Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...insurance. They are mandated by the workers' compensation act itself. The act itself makes it clear that the obligations and duties of the employer and carrier are regarded as inseparable to the extent necessary to carry out the purpose of the law. Section 440.41, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...l Commission should be affirmed. Sonny Boy's Fruit Co. v. Compton, Fla., 46 So.2d 17; Cook v. Henry C. Beck Co., Fla., 48 So.2d 743. In the briefs of counsel and in the findings of the Industrial Commission much is said about the scope and effect of Section 440.41, F.S.A....

...Matlock, 151 Kan. 293, 98 P.2d 456, 127 A.L.R. 461; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 198 Wis. 202, 221 N.W. 747, 223 N.W. 444; Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 177 Cal. 771, 171 P. 935. The concluding sentence of Section 440.41 provides that "any requirement by the commission, or any court under any compensation order, finding, or decision shall be binding upon the carrier in the same manner and to the same extent as upon the employer." Whether this provision...

...decide, and express no opinion at this time. We do hold that when the evidence shows the intent of the parties to an insurance contract and the scrivener fails to express that intent, or does so ambiguously, the Industrial Commission has power under Section 440.41 to interpret the contract to express the intent of the parties when it was made....

...However, when Section 440.11 and the rest of the provisions of the compensation law are examined as a whole we find numerous expressions of intent by the legislature to apply the same liabilities and immunities to the carrier as are applied to the employer. Indeed, Section 440.41 provides that the carrier may actually be substituted for the employer as the responsible party to the employee under the law....

...The deputy commissioner found that the employer's actions in this case were in bad faith and caused economic loss to the claimant. Although § 440.34(2)(b) refers only to the carrier's bad faith in the handling of the claim, the deputy imputed bad faith to the carrier through § 440.41(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: In any case where the employer is not a self-insurer, in order that the liability for compensation imposed by this chapter may be most effectively discharged by the employer, and in order that th...

...as it considers proper in order to effectuate the provisions of this chapter. For such purposes: (1) Notice to or knowledge of an employer of the occurrence of the injury shall be notice to or knowledge of the carrier. The deputy reasoned that under § 440.41, the employer was the carrier's alter ego for purposes of § 440.34(2)(b) and the manner in which the claim was handled. Therefore, concluded the deputy, even though the carrier was diligent in responding to the claim once it received actual notice of the injury, § 440.41(1) imputes the employer's knowledge of the injury and its dilatory tactics in handling the claim to the carrier....

...The employer/carrier argues that it is illogical as well as unfair to require a carrier which has acted without fault to bear the full penalty for wrongful acts which were committed by the employer. In conjunction with this argument, the employer/carrier also contends that § 440.41's provision imputing the employer's knowledge or notice to the carrier applies only to impute an employer's liability for "compensation" to the carrier and does not operate to impute liability for a "penalty" provision such as § 440.34(2)....

...The claimant contends, however, that bad faith in handling of the claim forced him to seek the assistance of an attorney; therefore, an assessment of attorney's fees is really only a recovery of the claimant's monetary damages rather than punitive damages. Under this rationale § 440.41(1) would operate to impute notice to the carrier since that section was intended to assist in the effective administration and discharge of "liability for compensation." Claimant's analysis of the purpose and effect of § 440.34(2)(b) coincides nicely with this Court's recent decision in Florida Erection Services, Inc....

...b) was clearly intended to compensate the claimant for the monetary losses sustained in trying to force some action on the claim. Admittedly, § 440.34(2)(b) refers only to the carrier's bad faith in handling the claim. It seems to us, however, that § 440.41, which has as its stated purpose the effective administration and discharge of liability for compensation, should impute the employer's notice of the claim to the carrier. To hold otherwise would frustrate both the general intent of the Workers' Compensation Act as well as the specific intent of § 440.41....

...injuries on the industry. By the same token, liability for the monetary damages suffered by the claimant as a result of delayed notice would certainly not be "effectively discharged" if the employer's notice could not be imputed to the carrier under § 440.41(1)....

...Where, as in this case, the carrier has acted diligently, this provision does seem to result in an unfair burden on the carrier. Unfortunately, the legislature has left us with a situation where any decision we make will result in an inconsistency. We have chosen to construe § 440.34(2)(b) consistently with § 440.41 and the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act....

...440.34, Florida Statutes (2008). Specifically, section 440.42(1), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that ”[e]very policy or contract of insurance issued under authority of this chapter shall contain ... [a] provision to carry out the provisions of s. 440.41.” Section 440.41, Florida Statutes (2008), entitled "Substitution of carrier for employer,” explains that the insurance carrier is liable for the obligations and duties that chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2008), imposes upon the employer....

...There, the industrial judge was allowed to determine that even though an insurance policy between employer and carrier was on file, nevertheless, neither party intended such a contract to be effective. The carrier was held not liable. Relevant statutes point to the same conclusions. Fla. Stat. § 440.41 (1967), F.S.A., authorizes the Industrial Commission to substitute a carrier for an employer....

of the carrier for the employer is provided. Section 440.41, Florida Statutes, 1941, and F.S.A. By the

...e. Notice A certificate of service creates a rebuttable presumption that notice was received. See generally Abrams v. Paul, 453 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Where the employer is not a self-insurer, notice to the employer is notice to the carrier. § 440.41, Fla....

...Accordingly, as this case involves a dispute between only one carrier and an employer, the corporate employee contends that the Industrial Claims Court does not have jurisdiction over the situation sub judice under § 440.42(3). It is also argued that Florida Statute 440.41 (1967) provides no basis for jurisdiction of the Industrial Claims Court....

...This latter section permits the substitution of an insurance carrier for an employer, who is not self-insured, so that the carrier discharges the obligations of an employer in a workmen's compensation claim. Appellant reasons that if 440.42(3) does not apply to the instant case, then 440.41 cannot be employed to give the Industrial Claims Court jurisdiction....

...Court has jurisdiction. In Blumberg v. American Fire and Casualty Company, 51 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1951), it was held that where the intent of the parties to an insurance claim was unclear, the claims court had the authority to interpret the policy under § 440.41....

...Section 440.185(1) provides that: “An employee who suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of employment shall advise his or her employer of the injury within 30 days after the date of or initial manifestation of the injury. Failure to so advise the employer shall bar a petition under this chapter.... ” Section 440.41(1), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that when the employer is not a self-insurer, “[njotice to or knowledge of an employer of the occurrence of the injury shall be notice to or knowledge of the carrier.” The plain language of sec...

...involving rules of construction or speculating as to the legislature’s intent. Courts should give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning and may not add words that were not included by the legislature.”) (citations omitted). Likewise, section 440.41(l)’s plain language imputes the Employer’s knowledge to the Carrier....

...1st DCA 1994) (holding evidence supported JCC’s excusal of claimant/employer’s failure to give timely notice of accident based on JCC’s finding that carrier was not prejudiced by late notice, an analysis then required by section 440.185(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1989) (repealed), without reference to section 440.41(1)); Vicki’s Styling, Inc....

...3d DCA 1958) (affirming deputy commissioner’s denial of claim where employer, claimant’s husband, attempted to waive carrier’s statute of limitations defense). Hanssen, Moberg, and Brent addressed a claimant’s right to ongoing medical treatment; thus, they have no bearing in the initial notice of injury, or section 440.41(l)’s clear statement that notice of injury to the employer is notice to the carrier....

...Further, the finding of the deputy commissioner that, under the circumstances of this case, the carrier had an independent right to assert valid defenses, which right could not be waived at the whim of the employer, is supported by the logic of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Section 440.41, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., 3 provides for the substitution of a carrier for the employer in cases when the employer is not a self-insurer....

...ter shall be jurisdiction of the carrier, and (3) any requirement by the commission, or any court under any compensation order, finding, or decision shall be binding upon the carrier in the same manner and to the same extent as upon the employer.” Section 440.41 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

Commission correctly held that Florida Statutes § 440.41 1 F.S.A., providing for substitution of the carrier

education under a rehabilitative program pursuant to F.S. 440.41(1), (2), or (3).’ “I have a great deal of empathy

...he employee suffers an accidental compensable injury . . . arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment”); § 440.38(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring the employer to “secure the payment of compensation under this chapter”); § 440.41, Fla....

...American Fire & Casualty Co., 51 So.2d 182 , 184: “We do hold that when the evidence shows the intent of the parties to an insurance contract and the scrivener fails to express that intent, or does so ambiguously, the Industrial Commission has power under Section 440.41 to interpret the contract to express the intent of the parties. * * * ” Section 440.41, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., referred to in the quotation, reads as follows : “In any case where the employer is not a self-insurer, in order that the liability for compensation imposed by this chapter may be most effectively discharge...

Auto-Owners. We find the ruling to be erroneous. Section 440.41(1) F.S. (1978) provides that “Notice to or

...We hold that reimbursement by State Farm to Acme Oil and Hill, Richards is proper based on State Farm’s “imputed” and “actual” notice of its potential liability. Reversal is required based on State Farm’s “imputed” notice of its potential liability. Pursuant to Section 440.41(1), Florida Statutes (1981) “notice to or knowledge of an employer of the occurrence of the injury shall be notice to or knowledge of the carrier.” Mr....

...Brickner notified his State Farm agent of the accident. See Acme Oil Company v. Vasatka, 465 So.2d at 1316 . In a similar case, this court held that where notice of a compensable accident was promptly made to the employer, notice to the workers’ compensation carrier was imputed by operation of Section 440.41(1), Florida Statutes....

...Because the earrier/servicing agent failed to raise the arguments they now raise on appeal before the JCC, their arguments have not been preserved for appellate review. Accordingly, the order of the JCC is AFFIRMED. ZEHMER, C.J., and ALLEN, J., concur. . Section 440.41(2), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: "Jurisdiction of the employer by the judges of compensation claims, the division, or any court under this chapter shall be jurisdiction of the carrier.”