Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...he beginning but also attorneys' fees and other specified costs. If a carrier fails to pay an installment due without an award within the specified period of fourteen days, under specified circumstances, the carrier suffers a penalty of 10% thereof, Section 440.20(5); and if the carrier fails to pay an award within fourteen days, there may be added thereto an amount equal to 20% thereof, Section 440.20(6), F.S....

...(2) Payments of Benefits When Challenged Benefits are Abandoned. When benefits challenged on appeal have been abandoned under subdivision (d)(1) above, benefits no longer affected by the appeal are payable within 30 days of the service of the brief together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, from the date of the order of the lower tribunal making the award. (3) Payment of Benefits After Appeal. If benefits are ordered paid by the court on completion of the appeal, they shall be paid, together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, within 30 days after the court's mandate....

...(2) Payments of Benefits When Challenged Benefits are Abandoned. When benefits challenged on appeal have been abandoned under subdivision (d)(1) above, benefits no longer affected by the appeal are payable within 30 days of the service of the brief together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, from the date of the order of the lower tribunal making the award. (3) Payment of Benefits After Appeal. If benefits are ordered paid by the court on completion of the appeal, they shall be paid, together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, within 30 days after the court's mandate....

...nstitution, F.S.A., which authorizes those courts to "issue writs of * * * certiorari." Sullivan v. Mayo, supra. Since the Court of Appeal decision last mentioned, *427 the Florida Legislature has enacted Chapter 59-422, Laws of Florida 1959, F.S.A. § 440.20(10)....

...The substantive rights are governed by the law in force when the injury occurred on December 23, 1955, and that would be Chapter 29778, Laws of Florida 1955. *429 Section 5, Chapter 29778, Laws of Florida, supra, reads as follows: "Section 5. Subsection (10) of Section 440.20, Florida Statutes, 1953, is amended to read: "440.20 Payment of Compensation — "(10) Whenever the Commission determines that it is for the best interests of a person entitled to compensation, the liability of the employer for such compensation shall be discharged by the payment of a lump sum eq...

...The deputy commissioner ordered payment of interest and a ten percent penalty for late payment, and awarded attorney's fees to claimant's attorney upon a finding of bad faith delay in payment of benefits. We will first consider the assessment of a ten percent penalty. Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1979), in pertinent part similar to former Section 440.20(5), Florida Statutes (1978), provides in part: (7) If any installment of compensation for ......

...there shall be added to such unpaid installment a punitive penalty of an amount equal to ten percent ... unless notice [controverting claim] is filed ... or unless such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control. Section 440.20(6) sets out the procedure to be followed if the carrier "controverts the right to compensation." Subsection (6) requires, among other things, that the notice set forth "the grounds upon which the right to compensation is controverted t...

...forth in detail the reason or reasons why the claim has been controverted. On appeal, the carrier argues that it should be relieved of the penalty under the above statute because it filed a notice to controvert within twenty-one days, as required by Section 440.20(6)....

...The decision of the division is not res judicata, but does become a part of the proceeding. As a corollary to the expanded duties of the division, the 1979 amendments increased the burden upon the carrier to investigate and promptly resolve claims based upon their merit. Section 440.20(6) added the requirement that when a claim is controverted, the carrier must not only set forth the grounds upon which the right to compensation is controverted, it must also include a written explanation setting forth in detail the reason or reasons why the claim has been controverted. The penalty provisions of Section 440.20(7) have been modified so that penalties are now "punitive," and under subsection (17) no penalty assessed against any carrier or self-insurer can be recouped in the rate base, premium, or rate filing. The division has been given additional responsibility, under Section 440.20(16)(a) to examine "on an ongoing basis" claims files in its possession in order to identify "questionable claims handling techniques, questionable patterns of claims, or a pattern of repeated unreasonably controverted claims by employers, carriers or self-insurers......

...f wages paid during the period was left blank. We are not impressed by the argument that the carrier was simply under a mistaken impression concerning the technical requirements of the act. The request for wage loss benefits here was adequate, under Section 440.20(4) to give "knowledge" of his claim, which is all that is required....

...1981), the constitutionality of section 440.11, relating to actions of claimants against negligent co-employees, was upheld because the court found that the statute merely modified the degree of negligence required, rather than abolishing the right of action. Similarly, this court has applied the exception to section 440.20(12)(a), which prohibits the release of the employer/carriers' liability for future medical expenses, and has concluded that that section is constitutional in that it merely limits a right of action rather than abolishing it....

...ecks were never received and cashed by claimant. The burden of failure of employer-carrier to make payment within the statutory period is placed by the majority on claimant when the applicable statutory provision places it on employer-carrier. F.S., Section 440.20, F.S.A....

...ERVIN, Justice (dissenting on rehearing). The opinion of the majority on rehearing further substantiates the petitioner's contention that the employer-carrier's burden of seeing that a claimant is timely paid his compensation benefits as required by, F.S., Section 440.20, F.S.A., is transferred by the Industrial Relations Commission and the Court majority to claimant who, by this transference is made to suffer the bar of the two-year statute....

...On the other hand, the concern's individual creditor shoulders such burden. Thus it appears a claimant, who admittedly was never paid the compensation, has the presumptions and burdens that he was paid by the employer-carrier resolved against him, although Section, F.S., 440.20 F.S.A....

...of benefits. In particular, the E/SA notified Lombardi that it intended to assert an additional offset based on past benefits it paid Lombardi that exceeded 100% of Lombardi's AWW. The E/SA based its claim of entitlement to an additional offset upon section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1993), and this Court's decision in Escambia County Sheriffs Department v....

...t unresolved in the wake of our opinion in Grice, 692 So.2d at 898. [10] In Grice, the employee received workers' compensation benefits, state disability retirement benefits and social security disability benefits. Id. at 897. This Court interpreted section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1993), [11] to mean that "an injured worker, except where expressly given such a right by contract, may not receive benefits from his employer and other collateral sources which, when totaled, exceed 100% of [a claimant's] average weekly wage." Id....

...ce was directed only to whether additional collateral benefits should be included in computing the AWW 100% cap for total benefits. We have acknowledged that the 100% AWW cap that we discussed in Grice did not come from a strictly literal reading of section 440.20(15), but rather from a "judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute." [14] Dixon, 767 So.2d at 445; see Acker, 755 So.2d at 601....

...overnment paid the social security disability." Lombardi, 738 So.2d at 497. Lastly, and most importantly, section 440.21 was not implicated in Grice, and therefore, in that case we could not have addressed the interplay between section 440.21(1) and section 440.20(15)....

...ULT OF A SUBROGATION LIEN UNDER SECTION 440.39, FLORIDA STATUTES, SHOULD THE EMPLOYER/CARRIER APPLY THE LIEN REDUCTION BEFORE OR AFTER CALCULATING TOTAL BENEFITS AND APPLYING THE 100 PERCENT AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE CAP AND RESULTANT OFFSET AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES, AND Escambia County Sheriff's Dept....

...1st DCA 1999), review dismissed, 753 So.2d 565 (Fla.2000). Additionally, Lombardi has raised the spectre of many unintended consequences and unanswered questions that have arisen as a result of Grice. However, it is beyond the scope of this opinion to deal with these issues. [11] Section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: When an employee is injured and the employer pays his full wages or any part thereof during the period of disability, or pays medical expenses for such employee, and the case is contested by the...

..."However, the total benefits from all sources cannot exceed the employee's weekly wage." Id. at 254 (citing Brown v. S.S. Kresge Co., 305 So.2d 191 (Fla.1974) and Domutz v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 339 So.2d 636 (Fla.1976)). Once the 100% cap has been reached, workers' compensation must be reduced pursuant to section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes, which states: When an employee is injured and the employer pays his full wages or any part thereof during the period of disability, or pays medical expenses for such employee, and the case is contested by the car...

...urnishes satisfactory proof to the judge of such payment of compensation and medical benefits. Any payment by the employer over and above compensation paid or awarded and medical benefits, pursuant to subsection (14), shall be considered a gratuity. § 440.20(15), Fla.Stat....

...He concluded that under Section 440.34, F.S., F.S.A., attorneys for the successful claimants were entitled to compensation and that their fees should be paid by the carrier. He based this finding on the holding that it was incumbent upon the carrier and not the Industrial Commission to make the investigation. When Section 440.20(8), F.S., F.S.A., is read in conjunction with Section 440.16, F.S., F.S.A., said the Deputy Commissioner, this conclusion is evident....

...ncy of any and all claimants. The dissenting Commissioner also contended that it was difficult to visualize a set of facts which more strongly indicated that the full Commission should make the investigation provided in Sec. 440.25, even though Sec. 440.20(8) was technically limited....

...440.34(1), F.S., F.S.A., entitled to an award of attorneys fees to be paid by the carrier? The answer to this question turns in the main on the interpretation of Sec. 440.34(1), F.S., F.S.A., as follows: "If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 of this chapter, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of same, or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation, and the injured person shall have employed an attorney...

...erred in imposing 10% statutory penalties on all unpaid compensation benefits which were not paid when due. The D.C.'s order does not reveal why a penalty was imposed. Moreover, there is nothing in the record showing that the claim had been controverted by the employer within 21 days, as required by Section 440.20(6); however, *479 in that portion of the order awarding attorney's fees, it was stated that the e/c controverted the claim for additional benefits....

...It is true that the e/c carries the burden as to whether it has sufficiently controverted a claim. See G & L Motor Corp. v. Taylor, 182 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1966). Nevertheless, the D.C. should not impose a penalty if the employer has a legitimate excuse for not controverting. See Section 440.20(7), and Burnup & Sims, Inc....

...(2) Payments of Benefits When Challenged Benefits a A re Abandoned. When benefits challenged on appeal have been abandoned under subdivision (d)(1) above, benefits no longer affected by the appeal are payable within 30 days of the service of the brief together with interest as required *878 under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, from the date of the order of the lower tribunal making the award. (3) Payment of Benefits After Appeal. If benefits are ordered paid by the court on completion of the appeal, they shall be paid, together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, within 30 days after the court's mandate....

...See id. The First District reasoned that Marchenko v. Sunshine Companies, 894 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), established that a "JCC no longer has jurisdiction to vacate settlement agreements pursuant to the statutory changes *1093 made in 2001 to section 440.20(11)(c)." Flamily, 924 So.2d at 80....

...[2] The First District further reasoned that this statutory change was a procedural change, which permitted retroactive application to Flamily's 1996 settlement agreement. See id. This review followed. II. ANALYSIS A. Introduction The City asserts that the 2001 amendment that added subsection (c) to section 440.20(11) divested the JCCs of the authority to vacate or set aside lump-sum settlement agreements entered into by claimants who are represented by counsel....

...§ 440.33(1), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied). Thus, we conclude that the JCCs clearly had jurisdiction to vacate or set aside compensation settlement agreements prior to the 2001 legislation. In 2001, the Legislature added subsection (c) to section 440.20(11), which is quoted above. Subsequently, in Flamily, the First District concluded that this amendment to section 440.20(11) rescinded and nullified the subject matter jurisdiction of JCCs to set aside settlement agreements of workers' compensation claims....

...except as follows: (a) If an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter.... (b) When an employer commits an intentional tort that causes the injury or death of the employee. § 440.11(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied). Additionally, the 2001 amendment that added section 440.20(11)(c) did not create an additional exception of any type. We conclude that if the Legislature had intended for section 440.20(11)(c) to constitute an explicit exception, it would have been explicit and most probably included under section 440.11, with the other exceptions....

...settlement agreements of workers' compensation claims expressly and directly conflicts with well-established precedent that JCCs have exclusive jurisdiction over workers' compensation matters. C. Effect of 2001 Amendment That Added Subsection (c) to Section 440.20(11) To analyze the 2001 amendment that added subsection (c) to section 440.20(11), we must first look to the plain language of the statute....

...We disagree with the City's assertion that a JCC has ever lost this authority, which was the conclusion of the First District in the decision below, and would be completely contrary to the uniform holdings of all other district courts with regard to jurisdiction. In the amendment that added section 440.20(11)(c), the following language is critical: "The settlement agreement requires approval by the judge of compensation claims only as to the attorney's fees paid to the claimant's attorney by the claimant." § 440.20(11)(c), Fla....

...ing approval by the JCC of a lump-sum settlement agreement, even though approval is not required. Additionally, the legislation only references "approval." There is absolutely no mention of jurisdiction or the concept of set aside or vacation within section 440.20(11)(c)....

...nd unrepresented parties as to whether JCC approval was required for their workers' compensation settlement agreements under various circumstances. This is supported by the other changes instituted by the 2001 legislation. Along with the addition of section 440.20(11)(c), the legislation added "[w]hen a claimant is not represented by counsel" to the beginning of section 440.20(11)(b). (Emphasis supplied.) This lone addition to section 440.20(11)(b) modified this entire subsection, making representation by counsel a salient factor. Moreover, all of the following language was stricken from section 440.20(11)(b): When the claimant is represented by counsel or when the claimant and carrier or employer are represented by counsel, final approval of the lump-sum settlement agreement ... shall be approved by entry of an order.... Ch.2001-91, § 17, at 779, Laws of Fla. (emphasis supplied). This deletion is consistent with Flamily's contention that the "requires" language of section 440.20(11)(c) does not prevent a JCC from either approving or vacating a settlement agreement of a represented claimant when the parties so request....

...Trazenfeld, 833 So.2d 734, 738 (Fla.2002) ("The word `may' when given its ordinary meaning denotes a permissive term rather than the mandatory connotation of the word `shall.'"). Here, the Legislature deleted the language that mandated approval under section 440.20(11)(b) to correlate with the language in section 440.20(11)(c) that made approval permissive upon the request of the parties. Moreover, the same 2001 amendment added section 440.20(11)(d), which includes the following language: *1096 With respect to any lump-sum settlement under this subsection, a judge of compensation claims must consider at the time of the settlement, whether the settlement allocation provides for the appropriate recovery of child support arrearages. § 440.20(11)(d), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied). This language is consistent with a JCC retaining jurisdiction to review settlement agreements, even though it may no longer be required to approve them. [3] In conclusion, the plain language of section 440.20(11), in its entirety, illustrates that the legislative intent for adding subsection (c) was to eliminate the requirement that a JCC approve the non-attorney fee portion of a lump-sum settlement agreement for a represented claimant....

...quirement of JCC approval for non-attorney fee portions of a lump-sum settlement agreement is efficient because the paperwork and delay that may result from JCC approval is often unnecessary for a well-represented claimant. The following language of section 440.20(11)(c) illustrates the increased efficiency under the amendment: "The parties need not submit any information or documentation in support of the settlement, except as needed to justify the amount of the attorney's fees." § 440.20(11)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001). The plain language of section 440.20(11)(c) fully implements the legislative intent of increased efficiency, while allowing JCCs to retain the power to protect represented claimants....

...d in a JCC to set aside or vacate the settlement agreement based upon matters that may be discovered after execution of the settlement agreement. Moreover, our interpretation is consistent with the exception for attorneys fees that is provided under section 440.20(11)(c). As described above, section 440.20(11)(c) does not eliminate the requirement that attorney-fee portions of represented claimants' lump-sum settlement agreements be approved by a JCC....

...ent. As the majority notes, before 2001 courts (including this Court) consistently interpreted the Worker's Compensation Act to vest the JCC with jurisdiction to set aside settlement agreements. Majority op. at 1093. In 2001, the Legislature amended section 440.20(11) to include the language presently found in subsection (c)....

...section as divesting the JCCs of authority to approve, vacate, or set aside settlement agreements, except when a party is unrepresented by counsel. Compare Flamily, 924 So.2d at 78 (holding that due to the retroactive application of the amendment to section 440.20(11)(c) the JCC was without jurisdiction to set aside a 1996 settlement agreement); and Marchenko v. Sunshine Co., 894 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that since the 2001 amendment to section 440.20(11)(c) the JCC is without jurisdiction to approve or set aside settlement agreements); with Vallecillo v. Bachiller Ironworks, 982 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that where the claimant is unrepresented by counsel, section 440.20(11) does not apply, and therefore the JCC has jurisdiction to rescind a settlement agreement). To date, the First District is the only district court of appeal to address the effect of section 440.20(11)(c)....

...s incurred in the course and scope of employment). Flamily and the alleged conflict cases can be read together to place subject matter jurisdiction over workers' compensation claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the JCC, except as provided in section 440.20(11)(c)....

...The settlement agreement requires approval by the judge of compensation claims only as to the attorney's fees paid to the claimant's attorney by the claimant. The parties need not submit any information or documentation in support of the settlement, except as needed to justify the amount of the attorney's fees. § 440.20(11)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied). [3] Contrary to the City's assertion, the staff analysis dated May 31, 2001, from the House of Representatives Committee on Insurance, is not dispositive with regard to the legislative intent behind section 440.20(11)(d), which is clear on its face....

...We choose not to address these issues, but instead, remand for consideration. These issues were not addressed by the First District in the decision below. Additionally, Flamily contends that the First District incorrectly concluded that the 2001 amendment, which added section 440.20(11)(c), applied retroactively. We also choose not to address this issue. As discussed above, the 2001 amendment did not divest the JCCs of jurisdiction to set aside or vacate settlement agreements. Thus, under our interpretation of section 440.20(11)(c), we grant relief for Flamily with regard to the 1996 settlement agreement without addressing whether the 2001 amendment should apply retroactively. [5] Section 440.20(11)(c) reads: (c) Notwithstanding s....

...The settlement agreement requires approval by the judge of compensation claims only as to the attorney's fees paid to the claimant's attorney by the claimant. The parties need not submit any information or documentation in support of the settlement, except as needed to justify the amount of the attorney's fees. § 440.20(11)(c), Fla....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. August 24, 2004. *432 Kevin G. Bennett; Grossman & Goldman, P.A., Boca Raton, for Appellant. Valentina M. Tejera, Miami, for Appellee. HAWKES, J. The issue before us is whether the amendments to section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), adopted by the 2000 legislature, eliminated the previously existing jurisdiction of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) to construe or enforce settlement agreements, or to determine whether a settlement was reached....

...We conclude the amendments did not alter the JCC's jurisdiction and reverse. Betty Jean Jacobsen (Claimant) and Appellees, Ross Stores and Sedgwick Claims Management Services (E/C), through mediation, entered a written, signed washout settlement agreement pursuant to section 440.20(11)(c),(d), and (e), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...representative of Claimant's estate, filed a notice of substitution of parties and a motion to compel enforcement of the settlement agreement. Following a hearing on Appellant's motion to compel, the JCC entered an Order concluding that, pursuant to section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), she lacked jurisdiction to either determine whether a washout settlement agreement was reached, or to enforce such an agreement....

...Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. See Seven Hills, Inc. v. Bentley, 848 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); see generally Klonis v. Dep't of Revenue, 766 So.2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). A claimant represented by counsel may enter a lump sum settlement agreement. See § 440.20(11)(c), Fla. Stat. However, pursuant to the year 2000 amendments to section 440.20(11)(c), such "settlement agreement requires approval by the [JCC] only as to the attorney's fees paid to the claimant's attorney by the claimant....

...Zientz of Williams & Zientz, Miami, for appellant. *493 Edward W. Levine of Marlow, Shofi, Connell, Valerius, Abrams, Lowe & Adler, Miami, for appellees. JOANOS, Chief Judge. Claimant Steven Steinbrecher appeals a workers' compensation order denying his claim for penalties pursuant to section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1983). The issue for review is the propriety of the denial of a twenty percent penalty pursuant to section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1983), for failure to make timely payment in accordance with a workers' compensation order....

...The wage loss benefits were not paid until October 17, 1989. On August 24, 1989, claim was made for the statutory twenty percent penalties and interest on the late payment of the order of July 12, 1989, and for additional penalties, interest, costs, and attorney's fees. See § 440.20(8) and (9), Fla....

...However, the amended order again contained a finding that late payment of the lump sum settlement was due to inadvertence brought on by a series of misfortunes, and that the servicing agent was shorthanded due to resignations and vacations. The statute applicable, section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: If any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within 30 days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to 20 percent...

...State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1977); White v. Means, 280 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Moreover, where a provision is accompanied by a penalty for failure to observe it, the provision is viewed as mandatory. 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 21 (1974). A reading of section 440.20(8) according to the plain meaning of its language, including the use of the usually mandatory "shall" and the accompanying penalty, leads inevitably to the conclusion that the provision is not amenable to an exercise of discretion in application. In other words, according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in section 440.20(8), if payment of a compensation award is made after the thirty-day period set forth in the statute, the twenty percent penalty must be imposed. Recent opinions addressing the section 440.20(8) penalty provision have construed the provision as mandatory. For example, in City of Miami v. Watkins, 579 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), in approving an award of penalties, the court stated that section 440.20(8) "provides, without exception, that `[i]f any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within 30 days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to 20 percent thereof ...'" Similarly, in Smith v. Burnup & Sims Comtec, Inc., 492 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), the court observed that section 440.20(8) states unequivocally that penalties "shall" be added when compensation is not paid within thirty days after it becomes due, as was the case in Burnup....

...See also Etheridge v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 557 So.2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Parker Lumber Co. v. Hart, 497 So.2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Telford v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 436 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). In concluding that the penalty provision of section 440.20(8) is mandatory, we are not unmindful that in Crowell v....

...1980), and Paver Development Corp. v. McDevitt, 419 So.2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), the provision was treated as discretionary. However, the cited cases are factually distinguishable from the instant case, and provide no articulable basis for construing the language of section 440.20(8) as discretionary....

...Even without using the exact phrase "condition precedent," the statute does not state that the subrogation claim can be brought "only" upon final resolution of the UM claim. See Sanders v. City of Orlando, 997 So.2d 1089, 1094 (Fla. 2008) ("We conclude that if the Legislature had intended for section 440.20(11)(c) to constitute an explicit exception, it would have been explicit....")....

...ompensation and death benefits shall be double the amount otherwise payable if it is determined that the injured employee was a minor, working in violation of the Child Labor Laws. We are convinced that Section 440.54 must be read in connection with section 440.20, Florida Statutes 1941, which provides that the “total compensation payable under this Chapter for disability and death shall in no event exceed the sum of $5000.00 in addition to any benefits under Section 440.13 for medical service...

...se was $10,000.00, plus funeral expenses, medical treatment and attorneys fees, the double feature or that part imposed on the employer was imposed on the ground that no age certificate was found at the place of deceased’s employment. In our view, Section 440.20, above quoted, was a clear limitation of $5000.00 on the amount of compensation or benefits that may be allowed in any case, to which may be added the cost of medical treatment and funeral expenses. Sections 440.54 and 440.20 were not enacted at the same time but were parts of the same statute and when the legislature employed the language, “Shall in no event” the compensation exceed $5000.00, the Industrial Commission was powerless to award more....

...This view is further supported by the well settled principle that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the person against whom the penalty is imposed. There can be no question that Section 440.54 imposes a penalty on the employer. Even though if read with Section 440.20, it could be said to be ambiguous, which we find no basis for, it would be our duty to construe it strictly in favor of the one against whom the penalty is imposed....

...This notion contrasts sharply with the deputy commissioner's duty to make findings of fact based on many factors, including permanent impairment, in determining the extent of disability to earn income. E.g., Lemus v. Industrial Sites Services, 482 So.2d 472 ( see p. 630, supra ). Section 440.20(3) specifies that "[i]mpairment benefits shall be payable in accordance with s. 440.15(3)(a)2," which provides for listed impairment benefits. Section 440.20(7) refers, in the alternative, to installments of "compensation for death or dependency benefits, disability, permanent impairment, or wage loss " (emphasis added). Section 440.20(13)(c), dealing with advance payments, authorizes small payments under certain conditions "[i]n the event the claimant has not returned to the same or equivalent employment with no substantial reduction in wages or has suffered a substantial loss of earning capacity or a physical impairment" (emphasis added)....

...been received. A second request for wage loss benefits was received by the servicing agent on May 2, 1980. Since the final hearing was held on May 14, 1980, the employer/servicing agent had not yet had a full opportunity to respond to the claim. See Section 440.20(4), (6), (7), Florida Statutes (1979).

...Unreported wages may not be included in the wage computations. Holiday Inn v. Pope, 402 So.2d 1303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). We now address claimant's points on cross appeal. First, regarding the denial of penalties, there was shown no statutory exception applicable to the general rule outlined in section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...As to the applicable rate of interest, the statutory provision in effect at the time of claimant's accident established a rate of 6%. § 687.01, Florida Statutes (1974); and former Rule 21, W.C.R.P. 1974. However, Chapter 78-300, Laws of Florida, amended § 440.20, Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.), to provide in subsection (7) an interest rate of 12%....

...Williams, 38 Fla. 305, 20 So. 931 (1896); see also Walker & LaBerge Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1977). The opinion in E & A Concrete v. Perry, supra , does not indicate that the parties presented or that the court addressed the issue of whether § 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1978), is a remedial or substantive provision....

...t, and that the ruling in E & A Concrete v. Perry, supra , was correct only insofar as it involved interest on benefits which became delinquent before July 1, 1978. Interest payable for delinquencies accruing on or after July 1, 1978, is governed by § 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1978), and is properly awarded at a rate of 12%....

...The carrier's failure to file a notice of denial with the division in response to a petition for benefits sent by certified mail violated section 440.192(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), inasmuch as neither appellant paid the benefits the claimant requested. The carrier did not invoke the "pay and investigate" provisions of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), nor was the claim accepted....

...I concurred, because I believed the decision should be limited to its facts involving an untimely notice of denial. I considered the majority had used language in its opinion broader than that necessary to its decision when it indicated that the "deemed-compensable" provisions of sections 440.192(8) and 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), were inapplicable to the carrier which defaulted in its obligation to take any action, and that a carrier which did nothing could be subjected only to the penalties set out by it at 683 So.2d at 1092 n. 1. I considered that the deemer language in sections 440.192(8) and 440.20(4), when construed in pari materia, meant that the carrier which did not act should be regarded as having accepted the compensability of the employee's injuries to the same extent as the carrier that had untimely initiated the payment of benefits....

...e statute. In fact, on further reflection, I believe that such interpretation is more consistent with the legislative purpose than my original interpretation. The explicitly stated legislative goals leading to the creation of sections 440.192(8) and 440.20(4), enacted by the 1993 special legislative session, as well as numerous other measures included within chapter 93-415, Laws of Florida, were the following: It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure the prompt delivery of benefits to the injured worker....

...rovisions, by either denying the petition or doing nothing, and be deemed to have denied because of inactivity. As indicated in Wuelling, 683 So.2d at 1092 n. 1, the carrier that takes no action can be subjected to the monetary penalties provided in section 440.20, the penalty assessed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-24.0231 for untimely filing practices, and attorney's fees under section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), particularly under subsection (b) thereof, making the E/C r...

...Pfeffer, Lake Worth, for Appellee. ERVIN, J. Appellants, Bynum Transport, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, respectively the employer and carrier (E/C), appeal an order in which the judge of compensation claims (JCC) concluded that under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1997), the E/C waived the right to deny compensability of hepatitis C contracted by claimant, Douglas Snyder, by failing to do so within 120 days after it had commenced providing such benefits....

...of hepatitis C by Dr. Grossman. The E/C never controverted the claim. The JCC found that claimant's hepatitis C was compensable, because the E/C failed to deny compensability within 120 days after initiating payment of benefits therefor, pursuant to section 440.20(4), which provides: If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits or compensation, it may initiate payment without prejudice and without admitting liability....

...Grossman's letter of March 23, 1998, or after claimant had filed the petition for benefits. In contrast, the JCC observed, the E/C would not have lost the right to deny compensability if it had simply controverted the claim by either filing a denial or not paying the benefits. The E/C first contends that section 440.20(4) applies only to the first claim following an injury ("initial provision of benefits"), rather than to any claim following an industrial accident....

...1st DCA 2000) (E/C could have avoided penalty for failing to pay permanent, total disability benefits within seven days after they became due, which claimant contended was one and one-half years after industrial injury, by commencing payment of such benefits and undertaking investigation during the 120-day period required by section 440.20(4))....

...decision on the part of the carrier to invoke it by paying benefits and issuing written notice to the claimant. Again we disagree. When an E/C becomes aware that a claimant has medical needs, it should either pay for them, pay and investigate under section 440.20(4), or deny compensability....

...Therefore, its failure to deny compensability within 120 days from the provision of benefits constituted its acceptance of compensability. AFFIRMED. WOLF and WEBSTER, JJ., CONCUR. NOTES [1] We make no determination as to whether doing nothing could be construed as a denial under section 440.20(4)....

...cy involving the health, safety, or welfare of an employee. An emergency conference under this section may result in the entry of an order or the rendering of an adjudication by the judge of compensation claims. In addition to this emergency relief, section 440.20, Florida Statutes (2000), sets a deadline for the timely payment of compensation claims and establishes penalties for late payments....

...Damages for bad faith are also authorized by the Act. See Florida Erection Serv., Inc. v. McDonald, 395 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). A claimant has a number of remedies if a workers' compensation carrier wrongfully attempts to, or deprives or ignores, a request for medical treatment. Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (2000), sets a deadline for the timely payment of compensation claims and establishes penalties for late payments....

...odification or claim for benefits. Hence, it was error for the dc to adjudicate a matter not in controversy. Moreover, our attention has not been directed to nor does our research reveal any authority for placement of interest on this type of award. Section 440.20, Florida Statutes, which provides for interest and penalties is limited to "compensation"....

...We concluded that an award of attorneys' fees was proper when there had been an award benefiting the claimant. Our position therein is substantiated by the statute, Section 440.34(1), which reads as follows: "(1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 * * *, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of same, or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation, and the injured person shall have employed an attorney at law in...

...Our conclusion that in workmen's compensation proceedings an award of attorneys' fees may be warranted even in the absence of an award benefiting the claimant is in keeping with our comments in Lockett v. Smith, 72 So.2d 817, supra, at p. 819, as follows: "One obvious purpose of Section 440.20, and especially subsections (5) and (6) thereof, is to protect the claimant against unnecessary delay in receiving his money....

...ed in the stipulation, of whether there is any basis in law or in fact for the award of the mentioned attorney's fees. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides: "If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 of this chapter, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they had notice of same, or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation, and the injured person shall have employed an attorney a...

...Claimant Rogers was injured in an accident on 26 September 1978. On 4 February 1980, the employer-carrier made an offer to settle the claim. The claimant died on 12 February 1980 and eight days later claimant's attorney accepted the settlement offer on behalf of the claimant and his estate. Under Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1978), a lump sum settlement agreement between an employer-carrier and the claimant is not final and enforceable until or unless it has been approved by the Deputy Commissioner....

...Zientz of Levine, Busch, Schnepper & Stein, P.A., Miami, Florida, for Florida Workers' Advocates, Amicus Curiae. QUINCE, J. We have for review three decisions certifying the following question to be of great public importance: WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(1)(e)1, FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS? Acker v....

...y pension benefits (pension benefits). Because Ms. Acker was receiving more than 100 percent of her average weekly wage (AWW), [1] her pension benefits were offset so that her actual compensation would not exceed 100 percent of her previous AWW. See § 440.20(15), Fla....

...ensation rate in effect at the time of payment as determined pursuant to s. 440.12(2). § 440.15(1)(e)(1), Fla. Stat. (1985). The City now claims increases in supplemental benefits are compensation and should be included in offset calculations under section 440.20(15), which provides: When an employee is injured and the employer pays his full wages or any part thereof during the period of disability, or pays medical expenses for such employee, and the case is contested by the carrier or the carr...

...roof to the judge of compensation claims of such payment of compensation and medical benefits. Any payment by the employer over and above compensation paid or awarded and medical benefits, pursuant to subsection (14), shall be considered a gratuity. § 440.20(15), Fla. Stat. (1985). Section 440.20(15) has been interpreted to mean *600 that an injured worker's compensation from all sources cannot exceed 100 percent of his individual AWW at the time of the injury....

...long-term effects of inflation that reduce the value of a fixed amount of benefits. The effects of inflation are the same irrespective of the method of calculating supplemental benefits. Once a lump-sum payment is authorized and received pursuant to section 440.20, a claimant has the option to invest the funds and offset the effects of inflation so that the purpose of supplemental benefits is satisfied. Id. at 79 (emphasis added). Clearly, the stated purpose for the enactment of section 440.15(1)(e)1, as a hedge against inflation, would be frustrated under the City's interpretation of section 440.20(15). [4] Thus, there is an apparent conflict between the purpose of the supplemental benefits statute and the City's argument that section 440.20(15) requires increases in supplemental benefits to be included in offset calculations....

...Thus, at the time the supplemental benefits statute was enacted, the Legislature could not have intended combined benefits to be limited to 100 percent of the worker's AWW at the time of the accident. The City contends that the Legislature's subsequent enactment of section 440.20(15) expressed the Legislature's desire that increases in supplemental benefits be included in offset calculations because the Legislature did not state that increases in supplemental benefits should be excluded. We disagree. To adopt such a literal interpretation ignores the historical development of section 440.20(15). In 1979, the Legislature enacted section 440.20(15). The plain language of section 440.20(15) does not state that injured workers may not receive in excess of 100 percent of their individual AWW....

...Instead, it states that employers who paid injured workers their benefits prior to a carrier's voluntary assumption or determination of liability will only be reimbursed up to 100 percent of the injured worker's individual AWW. It was not until 1989 that this Court interpreted section 440.20(15) as limiting an injured worker's combined benefits from all sources to 100 percent of his or her individual AWW. See Barragan, 545 So.2d at 252. The City is asking this Court to look at the language of section 440.20(15) and hold supplemental benefits should be included in offset calculations because the Legislature did not specifically state that increases in supplemental benefits should be excluded from the calculations....

...For the reasons expressed above, we approve the First District's decision in Rowe. Nothing in this opinion should be read to change the workers' compensation offset under section 440.15(9), Florida Statutes (1985). That offset provision is different from section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1985), because of the federal social security offset provisions....

...he claimant was hospitalized in August, 1977, and that this failure tolled the running of the statute of limitations. The deputy additionally found that the statute of limitations' defense was not available to American because it did not comply with Section 440.20(1), Florida Statutes (1975), [1] in that the evidence showed only that the checks were mailed to claimant's attorney — not to claimant....

...the provisions of Section 440.28 — not by Section 440.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1975). The deputy was also incorrect in holding that the limitation period did not apply to American because the carrier did not pay claimant directly, as required by Section 440.20(1), but rather claimant's attorney....

...They advance the point that the statute does not make the appellate fee contingent on success at the appellate level. The statute involved is Section 440.34 (1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which reads as follows: "(1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 of this chapter, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of same, or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation, and the injured person shall have employed an attorney...

...Security, Division of Workers' Compensation. BENTON, Judge. On appeal of an order denying his claim for penalties and interest, Terry Willette maintains that payments of his workers' compensation benefits were late, entitling him to penalties under section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Under the authority of section 440.271, Florida Statutes (1995), the Department of Labor and Employment Security has intervened in these proceedings, in order to defend Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-3.019, and the Department's interpretation of section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1995), which the rule was drawn to reflect....

...claimant ... `became due' ... five days after the order approving the washout agreement was mailed to the parties," Palm Beach County Sch. Bd. v. Miller-Neal, 674 So.2d 759, 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), review denied, 684 So.2d 1352 (Fla.1996), and that section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.) allowed an additional seven days, for a total of twelve, before penalties became due....

...Willette sent Gallagher Bassett eleven wage loss forms, each pertaining to a different two-week period in 1995 or 1996. For each period, he received the benefits he sought. Mr. Willette then filed a petition for benefits seeking late penalties, citing section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides: If any installment of compensation for death or dependency benefits, disability, permanent impairment, or wage loss payable without an award is not paid within 7 days after it becomes due, ......

...A separate rule, Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-3.0191, addresses temporary disability benefits payable on account of industrial accidents that occur on or after January 1, 1994. We have had occasion previously to construe other provisions of section 440.20, Florida Statutes, as amended by section 26, chapter 93-415, Laws of Florida. In connection with subsection (7) of section 440.20, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)—rather than subsection (6), which applies in the present case—we said in Bell: There was no delinquency in the payment of the settlement, and thus no liability for a penalty to compensate for such a delinquency, until after the effective date of the 1994 amendments....

...1st DCA 1997)(holding that allowing recovery of overpayments made after January 1, 1994, does not give retroactive effect to a statute taking effect on January 1, 1994, in a case with an earlier date of accident: "The overpayments, not the industrial accident, gave rise to appellees' right to repayment."). We conclude that section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1995), imposes a penalty for late payment of compensation due because of wage loss occurring after January 1, 1994, even where the industrial accident occurred before January 1, 1994, as in the present case....

...alties depend on the date of the industrial accident. Determinative instead are the dates delimiting the period of wage loss as to which late payment is made. With respect to section 26 of what became chapter 93-415, Laws of Florida, now codified as section 440.20, Florida Statutes, a Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement revised November 1, 1993, stated: "The provisions of this section apply to all unsettled claims, regardless of the date of the accident." Language to this effect was also enacted into law: "This section applies to all claims that the parties have not previously settled, regardless of the date of the accident." § 440.20(11)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994). The placement of the latter provision raises questions, but there is no ambiguity in the word "section." In context, "section" includes the entirety of section 440.20, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which has not been amended since chapter 93-415, Laws of Florida, was enacted....

...Once seven days elapsed after each wage loss form was received without payment of the corresponding "installment[s] of compensation... without an award" in controversy here, the statute required that "there ... be added to [each] such installment a punitive penalty." § 440.20(6), Fla. Stat. (1995). To the extent section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1995), conflicts with Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-3.019, the statute controls....

...n the later entry of an order approving attorney's fees, we reverse the trial court's order denying the claimant's widow's request to enforce the agreement. The disputed settlement agreement read in its entirety: This is a Washout Settlement under F.S. 440.20(11)....

...rder of a deputy commissioner *298 who allowed a 20% penalty for failure to pay a "washout" settlement within 20 days after it became due. We must decide whether approval of a "washout" settlement is an "award" within the contemplation of Fla. Stat. § 440.20(6) (1965), F.S.A....

...il the check cleared. On November 9, 1966, the check was returned because of insufficient funds. It was redeposited on November 14, 1966. It finally cleared on November 22, 1966. The employee, Brantley, claimed the 20% penalty provided by Fla. Stat. 440.20(6) (1965), F.S.A. The deputy awarded a $2,000 penalty and a $500 attorney fee. The Full Commission reversed and dismissed the claim. Fla. Stat. § 440.20(6) (1965), F.S.A., provides in part as follows: "If any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within twenty (20) days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to twenty...

...entered October 10, 1966, became effective on that date. For purposes of appeal under Fla. Stat. 440.25(4) (1959), F.S.A., such an order becomes final twenty days after the date copies are mailed to parties. However, the penalty period prescribed by § 440.20(6), supra, begins to run from the date that the compensation becomes due....

...1955). An obvious purpose of the penalty provision is to induce prompt payment of legitimate claims and to protect claimants against unnecessary and unjustifiable delays. Lockett v. Smith, 72 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1954). Consequently, in the instant case, § 440.20(6), supra, if applicable at all, would apply after October 30, 1966....

...or for doing so. We must, however, agree with the contention of respondent, ADH Building Contractors, Inc., to the effect that the penalty could not be allowed on that portion of the award which covered past and future medical expenses. Reference to § 440.20(6), supra, will reveal that the penalty is based on "unpaid compensation"....

...ition for benefits, plus interest, costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. Disposition of this case turns on the construction of the third sentence in section 440.192(8), which provides: "A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4) is deemed to have accepted the employee's injuries as compensable, unless it can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that could not have been discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day per...

...that no injury for which benefits may be due was occasioned by an accident that arose out of the employment and occurred during the course and scope of employment, when the carrier has availed itself *1092 of the "pay and investigate" provisions of section 440.20(4) and does not deny compensability within 120 days of providing requested benefits....

...1st DCA 1996), to the extent it holds that section 440.192(8) precludes the carrier from contesting compensability when it fails to file a notice of denial within 14 days after receipt of a petition for benefits. In construing the provision at issue, we must first understand the relationship between section 440.192(8) and section 440.20(4). Sections 440.20(1) and 440.20(2) require the carrier to deny compensability or entitlement to benefits or to pay benefits as required by law within 14 days after receipt of a notice of injury. Section 440.20(4) allows the carrier to postpone the decision to deny any obligation to pay benefits for up to 120 days while it conducts an investigation, provided it pays the requested benefits for which it is undertaking the period of investigation....

...requested benefits or file a notice of denial. However, the payment of benefits is "without prejudice to its right to deny within 120 days." This "right to deny" refers to that right which may have arisen under the "pay and investigate" provision of 440.20(4) and may not have expired at the time of service of the petition for benefits. Accordingly, the third sentence of 440.192(8) which reads: "A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4) is deemed to have accepted the employee's injuries as compensable ..." refers to and is a reiteration of the waiver provision of 440.20(4) as it relates to the opportunity to pay and investigate....

...The sanctions to be imposed upon a carrier who either files an untimely notice of denial or takes no action are found elsewhere in chapter 440. [1] As to the question of what the legislature intended by the term "compensability" in the context of sections 440.192 and 440.20, we note that section 440.20(1) refers to "compensability or entitlement to benefits," indicating that they are separate concepts, and that the last sentence of section 440.20(4) refers to "the issue of compensability," indicating a distinction from other issues. Having reviewed the uses of the terms "compensability" and "compensable" in the various sections of chapter 440, we conclude that "compensability" in the context of sections 440.192 and 440.20 is limited to a determination of whether the injury for which benefits are claimed arose out of, and occurred within the course and scope of, the claimant's employment....

...We find that the third sentence of section 440.192(8) does not apply in this case. The JCC's order is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. KAHN, DAVIS and BENTON, JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., concurs with result. NOTES [1] Sections 440.20(6), 440.20(7), and 440.20(8) provide sanctions (penalties and interest) for the carrier's failure to timely pay compensation within seven days after it becomes due....

...the result of an award previously entered by the Deputy Commissioner. After hearing the evidence with respect to this claim, the Deputy Commissioner awarded the claimant twenty percent of the amount of the previous award then delinquent, pursuant to Section 440.20 (6), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., but refused to grant an attorney's fee under Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., for services rendered by claimant's attorney at the hearing above mentioned. The full Commission affirmed the Deputy's order and claimant now petitions for certiorari to review the order of the Commission. The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act now before us are the following: "440.20 Payment of compensation * * * * * * "(6) If any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within fourteen days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to twenty per cent there...

...uch compensation, unless review of the compensation order making such award is had as provided in § 440.27." "440.34 Attorney's fees; costs; penalty for violations *818 "(1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 of this chapter, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of same, or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation, and the injured person shall have employed an attorney...

...re shall, in addition to the award for compensation be awarded reasonable attorneys fee, * * *." (Emphasis added.) Petitioner contends that it was error to deny him a reasonable attorney's fee because the award of the additional twenty percent under Section 440.20 was an award of additional compensation and therefore covered by Section 440.34....

...or such fees at the hearing or trial level by express statute. Larson on Workmen's Compensation (1952) Section 83.12. Some authority is available, however, on the construction of statutory provisions pertaining to extra payment for delinquency as in Section 440.20(6) above....

...endents as provided for in this chapter." F.S. § 440.02(11), F.S.A. And see Royer v. United States Sugar Corp., supra, 4 So.2d 692. A literal application of this definition would support petitioner's contention that the twenty percent prescribed by Section 440.20(6) is "compensation" but this would seem, without more, to be too superficial an analysis in view of the interpretation given by this court to Section 440.54....

...ng liable for the increased payment) was before us in Lollie v. General *819 American Tank Storage Terminals, 160 Fla. 208, 34 So.2d 306. We there held that although the double payment was a penalty against the employer, it was still comprehended by Section 440.20(13) (now repealed, Laws 1951, c....

...ery should be attended by a reasonable fee for counsel necessarily employed. Unlike the double compensation payment before us in the Lollie case, supra, the twenty percent delinquency payment is not restricted to the employer. One obvious purpose of Section 440.20, and especially subsections (5) and (6) thereof, is to protect the claimant against unnecessary delay in receiving his money....

...If doubt exists, it will be resolved in favor of the working man. Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Driggers, Fla., 65 So.2d 723; Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Pittman, Fla., 49 So.2d 600. We hold that the twenty percent additional amount here recovered under Section 440.20(6) was "compensation" within the meaning of Section 440.34(1)....

...or payment of compensation waives the right to deny compensability, unless the carrier can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120 day period. § 440.20(4), Fla....

...ility. The senior case manager noted that the employer/carrier might have a defense under the statute requiring an injured employee to give timely notice of an industrial accident. The employer/carrier never sent the "120 day letter" contemplated in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...the petition or file a notice of denial with the division. The carrier must list all benefits requested but not paid and explain its justification for nonpayment in the notice of denial. A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4) is deemed to have accepted the employee's injuries as compensable, unless it can establish material facts relevant to the issue that could not have been discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120 day period....

...& Tel. Co. v. McCook, 355 So.2d 1166 (Fla.1977). The JCC rejected the claimant's argument that even if the claim was not compensable, the employer/carrier were estopped by the effect of the "120 day rule" to deny compensability of the injury pursuant to section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1995), or to deny it under the general rules of estoppel....

...work-related injury. At that point when the employer/carrier recognized, or reasonably should have become aware, that the claimant had medical needs, the employer/carrier had three options: to pay for them; to pay and investigate in accordance with section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1995); or to deny compensability....

...e. By initiating payment, i.e., "after the initial provision of compensation benefits," the employer/carrier became obligated immediately and in good faith to "commence investigation of the employee's entitlement to benefits under this chapter." See § 440.20(4), Fla....

...e (MCC) of any need for further treatment or surgery. We agree with the E/C and reverse the JCC's authorization of this additional medical care. Finding no merit to the claimant's issues on cross-appeal, we affirm the JCC's denial of other benefits. Section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part: ....

...Co. v. Wuelling, 683 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), a case which was decided en banc, this court recognized that there is a distinction between the concept of compensability and a worker's entitlement to benefits as those terms are contemplated in section 440.20(4). The waiver provision of section 440.20(4) pertains solely to the concept of compensability....

...On appeal, the E/C contends that reversal is warranted because the claimant failed to prove that the industrial injury remains the MCC of her need for continuing medical treatment and surgery. The E/C further contends that the JCC erred in authorizing this medical care because, although section 440.20(4) barred the E/C from denying compensability after the expiration of the 120-day pay and investigate period, it did not preclude the E/C from challenging the claimant's entitlement to benefits. We agree. As explained in Wuelling, the section 440.20(4) waiver of the right to deny compensability does not necessarily establish an entitlement to benefits....

...Lykes Smithfield Packing, 870 So.2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), have at times blurred the distinction between compensability and entitlement to benefits. Other cases such as Bussey v. Wal-Mart Store # 725, 867 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), may have further clouded the application of section 440.20(4), in discussing the effect of an E/C's failure to respond to a petition for benefits....

...Because of the apparent confusion in this area and the potential conflict in the application of this court's decisions, the present case is being decided by this court en banc. As the earlier en banc opinion in Wuelling explained, section 440.192(8), Florida Statutes, must be read in conjunction with section 440.20(4), with regard to the statutory waiver of the right to deny compensability. Wuelling established that the recitation as to such a waiver in section 440.192(8) is merely a reiteration of the waiver provision in section 440.20(4), and that the failure to file a notice of denial in response to a claim under section 440.192(8) does not in itself result in a waiver. Instead, the waiver arises under section 440.20(4) when an E/C provides compensation or other benefits and does not deny compensability within 120 days of the initial provision of such compensation or benefits....

...And while an E/C's failure to respond to a petition for benefits might be treated as an implicit denial of the petition for certain other purposes, [1] an E/C's failure to respond to a section 440.192 petition does not interrupt the 120-day period and does not avoid the section 440.20(4) waiver provision. Similarly, a section 440.192(8) notice of denial which challenges entitlement to a claimed benefit but does not dispute compensability (the occurrence of an industrial accident resulting in injury) will not avoid the section 440.20(4) waiver. As that statute indicates, it is the payment of compensation or provision of benefits that begins the 120-day period within which the E/C may admit or deny compensability. And although section 440.20(4) directs the E/C to provide written notice when it has elected to pay the claim pending further investigation, an *351 E/C's failure to provide such notice does not negate application of the section 440.20(4) waiver when the E/C does not deny compensability within 120 days of the initial provision of benefits. Bynum Transp., Inc. v. Snyder, 765 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The 120-day period under section 440.20(4) thus commenced in the present case upon the E/C's initial provision of benefits. The JCC properly determined that the E/C's failure to respond to the section 440.192 petition requesting medical treatment with surgery did not constitute a denial of compensability as contemplated under section 440.20(4). The JCC then properly determined that the E/C's failure to deny compensability warrants the application of the section 440.20(4) waiver. However, the JCC improperly extended the scope of that waiver in precluding the E/C from challenging the claimant's entitlement to the requested benefits. Pursuant to section 440.20(4), the E/C is precluded from contending that there was no industrial accident resulting in injury. But section 440.20(4) does not preclude the E/C from challenging the claimant's entitlement to benefits, by contending that the injuries resulting from the industrial accident were not the MCC of the claimant's need for further treatment or surgery....

...To the extent that cases such as Collins, Hutchinson, and Bussey may reflect an approach inconsistent with the holdings in the present opinion, we recede from those cases and reaffirm the ruling in Wuelling as explicated herein. Accordingly, we conclude that the JCC erred in construing the waiver provision of section 440.20(4) to preclude the E/C's challenge to the claimant's entitlement to benefits....

...concurring in result. I agree with the decision the court has made on the facts of this case, but I am unable to join in the majority opinion, because the general rule stated in the opinion appears to limit the operation of the waiver provision in section 440.20(4) in a way that was not intended by the Legislature....

...discovered after the expiration of the time to deny compensability, I find nothing in the statute that would allow the employer or carrier to assert an untimely causation argument as to a condition that was known to exist when payment was made under section 440.20(4)....

...Damages for bad faith are also authorized by the Act. See Florida Erection Serv., Inc. v. McDonald, 395 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). A claimant has a number of remedies if a workers' compensation carrier wrongfully attempts to, or deprives or ignores, a request for medical treatment. Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (2000), sets a deadline for the timely payment of compensation claims and establishes penalties for late payments....

..."it doesn't make any difference what the settlement figure was," whether $25,000 or $250,000. We are of the opinion that the "money market" earning capacity of the $50,000 settlement has no place either in the deputy's approval of such a settlement, Section 440.20(10), or in assessing the value of that settlement for purposes of fixing a fee for claimant's attorney....

...ich was justified as enabling claimant to make more money on the same "money market" whose interest rates influenced the fee in this case. We held that "estate planning or money market considerations" are not among the relevant factors authorizing a Section 440.20(10) advancement....

...ermanent total disability rate, the other 60 percent of claimant's disability being "due to medical causes unrelated to his alleged industrial injury." We do not wish to press this seeming concession too far, recognizing that some kind of acceptable Section 440.20(10) rationale was necessary for a settlement that was desirable on other grounds but which could not be simply bargained for and effectuated....

...or in § 440.15(10). Since there is some indication that payments were made under 42 U.S.C. § 1381, no offset should be allowed. Finally, the claimant argued without rebuttal by the employer that the deputy erred by not awarding interest. We agree. Section 440.20(9) requires an award of 12% interest on all past-due payments of compensation....

...interest on amounts not paid after final judgment was entered. Florida Insurance Guaranty Association v. Gustinger, 390 So.2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). For any interest which FIGA is not required to pay, the employer must bear the responsibility. See § 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1978), which states that interest may be assessed against either the employer or carrier....

...ael dated December 3, 1992, to the Judge of Compensation Claims. Under the terms of the Joint Petition, Michael agreed to a lump sum settlement of Michael's workers' compensation claim in the amount of $6,500.00 in accordance with Florida Statu[t]es § 440.20(12)(b)....

...Brewer did not prove that her shoulder injury was work-related, but do not address the fact that the judge of compensation claims (JCC) found that the 120-day rule barred the E/C from disputing compensability. [2] Only in the reply brief do they argue that section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, does not control....

...Brewer made separate workers' compensation claims for her shoulder injury and knee injury. Ms. Brewer claimed that the shoulder injury was work-related and occurred on January 31, 2001. The knee injury, the compensability of which was undisputed, occurred on May 13, 1998. [2] The 120-day rule is contained in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes: If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits or compensation, it may initiate payment without prejudice and without admitting liability....

...or payment of compensation waives the right to deny compensability, unless the carrier can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period. § 440.20(4), Fla....

...The employer/carrier appeal a workers' compensation order wherein the deputy ordered the E/C to pay to claimant a lump sum advance of all future permanent total disability benefits commuted to a present value of $106,984.33. The E/C raise three points for our review: (1) whether section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...process of law; (2) whether the lump sum award is in the best interests of the claimant and is reasonable under the circumstances, without resulting in material prejudice to the carrier; and (3) whether the award complies with the 1983 amendments to section 440.20, chapter 83-305, Laws of Florida....

...He was ultimately declared to be permanently and totally disabled and was awarded appropriate periodic benefits by order entered on November 25, 1980. In May, 1983, claimant petitioned for a lump sum advance of all permanent total disability benefits pursuant to section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...are of him because of his permanent disability. The amount requested by claimant was derived by the consultant through use of a formula utilizing claimant's life expectancy, in accordance with the most recent United States Life Tables as required by section 440.20(10), the 4 percent discount factor, also mandated by the statute, and claimant's compensation rate....

...nd totally disabled if he were to regain his earning capacity or suffer a premature *422 death. The deputy also pointed out that the probability of the happening of any contingency other than the claimant's life expectancy is to be disregarded under section 440.20(10)....

...carrier's security interest; and a lump sum advance payment of all future permanent total disability benefits would be in claimant's best interests and reasonable under the circumstances. Finally, the deputy held that the 1983 amendments to sections 440.20(10) and 440.20(11)(d), increasing the discount rate to 8 percent and limiting the amount to be advanced to $7,500 in any 48-month period, were substantive amendments and prospective only....

...under Point I. However, we do not agree with the E/C on this point, and accordingly, affirm. As claimant's injury took place in November, 1978, the statute applicable to claimant generally, for substantive purposes, is the 1978 supplemental version. Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), provides that a lump sum award shall be computed at a 4 percent true discount. In 1979, section 440.20(10) was renumbered as section 440.20(12) and was subdivided. See chapters 79-400 and 79-312, Laws of Florida. Section 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), continues to provide for a 4 percent discount rate. However, in 1983, the legislature substantially amended section 440.20(12) and section 440.20(13) (formerly section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1978)), providing for an 8 percent discount rate and limiting a claimant's receipt of a lump sum advance payment in excess of $2,000, to $7,500 or twenty-six weeks of benefits in any 48-month period, whichever is greater. Chapter 83-305, Laws of Florida; section 440.20(12)(c) and (13)(d), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...w is presumed to apply prospectively. See Special Disability Trust Fund, et al. v. Motor and Compressor Company, 446 So.2d 224, 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and cases cited therein. Nothing in chapter 83-305 suggests that the 1983 amendments to sections 440.20(12) and (13), Florida Statutes (1979), should operate in any way other than prospectively....

...Both the increase in the discount rate to 8 percent and the $7,500 cap placed on the lump sum payments work to substantially reduce a claimant's award. All parties had expectations, entitlements, and perceptions arising from the 1978 version of chapter 440. Specifically, sections 440.20(10) and 440.20(11)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ant to *423 become a self-sustaining and productive member of society." Herndon v. City of Miami, 224 So.2d 681, 682 (Fla. 1969). We decline to ride roughshod over these rights and liabilities by accepting the E/C's argument. [2] By our holding that section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...No evidence was presented at the hearing to support any of these allegations. The E/C have simply failed to show that the statute, as applied to them, is arbitrary and capricious, or oppressively prejudicial, other than by expounding on what is pure speculation. We therefore decline to hold that section 440.20(10) is unconstitutional....

...1st DCA 1983) should compel a different result. The circumstances in Taylor did not involve an advance payment of all future compensation benefits in exchange for the employer/carrier's release, thereby calling into play the 4 percent discount factor of section 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Accordingly, we affirm the deputy commissioner's order directing payment of the lump sum advance of compensation, which payment, we emphasize, as did the deputy, is to be utilized in accordance with the investment plan and relevant testimony at the hearing. AFFIRMED. MILLS and SHIVERS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ompensation, computed at 4 percent true discount compounded annually... . [2] We distinguish this case from Myers v. Carr Construction Co., 387 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), in which we held section 25, chapter 78-300, amending the interest rate in section 440.20(7) from 6 percent to 12 percent, to be remedial in character and therefore applicable to currently accruing liability arising from an injury that occurred prior to its effective date, although the 6 percent figure still applied to the E/C's liability for compensation prior to the new statute's effective date....

...Thus, the JCC did not err in accepting Drs. Shure's and White's testimonies over Dr. Barnard's. We affirm the JCC's assignment of an overall 2% impairment rating. Penalties The claimant argues that the JCC erred in failing to award penalties on the temporary benefits awarded. Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in pertinent part: (1)(a) Unless it denies compensability or entitlement to benefits, the carrier shall pay compensation directly to the employee.......

...there shall be added to such unpaid installment a punitive penalty ... unless notice is filed under subsection (4) or unless such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control. That is, unless a notice is filed under section 440.20(4) or nonpayment occurs from circumstances out of the employer/carrier's control, a penalty applies when the employer/carrier refuses to pay benefits at the time facts then known to the employer/carrier would support an obligation to pay....

...Without these findings of fact, it is difficult to determine if a statutory penalty applies in this case. Therefore, we remand this issue to the JCC to make the appropriate findings of fact and to determine based on those findings whether penalties should be awarded under section 440.20....

...The claimant was awarded temporary disability benefits by the Order entered September 30, 1968. Claim was made for penalties but the Order failed to award or deny same. Accordingly, the Order must be vacated and set aside and the cause remanded to the judge of industrial claims to award penalties pursuant to Section 440.20(5) and (6), Florida Statutes [F.S.A.]." The Commission's order for payment of penalties is well-grounded....

...Claimant, however, states that despite the rule of automatic payment, the payment has not been made. In fairness to all parties, determination must be made whether the interest has in fact been paid. If it has not, it appears that imposition of penalties to Fla. Stat. §§ 440.20(5) and 440.20(6), F.S.A., would not be inappropriate....

...unavailability of work, ante, is an overly restrictive burden that is contrary to the majority rule. See my views expressed in Lake County Commissioners v. Walburn, 409 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1982) (Ervin, J., dissenting and concurring). NOTES [1] Section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1979), is a substantial codification of former industrial relations commission rule 9, referred to in Brown, 305 So.2d at 193....

...a public employer, see sections 440.15(10) and (12), Florida Statutes (1991), are likewise inapposite under the circumstances of this case. The only other conceivable statute arguably permitting the offset the employer claimed is also inapplicable. Section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1991), states: When an employee is injured and the employer pays his full wages or any part thereof during the period of disability, or pays medical expenses for such employee, and the case is contested by the ca...

...Rissman of Cooper & Rissman, Orlando, amicus curiae, for appellants. Thomas R. Mooney and J. Peyton Lea, III, of Meyers, Mooney & Adler, Orlando, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Employer/carrier appeals a worker's compensation order approving a lump-sum advancement pursuant to § 440.20(10), Fla. Stat. Before approving such an advancement, the deputy must determine that it is in the best interest of the claimant, is reasonable under the circumstances of the case, and will not materially prejudice the rights of the employer/carrier. § 440.20(10) Fla. Stat.; § 440.20(11)(d), Fla....

...While the judge has broad discretion in such matters, Herndon v. City of Miami, 224 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1969), we conclude that the present case involves an abuse of discretion, and we hereby reverse the order appealed. *444 Claimant indicated that the § 440.20(10) advancement would be used to purchase savings certificates with an interest rate exceeding the § 440.20(10) 4% discount rate....

...Under Chapter 440, Fla. Stat., however, worker's compensation benefits are not intended as life insurance. See Georgeson v. Oakland Park Rock Co., IRC Order 2-2971 (May 27, 1976) (concurring opinion), cert. denied 339 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1976). The relevant § 440.20(10) inquiry is whether an advancement is in "the best interests of the person entitled to compensation" [emphasis supplied]....

...ndition or "interests" were directly affected in any way by his concern over either of the above-noted estate planning or money market considerations. In the context of this case, such factors are in our opinion insufficient to permit an order for a § 440.20(10) advancement....

...sum payment of discounted future compensation benefits, awarded on account of Outland's permanent total disability. I wish only to add some additional, perhaps more fundamental, objections to lump-summing in this case. The award was made pursuant to Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides in part: Upon the application of any party in interest and after giving due consideration to the interests of all interested parties, if a judge of industrial claims finds that it is for the...

...laimant's "belief that he has a sound investment" and no evidence that the employer "would be materially prejudiced by the advance payment." The Court declared that the judge of industrial claims has "vast discretion" in making lump-sum awards under Section 440.20(10). While on the facts Herndon somewhat supports the payment ordered in this case, it must be noted that the Herndon Court read into Section 440.20(10), as a limitation on the lump-sum payment replacing and discharging liability for "all future payments," a concern to avoid "material prejudice" to the employer which Commission Rule 16 D then expressed as a limitation on advance payments. Herndon, 224 So.2d at 682. That Rule later became Rule 17(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, see 285 So.2d 601, 607 (Fla. 1973), and still later its provisions were enacted as Section 440.20(11)(d), Florida Statutes (1977). Chapter 77-290, Section 5, Fla. Laws. Thus, while a different construction may have been possible before Herndon, we must now read Section 440.20(10) as requiring both a showing that a lump-sum payment "is for the best interests of the person entitled to compensation" and a showing that the commutation of periodic benefits is not "materially prejudicial" to the employer....

...ithout transformation into labor or another form of capital, can rent itself out for a return higher than the discount rate which created the fund in the first place. For reasons we cannot now recover, the 1935 legislature fixed the present value of Section 440.20(10) money at "4 percent true discount compounded annually"; and succeeding legislatures have left the rate unchanged....

...y to the date of the final judgment, March 26, 1980. [2] Otherwise, *422 the judgment under review is affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. [3] NOTES [1] § 440.34, Fla. Stat. (1977). Fee awards are not "penalties," such as those provided in Section 440.20(5), (6), Florida Statutes (1977), for which FIGA would not have been liable under Sec....

...r to Show Cause" in the Circuit Court of Dade County in which he alleged that in the compensation award entered by the deputy commissioner on August 25, 1953, it was ordered that the employer should "Provide such surety as may be required by Chapter 440.20(9), F.S.A., to the Treasurer of the State of Florida to assure the payment of such further compensation and medical benefits as the same arise;" that the employer had failed to comply with said order; and that a rule should be directed to the...

...from May 9, 1953 (the date upon which the employer made his last payment to the employee) through the date of the judgment of October 28, 1953, and to disallow any credit for previous payment of medical benefits adjudicated in the sum of $12,625.07. Section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A., provides that "If the employer has made advance payments of compensation, he shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of any unpaid installment or installments of compensation due." Section 440.02(11), Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A., defines "compensation" as "the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter." Although the language of section 440.20(11) has not been definitively construed by this Court, it is apparent from a careful analysis of the provision that the term "advance payments" could refer only to payments which by the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act were not due or payable when made....

...e in excess of the amount ultimately found to be due such employee, such excess shall be considered a gratuity. *55 Rule 9, Rules of Procedure of the Florida Industrial Commission. As is plain, Rule 9 does not purport to preclude reimbursement under section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A., when, as in the present case, there are outstanding and unpaid installments of compensation due under the award. The clear and literal meaning of section 440.20(11) is that so long as there are "unpaid * * * installments of compensation due", an employer may recoup by way of credit against such unpaid sums if he has made payments over and above those required under the terms of the workmen's compensation law....

...v. Krejci, 149 Okla. 103, 299 P. 225. See also Modern Equipment Co. v. Industrial Comm., 247 Wis. 517, 20 N.W.2d 121; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Hay, 159 Tenn. 202, 17 S.W.2d 904. In view of the conclusions reached as to the intendment of section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A., it is apparent that the court below erred in ruling that as a matter of law no credit could be given for the monies received by the employee from his employer in this case prior to the entry of an aw...

...djudicated by the award. If in fact such was the character of the payments made, then clearly the employer is "entitled to be reimbursed out of any unpaid installment or installments of compensation due" under the award and judgment in question. *56 Section 440.20(11), supra....

...are "advance payments" in the sense that they are made before entry of a formal award determining total medical benefits allowable, they are not "payments which by the terms of the * * * Act were not due or payable when made," within the meaning of section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes 1953, as interpreted in this opinion....

...The employer's obligation is to furnish medical care "upon request" in any case of compensable injury, and such payments, if made as alleged, should be credited on the total medical award when finally determined, without reference to any provision for recoupment of "advance payments" as provided for in section 440.20 (11)....

...Although the E/C did file notices to controvert, the notices relate only to the claimed wage loss benefits. As the E/C did not pay all of the TTD benefits due within fourteen days of when they became due, the deputy properly assessed a penalty under section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes....

...servants, assigns, and any other person or entity so connected to the Employer/Carrier or Servicing Agent, of any nature whatsoever except only (1) further medical claims pursuant to other provisions of this agreement if settlement is pursuant to F.S. 440.20(12)(a) only, or (2) penalties, interest or attorney's fees which might be due because of late payment of Order approving this Joint Petition....

...of that condition, asserting it was not causally related to her compensable industrial accident. When they elected to provide medical care for Claimant's back complaints, Employer/Carrier did not file the required "pay and investigate" notice under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...In the October 30, 2001, order on rehearing, the JCC found that Employer/Carrier's denial of the compensability of Claimant's low back injury and condition was untimely, so that Employer/Carrier are estopped from denying the compensability thereof. § 440.20(4), Fla....

...the person's life expectancy. See 17 Fla.Jur.2d Damages, § 54 (1980). In the area of workers' compensation, specifically, the tables are used for the purpose of converting periodic, permanent compensation disability payments into lump sum payments. Section 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), explicitly mandates, in the absence of special circumstances, that the probability of the death of the injured employee "be determined in accordance with the most recent United States Life Tables publis...

...Petersburg, for appellant. Alex P. Lancaster, Sarasota, for appellee. MILLS, Judge. In this workers' compensation appeal, we affirm the deputy commissioner's assessment *1157 of a 20 percent penalty against Paver Development and Aetna, employer/carrier (E/C), pursuant to Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...[3] But see Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So.2d 266, 269 (Fla. 1973) wherein the court stated: "Dower is not a vested right. We have said that because of its defeasible nature dower is not to be given consideration in divorce or dissolution of marriage proceedings." [1] See § 440.20(12), Fla....

...fit the claimant began receiving in June of 1992. No further recalculation is allowed for the cost of living increases. As in Acker, we certify the following question to the supreme court: WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(1)(e)(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS? Reversed and Remanded....

...Penuel simply testified that the benefits were paid promptly when the forms were received; that is not, however, dispositive of the legal question as to whether E/C conducted themselves so as to avoid the payment of penalties and interest on the WL benefits. We find that they did not. Fla. Stat. section 440.20(4) (Supp....

...440.15(3)(b) or (4) shall be paid monthly, subsequent to the termination of the period for which such payments are due, within 14 days of the date upon which the carrier or employer has knowledge of the compensable wage loss. Penalties and interest may be assessed on compensation not timely paid; see id. at section 440.20(7), (8), and (9)....

...Kneski, Kneski & Kneski, Miami, for respondent Richard McLean. PER CURIAM. We have for review City of Miami v. Bell, 606 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), in which the district court certified the following question as one of great public importance: IS SECTION 440.20(7) APPLICABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, AND IF SO, CAN THE CITY OF MIAMI, BE LEGALLY EXCUSED FROM PAYING A PENALTY PURSUANT TO THAT SECTION ON THE AMOUNT OF PENSION OFFSET MONIES WITHHELD IN THE PAST BECAUSE THE CITY DID SO...

...The City filed a notice to controvert with the Division of Workers' Compensation on August 14, 1989. The Judge of Compensation Claims rejected the City's defenses and awarded Bell benefits of $307 per week for the offset portion, with interest, costs, attorneys' fees and a ten-percent penalty pursuant to section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...benefits for prior years would be fiscally unjust to the taxpayers of the City of Miami. Accordingly, the City must reimburse claimants for only those offsets taken after the effective date of Barragan, i.e., July 14, 1989. The penalty provision of section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1985), is inapplicable to offsets taken prior to that date, but applicable to those taken after....

...employee entitled to the benefits of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.083. (2) No agreement by an employee to waive his right to compensation under this chapter shall be valid. [2] Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1985), requires that workers' compensation payments made by employers are to be made when due without the claimant having to file a formal claim. Subsection 440.20(7) provides in part: If any installment of compensation for death or dependency benefits, disability, permanent impairment, or wage loss payable without an award is not paid within 14 days after it becomes due, as provided in subsectio...

...5, which shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, such installment of compensation, unless notice is filed under subsection six (6) or unless such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control. Subsection 440.20(6) provides in part: If the employer or carrier initially accepts the claim but subsequently controverts the claim, it shall file with the division a notice to controvert, within 10 days after the date of initial cessation of benefits......

...ate or dates the employer/carrier should have paid them, at the statutory legal rate. Section 687.01, Florida Statutes (1979). We acknowledge that the legislature has not provided for the assessment of interest on unpaid benefits of this class, that Section 440.20(6) and (7), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.) provides for assessment of monetary penalties when compensation "payable under the terms of an award" or as an "installment of compensation" due is not paid....

...ated payment of the compensation ordered by the Commission. Claimant obtained from the Circuit Court an order for the payment of the compensation due under the existing compensation order, plus payment of the 20% penalty provided for under F.S. Sec. 440.20, F.S.A., and an attorney's fee....

...strial Commission but was denied attorney's fees. This Court reversed, holding that the attorney's fee statute was not to be nullified by restrictive interpretation, saying: "[2] We hold that the twenty percent additional amount here recovered under Section 440.20(6) was `compensation' within the meaning of Section 440.34(1)....

...to date and the rating upon which payments for permanent partial disability were paid.' At that time there was no claim by the employee pending before the Commission for any further compensation or medical benefits. The carrier contended that under Section 440.20(8) of the Workmen's Compensation Law it was the duty of the Commission to adjudicate the status and rights of the parties....

...n after having completed payment without an award of compensation for permanent partial disability. "The Florida Workmen's Compensation Law contemplates that compensation shall be payable thereunder without an award, as indicated by the provision of Section 440.20(1) that, `Compensation under this chapter shall be paid periodically, promptly in the usual manner and directly to the person entitled thereto, without an award, except where liability to pay compensation is controverted by the employe...

...hen an employer fails to pay compensation when due or controverts the right to compensation, that resort to the claim, hearing, and determination provisions of the Act becomes necessary. "In its application for review the carrier contends that under Section 440.20 (8) of the Act the employer and carrier are entitled to a hearing `for the purpose of determination upon the record of their rights and obligations with respect to the benefits furnished to the claimant.' In support of this position it cites Superior Home Builders v. Moss, Fla., 70 So.2d 570. The said Section 440.20(8) provides that the Commission shall in any case (1) where right to compensation is controverted, or (2) where payments of compensation have been stopped or suspended, make such investigations, cause such medical examination to be mad...

...spended before payment of compensation due or claimed to be due has been completed. Where payment of compensation is terminated because payment of all compensation payable has been completed, the situation is governed by the immediately preceding subsection 440.20(7), which provides that within thirty days after final payment of compensation *559 has been made, the employer shall send to the Commission a notice, in accordance with a form prescribed by the Commission, stating that such final payment has been made and setting forth certain other information....

...ng the employee to the procedure of Section 440.28 in the event he decided to claim additional compensation, a procedure limited to cases involving a change in condition or a mistake in a determination of fact. "Assuming arguendo, however, that said Section 440.20(8) is applicable under the facts of the instant case, it does not require that the Commission either hold a hearing or make a formal adjudication in each case in which payments of compensation have been stopped or suspended....

...on as it considers will properly protect the rights of all parties.' Sections 440.18 and 440.36 of the Act require the employee and the employer or carrier to submit specified reports in respect of the injury to the Commission from time to time, and Section 440.20 requires certain additional notices and reports, including a notice of final payment containing specified information; and Section 440.13 requires that the attending physician or physicians furnish certain reports....

...Claimant appeals the deputy commissioner's order denying claimant's application for a 20% penalty for late payment of benefits due. We reverse. The issue presented by this appeal is when does an appellate court's order become final for purposes of section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...y of this court's order and, that if those benefits are not paid within 20 days after they become due (20 days being the applicable time period in Cling within which compensation was to be paid), the claimant is entitled to a 20% penalty pursuant to Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes....

...Accordingly, we find and hold that the judgment in the instant case became final on December 30, 1982, the date mandate was issued. This leads us to the second disagreement we have with the deputy's order. The date of accident in this case was March 17, 1980. The deputy apparently applied section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1980), and the respective parties' attorneys did not inform the deputy or this court to the contrary, as the applicable law *299 in this case, which section provides, in pertinent part, that a penalty shall be added to any compensation if such compensation is not paid within 30 days after it becomes due. However, we find that Chapter 80-236, Laws of Florida, which amended section 440.20(8) to extend the time within which compensation is to be paid from 20 to 30 days after it becomes due, was not to take effect until July 1, 1980. Accordingly, section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1979), not section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1980), would be applicable to this case, which former section provides for a penalty if compensation is not paid within 20 days after it becomes due....

...Since the compensation in this case became due December 30, 1982, the date mandate was issued, and since payment by the employer/carrier was made on January 21, 1983, more than 20 days after December 30, 1982, the employer/carrier's payment was untimely and a 20% penalty should have been assessed pursuant to section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The deputy's decision, therefore, is reversed and remanded with instructions to the deputy to conduct proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED. JOANOS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING SHIVERS, Judge. Appellees argue that the change in section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes, which extends the time within which compensation may be paid without penalty from twenty to thirty days, is merely procedural and that, therefore, the extended time period can be applied to all cases pending on the effective date, July 1, 1980....

...Kessler of Pyszka, Kessler & Adams, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant/claimant seeks review of an order of the judge of industrial claims contending the judge erred in denying her claim for additional compensation as a penalty, plus an attorney's fee pursuant to Sections 440.20(6) and 440.34, Florida Statutes (1977). We affirm. An order approving a joint petition and stipulation for lump sum payment of compensation *802 pursuant to Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1977), was entered June 28, 1978....

...The judge found, further, that there was no intent on the part of the employer to delay payment to the claimant. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the judge determined that there was an equitable basis for excusing the statutory penalty allowable under Section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...disability" for the word "injury." With the adoption of the Florida Statutes of 1941, § 20, subsection (m) of the Laws of 1935, as amended by the Laws of 1937, Chapter 18413, § 9, and the Laws of 1941, Chapter 20672, § 6, was revised and numbered Section 440.20, subsection (13) of the Florida Statutes of 1941, and reads as follows: "The total compensation payable under this chapter for disability and death shall in no event exceed the sum of Five thousand dollars in addition to any benefits under § 440.13 for medical services and treatment and under subsection (1) of § 440.16 for funeral expenses." The Laws of 1947, Chapter 23921, § 2, amended Section 440.20, subsection 13 of the Florida Statutes of 1941, and provided as follows: "The total compensation payable under this chapter for disability and death shall in no event be payable for a period in excess of three hundred and fifty weeks in addition to any benefits under Section 440.13 for medical services and treatment, and under subsection (1) of Section 440.16 for funeral expenses." With the adoption of the 1949 Florida Statutes, § 440.20, subsection (13), as amended by Chapter 23921, § 2, of the Laws of 1947, was revised and became Section 440.20, subsection (13) of the Florida Statutes of 1949. The Laws of 1951, Chapter 26877, § 2, expressly repealed Section 440.20, subsection (13) of the Florida Statutes of 1949. Both the adoption of Section 440.20, subsection (13) of the Florida Statutes of 1949, and the subsequent repeal thereof by Chapter 26877, § 2, of the Laws of 1951, substantially changed the liability of the employer from what it was when the injury occurred....

...238, 9 So.2d 359; Stansell v. Marlin, 153 Fla. 421, 14 So.2d 892; and Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472, 18 So.2d 251. The statute in existence and controlling at the time of the occurrence of the appellant's *347 injury was Section 440.20, subsection (13) of the Florida Statutes of 1941....

...tion. Id. at 641. In Grice the employer/carrier sought to reduce a claimant's workers' compensation benefits to the extent that his combined workers' compensation, SSD, and state disability retirement benefits exceeded his AWW. This Court found that section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1985), authorized such a reduction....

...urnishes satisfactory proof to the judge of such payment of compensation and medical benefits. Any payment by the employer over and above compensation paid or awarded and medical benefits, pursuant to subsection (14), shall be considered a gratuity. § 440.20(15), Fla. Stat. (1985). Because the claimant's ACE did not exceed his AWW, the limits of section 440.15(10) were not an issue. It was in that context that this Court interpreted section 440.20(15) to mean that "an injured worker, except where expressly given such a right by *445 contract, may not receive benefits from his employer and other collateral sources which, when totalled, exceed 100% of [a claimant's] average weekly wage." Escambia County Sheriff's Dept....

...By extending our decision in Grice to those situations in which a claimant's ACE exceeds his or her AWW, this Court would vitiate the express limits set forth in section 440.15(10)(a). As this Court noted in City of Clearwater v. Acker, 755 So.2d 597 (Fla.1999), our interpretation of section 440.20(15) to mean that a claimant may not receive in excess of 100 percent of his or her AWW was a judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute and should not be extended to render another statute meaningless. This Court must first try to read sections 440.15(10)(a) and 440.20(15) harmoniously....

...George Kagan of Miller, Kagan, Rodriguez and Silver, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. The claimant in this workers' compensation appeal challenges an order by which the judge of compensation claims (JCC) denied his request for an award of penalties and interest pursuant to sections 440.20(6) and 440.20(8), Florida Statutes....

...It is undisputed that the Employer/Carrier (E/C) in this case was, on several occasions, late in its payment of non-award disability benefits owed to the claimant, appellant. Applying Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-24.0231, in which the Division of Workers' Compensation set forth its interpretation of section 440.20(6), the JCC ordered the E/C to pay penalties in the amount of twenty percent of the first installment not paid before the expiration of the statutory seven-day grace period, and the sum of five dollars for each *236 subsequent late installment. We agree with claimant's argument that Rule 38F-24.0231 finds no possible support in the language of the statute. The claimant argues instead for an interpretation of section 440.20(6) that would require the E/C to pay for all late installments an amount equal to twenty percent "or five dollars," whichever is greater, just as the statute did before the 1994 amendments....

...We agree that claimant is entitled to the twenty percent penalty on all installments, but on a different interpretation than the one urged by claimant. Both parties acknowledge that this is a case of first impression, calling for an analysis of legislative amendments to section 440.20, effective 1994. Before amendment, section 440.20(7) provided that when a non-award compensation installment was not paid within fourteen days after becoming due, the E/C was required to pay, in addition to the compensation, an amount equal to "the greater of" ten percent of the unpaid installment or five dollars....

...Following the 1994 amendments, that provision—renumbered subsection (6)—was changed to read: ... there shall be added to such unpaid installment a punitive penalty of an amount equal to 20 percent of the unpaid installment or $5.... We conclude, as did the JCC below, that the deletion of the words "the greater of in section 440.20(6) rendered the provision ambiguous....

...courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless." State v. Goode, 830 So.2d 817 (Fla. 2002). We find further support for our conclusion that legislative oversight accounts for the failure to delete the term "or $5" from section 440.20(6) by consideration of the penalty provision related to untimely payments owed pursuant to an award, currently appearing in 440.20(7), Florida Statutes....

...That provision has, since its inception, required a penalty payment of twenty percent. Ch. 17481, Laws of Fla. (1935). We find it noteworthy that the legislature changed some of the provisions of subsection (7) in the same session law in which it amended section 440.20(6), by reducing the grace period for the payment of compensation from thirty days to seven days....

...uided the legislature in making these amendments, rather than to assume that it intended to enact an unintelligible provision. [2] *238 Accordingly, because we can only conclude that the legislature inadvertently failed to omit the term "or $5" from section 440.20(6), we read the statute as requiring a payment of twenty percent penalty on all non-award compensation installments not paid within the seven-day grace period....

...For the reasons stated we reverse the order appealed and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. We reject the E/C's request for application of the de minimus rule and direct that on remand, the E/C be ordered to pay all interest due under Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes. VAN NORTWICK, J., and SMITH, LARRY G., SENIOR JUDGE, CONCUR; POLSTON, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH WRITTEN OPINION. POLSTON, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part. Section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1994) states in relevant part that "there shall be added to such unpaid installment a punitive penalty of an amount equal to 20 percent of the unpaid installment or $5...." I agree with the majority that (i) the a...

...Therefore, the JCC's ruling that no additional penalty payments are due should be affirmed. NOTES [1] Appellant filed a notice of intent to rely on subsequent authority, calling our attention to House Bill 1837 of the current legislative session, which, among other things, deletes the term "or $5" from section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes. We note that the legislature did subsequently amend section 440.20(6) to delete the words "or $5." See Ch.2003-412, § 24, at 76, Laws of Fla. This amendment, which clarifies the ambiguity in the statute, may be considered in interpreting the legislative intent of section 440.20(6)....

...as to the meaning of the law. The court has the right and the duty, in arriving at the correct meaning of a prior statute to consider subsequent legislation.") [2] In addition, our interpretation gives practical effect to the remaining provisions of section 440.20(6), which retain the former provisions allowing the employer or carrier to be excused from payment of the penalty upon a showing that "such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control." As appel...

...to the first unpaid installment, rather than a penalty of twenty percent as we have interpreted the legislative intent. [3] I also agree with the majority that the E/C's request for application of the de minimus rule on the unpaid interest due under section 440.20(8) should be rejected and the JCC's denial of interest reversed and remanded.

...te with certainty that repetitive trauma at work caused her condition. Appellant's counsel argued that appellees waived the right to deny compensability, because they failed to investigate the matter within the 120-day limitation period set forth in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Appellant indicated that Dr. Fenichel said her injury was caused by repetitive motion and heavy lifting. The claims adjuster assigned to appellant's case testified that Exxon initially accepted the claim as compensable, and filed a 120-day letter, pursuant to section 440.20(4), advising appellant that after investigation of the claim, the carrier would notify her within 120 days whether compensability of the claim would be accepted or denied....

...al accident and subsequent treatment was the major contributing cause of appellant's condition when he treated her. The first issue presented by appellant is the JCC's finding that appellees did not waive the right to deny compensability pursuant to section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes. Section 440.20(4) "precludes a carrier from claiming that no injury for which benefits may be due was occasioned by an accident that arose out of the employment and occurred during the course and scope of employment, when the carrier has availed itself of the `pay and investigate' provisions of section 440.20(4) and does not deny compensability within 120 days of providing requested benefits." See North River Insurance Company v....

...dge's factual finding will be reversed. See id. In the instant case, appellees acknowledge that after serving the "pay and investigate" notice, the denial of compensability occurred after expiration of the 120-day investigation period provided under section 440.20(4)....

...That basic question was not asked until appellees' *973 counsel interviewed Dr. Fenichel prior to the merits hearing. Because there is an absence of competent substantial evidence to support a finding that the carrier conducted a reasonable, good faith investigation within the 120-day period permitted under section 440.20(4), appellees waived the right to deny compensability of appellant's injury....

...In our view, a reasonable investigation would include a direct inquiry of the authorized treating physician as to whether, in his opinion, the employee's injury was related to the employment. Since it is undisputed that appellees failed to ask this critical question at any point during the 120-day period provided by section 440.20(4), we conclude the right to deny compensability was waived....

...I also agree that, in light of this waiver, the claim for psychiatric evaluation and care must be revisited by the judge of compensation claims. I specifically do not join in the majority's unnecessary discussion of "major contributing cause." NOTES [1] Pursuant to section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1995), if a carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide workers' compensation benefits, it may initiate payment without admitting liability....

...rule shall constitute a valid claim. Copies of claims may be served upon the employer or carrier concurrently with the filing thereof with the Bureau. RULE 6 NOTICE TO CONTROVERT If the employer or carrier has not controverted the claim pursuant to Section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and regulations relating to reports to be filed with the Bureau, and a claim for compensation and/or application for hearing on a claim is filed with the Bureau pursuant to Rule 5 or Rule 7, upon receipt o...

...(b) Medical reports furnished upon demand to injured employees or their attorneys, pursuant to Section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., shall be without charge to the injured employee, except actual cost to the physician or hospital furnishing same. RULE 12 PENALTIES UNDER SECTION 440.20(5) DEEMED WAIVED UNLESS SPECIFICALLY CLAIMED When any installment of compensation payable without an award has not been paid within fourteen (14) days after it became due and the claimant concludes the prosecution of his claim before a judge without having specifically claimed additional compensation in the nature of a penalty under Section 440.20(5), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., he will be deemed to have acknowledged that owing to conditions over which the employer had no control such installment could not be paid within the period prescribed for the payment and to have waived his...

...If no claim for such penalty is presented and the judge does not raise the question on his own motion during the hearing, no penalty will be awarded and it will be deemed that the judge has excused such delay in payment of compensation pursuant to said Section 440.20(5)....

...ility with respect to which compensation is payable. RULE 14 DETERMINATION OF PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE PAYMENTS In determining the present value of future payments of compensation computed at four percent true discount compounded annually pursuant to Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the probability of the death of the injured employee or other person entitled to compensation before the expiration of the period during which he is entitled to compensation shall, in the absence of speci...

...id. (e) When a person entitled to compensation requests that the liability of the employer for such compensation be discharged by the payment of a lump sum equal to the present value of all future payments of compensation payable to him, pursuant to Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., such application shall be considered and determined in accordance with the provisions of this rule relating to advance payment of part of the compensation....

...rehabilitation section of the Bureau. The joint petition and the report of any investigation so made will be deemed a part of the proceeding. (h) A judge, in his discretion, may hear testimony relating to a proposed stipulation for settlement under Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., without having in hand the Bureau file; however, he shall in no event enter an order thereon without first having reviewed the Bureau file....

...award, provided the employer furnishes satisfactory proof to the Judge or the Commission of such payment of compensation and medical benefits. Any payment by the employer over and above compensation paid or awarded and medical benefits, pursuant to Section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., shall be considered a gratuity....

...subds. a and e of the Florida Appellate Rules. RULE 28 MOTION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (a) Any motion filed withe Commission shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law, save a joint motion for remand of jurisdiction for entry of an order pursuant to Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...Section 440.33(1), Florida Statutes, directs that a JCC may "do all things conformable to law which may be necessary to enable the judge effectively to discharge the duties of his or her office." A JCC is required to approve any attorney's fee paid as a result of a settlement agreement. See § 440.20(11)(c), Fla....

...Petersburg, for Appellees. HAWKES, J. In this appeal from the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying compensability of Claimant's hand condition, Claimant raises two arguments. First, after invoking the pay and investigate provisions of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2003), the E/C failed to conduct a "good-faith" investigation into the claim and was unable to produce a copy of their notice of denial....

...hes at work and a repetitive work injury. The unsigned notice of injury listed the date of injury as April 24, 2003. The carrier filed the notice of injury and sent Claimant a letter invoking its right to "pay and investigate" the claim, pursuant to section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes....

...ition was not due to a work-related accident, but was idiopathic and personal in nature. The denial was within the 120 days allowed by statute. THE "120 DAY RULE" AND GOOD-FAITH INVESTIGATIONS Carriers invoking the "pay and investigate" option under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, "shall immediately and in good faith commence investigation of the employee's entitlement to benefits" and must admit or deny compensability within 120 days after initial provision of compensation or benefits; employees must be notified in writing that the carrier has elected this option. See § 440.20(4), Fla....

...The parties to this case began to negotiate a washout settlement in April 1993, which culminated in approval of the agreement by the JCC on January 11, 1994. The employer/carrier (e/c) made payment eight days later, and Mr. Bell moved for imposition of a 20% statutory penalty under section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1994)....

...m. RULE 5. NOTICE TO CONTROVERT If the right to compensation is controverted, the employer shall, on or before the twenty-first day after it has knowledge of the alleged injury or death, file with the Bureau a notice to controvert in accordance with § 440.20(4), Florida Statutes....

...Pullo, 926 So.2d 448, 449 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (invoking en banc process to resolve direct conflict between two panel opinions of court); Checkers Rest. v. Wiethoff, 925 So.2d 348, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (invoking en banc process to clarify waiver provision of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, in light of several recent opinions that "blurred the distinction between compensability and entitlement to benefits"); Bay Point Club, Inc....

...This was the finding of the circuit court, in which we concur. However, the court rendered a judgment in favor of the claimant for this sum of $175.50, part of which represented the remaining future weekly payments. Counsel for the commission call our attention to Sub-section (10) of Section 440.20 E.S., which provides that whenever the commission determines that it is for the best interest of a person entitled to compensation, the liability of the employer therefor shall be discharged by the payment of a lump sum equal to the pr...

...he question, either in the court below or here; so we might dismiss the question thus raised by the commission by applying the maxim: “Deminimis non curat lex.” However, we think the circuit court had jurisdiction to apply paragraph (10) of said Section 440.20 if it had been brought to the court’s attention and if it had seen fit to do so....

...mpensable. Nevertheless, the JCC found that the employer and carrier waived the right to deny compensability of the lower back condition because they failed to deny compensation within 120 days after commencing payment of compensation as required by section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1995). Section 440.20 provides in part: (4) If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits or compensation, it may initiate payment without prejudice and without admitting liability....

...n within the 120 day period. (Emphasis added). In Franklin v. Northwest Airlines, 778 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), this court affirmed a JCC's finding that the employer and carrier had waived the right to deny compensability of a claim pursuant to section 440.20(4) because the claim was not denied within 120 days....

...(the Workers' Compensation Act). The trial court denied the motion, and the Board's appeal of that ruling was dismissed as untimely filed. Duffell thereafter entered into a settlement of his workers' compensation claim against the Board, pursuant to section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Farber's opinion testimony that claimant did not require attendant care benefits. As for the JCC's purported error in denying her claim seeking compensability of her left vocal cord paralysis, claimant primarily argues that the E/C violated the 120-day provision of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, and thus waived its right to deny compensability of such condition....

...The March order finds that the error could not be corrected (1) because carrier did not raise the issue at the time of entry of the 1984 merits order, which found "[c]laimant ... has a normal life expectancy which, according to the tables mandated for use by Section 440.20, Florida Statutes, is 26.4 years;" (2) because that order was already on appeal when the fee order was entered; and (3) because no objection was made until after claimant's counsel had submitted his evidence in the fee hearing in reliance on the finding....

...sent from the majority's affirmance of the order approving the agreement. The agreement signed by the parties and their attorneys provided as follows: Agreement: Parties desire to settle the employee/claimant's workers' compensation case pursuant to section 440.20(11) Florida Statutes....

...reement, I would reverse the enforcement order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this dissent. NOTES [1] The fact that claimant accepted and cashed the check for the advance is not evidence of an agreement to settle because section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes, permits claimants to receive advances up to $2,000, if they are found to be in the claimant's best interests....

...enefits. See this court's very recent decisions in E.H. v. Temporary Labor Source, Inc., 687 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and Horizons Painting v. Lessard, 688 So.2d 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Finally, we note that the E/C's ruling on the claimant's section 440.20(4) estoppel argument was incorrect, see North River Insurance Company v....

...As to the decretal portion of the order awarding claimant wage loss benefits for the period August 1, 1982 to April 1, 1983, and continuing, we agree with the employer/carrier that the language "and continuing" is error, since by law wage loss benefits are a monthly benefit, section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1980); with the employer/carrier having fourteen days from the date of receipt of the wage loss request to accept or reject the same....

...As stipulated, the E/C paid wage loss benefits for the months of May, June and July, 1981, but refused to pay wage loss benefits for the months of August and September, although wage loss request forms for these months were timely submitted. The E/C filed no notice to controvert (Section 440.20(6), (7), Florida Statutes (1979)), and filed no motion to dismiss the claim for either month (Section 440.19(2)(b))....

...Under that decision, the obligation of the E/C promptly to pay benefits upon receipt of a claim regular on its face, or to actively seek any information needed to cure an irregularity, is not dependent upon the claimant's compliance with technical requirements. A claim for wage loss benefits is adequate, under Section 440.20(4), if it is sufficient "to give `knowledge' of his claim, which is all that is required." Florida Erection Services, 395 So.2d at 212....

...satisfied." Id. at 173. Car Stop held that an application for hearing, under the circumstances presented, was properly treated as a claim. [4] Wage loss claims are payable 14 days from the date the E/C have "knowledge" of the compensable wage loss. Section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes....

...Carpenter defense and it turned out that the facts would not support such a defense, or that the judge of compensation claims did not accept it, the employer and carrier might well be required to pay penalties, interest and attorney fees in addition to the benefits at issue. See § 440.20, Fla....

...ermanent total disability supplemental benefits, pursuant to section 440.15(1)(e)(1), Florida Statutes (1985). Claimant also began to receive her disability pension from the City. The City informed Claimant that an offset would be taken, pursuant to section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...es. Recalculating the offset so as to include the cost-of-living adjustment would certainly erode that purpose. Accordingly, we reverse the JCC's order, but certify the following question: WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(1)(e)(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL...

...Hurt, Orlando, for Henry Hudson Parker. Burnis T. Coleman and Patrick H. Mears, Tallahassee, for Florida Industrial Commission. THOMAS J. COLLINS, Circuit Judge. This is a workmen's compensation case and the question, primarily, is the interpretation of the second sentence of section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., as relates to a lump sum discharge, often referred to as a "wash out." It is before us on original prohibition at the suggestion of the employer, Wilson Leonard's Hardware Store, and the insurer, Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company....

...Future medical expenses were anticipated. *638 In the light of this impasse between Parker and the carrier and the desire of the former to move to New Orleans and establish himself in business, a joint petition was filed as provided for by the second sentence of 440.20(10), supra, reciting the 25% disability, controversy between the workman and carrier, anticipated future medical expenses, and the desire of Parker to move to New Orleans to engage in business....

...We wish to say at the outset that from an examination of the record we do *639 not find any taint of fraud, mutual mistake, overreaching, nor any other reason which would invalidate the stipulation and order. Having so found, we are of the further opinion that the critical provision of 440.20 (10) is controlling and not 440.28, which permits modification....

...Respondent employee in his brief raised several points covered in his petition for modification, as amended. The first appears in his brief within which he says: "It is obvious from the record that neither the stipulation nor the order complies with the prerequisites as set out by the Legislature in Section 440.20(10) and if these prerequisites are not met, it is obvious that the stipulation is subject to modification by the Florida Industrial Commission." With this contention the court cannot agree. 440.20(10) provides, inter alia, as relating to the authority of the deputy commissioner that "* * * if he finds that it is for the best interests of the person entitled to compensation a deputy commissioner may enter a compensation order approving a...

...s for the best interests of the employee. It is noted that the law as amended uses the word "finds." Webster defines the word as "To arrive at, as a conclusion; to determine and declare * * *." The finding to be made by the deputy commissioner under 440.20(10) is to be distinguished from 440.25(3) (c) which states that: "The order * * * shall set forth a statement of the findings of fact and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue * * *." (Italics for emphasis.) Patently, the purpose o...

...he statute provides that lump sum payment shall be made `whenever the commissioner determines that it is for the best interests of a person entitled to compensation.'" For the sake of emphasis the word "manner" was italicized. The second sentence of 440.20(10) does not require nearly so much of the deputy commissioner....

...atters pertinent. In Sullivan v. Mayo, Fla.App., 121 So.2d 424, we indicated *640 that lump sum settlement orders "are not technically workmen's compensation orders." It is to be presumed that had the Legislature intended the same kind of finding in 440.20(10) as in 440.25(3) (c) it would have specifically spelled it out....

...ned upon the same being "in the interest of justice." Our terminology is somewhat different in that it requires the commutation to be "for the best interests of the person entitled to compensation." It is reasonable to assume that in the adoption of 440.20(10) the Legislature made a study of the commutation laws of our sister states, applying what it thought to be the best, and rejecting that which was incompatible with our labor philosophy in the workmen's compensation field....

...439, dealing with a lump sum settlement the court said: "* * * it is not necessary that the joint petition presented to the court for approval be supported by proof beyond the verification of the parties to the facts therein alleged. On this point we find ourselves in accord with the learned district judge." 440.20(10) does not even require that the joint petition be verified....

...The end result would be that all such claims would be forced into *641 litigation. Such a conclusion would be directly contrary to the policy of the laws favoring amicable settlement of disputes and the avoidance of litigation." We feel that this same policy should hold in release cases disposed of under 440.20(10). The order of March 21, 1961, complied with the prerequisites of the second sentence of 440.20(10)....

...This is a workmen's compensation case, in which the Deputy Commissioner found that the claimant, petitioner here, was entitled to compensation for a 10 percent permanent partial disability, plus a penalty of 10 percent for compensation due and unpaid as authorized by Section 440.20(5), Fla....

...ded to the JCC for such determination. [2] REVERSED and REMANDED. ERVIN, PADOVANO and LEWIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] A judge of compensation claims has discretionary authority to impose sanctions for a late payment of a settlement reached pursuant to section 440.20(11)(c), (2003)....

...1st DCA 1982), wherein this court affirmed the assessment of a penalty, even though there was no showing that the E/C intended to delay payment to the claimant. In that case, however, the court was reviewing the imposition of sanctions pursuant to section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes, which imposes a mandatory penalty if compensation is not paid within seven days after it becomes due....

...he Barragan decision. After the hearing, the judge of compensation claims ordered the City to pay the full amount of past benefits due under the Barragan decision from September 24, 1987, through August 1, 1989, and awarded a 10% penalty pursuant to section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1985), based on the City's failure to controvert the claim within the 10-day period specified in subparagraph (6) of that section....

...in the event the governing law should change, so long as such claim was not otherwise barred by applicable statutes of limitation, which it was not in this instance. III. The City's third point contends that it was error to award a 10% penalty under section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1985), [5] on the retroactively awarded setoff benefits....

...n Barragan, but they did not pay nor did they file a notice to controvert. The notice to controvert dated August 8, 1989, was not timely. The City has not shown that the failure to pay or to file a timely notice to controvert was beyond its control. § 440.20(7), Fla. Stat. (1984). We find no error in this ruling and hold that the 10% penalty was correctly awarded under the particular circumstances of this case. Section 440.20, entitled "Payment of compensation," makes the Florida Workers' Compensation statute self-executing by requiring that payments by the employer or carrier are to be made when due without the claimant having to file a formal claim pursuant to section 440.19. Section 440.20 sets the time when payment of compensation benefits is due under various circumstances. One of the enforcing elements of this self-executing procedure is the requirement to add a penalty to the award of benefits, with certain exceptions, whenever the employer or carrier has failed to make payments of benefits when due. Subsection 440.20(2) states that payment of benefits for total disability is due within 14 days after the employer has knowledge of the injury giving rise to the claimant's right to benefits. Subsection 440.20(4) states that wage loss benefits shall be paid "within 14 days of the date upon which the carrier or employer has *1187 knowledge of the compensable wage loss." Subsection 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1985), provides in pertinent part: If any installment of compensation for death or dependency benefits, disability, permanent impairment, or wage loss payable without an award is not paid within 14 days after it b...

...previously offset benefits that had been withheld. See City of Miami v. Burnett, 596 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); City of Daytona Beach v. Amsel, 585 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The City's having this knowledge meant, under any construction of section 440.20, that all such benefits were due to be paid at least by July 28, 1989, that is, within 14 days after the supreme court's July 14 order....

...nted this change on August 1. While the City was entitled to take the risk of an adverse decision on the retroactivity of the Barragan decision, in electing to do so the City necessarily incurred the risk of having to pay the penalty specified in subsection 440.20(7)....

...The City's failure to pay these benefits within 14 days after it had knowledge they should be paid requires assessment of the 10% penalty unless the City has shown that it is excused from such payment, either because it timely filed a notice to controvert authorized in subsection 440.20(6) or because its failure to timely pay was due to conditions over which it had no control....

...ted compensation payments were required to be paid to Bell. We recognize that the notice to controvert was filed on the 21st day after the claimant filed his claim on July 24, but that fact does not make it timely. The time constraints prescribed in section 440.20 setting the due dates for payment commence from the date an employer or carrier has the requisite knowledge that compensation is payable, not from the date a formal claim for benefits is filed pursuant to section 440.19....

...notice to controvert was due to conditions beyond its control. The City did not attempt to make any showing that its failure to timely pay was due to such conditions. Finding no basis for error in the judge's award of the 10% penalty pursuant to subsection 440.20(7) under these circumstances, that award is affirmed....

...With one judge recused, six judges voted in favor of considering the issue en banc and six voted against en banc; thus, the case remained with the panel. In view of this close vote, we certify the following question of great public importance to the supreme court: IS SECTION 440.20(7) APPLICABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, AND IF SO, CAN THE CITY OF MIAMI, BE LEGALLY EXCUSED FROM PAYING A PENALTY PURSUANT TO THAT SECTION ON THE AMOUNT OF PENSION OFFSET MONIES WITHHELD IN THE PAST BECAUSE THE CITY DID SO...

...No legal basis exists for this court to resolve the dispute presented by the City under this point. The appealed order is in all respects AFFIRMED. ERVIN, J., concurs. BOOTH, J., dissents in part with opinion. BOOTH, Judge, dissenting in part: I dissent from the affirmance of penalties awarded under section 440.20, Florida Statutes. The majority's efforts to fit the facts of this case under subsection (6) and, failing that, subsection (7), of section 440.20, fall short of what the law requires in applying a penalty statute....

...It has even been said that such provisions must not be construed to include anything beyond their letter even though within their spirit. One who seeks to recover a penalty imposed by statute must bring his case clearly within the terms of the statute. The instant case involves the ten-percent penalty of subsections 440.20(6) and (7), a penalty imposed for delay in paying or controverting the right to compensation....

...Where was appellant's opportunity to avoid the penalty? What was the effect of the ordinance remaining on the books that authorized the offset? The fact that these questions can be raised now by those of us having knowledge of the facts and changes in the law, shows that the penalty of subsections 440.20(6) and (7) does not "fit" here and should not be imposed....

...ch the employer or carrier had no control." Cases construe that provision to prevent the imposition of the penalty where the employer has a valid excuse, [11] and to require a finding of fault. [12] For this reason, in addition to the other basis of section 440.20 inapplicability, the penalty award should be reversed....

...es. [4] This case is to be distinguished from those cases involving compensable injuries that occurred prior to the repeal of section 440.09(4) in 1973. E.g., City of Miami v. Jones, 593 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). [5] The pertinent provisions of section 440.20 had not been significantly changed between 1985, the year in which Bell sustained his compensable injury, and 1990, when this matter came on for hearing....

...Knight, 510 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 518 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 1987); Hoffkins v. City of Miami, 339 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 948 (Fla. 1977). [9] Daytona Beach v. Amsel, 585 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). [10] § 440.20(7), Fla....

...Lord Colony Enterprises, 400 So.2d 856, 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), wherein employer offered no excuse for delay in determining correct compensation rate. [12] Florida Community Health Center v. Ross, 590 So.2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991): In the case of penalties, section 440.20(7) awards penalties against the employer or carrier depending upon fault....

...imant with a 120 day letter. Provision *271 of the 120 day letter is only required where the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits, and begins paying benefits while it investigates the compensability of an employee's injury. See § 440.20(4), Fla....

...Unless there is a change in those benefits, there is no reason to find that the stipulation of fact does not continue to remain in effect. The claimant also argues that the stipulation in the instant case is unenforceable unless approved by a JCC pursuant to section 440.20(12) and (13), Florida Statutes....

...ied on for granting the writ. It shall be accompanied by a supporting brief prepared as provided by Rule 3.7." [4] "440.34 Attorney's fees; costs; penalty for violations "(1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 * * *, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of same, or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation, and the injured person shall have employed an attorney at law in...

...denying a request for a statutory advance payment of compensation not in excess of $2,000.00. Claimant argues the JCC erred in determining advances of $2,000.00 or less are not awardable in contested cases. Under existing law, reversal is required. Section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (2009), permits a JCC to award an advance payment of compensation not in excess of $2,000.00, after giving due consideration to the "interests of the person entitled thereto," where a claimant demonstrates *889...

...may, in fact, be realized, the legislature has not seen fit to codify the possibility of employer prejudice as to advances not exceeding $2,000, as here." Id. The court reiterated, "The only conditions pertinent to the inquiry of the appropriateness of such advances are those stated in section 440.20(12)(c), and they do not mention the potential of employer prejudice." Id....

...The Williams case was decided in 1999, and the Legislature has substantially amended the Workers' Compensation Law since that time. See, e.g., Ch. 2001-91, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 2003-412, Laws of Fla. With presumptive knowledge of this court's holding in Williams, the Legislature elected not to amend section 440.20(12)(c)2....

...A court must therefore presume that the Legislature has adopted the statutory construction announced by the court in Williams. See id. at 1202 (holding Legislature is presumed to have adopted prior judicial constructions of law unless a contrary intention is expressed in new version). Section 440.20(12)(c)2....

...1st DCA 1984) (holding that where statute enumerates one thing, it is ordinarily construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned). Here, the JCC found Claimant suffered an apparent physical impairment, as required by the statute. See § 440.20(12)(c), Fla....

...Janet Rease appeals a final judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Anheuser-Busch, Inc., in her action for damages against Anheuser-Busch for terminating her employment because she pursued workers' compensation benefits. Her action was premised on section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...er week. After unsuccessfully pursuing a grievance against Anheuser-Busch, [2] Rease commenced the present action on August 1, 1991, when she filed a complaint alleging that Anheuser-Busch terminated her employment on August 5, 1987, in violation of section 440.205....

...ed to introduce evidence of Rease's receipt of workers' compensation wage-loss benefits. Rease argued that such evidence was an improper consideration of a collateral source and was irrelevant to the ultimate issue of whether Anheuser-Busch violated section 440.205....

...collateral source, that Anheuser-Busch's status as being self-insured does not change the collateral nature of the benefits, and that the payment of workers' compensation benefits was not probative of whether she had been terminated in violation of section 440.205, since the obligation to pay wage-loss benefits continues even after the employee is terminated....

...As the court in Robbins stated, "[T]he fact that limiting statutes bar the bringing of a cause of action on stale facts does not, alone, render those same facts inadmissible as evidence of motive to prove another valid cause of action." 613 So.2d at 581. A violation of section 440.205 is considered an intentional tort, [5] and Anheuser-Busch's state of mind was relevant to the issue of liability....

...The letter contained a statement that Anheuser-Busch considered Rease to have been terminated. It was submitted during negotiations between Anheuser-Busch and Rease's workers' compensation attorney that were conducted with the intent to settle her claim for a lump-sum amount of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to section 440.20, Florida Statutes....

...There, the proposal was relevant to the defendant's liability as alleged in the lawsuit. But in the present case, the July 9, 1991, letter did not relate to the controversy embodied in the present lawsuit involving charges of improper conduct in violation of section 440.205....

...Obviously, the statement embodied in the letter to the effect that Anheuser-Busch considered Rease to be terminated is an admission on the company's part and highly probative of the issue of whether Rease, in fact, had been terminated from her employment for purposes of the application of section 440.205. Thus, the letter was critical to Rease's case, and its exclusion constituted prejudicial error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. REVERSED and REMANDED. KAHN and BENTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.205 provides that "[n]o employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." [...

...Reiner of Broussard, Cullen & Degailler, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants. Dennis J. Hunter of the Law Office of Dennis J. Hunter, Orlando, for Appellee. BROWNING, J. This workers' compensation appeal presents a question of first impression: the definition of the phrase "initial provision of benefits" in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Appellants seek review of an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) finding compensability and awarding evaluation of Appellee/Claimant by an allergist. Appellants raise two arguments on appeal: that their denial of compensation was timely under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000); and that the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the industrial accident is the major contributing cause of Claimant's injury. Because the second argument was not preserved for appeal by argument below, we address only the first argument. Because we disagree with the trial court that Appellants' denial of compensability was untimely, we reverse. Section 440.20(4) provides that if a workers' compensation carrier is uncertain of compensability, it can admit or deny compensability within 120 days after the initial provision of compensation or benefits.......

...or payment of compensation waives the right to deny compensability, unless the carrier can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period. § 440.20(4), Fla....

...The use of the disjunctive "or" makes clear that the words "compensation" and "benefits" refer to two distinct entities. It is clear that payment of compensation refers to the payment of temporary or permanent, partial or total, disability benefits because section 440.20(1)(a) states that "the carrier shall pay compensation directly to the employee as required by ss. 440.14, 440.15, and 440.16 ...," and those statutes refer to the payment of disability or death benefits as calculated from the average weekly wage. Accordingly, the term "benefits" as used in section 440.20 must mean something other than payment of disability benefits....

...whether the injury is compensable, which is one of the reasons for the 120-day period. Therefore, the first authorized doctor's visit by a claimant is the "initial provision of benefits," beginning the 120-day pay-and-investigate period mentioned in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...(c) Payments of Benefits when Challenged Benefits Are Abandoned. When benefits challenged on appeal have been abandoned under subdivision (b) above, benefits no longer affected by the appeal are payable within 30 days of the service of the brief together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, from the date of the order of the judge of compensation claims making the award. (d) Payment of Benefits after Appeal. If benefits are ordered paid by the district court on completion of the appeal, they shall be paid, together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, within 30 days after the court's mandate....

...Claimant says that he immediately reported the accident to the circus employer, who failed to file reports of the injury as required by § 440.36, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and who failed to furnish medical treatment and compensation as required by § 440.13 and § 440.20, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Claimant also alleges that the circus failed to file notice to controvert with the Florida Industrial Commission as required by § 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., but that on December 29, 1960, it did mail to attorneys for the claimant a letter designated as a notice to controvert....

...was based upon two employments held prior to his accident. Secondly, the E/C argues Hart voluntarily limited his income by failing to obtain a second job. Lastly, the E/C asserts error in the deputy commissioner's assessment of penalties pursuant to Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The resulting order is the subject of this appeal. Hart sought and was awarded temporary partial disability benefits from 11 December 1985, through the date of the hearing and continuing until he is no longer TPD. In addition, the E/C was ordered to pay penalties pursuant to Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes....

...ts in claimant's hands, despite E/C's contention that benefits never became due because the claimant never submitted TPD request forms to the E/C). Nevertheless, no benefits were timely paid nor was a notice to controvert timely filed as required by Section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...This action does not subject the employer/carrier to payment of an attorney's fee. Four Quarters Habitat, Inc. v. Miller, 405 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). This claim for psychiatric care was merely a claim for a benefit incidental to the injury. The deputy erroneously assessed a penalty against the employer/carrier. Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.), states that the claimant will be deemed to have waived his claim for penalties if not made prior to the conclusion of the prosecution of his claim before the deputy....

...urse and scope of her employment. Although the JCC did not credit her version of events, the employer and carrier waived the right to deny compensability by failing "to deny compensability within 120 days after the initial provision of benefits...." § 440.20(4), Fla....

...ty that Mrs. Singletary's knee pain was caused by a preexisting condition, rather than a work-related injury, and "should have prompted a timely, thorough, good faith investigation." Franklin v. N.W. Airlines, 778 So.2d 418, 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Section 440.20(4) provides: The carrier shall immediately and in good faith commence investigation of the employee's entitlement to benefits under this chapter and shall admit or deny compensability within 120 days after the initial provision of compensation or benefits.......

...and continuing until such time as the employer/carrier provides rehabilitation to the claimant by a private rehabilitation facility." We agree with appellants that this award is erroneous as a matter of law. Wage-loss benefits are monthly benefits. Section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...the time] is for compensation and all medical benefits, including payment of all medical expenses incurred, as well as retroactive authorization, from the date of the second accident, March 21, 1987, through the date of the hearing. 4. Pursuant to F.S. 440.20 Cruise Quality Painting/Aetna filed a reimbursement claim against Tire Kingdom/Adjustco for any and all benefits paid the claimant after March 21, 1987....

...on rate. Two upward adjustments were made in claimant's compensation rate in July, 1979, while she was still receiving temporary total disability benefits, but several months after the incorrect payments were made. Appellant argues that, pursuant to Section 440.20(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...and temporary indemnity benefits only through July 31, 2000 (the date of maximum medical improvement). Appellees, the Employer/Carrier, cross-appeal the final order. Concluding that Employer/Carrier's failure to comply with the clear requirements of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000), waived their right to challenge compensability of Hutchinson's pulmonary condition, we reverse the final order, insofar as it limits the waiver of compensability, and remand for further proceedings....

...cident, and if so, whether the industrial accident caused a temporary or permanent aggravation of the condition. As Quailey continued to correspond with Dr. Goldstein during Summer and Fall 2000 regarding Employer/Carrier's concerns, the deadline in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000), for Employer/Carrier to act passed....

...ompensability, employer/carrier waived right to relief and were deemed to have accepted compensability). In fact, the JCC correctly found the May 11, 2000, industrial accident is compensable based on Employer/Carrier's lack of timely compliance with section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000), and on Employer/Carrier's failure to satisfy their burden to establish material facts relevant to the compensability issue that could not have been discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period....

...hearing. Id. at 422. As in Franklin, once Employer/Carrier knew, or reasonably should have known, that Hutchinson had medical needs, three options were available: 1) pay for those medical needs; 2) pay and investigate according *148 to the terms of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000); or 3) deny compensability....

...Employer/Carrier are deemed to have accepted compensability of Hutchinson's pulmonary condition. Franklin, 778 So.2d at 422. On the authority of Collins and Franklin, we AFFIRM that portion of the final order finding that Employer/Carrier waived compensability by failing to satisfy the requirements of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000); REVERSE that part of the order limiting the waiver of compensability; and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the pertinent cases cited herein....

...McKim of Wyland & Tadros, LLP, West Palm Beach, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals two orders of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC): the first denies an advance payment of compensation under section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (2010), and the second denies several claims for medical benefits....

...Accordingly, the fact that PFBs with other claims were still pending when the JCC issued the order denying the advance in this case is insufficient, by itself, to establish that the order denying an advance is not final for appellate purposes. An advance payment of compensation under section 440.20(12)(c) is a discrete benefit that is different in kind from other workers’ compensation claims – it is a stopgap, which can be (and, by its nature, should be) made before entitlement to other benefits (or even compensability) is determined.2 See Bonner, 148 So....

...Thus, on appeal, claimant raises these same issues as well as argues that the deputy commissioner erred in holding that he was unable to determine the present value of compensation — when the parties stipulated to the present value — and improperly considered a "contingency" not permitted by section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, in denying the advance payment based on claimant's being an inmate in a public institution....

...pports the JCC's finding, not whether the record contains evidence which could be interpreted to support arguments rejected by the JCC). In addition to seeking PTD benefits, Burnham sought to assess a penalty against the employer/carrier pursuant to section 440.20(6), which provides that if an installment of compensation benefits is not paid within seven days after it becomes due, then a penalty may be assessed....

...the JCC found that Burnham attained maximum medical improvement (MMI), to *750 the date of the order under review. In pertinent part, the order under review provides: Claimant seeks [a] 20% penalty on permanent total disability benefits pursuant to section 440.20(6) which applies if any installment of compensation is not paid with seven (7) days after it becomes due....

...In response, Burnham argues that a penalty was assessed in the instant case on the ground that the employer/carrier failed to file a notice of denial within 14 days of the filing of the petition for benefits, pursuant to section 440.192(8), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994). Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...unless notice is filed under subsection (4) or unless such non-payment results from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control. The employer/carrier could have avoided the imposition of a penalty if it had commenced payment of benefits while undertaking an investigation of the claim pursuant to section 440.20(4). Nevertheless, contrary to Burnham's argument, the mere filing of a notice of denial within 14 days of the filing of the petition for benefits would not necessarily have avoided the assessment of a penalty under the provisions of subsection (6) of section 440.20. Subsection (6) requires payment of compensation "within 7 days after it becomes due." § 440.20(6), Fla....

...2d DCA 1998)(payment by surety on guardianship bond becomes due when misconduct of principal occurs, not when principal's liability established by court order). The legislature has not defined the term "becomes due" for purposes of this statute. Reading subsection (6) in pari materia with all provisions of section 440.20, however, it is apparent that the penalty provision was intended to support the self-executing purposes of workers' compensation law. Thus, subsection (6) mandates a "punitive penalty" on the employer or carrier who refuses to pay compensation benefits at the time the facts then known to the employer and carrier would support an obligation to pay, unless a notice is filed under section 440.20(4) or unless such non-payment results from circumstances over which the employer or carrier had no control. § 440.20(6), Fla....

...o weeks before the merits hearing. The record contains no other evidence suggesting PTD from a vocational standpoint, and no medical evidence that Burnham was PTD as of April 26, 1996. In determining that claimant was entitled to a 20% penalty under section 440.20(6), the JCC made no findings as to the factual basis supporting his conclusion that the PTD benefits had become due on April 26, 1996....

...After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that there is no competent, substantial evidence in the record on which the JCC could find that PTD benefits became due as of April 29, 1996. Accordingly, on the findings and record before us, it was error to assess a penalty pursuant to section 440.20(6)....

...The JCC found that Bussey's lost earnings resulted from the termination for drug use rather than the work-related injury. He further found that the E/C's failure to respond to claimant's petition for benefits did not amount to a waiver of defenses under section 440.192(8) or section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes. On appeal, claimant argues that the E/C's failure to deny the petition for benefits mandates payment of the requested TPD benefits. Resolution of the issue requires a review of this court's previous decisions construing section 440.192(8) and 440.20(4)....

...Upon receiving the petition for benefits, an E/C has 14 days to "either pay the requested benefits without prejudice to its right to deny within 120 days from receipt of the petition or file a response to the petition.... A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4) is deemed to have accepted the employee's injuries as compensable." § 440.192(8), Fla....

...Wuelling, this court, sitting en banc, reversed an order holding that an E/C's failure to deny compensability within 14 days barred assertion of a statute of limitations defense against a claim for benefits. 683 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We analyzed the interrelationship between section 440.192(8) and section 440.20(4). Section 440.20(4) provides in part: If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits or compensation, it may initiate payment without prejudice and without admitting liability....

...f benefits or payment of compensation as required under subsection (2) or s. 440.192(8) waives the right to deny compensability. We noted, "the third sentence of 440.192(8) which reads: `A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4) is deemed to have accepted the employee's injuries as compensable ...' refers to and is a reiteration of the waiver provision of 440.20(4) as it relates to the opportunity to pay and investigate." Wuelling, 683 So.2d at 1092. We concluded that neither section 440.192 nor section 440.20 imposed a penalty for failing to timely deny a petition for benefits or barred an E/C from defenses to a petition for benefits....

...Thus, our precedent establishes that the E/C's decision not to respond within 14 days operates as a denial. Bussey, nevertheless, places a great deal of emphasis upon the language in section 440.192(8) referring to the 120-day "pay and investigate" period outlined in section 440.20(4). We agree that an E/C opting to pay benefits while reserving the right to deny compensability pursuant to section 440.20(4) must deny within 120 days or waive the right to challenge compensability. Here, however, the E/C did not invoke the pay and investigate option. The 120-day period becomes relevant only when an E/C has elected to pursue the "pay and investigate" option. Section 440.20(4) applies to a carrier that is "uncertain of its obligation to provide all benefits or compensation" and gives the E/C an option to pay benefits while reserving the right to later deny compensability after investigation. See Wuelling, 683 So.2d at 1092 (finding that the "deemed compensable" language in section 440.192(8) "refers to and is a reiteration of the waiver provision of 440.20(4) as it relates to the opportunity to pay and investigate " (emphasis added)). Here, the E/C was not uncertain and needed no investigation because Wal-Mart knew it had discharged claimant for drug use. As a result, the 120-day period was never triggered in this case. Under section 440.20(4), the 120-day period is measured from the "initial provision of benefits or payment of compensation as required under ......

...A claim for temporary partial disability, temporary total disability, permanent total disability, or impairment benefits may well, as in this case, raise questions quite different from the question of compensability of an accident. We do not read "entitlement to benefits" to mean the same as "compensability." Section 440.20(1)(a) directly recognizes that a carrier may deny "compensability or entitlement to benefits." (emphasis added). See Wuelling, 683 So.2d at 1092 (noting that compensability and entitlement to benefits are separate concepts, and that the last sentence of section 440.20(4) refers to "the issue of compensability" indicating a distinction from other concepts)....

...Bussey's temporary partial disability claim raises questions not concerning the compensability of her accident, but concerning the causal relationship between her injury and her lost earnings. The purpose of the 120-day limit is to ensure that an E/C complies with the mandate of section 440.20(4) to "immediately and in good faith commence investigation of the employee's entitlement to benefits." Our interpretation is consistent with the legislative goal of speedy resolution of claims and protects a claimant from prolonged periods of uncertainty regarding the E/C's position on the claim's compensability....

...in § 440.24(4), Florida Statutes, bars the Employer/Carrier from controverting entitlement to TPD." Finally, in her brief, Bussey does not suggest the argument made by the dissenting opinion. Instead, in the only issue on appeal, Bussey argues that section 440.20(4) "requires a payment of benefits not specifically controverted within 120 days of the request for benefits." Nothing in this case supports even an inference that Bussey attempted to avoid the E/C's defense with any evidence. Thus, no record exists to support the argument Judge Ervin would make on Bussey's behalf. Accordingly, we find that an E/C which neither denies a petition for benefits within 14 days of receipt nor elects to pay and investigate pursuant to section 440.20(4) is placed in the "identical position as the E/C that files a notice of denial." Russell Corp., 698 So.2d at 1336 (Ervin, J., concurring)....

...r a period of time in excess of 120 days from the initial provision of same does not obligate the employer/carrier (E/C) to pay as well claimant's temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits. The clearly expressed language of sections 440.192(8) and 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2001), when considered in pari materia, provides that an employer's waiver of its right to contest applies only to the compensability of an alleged injury, not to every claimed benefit requested....

...g at the time of the injury." § 440.02(12), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added). Therefore, claimant must prove that her compensable injury caused a loss in her wage-earning capacity. The judge's order, did not, however, simply reject the claimant's section 440.20(4) waiver argument....

...*212 Ronald S. Webster of Whittaker, Pyle, Stump & Webster, P.A., Orlando, for appellants. Robert C. Cooper of Cooper & Rissman, P.A., Orlando, for appellees. PER CURIAM. We find no substantial error in the deputy's order except in the assessment of section 440.20(8) penalties on the late payment of sums awarded to claimant's wife for nursing services....

...§ 423 and § 402 does not exceed 80% of the employee's average weekly wage or the employee's average current earnings, whichever is the higher. Finally, we note that our disposition of this matter results in affirmance of the Deputy's decision not to assess penalties against the E/C, pursuant to § 440.20(6), Fla....

...r the accidents occurring in October 1980. While this claim was pending, the claimant and his attorney reached an agreement with Johns Eastern Company, Inc., the carrier at the time of the July 18, 1983 accident, for a washout settlement pursuant to § 440.20(12)(b), Fla....

...Dunn, 85 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1956), to support its conclusion that the award of benefits was unjustified: "The Florida Workmen's Compensation Law contemplates that compensation shall be payable thereunder without an award, as indicated by the provision of Section 440.20(1) that, `Compensation under this chapter shall be paid periodically, promptly in the usual manner and directly to the person entitled thereto, without an award, except where liability to pay compensation is controverted by the employe...

...he money was not paid as advance compensation. The deputy commissioner first erred in finding that the periodic payments to the claimant by the employer in addition to the temporary total disability compensation paid were not intended as a gratuity. Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (1977), states: If the employer has made advance payments of compensation, he shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of any unpaid installment or installments of compensation due. Section 440.20(13), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: When an employee is injured and the employer pays his full wages or any part thereof during the period of disability ......

...employability, the related psychiatric condition is a physical limitation which continues to be compensable. See generally, Prahl Bros. Inc. v. Phillips, 429 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The judge also awarded statutory interest in accordance with section 440.20(9), Florida Statutes, on a prior payment of compensation....

...easonable attorney's fee in the amount of $35,000.00 and to reimburse her attorney the amount of $5,000.00 in costs. Said payment shall forever discharge any and all liability for compensation and rehabilitation (not medical) benefits under Sections 440.20(12)(a) and (c) and 440.28 of the Florida Statutes....

...I am the claimant in the above-styled cause, Claim No.: 266 78 5540, date of accident 1/1/86. 2. I have had fully explained to me the "washout" settlement, and I am fully aware that, once an Order is entered approving the Joint Petition pursuant to Florida Statute 440.20(12)(a) and (c), which I have duly executed, I will be forever barred from receiving any further compensation and rehabilitation (not medical) as a result of my industrial accident on January 1st, 1986, arising out of and in the course of my employment with GRAND BAY HOTEL....

...the petition or file a notice of denial with the division. The carrier must list all benefits requested but not paid and explain its justification for nonpayment in the notice of denial. A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4) is deemed to have accepted the employee's injuries as compensable, unless it can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that could not have been discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period....

...I find, however, that some further brief comment on the statute is advisable. The reason Waffle House is subject to a "procedural default" in the present case is that it is, under the statute before us, "a carrier that (has not denied) compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4)"....

...o, in the terms of the first sentence of the statute, "file(s) a notice of denial with the division." This is so because a carrier who files a notice of denial with the Division may well not have complied with the "pay and investigate" provisions of section 440.20(4). Therefore, such a carrier would not have denied compensability in accordance with section 440.20(4) and could arguably be caught under the deemed compensability provision of the third sentence....

...5th DCA), rev. den. 531 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 1988). The City argues that the award of penalties was erroneous in that, at the time it reduced Watkins' pension, the reduction was approved by *760 Florida case law. However, penalties were awarded herein under section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes, which provides, without exception, that "[i]f any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within 30 days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to 20 percent thereof ..." (emphasis supplied)....

...workers’ compensation benefits as its exclusive remedy in the settlement of the workers’ compensation claim and had received all workers’ compensation benefits owed under Part I of the policy; (2) the Estate’s claim was excluded by the 6 Under Florida Statute § 440.20(11)(c), a workers’ compensation claimant, if counseled, may waive any and all rights under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act by entering into a settlement agreement releasing the employer and the insurance carrier from liability for workers’ compensation benefits in exchange for a lump-sum payment. A judge of compensation claims must approve the settlement to the extent attorney’s fees are paid to the claimant’s attorney and to ensure the settlement allocates for recovery of child support arrearages. See Fla. Stat. § 440.20(11)(c), (d). 7 The Estate’s suit also included a declaratory judgment claim and a bad faith claim....

...Christine Franco, Tampa and Bill McCabe, Longwood, for Appellant. Jimmie Butler of Barbas, Weed, Koenig, Nunez & Wheeley, Tampa, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. We affirm, because, as found by the JCC, the Appellees' failure to make payment of a settlement reached under section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes, within 14 days of the JCC's mailing of her order approving Appellant's attorney's fees was not willful. We write only to dispel the misconception that sanctions in such case can be imposed on a non-fault basis under section 440.20(11)(c), and to dispel any doubt pertaining to a JCC's authority or jurisdiction to impose sanctions for late payment of settlements under such section for a willful violation. *259 Under section 440.20(11)(c), which requires that "[p]ayment of the lump sum settlement amount must be made within 14 days after the date the judge of compensation claims mails the order approving the attorney's fees," a JCC has the authority and jurisdicti...

...This cause is before the Court on petition for writ of certiorari to review an order of the Florida Industrial Commission reversing an order of its deputy by which the claimant Sullivan, petitioner in this Court, was awarded a lump sum settlement of his claim under the Workmen's Compensation Law, F.S. § 440.20(10), F.S.A....

...In the case of a petition for lump sum payment, however, dealing only with the manner of payment as opposed to claimant's right to compensation, the statute provides that lump sum payment shall be made "whenever the commission determines that it is for the best interests of a person entitled to compensation." F.S. § 440.20(10), F.S.A....

...Florida Jurisprudence, Vol. 5, page 514, para. 24 and the cases there cited. The mandate of the statute here involved is simply that the commission determine whether or not it is to the best interest of the claimant to have his compensation paid in a lump sum. Sec. 440.20 (10), supra....

...§ 440.15(1), did not purport to alter the existing provisions, which on their face permitted lump sum payments for total permanent disability, and such a result should not be implied in the absence of some legislative expression on the point. The language in Section 440.20(10) by which the probability of death before expiration of the compensation period may reduce a lump sum payment does not require that the applicability of the entire provision be limited to situations where compensation is payable for specified periods rather than for the duration of claimant's life. It should be emphasized that this opinion is confined solely to an interpretation of F.S. § 440.20(10), F.S.A., and shall not be construed to be generally applicable to the power of the commission under other sections of the Act to either perform or delegate to its subordinate agents or other duly authorized representatives the performance of functions required of it....

...sion departed from and failed to observe an essential requirement of the statute, certiorari is granted, the questioned order insofar as it is in conflict herewith is quashed and the commission is hereby directed to determine in accordance with F.S. § 440.20(10), F.S.A., whether it is or is not for the best interests of petitioner that his compensation be paid in a lump sum....

...Nix, d/b/a Nix Crane Service, when a truss broke apart and fell on DeFourny. DeFourny's workmen's compensation claim against Sandrew and its carrier was settled by the carrier. Payments by the carrier have exceeded $30,000 and may be more as the medical expenses remain open pursuant to section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. May 22, 2006. *688 George A. Helm, III, Esquire, Lake Mary, for Appellants. Kelli Biferie, Esquire, Winter Park, and Bill McCabe, Esquire, Longwood, for Appellee. HAWKES, J. We again confront the waiver provisions of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...The JCC found the only denial to the claim was when the E/C filed their formal response to the PFB on December 5, 2003. Since December 5, 2003 was more than 120 days after the initial provision of the cardiac benefits, the JCC concluded the E/C waived the right to deny compensability pursuant to section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes....

...An E/C who pays compensation or intentionally provides benefits, [1] but fails to deny compensability within 120 days waives its right to contest an injury "arose out of, and occurred within the course and scope of, the claimant's employment." North River, 683 So.2d at 1092; see also § 440.20(4), Fla....

...The Effectiveness of a Denial Avoiding Waiver Does Not Depend On A Claimant's Understanding To avoid waiver of the right to deny compensability, the E/C is only required to deny the claim within 120 days of "the initial provision of compensation benefits." § 440.20(4), Florida Statutes. Once the statute is triggered, section 440.20(4), requires the E/C to " advise the employee of claim acceptance or denial." Id....

...(2004) (for failure to use a safety appliance); § 440.15(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004) (for earned wages in cases of temporary partial disability); § 440.15(9), Fla. Stat. (2004) (for social security benefits); § 440.15(10), Fla. Stat. (2004) (for unemployment compensation benefits); § 440.20(13), Fla. Stat. (2004) (for advance payments of compensation); § 440.20(14), Fla....

...Kresge Co., 305 So.2d 191, 194 (Fla.1974), our supreme court held that "when an injured employee receives the equivalent of his full wages from whatever employer source that should be the limit of compensation to which he is entitled." Grice, 692 So.2d 898 (emphasis supplied). The Grice court relied on [*] section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides, in relevant part: When an employee is injured and the employer pays his full wages or any part thereof during the period of disability, or pays medical expenses for such employee, and the c...

...makes a payment of compensation or medical benefits, the employer shall be entitled to reimbursement to the extent of the compensation paid or awarded, plus medical benefits, if any, out of the first proceeds paid by the carrier in compliance. . . . This language, now codified at section 440.20(14), Florida Statutes (2004), pertains *129 to "the employer," not "any employer." The Grice decision held that the employer for whom the claimant was working at the time of the compensable injury — and who is therefore responsible fo...

...PADOVANO and HAWKES, JJ., concur. NOTES [*] Quoting Dixon v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 767 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla.2000), our supreme court has said: We have acknowledged that the 100% AWW cap that we discussed in Grice did not come from a strictly literal reading of [what is now] section 440.20(15), but rather from a "judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute." City of Hollywood v....

...The Department advised Summit that it was referring the matter to a judge of compensation claims pursuant to section 440.021, Florida Statutes (1989). Summit then filed its complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Polk County Circuit Court. The complaint sought a declaration that section 440.20(9)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ney's fees on review of an equitable distribution award, and is therefore distinguishable from the case before this court. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1973), states: If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of same, or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation, and the injured person shall have employed an attorney at law in the su...

...sue of compensation. The interests of the Fund must be protected in a later hearing. However, where, as in the case sub judice, the payment of compensation by employer was made on the basis of joint stipulations for a lump sum pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 440.20(10), F.S.A., the payment thus made shall be considered the proper and reasonable compensation due to the claimant for purposes of determining what reimbursement from the Fund, if any, is due....

...Following back surgery, her physician prescribed a supervised weight-loss program which was paid for in advance by the E/C and provided by Nutri/System. Subsequently, after attending a mediation conference, the parties entered into a stipulation and joint petition for lump sum settlement (a "washout") pursuant to section 440.20(11)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1994), which was approved by the JCC on March 12, 1998....

...Matthews's examination, evaluation, and directions to continue existing treatment "are logically considered to be remedial attention furnished by the employer as the law requires." This result clearly is consistent with the purpose and policy of Chapter 440. For example, section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), prohibited these parties from settling future medical benefits by washout because it is the policy of the act to indefinitely preserve on a continuing basis the employer's obligation to provide reasonably necessary remedial treatment for permanent medical conditions....

...Remaining uncontroverted were the awarded temporary total disability benefits and wage-loss benefits for the remaining months. The deputy commissioner made no finding concerning whether the employer/carrier were excused from paying penalties under section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes, where nonpayment resulted "from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control." We find that as to the temporary total disability benefits, the carrier not only paid based on an incorrect rate but voluntarily ceased payment....

...sed on Hulbert, the case is remanded on this issue for the deputy commissioner to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the employer/carrier complied with their obligations throughout and whether they are otherwise excused under section 440.20(7), during those months when no notices to controvert were filed....

...Randy D. Ellison, West Palm Beach, for Amicus Curiae Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers. PER CURIAM. This case involves the social security disability offset authorized in section 440.15(10), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), and the benefit cap arising under section 440.20(14), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court in Escambia County Sheriff's Dep't v....

...Despite this shifting of the offset, the Florida and federal statutes contain provisions designed to ensure that the injured employee does not receive less under the two acts than he or she would under either. Id. at 1064. The question then is whether the section 440.20(14) AWW cap on the amount of benefits a claimant may receive from combined collateral sources, as expressed in Grice, can be applied so as to limit a claimant's total benefits to 100 percent of his or her AWW regardless of the claimant's ACE....

...on 440.15(10) would apply and the E/C would be entitled to an SSD offset based on the greater of 80 percent of ACE or AWW. In a situation involving benefits in addition to compensation and SSD, if application of the 100 percent AWW cap arising under section 440.20(14) appears to reduce total benefits to less than 80 percent of a worker's ACE, such reduction of workers' compensation benefits appears to violate section 440.15(10), as well as 42 U.S.C....

...The legislature also enacted section 440.192(8), set out above, requiring payment of benefits within 14 days, or the filing of a notice of denial with the Division (of Workers' Compensation). The statute further provides that where a carrier does not deny compensability in accordance with section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...atment as a result of the accident and injury out of which this claim arose. The Employee and Employer *77 and/or Carrier hereby file application and joint petition for lump sum payment of the commuted future medical expenses under the provisions of Section 440.20(10) of the Florida Workers' Compensation Act....

...The Employee specifically stipulates that she fully intends for this to be a full and final settlement of her claim under the Florida Workers' Compensation Act for medical expenses. The parties further stipulate and agree that for purposes of this Stipulation, the Amendments to Florida Statutes 440.20(10) shall be considered procedural and not substantive and shall have full force and effect at the present time and at any time in the future in relation to the instant claim; that this settlement for medical expenses is a final one; and that...

...r Carrier shall be forever relieved and discharged of any and all future liability for medical expenses of the Employee in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. (R. 55-57). The deputy commissioner approved the joint stipulation pursuant to section 440.20(1), Florida Statutes (1981), after hearing....

...Section 440.15(1)(e)1, Florida Statutes (1981), provides: In case of permanent total disability resulting from injuries which occurred subsequent to June 30, 1955, and for which the liability of the employer for compensation has not been discharged under the provisions of s. 440.20(12), the injured employee shall receive from the division additional weekly compensation benefits equal to 5 percent of the injured employee's weekly compensation rate, as established pursuant to the law in effect on the date of his injury,...

...bility was made. The deputy commissioner therefore properly concluded that the parties intended to discharge all liability in exchange for lump-sum payment and that no modification should be allowed under section 440.28, Florida Statutes (1981). See section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), and J.F....

...long-term effects of inflation that reduce the value of a fixed amount of benefits. The effects of inflation are the same irrespective of the method of calculating supplemental benefits. Once a lump-sum payment is authorized and received pursuant to section 440.20, a claimant has the option to invest the funds and offset the effects of inflation so that the purpose of supplemental benefits is satisfied. We note that lump-sum payments are not a favored remedy. See 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...We have for review a decision on the following question of great public importance certified by the First District Court of Appeal in Alderman v. Florida Plastering, 748 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998): WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(1)(e)(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS? We have jurisdiction....

...Claimant's entitlement to wage loss benefits, and his/her need for rehabilitation or training. It is in the best interests of the Claimant and will definitely aid in his/her rehabilitation if this controversy be disposed of, it being understood that Section 440.20 of the Florida Statutes permits lump sum settlements in exchange for the Employer/Carrier or Servicing Agent's release from liability for future payments of compensation, other than medical expenses, where a Claimant is about to remove...

...*80 The JCC's Jurisdiction to Set Aside Settlement Agreement In Marchenko v. Sunshine Companies, 894 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), this court determined that a JCC no longer has jurisdiction to vacate settlement agreements pursuant to the statutory changes made in 2001 to section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes....

...Under Florida's workers' compensation law, a claimant's substantive rights are fixed on the date of accident; however, procedural or remedial changes may apply to claimants without regard to the date of accident. Paulk v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 615 So.2d 260, 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). The addition of section 440.20(11)(c) does not impact the amount of benefits or services that a claimant may receive or change the liability of the E/C....

are not “compensation” within the meaning of section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes, which provides for a

...Nancy L. Cavey, St. Petersburg, FL, for Respondent. QUINCE, J. We have for review a decision ruling upon the following two questions *1068 certified to be of great public importance: [1] WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(1)(e)1, FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL BE...

...We agree with the rationale set forth in the First District's opinion below and approve its decision. In this remaining claim, petitioners argue that the judge of compensation claims and the First District Court of Appeal erred in refusing to include respondent's health insurance subsidy within the cap on benefits under section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...ot disability benefits). Herny, at D2468-69. We therefore find that it was proper for the judge of compensation claims and the First District Court of Appeal to refuse to include respondent's health insurance subsidy within the cap on benefits under section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...against Lawns, Morales’ surviving spouse, Leticia Morales (who is also the personal representative of Morales’ estate), entered into a workers’ compensation settlement agreement with Lawns and Zenith. The agreement was entered pursuant to section 440.20(11)(c)-(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law, and contains the following release: ELECTION AND WAIVER: Pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 440.20(11)(c) (2001), in exchange for the consideration described below, the Claimant hereby waives all rights to any and all benefits under The Florida Workers’ Compensation Act....

...the claimant with respect to the employer and the carrier as to the coverage provided to the employer. We read this provision to do what it says, namely to elect the consideration described in the settlement agreement (i.e., a lump-sum payment authorized by section 440.20(11)(c) of the Workers’ Compensation Law) as the sole remedy for Morales’ death....

...1st DCA 1990) (recognizing that a “surviving spouse” of a deceased employee is entitled to claim workers’ compensation benefits). Further, the Workers’ Compensation Law allows a claimant who is represented by counsel, as Ms. Morales was, to settle such a claim, as Ms. Morales did. See § 440.20(11)(c)-(d), Fla....

...Carballo, 407 So.2d at 607 citing Florida Insurance Guaranty Association v. Gustinger, 390 So.2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Although FIGA cannot be required to pay prejudgment interest and penalties, the employer may be held liable in FIGA's stead. In the case of penalties, section 440.20(7) awards penalties against the employer or carrier depending upon fault....

...Teleflex, Inc., 382 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (repetitive trauma or exposure), rev. denied, 388 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 1980). [6] "Injury" is defined, in part, as "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.20(16), Fla....

...e avoided liability in the civil suit on the basis of statutory immunity"). The parties were entitled to settle the workers' compensation claims, and execution of the general release "in exchange for a lump-sum payment" accomplished that result. See § 440.20(11)(c), Fla....

...he appellee's workers' compensation claims, because the appellants make no alternative argument that the release was ambiguous but should nevertheless be construed in their favor, and because there is no indication that the parties complied with the section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes, directive that workers' compensation settlement agreements must be approved by a judge of compensation claims, I would affirm the order under review....

...efits pursuant to chapter 440. Finally, there is no indication or suggestion in this record that the settlement agreement which purportedly settled the appellee's rights under chapter 440 was approved by a judge of compensation claims as required by section 440.20(11)(c)....

...workers' compensation claims. And if they did not believe that the attorney was providing such representation, it seems unlikely that the release could have lawfully effected a waiver of the appellee's rights to workers' compensation benefits. See §§ 440.20(11)(c), 440.21(2), Fla....

...Dunlevy contends the JCC erred because: (1) the employer, Seminole County Department of Public Safety, and servicing agent, Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. (E/SA), waived their right to challenge the compensability of claimant's accident and injury under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), by failing to deny compensability within 120 days after the initial provision of benefits; (2) there was no competent, substantial evidence to support the JCC's finding that compensability was barred b...

...E/SA thereafter denied compensability. We first reject Dunlevy's contention that the E/SA waived the right to deny compensability of the claim, because it did not investigate his claim within 120 days of the initial provision of benefits pursuant to section 440.20(4), which provides: A carrier that fails to deny compensability within 120 days after the initial provision of benefits or payment of compensation waives the right to deny compensability, unless the carrier can establish material facts...

...Mary Ann Stiles, Boca Raton, for amicus curiae Associated Industries of Florida. MILLS, Judge. Appealing from the deputy commissioner's denial of a joint settlement agreement, appellant-claimant, George Johnson, challenges the constitutionality of Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), which prohibits the release of an employer-carrier's liability for future medical expenses....

...and the impairment of contract provisions of both the Florida and the United States Constitutions. Finally, it is asserted that the statute is an improper exercise of the state's police power. We affirm the deputy commissioner's denial and hold that Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), is constitutional....

...t is not properly a party appellee in this action. We have chosen to treat the Department's very helpful brief and its oral argument in support of the constitutionality of the statute as those of an amicus curiae. ACCESS TO COURTS Johnson urges that Section 440.20(12)(a) violates the access to courts provision of Article I, Section 21, of the Florida Constitution....

...In the instant case the subject statute does not preclude settlement based on all factors other than future medical needs and does not prohibit compensation to the employee for future medical needs but simply requires that it be paid on a periodic, as needed, basis. IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT Johnson's second contention is that Section 440.20(12)(a) violates the "right to contract" clauses of both the federal and state constitutions because it deprives the parties of the right of compromise and settlement of a claim....

...The authors assert, "Proceeding on the theory that workers' compensation is intended to supplement the lost wages of an injured worker, the new law states that, as a matter of public policy, it is in the best interest of an injured worker to receive disability payments on a periodic basis." See 440.20(12)(a), Fla....

...We reject Johnson's contention that the subject statute is confiscatory; it does not affect the right to make or receive compensation but simply controls the manner in which medical benefits shall be paid, namely, on a periodic rather than a lump sum basis. Accordingly, we hold that Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), is constitutional....

...Appellants, the employer/carrier, seek review of a workers' compensation order by which they were ordered to pay wage loss benefits, penalties and interest. Appellants raise several issues on appeal. Appellee concedes that appellants timely filed notices to controvert and that no penalties should be assessed under section 440.20(7) for late compensation payments....

...of her employer by working to diminish her debt at a rate of $2.00 per hour, which amount was credited in the wage loss calculation. The record shows that appellants filed notices to controvert appellee's claim within the 21 day period allowed under section 440.20(6). Appellee concedes that the deputy commissioner's assessment of a penalty pursuant to section 440.20(7) was in error....

...Because there is no evidence that Watkins was instructed that he could return to work, nor that he should have known that he had been released to work, he cannot be denied TTD benefits for the period in question. As to claimant's issue regarding his entitlement to receive penalties and interest under Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1989), due to the E/C's issuance of seven untimely benefit checks, the record shows that a check for benefits for the period December 13, 1989 through December 26, 1989 was paid December 27, 1989; for December 27, 19...

...90, on January 24, 1990. Two additional checks each covered two payment periods: benefits for the period between July 27, 1990 and August 30, 1990 were paid September 5, 1990; and for September 14, 1990 through October 11, 1990, on October 12, 1990. Section 440.20(2) provides that the first installment for total disability "shall become due on the fourteenth day after the employer has knowledge of the injury" (emphasis added), and that compensation should thereafter be paid in biweekly installments. Section 440.20(7) provides a penalty for each installment that is not paid "within fourteen days after it becomes due....

...Watkins is entitled to penalties, however, for the two checks containing two payments each, because each check was issued more than 14 days after the first biweekly payment in each period was due. Furthermore, claimant is entitled to interest on each of the seven untimely payments. The following language in section 440.20(9) differs from 440.20(7) by requiring the E/C to pay interest to the claimant if the E/C issues a benefit check beyond its *766 due date, which, as we stated above, is on the fourteenth day of the biweekly period: (9) In addition to any other penalties provided by...

...The second waiver, signed by the claimant on the same day as the first, but never presented to the dc for approval, was a release of all past and future medical expenses. The dc refused to enforce the waiver of future medical expenses, concluding that Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes, does not permit such a waiver. [1] We agree. Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes, prohibiting lump sum payments in exchange for the release of an employer's or carrier's liability for future medical expenses has been upheld as constitutional by this court in Johnson v....

...employee such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance by a health care provider and for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require...." AFFIRMED. SMITH, C.J., and MILLS, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes, states in pertinent part: "In no case may a lump sum payment be allowed in exchange for the release of an employer's or carrier's liability for future medical expenses."

...elow, we modify the appealed order with regard to the attorney’s fee issue. We reverse and remand the second issue because it is unclear why the JCC rejected Claimant’s waiver argument based on the 120-day “pay and investigate” rule under subsection 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...e second MVA resulting in the right shoulder injury and 25% is attributable to the workplace accident. Amended Final Order At the merits hearing, Claimant argued that the E/C had waived the right to deny compensability of his PTSD by operation of subsection 440.20(4)....

...In the amended final order now' on appeal, 1 the JCC overruled the Daubert objection based on a finding.that Claimant failed to “appropriately preserve” the objection during Dr. Miller’s deposition. With regard to Claimant’s waiver argument, the JCC noted the positions of the parties concerning subsection 440.20(4), but did not make any relevant findings....

...result of the parties’ mediation agreement. We thus modify the order to clarify that the denial of attorney’s fees does not extend to the attorney fee claim based on the benefits obtained via the parties’ mediation agreement. Application of Subsection 440.20(4) To prove entitlement to the requested psychiatric treatment, Claimant had the burden to show that the April 1, 2012, Compensable workplace accident is the MCC for his PTSD. §§ 440.09, 440.093, Fla. Stat. (2011). But Claimant need not present such evidence if his PTSD is com-pensable by operation of law. Subsection 440.20(4) provides that where a carrier is uncertain as to its obligation to provide' benefits, it may provide such benefits under a reservation of rights, but then must immediately begin an investigation....

...y, it waives the right to deny com-pensability of this injury “unless the carrier can establish material facts relevant to *867 the issue of compensability that it could not discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period.” § 440.20(4), Fla....

...See, e.g., McIntosh v. CVS Pharmacy, 135 So.3d 1157, 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Bynum Transp., Inc. v. Snyder, 765 So.2d 752, 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); see also § 440.192(8), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4) is deemed to have accepted the employee’s injuries as compensable, unless it can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that could not have been discovered ......

...his PTSD within 120 days after initially providing benefits for the PTSD. In the appealed order, the JCC noted the positions of the parties, but made no findings of fact or conclusions of law relevant to the application of the 120-day rule under subsection 440.20(4)....

...The necessary analysis may also include a determination of whether the “carrier can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period,” which is a statutory exception to the 120-day rule. See § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (2011). Once this analysis occurs, then the identity of any psychiatric injury made compensable by operation of the 120-day provisions of subsection 440.20(4), may be determined....

...t be proven here with evidence that the (allegedly) accepted compensable injuiy never *868 met the MCC standard in the first instance. In other words, where the waiver of the right to deny compensability of an identified injury has occurred under subsection 440.20(4), a later finding that the compensable injury was not caused in major part by the workplace accident in the first instance, will not satisfy the .necessary proof that the compensable injury “no longer” remains the major contribut...

...ble injury was never compensable,” which (assuming the 120-day rule results in waiver) is prohibited under section 440,20(4).. In this case, the JCC failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the application of subsection 440.20(4). As a result, this court cannot,perform a meaningful review of the JCC’s implicit rejection of Claimant’s arguments based on compensability of his PTSD by operation of subsection 440.20(4)....

...aluation by Dr. Segal remains unresolved. As modified, the order is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with directions for the JCC to make findings of fact and conclusions of law relevant to the application of the 120-day rule under subsection 440.20(4)....

...en paid or is not being provided. Any claim, or portion thereof, not in compliance with this subsection shall be subject to dismissal upon motion of any interested party, the division, or the deputy commissioners. Cf. § 440.25(1) Fla. Stat. (1979); § 440.20(10)(b), Fla....

...Grigas, who diagnosed claimant as suffering from asthma not causally related to work. At the hearing below, claimant argued that the e/c was estopped from denying benefits for claimant's current medical condition because the e/c failed timely to deny the claims under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The JCC found that the e/c made reasonable efforts to investigate the claim, that claimant's asthma was not diagnosed until July 1998, and that the e/c only accepted compensability *823 for the aggravation of claimant's sinusitis caused by exposure to the toxic fumes but did not knowingly pay any benefits related to asthma. Section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, requires a carrier to admit or deny compensability of a claim within 120 days....

...or payment of compensation waives the right to deny compensability, unless the carrier can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period. § 440.20(4)....

...ither to continue to pay or to deny compensability, and failure to deny compensability within 120 days constitutes acceptance of compensability). Recently in Franklin v. Northwest Airlines, 778 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), this court again applied section 440.20(4) to find that the e/c waived denial of compensability. Although competent substantial evidence supported the JCC's determination that the injury the claimant suffered was not the major contributing cause of the claimant's disability, this court held that the e/c waived denial of compensability under section 440.20(4)....

...This court concluded that "[b]y initiating payment of benefits..., the employer/carrier became obligated immediately and in good faith" to investigate the claimant's entitlement to benefits and that having failed timely to deny benefits, the e/c was deemed to have accepted compensability. Id. Under section 440.20(4) and the above cited cases, because the e/c did not timely deny benefits, it was the e/c's burden in this case to "establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable...

...itis/chronic sinusitis and asthma. [3] Accordingly, this material fact could have been readily discovered through reasonable means. In sum the e/c in the instant case presented no evidence [4] to support the arguments advanced and meet the burden of section 440.20(4). Accordingly, there is no competent substantial evidence supporting the JCC's findings and the determination that the e/c was not estopped to deny the compensability of appellant's claims. We conclude under section 440.20(4) that the e/c waived the right to deny compensability of claimant's medical condition by failing to establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period....

...living increases. However, because the employer has asked us to recede from Acker, which we decline to do, we certify to the supreme court the same question that we certified in that case: WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(1)(e)1, FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL BE...

...calculation. IV. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the judge of compensation claims is affirmed. AFFIRMED. BARFIELD, C.J. and BENTON, J., CONCUR. NOTES [*] Because the claimant in this case was injured in 1987, the 1987 version of sections 440.20(15) and 440.15(1)(e)1, rather than the 1985 version, applies....

...Schnepper, P.A., Miami, Amicus Curiae, Florida Workers' Advocates. Emily Moore, Tallahassee, Amicus Curiae, Florida Division of Retirement. ERVIN, J. This is an appeal challenging the application of the 100 percent average weekly wage (AWW) cap and resulting offset arising under section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986), and Escambia County Sheriffs Department v....

...enefits, her weekly social security disability benefit was $128.95, that her weekly state disability retirement benefit was $123.37, and that her AWW was $316.47. In determining the 100 percent AWW cap and resultant offset available to the E/C under section 440.20(15) and Grice, the JCC subtracted the total sum of claimant's weekly social security disability and state disability retirement benefits ($252.32) from her $316.47 AWW, which yielded a difference of $64.15....

...1, 1999) (pet. for rev. filed). In accordance with the above cases, we certify the same question certified in Acker. Turning next to the cross-appeal, we reverse the order to the extent it allows the 100 percent AWW cap and resultant offset arising under section 440.20(15) and Grice to be applied to benefits owed since August 1, 1989. The E/C specifically claims overpayments based on Grice, an argument suggesting that Grice interpreted section 440.20(15) in a manner contrary to existing law....

...Appellants, HRS District II and Alexsis Claims Management (the employer/carrier or E/C), contend that this court erroneously relied on City of Miami v. Bell, 634 So.2d 163 (Fla.1994), in deciding that the 100 percent average weekly wage (AWW) cap allowed under section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986), and Escambia County Sheriffs Department v....

...See Florida Forest & Park Serv. v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472, 18 So.2d 251, 253 (1944). We choose to write on this issue, however, to clarify our reasoning. The E/C admits that Grice is a case of first impression. There, the Florida Supreme Court for the first time interpreted section 440.20(15) as applying the 100 percent AWW cap discussed in Brown v....

...E SIS/Ace American Insurance Company and Delta Air Lines, Inc., together the *1112 Employer/Carrier (E/C) in this workers’ compensation appeal, challenge' an award by the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) to Deborah Kuhn (Ms. Kuhn) of a $2000 advance under section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes....

...Since the accident, she has continued to work as a flight attendant with Delta and has not suffered any diminishment in pay in that time. Over four years later, on July 22, 2011, Ms. Kuhn filed a new petition for benefits, the sole purpose of which was to obtain payment of a $2000 advance under the authority of section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes....

...If the judge of compensation claims finds that such advance payment is for the best interests of the person entitled to compensation, will not materially prejudice the rights of the employer and carrier, and is reasonable under the circumstances of the case, she or he may order the same paid. § 440.20(12), Fla....

...mants who have not “returned to the same or equivalent employment with no substantial reduction in wages”; (2) claimants who have “suffered a substantial loss of earning capacity”; or (3) claimants who have suffered a “physical impairment. § 440.20(12)(c)(2), Fla....

...Second, a JCC must determine that the claimant (a) is a proper claimant and (b) has provided adequate justification for her request. We address only this latter issue. 3 We first note that claimants eligible for advances are not automatically entitled to them. Nothing in section 440.20(12)(c)(2) suggests that requests for advances are entitlements that JCCs are required to approve perfunctorily. Instead, the operative language in subsection (c)(2) is that an advance “may be ordered” upon “due consideration of the interests of the claimant.” § 440.20(12)(c)(2), Fla....

...Kuhn’s claimed interest in obtaining $2000 as a “cushion” justifies the award. Ms. Kuhn argues that we should not disturb the JCC’s conclusion that a $2000 advance as a financial “cushion” was in her best interest. Indeed, we review an award of an advance under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, under the abuse of discretion standard, Workers of Fla....

...Williams, 743 So.2d 609, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), and will not overturn factual findings unless they lack competent substantial evidence. Pierre v. R & S Assembly, Inc., 31 So.3d 901, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). But the legal question of what “interest” under section 440.20(12)(c)(2) is sufficient to justify an advance award is one we address de novo....

...ted here. As such, we need not consider the E/C’s plea that we clarify, limit or recede from Lopez . We conclude that the provision of a financial “cushion” to a claimant is not, by itself, a justifiable basis for the award of an advance under section 440.20(12)(c)(2)....

...day? We are dealing, however, with a statutory framework in Chapter 440 whose principal purpose is to address medical and related financial needs arising from workplace injuries. In context, the type of interest that is furthered by an advance under section 440.20(12)(c)(2) must at least *1115 have some plausible nexus to this purpose....

...This Court held that “worker’s compensation benefits are not intended as life insurance” and that using advances as financial vehicles for “estate planning or money market considerations” is impermissible. Id. It concluded that “such factors are in our opinion insufficient to permit an order for as 440.20(10) advancement.” Id. Like the claimant’s interest in Court of Flags , Ms. Kuhn’s interest in having a “cushion” to safeguard her finances should difficulties arise is insufficient to justify an advance under section 440.20(12)(c)(2)....

...*1113 claims or the Chief Judge” is not at issue and is therefore omitted from our discussion. . In doing so, we question whether Ms. Kuhn is a proper claimant where the only purpose of filing her new petition is to seek an advance of $2000 under section 440.20(12)(c)(2), unaccompanied by any other claim for present or future benefits....

...Under subsection (d), a JCC may approve an advance upon due consideration of three factors: the "best interests" of the claimant; whether an advance (over $2000) will materially prejudice the E/C; and whether the requested advance is reasonable under the circumstances. § 440.20(12)(d), Fla....

...McCranie of McCranie & Lower, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellants. Sylvan A. Wells, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. This cause is before us on appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (hereinafter JCC) ordering the Employer/Carrier to recalculate the offset taken under section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes, and to exclude from the offset calculation permanent total disability supplemental benefits....

...itial offset calculation. See Acker, supra; Hunt v. Stratton, 677 So.2d 64, 67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part, and certify the following question: WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFF-SET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(1)(e)(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL...

...Our holding here is not a barrier to such a policy. See, e.g., Fla. Admin. Code R. 60K-5.031. Amount of Benefits While under section 440.09(1) an employer may not avoid paying workers' compensation benefits by offering alternative benefits, pursuant to section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1987): an injured worker, except where expressly given such a right by contract, may not receive benefits from his employer and other collateral sources which, when totaled, exceed 100% of his average weekly wage....

...The Employer and Carrier (E/C) appeal the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC), which found an Independent Medical Examination (IME) qualified as the "initial provision of benefits," triggering the 120-day pay and investigate provisions of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...If the IME is converted to a benefit, then the E/C had 120 days from January 10, 2003, or until May 10, 2003, to deny compensability. The JCC also concluded the E/C failed to timely deny compensability and was therefore estopped from defending the claim, pursuant to section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...Wolff was authorized to treat Claimant's back; (3) Together, any office visit (regardless of what occurs at the visit) to an authorized physician must equate to treatment; (4) Any treatment is a benefit provided to the Claimant; (5) Any provision of a benefit triggers the section 440.20(4), pay and investigate provisions....

...and (2) The JCC ignored the full import of the parties' stipulation. AN IME IS NOT TREATMENT Clearly, when the E/C fail to controvert a claim within 120 days after the initial provision of benefits, they are estopped from denying compensability. See § 440.20(4), Fla....

...authorized, is what the physician did, not what the parties suspected he did or believed he did. Thus, even if Dr. Wolff was authorized, [1] to treat, he must actually provide treatment before Claimant would receive a benefit that would trigger the section 440.20(4), pay and investigate provisions....

...treatment. See Lombardi v. S. Wine & Spirits, 890 So.2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Because Dr. Wolff did not provide treatment, Claimant did not receive a benefit. Because Claimant did not receive a benefit, the 120-day time period provided by section 440.20(4), was never triggered....

...d, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. The claimant, Bobby Willis, appeals the judge of compensation claims's ("JCC") order and argues that the JCC erred by (i) finding that the employer/carrier ("E/C") complied with the 120-day "pay and investigate" rule of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2001), and (ii) allowing the "updated IME" of a psychiatrist into evidence....

...The claimant received surgery on June 25, 2001, for carpel tunnel syndrome. Also on June 25, 2001, the claimant initiated a petition for workers' compensation benefits for his neck and back conditions. Publix decided to pay and investigate pursuant to the 120-day provision contained in section 440.20(4), Fla....

...within the time period. The claimant contends that it was error for the JCC to allow the E/C to deny compensability for the neck and back conditions claimed on June 25, 2001, when the E/C failed to deny compensability within 120 days as required by section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...1st DCA 2013), we concluded that the parties’ first putative settlement agreement, reached when Claimant was not represented by counsel, was neither binding nor enforceable, because Claimant permissibly withdrew from the settlement before it was approved by the JCC as required by section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes — which applies to workers’ compensation settlement agreements involving unrepresented claimants....

...ate penalties and interest "does not overcome the Agreement," Claimant's execution of a release was a condition precedent to the Agreement, the payment was not late, and, despite the October 15, 2007, order, penalties and interest were prohibited by section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes....

...recedent, these rulings are error, and, in any event, do not affect the finality or applicability of the October 15, 2007, order. The JCC rejected the October 15, 2007, order as a basis for awarding penalties and interest, reasoning, correctly, that section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes, precludes a statutory basis for an award of penalties and interest on lump-sum settlements such as Claimant's....

...The October 15, 2007, order expressly providing for penalties and interest is itself evidence suggesting Claimant did so here. Timeliness Of Payment "Payment of the lump-sum settlement amount must be made within 14 days after the date the judge of compensation claims mails the order approving the attorney's fees." § 440.20(11)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007). Here, the October 15, 2007, order approving attorney's fees was mailed October 17, 2007, and payment was not made until December 4 and 5, 2007. Accordingly, the payment was late. This delay in payment exceeds the 14 days dictated by section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes....

...C may assess penalties arising from the carrier's act of taking an excessive offset. See City of Miami v. Bell, 634 So.2d 163 (Fla.1994). Also, the "fourteen day rule" utilized by the JCC did not apply. Payment made on the 14th day is now late under section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Myrick of Kinsey, Myrick & Troxel, Pensacola, for appellant. Roy V. Andrews of Lindsay, Andrews & Arnold, Milton, for appellee. BOOTH, Judge. Claimant appeals the order of the deputy commissioner denying his application for a $13,050 advancement of benefits pursuant to Section 440.20(13), Florida Statutes....

...The advancement was requested for the purpose of having the employer pay, and claimant's attorney receive, in a lump sum, the attorney's fee, [1] the amount of which had previously been determined by the deputy. The employer, City of Milton, opposed the application. Section 440.20(13)(d) provides, in pertinent part, that: (d) When an application for an advance payment in excess of $2,000 is opposed by the employer or carrier, it shall be heard by a deputy commissioner after giving the interested parties not less than 10 days notice of such hearing by mail......

...the fee is to be paid in the event counsel and claimant are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements is affirmed. MILLS and SHIVERS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This opinion should not be construed as deciding whether advancement of benefits pursuant to Section 440.20(13) is the proper vehicle for the purpose sought by claimant's counsel herein....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. July 31, 2007. John J. Rahaim, II, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Bonnie J. Murdoch and Nicholas J. Elder, Jacksonville, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. When a represented claimant enters into a lump-sum settlement with an employer and carrier, section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes (2006), only requires JCC approval of the attorney's fees paid by the claimant to the claimant's attorney. See § 440.20(11)(c), Fla....

...There this court explained that under section 440.192, Florida Statutes, an E/C must, within 14 days, either pay the requested benefits or file a notice of denial. Payment could be made, however, without prejudice to the right to deny compensability within 120 days under the "pay and investigate" provisions in section 440.20, Florida Statutes....

...During the same time, Plaintiff, represented by an attorney, pursued his workers' compensation claim. ( Id. at A47.) On or about February 4, 2000, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Stipulation in Support of Joint Petition for Order Approving A Lump-Sum Settlement Under F.S. 440.20(11)(b)(1994)(the "Settlement Agreement") in which the parties settled his workers' compensation case....

...to the Employer, Self-Insurers Fund and/or Servicing Agent, of any nature whatsoever, without any limitation thereof. ( See Def. Mot. Summ.J. Attach App. D., Stipulation in Support of Joint Petition for Order Approving A Lump-Sum Settlement Under F.S. 440.20(11)(b)(1994).) During his workers' compensation settlement negotiations, Plaintiff never discussed *1379 excluding his EEOC charges or other claims from the release provision of the Settlement Agreement....

...This Court concludes that the release provision is clear and unambiguous in that "any and all claims" against Defendant are released, discharged and surrendered by Plaintiff. ( See Def. Mot. Summ.J. Attach App. D., Stipulation in Support of Joint Petition for Order Approving A Lump-Sum Settlement *1381 Under F.S. 440.20(11)(b)(1994).) Therefore, the third factor is satisfied since the release provision clearly include Plaintiff's federal claims....

...the employer/carrier (E/C), were not estopped as a matter of law to deny compensability of the requested surgery and incidental indemnity benefits in that the E/C had failed to deny compensability of the request within the 120 day period allowed in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000). [1] We affirm as to this issue because *1015 we do not interpret section 440.20(4) to encompass applications for surgery, unless included within a petition for benefits, as provided by section 440.192, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...[2] Claimant contends that the E/C was reasonably on notice as of March 22, 2000, that he might require back surgery; therefore, he argues that the E/C had 120 days from that date or until July 20, 2000, to undertake an investigation and make a reasoned decision whether to deny compensability of the surgery, as required by section 440.20(4). We cannot agree. Section 440.20(4) provides as follows: If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits or compensation, it may initiate payment without prejudice and without admitting liability....

...Northwest Airlines, 778 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), and Bynum Transport, Inc. v. Snyder, 765 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), to support his argument that the E/C was estopped from denying compensability of his request for surgery and related indemnity benefits pursuant to section 440.20(4)....

...the petition or file a notice of denial with the division. The carrier must list all benefits requested but not paid and explain its justification for nonpayment in the notice of denial. A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4) is deemed to have accepted the employee's injuries as compensable, unless it can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that could not have been discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period....

...Because claimant had not specifically requested the surgery until October 30, 2000, in his pre-trial stipulation, and thereafter in his amended petition for benefits dated December 6, 2000, the E/C's denial of the request as of October 30, 2000, clearly complied with the 120-day provisions of section 440.20(4), as incorporated in section 440.192(8)....

...She asserts, and we agree, that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in denying relief from a lump sum settlement and *101 stipulation which purports to impose limits on the employer's and carrier's (EC's) liability for claimant's future medical expenses in contravention of § 440.20(12)(a), Fla. Stat. The medical benefits for which the EC is responsible include medical treatment and care, as well as medicines, pursuant to § 440.13, Fla. Stat. Section 440.20(12)(a), Fla....

...[and other] expenses other than for medical expenses ..." Payments for medical services are not "compensation" under Chapter 440. Smith v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 535 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Therefore the prohibition of § 440.20(12) clearly precludes a claimant from accepting a lump sum payment in exchange for any limitation on future medical care or medication....

...forded by § 440.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. See also Lamounette v. Akins, 547 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Lump sum settlements are void as against public policy if they undertake to limit the EC's responsibility for future medical expenses contrary to § 440.20(12)....

...Section 687.01, Fla. Stat. (1977). Interest on biweekly benefits due on or after July 1, 1978 and before February 5, 1979, accrued from the appropriate due dates at a rate of 12 percent under the specific workers' compensation interest provision in § 440.20(7) (1978 Supp.)....

...the underlying benefits, claimant continued to be entitled to interest at 12 percent on this lump sum unpaid, beginning on the date it became fixed by payment of the underlying benefits and continuing through this appeal to the date of full payment. § 440.20(7), Fla. Stat. (1978 Supp.); § 440.20(9), Fla. Stat. (1981). On remand the deputy will also calculate and award this further interest. In addition to unpaid interest, claimant seeks a penalty under § 440.20(6) (1978 Supp.) for the employer/carrier's failure to pay the lump sum of interest, accrued on the underlying benefits paid February 5, 1979, within 20 days of the IRC's affirmance of the basic compensation order....

...side. In his order denying the claim to set aside the settlement, Deputy Commissioner Branham found, among other things, that the record supported a determination that MMI had been reached six months prior to the hearing on the stipulation. Although § 440.20(12)(b) provides that an order approving a lump sum settlement "shall not be subject to modification or review," appellee does not in this appeal challenge Deputy Branham's right to review and determine the question of whether MMI had been reached six months prior to the settlement hearing. Based on the language in § 440.20(12)(a), pertaining to the approval of lump sum settlements, we agree that review of the issue was proper in this case....

...At that time, it would seem obvious that the Deputy Commissioner considered that the Claimant had reached maximum medical improvement (without surgery) more than six months prior to the hearing or he would not have approved the settlement. This order was entered under the provisions of F.S. 440.20(12)(a) & (b) and is not subject to modification for `change of condition' or `mistake in a determination of fact'....

...ury one month prior to the accident. In this case, the evidence showed that appellee had no significant history of back problems, suffered pain the morning after the accident, and reported the injury to his employer within one month of the accident. Section 440.20(14) provides that "[i]f the employer has made advance payments of compensation, he shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of any unpaid installment or installments or compensation due." Testimony of the employer's bookkeeper establishe...

...to pay a claim filed with the division which meets the requirements of s. 440.19(1)(d) on or before the 21st day after receiving notice of the claim, and the injured person has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of his claim. [2] See section 440.20(2), Florida Statutes (1989) providing that total disability benefits shall be paid in bi-weekly installments.

...Gluckman, Esquire, Hurley, Rogner, Miller, Cox, Waranch & Westcott, P.A., Ft. Pierce, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. Claimant Svetlana Marchenko appeals the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC), denying claimant's motion to vacate or set aside a settlement agreement reached in accordance with section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...ent judicial power but only the power expressly conferred by chapter 440.'" Id. (quoting McFadden v. Hardrives Constr., Inc., 573 So.2d 1057, 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)). [1] The statutes give the JCC neither the authority to approve settlements under section 440.20(11)(c) nor the power to vacate or set aside a settlement reached privately between the parties under the statute....

...Michael Bross, P.A., Cocoa, for appellant. Jocelyn E. Lowther of Johnson and Bussey, P.A., Rockledge, for appellees. WOLF, Judge. Jeffry Sigg (claimant) appeals from a final order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) which denies claimant's request for penalties pursuant to section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...While appellant raises three issues on appeal, all of the issues relate to whether, based on the facts of this case, the JCC erred in denying appellant's request for penalties. We find that the JCC's findings that the employer/carrier was not on notice of entry of the compensation order is inconsistent with section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes, which requires a JCC to enter an order approving the lump-sum stipulation "within seven days of the filing of such joint petition and stipulation." We therefore reverse....

...The JCC found that the carrier had not received notice of entry of the order approving the lump-sum settlement which was entered and mailed on April 6, 1990. Though compensation was not paid until May 17, 1990, the JCC denied the claimant's request for sanctions pursuant to section *330 440.20(8), Florida Statutes, based upon the lack of notice. The record reflects, however, that the carrier was on notice that the joint stipulation had been presented to the JCC on April 5, 1990. The requirements of section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), would mandate that the JCC's order would have to be entered no later than April 12, 1990. The carrier would at least be on constructive notice of the entry of the compensation order at that time. Benefits were not paid until more than 30 days after that date. Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1989), provides as follows: If any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within 30 days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to 20 percent thereof, which shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, such compensation, unless review of the compensation order making such award is had as provided in s. 440.25. In light of the clear intent of section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1989), to promptly get benefits into the hands of the claimant, the facts of this case would not support relieving the carrier of its statutory responsibility. See Steinbrecher v. Better Constr. Co., 587 So.2d 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We, therefore, reverse and remand to the JCC for entry of an order assessing penalties pursuant to section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...[1] The appellant's request for attorney's fees is denied. See ACD Corp. v. Walker, 413 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and cases cited therein. WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We are not unmindful of the apparent conflict in cases in this district concerning § 440.20(8), Fla....

...At issue here is the determination of the applicable interest rate incident to compensation installments which have been declared past due both before and after the effective date of the twelve percent statutory interest provision. The new provision first appears in Chapter 78-300, Laws of Florida, which amends § 440.20(7) to provide: In addition to any other penalties provided by this chapter for late payment, if any installment of compensation is not paid when it becomes due, the employer or carrier shall pay interest thereon at the rate of 12 percent pe...

...from the date each installment was due and should have been paid. Parker v. Brinson Construction Co., 78 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1955). For example, the legal interest rate in Parker was, and is now, six percent. § 687.01, Florida Statutes (1979). We read § 440.20(7) to provide for a specific interest rate in worker's compensation cases which supersedes the general provisions of § 687.01....

...order until the date all bills were paid, and denied the claim for penalties on medical reimbursements. We recognize that payments for medical services are not "compensation" and therefore are not subject to penalties for late payment under Sections 440.20(8) and (9)....

...should apply to late medical reimbursement. Chapter 440, however, makes no express provision for such penalties, and the rationale of Brantley, supra, is contrary to appellants' contention. First of all, we note that the penalty provision is part of Section 440.20, Florida Statutes, entitled "Payment of compensation," whereas the provision covering payment for medical services, and for reimbursement to claimant for payment of medical services, is Section 440.13, Florida Statutes....

...the rationale of the Brantley decision. Accordingly, we affirm. However, we certify the following question to be a question of great public importance: WHETHER REIMBURSEMENT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES MAY BE CLASSIFIED AS COMPENSATION PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 440.20(8) AND (9), FLORIDA STATUTES, FOR AWARD OF PENALTIES....

...imbursed to the employer out of any unpaid "installments of compensation due for any class of disability." (E.S.) The commission found that the resolution conclusively characterized all payments thereunder as advance compensation, and construed F.S. Section 440.20(11), F.S.A., [2] F.I.C....

...his resolution for any class of disability in excess of the amount the employee would otherwise be entitled to under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of the State of Florida, shall constitute an advance payment of compensation within the meaning of F.S. 440.20(11) by the employer and the employer shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of any unpaid installment or installments of compensation due for any class of disability and shall forthwith deduct therefrom any and all payments made to the empl...

...ed the employer furnishes satisfactory proof to the Deputy Commissioner or the Commission of such payment of compensation and medical benefits. Any payment by the employer over and above compensation paid or awarded and medical benefits, pursuant to Section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, shall be considered a gratuity." [4] Fla. 1954, 73 So.2d 51. [5] F.S. Secs. 440.12, 440.20(2), F.S.A. [6] F.S. Sec. 440.20(10), F.S.A....

...ights of the employer/carrier as of the date of the hearing, and (2) advance payment would deprive the employer/carrier of the right to later challenge the claimant's status as permanently totally disabled if she were to regain her earning capacity. Section 440.20(11)(d), Florida Statutes (1977) states that, when an application for an advance payment in excess of $2,000 is opposed by the employer or carrier, the deputy commissioner may order it paid if he finds that it is "for the best interest...

...benefits by giving the employee, rather than the employer/insurer, immediate use and control over the total amount, otherwise payable in installments. Umbreit v. Quality Tool, Inc., 225 N.W.2d 10, 302 Minn. 376 (1975). This court is bound to enforce Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides for a four percent discount rate....

...who has been accepted as permanently totally disabled by the carrier since June of 1979 and has shown no improvement in her condition since that time. Furthermore, even were there a probability of claimant recovering earning capacity in the future, Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1977), appears to preclude such a probability as a contingency consideration affecting either the amount or duration of compensation awarded....

...uration of the compensation ... shall be disregarded." The basis of the deputy's denial of the lump sum advance payment was the finding that such an award would materially prejudice the employer/carrier, a finding which we reverse herewith. However, Section 440.20(11)(d), Florida Statutes (1977), additionally requires the deputy to find that the award of lump sum payment would be in the best interest of the claimant and reasonable under the circumstances. The order of the deputy in this regard is ambiguous, [2] and must be remanded for express determination of whether the best interest of the claimant would be served by the award of lump sum payment as required by Section 440.20(11)(d), Florida Statutes....

...to approve a lump sum advance but reversed that order because it involved an abuse of discretion. In a concurring opinion, Judge R. Smith noted (382 So.2d 443, 445): For reasons we cannot now recover, the 1935 legislature fixed the present value of Section 440.20(10) money at "4% true discount compounded annually;" and succeeding legislatures have left the rate unchanged....

...[2] Order of the deputy dated December 2, 1981: I find that the claimant's claim for advanced payment of the entire commuted value of all permanent total disability benefits to come due in the future should not be granted after giving "due consideration to the interest of all interested parties" as required by Section 440.20(10). I further find that the request for lump sum advance payment, if granted, would materially prejudice the rights of the employer and carrier. See Section 440.20(11)(d).

...McDonnell Douglas Corp., 590 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The second issue on cross-appeal involves the date to be used in determining the assessment of penalties. If an employer fails to pay compensation benefits when due, it is mandatory that a 10% penalty be assessed. § 440.20(7), Florida Statutes. The penalty can be excused only if a timely and appropriate notice of denial has been filed. City of Miami v. Bell, 606 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Section 440.20(6), Fla.Stat....

...However, the JCC did not use the filing dates in determining whether the E/C was subject to penalties. The filing dates of the notices of denial should have been used to properly assess the penalties for failure to pay compensation benefits when due pursuant to section 440.20(7)....

...es and interest on benefits totaling $8,478.75 that were paid on May 12, 1995; (2) in compelling the E/SA to take its 25 percent reduction for the subrogation lien before the application of the 100 percent average weekly wage (AWW) cap authorized by section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1993), and Escambia *493 County Sheriffs Dep't v....

...he E/SA a reduction of future indemnity and medical payments by 25 percent in further payment of the lien. After it had begun its reduction, the E/SA notified claimant by letter dated October *494 24, 1997, of its intention to assert an offset under section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1993), and Escambia County Sheriffs Dep't v....

...the offset was not to be taken until after the 25 percent lien reduction was first calculated. Turning to the issues raised by the E/SA on appeal, we affirm the first, regarding the award of penalties and interest on the May 1995 payments. Sections 440.20(7) and (9), Florida Statutes (1993), provide for the award of penalties and interest on any installment of compensation not paid within 14 days from the date when it is due....

...F A SUBROGATION LIEN UNDER SECTION 440.39, FLORIDA STATUTES, SHOULD THE EMPLOYER/CARRIER APPLY THE LIEN REDUCTION *495 BEFORE OR AFTER CALCULATING TOTAL BENEFITS AND APPLYING THE 100 PERCENT AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE CAP AND RESULTANT OFFSET AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES, AND ESCAMBIA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEP'T v....

...pply the social security disability offset back to January 1, 1994, the effective date of section 440.15(13). Nevertheless, we note that the E/SA is specifically claiming the overpayments based on Grice, an argument suggesting that Grice interpreted section 440.20(15) in a manner contrary to existing law....

...*498 Under the circumstances, we reverse and remand with instructions to determine whether claimant's disability pension has a provision comparable to that in Barragan. If such a provision exists, we direct the E/SA to pay full workers' compensation benefits and to apply any offset arising from the AWW cap, as provided in section 440.20(15) and Grice, to Lombardi's disability retirement pension benefits....

...We are convinced that the record clearly reflects an attorney/client relationship existed between Andrew Richard and the University of Miami when Mr. Richard represented the University and its then carrier, The Home Insurance Company, in a workers' compensation settlement proceeding via section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), involving claimant, Esta Dansky, and a 1989 compensable accident....

...tal benefits at all because the "purpose of supplemental benefits is to allow for increases in the cost of living." Dep't of Children and Families v. Monroe, 744 So.2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The present case does not involve an offset under section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1991) (now codified as § 440.20(14), Fla....

...(2000)), or Escambia County Sheriff's Department v. Grice, 692 So.2d 896 (Fla.1997). See also Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla.1989). As Grice makes clear, the social security offset under section 440.15(9)(a) is different and distinct from the offset allowed under section 440.20(15). See also City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770 So.2d 1196, 1204 & n. 14 (Fla.2000); Dixon v. GAB Bus. Servs., 767 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla.2000) (describing the interpretation in Grice "of section 440.20(15) to mean that a claimant may not receive in excess of 100 percent of his or her [average weekly wage as] a judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute")....

...as "weekly compensation benefits": In case of permanent total disability resulting from injuries which occurred subsequent to June 30, 1955, and for which the liability of the employer for compensation has not been discharged under the provisions of s. 440.20(12), the injured employee shall receive additional weekly compensation benefits equal to 5 percent of his weekly compensation rate, as established pursuant to the law in effect on the date of his injury, multiplied by the number of calendar years since the date of injury....

...society generally. There are other statutes which seem geared to protect claimant's right to compensation. Not only does Section 440.34(4)(a) make it a crime for an attorney to receive a fee without approval, but the carrier/employer is required by Section 440.20(1), Florida Statutes (1979) to make payment of compensation directly to the person entitled thereto....

...This leaves for consideration the claim of Genevish for interest, costs and attorneys fees. This claim is based on the contention that the Debtor handled the claim of Genevish by miscalculating his average weekly earnings; by seeking protection of Chapter 11 in this Court; and by challenging his claim in this Court. § 440.20(9) and § 440.34(3) of Florida Statutes mandates an allowance of interest and costs to the prevailing injured employee....

...porary partial disability benefits. However, we reverse the denial of penalties and interest. The denial of penalties was erroneous because the employer/self-insured neither paid the benefits within seven days of when they became due, as required by section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (2003), nor exercised the pay-and-investigate option provided by section 440.20(4); and because the employer/self-insured did not offer any relevant evidence showing that it was unaware, as of the date on which claimant alleged the benefits were due, of facts supporting the obligation to pay those benefits....

...1st DCA 2003); Bruno's, Inc./Food World v. Bruner, 805 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Eastern Indus., Inc. v. Burnham, 750 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). For the same reasons, the judge also erred in denying interest on the past due benefits, which ordinarily is awarded pursuant to section 440.20(8), in addition to other penalties for late payment of compensation....

...We also note from examination of the record on appeal that it does not reflect review by the judge of the bureau file (containing such materials as medical and other reports) before he approved the settlement agreement, as was expressly required by § 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, and W.C.R.P....

...efits. For the reasons below, we modify the JCC's order. The parties agree that a payment due on December 26, 2008, was not paid until December 29, 2008. The parties also agree that the amount of interest due on the late payment is five dollars. See § 440.20(8)(a), Fla....

...y installment by more than five dollars. The JCC *171 found "Claimant is owed interest" and ordered in the decretal portion of his order that "the claim for interest ... is granted" and "[i]nterest should be calculated pursuant to Florida Statute[s] § 440.20(8)(a)." In the first point on appeal, the E/C argues the JCC erred in awarding interest because Claimant already received more than the amount owed....

...Finding that the Judge of Compensation Claims (the "JCC") applied an incorrect rule of law in concluding that Rule 4.030(c), Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation Procedure, was inapplicable in this case, we reverse. The E/C and the claimant entered into a washout settlement which was approved by the JCC pursuant to section 440.20(11)(b), *760 Florida Statutes (1994). The order was mailed to the parties on February 18, 1994. Twelve days later, on March 2, 1994, the employer mailed payment to the claimant in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars. The claimant, relying upon section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1994), asserted that a twenty percent penalty was owed, because the employer failed to pay her within seven days after payment became due....

...However, this court has not yet addressed the issue raised in this case, i.e., on what date does payment pursuant to a washout settlement approved by order mailed to the parties "become due" to the claimant? The appellant urges that, in making this determination, section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1994), must be read in conjunction with Rule 4.030(c), Florida Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure....

installments or as otherwise provided in § 440.15.” § 440.20(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). For example, wage-loss

...At no time was this argument raised before the deputy commissioner, therefore the issue has been waived. See Sunland Hospital v. Garrett, 415 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). We reject E/C's argument that the issue of penalties was not raised in accordance with the requirements of Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in denying his request for a $2,000 advance, which was made pursuant to section 440.20(12)(c)2., Florida Statutes....

...tively responded. In response to the argument of the Employer/Carrier (E/C) that Claimant failed to present any evidence that $2,000, as opposed to say $500, was appropriate, the JCC asked Claimant’s counsel why $2,000 was requested and noted that section 440.20(12)(c) does not say that an advance must be made in that amount....

...something less than $2,000 was more appropriate. The JCC denied Claimant’s request for an advance, finding that Claimant failed to present any evidence regarding what amount not exceeding $2,000 would be in his best interest. This appeal followed. Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (2011), provides in part: (c) In the event the claimant has not returned to the same or equivalent employment with no substantial reduction in wages or has suffered a substantial loss of earning capacity or a physical impairment, actual or apparent: [[Image here]] 2....

...tion claims' (JCC's) denial of the compensability of the back condition because more than 120 days had expired from the initial provision of benefits by the carrier to the claimant, thereby waiving its right to deny compensability of the injury. See § 440.20(4), Fla....

...We cannot agree with the judge's denial in regard to the compensability of the injury to claimant's back. If a carrier fails to contest compensability of an injury within 120 days from the initial provision of benefits or the payment of compensation, the burden of producing evidence is clearly placed on it by section 440.20(4) to "establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period." As in Boyett v....

...on of the requisite 120-day period. We agree, however, that the JCC correctly denied the claim seeking authorization of a neurologist. As this court observed in Checkers Restaurant v. Wiethoff, 925 So.2d 348, 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (en banc), while section 440.20(4) does bar the *521 carrier from denying compensability after the expiration of the 120-day pay-and-investigate period, it does not have the effect of precluding the carrier from denying a specific claim for benefits on the ground tha...

...tended to address the exacerbation, which the E/C had accepted as compensable, but to resolve the entire disc herniation, which medical evidence revealed had occurred before the work-related accident. Id. at 1015. We concluded that the provisions of section 440.20(4) applied only to the compensability of the exacerbation of the condition, and not to a major surgical procedure which involved a condition that had pre-existed the work-related accident....

...insurance plan should be credited against workers' compensation benefits only to the extent that the combined monies exceed a claimant's average weekly wage. The rulings in Hoagey and Brown effectively synthesize the interplay between § 440.21 and § 440.20(15), which provides that: When an employee is injured and the employer pays his full wages or any part thereof during the period of disability ......

...ly noted that it was not determining whether an offset should be allowed for pension (as opposed to insurance) benefits when the combined monies do exceed a claimant's average weekly wage. Likewise, in the present case we do not consider whether the § 440.20(15) offset applies upon the payment of pension benefits....

...Thus, it would appear that claimant is entitled to penalties and interest for late payment. See § 440.15(3)(a)1 (providing that "[o]nce the employee has reached the date of maximum medical improvement, impairment benefits are due and payable within 20 days after the carrier has knowledge of the impairment"); § 440.20(6) & (8) (addressing liability for penalties and interest, respectively), Fla....

...ing, in pertinent part, that the employer's use of Grice in calculating the offset violated section 440.15(9), Florida Statutes, and was contrary to Dixon v. GAB Bus. Serv., 767 So.2d 443 (Fla.2000). In so doing, the JCC misapplied Dixon. Grice held section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1985), permits the employer to reduce a claimant's workers' compensation benefits to the extent his combined benefits from workers' compensation and collateral sources exceed 100% of his AWW....

...When reading Dixon, Grice , and the relevant statutes in tandem, a claimant's SSD benefit may be offset, but only to the extent it does not reduce total benefits to less than 100% of the claimant's monthly AWW ( Grice ) or 80% of his monthly ACE ( Dixon ), whichever is greater. See §§ 440.15(10)(a), and 440.20(15), Fla....

...is determination that the administrative rule is not valid. Both the JCC and Claimant, however, mistakenly assumed the applicability of rule 60Q-6.123(5) to this case. By its title and its context, rule 60Q-6.123(5) applies only to settlements under section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, where a claimant is responsible for paying his or her own attorney’s fees and costs out of a lump sum settlement extinguishing liability for all claims. In contrast, the stipulation here is for E/C-paid costs. Florida Administrative Code Rule 60Q-6.124(2), which is the applicable rule for fees and costs paid by a carrier apart from section 440.20(11) settlements, permits parties to “stipulate to the payment of attorney’s fees and costs,” with no requirement that the agreed-upon costs be justified or detailed....

...Claimant is not being asked to pay the costs incurred by his lawyer. The JCC’s apparent concern for Claimant’s welfare is misplaced where the E/C agrees to pay the payment of unspecified costs. While we express no opinion concerning the validity of rule 60Q-6.123(5) for settlements under section 440.20(11), the rule does not apply to the facts here....

...Borque asserts that after he sought treatment Trugreen management questioned his injury and threatened to give away his route. A month later he was fired. In March 2003 Borque retained an attorney and sued Trugreen in Florida state court for wrongful discharge under Fla. Stat. §§ 440.205 and 440.15 alleging that Trugeen terminated his employment because he pursued a claim for workers’ compensation benefits....

...Florida enacted the Workers’ Compensation Law to provide an injured employee with an efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits at a reasonable cost to the employer. Barry v. Burdines, 675 So.2d 587, 589 (Fla. 1996). Employers cannot punish employees for pursuing their rights under this scheme. Section 440.205 provides that “[n]o employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law.” Fla. Stat. § 440.205. If an employer violates this section, the employee has a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. See Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof’l Adm’rs., 427 So.2d 182, 183-84 (Fla. 1983). Section 440.20 of the Workers’ Compensation Law provides a framework for settling claims in an efficient and cost effective manner. The settlement 5 agreement between Trugreen and Borque provides that it was made pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 440.20(11)(c)....

...exchange for a lump-sum payment to the claimant. The Workers’ Compensation Law was amended in 2000 to limit approval of a settlement under subsection (c) by the claims judge to the attorney’s fees paid to the claimant’s attorney by the claimant. See Fla. Stat. § 440.20(11)(c). Accordingly subsection (c) makes clear that Borque’s first two arguments are without merit. When Borque retained Mermell to pursue his workers’ compensation claim he allowed Trugreen to utilize a general release in se...

...for Mermell’s attorney’s fees. Because the claims judge was not required to approve the settlement whether he had jurisdiction over any other claim including 1 Borque asserts Rule 4.143 of the Florida Rules of Workers Compensation which governs settlements under § 440.20(11) controls our decision here....

...issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Wright v. Hanna Steel Corp., 270 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 2001). In any event this rule which prohibits general release language in the settlement is inapplicable to settlements made with assistance of counsel under § 440.20(11)(c). See Fla. R. Work. Comp. P. 4.143. 6 Borque’s retaliatory discharge claim is inconsequential. Under Fla. Stat. § 440.20(11)(c) there was no need for him to approve anything other than the attorney’s fees....

... Borque’s third argument addresses the question left unresolved by Edenfield - the reach of the general release. Under Florida law it is unclear whether the general release signed by Borque was intended to encompass his retaliatory discharge claim under §440.205....

...The Florida Supreme Court made clear in Smith that mere reference to rights and benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law is insufficient to waive a claim for retaliatory discharge. Smith, 427 So.2d at 184. In Smith the court held that a “Section 440.205 wrongful discharge claim is not a claim for compensation or benefits” under the Workers’ Compensation Law. Id. Such claims are outside the jurisdiction of claims judges. See id. Moreover the general release provision in § 440.20(11)(c) refers only to a waiver of “all rights to any and all benefits.” Fla. Stat. § 440.20(11)(c). Accordingly a general release of benefits under § 440 does not necessarily release a retaliatory discharge claim under § 440.205 without evidence of intent by the claimant to do so. The language in the settlement agreement here does not clearly manifest such intent....

...ged accident and the 120 day rule never began to toll [sic]." The parties agreed to the entry of a summary final order in this matter. On August 12, 2004, the JCC rendered the Summary Final Order. In this order, the JCC quoted provisions in sections 440.20(2) and 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...1st DCA 2002) ("Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we review this case de novo. "). The 120-day "pay and investigate" provision is contained in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, and the version applicable at the time of Costa's accident provides: If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits or compensation, it may initiate payment without prejudice and without admitting liability....

...d. The initial provision of compensation or benefits, for purposes of this subsection, means the first installment of compensation or benefits to be paid by the carrier under subsection (2) or pursuant to a petition for benefits under s. 440.192(8). § 440.20(4), Fla....

...Thus, from a plain reading of the statute, the letter sent in this case had no effect because the E/C never paid any benefits. See Bussey, 867 So.2d at 545 ("The 120-day period becomes relevant only when an E/C has elected to pursue the ` pay and investigate' option. Section 440.20(4) applies to a carrier that is `uncertain of its obligation to provide all benefits or compensation' and gives the E/C an option to pay benefits while reserving the right to later deny compensability after investigation." (emphasis added))....

...ely authorized."); Osceola County Sch. Bd. v. Arace, 884 So.2d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ("[T]he first authorized doctor's visit by a claimant is the `initial provision of benefits,' beginning the 120-day pay-and-investigate period mentioned in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2000)."); Jeffrey's Steel v....

...Our decisions state that "when the employer/carrier recognized, or reasonably should have become aware, that the claimant had medical needs, the employer/carrier [have] three options: [1] to pay for them; [2] to pay and investigate in accordance with section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1995); or [3] to deny compensability." Franklin v....

...e claim. See Bussey, 867 So.2d at 545-46; Russell Corp. v. Brooks, 698 So.2d 1334, 1335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). In those cases, "an E/C which neither denies a petition for benefits within 14 days of receipt nor elects to pay and investigate pursuant to section 440.20(4) is placed in the `identical position as the E/C that files a notice of denial.'" Bussey, 867 So.2d at 546 (quoting Russell Corp....

...sulted in a compensable aggravation of a preexisting condition. Thereafter, Claimant was placed on no-work status by her treating chiropractor, Dr. Munday, through October 20, 2006. The E/C began providing benefits under the 120-day rule outlined in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...iled, and that the failure to pay compensation on the basis of the correct average weekly wage did not result from conditions over which the employer/carrier had no control. See Plymouth Citrus Products v. Jackson, 417 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1987), provides in part: If any installment of compensation for ......

...warded or excused. The division may assess without a hearing the above-mentioned 10-percent additional payment against either the employer or the insurance carrier, depending upon who was at fault in causing the delay.... Under the clear language of section 440.20(7), an award of penalties is inappropriate unless specifically claimed prior to the conclusion of the prosecution of the claim before the deputy....

...tal disability (TTD) benefits during a period of training and education pursuant to section 440.49(1)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990). The employer argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred as a matter of law in his interpretation of section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...as estopped from attacking the parties' settlement agreement, and that he departed from the essential requirements of law in considering matters not contained in the "clear and unambiguous" settlement agreement. We affirm the JCC's interpretation of section 440.20(12)(a), but find that the claimant is estopped from attacking the parties' settlement agreement, and that the other issues are mooted by these rulings or are without merit....

...Temporary disability benefits paid pursuant to s. 440.15(2)(a) and (4) shall include ... such period as the employee may be receiving training and education under a rehabilitation program pursuant to paragraphs (1)(a) and (d).... Section 16, chapter 89-289, Laws of Florida, amended section 440.20(12)(a), which states the policy for administration of the workers' compensation system (emphasis denotes language added): ......

...pursuant to section 440.49(1)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), within the obligation for "training and education" and intended that this part of the obligation remain the responsibility of the employer. We conclude that the JCC properly interpreted section 440.20(12)(a) as indicating the legislature's intention that lump sum settlements not be allowed in exchange for release of the employer's liability for payment of "additional compensation for temporary total disability during such period as the employee [is] receiving training and education" under a program pursuant to section 440.49(1)(d). We note that the legislative intent of amended section 440.20(12)(a) would be entirely frustrated if the employer were allowed to contract with the claimant for release of its remaining liability under section 440.49(1)(d). Having approved the JCC's interpretation of section 440.20(12)(a), we hold that he improperly rejected the employer's argument that the claimant is estopped by the plain language of the settlement agreement he signed from claiming the additional benefits he sought under section 440.49(1)(d)....

...ing and education pursuant to section 440.49(1)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990). I concur in Judge Barfield's well-written opinion save for the last full paragraph in which the majority concludes that claimant is estopped from asserting such claim. Section 440.20(12)(a) specifically provides: ......

...right to future medical care. But the claimant herein is not similarly situated because he has not sought to set aside the lump sum settlement. Rather, he has sought to retain the benefits of his settlement and secure additional benefits pursuant to section 440.20(12)(a). We have merely held that he is estopped to continue to assert his rights under the lump sum settlement and seek additional benefits pursuant to section 440.20(12)(a)....

...The E/C initially denied the claim, but eventually accepted compensability and provided benefits. In July 2015, Claimant requested approval of an attorney’s fee he owed his attorney for obtaining a washout settlement of his workers’ compensation case under section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes....

...The fact that Claimant was never awarded temporary benefits for that time does not bar penalties and interest, because temporary benefits are payable without an award, and were due regardless of any ruling. Consequently, late payment entitles Claimant to penalties and interest. See § 440.20(6), (8), Fla....

...s resolution for any class of disability in excess of the amount the employee would otherwise be entitled to under the Workmen’s Compensation Laws of the State of Florida, shall constitute an advance payment of compensation within the meaning of F.S. 440.20(jl1) by the employer and the employer shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of any unpaid installment or installments of compensation due for any class of disability and shall forthwith deduct therefrom any and all payments made to the emp...

...In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying penalties and interest on late indemnity payments. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Sections 440.20(6) and 440.20(8), Florida Statutes, govern penalties and interest, respectively. Because those subsections are substantive, the version that applies is that in effect on the date of accident. See Serv. Mgmt. Sys. v. Hood, 790 So.2d 578, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (applying section 440.20(6)); E....

...installment of compensation more than seven days after it becomes due “shall” also pay a penalty of twenty percent of the unpaid installment “unless such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control.” § 440.20(6), Fla....

...INTEREST The law as it existed on the date of accident provides that an E/C who does not pay an installment of compensation when it becomes due “shall pay interest thereon at the rate of 12 percent per year from the date the installment becomes due until it is paid.” § 440.20(8), Fla. Stat. (1997). Notably, this subsection contains no exceptions; in contrast to section 440.20(6), it does not condition itself on whether “such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control.” Given the JCC’s unchallenged finding that the payments were late, imposition of interest was mandatory....

...1st DCA 1998). In Corkery , this court reversed a JCC’s denial of penalties and interest on late indemnity payments, writing: “it cannot be said that the delay in payment was due to ‘conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control.’ § 440.20(6), Fla....

...We read the statute as forgiving penalties and interest only when neither the employer nor the carrier could have prevented the untimeliness.” 707 So.2d at 885 . The words “and interest” are dicta in the Corkery opinion, given that the relevant wording of subsections 440.20(6) and (8) is identical in both the version applicable there (1995) and the version applicable here (1997), and given that the payments in Corkery were indeed late; Corkery’s result as to interest is the same regardless of the E/C’s control over the delay....

...At the merits hearing, claimant contended that his hernia condition was compensable as a matter of law because the employer and servicing agent had failed to deny compensability within 120 days after the initial provision of benefits as required by section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2002), which, to the extent pertinent, reads: A carrier that fails to deny compensability within 120 days after the initial provision of benefits or payment of compensation....

...waives the right to deny compensability, unless the carrier can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period. . . . In his merits order, the judge rejected claimant's argument that section 440.20(4) prevented the employer and servicing agent from contesting compensability with the following statement: I acknowledge the claimant's argument in regard to the applicability of the 120-rule; however, I specifically reject this argume...

...ation could not have been reasonably obtained within the 120 day period. *1219 The judge then found that claimant's hernia condition and need for treatment were not work related and, accordingly, denied the petitions for benefits. As the language of section 440.20(4) quoted above clearly states, absent a denial of compensability made within 120 days of the initial provision of benefits or payment of compensation, the employer and carrier (or servicing agent) waive the right to later do so, unles...

...ntify any such "material facts," and our review of the record reveals none. Appellees seem to take the position that, because claimant allegedly gave an inaccurate history to the physician to whom he had been sent, they had no obligation pursuant to section 440.20(4) to perform any investigation....

...ice of Denial. In the interim, it made a single payment to the chiropractor in April of 2003, for treatment rendered on March 4, 2003. No further payments were made to the chiropractor. At the hearing on the petition, the claimant argued that, under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, the employer had waived its right to deny the compensability of her neck injury by failing to file a notice of denial within 120 days of the filing of her February 6, 2003, petition for benefits or of the payment of the chiropractor's bill in April of 2003....

...This is an appeal from a final workers’ compensation order awarding Claimant, Maryann Dickson, compensation for the second arthroscopic surgery she underwent to repair her injured knee. We reverse, finding the Judge of Compensations Claims (JCC) erred in awarding compensation based on its improper application of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2010), and subsequent determination that the Employer/Carrier (E/C) waived its right to deny compensability....

...nt for her knee. The JCC found, based in part on Dr. Goldsmith’s testimony, that Claimant had a new “accident” and suffered a new injury when she fell on July 5, 2009. However, despite neither party arguing for application of the provisions of section 440.20(4)— which gives the E/C a 120-day window from the time it first provides medical treatment to investigate compensability of a claim, after which it cannot deny com-pensability — the JCC found the provision to be “mandatory,” requiring her to apply it to the facts of this case....

...e date the E/C denied compensability, the JCC found she was compelled to conclude that the E/C waived the right to deny compensability. Thereafter, the E/C filed a motion for rehearing, asserting it was improper for the JCC to make a ruling based on section 440.20(4)’s 120-day provision because: (1) it was outside the scope of the issues presented; and (2) the JCC misapprehended or overlooked pertinent facts related to the application of the 120-day provision....

...f her file, she discovered that the notice of denial contained a typographical error and was actually issued on October 27, 2009 (within the 120-day period), not November 27, 2009. The JCC denied the E/C’s motion, finding that: The provisions of F.S. 440.20(4) are mandatory and not in the nature of an affirmative defense....

...provide accurate testimony at the time of trial, not after I enter my final compensation order. Analysis We reverse the JCC’s ruling for two reasons: First, the JCC violated the E/C’s right to due process by sua sponte raising the application of section 440.20(4) and denying the E/C the opportunity to present evidence regarding the section’s applicability. Second, section 440.20(4) does not operate to preclude an E/C from denying a specific claim for benefits on grounds that the claimant’s need for such benefits did not stem from a compensable accident or injury....

...pated in is a denial of due process and must be reversed.” Commercial Carrier Corp. v. LaPointe, 723 So.2d 912, 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing Se. Recycling v. Cottongim, 639 So.2d 155, 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (internal citations omitted)). Under section 440.20(4), if an E/C fails to contest compensability of an injury within 120 days of the initial provision of benefits or the payment of compensation, it has the burden of producing evidence to “establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period.” § 440.20(4) Fla. Stat. (2010); see also Mims v. Confederated Staffing, 940 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Thus, prior to determining whether an E/C has waived the right to deny compensability pursuant to section 440.20(4), a JCC should afford the E/C the opportunity to present evidence to refute allegations that it failed to deny a claim in a timely fashion. Here, the JCC denied the E/C due process when she sua sponte raised the application of section 440.20(4) without affording the E/C the opportunity to present evidence regarding the section’s applicability. Additionally, by finding “as a matter of law the E/C cannot deny compensability of claimant’s knee injury sustained on 7/5/09” and mischaracterizing section 440.20(4) as “mandatory” and “not in the nature of an affirmative defense,” the JCC improperly denied the E/C the opportunity to establish material facts that could be used to prove it did timely deny benefits. Regarding the applicability of section 440.20(4), it is well settled that a waiver resulting from an E/C’s failure to deny compensability within 120 days of an initial provision of benefits pertains solely to the concept of compensability. See Checkers Restaurant v. Wiethoff, 925 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Section 440.20(4) operates only to resolve the issue of whether a claimant suffered a compensable workplace injury, not to preclude an E/C from challenging the claimant’s entitlement to benefits, particularly whether the originally compensable workplace injury was the major contributing cause of the need for specific benefits....

...ury because, although the E/C did not deny compensability within the 120-day period, evidence showed that the major contributing cause of the claimant’s need for surgery was her preexisting condition); and see Mims, 940 So.2d at 520 (holding while section 440.20(4) does bar the carrier from denying compensability after the expiration of the 120-day pay- *1084 and-investigate period, it does not have the effect of precluding the carrier from denying a specific claim for benefits on the ground t...

...Goldsmith’s diagnosis) it was paying for treatment of an injury caused by the 2008 accident. It was not until later that the E/C learned the 2008 accident was not the major contributing cause of the second tear to Claimant’s medial meniscus and initiated a challenge to Claimant’s entitlement to treatment. As noted, section 440.20 does not preclude an E/C from denying a claim for benefits on the ground that a compensable accident was not the major contributing cause of the injury the claim is based on. Thus, even if the JCC had not erred in its sua sponte application of section 440.20(4) and the E/C were unable to prove it issued its notice of denial within 120 days of authorizing treatment, the section would not preclude the E/C from disputing Claimant’s right to benefits. Because the JCC’s sua sponte application of section 440.20(4) was in error, and because section 440.20(4) is inapplicable to claimant’s challenges regarding whether a compensable accident was the major contributing cause of an injury, we reverse....

...ond voluntary dismissal being with prejudice on the issues then before the Judge of Compensation Claims. Otherwise, for example, parties could easily circumvent the involvement of the Judge of Compensation Claims in approval of joint petitions under Section 440.20(12), Fla....

...The employer and carrier correctly concede on appeal that claimant is entitled to penalties and interest on the award of permanent impairment benefits. Accordingly, the final order is reversed for failure to award penalties and interest pursuant to section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1995), and the cause is remanded for this limited purpose....

...e opportunity to present evidence regarding her entitlement to the awards. See School Dist. of Hillsborough County v. Dickson, 67 So.3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding "JCC denied E/C due process when she sua sponte raised the application of section 440.20(4) without affording the E/C the opportunity to present evidence regarding the section's application")....

...1st DCA 2011) (holding penalties and interest were due because "claimant established that he was entitled to temporary, partial disability benefits, and proved that he was not paid these benefits within seven days of the date they became due, [thus,] he made out a prima facie case for penalties and interest. See § 440.20(6)(a), Fla....

...Appellees also challenged certain existing rules as vague and lacking adequate standards for agency decision making. That rule challenge was not sustained, and is not at issue in this appeal. . Handbook at 1-1; see §§ 393.066, 393.0661, 408.302(1), Fla. Stat. . Id. at 2-4; see 42 C.F.R. § 440.20 (2)(d) (2011) (providing that the state Medicaid agency "may place appropriate limits on a service based on such criteria as medical necessity or on utilization control procedures”)....

...Lucie had changed carriers from FMIT to PGCS. When medical bills from the second heart attack were submitted to FMIT, FMIT declined to pay; when they were submitted to PGCS, PGCS began paying benefits under the pay-and-investigate provision of the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law, section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes....

...At issue in this workers’ compensation appeal is whether Claimant may recover attorney’s fees from the Employer/Carrier (“E/C”) under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), when the E/C made a *925 $2,000 advance compensation payment pursuant to section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), 20 days after receiving Claimant’s petition for benefits (“PFB”), but failed to begin paying installments of the requested permanent total disability (“PTD”) benefits within 80 days of receiving the PFB....

...The Judge of Compensation Claims (“JCC”) ruled that the $2,000 advance compensation the E/C paid Claimant constituted PTD benefits. Thus, the benefits were timely paid, and Claimant is not entitled to attorney’s fees. We conclude, ,to the contrary, that payment of an advance under section 440.20(12) does not equate to initiating benefit payments, even though the E/C is entitled to deduct the advanced amount from future installments....

...She filed a PFB on January 25, 2011, seeking payment of PTD benefits, as well as payment of an attorney’s fee. The E/C received the PFB on January 28, 2011. On February 8, 2011, Claimant filed an unopposed motion for a $2,000 advance as authorized by section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (2008), which the JCC approved by order the following day....

...E/C initially denied her PFB but ultimately initiated benefit payments, including back benefits, penalties, and interest, due to the efforts of Claimant’s attorney. The JCC denied Claimant’s petition, concluding that an advance paid pursuant to section 440.20(12) is “a discharge of liability from the date thereof until such advance is recouped by offset against subsequent benefits,” and that the $2,000 advance at issue was paid within 30 days of the E/C’s receipt of Claimant’s PFB....

...41 days after receiving her PFB. We agree. The JCC’s conclusion that the E/C made timely payment on Claimant’s PFB by making the $2,000 advance compensation payment conflicts with decisions from this Court regarding the nature of such advances. Section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), permits claimants to request and obtain advances of up to $2,000 under specified circumstances. Although an E/C is entitled to subsequent reimbursement of advanced amounts from “any unpaid installment or installments of compensation due,” see section 440.20(13), Florida Statutes (2008), the advance payment occurs without regard to the E/C’s liability to pay a claimant compensation and/or benefits available under chapter 440....

...August 24, 2004. Kevin G. Bennett; Grossman & Goldman, P.A., Boca Raton, for Appellant. Susan J. Arrick; Arrick, Peacock, Hodges & Wiener, Miami, for Appellee. HAWKES J. We are asked to determine whether the amendments adopted by the 2000 Florida Legislature to section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), eliminated the JCC's jurisdiction to determine whether a settlement agreement was reached, or to determine *95 the terms of such an agreement....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. August 23, 2007. *895 Rosemary B. Eure, Sarasota; and Bill McCabe, Longwood, for Appellant. Mark D. Tinker and Jack A. Weiss of Fowler White Boggs Banker, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellees. ALLEN, J. Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes, provides that when compensation payable under a workers' compensation "award" is not paid within seven days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to twenty percent thereof....

...When a claimant who is not represented by counsel enters into a washout settlement agreement, the amount payable under the settlement is an award of compensation for which the unrepresented claimant is entitled to the additional twenty percent specified by section 440.20(7) in the event of late payment. But section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that the amount payable under a washout settlement entered into by a represented claimant is not an award of compensation. Accordingly, section 440.20(7) does not apply in connection with a washout settlement entered into by a represented claimant....

...and represented claimants violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. We affirm because the appellant has not demonstrated that this statutory distinction lacks a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Section 440.20(11)(c) provides, in relevant part, [W]hen a claimant is represented by counsel, the claimant may waive all rights to any and all benefits under this chapter by entering into a settlement agreement releasing the employer and the carrier...

...torney by the claimant. . . . Any order entered by a judge of compensation claims approving the attorney's fees as set out in the settlement under this subsection is not considered to be an award and is not subject to modification or review. Because section 440.20(11)(c) does not negatively impact a suspect class or result in the deprivation of a fundamental right, the appellant's challenge is subject to a rational basis review....

...ants have already received different treatment than that extended to unrepresented claimants. Unlike an unrepresented claimant who is subject to considerable oversight by the judge of compensation claims when she negotiates a washout settlement, see section 440.20(11)(b), Florida Statutes, a represented claimant is free to negotiate her settlement with only minimal oversight by the judge of compensation claims....

...g out for that Claimant's best interest, and would not agree to settle the workers' compensation case unless it was in the Claimant's best interest." For the same reason, however, a rational basis exists to support the legislature's decision to make section 440.20(7) inapplicable when a claimant has entered into a settlement agreement while represented by counsel....

...te for the inclusion of such terms in a settlement agreement when doing so would be in the claimant's best interests. As the appellant has acknowledged, by limiting the degree to which a judge of compensation claims must supervise a settlement under section 440.20(11)(c), the legislature has already apparently embraced the presumption that a claimant's attorney will act in the claimant's best interests during these negotiations....

...able and paid Claimant compensation benefits and medical expenses, including the costs of two hernia operations. On October 19, 1988, the parties entered into a Joint Stipulation and Joint Petition and Application for Lump Sum Settlement pursuant to section 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes....

...Ellison, 402 So.2d 36, 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), to timely provide medical benefits pursuant to section 440.13, and to pay temporary total disability compensation pursuant to subsection 440.15(2) within 14 days thereafter unless it timely controverted the claim, § 440.20, Fla....

...In the present case, when the claimant established that he was entitled to temporary, partial disability benefits, and proved that he was not paid these benefits within seven days of the date they became due, he made out a prima facie case for penalties and interest. See § 440.20(6)(a), Fla....

...We find it necessary to reverse on one issue. The final order states in part: "Penalties are due on the unpaid compensation since no formal notice to controvert was ever filed." Contrary to the JCC's order, a formal notice to controvert was filed within the 21-day period prescribed by section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes....

...Appellants also maintain that even if the settlement order was properly vacated, the JCC erred in awarding TTD and PTD benefits. The JCC found that at the time the settlement was approved, the claimant was actually TTD and had not yet reached psychiatric MMI. Citing section 440.20(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (1989), the JCC noted that a lump-sum settlement could not be approved until three months after the date of MMI, and could only be approved after consideration of all material factors by the JCC....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) abused her discretion in denying her a $2,000 advance of compensation as permitted by section 440.20(12)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2010)....

...The JCC found Claimant had sustained a substantial reduction in wages as a result of her alleged accident and injury and that Claimant had not returned to work since April 15, 2011. On that basis, the JCC concluded that Claimant met the preliminary test of entitlement to an advance payment of compensation under section 440.20(12)(c)2....

...Reiner, II, of Reiner & Reiner, P.A., Miami, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. The claimant seeks review of a summary final order dismissing his workers' compensation claim. We agree that the judge of compensation claims erred in enforcing the settlement agreement because it did not comply with section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes (2003). Although the judge of compensation claims concluded that he did not have jurisdiction to rescind the agreement under section 440.20(11)(c), that section did not apply here because it is undisputed that the claimant was not represented by counsel when he signed the release. The judge of compensation claims had jurisdiction to determine whether the parties entered into a valid, binding settlement agreement. Jacobsen v. Ross Stores, 882 So.2d 431, 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Absent compliance with section 440.20(11), any agreement by the claimant to waive his right to workers' compensation benefits was invalid. See §§ 440.20(11)(c) & 440.21(2), Fla....

...tion of a compensable physical injury, we reverse and remand for application of the correct standard. In *1158 addition, it is unclear whether the JCC applied the correct standard in determining whether the Employer/Carrier (E/C) was estopped, under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2010), from denying com-pensability of the PTSD....

...d for additional proceedings. Application of section M0.20U) In addition to the foregoing basis for reversal, Claimant also asserts that the JCC applied the wrong legal standard and, thus, erred by concluding the E/C was not estopped by operation of section 440.20(4) from denying compensability of the PTSD....

...It was of no consequence that compensa- bility was sought long after the date of the accident; the relevant inquiry is whether the E/C denied compensability within 120 days of first providing treatment for the PTSD. See Bynum Transp., Inc. v. Snyder, 765 So.2d 752, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding section 440.20(4) applies to any claim for compensability of any injury made following date of accident, not just first claim)....

...Thus, the E/C had to deny compensability of the PTSD within 120 days of July 11, 2012, “unless the carrier can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period.” § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (2010). It is unclear why the JCC rejected Claimant’s argument that the “120-day pay and investigate rule” as set out in section 440.20(4), precluded the E/C from denying compens-ability of her PTSD as of the March 2013 merits hearing....

...The Claimant was ultimately diagnosed with coronary artery disease (CAD) and acute anterior wall myocardial infarction. The E/C accepted compensability under the “120 day rule” and authorized continued medical care with Dr. Dietzius upon Claimant’s release from the hospital. See § 440.20(4), Fla....

TAKES A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY

TAKES A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY

...compensation claims to decide whether such a refusal is “justifiable.” 104 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). I agree. In Kuhn, this court correctly construed the discretion of a judge of compensation claims to award an advance payment of compensation under section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes, holding that the legislative intent could not have been simply to allow a claimant to obtain the advance payment for a reason unrelated to a workplace injury: We are dealing, however, with a statutory framework in Chapter 440 whose principal purpose is to address medical and related financial needs arising from workplace injuries. In context, the type of interest that is furthered by an advance under section 440.20(12)(c)(2) must at least have some plausible nexus to this purpose. A request for a $2000 advance, simply as an undifferentiated financial cushion with no relationship to the provision of medical or related care, does not have such a connection....

...CSE to support the JCC’s findings. 3 Chief Judge Thomas supports the E/C’s argument that this court should go further and adopt the “plausible nexus” standard similar to the one this court has developed in cases involving advances under section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes....

The 4 percent discount rate was borrowed from section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1975). While that section

BENTON, J. This workers’ compensation case asks whether penalties otherwise authorized by section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1997) for failure to pay “any installment of compensation ......

...emergency period began), subject only to the statutory 104 week cap on temporary disability benefits. See generally § 440.15(2)(a) & (4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997); Okeechobee Health Care v. Collins, 726 So.2d 775, 776-78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Under section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1997), the compensation order awarded penalties and interest on the temporary *153 total disability benefit's awarded for November 1, 1998, through January 20, 1999, but did not award penalties on the temporary to...

...d earlier awarded on an emergency basis for the period from January 21, 1999, to May 26,1999. Ms. Foster then filed a motion to assess penalties on the temporary total disability benefits awarded for the period beginning January 21, 1999, relying on section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides: If any installment of compensation for ......

...ed for payment and to have waived the right to claim such penalty. However, during the course of a hearing, the judge of compensation claims shall on her or his own motion raise the question of whether such penalty should be awarded or excused. *154 § 440.20(6), Fla....

...lenged portion of the order under review. Ms. Foster did not conclude the prosecution of her indemnity benefits claim before a judge of compensation claims “without having specifically claimed additional compensation in the nature of a penalty.” § 440.20(6), Fla....

...t “specifically claimed additional compensation in the nature of a penalty” on any and all temporary disability benefits that they had failed to pay in timely fashion. Ms. Foster did not, moreover, “conclude[ ] the prosecution of the claim,” § 440.20(6), Fla....

...Foster resumed prosecution of her temporary indemnity benefits claim (and prevailed) at the merits hearing before the successor judge of compensation claims. A clear purpose of an emergency conference is to isolate certain matters for expedited resolution because emergency circumstances require it. With this in mind, section 440.20(6) should be construed in pari materia with section 440.25(4)(h), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...1st DCA 1992), and City of Daytona Beach v. Amsel, 585 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA1991), we hold that Bar-ragan has retroactive application to July 1, 1973. The City of Miami also argues that the judge of compensation claims improperly awarded costs and penalties pursuant to section 440.20 because penalties and costs were not specifically included in the statement of the claim in the pretrial questionnaire....

...nnaire, these items were specifically requested in the claim for benefits and in the claimant’s memorandum of law which was submitted to the judge of compensation claims. See Sandestin Beach Resort v. Kever, 573 So.2d 98 (Fla. 1st DCA1991). 1 *954 Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1975), provides for imposition of a penalty when compensation is not timely paid....

...City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252, 253 (Fla.1989). No contention has been made that the City failed to pay the workers’ compensation benefits due pursuant to chapter 440.” Burnett, 596 So.2d at 478 n. 1. It does not appear that the amounts awarded were “compensation” as contemplated by section 440.20. Cf. Brantley v. ADH Building Contractors, Inc., 215 So.2d 297 at 299 (Fla.1968) (Reference to section 440.20(6) will reveal that the penalty is based on unpaid compensation....

...t sections of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Furnishing medical and hospitalization services is a benefit provided, but it is not compensation as contemplated by the Act.). We feel constrained, however, to affirm the award of penalties pursuant to section 440.20(5), Florida Statutes (1975), in view of the supreme court’s reliance in Barragan on the quoted portion of Jewel Tea Co....

...rkers’ compensation benefits, awarded pursuant to section 440.21 to offset illegal deductions from an employee’s pension fund, in accordance with Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla.1989), constitutes “compensation” for purposes of section 440.20, Florida Statutes? We also certify the same question certified in City of Miami v....

...van. He claimed that the constant turning of his head to survey the grounds caused injuries to his neck and left shoulder. The repetitive trauma claim was initially accepted by the E/C as compensable under the “pay and investigate” provision of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes....

claimant’s best interest, a prerequisite under Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1975), the statute applicable

...On June 28, 2002, claimant filed a petition seeking impairment benefits for her back injury. On July 23, 2002, the E/SA paid claimant for 15 weeks of impairment benefits for her back injury. On July 29, 2002, claimant filed a second petition seeking interest and penalties for the E/SA’s late payment of the benefits. Section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that, if the E/SA fail to make payment of impairment benefits within seven days after those benefits become due, the E/SA shall pay penalties unless such nonpayment results from conditions over which the E/SA had no control. Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that the E/SA shall also pay interest from the date the benefits were due until the date the benefits are paid....

...As such, it was incumbent on the JCC to award both penalties and interest. Id. Accordingly, we reverse and remand, with directions to the JCC to award claimant penalties and interest on the E/SA’s late payment of impairment benefits for claimant’s back injury pursuant to section 440.20(6) and section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...nder the circumstances. The deputy ordered the E/C to pay Robinson $111,-000 as a lump sum advance of PTD benefits, “said money to be utilized for those purposes set forth in the investment plan and testimony at this hearing.” The E/C argue: (1) Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutional as applied; (2) the lump sum award is not in the best interests of the claimant, materially prejudicial to the carrier, and unreasonable under the circumstances; and (3) the 1983 amendments to Section 440.20(12) and (13), Florida Statutes (1979), Chapter 83-305, Laws of Florida, operate retroactively. We affirm on authority of Cone Brothers Contracting v. Gordon, 453 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) 1 . In Gordon , the same arguments advanced in this case for the unconstitutionality of Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1975), and the retroactivity of the 1983 amendments were rejected....

PER CURIAM. The sole point on this appeal is whether or not by entering into a “wash out” set *52 tlement, pursuant to the provisions of § 440.20(10), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., a compensation carrier is prevented from instituting a suit against a third party tort feasor pursuant to the provisions of § 440.39(2) (4) (a), Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

...firmed. The City’s second point contends it was error to award penalties on the retroactively awarded setoff benefits. The judge in the present case awarded a 10% penalty on all benefits due from March 19, 1977 through February 10,1978 pursuant to section 440.20(5), Florida Statutes (1975). A 20% penalty on benefits due from February 11, 1978 through July 31, 1989, was awarded pursuant to section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1975). Section 440.20(6) provides: “If any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within 20 days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to 20 percent thereof.” The judge imposed the...

...Judge Henderson’s order was an approval of a lump sum payment of remedial treatment. The claimant testified that all the terms and conditions of this order had been met by the City. Furthermore, this was not an award of compensation as contemplated by section 440.20(6). See, e.g., Brantley v. ADH Building Contractors, Inc., 215 So.2d 297 (Fla.1968). The award of a 20% penalty under section 440.20(6) is reversed. We affirm the award of a 10% penalty. Section 440.20 provides, in part: (4) If the employer controverts the right to compensation he shall file with the division on or before the 21st day after he has knowledge of the alleged injury or death, a notice in accordance with a form prescribed...

...In the present case, the claim was filed on November 1, 1989; the City controverted the claim on November 17, 1989. The supreme court denied rehearing in Barra-gan on July 14, 1989. As recognized in City of Miami v. Bell, 606 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), the application of section 440.20(5), Florida Statutes (1975), to the facts of this case is a matter of great public importance and we so certify to the supreme court....

...No contention has been made that the City failed to pay the workers’ compensation benefits due pursuant to chapter 440.” Burnett, 596 So.2d at 478 n. 1. It does not appear that the amounts awarded were part of an “installment of compensation” as contemplated by section 440.20. Cf Brantley, 215 So.2d at 299 (Reference to section 440.20(6) will reveal that the penalty is based on unpaid compensation....

...t sections of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Furnishing medical and hospitalization services is a benefit provided, but it is not compensation as contemplated by the Act.). We feel constrained, however, to affirm the award of penalties pursuant to section 440.20(5), Florida Statutes (1975), in view of the supreme court’s reliance on the quoted portion of Jewel Tea Co....

...Claimant is entitled to workmen’s compensation in addition to any benefits under an insurance plan to which he contributed. Id. at 291 . Barragan, 545 So.2d at 254 . We remand to the judge of compensation claims for consideration of whether a penalty pursuant to section 440.20(5) should be imposed on benefits due from February 11, 1978 through July 31,1989....

...ion benefits, awarded pursuant to section 440.21 to offset illegal deductions from an employee’s pension fund, in accordance with Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla.1989), constitutes an “installment of compensation” for purposes of section 440.20, Florida Statutes? AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED....

...id not change after the 1969 and 1971 operations. In May 1971 appellant and Poole entered into a stipulation and joint petition for lump sum settlement for Poole’s workmen’s compensation claims against appellant for his back injuries pursuant to § 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, which provides in pertinent part as follows: Upon the application of any party in interest and after giving due consideration to the interests of all interested parties, if a judge of industrial claims finds that it i...

...In April 1978 appellant made a claim from which this appeal ensued for compensation for the muscular stiffness which resulted from the use of talwin. Appellant disputed the claims on the following grounds, among others: (1) the wash-out settlement entered pursuant to § 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1977), released appellant from responsibility for any further or future benefits of any nature under the provisions of the workmen’s compensation act; (2) Poole sustained no accidental injury arising out of and in t...

responds that in 1979, the Legislature amended section 440.20, substantially rewording it and adding additional

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. September 20, 2006. Gerald A. Rosenthal, West Palm Beach, and Bill McCabe of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, for Appellant. No appearance for appellees. PER CURIAM. This appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See § 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes (2005) (providing that an order entered by a JCC approving attorney's fees as set out in a settlement is not considered an award and is not subject to modification or review)....

commissioners. Cf. § 440.25(1) Fla.Stat. (1979); § 440.-20(10)(b), Fla.Stat. (1979). This differs — radically—from

...pulation in which the claimant receives a lump-sum payment of past or future benefits, or a combination of both, or a release of a lien against a third party, in exchange for releasing the carrier from liability for certain benefits as allowed under section 440.20(ll)(a)-(b), Florida Statutes....

...ocedure 1.351. RULE 4.065. MOTION PRACTICE (a) Substantive Motions. A motion relating to the adjudication of entitlement to benefits, including, but hot limited to, motions to vacate orders for lump-sum advances, motions for advances -under sections 440.20(12)(c)2 and 440.20(12)(d), Florida Statutes, appeals of administrative fines or penalties under section 440.106, Florida Statutes, motions for appointment of guardians, motions to appoint expert medical advisors under section 440.13, Florida Statutes, requests f...

...The time for serving a motion for rehearing has been shortened to 10 days to bring the workers’ compensation procedure more in line with the civil rules. The responsibility has been shifted to the judge of compensation claims as to the manner in which the motions are to be addressed. RULE 4.143. SETTLEMENT UNDER SECTION 440.20(11), FLORIDA STATUTES (a) Scope. This rule applies in any proceeding in which the parties undertake to compromise or release any class of benefits under section 440.20(11) (a) or (b), Florida Statutes....

...Joint petition and stipulation documents shall not purport to settle matters outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the judge of compensation claims and may include only accidents and injuries disclosed to the judge. (d) Required Documents. A joint petition seeking the approval of a lump-sum settlement under section 440.20(11) (a) or (b), Florida Statutes, shall be filed with the judge’s office with: (1) a stipulation using the standard forms published by the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims, or the equivalent, signed by the claimant, all at...

...davit of the claimant in which the claimant shall acknowledge the agreement and its material provisions under oath in writing or before the judge, unless all relevant information is incorporated in the verified stipulation; (3) for settlements under section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes only, a maximum medical improvement report, documentation of the permanent impairment rating, information concerning the need for future medical care, and other essential medical information; (4) any other evidence in the possession of the parties and their attorneys that is material to the consideration and disposition of the settlement; (5) a notice letter to the employer as required under section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes; (6) an attorney-fee data sheet; child support information; and (7)--an-attoEney^s-a£Bdawt seeMag approval of an attorney fee and specifying the^ statutory factors forming the-basis for a variance, if the requested fee exceeds the statutory — guidelines-under-sections 440.34(l)(a)-(l)(h), Florida Statutes; — and (87) the notice(s) of denial and the report to the deputy chief judge for settlements under section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes....

...usions of law to support the approval or disapproval of the proposed settlement? and may be in the form provided in these rules. Committee Notes 1996 Adoption. This rale replaces rule 4.131 because of the 1993 amendments to washout settlements under section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes....

...this rule. Separate agreements between the parties as to non-workers’ compensation matters should be summarized in the settlement agreement for informational purposes under subdivision (d)(4) of this rule. RULE 4.1435. RULE 4.142 SETTLEMENTS UNDER SECTION 440.20(ll)(c), (d) AND (e), FLORIDA STATUTES (a) Scope. This rule applies in any proceeding in which the claimant is represented by counsel and the claimant wishes to waive all rights to any and all benefits under this chapter by entering into a settlement agreement pursuant to section 440.20(ll)(c), (d) and (e), Florida Statutes, releasing the employer and the carrier from liability for workers’ compensation benefits in exchange for a lump sum payment to the claimant....

...approving the mediation agreement. (c) Enforcement of Agreement. In the event of any breach or failure to perform under a mediation agreement, enforcement shall proceed in accordance with section 440.24, Florida Statutes. (d) Agreement to Enter into Section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, Settlement. *812 Any mediation agreement compromising or releasing prospective benefits to the employee of any class of benefits pursuant to section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, shall not be approved or become binding until after the parties have first complied with rule 4.143 and the requirements of section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes....

...Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims Committee Notes 2000 Amendment. Brings the pretrial form into compliance with the relevant rules of procedure. FORM 4.911. ORDERS APPROVING SETTLEMENT OF PROSPECTIVE BENEFITS (a) Settlements Under Sections 440.20(ll)(a) and (ee), Florida Statutes. [For caption and style of pleadings, see Form 4.901.] *834 ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR ALL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS UNDER SECTION 440.20(ll)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES (49942001), FLORIDA STATUTES ' The parties jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation for settlement under section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes. Following review of the contents of the stipulation and supporting evidence, including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: 1. All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...¿udge of Compensation Claims *835 THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the above order was entered in the ©Office of the Judge of Compensation Claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mmail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on.(date). Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims (b) Settlements Under Section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes (49942001). [For caption and style of pleadings, see form 4.901.] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR PAYMENTS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION UNDER SECTION 440.20(ll)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (49942001) The parties jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation for settlement under section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes. On review of the contents of the stipulation and supporting evidence, including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: 1. All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...Judge of Compensation Claims THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the above order was entered in the ©Office of the Judge of Compensation Claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mmail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on.(date). Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims (c) Settlements Under Section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes (49942001), in which Right to Future Medical Benefits Is Left Open. [For caption and style of pleadings, see form 4.901.] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR PAYMENTS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION UNDER SECTION 440.20(ll)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (49942001) RIGHT TO FUTURE MEDICAL BENEFITS LEFT OPEN The parties jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation or settlement under section 440.20(1l)(b), Florida Statutes. On review of the contents of the stipulation and supporting evidence, including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: 1. All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...Judge of Compensation Claims THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the above order was entered in the ©Office of the Judge of Compensation Claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mmail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on.(date). Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims (d) Settlements Under Sections 440.20(ll)(b) and (ee), Florida Statutes (49942001), in which Right to Compensation Benefits Has Been Settled Previously. [For caption and style of pleadings, see form 4.901] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL BENEFITS PAYABLE UNDER SECTION 440.13, FLORIDA STATUTES, AS AUTHORIZED BY SECTIONS 440.20(ll)(b) and (ee), FLORIDA STATUTES (49942001) The parties jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation for settlement under sections 440.20(1l)(b) and (ee), Florida Statutes (49942001), which permit settlement of all claims not previously settled regardless of the date of accident....

...mpensation Law. On review of the contents of the stipulation and supporting evidence, including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: *838 1. All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...mailed or hand delivered to the above-named parties and counsel of record on . (date) . Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims FORM 4.917. MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY’S FEE AND ALLOCATION OF CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGE FOR SETTLEMENTS UNDER SECTION 440.20(ll)(c), (d), and (e), FLORIDA STATUTES [For caption and style of pleadings see form 4.901] *853 MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY’S FEE AND ALLOCATION OF CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGE FOR SETTLEMENTS UNDER SECTION 440.20(ll)(c)-(e), FLORIDA STATUTES 1....

...ORDER FOR ATTORNEY’S FEE STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICE OF THE JUDGES OF COMPENSATION CLAIMS DISTRICT.(district number). CLAIMANT/PETITIONER: ATTORNEY FOR CLAIMANT/PETITIONER: EMPLOYER: ATTORNEY FOR EMPLOYER/CARRIER: CARRIER/SA: CLAIM NO: DATE OF ACCIDENT: *854 ORDER UNDER SECTION 440.20(ll)(c)-(e), FLORIDA STATUTES Pursuant to section 440.20(ll)(c)-(e), Florida Statutes, the parties have entered into a settlement agreement....

...No error in calculation is alleged. The employer and carrier contend there is no competent substantial evidence that *923 this lump sum payment is in claimants best interests and we agree. The general policy with regard to lump sum payment is stated in Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1981): It is the stated policy for the administration of the workers’ compensation system that it is in the best interests of the injured worker that he receive disability or wage-loss payments on a periodic basis....

...Third, we reverse the denial of penalties on the late payment of temporary partial disability benefits for the period from November 5, 2005, through June 13, 2006, because an award of penalties on late payment of indemnity benefits is not discretionary, but mandatory. See § 440.20(6)(a), Fla....

...1st DCA 1998), we held that the offset should not be recalculated each year to include the yearly increases in permanent total disability supplemental benefits. As we did in Acker , we certify the following question: WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(l)(e)(l), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL...

...al forum. We find no basis, therefore, for North River’s contention that the term “reimbursement” limits recovery to out-of-pocket payments actually made by the carrier. Similarly, we reject North River’s argument that the later enactment of section 440.20(9), providing for prejudgment interest only on unpaid installments of compensation due to injured claimants, but making no reference to interest on carriers’ reimbursement claims, somehow manifests a legislative intent to preclude prejudgment interest on such reimbursement claims....

was generated by the agent’s violation of section 440.-20(2), Florida Statutes. Appellee cites neither

...208 , 34 So.2d 306, 308 , the court was not concerned with the definition of “compensation” alone but of “ ‘total compensation payable under this chapter.’ ” We held that “ ‘total compensation payable under this chapter’ ” was limited to $5,000 under the provisions of 440.20(13) F.S.1941, F.S.A. (now repealed). Two factors appear to have led the court to this conclusion: first, the additional amount payable under. 440.54 was a penalty and must be strictly construed; second, the fact that 440.54 and 440.20(13) were not enacted at the same time and the legislature employed the language “ ‘shall in no event’ ” the compensation exceed $5,-000. The pertinent part of the opinion was: “In our view, Section 440.20, above quoted, was a clear limitation of $5,000 on the amount of compensation or benefits that may be allowed in any case, to which may be added the cost of medical treatment and funeral ex *895 penses. Sections 440.54 and 440.20 were not enacted at the same time but were parts of the same statute and when the legislature employed the language, ‘shall in no event’ the compensation exceed $5,000 the Industrial Commission was powerless to award more.” (Emphasis supplied.) It may thus be deduced that “total compensation payable under this chapter” (as used in 440.20(13)) was composed of: “pure” compensation and the penalty “benefits” under 440.54....

...after injury looking backward to the earnings prior to disability. In Lockett v. Smith, Fla., 1954, 72 So.2d 817 , the court was concerned with the problem of whether the claimant was entitled to an attorney’s fee on the award of 20% payable under 440.20(6) (where carrier is delinquent in payment of the award)....

...A study of 440.34(1) indicates that the term “compensation” is used in conjunction with the word “claim”, although the court emphasized other provisions of the statute in the opinion. In fine, the court held “compensation” included compensation as well as the 20% payable under 440.20(6)....

...aimant’s situation could proceed. For example, the employee could designate the self-help doctor as his or her IME, thereby making the doctor’s opinion admissible under section 440.13(5)(e), or the employee could petition for an advance under section 440.20(12) to pay for another doctor who could be designated as an IME that could be used establish the compensability prerequisite for the admission of the self-help doctor’s opinions. Conclusion...

...Ring, LLC, Pompano Beach, for Appellee. PER CURIAM.  In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in denying her request for a $2,000 advance. We agree that the JCC erred in denying the advance. Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (2011), permits advances of up to $2,000 on the following proof: (c) In the event the claimant has not returned to the same or equivalent employment with no substantial reduction in wages or...

...ng her finances is unrelated to her injury is seemingly based on his categorization of some of Claimant’s monthly bills as “luxury expenses.” But whether an item is classified as a “luxury” is not a proper factor for consideration under section 440.20(12)(c)2. These small advances are merely a stopgap to help a claimant avoid defaulting with creditors while awaiting the potential distribution of workers’ compensation benefits, when the reduction in income is caused by the injury. A claimant is not required to live a pauper’s life to be eligible for an advance of up to $2,000 under section 440.20(12)(c)2. Advances in excess of $2,000 are permitted under subsections 440.20(12)(c)3. and (12)(d), and those subsections mandate that a JCC inquire into the reasonableness of those larger advances....

...laimant is lighter precisely because the financial burden on the employer or carrier is lighter. 3  As we made clear in Lopez v. Allied Aerofoam, 48 So. 3d 888, 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), “[s]ection 440.20(12)(c)2....

Construction Co., 387 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1980); § 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1980). However, by failing

...tion of the statute, the evidence is uncon-troverted that these payments were made mistakenly. Cf. Cole v. Fairfield Cmtys., 908 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (finding that employer/carrier did not waive its right to deny compensability pursuant to section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, even though employer/carrier mistakenly tendered a payment to the medical provider)....

...The Special Disability Trust Fund appeals a workers’ compensation order by which a lump sum advance payment of compensation benefits was approved. We find that such approval was not in accordance with the applicable standards for lump sum payments, and we therefore reverse the order appealed. Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes, expresses “the stated policy ... that it is in the best interests of the injured worker that he receive disability or wage-loss payments periodically.” Lump sum payments are nevertheless permitted in appropriate circumstances, but section 440.20(13)(d), Florida Statutes, requires a determination that a lump sum payment be in the claimant’s “best interests.” In the present case this determination was made upon a finding that the lump sum advance would counteract the effec...

...The supreme court later explained that: [0]ur decision in Grice was directed only to whether additional collateral benefits should be included in computing the AWW 100% cap for total benefits. We have acknowledged that the 100% AWW cap that we discussed in Grice did not come from a strictly literal reading of section 440.20(15), but rather from a “judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute.” Lombardi, 770 So.2d at 1204 (quoting Dixon v....

...The order required, however, that the award be disposed of as provided by the financial plan presented at the hearing, which plan assumed the continuation of the state supplemental benefit. The D/C rejected Dr. Alfonso’s testimony as to a reduced life span because he was not an actuarial expert. Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.) provides that the D/C may award lump-sum PTD benefits if it is in the best interest of the person receiving compensation....

...tify that he is ‘able’ to work and is ‘available’ for work. It is patent then that claimant’s own testimony and actions are contradictory. For proper disposition of the instant cause, we are of the opinion that under authority contained in Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes [F.S....

...Gilbert, 630 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We quash Gilbert and remand for proceedings consistent with our decision in City of Miami v. Bell, 634 So.2d 163 (Fla.1994). As noted in Bell , the penalty provisions of section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1989), apply only to offsets taken by the city after July 14, 1989....

...condition based upon its payment of bills from one other hospital visit related to that condition; however, the motion did not argue – as does the initial brief – that the E/C is estopped from denying compensability based upon the “120-day rule” in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes. 2 

...Wine & Spirits, 890 So.2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Although the briefs conflate the issues of whether the JCC erred in denying claims for penalties and interest, a clear analysis requires that the two issues be discussed separately. Penalties Section 440.20(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), provides in pertinent part: If any installment of compensation for death or dependency benefits, or compensation for disability benefits payable without an award is not paid within 7 days after it become...

...ll be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, such installment of compensation. This penalty shall not apply for late payments resulting from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control. In addressing when benefits become due, section 440.20(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: The carrier must pay the first installment of compensation for total disability or death benefits or deny compensability no later than the 14th calendar day after the employer receives notifica...

...chose to pay PTD and PTD supplemental benefits retroactive to a date it voluntarily selected, the time when those benefits became due did not begin to run from that date because Claimant never proved he was entitled to PTD benefits. Construction of section 440.20(6)(a) in a manner that requires a claimant to prove entitlement to PTD benefits in order to prove penalty entitlement whenever an employer or carrier voluntarily accepts a claimant as permanently and totally disabled retroactive to an earlier date is inconsistent with legislative intent that the workers' compensation system be self-executing. See § 440.015, Fla. Stat. (2007). It is also unnecessary because the Legislature has provided in section 440.20(6)(a) that a penalty shall not apply for late payments resulting from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control. PTD benefits voluntarily paid retroactively by an employer or carrier without an award become due, for purposes of section 440.20(6)(a), in bi-weekly installments pursuant to section 440.20(2)(a), commencing 14 days from the date designated by the employer or carrier as the retroactive start date for those benefits. If a payment is more than seven days late under this construction of section 440.20(6)(a), penalties are due unless the employer or carrier proves late payment resulted from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control....

...ly 23, 2009. We therefore reverse the denial of penalties and remand with instructions that the JCC enter an order awarding penalties on benefits paid more than seven days late for periods of PTD between May 13, 2009, and July 23, 2009. [*] Interest Section 440.20(8)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: In addition to any other penalties provided by this chapter for late payment, if any installment of compensation is not paid when it becomes due, the employer, carrier, or servicing agent shall...

...or under the terms of an order. The interest payment shall be the greater of the amount of interest due or $5. Because statutory subsections should be construed in pari materia in determining when compensation becomes due, we apply to interest under section 440.20(8)(a) the same analysis we apply to penalties under section 440.20(6)(a)....

...1st DCA 1992); City of Miami v. Burnett, 596 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA1992); City of Daytona Beach v. Amsel, 585 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We see no reason to depart from those holdings. The City also argues that it was error to award a ten percent penalty under section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1985) on the retroactively awarded setoff benefits....

...1st DCA 1992); City of Miami v. Burnett, 596 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA1992); City of Daytona Beach v. Amsel, 585 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA1991). We see no reason to depart from those holdings. The City also argues that it was error to award a ten percent penalty under section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1985) on the retroactively awarded setoff benefits....

...of benefits that was paid at an incorrect rate, as provided in Section 440.-20(7) and (9), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986). In her amended order filed January 11, 1990, the judge of compensation claims adopted the employer/carrier’s interpretation of section 440.20(7) and (9), to the effect that subsections (7) and (9) were not intended for application on a per pay-period basis for adjustments in the average weekly wage. The judge also added that the statute is specific in its application to benefits “not paid,” and does not apply to benefits paid incorrectly. Accordingly, the claim for additional penalties and interest was denied. Section 440.20(7) provides in pertinent part that, [i]f any installment of compensation ......

...there shall be added to such unpaid installment a punitive penalty of an amount equal to the greater of 10 percent of the unpaid installment or $5, which shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, such installment of compensation_ (emphasis added). Similarly, section 440.20(9) provides that, [1]n addition to any other penalties provided by this chapter for late payment, if any installment of compensation is not paid when it becomes due, the employer, carrier, or servicing agent shall pay interest thereon...

...Analysis The JCC is correct that “[t]here must first be a compensable accident and injury before an employee is entitled to any benefit allowed in Chapter 440” – with one single exception: an advance payment under section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes....

...BENTON, J., concurring in the judgment. “When an E/C becomes aware that a claimant has medical needs [of which a compensable injury is the purported major contributing cause], it should either pay for them, pay and investigate under section 440.20(4), or deny compensability.” Bynum Transp., Inc....

...440.192(8), the carrier shall provide written notice to the employee that it has elected to pay the claim pending further investigation, and that it will advise the employee of claim acceptance or denial within 120 days. § 440.20(4), Fla....

...In order to invoke the benefits of the pay and investigate rule, an employer or its carrier must give notice it is relying on the pay and investigate provision at or before “commencement of payment.” Id. “A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4) is deemed to have accepted the employee’s injuries as compensable ....

...Therefore, we find it necessary to remand on this issue for the deputy to decide whether, and to what extent, claimant has a psychiatric disability. The deputy also erred in failing to award penalties due to the carrier’s belated payment of certain compensation benefits, for Section 440.20(5), Florida Statutes (1977) provides: *1126 If any installment of compensation payable without an award is not paid within 14 days after it become due, ....

...Two issues are presented in this workers’ compensation appeal. First, whether the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in rejecting the opinion of the expert medical advisor, Dr. Sharfman. Second, whether the JCC erred in preventing the Claimant from asserting that section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2003) (commonly called the “120-day rule”), precluded the Employer from denying his entitlement to ongoing benefits....

...done so more than thirty days prior to the final hearing. Claimant filed his supplement more than thirty days before the hearing. Accordingly, the JCC erred in precluding Claimant’s amendment of the pretrial stipulation to include consideration of the waiver argument under section 440.20(4). On remand, the JCC should make findings as to whether the Employer failed to deny the claim within 120 days of learning that the MCC of Claimant’s condition may not be the workplace accident, as well as whether any of the E...

benefits, claimant filed a mo*610tion pursuant to section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (1997), seeking a $2

...and thus he was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. 2 In support of this claim, the appellees filed a “Notice of Denial” with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Workers’ Compensation, pursuant to section 440.20(6), a copy of which was attached to the complaint. After the termination of workers’ compensation benefits, however, the appellees and Kitschke entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to section 440.20(12)(b), which was later approved by a judge of compensa *1085 tion claims....

...not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The worker appealed this determination but later dismissed the appeal after entering into a workers’ compensation lump sum settlement agreement with the subcontractor and the carrier in accord with section 440.20(12)(b)....

...1st DCA 1992); City of Miami v. Burnett, 596 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA1992); City of Daytona Beach v. Amsel, 585 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We see no reason to depart from those holdings. *1110 The City also argues that it was error to award a ten percent penalty under section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1985) on the retroactively awarded setoff benefits....

...(2) [No Change] - 13 -  (3) Payment of Benefits After Appeal. If benefits are ordered paid by the court on completion of the appeal, they shallmust be paid, together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, within 30 days after the court’s mandate. If the order of the court is appealed to the supreme court, benefits determined due by the court may be stayed in accordance with rule 9.310....

...ation claims, not the mov-ant, has the responsibility to direct the disposition of a motion for rehearing within thirty days after the order is mailed to the parties. We also adopt the Committee’s proposed amendment to rule 4.143, Settlement Under Section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes....

..., procedural motions may also be heard at the time of the pretrial hearing. (kl) Pretrial of Penalty Hearings. • (1) When an employer or carrier has protested an assessment by the division of penalties, fines, or interest under sections 440.185 or 440.20, Florida Statutes, the judge shall cancel and waive attendance at a pretrial hearing regarding a hearing on such penalties, fines, or interest if a written pretrial stipulation is filed with the judge before the date of any scheduled pretrial hearing....

...final hearing. RULE 4.065. MOTION PRACTICE (a) Substantive Motions. A motion relating to the adjudication of entitlement to benefits, including, but not limited to, motions to vacate orders for lump-sum advances, motions for advances under sections 440.20(12)(c)2 and 440.20(12)(d), Florida Statutes, appeals of administrative fines or penalties under section 440.106, Florida Statutes, motions for appointment of guardians, motions to appoint expert medical advisors under section 440.13, Florida Statutes, requests f...

...il rules. The responsibility has been shifted to the judge of compensation claims as to the manner in which the motions are to be addressed. RULE 4.142. AGREEMENTS OR STIPULATIONS (a) Scope. Agreements or stipulations not involving settlements under section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, shall comply with this rule....

...The third alternative involves cases in which an agreement has been reached during an EAO conference held under section 440.191(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and the agreement has been submitted to a judge. The agreement or stipulation is binding when it is approved in writing by a .judge. RULE 4.143. SETTLEMENT UNDER SECTION 440.20(11), FLORIDA STATUTES (a)Scope. This rule applies in any proceeding in which the parties undertake to compromise or release any class of benefits pursuant-founder section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes....

...Joint petition and stipulation documents shall not purport to settle matters outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the judge of compensation claims and may include only accidents and injuries disclosed to the judge. (d) Required Documents. A joint petition seeking the approval of a lump-sum settlement under section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, shall be filed with the judge’s office along-with; (1)a stipulation using the standard forms published by the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims, or the equivalent, signed by the claimant, all attorney...

...and other essential medical information; (4) any other evidence in the possession of the parties and their attorneys that is material to the consideration and disposition of the settlement; *879 (5) a notice letter to the employer as required under section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes; (6) an attorney-fee data sheet; (7) an attorney’s affidavit seeking approval of an attorney fee and specifying the statutory factors forming the basis for a variance, if the requested fee exceeds the statutory guidelines under sections 440.34(l)(a)-(l)(h), Florida Statutes; and (8) the notice(s) of denial and the report to the chief judge for settlements under section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes....

...usions of law to support the approval or disapproval of the proposed settlement, and may be in the form provided in these rules. Committee Notes 1996 Adoption. This rule replaces rule 4.131 because of the 1993 amendments to washout settlements under section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes....

...ving the mediation agreement. (c) Enforcement of Agreement. In the event of any breach or failure to perform under a mediation agreement, enforcement shall proceed in accordance with section 440.24, Florida Statutes. *882 (d) Agreement to Enter into Section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, Settlement. Any mediation agreement compromising or releasing prospective benefits to the employee of any class of benefits pursuant to section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, shall not be approved or become binding until after the parties have first complied with rule 4.143 and the requirements of section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes....

...Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims Committee Notes 2000 Amendment. Brings the pretrial form into compliance with the relevant rules of procedure. FORM 4.911. ORDERS APPROVING SETTLEMENT OF PROSPECTIVE BENEFITS (a) Settlements Pursuant — toUnder Sections 440.20(ll)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes. [For caption and style of pleadings, see Form 4.901.] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR ALL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS PURSUANT TOUNDER SECTION 440.20(ll)(a) (1994), FLORIDA STATUTES *913 The parties jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation for settlement under section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes. Following review of the contents of the stipulation and supporting evidence, including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: 1. All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...ntered in the office of the Judge of Compensation Claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on ., 19=7.(date). Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims (b) Settlements Pursuant — teUnder Section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes (1994). *914 [For caption and style of pleadings, see forra 4.901.] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR PAYMENTS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PURSUANT — T-OUNDER SECTION 440.20(ll)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1994) The parties jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation for settlement under section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes....

...On review of the contents of the stipulation and supporting evidence submitted- in support — thereof, including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: 1. All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...red in the office of the Judge of Compensation Claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on ..._, 19=r.(date). Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims (c) Settlements Pursuant — toUnder Section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes (1994), in which Right to Future Medical Benefits Is Left Open. *915 [For caption and style of pleadings, see form 4.901.] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR PAYMENTS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION gURg-UA-NT- TOUNDER SECTION 440.20(11)09, FLORIDA STATUTES (1994) RIGHT TO FUTURE MEDICAL BENEFITS LEFT OPEN The parties jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation or settlement under section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes....

...On review of the contents of the stipulation and supporting evidence submitted in support thereof, including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: 1. All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...in the office of the Judge of Compensation Claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mail on.each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on , 19..(date). Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims (d) Settlements Pursuant — teUnder Sections 440.20(ll)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1994), in which Right to Compensation Benefits Has Been Settled Previously. ' [For caption and style of pleadings, see form 4.901] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL BENEFITS PAYABLE UNDER SECTION 440.13, FLORIDA STATUTES, AS AUTHORIZED BY SECTIONS 440.20(ll)(b) and (c), FLORIDA STATUTES (1994) The parties jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation for settlement under sections 440.20(ll)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1994), which permit settlement of all claims not previously settled regardless of the date of accident....

...On review of the contents of the stipulation and supporting evidence submitted in support-there-o-f, including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: 1. All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...death of her husband, a truck driver and delivery man employed by Wer-ner Enterprises, Inc., appellee. Because *682 the employer began paying death benefits and did not deny compensability within 120 days of the initial provision of benefits, under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2002), the employer has waived the right to deny compensability....

...The employer ceased benefits based upon a medical doctor’s report which found that Sol-saa’s heart attack was not caused by his employment. The employee’s widow, Cherie Solsaa, petitioned for resumption of death benefits arguing that the employer was estopped to deny such benefits pursuant to section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...The claim proceeded to a hearing before the JCC who denied the petition. The JCC found that the death benefits paid by the employer were paid under Nebraska law, not Florida law. As a result, the JCC concluded that the “pay and investigate” provisions of section 440.20(4) had not been invoked and that the employer was therefore not estopped from denying compensability. Section 440.20(4), provides: If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits or compensation, it may initiate payment without prejudice and without admitting liability....

...of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period. The statute is clear and unambiguous. The purpose of the 120-day limit is to ensure that an employer/carrier complies with the mandate of section 440.20(4) to “immediately and in good faith commence investigation of the employee’s entitlement to benefits.” Bussey v....

...er/carrier’s position on the claim’s compensability. Id. Here, the employer mistakenly believed Nebraska law applied and began paying benefits and investigating pursuant to that state’s workers’ compensation statute. The employer argues that section 440.20(4) does not apply since the benefits were not paid under Florida law....

...�� Compensation Act). The employer’s erroneous assumption or conclusion as to the applicable law does not create either a factual issue concerning the applicable law or a defense or exception to the 120-day “pay and investigate” requirement in section 440.20(4)....

...Wal-Mart, 867 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). In both Cole and Bussey , the JCC determined, and competent substantial evidence showed, that the employer in each case was not uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits, never invoked the pay-and-investigate provisions of section 440.20(4), and intended to deny com-pensability....

...1 In both cases, we concluded that, because the employer did not invoke the pay-and-investigate procedure and never intended to take any action other than deny compensability, the failure to respond to the petition operated as a denial and the 120-day provisions of section 440.20(4) did not apply....

...d did not provide a notice of the denial to claimant. Believing that Nebraska law applied, the employer here paid the claimant benefits while it investigated the claim, but failed to admit or deny compensability within the 120-day period provided by section 440.20(4)....

...happened. Employer/carrier provided no benefits to Friedman and failed to file a notice to controvert until April 22, 1981, followed then by Friedman submitting his claim on June 1, 1981. The deputy imposed penalties on employer/carrier pursuant to section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes, for the temporary total disability, permanent total disability, and medical benefits awarded....

...temporary total disability benefits. In point III, employer/carrier challenge the imposition of all of the penalties, arguing that no penalties may be assessed as to benefits accruing subsequent to their filing of the notice to controvert. However, section 440.20(6) requires that a notice to controvert be filed “on or before the twenty-first day” 'after the employer/carrier has knowledge of the alleged injury or, if the employer or carrier initially accepts the claim but subsequently controverts it, the notice of controversion must be filed within ten days after the date of initial cessation of benefits. Section 440.20(7) provides for the assessment of penalties on benefits awarded “unless notice is filed under subsection (6) .... ” Employer/carrier cannot rely upon that statutory exemption from penalties in this case since their notice to controvert was not filed timely under section 440.20(6)....

...ability benefit negotiations and ultimately reached a compromise settlement. On November 19, 1970, the Judge of Industrial Claims entered an order approving a joint petition from the petitioner and the employee’s widow, filed pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 440.20(10) F.S.A., for a full, lump sum settlement of $7,723.61....

...d the settlement. Our careful review of the record convinces us that neither of those findings is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse, and remand with directions that the order approving the settlement be set aside. § 440.20(12)(d) Fla....

the deputy awarded a lump sum advance under Section 440.-20(13)(d), Florida Statutes (1987) or rehabilitation

...Toscano, 40 So. 3d 795, 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). The date of MMI is defined as “the date after which further recovery from, or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be anticipated, based on reasonable medical probability.” § 440.20(10), Fla....

...e injured person has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of his claim." Our decisions hold that an employer or carrier's failure to pay the requested benefits, file a notice of denial, or invoke the "pay and investigate" provisions of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1995), results in the E/C being responsible for Claimant's attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(b)....

portion of the order awarding *602penalties. See § 440.20(8), Fla.Stat. (1991). The order is affirmed in

...ainly apparent. RULE 4,161. EFFECT OF APPEAL ON BENEFITS AWARDED (a) Benefits Unaffected By Appeal. Benefits ordered paid and not certified by appellant (or cross-appellant) to be affected by appeal under Rule 4.160(a) of these rules are governed by Section 440.20 Florida Statutes....

...*903 (b) Benefits Affected By Appeal. Benefits ordered paid which are certified under Rule 4.160(a) of these rules by appellant (or cross-appellant) as being affected by the appeal may be withheld pending outcome of the appeal under the authority of Section 440.20 Florida Statutes unless the appellant’s (or cross-appellant’s) challenge to the award of any such benefits so certified is deemed abandoned as provided by subsection (c) of this rule....

...its no longer affected by the appeal are payable and due within thirty (30) days of service of the initial brief deemed to have abandoned the challenge to benefits previously certified as affected by appeal, together with interest, as provided under Section 440.20, Florida Statutes, from the date of entry of the Deputy’s order making the award....

...d, pursuant to review sought with the Florida Supreme Court, in which case benefits become due, if such review is unsuccessful, within thirty (30) days of the Supreme Court’s final disposition of the cause, together with interest as provided under Section 440.20 Florida Statutes, from the date of entry of the Deputy’s order making the award....

knowledge, a “washout petition” under F.S. Section 440.20(10), F. S.A. The JIC approved the petition

Judge of Industrial Claims entered pursuant to F.S. 440.20(10). The employee, Jack Hotten, was injured on

shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before

release was controlled by the provisions of section 440.20(ll)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), relating to

PER CURIAM. Ocala Geriatric Center and Preferred Works, the employer and carrier, respectively (collectively the E/C), appeal a final workers’ compensation order directing them to pay the 20 percent penalty required by section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), for not timely paying a compensation award....

...Miller-Neal, 674 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). In that case, the JCC approved a washout settlement agreement and the order was mailed to the parties on February 18, 1994. When the E/C did not pay the settlement within seven days, as required under section 440.20(7), claimant sought the 20 percent penalty....

...We find that Miller-Neal is distinguishable from the case at bar, because the parties’ agreement in that ease provided that the 20 percent penalty would be assessed against payment not made within seven days “after it becomes due.” Hence, Miller-Neal answered the question of when such orders become due under section 440.20(7)....

...Claimant filed a claim for bad faith at the initial hearing; however, the deputy did not address her claim as required by Section 440.-20(7), Florida Statutes (1984). Claimant contends she is entitled to interest and penalties pursuant to Sections 440.20(7) and 440.20(9)....

...Lord Colony Enterprises, 400 So.2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Although the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA) is ex *1018 empt from payment of prejudgment interest and penalties, the employer may not use the carrier’s exemption as a shield to avoid its own liability. Section 440.20(7) allows penalties to be brought against the employer or carrier depending on fault....

...Any interest which FIGA, as the successor of a workers’ compensation carrier at risk which has gone into liquidation, is not required to pay must be born by the employer. Carballo v. Warren Manufacturing Company, 407 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In Section 440.20(9), Florida Statutes, likewise, the statute provides that “if any installment for compensation is not paid when it becomes due, the employer, carrier, or servicing agent shall pay interest.” In the present case, the employer unsucc...

...Petersburg; and Michele Guindon of Boydstun, Dabroski, Lyle & Wood, L.L.C., St. Petersburg, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Silvia Valerio, appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC), which denied her motion to vacate. Pursuant to section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), this court does not have jurisdiction to review this order, and we dismiss the appeal....

...*1228 Valerio, while represented by counsel, entered into a settlement agreement with her employer, Appellee, Lee Memorial Health Systems, in order to settle a workers' compensation claim. On February 5, 2001, the JCC entered an order approving the attorney's fees portion of the agreement, as required by section 440.20(11)(c)....

...approving the award of attorney's fees. The JCC entered an amended order on April 18, 2002, in which he found he did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Valerio's motion. Valerio filed a notice of appeal from the April 18, 2002, order. Section 440.20(11)(c) provides in pertinent part: [W]hen a claimant is represented by counsel, the claimant may waive all rights to any and all benefits under this chapter by entering into a settlement agreement releasing the employer and the carrier...

...attorney by the claimant.... Any order entered by a judge of compensation claims approving the attorney's fees as set out in the settlement under this subsection is not considered to be an award and is not subject to modification or review. Because section 440.20(11)(c) clearly states that orders approving attorney's fees under that subsection are not reviewable orders, we are without jurisdiction to allow a party to subvert the intent of the Legislature by having an order reviewed indirectly which may not be reviewed directly. Accordingly, Valerio's appeal is dismissed. ALLEN and DAVIS, JJ., CONCUR; BENTON, J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION. BENTON, J., dissenting. Section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes (2002), does not, in my view, divest the court of jurisdiction to review the order the judge of compensation claims entered on appellant's motion to vacate order approving attorney's fees and child support allocation. Accordingly, I would reach the merits and, because the judge of compensation claims found (at least implicitly) that the claimant was represented by counsel when her case was settled, affirm. See § 440.20(11)(c), Fla....

...determine the question of its own jurisdiction"). Among the grounds asserted for the motion was that the claimant was not represented at the time the release was executed. A pro se claimant is statutorily prohibited from settling his/her case under Section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes. Being unrepresented at the time, the case could only be settled under Section 440.20(11)(a) or (b).......

...e settlement precluded an award of benefits. "When a claimant is not represented *1229 by counsel, .... [i]f the settlement proposal together with supporting evidence is not approved by the judge of compensation claims, it shall be considered void." § 440.20(11)(a), Fla....

...o review orders entered post-settlement. See generally Frix v. All State Ins., 854 So.2d 258, 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ("dispel[ling] any doubt pertaining to a JCC's authority or jurisdiction to impose sanctions for late payment of settlements under" section 440.20(11)(c)); Levine, Busch, Schnepper & Stein, P.A....

...Competent substantial evidence supports com-pensability, and we affirm the JCC’s finding without further elaboration. However, the award of penalties must be reversed and remanded for further consideration in light of the following. Penalties should not be imposed where the e/c timely file a notice to controvert. § 440.20(6) and (7), Fla.Stat....

...tes (1991), the judge considered and relied on the attorney’s subsequent time and services which ultimately led to a lump sum settlement of any and all potential claims. Because the claimant did not establish any other basis for such an award, and section 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), indicates that the claimant shall be responsible for the payment of his own attorney’s fees in connection with the settlement, we reverse the appealed order and remand for reconsideration as to the amount of the fee award....

...lity benefits. In denying this claim the judge ruled that the employer took a proper offset in accordance with Escambia County Sheriff's Department v. Grice, 692 So.2d 896 (Fla.1997). However, while the Grice offset pertains in this case pursuant to § 440.20(15), Fla....

during Willingham’s disability) as required by § 440.20(13). Reversed and remanded for reconsideration

...en if other benefits are reversed and remanded, payment of the affirmed benefits becomes due upon finality of this Court’s order. If those benefits are not paid within 20 days after they become due, the claimant shall be entitled to a 20% penalty. Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes....

that Chapter 26877, Acts of 1951, repealed Section 440.20(13) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. This

...1 The E/C takes the position that it was permitted to deny compensability in its entirety at this point – even after having authorized treatment – because it did so “within 120 days after the initial provision of benefits or payment of compensation,” as permitted under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2013), conventionally known as the “120-day rule.” That rule “allows the carrier to postpone the decision to deny any obligation to pay benefits for up to 120 days while it conducts an investigation, prov...

...4  The JCC is correct that “[t]here must first be a compensable accident and injury before an employee is entitled to any benefit allowed in Chapter 440” – with one single exception: an advance payment under section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes....

...s. 440.192(8), the carrier shall provide written notice to the employee that it has elected to pay the claim pending further investigation, and that it will advise the employee of claim acceptance or denial within 120 days. § 440.20(4), Fla....

...Yet an 7 employer/carrier nonetheless must “elect” to rely on the rule, as both the rule itself and case law indicate. See id.; see also § 440.192(8), Fla. Stat. (2013) (“A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4) is deemed to have accepted the employee’s injuries as compensable . . . .” (emphasis added)); Bynum Transp. v. Snyder, 765 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“When an E/C becomes aware that a claimant had medical needs, it should either pay for them, pay and investigate under section 440.20(4), or deny compensability.”)....

PER CURIAM. The Judge of Compensation Claims applied the 120-day pay and investigate provision of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, to the claimant’s entitlement to further benefits under section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes. This was error. See Checkers Rest v. Wiethoff, 925 So.2d 348, 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[S]ection 440.20(4) does not preclude the E/C from challenging the claimant’s entitlement to benefits, by contending that the injuries resulting from the industrial accident were not the MCC of the claimant’s need for further treatment or surgery....

of years since the date of the injury. Under section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes, a deputy commissioner

...temporary total disability (TTD) and inpatient psychiatric care. We affirm the award of psychiatric care because the JCC did not err when he ruled that the E/C waived its right to challenge compensability of Claimant’s post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2010), based on its failure to show material facts that could not have been discovered through a reasonable investigation within the applicable 120-day time period....

PER CURIAM. The employer/carrier’s controvert of the claim for the February 1987 wage loss benefits was outside the 21-day limit set by Section 440.20(6)....

...or lump-sum payment of all benefits. Upon first impression this appeal appears to ask this court to review factual determinations made by the deputy commissioner and the application of those facts to the criteria for lump-sum settlement set forth in section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...ce of hen on May 9, 2001. On October 23,1995, Mr. Levine and the firm ceased to represent Mr. Guzman, and the first of a series of successor counsel became attorney of record. On August 25, 2000, a “washout” settlement was negotiated pursuant to section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes (2000), subject to “resolution of the hen of the firm of Levine, Busch, Schnepper & Stein, P.A.” When Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers) declined, on behalf of Pool Piling Enterprises, the claimant’...

of prejudgment interest and penalties under section 440.-20(8), (9), Florida Statutes (1985) is, as against

ON REMAND ZEHMER, Chief Judge. Our original decision in this case, City of Miami v. Bell, 606 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), was reviewed by the supreme court on a certified question concerning the application of the penalty provisions in subsection 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...In answering the certified question, the supreme court determined that its decision in Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla.1989), should not be given retroactive effect prior to the date of that decision, July 14, 1989. 1 The supreme court also held that penalties due under section 440.20 would be applicable to any offsets taken after that date but not applicable to offsets taken before that date....

...ember 16, 1992, and reported at 606 So.2d 1183 , is quashed to the extent that it is inconsistent with the supreme court’s disapproval of the retroactive application of Barragan before July 14, 1989, and disapproval of the award of penalties under section 440.20 prior to that date; that court’s opinion on these issues is adopted as the opinion of this court....

...A judge of compensation claims awarded workers' compensation benefits based on the so-called "120-day rule," which generally precludes carriers from denying compensability if they begin paying benefits and do not challenge compensability within 120 days. See § 440.20(4), Fla....

...A judge of compensation claims awarded workers’ compensation benefits based on the so-called “120-day rule,” which generally precludes carriers from denying compensability if they begin paying benefits and do not challenge compensability within 120 days. See § 440.20(4), Fla....

...pulation in which the claimant receives a lump-sum payment of past or future benefits, or a combination of both, or a release of a lien against a third party, in exchange for releasing the carrier from liability for certain benefits as allowed under section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes....

...aring, procedural motions may also be heard at the time of the pretrial hearing. (k) Pretrial of Penalty Hearings. (l) When an employer or carrier has protested an assessment by the division of penalties, fines, or interest under sections 440.185 or 440.20, Florida Statutes, the judge shall cancel and waive attendance at a pretrial hearing regarding a hearing on such penalties, fines, or interest if a written pretrial stipulation is filed with the judge before the date of any scheduled pretrial hearing....

...d-or is not being provided. — Any claim, or portion-thereof, not-in- compliance with this-subsec-tion-shall be--subject to dismissal upon-motion-of -any interested party, the division7-or the deputy commissioners. C£-M40^5(-l-)-Fla.Stat.-(1979⅜ § 440.20(10)(b), Fla.Stat....

...ial jurat. *645 RULE 4.065. MOTION PRACTICE (a) Substantive Motions. A motion relating to the adjudication of entitlement to benefits, including, but not limited to, motions to vacate orders for lump-sum advances, motions for advances under sections 440.20(12)(c)2 and 440.20(12)(d), Florida Statutes, appeals of administrative fines or penalties under section 440,106, Florida Statutes, motions for appointment of guardians, motions to appoint expert medical advisors under section 440.13, Florida Statutes, requests f...

...r before the judge of compensation claims, (c) An agreement under this rule-shall set forth the terms, conditions, and consideration for the settlement-together with all-material facts-necessary for approval of — the settlement pursuant to-seetion 440.20(12)-, Florida Statutes, (d) Prior to the approval of any-agreement under this rule, the parties and their attorneys shall submit-to the judge of-compensation claims for inclusion in the division file-all evidence in their possession which is material to-the consideration and disposition of the settlement agreement....

...e an order. 1995 Amendment. Subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) were moved to new rule 4.115, Orders. New subdivision (c) was added. RULE 4.142. AGREEMENTS OR STIPULATIONS (a) Scope. Agreements or stipulations not involving settlements under section *656 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, shall comply with this rule....

...Subdivision (c) requires that an order approving an agreement or stipulation under this rule also include a detailed statement of the issues, their resolution, and the benefits to be provided as reflected in the agreement or stipulation. RULE 4,143. SETTLEMENT UNDER SECTION 440.20(11), FLORIDA STATUTES (a) Scope. This rule applies in any proceeding in which the parties undertake to compromise or release any class of benefits pursuant to section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes....

...yee. The parties will use the standard forms published by the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims, or the equivalent, when submitting an agreement. (c) Required Documents. A .joint petition seeking the approval of a lump-sum settlement under section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, shall be filed with the .judge’s office along with; (1) a stipulation using the standard forms published by the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims, or the equivalent, signed by the claimant, all attorn...

...care, and other essential medical information; (4) any other evidence in the possession of the parties and their attorneys that is material to the consideration and disposition of the settlement; (5) a notice letter to the employer as required under section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes; (6) an attorney-fee data sheet; (7) an attorney’s affidavit seeking approval of an attorney fee and specifying the statutory factors forming the basis for a variance, if the requested fee exceeds the statutory guidelines under sections 440.34(l)(a)-(l)(h), Florida Statutes; (8) the notice(s) of denial and the report to the chief judge for settlements under section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes....

...s of law to support the approval or disapproval of the proposed settlement, and may be in the form provided in these rules. *657 Committee Notes 1995 Adoption. This rule replaces rule 4.131 because of the 1993 amendments to washout settlements under section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes....

...etition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in this subdivision and in subdivision (d), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmone-tary nature, or a penalty pursuant to section 440.20 or 440.24, Florida Statutes; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other costs incurred as a direct result of the violation....

...approving the mediation agreement. (e) Enforcement of Agreement. In the event of any breach or failure to perform under a mediation agreement, enforcement shall proceed in accordance with section 440.24, Florida Statutes. (d) Agreement to Enter into Section 440.20(121), Florida Statutes, Settlement. Any mediation agreement compromising or releasing prospective benefits of the claimant to-to the employee of any class of benefits pursuant to section 440.20(121), Florida Statutes, shall not be approved or become binding until after the parties have first complied with rule 4.1314,143 and the aforesaid statu-tery — provisionrequirements of section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes....

...rosecution of Claim and Petition for Benefits before Judge- Dated at.(city).,.County.(state)., on.(date). *702 Signature of Notary Public Print or type name FORM 4.911. ORDERS APPROVING SETTLEMENT OF PROSPECTIVE BENEFITS (а) Settlements Pursuant to Section 440.20(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, for Acci-dente Occurring After August 1,1979, and Before October L-1989....

...[For caption and style of pleadings see form 4;904j ORDER FQRrRELEASE FROM LIABILITY- FOR FUTURE PAYMEN-TS OF-COMPENSATION, REHABILITATION EXPENSESEOS DEATH BENEFITS BUT EXCLUDING M-EDICAL EXPENSES The joint petition-and stipulation for settlement pursuant-to- section 440.20(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers-’ Compensation Procedure 4.131-having-eome before the undersigned on due notice to the parties and their-eounsel^-and' having reviewed the joint petition and- stipulation...

...Judge of CompensatiomGlaims T-HIS IS TO CERTIFY that the above order-was-entered in the office of the judge of compensation claims and a copy was seryed by-U.&-Mail-on each party and counsel at the addresses-I-isted-above on , 19. Assistant to the Judge-of-Gompensation-Claims (b) Settlements Pursuant — to—Seetion 440.20(12)(a)> Florida Statutes^ for Accidents Occurring On or After Octobei-L-IDSIL and Section 440.20(12)(c) for Accidents-Occui-r-ing On or After October 1, 1989⅜ but Before July 1, 1990....

...aption-and style of pleadings-see form-4.9Q-l-j QRDER-FQR -RELEASE FROM LI-ABILITY FOR ALL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION-BENEFITS PUBSUANT-TO SECTION-440*20(12)03),■ FLORIDA STATUTES The joint petition- and stipulation-for settlement pursuant to-section-440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.131)-having come before the undersigned on due notice to the -parties-and their counsel; - and having-reviewed the joint petition-and stipulation for settlement-the division file, and the evidence ⅛-this cause; having-received in evidence the sworn proof of the employee; and having heard the argument of counsel;- IFIN-E4 (1) All requirements of-section 440.20(12)(b), Florida-Statutes-, and rule 4.131- have been complied with....

...order was entered-in-the-office of the judge of compensation claims-and-a-copy was served by U.S. Mai-l-on-each -party and counsel at the addresses listed ahova-om— ,19 — Assistant-to-the Judge of Compensation Claims (d) Settlements-Pursuant to Section 440.20(10)?-Florida Statutes (1978). [-F-or-caption and style of pleadings see-form-4r901-] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM-LIABILITY FOR PAYMENTS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.20(10), FLORIDA-ST-AT-U-T-ES-(-1978) (PRE-AUGUST 1,1979⅝ DATE OF ACCIDENT) The-joint-petition and stipulation for settlement pursuant-to -section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1978), and Florida-Rule of Workers’ Compensation Prooednre-l-l-S-l, having come before the undersigned-on-due notice to the parties and their eou-nselp-a-nd-having reviewed the joint petition and-stipulation- for settlement, the division file, and the -evidence in this cause; having received-in-evidence the sworn proof of the employee; and having-heard the argument-ef-counsel; I FIND: (-l-j-AIl-requirements of section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1978),-and-rule-4;131have been complied with.- *706 (2) The employer has had adequate notice of these proceedings....

...oint-petition and stipulation-Jor-settlement,-the division file, and the-e-vidence in this cause; having received in-evidence the sworn proof- of fee employee-; and-having heard the argument of counsel; I FIND-: *707 (1) All requirements of section -440.20(12)(c), Florida Statetes-(1990), and ruIe-4,-131 have been complied with....

...— I further find that the-employee has been assigned-a-permanent impairment rating — from 1 to 5% in accordance with chapter 440.2Q(12-)(c-),- Florida Statutes, and the applicable guidelines. (-7)-The amount of settlement-has-been determined according to-ttie provisions of section 440.20(12)(c), Florida-Statutesv (8)-The payment of an attorney-fee as set forth in the joint petition and stipulation for settlement is supported by the evidence and in compliance with-the requirements of chapter 440, Florida Statutes....

...rder'was entered in the office of the judge of compensation claims and a copy was served -by U.S. Mail on each party and counsel at the address listad above, nn . 1Q Assistanfr-to the Judge of Compensation Claims (a) Settlements Pursuant to Sections 440.20(ll)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes. [For caption and style of pleadings, see Form 4.901.] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR ALL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.20(ll)(a)(1994), FLORIDA STATUTES *708 The parties jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation for settlement under section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes. Following review of the contents of the stipulation and supporting evidence, including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: L All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...above order was entered in the office of the Judge of Compensation Claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on_, 19 . Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims (b) Settlements Pursuant to Section 440.20(11)(b), Florida Statutes (1994). [For caption and style of pleadings, see form 4.901.] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR PAYMENTS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.20(ll)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1994) *709 The parties jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation for settlement under section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes. On review of the contents of the stipulation and evidence submitted in support thereof including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: L All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...above order was entered in the office of the Judge of Compensation Claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on_, 19 . Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims (c) Settlements Pursuant to Section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes (1994), in which Right to Future Medical Benefits Is Left Open. [For caption and style of pleadings, see form 4.901.3 ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR PAYMENTS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.20(11)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1994) *710 RIGHT TO FUTURE MEDICAL BENEFITS LEFT OPEN The parties .jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation or settlement under section 440.20(11)(b), Florida Statutes. On review of the contents of the stipulation and evidence submitted in support thereof including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: L All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...der was entered in the office of the Judge of Compensation Claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on_, 19 , Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims (d) Settlements Pursuant to Sections 440.20(ll)(b) and (c) (1994), Florida Statutes, in which Right to Compensation Benefits Has Been Settled Previously. [For caption and style of pleadings, see form 4,901] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL BENEFITS PAYABLE UNDER SECTION 440.13, FLORIDA STATUTES, AS AUTHORIZED BY SECTIONS 440.20(11)(b) and (c) (1994), FLORIDA STATUTES The parties .jointly petition for an order approving a stipulation for settlement under sections 440.20(11)(b) and (c) (1994), Florida Statutes, which permit settlement of all claims not previously settled regardless of the date of accident....

...aw. On review of the contents of the stipulation and evidence submitted in support thereof including the sworn statement of the employee (petitioner/claimant) incorporated into the stipulation, the following findings are made: 1. All requirements of section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.143 have been complied with....

...1st DCA 2000) (restating that construction of written instruments is reviewed de novo). The E/C argued that Claimant was represented by counsel at the time he entered into the Agreement and, therefore, Claimant settled his workers’ compensation claim as section 440.20(ll)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), allows a represented claimant to enter into a settlement agreement without approval of the JCC....

...e month. Even though it is undisputed that Claimant had two periods of employment, he had but one “employment relationship” with the Employer. By its plain language, the release applied to Claimant’s relationship with the Employer. Pursuant to section 440.20(1l)(c), a represented “claimant may waive all rights to any and all benefits under this chapter by entering into a settlement agreement releasing the [E/C] from liability for workers’ compensation benefits in exchange for a lump-su...

...bject matter of the Complaint....” Id. at 923. The court concluded: The parties were entitled to settle the workers’ compensation claims, and execution of the general release “in exchange for a lump-sum payment” accomplished that result. See § 440.20(ll)(c), *872 Fla....

PER CURIAM. Attorney fees are not compensation within the meaning of section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), formerly section 440.-20(6), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Committee Notes 1979 Adoption?. This replaces Rrule 123, 1977 W.C.R.P. RULE 4.131. SETTLEMENT OF PROSPECTIVE BENEFITS In any proceeding in which the parties undertake to compromise or release the prospective entitlement of the employee to any class of benefits pursuant to Ssection 440.20(12), Florida Statutes: (a) The parties shall submit their agreement in writing executed by all attorneys of record and by the employee....

...fits no longer affected by-the appeal are payable and due within 30 days of service of the initial brief deemed to have abandoned the challenge to benefits previously certified as-affected-by-appealT together with interest, as provided under Section-440.20 Florida Statutes, from the date of entry of the Deputy-s-order-making the award....

...-pureuant-to-review sought with-the-Florida Supreme Court, in which-case benefits become due, if such review is unsuccessful, within.30.days-of the Supreme Court's final-disposition of the cause, -together with interest as provided under Section — 440.20,—Florida -Statutes, from the date of entry of- the-Deputy order-making the award, (a) Benefits Affected....

...(c) Payments of Benefits when Challenged Benefits are Abandoned. When benefits challenged on appeal have been abandoned under subdivision (b) above, benefits no longer affected by the appeal are payable within 30 days of the service of the brief together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, *442 from the date of the order of the judge of compensation claims making the award. (d) Payment of Benefits after Appeal. If benefits are ordered paid by the district court on completion of the appeal, they shall be paid, together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, within 30 days after the court’s mandate....

...However, the judge of compensation claims need not inquire beyond the stipulation or agreement. (c) Enforcement of Agreement. In the event of any breach or failure to perform under a mediation agreement, enforcement shall proceed in accordance with section 440.24, Florida Statutes. (d) Agreement to Enter into Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes, Settlement. Any mediation agreement compromising or releasing prospective benefits of the claimant to any class of benefits pursuant to section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes, shall not be approved or become binding until the parties have complied with rule 4,131 and the aforesaid statutory provision....

...the foregoing stipulation was mailed or hand delivered to the above-named parties and counsel on. —, 19 — IT Assistant to Judge of Compensation-DIaims FORM 4.911. ORDERS APPROVING SETTLEMENT OF PROSPECTIVE BENEFITS L(a) Settlements pursuant to Ssection 440.20(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, for accidents occurring after August 1, 1979, and before October 1, 1989....

...TFor caption and style of pleadings see form 4.901] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR FUTURE PAYMENTS OF COMPENSATION, REHABILITATION EXPENSES, OR DEATH BENEFITS BUT EXCLUDING MEDICAL EXPENSES The joint petition and stipulation for settlement pursuant to Ssection 440.20(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of .Workers' Compensation Procedure 4.131, Florida Workers’ Compensation -R»les~c>f Procedure^ having come before the undersigned upon *475 due notice to the parties and their co...

...ing reviewed the joint petition and stipulation for settlement, the ©division file¿ and the evidence in this cause; having received in evidence the sworn proof of the employee; and having heard the argument of counsel; I FIND: All requirements of Ssection 440.20(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, and Rrule 4.131, Florida Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure, have been complied with....

...of the Deputy CommissioBerjudge of compensation claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on_, 19_ Assistant to the Deputy- Commissioner Judge of Compensation Claims (b) Settlements Pursuant to Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes, for Accidents Occurring on or after October 1, 1989, and Section 440.20(12)(c) for Accidents Occurring on or after October 1, 1989, but before July 1, 1990....

...[For caption and style of pleadings see form 4.901] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR FUTURE PAYMENTS OF COMPENSATION, REHABILITATION EXPENSES, OR DEATH BENEFITS, BUT EXCLUDING MEDICAL, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION EXPENSES The joint petition and stipulation for settlement pursuant to section 440.20(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers' Compensation Procedure 4.131, having come before the undersigned on due notice to the parties and their counsel; and having *476 reviewed the joint petition and stipulation for settlement, the division file, and the evidence in this cause; having received in evidence the sworn proof of the employee; an? having heard the argument of counsel; I FIND: (1) All requirements of section 440.20(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, and rule 4.131 have been complied with....

...above order was entered in the office of the judge of compensation claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on, 19 Assistant to the Judge of Compensation Claims H.(c) Settlements ^Pursuant to Section 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes, before October 1, 1989. TFor caption and style of pleadings see form 4.901] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR ALL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.20(12)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES The joint petition and stipulation for settlement pursuant to Ssection 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.131, Fla, W.C.R.P.) having come before the undersigned upon due notice to the parties and their counsel; and having reviewed the joint petition and stipulation for settlement, the division fitei and the evidence in this cause; having received in evidence the sworn proof of the employee; and having heard the argument of counsel; I FIND: (1> All requirements of Ssection 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rrule 4.131,— Fla.W.C.R.P....

...the Deputy Commissionerjudge of compensation claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on_, 19_ Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner Judge of Compensation Claims HL(d) Settlements ^Pursuant to Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes,(1978). |~For caption and style of pleadings see form 4.9011 ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR PAYMENTS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.20(10), FLORIDA STATUTESTÍ1978) (PRE-AUGUST 1, 1979* DATE OF ACCIDENT) The joint petition and stipulation for settlement pursuant to Ssection 440.20(10), Florida Statutes* (1978), and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.131, Florida Workers’- Compensation Rules of Procedure* having come before the undersigned upon due notice to the parties and their counsel; and h...

...ewed the joint petition and stipulation for settlement, the Ddivision file* and the evidence in this cause; having received in evidence the sworn proof of the employee; and having heard the argument of counsel; *478 I FIND: {1}t All requirements of Ssection 440.20(10), Florida Statutes,(1978), and rule 4.131T Florida Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure, have been complied with....

...of the Deputy Commissionerjudge of compensation claims and a copy was served by U.S. Mail on each party and counsel at the addresses listed above on_, 19_ Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner Judge of Compensation Claims (e) Settlements Pursuant to Section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (1990), for Accidents Occurring on or after July 1, 1990. [For caption and style of pleadings see form 4.901] ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR PAYMENTS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.20(12)(c), FLORIDA STATUTES (1990), FOR ACCIDENTS OCCURRING ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 1990 The joint petition and stipulation for settlement pursuant to section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (1990), and Florida Rule of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 4.131, having come before the undersigned on due notice to the parties and their counsel; and having reviewed the joint petition and stipulation for settlement, the division file, and the evidence in this cause; having received in evidence the sworn proof of the employee; and having heard the argument of counsel; I FIND: (1) All requirements of section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (1990), and rule 4.131 have been complied with....

...a result of the industrial accident! and has not received medical care for at least 3 months prior to the date of this order. I further find that the employee has been assigned a permanent impairment rating from 1 to 5⅞ in accordance with chapter 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes^ and the applicable guidelines? (7) The amount of settlement has been determined according to the provisions of section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes....

...n connection with his alleged inability to work following repeated exposure to chemicals used in the dry cleaning profession. The E/C originally controverted the employee's claim, but the parties ultimately agreed to a washout settlement pursuant to section 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The Fund is authorized to reimburse only those benefits which the employer/carrier are required to pay under Chapter 440. The controverted settlement is not a required payment. 5. Even assuming there is authority under Section 440.92(2) to reimburse a Section 440.20(2)(b)1....

...In addition, because there is no prior ruling on reimbursement in settlement cases, we certify the following question as one of great public importance: WHETHER AN EMPLOYER/CARRIER, THAT HAS ENTERED INTO A TOTALLY CONTROVERTED WASHOUT SETTLEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.20(12)(b)1., FLORIDA STATUTES *267 (1989), AND HAS PROVEN THAT A PORTION OF THE SETTLEMENT CONSTITUTES PERMANENT DISABILITY COMPENSATION IN EXCESS OF THE FIRST 175 WEEKS, IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE SPECIAL DISABILITY TRUST FUND...

...hat a claimant promptly receive benefits that are uncontested on appeal and to permit a JCC to entertain unmatured issues during the pendency of *701 an appeal 1 . This conclusion is supported as well by-reference to the provisions of rule 4.161 and Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1987). Section 440.20 prescribes how compensation benefits should be paid....

...except when liability to pay compensation is controverted by the employer.” Wage loss or temporary disability benefits, which are the benefits at issue in this case, are to be paid “monthly ... within 14 days of the date upon which the carrier or employer has knowledge of the compensable wage loss.” § 440.20(4), Fla.Stat. (1987). If the E/C controverts the claim and an award is entered in favor of the claimant, compensation payable under that award must be paid within 30 days after it becomes due unless review of the compensation order is sought. Section 440.20(8), Fla.Stat....

...laimant was warranted). . Rule 4.161 provides in pertinent part: (a) Benefits Unaffected by Appeal. Benefits ordered paid and not certified by appellant (or cross-appellant) to be affected by appeal under Rule 4.160(a) of these rules are governed by Section 440.20 Florida Statutes. (b) Benefits Affected by Appeal. Benefits ordered paid which are certified under Rule 4.160(a) of these rules by appellant (or cross-appellant) as being affected by the appeal may be withheld pending outcome of the appeal under the authority of Section 440.20 Florida Statutes unless the appellant’s (or cross-appellant's) challenge to the award of any such benefits so certified is deemed abandoned as provided by subsection (c) of this rule....

...Pursuant to section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), the deputy commissioner awarded claimant’s attorney $4,000 in fees based on the $15,-925 in benefits he secured for the claimant. On December 17, 1982, claimant’s attorney, pursuant to section 440.20(ll)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), secured for claimant $7,345 of the previously awarded amount in an advance lump sum, over the City’s resistance....

...We find the above-quoted record objection sufficient to preserve for review the issue of whether there is a statutory basis for the award. Although claimant’s attorney sought fees “pursuant to the statute based upon the benefits obtained,” it is unclear whether he was relying on section 440.34(1) or section 440.20....

...th the manner of payment as opposed to claimant’s right to compensation, the statute provides that lump sum payment shall be made “whenever the commission determines that it is for the best interests of a person entitled to compensation.” F.S. § 440.20(10), F.S.A....

aside a settlement agreement entered under section 440.-20(12)(b), Florida Statutes. We reverse because

of 70 days of hospitalization. Pursuant to section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1977), Yambo entered

...�� compensation insurance carrier. While we do not question the good faith either of the employer or of its insurance carrier, it cannot be said that the delay in payment was due to “conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control.” § 440.20(6), Fla....

...ommissioner, we note that the award of 12% interest on delinquent payments is correct only to the extent that it involves interest on benefits which accrued on or after July 1, 1978. Myers v. Carr Construction Co., 387 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); § 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1978)....

...Claimant disputes both rulings, and, relative to impairment benefits, also argues in the alternative that she is entitled to some impairment benefits even if compensability is ultimately denied, because the Employer/Carrier made use of the “pay and investigate” rule set out in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...pensability of her claims. Here, Claimant asserts that she became entitled to the payment of impairment benefits during the period when her case was being handled by the Employer/Carrier “as if the claim had been accepted as compensa-ble,” under section 440.20(4)....

...compensa-ble, the Employer/Carrier was obligated to pay some amount of impairment benefits to satisfy its liabilities incurred under section 440.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), during the period when the case was accepted as if compensable under section 440.20(4)....

...Bhatt assigned a 10% PIR states “NO” in response to the question of whether Claimant had reached MMI. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Claimant did not establish that the E/C was liable for impairment benefits during the period when the case was accepted as compensable under section 440.20(4)....

...t a referral to the JCC. As a threshold matter, neither party disputes DFS’s basic authority under chapter 440 to audit and impose penalties on carriers and claims-handling entities that do not comply with Florida’s workers’ compensation laws. Section 440.20(8)(b), is clear, for instance, that DFS: shall monitor, audit, and investigate the performance of carriers....

BROWNING, J. Appellant seeks reversal of the JCC’s order denying his request for an advance payment of compensation not in excess of $2,000.00. We agree, reverse and remand. See § 440.20(12)(c)(2), Fla....

ERVIN, J. This workers’ compensation appeal poses the question of whether the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision set forth in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...nefits to which claimant was entitled had been provided. As a result, he made no determination of the applicability of the 120-day period. We decline to read the 120-day rule so restrictively and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. Section 440.20(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), requires the employer/carrier (E/C) to provide compensation benefits to the injured worker, unless the E/C denies compensability. Alternatively, the E/C may opt to “pay and investigate,” as set forth in subsection 440.20(4), as follows: If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits or compensation, it may initiate payment without prejudice and without admitting liability....

...aggravation thereof, as here, but rather involve a condition the E/C eventually contended was noncom-pensable. We conclude, however, that the occurrence of an exacerbation of a prior injury is not a legitimate factual distinction, because nothing in section 440.20(4) suggests that the pay-and-investigate rule does not apply to exacerbations of compen-sable injuries....

...ed treatment for an exacerbation of his preexisting disc condition on February 23, 2000. On May 5, 2000, the treating physician recommended surgery, which the E/C did not deny until October 30, 2000, more than 120 days later. This court decided that section 440.20(4), as applied to an exacerbation of a preexisting condition, should “be reasonably construed as commencing the 120-day period for an investigation as to the compensability of the exacerbation, and not in regard to the compensability of a major surgical procedure related to the pre-existing condition.” Id. at 1015 . An E/C may avoid application of the 120-day rule if it establishes material facts relevant to compensability that it could not have discovered within the 120-day period. See § 440.20(4), Fla....

...or fees, not the carrier’s, we are of the view that the Mazur rationale is applicable to the case at bar. Before granting a lump sum advance for any purpose, a deputy must be satisfied that such advance is in the claimant’s “best interests.” Section 440.20(12)(a)....

...At hearing, counsel for claimant argued that such interest payments were insufficient in light of case law requiring minimum payments of $5.00 per week. On motion for clarification, the e/c incorrectly assert that their maximum liability pursuant to Section 440.20(9), Florida Statutes, would be $5.00 for each of the 43 weeks of adjusted compensation benefits paid for the period April 20, 1985 through February 6, 1986. Actually, the interest payments provided for by Section 440.20(9), Florida Statutes (1991), would begin to accrue at the time the adjusted benefits became due, that is, during the period April 20, 1985 through February 6, 1986, and would continue to accrue through the date of satisfaction, which,...

...In the present case, we find the JCC’s denial of penalties and interest in “boilerplate” language insufficient to demonstrate proper consideration of the issue. The record does not clearly reflect that the interest payment of $115.77 was sufficient to satisfy the e/c’s obligation under Section 440.20(9), Florida Statutes, nor does the JCC’s order reflect due consideration of this issue and an adequate basis for the denial of the claim for statutory penalties and interest....

the City of Miami disputes in this appeal. Section 440.20(13)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), requires a

...es Act (APA), Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1975), and the due process guarantees of the Florida and United States Constitutions. The issue is whether the Special Disability Trust Fund is an "interested party" to a lump sum settlement authorized in Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1975), and in Workmen's Compensation Rule 17(f)....

commissioner of lump sum PTD benefits pursuant to Section 440.-20(10), Florida Statutes. We affirm in part, reverse

ERVIN, Judge. Of the three issues raised by appellants, only their challenge to the judge of compensation claim’s denial of a penalty, sought pursuant to the provisions of Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1985), is meritorious....

...Int’l Corp., 424 So.2d 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Jones v. Cling Elec., Inc., 397 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Appellants are similarly entitled to interest on the unpaid penalty from August 29, 1988, when the compensation was due, until the penalty is paid. § 440.20(9), Fla.Stat....

...prove entitlement to TPD benefits.  In January 2017, Claimant developed a left shoulder rash that she attributed to exposure to plastic at the workplace. The Employer/Carrier (E/C) conditionally accepted compensability of the rash under the pay-and-investigate provisions of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2016)....

...1st DCA 2010). As a general rule, a claimant bears the burden of proving entitlement to each requested workers’ compensation. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Osceola Cty. Sch. Bd., 974 So. 2d 1161, 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). But under the express language of section 440.20(4), the E/C here were obliged to provide “all benefits and compensation as if the claim had been accepted as compensable” during the pay-and- investigate period. Thus, Claimant met part of her burden to prove entitlement to the claimed benefits: her rash must be considered a compensable workplace injury through the date of the denial. Because compensability was established by operation of section 440.20(4), the JCC here erred as a matter of law to the extent that he denied TPD benefits based on the medical evidence that Claimant’s rash was never related to her employment. Nevertheless, Claimant’s prima facie burden here also inclu...

...Because the record contains no competent substantial evidence demonstrating the requisite reduction of wages, Claimant cannot satisfy her burden entitling her to the claimed benefits. For that 2 reason, the JCC’s error as to section 440.20(4) is harmless, and the benefits are properly denied....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, claimant seeks review of an order denying her claim made pursuant to section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (2002), seeking additional penalties on late payments of permanent total disability benefits....

...The judge of compensation claims denied the claim on the ground that all appropriate penalties had been paid. After the judge of compensation claims had entered his order we held, in a case of first impression, that, in circumstances like those presented here, section 440.20(6) required that a 20-percent penalty be paid on all late payments of non-award disability benefits....

shall file a notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20; (2) if the employer shall decline to pay a claim

...The claimant has cross-petitioned, complaining that the deputy erred in: (1) not finding him to be permanently and totally disabled; (2) not awarding payment or reimbursement for medical and transportation expense; and (3) not assessing penalties against the employer as authorized by Section 440.20(5), F.S.A....

...As to penalties and interest, we affirm the JCC’s denial because only medical benefits were involved. Smith v. General Conference of S.D.A., 535 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) [payments for medical services are not “compensation” and therefore are not subject to penalties for late payments under section 440.20(8), (9), Florida Statutes]....

...When the parties reached a settlement consisting of a “lump-sum payment in exchange for the employer’s or carrier’s release from liability for future medical expenses, as well as future payments of compensation and *510 rehabilitation expenses,” section 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), the merits of John Sandham’s claims then pending below against co-appellees were resolved....

...The judge of compensation claims ruled that there was no such entitlement. We reverse. We affirm the order of the judge of compensation claims insofar as it determined that the employer and carrier have no liability for attorney’s fees. The parties entered into a settlement approved under section 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), which provides that “a claimant shall be responsible for the payment of his own attorney’s fees in any case settled under this subsection.” We reverse only so much of the order as denies appellant...

banc process to clarify waiver provision of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, in light of several recent

proper benefits to the proper parties. Under section 440.-20(1), it is the employer’s duty to provide benefits

compensation unpaid within 14 days after becoming due. § 440.20(7), Fla. Stat. (1989). The JCC had no authority

...nal fee. We first note that a literal reading of the applicable statute supports appellants’ claim. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1978), reads in pertinent part: (1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in s. 440.20, shall decline to pay a claim on or before the 21st day after they have notice of same, or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation, and the claimant shall have employed an attorney at law in the successful prosecut...

...Smith, 72 So.2d 817 (Fla.1954), the court faced the question of whether an additional attorney’s fee was due under section 440.34 for services rendered by claimant’s attorney at a hearing which resulted in an additional award of 20% of delinquent compensation payments under section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes. The court in Lockett noted that a literal reading of the statute would support an additional attorney’s fee, but the court did not find this determinative. Rather, the court analyzed the “penalty” of section 440.20 from a public policy point of view “to determine whether or not it may be regarded as the kind of payment whose recovery should be attended by a reasonable fee for counsel necessarily employed.” 72 So.2d at 819 ....

...he time of the injury. The second is whether the deputy erred in failing to assess penalties against the employer because of his failure to commence payments for permanent partial disability within fourteen days of the time such payments become due. § 440.20(5) F.S.A....

...He concluded that despite the fact that claimant was at the time of the hearing earning more in wages than at the time of his injury, he had nevertheless suffered a loss of wage earning capacity. We think the evidence is sufficient to support his finding. Answer to the second question requires an interpretation of § 440.20(5) F.S.A....

...This subsection mandatorily requires, with certain exceptions, the imposition of the prescribed 10% penalty whenever “ * * * any installment of compensation payable without an award is not paid within fourteen days after it becomes due, as provided in subsection (2) [of Sect. 440.20] * * Subsection (2) provides that the first installment of compensation becomes due on the “ * * * fourteenth day after the employer has knowledge of the injury or death * * We think that the plain wording of these two subsections as well as their practical application requires that § 440.20(5) be construed to apply only to delinquent payments of compensation for temporary disability and death benefits. The obvious object of the penalty provided for in § 440.20(5) is to encourage an employer either to make prompt payment of compensation or death benefits, or to dispute immediately the compensability of the accident so as to hasten a ruling thereon....

...Similarly, the employer can determine the com-pensability of an accident which results in disability of an employee, the initial extent of the disability and the amount of compensation payable for the temporary disability. Therefore, it seems clear that § 440.20(5) can and should be applied to payments of compensation due for temporary disability or death. However, there are several reasons why § 440.20(5) cannot and should not be construed to be applicable to payments of compensation for permanent disability. First, the provision of § 440.20(2) making the first installment of compensation become due within fourteen days after knowledge of the injury indicates that the legislature did not intend it to apply to payments for permanent disability....

...ed. Therefore, if the statute were to be applied to payments of permanent disability and the employer be held to commence such payments within fourteen days after the date of maximum medical improvement he would be subject to the penalty provided in § 440.20(5) in almost every case....

...This factor is not easily determined by either deputies or courts. Therefore, we do not believe that this is the type payment which the legislature intended to encourage the employer to make without an award, or suffer a penalty for failure to do so. Here we note that § 440.20(5), and what we say in this opinion, applies only to penalties for an employer’s failure to make prompt payments of compensation without an award having first been made by a deputy....

...However, the particular provision with which we deal here is penal in nature and therefore must be construed in favor of him against whom the penalty applies. Lollie v. General American Tank Storage Terminal, 1948, 160 Fla. 208 , 34 So.2d 306 . Because of the foregoing we are led to the conclusion that § 440.20(5) F.S.A....

...We affirm the JCC’s order in all respects, thereby rejecting the Employer/Carrier’s request to recede from the holding in Acker , and to hold that an Employer/Carrier may include yearly supplemental benefits in calculating the offset authorized under section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1985). We grant the Employer/Carrier’s request to certify the question previously certified in Acker , and certify the following question: WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(l)(e)(l), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL...

...Although the Division’s letter to Dr. Nathanson recites that the Division is “performing” a utilization review, it is clear that the letter was a mere preliminary step by the Division in contemplation of or preparation for utilization review. Section 440.20(16)(b)(2) gives the Division subpoena power to perform its investigations....

claim before the wage loss benefits were due. Section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1979), and Rule 38F-3

...ant a lump sum advance of all future compensation benefits commuted to a present value of $103,700. The E/C raise three points for our review: (1) whether the lump sum advance is in claimant’s best interest; (2) whether the $7,500 cap appearing in section 440.20(13)(d), Florida Statutes *425 (1983), applies to the instant award; and (3) whether the 8 percent discount rate appearing in section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), applies to the instant award. We affirm. Points II and III were decided adversely to appellants’ position in our very recent decision in Cone Brothers Contracting v. Gordon, 453 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The 1983 amendments to sections 440.20(12) and 440.20(13), Florida Statutes (1979) are substantive and are to be applied prospectively only....

...L. Turner, III, and in the testimony. AFFIRMED, as amended. MILLS and SHIVERS, JJ., concur. . We distinguish our holding in Gordon from that in Kissimmee Construction Company (GAC Corporation) v. Riley, 400 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In Riley , section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (1979) was applied in place of section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), since the claimant’s injury took place following the effective date of the 1979 amendments....

...Pensacola Tractor & Equipment Co., Inc., 384 So.2d 156 (1st DCA Fla. 1980)... . The critical facts in this case were fully known by both parties. The only person in the dark concerning the true nature of the claimant's condition was the deputy commissioner. Despite these findings, the deputy denied the petition. Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), provides: It is the stated policy for the administration of the workers' compensation system that it is in the best interests of the injured worker that he receive disability or wage-loss payments on a periodic basis....

...um medical improvement has been reached. [emphasis added] We find that the parties' failure to present material facts to the deputy in their stipulation and joint petition for settlement prevented the deputy from being able to perform his duty under Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes, supra, which requires a determination by the deputy that a lump-sum settlement is clearly in the claimant's best interests....

...rties' failure to inform the deputy of the facts necessary for a true evaluation of the circumstances bearing on claimant's condition prevented the deputy from being able to perform his statutory duty in furtherance of the public policy expressed in Section 440.20(12)(a)....

...1st DCA 1984), reversing an order denying claimant's petition to set aside an approved lump-sum settlement agreement on the basis that, according to the record, maximum medical improvement had not been reached six months prior to the settlement as required by Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes, wherein, at the time the settlement agreement was approved, claimant was not represented by counsel....

1st DCA 1982). Furthermore, penalties under section 440.20(5), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.), are not

...First, we draw an important distinction between an E/C’s conceding compensability of a work accident versus accepting all subsequent claims for benefits. To be sure, an E/C cannot deny compensability of a work accident after the 120- day period in § 440.20(4), particularly where, as here, it has accepted the employee’s injuries as compensable....

...We affirm without discussion as to all issues raised, save one. We reverse the denial of penalties on the indemnity benefits awarded because the employer and carrier neither paid the benefits within seven days of when they became due, as required by section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), nor exercised the pay- and-investigate option provided by section 440.20(4); and because the employer and carrier failed to offer any evidence to suggest that they were unaware, as of the date on which claimant alleged the benefits were due, of facts supporting the obligation to pay those benefits....

...Although the employer had actual notice of claimant’s injury to his knee from the outset, it failed to file a first report of injury until December 29, 1980, ignoring the requirement of Section 440.185(2). Neither the employer nor carrier filed a notice to controvert as required by Section 440.20(6) even though their actions clearly amounted to a contro-version of claimant’s claim. Further, the employer failed to provide medical treatment and failed to provide compensation benefits after it had notice of claimant’s injury, contrary to Section 440.20(2), which provides that the first installment of compensation becomes due on the fourteenth day after the employer has knowledge of the injury....

(1974). The statute in question in Harper was section 440.20(10), Fla.Stat. (1973), which read: Upon the

...The JCC agreed with the E/C that who the representative payee is for the dependent benefits is unimportant. Nevertheless, the JCC reasoned that because claimant's children, not claimant, received the dependent benefits, they could not be included in the Grice offset calculation. This appeal followed. Section 440.20(14), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), provides: When an employee is injured and the employer pays his full wages or any part thereof during the period of disability, or pays medical expenses for such employee, and the case is contested by...

...Before any offsets, the claimant received approximately $723 weekly. Id. The supreme court concluded that the E/C could offset the claimant's workers' compensation benefits to the extent that the total of his workers' compensation, disability retirement, and SSD benefits exceeded his AWW. Id. at 898. After citing section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1985), which is virtually identical to the 1994 version of section 440.20(14), the supreme court held, "[A]n injured worker, except where expressly given such a right by contract, may not receive benefits from his employer and other collateral sources, which, when totalled, exceed 100% of his average weekly wage." [*] Id....

...NOTES [*] We note that the E/C did not take the separate social security offset provided for in section 440.15(10), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). "As Grice makes clear, the social security offset under section 440.15(9)(a) [codified in 1994 as section 440.15(10) ] is different and distinct from the offset allowed under section 440.20(15) [codified in 1994 as section 440.20(14) ]." Jackson v....

...to amend the pre-trial stipulation to assert defenses and to list witnesses and exhibits, on both of the grounds outlined in his final order awarding the claimant benefits. We find that the E/SA did not invoke the "pay-and-investigate" provision of section 440.20(4), and that any failure to respond to the petition for benefits (PFB) may not be considered as a waiver of the E/SA's defenses to the claims in the PFB, but only as a denial of the allegations in the PFB....

...eous, relying on' our decision in Eastern Industries, Inc. v. Burnham, 750 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We agree. In Burnham , decided shortly before the order under review was rendered, we concluded that penalties might be appropriate pursuant to section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), even if a notice of denial was filed within 14 days of the filing of the petition for benefits. Id. at 750 . We said that section 440.20(6) mandates a “punitive penalty” on the employer or carrier who refuses to pay compensation benefits at the time the facts then known to the employer and carrier would support an obhgation to pay, unless a notice is filed under section 440.20(4) [the “pay and investigate” provision] or unless such non-payment results from circumstances over which the employer or carrier had no control....

...er to make payment within 7 days of obtaining knowledge of the evidence supporting the payment obhgation or to comply with subsection (4) [the “pay and investigate” provision]. Id. at 751 . The substantive provisions of the pertinent portions of section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1997), which is applicable here, are identical to those addressed in Burnham . It is undisputed that the employer and servicing agent did not invoke section 440.20(4) (the “pay and investigate” provision), and there does not appear to be anything in the record to suggest that “non-payment resulted] from conditions over which the employer or [servicing agent] had no control.” § 440.20(6), Fla....

...l connection between her injury and lost wages. And thus she cannot recover TPD benefits because her injury did not cause a reduction in her earning capacity. 2 2 We also reject Claimant’s 120-day-rule argument for affirming this appeal, see § 440.20(4), Fla....

...Claimant further testified he informed his supervisor of this, and the Employer allowed Claimant to remain off work pending the cardiac evaluation. A First Report of Injury was prepared, and the Employer agreed to provide benefits subject to the "pay and investigate" provisions in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...Date of Accident: December 14, 2014. July 25, 2018 PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant challenges the order issued by the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying her request for a $2,000 advance pursuant to section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes, because she failed to establish a financial need for the advance....

...issue before us – what a JCC may consider when deciding whether to award an advance – is a legal one, our review is de novo. See Lombardi v. S. Wine & Spirits, 890 So. 2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review). Section 440.20(12)(c)2....

...considering the claimant’s financial need (or lack thereof) when determining whether to award an advance – even if the purpose of the advance is to fund litigation costs. To hold otherwise would frustrate the purpose of the advance statute and would contravene the language in section 440.20(12)(c)2 that requires the JCC to give “due consideration” to the “interests” of the claimant without placing any limit on the type of interests that can be considered. See Kuhn, 104 So....

...ce is to pay for litigation costs rather than other expenses such as rent or utility bills. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we hold that a JCC may consider a claimant’s financial need for an advance pursuant to section 440.20(12)(c)2 even when the purpose of the advance is to pay for expenses related to establishing compensability or entitlement to benefits....

...Employer/carrier appeal a workers’ compensation order by which an 80% lump sum advance of compensation payments was approved. We find that such approval was not in accordance with the applicable standards for lump sum payments, and we therefore reverse the order appealed. Section 440.20(13)(d), Florida Statutes, permits a lump sum advance of compensation payments if such advance is shown to be in the claimant’s “best interests.” In the present case this determination was made upon a finding that the lump sum adv...

weeks following March 10, 1977, was error. Section 440.20(9), Florida Statutes, provides: In addition

WETHERELL, J. The Citrus County School Board seeks review of a final order of the Department of Financial Services (DFS) imposing a $13,250 penalty on the School Board under section 440.20(8)(b), Florida Statutes....

...The auditor reviewed 498 temporary indemnity payments and found that 169 of the payments were made after their due date. Only four of the payments were made more than seven days after they were due. DFS concluded that all 169 payments made after their due date were “late payments” for purposes of section 440.20(8)(b) and it calculated the penalty based on this conclusion. The School Board filed a petition for administrative hearing, arguing that the penalty should have be calculated based only on the four payments made more than seven days after their due date because that is what section 440.20(6)(a) refers to as “late payments.” DFS rejected this argument after an informal hearing. The sole issue on appeal is whether, for purposes of section 440.20(8)(b), the phrase “late payments” should be interpreted to mean payments made after the date they were due, as DFS contends, or payments made more than seven days after they were due, as urged by the School Board....

...State, 629 So.2d 125, 126 (Fla.1993); see also State v. Bryant, 953 So.2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“Common understanding and reason must be used when analyzing a statute, and words of common usage not specifically defined must be given their plain and ordinary meaning.”). Section 440.20(8)(b) provides in pertinent part: In order to ensure carrier compliance under this chapter, the office shall monitor, audit, and investigate the performance of carriers....

...y payment performance standard. . 2. One hundred dollars per number of installments of compensation below a 90 percent timely payment performance standard. This section does not affect the imposition of any penalties or interest due to the claimant. § 440.20(8)(b), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The language in section 440.20(8)(b) is clear and unambiguous....

...This interpretation is also consistent with and furthers the purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Law, which is to provide an “efficient self-executing system” that “ensure[s] the prompt delivery of benefits to the injured worker.” § 440.015, Fla. Stat. The School Board argues that section 440.20(8)(b) should be construed in pari materia with section 440.20(6)(a) because both statutes include the phrase “late payments.” We reject this argument because, although both statutes deal with penalties, they serve different purposes. The penalty imposed by section 440.20(8)(b) is paid into the Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund and serves a regulatory compliance purpose — “to ensure carrier compliance under this chapter” — whereas the penalty imposed by section 440.20(6)(a) is paid to the injured employee as additional compensation. Accordingly, the fact that the Legislature has chosen to provide- a seven-day grace period before penalties must be paid to an injured employee under section 440.20(6)(a) has no bearing on the proper interpretation of section 440.20(8)(b)....

receive disability payments periodically. Section 440.-20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1985). To overcome

...ior order approving a joint petition for lump sum settlement. Because the evidence at the time of the settlement hearing clearly established that claimant had not reached maximum medical improvement six months prior to the settlement, we affirm. See section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980); and D’Amico v....

Settlement” on April 26, 1983, pursuant to section 440.-20(12)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes. Claimant

...Chung, 458 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We reverse the award of interest on the TPD benefits through the date of the April 5, 1996, order, however, because it is undisputed that interest does not begin to accrue until the benefits become due under section 440.20(9), Florida Statutes (1991), and the benefits in this case are not due until the forms are filed....

...In Alderman, we found that Hunt and Cruse Construction are still good law. See Alderman, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2579, ___ So. 2d at ___. As in Acker and Alderman, we certify the following question to the supreme court: [1] WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(1)(e)1., FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY FIVE PERCENT INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS? Reversed and remanded....

...The hearing was held on May 28, 1987, at which the E/C argued (although they had still not filed a notice to controvert) that claimant’s wage loss was not related to her industrial accident. No new evidence or testimony was presented, and the DC held in claimant’s favor and assessed penalties against the E/C pursuant to section 440.20(7) for late payment of benefits....

...cord contains no notice to controvert the claim for temporary total disability benefits filed July 13, 1992. 2 The failure to file a timely notice to controvert a claim for a certain class of benefits may subject an employer or carrier to penalties. § 440.20(6), Fla.Stat....

...AW-83 that the Fund lacks standing to raise the defense that a settlement is unreasonable from the standpoint of the Fund when a settlement is reasonable from the standpoints of the employer/carrier and the claimant. Our approval of this finding would nullify the provisions of Florida Statutes section 440.-49 and 440.20(12) and (13), which latter subsections should be read in pari materia with section 440.49....

...AW-83 that the settlement sub judice was reasonable even from the standpoint of the Fund and we affirm on that basis. We also affirm the deputy’s findings that a claimant’s life expectancy is the proper criterion to be used in determining a claimant’s probability of death pursuant to section 440.20(12)(b) and that the possibility of claimant regaining his earning capacity is to be disregarded in this calculation....

...The First District also certified the same question it had certified in Acker v. City of Clearwater, 755 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), approved, 755 So.2d 597 (Fla.1999), to be of great public importance: WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(l)(e)(l), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS? See Department of Labor & Employment Sec....

...The law is clear that there must be statutory authority to award fees. See Shipp v. State Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund, 481 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Knight v. City of Miami, 421 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Bowman seeks fees pursuant to section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1973), but this section permits fees against the carrier....

...Dan Beth Medical and United Self Insured Services, the employer and carrier (E/C), appeal an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC), awarding penalties and interest to Henry Snowden, the claimant, based upon the untimely payment of settlement proceeds pursuant to section 440.20, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...this part. (Emphasis added.) The parties entered into a stipulation seeking approval from the JCC of a lump- *760 sum settlement, which the JCC approved on September 9, 1999. Snowden received his settlement checks on October 25, 1999. As required by section 440.20(7), settlement proceeds must be paid within seven days after the JCC issues an order approving the settlement, with an additional five days allowed for mailing....

...ation. See Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Hyman, 379 So.2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The employer/carrier also contends that the deputy’s assessment of penalties for its failure to “timely” accept permanent disability was in error. We agree. Section 440.20(5), Florida Statutes (1979), provides for an award of penalties for late payment of compensation absent an award....

LARRY G. SMITH, Judge. In this worker’s compensation appeal, the wife of a deceased employee appeals an order denying her claim for a penalty under Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1979) 1 and interest....

...Later, the parties entered into a joint stipulation for lump sum washout settlement in the amount of $26,500.00. Although the settlement was approved by the deputy commissioner on January 9, 1980, payment was not made until February 12,1980. A subsequent claim for a penalty under Section 440.20(8) was made and re- *942 suited in an order awarding the widow $5,250.00....

...of interest was 6%. See, E & A Concrete v. Perry, 379 So.2d 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). However, in Myers , this court clarified the Perry decision and held that interest payable for delinquencies accruing on or after July 1, 1978, is governed by Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1978) [now Section 440.20(9), Florida Statutes (1981) ] and is properly awarded at the rate of 12%. 4 Next, appellant contests the deputy’s failure to award an additional penalty under Section 440.20(8) because the employer/carrier failed to pay the $5,250.00 until December 1, 1981....

...in Section 440.02(11), Florida Statutes (1979), 5 and therefore she is entitled to another penalty of 20% of the $5,250.00, or $1,050.00, for the employer/carrier’s late payment. On the other hand, the employer/carrier analogize the payment under Section 440.20(8) to a payment of nursing services, the late payment of which this court has already ruled does not result in the award of a penalty. Cox Oil and Sales Inc. v. Boettcher, 410 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In Boettcher , this court held that the payment of nursing services is not “compensation,” within the meaning of Section 440.20(8)....

...e benefit of other individuals. See, W. Jackson and Sons Construction Co. v. Dudley, 374 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Brantley v. A.D.H. Building Contractors, 215 So.2d 297 (Fla.1968). Unlike the payment of nursing services, the 20% payment under Section 440.20(8) is primarily designed to compensate a claimant for the injuries he may have suffered as a result of a delinquency. Lockett v. Smith, 72 So.2d 817 (Fla.1954). In Lockett , the Supreme Court held that the sum recovered under Section 440.20(6) [the predecessor of Section 440.20(8) ] is “compensation” *943 within the meaning of Section 440.34(1), and that the claimant was entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee for his successful prosecution of a claim for the additional 20% delinquency payment....

...nsidered to be a penalty against the employer and only secondarily to be a benefit to the unlawfully employed minor. Ferlita v. Florida Art Stucco Corporation, 74 So.2d 893 (Fla.1954). Accordingly, since the dominant purpose of the 20% payment under Section 440.20(8) is to compensate the employee, it follows that failure to pay the penalty under Section 440.20(8) amounts to a failure to compensate claimant so that a further 20% delinquency payment is due on the amount the employer/carrier fails to pay....

...South Broward Hospital District, 378 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The deputy commissioner made no finding of an equitable basis for excusing the penalty here, and nothing has been pointed to in the record that would support such a finding. REVERSED and REMANDED. ERVIN and SHIVERS, JJ., concur. . Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: (8) If any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within 20 days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to 20% thereof, whic...

...It is not entirely clear from the record how the deputy arrived at this interest figure. Presumably, the deputy computed interest at the rate of 6%. . Although the employer/carrier did not cross-appeal challenging the propriety of awarding interest on the penalty provided for in Section 440.20(8), they contend before us that an award of any interest on the $5,250.00 amount is improper since that amount does not constitute an award of “basic benefits.” Parker v....

...alary, which was the information contained in Ms. Alpizar’s wage statement. Until Ms. Alpizar filed her claim for an adjustment of her AWW to account for her tip income, the e/c had no way to know the amount of that income. Under Florida Statutes, section 440.20(7) (1991), the e/c is not liable for interest and penalties when a nonpayment results from conditions beyond the control of the e/c....

...advised to place every penny *416 of her present and future assets in one investment in real estate, a field in which the claimant is admittedly inexperienced. Ventura contends, and the E/C concede, the deputy erred in applying the 1983 amendment to Section 440.20(13)(d) retroactively....

...Before awarding an advance payment in excess of $2,000, the deputy is required by statute to find the advance payment (1) for the best interests of the person entitled to compensation, (2) not materially prejudicial to the rights of the E/C, and (3) reasonable under the circumstances. Section 440.20(13)(d), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...ttorney’s fees (PICA). On appeal, Claimant challenges the denial of pain management and PICA, and for the following reasons, we agree with Claimant and reverse that ruling (save penalties and interest, which are not due on medical benefits, see section 440.20(6), (8), Florida Statutes). As background, Claimant suffered a compensable injury to her low back on August 14, 2006....

...at the time payments were suspended the law on the question of simultaneous receipt of workmen’s compensation and unemployment compensation benefits was as announced in the Stubbs case, supra, we must hold it was error to assess penalty under F.S. § 440.20(5) 3 , F.S.A., because under the law as construed the suspended payments were not due....

...mely paid. Since there was no basis for the assessment of the attorney's fee against the E/C pursuant to § 440.34(3), Fla. Stat., the claimant is responsible for the payment of his own attorney's fees. The claimant requested an advance, pursuant to § 440.20(13)(d), Fla....

...The deputy awarded claimant's attorney a $12,000 fee to be paid by the claimant, although we question what benefits the attorney obtained for the claimant. The deputy also granted claimant's request for the advance of benefits in the amount of the fee. Under the provisions of § 440.20(13)(d) such an advance payment must be approved by the deputy who must find that the advance payment "is for the best interests of the person entitled to compensation, will not materially prejudice the rights of the employer and carrier, an...

...Such a proposal and loss by the carrier must of necessity materially prejudice the carrier's rights and is not reasonable under the circumstances, particularly considering the questionable benefit to the claimant. The deputy is without authority to order an advance payment under the provisions of § 440.20(13)(d) over the objection of the employer or carrier unless he makes the required findings which must be supported by competent substantial evidence....

...not materially prejudiced and that the settlement was reasonable under the circumstances. On the contrary, the requirement of an interest free advance for 15 years affirmatively shows the carrier will be materially prejudiced. Claimant contends that § 440.20(12)(b), Fla....

...advance payment of compensation under subsection 13. The 4 percent discount factor applies only to the irrevocable lump sum washout settlements of all future compensation benefits that are now authorized, subject to far more restrictions than under § 440.20(10), Fla....

...In reaching his decision approving an advance payment of $12,000, as attorney's fees, to be deducted from claimant's monthly compensation payments, the deputy expressly relied upon this court's opinion in Sanford v. Alachua County School Board, 425 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), which involved an interpretation of Section 440.20(11)(d), Florida Statutes (1977). This statute is identical to Section 440.20(13)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), in requiring that an advance payment be found to be "for the best interests of the person entitled to compensation, will not materially prejudice the rights of the employer and carrier, and is reasonable under the circumstances of the case......

...It is conceivable that some other method of advance payment might have been preferable to that chosen. This, however, is not the question before us. We are asked only to decide whether the method approved by the deputy is at variance with the provisions of section 440.20(13)(d)....

...set the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded to claimant’s counsel. Specifically, petitioner complains that the JCC questioned the claimant about the fee award during the hearing. Claimant sustained accidents in October 2001 and January 2004. Section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), requires the Judge of Compensation Claims to determine whether a settlement will be in the “best interests” of the claimant and authorizes the JCC to make or cause to be made such investigations as the JCC considers necessary. In addition, section 440.20(ll)(c), Florida Statutes, was amended by Chapter 2001-91, section 17, Laws of Florida, effective October 1, 2001, to provide that the parties are required to submit information in support of the settlement “as needed to justify the a...

...iter in a hearing to set the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded to claimant’s counsel. Specifically, petitioner complains that the JCC questioned the claimant about the fee award during the hearing. Claimant sustained two accidents in 2001. Section 440.20(ll)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), requires the Judge of Compensation Claims to determine whether a settlement will be in the “best interest” of the claimant and authorizes the JCC to make or cause to be made such investigations as the JCC considers necessary....

...MacDonald Transit Management concedes that Wichman subsequently refused to executed such a waiver. Docket No. 8 at page 3. MacDonald Transit Management also submits a document captioned "Stipulation in Support of Joint Petition for Order Approving a Lump Sum Settlement Under F.S. 440.20(11)(b) (Complete Settlement)." Docket No....

appellees’ joint petition and stipulation under Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1975),1 and for attorneys’

TAKES A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY

...Secondly, there was no authority in the circuit court under § 440.24(1) to award attorney’s fees in a collateral proceedings for the enforcement of an award. Lastly, the authority to award penalties on past due compensation payments was vested solely in the Florida Industrial Commission as provided by § 440.20(6), Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

compensation rate and penalties pursuant to Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1979). We have reviewed

...party to the original settlement agreement and the Fund lacks standing to contest the agreement. To raise the defense that a settlement is unreasonable from the standpoint of the employer and carrier and the claimant would nullify the provisions of Section 440.20(12) & (13), which subsections should be read in pari materia with Section 440.50 establishing the Trust Fund....

...There is no continuing responsibility by the employer/carrier to provide periodic payments nor are the periodic payments accumulated with interest to be payable at age 65. In fact, appellee would receive no benefit due to earned interest on the deferred 5%. The concern in s. 440.20(12)(a) is for continued periodic payment of permanent total disability benefits which entitle a claimant to supplemental benefits....

...This case, as did the settlement in Shipp , implicated the rationale expressed in Shipp that supplemental benefits are intended as protection “from the long-term effects of inflation that reduce the value of a fixed amount of benefits.... Once a lump-sum payment is authorized and received pursuant to § 440.20, a claimant has the option to invest the funds and offset the effects of inflation so that the purpose of supplemental benefits is satisfied.” Shipp, 481 So.2d at 79 ....

...of injury and subject to the maximum weekly compensation rate set forth in s. 440.12(2). Such additional benefits shall be paid out of the Workers’ Compensation Administration Trust Fund. This applies to payments due after October 1, 1974. (e.s.) Section 440.20(12) addresses the subject of lump-sum/advance payment of compensation....

...laimant by resorting to ordinary annuity methods rather than administration under the Workers' Compensation Act should be encouraged, not condemned, in this period when the entire workers' compensation insurance system is undergoing such a crisis. . Section 440.20(2) authorizes a judge of compensation claims to alter the biweekly payments therein required to installments at other periods. This section does not explicitly authorize the approval of the substitution of an annuity for such payments. The provisions in subsections 440.20(12) and (13), however, do give the judge broad powers over agreements for alternatives to simply making periodic payments of compensation benefits as stipulated in the Act, and it would seem that these provisions could be broad enough to encom...

Absolute Discharge of Compensation Pursuant to F.S. 440.-20(12)(a).” The joint petition and stipulation

...award are due with the determination of when an order is final. Even though, pursuant to section 440.25(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), an order is not final until thirty days after it has been mailed to the parties, unless a timely appeal is filed, section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (2002), controls the payment of penalties and requires that a 20% penalty be paid if the compensation is not paid within seven days after it becomes due....

statutory criteria for a lump sum advance under Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes, cf. Buono v. City of

...[2] Workers Compensation Rule 4.161 provides in pertinent part: (b) Benefits Affected By Appeal. Benefits ordered paid which are certified under Rule 4.160(a) of these rules by appellant (or cross-appellant) as being affected by the appeal may be withheld pending outcome of the appeal under the authority of Section 440.20 Florida Statutes......

...ned, pursuant to review sought with the Florida Supreme Court, in which case benefits become due, if such review is unsuccessful, within thirty (30) days of the Supreme Court's final disposition of the cause, together with interest as provided under Section 440.20 Florida Statutes, from the date of entry of the Deputy's order making the award....

...dent. A penalty of 10% was assessed against petitioners by the Deputy for their failure to pay compensation benefits to claimant, although they had knowledge of the claim, and be *610 cause they failed to file a notice to controvert pursuant to F.S. § 440.20(4), F.S.A....

...eversing the Deputy’s assessment of a penalty against petitioners. The Deputy found that petitioners, with knowledge of claimant’s injury, failed to pay compensation benefits to claimant and failed to file a notice to controvert pursuant to F.S. § 440.20(4), F.S.A....

...Mulkerrin, 444 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Stardust Motel v. St. Claire, 418 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Our second reason for reversal is because claimant concedes that the assessment of penalties against the employer and carrier pursuant to section 440.20 Florida Statutes, was error, except for September and October 1985, and February 1986....

...period for which he is awarding wage loss benefits, penalties, and interest. The award of wage loss is affirmed. However, we reverse the award of penalties and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. SHIVERS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . Section 440.20 Florida Statutes (1985) provides in pertinent part: 440.20 Payment of compensation.— (1) Compensation under this chapter shall be paid periodically, promptly in the usual manner, and directly to the person entitled thereto, without an award, except when liability to pay compensation is controverted by the employer....

order approving a lump sum settlement under section 440.20(12)(a) and (e), settling the claims arising

the judicial discretion provided for in Florida Statute 440.20(10) and Rule 16(d) (e) of the Rules promulgated

...(2) Payments of Benefits When Challenged Benefits Are Abandoned. When benefits’ challenged on appeal have been abandoned under- subdivision (d)(1) above, benefits no longer affected by the appeal are payable within 30 days of the service of the brief together with interest as- required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, from the date of the order of the lower tribunal making the award. (3) Payment of Benefits After Appeal. If benefits are ordered paid by the court on completion of the appeal, they shall be paid, together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, within 30 days after the court’s mandate....

...rk) and that consequently he was still entitled to compensation payments under the original award, pursuant to section 440.15(2), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A. The full commission apparently agreed with this view and ordered a hearing on the merits. Section 440.20,, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., provides, in respect to compensation, that “upon suspension of payment for any cause, the employer shall immediately notify the commission * * * that payment of compensation * * *' has been suspended * * *.” Subsection (3)....

shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20 of this chapter, or shall decline to pay a claim

...However, upon a review of the evidence he changed his testimony and gave her a 20% rating. Therefore, the deputy commissioner erred, understandably, in finding a 25% permanent partial disability. The deputy commissioner also erred in ordering both carriers to pay penalties. Section 440.20(5), Florida Statutes (1978), provides for a 20% penalty on compensation which is not timely paid unless a notice to controvert is filed....

...We have for review a decision on the following question of great public importance certified by the First District Court of Appeal in Department of Transportation v. Hogan, 777 So.2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999): WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(l)(e)(l), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS? We have jurisdiction....

...We have for review a decision on the following question of great public importance certified by the First District Court of Appeal in Conklin v. Ford, 737 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999): WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(l)(e)l, FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS? We have jurisdiction....

NIMMONS, Judge. In this workers’ compensation appeal, the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) initially found that the employer/carrier did not file a notice to controvert as required by Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1989), and that the claimant was entitled to a penalty assessment....

...ented claimants as opposed to unrepresented claimants. The statutory amendment relevant to this appeal took place in 2001, and that amended language remains, in relevant part, unchanged through the present. See Ch. 01-91, § 17, at 777, Laws of Fla. Section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, was amended to distinguish the process for approval of settlements reached with unrepresented claimants from the agreements reached with represented claimants. Section 440.20(ll)(a) now permits unrepresented claimants to settle their rights to future benefits “at any time in any case in which the employer or carrier has filed a written notice of denial within 120 days after the employer receives notice of...

...required to consider the settlement at a hearing and, thereafter, “may enter a compensation order approving and authorizing the discharge of the liability of the employer for compensation and remedial treatment ... by the payment of a lump sum.” § 440.20(ll)(a), Fla. Stat. Likewise, section 440.20(ll)(b)’s application is also limited to unrepresented claimants, and allows settlement of compensable claims, utilizing the same procedure, after the claimant reaches maximum medical improvement. Section 440.20(ll)(e) was added in 2001 and applies only to represented claimants. For represented claimants, “[t]he settlement agreement requires approval by the [JCC] only as to the attorney’s fees paid to the claimant’s attorney by the claimant.” § 440.20(ll)(c), Fla....

...tlement involving a represented claimant, and retained the requirement that settlements with unrepresented claimants be approved by the JCC, this court continued to rule that, in the instance of an unrepresented claimant, “[ajbsent compliance with 440.20(11), any agreement by the claimant to waive his right to workers’ compensation benefits [is] invalid.” See Vallecillo v....

...oving the requirement that the JCC approve the substantive aspect of settlements with represented claimants, held that a valid and enforceable agreement can be reached before, and without the necessity of, JCC approval, notwithstanding the fact that section 440.20(ll)(c) and (d) still require a JCC to approve attorney’s fees....

...1st DCA 2005) (holding represented employee’s execution of general release in civil suit against employer was sufficient to settle workers’ compensation claim, notwithstanding, as pointed out in dissent, there was “no indication that the parties complied with” section 440.20(ll)(c))....

...This court’s interpretation is long-standing, binding, and consistent with the general proscriptive treatment of settlements contained in section 440.21(2), Florida Statutes (“[a]n agreement by an employee to waive her or his right to compensation under this chapter is invalid.”), for which exceptions are created in section 440.20(1l)(a)-(e), Florida Statutes....

...E/C’s suggestion that somehow the mediation process altered or supplanted the statutory requirement that the JCC approve the settlement agreement before it is enforceable simply has no basis and appears crafted from whole cloth. As we made clear most recently in 2008, “[a]b-sent compliance with section 440.20(11), any agreement by the [unrepresented] claimant to waive his right to workers’ compensation benefits [is] invalid. See §§ 440.20(ll)(c) & 440.21(2), Fla....

...The Special Disability Trust Fund cross appealed on the issue of whether a lump sum advance extinguishes a claimant's right to supplemental benefits. Buono was injured in an industrial accident on February 8, 1981. As a result, he suffered permanent total disability. In November 1984, pursuant to section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ty benefits operates to discharge a claimant's right to supplemental benefits. Shipp v. Florida Workers' Compensation Trust Fund, 481 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). As stated in Shipp, "[o]nce a lump sum payment is authorized and received pursuant to § 440.20, a claimant has the option to invest the funds and offset the effects of inflation so that the purpose of supplemental benefits is satisfied." As a necessary corollary of Shipp, *54 the deputy commissioner should consider the loss of supplemental benefits in determining whether a proposed lump-sum advance meets the statutory criteria. The initial burden is on claimant, as movant, to establish the statutory criteria for a lump-sum advance under section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...It is the deputy's duty to weigh all evidence bearing on the statutory criteria and determine whether the lump-sum payment is in the best interest of the injured worker. If so, the deputy must next consider whether the lump-sum advance "will not materially prejudice the rights of the employer and carrier." § 440.20(13)(d), Fla....

...The deputy may receive additional evidence from the parties. This opinion should not be construed as any expression by the court on the ultimate decision to grant or deny the claim. REVERSED AND REMANDED. BOOTH, C.J., and NIMMONS, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The Employer and Carrier (E/C) appeal the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC), which found the claimant’s alleged work place injuries to be compen-sable because the E/C failed to timely comply with the 120-day pay and investigate provisions of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...The final hearing (originally scheduled for June 29, 2004) was held on November 9, 2004. The JCC erred in determining the E/C waived its right to challenge the compens-ability of claimant’s injuries based on failure to timely deny compensability pursuant to section 440.20(4)....

believe to be of great public importance: IS SECTION 440.20(7) APPLICABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS

...In this workers’ compensation case, Appellant challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying all requested benefits. In five issues on appeal, Appellant challenges the exclusion of evidence and the rejection of his argument based on the “120-day rule,” section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes....

QUINCE, J. We have for review a decision on the following question certified to be of great public importance: 1 WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(l)(e)l, FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS? HRS District II v....

...School Board of Pinellas County v. Mauri, IRC Order 2-3330 (1978). That portion of his order is reversed. We find no merit in appellant’s second point. The record contains competent substantial evidence to support the judge’s finding that the payments were not timely and Section 440.20(5) Florida Statutes (1977) provides for the assessment of penalties in such circumstances....

...The omissions and oversights found by the Judge amount to negligence, at the least. Reversed ‘End remanded for the Judge to award the attorney’s fee in accordance with his findings, and to order payment of interest on the untimely benefits according to Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1979).”), such a proceeding was indeed commenced and recognized without objection by the employer Gim-rock and its carrier. Only after the payment of over $2,000 in benefits and the claim had been terminated by a court-approved wash out settlement of an additional $10,000.00, see § 440.20(ll)(b), Fla....

...February 11, 2019 PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, the claimant, William Rente, seeks reversal of the order denying him benefits. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred by failing to complete the analysis required by case law and section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...ition.” The JCC did not, however, decide when the E/C had sufficient information to renew its investigation after receipt of the additional information in this case. 3  120-Day Rule Section 440.20(4) provides: If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide all benefits or compensation, the carrier shall immediately and in good faith commence investigation of the employee’s entitlement to benefits und...

...question their obligations to Rente, thus triggering the duty to “immediately and in good faith commence investigation of the employee’s entitlement to benefits under this chapter” and whether they denied compensability within 120 days thereafter. § 440.20(4), Fla....

settlement agreement. Pursuant to the provisions of section 440.20(ll)(c), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides

...Fornaris, Coral Gables, and Bill McCabe, Longwood, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. In this case, the trial court correctly found that appellants failed to deny compensability of appellee's workplace injury within 120 days "after the initial provision *288 of benefits." § 440.20(4), Fla....

...Where the employer/carrier seeks relief from the harshness of the 120-day "pay and investigate" provision, the burden is on the employer/carrier to demonstrate "material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period." § 440.20(4), Fla....

rather than “compensation” within the meaning of section 440.20, Florida Statutes.1 After a thorough review

the claims for temporary partial benefits. Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1991) provides for the

...Employer/carrier seek review of a workers' compensation order by which claimant's application for a lump-sum advance of all compensation payments was approved. We find no sufficient showing that such lump-sum payment would be in claimant's best interests as contemplated by § 440.20(13)(d), Florida Statutes, and we therefore reverse the order appealed....

...and concluded that a lump-sum advance of all compensation payments, with the proceeds applied toward the recommended financial plan, would be in claimant's best interests. The deputy therefore approved claimant's application for a lump-sum payment. Section 440.20(12)(a) expresses "the stated policy ... that it is in the best interests of the injured worker that he receive disability or wage-loss payments on a periodic basis." The statute nevertheless permits lump-sum payments in appropriate circumstances. Section 440.20(13)(d) provides for approval of a lump-sum application, despite an employer/carrier's opposition, upon a determination that it would be in the claimant's "best interests." While the deputy made such a finding in the present case, this...

...rney and authorizing her attorney to retain 20% of all benefits paid in trust to be applied toward the amount of an attorney’s fee, to be determined at a later date. There is no statutory or case law authority to support this portion of the order. Section 440.20(1), Florida Statutes (1977), directs that compensation shall be paid directly to the entitled person....

...course and the scope of employment,” and requiring that “the accidental compensable injury must be the major contributing cause of any resulting injuries” (emphases supplied)); § 440.192(8), Fla. Stat. (providing that a carrier’s failure to deny compensability under section 440.20(4) “is deemed to have accepted the employee’s injuries as compensable” (emphasis supplied)); § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat....

...would justify Employer’s taking a statutory 25 percent reduction in Claimant’s indemnity benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the JCC’s order restoring the 25 percent of compensation. Claimant cross-appeals the JCC’s refusal to assess penalties. Section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1991), requires an employer or carrier that “initially controverts the right to compensation” to file with the division, on or before the 21st day after having knowledge of the employee’s injury, a notice (o...

...Employer received notice of Claimant’s injury on the date of the accident. It is an employer/carrier’s burden to show that a claim has been sufficiently controverted. Four Quarters Habitat, Inc. v. Miller, 405 So.2d 475, 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Employer did not comply with the provisions of section 440.20(6). In that regard, the JCC correctly found that “a formal timely notice of denial was not filed with the division as required.” Claimant noted that Employer, in fact, never filed an actual notice to controvert. Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (1991), sets forth certain grounds for excusal of the statutory mandate (to pay a timely installment of compensation) if proper notice was filed under subsection (6) or where nonpayment of benefits due “results from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control.” A proper excusal will avoid assessment of the statutory penalty. No such uncontrollable conditions contemplated in section 440.20 were found in the instant case....

...Unless notice is filed under subsection (6), or failure to pay is found to be beyond the employer/carrier’s control, a punitive penalty shall be added if any installment of compensation for benefits “without an award” is not *226 paid “within 14 days after it becomes due.” § 440.20(7), Fla.Stat.; Friedman, 438 So.2d at 994 (affirming imposition of penalties with disability award, where notice to controvert was not timely filed)....

...1st DCA 1990), where claimant Santana was injured in March 1987 and immediately received disability benefits. However, for 16 two-week periods, his benefits were miscalculated, to his disadvantage. In August 1988, the employer/carrier accepted the error and issued a check for the difference. We construed section 440.20(7) & (9) as applying to situations where any installment is paid in part but the rest is withheld incorrectly....

...Claimant requested penalties in the claim for benefits and pretrial stipulation. Having established that Employer’s 25 percent offset equates to a failure to make timely payment of an installment,- Claimant has demonstrated a basis for assessment of penalties with interest. § 440.20(7) & (9), Fla.Stat....

...past-due compensation, reimbursement of taxable costs, and attorney’s fees. We reverse, however, that portion of the order denying statutory penalties, and remand to allow for imposition of penalties and interest due and payable in accordance with section 440.20, Florida Statutes....

...(“Claimant”) and related attorney fees and costs. The E/C argues the Judge of Compensation Claims (“JCC”) erred by, 1) barring, as a matter of law, its defense of major contributing cause (“MCC”); and 2) applying, sua sponte, the “120-Day Rule” pursuant to section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, as a limitation of available defenses....

...of “Affirmative Claims and Defenses.” 5  Prior to the merits hearing, pre-trial memoranda were filed by the parties setting out the claims and defenses. Claimant’s memorandum did not raise the “120- Day Rule” under section 440.20(4) or attach case law concerning its application or any mention of waiver....

...the E/C was precluded from raising MCC related defenses because: 1) Claimant’s prior arthritic knee condition could not be considered a contributing cause, as it did not qualify as a “preexisting condition” in accordance with case law; and 2) pursuant to “120-Day Rule” of section 440.20(4), the E/C waived the right to deny compensability of the preexisting arthritic condition....

...For the above reasons, we find that Claimant’s osteoarthritis qualified as a preexisting condition under section 440.09(1)(b), and its consideration in the MCC analysis appropriate. “The 120-Day Rule” Section 440.20(4), commonly referred to as the “120-Day Rule,” allows a carrier the option of paying and investigating a claim for up to 120 days. Further, a carrier who fails to deny compensability within that 120 days after the initial provision of benefits waives the right to deny compensability, unless material relevant facts could not have been discovered during the 120 day period. § 440.20(4). Once aware of the need for medical benefits for a particular condition or injury, the carrier has three options: pay, pay and investigate within 120 days, or deny....

...Snyder, 765 So. 2d at 754; Boyle v. JA Cummings, Inc., 212 So. 3d 1060, 1062-63 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (holding JCC erred by excluding adjuster’s testimony concerning specific identity of condition accepted as compensable as it related to application of subsection 440.20(4) to preexisting condition); McIntosh v....

...In School District of Hillsborough County v. Dickson, 67 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), nearly identical issues were addressed. This Court determined that the JCC violated the due process rights of the E/C by sua sponte raising waiver under subsection 440.20(4); specifically, by “mischaracterizing section 440.20(4) as ‘mandatory’ and ‘not in the nature of an affirmative defense,’ the JCC improperly denied the E/C the opportunity to establish material facts that could be used to prove it did timely deny benefits.” Id....

...60Q-6.113(2)(a),(h).3 We find no merit to Claimant’s argument that waiver was tried by consent due to inferences during closing arguments. Claimant argues the pretrial stipulation contained the “substance” of the waiver defense under section 440.20(4) and, as such, was properly raised....

...g condition itself. But, as in McFarlane, the trial memorandum was filed very shortly before the final hearing. Moreover, in the instant case, Claimant never expressly argued at any point that the preexisting condition was compensable pursuant to section 440.20(4). Conclusion We reverse the JCC’s determination that the E/C was barred, as a matter of law, from asserting a MCC defense regarding the left total knee replacement. Claimant’s preexisting osteoarthritis is a qualifying preexisting condition under section 440.09(1)(b). As an affirmative defense, the “120-Day Rule” pursuant to section 440.20(4), must be timely and specifically plead by a claimant and may not be raised, sua sponte, by the JCC....

...After a hearing, the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) entered an order finding that the parties had entered into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement. Neither the employer/carrier nor the claimant timely appealed this order. Thereafter, pursuant to sections 440.20(11)(c), 440.20(11)(d), and 440.20(11)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), the JCC entered an order approving the attorney's fee to be paid to the claimant's attorney by the claimant in the amount of $1,600....

...). The order did not address the payment of the additional fees. Claimant has appealed contending that the JCC should have also ordered the employer/carrier to pay claimant's attorney *630 the $4,000 which was part of the settlement agreement. Under section 440.20(11)(c), however, "[t]he settlement agreement requires approval by the JCC only as to the attorney's fees paid to the claimant's attorney by the claimant." Although, it is clear from the record before us that, as part of the negotiated...

...Employer/carrier seek review of a workers’ compensation order by which a section 440.15(9)(a), Florida Statutes, compensation offset for social security benefits was disallowed. Claimant is receiving compensation for permanent total disability which employer/carrier is paying on a biweekly basis as allowed by section 440.20(2), Florida Statutes....

permanent and total disability benefits pursuant to Section 440.20(13), Florida Statutes (1979). Record evidence

...' The deputy also found against claimant on her argument that the failure of the deputy entering the lump sum payment order to comply with Commission Rule 16(g) invalidated that order. Rule 16(g) requires that, before entering a lump sum settlement order under the second sentence of Sec. 440.20(10), F.S.A., the deputy refer the claimant to the rehabilitation department of the commission for recommendation as to the advisability of such a lump sum settlement....

...The commission reversed this part of the deputy’s order on two grounds. First, it reasoned that the stipulation on which the lump sum payment order was entered was not a “joint petition of all interested parties” as required for a “wash out” order under the second sentence of Sec. 440.20(10), F.S.A....

...ployer did not sign it. Were it not for the provisions of the stipulation itself, we would be inclined to agree with the Full Commission that the “lump sum” settlement order was not immune from modification or review under Section 440.28, supra. Section 440.20(10) provides for two kinds of lump sum payment orders....

...’s order except for the award of wage loss benefits that constitute a lump sum advance. The DC’s order providing “wage loss benefits from March 13, 1987, for two years bringing all payments current in one lump sum ...” is in contravention of section 440.20(4), Fla.Stat....

...tion Law deputy commissioners have no jurisdiction beyond that specifically conferred by statute, and that they have no-authority to adjudicate’ an application for a lump sum payment in lieu of installment payments. We further held that under Sec. 440.20(10), F.S., F.S.A., it is the sole prerogative of the Full Commission to adjudicate such applications, although the Commission may delegate to a deputy commissioner or any other duly authorized representative or subordinate agent the duty of co...

...The only other point for determination is whether the order of the Full Commission operates as a final adjudication and denial of petitioner’s attempt, as successor in interest of the employee, to receive a lump sum payment under the provisions of Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, F.S....

...1st DCA 1998), approved, 755 So.2d 597 (Fla.1999), should be applied retroactively to the computation of the permanent total disability benefits payable to appellee Richard McGrath, claimant below. We affirm. In Acker, this court held that, where an employer/carrier 1 takes a workers’ compensation offset under section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1985), and initially includes supplemental benefits paid under section 440.15(l)(e)(l), Florida Statutes (1985), the employer/carrier is not entitled to recalculate the offset amount to include increases in supplemental benefits....

...1st DCA 1992); City of Daytona Beach v. Amsel, 585 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We certify to the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great public importance the following question which was certified in City of Miami v. Bell, supra at 2184: IS SECTION 440.20(7) APPLICABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, AND IF SO, CAN THE CITY OF MIAMI BE LEGALLY EXCUSED FROM PAYING A PENALTY PURSUANT TO THAT SECTION ON THE AMOUNT OF PENSION OFFSET MONIES WITHHELD IN THE PAST BECAUSE THE CITY DID SO...

compensable, filing a “120-day” letter under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, reserving its right to

...e the result of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs she took on doctors’ orders, because of injuries she sustained in the fall. Eventually she and her employer entered into a stipulation in order to effect a “washout” settlement, pursuant to section 440.20(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (1987). We reverse the order on appeal in which a successor judge of compensation claims found that the section 440.20(12) order adopting the parties’ stipulation did not authorize treatment for Ms....

...MeTier’s hypertension and renal insufficiency. The washout order is not subject to modification under section 440.28, Florida Statutes, insofar as it discharges the employer and carrier from liability for future payments of compensation, death benefits and rehabilitation expenses, § 440.20(12), Fla....

...*1295 The point at which the Division has notice of the asserted right to benefits and must begin its independent investigation appears to us the only logical point at which to end the worker’s attorney’s right to a fee for deposition attendance. Under Section 440.20(10)(b), the Division must investigate, hold hearings, and take other appropriate action when an employer files a notice to controvert claimed compensation....

formal notice to controvert had not been filed. Section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes, requires that a notice

...benefits (PFBs), and dismissing those PFBs with prejudice. The premise of the motion to dismiss is that the parties entered into a “global” settlement agreement — one for which the JCC had already approved the attorney’s fees as required by section 440.20(1l)(c), Florida Statutes — and thus that the E/C’s liability under the Workers’ Compensation Law had been released....

...tisfied all sums due under the agreement. By all appearances, the JCC concluded that, as a matter of law, the agreement released the E/C from all liability under chapter 440 because (as the parties concede) the agreement was entered into pursuant to section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes....

the period in question and that, pursuant to section 440.-20(15), Florida Statutes, the only gratuitous

...We reverse. A lump-sum advance is not properly awarded before a claimant has reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). Butler’s Dairy, Inc. v. Honeycutt, 432 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); City of St. Petersburg Beach v. Harper, 8 FCR 333 (1974); Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

PER CURIAM. REVERSED. See § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994); see also Franklin v. Northwest Airlines

...Claimant has also required gall bladder surgery and treatment for a polyp, which, though not related to his industrial injury, have added to his financial difficulties. On October 8, 1985, claimant applied for an advance payment of disability benefits pursuant to Section 440.20(13)(d), Florida Statutes....

...Guthrie, 473 So.2d 806, 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). .The statutory scheme contemplates “the determination of wage-loss benefits on a month-to-month basis in which each month constitutes a separate claim.” National Distillers v. Guthrie, 473 So.2d at 808 . See also s. 440.20(4), Fla.Stat....

...nefits due appellant in accordance with a settlement agreement. We affirm. On December 4, 1981, when appellant’s claim for benefits was presented to the deputy commissioner for final hearing, the parties presented a washout settlement, pursuant to Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), the terms of which were set forth on the record before the deputy commissioner....

...eputy announced at the December 4 hearing that the settlement was final at that time and because the settlement was validated by having been dictated on the record, 1 the twenty-day time period during which benefits should have been paid pursuant to Section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978) began to run on December 5 and thus had expired by the time payment was received on January 5....

...Thus, the time period began to run as of that date. We agree with the deputy commissioner that the obligation to pay benefits arose on the date copies of the order were mailed to the parties, as provided in Section 440.-25(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978). Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Payment was made by appellee within twenty days of the date of the mailing of deputy commissioner’s order. Therefore, payment was made timely and penalties, interest, and attorney’s fees are not due appellant. AFFIRMED. JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. . Fla.W.C.R.P. 13 (1981). . Section 440.20(6), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1978) provided that penalties are due if compensation benefits are not paid within twenty days of an award. Section 440.20(7), Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1978) provided for the payment of interest when compensation is not paid timely. Section 440.20(8), Fla.Stat. (1981) provides that penalties are owed if payment is not made within thirty days of an award. The provision for interest now is contained in Section 440.20(9), Fla.Stat. (1981). .Now codified in 440.20(12)(b), Fla.Stat....

...(2) Payments of Benefits When Challenged Benefits Are Abandoned. When benefits challenged on appeal have been abandoned under subdivision (d)(1) above, benefits no longer affected by the appeal are payable within 30 days of the service of the brief together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, from the date of the order of the lower tribunal making the award. (3)Payment of Benefits After Appeal. If benefits are ordered paid by the court on completion of the appeal, they shall be paid, together with interest as required under section 440.20, Florida Statutes, within 30 days after the court’s mandate....

...d such fees are made a lien upon compensation benefits awarded the claimant. § 440.-34(4), Fla.Stat. As a matter of “stated policy,” the present act encourages periodic payment of *569 benefits to claimants and discourages lump-sum settlements. § 440.20(12), Fla....

...When the claimant seeks an advance payment, as in this case, the deputy commissioner must determine, based upon competent, substantial evidence, that such advance is in the best interest of the claimant, is reasonable under the circumstances, and will not materially prejudice the rights of the employer and carrier. § 440.20(13)(d), Fla.Stat....

...nefits; both documents requested treatment with a cardiologist and a determination of Appellant’s average weekly wage and compensation rate (AWW/CR). Appellee, in response to the request for benefits, filed a pay and investigate letter pursuant to section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes....

...The order is affirmed except as to the award of interest to which the appellee confesses error. Paragraph C. of the decre-tal portion of the order is accordingly stricken and the cause is remanded to the Judge of Industrial Claims with directions that he reconsidered his award of interest in light of § 440.20(7), Florida Statutes....

...COMMENTS: 1979 Committee Note: This replaces rule 12, 1977 W.C.R.P. RULE 4.131. SETTLEMENT OF PROSPECTIVE BENEFITS In any proceeding in which the parties undertake to compromise or release the prospective entitlement of the employee to any class of benefits pursuant to Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes: (a) The parties shall submit their agreement in writing executed by all attorneys of record and by the employee....

...on 440-20(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes. ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR FUTURE PAYMENTS OF COMPENSATION, REHABILITATION EXPENSES, OR DEATH BENEFITS BUT EXCLUDING MEDICAL EXPENSES The joint petition and stipulation for settlement pursuant to Section 440.20(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 4.131, Florida Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure, having come before the undersigned upon due notice to the parties and their counsel; and having reviewed the joint petition and stipu...

...Mail on each party and counsel at the address listed above on_, 19_ Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner II. Settlements pursuant to Section 440.-20(12)(b), Florida Statutes. ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR ALL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.20(12)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES The joint petition and stipulation for settlement pursuant to Section 440.20(12)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rule 4.131, Fla.W.C....

...Mail on each party and counsel at the address listed above on_, 19_ Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner III. Settlements pursuant to Section 440.-20(10), Florida Statutes, 1978. ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM LIABILITY FOR PAYMENTS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.20(10), FLORIDA STATUTES, 1978 (PRE-AUGUST 1, 1979 DATE OF ACCIDENT) The joint petition and stipulation for settlement pursuant to Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, 1978, and Rule 4.131, Florida Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure, having come before the undersigned upon due notice to the parties and their counsel; and having reviewed the joint petition and stipulatio...

...ed penalties, stating, “[I]t appears ... there was an error in the order and the parties were unsure as to the applicable average weekly wage. This was arranged and agreed to and the benefits were paid within thirty (30) days of that agreement.” Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1981), states unequivocally: “If any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within 30 days after it *1179 becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to...

...of the April 9, 1984 order, could not serve to stay the enforceability of the compensation order. Moreover, we do not construe the May 7 letter or any other action taken by the parties thereafter to preclude the deputy from assessing penalties under section 440.20(8)....

...ed in Barragan. See, City of Miami v. Bell, 606 So.2d 1183, 1192, n. 7 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Other decisions of this court have addressed this issue. In Belle v. General Electnc Company, 409 So.2d 182, 184, n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), the court stated: Section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1979), is a substantial codification of former industrial relations commission rule 9, referred to in Brown, 305 So.2d at 193 . See also, Dept. of Highway Safety, etc. v. McBride, 420 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), "[t]he rulings in Hoagey [Jewel Tea] and Brown effectively synthesize the interplay between § 440.21 and § 440.10(15) [F.S.]...." Section 440.20(15), which incorporates former rule 9 mentioned in Brown , was enacted into law in 1977 as section 440.20(13), later renumbered to § 440.20(15), and by amendment in 1994, Chapter 93-415, Section 26, Laws of Florida, was again renumbered as section 440.20(14)....

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from an order of the trial court enforcing the payment of workmen’s compensation benefits to the appel-lee. We find no error by the trial court except in assessing a 20% penalty against the appellant under Section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1977), for failure to pay a past due medical bill. The penalty provisions of Section 440.20(6) are only applicable to the money allowance payable to an employee as a consequence of his injury and are not applicable to past due medical expenses....

...She does not appeal that ruling. Rather, she argues that the Employer/Carrier (E/C) were obligated to pay for her hospitalization that occurred before the E/C denied compensability and after the E/C began providing benefits under the 120-day rule of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2014)....

...vidence of causation and Dr. Kerr’s office note regarding the presence of a well-developed infection only one day after the alleged accident. Pay And Investigate. The “pay-and-investigate” rule of Subsection 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2014), provides as follows (emphasis added): If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide all benefits or compensation, the carrier shall immediately and in good faith commence inve...

...A merely internal intent or decision to deny a claim does not satisfy the requirement of advising the employee, and therefore the denial here occurred on March 17 when the E/C advised Claimant of the denial. We reverse the JCC’s ruling to the contrary. Under subsection 440.20(4), the E/C were required to pay all benefits due “as if the claim had been accepted as compensable” until the date of denial.∗ However, the E/C retained the right to challenge other issues relevant to Claimant’s entitlement to benefits, including major contributing cause. Trimble, 929 So. 2d at 689-90; see also Sch. Dist. of Hillsborough Cty. v. Dickson, 67 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding section 440.20(4) does not preclude E/C from challenging claimant’s entitlement to benefits on other grounds particularly including major contributing cause). Emergency Care. The pay-and-investigate rule does not resolve this case, however. The E/C were entitled to an opportunity to give prior authorization for the care under at least two statutory provisions. First, a referral from one health care provider to another ∗ It should be noted that prior to October 1, 2003, subsection 440.20(4) permitted an E/C the option of paying some benefits while they investigated the claim....

...Stat. (2005)). The care here is considered compensable under the 120-day pay-and- investigate rule because the statute requires benefits to be provided during the investigatory period “as if the claim had been accepted as compensable.” § 440.20(4), Fla....

...In so ruling, we note that the voluntary dismissal claimant filed in April 1997, relating to the pain-management claim included in the 1996 petition for benefits, acted to dismiss the entire petition. See Perez v. Winn-Dixie, 639 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). We reverse, however, the denial of penalties authorized by section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), because the employer/carrier (E/C) failed to pay temporary total disability (TTD) benefits that were awarded for the period from March 5 to May 27, 1999, pursuant to a second petition for benefits filed on April 23, 1999....

...1st DCA *596 2000), an E/C can no longer avoid penalties under the 1994 statute simply by filing a notice of denial within 14 days of a claim. Rather, the E/C must either pay the benefits within seven days or exercise the 120-day pay-and-investigate option under section 440.20(4). Here, the E/C did neither, yet it contends on appeal, based on section 440.20(6) and Burnham , that penalties are not due, because it was unaware of claimant’s surgery on March 5, 1999, and thus nonpayment resulted from conditions over which it had no control....

...isability, it was on notice of the TTD claim, based upon the petition for benefits claimant had executed on April 23, 1999, and filed -with the Division on May 10, 1999.. Because the E/C did not pay the TTD benefits within seven days, as required by section 440.20(6), or exercise the 120-day pay-and-investigate option under section 440.20(4), it appears that the JCC should have awarded penalties under section 440.20(6)....

JOANOS, Judge. In these consolidated workers' compensation appeals the determinative issue is whether Section 440.20(13)(d), Florida Statutes (1983) [effective July 1, 1983], is a procedural enactment which would be applicable irrespective of the date of injury. We find that it is not. Our conclusion is required by Sullivan v. Mayo, 121 So.2d 424 (Fla.1960). The 1983 Legislature amended Section 440.20(13)(d) to limit advance payments opposed by the employer and carrier to $7,500.00 or 26 weeks of benefits in any 48-month period, whichever is greater, from the date of the last advance payment. Prior to the 1983 amendment there was no such limitation. Additionally, in 1983, the discount rate for determining the present value of future benefits was raised to 8-percent from the previous rate of 4-per-cent. Section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Likewise, a claimant’s substantive right to seek lump-sum payment to release the employer and carrier from liability cannot be abridged by retrospective application of an enactment limiting the amount of lump-sum advance payments. The 1983 amendment to Section 440.20(13)(d) effectively precludes “wash-out” lump-sum advance payments in excess of the statutory limits since only when the parties stipulate to such an advance, subject to division and deputy commissioner approval, would an advance above the statutory limitation be allowed....

...found the 1983 amendment to be a procedural enactment, allowing retrospective application to Weinstein’s accident which occurred on August 20, 1980 and denying payment in excess of the statutory limits. Our determination that the 1983 amendment to Section 440.20(13)(d) affects substantive rights and, therefore, cannot be retrospectively applied to accidents occurring prior to its effective date, requires that the deputy commissioner’s order be reversed and that the cause be remanded for consideration under the law in effect at the time of Weinstein’s accident....

property. The deputy commissioner found that Section 440.-20(13)(d), Florida Statutes (1983), imposing a

Appellees waived the right to deny compensability. See § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (requiring a carrier to deny a

JCC ruled that the settlement was contrary to section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (1993), insofar as it

denial of the claim for penalties pursuant to § 440.20(7), Florida Statutes. Appellee concedes that claimant

...Notably, the E/C’s provision of medical care for the back condition, in the absence of a subsequent denial of compensability within 120 days of the initial provision of care for this same condition, precludes any challenge to com-pensability of the condition. See § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (2004); Ch. 93-415, § 26, at 139, Laws of Fla. (creating section 440.20(4))....

conceded by the employer/carrier as being late.. § 440.-20, Fla.Stat. (1981). JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur

...aims ("JCC") denying his claim for continued palliative care for a November 2002 injury. He claims the JCC reversibly erred in finding the E/C satisfied its burden of proving a break in the causal chain and by failing to find waiver by the E/C under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes....

...aims ("JCC") denying his claim for continued palliative care for a November 2002 injury. He claims the JCC reversibly erred in finding the E/C satisfied its burden of proving a break in the causal chain and by failing to find waiver by the E/C under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes....

...(“JCC”) denying his claim for continued palliative care for a November 2002 injury. He claims the JCC reversibly erred in finding the E/C satisfied its burden of proving a break in the causal chain and by failing to find waiver by the E/C under section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes....

...n 30 days. Therefore, although the judge of compensation claims erroneously extended the 30-day period by five days pursuant to Rule 4.030(c), Florida Rules of Workers’ Compensation Procedure, the judge properly assessed a 20 percent penalty under section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...the most generous compensation benefits, which would be the amount available to the claimant had she filed her entire claim in such state in the first instance. II. Claimant has also argued that the overpayment should be considered a gratuity under section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides that “[a]ny payment by the employer over and above compensation paid or awarded ......

...We affirm in part and reverse in part for the following reasons. The Employer/Carrier (E/C) first argues the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in the method he employed in directing its recoupment of an advance payment of compensation made to Claimant pursuant to section 440.20(12)(c)l., Florida Statutes (2010)....

...supplemental benefits would be discontinued, and that the social security offset would apply. Accordingly the e/e argues that the deputy could not make a reasoned decision that the lump sum advance was in claimant’s best interests, as required by section 440.20(12)(a). We agree. Section 440.15(l)(e)(l), when read in pari materia with Section 440.20(12)(a), 1 provides that a lump sum payment of all PTD benefits operates to discharge a claimant’s right to supplemental benefits....

...ny circumstances exceed eighty percent of his average weekly wage, which at the time of the accident would have been $103.26, would substantially eviscerate the purpose of providing claimants with lump sum advances under the circumstances allowed by section 440.20(12)....

...While recognizing that the social security offset is not under section 440.15(10) applicable to lump sum advances, we do not mean to say that it is not a relevant factor to be considered in determining whether the lump sum advance is, as provided in section 440.20(12)(a), in claimant’s best interests, since § 224(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C....

...nature and purpose of the payment rather than the words used to describe it...” Larson, at 18-27. The key inquiry then is whether it can be said that a “claimant gives up in exchange for the settlement ... his right to periodic payments.” Id. Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that lump sum payments are made “in exchange for the employer’s or carrier’s release from liability for future payments of compensation.” (emphasis supplied) We therefore regard that lu...

...ximum weekly compensation rate set forth in s. 440.12(2). Such additional benefits shall be paid out of the Workers’ Compensation Administration Trust Fund. This applies to payments due after October 1, 1974. (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted) Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: It is the stated policy for the administration of the workers' compensation system that it is in the best interests of the injured worker that he receive disability or wage-loss payments on a periodic basis....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, St. Lucie School Board and its carrier, EMI, appeal an order granting total knee replacement benefits on the authority of the so-called 120-day rule, section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...This request was denied on the ground that the workplace accident was not the major contributing cause of the need for such surgery. Fuller filed a claim for such a procedure, arguing the employer and carrier were estopped to deny authorization by operation of section 440.20(4), the 120-day rule....

...When considering the claim for knee replacement surgery, the judge of compensation claims did not have before him our *43 en banc decision in Checkers Restaurant v. Wiethoff, 925 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In Checkers, we explained that the waiver of the right to deny compensability provided in section 440.20(4) does not necessarily establish an entitlement to benefits and that the statute “does not preclude the E/C from challenging the claimant’s entitlement to benefits, by contending that the injuries resulting from the industrial acc...

...In this workers’ compensation appeal, St. Lucie County School Board and EMI, its carrier, appeal a final order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) granting medical benefits to Sharon Richards, appellee and claimant below, under the so-called 120-day rule, section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...hat the accident is not the major contributing cause of Richards’ need for medical treatment. At the merits hearing which followed, Richards indicated in her opening remarks that benefits were being sought pursuant to the 120-day rule, codified at section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2002), among other grounds....

...The deputy concluded that the lump sum award was in claimant's best interests, and the failure to make the award would prolong undue expense and undue hardship to claimant. The total award of $99,043.88 based on claimant's 25.7 year life expectancy was approved. Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1979) provides: It is the stated policy for the administration of the workers' compensation system that it is in the best interests of the injured worker that he receive disability or wage-loss payments on a periodic basis....

...full life expectancy, the payment is made "in exchange for the employer's or carrier's release *1292 from liability for future payments of compensation." The deputy's conclusions in paragraphs nine and ten of the order were therefore in error. While Section 440.20 also discusses partial lump sum advances, it is clear this is not the result of the deputy's order in this case. Because of the deputy's misconception regarding the effect of the lump sum payment ordered in this case, we reverse and remand for reconsideration in light of this opinion. We also emphasize that Section 440.20(12)(a) contains a strong policy statement against lump sum payment, Kissimmee Construction Co....

...ll benefits. REVERSED and REMANDED. ERVIN and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING JOANOS, Judge. Appellee claimant, Monie B. Powell, has moved for rehearing. She has urged that this court's opinion is in error because of its reliance upon Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). She argues that the order being reviewed pertained to a "lump sum advance" instead of a "washout". She urges that only "washouts" are subject to the language of 440.20(12)(a) and that the matter on review was not a "washout" because it was not "......

...d permanent impairment workers’ compensation benefits. On cross-appeal, claimant argues that the judge of compensation claims erred in denying her claim that a penalty should be added to the temporary total disability benefits awarded, pursuant to section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...r competent substantial evidence supports the decision below, not whether it is possible to recite contradictory record evidence which supported the arguments rejected below.”). On the cross-appeal, we reverse the denial of penalties called for by section 440.20(6), and remand with directions that all penalties be imposed....

PER CURIAM. An attorney’s fee is not “compensation” within the meaning of section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (1991)....

Kirk, 177 So.2d 329, 330 (Fla.1965), construed Section 440.20(5)1 “to apply only to delinquent payments of

erred by overturning a penalty awarded under Section 440.20, Florida Statutes 1967, F.S.A. As to the first

affirmed. SHIVERS and LILES, JJ., concur. . Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1979 amendment).

...nt respiratory distress and certain other complications. Following intensive care and hospitalization, claimant returned to work on August 1, 1971. By Order of March 27, 1972, the Judge of Industrial Claims approved a lump sum settlement pursuant to § 440.20(10), F.S....

...d on grounds that no benefits are due, because on March 27, 1972, Michael Lupola, the deceased employee while alive was granted a lump sum settlement pursuant to a joint petition for settlement executed by him prior to his demise under provisions of Section 440.20(10)." * * * * * * "5....

...ct claim for death benefits which is an independent right, derived from the Statute and not from the rights of the decedent. Accordingly, death benefits are not affected by the joint petition, and stipulation approved by order of March 27, 1972...." Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, the "washout settlement" statute, upon which the parties' joint petition and stipulation for settlement was based, provides: "Upon the application of any party in interest and after giving due consideration to th...

...in return for the present lump sum payment to the employee. In the case sub judice, there is no doubt that both parties understood quite well the import of entering such an agreement. The parties' "Joint Petition for Settlement and Lump Sum Under F.S. 440.20(10)" provided, in pertinent part: "6....

...That it appears for the best interest of the employee that the above payments be made in a lump sum. "7. That the Order of the Judge of Industrial Claims in approving this Joint Petition and Stipulation shall not be subject to modification or review under F.S. 440.20(10). (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, we must conclude that the Judge of Industrial Claims erred in holding that the claim for death benefits under Section 440.16 was not "washed-out" by the settlement entered into under Section 440.20(10). It is clear, and we so hold, that a Section 440.20(10) "washout" settlement, freely entered into by both parties, releases the employer/carrier from responsibility for any further or future benefits of any nature under the Workmen's Compensation Act and, more specifically, under Section 440.16....

...death to the industrial accident and the majority opinion's correction of the erroneous conclusions of the J.I.C. and the Commission. Emphasis should have been placed upon the "probability of death of the injured employee" as a special circumstance (Section 440.20(10), F.S.) in passing upon the widow's claim by an appropriate evidentiary finding.

...nt respiratory distress and certain other complications. Following intensive care and hospitalization, claimant returned to work on August 1, 1971. By Order of March 27, 1972, the Judge of Industrial Claims approved a lump sum settlement pursuant to § 440.20(10), F.S....

...d on grounds that no benefits are due, because on March 27, 1972, Michael Lupola, the deceased employee while alive was granted a lump sum settlement pursuant to a joint petition for settlement executed by him prior to his demise under provisions of Section 440.20(10).” >}í sji i¡< “5....

...m for death benefits which is an independent right, derived from the Statute and not from the rights of the decedent. Accordingly, death benefits are not affected by the joint petition, and stipulation approved by order of March 27, 1972 . . . . ” Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, the “washout settlement” statute, upon which the parties’ joint petition and stipulation for settlement was based, provides: “Upon the application of any party in interest and after giving due considerati...

...return for the present lump sum payment to the employee. In the case sub judice, there is no doubt that both parties understood quite well the import of entering such an agreement. The parties’ “Joint Petition for Settlement and Lump Sum Under F.S. 440.20(10)” provided, in pertinent part: “6....

...That it appears for the best interest of the employee that the above payments be made in a hemp sum. “7. That the Order of the Judge of Industrial Claims in approving this Joint Petition and Stipulation shall not be subject to modification or review under F.S. 440.20(10)....

...(Emphasis supplied.) Thus, we must conclude that the Judge of Industrial Claims erred in holding that the claim for death benefits under Section 440.16 was not “washed-out” by the settlement entered into under Section 440.-20(10). It is clear, and we so hold, that a Section 440.20(10) “washout” settlement, freely entered into by both parties, releases the employer/carrier from responsibility for any further or future benefits of any nature under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and, more specifically, under Section 440.16....

...Subsequently, the parties applied to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, through the Deputy Commissioner at St. Petersburg, for approval of the payment previously made, and for authority to pay the remainder of the disability benefits in a lump sum. “Lump sum” payments were provided for by Section 440.20(10), Fla.Stat.1957, F.S.A....

...058-335, it appears that an employee of the State Road Department was injured and received an award of weekly benefits for the period beginning December 16, 1957 and ending July 3, 1959. The compensation was paid in advance in a lump sum under the provisions of Sec. 440.20(10)....

...provider. See Gallagher Bassett v. Laber, 722 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). However, we determine that this error was harmless in light of the JCC’s determination that the employer/carrier was precluded from challenging compensability pursuant to section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...workers’ compensation benefits as its exclusive remedy in the settlement of the workers’ compensation claim and had received all workers’ compensation benefits owed under Part I of the policy; (2) the Estate’s claim was excluded by the 6 Under Florida Statute § 440.20(11)(c), a workers’ compensation claimant, if counseled, may waive any and all rights under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act by entering into a settlement agreement releasing the employer and the insurance carrier from liability for workers’ compensation benefits in exchange for a lump-sum payment. A judge of compensation claims must approve the settlement to the extent attorney’s fees are paid to the claimant’s attorney and to ensure the settlement allocates for recovery of child support arrearages. See Fla. Stat. § 440.20(11)(c), (d). 7 The Estate’s suit also included a declaratory judgment claim and a bad faith claim....

...§ 55.-03(1), Florida Statutes; § 687.01, Florida Statutes; Miami-Dade Water & Sewer Authority v. Caravasios, 377 So.2d 56 (Fla.lst DCA 1979); Parker v. Brinson Construction Co., 78 So.2d 873 (Fla.1955). As to interest, if any, on benefits accruing after July 1,1978, which is the effective date of § 440.20(9), Florida Statutes, appellee here (as in Miami-Dade Water & Sewer Authority v....

...Concrete Sciences, Inc., 394 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The responsibility of the judge in considering a settlement agreement is not to perform a perfunctory, mechanical act. Brantley v. A.D.H. Building Contractors, Inc., 215 So.2d 297 (Fla.1968). Rather, section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (1989), requires the judge to perform several acts prior to approving a lump-sum settlement agreement, including reviewing the division file, determining whether a lump-sum payment in exchange for the employer and...

...1st DCA 1985) (“[T]he parties’ failure to inform the deputy of the facts necessary for a true evaluation of the circumstances bearing on the claimant’s condition prevented the deputy from being able to perform his statutory duty in furtherance of the public policy expressed in Section 440.20(12)(a).”)....

...excess of $5,350? We accept the question stated by the majority of the Commission, being substantially in accord with that stated by petitioner, as being the primary question presented. We do this because our answer comprehends all questions argued. Section 440.20(13), Florida Statutes 1945, F.S.A., provides: “The total compensation payable under this chapter for disability and death shall in no event exceed the sum of five thousand dollars in addition to any benefits under § 440.13 for medic...

...eath shall continue until the limit upon such benefits fixed in this workmen’s compensation law is reached.” From this it seems evident that the legislature, in authorizing progressive increase in total compensation greater than that provided in § 440.20(13) which limits compensation recoverable to $5,000, did not intend to compensate a claimant greater than that said amount....

...We affirm the award of the advance because competent substantial evidence supports the JCC’s finding that Claimant has been unable to return to the same or equivalent employment, one of the three alternative statutory requisites for an award of an advance of $2,000 or less. See § 440.20(12)(c), Fla....