Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...which permits such an award. The E/C asserts, however, that citation to that section in both of their motions, and in both of the JCC's summary final orders, was a scrivener's error. The E/C contends the proper statutory basis for awarding costs was section 440.32, Florida Statutes. Section 440.32(1) provides for an award of costs if the JCC "determines that the proceedings in respect of such claim or order have been instituted or continued without reasonable ground...." Section 440.32(2) provides for an award of costs if the JCC "determines that the proceedings were maintained or continued frivolously...." However, in neither of the E/C's motions for summary final order did the E/C assert Claimant's PFBs included cl...

...1st DCA 1998) (holding this court will not reverse a JCC's order for a readily correctable technical error that the JCC was not asked to correct within the time available for correction). Consequently, to the extent, if any, the JCC erred in not awarding costs pursuant to section 440.32, Florida Statutes, the error was invited by the E/C....

...e. Because we find that claimant is making a good faith effort to resolve the alleged wrong of offsetting workers' compensation benefits against pension benefits, we deny the appellee's motion to dismiss and its motion for fees and costs pursuant to section 440.32, Florida Statutes....

...In September 2011, by which time all Claimant’s other treating medical professionals had also placed Claimant at MMI, Claimant filed a petition for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits based on the January 14, 2011, date of MMI; the petition necessarily, under section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes (2004), averred that Claimant had reached MMI....

...ht to dismiss voluntarily and without penalty his claim at any time before he presents his case-in-chief. Those cases permit a party to dismiss a claim under such circumstances and subsequently refile it, but they do not involve an interpretation of Section 440.32, empowering a judge to assess costs against a party who has continued the proceeding “without reasonable ground.” It is one thing to say that a worker’s claim will not be jeopardized before he establishes his case; it is an altog...

...continued, and then finesses the denial by simply dismissing the claim, and later refiles it, thereby in effect achieving that which he was denied. The anomalous result urged by claimant cannot have been intended by the legislature’s enactment of Section 440.32....

...levying sanctions against the indolent party. We refuse to accept a construction of the statute which in effect places control over the progress of worker’s claims not in the deputy commissioners, but at the whim of the litigants. We conclude that Section 440.32 may logically be interpreted as authorizing the assessment of costs against one who, without reasonable grounds, seeks a continuance of a hearing and, upon its denial, dismisses the claim only to refile it....

...After receiving the petition feom-fee- division, the docketing judge shall promptly r-evievMdie Upon receipt, the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims shall review each petition and attachments to determine if the requirements of sections 440.192 and 440.32(3), Florida Statutes, have been met and the matters in dispute have been acted on- by the EAO....

...— Judge -of-Com-pensatioa- ClaimsT, Committee Notes 1996 Adoption. The docketing judge’s ruling on specificity under section 440.192, Florida Statutes, or on the issue of whether the allegations contained in the petition were well grounded as required under section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes, is not a final determination on either issue....

...iss for lack of specificity or for failure to exhaust EAO remedies may be filed with the presiding judge. The same is true for a motion to strike or dismiss the petition for lack of an appropriate signature or for a motion to impose a sanction under section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes....

...Subpoenas will be issued on request of the parties or their counsel. If any party or legally subpoenaed witness fails to appear at the time and place set for the hearing, sanctions under rule 4.150 may be imposed or punitive actions authorized under sections 440.32 and 440.33, Florida Statutes, may be initiated....

...Nor did the claimant petition the deputy to modify the November 12, 1982 order to allow reauthorization of Dr. Grossman. Nevertheless, the deputy granted Dr. Grossman’s request for payment of the disputed medical bills, and also granted Dr. Grossman’s requests for attorney’s fees and costs filed pursuant to Section 440.32 and 440.34, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Grossman’s medical bills in error would preclude recovery of any attorney's fees. United Telephone Company of Florida v. Wooten, 468 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Likewise, in light of our disposition of this case, the deputy erred in assessing costs against the E/C. See, Section 440.32, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...As the totality of the evidence indicates claimant was able to work during the period of time in question, we affirm the Commissioner’s findings. See Superior Pontiac v. Hearn, 458 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Last, we find that the Commissioner erred in assessing costs against the claimant. Section 440.32, Florida Statutes (1983) provides a Commissioner with the authority to assess costs against a party who institutes or continues a proceeding without “reasonable ground.” Although claimant may not have prevailed before the Commissioner, she had reasonable grounds to institute the action....

...Aetna Insurance Company, 445 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), where the claimant’s first injury was compensable, and hence reimbursable between carriers. See also Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Authority, et al. v. Leech, 447 So.2d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (same). Section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes (1981), by its terms requires that the first accident of two or more accidents creating a potential for reimbursement must be compensable in order to trigger liability between carriers....

...0 with an additional sanction or remedy. The essentially self-contained workers’ compensation law in chapter 440 already provides a host of specific sanctions and remedies which includes attorney’s fees for frivolous claims and defenses under section 440.32, Florida Statutes (2011)....

...Committee Notes 1988 Adoption. This rule is intended to standardize the form of pleadings and the preparation of documents by counsel for the use of the deputy commissioner. 1995 Amendment. Aligns pleadings in workers’ compensation matters with those in the court system. Section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes, requires that every pleading be signed by the attorney of record regardless of whether the claimant or petitioner executes the pleading....

...the appropriate district. Committee Notes 1995 Adoption. The docketing judge’s ruling on specificity under section 440.192, Florida Statutes, or on the issue of whether the allegations contained in the petition were well grounded as required under section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes, is not a final determination on either issue....

...iss for lack of specificity or for failure to exhaust EAO remedies may be filed with the presiding judge. The same is true for a motion to strike or dismiss the petition for lack of an appropriate signature or for a motion to impose a sanction under section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes....

...Subpoenas- will be issued on request of the parties or their counsel. If any party or legally subpoenaed witness fails to appear at the time and place set for the hearing, sanctions under rule 4.150 may be imposed or punitive actions authorized under sections 440.32 and 440.33, Florida Statutes, may be initiated....

...It is derived from Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410,1979. 1995 Adoption. This rule extensively amends the prior rule. It is adopted from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and the intent is to create a uniform procedure to consider requests for sanctions relating to violations of section 440.32, Florida Statutes....

...d. Subpoenaed witnesses — failure to appear, sanctions. If any party or legally subpoenaed witness fails to appear at the time and place set for this hearing, sanctions under rule 4,150 may be imposed or punitive actions authorized under sections 440.32 and 440.33, Florida Statutes, may be initiated....

KAHN, C.J. Appellant seeks review of a final order granting fees to Appellee, Travelers Insurance Co., pursuant to section 440.32(2), Florida Statutes (2002)....

under Florida Statutes, Section 440.31 or Section 440.-32, neither of which require prior “authorization”

...Lazzara, Judge. Date of Accident: June 25, 2012. July 9, 2019 PER CURIAM. Patricia Phillips (“Claimant”) appeals on procedural grounds the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (“JCC”) order denying, without hearing, her motion for sanctions under section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes (2017)....

...denied, in part; (2) the motion for sanctions was untimely; and (3) did not comply with the procedural requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60Q-6.125. Because we find the JCC’s reasons for denial contrary to the statutory language of section 440.32(3) and based on an improper application of the administrative rule, we reverse and remand for a hearing on the merits. I. The underlying dispute here involved the amount of attorney’s fees and costs payable to Claimant’s attorney by the E/SA pursuant to a prior order....

...rate of pay per hour. No documents were identified to Porcher that were withheld as containing work product or other privileged information. Several weeks later, the Claimant filed the subject motion for sanctions. The motion requested sanctions pursuant to section 440.32(3), which states: The signature of an attorney [on a pleading, motion, or other paper] constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the sign...

...The JCC denied the Claimant’s motion for sanctions finding that the E/SA’s motion for protective order was denied, in part, and the motion for sanctions was untimely and noncompliant with rule 60Q-6.125. In a motion for rehearing, the Claimant 3 asserted, among other points, that section 440.32(3) is not a prevailing party provision and that the JCC’s description of the ruling on the motion for protective order “did not tell the whole story” as Cruickshank was instructed by the JCC to prepare a privilege log which she did not do. The Claimant also reiterated that the motion for sanctions was not untimely under section 440.32(3), and an evidentiary hearing was necessary so that the claim for sanctions could be heard on its merits....

...The JCC entered an order which denied the Claimant’s motion for rehearing and instructed counsel for the parties to re-read The Florida Bar Workers’ Compensation Section Guidelines for Professional Conduct. This appeal followed. II. Under the unambiguous language of section 440.32(3), sanctions are both mandatory and not subject to any specific time limitation other than the pendency of ongoing litigation....

...r the imposition of sanctions for violation of the rules or of any order of the JCC. Section (2) refers to representations to the JCC and sets forth a detailed description of specific conduct which reiterates and expands on some of the provisions of section 440.32(3). In fact, the rule is identified as an implementation of section 440.32 along with other statutory provisions....

...rule challenge, to address validity of rule changing time deadline for providing workers’ compensation benefits). The statute also does not exempt from violation a person who is the prevailing party. The JCC assumed there can be no violation of section 440.32(3) if the offending party should prevail in any aspect of the pleading or motion....

...In fact, the statute would appear to include sanctions for pleadings, motions, or other papers that are interposed “for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,” without regard to the actual merits or outcome. § 440.32(3), Fla....

...But, this qualification would appear to go more to the merits of the alleged violation— not to the procedural requirements of rule 60Q- 6.125(4)(a). At the heart of the issue here is the tension between the statutory mandate to sanction all violations of section 440.32 and the 21-day safe harbor period created by rule 60Q-6.125(4)(a)....

...The Claimant maintains that there is no conflict between the statute and rule if we reject the E/SA’s pendency argument. However, reconciling the rule with the statute remains problematic if we do so because, the implication is that any offending party can violate the provisions of section 440.32(3) without the risk of sanctions, or— in the Claimant’s words— “with impunity,” if the pleading or motion is dispensed with quickly enough (e.g., adjudicated or withdrawn). To accept the E/SA’s application of the rule, the mandatory sanctions for violations of section 440.32(3) become not only discretionary, but also completely avoidable. We recognize that this Court in Soca addressed the correct interpretation of the safe harbor requirement under the rule and in the context of alleged violations of section 440.32. See Soca, 185 So. 3d at 1259. But, the parties there assumed that the administrative rule applied. As a result, the court’s reference to rule 60Q-6.125(4)(a) as an implementation of section 440.32(3) is dicta. We now clarify that this rule does not apply to the extent its provisions contradict the plain language of the statute. The sanction in 440.32(3) is a stand-alone statutory sanction by its text and history without regard to the rule....

...There is no reasonable way to read the statute as imposing merely discretionary sanctions to violations or as allowing a skilled violator a 21-day grace period. The safe harbor of the rule cannot be viewed as a procedural amendment to the statute. Either section 440.32(3) provides a stand-alone basis for sanctions, not subject to the administrative rule, or the administrative rule should be interpreted harmoniously with the statutory language 7 of section 440.32(3)....

...Should the JCC’s denial be viewed as a true procedural denial, then the Claimant should have been allowed to correct the procedural deficiency. Thus, rule 60Q-6.125(4)(a) should not apply to the extent it precludes filing a motion for sanctions under the plain language of section 440.32(3). We, therefore, REVERSE the JCC’s denial of Claimant’s motion for sanctions and REMAND for a hearing on the merits. MAKAR, WINOKUR, and M.K....

...Stat. (2009). Claimant, believing that the four costs itemized in that motion could not have been incurred to defend against the claims in the PFB, served a motion for sanctions on the E/C. The motion for sanctions was made under authority of section 440.32, Florida Statutes (2009), which permits taxation of costs against a party who has instituted or continued proceedings without reasonable ground, and against an attorney who has maintained or continued proceedings frivolously....

...(although not, given the withdrawal of the costs motion, to award or deny costs). Therefore, the JCC had jurisdiction to rule on the sanctions motion. To conclude 3 otherwise would render the safe-harbor provision meaningless and section 440.32 toothless. The JCC added a second ground for denying the sanctions motion: Claimant had not shown the costs motion to have been lodged “in bad faith for unreasonable purposes.” But that second finding implies that the JCC...

...1st DCA 2010), or whether the cost proceedings were “maintained or continued frivolously” or whether the motion to tax costs was “well grounded in fact and . . . warranted by existing law or a good faith argument” for modification or extension of existing law, § 440.32, Fla....

...authorized medical providers for compensable conditions, and the dispute about their payment does not implicate Claimant but is between only itself and the medical providers. The E/C’s representation was a binding legal concession, by operation of section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes, and it waived any challenge to the medical necessity of the care such as was asserted in Williams v....