavoidably” results from an initial, compensable workplace injury, not a synonym for the initial compen-sable injury. § 440.02(19), Fla....

...rom her son's dry cleaning business. Because the JCC ordered an adjustment in the claimant's AWW contrary to controlling precedent of this court holding that earnings from employment that do not fall within the definition of "employment" provided in section 440.02 are not includable in the determination of the AWW, we reverse....

...The parties stipulated that the only issue to be decided by the JCC was whether the claimant's concurrent earnings from her work at her son's dry cleaning business should be included in the calculation of her AWW. The claimant and her son were the only employees of the dry cleaning business. Section 440.02(15)(b)2., Florida Statutes (1993), defines "employment" as "[a]ll private employments in which four or more employees are employed by the same employer......

...Chism, 404 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) and State, Dep't of Corrections v. Tharpe, 413 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). [1] In Randell, this court held that the claimant's "employment" by his girlfriend was excluded from coverage under chapter 440 by virtue of section 440.02(1)(b)2, Florida Statutes, which provided that "employment" shall include "all private employments in which three or more employees are employed by the same employer." Because the claimant's girlfriend did not have three or more employees, the court held that the claimant's earnings from that employment should not be included in determining his AWW. In *449 Tharpe, this court held that the claimant's "employment" as a landowner's sole employee was not covered employment under section 440.02(1)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1979), which defined "employment" as "private employments in which three or more employees are employed by the same employer." Because the claimant's employer did not have three or more employees, the court he...

...1st DCA 1993), review denied, 637 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1994). Wages earned by a claimant in employment excluded from coverage under chapter 440 cannot be included in determining the AWW. Rollins Bldg. Services, Inc. v. Thomas, 393 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Section 440.02(15)(b)2., Florida Statutes (1993), provides *450 that "employment" includes "[a]ll private employments in which four or more employees are employed by the same employer......

...." In the present case, because the claimant and her son were the only employees of the dry cleaning business, we hold that the JCC erred in ordering inclusion of concurrent earnings in the AWW from a job that did not meet the definition of "employment" set forth in section 440.02(15)(b)2., Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Claimant sought a determination of the correct AWW for calculating the amount of catastrophic temporary total indemnity benefits to which he claimed entitlement. The E/C contended that Claimant's AWW was zero due to his failure to report his wages for income tax purposes as required by section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...on 440.09(4)(a). The JCC did not rule on this motion. In her final order, the JCC found that Claimant "reported his 2008 earnings from the Employer to the IRS in [January 2009]"; that "the cash payments made to him constitute `wages' as defined in F.S. 440.02(28)"; and that the "unrefuted evidence" *1275 showed Claimant's AWW is $290.00....

...September 4, 2008, through March 4, 2009. The E/C filed a motion for rehearing, arguing that the JCC misapprehended this court's decision in Fast Tract Framing, Inc. v. Caraballo, 994 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), in finding Claimant complied with section 440.02(28), and that Claimant forfeited his rights to all workers' compensation benefits by allegedly violating section 440.105(4)(b)....

...Additionally, the E/C was clearly aware of the factual basis for the defense at the final hearing because during closing arguments, the E/C's attorney made reference to Claimant's incomplete tax return and argued that the incompleteness rendered the return insufficient to satisfy the reporting requirement in section 440.02(28)....

...to the AWW issue. First, the E/C argues that the JCC incorrectly found that there was "unrefuted" evidence that Claimant's AWW was $290.00. Second, the E/C argues that the JCC erred by finding that Claimant complied with the reporting requirement in section 440.02(28) in order to have wages upon which his AWW could be calculated....

...inal hearing below, and in so doing, the E/C essentially asks us to substitute our judgment for the unrefuted testimony of a CPA regarding what forms Claimant was supposed to file given his tax and immigration status. In essence, the E/C argues that section 440.02(28) requires a claimant to comply with the precise IRS statutory/regulatory provisions applicable to his tax situation, and if he does not, the claimant has no wages under the statute. The JCC rejected this argument, stating: I decline to read F.S. 440.02(28) as requiring Claimant to be knowledgeable about the IRS Tax Code and Tax Regulations to the technical degree suggested by the Employer/Carrier with respect to the "reporting" of earnings....

...d of regulations contained in the U.S. Tax Code, or that the Legislature intended that a JCC decipher the U.S. Tax Code when determining whether an injured worker "reported" his earnings to the IRS. (emphasis in original). We agree with the JCC that section 440.02(28) does not require the level of precision urged by the E/C....

...e job where the employee is injured and any other concurrent employment where he or she is also subject to workers' compensation coverage. (emphasis added). In Fast Tract, we gave the statute its plain meaning and held, over a spirited dissent, that section 440.02(28) requires the claimant "to show that he reported his wages for federal income tax purposes." 994 So.2d at 358....

...1st DCA 2009), in which the claimants failed to report their income to the IRS. Here, Claimant timely filed a tax return in which he informed the IRS of the wages that he earned with the employer for whom he was working when he was injured. This satisfied the reporting requirement in section 440.02(28), and because the JCC's findings on this issue are supported by competent substantial evidence, we affirm the AWW established in the final order....

...ensation rate commencing March 1, 1984. (e.s.) The order thus awards benefits based on permanent total disability, and the appellee carrier does not on this appeal controvert the determination of permanent total disability. That determination, under § 440.02(7)(b), (9), Florida Statutes, establishes that claimant is totally incapacitated "to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." Since the fact of permanent total disabilit...

...Quite aside from complex merger arguments, that result follows from the basic statutory definition of compensable disability as all "incapacity because of the injury to earn ... the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." § 440.02(7)(b), (9). Primary among the numerous interrelated statutory provisions considered in Goldsmith was the following 1979 revision of § 440.02(18), Florida Statutes, as to pre-existing conditions: ......

...See also, as to apportionment issues different from those in Goldsmith, the decision in Flagship National Bank, et al. v. Hinkle, et al., 479 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), stating "we hold that the 1979 amendments transferring the statutory language prohibiting apportionment from section 440.02(18) to section 440.15(5) did not alter the prior substantive law......

...We see no reason to revisit our holding in Coleman, which is controlling here. Finally, we turn to the issue of whether the judge erred when he included the costs of parking, shuttle transportation, and claimant's uniform in his determination of claimant's AWW. Section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes (1987), defines "wages" to include "the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging; employer contributions for uniforms or cleaning allowances; ......

...Both parties agreed that claimant was given not a complete new uniform but, rather, some used pieces consisting of a $97 blazer, a $45 skirt, and an $18 blouse. We reject the E/SA's argument that claimant's uniform, because used, had no cost to the E/SA within the meaning of Section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes....

...isability benefits, made available through a general health insurance policy, of $150.71 per week for twenty-six weeks, equal to 60% of appellee's wages. Appellants argue that there was no sudden event or result on which compensability may be based. Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1985), defines accident as "an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly." We find competent substantial evidence in the record to support the deputy commissioner's finding that appellee suffered a...

...Chizick of Anderson, Culliton & Sullivan, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant. *562 William W. Blue of Cooper, Byrne, Blue & Schwartz, Perry, for Appellees. ERVIN, J. This is an appeal from a final workers' compensation order denying compensability of an accident occurring after the effective date of section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), [1] defining the term "arising out of," for the reason that the claimant's accident did not satisfy such definition....

...ry or incidental to the performance of her duties, she could not be considered to be within the course and scope of employment at the time she suffered her accidental injuries. In support of his decision, the JCC cited this court's interpretation of section 440.02(32) in Vigliotti v....

...The statute provides: "Arising out of" pertains to occupational causation. An accidental injury or death arises out of employment if work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death. The JCC misconstrued the effect of both Vigliotti and section 440.02(32)....

...See Tanguilan v. PMI Employee Leasing, 832 So.2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); La. Pac. Corp. v. Harcus, 774 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). REVERSED. BARFIELD and POLSTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] At the time of claimant's injury, the definition was found at section 440.02(35), Florida Statutes (2000).

...rway; during one such dive, he hit bottom and suffered paralysis as well as other injuries. The judge of industrial claims found that appellant was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment but denied benefits because § 440.02(1)(c)3, Florida Statutes (1977), excludes professional athletes from workers' compensation coverage....

...tes violates equal protection, because there is another ground for reversal of the judge of industrial claims' order. We find coverage in this case by analogizing its facts to those of a line of Florida cases dealing with the exemption, contained in § 440.02(1)(c)2, Florida Statutes (1977), of agricultural laborers....

...Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, 229 So.2d 232, 235 (Fla. 1970) and Thomas Smith Farms, Inc. v. Alday, 182 So.2d 405, 411 (Fla. 1966) are cited as support for the opinion. These two cases, however, deal with agricultural laborers who cannot, in my opinion, be analogized to professional athletes. Section 440.02(1)(c)2 and 3, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: *1327 2....

...She also points out that when she retired, the e/c stopped contributing to her retirement account. It is well settled by case law and subsequent amendment of the statute that vested pension and retirement benefits are within the statutory definition of "wages." § 440.02(21), Fla....

...parties are now in agreement. [1] Thus, the dispute here is limited to the dc's inclusion of pre-injury real estate earnings in determining claimant's AWW. A review of the record persuades us that claimant was not an "employee" within the meaning of Section 440.02(11)(d)(1), Florida Statutes (1987), during the time he was selling real estate part-time....

simply construing a statute. That statute, section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes (2007), an enactment

...This cause is before us on appeal from a workers' compensation order denying inclusion of claimant's tips in the calculation of his average weekly wage and denying his claim for attorney fees. We reverse on the first point, affirm on the second, and remand. Section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes, defines "wages" to include tips received by *615 an employee with knowledge of the employer....

...AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED for further proceedings. ERVIN and JOANOS, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING BARFIELD, Judge. This case is before the court on Petition for Rehearing and Reconsideration suggesting to the court that section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...umstances." He thereupon accepted the testimony of appellee that she earned $200.00 a week and based her entitlement *456 to temporary total disability compensation upon that figure. Citing Holiday Inn v. Pope, 402 So.2d 1303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) and section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes, appellants urge that unreported wages may not be included in wage computations....

...We also reject the argument that it was error to include Claimant's accrued annual leave in calculating AWW. We have now held that leave programs, because they represent valuable consideration over and above the hourly wage, fit within the broad definition of "income" under section 440.02(23) of the workers' compensation statute....

...should have been included in AWW. Like annual leave, sick leave is a valuable consideration Claimant receives from Employer in addition to the wages paid to Claimant as a condition of employment, and so constitutes "income" as broadly defined under section 440.02(23)....

...Prior to the 1990 changes in the statute, the language pertaining to inclusion of gratuities in the average weekly wage computation specified: "Wages" means ... gratuities received in the course of employment from others than the employer, only when such gratuities are received with the knowledge of the employer. See § 440.02(23), Fla....

...Effective July 1, 1990, the legislature rewrote and renumbered the definition of wages to provide in pertinent part: "Wages" means ... gratuities to the extent reported to the employer in writing as taxable income received in the course of employment from others than the employer ... See § 440.02(24), Fla....

...In Barragan, supra, 545 So.2d at 255, the Supreme Court held: The employer may not offset workers' compensation payments against an employee's pension benefits except to the extent that the total of the two exceeds the employee's average monthly wage. [emphasis added] Section 440.02(6), Florida Statutes (1983), provides in pertinent part: "Compensation" means the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter....

...The term "employee" is defined as follows: (12)(a) "Employee" means every person engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens and also including minors, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed. Section 440.02(12)(a), Florida Statutes....

...statutory construction enumerated in Stone-Brady, Inc. v. Heim, 152 Fla. 710 , 12 So. (2nd) 888 , not yet reported; *750 Sweat v. Allen, 145 Fla. 733 , 200 So. 348 ; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Moore, 143 Fla. 103 , 196 So. 495 . Subsection 19 of Section 440.02, Fla....

...As mentioned, the circuit court entered summary judgment for DJJ and DMS. The employees challenge the judgment on three bases. For one, they maintain the court erred by granting judgment *795 to DMS because DMS did not employ them and therefore did not enjoy workers' compensation immunity. But section 440.02(14), Florida Statutes (1997), defines "employer" to include "the state and all political subdivisions thereof." In other words, for purposes of the workers' compensation law the state, not a particular agency, is deemed to be the employer....

...Upon being advised that the gunshot victim had AIDS, the claimant became concerned that he might contract this disease from the blood which had come into contact with his hand wounds. The claimant developed psychological problems, and sought workers' compensation benefits for this mental or nervous injury. Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes, provides that a "mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only ......

...The record in the present case supports the finding that the claimant's psychological problems resulted from the combined effect of the two incidents. The bite and scratch wounds to the claimant's hands constituted the necessary physical injury under Holmes Beach, and section 440.02(1) thus does not preclude compensability because the resulting mental or nervous injury was not due to fright or excitement only....

...benefits is a medical question. This construction is at odds with the statutory definition of disability, which is "the incapacity... to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." § 440.02(9), Fla....

...rder failed to adjudicate the other issues which were ripe for adjudication. We therefore affirm the denial of PTD benefits but again remand this cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion. SHIVERS, C.J., and ALLEN, J., concur. NOTES [1] Now § 440.02(10), Fla....

...1993) ; see also Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Williams , 998 So.2d 677 , 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Under Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, an "employee" is any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance of any work or service. See Fla. Stat. § 440.02 (15)(a) (2018) (defining "statutory employee" under the Workers' Compensation Law)....

...l worker" under the Workers' Compensation Law. Under the Workers' Compensation Law, "[a] person whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer" is not an "employee." Fla. Stat. § 440.02 (15)(d)(5). "Casual" is defined as employment anticipated to be completed in 10 working days or less and at a total labor cost of less than $500. Fla. Stat. § 440.02 (5) (emphasis added)....

...Further, UCE, Lopez's statutory employer, was a certified roofing contractor. (Pereira Depo. 5:20-6:4, 10:14-21). Thus, Lopez's work was within the "course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of [UCE]," and was, therefore, not "casual." See id. ; see also Fla. Stat. § 440.02 (15)(d)(5)....

...and should be affirmed. I. Section 440.28 provides that a claim for modification is timely only if filed "prior to 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation pursuant to any compensation order." The term "compensation" is defined in section 440.02(6) as meaning "the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter." This definition of the term "compensation" has been in the statute for decades....

...n for disability. Thus, it is evident that section 440.10 treats the payment of medical benefits under 440.13 as "compensation" payable by the employer under the act, and is to that extent seemingly in conflict with the definition of compensation in 440.02(6)....

...aimant's employment. The legal requirement of causation between an accidental injury sustained by an employee and the employee's employment derives from statutory language that the injury must be one "arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.02(17), Fla....

...ny such condition. Disability, for purposes of workers’ compensation, is defined by statute as “incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2009); see also § 440.151(3) (defining “disablement,” for purposes of determining compensation for occupational diseases, as “disability as described in s. *141 440.02(13)”)....

...v. Cambridge Integrated Servs., 888 So.2d 58, 61-62 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (recognizing that section 440.39(7), Florida Statutes, creates an independent cause of action for spoliation of evidence). [3] The terms "employer" and "employee" are defined in section 440.02, Florida Statutes, which begins by stating that "[w]hen used in this chapter, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following terms shall have the following meanings." § 440.02, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). *427 Subsection (15) of section 440.02 then broadly defines "employer" to include, inter alia, "every person carrying on any employment." "`Employee' means any person engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed. . . ." § 440.02(14)(a), Fla. Stat. "`Employment' . . . means any service performed by an employee for the person employing him or her." § 440.02(16)(a), Fla....

...ob. Claimant filed a claim requesting permanent total disability benefits from November 14, 2005, and continuing. In the order on appeal, the JCC found that Claimant established that his workplace injury was "catastrophic" as that term is defined in section 440.02(34), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The law which governs Claimant's entitlement to permanent total disability benefits is the law in effect on the date of accident. See Royal & Sunalliance v. Chavez, 920 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Section 440.15(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that "[o]nly a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02 shall, in the absence of conclusive proof of a substantial earning capacity, constitute permanent total disability....

...Only claimants with catastrophic injuries are eligible for [permanent total disability] benefits. In no other case may [permanent total disability] be awarded." Here, the JCC found Claimant's workplace injuries met the "catastrophic" definition found in section 440.02(34)(f), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...ld "grandchild," whose mother was determined by the probate court to have been virtually or equitably adopted by the employee killed in an industrial accident. The district court held that a virtual adoption is not "a legal adoption" as specified in section 440.02(5), Florida Statutes (1983), the Workers' Compensation Act, and, consequently, the dependency award must be set aside as unauthorized by the statute....

...Prior to the workers' compensation proceeding, the probate court, in administering the intestate estate of Lamar Tarver, expressly declared Mahala Tarver to be the adopted child of Lamar Tarver by virtual adoption. The critical question in this workers' compensation proceeding concerns the application of section 440.02(5), as it applies to a determination of whether a child or grandchild is dependent under the provisions of chapter 440. Section 440.02(5) defines the terms "child" and "grandchild" as follows: "Child" includes a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee, and a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased, but does not include married children unless wholly dependent on him....

...1st DCA 1996) (setting forth a two-part test for determining compensability: (1) the claimant must have been performing work in the course and scope of his employment, and (2) the work performed by the claimant must be the major contributing cause of the claimant's injury); see also § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2000); § 440.02(35), Fla....

...MMI date according to Dr. McKinnon's testimony. We find merit in this argument. MMI is the date after which recovery or lasting improvement from an injury can no longer be anticipated. Rolle v. Picadilly Cafeteria, 573 So.2d 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); section 440.02(8), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...He has drawn sufficient inference from these facts to make an apportionment as between the two accidents and their respective contribution to claimant's permanent partial disability. He did not, of course, make an apportionment within the contemplation of F.S. Section 440.02(19), F.S.A., which was not applicable....

...enefits for ninety-eight weeks, holding that he had the burden to "show not only total disability upon the cessation of temporary benefits but also that total disability will be `existing after the date of maximum medical improvement.'" Id. (quoting § 440.02(19), Fla....

...NOTES [1] MMI denotes maximum medical improvement. "`Date of maximum medical improvement' means the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability." § 440.02(9), Fla....

...As to the first point, a review of Sections 440.24(1) and 440.34(1) reflects that the provisions thereof are concerned with the enforcement of “any compensation order”, “payment of compensation”, or “award for compensation”. Compensation is defined in Section 440.02(11) as “money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter”....

...ent accident. All that the statute does is prevent an employee with a pre-existing hernia from claiming, in event of accident, full compensation as for a ‘hernia resulting from injury by an accident,’ and leaves such employee to his remedy under section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A....

...’ compensation benefits. Consequently, the order requiring him to pay the claim does not meet the basic requirements of due process. See Ahlers, 867 So.2d at 525-527 . The claimant argues that Smith qualified as an employer under the definition in section 440.02(16), Florida Statutes (2002), but the part of the statute the claimant relies on is inapplicable here....

...limited to, the president, officers who exercise broad corporate powers, directors, and all shareholders who directly or indirectly own a controlling interest in the corporation, are considered the employer for the purposes of ss. Ipk0.105 or 0.106. § 440.02(16), Fla....

...Harold Pratt Paving, Inc., 518 So.2d 1320, 1323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), review denied, 525 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1988). "`Permanent impairment' means any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury." § 440.02(16), Fla....

...Emphasis added.) There was no explicit finding therein that claimant's TTD status was caused by her physical condition. A finding that a worker has not attained MMI clearly is not a finding that the worker is temporarily disabled. MMI, as defined in Section 440.02(22), Florida Statutes (1981), "means the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably *703 be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability." Temporary total...

...to and accepted by the employee. The binding effect of these statements of detail on the checks is not mitigated by the fact that the claimant is a Cuban and does not have the benefit of a reading acquaintance with the English language. Referring to Section 440.02(12), supra, we do not overlook the provision that the wages include “the reasonable value of board.” We also consider that provision of the cited Section to the effect that where an employee receives consideration other than cash t...

...the purpose of fixing the amount of a compensation award. Crane Co. v. Jamieson, 192 Tenn. 41 , 237 S.W.2d 546 . See also, Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law Section 60.12. If the employment contract had been silent on the value of the food, then Section 440.02(12) Florida Statutes, F.S.A., would have justified the action of the deputy commissioner in attempting to fix a value therefor....

...— was a causative factor with regard to the claimant's psychiatric condition. Because the claimant's proof of causation was inadequate even under Prahl and Sheppard, he is not being disadvantaged by an application of the ruling in Grace. NOTES [1] Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides in pertinent part: "Accident" means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly....

...e had paid his son (Claimant) during the previous year. Styles told Mr. Perkins that the law permitted the exemption of owners, sole proprietors, and partners, and if the business was incorporated, it allowed the exemption of corporate officers. See section 440.02(12)(b), (12)(c), & (12)(d)(4), Florida Statutes (1989) (defining "employee" and permitting exemption from W/C coverage for certain classifications)....

...s found to be a reasonable replacement for the W/C coverage of Claimant because of the substantially lower costs of the substituted policy. In a *189 Notice of Denial, dated October 16, 1990, the reason given for denying W/C coverage of Claimant was section 440.02(12)(c) [Florida Statutes (1989)], which included in the definition of "employee" "a sole proprietor or a partner who devotes full time to the proprietorship or partnership and elects to be included in the definition of employee by filing notice thereof ......

...e business. Claimant's testimony, accepted as credible and true by the JCC, demonstrates he never considered himself to be a partner in his father's business. The JCC found that, on the date of the accident, Claimant was an "employee," as defined in section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Finding it unnecessary to address the issue of estoppel, we affirmed the order awarding benefits to Burnsed on the basis of statutory coverage. Id. at 648. In 1990, the Florida Legislature comprehensively revised the W/C laws. See Chapter 90-201, Laws of Florida. Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So.2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 1991). Section 440.02(13)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp....

..."[a]ny officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from coverage under this chapter," but the same provision stated "however, no officer of a corporation engaged in the construction industry shall be exempted from coverage under this chapter." Section 440.02(13)(d)(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...pecial legislative session was convened, resulting in Chapter 91-1, which expressly provided the law "shall operate retroactively to July 1, 1990." Burnsed, 591 So.2d at 646. Chapter 91-1 reenacted the W/C portion of Chapter 90-201 and did not amend section 440.02(13)(d)(4)....

...ors actively engaged in the construction industry are considered employees in all instances whether or not the right to election is exercised." See Chapter 91-1, § 7, Laws of Florida. We conclude that, as a result of the non-exempting provisions in section 440.02(13)(c) and (13)(d)4 including partners, sole proprietors, and corporate officers engaged in the construction industry within the definition of "employee," the JCC correctly determined Claimant was statutorily covered on the date of the accident....

...ney's fee award to anyone other than claimant's attorney). We hold the JCC erred, as a matter of law, in applying the insurance code statute to prevent Claimant's recovery from the Carrier. We are aware of the public policy underlying the changes in section 440.02(13)(d)(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...See section 440.381, Florida Statutes (1989). The decision whether to enact or exclude a particular remedy is a legislative prerogative that we shall not disturb. In summary, we agree with the JCC's finding Claimant was a statutory "employee" at the time of the accident pursuant to section 440.02(13)(d)(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...hat purpose, the award for medical care and treatment should be limited to that which can be attributed to petitioner's second injury and that which it is impossible to specifically attribute to either injury. This decision is contrary to Fla. Stat. § 440.02(19), F.S.A., which declares that medical treatment is not apportionable....

...The pretrial stipulation filed in this case reveals that Ormond denied Armstrong's status as an employee. In the compensation order, the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) made extensive findings on the statutory factors determinative of independent contractor status. See § 440.02(13)(d)1., Fla....

...rs: Partners or sole proprietors actively engaged in the construction industry are considered employees unless they elect to be excluded from the definition of employee by filing written notice of election with the division as provided in s. 440.05. § 440.02(13)(c), Fla....

...When appropriate to the context, "construction" refers to the act of construction or the result of construction. However, "construction" shall not mean a landowner's act of construction or the result of a construction upon his or her own premises, provided such premises are not intended to be sold or resold. § 440.02(13)(7), Fla. Stat. (1995). The Act also lists nine conditions that must be met for an independent contractor to be considered as anything other than an employee for purposes of workers compensation benefits. § 440.02(13)(d)1.a.-i, Fla....

...ustry. If a worker falls into this status, the JCC need not address the statutory criteria describing an independent *598 contractor. See Arruda v. Gold Crest Kitchens, 642 So.2d 624, 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)("[T]he more specific language of sections 440.02(13)(c) and [former] 440.02(13)(d)(5) appears to have been added to the definitional statute to ensure that sole proprietors in the construction trade are not considered `independent contractors,' unless they make an affirmative decision to come within such category.")....

...Under the present statute, a sole proprietor actively engaged in the construction industry is considered an employee for workers compensation purposes unless the sole proprietor elects to be excluded from the definition of employee by filing written notice of such election with the Division of Workers' Compensation. § 440.02(13)(c), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Notwithstanding the teaching of Arruda, and the clear provisions of the statute concerning certain workers engaged in the construction industry, it appears to us that the parties tried this case primarily on the question of whether Armstrong qualified as an independent contractor under section 440.02(13)(d)1....

...struction industry. The JCC, however, made such a finding sua sponte. Under the statutory scheme, employee status for independent contractors in general, and construction industry workers in particular, serves as the default position. The wording of section 440.02(13)(c) illustrates this point as it provides that "an independent contractor is an employee" unless he or she meets all of the conditions set forth in subparagraph (d)1....

...ors actively engaged in the construction industry are considered employees, absent an election to the contrary, whether or not they are independent contractors. Because the JCC focused on the landowner exemption to the definition of "constructor" in section 440.02(7), our analysis comes down to whether the JCC properly employed that exemption....

...contracted by Ormond to do construction work. Neither party disputed this and, in fact, the E/C admitted this in their trial memorandum. On appeal, the E/C argue that no evidence placed Armstrong outside the limited landowner exception contained in section 440.02(7), and, therefore, the JCC ruled correctly....

...We hold that once a claimant either adduces evidence or demonstrates a lack of material dispute that he or she is a sole proprietor in the construction industry, the burden shifts to the employer seeking the benefit of the exception contained in the last sentence of section 440.02(7)....

...The JCC's finding that "the employer is not a business operating in the construction industry" is surplusage. Under the statute, the question is whether the partner or sole proprietor seeking employee status is "actively engaged in the construction industry." § 440.02(13)(c), Fla....

...t, and is not a compensable injury. See e.g., Superior Millwork v. Gabel, 89 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1956); Polk Nursery Co. Inc. v. Riley, 433 So.2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Williams v. Hillsborough County School Board, 389 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes, expressly provides that "mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only ......

...Beasley, 141 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1961). The opinion in Massie is consistent with this approach, as the case involved an internal failure which was not merely a mental or nervous injury. However, Massie did not depart from the principle delineated in Gabel, et al., supra, and section 440.02(1), with regard to mental or nervous injuries....

..."Disablement means the event upon which the employee becomes actually incapacitated, partially or totally, from performing his employment." [ Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So.2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).] That definition more closely reflects the statutory concept of "disability." See § 440.02(13), Fla....

...If the hernia were the sole cause of the disability, then the amount of the claim would be governed by F.S. Section 440.15(6), F.S.A. This is the section which deals expressly with industrially created hernias. The deputy commissioner, however, grounded his award on Section 440.02(19), which covers the aggravation of a pre-existing disease, and Section 440.15(3) (u), which fixes the amount of compensation for unscheduled "body as the whole" injuries....

...Claimant contended the premium should be valued at her cost, not *593 the employer's, and filed the claim which is the subject of this appeal. [1] The deputy erred in valuing the health insurance premium based on the cost to the employer rather than the cost to claimant on the record made in this case. Wages are defined in section 440.02(12), Florida Statutes (1981): `Wages' means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury, including the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging, or similar advantage received from the employer......

...firm. Resolution of this issue requires an understanding of the definitions of "average weekly wage" and "wages" in the worker's compensation statutes. The JCC correctly held that claimant's AWW should include vested annual leave time pursuant to subsection 440.02(23), Florida Statutes (1989), finding that the annual leave time constitutes "consideration received from the employer that is considered income under the Internal Revenue Code in effect on January 1, 1987." Section 440.14, Florida Sta...

...ame or another employer, during substantially the whole of 13 weeks immediately preceding the injury, his average weekly wage shall be one-thirteenth of the total amount of wages earned in such employment during the 13 weeks.... (Emphasis added.) Subsection 440.02(23), Florida Statutes (1989), defines the term "wages" as meaning: the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury, together with ... any other consideration received from the employer that is considered income under the Internal Revenue Code in effect on January 1, 1987 ... (Emphasis added.) Prior to the 1987 amendment to section 440.02, which added the above-emphasized language to what was previously subsection 440.02(21), this court required that leave time or similar benefits be included in the computation of a claimant's AWW only "when such benefits have a real present day value to the employee, i.e., `the worker must be able to withdraw the fund...

...Gates, 416 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Sunland Training Ctr. v. Irving, 384 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In Dubois Farms, Inc. v. Paul, 566 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), however, this court interpreted the 1987 amendment to the subsection as follows: In section 440.02(21) [now 440.02(23)], the Legislature included "any other consideration received from the employer that is considered income under the Internal Revenue Code in effect on January 1, 1987." The Legislature did not say "gross income" or reference section 61 of t...

...e" concepts under the workers compensation law should be governed by strict tax concepts of "gross income" under the Code and the Congressionally enacted exclusions from "gross income." Instead, it is our view that by its use of the word "income" in section 440.02(21), the Legislature intended this court to be guided by the broad concept of "income" under the Code in arriving at a determination of what consideration is includable in AWW....

...ives a benefit. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 75 S.Ct. 473, 99 L.Ed. 483 (1955); and Lonsdale v. CIR, 661 F.2d 71(5th Cir.1981). 566 So.2d at 925-26. (Footnotes omitted.) Based on this interpretation of subsection 440.02(23), which utilizes a broad definition of the term "income," for purposes of defining "wages," the judge in the present case did not err in finding that the value of claimant's accrued annual leave time should have been included in the computation of his AWW for those weeks in which it was earned and vested....

...tuities are received with the knowledge of the employer. In employment in which an employee receives consideration other than cash as a portion of this compensation, the reasonable value of such compensation shall be the actual cost to the employer. § 440.02(23), Fla. Stat. (1989)(emphasis added). The nub of the present controversy should be whether unused leave accrued by a State University System employee like Mr. Bowens "is considered income under the Internal Revenue Code in effect on January 1, 1987." § 440.02(23), Fla....

...an present a daunting challenge. See, e.g., Fla. Admin. Code R. 6C5.920(10)(d). The cases cited by the majority in support of including accrued but unused leave credits in the average weekly wages calculation antedate the 1987 amendment to former subsection 440.02(21), [2] or, in the cases of City of Daytona Beach v....

...on account of dependency upon the deceased ...: (3) To the child or children, if there is no spouse, 33 1/3 percent for each child." (e.s.) Child is defined, for purposes of the Act, as "... a posthumous child, a child legally adopted ..., and a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased. ..." Section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ute competent substantial evidence that Claimant reported his wages for federal income tax purposes unless the documents Claimant testified he filed with the Internal Revenue *1026 Service were also introduced into evidence. This was error. Although section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes (2008), defines wages as those “wages earned and reported for federal income tax purposes,” nothing in section 440.02(28), or elsewhere in the Workers’ Compensation Law, requires that a tax return be introduced into evidence....

...only informing the parties after the evidence had closed that nothing short of the actual tax return would suffice to prove that Claimant had reported his wages. We therefore reverse the JCC’s finding that Claimant did not have wages as defined in section 440.02(28), and remand for further proceedings. To provide guidance to the JCC on remand, we note that the definition of wages in section 440.02(28) does not state that wages reported for federal income tax purposes include only those wages reported by an employee....

...d reported for federal income tax purposes’ and cannot be the basis for calculating average weekly wage under section 440.14, Florida Statutes.” Id. at 356 . The argument advanced by the claimant in Fast Tract was that the definition of wages in section 440.02(28) should be read as including only those wages reported by the employee to the employer instead of to the Internal Revenue Service....

...REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. PADOVANO, and HAWKES, JJ., concur. We need not decide in this case whether an employee may rely upon this presumption to prove compliance with the reporting requirement of section 440.02(28).

...Concurrently with his volunteer fireman duties, Angell operated an electrical contractor company as a sole proprietorship with two employees. He was not covered in that work by worker's compensation insurance, nor was he an "employee" as defined by Section 440.02(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) (the term "employee" shall include a sole proprietor who devotes full time to the proprietorship and elects to be included in the definition of employee by filing notice thereof as provided in section 440.05)....

...Byrd emphasized that claims for severe emotional disorders are not compensable under worker’s compensation where no physical injury has occurred, and noted that “the statute expressly prohibits a worker’s compensation award for ‘[a] mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only.’” Id. (quoting § 440.02(1), Fla....

...supplemental benefits. Because the judge of compensation claims used an incorrect legal test to reach that determination, we reverse. Claimant sustained work-related injuries in 1999. Since 1994, "[o]nly a catastrophic injury as defined in s[ection] 440.02 shall, in the absence of conclusive proof of a substantial earning capacity, constitute permanent total disability." Ch. 93-415, §§ 20, 112, at 118, 215, Laws of Fla. (codified as § 440.15(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999)). See Union Camp Corp. v. Hurst, 696 So.2d 873, 875-76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The term "catastrophic injury" is defined in section 440.02(37)(a)-(f), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the order of the Florida Industrial Commission vacating and setting aside the Deputy Commissioner’s order is quashed and the Deputy Commissioner’s order is hereby reinstated. It is so ordered. TERRELL, Acting C. J., and DREW, THORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., concur. . Section 440.02(8), F.S.A....

...rning notice of injury and causation which came into effect on January 1, 1994, Ch. 93-415, at 62, Laws of Fla., we reverse and remand for consideration in light of chapter 93-415, section 2, at 73, and section 22, at 132 (codified respectively at §§ 440.02(32) and 440.185(1), Fla....

...y lessened." For accidents after January 1, 1994, a claimant has the burden of showing that her injury is one "arising out of employment," and that "work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury." § 440.02(32), Fla....

...t immunity to property owners. This conclusion is further supported by the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Deen v. Quantum Resources, Inc., 750 So.2d 616 (Fla.1999). In Deen, FP & L argued that as a self-insurer, it was a "carrier" as defined by section 440.02(3), Florida Statutes (1991), and therefore, it was immune from suit by a subcontractor's employee under sections 440.11(1) and 440.11(4), Florida Statutes (1991). In rejecting FP & L's argument, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the trial court's holding, which is as follows: I agree that FP & L is a "carrier" as defined in section 440.02(3), Florida Statutes (1991), and has the benefit of all immunities granted to "carriers" under chapter 440....

...s are supported by competent substantial evidence. From January 1, 1994, until October 1, 2003, the effective date of chapter 2003-412, section 18, Laws of Florida, a claimant seeking PTD was bound to demonstrate "a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02." § 440.15(1)(b), Fla....

...Under the definition section referenced by the catastrophic injury requirement, claimant had to prove industrial causation and that the injury complained of was "of a nature and severity that would qualify an employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II . . . of the federal Social Security Act." § 440.02(34)(f), Fla....

...awarded to the claimant in the order, notwithstanding that Ahlers had in the meantime sold IREC. Because the parties agree that at the time the claimant was injured, he was not covered by workers' compensation insurance, the employer, as defined in section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes, is subject to the sanctions set out in section 440.06, Florida Statutes....

...There is no decisional precedent directly on point. [3] The purpose and application of § 440.12(2) remains, as with predecessor provisions commencing with the original enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act, [4] to provide a legislatively mandated minimum "compensation," a term defined in § 440.02(11) [5] of the present Act. Because § 440.12(2) provides a minimum for "compensation," and because compensation is defined by § 440.02(11) as money payable "as provided for in this chapter," we conclude that money payable under social security laws is not money payable under Chapter 440 or provided for therein....

...Accordingly, the order below is REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent herewith. BOOTH, SHAW and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION PER CURIAM. Because money payable under social security laws is not "compensation" as defined by § 440.02(11), the minimum compensation provision of § 440.12(2) is unaffected by the receipt of social security benefits....

...1980), wherein claimant's workers' compensation benefits were reduced to four cents per week after offset for social security benefits, but § 440.12(2) was, apparently, not considered. [4] Laws of Florida, 1935, c. 17481, § 12. [5] Florida Statutes, § 440.02(11): "Compensation" means the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter....

...[3] The Act defines a "carrier" as any person or fund authorized under section 440.38, Florida Statutes (2000), to insure under the law, and includes a self-insurer and a commercial self-insurance fund, authorized under section 624.462, Florida Statutes (2000). See § 440.02(4), Fla....

...His contention here is that the appellee general contractor is liable for payment of compensation to him because, as a subcontractor, he is deemed an "employee" of the general contractor under § 440.10, Florida Statutes. [1] However, appellant elected pursuant to § 440.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes, to be exempt from coverage under the Act....

...f the general contractor to him as a deemed employee for injury incurred in work beyond his functions as an officer. We conclude that two sections of the Act require a contrary conclusion with respect to liability of the appellee general contractor. Section 440.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes, defines "employee" under the workers' compensation law to include: any person who is an officer of a corporation and who performs services for remuneration for such corporation within this state, whether or not such services are continuous. However, any officer of a corporation may elect to be exempt from coverage under this chapter by filing written certification of the election ... (e.s.) Also, § 440.02(2)(d)4 states: (d) The term `employee' shall not include ......

...Collins, 726 So.2d 775, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). The Workers' Compensation Act defines disability as "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury," § 440.02(13), Fla....

...and distinct injuries, which led to separate and distinct disabilities, as defined by statute. The compensation order severed "disability" from its statutory moorings. Under the statute, "disability" is defined as "incapacity because of the injury," § 440.02(13), Fla....

...ring 93 of those 104 weeks she was temporarily totally disabled because of both injuries. It strikes me that such a conclusion is consistent with common sense. However, given the use in section 440.15(2)(a) of the word "disability" and the fact that section 440.02(13) defines a "disability" as "incapacity because of the injury " (emphasis added), I find myself constrained to conclude that the construction reached by the majority is as reasonable as any other....

...Claimant testified at the hearing that her working conditions were very crowded, much more so than her home, and that she was required to constantly get up and down from her desk. I. A compensable injury under the Florida workers' compensation statute must "arise out of" employment. §§ 440.02(1) and (14), 440.09, Fla....

...For example, in deciding whether or to what extent apportionment should be applied to permanent disability benefits when a worker's "preexisting disease is ... aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment," pursuant to Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (1961) (now renumbered Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1985)), the Florida Supreme Court has held, as a logical extension of the maxim that the employer accepts the employee as he finds him, that it was the duty of the court to minimize any inconsistency with the above maxim when applying apportionment provisions....

...rsuant to subsection (1), there shall be paid to the injured worker the following: a. Two hundred and fifty dollars for each percent of permanent impairment of the body as a whole from 1 percent through 10 percent. Permanent impairment is defined in section 440.02(16) as "any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury." The term "amputation" is not defined in the statute, so we must look to its generally accepted meaning....

....15(3)(b), whenever a claimant suffers the described condition coupled with any degree of permanent impairment. Accordingly, we construe the term "amputation" as used in section 440.15(3)(a), in context with the definition of permanent impairment in section 440.02(16), to mean that special benefits for "permanent impairment due to amputation" shall become payable as a consequence of the severance of any part of the body or limb that results in a permanent impairment rating....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant argues the Judge of Compensation (JCC) erred in finding she failed to sustain her burden of proof under section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (2009), regarding “occupational causation” of her left shoulder injury....

...are 1The typical workers' compensation issue in this context is not whether a contractor/subcontractor relationship exists. Instead, the question is usually whether an injured worker was a statutory employee rather than a true independent contractor, thereby rendering the defendant a statutory employer. See § 440.02(15)(d)(1), Fla. Stat....

...Therefore we reverse and remand on this issue to afford the deputy commissioner an opportunity to explain why he determined that the retirement benefits have vested, or alternatively, to re-assess claimant's average weekly wage without including the value of such benefits. Section 440.02(21) Florida Statutes (1985) requires that in order for tips to be included in an average weekly wage assessment, their receipt by the claimant must be with knowledge of the employer....

...In fact, the insurance policy makes no specific reference to any employees for whom benefits were secured by the policy. Only a partner who devotes full time to the partnership and elects to be included in the definition of employee by filing a notice thereof as provided in Section 440.05, is included in the term "employee". Section 440.02(2)(c), Fla....

...However, any false, incomplete, or misleading information which the JCC concludes was provided to obtain benefits results in forfeiture of benefits. It is not the act, but the intent behind the act, that dictates the result. Illegal aliens are, of course, covered by the Florida Workers' Compensation Law. See § 440.02(15)(a), Fla....

...In this case, the deputy's award of continuing wage loss benefits for the period after claimant's MMI date was erroneous, because the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that claimant suffered any permanent impairment as a result of her industrial accident. Permanent impairment is defined in Section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes (1979) as "any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury." The pertinent portions of Section 440.15(3), Florida Statutes (1979) state: (3) PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT AND WAGE-LOSS BENEFITS....

...bility (PTD) benefits from the date of his accident, but is not entitled to catastrophic temporary total disability (TTD) benefits because a claimant cannot be PTD and TTD at the same time. Appellant argues three contentions: (1) that under sections 440.02(37)(b) and 440.15(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), amputation constitutes a catastrophic injury, and thus, he is entitled to PTD benefits; (2) that based on section 440.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), as an amputee, he is entitled to receive...

...Further, we agree that Appellant is entitled to catastrophic TTD benefits. A catastrophic injury is a "permanent impairment constituted by ... [a]mputation of an arm, a hand, a foot, or a leg involving the effective loss of use of that appendage." § 440.02(37)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). "Only a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02 shall, in the absence of conclusive proof of substantial earning capacity, constitute [PTD] ..." § 440.15(1)(b), Fla....

...s. On that point, we agree. That concept is inapplicable here, because Claimant was injured on November 24, 1990, and the Legislature did not implement that higher standard of proof until January 1, 1994. See Ch. 93-415, § 2, Laws of Fla. (amending section 440.02(32), Fla....

...As the Florida Legislature specified, “‘[a]rising out of’ pertains to occupational causation. An accidental injury or death arises out of employment if work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death.” § 440.02(36), Fla....

...ment created an increased risk of the fall itself or of the injuries which resulted.”). Regardless of the type of injury, compensability always turns on whether the employment led to the risk—whether there was “occupational causation,” § 440.02(36), Fla....

...out of . . . employment” (alteration in original)). If any ambiguity remains, we hope to remove it now: For any injury to be compensable, it must “arise out of” the employment; there must be—as the statute says—“occupational causation.” § 440.02(36), Fla....

...Claimant’s non-employment life”). Nor are we holding—as the dissents mistakenly suggest—that there can be no compensability unless the employee is actively working at the time of the accident. An accident on a break, for example, might still “arise[] out of employment,” § 440.02(36), Fla....

...I respectfully submit that the en banc majority has gone beyond what the E/C has sought, has upended the long-standing personal comfort doctrine, and has now defined “occupational causation” in “arising out of” to mean only “directly caused by” engaging in the core functions of employment. See § 440.02(36), Fla....

...Corp v. Richardson, 4 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1941)). The majority opinion puts at risk many established doctrines of Florida workers’ compensation by interpreting “occupational causation” in “arising out of” to only mean directly performing work. See § 440.02(36), Fla....

...Acme Homes nevertheless posits that in 2003, the Florida Legislature amended the worker’s compensation statutes to make all persons working or performing services on a construction site statutory employees. It did so, according to the brief filed in this court by Adams Homes, by amending section 440.02(15)(c)(2) to include as statutory employees of a contractor, “[a]ll persons who are being paid by a construction contractor.” The phrase, however, does not end there....

...finds Claimant's mold exposure injury compensable. We agree with the E/C's argument that reversal is warranted because no record evidence establishes the levels of mold to which Claimant was exposed in the workplace, a statutory condition imposed by section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...In reaching this conclusion, the JCC properly exercised her prerogative as the finder of fact. The majority holds, however, that the JCC was prohibited from reaching her finding of compensability because Claimant failed to introduce direct evidence of "the levels of mold to which [she] was exposed in the workplace." While section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2005), imposes a heightened standard for the compensability of injuries caused by mold exposure, it does not impose the practically impossible burden suggested by the majority. Section 440.02(1) provides that an injury caused by exposure to fungus or mold is not a compensable injury, unless "there is clear and convincing evidence establishing that exposure to the specific substance involved, at the levels to which the employee was exposed, can cause the injury or disease sustained by the employee....

...the evidence by determining independently whether the evidence as a whole satisfies the clear and convincing standard, but to determine whether the record contains competent substantial evidence to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard."). Section 440.02(1) does not require an employee to demonstrate the precise levels of mold to which she is exposed, nor does it require that any element of a mold claim be proven by any particular form of evidence, or to a degree of irrefutable certainty....

...At the time of the injury, claimant was a member of the Florida National Guard. In an issue of first impression in this state, the employer and carrier successfully contended below that National Guard service was not "employment" within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act. This contention was erroneous. Section 440.02(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), [1] states that employment is any service performed by an employee for the person employing him. "Employee" is defined in Section 440.02(11), Florida Statutes (1983), as " every person engaged in any employment" (emphasis added)....

...Although there are some specific statutory exclusions from the definition of "employee," none of these are applicable sub judice. In other words, "employee" was not statutorily defined to specifically or impliedly exclude members of the National Guard. Likewise, the wording "any service performed" in the Section 440.02(13)(a) definition of "employment" is extremely broad and is only limited by Section 440.02(13)(c), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...That section states that employment does not include service performed by domestic servants in private homes, agricultural labor performed under certain circumstances, professional athletes, and labor under court sentences. "Employment" is further defined under Section 440.02(13)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1983), to include "employment by the state and all political subdivisions thereof." Because claimant was never called into active service by the State of Florida, instead remaining a reserve guard member at a...

...mber of the federal system, which was solely responsible for his training and pay. [2] Thus, they conclude that claimant was never engaged in state employment within the meaning of the Act. As outlined above, claimant was an "employee" as defined in Section 440.02(11), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Thus, we reject appellant's public policy argument as one more appropriate for the legislature. Cf. Thorkelson v. N.Y. Pizza & Pasta Inc., 956 So.2d 542, 544-45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (noting that the "policy implications" of the Legislature's definition of misconduct in section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes, "are for the Legislature, not the courts.")....

...MCC is defined as, “the cause which is more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined for which treatment or benefits are sought.” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. Section 440.09(1) must be read in conjunction with section 440.02(1), which provides as follows: ......

capacity measured by the terms of the statute. Section 440.02(9), F.S.A. As in all such cases, we must continually

...properly excluded from claimant’s average weekly wage calculation and accordingly affirm. The fair market value of an employer contribution for group health insurance has been included in the calculation of an employee’s average weekly wage. See section 440.02(21), Fla.Stat.; Constanzer v....

...evidence which is entirely presented by deposition. McCabe Bechtel Power Corp., 510 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). The date of MMI marks the point after which no further recovery or improvement from an injury or disease can be reasonably expected. Section 440.02(7); Kirkland v....

...e employed in one and the same business or establishment; and the contractor shall be liable for, and shall secure, the payment of compensation to all such employees except to employees of a subcontractor who has secured such payment. * * * (e.s.) . Section 440.02(1 l)(c), Florida Statutes (1985) provides: (c) "Employee” includes a sole proprietor or a partner who devotes full time to the proprietorship or partnership and elects to be included in the definition of employee by filing notice thereof as provided in s. 440.05. We would note that this section has been virtually unchanged since prior to the formation of the appellant's business in 1981. However, it formerly appears as 440.02(2)(c). . Section 440.02(1 l)(b), Florida Statutes (1985) provides: (b) "Employee” includes any person who is an officer of a corporation and who performs services for remuneration for such corporation within this state, whether or not such services are continuous....

...mpensated by other than dividends upon shares of stock of such corporation owned by him. We would note that this section has been virtually unchanged since prior to the formation of the appellant’s business in 1981. However, it formerly appears as 440.02(2)(b)....

an employee as provided for in Chapter 440. Section 440.-02(11), Florida Statutes (1975). As noted in Burnett

...2d at 884–85. If, however, there is a period of time when no PFB is pending (rendering the entire “action” effectively any other disputed issue that a judge of compensation claims will be called to rule upon.” § 440.192(2), Fla. Stat.; see also § 440.02(40), Fla....

...date the petition is filed.” Id. (emphasis supplied); see also id. (1) (“Any employee may, for any benefit that is ripe, due, and owing, file . . . a petition for benefits which meets the requirements of this section and the definition of specificity in s. 440.02.”). Under the workers’ compensation regime, benefits fall into two categories: 1) compensation for disability or death; and 2) medical and attendant care....

...subsequently filed PFB’s when a claimant decides to leave pending his demand for fees on an earlier, timely filed PFB while dismissing his claims for benefits under that PFB. 8 and disability and death benefits); § 440.02(7), Fla....

...In this workers’ compensation case, the employer and carrier (E/C) challenge the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC) finding that Appellee was, at the time of his injury, a sole proprietor actively engaged in the construction industry. Appellants also argue that Sections 440.02(7) and 440.02(14)(c), Florida Statutes (1999), are unconstitutionally vague....

...We reject Appellant’s constitutional challenge without further comment. Compensability for Appellee’s injuries, suffered when he fell from a trailer and fractured his arm, turns on the issue of whether he was a statutory employee at the time of his injury. Pursuant to section 440.02(14)(c), Florida Statutes (1999), a sole proprietor actively engaged in the construction industry is an employee unless he elects to be excluded from the definition of employee by filing a notice with the Division of Workers’ Compensation....

...When appropriate to the context, “construction” refers to the act of construction or the result of construction. However, “construction” shall not mean a landowner’s act of construction or the result of a construction upon his or her own premises, provided such premises are not intended to be sold or resold. Section 440.02(7), Florida Statutes, 1999....

...It contends that section 440.49(2), requires a finding that the claimant had a preexisting permanent physical impairment *1037 as a prerequisite for the e/c to receive reimbursement from the Fund. Relying on the definition of permanent impairment found in Section 440.02(16), Florida Statutes, the Fund contends that a permanent physical impairment requires an anatomical rating, and, because the claimant did not receive an anatomical rating for his preexisting 1982 injury, there is no competent, substan...

...Goldsmith, 500 So.2d 626, 632, n. 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), we explicitly observed that the term permanent physical impairment is not defined the same for purposes of Fund involvement under section 440.49, as opposed to the term’s general definition under Sectioh 440.02(21), Florida Statutes....

...ndrance or obstacle to the worker’s continued employment. The evidence in this case meets the requirements of both the statute and the case law. The statutory definition of permanent impairment, requiring an anatomical rating *1040 as contained in section 440.02(16), upon which the Fund relies, governs the award of wage loss benefits, among other things, but has no applicability to the Fund reimbursement statute which has provided its own definition of permanent physical impairment....

...The circuit court correctly applied the language used in Barragan , which requires a comparison between total payments and “average monthly wage.” The key word here is “wage” as this word has a specific meaning within chapter 440, distinct from “compensation.” Compare § 440.02(7) with § 440.02(28)....

...Gomez acts as the chief operating officer, handling all the business details. Claimant and his brother perform the services provided by the corporation and are also paid as employees of the Employer. Claimant did not elect to exempt himself from the provisions of chapter 440, as he is empowered to do by section 440.02(15)(b)l., Florida Statutes (2010)....

...See 377 So.2d at 791-92 . The Legislature is not unaware of the fact that small corporations often have shareholders and corporate officers that also occupy the position of employee; indeed, the plain language of chapter 440 acknowledges as much. See § 440.02(15)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010) (defining employee as officer of corporation who performs services for remuneration); see also § 440.02(15)(b)2., Fla....

...Accordingly, the deputy commissioner erred in determining that claimant’s pre-existing loss of three fingers did not constitute a disability and therefore all of his present permanent partial disability of the hand is compensable as a result of the injury suffered on April 10, 1959, and in failing to apply the provision of Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes, that where a pre-existing disease is aggravated by accident only the aggravation of disability reasonably attributable to the accident shall be compensable....

...ility by subsequent accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, except in those instances relating to reimbursement under the Special Disability Fund. Specifically, the claimant’s condition here does not fall within the purview of Section 440.02(19) since this section relates to the acceleration or aggravation of a pre-existing disease....

...The deputy has that exclusive right. Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 508, 507 ; Wiedman v. Daryl Products Corp., Fla.1961, 127 So.2d 448 ; Adams v. Wagner, Fla.1961, 129 So.2d 129 ; Miami Beach Awning Co. v. Socalis, Fla.1961, 129 So.2d 414, 417 . . Section 440.02(19): “ ‘Accident’ shall mean only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly....

...do so imminently — must be able to show not only total disability upon the cessation of temporary benefits but also that total disability will ‘be existing after the date of maximum medical improvement.’ ” Oswald, 710 So.2d at 98 . (quoting § 440.02(19), Fla....

...hall cease and the injured worker’s permanent impairment shall be determined. § 440.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The use of the term “permanent impairment” signifies that the disabled worker has attained maximum medical improvement. Section 440.02(22), Florida Statutes (2009), defines “permanent impairment” as “any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss determined as a percentage of the body as a whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury” (emphasis added)....

...med to be at maximum medical improvement, regardless of any potential for improvement. The doctor is required by section 440.15(3)(d) to assess and certify the injured worker’s “permanent impairment,” a term that can have but one meaning under section 440.02(22): a condition existing “after the date of maximum medical improvement.” It follows that the permanent impairment rating that must be given at that time is the legal equivalent of a medical finding that the worker has reached maximum medical improvement....

employee as pro*1194vided for in Chapter 440. Section 440.-02(11), Florida Statutes (1975). As noted in Burnett

...An occasional increase in the number of workmen for some unusual occasion does not automatically result in application of the Act. 5 Lewis tells us in his brief “that the chest beating and.teeth-gnashing of the defendant [appellant] about Florida Statute 440.02(1)(b) on October 17, 1972 is much ado about nothing.” In support of this statement, appellee analyzes testimony from which he concludes that the requisite proof was met that Subterranean had in its employ three or more employees....

...on appeal which are posed by appellant. The judgment appealed is reversed and remanded for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. McCORD, J., and SMITH, Samuel S., Associate Judge, concur. . Sullivan v. Mayo, 121 So.2d 424 (Fla.1960). . Florida Statute 440.02(1) (b) (1972). .Florida Statute 440.02(1) (b) (1973), as amended by Chapter 73-127, Laws of Florida....

...The existence of prior medical conditions does not necessarily preclude workers’ compensation benefits under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law. Any benefit available under chapter 440 can be payable despite an injured worker’s preexisting injuries and conditions. See § 440.02(1), Fla....

anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.” § 440.02(8), Fla. Stat. (1993). I am of the opinion that

the supreme court’s strict construction of section 440.02 helpful in resolving the narrow issue before

...proceedings consistent herewith. KAHN and MICKLE, JJ., concur. . “Disability” is defined as “incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02(9), Fla.Stat.; Fegles Power Company v....

to apply the domestic servant exclusion of Section 440.-02(15)(e)l., Florida Statutes, and finding the

under the Workers’ Compensation Law.1 See Section 440.-02(13)(c)2. *201In the ease at bar, the employee

...Claimant became ill within minutes and was hospitalized for seven days. The deputy commissioner found, without further elaboration, that claimant did not suffer an on-the-job accident. The employer did not appear at the hearing, and there was no dispute as to the facts. Section 440.02(14), Florida Statutes (1987), defines an “injury” as “personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.” In Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company v....

behalf of Jackson for health insurance benefits. § 440.02(23), Fla. Stat. (1989).1 The carrier’s claims

...time during which workers’ compensation payments are received pursuant to Fla.Admin.Code Rule 22B2.12, 1 she has lost no benefits as a result of her temporary total disability. Claimant argues, based on the difference in language used in sections 440.02(12), Fla....

...d, rent, housing, or lodging, the value of such consideration shall be deducted when calculating the average weekly wage of the employee so long as these benefits continue to be provided, (e.s.) The underscored language is similar to the language in section 440.02(12), which has been construed to include vested retirement and pension benefits, thus lending support to the argument for inclusion of vested retirement or pension benefits within the scope of consideration under section 440.14(3)....

ALLEN, Judge. The employer/carrier appeal a workers’ compensation order by which unreported tips were included in the average weekly wage computation. The employer/carrier contend that this is contrary to the written reporting requirement in section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990). We conclude that the employer/carrier may not rely on this provision when they have failed to adequately inform the claimant of her potential rights and responsibilities under the statute. Section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...In the present case the judge found that the employer’s procedures were confusing, and that the claimant was actually advised to report less than the total amount of her tips. The record indicates that the claimant was not properly informed of the reporting requirement in section 440.02(24), or the statutory consequences of a failure to fully report....

...American Freight Systems, 565 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Wood v. McTyre Trucking, 526 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Gall Silica Mining v. Sheffield, 401 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Consistent with these cases, the employer/carrier may not rely on the reporting provision in section 440.02(24), given their failure to apprise the claimant of this responsibility and the consequences of a failure to report....

opinion. SMITH, C.J., and MILLS, J., concur. . Section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes (1979), provides in pertinent

...Dennis, the general manager, and agreed to clean a house trailer previously occupied by a former maid. It was during this cleaning that she was injured. The carrier defended the claim on the basis that the claimant was not within the definition of employment or employee as set forth in § 440.02, Florida Statutes; the claimant was a domestic servant, or in the alternative a casual laborer, or in the alternative an independent contractor....

...ployment was casual. This is error. The disqualifying provision provides that the term “employee” shall not include a person whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer. Section 440.02(2)(d)2, Florida Statutes....

...The appellant in this workers’ compensation appeal is a private employer who would ordinarily not be required to secure payment of compensation under chapter 440 because it has less than four employees and is not engaged in the construction industry. See § 440.02, Fla....

...By its terms, the statute imposes no obligation upon one who is not an “employer,” and a private employer with less than four employees who engages in business outside the construction industry is, by legislative definition, not an “employer” for purposes of chapter 440. See sections 440.02(14) and 440.02(15)(b)2....

...for federal income tax purposes on the job where the employee is injured and any other concurrent employment ... together with the reasonable value of housing furnished to the employee by the employer ... and gratuities reported to the employer.... § 440.02(28), Fla....

...The phrase “and reported for federal income tax purposes” was added by amendment effective January 1, 1994. Ch. 93-415, § 2, at 72, Laws of Fla. The E/C argues the amendment to the above definition of “wages” means the term is limited to “wages” as defined under the federal tax code. The plain language of section 440.02(28), however, does not rely on the federal tax code’s definition; instead, it defines wages differently as “the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of injury.”...

claimant’s injury is catastrophic as defined in section 440.02(34), Florida Statutes if there is proof of

are employed by the same employer.” Fla. Stat. § 440.02(17)(b)(2) (emphasis added). Within this context

...David Piercy Plumbing, 765 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Pursuant to section 440.15, Florida Statutes (1997), claimant was obligated to show he sustained a catastrophic injury to qualify for PTD benefits. A “catastrophic injury” is either one of the specific injuries listed in section 440.02(37) or an injury which would qualify claimant for federal disability benefits....

...idence, and was injured while in the performance of this work. A claim was made for workers' compensation benefits and various defenses were interposed, including an assertion that claimant was either an independent contractor or a domestic servant. Section 440.02(13)(c)1, Florida Statutes, excludes domestic servants in private homes from the definition of employments covered under Chapter 440....

...However, claimant's work in the present case was not of this character, and we conclude that it was likewise not of such a nature as to constitute domestic service in a private home. The claim thus should not have been denied upon an application of section 440.02(13)(c)1....

...tes; thus, the deputy chief judge erred by dismissing his first petition. We agree. Section 440.192(1), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that a petition for benefits must meet “the requirements of this section and the definition of specificity in section 440.02” before being filed with the OJCC....

...tions of great public importance and motion for rehearing en banc. denial of workers’ compensation coverage to Appellee, American Residuals and Talent, Inc. (ART). We affirm, but write to address FWCJUA’s claim that ART is not an employer under section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes and to clarify the scope of the Final Order under review. I. FWCJUA is a self-funding, residual-market insurer created by the Legislature in order to provide workers’ com...

...ection 468.526, F.S. In the Written Report and Recommendation, OIR reversed FWCJUA’s denial of workers’ compensation coverage to ART. Specifically, OIR found that ART, while not operating as an employee leasing company, is an employer under section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes, as a “similar agent.” Additionally, OIR concluded that the contracts between ART and its client production companies created a “co-employment” relationship with the Talent selected by the production co...

...The definitional section of Chapter 440 defines “employer,” in pertinent part, as “every person carrying on any employment . . . [and] includes employment agencies, employee leasing companies, and similar agents who provide employees to 4 other persons.” § 440.02(16)(a), Fla. Stat. “Employment,” in turn, is defined as “any service performed by an employee for the person employing him or her.” § 440.02(17)(a), Fla. Stat. Additionally, “employee” is defined as “any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance of any work or service while engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract for hire.” § 440.02(15)(a), Fla....

...corporation or other legally recognized entity subject to the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law.” (Emphasis added.) Here, the narrow question is whether competent substantial evidence supports OIR’s conclusion that ART is an “employer” under section 440.02 as a “similar agent.” III. FWCJUA claims that there is no competent substantial evidence to support OIR’s finding that ART is a “similar agent” and relies on this Court’s decision in Bolanos v....

...The petitioner then met with this individual and agreed to a tree-trimming job. Id. The individual, and not Workforce Alliance, paid the petitioner. Id. The petitioner then suffered an injury on the job and claimed that Workforce Alliance was his employer pursuant to language of section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes, specifically that Workforce Alliance was a “similar agent” to an employment agency or employment leasing company....

...below and, is therefore, not before this court. Based on the character of ART’s relationship to its clients, its contractual financial arrangements with those clients, and this Court’s own precedent, OIR did not err in concluding that ART is an “employer” under section 440.02(16)(a). However, we note that the scope of the Final Order on appeal and of this opinion is limited to ART’s satisfaction of the “employer” definition of section 440.02. The issue of whether FWCJUA is required, under section 627.311 and by its Operational Manual, to provide coverage to entities satisfying the definition of “employer” under 440.02(16)(a) is not before us. 2 This ruling does not define ART as an “employer” under any Florida law other than section 440.02(16)(a). IV. Because competent substantial evidence supports OIR’s determination that ART qualifies as an “employer,” the Final Order is affirmed. AFFIRMED. 2 FWCJUA’s Operations...

...FWCJUA. An “employer” for workers’ compensation purposes includes “every person carrying on any employment . . . [as well as] employment agencies, employee leasing companies, and similar agents who provide employees to other persons.” § 440.02(16)(a), Fla....

...Yet OIR and the majority conclude that ART meets the statutory definition of an employer because it is a “similar agent” to an employment agency or employee leasing company. I believe such an interpretation sweeps too broadly because it fails to consider that section 440.02(16)(a) includes within the definition of the term “employer” only “similar agents who provide employees to other persons.” In Bolanos v....

...allocates the direction of and control over the leased employees between the leasing company and the client.” Id. (quoting §§ 468.520(4), (5), Fla. Stat.). From these definitions, we explained that the key features necessary to constitute a “similar agent” under section 440.02(16)(a) include “a financial arrangement between the agency and either the end employer/client or the employee, as seen in employment agencies” or “the use of the entity’s own employees by the end employer/client, as seen in employee leasing companies.” Id....

...supervised in their jobs only by ART’s clients; and are paid by ART only in the amount provided by the clients. The fact that ART may perform some services that are “similar” to those of an employee leasing company does not make it a “similar agent” under section 440.02(16)(a) because ART does not “provide employees to other persons”—a requirement explicit in the statutory text. Because ART is not the employer of the employees for whom it seeks to obtain workers’ compensation coverage, a...

...- 27 -  (8)-(9) [NO CHANGE] (g) Relief From Filing Fee and Cost; Indigency. (1) Indigency Defined. Indigency for the purpose of this rule is synonymous with insolvency as defined by section 440.02, Florida Statutes. (2) Filing Fee. (A)-(B) [NO CHANGE] (C) Verified Petition; Contents....

...t alone. The deputy commissioner then directed the Fund to reimburse the employer for excess expenditures in permanent disability and temporary total disability and medical benefits. On appeal the Fund raises three points: (1) Sections 440.09(2) and 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1979), read together, constitute a bar against any alcohol-related impairment forming the basis of merger; (2) the employer failed to establish merger; and (3) the employer *393 did not have knowledge of claimant's preex...

...he permanent physical impairment not existed and the employer has been required to pay, and has paid, permanent total disability, permanent impairment, or wage-loss benefits for that materially and substantially greater disability. [Emphasis added.] Section 440.02(18) defines "accident" as follows: "Accident" means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly....

...We decline to accept the Fund's statutory construction. The word "accident" in section 440.49(2)(b)(2) is preceded by the word "subsequent." This section is clearly meant to refer to the second or industrial injury, in this case the rupture of claimant's aneurysm. Also, section 440.02(18) speaks in terms of a disease due to use of alcohol as not constituting an "accident arising out of employment." This section, too, refers to the industrial injury....

Pica-dilly Cafeteria, 573 So.2d 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); § 440.02(8), Fla.Stat. (1991). Remedial treatment may not

...e of Industrial Claims is quashed with directions to reinstate the judge’s order. Petition for attorney’s fees is granted in the amount of $500.00. It is so ordered. ERVIN, C. J., CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., and DEKLE, Circuit Judge, concur. . F.S. § 440.02(9) F.S.A.: “‘Disability’ means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.”

...tionment did not apply — is misleading and inapplicable to claimant's circumstances. As we stated in Evans v. Florida Industrial Commission [1] and reiterated in Robinette v. E.R. Jahna Industries, Inc. [2] apportionment *805 under Florida Statutes Section 440.02(19), F.S.A., is required when and to the extent a "pre-existing disease either, (1) was disabling at the time of the accident and continued to be so at the time the award is made or, (2) was producing no disability at the time of the a...

...preexisting disability prior to any accident which may occur, is required to compensate a claimant for his entire disability, including that portion attributable to the preexisting condition. Even though there would otherwise be apportionment under Section 440.02(19) in either of the two circumstances discussed in the preceding paragraph, there is no apportionment or carving out of benefits due the employee, according to prior case law....

...g her claims for disability benefits. In the order on appeal, the JCC determined that Claimant was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits because Claimant failed to prove that her injury was catastrophic under the definition provided by section 440.02(34)(f), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...We are unable to accept P & G's expansive reading of Mandico. The Mandico court interpreted section 440.04, Florida Statutes (1983), as granting an employer, which has in its "employ" an individual who is not included within the definition of "employee" under section 440.02(13) by virtue of being an independent contractor, the ability to obtain section 440.11 immunity by procuring workers' compensation benefits for such individual....

...In many cases it could not do so, it must be shown by reasonable deductions from the evidence which must be competent and substantial and accord with reason. Neither party has raised any question of apportionment because of the pre-existing condition. Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). The JCC

has not suffered “disability” as defined by F.S. § 440.02(9), F.S.A. I must dissent.

an exclusion from chapter 440 as provided in section 440.02(13)(d) 1.3 Rather, Deen was an employee of

...This cause is before us on appeal from a final order awarding compensation benefits for injuries sustained by claimant while playing on a softball team sponsored by the employer, Copytronics. The sole issue presented is whether the injury arose out of and in the course of claimant’s employment. Section 440.02(16); Fla.Stat....

...MCC of the need for treatment. 1 Compare § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2013) (requiring employer to pay compensation or furnish benefits if employee suffers accidental compensable injury “arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment”), and § 440.02(36), Fla....

of the federal Social Security Act....” See section 440.02(34)®, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). This finding

...al life, the term permanent impairment is not synonymous with disability. Permanent impairment is defined as “any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury.” § 440.02(21), Fla.Stat. Disability, on the other hand, is defined as “incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02(9), Fla.Stat....

...Claimant and two other individuals performed services as drivers for the employer. One of these drivers was a corporate officer and had elected to be exempt from coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Law by filing a written certification as provided in §§ 440.02(2)(b) and 440.05, Flor-ida Statutes. Section 440.02(2)(d)4 establishes that, in the context of the Workers’ Compensation Law, the term “employee” shall not include: Any officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from coverage under this chapter....

...Without dispute, appellant has not "returned to work." Further, the post-injury pension does not meet our common understanding of wages or earnings. Although chapter 440, Florida Statutes, does not define earnings, the statutory definition of wages, found in section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...His claim for additional benefits was primarily predicated upon the anxiety complex rather than upon the physical injury and the deputy’s award was correspondingly predicated. Petitioners argue that the award was erroneous in that it was based upon “fright” only, whereas Section 440.02(19), F.S.A., specifies that injury due to “fright or excitement only * * * shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment.” The commission correctly upheld the deputy in that respect....

...The E/C contend that there is no evidence in the record establishing a causal relationship between the very minor physical trauma suffered by the claimant on July 17, 1985, and claimant’s subsequent post-traumatic stress disorder. In essence, argue the E/C, this is essentially a “fright” case and that section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1985), defining “accident” excludes a mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only....

...However, because a recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court, Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshield Security, 552 So.2d 1099 , 1101 n. 4 (Fla.1989), casts doubt on the continuing validity of Sheppard , and the line of cases upon which it relies, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: WHETHER SECTION 440.02(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), DEFINING “ACCIDENT” EXCLUDES A MENTAL OR NERVOUS INJURY WHERE THE INJURY SUFFERED BY THE CLAIMANT RESULTS IN ONLY MINOR PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES? WIGGINTON, J., concurs....

...laimant suffered no disability as a result of the earlier 1987 industrial injury. "`Disability' means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." Section 440.02(10), Fla....

Judge and Full Commission have misconstrued F.S. § 440.-02(1) (b) 2, F.S.A.1 as requiring that a person employ

...Claimant alleged entitlement to PTD benefits because he had a catastrophic injury pursuant to the five-step sequential evaluation used to evaluate claims for Social Security disability income benefits, which was causally related to his compen-sable injury. See § 440.02(38), Fla....

and'is-exemptefrom EAO consideration under section 440-2.14_glorida Statutes. S, — Maximum-medical-improvement

...440.13, Florida Statutes. However, the claimant concedes that the adjustment in her average weekly wage was erroneously based upon the retail value of meals provided to her by the employer, rather than the actual cost to the employer as required by section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...emporary disability was nevertheless awarded at the minimum rate provided in section 440.12(2). However, the temporary disability award under section 440.15, Florida Statutes, pertains to compensation for disability, with disability being defined at section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes, as an incapacity “to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” Because the claimant here was receiving no wages in any employment, there was no basis for an award of compensation for disability. Although volunteers working for governmental entities are treated as covered employees pursuant to section 440.02(15)(d)6, Florida Statutes, in order to obtain an award of compensation for disability such workers must have some earnings upon which the award may be based....

paid as required pursuant to chapter 440.5 See § 440.02(7), Fla. Stat. (2002). That did not happen here

the time of the injury.’ ” Id. at 925 (quoting § 440.02(10), Fla.Stat. (1989)). Similarly, in Delgado

...fits, medical expenses, costs and attorney’s fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions. The date of MMI marks the point after which no further recovery or improvement from an injury or disease can be reasonably expected. Section 440.02(7), Florida Statutes (1985), Cheuvront v....

...ly not presented. Section 440.-02(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that the term “employee” shall not include a person whose employment is both casual and not in the course of a trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer. Section 440.02(3), Florida Statutes (1981), defines casual as referring only to employments where the work contemplated is to be completed in not exceeding ten working days, without regard to the number of men employed, and where the total labor costs of such work is less than $100....

...Accordingly, since this case does not present a proper case for the application of the “casual employee” doctrine, we find it unnecessary to discuss the question of whether the deputy erred in narrowly construing the term “course of business” as used in Section 440.02(2)(d)....

...reaching MMI and undergoing palliative care. The date of MMI “means the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.” § 440.02(8), Fla....

...Geisen was “employed” was not an admission that she was an “employee” for whom workers’ compensation coverage had to be provided. An employer is required to provide workers’ compensation coverage for those who qualify as an “employee” as defined in section 440.02(15). That section defines an employee as anyone who received remuneration. Volunteers are specifically excluded from the definition of an employee. Pursuant to section 440.02(15)(d)(6), “[a] person who does not receive monetary remuneration for services is presumed to be a volunteer.” The parties stipulated, as a matter of law, that Twin City was not responsible for providing workers’ compensation coverage for individuals providing services to Twin City on a gratuitous basis....

...as the meaning which would give effect to the objectives and purpose of the statute. To give meaning and effect to the purpose of Chapter 440 and especially section 440.205, we construe the words "valid claim" to mean a meritorious claim. Fla. Stat. § 440.02(6)....

Division of Labor of the Department of Commerce. § 440.02(8)(a). However, § 2, Ch. 79-40 created the Division

necessity therefor is “because of the injury.” Section 440.02(9) Fla.Stat., F.S.A. This provision should

...d its subcontractors to maintain workers’ compensation insurance, which Green- Simmons, Fisher Thomas, and Wilson Floor did at all relevant times. As an officer of Gladden Carpet,2 Gladden elected to be exempt from workers’ compensation 2 Section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that “[a]s to persons engaged in the construction industry, the term ‘officer of a corporation’ includes a member owning at least 10 percent of a limited liability company created and approved under 3 coverage pursuant to section 440.02(15)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2008)....

...VMS, Inc., 147 So. 3d at 1074-75; § 440.10(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2008). The issue, as framed by Gladden, is whether Gladden was an “employee” under the Workers’ Compensation Law at the time of the accident. If, as the trial court found, Gladden was an “employee” under section 440.02(15)(c)2., Florida 4 Because Green-Simmons’ Cross-Appeal is a contingent appeal, both Green- Simmons and Wilson Floor agree that the outcome of Gladden’s appeal will apply equally to both Green-Simmons and Wilson Floor....

...If he was not an “employee,” however, he contends that workers’ compensation immunity does not apply. The Workers’ Compensation Law contains definitions of commonly used terms that apply “unless the context clearly requires otherwise.” § 440.02, Fla....

...Stat. (2008). For workers in the construction industry, an “employee” includes “[a]ll persons who are being paid by a construction contractor as a subcontractor, unless the subcontractor has validly elected an exemption as permitted by this chapter.” § 440.02(15)(c)2., Fla....

...who elects to be exempt from the provisions of this chapter, as otherwise permitted by his chapter. Such officer is not an employee for any reason until the notice of revocation of election filed pursuant to s. 440.05 is effective. § 440.02(15)(d)8., Fla....

...to make a claim for workers’ compensation benefits as a result of his on-the-job accident. The question is whether Appellees qualify for tort immunity under section 440.11. In Weber, the Florida Supreme Court expressly declined to apply the section 440.02 definition of “employee,” which refers to “those persons who are entitled to file claims under the Workers’ Compensation Law,” to “the context of granting statutory immunities provided by the Workers’ Compensation Laws.” 616 So....

...’s symptoms were directly related to the accident; (2) whether claimant’s work search constituted competent, substantial evidence sufficient to support an award of wage-loss benefits; (3) whether the deputy erred in finding the 1987 amendment to Section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes, is substantive in nature and cannot be applied retroactively; and (4) whether the deputy erred in awarding temporary total disability benefits for a period which the parties had stipulated the benefits had already been paid....

...arise “out of” the employment. The record failing to reveal such a connection the compensation order of the full commission is affirmed and the petition for certiorari is denied. It is so ordered. HORTON, C. J., and CARROLL, CHAS., J., concur. . Section 440.02(6), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

...stated the statute in more precise language. If that is the case we fear that however valiant may have been the attempt the result leaves much to be desired, for the provision is not happily drafted. Reading the amended version in conjunction with F.S. 440.02(19), 2 however, elicits the unavoidable conclusion that the Fund’s liability in a death case is for all compensation for death paid over and above that reasonably attributable to the last accident’s acceleration of death....

...ation which otherwise would have been payable for acceleration of death reasonably attributable to the subsequent injury or occupational disease when considered by itself and not in conjunction with the previous permanent physical impairment.” . F.S. 440.02(19)....

...However, given the facts of this case, the JCC’s finding that claimant’s heart attack is not compensable is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Accordingly, we REVERSE the JCC’s order and REMAND with instructions that the JCC address the issue of medical causation. See § 440.02(35), Fla....

him “for justifiable cause,” as required by section 440.02(22). She was apparently helping her daughter

anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.” § 440.02(8), Fla. Stat. (1995). Ascertaining the exact

abnormality or loss” as a result of this insect bite, Section 440.02(21). She is, instead, rendered by this bite

...ERVIN, Acting C. J., CARLTON, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur. . Yates v. Gabrio Electric Co., 167 So.2d 565 (Fla.1964); Krause v. West Lumber Co., 227 So.2d 486 (Fla.1969); Meadows v. Curly’s Trash Service, Inc., 244 So. 2d 417 (Fla.1971). . Fla.Stat. §440.02(12), F.S.A.: ‘“Wages’ means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury, including the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging, or similar advant...

employee was receiving at the time of injury,” Section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes, the judge should have

...nclude support personnel employed by the employing agency." 3 See , Rules Chapters 38F-3, 38F-8, and 38F-24, F.A.C.; and Rules 3A-31.217, And 8I-3.019 , F.A.C. 4 The Workers' compensation Law was amended and reenacted in Ch. 91-1, Laws of Florida. 5 Section 440.02 (17), F.S....

state employment which is covered pursuant to section 440.-02(14)(b), Florida Statutes. While Atkins v. State

...xemption, and an alleged lapse in the appellant’s workers’ compensation coverage. We affirm the deputy commissioner’s determination that the claimant was not exempt from the Workers’ Compensation Act under the agricultural labor provision of section 440.02, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...ermanent total disability as to earning capacity. Claimant’s injury is a nonscheduled injury. Compensation benefits must be determined not on a functional disability of the body, as established by the doctors, but on “disability” as defined in § 440.02(9), Florida Statutes Annotated, i....

McDonald, justice. We review Theis v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 357, 358-59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), in *118 which the district court certified the following question as one of great public importance: Whether the definition of “child” in section 440.02(5), Florida Statutes (1987), and Florida’s public policy favoring the legitimacy of children permits a child born of a legitimate marriage but fathered by someone other than the husband, to be denied death and dependency benefits under section 440.16, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...The district court affirmed the deputy commissioner’s decision, but certified the previously stated question. We disagree and quash the district court’s decision. The definition of “child” for purposes of workers’ compensation claims is set forth in subsection 440.02(5), Florida Statutes (1987), which states: “ ‘Child’ includes a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee, and a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased, but do...

...er a claimant is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Tarver held that a child allowed to inherit an intestate share on the theory of "virtual adoption” in probate proceedings could not recover workers’ compensation death benefits under § 440.02(5), Fla....

...this provision alone might indicate that not only must Nadine Theis be the "child” of the decedent but she must also prove economic dependency to recover benefits. However, this provision must be read in conjunction with the definition of child in § 440.02(5), which only requires proof of de *120 pendency by a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child....

...compensability is 5 employer to pay compensation or furnish benefits if employee suffers accidental compensable injury “arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment”), and § 440.02(36), Fla....

...ward of PTD is supported by competent substantial evidence. We also find that under the facts before him, the JCC properly denied the employer/carrier’s claim for apportionment. The balance of our opinion will discuss only the apportionment issue. Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1980), provides in relevant part: Where a preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only acceleration of death or acceleration or a...

...; and (3) that which resulted from the normal progress of the disease and would have existed had the accident never occurred. Disability falling within the first two categories is compensable under the terms of the statute. It is the purpose of See. 440.02(19) to relieve the employer of disability within the third category by apportioning it out of an award....

...nd was unrelated to the accident. Furthermore, “disability” has been consistently defined as “incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02(9), Fla.Stat....

...an al *1332 tercation with the police regarding the shooting. Finally, the claimant had been accused of sexual molestation of his girlfriend’s child and, as of September 1988, was awaiting further disposition of the criminal charges against him. . Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (1961), the provision addressed in Evans , provided as follows: Where a preexisting disease is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, only acceleration of death o...

this benefit. Hence, I respectfully dissent. Section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes (1987) values a fringe

dependents. The employer also asks that we interpret § 440.02(14) to require that persons standing in the place

...Roth Brothers is distinguishable from the instant case because the opinion does not indicate that Spodris’ aseptic necrosis was caused by alcoholism, nor does the opinion indicate that the e/c raised an “alcoholism” defense based upon the application of Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1983). 1 In the instant case, the e/c presented a defense based upon the application of Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1991), which provides in pertinent part: “Accident” means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening sudden-ly_ [Disability ......

...Cobb, 335 So.2d 261 (Fla.1976), specifically noted that pater *358 nity determinations were permissible in workers’ compensation cases where necessary to determine entitlement to benefits. Appellant also argues that the deputy erred in ruling that Section 440.02(5), Florida Statutes (1987), requires that a child bom of two married persons be the natural, biological offspring of those persons....

...s feel the law should be.” As in Evergreen Sod, we recognize that this construction is a harsh result. Consequently, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court as one of great public importance: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF “CHILD” IN SECTION 440.02(5), FLORIDA STATUTES (1987), AND FLORIDA’S PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING THE LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN PERMITS A CHILD BORN OF A LEGITIMATE MARRIAGE BUT FA *359 THERED BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE HUSBAND, TO BE DENIED DEATH AND DEPENDENCY BENEFITS UNDER SECTION 440.16, FLORIDA STATUTES (1987)....

...JOANOS and MINER, JJ., concur. . As initially enacted, the definition read "‘Child’ shall include...." This definition was later amended to read “‘Child’ includes....” Some years prior to this slight alteration, a directory preamble was added to Section 440.02, Florida Statutes, stating that “When used in this chapter, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following terms shall have the following meanings.” There is no legislative indication that the above alterations were i...

...p; G by appellant at the direction of Phillips and Jordan were “claims,” in part because there appears on the face of each request and certification form the word “claim.” We find this argument unavailing. While “claim” is not defined in section 440.02, the Definitions section of the statute, that term is adequately defined in section 440.19(l)(e)l which provides that a “claim” shall: (1) be filed with the Division; (2) contain names and addresses of the employer and employee; (3...

...the Judge of Compensation Claims heard undisputed evidence that Appellant failed to report his wages as taxable income. Thus, his income could not constitute wages under Florida Statutes because it was not reported "for federal income tax purposes." § 440.02(28), Fla....

...As noted by Appellee and the majority opinion, there is no evidence or claim that Appellant had ever reported his income. In fact, Appellant stated below that he had not filed a tax return in ten years. As we noted in Fast Tract Framing, the unambiguous text of section 440.02(28) requires that a claimant, not his employer, report wages to the Internal Revenue Service....

...zed parties to stipulate to arbitration. 932 So.2d at 637. By contrast, the legislature has not authorized parties to waive the requirement that employees must report their wages "for federal income tax purposes" in order to qualify as "wages" under section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes. Under section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes, Appellant had the legal duty to report his income for federal income tax purposes in order to establish that he earned "wages" which could form the basis of an average weekly wage and an award of temporary partial disability....

...denying and dismissing with prejudice his claims for methadone treatment, methadone reimbursement, mileage, and attorney’s fees and costs connected to the claims for methadone treatment. The JCC found these claims are precluded by the operation of section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1989), as construed in Milmir Constr....

...t or result, happening suddenly. A ... disability ... due to the accidental acceleration or aggravation of a ... disease due to the habitual use of alcohol or narcotic drugs, shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of employment. § 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1989). The same chapter defines “disability” as follows: “Disability” means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury. § 440.02(10), Fla....

...(1989). “Injury” is defined, in pertinent part, as follows: “Injury” means personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury. § 440.02(16), Fla....

...avation of a disease due to the habitual use of narcotic drugs must be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of employment. Specifically, the employer/carrier raised the following defenses: 1) according to Milmir Constr. Co., supra, and section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1989), the definition of “accident” does not include the provision of medical care for aggravating/making symptomatic pre-existing narcotic drug use or the tendency to use the same; 2) Dr....

...Mindful that the statutory provision is to be given a liberal construction in this case, we must decide what constitutes an “accident” and a “disability.” The first part of the definition of “accident” is clear. An accident “means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly.” § 440.02(1), Fla....

...that resulted in pain for which he was medically treated with narcotics. A disability refers to “incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02(10), Fla....

...The disability at issue here is the debilitating effect of narcotics addiction; the disease is prescription drug dependency. The legislature has elected to exclude certain types of disabilities from its definition of “an injury by accident arising out of the employment.” See § 440.02(1)....

...Specifically, if the disability is “due to the accidental acceleration or aggravation of a ... disease due to the habitual use of alcohol or narcotic drugs,” then the disability is not to be considered “an injury by accident arising out of the employment.” See § 440.02(1)....

...reexisting alcoholism based on a finding that the work-related accident “aggravated and/or made symptomatic” the alcoholism. See id. at 58 . Reviewing the JCC’s order in the employer/carrier’s direct appeal in Milmir Constr. Co., we examined section 440.02(1) and determined that the provision “was intended to preclude recovery for alcohol and drug-related diseases, such as are sought here.” See id....

...However, for the event or result not to be deemed “an inju *78 ry by accident arising out of employment,” the statute requires also that any “acceleration or aggravation” of the disease be “accidental” and that the use be “habitual.” See § 440.02(1), Fla....

...We conclude that the JCC erred as a matter of law in ruling summarily that involuntary addiction to a legal narcotic, prescribed by an authorized treating physician as necessary treatment for an industrial injury, is automatically deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of employment under section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Given his threshold finding that the facts did not demonstrate an injury by accident arising out of employment, the JCC initially did not need to address the employer/carrier’s other defenses. In light of our holding regarding the scope and meaning of “accident” and “habitual” in section 440.02(1), we REVERSE the JCC’s order and REMAND the case for further proceedings....

PER CURIAM. As the appellee engineering firm is squarely within the definition of construction design professional, § 440.02(25), Fla....

...car’s high beam headlights, and sped towards Mr. Pivaral-Ramirez, striking and ultimately killing him. Analysis The Workers’ Compensation Law defines “injury” as “personal injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment.” § 440.02(19), Fla....

...real hard pain” in the center of her back and down her leg that caused her to freeze momentarily and to lose her breath. The JCC’s finding that Claimant hurt herself while on the job satisfied the “in the course of employment” requirement of section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1989) (defining “accident”)....

...379 ; Rockhaulers, Inc. v. Davis, 554 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The Employer/Seif-Insured challenges the order based on the JCC’s failure to make specific findings on the issue of whether the on-the-job incident constituted an “accident.” § 440.02(1), Fla....

...While we agree that there is sufficient evidentiary proof to establish dependency under the law, we focus our attention on the deputy commissioner’s ruling regarding the conclusive presumption of entitlement to benefits without proof of dependency. The deputy commissioner is correct in this ease. Section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes (1981) divides the classification of “child” into two groups....

...pportioned the award. The following is from the full commission’s order: “ * * * A review of the medical evidence convinces us that the deputy commissioner should have apportioned the award of permanent partial disability. The 1963 provisions of Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes, are applicable in the instant case, a portion of which reads as follows: “ * * * Where a pre-existing disease is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only accele...

...By their cross petition for certiorari the employer and carrier concede the correctness of the deputy’s conclusion regarding the continued validity of the first marriage. They contend, however, that the first wife is not entitled to receive compensation benefits because of the provisions of Section 440.02(15), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which reads as follows: “The term ‘widow’ includes only the decedent’s wife, living with him at the time of his injury and death, or dependent for support upon him and living apart at the said tim...

...n supported by her husband for many years, she would still be entitled to support despite the fact that he had deserted her and “left her on her own.” Her legal entitlement to support is the test of dependency applicable to a wife or widow under Section 440.02(15), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

not have a catastrophic injury as defined in section 440.02(34), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), and was

exceeded the one-hundred dollar statutory limit. § 440.02(4), Fla. Stat. (1997). We affirm the order under

ADKINS, Justice. This case arose when petitioner Cornaros injured himself in the course of his employment at The Carillon Hotel September 22, 1966. The Judge of Industrial Claims was presented with-conflicting evidence as to application of Fla.Stat. § 440.02(12), F.S.A., which provides that for purposes of establishing compensation, wages of an employee will include tips or gratuities “only when such gratuities are received with the knowledge of the employer.” The employer offered business...

Industrial Commission, 174 So.2d 404 (Fla.1965); Section 440.02(12), Florida Statutes (1975). Having found

ERVIN, Judge. In this workers’ compensation action, the appellants contend that the deputy commissioner erroneously determined that the claimant, an inmate at Tampa Correctional Center, was an “employee” within the ambit of Section 440.02, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...o remand the cause to the deputy for the entry of an order dismissing the respondent’s claim. THOMAS, C. J., and HOBSON and THORNAL, JJ., concur. TERRELL, J., dissents. . Workmen’s Compensation Law, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1959), F.S.A. . Section 440.02(6), Florida Statutes (1959), F.S.A....

...of workers' compensation benefits. See § 440.38(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). In 1997, the Trust began refurbishing an apartment building. It contracted with ABC Insurance Co. to secure workers' compensation coverage for the Trust's employees. See id.; § 440.02(13)(a) (defining an employee)....

...The Department then sued the Trust. In due course, the Trust moved for summary judgment. It contended that, as a matter of law, Freundl and Lehmkuhle were independent contractors and that the Trust had no legal obligation to provide workers' compensation coverage for them. See § 440.02(13)(d)(1) (providing that an "employee" for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law does not include an independent contractor). The Department countered that Freundl and Lehmkuhle were employees because the two men were in the construction industry and had not elected to be excluded from that definition as required in section 440.02(13)(c)....

...loyees *585 unless they elect to be excluded from the definition of employee by filing written notice of the election with the [Division of Workers' Compensation of the Department of Labor and Employment Security] as provided in s. 440.05." See also § 440.02(13)(d)(8) (providing that an "employee" does not include "[a] sole proprietor ....

...ion." Freundl and Lehmkuhle each wrote his full name in the blank provided. Each form also included an "affidavit of independent contractor status," in which the signer swore that he met the nine tests for independent contractor status delineated in section 440.02(13)(d)(1)....

...The evidence before the court on the Trust's motion for summary judgment consisted only of the above-described forms completed by Freundl and Lehmkuhle and the affidavit of one of the trustees. The trustee's affidavit stated that the Trust was engaged in the "construction industry" as defined in section 440.02....

...that they were independent contractors, that they were therefore exempt from the definition of an "employee" for purposes of workers' compensation, and that the Trust was therefore not obligated to obtain workers' compensation coverage for them. See § 440.02(13)(d)(1)....

...cannot be considered an "independent contractor" unless he or she makes the affirmative election to come within that category as set forth in section 440.05. The court noted that the specific language addressing the construction industry in sections 440.02(13)(c) and 440.02(13)(d)(8) [1] controlled over the more general language discussing independent contractors in section 440.02(13)(d)(1)....

...Arruda, 642 So.2d at 626; see also Armstrong v. Ormond in the Pines, 734 So.2d 596, 597-98 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing Arruda, and noting that in the case of a construction worker who is a sole proprietor, the general statutory criteria for an independent contractor set forth in section 440.02(13)(d)(1) need not even be addressed)....

...Thus, even though Freundl and Lehmkuhle swore that they met the independent contractor definition, under these facts their affidavits were not legally sufficient to exempt them from the definition of an employee for workers' compensation purposes. See § 440.02(13)....

...Because the forms in evidence did not contain the Division's notations of their effective dates, proof of the dates they were mailed was essential to establish that they were valid certificates of exemption. Under the Workers' Compensation Law, employee status is the default position. See § 440.02(13)(a); Armstrong, 734 So.2d at 598....

...Accordingly, we reverse the final summary judgment in favor of the Trust, and we remand for further proceedings. Final summary judgment reversed and remanded; appeal of order establishing entitlement to fees dismissed. WHATLEY and LaROSE, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] The Arruda court examined the 1991 version of section 440.02. The opinion discusses section 440.02(13)(d)(5), which was renumbered as section 440.02(13)(d)(8) in the 1997 statutes pertinent to this appeal.

...shop. This is not a “sheltered employment” case. Absent unusual circumstances, the sustained work record of earnings, substantially equivalent to that received prior to the accident, necessitates a finding of no permanent disability. Under F.S. § 440.02 (9), F.S.A....

...as, however, untimely. The amount of each indemnity payment was based on her average weekly wage, as calculated by the insurance carrier. Average weekly wage is determined on the basis of “wages,” as defined by the Workers’ Compensation Law in section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (1995). By petition for benefits, Ms. Corkery sought an upward adjustment to average weekly wage, on the basis of unreported tips. Such an adjustment is warranted only if she received tips which were “reported for federal income tax purposes.” § 440.02(24), Fla....

...n the circumstances, we need not decide whether Ms. Corkery proved that she met the additional requirement of reporting gratuities “to the employer in writing as taxable income received in the course of employment from others than the employer.” § 440.02(24), Fla....

...ed from denying coverage on the basis of its having led claimant to believe that he would be covered under appellee’s policy of insurance. If necessary, the JCC may hear and consider additional evidence on remand. JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. . Section 440.02(12)(c), Florida Statutes (1989).

...Based solely on her $250 per month auto payment, the claimant concluded that she recognized a “profit” of approximately ten cents per mile on her allowance check. After consideration of claimant’s testimony, the JCC concluded that the allowance check did constitute “wages” as defined in section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes, and that the amount of the check “far exceeded” her monthly auto expenses. The E/C were ordered to adjust claimant’s AWW to in- *239 elude the full stipulated amount of the allowance check. The term “wages” is defined in section 440.02(21), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986) 1 as follows: “Wages” means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury, including the reasonable value of board, ren...

...DiCosola who opined that he had suffered a new injury to his back. The Deputy Commissioner denied the appellant’s claim for compensation and dismissed the claim with prejudice. The following paragraph from the order sheds light upon the dismissal: 6. Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes, defines “accident” as being merely “an unexpected or unusual event or result happening suddenly....

...imum medical improvement (MMI). Further, impairment benefits are payable upon establishment of a “permanent impairment.” § 440.15(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2011). “Permanent impairment” is defined in part as “existing after the date of [MMI].” § 440.02(22), Fla....

v. State Rd. Dept., 171 So.2d 523 (Fla.1965); § 440.02, Fla.Stat. (1985); see Parker v. Hill, 72 So.2d

...s liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for ... benefits under this chapter, the deputy commissioner shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate such controversy....” (emphasis supplied). Section 440.02(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1979) defines “carrier,” in pertinent part, as “any person ......

...is employer, pursuant to his employer's optional reporting policy, nor did he report them to the Internal Revenue Service. We find that the JCC's decision not to include tips in Mehrer's AWW is proper and supported by competent substantial evidence. Section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (1991), defines "wages" in pertinent part: "Wages" means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury and includes only the wages earn...

...and make provision for the risk of exposure for compensation benefits. Because Mehrer failed to provide his employer with a written record of the tips he says he received, such tips do not qualify as "wages" under a plain reading of the statute. See § 440.02(24), Fla....

...Additionally, it neglects statute-of-limitation issues that could arise. It also ignores the statutory definition of “accident,” which is “an unexpected or unusual event or result that happens suddenly,” and includes “acceleration or aggravation *1144 of the preexisting condition.” § 440.02(1), Fla....

...ople, the claimant was not an “employee” for purposes of the workers’ compensation act and, therefore, not entitled to benefits pursuant to the act. This was error. The judge of compensation claims based his decision on the following analysis. Section 440.02(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), defines an “employee” for purposes of the act as “any person engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written.... ” In turn, section 440.02(17)(b)2 defines “employment” as including “[a]ll private employments in which four or more employees are employed by the same employer or, with respect to the construction industry, all private employment in which one or more emp...

...be deemed to be employed in one and the same business or establishment .... ” We construe this language to require that all employees of the contractor and subcontractors be counted for purposes of determining whether the numerical requirements of section 440.02(17)(b)2 have been met....

...The carriers could simply delegate responsibility for workers’ compensation coverage to small “independent contractors” who routinely do not comply with the carrier’s contractual stipulation to provide such coverage because they do not employ three or more employees, as in this case. Id. at 60. (At the time, section 440.02(13)(b)2 “define[d] employment as including ‘all private employments in which three or more employees are employed by the same employer.’ ” Id....

...So read, it is perfectly consistent with Roberts, and with the result we reach here. Because it is undisputed that Estes, Bush and Martin, together, employed at least four people who were engaged in the contract work, we hold that, pursuant to sections 440.10(1)(b), 440.02(15)(a) and 440.02(17)(b)2, the claimant was an “employee” pursuant to the workers’ compensation act....

...Birmingham of Fulmer, Leroy, Albee, Bauman & Glass, P.L.C., Orlando, and Christopher A. Thorne of Thorne & Storey, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees. KAHN, J. Claimant, Timothy Reynolds, seeks review of an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that concludes Reynolds was an "owner-operator" as that term is used in section 440.02(14)(d)4., Florida Statutes (2000), excepting him from coverage as an employee under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law. In the first of three points raised on appeal, claimant argues the JCC erred because the unambiguous terms of the owner-operator agreement that he entered into with Rinker Transportation Corp. (Rinker), and the plain language of section 440.02(14)(d)4., Florida Statutes, compel a conclusion that he was not an owner-operator as the term is used in the statute....

...he terms of the Agreement. Claimant filed a petition for benefits (PFB) against Rinker claiming the right to receive workers' compensation medical and indemnity benefits. Rinker denied the PFB, alleging claimant was an owner-operator as described in section 440.02(14)(d)4., Florida Statutes, and thus excluded from coverage under chapter 440....

...e, applicable when claimant operated his tractor on Rinker's business. Notwithstanding this finding, the JCC concluded such an arrangement had no legal significance and denied all compensation, reasoning claimant was an owner-operator as provided in section 440.02(14)(d)4., Florida Statutes, and not an employee entitled to workers' compensation coverage under the law....

...see e.g., Russell v. P.I.E. Nationwide, 668 So.2d 696, 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding substantive statutes cannot be applied retroactively); therefore, the 2000 *270 version of the owner-operator statute controls the disposition of this case. [*] Section 440.02(14)(d)4., Florida Statutes, provides that the term "employee" does not include: An owner-operator of a motor vehicle who transports property under a written contract with a motor carrier which evidences a relationship by which the owne...

...Here, the JCC correctly found that Rinker incurred the cost of the insurance required by paragraph twelve of the Agreement, and this finding is not challenged on appeal. The JCC erred, however, in concluding that Rinker's provision of such insurance was of no legal significance. *271 Section 440.02(14)(d)4., Florida Statutes, conditions the exclusion of coverage upon a showing that the owner-operator is required to furnish all costs for performance of the owner-operator agreement. Rinker did not, and could not, show that this condition was met and, therefore, claimant was not, at the time of his accident, a statutory owner-operator, as described in section 440.02(14)(d)4., Florida Statutes....

...NOTES [*] In 2005, the Legislature changed the statutory owner-operator exclusion by providing an owner-operator is not an employee if he is required to furnish the principal (as opposed to all) costs incidental to performance of the contract. See Ch. 2005-78, § 1, Laws of Fla.; § 440.02(15)(d)4....

...Delgado testified that under the Florida Guides a 2 percent rating was proper for the 1994 surgery. On cross examination, Dr. Vega admitted that the Florida Guides state “the second operation is at 2 percent,” but emphatically stated his disagreement with these Guides. Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (1991), defines “permanent impairment” as “any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury.” Section 440.15(3)(a)3., Fl...

PER CURIAM. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) adjudicated appellee Erika Campbell permanently and totally disabled pursuant to section 440.15(l)(b) and section 440.02(34)(f), Florida Statutes (1995). Claimant’s theory, accepted by the JCC, was that she suffered a catastrophic injury because her injury would qualify “an employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II ..' of the Federal Social Security Act _” § 440.02(34)(f), Fla....

...The deputy commissioner stated in his order: “In the absence of competent, substantial evidence regarding the exact amount of the gratuities, such gratuities cannot be included in computing the claimant’s average weekly wage.” (emphasis supplied) Section 440.02(12), Florida Statutes, states that wages shall include “......

“professional athlete” within the exclusions of Section 440.02(1)(c)(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.; that he

...This was enough evidence for the deputy commissioner to find that Lee enjoyed by an independent contractor. See La Grande v. B & L Services, Inc., 432 So.2d 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We reject Lee’s contention that only musical performers defined as independent contractors by Section 440.02(2)(d)l, Florida Statutes (1981), can be independent contractors for purposes of the workers’ compensation laws. Section 440.02(2) provides in pertinent part: (d) The term “employee” does not include: 1....

...dencing an 'independent contractor relationship is entered into prior to the commencement of such entertainment; Clearly, the legislature did not intend to limit the definition of independent contractor to those who work solely by way of commission (Section 440.02(2)(d)l.a.), and to musical and theatrical performers (Section 440.02(2)(d)l.b.)....

...Accordingly, our analysis will focus on the statutory predicate for a finding of compensability. Compensation is payable under chapter 440 to an employee if “disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (1991). Subsection 440.02(17), Florida Statutes (1991), defines “injury” as meaning “personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury.” “Accident” is defined in subsection 440.02(1) as “only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly,” but in the very next sentence of that subsection, the legislature has deemed not to be an accident “[a] mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright or...

...disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis, the full disability, including the effects of the neurosis, is compensable under the workers’ compensation law. Superior Mill Work v. Gabel, 89 So.2d 794 (Fla.1956). However, pursuant to section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1985), a ‘mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only ......

to justify the award. Disability is defined in § 440.02(9), Florida Statutes, as the “... incapacity because

Full Commission. In Evans we held that Fla.Stat. § 440.02 (19), F.S.A. requires apportionment when and to

...1st DCA 1994), we said: *339 Under the factors articulated in Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173 (Fla.1966), Arru-da would be appropriately considered an independent contractor, as the JCC con-cluded_ The JCC correctly found Ar-ruda’s work status to be that of a sole proprietor_ [S]eetion 440.02(13)(d)(5) states that a sole proprietor actively engaged in the construction industry is not an employee if he or she “elects to be exempt from the provisions of this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) No evidence was submitted that Arruda had elected to be excluded or exempted from chapter 440. We therefore conclude that Arruda is an employee of Gold Crest, rather than an independent contractor. We reject the assertion of appellee, Cas-to Homes, Inc., the general contractor, that section 440.02(13)(d)(l), which provides that an independent contractor is not an employee, should apply to Arruda, because it is more specific than section 440.02(13)(e). On the contrary, the more specific language of sections 440.02(13)(c) and 440.02(13)(d)(5) appears to have been added to the definitional statute to ensure that sole proprietors in the construction trade are not considered “independent contractors,” unless they make an affirmative decision to come within such category....

...Smith was a sole proprietor actively engaged in the construction industry. He therefore had the legal capacity to elect to be exempt from workers’ compensation coverage. But he did not have a valid certificate of election to be exempt at the time of the industrial accident. As a matter of law, section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes (1995), deems such a person a statutory employee. Section 440.02(13)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), provided that “sole proprietor[s] ......

...Section 440.10(g), Florida Statutes (1995), may have been the source of the confusion. It provides: For purposes of this section, a person is conclusively presumed to be an independent contractor if: 1. The independent contractor provides the general contractor with an affidavit stating that he meets all the requirements of § 440.02(13)(d); and 2....

...er by filing a certificate of election under § 440.05 may not recover benefits or compensation under this chapter. An independent contractor who provides the general contractor with both an affidavit stating that he or she meets the requirements of § 440.02(14)(d) and a certificate of exemption is not an employee under § 440.02(14)(c) and may not recover benefits under this chapter....

...Contemporaneous analysis of this amendment explained that it [c]hange[d] the language of the Senate bill to clarify that an independent contractor who provides the general contractor with both an affidavit stating that he/she meets the requirements of an independent contractor (under § 440.02, FS) and a certificate of exemption is not an employee and may not recover benefits under this chapter....

PER CURIAM. This case is before us on appeal from an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC), applying section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), to deny inclusion of concurrent earnings in the calculation of Felicia Nnonyelu’s average weekly wage (AWW)....

excluded from protection of the Act under Section 440.-02(2)(d)(1), Florida Statutes (1981). Huwer was

ALLEN, Judge. The claimant appeals a workers’ compensation order denying a claim for benefits relating to a mental or nervous injury. We conclude that this claim was properly denied in accordance with section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes, as applied in City of Holmes Beach v....

...The claimant was working as a correctional officer when he unexpectedly collided with a mailbox, injuring his back. The claimant immediately thought he was being attacked from behind by an inmate, but then realized what had happened. He began having psychiatric problems after this incident. Section 440.02(1) provides that a “mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only ......

...However, the claimant’s psychiatrist attributed the claimant’s problems to anxiety and fear associated with his misapprehension of the incident, and indicated that the situation would be unchanged even if the claimant had sustained no physical injury. In Holmes Beach the supreme court ruled that section 440.02(1) precludes compensability for mental or nervous injuries unless an underlying physical injury is a causative factor....

...Fla.Stat. Ann. § 440.10 (West 1981). The Florida Worker’s Compensation Statute applies to two types of employers. Ordinary employers include the state and its political subdivisions as well as “every person carrying on any employment.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 440.02(4)....

...The Deputy Commissioner denied the appellant's claim for compensation on account of the death of his wife. The full Commission affirmed his ruling and upon appeal to the Circuit Court the original ruling was reaffirmed. The Workmen's Compensation Law of Florida in Section 440.02 (16) defines the term "widower" as follows: "the term `widower' includes only the decedent's husband who at the time of her death lived with her and was dependent for support upon her, and was not capacitated to support himself." The r...

...njuries—one on each day of the two- day tryout. The judge of compensation claims rejected Bishop’s claim related to the first day’s injury, and Bishop has not challenged that ruling. We therefore do not consider that injury. Nor do we consider section 440.02(17)(c)(3), Florida Statutes (2013), which excludes professional athletes from workers’ compensation coverage. For reasons not pertinent here, the judge of compensation claims found that provision inapplicable, and no one has challeng...

his pre-existing diabetes disease, and under Section 440.02(19), F.S.A., and our former adjudications,

...tly and totally disabled.” 4. Despite the undiagnosed feature of the arthritis, and despite the fact that the entire loss of wage earning capacity is attributable to the aggravation of the preexisting arthritis, rather than the arthritis itself, F.S. 440.02(19), F.S.A., compels apportionment and thus the benefits for permanent and total disability should be apportioned equally between the arthritis and the aggravation....

...e., disability, is fairly measured by the difference between the average weekly wage and the post-recovery ability to “ * * * earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” F.S. Sec. 440.02(9), F.S.A....

...ury employment is found to have been enlarged or resorted to by the claimant as a substitute for the loss of earning *330 capacity in the injury-producing employment. In other words, we construe the words “any other employment” contained in Sec. 440.02(9) to mean any employment other than one in which the claimant was concurrently engaged at the time of the injury and which was not included in the computation of average weekly wage....

...r state, there is no dispute that the Florida Legislature has expressed an unyielding, textual intent that aliens, including those who are illegal and unlawfully employed, be covered and compensated under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law. See § 440.02(15)(a), Fla....

...r is matter for state legislature, and Florida “clearly” allows benefits for illegal aliens). And, the Florida Legislature has made pellucidly clear its intent that illegal immigrants be covered under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law. See § 440.02(15)(a); see also Velazquez, 860 So.2d at 985-86 ....

...payment of compensation, and the claimant shall have employed an attorney at law in the successful prosecution of the claim, there shall, in addition to the award for compensation, be awarded a reasonable attorney’s fee .... Id. (emphasis added). Section 440.02(11), Florida Statutes (1978), defines “compensation” as “the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter.” Since section 440.34 does not require an attorney’s fee award to be pa...

his dependents as provided in this chapter.” § 440.-02(6), Fla.Stat. (1989).

...of 100 pounds. The deputy commissioner awarded benefits under the hernia statute. The Full Commission con- *330 eluded that the' claimant had failed to prove by competent substantial evidence the occurrence of an accident within the requirements of Section 440.02(6), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.' It reversed the deputy and directed that the claim be dismissed....

...(requiring mental or nervous injuries to be demonstrated by clear and convincing medical evidence); § 440.09(1) (in occupational disease and repetitive exposure cases both causation and sufficient exposure to support causation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence); § 440.02(1), Fla....

...(Emphasis added.) Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: “The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.” Section 440.02(17)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2007), defines “employment” as including “[a]ll private employments in which four or more employees are employed by the same employer or, with respect to the construction industry, all private employme...

...m Chapter 440 whether Wood could otherwise be deemed a statutory “employee.” The trial court did so by concluding as a matter of law that the tree removal project involving a crane was one which fell within the construction industry. Thus, under section 440.02(17)(b)2., Arbor Pro’s “employment” contemplated only “one or more employees.” Further, under the terms of section 440.02(15)(c)3., Florida Statutes (2007), Wood is deemed to be Arbor Pro’s “one” statutory employee, where “employee” is defined as “[a]n independent contractor working or performing services in the construction industry.” § 440.02(15)(c)3., Fla....

...conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work ... is protected by the exclusiveness-of-liability provisions of s. 440.11 from any action at law ... on account of injury to an employee ... of the contractor ... (Emphasis added.) Section 440.02(8), Florida Statutes (2007), defines the construction industry as follows: “Construction industry” means for-profit activities involving any building, clearing, filling, excavation, or substantial improvement in the size or use of any structure or the appearance of any land....

...n Crane’s crane operations. As such, Arbor Pro was not acting as a construction contractor and, therefore, had no obligation under section 440.10 to secure workers’ compensation for Wood, who could not be considered as a statutory employee under section 440.02(15)(c)3....

...On March 11, 1990, the JCC ordered the E/C to provide benefits for treatment of claimant’s preexisting alcoholism based upon a finding that the industrial accident “aggravated and/or made symptomatic” claimant’s preexisting alcoholism. Determinative here is Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes, which provides in pertinent part: “Accident” means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly....

...A mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only, or disability or death due to the accidental acceleration or aggravation of a venereal disease or of a disease due to the habitual use of alcohol or narcotic drugs, shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment. Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes, was intended to preclude recovery for alcohol and drug-related diseases, such as are sought here....

...Accordingly, we affirm the recalculation of claimant’s AWW and reverse the award of benefits related to claimant’s alcoholism. SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . See Dan River, Inc. v. Shinall, 186 Ga.App. 572 , 367 S.E.2d 846 (1988), involving a similar statute, for discussion of policy involved. For an analysis of Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes, see 1 J....

...its have run out — or are expected to do so imminently — must be able to show not only total disability upon the cessation of temporary benefits but also that total disability will be “existing after the date of maximum medical improvement.” § 440.02(19), Fla....

employer and claimant. The 1987 amendment to section 440.02(21) includes in the definition of “wages” “any

...ct their employer (who is obligated to provide workmen’s compensation insurance) from liability for the employee’s negligence. Clearly, Raber had no obligation to provide workmen’s compensation insurance because he had no employees. Fla. Stat. § 440.02 (1973)....

...disability benefits ends when a totally disabled injured worker reaches the date of maximum medical improvement or after 104 weeks, whichever occurs earlier. § 440.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. The “date of maximum medical improvement” is defined in section 440.02(10), Florida Statutes (2009), as “the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.” Westphal did not...

...o show not only total disability upon the cessation of temporary benefits but also that total disability will be ‘existing after the date of maximum medical improvement.’ ” 710 So. 2d at 98, abrogated by Westphal, 122 So. 3d at 448 (quoting § 440.02(19), Fla....

...(1967). In 1979, the Legislature added the term “date of maximum medical improvement” to the statute, defining it consistently with this Court’s prior 1969 construction in Corral and requiring that the date be “based upon reasonable medical probability.” § 440.02(22), Fla....

...In addition, section 440.15(3), which pertains to “permanent impairment benefits,” is the only section that discusses an “evaluation” for permanent impairment of the employee, with entitlement to such benefits to commence the day after the 5. As defined in section 440.02(22), Florida Statutes (2009), “permanent impairment” means “any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss determined as a percentage of the body as a whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results f...

...imant’s disability constituted testimony “beyond his competency as a medical expert.” Permanent physical impairment is a medical issue. This is to be distinguished from “disability” which is a legal question. “Disability” is defined in section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes (1988) as the incapacity because of injury to earn wages the claimant was receiving at the time of injury....

...nion. REVERSED and REMANDED. SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . The accidents in this case occurred on May 1 and October 15, 1986. We note that the accidents occurred prior to the effective date of Ch. 87-330, section 1, Laws of Fla., which changed section 440.02(21), Fla.Stat....

...By this appeal, defendants in the trial court seek review of an adverse final judgment based upon a jury verdict. The plaintiff in the trial court was the employee of the appellants. The employers did not provide workmen’s compensation insurance pursuant to Section 440.02, Florida Statutes (1973)....

and apportioning the benefits pursuant to Section 440.-02(19), Florida Statutes.’ ” (at p. 2.) (4) Pursuant

employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphasis added). 5 The

...This court reversed, however, because Ms. Ahles’s disability did not contribute to her lost wages. Id. at 969. In reversing, we noted that TPD benefits are compensation “for disability.” Id. (quoting § 440.15, Fla. Stat.). And “disability” is defined by § 440.02(13) as “incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” Id....

...1st DCA 1997)(holding that a claimant may still be entitled to benefits if a compensable injury prevented him from acquiring employment within his abilities at his previous wage); Vencor Hosp. v. Ahles, 727 So.2d 968, 969 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(noting that section 440.02(11) defines “disability” as the “incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.”)....

weeks preceding the accident. She argues that section 440.02(24), Florida Statutes (1991), which specifically

Chapter 93 — 415, § 2, Laws of Florida, amended section 440.02(81) to provide a definition of “insolvent”

included employer benefits, such as health insurance. § 440.02(21), Fla. Stat. (1987). Recognizing that section

...ing all expenses. Workers’ compensation insurance was obtained by D & K, and its carrier paid the workers’ compensation benefits in this case. It is clear that Mr. Berry and Mr. Bryant were employees of D & K at the time of the accident. § 440.02, Fla.Stat....