Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The carrier paid temporary total disability benefits through December 5, 1979, on which date according to the report of the claimant's treating physician he reached maximum medical improvement, with permanent impairment. The carrier properly forwarded to the claimant the notice required by Section 440.185(10), Florida Statutes (1979) (and the appropriate rule) of his possible entitlement to wage loss benefits, along with instructions for claiming such benefits....

...Schiffman, 144 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1962)). The recent changes in the act make it clear to us that there is even less reason to view the initiation of a claim by the injured worker as a matter requiring the services of *211 counsel. We note particularly that Section 440.185(4) imposes a duty upon the State Division of Workers' Compensation, Department of Labor and Employment Security, to provide information to the claimant, in "clear and understandable language." It further provides for review by the division of any notice or indication of injury....

...We are not impressed by the argument that the carrier was simply under a mistaken impression concerning the technical requirements of the act. The request for wage loss benefits here was adequate, under Section 440.20(4) to give "knowledge" of his claim, which is all that is required. The division is authorized by Section 440.185(10) to provide by rule for reporting wage loss claims....

...benefits from February 12 until the March 1 letter? We do not believe so. No section of the act explicitly directs an employer to inform a claimant of the employee's rights, benefits, and obligations under the workers' compensation act in the manner section 440.185(4) requires the Division to so inform an employee when notice of a claim is received....

...apply for social security disability. Moreover, the requirement for employer notification is founded upon practical necessity and the E/C's obligation to inform claimants of their rights and responsibilities under the Workers' Compensation Act. See § 440.185, Fla.Stat.; Turner v....

...ependent contractor for HJR and thus was entitled to an increased average weekly wage (AWW). I. Appellants initially assert that the claimant did not give the employer timely notice of injury within the statutory period of thirty days as mandated by Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes....

...es a two-year limitations period during which claims must be brought. The limitations period does not begin to run, however, until an injured employee is aware that he or she may be entitled to compensation benefits. See MacDonald, 671 So.2d at 210. Section 440.185(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: (2) Within 7 days of actual knowledge of injury or death, the employer shall report such injury or death to the carrier and the employee, on a form prescribed by the division, providing the following information: ....

...(e) Such other information as the division may require, including a clear and understandable summary statement of the rights, benefits, and obligations of injured workers under the Workers' Compensation Law. The duty to provide the required information rests not only on the employer under section 440.185(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), but also on the Division of Workers' Compensation under section 440.185(4), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...ware of possible entitlement to the benefits. We held in MacDonald, 671 So.2d at 210: Once the employer receives information that an employee's injury or condition may be work-related, the employer is required to comply with the notice provisions of section 440.185 by informing the employee of his rights....

...See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Tyler, 716 So.2d 295, 300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Mr. Hanssen had actual knowledge of his right to receive medical benefits—the only benefits sought in the petition and at issue on appeal—even if he never received the notice required by section 440.185(2)(e) and (4), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...ce. 5. The claimant has not proved with competent and substantial evidence that the lifting activity caused the claimant's medical problems. He certainly did not report it in a timely fashion to avail himself of the presumptions accorded by the law. Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (1986) states that an employee shall give notice of an injury to the employer within thirty days after the date of the injury. Although the DC found that claimant failed to give notice to his employer within the statutorily required thirty-day period, section 440.185(1)(b) permits a DC to excuse the failure to give notice if "for some satisfactory reason such notice could not be given." This court has recently addressed this statutory language in the cases of Slater v....

...The unrefuted testimony in the record indicated that the claimant notified his employer at some point in October, approximately 1 1/2 months after the alleged injury. The DC denied the claimant's claim for benefits finding that the claimant failed to give notice of the alleged injury in accordance with section 440.185....

..."penalty" provision such as § 440.34(2). In response to the claimant's contention that § 440.34(2)(b) was clearly intended to prevent exactly the type of recalcitrant conduct engaged in by the employer in this case, the employer/carrier points to § 440.185(2) and (9)....

...24, 1984. Later a claim was filed, which the employer/carrier (e/c) controverted. Following a hearing, the dc found that the claimant's notice of April 23 was not timely reported to the e/c within the statutorily required period of thirty days. See Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes. Section 440.185(1)(b), however, permits a dc to excuse the failure to give notice if "for some satisfactory *1148 reason such notice could not be given." (e.s.) We are in agreement that the record supports claimant's argument that the reason furnished by him was satisfactory....

...k injury. We find no error in any of the points raised on appeal, and specifically reject the employer/carrier's argument that Sheffield waived his right to wage-loss disability benefits by his failure to file a timely request for some of them under section 440.185(10), Fla. Stat. (1979). Section 440.185(10), added by the legislature in 1979, provides in pertinent part: Any compensable wage loss shall be reported by the employee to the carrier or self-insured employer within 30 days after the termination of the month for which such loss is claimed....

...Code Rule 38F-3.17(3), .19(1), notifying claimant that he might be eligible for wage-loss benefits. The letter advised claimant that he must file a request for wage-loss benefits for each month during which he suffered wage loss due to his injury, but it did not tell him when he must file such requests to comply with § 440.185(10). We hasten to add that the letter complied with Rules 38F-3.17(3) and .19(1); the rule, like the carrier's letter, makes no mention of the filing deadline. Employer/carrier argue that since section 440.185(10) contains no provision excusing failure to report wage-losses in a timely fashion, its reporting requirements are mandatory, and Sheffield has lost his benefits due to failure to comply with them....

...In DeFrees this court held, on facts showing the claimant's asserted inability to continue working for the employer because she suffered from a bronchial condition and her lack of notice by the E/C of her duty to conduct a work search, that claimant could not be denied disability benefits, because Section 440.185(2)(e) and (4), Florida Statutes (1979), placed an affirmative duty upon the employer to provide a summary of the worker's "rights, benefits, and obligations." Id....

...at 325-26. As a consequence of these reciprocal obligations — the duty imposed upon an employee by section 440.15(3)(b)(2) to establish that any wage loss claimed was the result of the compensable injury, and the obligation placed upon the employer by section 440.185(2)(e) and (4) to inform the injured worker of his or her responsibility for satisfying such burden — this court's case law has been consistent, with the exception of the majority's opinion, in requiring an employer to pay compensatio...

...The Workers' Compensation Act remains a presumptively self-executing, but fundamentally employer/carrier monitored, system. Saavedra v. Cedars Medical Center, 584 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); and Barnes v. PCH Walter T. Parker, 464 So.2d 1298 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Section 440.185(10), Florida Statutes (1991) provides that the Division of Workers' Compensation, Department of Labor and Employment Security shall require by rule that the employer inform a worker who suffers a permanent impairment of his possible e...

...lly that the act previously contained (as it still does) a reporting requirement that wage loss be reported by the employee to the carrier or self insured employer within 30 days after the termination of the month for which such loss is claimed. See § 440.185(10), Fla. Stat. (1991). Interpreting section 440.185(10), this court has held that in the absence of any contention that the E/C was prejudiced by a worker's untimely filing of WL forms, an untimely filing did not require denial of benefits....

...itial response to the petition for benefits. If a claimant contends that an employer or its carrier is estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense and the carrier demonstrates that it has provided notice to the employee in accordance with s. 440.185 and that the employer has posted notice in accordance with s. 440.055, the employee must demonstrate estoppel by clear and convincing evidence. (Emphasis added). Appellant argues that the emphasized language must be read to say that the E/C's failure to comply with either section 440.185 or section 440.055 estops the E/C from raising a statute of limitations defense. Under that view, no matter what the claimant may have known about her rights, the E/C can never raise a statute of limitations defense if it has failed to comply strictly with the provisions of either section 440.185 or 440.055. We disagree. *229 There is no dispute in this case that the E/C failed to comply with section 440.185(4)....

...In Tallahassee Memorial Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 743 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), this court addressed the post-1994 version of section 440.19. In Coleman, as in this case, the E/C had not apprised the claimant of all her rights, as required by section 440.185....

...ring the two years following her last visit to Dr. Loeb." Coleman, 743 So.2d at 1201. Implicit in this court's decision in Coleman was a rejection of Appellant's claim that a claimant need only show that the E/C failed to comply strictly with either section 440.185 or section 440.055 in order to estop the E/C's statute of limitations defense....

...We read the statute to say that after the E/C *230 raises a statute of limitations defense, the claimant must prove that the E/C should be estopped from raising the defense. The burden of proof on the claimant is a preponderance of the evidence, unless the E/C has complied with both sections 440.185 and 440.055, in which case the claimant has a higher burden of proof— clear and convincing evidence....

...I, therefore, join the majority in reversing the JCC's order. However, I do not agree that section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (1995), requires that the claimant must prove estoppel by a preponderance of the evidence unless the E/C complies with sections 440.185 and 440.055, Florida Statutes (1995). This case revolves around the statutory construction of section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1995). The claimant contends that because she never received the notice mandated by section 440.185, the JCC erred in determining that her claim for benefits was barred by the statute of limitations. As she raised estoppel in response to the E/C's statute of limitations defense, she claims that she was not required to prove estoppel unless the carrier demonstrated that it provided the notice required in section 440.185. Therefore, the claimant argues that because the carrier failed to meet this burden, the carrier's statute of limitations defense automatically fails. I agree. Thus, I respectfully dissent from the majority's contrary interpretation. Before 1989, section 440.185(3), Florida Statutes, provided that, within seven days of actual knowledge of an employee's injury, the employer would provide a statement of rights, benefits, and obligations to the employee and provide notice to the Division of Workers' Compensation. Section 440.185(4), Florida Statutes, required the division to mail an informational brochure to the employee immediately upon notice by the employer....

...ile a claim for benefits. Section 440.19, prior to 1989, contained no express provision regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations should the carrier fail to provide the injured employee with the notice of rights and obligations required in section 440.185. Case law, however, did provide for such tolling. Where the employee had not been informed *231 as required by section 440.185 and could demonstrate prejudice from the carrier's failure to notify, the carrier was estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense until the employee received actual knowledge of a possible entitlement to benefits....

...4), which provided, in pertinent part, that: If a claimant contends that an employer or its carrier is estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense and the carrier demonstrates that it has provided notice to the employee in accordance with s. 440.185 and that the employer has posted notice in accordance with s. 440.055, the employee must demonstrate estoppel by clear and convincing evidence. See ch. 93-415, § 23, at 135, Laws of Fla. The Legislature also amended section 440.185(4) to require the carrier, rather than the division, to notify the claimant of her rights, benefits, obligations and procedures for obtaining benefits under the workers' compensation statutes. See ch. 93-415, § 22, at 134, Laws. of Fla. Section 440.185(4) mandates that within three days after the employer or the employee informs the carrier of an injury, "the carrier shall mail to the injured worker an informational brochure approved by the division which sets forth in clear and und...

...es, and obligations of injured workers and their employers under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law." (emphasis added). As the claimant's accident occurred in August 1996, these amendments are applicable to this case. *232 Section 440.19(4) cites section 440.185; therefore, the statute must be read in pari materia with section 440.185....

...Ford Motor Co., 748 So.2d 993, 1000 (Fla.1999). Pursuant to the 1994 amendment, once the claimant alleges that the E/C are estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense, the statute requires the carrier to demonstrate that it provided the required notice under section 440.185....

...notice with the intent to deprive the claimant of benefits. With section 440.19(4), the Legislature struck a balance between pre-1989 case law and the 1989 provision, which so burdened the claimant. If the carrier cannot demonstrate compliance with section 440.185, then its statute of limitations defense automatically fails. The use of the word "shall" in section 440.185(4) denotes a mandatory action by the carrier. Therefore, if the carrier fails to comply with section 440.185(4), it cannot seek the protection of the affirmative defense of statute of limitations under section 440.19....

...and the claimant then carried his or her burden of proving estoppel by clear and convincing evidence. Under the plain meaning of section 440.19(4), the E/C must prove that the carrier actually provided the required notice to the claimant pursuant to section 440.185. The statute does not state, as the case law construing the pre-1989 statute held, that if the E/C proves that the claimant had knowledge of some benefits, the E/C cannot be estopped. By the use of the word "shall" in section 440.185, the carrier has the responsibility to provide notice of workers' compensation rights, benefits, and procedures to the claimant. Section 440.19 does not provide that if the E/C proves that the claimant had knowledge from some other source, then the carrier has met its burden. Under the *233 plain meaning of sections 440.19 and 440.185, only if the carrier demonstrates that the carrier, itself, provided the claimant the notice required in section 440.185 must the claimant demonstrate estoppel to the carrier's statute of limitations defense. If the carrier fails to demonstrate that notice, the carrier cannot defeat the claimant's estoppel argument. In construing section 440.19(4) in isolation, the majority renders the mandatory notice requirement in section 440.185(4) meaningless. Requiring a claimant to prove estoppel regardless of whether the carrier provides the notice under section 440.185 negates the statutory language mandating that the carrier provide such notice....

...(1995) ("It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure the prompt delivery of benefits to the injured worker."); see also S & A Plumbing v. Kimes, 756 So.2d 1037, 1041 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Here, the E/C did not clearly demonstrate that they provided the notice required under section 440.185 within the mandatory three-day period. Therefore, under the plain meaning of section 440.19(4), the carrier cannot raise the statute of limitations defense. The statute only requires that the claimant prove estoppel if the carrier has provided the requisite notice in section 440.185....

...aningless. The majority relies on Tallahassee Memorial Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 743 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), for support in its remand. However, in Coleman, it is unclear whether the carrier failed to comply with the notice requirement in section 440.185....

...Coleman, 743 So.2d at 1201 (citing Gaines, 710 So.2d at 139). This Court then remanded for the JCC to determine whether the claimant lacked actual knowledge of her rights under the workers' compensation law. Id. Because the Coleman decision is unclear regarding the carrier's compliance with section 440.185, I cannot agree with the majority that the decision implicitly rejected any "claim that a claimant need only show that the E/C failed to comply strictly with either section 440.185 or section 440.055 in order to estop the E/C's statute of limitations defense." Proof of a claimant's actual knowledge of workers' compensation rights and obligations is only relevant after the carrier demonstrates compliance with section 440.185....

...Therefore, remand for the JCC to determine whether the claimant lacked actual *234 knowledge of her rights under workers' compensation law is neither necessary nor appropriate. I would hold that the claimant has estopped the E/C's statute of limitations defense because the carrier failed to demonstrate compliance with section 440.185. Consequently, I would reverse and remand for the JCC to address the claimant's petition for benefits on its merits. NOTES [1] Section 440.185(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...*238 of her attorney in the proceedings below. BOOTH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Rules 3.17 and .18 were amended in 1984 but the operative provisions quoted here were unchanged. [2] The rules were promulgated under authority of Fla. Stat. section 440.185(10) (Supp....

...worker with forms for use in furnishing information pertinent to possible temporary partial disability benefits. Fla. Admin. Code R. 38F-3.19. Id. at 327. Rule 38F-3.19 obligates the E/C to furnish forms for TPD benefits to the claimant when the claimant, prior to MMI, returns to a partial wage-earning capacity. Furthermore, section 440.185(10), Florida Statutes (1981) provides that "[t]he division shall require by rule that the employer inform a worker who suffers a permanent impairment of his possible entitlement to wage-loss and other benefits and of the worker's obli...

...Notwithstanding the breach of its obligation to inform, it now inconsistently relies upon the statute of limitations defense. We are in agreement that Florida's statutory notice requirement bars the employer's assertion of the defense under such circumstances. Section 440.185(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...of statutory deadlines). The instant case is similar in its facts to those in Wood v. McTyre Trucking Co ., wherein the court, in holding the statute of limitations tolled due to the failure of the employer to comply with the notice requirements of section 440.185, stated: Under the Workers' Compensation Law, an employer is under a continuing obligation, once it has knowledge of an employee's injury, to place needed benefits in the hands of the injured worker....

...We therefore conclude from our review of the above authorities that if an employer has received substantially the same information as an employee indicating that a possible cause of the employee's injury or disease is work-related, the employer is required to comply with the notice provisions of section 440.185 by informing the employee of his or her rights therein, and if the employer breaches its duty to so inform, and such breach causes prejudice to the employee, the running of the statute of limitations will be tolled until such time tha...

...NOTES [1] That subsection provides in part: "The right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor ... is filed within 2 years after the time of injury... ." [2] As previously observed, Section 440.185, Florida Statutes, places the same obligation on the employer....

...We deny all the remaining motions, as they constitute prohibited reargument or disagreement with this court's decision. The E/C raises two issues in this case: First, that the judge of compensation claims (JCC) erred in deciding that claimant, Eddie Harcus, provided timely notice of his work injury, as required by section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (1997), and second, in finding that claimant suffered a compensable accident under a repeated trauma theory....

...ing out of and in the course and scope of employment." Specifically, the denial of benefits stated: The carrier has denied the claim in its entirety. The claimant did not report the alleged injury to the employer in a timely manner, as required by F.S. 440.185(1)....

...1st DCA 1986); West Coast Insulation v. Lee, 464 So.2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). It is well settled that it is the employer/carrier's responsibility to apprise *423 the claimant of his possible entitlement to benefits and his duty to conduct a work search. § 440.185(10), Fla....

...Bellino translating his original medical finding into a new rating through the use of the AMA tables. Deinema v. Pierpoint Condominiums, supra . The deputy also correctly noted in his order that Racz failed to file wage loss forms within the time specified in Section 440.185(10), Florida Statutes....

...The employer/carrier defenses are that there was no accident arising out of and in the course of claimant's employment and that no notice of the accident was given by the claimant. The deputy commissioner's (DC's) order denying benefits found that claimant failed to give notice of the alleged injury in accordance with Section 440.185 of the Florida Statutes....

...excess of a month after the date of the alleged accident." Although the DC never explicitly states her conclusions, it is clear that she found claimant failed to give proper notice because his notice occurred after the 30-day time limit set forth in Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (1987). Although competent substantial evidence exists to support the DC's finding that claimant failed to give notice within the statutorily required 30-day period, the DC failed to consider Section 440.185(1)(b), which permits a DC to excuse the failure to give notice if "for some satisfactory reason such notice could not be given." In the case of Slater v....

...Gaines argues that the statute of limitations was amended effective January 1, 1994, to allow a claimant to raise estoppel to the defense of statute of limitations if the employer or its carrier had failed to advise the claimant of his rights, benefits and obligations under the workers' compensation law as required by section 440.185, Florida Statutes, and that, because his existing claim had not been extinguished under the 1990 statute of limitations as of the effective date of this 1994 amendment, he should have the benefit of the 1994 statute....

...employee of his benefits. Although, prior to this 1989 amendment, section 440.19(1)(b) contained no express provision tolling the statute of limitations in cases where the employer or carrier failed to provide the informational materials required by section 440.185, case law tolled the statute if the employer or its carrier had failed to inform the claimant of his rights under the workers' compensation law....

...itial response to the petition for benefits. If a claimant contends that an employer or its carrier is estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense and the carrier demonstrates that it has provided notice to the employee in accordance with s. 440.185 and that the employer has posted notice in accordance with s....

...1st DCA 1993), the JCC determined that the date of injury establishes the statute of limitations applicable to a pending claim. Accordingly, even though the JCC accepted claimant's testimony that appellees, the employer and servicing agent, did not advise him of his rights, benefits and obligations under section 440.185(2)(f) and (4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...In Timmeny, the accident occurred on February 1, 1987, but the claim was not filed until June 29, 1990, after the effective date of the 1989 amendment to section 440.19 which precluded a claimant from raising the estoppel defense to the statute of limitations. In that case, contrary to section 440.185(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986), the employer had failed to notify the claimant that a possible *141 cause of the claimant's disease was his exposure to pesticides at his place of employment....

...extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death pursuant to s. 440.185(1) and the petition is filed within 2 years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment....

...ce of events above recited in the light of the current statutes does not show that the procedures here in question prevented any fair opportunity for action by appellant and the Division toward which the provisions of the law and rules are directed. § 440.185(10) and § 440.19(1) and (2)(d); Rule 38F-3.10 and 3.18, State of Florida Rules and Regulations....

...He first contends that the deputy commissioner committed a factual error in finding that claimant's injuries were the result of a non-compensable accident; and secondly, that claimant's notice of injury was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 440.185(a)....

...laimant of the intricacies of the statute of limitations. We hold that the statute of limitations did not bar the claimant's claim for benefits because the E/C failed to properly advise the claimant of her rights under the Workers' Compensation Law. Section 440.185(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), provides in part: (2) Within 7 days of actual knowledge of injury or death, the employer shall report such injury or death to the carrier and the employee, on a form prescribed by the division providing...

...This obligation cannot be met unless the employer informs the injured worker of the benefits to which he is entitled. Id. Once the employer receives information that an employee's injury or condition may be work-related, the employer is required to comply with the notice provisions of section 440.185 by informing the employee of his rights....

...the necessity for filing an employer's workers' compensation report on claimant. We hold that the deputy did *1330 not err in concluding that these facts were sufficient to have put the employer on notice of the injury pursuant to the provisions of section 440.185(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...The claimant responded that she notified the E/C within thirty days of obtaining a medical opinion concerning a causal connection between her disease and her employment. The E/C argues on appeal that the JCC erred in (1) finding that the claimant reported her industrial accident in a timely manner under section 440.185, Florida Statutes because the claimant waited two years after her disability began to report it, (2) finding the claimant's testimony to be credible where there were inconsistencies in her testimony, and (3) rendering its final order...

...1st DCA 1996), and Marley Roof Tiles v. Smarr, 672 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The claimant argues in response that (1) the claimant notified the E/C of her occupational accident in a timely manner after discovering the cause of her illness as required under section 440.185(1)(b), Florida Statutes, (2) the E/C did not preserve its argument as to credibility and the trial court's findings as to credibility were proper under the evidence, and (3) the E/C did not preserve its argument as to the timing of the order and the order was not stale, citing Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fuchs Baking Co., 577 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). II. Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (2000), requires a claimant to report an injury within thirty days after the date of, or the initial manifestation of an injury. Section 440.151(6) extends the period of time to report an occupational disease to ninety days. Section 440.185(1)(b) further provides that failure to advise an employer of an injury within thirty days after the date or initial manifestation of the injury does not bar a petition for benefits if: The cause of the injury could not be identified w...

...oceedings. Appellant contends the employer/carrier (E/C) is estopped from relying on the defense because it did not instruct him in its informational brochure of the one-year limitation period, which, he argues, is required by sections 440.19(4) and 440.185....

...The JCC's interpretation of the statute, as it existed as of the date of claimant's 1996 injury, was legally incorrect because it failed to take into account the subsection (4) amendment to 440.19, requiring the carrier to comply with the provisions of section 440.185(4) by mailing to the injured worker an informational brochure setting forth in clear and understandable language an explanation of his or her "rights, benefits, procedures for obtaining benefits ......

...tions defense. REVERSED and REMANDED. WOLF and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Subsection (4) amended section 440.19 by adding the language estopping an E/C from raising the statute of limitation defense unless the E/C shows that it had provided the section 440.185 notice to the employee, whereupon the employee is required to show estoppel by clear and convincing evidence....

...l September 2012, some sixteen months after it occurred. Had the Employer notified the Carrier in a timely fashion, as required by statute—“[w]ithin 7 days of actual knowledge of injury or death” 4 § 440.185(2), Fla. Stat. (2010)—then all of the statutorily-mandated notices and information, including the statutorily-required informational brochure (see § 440.185(4), Fla....

...he burden of filing their claims for benefits with the carrier, and because Wilczewski and Leon did not do, Ocean Reef was not barred from asserting the defense of immunity since it was relieved of its duty to report the injuries to the carrier. See § 440.185(2), Fla....

...led to worker’s compensation tort immunity on the grounds that Wilczewski and Leon failed to file a claim for benefits with the carrier for their illnesses. As stated in Timmeny v. Tropical Botanicals Corp., 615 So.2d 811, 814 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993): Section 440.185(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...A coworker testified that appellee complained of back pain following the event. Appellee related his back pain to that occurrence, and his treating physician opined that the activity was the cause of appellee's herniated disc. Appellee gave timely notice of the injury to his employer within thirty days as provided under section 440.185(1)....

...Claimant, a city police officer, was required to intercede in a domestic dispute; a physical struggle ensued and claimant's arm was severely twisted. Although claimant soon recovered from this physical trauma, he thereafter developed a disabling psychophysiological reaction. Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes, requires that an employer be given notice, within 30 days, that an injury has resulted from an industrial accident....

...with musculoskeletal difficulties and severe anxiety overlay. Although Tingler reported the employment altercation in the police report, he did *317 not indicate that he sustained any injury and he did not file a notice of injury until June of 1979. Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (1978), requires notice of injury within 30 days of its occurrence....

...The legislature could have included a requirement that the local governmental authority provide notice, but it did not do so in the Whistle-blower's Act. Cf., e.g., § 448.109(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018) (requiring employers to post notice of employees' rights to Florida minimum wage in a conspicuous and accessible place); § 440.185(10), Fla....

...requires reversal of this award. We reject this argument. The record contains no proof of the extent of Claimant's knowledge of the statutory work-search requirements. Just as we will not infer from a silent record the absence of notice required by section 440.185, Clark v....

...s after benefits are due. When the Legislature amended subsection 440.15(3)(b)(2) to read "after the employee has knowledge that a job search is required," it gave some relief to the employer from its failure to give the statutory notice required by section 440.185 as construed by this court in DeFrees v....

...oyee's knowledge of all statutory requirements regarding the performance of a job search to avoid the obligation in section 440.15(3)(b)(2). When the Legislature amended subsection 440.15(3)(b)(2), it did not delete from the act the provisions of subsection 440.185(2), Florida Statutes (1991), requiring an employer, within seven days after an employee's injury, to notify the employee in writing of the obligations that must be satisfied in order to establish entitlement to wage-loss benefits....

...r complete down to the last detail, see, e.g., Ardmore Farms v. Smith, 423 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), this court has never ruled that a claimant need not file a wage loss benefit request at all. Such would not be consistent with the dictates of § 440.185(10), Fla....

...arrier cannot be held responsible for failing to pay wage-loss benefits to the injured worker until a request from the employee for such benefits is made. I agree that once the carrier demonstrates it has complied with its statutory duty, imposed by Section 440.185, Florida Statutes (1979), of advising the worker that any payment of wage-loss benefits must be preceded by a request from him, the carrier cannot be said to have acted in bad faith by not distributing such benefits to the employee before its receipt of the request....

...failed to give her employer notice of a work-related injury within 30 days. Claimant raises the following two issues in this appeal: (1) whether the employer's knowledge of her accident constituted adequate notice of her back problem for purposes of section 440.185(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985); (2) and whether, in the circumstances of the instant case, claimant's unmanifested back injury extended the time for giving notice to her employer until it became apparent several weeks later....

...On August 30, 1985, the deputy commissioner held a hearing to determine whether claimant was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. The deputy commissioner denied claimant's claim, stating in his order that she "failed to give notice of ... [her] accident within the time (30 days) required by law." Section 440.185(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), provides the statutory time limit within which an employee must notify his employer of a work-related injury: Within 30 days after the date of injury, the employee shall give notice of such injury to the employer....

...give such notice... . The central question in this appeal is whether claimant's employer had knowledge of her injury at the time it occurred. The answer to this question depends on what the Legislature meant by the word "knowledge," as it is used in section 440.185(1)(a)....

...Davis further indicated that he asked claimant if she was all right and that she replied she thought so. We hold that these facts indicate that the employer was amply supplied with "knowledge" of claimant's injury sufficient to comply with the notice provision of section 440.185(1)(a). Subsection (1)(a) of section 440.185 is ambiguous in its terms and thus is susceptible to two different interpretations, one favoring the employer/carrier, and one favoring the claimant....

...r through learning of it in any reasonable way. We find the second interpretation to be the more persuasive one, and hold that it is unnecessary for an accident to have occurred in the direct view of the employer in order for the notice provision of section 440.185(1)(a) to be invoked, and that the provisions of the statute are satisfied whenever the employer becomes reasonably aware of the accident as did the employer here when he heard claimant scream from the cooler that she had hurt her arm....

...*246 ON MOTION FOR REHEARING SHIVERS, Judge. Appellees, Mac Dinton's Restaurant and its workers' compensation carrier, the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, move for rehearing contending our original opinion misapprehended the notice requirements of section 440.185(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985). Appellees acknowledge that section 440.185(1)(a) does not require an accident to have occurred within the direct view of the employer in order for the statute's notice requirement to be met....

...jured her arm. Nevertheless, appellees maintain our original decision was flawed because the employer did not have knowledge of the claimant's back injury within 30 days after it occurred on March 29, 1985. In other words, the notice requirements of section 440.185(1)(a) are not met unless the employer receives knowledge of the claimant's specific injury....

...port if the accident was more than twenty-four hours old. In view of the Act's provisions that notice is to be given within thirty days of the accident and that failure to give notice within such time period can be excused for a satisfactory reason, § 440.185(1), Fla....

...Because the subcontractor did not have workers' compensation coverage in effect when the claimant was injured, T.E. James became the claimant's statutory employer under section 440.10(1), Florida Statutes. The claimant's obligation to provide notice of injury in accordance with section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes, was satisfied by the notice to the subcontractor, from which legal notice may then be imputed to T.E....

...Subsequently, more than 30 days after the accident, the claimant filed a formal notice of the accident and filed two petitions for benefits (PFBs), which the E/C denied as untimely. The JCC conducted a hearing on the PFBs and excused the claimant's untimely filing pursuant to sections 440.185(1)(a) & (d), Florida Statutes (2005). Sections 440.185(1)(a) & (d) provide that an employee who fails to report any injury sustained during the course of employment to his employer within 30 days will be barred from filing a PFB unless the employer or the employer's agent had actual knowledge of...

...justify such failure. Although the JCC determined that the claimant's untimely filing was excused by the E/C's actual knowledge of the accident, we find that the JCC erroneously applied a constructive knowledge analysis in making its determination. Section 440.185(1)(a) does not define the term actual knowledge; however, Black's Law Dictionary defines the term as "direct and clear knowledge or knowledge of such information as would lead a reasonable person to inquire further." The record in thi...

...jury and causation which came into effect on January 1, 1994, Ch. 93-415, at 62, Laws of Fla., we reverse and remand for consideration in light of chapter 93-415, section 2, at 73, and section 22, at 132 (codified respectively at §§ 440.02(32) and 440.185(1), Fla....

...at she had failed to provide the statutorily required notice of injury. The judge of compensation claims found that Ms. Robison's injury was compensable and awarded the medical benefits she requested. Before it was amended effective January 1, 1994, section 440.185(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), provided that failure to give notice of an injury to an employer within thirty days of the date of the injury would bar a claim unless [t]he judge of compensation claims excuses such failure on the ground that for some satisfactory reason such notice could not be given....

...ised the employer within 30 days after obtaining a medical opinion indicating that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment; .... (d) Exceptional circumstances, outside the scope of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) justify such failure. § 440.185(1), Fla....

...Therefore I find that the claimant timely reported the injury to her employer. This analysis does not specify exceptional circumstances excusing timely notice of injury as to the first of Ms. Robison's claimed injuries. We therefore reverse and remand for the judge of compensation claims to reconsider this question under section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Appellee Mission Insurance Company was assessed a $100 penalty for late filing of a progress report on a workers' compensation claim. By Fla.Admin.Code Rule 38F-3.16 the Division prescribed the time within which such reports are to be filed, in accordance with section 440.185(5), Florida Statutes, which provides that carriers shall file reports “at such times and in such manner as the division may prescribe.” Appellee’s penalty was assessed pursuant to Rule 38F-24.13, which states that: Any carrier w...

...This enactment, as then effective, 1 provided that: Any employee or carrier who fails or refuses to send any form, report, or notice required by this section shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100 for each such failure or refusal.... The hearing officer concluded that a failure to file under section 440.185(9) does not include untimely filing as addressed by Rule 38F-24.13. However, the Division’s interpretation is a permissible construction of section 440.185(9) in context with section 440.185(5), allowing the assessment of a penalty upon a failure to file required reports at such times and in such manner as the Division prescribes. Rule 38F-24.13 comports with this interpretation of the statutes, and in enacting the rule the Division has therefore not exceeded its delegated authority. The order appealed is reversed. WIGGINTON and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. . Section 440.185(9) was amended in 1986 so as to now expressly authorize a penalty for failure to timely file required reports....

LEWIS, J. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Appellants challenge an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that bars Eugenio Gomez’s (Claimant’s) petition for benefits, based on the JCC’s interpretation of section 440.185, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...Gomez notified the Employer’s workers’ compensation carrier, The Hartford (Carrier), of the claim on approximately December 1, 2010. On January 26, 2011, *214 when the Carrier failed to activate a claim, Claimant filed a petition for benefits. The Carrier denied the claim, citing lack of timely notice pursuant to section 440.185, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...after the accident. The JCC reasoned that, because Claimant “pursued a course of treatment and received a diagnosis that could lead to more extensive medical care including surgery,” it was “necessary to determine if the exceptions in Section [440.185(l)](b) or (d) of the Statute would apply and render effective the otherwise not timely notice.” The JCC concluded that, based upon his assessment of Mrs....

...cts is reviewed de novo. See Airey v. Wal-Mart, 24 So.3d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). When the issue is one of statutory interpretation, appellate review is de novo. See McKenzie v. Mental Health Care, Inc., 48 So.Sd 767, 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Section 440.185(1) provides that: “An employee who suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of employment shall advise his or her employer of the injury within 30 days after the date of or initial manifestation of the injury....

...” Section 440.41(1), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that when the employer is not a self-insurer, “[njotice to or knowledge of an employer of the occurrence of the injury shall be notice to or knowledge of the carrier.” The plain language of section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (2010), the version of the operative statute based on Claimant’s date of accident, required Claimant to report his injury to his Employer within thirty days of its occurrence, and nothing more....

...egislature.”) (citations omitted). Likewise, section 440.41(l)’s plain language imputes the Employer’s knowledge to the Carrier. Accordingly, once Claimant gave notice to the Employer, Claimant fully satisfied the notice requirement imposed by section 440.185(1). The JCC had no authority to read into section 440.185(1) a requirement that Claimant report the injury to the Carrier within thirty days....

...We concluded that “as the JCC recognized at the final hearing, had the Legislature intended to give the JCC the authority to sanction an E/C or its attorney for violating section 440.105, it could have easily done so as it did in section 440.09(4) for fraud by employees.” Id. at 107 (footnote omitted). Nothing in section 440.185 requires an injured employee to notify the carrier of an injury, nor does the section permit a JCC to deny entitlement to benefits if the carrier is not timely notified. Section 440.185(2) addresses an employer’s obligation to notify the carrier of a reported injury, requiring that notice to the carrier be provided by the employer within seven days....

...Erskine, 634 So.2d 289, 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (holding evidence supported JCC’s excusal of claimant/employer’s failure to give timely notice of accident based on JCC’s finding that carrier was not prejudiced by late notice, an analysis then required by section 440.185(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1989) (repealed), without reference to section 440.41(1)); Vicki’s Styling, Inc....

...they have no bearing in the initial notice of injury, or section 440.41(l)’s clear statement that notice of injury to the employer is notice to the carrier. Erskine and Dean address notice of injury issues; however, in each instance the version of section 440.185(l)(a) there at issue contained a caveat that an employee’s late notice would be excused if the judge found there was no prejudice to the employer or carrier....

...In Erskine (date of accident May 23, 1990), this Court affirmed the JCC’s finding that the carrier was not prejudiced. 634 So.2d at 290 . In Dean , the date of the accident was not given, and the opinion does not specifically reference any statutory provision or year, but, it is noted that a version of section 440.185(1), identical to the 1990 version of section 440.185(1), was in effect *216 between 1975 and 1979, and was likely at issue given the opinion’s release date of December 7, 1979....

...(2010) (defining employee as officer of corporation who performs services for remuneration); see also § 440.02(15)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2010) (limiting number of corporate officers that can be exempted as non-employees under chapter 440). Nevertheless, the Legislature has not seen fit to implement within section 440.185 any specialized rules regarding notice where the employee has some ownership interest in the corporate employer....

...rcumstances unwieldy at its inception), it is axiomatic that it is the role of the Legislature, not this Court (and certainly not that of the JCC), to construct such specialized rules of law. Lest it be overlooked, the notice requirements imposed by section 440.185 are purely legislative edicts, and an injured employee who provides notice as required by the statute is not thereby excused from proving the merits of his case. Accordingly, although the plain language of section 440.185(1) might well have delayed the Carrier the notice it would have received had the Employer had other owners (of course, another owner might also have provided even more delayed notice, or the delay here might have indeed saved the Carrier money), to the extent this result is unfair, the resolution lies with the Legislature, not this Court. The statutory penalty imposed upon an employer who fails to timely report injuries is as set out in section 440.185(9)....

...ests of the Employer and Carrier are identical; (2) the Employer lacks standing to file an appeal because the order is wholly favorable to it; and (3) the Employer did not preserve for appellate review its argument that the JCC erred in not applying section 440.185(9), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...Because the Employer has standing to proceed with this appeal, Claimant’s notice of appeal and joinder were filed timely. Addressing finally the preservation issue, the Carrier’s premise is inaccurate— the Employer is not asking the JCC to impose the remedy in section 440.185(9); accordingly, there was no need to “preserve” this argument in the traditional sense. The sole issue before the JCC, and the dispositive issue here, is whether the JCC properly applied section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (2010), when he found Claimant/Employer failed to give the Carrier timely notice of the injury....

...e. Just as parties may cite case law in their briefs in support of their position that often times was not put before the JCC, they may also cite other statutory provisions that lend support to their argument. The Employer is not requesting that the section 440.185(9) penalty be applied; indeed, the JCC has no authority to impose this penalty. Instead, the Employer is referencing *218 that section in support of its argument that the JCC imposed an impermissible, non-textual penalty — one not found in section 440.185(1) — on Claimant....

...neously applied the reverse merger doctrine to support the finding of compensability. Third, there is competent substantial evidence to support the finding that the claimant properly notified his employer of his July 15, 1984 back injury pursuant to Section 440.185(1)....

...9.180(b)(1)(C), we review the nonfinal order issued below in which the Judge of Compensation Claims determined that claimant gave timely notice of his accident and injuries and was entitled to receive benefits. We agree with the employer/ear-rier that the order must be reversed. Under section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (1995), an employee must notify the employer of an injury suffered within the course and scope of employment “within 30 days after the date of or initial manifestation of the injury.” A claimant’s failure timely to notify the employer results in a bar to any petition for benefits unless one of the four statutory exceptions applies. § 440.185(1), Fla. Stat. In the instant case, although the JCC found claimant’s untimely notice was excused, she did not address the provisions of this statute. Appellee claimant suggests that paragraphs (b) and (d) of the section 440.185(1) apply here. Based on the findings made by the JCC, however, we are unable to determine whether the JCC applied this statute. 1 Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the JCC to make findings in accordance with section 440.185(1)....

...Richard Kane City Attorney City of Hallandale 308 South Dixie Highway Hallandale, Florida 33009 Dear Mr. Kane: You have asked for my opinion on the following question: Is a notice of injury form filed with a municipality, as a public employer, and the Division of Workers' Compensation pursuant to s. 440.185 , F.S., a public record if it contains medical information about the employee? In sum: A notice of injury form filed with a municipality, as the public employer, 1 and the Division of Workers' Compensation under s. 440.185 , F.S., is a public record. The fact that medical information is included in a document does not convert it to a medical record which is exempt from disclosure. Pursuant to s. 440.185 , F.S., as amended, 2 an employee is required to provide notice of injury to his or her employer within 30 days of the date of the injury....

...7 (e.s.) Thus, a distinction appears to have been made by the separate treatment of medical records and reports within the statute and there is no indication that the Legislature intended that a notice of injury form be treated as a medical report or record within the terms of s. 440.185 , F.S....

...Clearly, patient medical records may not be made public or disclosed generally without the patient's consent and this applies to medical records relating to Workers' Compensation claims. However, I find no evidence that a notice of injury form as described in s. 440.185 , F.S., was intended by the Legislature to be considered a medical record or report. Therefore, it is my opinion that a notice of injury form prepared and filed as required in s. 440.185 , F.S., is a public record pursuant to s....

...ty benefits. All information which is exempt from subsection (1) pursuant to this paragraph shall be maintained separately from nonexempt employment information. (e.g.) However, the worker involved in the instant situation is a municipal employee. 2 Section 440.185 , F.S., was amended by s. 22, Ch. 90-201, Laws of Florida. 3 Section 440.185 (1), F.S. 4 Section 440.185 (2), F.S. 5 Id. 6 See, Overholser Construction Company v. Porter, 173 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1964). 7 And see, s. 440.185 (6), F.S., which provides that the reports required by this section may not be used as evidence of any fact stated therein except for medical reports which may be admitted in a proceeding at the discretion of a judge of compensation claims....

him from the formal notice requirement of Section 440.-185, Florida Statutes (1981), regarding *122Boyd’s

..., and if so, whether the deputy commissioner erred in awarding claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits from May 11, 1983, and continuing, in view of claimant’s alleged failure to provide the E/C with formal notice of injury, pursuant to Section 440.185, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Christopher Brown. The Claimant’s last visit with Dr. Brown—the most recent provision of any claim-related medical benefit to the Claimant—took place in May of 1 The Claimant acknowledges that the E/C timely mailed the informational brochure required by section 440.185(4), Florida Statutes, detailing the applicable one- and two-year statutes of limitations. 2 2010....

...E/C was estopped from raising its limitations defense. Analysis 2 The record on appeal documents that at the hearing, the Claimant stipulated that he received the full informational brochure from the E/C as required by section 440.185, Fla....

...itiated payment of the IBs. Further, the Claimant stipulated that the E/C timely raised the affirmative defense of statute of limitations and that he received notice of the statute of limitations via an informational brochure compliant with section 440.185, Florida Statutes....

...On March 26, 2007, the Carrier sent Claimant an “initial claim packet” via certified mail, and Claimant’s wife signed the certified mail receipt. The packet included the informational brochure approved by the Department of Financial Services entitled “Facts for Florida Injured Employees,” as required by section 440.185(4), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...its April 4, 2007, notice of denial. On these bases, the JCC concluded that the E/C was es-topped from raising the statute of limitations defense provided in section 440.19(1). The JCC erred both in finding the E/C failed to meet the requirements of section 440.185(4) and in finding that the E/C was otherwise estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense. Neither section 112.18(1) nor section 440.185(4), nor any other portion of chapter 440, requires the E/C to provide an injured worker any details regarding the presumption found in section 112.18(1). Here, the claim packet sent to Claimant included the pamphlet published by the Department of Financial Services, the item specifically referenced in and required by section 440.185(4)....

...We find merit in Claimant's other argument, asserting that the E/C failed to prove Claimant had actual notice of the statute of limitations. Claimant had a compensable accident on June 10, 2003, but the E/C did not give him notice of the statute of limitations at that time as contemplated by section 440.185(4), Florida Statutes....

...*1125 Section 440.19(4) outlines the standards of proof and burdens of proof applicable in such a situation: If a claimant contends that an employer or its carrier is estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense and the carrier demonstrates that it has provided notice to the employee in accordance with s. 440.185 and that the employer has posted notice in accordance with s. 440.055, the employee must demonstrate estoppel by clear and convincing evidence. "We read the statute to say that ... [t]he burden of proof on the claimant is a preponderance of the evidence, unless the E/C has complied with both sections 440.185 and 440.055, in which case the claimant has a higher burden of proof—clear and convincing evidence." Crutcher v....

...o the E/C to show the claimant "had actual knowledge" of the limitations period. Fontanills v. Hillsborough County Sch. Bd., 913 So.2d 28, 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). In this case, it is uncontested that the E/C did not provide notice in accordance with section 440.185; therefore, the appropriate standard of proof by which Claimant could establish estoppel is preponderance of the evidence....

WENTWORTH, Judge. The appellant urges several points on appeal including a contention that the deputy commissioner erred in excusing claimant’s untimely notice of injury. § 440.185, Florida Statutes (Supp.1978)....

...2 *850 Section 440.192 took effect on January 1, 1994. Ch. 93-415, §§ 25 & 112, at 137 & 215, Laws of Fla. Previously, the E/C was required to file a notice to controvert within 21 days of receipt of an acknowledged claim from the division, or be subject to a monetary penalty under section 440.185(9)....

...carrier, but did not state that compensability was denied on that ground. While the record contains evidence that would support a finding of lack of notice, it also contains evidence that would support a finding that lack of notice could be excused. Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that failure to give notice of a claim shall not be a bar if such failure is excused for a satisfactory reason....

reasoning, the JCC excused the 30-day notice under section 440.185, Florida Statutes (1991), and found that notice

timely notice of Claimant’s injury pursuant to section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (1989); 2) finding a causal

employer in compliance with section 440.185(7), Florida Statutes. Section 440.185(7) provides that “[n]otice

claimant did not follow the literal requirement of § 440.-185(1), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), governing

...MacDonald of Dixon & Associates, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) finding his claim barred because he failed to give notice of his injury to the employer/carrier (E/C) within 30 days of the injury as required by section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (2007). Claimant argues the JCC erred by finding he was not excused from complying with this requirement pursuant to section 440.185(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), because the E/C had actual knowledge of his injury....

...l knowledge of the injury be communicated by the employee to the employer within thirty days or the petition is barred." (emphasis in original). The JCC cited Marion County v. Futch, 983 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), as support for this conclusion. Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes, provides that an "employee who suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of *1286 employment shall advise [the] employer within 30 days after the date of ... the injury." If an employee fails to comply with this requirement, his claim is barred. An employee may be excused from this notice requirement if "[t]he employer or the employer's agent had actual knowledge of the injury." See § 440.185(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The JCC's finding that "the statute" requires "actual knowledge of the injury to be communicated ... to the employer within thirty days" conflates the notice provision of section 440.185(1) with the "actual knowledge" exception found in subsection (1)(a)....

...ss than thirty days after the accident. Thus, there was nothing constructive about the E/C's knowledge that an accident occurred, nor that Claimant experienced some sort of injury. This was sufficient to satisfy the "actual knowledge" requirement in section 440.185(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Constructors, Inc., 527 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Winter Park Mem'l Hosp. v. Brown, 452 So.2d 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Based on the foregoing, the JCC erroneously concluded Claimant failed to satisfy the actual knowledge exception to the thirty-day notice requirement in section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes....

...ution of any claims. Claimant also argues that the JCC erred by ruling on reserved claims for attorney’s fees and costs related to previously provided benefits. We agree and reverse the order on appeal, and remand the case for additional findings. Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (2002) requires that a claimant advise his employer of an injury within 30 days of either the date of the injury or the date of the initial manifestation....

...lternate date for timely reporting of this claim based on alleged repetitive trauma (nor did the JCC make any findings as to whether Claimant suffered an injury of any sort). Instead, the JCC appears to have interpreted the reporting requirements of section 440.185 in a manner that *1225 would require this court to add the phrase “whichever occurs first” following the two alternate dates after which an employee can timely report an injury....

...Conflicts in the lay testimony and expert medical opinion concerning other elements of the claim, such as causation, remain unresolved and this Court cannot perform a meaningful review on the issue of whether Claimant’s report of injury was timely under section 440.185....

...We find the employer/carrier’s appeal totally without merit. Although the employer had actual notice of claimant’s injury to his knee from the outset, it failed to file a first report of injury until December 29, 1980, ignoring the requirement of Section 440.185(2)....

...In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant first argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in applying the 30-day notice requirement for the reporting of injuries arising out of and in the course and scope of employment, found in subsection 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (2012), to his subsequent intervening accident for which he sought coverage under subsection 440.092(5), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...[The JCC found] that the injuries sustained by the Claimant in the motor vehicle accident were the direct and natural consequence of the original injury of July 20, 2012.” This finding is not challenged by the E/C. The JCC nevertheless found that the accident was “not compensable under Florida Statute 440.185(1) for the failure of the Claimant to advise his Employer within 30 days after the date of the injury.” The JCC correctly noted that subsection 440.185(1) “requires an employee who suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of employment to advise his employer with 30 days” that an accident has occurred....

...to have arisen out of and in the course and scope of employment, subsection (5), as noted, addresses a subsequent injury during an activity that does not fall within the course and scope of the employee’s employment activities. Thus, by its plain language, subsection 440.185(1) does not apply to subsequent accidents because the injuries sustained in those accidents do not “arise out of and in the course of employment.” Because subsection 440.092(5) is silent on any reporting requirement, we must lo...

...asserting the statute of limitations defense, Mr. Acle cites Southern Bell v. MacDonald, 671 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(holding that the statute of limitations did not bar claim for benefits where E/C failed to advise claimant of her rights under section 440.185(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1985)); Timmeny v....

...See Chavarria v. Selugal Clothing, Inc., 840 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)." McCurdy v. City of Hialeah, 949 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). At issue below was whether "[t]he cause of the injury could not be identified without a medical opinion." § 440.185(1)(b), Fla....

...BARFIELD and BENTON, JJ., concur; BROWNING, C.J., dissents with separate opinion. BROWNING, C.J., dissenting. I would reverse, and I accordingly dissent. Background The facts that show the JCC erroneously failed to properly apply the "medical opinion" exception provided by Section 440.185(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), to Appellant's failure to report his industrial injury within 30 days from its occurrence are rather complex....

...At treatment, he was advised by his treating physician that his condition was not spina bifida, but accidental in nature. On these facts, the JCC reversibly erred by denying Appellant benefits for failure to report his industrial accident within 30 days from its occurrence. See § 440.185(1)(b) Fla....

...Whatmough, 487 So.2d 1169, 1171-72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (applying Larson's "reasonable person" test). Had the correct test been applied, it seems inconceivable to me that the facts here would not impel a finding that Appellant was entitled to the "medical opinion" exemption under section 440.185(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...The notice given was sufficient to satisfy claimant’s initial obligation, even though additional symptoms developed later. See Alfonso v. Mac Dinton’s Restaurant, 515 So.2d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), on motion for reh. The employer was thus in turn obligated to furnish notice to the Division of Workers’ Compensation. See section 440.185(2), Florida Statutes. The Division would then have been required to send claimant an informational brochure which included a summary of the rights, benefits, and obligations pertaining under chapter 440. See section 440.185(4), Florida Statutes....

the dates of May 11,1980, and July 16, 1980. Section 440.185(10), Florida Statutes, requires a wage-loss

...AM. We conclude that the judge of compensation claims erred in precluding the employer and carrier from asserting a defense based on the statute of limitations. An employer who fails to provide an employee with the informational brochure required by section 440.185, Florida Statutes may be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense, see Gaines v....

...Glades Correctional Inst. v. Bukowski, 528 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1DCA 1988)[.] Our review of the record shows that this finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence, and accordingly, we affirm the order below. BOOTH, SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ„ concur. . § 440.185, Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. The employer/carrier (E/C) appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) finding Claimant’s claim was not time-barred by the notice provisions of section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...The E/C argues that the JCC erred by finding Claimant complied with the statute by informing the E/C of her injury within thirty days of realizing the nature, seriousness and probable compensable character of the injury. For the reasons explained below, we affirm. Section 440.185(1), as amended effective January 1, 1994, provides, in relevant part: An employee who suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of employment shall advise his or her employer of the injury within 30 days after the date of or initial manifestation of the injury, (emphasis added)....

...riousness and probable compensable character of his injury or disease.” Id. at 485 . The E/C argues that the amendment abolished the “reasonable person” doctrine. To the contrary, the doctrine is still a valid basis for finding compliance with section 440.185(1). Consequently, the JCC did not err by applying it. Because competent substantial evidence supports the JCC’s finding that Claimant complied with section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes, by informing her employer of her injury within thirty days of its initial manifestation, the JCC’s order is AFFIRMED....

appellant filed a report of this injury, pursuant to § 440.185(2), Fla.Stat. (1979), listing a Palm Beach County

...R CURIAM. This is an appeal of final worker’s compensation order denying compensation. The JCC determined that Claimant failed to provide timely notice of his injury and that Claimant did not meet the exceptions to the timely notice requirement in section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (2000). However, having reviewed the undisputed facts in this case, we hold that these facts do fall within the exceptional circumstances exception in section 440.185(l)(d)....

...In this workers’ compensation appeal, the claimant appeals the denial of his claim for an award of bad faith attorney’s fees. We reverse and remand with directions. The three and one-half month delay by the employer in filing the notice of injury pursuant to Section 440.185(2), Florida Statutes, is inexcusable bad faith....

...1st DCA 2005), the claimant asserts that he was not given sufficient information as to his rights in connection with this limitations period, despite the employer having provided him with an approved informational brochure in accordance with § 440.19(4) and § 440.185(4), Florida Statutes....

Compensation (the Division) as required by Section 440.185, Florida Statutes (1983). Due to the employer/carrier’s

...9 amendments, to the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Division’s implementing rules. In order to qualify for the wage loss benefits available under Section 440.15(3)(b), the act requires the worker to report wage losses monthly to the employer. Section 440.185(10)....

...injury. The judge also erred in imposing a good-faith work search requirement on claimant, in that the letter sent by the employer did not inform claimant of his obligation to conduct a good-faith work search and was therefore legally insufficient. § 440.185(2)(e), Fla.Stat....

...Appellant, Martin Perez-Ramirez, appeals a final order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying com-pensability of his back condition. The JCC found that the claim was barred due to appellant’s failure to report the injury within the thirty-day reporting period mandated by section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (2000); excluded appellant’s independent medical examining physician’s testimony because the physician charged and collected in excess of the maximum allowable fee for an independent medical examination, for which exclusion the JCC relied on City of Riviera Beach v....

...ify the employer of his alleged work-related injury because the JCC found that the claimant’s actions were reasonable and the E/C were not prejudiced by the untimely notice. Because the JCC did not address the provisions of the applicable statute, section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), we reverse and remand for such consideration....

obligations upon the employer and the employee: Section 440.185(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that

...Whether the Judge of Industrial Claims erred, as both a matter of fact and matter of law, in finding appellee had sustained a compensable hernia on or about April 23, 1975. 1 2. Whether the Judge erred in suggesting appellee had satisfied the notice requirements of § 440.185, Fla.Stat....

take into consideration that *407provision of Section 440.185(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), allowing the