Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Co. v. White, supra, we are not convinced that we should "dance the back step" in connection with our opinion therein. Indeed, upon a careful reconsideration of said case and a restudy of Chapter 440, F.S.A., and particularly Sections 440.02(18) and 440.19(1), we are firmly convinced that we should not recede from our opinion and judgment in the case of Canada Dry Bottling Co....

...te such as ours which by its own terms, in clear and unambiguous language, defines the phrase "time of injury" Section 440.02(18) reads as follows: "The term `time of injury' means the time of the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury." Section 440.19(1) reads as follows: "The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two years after the time of injury, and the right to compensation for death shall be barred unles...

...efined the expression "time of injury" to mean the time of the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury, there is no room for us to theorize; nor are we authorized to place a different construction upon the term "time of injury" as used in Section 440.19 (1)....

..., and is subject to civil penalties under the compensation law, may it invoke the statute of limitations in bar of claimants rights?" We are of the opinion that the answer to this question is likewise found in Chapter 440, F.S.A. and particularly in Section 440.19(1)....

...notice or indication of injury. If it appears that the injury will result in permanent impairment, the Division shall contact the claimant, or members of his family, to assist the injured worker in securing any benefits to which he may be entitled. Section 440.19(1) requires the division to evaluate every claim for benefits filed under the law, to make a decision as to entitlement of benefits, and notify the parties....

...fect of extending the statute of limitations to two years as to claims not barred on July 1, 1947.” The injury occurred in August, 1946. The claim was filed in October, 1947. The legislature amended the law by enacting Chapter 23908, Acts of 1947, Section 440.19, Fla....

...iod for modification begins to run does not adversely affect our holding in the instant case. In fact we have followed it. Although Corbett v. General Engineering & Machinery Co., supra, involved the section of the Workmen's Compensation Act, F.S.A. § 440.19, covering the period within which the initial presentation of a claim might be made, rather than the period for a request for modification, we think that the rule there announced is equally applicable to the case before us....

...while such claim is pending before DOAH or on appeal. § 766.306. [1] Conversely, the workers' compensation scheme does just the opposite, tolling the time for filing a workers' compensation claim while the injured individual pursues a civil remedy. § 440.19(4), Fla.Stat....

...sentative. Such health care practitioner also is authorized to hold ex parte discussions about this medical information with such attorney or representative so long as the employee has not filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits pursuant to section 440.19....

...Since a claim had been filed when the issue arose in the Perez case, that decision is consistent with this principle. Fourth, in recognition of the fact that not all injuries can be cooperatively processed without a claim, after the claimant has filed a claim for benefits pursuant to section 440.19, we deem that an adversarial relationship exists, and discussions of a claimant's medical condition between an attorney or representative of the employer/carrier/servicing agent and the health care practitioner will be permissible only...

...year of the furnishing of remedial treatment, care or attendance, or within one year of the payment of indemnity benefits. This appeal follows. The outcome of this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. See, e.g., Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Delco Oil, Inc., 721 So.2d 376, 377 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ("judicial interpretation of Florida statutes is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to de novo review"). To the extent pertinent, section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), reads: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death pursuant to s....

...This tolling period does not apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment. (3) The filing of a petition for benefits does not toll the limitations period set forth in this section unless the petition meets the specificity requirements set forth in s. 440.192....

...However, relying on the language of subsection (3) of the statute, claimant contends that running of the statute was tolled during the period between May 29, 2002, and February 7, 2003, when he voluntarily dismissed his two previous petitions (which, he argues, met the specificity requirements of section 440.192)....

...We have previously inferred that this rule applies in workers' compensation cases. Kinsey v. Skyline Corp., 395 So.2d 626, 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). See also Morris Canning Corp. v. Blanchard, 528 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). However, claimant argues that our cases predate the enactment of section 440.19(3) in 1994 and are inconsistent with the plain language of that statute, to the effect that filing a petition meeting the specificity requirements set forth in section 440.192 tolls the limitations period....

...s the crucial date for determining the timeliness of [an] action ... [and] do not address... the tolling effect of an earlier [dismissed action] on the limitations period applicable to a later [action]." Fernon v. Itkin, 476 F.Supp. at 3. Similarly, section 440.19(3) merely states that a petition must be filed in compliance with the specificity requirements of section 440.192 to be timely for purposes of the applicable statute of limitations....

...Instead, it appears intended *389 to eliminate a tolling provision in the pre-1994 statute which stated that when a claim is dismissed for lack of specificity, "the claimant shall be allowed 60 days from the date of the order of dismissal in which to file an amended claim regardless of any other limitation in this chapter. " § 440.19(1)(e)4, Fla. Stat. (1993) (emphasis added). In short, there is nothing to suggest that section 440.19(3) was intended to alter the well-established rule that the statute of limitations is not tolled during the period that a dismissed action was pending....

...Duffell, 651 So.2d 1176, 1179 (Fla.1995) ("The legislature is presumed to know existing law when it enacts a statute"). Accordingly, we hold that, absent a clear statement from the legislature to the contrary, the one-year statute of limitations specified in section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), is not tolled during the period that an earlier filed petition was pending before it was voluntarily dismissed....

...No compensation or medical benefits were paid by the employer or its carrier. Claim for these benefits was not filed until July 16, 1954, more than two years after the date of injury. The employer interposed the defense that the two-year limitations period provided in § 440.19(1) (a) had expired. [1] Claimant sought to avoid this defense by a plea of mental incompetency under F.S. § 440.19 (3), F.S.A., which provided that F.S. § 440.19(1), F.S.A., shall not apply if the person entitled to compensation is mentally incompetent and has no guardian or other authorized representative....

...It follows that the order of the full Commission, affirming the deputy, conformed to the essential requirements of law. Accordingly the petition for writ of certiorari must be and the same is hereby denied. STURGIS, C.J., and CARROLL, DONALD, J., concur. NOTES [1] Sec. 440.19(1) (a). "The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two years after the time of injury, * * *." [2] Sec. 440.19(3)....

...Laurence Leavy of Laurence Leavy & Associates, Fort Lauderdale, and Andrea White, Winter Park, for Appellees. WEBSTER, J. In this workers' compensation case, claimant seeks review of a final order dismissing his petition for benefits filed on February 15, 2007, as time-barred pursuant to section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...he conclusion that the petition had been pending for too long—i.e., that it should have been resolved at some earlier time. This was error. A properly drafted petition for benefits tolls the statute of limitations as long as it remains pending. See § 440.19(3), Fla....

...1st DCA 1985) (holding that a claim may not be dismissed for lack of prosecution if record activity has occurred within the time specified by the statute). *1266 Because the petition for benefits was timely filed and remained pending, it was error to conclude that it was barred by section 440.19....

...The Commission did not hear from claimant or his wife again until December 3, 1969, when it received a claim filed by claimant's second attorney. This claim came on for hearing on January 9, 1970. The paramount issue was whether the statute of limitations provided by Fla. Stat. § 440.19(1) (a), F.S.A....

...eived compensation or benefits is treated as a claim. See also Gamage v. Reeks, 142 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1962). This indication is supported by the applicable portions of the Workmen's Compensation Law. Rule of Procedure No. 12, which restates Fla. Stat. § 440.19(1) (c), F.S.A....

...of this issue, we think that the pre- Troyer decisions of A.B. Taff & Sons v. Clark, Port Everglades Terminal Co. v. Canty, and Florida Telephone Corporation v. Oliver, supra , announce the preferable result. Rule of Procedure No. 12 and Fla. Stat. § 440.19(1) (c), F.S.A....

...uent receipt of letters asking for advice, and that as an administrative matter *40 the completion of forms is helpful. But the position that a claim can be initiated only upon "completion of necessary forms" is contrary to the wording of Fla. Stat. § 440.19(1) (c), F.S.A....

...eatment, naming both Fidelity and American as parties. The deputy commissioner found that the 1982 volleyball injury would *1254 not have occurred except for the 1978 injury, but that the statute of limitations contained in sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), barred any claim against Fidelity....

...On en banc hearing before the First District Court of Appeal, the court split on a six-to-six vote which had the effect of affirming the deputy commissioner's ruling. Fla.R.App.P. 9.331. Upon Daniel's motion, the district court certified the instant question to this Court. Section 440.19(1)(a) provides: The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made or remedial trea...

...has been furnished by the employer without an award on account of such injury a claim may be filed within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation or after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer. Just as section 440.19(1)(a) deals with the right to disability compensation, section 440.13(3)(b) provides a parallel provision with the identical exceptions for recovery for remedial attention. [1] The parties agree that, under the express language of sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a), a claim filed within two years of a compensation payment voluntarily made without an award would normally be timely....

...e the two-year limitation period expired no subsequent payments or remedial attention could revive the period for filing a claim related to that injury. On the other hand, Daniel maintains that under the plain terms of both sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a) the occurrence of a two-year time gap in compensation payments is irrelevant....

...Both the conflicting case law which the parties cite and the six-to-six vote in the district court reflect the judicial confusion as to the precise effect of voluntary compensation payments upon the two-year limitations period contained in sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a)....

...tment or compensation, that existed in 440.13(3)(b) at the time relevant to the case at bar. Watson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 288 So.2d 193, 194 (Fla. 1973). Ten years after this amendment, we reconsidered the application of sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a) to compensation claims....

...1965), also lends support to this position. As to Hodges, however, we find that it focused more on res judicata than the issue presently before us and we decline to read a binding pronouncement into Hodges when that opinion mentioned neither section 440.13(3)(b) nor 440.19(1)(a)....

...Petersburg Kennel Club, 396 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1981); Farrens Tree Surgeons v. Winkles, 334 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1976); Thomas Smith Farms v. Alday, 182 So.2d 405 (Fla. 1966); Topeka Inn Management v. Pate, 414 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Yet in the case of sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a) no ambiguities exist. These statutes unequivocally state that so long as an employee files a claim within two years of the last voluntary compensation payment or dispensation of remedial treatment made without an award the claim is timely. §§ 440.13(3)(b) & 440.19(1)(a), Fla....

...Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1983); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1979); Heredia v. Allstate Insurance Co., 358 So.2d 1353 (Fla. 1978); Phil's Yellow Taxi Co. v. Carter, 134 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1961). Therefore, given the unambiguous language of sections 440.19(1)(a) and 440.13(3)(b), it would be inappropriate for us to read into the statutes more obstacles for claimants than these provisions otherwise require....

...is barred but would remand for a determination as to whether American knew or should have known that it was compensating for injuries arising from the 1978 accident. BOYD, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] The two limitation provisions were combined in 1978. § 440.19, Fla....

...ry presumption shall be against the validity of the claim." It is evident that the notice contemplated by Section 440.18, supra, is separate and distinct from a "claim" as referred to in Section 440.34(1), supra, and from a "claim" as referred to in Section 440.19(1) (a), (c), also to be considered in pari materia and upon which the employer relies, providing as follows: "(1) (a) The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within t...

...equivalent of the written "claim" required by and referred to in the other above-quoted sections of Chapter 440 and, a fortiori, that actual notice of injury, as existed here, is the equivalent of actually filing a written "claim" as contemplated by Section 440.19(1) (c), supra....

...We are unable to accept that argument which neither dispels the clear language of the statutes nor provides a logical explanation for the substantial duplication of the data which Section 440.18(2) requires the employee to furnish in the "notice" of injury with that which Section 440.19(1) (c) requires him to furnish if and when he files a "claim" for compensation....

...Absent the actual payment of compensation or furnishing of remedial treatment by the employer, one of the important aspects of the notice under Section 440.18 is that it accurately fixes the date on which the two-year period allowed for the filing of a claim under Section 440.19 commences to run....

...employee is entitled to receive on account of a compensable injury, nor does it establish a right of the employee to indefinitely continue to receive compensation or remedial treatment that is voluntarily furnished by the employer. It is provided by Section 440.19(1) (a), supra, that the two-year period during which a "claim" may be filed does not commence to run in those cases where voluntary payment of compensation is made or remedial treatment furnished until the date *433 of the last payment of compensation or the date of the last remedial treatment....

...e disease — he filed an amendment to his original claim against Mundy by adding thereto the names of the two employers for whom he had worked after he left Mundy's employ. Both of these employers pleaded the two-year limitation period prescribed by Section 440.19, Fla....

...The deputy rejected the claimant's contention that the statute of limitations does not bar his claim until two years after the claimant's last day of employment with the employer as a firefighter. The deputy did not reach the other defenses raised by the City. Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1985), [1] provides that a timely claim may be filed within two years of (1) the time of injury; or (2) the last payment of compensation; or (3) the date of the last medical treatment furnished by the employer....

...on Act." [4] We are compelled to agree with U.S. Steel on the question of notice. Neither form of notice given by Green was adequate to apprise U.S. Steel of "the nature of [Green's] claim" for permanent and total disability benefits, as required by Section 440.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...he running of the limitation period provided in Section 440.28. See Brown v. Giffen Industries, Inc., 281 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1973). *1000 Finally, the claimant contends that her claim should be considered a new claim for additional benefits pursuant to Section 440.19(1)(a). [3] Yet, Section 440.19(1)(a) is also inapplicable since it authorizes a claim under circumstances where payments are initially made without an award "in which case further claims may be made within two years after payment of compensation or remedial treatment." Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So.2d 760, 761 (Fla. 1956). Here, as in Jones, medical payments were made pursuant to an award and thus Section 440.19(1)(a) is also inapplicable....

...ter the date of last payment of compensation pursuant to a compensation order. [3] Providing that a claim may be filed within two years after either payment of compensation or remedial treatment is furnished to a claimant without an award. Note that Section 440.19 (Supp....

...Hanssen's testimony that he continued to use the corset nevertheless once or twice a month, until less than two years before he *963 filed the petition for benefits that began the present proceedings in 1995. Claims Center met the petition with a notice of denial raising, inter alia, the statute of limitations as a defense. Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1985), the statute of limitations in effect at the time of the injury, establishes a two-year limitations period during which claims must be brought....

...imputed knowledge tolled the limitations period. Our supreme court has held that actual knowledge on the part of employer or carrier is required if the limitations period is to be *965 tolled by an injured employee's use of a medical device. [3] Subsection 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1971) requires a worker's compensation claim to be filed within two years of the time of injury, the date of the last payment of compensation, or "the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer." ....

...Co., 642 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tenn.1982) (rejecting contention that an "employee-supervisor's knowledge [of his own back problems be] ... imputed to the Company"). "To apply such a theory to this case would in no way further the legislative objective behind the statute," id., here section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Taylor of McKenzie & Soloway, Pensacola, for Appellee. EN BANC BARFIELD, Chief Judge. The employer/carrier (E/C) appeal a workers' compensation order finding that the claimant's petition for benefits was not barred by the statute of limitations, based on application of section 440.192(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...On August 15, 1995, the carrier received a petition seeking payment of these medical expenses, but did not file its notice of denial, which was based on the statute of limitations, until October 25, 1995. In the challenged order, the judge of compensation claims found that section 440.192(8) is procedural, that the penalty for failure to timely respond to the petition for benefits is "forfeiture of the carrier's right to contest compensability of the petition" and that by asserting the statute of limitations defense, "[t]he E/C deny all benefits claimed and, in effect, denying (sic) compensability of the claim in its entirety." The JCC ruled that in the instant case, the "procedural default" aspects of section 440.192(8) "act to revive a claim previously barred by the statute of limitations under F.S. 440.19(2)(a)." He ordered the E/C to pay the medical bills detailed in the petition for benefits, plus interest, costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. Disposition of this case turns on the construction of the third sentence in section 440.192(8), which provides: "A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s....

...d does not deny compensability within 120 days of providing requested benefits. We agree with the latter position. In doing so, we recede from our decision in Waffle House v. Hutchinson, 673 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), to the extent it holds that section 440.192(8) precludes the carrier from contesting compensability when it fails to file a notice of denial within 14 days after receipt of a petition for benefits. In construing the provision at issue, we must first understand the relationship between section 440.192(8) and section 440.20(4)....

...for up to 120 days while it conducts an investigation, provided it pays the requested benefits for which it is undertaking the period of investigation. If, at the end of 120 days, the carrier does not deny compensability, it loses its right to deny. Section 440.192 sets out the mechanism for the employee to recover the benefits which he has not received and to which he believes he is entitled. This action is initiated by serving a petition for benefits, which could occur during the 120 day period for investigation following the notice of injury, if the carrier has denied some benefits. Section 440.192(8) requires the carrier, within 14 days of the petition for benefits, to either pay the requested benefits or file a notice of denial....

...However, the payment of benefits is "without prejudice to its right to deny within 120 days." This "right to deny" refers to that right which may have arisen under the "pay and investigate" provision of 440.20(4) and may not have expired at the time of service of the petition for benefits. Accordingly, the third sentence of 440.192(8) which reads: "A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s....

...The sanctions to be imposed upon a carrier who either files an untimely notice of denial or takes no action are found elsewhere in chapter 440. [1] As to the question of what the legislature intended by the term "compensability" in the context of sections 440.192 and 440.20, we note that section 440.20(1) refers to "compensability or entitlement to benefits," indicating that they are separate concepts, and that the last sentence of section 440.20(4) refers to "the issue of compensability," indicating a distinction from other issues. Having reviewed the uses of the terms "compensability" and "compensable" in the various sections of chapter 440, we conclude that "compensability" in the context of sections 440.192 and 440.20 is limited to a determination of whether the injury for which benefits are claimed arose out of, and occurred within the course and scope of, the claimant's employment. We find that the third sentence of section 440.192(8) does not apply in this case....

...nded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Claimant's second point on appeal contends it was error to rule that his claim for benefits arising out of the December 3, 1985, accident was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...epared by Ms. Bell, to pay attendant care costs to claimant's sister for her past service, and to pay attorney fees of $800,000 and costs. As to issue one, the judge correctly held the compensation claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Section 440.19(3), Florida Statutes, tolls the statute of limitations where the claimant is incompetent and has not been appointed a guardian or other authorized representative....

...However, the JIC's Order is patently based on evidence relating to a knee injury, and in fact, the JIC awarded compensation for a knee injury. The appellants properly complain of a lack of adequate notice regarding a claim based on such an injury, see Fla. Stat. § 440.19(1)(c) (1977), thereby resulting in a denial of appellants' rights to due process....

...There is no liability on the part of the employer or its carrier to the State of Florida or any persons, because any claims of any nature are barred by the Statute of Limitations.” In support of the position stated in grounds 2 and 3, supra, reliance is based on Sec. 440.19 (1), which is as follows : “(1) The right to compensation for disability under this Chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the time of injury and the right to compensation for death shall be barred unl...

...under conditions resulting in liability upon the employer and carrier, but the circuit court reversed the holding ,of the full Commission as to the enforcement of liability by holding that the enforcement of the claim was barred by the provisions of Section 440.19 (1) supra....

...ly to the Florida Industrial Commission and in making Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollar statutory award to the Florida Industrial Commission be, and the same is, hereby reversed.” It is our view that no claim for compensation is involved here and that Section 440.19 (1) has no application to the right of the Commission to enforce the payment of the $500.00 contribution or levy fixed by Section 440.16 (2) (g), supra....

...McCORD, Judge. Dr. Robert K. Fabric, the claimant's treating physician, appeals from a workers' compensation order finding that certain of his claims for payment of services rendered to the claimant are barred by the two year statute of limitations of Section 440.19, Florida Statutes. Fabric essentially argues that because physicians are not specifically *285 mentioned in Section 440.19, his claims are governed by the four year statute of limitations for breach of contract contained in Section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes, and are thus timely....

...Hedman, 290 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1974). That statutory provision was subsequently amended to bring doctors' claims for workers' compensation bills under the provisions of the Act. Ch. 74-197, § 6, Laws of Fla. However, in none of the various permutations of Section 440.19 has the legislature seen fit to specifically include a physician's claim within that statute's ambit....

...1963). When there is doubt as to the legislative intent, the doubt should be resolved against the power of the court to supply missing words. In Re: Estate of Jeffcott, 186 So.2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). Since the omission of the term "physician" from Section 440.19 certainly renders doubtful a legislative intent that his or her claims be specifically included, we decide against construing this statute in such a way....

...n period, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the plaintiff. See Haney v. Holmes, 364 So.2d 81 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). As Dr. Fabric is the plaintiff in this dispute below, he should be given the benefit of the doubt as to the inapplicability of Section 440.19....

...Tucker testified that his treatment of appellee during the period from 1983 to 1986 would have been the same whether or not he had seen him personally. On April 29, 1986, appellee filed his claim particularly seeking payment for the prescriptions. Appellants defended that the statute of limitations had run pursuant to section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Appellants assert that since the only treatment they furnished to appellee for more than two years prior to the filing of the claim was undisputedly palliative in nature, the above statute of limitations has run and thus appellee's claim is barred. We decline to interpret the word "remedial" as used in section 440.19 in such a narrow manner to mean strictly curative care to the exclusion of treatment which is not curative but which nevertheless mitigates the conditions or effects of the injury....

...r 440, which is to provide an injured worker with appropriate benefits which undisputedly are necessary. Although we have found no cases dealing specifically with this issue, several cases lend support to our view that the word "remedial" as used in section 440.19 should be interpreted to include all medical treatment or attention which is reasonably necessary to treat a compensable injury or to mitigate its effects or conditions....

...n exclusive, sense to include not only strictly curative care, but also palliative treatment which merely mitigates the conditions or effects of the injury. No reasonable basis exists for finding otherwise in regard to the term "remedial" as used in section 440.19 since such a construction of the term does not infringe upon the purpose of the statute of limitations, which is to protect the employer against old claims that can no longer be successfully investigated and defended and to encourage prompt and nonadversarial payment of benefits....

...1984), in which this Court recognized that a claimant "must go through the form of receiving remedial care every two years in order to preserve the right to future benefits." Nothing in that declaration precludes an interpretation of the word "remedial," as used in section 440.19, to include treatment that has been deemed not to be curative but nevertheless mitigates the effects of the injury, such as pain....

...That decision in no way conflicts with our decision in this case that the furnishing by the employer of prescription medications to the claimant for the undisputed purpose of mitigating the effects of his injury qualifies as "remedial treatment" for the purpose of the application of section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1981).

...mployer, is without merit. Therefore, we affirm as to the cross-appeal and affirm the deputy's last order as to issue one, but reverse and remand as to issue two for proceedings consistent with this opinion. ERVIN and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.19, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: 440.19 Time and procedure for filing claims....

...Amos, 76 Fla. 26, 79 So. 433 (1918). See also Mayo v. American Agricultural Chemical Co., 101 Fla. 279, 133 So. 885 (1931). Nor in my view was there created a claim that is cognizable under Chapter 440. Section 440.25(1) provides: Subject to the provisions of s. 440.19, a claim for compensation may be filed with the division at its office in the City of Tallahassee in accordance with rules prescribed by the division at any time after a specific benefit becomes due and is not paid, and the deputy commissioner shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions in respect to such claims. The claimant's request for a finding under Section 440.205 is neither a "claim for compensation", nor a "claim for benefits", see Section 440.19....

...Section 440.021 provides: Workers' compensation adjudications by deputy commissioners and the Industrial Relations Commission are exempt from chapter 120, and neither the deputy commissioners nor the Industrial Relations Commission shall be considered an agency or a part thereof. Advisory opinions of the division pursuant to s. 440.19(1) as to the entitlement of an employee or his dependents to benefits under this chapter are exempt from chapter 120....

...Claimant appeals an order of the deputy commissioner denying his request for future remedial medical care for his eyes. Testimony establishes that medical care will be required due to the industrial accident, but at a time in the future probably beyond the two-year statute of limitations of Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...Lauderdale, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Miriam Crutcher, appeals an order finding that her petition for workers' compensation benefits was barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons expressed below, we remand for further proceedings. Section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), states: Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the failure to file a petition for benefits within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee's claim unless the carrier advances the de...

...owledge of entitlement to medical benefits is unmistakable from the record." While the JCC's factual findings are supported by competent and substantial evidence, sole reliance on Hanssen was incorrect because that case dealt with a prior version of section 440.19. In Tallahassee Memorial Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 743 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), this court addressed the post-1994 version of section 440.19....

...rker that a statute of limitations exists." Coleman, 743 So.2d at 1201. In both Coleman and Hanssen, as well as in this case, it was clear "that the claimant knew of her entitlement to medical benefits." Id. However, because of the 1994 amendment to section 440.19, this court remanded in Coleman for the JCC "to determine whether she lacked actual knowledge of any other pertinent right under the workers' compensation law and, if so, whether such ignorance accounted for her failure to obtain care during the two years following her last visit to Dr....

...LEWIS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. As the majority explains, the Judge of Compensation Claims ("JCC") erred in relying on Solar Pane Insulating Glass, Inc. v. Hanssen, 727 So.2d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), as that case addressed a previous version of section 440.19, Florida Statutes. I, therefore, join the majority in reversing the JCC's order. However, I do not agree that section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (1995), requires that the claimant must prove estoppel by a preponderance of the evidence unless the E/C complies with sections 440.185 and 440.055, Florida Statutes (1995). This case revolves around the statutory construction of section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...fits, and obligations to the employee and provide notice to the Division of Workers' Compensation. Section 440.185(4), Florida Statutes, required the division to mail an informational brochure to the employee immediately upon notice by the employer. Section 440.19, Florida Statutes, provided that the claimant had two years after the time of the injury in which to file a claim for benefits. Section 440.19, prior to 1989, contained no express provision regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations should the carrier fail to provide the injured employee with the notice of rights and obligations required in section 440.185....

...1st DCA 1993) (discussing and citing cases for the principle that, since 1979, courts have construed the Workers' Compensation Act limitations to be tolled if the employer fails to comply with its statutory duty to inform an injured employee of benefits). In 1989, the Legislature amended each subsection of section 440.19(1) to include the following provision: This limitations period shall not be tolled or extended by the failure of the employer or carrier to file a notice of injury or any other report or notice required to be filed under this chapter o...

...that the E/C's failure to provide the required information was intentional and done to deprive the claimant of his or her right to benefits. See Gaines v. Orange County Pub. Utils., 710 So.2d 139, 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Effective January 1, 1994, section 440.19 was again amended to remove the preclusion on the tolling of the statute of limitations imposed in the 1989 amendment. See ch. 93-415, §§ 23, 112, at 135, 215, Laws of Fla. The statute was reorganized, and the Legislature added section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which provided, in pertinent part, that: If a claimant contends that an employer or its carrier is estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense and the carrier demonstrates that it has provided notice to the employee in accordance with s....

...stance, criminal penalties, and obligations of injured workers and their employers under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law." (emphasis added). As the claimant's accident occurred in August 1996, these amendments are applicable to this case. *232 Section 440.19(4) cites section 440.185; therefore, the statute must be read in pari materia with section 440.185....

...nse by requiring the claimant to show, in order to toll the statute of limitations, that the claimant did not receive the required notice and that the E/C purposely did not provide the notice with the intent to deprive the claimant of benefits. With section 440.19(4), the Legislature struck a balance between pre-1989 case law and the 1989 provision, which so burdened the claimant....

...The use of the word "shall" in section 440.185(4) denotes a mandatory action by the carrier. Therefore, if the carrier fails to comply with section 440.185(4), it cannot seek the protection of the affirmative defense of statute of limitations under section 440.19. If the carrier can demonstrate that it has complied with this long standing notice requirement, the claimant can only establish estoppel to the statute of limitations defense with clear and convincing evidence. Section 440.19(4) is not a codification of the pre-1989 judicial estoppel/tolling principle....

...owledge to defeat the estoppel claim. Such evidence would only be relevant if the carrier made its initial demonstration and the claimant then carried his or her burden of proving estoppel by clear and convincing evidence. Under the plain meaning of section 440.19(4), the E/C must prove that the carrier actually provided the required notice to the claimant pursuant to section 440.185....

...e claimant had knowledge of some benefits, the E/C cannot be estopped. By the use of the word "shall" in section 440.185, the carrier has the responsibility to provide notice of workers' compensation rights, benefits, and procedures to the claimant. Section 440.19 does not provide that if the E/C proves that the claimant had knowledge from some other source, then the carrier has met its burden. Under the *233 plain meaning of sections 440.19 and 440.185, only if the carrier demonstrates that the carrier, itself, provided the claimant the notice required in section 440.185 must the claimant demonstrate estoppel to the carrier's statute of limitations defense. If the carrier fails to demonstrate that notice, the carrier cannot defeat the claimant's estoppel argument. In construing section 440.19(4) in isolation, the majority renders the mandatory notice requirement in section 440.185(4) meaningless....

...even where it failed to comply with the workers' compensation law. This is manifestly unfair to the claimant. The majority seeks to impose unnecessarily an additional burden of proof in the statute where none exists. The majority's interpretation of section 440.19 defeats the objective of the workers' compensation law to facilitate the prompt receipt of benefits to claimants, which includes the prompt receipt by the claimant of the procedures to receive such benefits....

...& A Plumbing v. Kimes, 756 So.2d 1037, 1041 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Here, the E/C did not clearly demonstrate that they provided the notice required under section 440.185 within the mandatory three-day period. Therefore, under the plain meaning of section 440.19(4), the carrier cannot raise the statute of limitations defense....

...The JCC merely concluded that the claimant had not been apprised of her rights under the workers' compensation law and that the omission was not "intentional and done to deprive the employee of benefits." Id. at 1201. This Court rejected the JCC's application of section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), because the amended section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (1994), applied even though the claimant's injury occurred in 1992....

...The DC determined that the last date of authorized remedial medical attention was claimant's visit to Dr. Huster on July 8, 1982. Because claimant filed his claim for benefits more than two years after July 8, 1982, the DC denied all claims and dismissed the case finding that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1981) had run....

...sible benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, and then assert that claimant's untimely claim for benefits is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the DC finding that the statute of limitations set forth in section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1981) has run, and we remand the case to the DC for further proceedings....

...ed employee reaches the date of maximum medical improvement, unless during such 2-year period wage-loss benefits shall have been payable during at least 3 consecutive months; Section 440.15(3)(b)3.a. is not a statute of limitations in the sense that section 440.19(2)(b) is a statute of limitations....

...Krainin of Kelley, Kronenberg, Kelley, Gilmartin & Fichtel, Miami Lakes, for appellees. ERVIN, Judge. Appellant, William Timmeny, appeals an order denying his claim for temporary and/or permanent disability benefits, medical care, costs, and attorney's fees, based upon the bar of the two-year statute of limitations found in Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Fleming in 1990 contrasted sharply from that which he obtained from his treating physician, Dr. Ahn, who, when he was last deposed in 1991, stated that he remained uncertain as to what caused claimant's disease. Appellant argues that in applying the statutory bar of section 440.19(1)(a), based upon the fact that claimant knew more than two years before the filing of his claim that one of the possible causes of his condition was pesticide exposure at the workplace, the JCC applied an incorrect legal standard....

...mant received actual notice that his disease was compensable within a reasonable degree of medical probability, which, in the case at bar, did not occur until 1990. Because he filed his claim within the same year, the bar of the limitation period in section 440.19 is inapplicable....

...ither physician/witness was asked to assign impairment rating, and carrier did not question impairment rating in pre-hearing filing or at the hearing). The appellee also refers in its answer brief to the 1989 amendment to the statute of limitations, Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), which provides: This limitations period shall not be tolled or extended by the failure of the employer or carrier to file a notice of injury or any other report or notice required to be filed under this...

...rials required under this chapter, unless such omission by the employer or carrier was intentional and done to deprive the employee of benefits due under this chapter. The E/C asserts that the above provision is remedial, because it merely explained section 440.19(1)(a), thus it applies to the case at bar, notwithstanding that appellant's illness commenced in February 1987, before the amendment was enacted....

...was a matter within the authority of the deputy commissioner to decide; based upon all the evidence. The E/C next contend that the claim for benefits was untimely because the claimant failed to file his claim within the two-year period prescribed by Section 440.19, Florida Statutes....

...parties' in each of the many thousands of cases in which final payment of compensation is made each year. Such adjudication in the absence of any claim for further or additional compensation would operate to foreclose the right of the employee under Section 440.19(1) of the Act to file a claim for permanent partial disability `within two years after the date of the last payment' of compensation made without an award, thereby relegating the employee to the procedure of Section 440.28 in the event...

...iod that claimant is temporarily and totally disabled,' and in addition thereto, without an award, it has paid the employee certain compensation for permanent partial disability. The employee has made no claim for further or additional compensation. Section 440.19 of the Act (1953) specifically provides that the right to compensation for disability shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two years after the injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made without an award a claim may be filed within two years after the date of the last payment....

...ruary 13, 1953, for additional compensation and medical treatment. The `matter was still open for such an adjudication' because the employee presented his claim for such additional compensation `within two years after the time of injury' pursuant to Section 440.19." The commission's interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act seems logical and reasonable to us; and, under the familiar rule that an administrative interpretation of an Act will not be overturned "except for the most cogent reasons, and unless clearly erroneous", King v....

...That case is authority only for the proposition that, in the absence of a final order adjudicating that the carrier has discharged its obligation to the claimant in full, the claimant may file a claim for additional compensation within the two-year limitation period prescribed by Section 440.19, Fla....

...In essence, the statute transforms any overpayment of indemnity benefits into an interest-free loan, to be repaid on terms prescribed by the Legislature. The statute does not, however, contain an allowance for the avoidance of the rights and obligations of the parties by a showing of estoppel, reliance, or laches. Cf. § 440.19(4), Fla....

...At the hearing on the ensuing petition for benefits, the judge of compensation claims concluded that she had not been apprised of all of her rights under the workers' compensation law but that the omission was not "intentional and done to deprive the employee of benefits." § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). After the hearing, however, the decision in Gaines v. Orange County Public Utilities, 710 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), came down. In his compensation order, the judge of compensation claims noted: "In Gaines, the Court found that § 440.19(4), Florida Statute[s] (Supp.1994)......

...Therefore, we grant the petition and declare the rule invalid. Petitioner filed a claim with the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation on August 3, 1979 for injuries and occupational disease allegedly received on November 2, 1978 while he was employed as a baker in Pinellas County. The claim was filed pursuant to Section 440.19(1)(c), Fla....

...For this reason, I would request that you file a specific claim for those benefits which have not been specifically set forth in your recent letter as required by this rule. It is thus apparent that the claim was rejected, not because it had failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 440.19(1)(c), Fla....

...ction 440.25(1), Ch. 79-40, Laws of Florida, [3] and provides that any claim for benefits under Chapter 440, regardless of the date of the accident or occupational disease, shall be filed with the Division [4] and contain the information required by Section 440.19(2)(d), Ch. 79-40, Laws of Florida. This section, which is an amendment and redesignation of Section 440.19(1)(c), represents a radical departure from prior requirements with respect to the filing of claims (and, for that matter, from the traditional source of creating and disciplining the pleading by *1202 which civil actions are initiated)...

...While it is true that the "new" Division [7] began business on August 1, 1979, without its very own rules, the rules of its "predecessor", as well as the Florida Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure, were still in effect. Moreover, the amendments to Chapter 440, especially Section 440.19(2)(d), Ch....

...shall not stand repealed on July 1, 1979 as scheduled, ... but Ch. 440, ... as amended, is hereby revived and readopted." Later in the same session, however, the legislature provided in Ch. 79-312 that the effective date of the amendments in Ch. 79-400 would be August 1, 1979. § 440.19(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1977). [2] Fla.W.C.R.P. 4 reflects the language of Section 440.19(1)(c): Claims for compensation shall be filed with the Bureau, and shall contain the name, social security number, and address of the employee, the name and address of the employer, and a statement of the time, place (including county)...

...d cause of the injury or such fairly equivalent information as will put the Bureau and the employer on notice concerning the identity of the parties, claimants, and the nature of the claim. [3] This section provides: (1) Subject to the provisions of § 440.19, claim [sic] for compensation may be filed with the division......

...Lyons, Jr., and Frank Garcia of Moran, Kidd, Lyons, Johnson, P.A., Miami Lakes, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in finding that his April 2014 petition for benefits (PFB) was barred by the statute of limitations in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2011). Finding no error in the JCC’s application of the law to the facts, we affirm.  Subsection (1) of section 440.19 provides generally that a PFB must be filed within two years after the date of injury or it will be barred, and subsection (2) provides that the only events that will extend the statute of limitations are the payment of indemnity benefits or the furnishing of medical treatment....

...Consequently, the narrow question presented in this case is whether the payment of attorney’s fees to Claimant’s counsel—with no other medical or disability benefits being paid simultaneously to Claimant and no PFBs pending—is sufficient to extend the statute of limitations under subsection 440.19(2)....

...ns. We reject this argument because it is well-settled that the payment of an attorney’s fee is neither a payment of compensation nor the furnishing of medical treatment—the only two events that will extend the statute of limitations under subsection 440.19(2)....

...Fire Insurance, 668 So. 2d 653, 653-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), that for purposes of determining whether the statute of limitations ran, “payment of an attorney’s fee to the claimant’s attorney is not the ‘payment of compensation’ within the meaning of section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985).” The definition of “compensation” in the 2011 statutes applicable in this case is the same as that in the 1985 statute construed in Houston-Miller. Moreover, even though “indemnity” is not d...

...After being relieved by an encephalogram operation in 1946, claimant, on September 18,1946, by letter to the Florida Industrial Commission, Tallahassee, Florida, filed claim for compensation and, pursuant to this claim, hearings were conducted. The carrier contested payment of the claim because of Section 440.19, Florida Statutes, 1941, which requires that *689 claims be filed within one year from the date of the accident or within one year of the last date of payment of compensation. Claimant maintained that it was not necessary for him to have filed his claim within that period because of subsection 3 of Section 440.19, Florida Statutes, 1941, which subsection provides that: “If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent, ....

...ths of August and September, although wage loss request forms for these months were timely submitted. The E/C filed no notice to controvert (Section 440.20(6), (7), Florida Statutes (1979)), and filed no motion to dismiss the claim for either month (Section 440.19(2)(b))....

...is all that is required." Florida Erection Services, 395 So.2d at 212. Social security and unemployment compensation information is not required to be included in order for a claim to be "in compliance" with the law governing the contents of claims. Section 440.19(2)(d); and see footnote 3....

...g, and thus should be signed by the claimant personally. The form directs that the employee complete and sign that section and there is no authority in the law or on the form for execution of the form by the claimant's attorney. It is contended that § 440.19(2)(d), Fla....

...Stat., which specifies the information to be contained in claims, does not require the inclusion of social security or unemployment compensation information. While that statement is true, that section does not apply to wage loss claim form BCL-13b. Section 440.19(2)(d) applies to original claims for benefits which are filed with the Division of Workers' Compensation (Division) and which, if contested, are thereafter referred to a deputy for hearing. The information which the statute requires to be included with the original claim permits the Division to identify the claim and the claimant, and to make the evaluation of the claim required under § 440.19(1)....

...Code Rule 38F-3.18(3) which provides in part: (3) LES Form BCL-13b as Claim for Benefits. The original filing of LES Form BCL-13b with the employer or carrier does not constitute the filing of a formal claim for benefits or claim for compensation as contemplated in subsection 440.19 or 440.25, Florida Statutes....

...est, or by using more formal methods. The Division's Rules 38F-3.20 and 38F-3.22 provide for social security and unemployment compensation information requests, and these rules also provide for specific forms for this purpose (Forms BCL-14, BCL-20). Section 440.19(2)(d), which specifies the information required to be included in claims, does not require the inclusion of social security or unemployment compensation information....

...of Risk Management. PER CURIAM. The claimant appeals a workers' compensation order by which it was determined that she did not sustain a compensable injury with a new employer, and that the claim against a prior employer was not filed within the time allowed under section 440.19, Florida Statutes....

...More than two years after the last active medical care was provided the claimant experienced further problems with her ankle, and she then filed a claim for additional benefits. The claimant seeks to extend the two-year limitations period which is now contained in section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by arguing that the support hose, shoe inserts, cane, and medication is remedial treatment which was furnished by the employer. The claimant testified that she used these modalities within the two year period immediately before the claim was filed. Not all medically recommended care is the type of treatment which will extend the limitations period under section 440.19(1)(a)....

...case does not extend the limitations period under the statute. Although the doctor indicated that the claimant should use the shoe inserts on a permanent basis, such use does not thereby become treatment furnished by the employer within the ambit of section 440.19(1)(a)....

...Claimant continued to suffer low back pain and was prescribed the drug Vicodin which he received on May 27, 1987. The employer refused to pay for this prescription and refused to pay for further treatment. A claim for benefits was filed July 7, 1987. The employer/carrier asserted that the statute of limitations, section 440.19(2)(a), Fla....

...There is no indication, however, that the DC considered Blackburn which case requires reversal in the instant case. The DC's denial of the claim in the instant case was based on an understanding that the palliative treatment provided claimant in the form of prescribed medication did not toll the statute of limitations, section 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1979), and thus the period within which the claim could be brought had run. In Blackburn we affirmed the DC's grant of payment for prescribed medication on the ground that "the word `remedial' as used in section 440.19 should be interpreted to include all medical treatment or attention which is reasonably necessary to treat a compensable injury or to mitigate its effects or conditions.......

...ensation. In February 1986 claimant used his own funds to enroll in a structured exercise program as his physician had recommended. Sauer/CNA assert that the claim filed against them in 1987 should be barred by the two-year statute of limitations in section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which requires that medical claims be filed within two years after the date of the last payment of compensation or remedial attention furnished by the employer....

...compensable accident, the employer, without an award, has paid compensation and furnished remedial treatment. The statutes with which we are concerned are Section 440.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), relating to claims for remedial attention, and Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), [1] relating to claims for compensation, each of which provides that rights are barred unless a claim is filed within two years after time of injury, but each of which contains the following exception: "......

...However, in the later case of Watson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 288 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1973), the court distinguished the Miller case, pointing out that subsequent to the Miller decision, Section 440.13(3)(b) had been amended to include the same exceptions as then existed in Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...In all other respects, the order is reversed and this cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. LARRY G. SMITH and McCORD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] These statutes, with minor revision, are now numbered 440.19(2)(a) and (b), F.S....

...and an incident on November 29, 1980, when claimant injured his back while lifting a case of oil. In response to the deputy's finding of two accidents, the employer/carrier filed a motion for rehearing, raising a statute of limitations defense under section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Claimant's testimony and the medical evidence support the deputy's conclusion of a second accident resulting in the occluded artery. Cf. Winter Park Memorial Hospital v. Brown, 452 So.2d 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Issue two merits further discussion. Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...r the claimant prosecuted his claim with that degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances... .'" [2] Larson also notes in section 78.41(b) that the usual statute, as is true with section 440.19, merely dates the period from the time of injury, disability, or accident, saying nothing about time of discovery of the nature of the condition....

...ined. In that same section, Larson also recognizes the significance of statutory language dating the period from the time of the "injury" rather than the "accident," the former language. being amenable to interpretation under the more "humane rule." Section 440.19 uses the injury as the starting point of the limitations period.

...The claimant did not file a claim for workmen's compensation until May of 1954 which was, of course, more than two years from the date of either of his injuries. The question here is whether, under the circumstances outlined above, there has been a "payment of compensation" to the claimant within the meaning of Section 440.19, Fla....

...1953, F.S.A., so that the limitation period prescribed therein did not begin to run until "the date of the last payment." There can be no doubt that the payment of regular wages to a disabled employee during his absence from work because of the disability will be deemed to be "payment of compensation" within the intent of Section 440.19, supra....

...(2) the payment of regular wages to a disabled employee who stays on the job but who, with the knowledge and consent of his employer, does light work because of his disability will be deemed to be the "payment of compensation" within the meaning of Section 440.19(2), supra; but that the furnishing of medical treatment, alone, will not be so considered....

...tation to the Act in favor of the claimant. And it should be noted, parenthetically, that this is not a question of the jurisdiction of the Commission over the claim, as indicated in Royer v. United States Sugar Corp., supra, since Subsection (2) of Section 440.19, Fla....

...Bench of Whittaker, Stump, Webster, Miller & Craig, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees. VAN NORTWICK, Judge. In this workers' compensation appeal, Herbert Gaines, the claimant, appeals an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) which denied and dismissed his petition for benefits on the grounds that his claim was barred by section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), the statute of limitations in effect on February 1, 1991, the date of Gaines' industrial accident....

...ng physician for further treatment to his knee, authorization was denied on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run on any claim for further treatment related to his knee. Claimant filed the instant petition for benefits on July 3, 1996. Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), provides that all rights for remedial attention shall be time barred unless a claim is filed within two years after the *140 time of the injury, or if compensation has been made or remedial attentio...

...the statute of limitations in cases where the employer or carrier failed to provide the necessary informational materials, unless such omission was intentional and done to deprive the employee of his benefits. Although, prior to this 1989 amendment, section 440.19(1)(b) contained no express provision tolling the statute of limitations in cases where the employer or carrier failed to provide the informational materials required by section 440.185, case law tolled the statute if the employer or its carrier had failed to inform the claimant of his rights under the workers' compensation law. See, e.g., Southern Bell v. MacDonald, 671 So.2d 207, 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Effective January 1, 1994, section 440.19(1)(b) was further amended to remove the preclusion on tolling of the statute of limitations adopted in the 1989 amendment. See ch. 93-415, § 23, at 135, Laws of Fla. Section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...( quoting 34 Am.Jur. Limitation of Actions § 43, page 44). Timmeny does not compel an affirmance. In Timmeny, the accident occurred on February 1, 1987, but the claim was not filed until June 29, 1990, after the effective date of the 1989 amendment to section 440.19 which precluded a claimant from raising the estoppel defense to the statute of limitations....

...s place of employment. Because of this failure, this court ruled that the employer was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. Timmeny, 615 So.2d at 814. The court rejected the employer's assertion that the 1989 amendment to section 440.19 should be applied, ruling that the amendment was clearly substantive in its effect....

...See also Wiley v. Roof, 641 So.2d 66 (Fla.1994)(holding that statutory amendment purporting to revive previously time barred action violated Wiley's property right to the defense of the statute of limitations). Thus, Timmeny does not compel application of section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...r/Servicing Agent acted intentionally to deprive the Claimant of benefits due under Chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes, the Employee/Claimant's claim for benefits is barred by the statute of limitations in effect at the time of Claimant's accident, § 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1990)....

...The court should apply neutral rules of decision consistently and affirm. NOTES [1] The petition for benefits was filed more than five years after the industrial accident and more than four years after remedial care had last been furnished. The amended statute, Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), provides: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death pursuant to s....

...e been furnished by the employer on account of such injury, a claim may be filed within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation of after the date of the last remedial treatment or rehabilitative services furnished by the employer. § 440.19(1)(a), Fla....

...e had been exposed to asbestos. 4. I find that the Claimant's current claim is time barred, because he knew, or should have known, about a possible exposure to asbestos, and possible injury therefrom, in 1989, well over the two year limit imposed by Section 440.19, Florida Statutes....

...Claimant, by his own admission, was aware that he was possibly exposed to asbestos no later than 1989. Indeed, the Employer exercised proper diligence in asking Claimant to submit to an examination; however, he chose to ignore these requests until 1995. This is well after the applicable statute of limitations had run. Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1995), bars all petitions not "filed within 2 years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury ......

...carrier refused payment on the ground that the condition necessitating treatment was due to the 1956 accident at which time Iowa National was the carrier. The deputy further found and held that the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, Section 440.19, F.S....

...rence of the condition caused by the 1956 injury to claimant's back, and not an aggravation of it or a new accident. Before us the petitioner, Iowa Mutual, argues two questions. First, it contends that as to it the claim of the employee is barred by Section 440.19, F.S....

...provides that claims for medical benefits are barred unless a claim is filed therefor or the commission acts on its own initiative within two years after the last remedial treatment is furnished by the employer, or the last payment of compensation. Section 440.19(1) (a), F.S....

...recited in the light of the current statutes does not show that the procedures here in question prevented any fair opportunity for action by appellant and the Division toward which the provisions of the law and rules are directed. § 440.185(10) and § 440.19(1) and (2)(d); Rule 38F-3.10 and 3.18, State of Florida Rules and Regulations....

...Section 440.20, entitled "Payment of compensation," makes the Florida Workers' Compensation statute self-executing by requiring that payments by the employer or carrier are to be made when due without the claimant having to file a formal claim pursuant to section 440.19....

...The time constraints prescribed in section 440.20 setting the due dates for payment commence from the date an employer or carrier has the requisite knowledge that compensation is payable, not from the date a formal claim for benefits is filed pursuant to section 440.19....

...ears after he was first treated for his injury, and approximately two and one-half years after he left Steel's employment. Thus, unless Claimant's claim against Steel falls under a statutory exception, it is barred by the statute of limitations. See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). Payment of indemnity benefits or furnishing remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to a notice of injury or a PFB will toll the limitations period for one year from the date of payment. See § 440.19(2), Fla....

...Because Claimant did not seek remedial treatment for over two years after Steel's last payment for treatment, his claim against Steel did not fall under a statutory exception. Thus, the statute of limitations was not tolled. However, "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section [440.19], the failure to file a[PFB] within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee's claim unless the carrier advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its initial response to the [PFB]...." § 440.19(4), Fla....

...l be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall, for each offense, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment not to exceed one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment." [5] "It is provided by Section 440.19(1) (a), supra, that the two-year period during which a `claim' may be filed does not commence to run in those cases where voluntary payment of compensation is made or remedial treatment furnished until the date of the last payment of compensation or the date of the last remedial treatment....

...equivalent of the written `claim' required by and referred to in the other above-quoted sections of Chapter 440 and, a fortiori, that actual notice of injury, as existed here, is the equivalent of actually filing a written `claim' as contemplated by Section 440.19 (1) (c), supra....

...We are unable to accept that argument which neither dispels the clear language of the statutes nor provides a logical explanation for the substantial duplication of the data which Section 440.18(2) requires the employee to furnish in the `notice' of injury with that which Section 440.19(1) (c) requires him to furnish if and when he files a `claim' for compensation....

...tatute of limitations in a workers' compensation case where no guardian or other authorized representative had been appointed at the time prior proceedings were held, and 2) whether an attorney is an "authorized representative" within the meaning of section 440.19(3), Florida Statutes (1977), that would allow the statute of limitations to run against a mentally incompetent person for whom no guardian has been appointed....

...deputy commissioner whose order the Court was reviewing. In addition to the record evidence suggesting claimant's incompetence, this Court had before it a motion for rehearing filed by claimant's appellate counsel, Bill McCabe, asserting that under section 440.19(3), the statute of limitations was tolled from December, 1977, when claimant became mentally incompetent, because no guardian or authorized representative had been appointed for him, citing Aris, and pointing out the portions of the re...

...oner", that "claimant is so unsound of mind that he is unable to manage his ordinary affairs of life", that the prior record and testimony established that claimant was totally incompetent after December, 1977, and that "he meets the requirements of Section 440.19(3), F.S....

...he matter, and that the claimant had waived his position by not putting his incompetency at issue in the original hearing. The parties apparently ignored Aris, in which the Florida Supreme Court upheld the ruling of a Judge of Industrial Claims that section 440.19(1) would not apply to an incompetent until a guardian or other authorized representative had been appointed to protect his interests....

...ome other unnamed, like legal theory," and the employer/carrier asserted on appeal that Mr. Aris had been competently represented in fact in all of the compensation proceedings. Id. at 466-67. The Florida Supreme Court responded: That may be so, but Section 440.19(3) does not allow the claims statute to run against adequately represented incompetents for whom no guardian has been appointed. We hold, therefore, that the claims statute in Section 440.19(1) is no bar to Mr....

...der Ch. 440, F.S., for temporary disability during knee replacement surgery, and for consequential impairment ( cf. City Investing v. Roe, 566 So.2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), [ quashed, 587 So.2d 1323 (Fla. 1991)]), governed by Sec. 440.28 or by Sec. 440.19(1)(a) when permanent disability compensation has been previously awarded and paid under a compensation order which determined maximum medical improvement at a time when future surgery was uncertain? 586 So.2d at 1146. [1] Based on the unique facts of this case, we quash the decision under review and hold that section 440.19(1)(a) governs the compensation claim at issue....

...to the 1980 order, the limitation period expressed in section 440.28 barred Holder's 1988 compensation claim. The judge of compensation claims found that Holder was not required to proceed by way of modification. Holder was allowed to proceed under section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), currently section 440.19(1)(a), which provides that a claim for compensation is timely if filed within two years of the last furnishing of compensation or remedial treatment by the employer....

...dings and therefore was not adjudicated. See 32 Fla.Jur.2d, Judgments and Decrees §§ 102, 105, 116-18 (1981). When resort to section 440.28 was not necessary, the judge of compensation claims properly applied the limitation provisions contained in section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). At the time of Holder's compensable accident section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), provided: The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has...

...compensation or after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer. (Emphasis added.) Chapter 79-40, Laws of Florida, which took effect after Holder's accident, deleted the phrase "without an award" and renumbered the provision section 440.19(2)(a). This provision has since been redesignated section 440.19(1)(a). See § 440.19(1)(a), Fla....

...ble at the time of the amendment. Garris v. Weller Construction Co., 132 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1961); Walter Denson & Son v. Nelson, 88 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1956). Therefore, Holder's claim for temporary disability benefits is governed by the 1979 amendment to section 440.19(1)(a)....

...The employer further contends that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a contract when entered into by the state, the employer, the employee and the carrier as of the date of the accident and that the employee has not proceeded as the said act requires, § 440.19 (1) (a), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...The employer advances other contentions which we do not discuss. In response to the contention of employee with reference to statute of limitations being raised against him, it is pertinent to point out that from the terms of the statutes quoted and relied on in addition to provisions of § 440.19, it does not appear at this time that the employer is in position to raise the defense they contemplate so it becomes unnecessary to mention them....

...Ginsburg, Dade County Atty., Douglas W. Rice, Asst. Dade County Atty., Miami, for appellee. PER CURIAM. In this appeal of a workers' compensation order, the claimant challenges the denial of his claim for medical benefits. The claim was deemed time-barred by section 440.19, Florida Statutes, because it was filed more than two years after the claimant last received active medical care from his authorized physician....

...claim for treatment from Dr. Wancier. [2] In denying the claim, the JCC correctly noted that more than two years had elapsed between the last visit to Dr. Wancier and the filing of the claim. On this basis, the JCC found the claim time-barred under section 440.19, Florida Statutes....

...or respondents. McDONALD, Justice. We have for review Lee v. City of Jacksonville, 598 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), in which the district court certified the following question of great public importance: *38 WHETHER THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD OF SECTION 440.19(1)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS TOLLED BY THE CLAIMANT'S ROUTINE USE OF A DEPENDENCY-INDUCING MEDICAL DEVICE FURNISHED BY THE EMPLOYER AND PRESCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED PHYSICIAN FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME WITHOUT SUPERVISION, EVEN TH...

...continuing to use the unit. Although Lee did not see any of his treating physicians between May 1986 and January 1989, he continued to use the TENS unit on a regular basis. [1] In March 1990, Lee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Subsection 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1971) requires a worker's compensation claim to be filed within two years of the time of injury, the date of the last payment of compensation, or "the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer." The judge of compensation claims dismissed Lee's claim for benefits, finding that Lee did not receive remedial attention furnished by the employer as required by subsection 440.19(1)(a)....

...1984). Because the employer clearly did not have actual knowledge that Lee was continuing to use the TENS unit, we hold that the treatment was not "furnished by the employer." We approve the district court's decision that the limitations period in subsection 440.19(1)(a) is not tolled by Lee's use of the TENS unit....

...for the cost of surgical insertion of a spinal prosthetic device despite the lapse of a two-year period since the date of claimant's injury. Claimant cross-appeals a denial of disability benefits in the same order. We affirm the order and note that section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes, contains a specific exception to the statute of limitations with respect to the "right for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device to any part of the body." (e.s.) No defense under this statute accrues with respect to a claim for such remedial care. In contrast, there is no concomitant statutory exemption in section 440.19(1)(a) which would prevent the accrual of a limitations defense against a claim for disability benefits when there has been a lapse of more than two years from the date of injury, even when a claimant is to be provided with remedial care in the form of the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device under section 440.19(1)(b). Proctor v. Swing Set Day Care Center, 498 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), concludes that "[u]nder the language of section 440.19(2)(a), as most recently construed, the voluntary payment of compensation or remedial treatment revives the two year limitation period, even if an accrued defense existed at the time of such payment....

...Appellee/cross-appellant seeks rehearing of this court's opinion in City Investing/General Development Corp. v. Roe, 15 F.L.W. 788 (Fla. 1st DCA March 21, 1990), arguing that his claim for disability benefits is not barred by the statute of limitations because under section 440.19(1)(a) disability benefits are payable despite the lapse of a two-year period since his compensable injury because his former employer has been directed to pay for remedial attention in the form of the attachment of a prosthetic device....

...The judge of compensation claims (JCC) decided three issues involving the present claims: whether the statute of limitations (SOL) expired for a 1989 injury; whether the two-year SOL expired for a 1992 injury; and whether the one-year SOL expired for a 1995 repetitive trauma. See § 440.19(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994) (stating the one-year SOL); § 440.19(1)(a), Fla....

...1st DCA 1989), where the later treatment did not revive the SOL for an older injury because the claimant did not show that the later treatment was provided on account of any previous injury. Thus, the two-year SOL for the 1992 accident was revived upon treatment in 1995. See § 440.19(1)(a), Fla....

...Upon consideration, we have concluded that the carrier's payment on January 4, 1978 of interest on compensation payable under a worker's compensation order should be deemed "compensation" within the meaning of that term as used in the two year statute of limitations provision of Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...expenses, temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits beginning August 14, 1987, costs, interest, penalties, and attorney's fees. City Investing and Home Insurance denied the claim as barred by the two-year statute of limitations under section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). A hearing was held, and the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) ruled that section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), exempts from the statute of limitations remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device to any part of the body....

...xempt from the two-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the JCC determined that Roe's claim for remedial care was compensable. However, regarding Roe's claim for temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits, the JCC found nothing in section 440.19(1)(a) that exempted the disability claim from the two-year statute of limitations, and thus dismissed that part of Roe's claim. The First District affirmed, but upon Roe's petition for rehearing, certified the question to this Court. Our analysis necessarily begins with the language of the statute. [3] Section 440.19(1)(a) provides in pertinent part: The right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim ......

...reatment has been furnished by the employer without an award on account of such injury a claim may be filed within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation or after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer. § 440.19(1)(a), Fla....

...McDONALD, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which OVERTON, J., concurs. GRIMES, J., concurs specially with an opinion. McDONALD, Justice, specially concurring. A determinative issue in this case is whether the exemption to the two-year statute of limitations under section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), was applicable under the facts of the case....

...te of limitations period had lapsed, the rules of statutory construction in workers' compensation cases mandate the conclusion reached in the majority opinion. OVERTON, J., concurs. GRIMES, Justice, specially concurring. When the legislature amended section 440.19 to eliminate the statute of limitations for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device, I doubt if it intended that the providing of such remedial attention would reopen the claim period for the payment of compensation....

...However, I believe the plain meaning of the statutory language dictates the result we reach in this case. See Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 556 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1990). NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. [2] Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), provides in pertinent part: [N]o statute of limitations shall apply to the right for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device to any part of the body. [3] We address only the certified question and do not address the correctness of the district court's determination that Steffee plates are prosthetic devices. [4] The legislature removed the words "without an award" in 1979. See § 440.19(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979). The statute was renumbered in 1983. See § 440.19(1)(a), Fla....

...It is my specific finding that the Statute of Limitations had run and the claim must be and is hereby denied and dismissed with prejudice." On review by the Industrial Relations Commission, the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims was affirmed. Fla. Stat. § 440.19(1)(a) F.S.A., provides: "(1)(a) The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two (2) years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made...

...is now to the same effect and provides the same exceptions in order to recover for "remedial" attention as distinguished from the right to "compensation." [1] This has been so since its amendment in 1963 to conform to the already existing same exceptions in § 440.19(1)(a) to recover voluntary "compensation" payments....

...compensation or medical (remedial) payments. It was § 440.13(3)(b) regarding the remedial remedy that was involved in Miller which was relied upon by the JIC who failed to note that Miller was under the former statute which did not include then (as § 440.19(1)(a) did for "compensation") the present exceptions now also in § 440.13(3)(b)....

...compensation payment or last remedial treatment so furnished by the employer without an award. Justice Drew with characteristic clarity in Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So.2d 760, 761 (Fla. 1966), points up "the clear distinction made in this instance [§ 440.19(1)(a)] and throughout the act between medical benefits and disability compensation" and then highlights the exception in explicating that § 440.19(1)(a) "is limited, however, [2] ......

...1968). Our claimant filed his claim for compensation on May 25, 1970, promptly after the last payment of compensation to him without an award which was made on April 20, 1970, and thus was clearly within the two-year statutory exception of Fla. Stat. § 440.19(1)(a) for his compensation claim....

...Thus, on the dual basis of 1) "remedial" attention having been voluntarily furnished within the two years required by the same exceptions within the two statutes, and 2) compensation voluntarily paid "without an award" also within such two years, the claimant falls within the statutory exceptions in § 440.13(3)(b) and § 440.19(1)(a) and is within such "extended" two year statute of limitations as a basis for recovery....

...This case requires us to construe the workers' compensation statute of limitations as it has existed since January 1, 1994. The question is whether the statute bars a petition for benefits filed within two years of an industrial accident where more than a year has elapsed since "the furnishing of remedial treatment." § 440.19(2), Fla....

...e than a year later. When she did, one of United's claims representatives informed her that the statute of limitations had run and refused her request. The petition for benefits with which the present proceedings began was then filed. Complying with section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (1995), the Board and United raised the statute in their notice of denial. [1] They contend that section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1995), limited the period in which Ms. Best could file a petition for benefits to the year following the date on which she last received remedial treatment. The controversy turns on construction of the first two subsections of section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1995), which provide: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death pursuant to s....

...This tolling period does not apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment. We conclude Ms. Best's petition for benefits was timely under subsection (1) and that nothing in subsection (2) provides otherwise. We read section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1995), as the statute of limitations generally applicable in workers' compensation cases, subject to the exceptions—which extend the limitations period in certain circumstances— set out in the other subsections of section 440.19....

...ents of the state, during the time of the absence. 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Action § 142 (1970) (footnotes omitted). Subsections that follow subsection (2) [2] can have no effect other than to extend the two-year statute of limitations set out in section 440.19(1), Florida *1188 Statutes (1995). Subsection (2) should be construed in pari materia with these provisions. Section 440.19(2) states: "Payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of remedial treatment ......

...Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.) defines "toll" to mean "[t]o suspend or stop temporarily as the statute of limitations is tolled during the defendant's absence from the jurisdiction and during the plaintiffs minority." To interpret section 440.19(2) as reducing rather than expanding the limitations period ignores the meaning of the word "toll." See Daniel v....

...may not look beyond the plain meaning of that language."); Special Disability Trust Fund v. A-1 Block Corp., 688 So.2d 968, 970 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) ("Where the language is plain and unambiguous... there is no occasion for judicial interpretation."). Section 440.19(2) has no practical effect until after the two-year period provided for in section 440.19(1) expires. As long as the petition is timely under either section 440.19(1) or section 440.19(2), the statute of limitations is no bar....

...of this section, the failure to file a petition for benefits within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee's claim unless the carrier advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its initial response to the petition for benefits. § 440.19, Fla....

...however, in such an event, the employer is allowed a credit of his or her actual cost of defending such suit in an amount not to exceed $250, which amount must be deducted from any compensation allowed or awarded to the employee under this chapter. § 440.19, Fla....

...Creed, 573 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), review denied, 584 So.2d 997 (Fla.1991), this court held that where medical services are rendered by a clearly authorized physician for an undisputed compensable condition, the medical services are "furnished" under section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes, when received by the claimant, as a minimal administrative delay in effecting payment would not impact the E/C's established acknowledgement of responsibility....

...ed in 1962 during a robbery in the course of his employment as a taxicab driver. The Judge also ruled that respondent was responsible for workmen's compensation benefits because the statute of limitations which would bar his entitlement to benefits (Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1973)) would not apply to an incompetent unless a guardian or other authorized representative had been appointed to protect his interests. Section 440.19(3), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...The Commission held no hearing on respondent's application for review of the Judge's order. Nonetheless, the commission reversed the ruling of the Judge and reversed his award, indirectly at least ruling that the statute of limitations barred Mr. Aris' claim. We hold this was error. Section 440.19(3) suspends the period of limitations until a guardian is appointed to represent an incompetent....

...Aris so long as he is incompetent and no guardian has been appointed to represent him. Respondent's counsel bottoms his argument to us relative to limitations on an assertion that Mr. Aris was competently represented *467 in fact in all of the compensation proceedings. That may be so, but Section 440.19(3) does not allow the claims statute to run against adequately represented incompetents for whom no guardian has been appointed. We hold, therefore, that the claims statute in Section 440.19(I) is no bar to Mr....

...This court has recognized that "due process problems arise when the deputy commissioner undertakes to rule on issues not framed by the parties." Farm Stores v. Dyrda, 384 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Central Oil Co. v. Campen, 390 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). To prevent surprise and prejudice, Section 440.19(2)(d) requires any claim for benefits filed with the division be specific as to the particular benefits being claimed. In the instant case, claimant did not file a claim for remedial attention pursuant to Section 440.19(2)(b)....

...On appeal, claimant argues the JCC erred in finding the E/C was not estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense. We base our analysis upon the E/C's failure to obtain an MMI date and impairment rating. ANALYSIS Claimant's petition was untimely under section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2005), because her claim was made more than two years after her injury and more than one year after her last receipt of benefits. Section 440.19(4), however, provides than an E/C may be estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense. Because the E/C complied with the notice requirements of sections 440.185 and 440.055, Florida Statutes (2005), claimant *224 can demonstrate estoppel only by proof that is clear and convincing. See § 440.19(4), Fla....

...Further, the carrier apparently felt that the professional services rendered to the claimant by Dr. Matthews on July 10, 1986 constituted treatment because they paid Dr. Matthews for those professional services in September of 1986. Florida Statute 440.19(2)(b), which is the statute applicable to this situation, clearly provides for remedial attention rather than specific remedial treatment....

...Because we find no error in the deputy commissioner's ruling on the first issue, we have no occasion to reach appellants' second issue. We fully agree with the deputy commissioner that Dr. Matthews provided remedial attention to claimant on July 10, 1986. Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations applicable to this claim, states: All rights for remedial attention under this section shall be barred unless a claim therefor which meets the requirements of paragraph (d) is filed w...

...employer." In Barnett v. EMR Telemetry, 396 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), in determining whether a physician's examination of a claimant constituted remedial attention furnished by the employer within the contemplation of Sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1971), [3] we held: A distinction has been drawn between "examination" and "treatment"; however, such distinction should not be artificially and unrealistically made....

...whether directions to claimant concerning changes or continuation of existing treatment were necessary. We hold that the purpose and totality of circumstances surrounding claimant's 1986 visit fit within the meaning of remedial attention as used in Section 440.19(2)(b)....

...was different from "medical treatment." Otherwise, remedial attention for permanent medical conditions having a proven prognosis of future degenerative changes known to require further medical attention might, by pure happenstance, become barred by section 440.19(2)(b) if the expected degenerative change failed to require active medical treatment within a particular two-year period....

...NOTES [1] The employer alleged that "remedial medical treatment had not been rendered nor deemed medically necessary, by the authorized physician for the Workers' Compensation injury, since November 20, 1984. As such, the 2 year Statute of Limitations had expired pursuant to F.S. 440.19." [2] The "wash-out" settlement agreement and order approving it are not included in the record on appeal, so we have no way of knowing the date of the settlement or whether the medical services being rendered by Dr. Matthews were pursuant to an award. Lack of such information does not, however, make any difference under our holding in this case. [3] Chapter 79-40, § 15, Laws of Fla., moved Section 440.13(3)(b), in substantially the same form, to Section 440.19(2)(b) (the statute at issue in the case sub judice )....

...A claimant's right to compensation is fixed at the time of his injury. Since the claimant was injured in 1970 and 1972, the provisions of the 1969 and 1971 Workers' Compensation Act are applicable to this case. The applicable limitation on filing initial claims for compensation without an award is governed by § 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1969), effective until 1979, which read as follows: (1)(a) The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two (2) years after the time of injury,...

...hed by the employer. The April 29, 1980 claim was filed within two years after the last payment of compensation without an award, and the claimant argues that this claim for permanent total disability compensation therefore meets the requirements of § 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1969)....

...On appeal, claimant argues that the judge erroneously shifted to her the burden of proving that the statute of limitations had not run. However, in making this argument, claimant fails to appreciate the distinction between the general statute of limitations contained in section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (2001) (stating that a claim must be filed within two years of the date of injury), and the express tolling exception to that statute found in section 440.19(2), which extends the filing period for one year upon the payment of indemnity benefits or the furnishing of medical care. Because running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the employer and servicing agent had the burden of raising that defense and proving that the petitions for benefits were untimely pursuant to section 440.19(1). See § 440.19(4), Fla....

...However, here the employer and servicing agent were obliged only to establish the date of injury (stipulated as August 17, 2001) and the date of the first petition for benefits (July 5, 2005) to carry that burden. Having done so, they established a prima facie case that the petitions for benefits were untimely pursuant to section 440.19(1) because the first petition was filed more than two years after the date of injury. The question then becomes whether the general statute was tolled or extended pursuant to the exception in section 440.19(2), and which party carries the burden of proving the applicability of that exception. Although it can be inferred from our prior decisions that we have concluded (without expressly saying so) that a workers' compensation claimant carries the burden of proving the applicability of the tolling exception contained in section 440.19, it does not appear that we have directly addressed the issue....

...1st DCA 1986) (holding that, while the burden is on the defendant to prove that the action was not brought within the appropriate limitation period, the burden of proving the conditions which would invoke a statutory tolling provision, is on the plaintiff). The tolling exception in section 440.19(2) is analogous to the statutory tolling exceptions to the statutes of limitations applicable to civil actions found in section 95.051. Having held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving tolling exceptions contained in section 95.051, we can think of no reason why we should not reach the same result with regard to the tolling exception found in section 440.19(2). Accordingly, we hold that, where a workers' compensation *564 claimant seeks to extend or avoid the statute of limitations by operation of section 440.19(2), he or she bears the burden of establishing the exception....

two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). The claimant

...Finally, the E/SA assert that the JCC erred in awarding penalties based on a premature filing of the notice to controvert. It is not clear what statutory basis the JCC used to order the E/SA to pay a penalty. However, since no compensation benefits were awarded, it appears to be pursuant to section 440.19(1)(e)7, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...receipt of the acknowledged claim from the division." Here, claimant filed a claim for benefits on October 8, 1992. The notice to controvert was filed approximately one month earlier, on September 9, 1992. Technically, the E/SA failed to comply with section 440.19 because the notice to controvert was not filed within 21 days of receiving the claim for benefits....

...Appellant contends the true nature and full extent of a back injury he sustained in 1977 was not detected until seven years after the date of the injury. We find that appellant's claim was a subsequent claim for additional compensation governed by section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes, rather than a petition for modification of a prior order under section 440.28, Florida Statutes....

...s June 1985 claim was not substantively a petition for modification of a prior order. Appellant was not requesting benefits that were specifically denied by or were inconsistent with the prior order, but was instead claiming additional compensation. Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes, applies to initial or subsequent claims for compensation....

...he date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer. In this case, the employer authorized and provided medical treatment from June 11, 1985 until September 17, 1985, a period clearly not covered by the 1978 order. Under the language of section 440.19(2)(a), as most recently construed, the voluntary payment of compensation or remedial treatment revives the two year limitation period, *618 even if an accrued defense existed at the time of such payment....

...*927 Because neither the release language nor the parties' conduct in relation to the release clearly and unambiguously reveals an intent to settle potential workers' compensation claims, the order under review should be affirmed. NOTES [1] The petition for benefits was filed outside the statutory limitations period, see § 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (2001) ("[E]mployee petitions for benefits ......

...the petition is filed within 2 years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury... arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment."), but Patco did not raise the statute of limitations as a defense in its initial response to the petition. See § 440.19(4), Fla....

...Moore of Thomas A. Moore, P.A., Orlando, for appellees. JOANOS, Judge. Melvin H. McNeilly has appealed an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying his claim for benefits and medical expenses based on the running of the statute of limitations, Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...On February 25, 1988, the employer/carrier's representative informed McNeilly that the surgery would not be covered in that the statute of limitations had run on the claim. In actuality, the statute did not run until at least March 10, 1988, two years after the employer/carrier's last payment of benefits. Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...njury, except that, if compensation benefits have been paid or remedial attention has been furnished by the employer, a claim may be filed within 2 years after the date of the last payment of benefits or remedial attention furnished by the employer. Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Appellant is entitled to reversal and remand because the JCC failed to address her argument that the E/C was estopped from denying benefits on that basis because of its advice to her that "there is nothing we can do now." Appellant's petition was untimely under section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2002), because her claim was made more than two years after her injury and more than one year after her last receipt of benefits. However, section 440.19(4) provides that an E/C may be estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense. Because the E/C complied with the notice requirements of sections 440.185 and 440.055, Florida Statutes, Appellant can demonstrate estoppel only by proof that is clear and convincing. See § 440.19(4); Crutcher v....

...("E/C") appeal an order entered by the judge of compensation claims ("JCC") awarding claimant's attorney a fee pursuant to the 21-day provision of section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990). The E/C argue on appeal that the JCC erred (1) in holding that the procedural provisions of section 440.191, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1994), did not preclude claimant's entitlement to an attorney's fee pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990); and (2) in determining that the docketing judge's dismissal of the claimant's claim for benefits based upon noncompliance with the procedural provisions of section 440.191, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), and section 440.192, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1990), is substantive and the 1994 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law significantly change the substantive right to have the employer pay attorney's fees, and because the E/C failed to accept the claimant as PTD within 21 days of service of a claim which met the specificity requirements of section 440.19(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), we affirm....

...On June 1, 1994, the claimant mailed a claim for PTD benefits, costs and attorney's fees using a form acceptable for claims filed prior to the effective date of the 1994 amendments. On the same date, she requested assistance from the Employee Assistance and Ombudsman Office ("EAOO") pursuant to section 440.191, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Although the record is unclear, it appears the docketing judge treated claimant's claim as a petition. On June 10, 1994, the docketing judge entered an order dismissing claimant's petition, without prejudice, based upon failure to meet the specificity requirements of section 440.192(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), and for failure to include a certificate indicating that a good faith effort had been made to resolve the dispute as required by section 440.192(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...s stringent standards contained in the law predating the 1994 amendments. The JCC determined that because the E/C failed to accept the claimant as PTD within 21 days of service of a claim, which claim the JCC held met the specificity requirements of section 440.19(1)(e), claimant's attorney was entitled to recover an attorney's fee pursuant to section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...tatute occurring after a claimant's injury cannot be retroactively applied). The JCC correctly decided that the docketing judge's dismissal of a claim that the docketing judge treated as a petition which, in fact, met the specificity requirements of section 440.19(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), did not preclude an award of attorney's fees under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...xcept that a claimant shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee from a carrier or employer: ..... (b) In any case in which the employer or carrier fails or refuses to pay a claim filed with the division which meets the requirements of s. 440.19(1)(e) on or before the 21st day after receiving notice of the claim, and the injured person has employed an *1231 attorney in the successful prosecution of his claim. The claimant in the present case complied with the procedure set forth in section 440.191, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), by filing a request for assistance initiating the EAOO process. At the same time, the claimant filed a claim for benefits which met the specificity requirements of section 440.19(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), to preserve her right to recover an attorney's fee under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Sculco, Judge. Dates of Accidents: June 9, 2011; January 6, 2013. April 30, 2018 M.K. THOMAS, J. In this workers’ compensation case, we address the interplay between section 440.25(4)(i), Florida Statutes (2011), permitting motions to dismiss for lack of prosecution, and section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2011), the statute of limitations (“SOL”) provision....

...On September 1, 2016, after the filing of the motion and before a hearing, Moise filed two additional PFBs (covering both dates of accident) seeking additional medical benefits and attorney’s fees and costs. In response, Disney filed notices of denial raising SOL defenses pursuant to section 440.19 as to both dates of accident and denying entitlement to all further benefits....

...t be misconstrued to require a JCC to determine the intentions for or the merits of a PFB filed subsequent to a motion to dismiss under section 440.25(4)(i). The motivating factor(s) to file a PFB is not pertinent to the analysis of timeliness under section 440.19. The date of filing of a PFB, which meets the specificity requirements of section 440.192, Florida Statutes, is the determining factor. Neither the claimant’s basis for filing nor the merits of the claims raised in the PFB are relevant to whether its filing was timely pursuant to section 440.19. Disney argues that, instead of Akers, this case is controlled by Limith v....

...Rule 60Q-6.124(4), allows a motion “by any party” to initiate resolution of disputed attorney’s fees and costs. The common thread of these statutory 5  As illustrated by the facts of this case, the interaction of sections 440.19 and 440.25(4)(i) can prompt a “race to the courthouse” when a pending claim originally brought by PFB (whether for attorney’s fees and costs or otherwise) acts to toll the statute of limitations and no record activity has occurred for over a year....

...Inv., 37 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (Wetherell, J., specially concurring); Airey v. Wal-Mart/Sedgwick, 24 So. 3d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the 2016 PFBs as untimely and, therefore, barred by section 440.19. AFFIRMED. B.L....

...The determinative question in this workers' compensation appeal is whether a claim for additional compensation filed in February, 1982, was barred by the limitations period set forth in Section 440.28, Florida Statutes, or was properly allowed to proceed under Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1969), current version found at Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...20% permanent partial disability ("PPD") previously awarded, PPD benefits, permanent total disability benefits, and other items. The deputy commissioner determined that: the limitations period for modification under Section 440.28 had run, but under Section 440.19(1)(a), the limitations period had not run; claimant was proceeding under the latter section; and claimant was entitled to additional TTD benefits and compensation for an additional 20% PPD of the body as a whole based on loss of wage earning capacity. No additional remedial care was awarded, therefore the propriety of such an award under applicable statutory provisions is not at issue. We deal solely with the propriety of the award of further compensation. Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1969) provides: The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has...

...Further, appellants contend that because the TTD benefits paid from June, 1981, to October 10, 1981, were paid in error this case is distinguishable from Bowman v. Food Fair Stores, 400 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), on which the deputy commissioner relied in determining Section 440.19(1)(a) applies in this case....

...does not allow renewal of the limitation period by a voluntary carrier payment after that two year period." This court also stated, however, that "[t]he applicable limitation on filing initial claims for compensation without an order is governed by § 440.19(1)(a) ...," and that the April 29, 1980 claim was timely under that section because the payment of TTD in February, 1979, was not paid pursuant to the 1974 order, but was paid "without an award." The above quoted language from Bowman indica...

...period of Section 440.28 had run. We read the case this way even though the carrier at the time of the 1970 injury was not the carrier at the time of the 1972 injury, yet that carrier voluntarily paid the benefits which triggered the application of Section 440.19(1)(a) to the 1972 injury, because those benefits were paid on behalf of the employer....

...s. Only Section 440.28 is appropriately applied to the present case and no events have occurred which would toll or renew the limitations period under that section. The distinction between Bowman and the instant case is significant, because Sections 440.19(1)(a) and 440.28 are designed to be used in different situations, depending on *1359 whether benefits for a particular injury have been furnished pursuant to a compensation order or entirely without an award....

...1964); Budget Luxury Inns, Inc. v. Boston, 407 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The deputy commissioner misapplied Bowman to the present situation. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the order of the deputy commissioner determining that the claim was timely under Section 440.19(1)(a) is REVERSED....

...r [for judicial function] pursuant to an application for hearing, is solely and totally within the purview of the division and ought not be addressed by these Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure, or any other rules except those of the division. § 440.19(2)(d), Fla....

...Robert W. Bleakley and R.G. (Mack) McCormick, Jr., of The Bleakley Firm, Tampa, for Appellee. ERVIN, J. Henry Fontanills, claimant, appeals an order determining that his petition for continuing medical benefits was barred by the limitation period in section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1995), requiring that he file his petition within one year from the time he had been provided remedial treatment....

...for further proceedings. Appellant contends the employer/carrier (E/C) is estopped from relying on the defense because it did not instruct him in its informational brochure of the one-year limitation period, which, he argues, is required by sections 440.19(4) and 440.185....

...he limitation period, despite the failure of the E/C to advise him of the time to file, the JCC in the case at bar erred in concluding that the statute of limitations had expired, because she failed to take into consideration post-1994 amendments to section 440.19 that were inapplicable to the court's analysis of the statute considered in Hanssen. As this court explained in Crutcher v. School Board of Broward County, 834 So.2d 228, 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), the *30 JCC's reliance there on the court's opinion in Hanssen was incorrect because Hanssen had dealt with a prior version of section 440.19....

...Inc. v. Coleman, 743 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), that the statutory limitation period is not tolled solely by the failure of an E/C to advise an injured worker that a statute of limitations exists, nevertheless, because of the 1994 amendment to section 440.19, [1] the court remanded the case to the JCC for a determination of whether the claimant lacked actual knowledge of his rights under the workers' compensation law, and, if so, whether the absence of such knowledge was the cause of the claimant's failure to obtain the requested care within the limitation period....

...uence, the E/C was not estopped from asserting the defense. The JCC's interpretation of the statute, as it existed as of the date of claimant's 1996 injury, was legally incorrect because it failed to take into account the subsection (4) amendment to 440.19, requiring the carrier to comply with the provisions of section 440.185(4) by mailing to the injured worker an informational brochure setting forth in clear and understandable language an explanation of his or her "rights, benefits, procedures for obtaining benefits ... under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law." Section 440.19(4), as construed by this court in Crutcher and Coleman, places the burden on the claimant to prove that he or she did not receive proper notice of such rights....

...claimant with the information required by the statute, including the appropriate limitation period, claimant otherwise had actual knowledge of the time required, which could have been provided by the employer other than through the method set out in section 440.19(4), or from any source....

...statute. Because his evidence was not contradicted by the E/C, the JCC erred in holding the E/C was not estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense. REVERSED and REMANDED. WOLF and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Subsection (4) amended section 440.19 by adding the language estopping an E/C from raising the statute of limitation defense unless the E/C shows that it had provided the section 440.185 notice to the employee, whereupon the employee is required to show estoppel by clear and convincing evidence....

...vised him that the applicable period for his claim was two years. Acting on this information, claimant filed his petition within two years from the provision of remedial treatment for the 1996 injury, but outside the one-year period then required by section 440.19....

...Walter E. Beisler of Beisler & Wells, West Palm Beach, for appellees. ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Judge. As the deputy found, claimant's December 1981 claim for chapter 440 compensation and medical benefits was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), bars claims for compensation for disability unless filed within two years "after the date of the last payment of compensation or after date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer." Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), similarly bars his claim for remedial attention unless filed within two years "after the date of the last payment of compensation or ......

...oyer of the injury or death pursuant to s. 440.185(1) and the petition is filed within 2 years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment. § 440.19(1), Fla....

...Stat. (1997 and 2001). The next subsection of the statute allows for a one-year extension of this period based on the payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of treatment pursuant to a notice of injury or petition for benefits (PFB). See § 440.19(2), Fla....

...SRS last paid benefits pursuant to the 1999 notice of injury on August 11, 2000, which extended, for one year, the *205 time within which Claimant could file a PFB or obtain benefits pursuant to that notice of injury. See Orange County Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (explaining section 440.19(2) extends rather than shortens limitation period described in section 440.19(1), and if PFB is timely under section 440.19(1) or section 440.19(2) there is no bar to compensation)....

...Neither Bell nor Ellis present issues of contribution between carriers. The holdings in both cases are premised on this court’s interpretation of now-repealed statutory language which allowed for the creation of a new statute of limitations upon each provision of benefits from the employer. See § 440.19(l)(a)-(b) Fla....

...vices furnished by the employer ... ”). On January 1, 1994, the Legislature repealed the provisions interpreted in Bell and Ellis , and implemented significant substantive changes to the statute of limitations in workers’ compensation cases. See § 440.19(l)-(2), Fla....

...Stat. (1994). Because the holdings in Bell and Ellis are predicated on a reading of the “clear language” of statutes no longer in effect, the court is not bound by these decisions. See Bell, 603 So.2d at 685 (interpreting “clear language” of section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1991))....

...e of injury). And the provision of benefits pursuant to a PFB or notice of injury, rather than creating an independent point of reference from whence a claim may be filed, only operates to “toll” or extend the initial statute of limitations. See § 440.19(1)-(2), Fla....

...* Rather, the statute envisions a potentially continuous extension (tolling) of the original statute of limitations predicated on the timely receipt of benefits pursuant to a PFB or notice of injury, or the filing of a *206 PFB. The Legislature’s use of the word “toll” (to extend or suspend) in section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1994) requires that there must be some viable period which is to be extended or prolonged....

...atute of limitations by merely providing benefits. For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the order on appeal requiring SRS to pay contribution to Zenith. BARFIELD and CLARK, JJ., and BROWNING, JR., EDWIN B., Senior Judge, concur. We are mindful that section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (1997), allows for waiver and equitable tolling of the post-1994 statute of limitations....

...oyer of the injury or death pursuant to s. 440.185(1) and the petition is filed within 2 years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment. § 440.19(1), Fla....

...Stat. (1997 and 2001). The next subsection of the statute allows for a one-year extension of this period based on the payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of treatment pursuant to a notice of injury or petition for benefits (PFB). See § 440.19(2), Fla....

...SRS last paid benefits pursuant to the 1999 notice of injury on August 11, 2000, which extended, for one year, the *205 time within which Claimant could file a PFB or obtain benefits pursuant to that notice of injury. See Orange County Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (explaining section 440.19(2) extends rather than shortens limitation period described in section 440.19(1), and if PFB is timely under section 440.19(1) or section 440.19(2) there is no bar to compensation)....

...Neither Bell nor Ellis present issues of contribution between carriers. The holdings in both cases are premised on this court's interpretation of now-repealed statutory language which allowed for the creation of a new statute of limitations upon each provision of benefits from the employer. See § 440.19(1)(a)-(b) Fla....

...ve services furnished by the employer ..."). On January 1, 1994, the Legislature repealed the provisions interpreted in Bell and Ellis, and implemented significant substantive changes to the statute of limitations in workers' compensation cases. See § 440.19(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (1994). Because the holdings in Bell and Ellis are predicated on a reading of the "clear language" of statutes no longer in effect, the court is not bound by these decisions. See Bell, 603 So.2d at 685 (interpreting "clear language" of section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991))....

...date of injury). And the provision of benefits pursuant to a PFB or notice of injury, rather than creating an independent point of reference from whence a claim may be filed, only operates to "toll" or extend the initial statute of limitations. See § 440.19(1)-(2), Fla....

...[*] Rather, the statute envisions a potentially continuous extension (tolling) of the original statute of limitations predicated on the timely receipt of benefits pursuant to a PFB or notice of injury, or the filing of a *206 PFB. The Legislature's use of the word "toll" (to extend or suspend) in section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1994) requires that there must be some viable period which is to be extended or prolonged....

...imitations by merely providing benefits. For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the order on appeal requiring SRS to pay contribution to Zenith. BARFIELD and CLARK, JJ., and BROWNING, JR., EDWIN B., Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [*] We are mindful that section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (1997), allows for waiver and equitable tolling of the post-1994 statute of limitations....

...ces, Inc. (jointly the employer/servicing agent), appeal an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) finding that the petition for benefits filed by Menisier St. Louis, claimant and appellant, was not barred by the statute of limitations. See § 440.19, Fla....

...Workers' Compensation Law; that the claimant was unaware of such rights, benefits and procedures, and specifically unaware of the limitations period; and that this ignorance accounted for his failure to obtain care within the limitations period. See § 440.19(4), Fla....

...cribed by § 440.15(3)(f), Fla. Stat. IV. Whether the instant record fails, as a matter of law, to support an award of temporary total disability benefits from July 26, 1977, to November 16, 1978. We affirm as to Points I and II. § 440.13(3)(b) and § 440.19(1)(a), Fla....

...ompletion of paper formalities... ." 1A Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 26.23 p. 5-325 (1992). [2] Because benefits were voluntarily paid, no claim was filed invoking the jurisdiction of the Division of Worker's Compensation. See § 440.19(1), Fla....

...1), provides that a claimant shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fees from a carrier or employer "[i]n any case in which the employer or carrier fails or refuses to pay a claim filed with the division which meets the requirements of s. 440.19(1)(e) on or before the 21st day after receiving notice of the claim, and the injured person has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of his claim." Section 440.19(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), provides, in part, that a "claim may contain a claim for both past benefits and continuing benefits in any benefit category, but is limited to those in default and ripe, due, and owing on the date the claim is filed." Section 440.19(1)(e) also provides that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of s....

...h up to the date of the July 13, 1995 hearing, twelve months after the petition was filed and twenty-one months later than the date alleged in the petition. We conclude that an award of attorney's fees in this situation does not comply with sections 440.19(1)(e) and 440.34....

...George M. Murphy of Langston, Hess & Murphy, P.A., for appellee. ERVIN, Judge. The judge of compensation claims erred in determining that appellant's claim for *254 compensation benefits was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set out in Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...t they had incurred $10,622.87 in defending against claimant’s petition for benefits. The judge of compensation claims concluded that the employer and carrier were entitled to recover $8,992.93, rejecting claimant’s arguments that sections *1091 440.19(6) and 440.24(4), Florida Statutes (2004), controlled....

...g arguments that sections 440.13(5) and 440.30, Florida Statutes (2004), applied, and reaffirming the rejection of claimant’s previously advanced statutory arguments. This appeal follows. II. A. In his first point on appeal, claimant contends that section 440.19(6) permits an award of either zero costs or, at most, $250 in costs against a claimant in a case where compensability is denied because there is no fund of money from which to deduct the $250. Section 440.19(6) reads: When recovery .is denied to any person in a suit brought at-law or in admiralty to recover damages for injury or death on the ground that such person was an employee, that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of t...

...he employee under this chapter. To the extent the issues raised by claimant concern statutory construction, our review is de novo. See Palm Beach County Sch. Dist. v. Ferrer, 990 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Contrary to claimant’s contention, section 440.19(6) applies only when a claimant first proceeds against an employer at law or in admiralty, and such relief is denied on the basis of workers’ compensation exclusivity/immunity....

...gainst compensation benefits. Id. Here, however, the employer and carrier were not seeking to recover costs incurred in defense of an action brought (as an alternative to the workers’ compensation claim) either at law or in admiralty. Accordingly, section 440.19(6) does not apply- B....

...er provisions of the same act”), and furthers a reasonable public policy to reimburse the costs of litigation, regardless of who the prevailing party might be. IV. Based on the foregoing, we reject claimant’s first point on appeal, that sections 440.19(6) and 440.24(4), Florida Statutes (2004), prevail over section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2004), the statutory basis for the award of costs to a prevailing party in workers’ compensation matters. Neither section 440.19(6) nor section 440.24(4) restricts an employer’s or carrier’s entitlement to prevailing party costs when it successfully defends against compensability of a claim....

...mant's claims for treatment for both accident dates. Specifically, the order disposed of both case numbers XX-XXXXXX and XX-XXXXXX. [1] ANALYSIS The April 3, 2000 Accident Claimant argues that because his first petition for benefits was timely under section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (2000) [2] , his petition filed March 12, 2004 is likewise timely filed....

...In McBride, the claimant dismissed his timely filed petition and several months later filed another petition. Id. at 387. This Court held, "absent a clear statement from the legislature to the contrary, the one-year statute of limitations specified in section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), is not tolled during the period that an earlier filed petition was pending before it was voluntarily dismissed." Id....

...WEBSTER, BROWNING and POLSTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The original order entered by the JCC listed only case number XX-XXXXXX. However, after being given leave of this Court to amend its final order, the JCC entered an amended order listing both case numbers. [2] Section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (2000), provides: "Payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to either a notice of injury or a petition for benefits shall toll the limitations period set forth above for 1 year from the date of such payment....

...This tolling period does not apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment." [3] Florida Administrative Code Rule 60Q-6.105(1) provides that "[a] party commences a new case by filing a petition for benefits pursuant to Section 440.192, Florida Statutes, when there is not an existing case pertaining to the same claimant and date of accident." Subsection (2) provides in part, "any subsequent petition for benefits or claim relating to that claimant and date of acciden...

period of six (6) weeks at $20.00 per week. Section 440.19 Fla. Statutes, 1941, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2

...Lawless of Dickinson, O'Riorden, Gibbons, Quale, Shields & Carlton, P.A., Sarasota, for appellees. PER CURIAM. The sole issue for our determination is whether claimant's examination by Dr. Padar on August 7, 1978 constituted remedial attention or remedial treatment as contemplated by Sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1971)....

...without an award on account of such injury a claim may be filed within two years after the date of the last payment of compensation or within two years after the date of the last remedial attention furnished by the employer; ... [Emphasis supplied] Section 440.19(1)(a) provides: The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless *792 a claim therefor is filed within two years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made or remedi...

petition for benefits expired pursuant to Florida Statute 440.19.” A-*7though Wilczewski and Leon received

...Perkins, Jr., Winter Park and Bill McCabe of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, for Appellee. KAHN, Judge. The employer/carrier (E/C) appeal from a final workers' compensation order awarding benefits based on the "reasonable person" exception to the two-year statute of limitations found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Foncea described the heterotopic bone formation as a long-term complication from the bone graft, which is seldom seen. The E/C argued below, and on appeal, that because more than two years passed without medical care furnished by the employer, the right to further compensation is barred by the terms of section 440.19....

...The judge of compensation claims (JCC) disagreed with the statute of limitations defense. The JCC relied on the holdings in Herb's Exxon v. Whatmough, 487 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) and Paulk v. Berkeley Florist Supply, 574 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), which state that the section 440.19 limitations period for filing a claim does not begin to run until the claimant, as a reasonable man, should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable compensable character of his injury or disease....

...The JCC found that because the heterotopic bone growth was asymptomatic until March 1995, a reasonable man, and specifically the claimant, could not have recognized the nature, seriousness and compensable character of the injury until March 1995. We first note that the statute of limitations contained in section 440.19 contains no reasonableness exception for unforeseen medical problems which arise after a two-year gap in treatment....

...40.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), a claim for remedial attention is barred unless filed within two years after the date of the last payment of compensation, or within two years after the last remedial attention "furnished by the employer." Under section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), the right to compensation is barred unless a claim is filed within two years after the date of the last payment of compensation or after the date of the last remedial treatment "furnished by the employer...

...Since, in the instant case, appellee proved his entitlement to workers' compensation medical benefits on the basis of the exposure theory, we affirm the deputy commissioner's award of those benefits. Appellant also asserts that appellee's claim is barred by section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1979) which precludes a claim unless it is filed within two years after the time of injury, after the date of the last payment of compensation, or after the date of the last remedial attention furnished by the employer....

...Barry Keyfetz of Keyfetz, Asnis & Srebnick, P.A., Miami, for Appellant. Robert A. Ginsburg, Miami Dade County Attorney, Miami, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. In this appeal, appellant-claimant contends that appellee-employer's [hereafter E/C] failure to file a notice of denial within 14 days, as required by section 440.192(8), Florida Statutes (1997), constituted a "general denial," and that the E/C could not thereafter file a notice of a denial specifically asserting the statute of limitations as a defense, since the notice of denial was not the initial response to the petition. See § 440.19(4), Fla....

...1st DCA 1997), we find no authority to support claimant's "general denial" theory. In fact, North River Insurance Co. v. Wuelling, 683 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (en banc), indicates a contrary conclusion. There this court explained that under section 440.192, Florida Statutes, an E/C must, within 14 days, either pay the requested benefits or file a notice of denial....

...claimed to have been harassed by the Siegal Clinic and Medical Center as to unpaid bills. [2] We note that the claim to set aside the settlement was filed within two years of the order approving it. We therefore do not consider the applicability of § 440.19(2)(a) to such a claim....

...Swain of Webb, Swain & O'Quinn, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellees. PER CURIAM. Appellant, the claimant in a workers' compensation case, appeals an order denying his claim for permanent impairment benefits based upon the two year statute of limitations found in Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...tify injured workers of their possible entitlement *156 to benefits. We find that the January 24, 1985 letter did not afford the claimant adequate notice of his eligibility for permanent impairment benefits, and therefore the claim was not barred by Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...May 3, 1991, fulfilled its duty. Appellant has offered no authority to support his argument that a 17-day delay in authorizing requested chiropractic care constitutes a failure of E/C's obligations. Moreover, we note the E/C fulfilled its duty under section 440.19(1)(f)7, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...nt already had been provided care by Dr. Daruna. Appellee then requested a hearing to determine his entitlement to psychiatric care by Dr. Stillman. Section 440.13, Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), provides: (1) Subject to the limitations specified in section 440.19(2)(b), the employer shall furnish to the employee such remedial treatment, care, and attendance under the direction and supervision of a qualified physician or surgeon or other recognized practitioner, nurse, or hospital, and for such...

...Freed "as the nature of his injury and the process of his recovery might require." The deputy refused to invoke the limitation provisions of Section 440.28. The limitation statutes relevant to this case are §§ 440.13(3)(b) and 440.28, F.S. (1977) (currently 440.19(1)(b) and 440.28 (1983), respectively)....

...The claimant received continuing medical treatment through 1981. The E/C voluntarily paid TTD for five months in 1981. In 1982 the claimant filed a claim for further medical care, rehabilitative TTD, modification of PPD, PTD and other benefits. The deputy found the claim to be timely under Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1969)....

...1963), that it was not incumbent upon the claimant to establish a change of condition under Section 440.28 in order to obtain additional medical care. [2] Therefore, the two-year limitation period under Section 440.28 is not applicable. Section 440.13(3)(b) (1977) (currently 440.19(1)(b) (1983)) provides for the circumstances under which the right to remedial attention will be time barred: (b) All rights for remedial attention under this section shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed with the division within 2...

...be its effect after an order finding MMI, the parties clearly did not treat the 1980 order as one terminating remedial care during the years preceding the current claim. [1] NOTES [1] The court in Bassett's Dairy noted that the "current version" of Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1969), could be found at Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). Since 1981, this provision was again moved back to Section 440.19(1)(a) as reflected in the 1983 edition of Florida Statutes....

...1st DCA 1982). We will treat the claim as properly filed, even though it was completed and mailed before the claimant's disability began. However, if purely technical requirements are considered, a claim is not "filed" until it reaches the division. Sections 440.19, 440.25, Florida Statutes (1981); Rule 2(g), Florida Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure....

...[2] We regard the "claim," for Section 440.34(2)(a) purposes, as the one filed with the division on September 7, 1979, which included compensation as well as medical benefits. Thus, the November 1, 1979 request for an operation submitted to the E/C, but not filed as a claim in accordance with Section 440.19(2)(d), did not qualify as a claim. The filing of a claim is no mere formality in this context, because by filing a claim, the division is enabled to conduct its investigation and attempt to resolve the dispute without resort to a hearing. Section 440.19(1)....

...jury. Inland/ERC moved to dismiss the reimbursement claim, and any claims by Green, alleging that "more than two years has elapsed since [Inland/ERC] ... paid or provided any indemnity or medical benefits to the claimant [on February 21, 1985]." See § 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (the right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss shall be barred unless a claim therefore is filed within 2 years of the time of injury or within 2 years after the date of the last pay...

...In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals, and the Employer/Carrier (E/C) cross-appeals, an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying a follow-up medical visit, but also rejecting the E/C’s affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations, section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...The deputy denied retroactive TTD benefits, but awarded greater PPD benefits. The order, as amended, was entered on 30 April 1982. On 11 April 1983, Ford filed a claim again requesting pain clinic treatment. He argued the claim was timely under Section 440.13(3)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), now Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), or under Section 440.28, Florida Statutes (1979). The deputy entered an order finding Ford could not proceed under Section 440.19(1)(b), and treating the claim as a Section 440.28 petition to modify the 6 March 1981 order. Finding the de facto petition filed more than two years after 6 March 1981, the deputy denied it as untimely. The deputy did not err in finding Ford could not proceed under Section 440.19(1)(b)....

...s are not always considered compensation. For example, remedial medical treatment is not payment of compensation so as to toll the limitation period of Section 440.28. Dean v. McLeod, 270 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1972). The distinction is also perpetuated in Section 440.19(1), which contains two limitation periods for compensation and a third for remedial attention....

...1st DCA 1998) (applying the 1985 version of the workers' compensation statute of limitations where a claimant was injured in 1985). Under the statutory provision in effect the year Claimant was injured, a petition for benefits is timely if filed within two years after the date of the last payment of compensation. § 440.19(1)(a), Fla....

...along with this court’s prior application of this statute — compels the award of attorney’s fees where a claimant’s attorney is required to attend a deposition set by an employer or carrier when no petition for benefits has been filed under section 440.192, we conclude that the JCC erred in denying fees under section 440.30 for Shannon’s counsel’s attendance at the second deposition....

...At the time the foregoing language was enacted, a “claim” was the name given to the formal document that an employee was required to file with the Division of Workers’ Compensation to toll the statute of limitations and claim substantive benefits that were allegedly improperly denied by the employer or carrier. See § 440.19(l)-(6), Fla....

...�claim” with “the division at its office in Tallahassee”). Effective January 1, 1994, the Legislature renamed the official document that must be filed to toll the statute of limitations, from “claim” to “petition for benefits.” Compare § 440.19(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993) (providing compensation is barred unless timely “claim” is filed), with § 440.19(1), Fla....

...Significantly, when this court was first confronted with an opportunity to interpret section 440.30 after the 1994 revisions to chapter 440, we held that the term “claim,” as used in section 440.30, is “properly construed as the filing of a petition for benefits under *1233 section 440.192.” See Wright v. Indus. Auto., 662 So.2d 1321, 1322-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Further, although the term “claim” is not explicitly defined within chapter 440, the contextual use of the term in section 440.192(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), illustrates that a “claim” is the (sub)part of a petition for benefits requesting the payment of benefits that are alleged to be due, ripe, and owing. See § 440.192(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994) (“A petition for benefits may contain a claim for past benefits and continuing benefits in any category, but is limited to those in default and ripe, due, and owing on the date the petition is filed.”); see also 440.192(3), Fla....

...nces where a claimant’s attorney is required to attend a deposition set or compelled by an employer or carrier, when no petition for benefits — or other document that if timely filed would toll the statute of limitations — has been filed under section 440.192. We conclude that Shannon’s counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees was not a “claim” as the term is used in section 440.30; the motion was not filed in accordance with the requirements of section 440.192 nor was it contained within a petition for benefits, and it would not toll the limitation period regarding Shannon’s entitlement to benefits under the applicable statute of limitations, section 440.19(2), Florida Statute (2010)....

...the Judge is not divested of jurisdiction to award the fee by the withdrawal of the claim.”). Given our bright-line interpretation of the word “claim” as used in section 440.30 — whereby either a “claim” for benefits has been filed under section 440.192, or it has not (removing any reasonable debate regarding whether a fee is due under section 440.30) — we see no reason to recede in any way from our holding in Snack ....

...of PPD benefits, the limitation period expressed in Section 440.28 was operative to bar appellee's claim for TTD benefits. The judge found that appellee was not required to proceed by way of modification and that his claim was therefore governed by Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), which provides that a claim for compensation is timely if filed within two years of the last furnishing of compensation or remedial treatment by the employer....

...ermined by context as well as the label assigned upon payment, although either party may be foreclosed by stipulation or otherwise to raise such issues. The current order before us resolves the claim on the ground that only the limitations period in Section 440.19 need be applied, which conclusion we now reverse....

...nd permits a statute of limitation to bar a particular claim before it comes into being. The judge's ruling in the appealed order that this claim for temporary disability compensation benefits is a new claim governed by the statute of limitations in section 440.19(2)(a) is correct and should be affirmed....

...1986), it would seem only reasonable that the compensation referred to in the section 440.28 time limitation must necessarily include payments for remedial medical benefits under section 440.13. This construction of section 440.28 is consistent with the legislative intent now expressed in section 440.19 in regard to the tolling of the two-year period for filing claims for disability compensation benefits being tied to the payment of either disability compensation benefits or remedial medical benefits....

...r this court or the supreme court in any prior case. II. My principal disagreement with the majority's holding lies in their conclusion that claimant's claim is not a new claim for disability compensation benefits governed by the time limitations in section 440.19 because the 1980 order forecloses any future payment of compensation benefits for temporary disability and must be timely modified pursuant to section 440.28, even though such benefits are directly caused by his having to undergo the t...

...of claims under said Statutes; one in reference to compensation and the other in reference to medical care. In 1979, during the time that the claimant had a valid claim pending and being paid, the legislature enlarged the Statutes of Limitations in 440.19(b) to say that the Statute of Limitations shall run from the last payment of compensation or the last medical care rendered....

...Obviously, this claim for temporary disability compensation benefits did not come into being until made necessary by the admittedly compensable knee replacement operation. Thus it was characterized by Judge Householder as a new claim for benefits governed by section 440.19(2)(a)....

...1st DCA 1987). Likewise, Judge Householder correctly ruled that the carrier's furnishing of medical care pursuant to the 1980 order continuously to the filing of the current claim was sufficient to avoid any bar to this claim by the two-year limitation in section 440.19(2)(a)....

...Rather, this principle of law is based only on a conclusion inferred from a series of principles extracted from case decisions, none of which has directly addressed the precise issue presented here. The plain language of the statutes belies this conclusion. Section 440.19(d) states that, "A claim may contain a claim for both past benefits and continuing benefits in any benefit category in default at the time the claim is filed." It is perfectly plain that this provision precludes a claimant from filing...

...Recognizing that remedial medical treatment may be warranted after an injured employee has reached MMI without modifying the order establishing MMI, the courts have now concluded that medical care characterized as "palliative" is in fact "remedial" within the meaning of sections 440.13 and 440.19, and have allowed recovery on claims therefor filed under section 440.19 more than two years after the claimant reached MMI because the employer had made payments for "palliative" care during the two year time limitation period. E.g. Thomas v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 536 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); City of Orlando v. Blackburn, 519 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). These awards have been made on the basis of a new claim for benefits under section 440.19 without requiring modification of any previous order establishing claimant at MMI, thereby establishing that the claimant is limited to palliative medical treatment and permanent disability compensation benefits....

...While the claimants apparently proceeded under section 449.28 in those cases, nothing in the statutory language of chapter 440 required that they do so. Just as the cases recognizing the right to further remedial medical treatment after MMI allowed the claim to be filed as a new claim under section 440.19 and did not require modification of the prior orders establishing MMI, likewise there is no statutory necessity for the claimant to proceed by way of modification of the prior order establishing MMI when filing a new claim for temporar...

...Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v): Is a compensation claim under Ch. 440, F.S., for temporary disability during knee replacement surgery, and for consequential impairment ( cf. City Investing v. Roe, 566 So.2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), pending S.Ct. 76-702), governed by Sec. 440.28 or by Sec. 440.19(1)(a) when permanent disability compensation has been previously awarded and paid under a compensation order which determined maximum medical improvement at a time when future surgery was uncertain? MINER, J., and WENTWORTH, Senior Judge, concur....

...The critical issue, as I see it, is whether the 1988 claim for temporary disability benefits is a new claim for disability and medical benefits arising out of the 1979 accidental injury that could not have been previously asserted and is thus cognizable pursuant to section 440.19....

...This is the ruling of the judge of compensation claims that is reversed by the majority opinion. In Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 490 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 1986), the supreme court treated the 1983 claim for disability and medical benefits arising out of the covered 1978 industrial injury as a new claim cognizable pursuant to section 440.19....

...While it does not appear that any order was ever entered in that case in respect to the benefits voluntarily paid in 1978 by the employer and carrier on account of that injury, the lack of an order should have no material bearing on determining that the subsequent claim for benefits is a new claim under section 440.19 so long as it is for benefits that could not have been asserted previously....

...he workers' compensation act applicable to the issues in this case. NOTES [1] This finding is not challenged on appeal and is accepted as correct. [2] Only the TTD award is at issue in this appeal. [3] At the time of appellee's compensable accident, Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), provided: (1)(a) The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensati...

...ayment of compensation or after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer. (e.s.) Chapter 79-40, Laws of Florida, which took effect soon after appellee's accident, deleted the qualifying term "without an award" and renumbered Section 440.19(1)(a) as 440.19(2)(a). (Note: the original section number, 440.19(1)(a), has since been restored.) The judge applied the amended statute under the principle announced in such cases as Garris v....

...s absent. Northwest Orient Airlines v. Gonzalez, 500 So.2d 699, 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Boston v. Budget Luxury Inns, 474 So.2d 355, 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). [5] In case law applying the pre-1979 Act, the qualifying term "without an award" found in Section 440.19(1)(a) is cited as a ground for requiring the claimant seeking additional compensation to meet the stricter time limitation requirements of Section 440.28, since benefits furnished pursuant to an earlier order did not act to toll the time limitations of Section 440.19....

...1st DCA 1959); and Garris v. Weller Construction Co., 132 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1961), for the proposition that a statutory amendment enlarging the applicable statute of limitations should be applied to claims presented after the effective date of the amendment. [3] Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provided: The right to compensation for disability, impairment, or wage loss under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor which meets the requirements of paragraph (d) is filed within 2 yea...

...isability benefits and finding that the two-year statute of limitation, which otherwise would bar the claim, was tolled by the employer's payment to Allen of wages in lieu of disability compensation within two *1116 years before the claim was filed. Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...orate her "logical cause" finding. The carrier having stopped payment to Allen of any sort of workers' compensation benefits more than two years before his claim was finally filed on January 15, 1980, the claim would indisputably have been barred by Section 440.19(1)(a) [1] had the City of St....

...assert his formal rights. 3 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.43(c) (1976). *1118 These apparent snares notwithstanding, and despite only faint praise for the rule, [2] the Florida decisions including Chemstrand appear to have interpreted Section 440.19(1)(a) as liberally as that statute permits, allowing the payment of wages to trump the limitation statute only if the payment was "intended to be made on account of compensation liability, or if the employee reasonably believed it was so intended." Chemstrand, 231 So.2d at 818-19, quoting Larson....

...son to stay the running of the statute. Allen mistakenly accepted the surcease of continued wages without preserving by asserting his compensation claim; and after two years his claim was barred. REVERSED. JOANOS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.19(1)(a) provides: The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made or remedial trea...

...state rehabilitation nurse and with a private rehabilitation and vocational counselor. On May 14, 1981, a Division of Workers' Compensation (Division) field specialist completed and forwarded to the parties his claim evaluation conducted pursuant to § 440.19(1), Fla....

...In our view, these statutes permit, if indeed they do not require, a more extensive investigation of a PTD claim than of lesser claims. We note the deputy's omission from his order of any reference to the claim evaluation performed by the Division pursuant to § 440.19(1), Fla....

...an be deemed sufficient without more. Reyes v. Johnstone, 388 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Continental's second argument that Pisseri was required to file a claim against them before they could be made to pay benefits is without merit according to Section 440.19, Florida Statutes....

...its Tallahassee office. Likewise, Continental's contention that the claim filed by Pisseri is not effective against them because it does not mention a 1973 accident is without merit. Pisseri noticed the date of his injury in his claim as mandated by Section 440.19(1)(d)....

...PER CURIAM. Claimant appeals an order granting the employer/carrier's (E/C) motion for summary final order entered by the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC), denying and dismissing all pending claims based on the running of the statute of limitations, section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1998)....

...physician's appointment, June 27, 2002, and not from some arbitrary point in the future when the Claimant asserts that he finished taking the prescription." The order denied and dismissed all pending claims regarding the 1998 accident. II. ANALYSIS Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1998), provides a two-year statute of limitations for workers' compensation claims from the date the employee knew or should have known of an injury arising out of work performed in the scope and course of employment. This statute of limitations would bar the claims in the present case unless the statute was tolled pursuant to section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1998)....

...or a petition for benefits shall toll the limitations period set forth above for 1 year from the date of such payment. This tolling period does not apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment. § 440.19(2), Fla....

...1st DCA 1988) (holding that the prescribed medication in that case received on May 27, 1987, tolled the statute of limitations and therefore, the July 7, 1987 claim for benefits was timely filed); City of Orlando v. Blackburn, 519 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding that "remedial" as used in section 440.19 includes treatment that mitigates the effects of injury, such as pain medication, and that eleven prescriptions for pain medication ordered by the doctor without office visits tolled the statute of limitations so that claimant's claim, filed within one year of the last prescription, was not barred)....

...escribed during the thirty-day period. REVERSED and REMANDED with directions. BENTON and POLSTON, JJ. CONCUR; THOMAS, J. CONCURS WITH OPINION. THOMAS, J., specially concurring. I concur because prior decisions constrain me from properly interpreting section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1998)....

...r rule and proper interpretation of the operative language would hold that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date that the drugs are prescribed, not on the date that a person consumes the last pill prescribed. The operative language in section 440.19(2) initiates the statute of limitations with E/C's "furnishing of remedial treatment. . . ." I do not believe the language includes the time that a claimant consumes a prescription medicine which was previously provided to him by prescription. I believe that the correct interpretation of section 440.19(2) here would result in affirming the JCC's order, as the medicine was "furnished" when Dr. Eaton provided the prescription to Claimant. To interpret section 440.19(2), as this court did in Fuster, requires extensive factual determinations that are problematic....

...Appellant correctly asserts that in construing Section 440.11, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we must consider the Workmen’s Compensation Law (F.S. Chapter 440, F.S. A.) as a whole, citing Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pinkerman (Fla.1950), 47 So.2d 547 . He then points to the provisions of Section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., whereby when recovery is denied in a suit at law or in admiralty on the ground that the plaintiff was an employee and the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Law and that such employer had secured compensation to such employee under the law, the limitation of time prescribed in subsection (1) of said Section 440.19 begins to run only from the date of termination of the suit, and on this premise asserts the existence of a legislative intent to allow a claimant who for any cause is unsuccessful before one or the other tribunals to which he may initially apply for relief, to have a go at it in the other forum. We must reject that contention. There is an obvious distinction between the situation contemplated by the mentioned provision of F.S. 440.19(4), F.S.A. and that with which we are confronted under F.S. 440.11, F.S.A. Section 440.19(4) operates to preserve to the employee the rights and benefits to which he is entitled in the light of the employer’s qualification and coverage under the Workmen’s Compensation Law,' while Section 440.11 affords the employee, or...

...TD benefits. Although the claim was treated as a petition for modification at the final hearing, the JCC's order characterized the proceeding as a proceeding on a claim. In finding that claimant's claim was not time-barred, the JCC noted that, under section 440.19(3), Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations defense is waived unless the defense is asserted at the first hearing involving the claim....

...s. 440.25 and, in accordance with such section, issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation or award compensation... . Unlike the limitations period for filing a claim provided in section 440.19, Florida Statutes, the limitations period for modification of orders provided in section 440.28, Florida Statutes, is jurisdictional and is not an affirmative defense that may be waived by the parties....

...h the employer directly paying medical bills above the policy limit. The provision of orthopedic treatment by the employer revives the limitations period as to claimant's 1981 back injury. See Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 490 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 1986). Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes, allows a claim to be filed within two years after the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer....

...the claim had already been denied in its entirety. [1] Eventually, Claimant learned about the ten percent rating and filed a petition for benefits (PFB) seeking permanent total disability benefits, which was barred by the statute of limitations. See § 440.19, Fla....

...t's attorney. Section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that a claimant may recover an attorney's fee: In any case in which the employer or carrier fails or refuses to pay a claim filed with the division which meets the requirements of s. 440.19(1)(e) on or before the 21st day after receiving notice of the claim......

...ivision of Workers' Compensation. However, section 440.34(3)(b) does not refer to an acknowledged claim, and the statute should not have been given such limited effect. While section 440.34(3)(b) does refer to a claim which meets the requirements of section 440.19(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and that statute identifies the specific information which a claim should contain, the present claim was sufficient in this regard. [1] Although section 440.19(1)(e)7 authorizes a penalty assessment if the employer/carrier does not act within 21 days of receipt of an acknowledged claim, liability for a penalty is a matter separate and apart from liability for an attorney's fee. This penalty provision is not a part of the requirements of a claim as identified in section 440.19(1)(e), and as referenced in section 440.34(3)(b). Indeed, when the pertinent language in section 440.34(3)(b) was first enacted, section 440.19(1)(e) did not even mention an acknowledged claim....

...to the basis and necessity for such a request, in the circumstances of this case, involving a potential musculoskeletal injury and the apparent absence of any other orthopedic care, the claim contains sufficiently detailed information to comply with section 440.19(1)(e). [2] The reference in section 440.34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), to section 440.19(1)(e) is the result of an editor's revision which changed a paragraph (d) reference to (e) after various amendments were made to section 440.19(1) by chapter 90-201, section 23, Laws of Florida. When the section 440.34(3)(b) attorney's fee provision was created in chapter 89-289, section 19, Laws of Florida, neither section 440.19(1)(d) nor (e) made any mention of an acknowledged claim. Section 440.19(1) was revised the following year, with the necessary contents of a claim being moved from paragraph (d) to (e), and the penalty provision being created at paragraph (e)7. See chapter 90-201, section 23, Laws of Florida. The absence of any corresponding legislative action to alter the reference in section 440.34(3)(b) in connection with the amendment to section 440.19(1) in chapter 90-201 suggests that the legislature did not thereby contemplate that such changes would be entirely incorporated in section 440.34(3)(b).

the injured individual pursues a civil remedy. § 440.19(4), Fla.Stat. (1993). Petitioners contend that

...strial accidents. The JCC also found that these prescriptions constituted "palliative" treatment and were paid for by the E/C on December 19, 2001. These findings are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The JCC recognized that section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes, provides, as an exception to the two-year statute of limitations, that if the E/C provides remedial attention or rehabilitative services without an award on account of such injury, the claim may be filed within two years after the date of the last remedial attention....

...Despite the above findings, the JCC based her ruling upon an erroneous legal distinction between "remedial" and "palliative" treatment, construing Ellis v. Galloway's Inc., 794 So.2d 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), as meaning that only "remedial" and not "palliative" treatment is capable of reviving the limitations period under section 440.19. No such distinction was created by Ellis. Ellis merely recognizes that "remedial" care is capable of reviving the limitations period. 794 So.2d at 711. "Remedial," as it is used in section 440.19, Florida Statutes, has been defined to include "palliative" care. See City of Orlando v. Blackburn, 519 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding that "remedial," as it is used in Section 440.19, includes "all medical treatment or attention which is reasonably necessary to treat a compensable injury or to mitigate its effects or conditions"); see also Colvin v....

...The deputy commissioner rejected the employer/carrier defense that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations and found that the statute of limitations had been tolled by the rendering of treatment by the authorized physician. Appellants correctly point out the two pertinent statutes: section 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1977) and section 440.13(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (1978 Supp.). Section 440.19(1)(a) reads: The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made or remedial treatme...

...Stepter, Jr., of Fishback, Dominick, Bennett, Stepter & Ardaman, Orlando, for appellants. Michael M. O'Brien, of O'Brien & Hooper, Orlando, for appellee. WENTWORTH, Judge. Employer/carrier appeal a workers' compensation order, contending that the claim should be barred by the two year statute of limitations under section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1986)....

...appealed. Employer/carrier maintained below that the claim was untimely in that it "was filed more than two years after the last rendering of medical treatment or payment of compensation but was filed within two years of payment of a medical bill." Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1986), imposes a two year limitations period from "the date of the last payment of compensation or ......

...This case appears to me to be controlled by the holding in *37 Whiteman v. United Parcel Serv., 438 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), wherein we held that where remedial treatment is provided by an authorized physician, the treatment is "furnished by the employer," for purposes of the Section 440.19, Florida Statutes, limitations period, when the services are performed, not when the bill for the remedial treatment is paid....

...further acknowledges that more than two years expired between the performance of the treatment and the filing of the claim, the ratio decidendi of Whiteman appears to me to dictate a holding that the claim was barred by the limitation prescribed by 440.19....

...Accordingly, any language in either Proctor or Iuen which might be taken to suggest that it is the voluntary payment for remedial treatment, rather than the performing of the remedial treatment, which constitutes the "furnish[ing]" of such treatment for purposes of the Section 440.19 limitations period is obiter dictum....

...hiropractic care." (R. 251). Nieves contends that the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support these findings and that the denial of an attorney's fee for obtaining chiropractic care benefits is error. We agree and reverse. Section 440.19(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1983), the statute in effect at the time the claim for benefits was filed in this case, required that the claim set forth "the type or nature of medical treatment sought." The claim for benefits in this case requested "remedial care and attendance." (R....

...as filed more than two years after the date of Claimant's injury. At a hearing before the JCC, Claimant argued her use of a prosthetic device represented a continuous provision of remedial treatment that tolled the statute of limitations pursuant to section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...devices. The JCC rejected Claimant's argument that her prosthesis represented a continuous provision of remedial care that tolled the statute of limitations. The JCC reasoned that the Legislature made a substantive change to the law when it amended section 440.19, Florida Statutes, regarding the application of the statute of limitations to prosthetic devices, and therefore intended a specific alteration of the law. The JCC concluded, as a matter of law, that Claimant could not demonstrate the statute was tolled pursuant to *848 the remedial treatment tolling exception contained in section 440.19(2). On appeal, Claimant argues that her prosthetic device qualifies as a "medical device," the use of which tolls the statute of limitations pursuant to section 440.19(2). In response, the E/C argues that a prosthesis is, as a matter of law, distinct from a medical device and, therefore, insufficient to constitute the provision of remedial care sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Analysis Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that a petition for benefits is barred unless filed within two years of the date of accident. Section 440.19(2) acts to toll this statute of limitations for a period of one year from the payment of compensation or furnishing of remedial treatment....

...al apparatus prescribed by an authorized doctor, the statute of limitations is tolled during such use. We agree with Claimant that a prosthetic device qualifies as a medical apparatus, the use of which may toll the statute of limitations pursuant to section 440.19(2)....

...prostheses, and other medically necessary apparatus." We find no reason to treat prostheses differently from other medically necessary apparatus used to mitigate the effects of a compensable injury. See City of Orlando v. Blackburn, 519 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding "remedial," as used in section 440.19, includes treatment that mitigates the effects of an injury)....

...Indeed, it should come as no surprise to an E/C that a claimant may seek follow-up treatment to repair or replace a no longer functioning apparatus that was prescribed by an authorized physician and used on a continuous basis. Our analysis does not overlook the legislative amendments to section 440.19(1)(b). As noted by the JCC, for accidents occurring prior to 1994, there was no statute of limitations applicable to remedial treatment related to prosthetic devices. Specifically, section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), provided, in relevant part, that "no statute of limitations shall apply to the right for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device to any part of the body." The Legislature has removed this language from the statute....

KAHN, Judge. Claimant Charlton Bell appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) dismissing Bell’s workers’ compensation claim as outside the applicable period of the statute of limitations, section 440.19(2), 1 Florida Statutes (1981)....

...We reverse the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims and direct that Mr. Bell’s claim be considered on its merits. ZEHMER and WOLF, JJ., concur. . The statute was renumbered in 1983 as 440.-19(l)(a). Although it has been amended several *684 times, the current version of the statute is substantially the same. Section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), bars claims unless they are: "filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that, if payment of compensation has been made or remedial treatment or rehabilitation services have been furnished by...

...The same day, the Employer/Carrier also prepared a Notice of Denial stating, inter alia: "Claim has been filed more than three years after the alleged date of accident." The notice was sent to the Florida Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation ("Division") on November 21, 2008. Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that a petition for benefits is barred unless filed within two years after the date of accident. But section 440.19 states elsewhere that: Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the failure to file a petition for benefits within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee's claim unless the carrier advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its initial response to the petition for benefits. § 440.19(4), Fla....

...not mailed to the Division for filing until the following day. Because the Employer/Carrier's initial response to the Petition for Benefits failed to raise the statute of limitations as grounds for denying the claim, the petition is not time barred. § 440.19(4), Fla....

...TANENBAUM, J. The Florida Workers’ Compensation Law (chapter 440, Florida Statutes) bars the filing of any petition for benefits (“PFB”) beyond two years from when the employee became aware that he suffered an accidental work-caused injury. § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). 1 A pending, legally sufficient PFB filed within that two- year period, however, tolls that statute’s running. § 440.19(3), Fla. 1 The accident occurred in 2016, so all statutory references are to the 2016 version of the Florida Statutes, unless otherwise noted. Stat....

...benefits for the September 2016 date of accident. II As typically is the case in a compensation appeal, we are called upon to apply statutory text to a set of procedural facts. We have here two statutes to consider: section 440.19, Florida Statutes, containing both the statute of limitation and the relevant tolling provision; and section 440.192, Florida Statutes, governing PFBs. A A PFB must be “filed within 2 years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment,” otherwise the PFB is “barred.” § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat.; cf....

...ment of all benefits or compensation that the employee is seeking”; “[t]he type or nature of treatment care or attendance sought and the justification for such treatment”; and a “[s]pecific explanation of 5 § 440.19(3), Fla....

...“[T]olling focuses directly on limitation periods and interrupting the running thereof.” Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179, 1185 (Fla. 2000). It “suspend[s] the running of the statute of limitations time clock until the identified condition is settled.” Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 2000). Under section 440.19(3), a timely filed, legally compliant PFB stops any further time in the two-year limitation period from elapsing and being “counted against the claimant” for as long as the PFB remains pending and awaiting adjudication....

...even if filed more than two years after the accidental injury occurs, because its filing occurred while the limitation period remained suspended. As noted in the introduction, with regard to the application of the limitation period set out in section 440.19(3), this court has said that when a claimant files multiple PFBs for the same date of accident, as long as “at least one petition [remains] pending at all times between the filing of the first petition and the hearing on the last pet...

...PFBs untimely. Rice, 924 So. 2d at 884–85. If, however, there is a period of time when no PFB is pending (rendering the entire “action” effectively any other disputed issue that a judge of compensation claims will be called to rule upon.” § 440.192(2), Fla....

...g on this court’s later decision in Moise v. Disney Pop Century Resort, 244 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). On this, we agree. Moise is distinguishable from both this case and Rice. By its own terms, Moise addressed “the interaction of sections 440.19 and 440.25(4)(i),” Florida Statutes—the tolling effect of a timely filed PFB vis-à-vis a PFB filed after the former PFB is subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute....

...ter Murphy filed his second PFB. 7 request for a compensability determination, his claims for medical benefits and for compensation, but not his demand for attorney’s fees. 4 To address this question, we turn to section 440.192. B A PFB is the statutory vehicle by which an employee may claim “past benefits and continuing benefits in any benefit category.” § 440.192(3), Fla....

...can Airlines Group v. Lopez, 388 So. 3d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). Lopez addressed a related question: whether a reservation on fees (albeit unclear whether the reservation was under a settlement or adjudication of the claim) was a tolling event under section 440.19(2)....

...1st DCA 1996) (holding “that the payment of an attorney’s fee to the claimant’s attorney is not the ‘payment of compensation’”); Sanchez v. Am. Airlines, 169 So. 3d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (noting, in the context of a similar tolling provision in section 440.19(2), that “it is well-settled that the payment of an attorney’s fee is neither a payment of compensation nor the furnishing of medical treatment,” which are the only “two categories of benefits provided to a claimant” under chapter 440); Lopez, 388 So....

...Thomas, J., concurring in result only with opinion. The JCC correctly dismissed the fourth PFB, and the order should be affirmed. My reasoning behind affirmance, however, differs from that of the majority. Here, the only question before us is whether the fourth PFB was timely filed pursuant to section 440.19, Florida Statutes, which sets forth the statute of limitations (SOL) in workers’ compensation cases....

...Then in Rice v. Reedy Creek Improvement District, 924 So. 2d 882, 884–85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), the application of McBride was addressed in the context of a claimant filing multiple PFBs subsequently voluntary dismissing them. Rice declared that pursuant to section 440.19(2), when a claimant files multiple PFBs for the same date of accident, as long as “at least one petition [remains] pending at all times between the filing of the first petition and the hearing on the last petition filed,” the voluntary 1 I note this Court’s recent opinion in Fox v....

...1st DCA 2021). This Court announced in Sanchez that the payment of attorney’s fees does not toll the one-year limitations period. 169 So. 3d at 1198. It is only the payment of compensation or the furnishing of medical care that extend the SOL under subsection 440.19(2)....

...3d at 1197 (“holding that payment of attorney's fee does not extend statute of limitations because ‘the payment of an attorney's fee is neither a payment of compensation nor the furnishing of medical treatment—the only two events that will extend the statute of limitations under subsection 440.19(2)’”))....

...Id. The question raised was whether the pending claim for amount saved the subject PFB from a SOL defense. Id. This Court answered “no” for the above reasons and barred the PFB even though claim for amount remained “pending.” Id. In Moise this Court specifically addressed “the interaction of sections 440.19 and 440.25(4)(i).” 2 244 So....

...and “tolling.” Lopez artfully explained as follows: 16  “Pending” status of a PFB is an element of jurisdiction, while “tolling” is a separate legal doctrine that delays the time limits for pursuing or continuing a lawsuit. Section 440.19(2) specifies only two tolling events: “payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of remedial treatment, care, or attendance.” Id. On its face, this statute does not authorize tolling for either the pendency of a PFB or the payment of attorney's fees. For purposes of tolling under section 440.19(2), these are separate events and separate issues....

...R CURIAM. This cause is before us on appeal from a workers’ compensation order finding the statute of limitations has run and is a bar to the claim for benefits. We reverse and remand for a hearing to determine whether fraud occurred in this case. Section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1970), acts as a statute of limitations barring compensation unless a claim is filed within two years after the date of the last compensation payment....

benefits two years after the industrial accident. See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2009).5 Like the statutory limit

...Appellant seeks review of an August 13, 1987 workers’ compensation order by which his claim for permanent total disability benefits', wage loss, medical bills and attorney’s fees, costs, interest and penalties was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations, section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes. We affirm. Appellant contends the deputy commissioner erred in looking to the intent of section 440.19(l)(d), Florida Statutes, infra, arguing that the language of the section is unambiguous and clear, and allows for the refiling of a claim for benefits within sixty days of the dismissal of such claim “regardless of any other limitation in this chapter.” Section 440.19(l)(d) was amended, effective July 1983....

...The amendment added the following provision to the existing statute: When any claim is dismissed pursuant to this Section the claimant shall be allowed sixty days from the date of the order of dismissal in which to file an amended claim regardless of any other limitation provisions in this chapter. Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: The right to compensation .'.....

...e time it was filed. 4) In an attempt to revive the statute of limitations, the claimant has attempted a unique procedure. He filed a Motion dated September 24, 1985, requesting the undersigned to dismiss his own claim for being too vague under sec. 440.19(l)(d), Florida Statutes....

...No intent to indefinitely extend the two-year limitation period of subsection (2)(a) is evident in the title of the act or the wording of the amendment. Appellant’s claim of November 19, 1984 was time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations under section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The date of the last compensation payment furnished by the employer was July 22,1982 (the date of the last medical care furnished by the employer was June 8, 1982), more than two years prior to the claim. The fact that the deputy commissioner dismissed the November 1984 claim for vagueness pursuant to section 440.19(l)(d) would not preclude his later determination, in dismissing the amended claim, that the initial claim was time barred under section 440.19(2)(a). Even if appellant’s interpretation of amended section 440.19(l)(d) were tenable, a claim once barred by the statute of limitations is not ordinarily revived by a later legislative act....

any other rules except those of the division. § 440.19(2)(d), Fla.Stat., (1979) provides that: Such claim

...r 21, 1979, and continuing until the commencement of the temporary partial benefits. The claimant had filed a claim for temporary total benefits, and at the hearing took the position that she had as yet not reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). Section 440.19(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), requires a claimant to file a claim for all specific benefits due him under Chapter 440....

...The claimant, Mr. Boyd, testified at the hearing that he did not tell Arciola when he would be released from prison, as he did not know himself until two weeks prior to his release. The statute of limitations on Boyd’s claim ran on February 4, 1983. Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...en furnished by the employer without an award on account of such injury, a claim may be filed within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation or within 2 years after the date of the last remedial attention furnished by the employer Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981) (emphasis supplied)....

...by a physician cannot constitute notice to the E/C of the need for such care, pursuant to Section 440.13(2)(b), (3). Notice, however, is not the issue here. .See, Section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981): Subject to the limitations specified in Section 440.19(2)(b), the employer shall furnish to the employee such remedial treatment, care, and attendance under the direction and supervision of a qualified physician or surgeon or other recognized practitioner, nurse, or hospital and for such p...

The same filing requirement is contained in Section 440.19(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1975). Section 440

...Such a situation would defeat the purpose which the statute of limitations is intended to serve. For the reasons above stated, it is the judgment of the Court that the writ issue, and the order appealed from is accordingly quashed. TERRELL, C. J., and HOBSON, DREW, THORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., concur. . Section 440.19, R.S.A....

...This court held that the “claim” was not filed for purposes of section 440.30 until after the notice to controvert was filed because it was at that point that the Division had notice of the asserted right to benefits and began its independent investigation under sections 440.20(10)(b) and 440.19(1), Florida Statutes....

...In the instant case, the notice to controvert was filed on November 25, 1980, shortly after the accident. Appellant’s formal claim for benefits was not filed until March 10, 1982, and it was only subsequent to that time that the Division investigated and rendered an advisory decision pursuant to section 440.19(1)....

...ion was a result of the last four accidents. A question as to the applicability of the statute of limitations to the second accident was raised. At the time of this accident (December 13, 1954) there existed a two-year statute of limitations, F.S.A. § 440.19, and on July 1, 1955, a three-year statute of limitations, Laws 1955, c....

...1 Appellant then pursued a civil suit against the owner of the premises where he was injured. After that suit was concluded, 2 appellant filed a claim for benefits. Since the claim was filed more than two years after appellant’s injury, the E/C asserted that the claim was time-barred under Section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Because we find that Claimant suffered a repetitive injury, we reverse the lower court's dismissal of his claim. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denied Claimant's petition for benefits regarding his condition in both wrists due to the statute of limitations set forth in section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (2001)....

PER CURIAM. We find competent, substantial evidence in the record to affirm the dismissal of the claims against both employer/carriers, as time-barred by the statute of limitation provisions of section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...(JCC) erred by issuing a summary final order finding that his amended petition for benefits was barred by the statute of limitations; 2) and the deputy chief judge erred by dismissing his original petition for benefits for reasons not enumerated in section 440.192(2), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Eckerd Drugs, 987 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). We disagree with the JCC’s reliance on the deputy chief judge’s dismissal of Claimant’s original petition for benefits when finding that the Claimant did not comply with the statute of limitations. Claimant correctly argues section 440.192(2)(a)-(j), Florida Statutes, does not require the signing of a fraud statement, an OJCC number, or a verified motion for assignment of a substitute identification number, which were the reasons his first petition for benefits was dismissed without prejudice by the deputy chief judge....

...60Q-6.1G3(l)(d), 6.105(4). Claimant does not contest that his original petition did not comply with either rule 60Q-6.103(l)(d) or rule 60Q-6.105(4). Claimant argues, however, that petitions for benefits may only be dismissed for lack of specificity under section 440.192, Florida Statutes; thus, the deputy chief judge erred by dismissing his first petition. We agree. Section 440.192(1), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that a petition for benefits must meet “the requirements of this section and the definition of specificity in section 440.02” before being filed with the OJCC. Accord Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Q-6.105(1) (providing that a claimant commences a new case by filing a petition pursuant to section 440.192). Section 440.192(1) is silent as to whether rules 60Q-6.103(l)(d) and 60Q-6.105(4) must be complied with when filing a petition for benefits. In fact, Florida Administrative Code Rule 60Q-6.107(1), entitled “Amendment and Dismissal of Petitions for Benefits,” indicates petitions will be dismissed only for failure to comply with section 440.192(2)-(4), Florida Statutes. Section 440.192(2), Florida Statutes (2006), provides: the [OJCC] shall review each petition and shall dismiss each petition or any portion of such a petition that does not on its face specifically identify or itemize the following: (a) Name, address, telephone number, and social security number of the employee....

...statement and an OJCC case number or verified motion for substitute identification number. Accordingly, we direct that the claim be reinstated. Claimant’s first petition for benefits was filed within the two-year statute of limitations period. See § 440.19(1), Fla....

...Newport Trucking and Southern Fire Adjusters (E/C) appeal from a workers’ compensation order, raising the following issues for this court’s consideration: (1) whether the deputy commissioner erred in finding the instant claim was not barred by the statute of limitations found in Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1983); (2) whether the deputy commissioner erred in awarding temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits from 8 January 1983 until 10 December 1983; (3) whether the deputy commissioner erred in awarding TPD benefits...

...Likewise, from 25 March 1985 (the date of MMI) until 30 June 1985, Gonzalez’ job search was deemed adequate and the E/C ordered to pay wage loss benefits. The E/C was also ordered to pay the medical bills of Dr. Albanes, Dr. Martinez and Hialeah Hospital. Pursuant to Section 440.19(l)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, the right to compensation shall be barred unless a claim is filed within two years after the date of the last payment of compensation or after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employee. Further, it is the receipt of medical care, not the reporting of the same, which tolls the statute of limitations contained in Section 440.19....

...nced by Gonzalez in 1983 was an exacerbation of his original injury. Accordingly, we affirm the deputy commissioner’s finding that the treatment received by Gonzalez in 1983 was remedial in nature and tolled the statute of limitations contained in Section 440.19....

...440.28, Florida Statutes (1983). The E/C further contends that all care provided to an employee once a date of MMI has been determined must be considered palliative in nature, and such care cannot toll the statute of limitations contained in either Section 440.19(l)(b) or Section 440.28, Florida Statutes (1983). We do not feel it is necessary to make a direct determination of the relevancy of Sections 440.28 and 440.19(1)(b) in the present case, as it can be decided on the principle announced in Daniel v....

...erage weekly wage and the amount of credit to which employer and carrier would be entitled. Neither the employer and carrier nor the judge complied with this procedure. The only statutory authority for dismissal of a workers’ compensation claim is section 440.19(l)(d), which authorizes dismissal of a claim for failure to comply with the procedural requirements contained in that section upon motion of an interested party....

...od of one year and was not applicable to this case. That rule clearly did not authorize the subject order of dismissal. We hold that the judge had subject matter jurisdiction to hear this claim because the claim satisfied the requirements set out in section 440.19....

...orney’s fees.” He otherwise denied Dale’s claim, finding the heart attack not causally related to the industrial accident. The applicable statute of limitations, section 440.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), which is substantially the same as section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), provides in pertinent part: [A]ll rights for remedial attention under this section pursuant to the terms of an award shall be barred unless a further claim therefor is filed with the division within 2 ye...

...or review an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying Appellant, Claimant’s former attorney (Panzer), entitlement to an attorney’s fee based on the failure of the relevant petition for benefits (PFB) to meet the requirements of section 440.192, Florida Statutes (2006). Because the JCC erred by failing to give full effect to all of the provisions of section 440.192, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Because the facts are not in dispute, our review is de novo....

...[i]n any case in which the employer or carrier files a response to petition denying benefits with the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims and the injured person has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of the petition,” § 440.34(3)(b), Fla. Stat., while section 440.192, Florida Statutes (2006 and 2008), provided in part: (1) Any employee may, for any benefit that is ripe, due, and owing, file ....

...sions of s. 440.34, a [JCC] may not award attorney’s fees payable by the carrier for services expended or costs incurred prior to the filing of a petition that does not meet the requirements of this section. § 440.192, Fla....

...attorney in the successful prosecution of the petition.” § 440.34(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006 and 2008). Whenever a “physician’s request, authorization, or recommendation for treatment, care, or attendance must accompany the petition,” § 440.192(2)(i), Fla. Stat., the requirement that the claimed benefits be “ripe, due, and owing” is inextricably intertwined with the subsection 440.192(2) specificity requirement....

...at 712. In the present case, too, an attachment would both have established ripeness and satisfied the specificity requirement, and the E/C’s failure to object to the absence should be deemed a waiver of both legal defenses. Our conclusion in this regard is buttressed by the Legislature’s adding to section 440.192 the language now ∗ We note that the relevant statute in Straw was the 1991 version of the Workers’ Compensation Law and the statutory citations were to section 440.19, not 440.192. A comparison of the two subsections reveals, however, that the relevant provisions are essentially identical. Section 440.192 first appeared in chapter 440 in 1993, moving the provisions relating to the “Procedure for Resolving Benefit Disputes” from section 440.19 to section 440.192. See Ch. 93-415, § 25, at 137, Laws of Fla. 5 found in subsection (5), when section 440.192 was first enacted in 1993—“Any grounds for dismissal for lack of specificity under this section which are not asserted within 30 days after receipt of the [PFB] are thereby waived.” § 440.192(5), Fla. Stat. Plainly “ripeness” and “specificity” will not be the same in every case. Here, however, where section 440.192(2)(i) required that a copy of the request or recommendation be attached to the PFB in order to meet the specificity requirement, that same attachment would have established the ripeness of the PFB. Thus, because the E/C failed to move to dismiss the PFB in a timely manner, the JCC erred in failing to give effect to the waiver provision of section 440.192(5). Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion. LEWIS, C.J., BENTON, and RAY, JJ., CONCUR. 6 

...correct rate,” penalties and interest on any late payment of indemnity benefits, and attorney’s fees and costs. The E/C contested the claims, asserting, among other defenses, that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes, which provides that a PFB must be filed within two years after the date a claimant knew or should have known that his injury arose out of a compensable, work-related event, with the exception that the two-year per...

...Banegas subsequently filed a Petition for Rule Nisi with the trial court to enforce the medical attention provision of the 1993 order. Sodpolis and Travelers denied the medical treatment sought on the basis that the two-year statute of limitations had run pursuant to section 440.19, Florida Statutes, and that jurisdiction over the issue rested with the Judge of Compensation Claims....

...ed Employees,” as required by section 440.185(4), Florida Statutes (2006). On October 18, 2011, Claimant filed a petition for benefits on account of the March 15, 2007, date of accident, which is beyond the two-year limitations period set forth in section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...The JCC also noted that the E/C did not authorize any medical treatment upon receiving notice of the claim; rather, the E/C *1102 fully controverted the claim with its April 4, 2007, notice of denial. On these bases, the JCC concluded that the E/C was es-topped from raising the statute of limitations defense provided in section 440.19(1)....

...iod, and further, because the record does not support a finding that the E/C should otherwise be estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense, Claimant’s right to file a petition was barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in section 440.19(1)....

...prior to the filing of a claim. The facts of this ease are not in dispute. On January 14, 1994, the claimant suffered an injury. On September 29, 1994, with the assistance of counsel, the claimant filed a Request for Assistance as now required under section 440.191, Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.). On October 24, 1994, the appel-lee/employer took the claimant’s deposition. Counsel for the claimant prepared for and attended the claimant’s deposition. On November 28,1994, the claimant filed a Petition for Benefits pursuant to section 440.192, Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.)....

...In addition, numerous provisions of Chapter 440 establish that the commencement of the litigation process required to invoke the remedies under that chapter is accomplished by the filing of a “claim.” The pre-1994 amendment “Claim for Benefits” under section 440.19, Florida Statutes and the post-1994 amendment “Petition for Benefits” under section 440.192, Florida Statutes, both constitute “claims” as they are required to be filed with the Division, contain such information as will put the Division, the employer and the carrier on notice, and also operate to commence the litigation process....

...Further, a Request for Assistance is filed with the Employee Assistance and Ombudsman Office, not the Division. In addition, the claimant may not begin litigation by filing a Petition for Benefits until the claimant has first exhausted the procedures of informal dispute resolution under section 440.191, Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.), which includes the submission of a Request for Assistance to the Employee Assistance and Ombudsman Office....

...In serving this purpose, a Request for Assistance cannot be construed to constitute a claim under section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1993). We find that the reference to a filing of a “claim” in section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1993) should properly be construed as the filing of a Petition for Benefits under section 440.192, Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.) and not the filing of a Request for Assistance under section 440.191, Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.)....

within which to file his claim for compensation. F.S. 440.19. It is necessary therefore that the Fund be timely

...Hoover or under his direction as he deems necessary.” Employer/carrier asserts that the order is an award of lifetime treatment and argues that it effectively overcomes or waives the limitations period found in Section 440.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1975) (current version at Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979))....

...ing Section 440.13(1) subject to the limitations period of Section 440.13(3)(b). AFFIRMED. JOANOS, J., and WOODIE A. LILES (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur. . Section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes (1979) reads “subject to the limitations specified in S. 440.19(2)(b)_” Chapter 79-40, 1979 Florida Laws, moved Section 440.13(3)(b) to Section 440.19(2)(b) in substantially the same form.

...Claimant was employed by her husband, a race horse trainer, and his carrier controverted her right to recovery. Claim for compensation under the Florida Workmen’s Compensation Act was filed on April 4, 1956. The carrier interposed as a defense the limitation period as provided by section 440.19, Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

...ent has been furnished by the employer without an award on account of such injury a claim may be filed within two years after the date of the last payment of compensation or after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer.” Section 440.19(1) (a), Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

Pinel-las County. The claim was filed pursuant to Section 440.19(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1977),1 Fla. W.C.R.P. 4,2

within the two-year period in accordance with section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1992), was apparently

November 2, 1981. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), an employee’s

...Claimant last received benefits on June 9, 2008. The E/C mailed Claimant notice of the statute of limitations on April 14, 2009. Claimant filed a petition for benefits on July 2, 2010, and the E/C defended by alleging the limitations period set forth in section 440.19, Florida Statutes, had run....

...Claimant, in turn, alleged the E/C was estopped from raising that defense, because it had not provided statutory notice of the statute of limitations. The JCC found Claimant received actual notice, and did not prove estoppel by clear and convincing evidence. *1125 Section 440.19(4) outlines the standards of proof and burdens of proof applicable in such a situation: If a claimant contends that an employer or its carrier is estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense and the carrier demonstrates that it has provided notice to the employee in accordance with s....

...hts against CIGNA and Gallagher Bassett for any future benefits” precludes claimant from receiving certain future benefits on those claims. Thus, claimant is adversely affected by the deputy commissioner’s order and has standing to challenge it. Section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes, provides: The right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor ......

...treatment, and claimant cites to no record evidence that contravenes the deputy commissioner’s conclusion that the current treatment is not on account of one of these earlier injuries. Claimant’s current claim for benefits is therefore barred by section 440.19(1)(a)....

concur. . “(1) Subject to the provisions of § 440.-19, claim for compensation may be filed with the

...��s compensable injuries and his present psychiatric condition. We also find competent substantial ’ evidence to support the finding that Donahue suffered a compensa-ble injury on 4 April 1983. Accordingly, the City of Clearwater’s argument that Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1983), bars Donahue’s claim for benefits is without merit....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) rejecting its statute of limitations defense and awarding benefits. For the reasons below, we reverse. Section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (2006), provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the failure to file a petition for benefits within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee’s claim unless the carrier advances the def...

...1st DCA 2010), that the “initial response” “denied the claim in its entirety” evinces the need for an “initial response” to explicitly state a position either denying or conceding the particular claims therein. This reading of Certain fits with the requirement in section 440.192(8), Florida Statutes, that an E/C in a “response to benefits” must “list all benefits requested but not paid and explain its justification for nonpayment,” although that requirement does not appear to be intended as a definition....

...phrase “based on a preponderance of the evidence”; the E/C asserts the proper standard of proof was instead “clear and convincing evidence” because it proved compliance with sections 440.185 and 440.055, Florida Statutes. We disagree because section 440.19(4) places the (potentially) heightened burden on Claimant to prove estoppel, whereas the burden rests on the E/C to prove it asserted the statute of limitations defense in its “initial response.” The JCC also found the E/C’s failure to respond to the petition for benefits within fourteen days, as required by section 440.192(8), waived the statute of limitations defense....

...Ernesto Sivilla without first having sought authorization for Dr. Sivilla's services and did not afford Employer/Carrier sufficient time to offer its choice of alternative care. I find that the Employer/Carrier's response was within the time restrictions set forth in Florida Statute 440.19(e)(7) [sic]....

...On the latter visit claimant reported experiencing pain and Dr. Rid-dick prescribed anti-inflammatories. Claimant’s continued receipt of treatment provided by the E/C (whether remedial or palliative) extended the limitations period for filing his claim. Section 440.19(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

...The issues before us are questions of law, and therefore our standard of review is de novo. Moise v. Disney Pop Century Resort, 244 So. 3d 403, 405 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). We conclude the JCC erred in finding that the E/C/SA’s payment of attorney’s fees and costs was a provision of “benefits” within the meaning of section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (2019). The underlying facts are undisputed....

...Upon filing the June 6, 2022 PFB, Claimant voluntarily dismissed the December 1, 2021 PFB. Thus, the only PFB remaining was filed one year, six months, and twenty-five days after the last payment of medical or indemnity benefits. The E/C/SA asserted the statute of limitations as a defense, citing section 440.19(1) of the Florida Statutes....

...advised the employer of the injury or death pursuant to s. 440.185(1) and the petition is filed within 2 years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment. § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). Section 440.19(2) allows for a one-year tolling period in limited circumstances, as follows: 2  Payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to...

...r benefits shall toll the limitations period set forth above for 1 year from the date of such payment. This tolling period does not apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment. § 440.19(2), Fla....

...Once the fee issue is resolved— whether by the JCC’s approval of a fee and cost stipulation or denial for failure of proof, or the claimant’s voluntary dismissal of the PFB—that pending status is extinguished. The JCC erred again in disregarding the plain language of section 440.19(2)....

...itlement to attorney’s fees with tolling of the statute of limitations. “Pending” status of a PFB is an element of jurisdiction, while “tolling” is a separate legal doctrine that delays the time limits for pursuing or continuing a lawsuit. Section 440.19(2) specifies only two tolling events: “payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of remedial treatment, care, or attendance.” Id. On its face, this statute does not authorize tolling for either the pendency of a PFB or the payment of attorney’s fees. For purposes of tolling under section 440.19(2), these are separate events and separate issues....

...nefits: indemnity benefits, governed by section 440.15 of the Florida Statutes; and remedial treatment, care, or attendance, governed by section 440.13. Attorney’s fees are neither of these. We have previously followed the plain language of section 440.19(2) to hold that payment of attorney’s fees does not toll the one-year limitations period....

...3d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“[I]t is well-settled that the payment of an attorney’s fee is neither a payment of compensation nor the furnishing of medical treatment—the only two events that will extend the statute of limitations under subsection 440.19(2).” (citing Houston-Miller v....

...r, the statute will run as if the dismissed action had never been filed.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); McBride v. Pratt & Whitney, 909 So. 2d 386, 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“[T]he one- year statute of limitations specified in section 440.19(2), Florida 4 Statutes[], is not tolled during the period that an earlier filed petition was pending before it was voluntarily dismissed.”). Finally, applying controlling law, we reject the...

...to allow further proceedings on the petition for benefits filed June 6, 2022. The accident occurred on August 8, 2019, and the last tolling payment to Claimant was on November 13, 2020. The one- year tolling following that last qualifying benefit payment under section 440.19(2) ended before the new petition was filed, so that petition was untimely and barred. VACATED. KELSEY, WINOKUR, and NORDBY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla....

...e there appears on the face of each request and certification form the word “claim.” We find this argument unavailing. While “claim” is not defined in section 440.02, the Definitions section of the statute, that term is adequately defined in section 440.19(l)(e)l which provides that a “claim” shall: (1) be filed with the Division; (2) contain names and addresses of the employer and employee; (3) contain a statement of the time, date, place, nature and cause of the injury; and (4) contain specific details of the benefits alleged to be due....

...Rule 4.050, Fla.R.Work.Comp.P. also states that a claim “shall be filed with the Division.” Rule 38F-3.010, F.A.C. provides that a claim “shall be filed with the Division on L.E.S. Form D.W.C.-16 ... or its equivalent.” It is undisputed that Holder never filed a § 440.19(1) claim invoking jurisdiction of the Division of Workers’ Compensation because the benefits he received were paid to him voluntarily....

appeal. The applicable statute of limitations, section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), provided that:

...ly concluded that as a matter of law it was unnecessary. 4. Did the judge of industrial claims have jurisdiction over appellants in the previous hearings? Yes. The filing of the amended claim with the deputy, rather than the Division, is sufficient. Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Inc./FESA (the E/C), appeal an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC), striking the E/C’s defense under Martin Co. v. Carpenter 1 and directing the E/C to pay benefits to the claimant, John H. Sheppard. As the JCC properly concluded that section 440.192(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), is procedural and therefore applicable to claimant’s 1993 accident, we affirm the order....

...Once Sheppard reached maximum medical improvement on January 3, 1994, he filed a petition seeking permanent total disability benefits. In February 1995, nearly a year later, the E/C raised the Martin v. Carpenter defense. The JCC struck the defense as untimely, pursuant to section 440.192(8), which requires the E/C to either commence payment of requested benefits or file a notice of denial within 14 days after receipt of the petition for benefits. 2 *850 Section 440.192 took effect on January 1, 1994....

...93-415, §§ 25 & 112, at 137 & 215, Laws of Fla. Previously, the E/C was required to file a notice to controvert within 21 days of receipt of an acknowledged claim from the division, or be subject to a monetary penalty under section 440.185(9). § 440.19(l)(e)(7), Fla.Stat....

...d upon the occurrence of each period of wage loss, every WL period that occurs after the amended statute’s effective date is subject to its provisions. Id. at 1355-56. In applying the Litvin reasoning to the case at bar, the JCC observed, “Under section 440.192(8), Fla.Stat., the occurrence that invokes the need for a response within 14 days is the filing of a petition for benefits.” In our judgment, the instant case is controlled by this court’s recent decision in Waffle House v. Hutchinson, 673 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), wherein we applied the Lit-vin reasoning to the newly enacted section 440.192(8) and concluded that the statute was procedural and therefore should be retroactively applied to an industrial accident which occurred before the statute’s effective date. In so concluding, we observed that section 440.192(8) “merely alters the process by which the judge of compensation claims makes a determination of the parties’ rights or otherwise affects the parties’ burden of proof.” Id., at 885 . In other words, the new provision does not change the rights or defenses of either party; it simply prescribes the manner in which they may be asserted. AFFIRMED. ERVIN, BARFIELD and DAVIS, JJ., concur. . 132 So.2d 400 (Fla.1961). . Section 440.192(8) provides: Within 14 days after receipt of a petition for benefits by certified mail, the carrier must either pay the requested benefits without prejudice to its right to deny within 120 days from receipt of the petition or file a notice of denial with the division....

NIMMONS, Judge. We find that there is competent substantial evidence to support the order of the deputy commissioner that Shaw’s workers’ compensation claim against appellees is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Keller Kitchen Cabinets, 610 So.2d 1264 (Fla.1992) (Holder III), reversing this court’s prior decision, reported at 586 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) CHolder II). In Holder III, the Florida Supreme Court, answering a question certified by this court, held that under the unique facts presented, section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes, rather than section 440.28, governed Holder’s claim for temporary disability during knee replacement surgery and the impairment resulting therefrom, despite the fact that under an earlier order maximum medica...

...yment of compensation. The JCC was further confronted with the fact that the provision of the 1980 order concerning the need for future knee surgery had been stricken by the appellate court. Nevertheless, the JCC concluded, the claim was governed by section 440.19(l)(a), and was thus timely filed, since the E/C had provided continuing medical care up to the time of hearing on the claim....

...porary disability during periods of subsequent hospitalization and incapacitation resulting from his 1983 occupational disease. Instead, consistent with Holder, we conclude that claimant is entitled to maintain his claim filed August 15, 1989, under section 440.19(l)(a), provided it is determined on remand that the claim was filed within two years of the last furnishing of remedial treatment by the E/C....

...ted with other claims not contained in a petition. Proposed rule 4.028(a)(5)(D) is amended to clarify that in cases in which an injured employee is required to exhaust all managed care grievance procedures before filing a petition for benefits under section 440.192(3), Florida Statutes (1995), any claims for benefits under section 440.13(2)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1995), brought after the grievance procedures required by section 440.134(15) are exhausted are to be determined by a judge of...

...epartment of Labor and Employment Security. (h) “Docketing judge” means one or more judges designated by the chief judge pursuant to section 440.45(3), Florida Statutes. (i) “EAO” means the Employee Assistance and Ombudsman Office created by section 440.191, Florida Statutes....

...(s) “Mediator” means the person who conducts a mediation conference. (t) “Parties” include the employee, claimant, employer, carrier, health care provider, and division. (u) “Petition for benefits” means a pleading meeting, specifically but not limited to, the requirements of sections 440.192(1)-(4), Florida Statutes, that invokes the jurisdiction of the judge....

...Motions that do not seek adjudication of entitlement to benefits and are based upon stipulated facts requiring no other evidence also shall be treated as procedural motions. (y) “Request for assistance” means the initiation of the informal dispute resolution procedure established by section 440.191, Florida Statutes....

...ocketing .judge. Claims shall be limited to the following subjects: (1) Modification of Prior Compensation Order. Application for modification of an order under section 440.28, Florida Statutes, shall be substantially in the form of a petition under section 440.192(2), Florida Statutes, *636 and shall include a reo[uest for a hearing....

...y Trust Fund referred to in subdivision (a)(2), with any pending petition for the purpose of a hearing or for any other purpose. Committee Notes 1995 Adoption. This rule defines the types of claims not included in a petition for benefits filed under section 440.192, Florida Statutes, that bypass the request-for-assistance process in section 440.191(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and the docketing judge’s review under section 440,45(3), Florida Statutes....

...n the employer, carrier, and the division in Tallahassee. Counsel for each party and any unrepresented party shall be served under rule 4.030. Upon receipt of the petition, the division shall forward it immediately to the docketing judge pursuant to section 440.192(2), Florida Statutes. (2) Form. A petition shall meet the specificity requirements of sections 440.192(2) and (3), Florida Statutes, shall include a request for a hearing, and shall be in substantial compliance with the forms of these rules. The judge may request the EAO to assist unrepresented employees in filing a petition, as provided in section 440.192(2), Florida Statutes....

...to resolve the dispute with the carrier. (5) Certificate of Completion of Informal Administrative Remedies. A petition shall also include a certifícate that one of the following has occurred: (A) The informal dispute resolution process required by section 440.191, Florida Statutes, has been concluded....

...ion includes a claim for medical care under section 440.13(2)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, the certificate must indicate that the grievance procedures required by section 440.134(15), Florida Statutes, were exhausted before Sling the petition under section 440.192(3), Florida Statutes....

...ttachments filed with or received by the division to the docketing judge- lb) Review. After receiving the petition from the division, the docketing judge shall promptly review the petition and attachments to determine if the requirements of sections 440.192 and 440,32(3), Florida Statutes, have been met and the matters in dispute have been acted on by the EAO. (c) Dismissal of Petitions Without Prejudice. If the issues raised in the petition do not meet the requirements of sections 440.192(2)-(4), Florida Statutes, or the petitioner did not exhaust the EAO administrative remedies, the docketing judge shall summarily dismiss the petition without prejudice with leave to amend within 30 days. (d) Dismissal of Petitions With Prejudice. If the petition does not meet the requirements of sections 440.192(2)-(4), Florida Statutes, and these rules, and the judge intends to dismiss the petition with prejudice, the judge may do so only after first giving the parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard....

...If the docketing judge determines the petition meets all statutory requirements, the .judge shall so indicate and immediately forward the petition to the appropriate district. Committee Notes 1995 Adoption. The docketing judge’s ruling on specificity under section 440.192, Florida Statutes, or on the issue of whether the allegations contained in the petition were well grounded as required under section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes, is not a final determination on either issue. Subject to the time limitations of section 440.192(5), Florida Statutes, a motion to dismiss for lack of specificity or for failure to exhaust EAO remedies may be filed with the presiding judge....

...al function] -pursuant to an application for hearing, is solely and totally within the purview of the division and ought not be addressed by-these Workers’ Compensation — Rules-of-Procedure, or any other-rules-except those of the division-,- — Section 440.19(2)(d)> Florida Statutes (1979), provides that: Such claim shall be filed-with the division- at its office in Tallahassee and shall contain the name and address of the employee, the name and address of the employer, and a statement o...

...The judge shall enter an order on such motions without a hearing, unless good cause for the hearing is shown. (2) Notwithstanding the entry of a docketing order under rule 4.029, any motion to dismiss for lack of specificity must be filed pursuant to section 440.192(5), Florida Statutes, and comply with the requirements of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this rule....

...— This replaces rule 10, 1977 W.C.R.P., but is -substantially-t-he-same.- 1984 Amendment. — Provides that - a -party-lias the right to a pretrial conference.upon request. — Deletes---requirement-of—notice-of pretrial by-order- RULE 4.105. EXPEDITED HEARINGS (a) Generally. If a petition filed in accordance with section 440.192, Florida Statutes, involves a claim or petition of $5,000 or less, excluding attorney fees and costs, it may be considered for resolution under section 440.25(4)(j), Florida Statutes. (b) Application for Expedited Hearings. On written application of one party or by stipulation, any claim or petition filed in accordance with section 440.192, Florida Statutes, may be resolved under section 440.25(4), Florida Statutes....

...(b) Generally. No agreement or stipulation shall be enforceable unless it is: (1) in writing and signed by the parties or their attorney; (2) dictated on the record; or (3) in the case of a settlement agreement resulting from a conference pursuant to section 440.191(2)(c), Florida Statutes, approved in writing by the docketing judge....

...and subdivision (e) is from former rule 4.340(e). RULE 4.310. MANDATORY MEDIATION (a) Initial Mandatory Mediation. Except as hereinafter provided, an initial mandatory mediation conference is required to be held concerning every petition filed under section 440.192, Florida Statutes, that survives dismissal after review by a docketing judge under section 440.45(3), .Florida Statutes, or a motion to dismiss filed under section 440.192(5), Florida Statutes. (b) Notice and Date of Mandatory Mediation Conference. (1) Within 7 days after a petition is filed under section 440.192, Florida Statutes, but in no event more than 7 days from the presiding judge’s receipt of the petition that survives a dismissal, the judge, or the mediator if the judge so designates, shall notify all interested parties of the date, time, and location of the initial mandatory mediation conference. The notice may be served personally or by mail upon the interested parties. (2) The mediation conference shall be held within 21 days after a petition is filed under section 440.192, Florida Statutes, but if continued or rescheduled as hereinafter provided, it shall be held and completed no later than 10 days before any scheduled pretrial hearing....

...conference shall be entered-by-a-presiding-judge-upon the application.- (1) Notwithstanding attendance at a mandatory mediation conference, any interested party may request a mediation conference at any time following the filing of a petition under section 440.192, Florida Statutes, or any other claim subject to adjudication by a judge....

...L Jurisdiction: The judge has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this petition. 2. Employee Assistance and Ombudsman Office (EAO) unable to resolve dispute. The subject matter of this petition was presented to the EAO created under section 440.191, Florida Statutes, in a good-faith effort to resolve the disagreements between the parties....

..._L The employer/carrier/servicing agent has denied the compensability of the claim.. _2. Give a specific explanation of any other issues the judge should consider in connection with the benefits claimed in this petition that were not referenced above. SECTION I: CERTIFICATE OF PETITIONER OR PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY (SECTION 440.192(4), FLORIDA STATUTES) AND PETITIONER’S ATTESTATION (SECTION 440.105(7), FLORIDA STATUTES)....

...I, or (print or type name of petitioner) _hereby certify (print or type name of petitioner’s attorney) that a good-faith effort was made to resolve the dispute and that (he) (she) was unable to resolve the dispute with the employer/carrier/servicing agent. In accordance with section 440.192(1), Florida Statutes, a copy of this petition for benefits has been served by certified mail on the injured worker’s employer and the employer’s carrier, and the original and one copy on the Division of Workers’ Compensation in Tallahassee on_, 19 ....

...L Jurisdiction: The judge has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this petition. 2. Employee Assistance and Ombudsman Office (EAO) unable to resolve dispute. The subject matter of this petition was presented to the EAO created under section 440.191, Florida Statutes, in a good-faith effort to resolve the disagreements between the parties....

..._L The employer/carrier/servicing agent has denied the compensability of the claim. _2. Give a specific explanation of any other issues the judge should consider in connection with the benefits claimed in this petition that were not referenced above. SECTION I: CERTIFICATE OF PETITIONER OR PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY (SECTION 440.192(4), FLORIDA STATUTES) AND PETITIONER’S ATTESTATION (SECTION 440.105(7), FLORIDA STATUTES)....

...R_or (print or type name of petitioner) _hereby certify (print or type name of petitioner’s attorney) that a good-faith effort was made to resolve the dispute and that (he) (she) was unable to resolve the dispute with the employer/carrier/servicing agent. In accordance with section 440.192(1), Florida Statutes, a copy of this petition for benefits has been served by certified mail on the injured worker’s employer and the employer’s carrier, and the original and one copy on the Division of Workers’ Compensation in Tallahassee on_, 19 ....

...The claimant did not visit the doctors from May 1986 to January 1989, but he continued to use the TENS unit on a regular basis. He filed a claim for benefits in March 1990, and a hearing was conducted to determine whether the claim was barred by the two year limitations period of section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Devilling and Taylor appear to place a burden on the claimant to prove what the employer actually knew, even if the claimant has had no contact with employer for years. We therefore certify the following question as one of great public importance: WHETHER THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD OF SECTION 440.19(l)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS TOLLED BY THE CLAIMANT’S ROUTINE USE OF A DEPENDENCY-INDUCING MEDICAL DEVICE FURNISHED BY THE EMPLOYER AND PRESCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED PHYSICIAN FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME WITHOUT SUPERVISION, EVEN...

other rules except those of the division. §Section 440.-19(2)(d), Floridar StaRutesT (1979)¿ provides

...See § 440.09(1), Fla.Stat. (1987), which provides that “[w]here an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state ... the employee ... shall be entitled to compensation if the contract of employment was made in this state.” . Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1987), “Time and procedure for filing claims,” provides in pertinent part: (1)(d) Such claim shall be filed with the division at its Tallahassee office and shall contain the names and addresses of the employer and employee,.......

...S, Judge. Alice Gilbert, as guardian for the claimant Bruce Gilbert, appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims denying claimant’s petition for benefits on the basis that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...1 The claimant argues that, because the uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Jones establishes that the claimant became mentally incompetent in July 1990, the statute of limitations was tolled until the claimant’s wife was appointed as his guardian on March 2, 1994. Section 440.19(8), Florida Statutes (1985), provides in part: If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the provisions of subsection (1) shall not be applicable so long as such person has no gu...

...to an attorney’s fee payable by the appellees, Orlando Shader Realty and Associated Industries Insurance Company, Inc. (jointly, the employer/earrier). The claimant argues that the JCC erred (i) in dismissing her petition for benefits pursuant to section 440.192(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994); 1 and (ii) in denying her petition for attorney’s fees when the employer/earrier had first denied and then accepted claimant as permanently and totally disabled all within the 14-day period provided by section 440.192(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. We conclude that the JCC did not err in dismissing the claimant’s petition for benefits because the petition clearly failed to comply with the filing requirements of section 440.192(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). Both this statute and rule 4.029(c), Florida Rules of Workers’ Compensation Procedure, require the JCC, sitting as docketing judge, to promptly review the petition for benefits to determine whether the requirements of sections 440.192 have been satisfied and, when the petition fails to meet such requirements, to summarily dismiss the petition without prejudice and with leave to amend. See rules 4.029(b) and (c), Fla. R. Work. Comp. P. The employer/earrier is not required to file a motion to dismiss to trigger the JCC’s review of the petition, but may file a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 440.192(5)....

...mployer/carrier to understand the benefits sought, citing Orin Cummings Constr. Co. v. Beckman, 395 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) and Turner v. Keller Kitchen Cabinets Southern, Inc., 247 So.2d 35 (Fla.1971). This argument is without merit. Sections 440.192(2) and (4) set forth basic information which the petition must identify or contain oh its face....

...e of the benefits sought by the claimant. The intent of the legislature is clear — in the event the requirements are not met, dismiss *158 al without prejudice is mandated. The cases on which claimant relies interpreted statutory provisions unlike section 440.192 before us and are not applicable to the workers’ compensation statutory design enacted in 1994....

...the instant case. In Straw , the parties fully litigated the merits of the claim; and it was only after a petition for attorney’s fees was filed that the employer/earrier argued that the claim failed to comply with the specificity requirements of section 440.19(l)(e)l, Florida Statutes (1991). Further, the statute controlling Straw contained no prompt review requirement as is now mandated by section 440.192(2) and rule 4.029(b) and (c). In the instant ease, the merits of the petition for benefits were not litigated and the employer/earrier accepted the claimant as permanently and totally disabled within the 14-day time period provided by section 440.192(8), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994). In addition, even though the employer/earrier initially denied the petition, no fee is payable here because section 440.192(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), prohibits an award of attorney’s fees payable by the employer/earrier for services expended or costs incurred prior to the filing of a petition that does not meet the requirements of section 440.192....

...Upon en banc consideration the court was evenly divided as to disposition of the appeal, Judges Mills, Booth, Wentworth, Joanos, Thompson and Barfield voting to affirm the deputy on the grounds that the claim of Leonard H. Daniel is barred by the limitations provision of Florida Statutes, § 440.19(1), and Judges Ervin, Smith, Shivers, Wiggin-ton, Nimmons and Zehmer voting to reverse....

incompetency sufficient to defeat applicability of § 440.-19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), can be found in

...Erb, an authorized treating provider and pain management physician, through at least September 30, 2004. Because the E/C took no steps to deauthorize Dr. McGarahan, and his evaluation of claimant on September 21, 2004 was within the limitations period imposed by section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1995), 2 Dr....

...“Payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to either a notice of injury or a petition for benefits shall toll the limitations period set forth above for 1 year from the date of such payment.” § 440.19(2), Fla....

...ld be observed that we here deal with the requirement of the so-called thirty-day notice of injury or death required by Section 440.18, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., as distinguished from the requirement for the filing of a formal claim as prescribed by Section 440.19, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...The purpose of the notice under Section 440.18, supra, is to advise the employer and the Industrial Commission that an injury or death has occurred and to supply promptly *165 the salient facts which ultimately furnish the basis for the formal claim filed under Section 440.19, supra....

...At the time the petitioner-claimant filed her claim the applicable statute of limitations provided for a two-year period. The state legislature in 1955 extended the period to three years. Laws 1955, c. 29778, § 4.. In 1957 the legislature amended the law (Chapter 57-192),' F.S.A. § 440.19 to provide for a two-year period, the effective date of which amendatory statute was July 1, 1957....

...ast on June 21, 1989. It is undisputed that Flippo last consulted his authorized physician on July 5, 1989. He thereafter developed severe back pain, and on August 13, 1991, filed the instant claim for medical care. The E/C defended the claim citing section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes: All rights for remedial attention under this section shall be barred unless a claim therefor ......

...hts against CIGNA and Gallagher Bassett for any future benefits” precludes claimant from receiving certain future benefits on those claims. Thus, claimant is adversely affected by the deputy commissioner’s order and has standing to challenge it. Section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes, provides: The right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor ......

...treatment, and claimant cites to no record evidence that contravenes the deputy commissioner’s conclusion that the current treatment is not on account of one of these earlier injuries. Claimant’s current claim for benefits is therefore barred by section 440.19(1)(a)....

by the applicable statute of limitations. Section 440.-19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), bars a claimant’s

...Appellees have presented no reason as to how they would have been prejudiced if Stromberg-Carlson were allowed to assert the workers’ compensation tort immunity defense and we find in this record no basis to apply equitable estoppel. 1 Jackson’s compensation claim will not be barred by the statute of limitations because section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (1983) provides that the two-year time limit for filing a workers’ compensation claim does not start to run until the termination of a civil suit for damages....

PER CURIAM. By this petition for review, Peter Hall seeks to challengé certain rules promulgated by the Division of Workers’ Compensation pursuant to sections 440.19 and 440.25, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The order from which Hall brings this petition is a letter informing Hall that his claim does not meet the requirements of Rule 38F-3.10 and that if he does not amend the claim within ten days, the Division or the employer/carrier may file a motion to dismiss. Section 440.19(2)(d) sets forth the information that must be contained in a claim and states: “Any claim, or portion thereof, not in compliance with this subsection shall be subject to dismissal upon motion of any interested party, the division, or a deputy commissioner.” Section 440.25(1) states: (1) Subject to the provisions of 440.19, a claim for compensation may be filed with the division at its office in the City of Tallahassee in accordance with rules prescribed by the division at any time after a specific benefit becomes due and is not paid, and the deputy commissioner...

...fits,” among other things. On October 18, 1978, the carrier wrote another $5,120.00 check to McGuire. If McGuire’s claim was filed within two years of the date of the last payment of compensation, it was not barred by the statute of limitations. Section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes....

McCAIN, Justice. In this workmen’s compensation case, we are called upon to consider whether claim *25 ant Catalano’s claim for compensation filed with the Commission on October 10, 1969, is barred by Fla.Stat. § 440.19 which provides that claim for compensation must be filed within two years after the date of last remedial treatment furnished by the employer....

...rd to his claim filed with the Commission on October 10, 1969. Upon applying the doctrine of estoppel it becomes unnecessary for us to consider whether Catalano’s April 12, 1968, visit constituted remedial treatment within the purview of Fla.Stat. § 440.19, F.S.A....

...The employer’s insurance carrier has refused to pay the medical expenses incurred in connection with either operation and has denied liability for the payment of any compensation benefits, both on contention that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Section 440.19, F.S....

..., 1993, October 25, 1994, and August 15,1996. There was, therefore, no two-year lapse between treatments before the claimant filed her claim on March 25, 1997. As a result, the claim was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Appellant, Aaron C. Hartzog, Jr., received skilled services provided by a physician in October 1999, and therefore, he received “remedial treatment or attention” as defined by the relevant workers’ compensation statute in effect at the time he was injured, section 440.19(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1991). 1 As such, under the specific facts of this case, the Judge of Compensation Claims erred in denying appellant’s claim based on the statute of limitations, section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...This section was substantially and materially amended effective January 1, 1994. See Ch. 93-415, § 23 at 135-136, Laws of Fla. We note that it is unlikely that appellant's Octo-her 1999 visit would qualify as "remedial treatment” under the post-1994 workers' compensation statute. See § 440.19(2), Fla....

...Stat. (exposure to toxic substance is not an injury by accident arising out of employment unless there is clear and convincing evidence establishing that exposure to the specific substance involved, at the levels to which the employee was exposed, can cause the injury); § 440.19(4), Fla....

accident. See § 440.19(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985). We formerly noted that section 440.19’s two-year limitations

...deputy was reversed. The sole question before the full commission was whether respondents timely raised their defense that petitioner’s claim was barred by his failure to file the same within two years after the time of the injury as set forth in § 440.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) failure to file claim within the period prescribed in such subdivision shall not be a bar to such right unless ¡objection to such failure is m...

...uld be produced for purposes of taking his deposition five days prior to the final hearing. Summarized, the claimant contends that the hearing of either March 30, 1961, or the hearing of April 11, 1961, was the “first hearing” as contemplated by § 440.19 (2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and, therefore, the respondents have waived the defense of the statute of limitations....

...It was addressed by the deputy commissioner to the parties and their attorneys. The notice was by registered mail and the parties had in excess of the ten days’ notice required by § 440.23(3), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. The full commission held that § 440.19(2), Florida Statutes, requires the carrier to state its position with regard to limitations “at the first official gathering of the parties before the deputy” and that the prehearing conference was such a “first hearing.” In Nixon v....

...ctionary, 2d ed. p. 580, and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p. 1040. From the cases set forth above, it is clear that various criteria have been used to determine the meaning of the phrase “at the first hearing” as it is used in § 440.19 (2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...r 440, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Applying this rule to the instant facts, it follows that the first hearing held pursuant to proper notice was that of May 9, 1961, at which the respondents raised their defense of statute of limitations as required by § 440.19(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...n 440.185(1) does not apply to subsequent accidents because the injuries sustained in those accidents do not “arise out of and in the course of employment.” Because subsection 440.092(5) is silent on any reporting requirement, we must look to section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2012) (requiring generally that petition be filed within two years of date of accident or one year from date of indemnity payment or furnishing of medical treatment), for guidance as to the time limits for filing...

...Claimant cites numerous cases for the proposition that there is essentially a “race to the court house,” that is, any record activity prior to the filing of a Motion to Dismiss for lack of prosecution will defeat said Motion. However, reliance upon these cases is misplaced. Section 440.19(l)(d) Fla.Stat....

...r, certainly not with the requisite specificity to put the parties on notice that a fee was being claimed specifically against benefits relating to that Joint Stipulation and Order.” The order errs in so concluding for at least two reasons. First, section 440.19(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1987), the provision cited and relied on in the order, requires that the order “state with particularity why the claim is not in compliance” with section 440.19 and mandates that leave to amend will be *595 granted whenever the claim is found to be insufficient under its provisions: When any claim is dismissed pursuant to this subsection, the claimant shall be allowed 60 days from the date of...

...denying their statute of limitations defense to Jorge Acle’s claim for treatment from Dr. Richard Levitt. The petition for benefits was filed more than four years after claimant last received treatment from Dr. Levitt. We find the claim barred by section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1987), and reverse....

...The Judge of Compensation Claims found that the employer/ carrier were estopped from relying on the statute of limitations defense, because Mr. Acle, whom the Judge of Compensation Claims found “fully credible,” testified that he was never informed of section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides: All rights for remedial attention under this section shall be barred unless a claim therefor ......

PER CURIAM. Nelson appeals from a final order of the judge of compensation claims finding that his claim for medical care and treatment was time barred by section 440.19, Florida Statutes....

...tion a court of competent jurisdiction for the appointment of a guardian or representative before dismissing the claim with prejudice. Furthermore, the statute of limitations did not bar the claim of any minor dependents of the decedent. Pursuant to section 440.19(5), Florida Statutes (1997), the two-year limitations period is tolled while a minor or mentally incompetent person has no guardian or authorized representative: If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentall...

...ay’s notice was not reasonable); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(reasonable notice in writing of deposition must be given to parties in action). The case is remanded for a new hearing to determine the application of the statute of limitations pursuant to section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the allocation of palliative medical treatment, and the application of statute of limitations to any contribution claims....

two-year statute of limitations set out in section 440.19(b), Florida Statutes, clearly barred the 1987

SHIVERS, Judge. In this workers’ compensation case, Es-cribano appeals an order of the deputy commissioner which dismisses Escribano’s claim based on the running of the Statute of Limitations, section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...back pain was related to his employment. The deputy commissioner also specifically found that the medical treatment rendered on March 12, 1981, was not furnished on account of the injury occurring in November 1979. The relevant statutory provisions, section 440.19(2)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1979), read as follows: (2)(a) The right to compensation for disability, impairment, or wage loss under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor which meets the requirements of paragraph (d)...

...1994. . In this case, the absolute earliest the contribution claim could have arisen was July 30, 1994. The JCC applied the four-year statute of limitations found in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes. This, rather than the two years mentioned in section 440.19, Florida Statutes, is the correct limitations period because the wording of section 440.19(1) indicates that 'it applies to “employee petitions for benefits” and not to an employer/carrier’s petitions for reimbursement or contribution, and because League’s reliance on Skip’s Shoes and Western Boots v....

...t a potentially liable E/C is barred, the paying of E/C’s claim for reimbursement is also barred; it simply found that the employee’s claim was not barred. Accordingly, the Skip’s Shoes opinion discusses in detail the statute of limitations in section 440.19, the statute applicable to claims made by an injured employee....

...uly 1, 1978 and that said payments were found to be payments in lieu of compensation. Payments in lieu of compensation for industrial accidents prevent the statute of limitations from starting to run until the date of the last of such payments under section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...d as in lieu of compensation and that the claimant could not have reasonably thought that they were. On October 22, 1981 the claimant filed a motion for rehearing contending, for the first time, that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to section 440.19(3), Florida Statutes (1977), in that the *940 claimant was incompetent....

...an abundance of caution only because he did not feel that the 1988 and 1990 orders needed to be modified prior to an award of his claimed benefits. The Employer and Carrier defended on a number of grounds urging that the statute of limitations under section 440.19, Florida Statutes, had run; modification was impermissible because more than two years had elapsed since the entry of the orders setting forth the findings sought to be modified; and the evidence did not establish that Causey was perma...

...me relevant to the two previous claims for wage-loss benefits that these issues were adjudicated or capable of adjudication in the earlier orders. Therefore, Causey was not required to proceed by way of modification, and the limitations provision of section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), applied....

WENTWORTH, Judge. Claimant appeals a workers’ compensation order by which his claim was dismissed upon a determination that it is barred by the statute of limitations. We find that the two year limitations period under section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes, does not bar the claim in this case, and we therefore reverse the order appealed....

...240 nevertheless determined that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The judge reached this conclusion despite finding that neither the employer nor the servicing agent advised claimant of his rights and obligations under chapter 440. Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes, imposes a two year limitations period, but this time period does not commence until a reasonable person would recognize “the nature, seriousness and probable compensa-ble character of his injury or disease.” See Herb’s Exxon v. Whatmough, 487 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). And the doctrine of estoppel may apply to a limitations defense under section 440.19....

...While an affirmative misrepresentation might not have been made, the actions of the employer and servicing agent did frustrate claimant in the ability to timely pursue his claim, and in these circumstances the claim should not be barred by a strict application of the limitations period in section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes....

statute of limitations of two years (Fla.Stat. § 440.19(b), F.S.A.), or the failure to give notice pursuant

...Colonial Oaks Apartments, the employer, and Continental Loss Adjusting Services, the servicing agent (together, the E/SA) appeal a workers’ compensation order wherein the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found that a penetrating keratoplasty or corneal graft constituted a “prosthetic device” for the purposes of section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1990)....

...Moore’s bill on or about March 6, 1994. The E/SA defended on the basis of the statute of limitations. Following- a hearing, the JCC rendered an order rejecting the statute of limitations defense on the basis of the prosthetic device exception in section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1990)....

...orneal transplant and Hood’s industrial injury, the JCC awarded the benefits requested. The E/SA have timely appealed. The determinative issue in this appeal is whether a corneal transplant or graft is a “prosthetic device” for the purposes of section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1990)....

...external or implanted, for a missing or defective natural part of the body.” Universal Rivet, Inc. v. Cash, 598 So.2d 154, 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (e.s.). The supreme court subsequently adopted that definition and added that, for *448 purposes of section 440.19(l)(b), a prosthetic device “requires a relatively permanent functional or cosmetic purpose.” Cash v....

...Neither the Deputy nor the Commission considered it material in deciding the issues involved in the claim. Claim for compensation was filed on October 21, 1963, for the 1956 injury. Both the Deputy and the Commission held the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. F.S. Section 440.19(1) (a), F.S.A....

...On May 15, 1981, a claim for benefits was received by the carrier and the local deputy commissioner, who timely forwarded same to the Division at Tallahassee. The claim was not received by the Division until May 19, 1981, one day after the limitation period. Section 440.19(l)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (1977), are to be read in para materia as establishing both the time limitation and place of filing for statute of limitation purposes. See Thompson v. Alonzo Cothron, Inc., 5 FCR 347 (May 6, 1965). Section 440.19(l)(c) clearly mandates that the claim “shall be filed with the Division at its office in Tallahassee.” The only statutory exception is that which permits the tolling of the statute of limitations where a claim was received by the deputy commissioner, who thereafter failed to timely forward same to the Division. Sections 440.19(l)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes (1977)....

deputy’s other findings of statutory non-compliance, § 440.19(1) relates to the investigative responsibility

...Saiontz, and to pay for drugs prescribed in the future. The employer’s contention that the deputy commissioner should have granted its motion to dismiss claimant’s motions for further medical treatment and payment for prescription drugs, because of lack of specificity as required by Section 440.19(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), and Rule 3.10(4)(j-1), Division of Worker’s Compensation, is not well-founded under the facts presented....

...The employer/carrier then made an oral motion to dismiss, which was granted by the deputy commissioner without prejudice to appellant. The deputy commissioner erred in ruling that appellant’s application for a hearing was a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Section 440.19(2)(d), Fla.Stat....

...(Emphasis added.) In appellant’s application for hearing which was construed as a claim, appellant clearly states that the employer/carrier have been providing compensation and remedial treatment. The application fails to claim any specific compensation benefit, as required under Section 440.19(2)(d), which is due but has not been paid or is not being provided....

...y pursuant to Section 440.34(1), Fla.Stat. (1979). It should be noted that the Division of Workers’ Compensation has neither ac *377 knowledged the filing of a claim by appellant nor rendered an advisory opinion evaluating the claim as required by Section 440.19(1), Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from a deputy commissioner’s order finding, among other things, that the limitations period of Section 440.19, Florida Statutes, had been tolled by the employer’s continued payment of regular wages under the circumstances, citing as authority St....

...Claimant left the employer’s service in order to have further surgery necessitated by the accident. This policy toward claimant by the employer was deemed to constitute sufficient payment of compensation to toll the statute of limitations. Recently, however, the focus of inquiry in cases interpreting Section 440.19 has been modified....

PER CURIAM. In this Workers’ Compensation case, the Claimant challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims finding his petition for benefits barred by the running of the statutory limitations period under section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2008)....

...Finding no merit in the Claimant’s argument that the Employer/Carrier was estopped from raising the statute of limitations, we affirm this issue without comment. We also affirm the JCC’s finding that the statute of limitations was tolled under section 440.19(1) for one year from the date that the claimant was furnished with a prescription for medication by his authorized physician in July of 2011 and, as a consequence, that the Claimant’s petition for benefits filed in October of 2012 was untimely....

failed to meet the specificity requirements of section 440.19(l)(e)l, Florida Statutes (1991), the mandatory

medical care and treatment were time barred by section 440.19, Florida Statutes. We find that the order of

statute of limitations is not a bar to that claim. § 440.-19(1), Fla.Stat. (1987). It was error for the judge

the ground that the Statute of Limitations, Section 440.19, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., had run inasmuch

ALLEN, Judge. The employer/carrier appeal a workers’ compensation order by which the judge awarded payment for medical care. We conclude that the claim should have been denied because it was untimely under section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Indemnity benefits were settled in 1989, and the last payment for medical treatment was made in November 1991. The claimant returned to Dr. Csen-scitz in March 1994, and sought payment for this visit by a claim filed in January 1995. The employer/carrier interposed a statute of limitations defense under section 440.19(l)(b), asserting that they had not paid compensation or furnished medical care within the preceding two years. As it pertains in the circumstances of this case, section 440.19(l)(b) bars medical claims unless filed within two years after the last payment of compensation, or the last medical care “furnished by the employer.” Relying on McNeilly v....

...The limitations period had expired in the present ease before the claimant returned to Dr. Csenscitz in 1994, and the record does not suggest that the employer/carrier accepted responsibility for this care. Such care was thus not furnished by the employer, and the claim should have been denied as untimely under section 440.19(l)(b)....

...1989 failures to appear for depositions. In support of his argument for reversal, Iafornaro cites the holding of Grieco v. Lehigh Corporation, 549 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), that a workers’ compensation claim can only be dismissed pursuant to Section 440.19(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1987), or Rule 4.090(a), Florida Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure, neither of which is applicable herein....

benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Section 440.19(l)(d) bars the right to compensation for death

... Murphy’s employer last provided worker’s compensation benefits in 2013. In 2016, Murphy filed a petition for benefits, seeking additional treatment. Because the petition was filed long after the last treatment, the employer asserted a statute-of- limitations defense. See § 440.19, Fla. Stat. (2006) (establishing general two-year limitations period). Murphy responded by asserting that section 440.19(2) applied, making his petition timely....

...That provision “acts to toll [the] statute of limitations for a period of one year from the payment of compensation or furnishing of remedial treatment.” Gore v. Lee Cty. Sch. Bd., 43 So. 3d 846, 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); accord Lee v. City of Jacksonville, 616 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. 1993) (noting that based on § 440.19(2), claimant must receive periodic remedial care “[i]n order to preserve the right to future benefits”). The judge of compensations claims agreed with Murphy, concluding that because rods and screws remained inside him, Murphy was...

...1st DCA 2002) (JCC’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo). This appeal turns on statutory interpretation. We must decide whether having rods and screws attached indefinitely means a claimant is “furnish[ed] remedial treatment” indefinitely. See § 440.19(2), Fla....

...Employer/carrier appeals a workers’ compensation order, asserting as error, among *210 other points, the deputy commissioner’s refusal to admit into evidence the claim evaluation prepared by the Division of Workers’ Compensation. We find no reversible error and affirm the order appealed. Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1980), establishes the division’s claim evaluation procedure, and mandates that: At any hearing before the deputy commissioner, the decision of the division shall not be res judicata, but shall be included in the case file in the division and shall be deemed a part of the proceeding....

...ither party. We conclude the deputy properly refused to admit the claim evaluation into evidence after considering its merits above noted, and directing the court reporter to include *211 the document in the record as “a part of the proceeding.” Section 440.19(1) does not provide that the claim evaluation shall be admitted into evidence, but states that it “shall be deemed a part of the proceeding.” While the document may be admitted into evidence in appropriate circumstances, the mandate of § 440.19(1) is satisfied upon inclusion in the record in the same manner as the claim and notice to controvert pursuant to Rule 18(a)(1), WCRP; the deputy may then give the claim evaluation the consideration it is entitled to in the circumstances of each case....

...These forms were dated June 27,1994, and received by the Division of Workers’ Compensation, Employee Assistance Office, by certified mail on June 30,1994. Sanchez also filed a “Petition for Benefits” using the procedures set forth in the newly enacted section 440.191, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), and section 440.192, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), seeking the benefits set forth above. The petition was dated July 20, 1994, and received by the Division by certified mail on July 22,1994. The statute of limitations in effect on the date of the accident, section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1991), provided: The right to compensation ... under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor which meets the requirements of paragraph (e) is filed within 2 years after the date of injury. The judge of compensation claims (JCC) observed that the legislature changed section 440.19 effective January 1,1994 to read: Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee’s estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death pursuant to s....

...out of work performed in the course and scope of employment. The JCC noted that claimant had timely filed the Request for Assistance and the Claim for Benefits. However, the JCC determined that since the legislature removed the word “claim” from section 440.19 and substituted the word “petition,” a petition must be filed to toll the statute of limitations even though the date of accident preceded January 1, 1994....

...oyer’s failure to file notice of injury was plainly substantive in its effect and could not be applied retroactively to employee whose illness commenced before statute’s effective date). The statute governing this workers’ compensation case is section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1991), which required filing of “a claim” within two years after the date of injury....

...judge of compensation claims. They further urge that, under the 1994 law, such jurisdiction may only be invoked by a petition and, in turn, a petition may not be filed until an employee has exhausted procedures for informal dispute resolution under section 440.191, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...-16 Claim for Benefits filed by appellant, however, complied with the applicable statute of limitations. We have previously held in Baptist Manor Nursing Home v. Madison, 658 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), that the claim for benefits required under section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1991), has, in some respects, survived the new workers’ compensation law....

...uest for Assistance, we nonetheless find that the actions undertaken by Sanchez in filing both the Claim for Benefits and the Request for Assistance tolled the statute of limitations. To hold otherwise would effectively shorten the statute because a section 440.192 petition may not be filed until a claimant has exhausted the informal dispute resolution procedures under section 440.191, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). These pretrial procedures may extend for 30 days or more, section 440.191(2)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), and the statute does not confer upon the JCC authority to impose sanctions for a party’s failure to attempt to resolve disputes in good faith or to cooperate with the employee assistance office in resolving disagreements....

bar the claim, because the 1979 amendment to section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes, abrogating the statute

JOANOS, Judge. Claimant Todd Iuen has appealed from a determination by the deputy commissioner that his claim for medical benefits was barred by the statute of limitations, Section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...ays. It was not until Iuen sought authorization for knee surgery that the employer and carrier (E/C) alleged that the statute of limitations had run on the May 1984 injury. The deputy commissioner agreed, and dismissed Iuen’s claim on that ground. Section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1985) provides that all rights for remedial *1313 attention shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed with the division within two years after the time of injury, except that, if remedial attention has b...

...all further claims were barred by the two-year limitation provisions of section 440.28, as of April 25, 1984. On March 25, 1985, the deputy entered the order on review, finding that the claim filed on November 19, 1984 was timely under both Sections 440.19(1)(a), and 440.28, Florida Statutes (1975), and therefore claimant was entitled to TTD and other benefits during the requested period. Specifically, the deputy held that the claim was properly filed under section 440.19(1)(a) [1] because the current claim sought only TTD benefits for the healing period required by claimant's recently performed surgery, and the e/c had never controverted claimant's entitlement to such benefits; therefore claimant had b...

...The deputy reasoned that because the last voluntary payment of TTD benefits was made to the claimant in August of 1984, and remedial treatment continued to be voluntarily furnished to the claimant, the claim for TTD benefits filed in November of 1984 was timely and not barred by the limitation provisions of section 440.19(1)(a)....

...nt to PPD benefits. Although we find nothing in the record to support the claimant's assertion that the claim for TTD was withdrawn, and not considered by the deputy, we consider that such disputed issue is immaterial insofar as the applicability of section 440.19(1)(a) to the instant claim....

...Indeed, if an order has been entered awarding compensation benefits, regardless of their classification as either temporary or permanent, the rule is that a carrier's voluntary payment or reinstatement of benefits does not trigger the time provisions of section 440.19(1)(a). See Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So.2d 760, 761 (Fla. 1966) (section 440.19(1)(a) "is limited ......

...to the situation where payments are made without an award, in which case further payments may be made within two years after payment of compensation or remedial treatment"). Accord Bassett's Dairy v. Thomas, 429 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (Sections 440.19(1)(a) and 440.28 are designed to be used in different situations, depending upon whether benefits for a particular injury have been furnished pursuant to a compensation order for a single injury, or entirely without an award.)....

...Spann is clear-cut authority for the position that once an order fixes the date of MMI and awards PPD, a later claim, whether seeking additional temporary or permanent benefits, or both, must meet the limitation provisions of only section 440.28 — not 440.19(1)(a)....

...Budget Luxury Inns, Inc. v. Boston, 407 So.2d 997, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Because the instant claim was not filed within the time limitations provided in section 440.28, the order entered below is REVERSED. SMITH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), provides: The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has...

judge erred in finding his claim time-barred under § 440.19, Florida Statutes (1977). We agree and reverse

appellee’s claim letter failed to comply with § 440.19(2)(d), Fla.Stat. (1979), which requires that the

...This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the order of the Full Commission affirming the award of 75% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole. Petitioners contend that the claim is barred under Florida Statute § 440.19(1) (a), F.S.A....

...ourt. In Townsley v. Miami Roofing and Sheet Metal Co. 3 we held that payment of regular wages to a disabled employee during his absence from work because of the disability will be deemed payment of compensation within the intent of Florida Statutes § 440.19, F.S.A....

...Petitioners also contend that claimant’s present disability is not due to any work-connected accident but rather to spondylol-isthesis, a congenital back defect, for which he was operated on in 1965. In view of our holding that the claim is barred under Florida Statute § 440.19, F....

...he Judge of Industrial Claims and remand the cause for entry of an order dismissing the claim. Petition for attorney’s fees is denied. It is so ordered. ERVIN, C. J., ADKINS, J., and BALA-BAN, Circuit Judge, concur. DREW, J., dissents. . Fla.Stat. § 440.19(1) (a), F.S.A.: “The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two (2) years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made or remedial...

...nd time.” We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.180(b)(1)(C). The judge of compensation claims (JCC) determined that the claim of appellee George Philip (claimant) was not barred by the statute of limitations under section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1994)....

...or a petition for benefits shall toll the limitations period set forth above for 1 year from the date of such payment. This tolling period does not apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment. § 440.19(1),(2)(emphasis added)....

...Because both petitions were filed within this period, claimant contends that the filing was timely. The claimant and E/C both cite as authority for their respective positions our decision in Orange County School Board v. Best, 728 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). This decision construed section 440.19, but the E/C in Best was urging the court to shorten the basic two-year limitation period....

...The claimant in Best filed a petition for benefits within two years of the date of injury but more than one year after the “furnishing of remedial treatment.” The Best court, declining to reduce the basic two-year limitation period under subsection (1), said: Section 440.19(2) has no practical effect until after the two-year period provided for in section 440.19(1) expires. As long as the petition is timely under either section 440.19(1) or section 440.19(2), the statute of limitations is no bar....

...A petition is timely if filed within two years of the date of accident or, even thereafter, if filed within one year of the last date the petitioner received medical treatment or indemnity benefits. Id. at 1188 . While the Best decision is not dispositive of the instant case, our construction of section 440.19(2) nevertheless depends upon an interpretation of the term “toll” for which no definition is contained in Chapter 440....

ample time to present a claim for compensation. Section 440.19, Florida Statutes, 1941, and F.S.A. The common

PER CURIAM. The claimant appeals a workers’ compensation order in which it was determined that his petition for benefits is barred by the statute of limitations in section 440.19, Florida Statutes....

...Hillsborough County School Board, 913 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), the claimant asserts that he was not given sufficient information as to his rights in connection with this limitations period, despite the employer having provided him with an approved informational brochure in accordance with § 440.19(4) and § 440.185(4), Florida Statutes. The Fon-tanills opinion indicates that although the claimant there apparently received an informational brochure he was not made aware of the limitations period under section 440.19(2), which provides that the period is tolled for one year from when indemnity benefits are paid or remedial treatment is furnished....

...In a claim dated December 11,1990, the claimant sought additional medical treatment, additional temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits, and attorney’s fees and costs. The E/C filed a motion to dismiss on April 4, 1991, asserting the claim for benefits failed to comply with section 440.19(l)(e), Florida Statutes, which requires a claim to be filed with specificity....

...• At a hearing held on May 17,1991, counsel for the E/C stated that he had no objection to the amended claim, which conformed with the statute, but that he would like the JCC to dismiss the claim which was filed earlier. The JCC denied the motion to dismiss based on a finding that section 440.19(l)(e) is not to be applied retroactively....

...The JCC concluded that use of the back brace tolled the statute of limitations and the claimant was therefore entitled to future medical treatment. The JCC also concluded that the E/C waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it at the May 17,1990 hearing based on section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...The brace was prescribed after she ceased working for the employer. The E/C also argue that the JCC erred in finding that the statute of limitations defense was waived by the failure to raise that defense at a hearing on the motion to dismiss for lack of specificity. We disagree. Section 440.19 provides: (l)(a) The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made or remedial tre...

...period—tolling that would have started from her last visit to the urologist—had expired, meaning (in Sedgwick’s view) the limitation period had run for filing a petition for benefits (“PFB”) regarding care for her injured urinary tract. See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat....

...insurance, the services provided still fell within the scope of care that had been authorized—each one restarting the one-year tolling period, obviating Sedgwick’s basis for terminating the promised medical care supplied on Winn-Dixie’s behalf. See § 440.19(2), Fla. Stat....

...“ongoing medical supervision for a permanent medical condition caused by [an] industrial accident,” authorized and paid for by the employer, constituted the provision of “remedial attention” that restarted the two-year statute of limitation under the pre-1994 version of section 440.19, Florida Statutes); McNeilly v....

...Young, claiming the limitation period expired on January 29, 2020. On August 26, 2020, Ortiz filed a PFB seeking authorization, provision, and scheduling of an appointment with Dr. Young. Sedgwick responded, asserting in part that the PFB was barred by the time limitation set out in section 440.19. At the final hearing, only Ortiz testified in person....

...ick and private insurance paid for from 2015 through 2020. Denying Ortiz’s claim, the JCC concluded Winn-Dixie had sufficiently demonstrated a limitation defense, focusing exclusively on the question whether the one-year tolling period provided by section 440.19(2) (ostensibly running from the January 29, 2019, visit) had expired before Winn-Dixie provided further care again through Dr....

...The industrial judge did not personally see any of the witnesses. The Full Commission was, therefore, in as good a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence as was the industrial judge.”). The pertinent facts also are not in dispute. Our review of the JCC’s application of section 440.19 to those facts is de novo. See McBride v. Pratt & Whitney, 909 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“The outcome of this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...3d 767, 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (noting that review is de novo when an issue requires interpretation and application of a statute). We conclude the JCC 9 misapplied the limitation and tolling provisions found in section 440.19, as we now explain. II Typically, and as with any statute of limitation, under the one found in section 440.19(1), the employer or its carrier bears the burden of raising the statute of limitation as a defense, indeed waiving the defense unless it “advances the defense . . . in its initial response to the petition for benefits.” § 440.19(4), Fla....

...McKesson Corp., 7 So. 3d 561, 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“Because running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the employer . . . had the burden of raising that defense and proving that the petitions for benefits were untimely pursuant to section 440.19(1).”)....

...Also, like with any statute of limitation, the employee—as proponent of the claim—bears the burden of proving avoidance of that defense. See Palmer, 7 So. 3d at 563–64 (stating that “where a workers’ compensation claimant seeks to extend or avoid the statute of limitations by operation of section 440.19(2), he or she bears the burden of establishing the exception”)....

...ommon practice (or preference) among counsel and JCCs, here is what the law (read: the statute) mandates for the determination of whether a workers’ compensation claim is time-barred, given the plain meaning of the term “toll” as it is used in section 440.19, Florida Statutes. A The Workers’ Compensation Law gives an employee two years to file a petition seeking a benefit stemming from a compensable injury, the two years running from “the date on which [he or she] knew or should have known that the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.” § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat.; cf. § 440.192(1), (3), Fla....

...is ripe, due, and owing” and permitting a PFB to “contain a claim 17 for past benefits and continuing benefits in any benefit category,” provided the benefits are “in default and ripe, due, and owing on the date the petition is filed”). Section 440.19(1) undoubtedly is a “statute of limitation” for workers’ compensation claims....

...1991) (treating the predecessor provision as a “two-year statute of limitations”); Cash v. Universal Rivet, Inc., 616 So. 2d 446, 447–48 (Fla. 1993) (same); Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Grp., P.A. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202, 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (referencing the Legislature’s 1994 revision of section 440.19 to implement “significant substantive changes to the statute of limitations in workers’ compensation cases”); see generally Gaines v. Orange Cnty. Pub. Utils., 710 So. 2d 139, 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (treating revised section 440.19 as a statute of limitation). There, however, also is a tolling provision, which states as follows: Payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to either a no...

...r benefits shall toll the limitations period set forth above for 1 year from the date of such payment. This tolling period does not apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment. § 440.19(2), Fla....

...section 766.106(4)”); Hearndon, 767 So. 2d at 1184–85 (considering the meaning and application of “toll” as used in section 95.051). “Toll,” then, must carry the same meaning wherever it appears in a limitation statute, including its usage in section 440.19(2)....

...or phrases in two different statutes, we may assume it intended the same meaning to apply.” (citing Goldstein, 103 So. 2d 202)). B There is nothing unique about how the term “toll” appears in the limitation provision of section 440.19—no special definition provided....

...The first question to be answered, then, is when did the claim accrue. In clear terms, the two-year limitation period for a workers’ compensation claim runs from “the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury [] arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.” § 440.19(1), Fla....

...l compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment,” and requiring that “the accidental compensable injury must be the major contributing cause of any resulting injuries” (emphases supplied)); § 440.192(8), Fla....

...benefits”); Checkers Rest. v. Wiethoff, 925 So. 2d 349, 349–50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (distinguishing between compensability (defined as “the occurrence of an industrial accident resulting in injury”) and 20  Relevant to this case, section 440.19(2) tolls this running for a period of one year each time the carrier “furnish[es] remedial treatment [or] care” in response “to either a notice of injury or a “[o]ther issues concerning the worker’s entitlement to benefits ....

...part by the workplace ‘accident’ evades the essential determination of the identity of the compensable injury.” (emphasis supplied)). There is only one injury relevant to the issue at hand, but it nevertheless stands to reason—based on section 440.19’s injury- centric limitation period—that a subsequently discovered or arising injury would carry with it a separate two-year limitation period during which PFBs could be filed (for the determination of entitlement to benefits relat...

...2d at 99 (referring to times when the limitation period is suspended and when it begins “running again” after expiration of a tolling period); id. at 100 n.7 (same). 3 As long as the employee files the PFB related to the injury 2 “Payment of any indemnity benefit” also starts the tolling period. § 440.19(2), Fla....

...2d at 182 (noting how an extension of a limitation period “is separate and additional to any other tolling period”). This distinction here is key to understanding the significance of the Legislature’s addition of the current tolling provision to section 440.19 in 1994. Before 1994, section 440.19 did not contain an express tolling provision; it used language that effectuated an extension. Cf. § 440.19(1)(a), (b), Fla....

.... . . so long as the claim is filed within two years after the last remedial treatment,” even if the original two-year limitation period had run. Roe, 587 So. 2d at 1325; cf. Bell v. Com. Carriers, 603 So. 2d 683, 685 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (reading section 440.19 as allowing for “revival” of the limitation period); Ellis v....

...With this addition, our court, JCCs, and practitioners are not at liberty to carry on with the practice of considering only whether the one-year tolling period has run and ignoring whether there is still time left in the statutory limitation period. We are all bound to give the term “toll,” as it appears in section 440.19, the same meaning and application the supreme court did in Tanner v. Hartog and Hankey—because that is what the supreme court has directed must happen whenever the term appears in a statutory limitation context. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 434 (Fla. 1973) (noting that district courts “are [] bound to follow the case law set forth by” the supreme court). 4 4 Twice in the past, by my count, this court has (erroneously) referred to section 440.19(2) as an extension of the two-year period, rather than as the true tolling provision that it clearly is. See Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (referring to subsection two as having “no practical effect until after the two-year period provided for in section 440.19(1) expires,” because the “[p]rovision of medical treatment or indemnity benefits can extend the limitations period but cannot shorten it” (emphasis supplied)); Sanchez v. Am. Airlines, 169 So. 3d 1197, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“Subsection (1) of section 440.19 provides generally that a PFB must be filed within two years after the date of injury or it will be barred, and subsection (2) provides that the only events that will extend the statute of limitations are the payment of indemnity benefits or the furnishing of medical treatment.” (emphasis supplied))....

...EC furnished Claimant with authorized medical treatment from the date of her accident until January 29, 2019. (emphasis supplied). The highlighted text should have been the end of the matter regarding the limitation period. This determination by the JCC meant that under the plain meaning of “toll” as used in section 440.19(2)—and under the supreme court’s application of the term in a limitation context—no days on the limitation clock could have ticked off before the initial one-year tolling period began, and no days could have ticked off due to bre...

...3d at 1197 (framing “the narrow question presented in this case [as] whether the payment of attorney’s fees to Claimant’s counsel— with no other medical or disability benefits being paid simultaneously to Claimant and no PFBs pending—is sufficient to extend the statute of limitations under subsection 440.19(2)”(emphases supplied)). 25 provision of care by Dr....

...blow to her right side, requiring emergency treatment. 6 This year was a leap year. 7 The PFB “tolls the statute of limitations as long as it remains pending.” Airey v. Wal-Mart/Sedgwick, 24 So. 3d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); see § 440.19(3), Fla....

... To be fair to the JCC, Ortiz also did not argue the two-year limitation period at the final hearing as a basis for rejecting the time-bar defense. And, as it turns out, practitioners have not been seeking an application of the tolling provision in section 440.19(2) the way statutory tolling provisions have been applied nearly everywhere else in Florida civil litigation—indeed, the way the supreme court described in Tanner and Hankey....

...Practitioners across the spectrum of the workers’ compensation bar seem to have hewed to the one-year-extension approach for quite some time— which the appellees, oddly enough, characterize as “decades of settled law”—despite the 1994 amendment that added the word “toll” in a new section 440.19(2), and despite the supreme court decisions going the other way. Holding aside the plain meaning of “toll” and the supreme court analysis described above, for a moment; not only is this old approach contrary to the plain meaning of the term “toll”; but it also simply does not make sense. The one-year-extension approach necessarily presumes that the two-year limitation period already has run, so no further inquiry on the amount of time remaining in that period would be warranted. Section 440.19(2), however, literally refers to “toll[ing] the limitations period.” If the two-year period already has run, what is still being tolled? By the clear terms of this statutory provision, it is the limitation period being tolled—nothing else—and an expired period obviously could not be tolled, there being nothing left to suspend. Section 440.19(2) does not use the language of extension, so it cannot be read to operate as a reanimation of the moribund period....

...Accordingly, the order below is REVERSED. MICKLE and BENTON, JJ., concur. . We have reviewed similar orders: Commercial Roof Decks v. Flippo, 616 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Eagle Point Mobile Home Estates v. Smith, 475 So.2d 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). . Section 440.19(l)(a) & (b) bar disability compensation and remedial attention claims filed more than two years after the last payment of compensation.

PER CURIAM. Bobby Coburn, claimant, appeals a final order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) which determined that Co-burn’s claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....

Commission on January 11, 1950, was too late. .Section 440.19(1), F.S.A., provides that a workmen’s compensation

...en made, as appears to have been made in this case, and there are recitals of a fact that a petition has been filed or a claim has been filed, in the absence of anything to the contrary, such recitals are taken and considered to be true and correct. Section 440.19(1) F.S.A....

...pt that if payment of compensation has been made without an award on account of such injury or death a claim may, be filed within one .year after the date of the last payment. Such .claim shall be filed with the commission.” (Emphasis supplied.) , Section 440.19(3) F.S.A....

awarding reimbursement of pension offset benefits. Section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: The

...This interpretation makes Section 440.30 nonsensically technical even by Chapter 440’s awesome standards of complexity. We decline to nullify the statute in that way. Chapter 440 does offer some guidance as to when a claim has been filed. Both Sections 440.19(2)(d) and 440.25(1), Florida Statutes (1979), provide that “claims” are to be filed with the Division, as does Florida Workers’ Compensation Rule of Procedure 5....

...er the submission to pay the benefits. Finally, when a “claim” has been filed, the revised act now imposes affirmative duties on the Division to investigate and within 10 days to make an advisory decision on whether the claimed benefits are due. Section 440.19(1)....

...Under Section 440.20(10)(b), the Division must investigate, hold hearings, and take other appropriate action when an employer files a notice to controvert claimed compensation. The filing of the notice to controvert in this context also ought to trigger the Division’s responsibility under Section 440.19(1) to render an advisory decision within 10 days....

...ed by the statute of limitations. Claimant’s last date of service for medical treatment related to her compensable injury was April 28, 2011. The PFBs, filed on June 13, 2012, and October 15, 2012, were outside the two-year limitations period. See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); § 440.19(2), Fla....

...In its initial response to the June 13, 2012, PFB, the Employer/Carrier (“E/C”) asserted the statute of limitations defense. However, the E/C failed to assert the defense in its initial response to the October 15, 2012, PFB, waiting, instead until the January 24, 2013, hearing before the JCC. Section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that, “the failure to file a petition for benefits within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee’s claim unless the carrier advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its...

...itations. Palmer, 7 So.3d at 562 . We stated that to establish a prima facie case that limitations period had run, the employer/carrier only had to show the first petition was untimely. Id. at 563 . Nothing we said in Palmer affects the operation of section 440.19(4) or has any bearing on the outcome of this case....

barred by the two-year statute of limitations, section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979). The issue arises

..., 1985. These expenses were incurred within two years of the last medical care paid for by the e/c, which was provided in September, 1984 and paid in October, 1985. The e/c argues that the claim is now barred by the two year statute of limitation in section 440.19, Florida Statutes....

PER CURIAM. Appellants, the employer and carrier- in this workers’ compensation matter, challenge the finding of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) that appellee’s claim was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations, section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Employer/Carrier (“E/C”) was not estopped from asserting the statute of limitations (“SOL”) defense. Claimant concedes that the limitations period had run but challenges the estoppel ruling, arguing that it thwarts the presuit resolution process set forth in section 440.192(4), Florida Statutes....

...1st DCA 2005) (noting that JCC’s interpretation and application of SOL is reviewed de novo). The SOL under Florida Workers’ Compensation Law requires a PFB to be filed within two years after the date a claimant knew or should have known the injury arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment. § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). This two-year period is tolled for one year following the date any indemnity benefit is paid or medical treatment is furnished. § 440.19(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). But, the statute contemplates two avoidances to the SOL defense: 1) where an E/C fails to lodge the SOL defense in its “initial response” to a PFB; and 2) where the E/C “is estopped from raising a [SOL] defense.” § 440.19(4), Fla. Stat....

...3 E/C’s “initial response” was the September 6 Response to PFB, which asserted the SOL defense. Accordingly, our review relates to the JCC’s determination that the Claimant failed to demonstrate estoppel pursuant to section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes. To demonstrate estoppel under section 440.19(4), Claimant must show that (1) the E/C misrepresented a material fact; (2) Claimant relied on the misrepresentation; and (3) Claimant changed his position to his detriment because of the misrepresentation. Deere v. Sarasota Cty. Sch. Bd., 880 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Section 440.19(4) does not include a requirement of intent....

...rocess. The presuit resolution process is a statutory requirement that a PFB include a certification that claimant or his counsel “has made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute and . . . was unable to resolve the dispute with the carrier.” § 440.192(4), Fla....

...ida Statutes (1989), in connection with a claim for medical benefits only. The reason the judge of compensation claims (JCC) gave for the denial was that the medical benefits claim contained an incorrect date of injury, contrary to the provisions of section 440.19(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...During the pendency of the 1991 claim, the carrier forwarded a letter to claimant’s attorney on April 19, 1991, acknowledging the accident date of May 16,1990. Under the circumstances, we cannot accept the interpretation which the judge below appears to have placed upon section 440.19(l)(d): that a claim must be denied if the correct date of the accident is not stated on the face of the claim for benefits....

...h requires specific factual details, or “such equivalent information as will put the division and the employer on notice.” (Emphasis added.) The legislative purpose, we believe, in requiring that an employee furnish the information designated in section 440.19(l)(d) is to protect an employer from being unfairly disadvantaged in defending a claim for benefits....

...Once, however, evidence is adduced from which one can decide that an employer has received reasonable or actual notice of the facts required to be provided in the claim, the reason for exact specificity disappears. In creating the “equivalent information” language in section 440.19, 1 we consider that the legislature required some showing of prejudice in order to defeat a claim for benefits. Our conclusion in this regard is supported by case law both from the Florida Supreme Court and our own. In its interpretation of section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1957), which contained a provision similar to that in the statute now on review, this court, in A.B....

...We therefore conclude from the record that the employer at bar was sufficiently aware of the actual date of the employee’s injury, and, as a consequence, the claim for medical benefits should not have been rejected as either incorrect or insufficiently stated. If we were to accept the JCC’s rigid interpretation of section 440.19(l)(d) as requiring the explicit date of the injury to be stated on the face of a claim, notwithstanding that the employer had otherwise been provided notice of the actual date, such construction would, in our judgment, thwart one of th...

...25, 1993, the order denying fees is REVERSED, and the case REMANDED with directions for the JCC to determine a reasonable sum. BARFIELD, C.J., concurs. DAVIS, J., concurs in result. . Although we have referred in this opinion to the 1989 version of section 440.19, which was in effect at the time of injury, no issue has been raised as to whether this statute has substantive or procedural application....

...In any event, we note that the identical "equivalent information" language was contained in the statute in 1993 when Mays filed his claim. This language, which the 1955 legislature first placed in the statute, has since been deleted and the provisions of section 440.19, relating to the information required in a claim, were substantially revised by the creation of section 440.192, which took effect on January 1, 1994....

...of 0-10% impairment. In the present appeal, the claimant filed a claim for medical treatment and rehabilitative assistance on February 18, 1987. The employer defended on the ground that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, pursuant to Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...ations was tolled by the payment made on the date in question, and, if so, whether claimant is otherwise entitled to the benefits claimed. REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JOANOS and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. . Section 440.19(2)(a) provides: The right to compensation for disability, impairment, or wage loss under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor which meets the requirements of paragraph (d) is filed within 2 years after the time of injur...

ALLEN, J. The claimant appeals a workers’ compensation order by which his claim was denied as untimely under section 440.19(1), Fla....

...1st DCA 1983), which was cited by the judge, do not apply here as those cases involved care rendered by authorized doctors. In accordance with Creed the claim in the present case, by a petition filed within two years of payment for the unauthorized care, was timely under section 440.19(1)....

...Upon review, a majority of the- full Commission reversed the deputy commissioner on both of the aforementioned points, with one commissioner dissenting. It is our opinion that the deputy commissioner’s order should have been upheld by the full Commission. Section 440.19(1) (a) provides as follows: “The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made...

...Anna Canestrelli, the surviving spouse of Oreste Canestrelli, the employee, appeals a workers’ compensation order dismissing her claim for death benefits on the grounds that such claim is barred by the statutes of limitations contained in sections 440.16(1) and 440.19, Florida Statutes....

...hether the death resulted from the accident.... 10. In addition to and separate from the grounds for barring the Claim for Death Benefits pursuant to Section 440.-16(1) of the Florida Statutes, the Claim for Death Benefits is also barred pursuant to Section 440.19 of the Florida Statutes due to the Employee’s voluntary abandonment of his rights to benefits. As reasons for determining that the claim is also barred under Section 440.19 of the Florida Statutes I hereby note the following: a....

...or the wife. The right to death benefits is derivative from the establishment of the Claimant’s lawful right to workers’ compensation benefits. ****** e. Since the Employee abandoned his rights to benefits pursuant to the statute of limitations, Section 440.19 of the Florida Statutes, his death can not revive rights and derivative rights to benefits which he chose to give up voluntarily. (R. 97-104). On appeal, Mrs. Canestrelli first argues that the judge clearly erred in basing the dismissal of her claim on section 440.19, Florida Statutes, because the claim was filed well within the two-year limitation period prescribed by section 440.19(l)(c). The employer and the carrier argue that in this case, the two-year limitation period contained in section 440.19(l)(c) began to run on November 17, 1987, because at that time an order was entered “judicially withdrawing” Mr....

...Furthermore, there is absolutely nothing in the November 17 order that supports the employer and the carrier’s argument or the conclusion of the judge of compensation claims that: Since the Employee abandoned his rights to benefits pursuant to the statute of limitations, Section 440.19 of the Florida Statutes, his death can not revive rights and derivative rights to benefits which he chose to give up voluntarily. (R. 103). This conclusion is obviously based on the erroneous conception that the November 17 order legally extinguished Mr. Canestrelli’s right to all future benefits. The undisputed facts of this case show quite clearly that section 440.19(l)(c), Florida Statutes, 1 the only portion of section 440.19 that addresses death benefits, cannot operate to bar the claim for death benefits under review....

...ion should have been denied. For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WIGGINTON, J., and CAWTHON, Senior Judge, concur. . This language in section 440.19(l)(c) has not been changed since Mr....

...ecause the 2-year statute of limitations had run; or, "[i]n the alternative, if the shoulder pin is a prosthesis, then the [s]tatute of [l]imitations bars all claims except for medical associated with the pin." To the extent relevant to this appeal, Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that "[t]he right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss ... shall be barred unless a claim therefor ... is filed... within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation or after the date of the last remedial treatment ... furnished by the employer." Section 440.19(1)(b) provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll rights for remedial attention ......

...f the body." On May 31, 1989, the judge of compensation claims entered an order in which she concluded that the staple inserted by Dr. Ennis into claimant's right shoulder in 1986 was a "prosthetic device," within the meaning of that term as used in Section 440.19(1)(b). Therefore, the judge of compensation claims held that "the 2-year [s]tatute of [l]imitations [found in Section 440.19(1)(b)] does not apply to the right for remedial attention relating to the metallic staple inserted in [c]laimant's right shoulder." Jurisdiction was reserved to address all of the remaining issues at a later date....

...mant filed a claim for reimbursement of the cost of the examination. On May 23, 1991, the judge of compensation claims entered a second order which once again held that the staple was a "prosthetic device," within the meaning of that term as used in Section 440.19(1)(b); and that, therefore, that Section's 2-year statute of limitations did "not apply to the right for remedial attention relating to the replacement or removal of the metallic staple inserted in [c]laimant's right shoulder." The jud...

...al or cosmetic reasons, or both," Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1369 (27th ed.). From these definitions (and in the absence of any suggestion to the contrary from the legislature), we conclude that the term "prosthetic device," as used in Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), was intended to refer to an artificial substitute or replacement, whether external or implanted, for a missing or defective natural part of the body. Applying this definition to the facts developed below regarding the staple inserted into claimant's shoulder, we conclude, further, that the staple does not fit within the definition; and, therefore, is not a "prosthetic device" for purposes of Section 440.19(1)(b)....

...ficial or naturally occurring." "It only has the limited function of holding something in place while something is healing. After that, it's superfluous... ." Because the staple is not a "prosthetic device" within the meaning of that term as used in Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), the exception to the 2-year *158 statute of limitations, pertaining to "remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device to any part of the body," is inapplicable....

...sis, we hold that it was error to conclude that the staple which had been inserted into claimant's shoulder in 1986 was a "prosthetic device," precluding application to the claim for "remedial attention" of the 2-year statute of limitations found in Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985); and to order the employer and carrier to reimburse claimant for the cost of the March 5, 1991, examination by Dr....

...However, because we believe that this issue is one of considerable concern to the workers' compensation community, we certify to the Supreme Court, as one of great public importance, the following question: WAS THE FIXATION STAPLE INSERTED INTO CLAIMANT'S SHOULDER A "PROSTHETIC DEVICE," AS THAT TERM IS USED IN SECTION 440.19(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985)? REVERSED....

...ERVIN, J., concurs and dissents with written opinion. ERVIN, Judge, concurring and dissenting. The issue in this case is whether the judge of compensation claims erred by concluding that the metallic staple inserted in claimant's shoulder constitutes a prosthetic device within the meaning of Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), which thereby precluded application of the two-year statute of limitations to his claim for medical benefits....

...dge's determination that the metallic staple was a prosthetic device. Nor do I consider that the legislature reasonably contemplated that, in excepting from the statute of limitations the insertion or attachment of prosthetic devices, as provided in section 440.19(1)(b), the exception would not apply as well to the maintenance or repair of such devices required after the passage of more than two years....

...ption medications furnished by the E/C thereafter, was furnished inadvertently, and that Claimant had failed to prove detrimental reliance, then concluded the petition for benefits filed on February 8, 2010, was barred by the statute of limitations. Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2007), provides in pertinent part: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if...

...or a petition for benefits shall toll the limitations period set forth above for 1 year from the date of such payment. This tolling period does not apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment. Section 440.19(1) thus provides that a petition for benefits is timely if filed within two years after the employee knew or should have known the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment. Accordingly, because Claimant was injured on December 10, 2007, under no circumstance could the statute of limitations have run before December 11, 2009. See Orange County Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (explaining section 440.19(2) extends rather than shortens limitation period described in section 440.19(1), and if petition for benefits is timely under section 440.19(1) or section 440.19(2) there is no bar to compensation)....

...Instead, Claimant correctly contended the statute of limitations never expired because the E/C continued to provide medical benefits. When an E/C furnishes an indemnity or medical benefit before the statute of limitations expires, the limitations period is extended for one year by operation of law pursuant to section 440.19(2)....

...The full Commission also found that the statute of limitations in existence in 1953 (two years) and not the one year period of the 1945 Act controlled. The following portion of the order of the full Commission is pertinent and is as follows : “Certainly the two year period for filing a claim under Section 440.19 had not expired upon the date that the claim was filed....

PER CURIAM. Claimant appeals from an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) denying her claim for benefits as time-barred under the statute of limitations, section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...out the E/C’s providing any payment of compensation or furnishing any remedial treatment or rehabilitative services arising out of, or attributable to, the December 27, 1986, industrial accident. Accordingly, the order denying benefits pursuant to section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes, is AFFIRMED....

...nt rendered to Claimant was time-barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse, finding as a matter of law that the care provided was “remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device” as con- ■ templated in section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The effect of the statute of limitations is that all rights to remedial attention shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two years of any of several time periods (e.g., dates of injury, last payment of compensation, or last remedial attention). The following statutory exception is included in section' 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1983): *1132 However, no statute of limitations shall apply to the right for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device to any part of the body....

appellant’s notice to controvert was untimely under section 440.19(l)(e)7, Florida Statutes (1991). The employer/camer’s

...er. In addition to the prejudicial lack of timely notice, the claimant did not actually file a claim for benefits form in connection with the April 1983 injury until November 15, 1986, approximately three and one-half years after the alleged injury. Section 440.19, Fla.Stat....

...in § 440.15(6)(f). Padrick Chevrolet Co. v. Crosby, 75 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1954). Where a hernia has been successfully repaired and a new accident causes recurrence of the hernia, that injury is governed by the § 440.15(6)(f) six weeks limitation, and § 440.19 is not applicable....