The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . ." § 440.02(36), Fla. Stat.; accord Strother v. . . . always turns on whether the employment led to the risk-whether there was "occupational causation," § 440.02 . . . it must "arise out of" the employment; there must be-as the statute says-"occupational causation." § 440.02 . . . An accident on a break, for example, might still "arise[ ] out of employment," § 440.02(36), Fla. . . . See § 440.02(36), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 440.02(36), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . See § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (1968). . . .
. . . Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2016), provides, in pertinent part, that an injury or disease caused . . . But these records are not clearly applicable to Prendiville's medical condition, whereas section 440.02 . . .
. . . . § 440.02(15)(a) (2018) (defining "statutory employee" under the Workers' Compensation Law). . . . Stat. § 440.02(15)(d)(5). . . . Stat. § 440.02(5) (emphasis added). . . . Stat. § 440.02(15)(d)(5). B. . . .
. . . Gladden Carpet, Gladden elected to be exempt from workers’ compensation coverage pursuant to section 440.02 . . . contains definitions of commonly used terms that apply “unless the context clearly requires otherwise.” § 440.02 . . . for any reason until the notice of revocation of election filed pursuant to s. 440.05 is effective. § 440.02 . . . In Weber, the Florida Supreme Court expressly declined to apply the section 440.02 definition of “employee . . . Section 440.02(9), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that “[a]s to persons engaged in the construction . . .
. . . Nor do we consider section 440.02(17)(c)(3), Florida Statutes (2013), which excludes professional athletes . . .
. . . Section 440.09(1) must be read in conjunction with section 440.02(1), which provides as follows: ... . . .
. . . (quoting § 440.02(1), Fla. Stat.). . . .
. . . . § 440.02(17)(b)(2) (emphasis added). . . . Stat. § 440.02(8). . . . Construction Codes”) for businesses within the “construction industry” under to Florida Statutes, § 440.02 . . .
. . . Sec. 440.02(9) (West Supp. 1984) with 20 C.F.R. 404.1505(a)(1983). . . .
. . . As defined in subsection 440.02(36), Florida Statutes (2012), ‘“Arising out of pertains to occupational . . .
. . . The “date of maximum medical improvement” is defined in section 440.02(10), Florida Statutes (2009), . . . maximum medical improvement.’ ” 710 So.2d at 98, abrogated by Westphal, 122 So.3d at 448 (quoting § 440.02 . . . construction in Corral and requiring that the date be “based upon reasonable medical probability.” § 440.02 . . .
. . . affirm the JCC’s order in all respects, we write-to discuss the meaning of “misconduct” under subsection 440.02 . . .
. . . .; (5) a heightened burden of proof of “clear and convincing evidence” in some types of cases, §§ 440.02 . . .
. . . compensable injury “arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employmeht”), and § 440.02 . . .
. . . . § 440.02(15)(c)2, Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). . . . (amending §§ 440.02(15)(c) & 440.10(e)). ' After the 2003 .amendment, section 440.10(e) now reads: (e . . . Accordingly, we hold that the current versions of sections 440.02(15)(c), 440.10(e), and 440.11, when . . .
. . . See § 440.02(15)(d)(l), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
. . . Specifically, under the text of section 440.02(10), an individual reaches MMI only when it is affirmatively . . . .” § 440.02(10), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .
. . . . § 440.02(15)(a), an employee is any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance . . . Stat. § 440.02(15)(d) (6). . . . Stat. § 440.02(15)(d) (6). . . .
. . . .” § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
. . . adoption of the “major contributing cause” standard effective January 1, 1994, see sections 440.09(1) & 440.02 . . .
. . . the same [even] if [he] determined the claimant was terminated for ‘misconduct’ as defined by section 440.02 . . . reaching the issue of whether Claimant’s conduct rose to the level of misconduct as defined by section 440.02 . . .
. . . .” § 440.02(22), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .
. . . petition for benefits which meets the requirements of this section and the definition of specificity in § 440.02 . . .
. . . .” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). . . . unnecessary to reach the issue concerning the relevant market or meaning of "other employment” in section 440.02 . . .
. . . . § 440.02(28), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . The plain language of section 440.02(28), however, does not rely on the federal tax code’s definition . . .
. . . (quoting § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994)). . . . Section 440.02(22), Florida Statutes (2009), defines “permanent impairment” as “any anatomic or functional . . . certify the injured worker’s “permanent impairment,” a term that can have but one meaning under section 440.02 . . . account of disability existing after the date of maximum medical improvement as defined by section 440.02 . . . that total disability will be ‘existing after the date of maximum medical improvement.’ ”) (quoting § 440.02 . . . interpretation on a purported interplay between the definitions of “permanent impairment” contained in sections 440.02 . . . injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.” § 440.02 . . . Oswald, 710 So.2d at 98 (quoting “permanent impairment” definition found in § 440.02(19), Fla. . . . Stat. (1994 Supp.), now codified in § 440.02(22)). Here, the JCC could not rely on Dr. . . .
. . . Section 440.02(17)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2007), defines “employment” as including “[a]ll private employments . . . Thus, under section 440.02(17)(b)2., Arbor Pro’s “employment” contemplated only “one or more employees . . . Further, under the terms of section 440.02(15)(c)3., Florida Statutes (2007), Wood is deemed to be Arbor . . . defined as “[a]n independent contractor working or performing services in the construction industry.” § 440.02 . . . Section 440.02(8), Florida Statutes (2007), defines the construction industry as follows: “Construction . . .
. . . established his entitlement to PTD benefits under the standards set forth in section 440.15(l)(b) and 440.02 . . .
. . . carrier,” and whether the plaintiff is thus excluded from the definition of “employee” under section 440.02 . . . carrier,” and thus that the plaintiff did not fall within the “owner-operator” exclusion in section 440.02 . . . However, section 440.02(15)(d)4., Florida Statutes (2009), provides that the term “employee” does not . . . whether federal law is relevant in determining the meaning of the term “motor carrier” under section 440.02 . . . The structure of section 440.02(15) suggests that section 440.02(15)(d) excludes individuals from the . . .
. . . See § 440.02(10), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . average weekly wage (AWW) based on her wages together with includable fringe benefits under section 440.02 . . .
. . . First, in section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), the Legislature defines “employer” and states . . . Next, in section 440.02(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), the Legislature defines “employee” as follows . . .
. . . .” § 440.02(10), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . Because we conclude that Claimant was an “employee” as the term is defined in section 440.02(15)(a), . . . Section 440.02(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), defines “employee” as: ... any person who receives remuneration . . . See § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment”) and 440.02 . . .
. . . .” § 440.02(8), Fla. Stat. (1989). . . .
. . . .” § 440.02(13), Fla. . . . for purposes of determining compensation for occupational diseases, as “disability as described in s. 440.02 . . .
. . . not elect to exempt himself from the provisions of chapter 440, as he is empowered to do by section 440.02 . . . See § 440.02(15)(b), Fla. . . . 2010) (defining employee as officer of corporation who performs services for remuneration); see also § 440.02 . . .
. . . Judge of Compensation (JCC) erred in finding she failed to sustain her burden of proof under section 440.02 . . .
. . . carrier, in turn, issued a denial of benefits for two reasons: (1) lack of workplace injury under section 440.02 . . . The condition complained of is not the result of an injury, as defined by F.S. 440.02(1). . . . employment, and the legal representative of a deceased person or the receiver or trustees of any person.” § 440.02 . . .
. . . 1st DCA 1999) (holding the MCC requirement in section 440.09(l)(b) and the MCC provision in section 440.02 . . .
. . . existing after the date of [MMI].’ ” Id. at 98 (quoting definition of “permanent impairment” in section 440.02 . . . (19), Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.), which is now codified in section 440.02(22)). . . . as whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from an injury.” § 440.02 . . . is not reasonably anticipated to have further medical recovery or improvement from the injury, see § 440.02 . . . Section 440.02(22), Florida Statutes (2006) defines “permanent impairment” as “any anatomic or functional . . .
. . . . § 440.02(36), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .
. . . The order also states that the trial court found “through reading of Florida Statute 440.02(15)(c)(l) . . . Section 440.02 of the Florida Statutes defines the term employee (generally referred to in the case law . . . as statutory employee), in relevant part, as follows: 440.02. . . . construction industry and a partner or partnership that is engaged in the construction industry. § 440.02 . . . Section 440.02(8) of the Florida Statutes (2007) defines the term construction industry as meaning “for-profit . . .
. . . Although section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes (2008), defines wages as those “wages earned and reported . . . for federal income tax purposes,” nothing in section 440.02(28), or elsewhere in the Workers’ Compensation . . . We therefore reverse the JCC’s finding that Claimant did not have wages as defined in section 440.02( . . . To provide guidance to the JCC on remand, we note that the definition of wages in section 440.02(28) . . . The argument advanced by the claimant in Fast Tract was that the definition of wages in section 440.02 . . .
. . . contractor or its employees with the equipment necessary to perform the job properly and safely, cf. section 440.02 . . .
. . . See § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. . . . See § 440.02(15)(a); see also Velazquez, 860 So.2d at 985-86. . . .
. . . petition for benefits which meets the requirements of this section and the definition of specificity in s. 440.02 . . .
. . . While section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2005), imposes a heightened standard for the compensability . . . Section 440.02(1) provides that an injury caused by exposure to fungus or mold is not a compensable injury . . . Section 440.02(1) does not require an employee to demonstrate the precise levels of mold to which she . . . levels of mold to which Claimant was exposed in the workplace, a statutory condition imposed by section 440.02 . . .
. . . Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (2009), defines “injury” as a “personal injury or death by accident . . .
. . . liability to the appellee-employee for injuries in a construction accident as a matter of law, see sections 440.02 . . .
. . . See §§ 440.02(15)(c)l.-4., Fla. . . . See §§ 440.02(15)(a), 440.38(1)(a)-(b) Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . the construction industry (and thus was, by definition, an “employee” of the Employer, see section 440.02 . . .
. . . . § 440.02(1) ]. . . .
. . . That statute, section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes (2007), an enactment the majority in Caraballo characterized . . .
. . . Claimant failed to prove that her injury was catastrophic under the definition provided by section 440.02 . . .
. . . injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability” § 440.02 . . . eligibility, and will remain totally disabled after the date of MMI as that phrase is statutorily defined. § 440.02 . . . a whole, existing after the date of maximum medical improvement, which results from the injury.” § 440.02 . . . same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02 . . .
. . . See § 440.02(38), Fla. . . .
. . . processes having nothing to do with his employment, and that the claim is barred pursuant to section 440.02 . . . She further found Claimants injury barred pursuant to section 440.02, Florida Statutes, due to the accidental . . .
. . . . § 440.02(19), Fla. . . .
. . . Stat. (2007); see also § 440.02(13) (defining “disability” as the “incapacity to earn in the same or . . .
. . . Section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), defines “Employer” to include “the state and all political . . . section 440.03, Florida Statutes (2004), provides that “[e]very employer and employee as defined in s. 440.02 . . .
. . . .” § 440.02(28), Fla. Stat.; Fast Tract Framing, 994 So.2d 355, 358 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). . . . As we noted in Fast Tract Framing, the unambiguous text of section 440.02(28) requires that a claimant . . . must report their wages “for federal income tax purposes” in order to qualify as “wages” under section 440.02 . . . Under section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes, Appellant had the legal duty to report his income for federal . . .
. . . (amending section 440.02(32), Fla. Stat.). . . .
. . . Compensation Claims (JCC) that concludes Reynolds was an “owner-operator” as that term is used in section 440.02 . . . (Rinker), and the plain language of section 440.02(14)(d)4., Florida Statutes, compel a conclusion that . . . Rinker denied the PFB, alleging claimant was an owner-operator as described in section 440.02(14)(d)4 . . . Section 440.02(14)(d)4., Florida Statutes, conditions the exclusion of coverage upon a showing that the . . . See Ch. 2005-78, § 1, Laws of Fla.; § 440.02(15)(d)4. Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .
. . . The condition complained of is not the result of an injury, as defined by F.S. 440.02(1). . . .
. . . AWW was zero due to his failure to report his wages for income tax purposes as required by section 440.02 . . . Caraballo, 994 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), in finding Claimant complied with section 440.02(28), and . . . In essence, the E/C argues that section 440.02(28) requires a claimant to comply with the precise IRS . . . The JCC rejected this argument, stating: I decline to read F.S. 440.02(28) as requiring Claimant to be . . . We agree with the JCC that section 440.02(28) does not require the level of precision urged by the E/ . . .
. . . .” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . “We have interpreted section 440.02(13) to mean that disability only occurs when the employee becomes . . .
. . . for benefits must meet “the requirements of this section and the definition of specificity in section 440.02 . . .
. . . Instead, he argues that section 440.02(16)(a) defines “employer” to include “employment agencies, employee . . . It follows from these definitions that the key features needed to be a “similar agent” under section 440.02 . . . after the 2003 amendments were enacted recommended that the legislature "delete the amendments to s. 440.02 . . .
. . . Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (2005) defines “injury” in pertinent part as “personal injury or . . .
. . . See § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006); Safeharbor Employer Servs. I, Inc. v. . . .
. . . It did so, according to the brief filed in this court by Adams Homes, by amending section 440.02(15)( . . .
. . . was the major contributing cause of the partial rupture of a prosthetic device pursuant to section 440.02 . . . See § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. . . . This interpretation is supported by the most common example that could arise under section 440.02(19) . . . We find it unimaginable that the Legislature, by including "prosthetic devices” in section 440.02(19) . . . Failure to recognize section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes, as a unique statutory provision concerned . . .
. . . However, given the use in section 440.15(2)(a) of the word “disability” and the fact that section 440.02 . . . same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury,” § 440.02 . . . Under the statute, “disability” is defined as “incapacity because of the injury,” § 440.02(13), Fla. . . .
. . . Claimant established that his workplace injury was “catastrophic” as that term is defined in section 440.02 . . . 440.15(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that “[o]nly a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02 . . . Here, the JCC found Claimant’s workplace injuries met the “catastrophic” definition found in section 440.02 . . .
. . . 440, Florida Statutes, does not define earnings, the statutory definition of wages, found in section 440.02 . . .
. . . Section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes (2007), defines “disability” as “incapacity because of the injury . . . We have interpreted section 440.02(13) to mean that disability occurs only when “the employee becomes . . .
. . . legislature did not intend to include unreported income in its definition of wages contained in section 440.02 . . . Thus, Claimant would have us read the first part of section 440.02(28) as “ Wages’ ... includes only . . . It is simply a matter of common sense that persuades us that it is unreasonable to read section 440.02 . . . Claimant also argues that section 440.02(28) has no impact on the proper interpretation of section 440.14 . . . We find that the more specific definition of wages in section 440.02(28) requires the conclusion that . . . Section 440.02(28), Florida Statutes, defines the term “wages” to include only those wages that are reported . . . The majority’s interpretation of the term “wages” in section 440.02(28) is also at odds with other provisions . . . whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, and includes, but is not limited to, aliens and minors. § 440.02 . . .
. . . caused by exposure to specific harmful chemicals at the levels to which she was exposed, see section 440.02 . . . Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2005), which defines the term “accident” for purposes of the workers . . . Even though section 440.02(1) imposes a heightened standard of proof on the JCC, our standard of review . . . support the JCC’s finding that the claimant satisfied the evidentiary threshold required by section 440.02 . . . substantial record evidence supports the findings that the claimant satisfied the requirements of section 440.02 . . .
. . . See § 440.02(34)(f), Fla. Stat. (1996). . . .
. . . 2007) (noting that the “policy implications” of the Legislature’s definition of misconduct in section 440.02 . . .
. . . of Florida, a claimant seeking PTD was bound to demonstrate “a catastrophic injury as defined in s. 440.02 . . . employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II ... of the federal Social Security Act.” § 440.02 . . .
. . . Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . See § 440.02, Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .
. . . provide workers’ compensation coverage for those who qualify as an “employee” as defined in section 440.02 . . . Pursuant to section 440.02(15)(d)(6), “[a] person who does not receive monetary remuneration for services . . .
. . . The terms “employer” and “employee” are defined in section 440.02, Florida Statutes, which begins by . . . unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following terms shall have the following meanings.” § 440.02 . . . Subsection (15) of section 440.02 then broadly defines “employer” to include, inter alia, “every person . . . apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed .... ” § 440.02 . . . ‘Employment’... means any service performed by an employee for the person employing him or her.” § 440.02 . . .
. . . See § 440.02(13), Fla. . . .
. . . “Employee,” for purposes of workers’ compensation coverage, is defined at section 440.02(15)(a), Florida . . . Education received in exchange for payment of tuition is not remuneration for purposes of section 440.02 . . . The claimant must still meet the definition of an employee in section 440.02(15)(a). . . . was not an employee, she was a volunteer eligible for workers’ compensation benefits under section 440.02 . . .
. . . Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (2004), defines “misconduct”: “Misconduct” includes, but is not . . . disregard of an employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer. § 440.02 . . .
. . . .” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2003); see also § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. . . . contain the definition of “disablement” relied upon by the majority but, rather, merely refers to section 440.02 . . . Legislature amended the statute to define "disablement” to mean "disability” as set forth in section 440.02 . . . The definition in section 440.02(13), expressly requires wage loss for disability. . . . .
. . . .; § 440.02(13)(a) (defining an employee). . . . in section 440.02(13)(d)(l). . . . See § 440.02(13). . . . See § 440.02(13)(a); Armstrong, 734 So.2d at 598. . . . The opinion discusses section 440.02(13)(d)(5), which was renumbered as section 440.02(13)(d)(8) in the . . .
. . . claimant also argues that, notwithstanding section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2003), under sections 440.02 . . .
. . . .” § 440.02(10), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .
. . . Section 440.02(15)(a) defines “employee” in the worker’s compensation context as follows: “Employee” . . . or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed... § 440.02 . . . agencies, employee leasing companies, and similar agents who provide employees to other persons. § 440.02 . . .
. . . Indigency for the purpose of this rule is synonymous with insolvency as defined by section 440.02, Florida . . .
. . . See, e.g., § 440.02(7), Fla. . . .
. . . . § 440.02(21), Fla. Stat. (1987). . . . contributions are not ‘wages’ for the purpose of calculating an employee’s average weekly wage.” § 440.02 . . .
. . . the business activities of Just Overlay were within the “construction industry” as defined in section 440.02 . . . Section 440.02 defines “employment” for the purposes of chapter 440 as including “all private employments . . . See § 440.02(17)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . Section 440.02(8) defines “construction industry” as follows: “Construction industry” means for-profit . . . Pursuant to the authority provided by section 440.02(8), the Division of Workers’ Compensation of the . . .