Home
Menu
Call attorney Graham Syfert at 904-383-7448
Personal Injury Lawyer
Florida Statute 440.02 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 440.02 Case Law from Google Scholar
Statute is currently reporting as:
Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 440.02

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXXI
LABOR
Chapter 440
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 440.02
440.02 Definitions.When used in this chapter, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
(1) “Accident” means only an unexpected or unusual event or result that happens suddenly. Disability or death due to the accidental acceleration or aggravation of a venereal disease or of a disease due to the habitual use of alcohol or controlled substances or narcotic drugs, or a disease that manifests itself in the fear of or dislike for an individual because of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment. Subject to s. 440.15(5), if a preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only acceleration of death or acceleration or aggravation of the preexisting condition reasonably attributable to the accident is compensable, with respect to any compensation otherwise payable under this chapter. An injury or disease caused by exposure to a toxic substance, including, but not limited to, fungus or mold, is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment unless there is clear and convincing evidence establishing that exposure to the specific substance involved, at the levels to which the employee was exposed, can cause the injury or disease sustained by the employee.
(2) “Adoption” or “adopted” means legal adoption prior to the time of the injury.
(3) “Agency” means the Agency for Health Care Administration.
(4) “Arising out of” pertains to occupational causation. An accidental injury or death arises out of employment if work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death.
(5) “Carrier” means any person or fund authorized under s. 440.38 to insure under this chapter and includes a self-insurer, and a commercial self-insurance fund authorized under s. 624.462.
(6) “Casual” as used in this section refers only to employments for work that is anticipated to be completed in 10 working days or less, without regard to the number of persons employed, and at a total labor cost of less than $500.
(7) “Child” includes a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee, and a stepchild or acknowledged child born out of wedlock dependent upon the deceased, but does not include married children unless wholly dependent on the employee. “Grandchild” means a child as above defined of a child as above defined. “Brother” and “sister” include stepbrothers and stepsisters, half brothers and half sisters, and brothers and sisters by adoption, but does not include married brothers or married sisters unless wholly dependent on the employee. “Child,” “grandchild,” “brother,” and “sister” include only persons who at the time of the death of the deceased employees are under 18 years of age, or under 22 years of age if a full-time student in an accredited educational institution.
(8) “Compensation” means the money allowance payable to an employee or to his or her dependents as provided for in this chapter.
(9) “Construction design professional” means an architect, professional engineer, landscape architect, or surveyor and mapper, or any corporation, professional or general, that has a certificate to practice in the construction design field from the Department of Business and Professional Regulation.
(10) “Construction industry” means for-profit activities involving any building, clearing, filling, excavation, or substantial improvement in the size or use of any structure or the appearance of any land. However, “construction” does not mean a homeowner’s act of construction or the result of a construction upon his or her own premises, provided such premises are not intended to be sold, resold, or leased by the owner within 1 year after the commencement of construction. The division may, by rule, establish codes and definitions thereof that meet the criteria of the term “construction industry” as set forth in this section.
(11) “Corporate officer” or “officer of a corporation” means any person who fills an office provided for in the corporate charter or articles of incorporation filed with the Division of Corporations of the Department of State or as authorized or required under part I of chapter 607. The term “officer of a corporation” includes a member owning at least 10 percent of a limited liability company as defined in and organized pursuant to chapter 605.
(12) “Date of maximum medical improvement” means the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.
(13) “Death” as a basis for a right to compensation means only death resulting from an injury.
(14) “Department” means the Department of Financial Services; the term does not include the Financial Services Commission or any office of the commission.
(15) “Disability” means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.
(16) “Division” means the Division of Workers’ Compensation of the Department of Financial Services.
(17) “Domestic individual self-insurer” means an individual self-insurer:
(a) Which is a corporation formed under the laws of this state;
(b) Who is an individual who is a resident of this state or whose primary place of business is located in this state; or
(c) Which is a partnership whose principals are residents of this state or whose primary place of business is located in this state.
(18)(a) “Employee” means any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance of any work or service while engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract for hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, and includes, but is not limited to, aliens and minors.
(b) “Employee” includes any person who is an officer of a corporation and who performs services for remuneration for such corporation within this state, whether or not such services are continuous.
1. Any officer of a corporation may elect to be exempt from this chapter by filing notice of the election with the department as provided in s. 440.05.
2. As to officers of a corporation who are engaged in the construction industry, no more than three officers of a corporation or of any group of affiliated corporations may elect to be exempt from this chapter by filing a notice of the election with the department as provided in s. 440.05. Officers must be shareholders, each owning at least 10 percent of the stock of such corporation and listed as an officer of such corporation with the Division of Corporations of the Department of State, in order to elect exemptions under this chapter. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “affiliated” means and includes one or more corporations or entities, any one of which is a corporation engaged in the construction industry, under the same or substantially the same control of a group of business entities which are connected or associated so that one entity controls or has the power to control each of the other business entities. The term “affiliated” includes, but is not limited to, the officers, directors, executives, shareholders active in management, employees, and agents of the affiliated corporation. The ownership by one business entity of a controlling interest in another business entity or a pooling of equipment or income among business entities shall be prima facie evidence that one business is affiliated with the other.
3. An officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from this chapter by filing a notice of the election with the department as provided in s. 440.05 is not an employee.

Services are presumed to have been rendered to the corporation if the officer is compensated by other than dividends upon shares of stock of the corporation which the officer owns.

(c) “Employee” includes:
1. A sole proprietor or a partner who is not engaged in the construction industry, devotes full time to the proprietorship or partnership, and elects to be included in the definition of employee by filing notice thereof as provided in s. 440.05.
2. All persons who are being paid by a construction contractor as a subcontractor, unless the subcontractor has validly elected an exemption as permitted by this chapter, or has otherwise secured the payment of compensation coverage as a subcontractor, consistent with s. 440.10, for work performed by or as a subcontractor.
3. An independent contractor working or performing services in the construction industry.
4. A sole proprietor who engages in the construction industry and a partner or partnership that is engaged in the construction industry.
(d) “Employee” does not include:
1. An independent contractor who is not engaged in the construction industry.
a. In order to meet the definition of independent contractor, at least four of the following criteria must be met:
(I) The independent contractor maintains a separate business with his or her own work facility, truck, equipment, materials, or similar accommodations;
(II) The independent contractor holds or has applied for a federal employer identification number, unless the independent contractor is a sole proprietor who is not required to obtain a federal employer identification number under state or federal regulations;
(III) The independent contractor receives compensation for services rendered or work performed and such compensation is paid to a business rather than to an individual;
(IV) The independent contractor holds one or more bank accounts in the name of the business entity for purposes of paying business expenses or other expenses related to services rendered or work performed for compensation;
(V) The independent contractor performs work or is able to perform work for any entity in addition to or besides the employer at his or her own election without the necessity of completing an employment application or process; or
(VI) The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services rendered on a competitive-bid basis or completion of a task or a set of tasks as defined by a contractual agreement, unless such contractual agreement expressly states that an employment relationship exists.
b. If four of the criteria listed in sub-subparagraph a. do not exist, an individual may still be presumed to be an independent contractor and not an employee based on full consideration of the nature of the individual situation with regard to satisfying any of the following conditions:
(I) The independent contractor performs or agrees to perform specific services or work for a specific amount of money and controls the means of performing the services or work.
(II) The independent contractor incurs the principal expenses related to the service or work that he or she performs or agrees to perform.
(III) The independent contractor is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the work or services that he or she performs or agrees to perform.
(IV) The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services performed for a commission or on a per-job basis and not on any other basis.
(V) The independent contractor may realize a profit or suffer a loss in connection with performing work or services.
(VI) The independent contractor has continuing or recurring business liabilities or obligations.
(VII) The success or failure of the independent contractor’s business depends on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures.
c. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this subparagraph, an individual claiming to be an independent contractor has the burden of proving that he or she is an independent contractor for purposes of this chapter.
2. A real estate licensee, if that person agrees, in writing, to perform for remuneration solely by way of commission.
3. Bands, orchestras, and musical and theatrical performers, including disk jockeys, performing in licensed premises as defined in chapter 562, if a written contract evidencing an independent contractor relationship is entered into before the commencement of such entertainment.
4. An owner-operator of a motor vehicle who transports property under a written contract with a motor carrier which evidences a relationship by which the owner-operator assumes the responsibility of an employer for the performance of the contract, if the owner-operator is required to furnish motor vehicle equipment as identified in the written contract and the principal costs incidental to the performance of the contract, including, but not limited to, fuel and repairs, provided a motor carrier’s advance of costs to the owner-operator when a written contract evidences the owner-operator’s obligation to reimburse such advance shall be treated as the owner-operator furnishing such cost and the owner-operator is not paid by the hour or on some other time-measured basis.
5. A person whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer.
6. A volunteer, except a volunteer worker for the state or a county, municipality, or other governmental entity. A person who does not receive monetary remuneration for services is presumed to be a volunteer unless there is substantial evidence that a valuable consideration was intended by both employer and employee. For purposes of this chapter, the term “volunteer” includes, but is not limited to:
a. Persons who serve in private nonprofit agencies and who receive no compensation other than expenses in an amount less than or equivalent to the standard mileage and per diem expenses provided to salaried employees in the same agency or, if such agency does not have salaried employees who receive mileage and per diem, then such volunteers who receive no compensation other than expenses in an amount less than or equivalent to the customary mileage and per diem paid to salaried workers in the community as determined by the department; and
b. Volunteers participating in federal programs established under Pub. L. No. 93-113.
7. Unless otherwise prohibited by this chapter, any officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from this chapter. Such officer is not an employee for any reason under this chapter until the notice of revocation of election filed pursuant to s. 440.05 is effective.
8. An officer of a corporation that is engaged in the construction industry who elects to be exempt from the provisions of this chapter, as otherwise permitted by this chapter. Such officer is not an employee for any reason until the notice of revocation of election filed pursuant to s. 440.05 is effective.
9. An exercise rider who does not work for a single horse farm or breeder, and who is compensated for riding on a case-by-case basis, provided a written contract is entered into prior to the commencement of such activity which evidences that an employee/employer relationship does not exist.
10. A taxicab, limousine, or other passenger vehicle-for-hire driver who operates said vehicles pursuant to a written agreement with a company which provides any dispatch, marketing, insurance, communications, or other services under which the driver and any fees or charges paid by the driver to the company for such services are not conditioned upon, or expressed as a proportion of, fare revenues.
11. A person who performs services as a sports official for an entity sponsoring an interscholastic sports event or for a public entity or private, nonprofit organization that sponsors an amateur sports event. For purposes of this subparagraph, such a person is an independent contractor. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “sports official” means any person who is a neutral participant in a sports event, including, but not limited to, umpires, referees, judges, linespersons, scorekeepers, or timekeepers. This subparagraph does not apply to any person employed by a district school board who serves as a sports official as required by the employing school board or who serves as a sports official as part of his or her responsibilities during normal school hours.
12. Medicaid-enrolled clients under chapter 393 who are excluded from the definition of employment under s. 443.1216(4)(d) and served by Adult Day Training Services under the Home and Community-Based or the Family and Supported Living Medicaid Waiver program in a sheltered workshop setting licensed by the United States Department of Labor for the purpose of training and earning less than the federal hourly minimum wage.
13. Medicaid-enrolled clients under chapter 393 who are excluded from the definition of employment under s. 443.1216(4)(d) and served by Adult Day Training Services under the Family and Supported Living Medicaid Waiver program in a sheltered workshop setting licensed by the United States Department of Labor for the purpose of training and earning less than the federal hourly minimum wage.
(19)(a) “Employer” means the state and all political subdivisions thereof, all public and quasi-public corporations therein, every person carrying on any employment, and the legal representative of a deceased person or the receiver or trustees of any person. The term also includes employee leasing companies, as defined in s. 468.520(5), and employment agencies that provide their own employees to other persons. If the employer is a corporation, parties in actual control of the corporation, including, but not limited to, the president, officers who exercise broad corporate powers, directors, and all shareholders who directly or indirectly own a controlling interest in the corporation, are considered the employer for the purposes of ss. 440.105, 440.106, and 440.107.
(b) A homeowner shall not be considered the employer of persons hired by the homeowner to carry out construction on the homeowner’s own premises if those premises are not intended for immediate lease, sale, or resale.
(c) Facilities serving individuals under subparagraph (18)(d)12. shall be considered agents of the Agency for Health Care Administration as it relates to providing Adult Day Training Services under the Home and Community-Based Medicaid Waiver program and not employers or third parties for the purpose of limiting or denying Medicaid benefits.
(20)(a) “Employment,” subject to the other provisions of this chapter, means any service performed by an employee for the person employing him or her.
(b) “Employment” includes:
1. Employment by the state and all political subdivisions thereof and all public and quasi-public corporations therein, including officers elected at the polls.
2. All private employments in which four or more employees are employed by the same employer or, with respect to the construction industry, all private employment in which one or more employees are employed by the same employer.
3. Volunteer firefighters responding to or assisting with fire or medical emergencies whether or not the firefighters are on duty.
(c) “Employment” does not include service performed by or as:
1. Domestic servants in private homes.
2. Agricultural labor performed on a farm in the employ of a bona fide farmer, or association of farmers, that employs 5 or fewer regular employees and that employs fewer than 12 other employees at one time for seasonal agricultural labor that is completed in less than 30 days, provided such seasonal employment does not exceed 45 days in the same calendar year. The term “farm” includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, fur-bearing animals, fish, and truck farms, ranches, nurseries, and orchards. The term “agricultural labor” includes field foremen, timekeepers, checkers, and other farm labor supervisory personnel.
3. Professional athletes, such as professional boxers, wrestlers, baseball, football, basketball, hockey, polo, tennis, jai alai, and similar players, and motorsports teams competing in a motor racing event as defined in s. 549.08.
4. Labor under a sentence of a court to perform community services as provided in s. 316.193.
5. State prisoners or county inmates, except those performing services for private employers or those enumerated in s. 948.036(1).
(21) “Foreign individual self-insurer” means an individual self-insurer:
(a) Which is a corporation formed under the laws of any state, district, territory, or commonwealth of the United States other than this state;
(b) Who is an individual who is not a resident of this state and whose primary place of business is not located in this state; or
(c) Which is a partnership whose principals are not residents of this state and whose primary place of business is not located in this state.
(22) “Individual self-insurer” means any employer who has secured payment of compensation pursuant to s. 440.38(1)(b) as an individual self-insurer.
(23) “Injury” means personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury. Damage to dentures, eyeglasses, prosthetic devices, and artificial limbs may be included in this definition only when the damage is shown to be part of, or in conjunction with, an accident. This damage must specifically occur as the result of an accident in the normal course of employment.
(24) “Insolvency” or “insolvent” means:
(a) With respect to an individual self-insurer:
1. That all assets of the individual self-insurer, if made immediately available, would not be sufficient to meet all the individual self-insurer’s liabilities;
2. That the individual self-insurer is unable to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business;
3. That the individual self-insurer has substantially ceased or suspended the payment of compensation to its employees as required in this chapter; or
4. That the individual self-insurer has sought protection under the United States Bankruptcy Code or has been brought under the jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy as a debtor pursuant to the United States Bankruptcy Code.
(b) With respect to an employee claiming insolvency pursuant to s. 440.25(5), a person is insolvent who:
1. Has ceased to pay his or her debts in the ordinary course of business and cannot pay his or her debts as they become due; or
2. Has been adjudicated insolvent pursuant to the federal bankruptcy law.
(25) “Insolvent member” means an individual self-insurer which is a member of the Florida Self-Insurers Guaranty Association, Incorporated, or which was a member and has withdrawn pursuant to s. 440.385(1)(b), and which has been found insolvent, as defined in subparagraph (24)(a)1., subparagraph (24)(a)2., or subparagraph (24)(a)3., by a court of competent jurisdiction in this or any other state, or meets the definition of subparagraph (24)(a)4.
(26) “Insurer” means a group self-insurers’ fund authorized by s. 624.4621, an individual self-insurer authorized by s. 440.38, a commercial self-insurance fund authorized by s. 624.462, an assessable mutual insurer authorized by s. 628.6011, and an insurer licensed to write workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurance in this state. The term “carrier,” as used in this chapter, means an insurer as defined in this subsection.
(27) “Misconduct” includes, but is not limited to, the following, which shall not be construed in pari materia with each other:
(a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer’s interests as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of the employee; or
(b) Carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of an employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer.
(28) “Office of Insurance Regulation” means the Office of Insurance Regulation of the Financial Services Commission.
(29) “Parent” includes stepparents and parents by adoption, parents-in-law, and any persons who for more than 3 years prior to the death of the deceased employee stood in the place of a parent to him or her and were dependent on the injured employee.
(30) “Partner” means any person who is a member of a partnership that is formed by two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business with the understanding that there will be a proportional sharing of the profits and losses between them. For the purposes of this chapter, a partner is a person who participates fully in the management of the partnership and who is personally liable for its debts.
(31) “Permanent impairment” means any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss determined as a percentage of the body as a whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury.
(32) “Person” means individual, partnership, association, or corporation, including any public service corporation.
(33) “Self-insurer” means:
(a) Any employer who has secured payment of compensation pursuant to s. 440.38(1)(b) or (6) as an individual self-insurer;
(b) Any employer who has secured payment of compensation through a group self-insurance fund under s. 624.4621;
(c) Any group self-insurance fund established under s. 624.4621;
(d) A public utility as defined in s. 364.02 or s. 366.02 that has assumed by contract the liabilities of contractors or subcontractors pursuant to s. 624.46225; or
(e) Any local government self-insurance fund established under s. 624.4622.
(34) “Soft-tissue injury” means an injury that produces damage to the soft tissues, rather than to the skeletal tissues or soft organs.
(35) “Sole proprietor” means a natural person who owns a form of business in which that person owns all the assets of the business and is solely liable for all the debts of the business.
(36) “Specificity” means information on the petition for benefits sufficient to put the employer or carrier on notice of the exact statutory classification and outstanding time period of benefits being requested and includes a detailed explanation of any benefits received that should be increased, decreased, changed, or otherwise modified. If the petition is for medical benefits, the information shall include specific details as to why such benefits are being requested, why such benefits are medically necessary, and why current treatment, if any, is not sufficient. Any petition requesting alternate or other medical care, including, but not limited to, petitions requesting psychiatric or psychological treatment, must specifically identify the physician, as defined in s. 440.13(1), who is recommending such treatment. A copy of a report from such physician making the recommendation for alternate or other medical care shall also be attached to the petition. A judge of compensation claims shall not order such treatment if a physician is not recommending such treatment.
(37) “Spouse” includes only a spouse substantially dependent for financial support upon the decedent and living with the decedent at the time of the decedent’s injury and death, or substantially dependent upon the decedent for financial support and living apart at that time for justifiable cause.
(38) “Statement,” for the purposes of ss. 440.105 and 440.106, shall include the exact fraud statement language in s. 440.105(7). This requirement includes, but is not limited to, any notice, representation, statement, proof of injury, bill for services, diagnosis, prescription, hospital or doctor record, X ray, test result, or other evidence of loss, injury, or expense.
(39) “Time of injury” means the time of the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury.
(40) “Wages” means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury and includes only the wages earned and reported for federal income tax purposes on the job where the employee is injured and any other concurrent employment where he or she is also subject to workers’ compensation coverage and benefits, together with the reasonable value of housing furnished to the employee by the employer which is the permanent year-round residence of the employee, and gratuities to the extent reported to the employer in writing as taxable income received in the course of employment from others than the employer and employer contributions for health insurance for the employee or the employee’s dependents. However, housing furnished to migrant workers shall be included in wages unless provided after the time of injury. In employment in which an employee receives consideration for housing, the reasonable value of such housing compensation shall be the actual cost to the employer or based upon the Fair Market Rent Survey promulgated pursuant to s. 8 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1974, whichever is less. However, if employer contributions for housing or health insurance are continued after the time of the injury, the contributions are not “wages” for the purpose of calculating an employee’s average weekly wage.
(41) “Weekly compensation rate” means and refers to the amount of compensation payable for a period of 7 consecutive calendar days, including any Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, and other nonworking days which fall within such period of 7 consecutive calendar days. When Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or other nonworking days immediately follow the first 7 calendar days of disability or occur at the end of a period of disability as the last day or days of such period, such nonworking days constitute a part of the period of disability with respect to which compensation is payable.
History.s. 2, ch. 17481, 1935; s. 1, ch. 17482, 1935; s. 1, ch. 17483, 1935; CGL 1936 Supp. 5966(2); s. 1, ch. 18413, 1937; s. 1, ch. 20672, 1941; s. 1, ch. 28238, 1953; s. 1, ch. 29778, 1955; s. 1, ch. 57-155; s. 1, ch. 57-225; s. 1, ch. 59-100; s. 1, ch. 65-184; s. 1, ch. 67-554; ss. 17, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 1, ch. 71-80; s. 162, ch. 71-377; s. 1, ch. 72-243; s. 1, ch. 73-127; s. 1, ch. 73-283; s. 116, ch. 73-333; s. 1, ch. 74-46; s. 1, ch. 74-124; s. 1, ch. 74-197; s. 1, ch. 75-209; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 1, ch. 77-290; ss. 1, 23, ch. 78-300; s. 15, ch. 79-7; ss. 2, 124, ch. 79-40; s. 21, ch. 79-312; s. 1, ch. 80-236; s. 3, ch. 81-119; ss. 1, 20, ch. 83-305; s. 1, ch. 84-267; s. 6, ch. 86-171; s. 1, ch. 87-330; s. 1, ch. 88-203; s. 2, ch. 89-61; ss. 3, 43, ch. 89-289; ss. 9, 56, ch. 90-201; ss. 7, 52, ch. 91-1; s. 1, ch. 91-2; s. 2, ch. 93-415; s. 117, ch. 94-119; s. 59, ch. 94-218; s. 97, ch. 97-103; s. 1, ch. 98-174; s. 89, ch. 2000-153; s. 7, ch. 2001-91; s. 11, ch. 2002-194; s. 5, ch. 2002-236; s. 54, ch. 2003-164; s. 467, ch. 2003-261; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2003-412; s. 2, ch. 2003-422; s. 59, ch. 2004-5; s. 32, ch. 2004-373; s. 21, ch. 2005-60; s. 12, ch. 2005-71; s. 1, ch. 2005-78; s. 4, ch. 2006-15; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2012-213; s. 1, ch. 2013-141; s. 46, ch. 2014-209; s. 19, ch. 2015-148; s. 11, ch. 2022-138; s. 95, ch. 2023-8.

F.S. 440.02 on Google Scholar

F.S. 440.02 on Casetext

Amendments to 440.02


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 440.02
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 440.02.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

SEDGWICK CMS CMS, v. VALCOURT- WILLIAMS,, 271 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . ." § 440.02(36), Fla. Stat.; accord Strother v. . . . always turns on whether the employment led to the risk-whether there was "occupational causation," § 440.02 . . . it must "arise out of" the employment; there must be-as the statute says-"occupational causation." § 440.02 . . . An accident on a break, for example, might still "arise[ ] out of employment," § 440.02(36), Fla. . . . See § 440.02(36), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 440.02(36), Fla. Stat. . . .

KNEER, v. LINCARE AND TRAVELERS INSURANCE,, 267 So. 3d 1077 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . See § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (1968). . . .

CROWN DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIES CORP. v. PRENDIVILLE,, 263 So. 3d 103 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2016), provides, in pertinent part, that an injury or disease caused . . . But these records are not clearly applicable to Prendiville's medical condition, whereas section 440.02 . . .

ENDURANCE AM. SPECIALTY INS. CO. v. UNITED CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING, INC., 343 F. Supp. 3d 1274 (S.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 440.02(15)(a) (2018) (defining "statutory employee" under the Workers' Compensation Law). . . . Stat. § 440.02(15)(d)(5). . . . Stat. § 440.02(5) (emphasis added). . . . Stat. § 440.02(15)(d)(5). B. . . .

GLADDEN, v. FISHER THOMAS, INC. v., 232 So. 3d 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Gladden Carpet, Gladden elected to be exempt from workers’ compensation coverage pursuant to section 440.02 . . . contains definitions of commonly used terms that apply “unless the context clearly requires otherwise.” § 440.02 . . . for any reason until the notice of revocation of election filed pursuant to s. 440.05 is effective. § 440.02 . . . In Weber, the Florida Supreme Court expressly declined to apply the section 440.02 definition of “employee . . . Section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that “[a]s to persons engaged in the construction . . .

ARENA FOOTBALL LEAGUE LLC, v. BISHOP,, 220 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Nor do we consider section 440.02(17)(c)(3), Florida Statutes (2013), which excludes professional athletes . . .

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE v. RATLIFF,, 217 So. 3d 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Section 440.09(1) must be read in conjunction with section 440.02(1), which provides as follows: ... . . .

LETT, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A., 233 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . (quoting § 440.02(1), Fla. Stat.). . . .

WOOD, v. CLEAN FUELS OF INDIANA, INC., 214 F. Supp. 3d 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 440.02(17)(b)(2) (emphasis added). . . . Stat. § 440.02(8). . . . Construction Codes”) for businesses within the “construction industry” under to Florida Statutes, § 440.02 . . .

PEREZ, v. W. COLVIN,, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1200 (N.D. Ala. 2016)

. . . Sec. 440.02(9) (West Supp. 1984) with 20 C.F.R. 404.1505(a)(1983). . . .

DAVIS, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE USIS,, 196 So. 3d 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . As defined in subsection 440.02(36), Florida Statutes (2012), ‘“Arising out of pertains to occupational . . .

WESTPHAL, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, St. v., 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016)

. . . The “date of maximum medical improvement” is defined in section 440.02(10), Florida Statutes (2009), . . . maximum medical improvement.’ ” 710 So.2d at 98, abrogated by Westphal, 122 So.3d at 448 (quoting § 440.02 . . . construction in Corral and requiring that the date be “based upon reasonable medical probability.” § 440.02 . . .

CORY FAIRBANKS MAZDA PMA v. MINOR,, 192 So. 3d 596 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . affirm the JCC’s order in all respects, we write-to discuss the meaning of “misconduct” under subsection 440.02 . . .

CASTELLANOS, v. NEXT DOOR COMPANY,, 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016)

. . . .; (5) a heightened burden of proof of “clear and convincing evidence” in some types of cases, §§ 440.02 . . .

BABAHMETOVIC, v. SCAN DESIGN FLORIDA INC., 176 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . compensable injury “arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employmeht”), and § 440.02 . . .

MORADIELLOS, v. GERELCO TRAFFIC CONTROLS, INC., 176 So. 3d 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . . § 440.02(15)(c)2, Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). . . . (amending §§ 440.02(15)(c) & 440.10(e)). ' After the 2003 .amendment, section 440.10(e) now reads: (e . . . Accordingly, we hold that the current versions of sections 440.02(15)(c), 440.10(e), and 440.11, when . . .

SLORA, v. SUN N FUN FLY- IN, INC., 173 So. 3d 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 440.02(15)(d)(l), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

F. CRUZ, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, 189 So. 3d 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Specifically, under the text of section 440.02(10), an individual reaches MMI only when it is affirmatively . . . .” § 440.02(10), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

WESCO INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. DON BELL, INC. a d. b. a. DBI AC, a RC, a, 574 F. App'x 872 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 440.02(15)(a), an employee is any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance . . . Stat. § 440.02(15)(d) (6). . . . Stat. § 440.02(15)(d) (6). . . .

SANTIZO- PEREZ v. GENARO S CORPORATION d b a s, 138 So. 3d 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

ENERGY AIR AND AMERISURE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. LALONDE,, 135 So. 3d 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . adoption of the “major contributing cause” standard effective January 1, 1994, see sections 440.09(1) & 440.02 . . .

SOUTHEAST MILK ZURICH NORTH AMERICA, v. W. FISHER,, 135 So. 3d 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . the same [even] if [he] determined the claimant was terminated for ‘misconduct’ as defined by section 440.02 . . . reaching the issue of whether Claimant’s conduct rose to the level of misconduct as defined by section 440.02 . . .

WHITE, v. STATE, 134 So. 3d 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 440.02(22), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

PICON, v. GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC. a, 548 F. App'x 561 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . petition for benefits which meets the requirements of this section and the definition of specificity in § 440.02 . . .

PASCO COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE v. SHAFFER,, 125 So. 3d 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . .” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). . . . unnecessary to reach the issue concerning the relevant market or meaning of "other employment” in section 440.02 . . .

K- C ELECTRIC CO. Co. c o v. WALDEN, o b o, 122 So. 3d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 440.02(28), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . The plain language of section 440.02(28), however, does not rely on the federal tax code’s definition . . .

WESTPHAL, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG RISK MANAGEMENT,, 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . (quoting § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994)). . . . Section 440.02(22), Florida Statutes (2009), defines “permanent impairment” as “any anatomic or functional . . . certify the injured worker’s “permanent impairment,” a term that can have but one meaning under section 440.02 . . . account of disability existing after the date of maximum medical improvement as defined by section 440.02 . . . that total disability will be ‘existing after the date of maximum medical improvement.’ ”) (quoting § 440.02 . . . interpretation on a purported interplay between the definitions of “permanent impairment” contained in sections 440.02 . . . injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.” § 440.02 . . . Oswald, 710 So.2d at 98 (quoting “permanent impairment” definition found in § 440.02(19), Fla. . . . Stat. (1994 Supp.), now codified in § 440.02(22)). Here, the JCC could not rely on Dr. . . .

CARROSO, v. STATE, 129 So. 3d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 440.02(1), Fla. . . .

WOOD, v. SOUTHERN CRANE SERVICE, INC. a, 117 So. 3d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Section 440.02(17)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2007), defines “employment” as including “[a]ll private employments . . . Thus, under section 440.02(17)(b)2., Arbor Pro’s “employment” contemplated only “one or more employees . . . Further, under the terms of section 440.02(15)(c)3., Florida Statutes (2007), Wood is deemed to be Arbor . . . defined as “[a]n independent contractor working or performing services in the construction industry.” § 440.02 . . . Section 440.02(8), Florida Statutes (2007), defines the construction industry as follows: “Construction . . .

MIAMI DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD v. SMITH,, 116 So. 3d 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . established his entitlement to PTD benefits under the standards set forth in section 440.15(l)(b) and 440.02 . . .

GONZALEZ v. J. W. CHEATHAM LLC, a, 125 So. 3d 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . carrier,” and whether the plaintiff is thus excluded from the definition of “employee” under section 440.02 . . . carrier,” and thus that the plaintiff did not fall within the “owner-operator” exclusion in section 440.02 . . . However, section 440.02(15)(d)4., Florida Statutes (2009), provides that the term “employee” does not . . . whether federal law is relevant in determining the meaning of the term “motor carrier” under section 440.02 . . . The structure of section 440.02(15) suggests that section 440.02(15)(d) excludes individuals from the . . .

BENNIEFIELD, v. CITY OF LAKELAND, 109 So. 3d 1288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 440.02(10), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

ESCAMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD, v. VICKERY- ORSO,, 109 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . average weekly wage (AWW) based on her wages together with includable fringe benefits under section 440.02 . . .

W. FELDER, v. KING MOTOR COMPANY OF SOUTH FLORIDA d b a, 110 So. 3d 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . First, in section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), the Legislature defines “employer” and states . . . Next, in section 440.02(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), the Legislature defines “employee” as follows . . .

BUTTRICK, v. BY THE SEA RESORTS, INC., 108 So. 3d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . .” § 440.02(10), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

JENKS, v. BYNUM TRANSPORT, INC., 104 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Because we conclude that Claimant was an “employee” as the term is defined in section 440.02(15)(a), . . . Section 440.02(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), defines “employee” as: ... any person who receives remuneration . . . See § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. . . .

L. ROSS, v. CHARLOTTE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 100 So. 3d 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment”) and 440.02 . . .

AVERY, v. CITY OF CORAL GABLES, 100 So. 3d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 440.02(8), Fla. Stat. (1989). . . .

ROCHA, v. CITY OF TAMPA, 100 So. 3d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 440.02(13), Fla. . . . for purposes of determining compensation for occupational diseases, as “disability as described in s. 440.02 . . .

GOMEZ LAWN SERVICE, INC. v. THE HARTFORD,, 98 So. 3d 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . not elect to exempt himself from the provisions of chapter 440, as he is empowered to do by section 440.02 . . . See § 440.02(15)(b), Fla. . . . 2010) (defining employee as officer of corporation who performs services for remuneration); see also § 440.02 . . .

WALKER, v. BROADVIEW ASSISTED LIVING, 95 So. 3d 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Judge of Compensation (JCC) erred in finding she failed to sustain her burden of proof under section 440.02 . . .

OCEAN REEF CLUB, INC. a v. WILCZEWSKI, 99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . carrier, in turn, issued a denial of benefits for two reasons: (1) lack of workplace injury under section 440.02 . . . The condition complained of is not the result of an injury, as defined by F.S. 440.02(1). . . . employment, and the legal representative of a deceased person or the receiver or trustees of any person.” § 440.02 . . .

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION CMS, v. LUPO,, 77 So. 3d 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . 1st DCA 1999) (holding the MCC requirement in section 440.09(l)(b) and the MCC provision in section 440.02 . . .

MATRIX EMPLOYEE LEASING, INC. v. HADLEY,, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . existing after the date of [MMI].’ ” Id. at 98 (quoting definition of “permanent impairment” in section 440.02 . . . (19), Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.), which is now codified in section 440.02(22)). . . . as whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from an injury.” § 440.02 . . . is not reasonably anticipated to have further medical recovery or improvement from the injury, see § 440.02 . . . Section 440.02(22), Florida Statutes (2006) defines “permanent impairment” as “any anatomic or functional . . .

SENTRY INSURANCE COMPANY v. HAMLIN,, 69 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 440.02(36), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

LOVERING, v. C. NICKERSON, 72 So. 3d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . The order also states that the trial court found “through reading of Florida Statute 440.02(15)(c)(l) . . . Section 440.02 of the Florida Statutes defines the term employee (generally referred to in the case law . . . as statutory employee), in relevant part, as follows: 440.02. . . . construction industry and a partner or partnership that is engaged in the construction industry. § 440.02 . . . Section 440.02(8) of the Florida Statutes (2007) defines the term construction industry as meaning “for-profit . . .

GARCIA- LOPEZ, v. AFFORDABLE PLUMBING VININGS INSURANCE CO., 66 So. 3d 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Although section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes (2008), defines wages as those “wages earned and reported . . . for federal income tax purposes,” nothing in section 440.02(28), or elsewhere in the Workers’ Compensation . . . We therefore reverse the JCC’s finding that Claimant did not have wages as defined in section 440.02( . . . To provide guidance to the JCC on remand, we note that the definition of wages in section 440.02(28) . . . The argument advanced by the claimant in Fast Tract was that the definition of wages in section 440.02 . . .

STRICKLAND, v. TIMCO AVIATION SERVICES, INC. a a d b a, 66 So. 3d 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . contractor or its employees with the equipment necessary to perform the job properly and safely, cf. section 440.02 . . .

HDV CONSTRUCTION SYSTEMS, INC. v. E. ARAGON,, 66 So. 3d 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. . . . See § 440.02(15)(a); see also Velazquez, 860 So.2d at 985-86. . . .

BRONSON S INC v. MANN,, 70 So. 3d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . petition for benefits which meets the requirements of this section and the definition of specificity in s. 440.02 . . .

ALTMAN CONTRACTORS v. GIBSON,, 63 So. 3d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . While section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2005), imposes a heightened standard for the compensability . . . Section 440.02(1) provides that an injury caused by exposure to fungus or mold is not a compensable injury . . . Section 440.02(1) does not require an employee to demonstrate the precise levels of mold to which she . . . levels of mold to which Claimant was exposed in the workplace, a statutory condition imposed by section 440.02 . . .

GERBER, v. VINCENT S MEN S HAIRSTYLING, INC., 57 So. 3d 935 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (2009), defines “injury” as a “personal injury or death by accident . . .

TOTAL SIGNS LIGHTING, INC. v. BARRIOS,, 59 So. 3d 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . liability to the appellee-employee for injuries in a construction accident as a matter of law, see sections 440.02 . . .

J. BEND, Jr. v. SHAMROCK SERVICES, 59 So. 3d 153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See §§ 440.02(15)(c)l.-4., Fla. . . . See §§ 440.02(15)(a), 440.38(1)(a)-(b) Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . the construction industry (and thus was, by definition, an “employee” of the Employer, see section 440.02 . . .

RUSH, v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. d b a AT T, 773 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . . § 440.02(1) ]. . . .

MARIN, v. AARON S RENT TO OWN, 53 So. 3d 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . That statute, section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes (2007), an enactment the majority in Caraballo characterized . . .

SPOONER, v. POMPYS TYPESETTING PRINT RISK ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT,, 48 So. 3d 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Claimant failed to prove that her injury was catastrophic under the definition provided by section 440.02 . . .

CRUM v. RICHMOND,, 46 So. 3d 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability” § 440.02 . . . eligibility, and will remain totally disabled after the date of MMI as that phrase is statutorily defined. § 440.02 . . . a whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury.” § 440.02 . . . same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02 . . .

PAZ, v. A. DUDA SONS, INC. CNA, 45 So. 3d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 440.02(38), Fla. . . .

WITHAM, v. SHEEHAN PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION CO. Co., 45 So. 3d 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . processes having nothing to do with his employment, and that the claim is barred pursuant to section 440.02 . . . She further found Claimants injury barred pursuant to section 440.02, Florida Statutes, due to the accidental . . .

McKENZIE, v. MENTAL HEALTH CARE, INC. SUMMIT CLAIMS CENTER,, 43 So. 3d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 440.02(19), Fla. . . .

WYETH PHARMA FIELD SALES v. TOSCANO,, 40 So. 3d 795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Stat. (2007); see also § 440.02(13) (defining “disability” as the “incapacity to earn in the same or . . .

M. BIFULCO, v. PATIENT BUSINESS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., 39 So. 3d 1255 (Fla. 2010)

. . . Section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), defines “Employer” to include “the state and all political . . . section 440.03, Florida Statutes (2004), provides that “[e]very employer and employee as defined in s. 440.02 . . .

SALINAS, v. C. A. T. CONCRETE, LLC, 46 So. 3d 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . .” § 440.02(28), Fla. Stat.; Fast Tract Framing, 994 So.2d 355, 358 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). . . . As we noted in Fast Tract Framing, the unambiguous text of section 440.02(28) requires that a claimant . . . must report their wages “for federal income tax purposes” in order to qualify as “wages” under section 440.02 . . . Under section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes, Appellant had the legal duty to report his income for federal . . .

CANGELOSI, v. PICADILLY CAFETERIA, 31 So. 3d 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . (amending section 440.02(32), Fla. Stat.). . . .

J. REYNOLDS, v. CSR RINKER TRANSPORT, a k a, 31 So. 3d 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Compensation Claims (JCC) that concludes Reynolds was an “owner-operator” as that term is used in section 440.02 . . . (Rinker), and the plain language of section 440.02(14)(d)4., Florida Statutes, compel a conclusion that . . . Rinker denied the PFB, alleging claimant was an owner-operator as described in section 440.02(14)(d)4 . . . Section 440.02(14)(d)4., Florida Statutes, conditions the exclusion of coverage upon a showing that the . . . See Ch. 2005-78, § 1, Laws of Fla.; § 440.02(15)(d)4. Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

COASTAL MASONRY, INC. a v. GUTIERREZ,, 30 So. 3d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . The condition complained of is not the result of an injury, as defined by F.S. 440.02(1). . . .

RENE STONE WORK CORPORATION USIS, v. GONZALEZ,, 25 So. 3d 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . AWW was zero due to his failure to report his wages for income tax purposes as required by section 440.02 . . . Caraballo, 994 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), in finding Claimant complied with section 440.02(28), and . . . In essence, the E/C argues that section 440.02(28) requires a claimant to comply with the precise IRS . . . The JCC rejected this argument, stating: I decline to read F.S. 440.02(28) as requiring Claimant to be . . . We agree with the JCC that section 440.02(28) does not require the level of precision urged by the E/ . . .

CARNEY, v. SARASOTA COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE, 26 So. 3d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . .” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . “We have interpreted section 440.02(13) to mean that disability only occurs when the employee becomes . . .

PADILLA, v. COLLINS CONTRACTING,, 22 So. 3d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . for benefits must meet “the requirements of this section and the definition of specificity in section 440.02 . . .

A. BOLANOS, v. WORKFORCE ALLIANCE Am-, 23 So. 3d 171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Instead, he argues that section 440.02(16)(a) defines “employer” to include “employment agencies, employee . . . It follows from these definitions that the key features needed to be a “similar agent” under section 440.02 . . . after the 2003 amendments were enacted recommended that the legislature "delete the amendments to s. 440.02 . . .

SCHROEDER v. PEOPLEASE CORPORATION L S, 18 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (2005) defines “injury” in pertinent part as “personal injury or . . .

ARREOLA, v. ADMINISTRATIVE CONCEPTS, 17 So. 3d 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006); Safeharbor Employer Servs. I, Inc. v. . . .

ADAMS HOMES OF NORTHWEST FLORIDA, INC. v. CRANFILL, 7 So. 3d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . It did so, according to the brief filed in this court by Adams Homes, by amending section 440.02(15)( . . .

MULLINS, v. ELEVEN, INC. CMS,, 5 So. 3d 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . was the major contributing cause of the partial rupture of a prosthetic device pursuant to section 440.02 . . . See § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. . . . This interpretation is supported by the most common example that could arise under section 440.02(19) . . . We find it unimaginable that the Legislature, by including "prosthetic devices” in section 440.02(19) . . . Failure to recognize section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes, as a unique statutory provision concerned . . .

AUMAN, v. LEVEROCK S SEAFOOD HOUSE, s HR LLC,, 997 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . However, given the use in section 440.15(2)(a) of the word “disability” and the fact that section 440.02 . . . same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury,” § 440.02 . . . Under the statute, “disability” is defined as “incapacity because of the injury,” § 440.02(13), Fla. . . .

HOUCK, v. LEE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 995 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Claimant established that his workplace injury was “catastrophic” as that term is defined in section 440.02 . . . 440.15(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that “[o]nly a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02 . . . Here, the JCC found Claimant’s workplace injuries met the “catastrophic” definition found in section 440.02 . . .

WILDER, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH Co., 993 So. 2d 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . 440, Florida Statutes, does not define earnings, the statutory definition of wages, found in section 440.02 . . .

BIVENS, v. CITY OF LAKELAND,, 993 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes (2007), defines “disability” as “incapacity because of the injury . . . We have interpreted section 440.02(13) to mean that disability occurs only when “the employee becomes . . .

FAST TRACT FRAMING, INC. s v. CARABALLO, AIG, 994 So. 2d 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . legislature did not intend to include unreported income in its definition of wages contained in section 440.02 . . . Thus, Claimant would have us read the first part of section 440.02(28) as “ Wages’ ... includes only . . . It is simply a matter of common sense that persuades us that it is unreasonable to read section 440.02 . . . Claimant also argues that section 440.02(28) has no impact on the proper interpretation of section 440.14 . . . We find that the more specific definition of wages in section 440.02(28) requires the conclusion that . . . Section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes, defines the term “wages” to include only those wages that are reported . . . The majority’s interpretation of the term “wages” in section 440.02(28) is also at odds with other provisions . . . whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, and includes, but is not limited to, aliens and minors. § 440.02 . . .

MATRIX EMPLOYEE LEASING FCIC v. PIERCE,, 985 So. 2d 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . caused by exposure to specific harmful chemicals at the levels to which she was exposed, see section 440.02 . . . Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2005), which defines the term “accident” for purposes of the workers . . . Even though section 440.02(1) imposes a heightened standard of proof on the JCC, our standard of review . . . support the JCC’s finding that the claimant satisfied the evidentiary threshold required by section 440.02 . . . substantial record evidence supports the findings that the claimant satisfied the requirements of section 440.02 . . .

BUTLER, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,, 980 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 440.02(34)(f), Fla. Stat. (1996). . . .

GUCKENBERGER, v. SEMINOLE COUNTY Co., 979 So. 2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . 2007) (noting that the “policy implications” of the Legislature’s definition of misconduct in section 440.02 . . .

WAL- MART STORES INC. v. THOMPSON,, 974 So. 2d 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . of Florida, a claimant seeking PTD was bound to demonstrate “a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02 . . . employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II ... of the federal Social Security Act.” § 440.02 . . .

AMS STAFF LEASING, INC. LLC v. ARREOLA,, 976 So. 2d 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. . . .

BARROCAS, v. DIRECTV, INC. L. L. C., 974 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 440.02, Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .

TWIN CITY ROOFING CONSTRUCTION SPECIALISTS, INC. v. STATE DEPT. OF FINANCIAL SERVICES,, 969 So. 2d 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . provide workers’ compensation coverage for those who qualify as an “employee” as defined in section 440.02 . . . Pursuant to section 440.02(15)(d)(6), “[a] person who does not receive monetary remuneration for services . . .

GAYER, v. FINE LINE CONSTRUCTION ELECTRIC, INC. L. F. I., 970 So. 2d 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The terms “employer” and “employee” are defined in section 440.02, Florida Statutes, which begins by . . . unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following terms shall have the following meanings.” § 440.02 . . . Subsection (15) of section 440.02 then broadly defines “employer” to include, inter alia, “every person . . . apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed .... ” § 440.02 . . . ‘Employment’... means any service performed by an employee for the person employing him or her.” § 440.02 . . .

ORANGE COUNTY FIRE RESCUE v. JONES,, 959 So. 2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . See § 440.02(13), Fla. . . .

ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD v. POWERS,, 959 So. 2d 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . “Employee,” for purposes of workers’ compensation coverage, is defined at section 440.02(15)(a), Florida . . . Education received in exchange for payment of tuition is not remuneration for purposes of section 440.02 . . . The claimant must still meet the definition of an employee in section 440.02(15)(a). . . . was not an employee, she was a volunteer eligible for workers’ compensation benefits under section 440.02 . . .

THORKELSON, v. NY PIZZA PASTA INC., 956 So. 2d 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (2004), defines “misconduct”: “Misconduct” includes, but is not . . . disregard of an employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer. § 440.02 . . .

CITY OF PORT ORANGE PGCS, v. SEDACCA,, 953 So. 2d 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . .” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2003); see also § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. . . . contain the definition of “disablement” relied upon by the majority but, rather, merely refers to section 440.02 . . . Legislature amended the statute to define "disablement” to mean "disability” as set forth in section 440.02 . . . The definition in section 440.02(13), expressly requires wage loss for disability. . . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES v. MJ VERSAGGI TRUST d b a, 952 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . .; § 440.02(13)(a) (defining an employee). . . . in section 440.02(13)(d)(l). . . . See § 440.02(13). . . . See § 440.02(13)(a); Armstrong, 734 So.2d at 598. . . . The opinion discusses section 440.02(13)(d)(5), which was renumbered as section 440.02(13)(d)(8) in the . . .

PEARSON, v. PARADISE FORD CNA, 951 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . claimant also argues that, notwithstanding section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2003), under sections 440.02 . . .

LEMMER, v. URBAN ELECTRICAL, INC., 947 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . .” § 440.02(10), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

HAZEALEFERIOU, v. LABOR READY ESIS, 947 So. 2d 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Section 440.02(15)(a) defines “employee” in the worker’s compensation context as follows: “Employee” . . . or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed... § 440.02 . . . agencies, employee leasing companies, and similar agents who provide employees to other persons. § 440.02 . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE OUT OF CYCLE, 941 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 2006)

. . . Indigency for the purpose of this rule is synonymous with insolvency as defined by section 440.02, Florida . . .

KONE, INC. f k a v. ROBINSON, 937 So. 2d 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . See, e.g., § 440.02(7), Fla. . . .

ROTSTEIN, v. PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC., 933 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . . § 440.02(21), Fla. Stat. (1987). . . . contributions are not ‘wages’ for the purpose of calculating an employee’s average weekly wage.” § 440.02 . . .

FICOCELLI, Sr. v. JUST OVERLAY, INC., 932 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . the business activities of Just Overlay were within the “construction industry” as defined in section 440.02 . . . Section 440.02 defines “employment” for the purposes of chapter 440 as including “all private employments . . . See § 440.02(17)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . Section 440.02(8) defines “construction industry” as follows: “Construction industry” means for-profit . . . Pursuant to the authority provided by section 440.02(8), the Division of Workers’ Compensation of the . . .