CopyCited 576 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Russell, Clearwater, and David H. Bludworth, West Palm Beach, for amicus curiae, Florida Pros. Attys. Ass'n, Inc. ADKINS, Justice. These cases pose several questions arising from the possibility of the imposition of the penalty of death pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., which became effective December 8, 1972....
...We have jurisdiction to determine the questions certified pursuant to Fla. Const., *3 art. V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A. The case of State v. Dixon, Lester and Sawyer is before this Court on appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court for Dade County that Fla. Stat. §§
775.082,
921.141, F.S.A., are unconstitutional....
...2726 (1972), and the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Donaldson v. Sack, (Florida 1972),
265 So.2d 499." In the case of State v. Hunter and Moore, the questions certified are: "1. Whether the new Florida Murder Statute, Ch. 72-724, Laws of Florida (1972) amending Florida Statute sections
782.04 and
921.141, is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Florida because a grand jury when called upon to consider bringing an indictment would be unable to distinguish the language between Murder in the First Degree and Murder in the Second Degree. "2. Whether the new Florida Murder Statute, Ch. 72-724, Laws of Florida (1972), amending Florida Statute sections
782.04 and
921.141, is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Florida because a trial judge cannot determine what specific crimes are embodied within...
...trial under the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Washington,
268 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1972)." In the case of State v. Sheppard, the questions certified are: "Whether the provisions of Florida Statutes
782.04,
775.082 and
921.141 prescribing the penalties for felonies and misdemeanors, the definitions of the degrees of murder and the methods and means of determining the penalty to be imposed upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony: "A....
...Is placing upon the defendant the burden of proving mitigating circumstances in violation of his right *4 against self-incriminating as provided in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?" The statutes involved in the questions before this Court are Fla. Stat. §§
775.082,
782.04, and
921.141, F.S.A....
...al felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than twenty-five (25) calendar years before becoming eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in section 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter event such person shall be punished by death." Fla....
...n such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user shall be murder in the first degree and shall constitute a capital felony, punishable as provided in §
775.082. "(b) In all cases under this section the procedure set forth in section
921.141 shall be followed in order to determine sentence of death or life imprisonment....
...r discharging of a destructive device or bomb, it shall be murder in the third degree and shall constitute a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in section
775.082, section
775.083, or section
775.084." (Emphasis supplied) Fla. Stat. §
921.141, F.S.A., provides the procedure to be followed in determining what penalty should be assessed following a conviction for a crime designated as a capital felony....
...Even after the final appeal is laid to rest, complete discretion remains in the executive branch of government to honor or reject a plea for clemency. See Fla. Const., art. IV, § 8, F.S.A., and U.S. Const., art. II, § 2. *7 Thus, if the judicial discretion possible and necessary under Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., can be shown to be reasonable and controlled, rather than capricious and discriminatory, the test of Furman v....
...can only be developed by involvement with the trials of numerous defendants. Thus the inflamed emotions of jurors can no longer sentence a man to die; the sentence is viewed in the light of judicial experience. The fourth step required by Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., is that the trial judge justifies his sentence of death in writing, to provide the opportunity for meaningful review by this Court....
...Not only is the sentence then open to judicial review and correction, but the trial judge is required to view the issue of life or death within the framework of rules provided by the statute. Review of a sentence of death by this Court, provided by Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., is the final step within the State judicial system....
...rovides a standard for life imprisonment against which to measure the standard for death established in the defendant's case, and again avoids the possibility of discriminatory sentences of death. The most important safeguard presented in Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., is the propounding of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which must be determinative of the sentence imposed. It is argued that the circumstances are vaguely worded in some cases, and that they do not provide *9 meaningful restraints and guidelines for the discretion of judge and jury. We disagree. The aggravating circumstances of Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6), F.S.A., actually define those crimes when read in conjunction with Fla....
...§§
782.04(1) and 794.01(1), F.S.A. to which the death penalty is applicable in the absence of mitigating circumstances. As such, they must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before being considered by judge or jury. Considered in that vein, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6), subsections (a) and (b), F.S.A., prescribe the death penalty for a capital felony committed by a prisoner or by one previously convicted of a capital felony. These conditions represent two situations wherein the death penalty has been determined by the Legislature to be applicable, absent overriding mitigating factors. Likewise, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(c), F.S.A., provides the death penalty for one who is convicted of a capital felony in which he knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. The use of the adjectives "great" and "many" is attacked as vague, but we feel that a man of ordinary intelligence and knowledge easily conceives the concepts involved. Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(d), F.S.A., provides that the commission of a capital felony as part of another dangerous and violent felony constitutes not only a capital felony under Fla....
...Capital felonies committed with the motive of avoiding arrest, escape, monetary gain, or the disruption or hinderance of the lawful exercise of government or law enforcement have also been designated as aggravated capital felonies pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., subsections (e), (f) and (g), F.S.A., and we again feel that the definitions of the crimes intended to be included are reasonable and easily understood by the average man. The aggravating circumstance which has been most frequently attacked is the provision that commission of an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel capital felony constitutes an aggravated capital felony. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(h), F.S.A....
...is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. When one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found, death is presumed to be the proper sentence unless it or they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating circumstances provided in Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7), F.S.A. All evidence of mitigating circumstances may be considered by the judge or jury. The first mitigating circumstance is that the defendant has no prior significant history of criminal activity. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7)(a), F.S.A....
...al activity. Also, the less criminal activity on the defendant's record, the more consideration should be afforded this mitigating circumstance. *10 Extreme mental or emotional disturbance is a second mitigating consideration, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7)(b), F.S.A., which is easily interpreted as less than insanity but more than the emotions of an average man, however inflamed....
...If the victim was a participant in or consented to the criminal conduct, or if the defendant was found guilty of a capital felony as an accomplice and did not play any major part in the capital felony, these factors are also to be considered. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7), subsections (c) and (d), F.S.A. While duress or domination by another person may not excuse a capital felony, the Legislature has determined that they should be considered in mitigation, not of the guilt of the defendant, but of the sentence. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7)(e), F.S.A....
...Such a consideration appears to us to be reasonable, and another protection of the defendant who has at least some basis for seeking the mercy of society. Mental disturbance which interferes with but does not obviate the defendant's knowledge of right and wrong may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7)(f), F.S.A....
...Like subsection (b), this circumstance is provided to protect that person who, while legally answerable for his actions, may be deserving of some mitigation of sentence because of his mental state. Finally, the age of the defendant may be considered pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7)(g), F.S.A....
...As to the distinction in any particular case, we need but refer to the rich heritage of case law on the distinctions between principals in the first or second degree and accessories before the fact. Having reviewed the statutes under consideration, it is the opinion of this Court that Fla. Stat. §§
775.082,
782.04 and
921.141, F.S.A., are constitutional as measured by the controlling law of this State and under the constitutional test provided by Furman v....
...In those cases where the defendant was not sentenced to *13 death but to life imprisonment, appellate review was available to the respective District Courts of Appeal. As a result of the Furman line of cases, the Florida Legislature enacted the death penalty statute which is challenged in the cases before us, F.S. Section 921.141, F.S.A....
...ute within the requirements of Furman . The majority of this Court has held that the Legislature's attempt to re-establish the death penalty has been successful in meeting those requirements. I cannot agree. Under the new death penalty statute, F.S. Section 921.141, F.S.A....
...nstitutional were not sufficiently answered by the U.S. Supreme Court. Nor do I find it necessary to reach those questions at this time. All that is necessary for this Court to decide is the question of whether or not the system provided for in F.S. Section 921.141, F.S.A....
...and "(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist ... which outweigh aggravating circumstances found to exist ..." (Emphasis supplied.) [18] According to the majority, the existence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is the "most important safeguard presented in Fla. Stat. § 921.141......
...osed by the trial judge. Thus "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not," [46] is provided for. *19 Finally, in addition to the discretion required by F.S. Section 921.141, F.S.A., there exists in our judicial system a degree of discretion at every stage of a criminal proceeding....
...find it, in the heart of every man these are the symbols which in the treatment of crime and criminal mark and measure the shored up strength of a nation, and are sign and proof of the living virtue within it." It is therefore my conclusion that Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is unconstitutional because: (1) the statute does not sufficiently eliminate the discretion in imposing the death penalty which Furman condemns; (2) the State has failed to consider or present sufficient pro...
...idden by the trial judge: Kelbach v. Utah,
408 U.S. 935,
92 S.Ct. 2858,
33 L.Ed.2d 751 (1972); Seeney v. Delaware,
408 U.S. 939,
92 S.Ct. 2871,
33 L.Ed.2d 760 (1972), and Steigler v. Delaware,
408 U.S. 939,
92 S.Ct. 2872,
33 L.Ed.2d 760 (1972). [18] §
921.141(2)(a), (b), F.S.A. Also see §
921.141(3), F.S.A....
...183, 207,
91 S.Ct. 1454, 1467,
28 L.Ed.2d 711, 726 (1971). [34] Id.
408 U.S. at 208,
91 S.Ct. at 1467-1468,
28 L.Ed.2d at 727. [35] Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 401,
92 S.Ct. 2726, 2809-2810,
33 L.Ed.2d 346, 442-443 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting.) [36] §
921.141(6)(a), F.S.A. [37] §
921.141(6)(c), F.S.A. [38] §
921.141(6)(h), F.S.A. [39] §
921.141(7)(a), F.S.A. [40] §
921.141(7)(b), F.S.A. [41] §
921.141(7)(f), F.S.A. [42] §
921.141(7)(e), F.S.A. [43] §
921.141(7)(d), F.S.A. [44] §
921.141(7)(g), F.S.A....
...572,
85 L.Ed. 859 (1941); United States v. Bank of New York and Trust Company,
296 U.S. 463,
56 S.Ct. 343,
80 L.Ed. 331 (1936); Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103,
55 S.Ct. 340,
79 L.Ed. 791 (1935). [3]
408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). [4] Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, 1971, F.S.A., which provided: "A defendant found guilty by a jury of an offense punishable by death shall be sentenced to death unless the verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by [a majority of] the jury....
...phasis supplied.) Of course, according to its normal usage, the word "shall" in a statute has a mandatory connotation. See City of Orlando v. County of Orange,
276 So.2d 41, 43, n. 4 (Fla. 1973), citing Neal v. Bryant,
149 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1962). [5] Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 72-724, Laws of Florida, which provides: "(1) Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine w...
CopyCited 537 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 433, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 2305
...We held there, consistent with longstanding precedent, that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme was not violative of the Sixth Amendment or the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 ,
122 S.Ct. 2428 ,
153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). See Hurst v. State,
147 So.3d at 445-46 . We concluded that section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2012), the capital sentencing statute under which Hurst was sentenced to death, was not unconstitutional for failing to require the jury to expressly find the facts on which the death sentence was imposed in this case....
...State,
819 So.2d 689, 692-94 (Fla.2002)). Hurst was convicted of first-degree murder and the case proceeded to a penalty phase trial to determine what sentence should be imposed. After a penalty phase proceeding was conducted under the provisions of section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1998), at which evidence of aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances was presented, the jury returned an advisory verdict by a vote of eleven to one recommending that Hurst be sentenced to death....
...In the sentencing order, the judge found as aggravating factors that the murder was committed while Hurst was engaged in the commission of a robbery, although he was not charged with robbery and the jury did not find him guilty of robbery, and the judge found that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. See §§ 921.141(5)(d), (h), Fla. Stat. (2012). In mitigation, the trial court found the statutory mitigating circumstances that Hurst had no significant history of prior criminal activity, that he was nineteen years old, and that he had an even younger mental age. See §§ 921.141(6)(a), (g), Fla....
...er of state law. First, section
775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2012), provided: *52 (1)A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s.
921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole. §
775.082(1), Fla. Stat., (emphasis added). Section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2012), provided in pertinent part as follows: (1) SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS ON ISSUE OF PENALTY.—Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencin...
...s upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts: (a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5), and (b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. § 921.141(1)-(3), Fla....
...ath may be imposed, “the trial court alone must find ‘the facts ... [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’ and ‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting § 921.141(3), Fla....
...308 ,
111 S.Ct. 731 ,
112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991), under Florida law, “The death penalty may be imposed only where sufficient aggravating circumstances exist that outweigh mitigating circumstances.” Id. at 313 ,
111 S.Ct. 731 (emphasis added) (quoting §
921.141(3), Fla....
...Florida repealed its mandatory death sentencing provision in 1972 in an attempt to comply with Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 ,
92 S.Ct. 2726 ,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), in which arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing was found unconstitutional. The Legislature, in regular and special session, amended section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1972), to provide for consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances before a death sentence could be imposed....
...Ring,
536 U.S. at 614 ,
122 S.Ct. 2428 (Breyer, J., concurring in result). Justice O'Connor dissented and opined that facts that increase the maximum penalty should not be treated as elements. Id. at 619 ,
122 S.Ct. 2428 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). . See §
921.141(3), Fla....
...id., and "the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty,” id. at 622 (emphasis added). Florida law has long required findings beyond the existence of a single aggravator before the sentence of death may be recommended or imposed. See § 921.141(3), Fla....
...State,
132 So.3d 93, 117 (Fla.2013), and may include any aspect of the defendant’s character or background that is proffered as a basis for a sentence less than death. See Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 ,
98 S.Ct. 2954 ,
57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); §
921.141(6)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 387 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ce in the case the Court makes the following findings of fact as to aggravating circumstances: 1) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of the crime of kidnapping [Florida Statutes, Section 921.141(5)(d)]....
...scene of the marijuana smuggling operation. 2) Although there would be pecuniary gain in the event the smuggling operation was successful, the Court does not find that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain as contemplated by Florida Statutes, Section 921.141(5)(f). Although the smuggling operation was for pecuniary gain, the murder was not. 3) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Florida Statutes, Section 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 379 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Appellant would not permit his wife to examine the body. The next morning appellant was arrested at a farm owned by his father. On February 14, appellant's mother-in-law died from gunshot wounds. Appellant's trial resulted in a conviction for first degree murder. Pursuant to Section 921.141, Fla....
...on report showing that appellant had been convicted on one prior occasion of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor (petit larceny). At the conclusion of this hearing the trial judge recommended a sentence of death, complying with Section 921.141(3) by listing three aggravating circumstances and finding none in mitigation....
CopyCited 374 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 74255
...be heard in person. Second, after hearing the evidence and argument, the trial judge should then recess the proceeding to consider the appropriate sentence. If the judge determines that the death sentence should be imposed, then, in accordance with section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), the judge must set forth in writing the reasons for imposing the death sentence....
CopyCited 255 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15705, 2016 WL 4474677
...At 7:35 p.m., they returned with
a recommendation for the death penalty, by a vote of ten to two.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge found three statutory aggravating
circumstances, including that (1) Jones was previously convicted of another violent
felony, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b) (1991); (2) the murder was committed while
6
Case: 13-15053 Date Filed: 08/25/2016 Page: 7 of 48
Jones was engaged in the commission of a robbery, id., § 921.141(5)(d); and
(3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, id., § 921.141(5)(h).
Jones, 648 So....
...2d at 673. In mitigation, the trial judge also found that (1) as a
statutory mitigator, Jones’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired,
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f) (1991); and, as non-statutory mitigating circumstances,
(2) Jones suffered from a traumatic and difficult childhood, and (3) he had the love
and support of his family....
...suffered brain injury prior to the
homicide. Dr. Berland offered the opinion that, on account of his mental illness,
Jones was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the
time he committed the homicide. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b) (1991)....
...In
addition, Dr. Berland concluded, because of the combined effects of his biological
mental illness and his intoxication at the time of the offense, Jones’s ability to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.
See id., § 921.141(6)(f)....
...Berland testified that, because of the mental illness and Jones’s
intoxication at the time of the homicide, two statutory mitigating factors were
satisfied, namely, that Jones was under the influence of an extreme mental or
emotional disturbance when he murdered Young, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b) (1991),
and his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was
substantially impaired, id. § 921.141(6)(f).7 However, as the Florida Supreme
6
The state challenges the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that Cummings
rendered deficient performance under Strickland, but we discern no error....
CopyCited 247 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 2056
...on in adolescence; (2) poverty; (3) good family man; and (4) circumstances of the crimes do not set this murder apart from *958 the norm of other murders. [1] Terry also requested a jury instruction on the age statutory mitigating circumstance under section 921.141(6)(g), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...After the penalty phase, the jury recommended the death sentence by a vote of eight to four. The trial judge found no mitigators and two aggravators: prior violent felony and the merged aggravators of capital felony committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery and pecuniary gain. See § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (f)....
...or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person (conviction for principal to aggravated assault); and (2) capital felony committed during the course of an armed robbery/pecuniary gain. Terry waived the statutory mitigator found in section 921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1993) (the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity)....
...r mother (the victim); (15) the trial court erred in limiting appellant's penalty phase closing argument regarding the sentence which appellant could receive; (16) the trial court erred in failing to weigh the proposed mitigating circumstances; (17) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1991), is unconstitutional; and (18) the death sentence is a disproportionate penalty in this case....
...denied,
456 U.S. 984,
102 S.Ct. 2257,
72 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982). [13] As in this case, the trial court merged as one circumstance the aggravating circumstances of murder committed for pecuniary gain and murder committed while engaged in the commission of a robbery. §
921.141(5)(d), (f), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 211 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4479, 1994 WL 73855
...mitigating factors proved, death. Neither jury recommendation is binding upon the trial court, which conducts its own sentencing hearing and ultimately fixes the sentence after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(1)-(3) (West 1985); Cooper v....
...Instead, as the court explained in that ease, the “construction of Section 921.-141(6) has been that all relevant circumstances may be considered in mitigation, and that the factors listed in the statute merely indicate the principal factors to be considered.” Id. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court held that section 921.141(6), as interpreted, satisfied the constitutional mandates enunciated in Lockett ....
...ntencing and, more importantly, that he understood the implications of those decisions. In a pretrial motion, defense counsel cited both cases in arguing that the mitigating circumstances provision of the Florida death penalty statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141, was unconstitutional on its face, “violative of the mandate of the United States Supreme Court as expressed in Lockett v....
...stances in fashioning an appropriate sentence. In Jackson , for example, the sentencing order was almost identical to that at issue in Hitchcock, referring explicitly to “insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in Subsection (7) of ... Section 921.141” and not to other mitigating factors....
...On January 25, 1990, after being found competent to stand trial, Thompson pled guilty to four counts of second degree murder for his role in the crimes at issue here, thereby avoiding the death penalty. 4 . The court found the following aggravating circumstances present, as enumerated in Fla.Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5) (West 1985): the capital felony was committed (1) by a person under sentence of imprisonment; (2) by a defendant who knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons; (3) during.the perpetration of a robbery/kidnapping; (4) for p...
...ant had not previously been convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. It should be noted that two additional aggravating circumstances were later added to the statute. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5) (West Supp.1993)....
...ed awaiting trial, Skipper,
476 U.S. at 4 ,
106 S.Ct. at 1671 , and evidence of family history and emotional disturbance, Eddings,
455 U.S. at 113-116 ,
102 S.Ct. at 876-77 , could not be excluded from capital sentencing hearings. 19 . Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141(6) (West 1985) provides that: Mitigating circumstances shall be the following: (a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity....
...I would say that based on that fact, it should act or inure to Mr. Bolender’s benefit. 28 . Florida is a "weighing”, state because a death sentence may be imposed only when the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(2)—(3) (West 1985)....
...itted for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. (g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5) (West 1985 & Supp.1993)....
CopyCited 203 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 205895
...an his resumption of attack on Billy, unlike the situation in Swafford wherein the act of reloading the gun provided a break in the attack. As to mitigating factors, the trial judge concluded that Campbell did not suffer from impaired capacity under section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (1985), because no evidence indicated that he was "insane" at the time of the killing....
...cted to such extensive mistreatment that he was declared a dependent and removed permanently from his parents' home. As this case demonstrates, our state courts continue to experience difficulty in uniformly addressing mitigating circumstances under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1985), which requires "specific written findings of fact based upon [aggravating and mitigating] circumstances." Federal caselaw additionally states that [j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the senten...
CopyCited 193 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1998 WL 223432
...Urbin and Damren were convicted of armed robbery with a firearm, burglary with assault, and armed kidnapping on April 24, 1996. [2] The trial court found the following statutory aggravators: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995); (2) the murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, § 921.141(5)(d); (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, § 921.141(5)(f); and (4) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, § 921.141(5)(e). Aggravators (2) and (3) were merged and treated as one aggravator by the trial court. The trial court found the following statutory mitigators: (1) the age of the defendant at the time of the crime, § 921.141(6)(g), accorded some weight; and (2) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, § 921.141(6)(f), accorded some weight....
CopyCited 182 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 368
...eged violence during an incident in a restaurant. We agree that this testimony violated Elledge v. State,
346 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1977), and we admonish the state to confine its evidence during the penalty phase to those matters provided by statute. See §
921.141, Fla....
...There appears to be some confusion over the concept of mitigation as set forth in our death penalty statute, which requires "specific written findings of fact based upon [aggravating and mitigating] circumstances ... and upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings." § 921.141(3), Fla....
...3368,
73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), is misplaced. Enmund established only that certain accomplices not physically present at the scene of the murder cannot be held accountable under the felony-murder rule. The thirteenth issue on appeal, Rogers' challenge to Florida's capital sentencing statute, section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1985), must be rejected....
CopyCited 180 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...In the second phase of the bifurcated proceeding the jury issued an advisory sentence recommending the death penalty, and the judge, in agreement with that recommendation, sentenced appellant to death. Pursuant to Florida's capital sentencing statute, Pub.L.No. 72-724, § 9, 1972 Fla. Laws (current version at Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141 (West Supp.1982)), appellant was afforded an automatic appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, which upheld his conviction and sentence....
...d is necessary for informed evaluation of both the procedural and substantive issues, we preliminarily set forth a brief description of that act and of the sentencing proceeding in this case.II. Florida's Capital Sentencing Statute 3 Under Fla.Stat. § 921.141, 7 following the guilt phase of trial for a defendant convicted of a capital felony, the trial judge conducts a separate sentencing proceeding before the jury that convicted the defendant....
...At the sentencing hearing, the parties may introduce evidence of and argument concerning aggravating 8 and mitigating factors. 9 On the basis of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing together with that presented at the guilt phase of the trial, 10 a majority of the jury renders an advisory sentence. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(2), (3) (West Supp.1982)....
...The jury is instructed to consider "(w)hether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist"; "(w)hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist"; and, "(b)ased on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death." Id. § 921.141(2). The trial judge then independently evaluates the evidence, makes the same determination as to the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, and decides which sentence to impose. Id. § 921.141(3)....
...to sentencing in two respects. First, a defendant's prior conviction for "another capital felony or ( ) a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person" may be considered by the sentencer as an aggravating circumstance. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5)(b) (West Supp. 1982). Second, that "(t)he defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity" is a statutory mitigating circumstance. Id. § 921.141(6)(a)....
...ence that could be considered to that falling within the seven statutory factors. 30 In view of these facts, the defense attorney's belief that he could not, under the Florida statute, introduce evidence of mitigating factors not listed in Fla.Stat. § 921.141(6) was entirely reasonable....
...1197, 1204 ,
51 L.Ed.2d 393 . 2. Nonstatutory Aggravating Factors 100 In addition to the two aggravating factors discussed above, appellant challenges a third factor relied on by the judge because it does not accord with circumstances identified as aggravating in Fla.Stat. §
921.141(5)....
...We cannot conclude, however, that appellant's entry of the victim's house, which he did for the purpose of committing the murder, was a circumstance "sufficient(ly) aggravating" in nature that the judge necessarily would have imposed the death penalty on that ground alone. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(3) (West Supp.1982) (judge must find "sufficient aggravating circumstances" exist to justify sentence of death)....
...1337 (1949). 120 In addition to the historical recognition of an individual's character at the sentencing phase, counsel should have been alerted to the importance of mitigating circumstances by the Florida capital crime statute enacted in 1972, Fla.Stat. § 921.141 (1973), after Furman v....
...That statute explicitly provided: 121 In the (sentencing) proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections ((5)) and ((6)). 122 § 921.141(1) (emphasis added)....
...943 ,
94 S.Ct. 1951 ,
40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), in which the Florida Supreme Court discussed the new statute thoroughly, and pointed out the advantage to the defendant of presenting matters in mitigation: 123 The most important safeguard presented in Fla.Stat. §
921.141, F.S.A., is the propounding of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which must be determinative of the sentence imposed. 124 When one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found, death is presumed to be the proper sentence unless it or they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating circumstances provided in Fla.Stat. §
921.141(7), F.S.A....
...as under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" or had a substantially impaired capacity "to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired." Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(6)(b) and (f) (West Supp....
...§ 636 (b)(1) and Rule
6.02, Local Rules of the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida. See Nettles v. Wainwright, supra 7 The current version of Florida's capital sentencing statute, which has been amended four times since appellant was sentenced, is at Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141 (West Supp.1982)....
...(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. (g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws. (h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5) (West Supp.1982)....
...(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. (f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. (g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. Id. § 921.141(6)....
...pendently mitigating factor." Id. at 621 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. at 607 ,
98 S.Ct. at 2966 ) 19 The statute prefaces the list of aggravating circumstances with the statement that they "shall be limited to the following: ..." Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141(5) (West Supp.1982). The list of mitigating factors is preceded by the words: "Mitigating circumstances shall be the following: ..." Id. §
921.141(6)....
...After Lockett, the Florida Legislature amended the statute so that it now expressly allows presentation of evidence at the sentencing hearing "as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant." 1979 Fla.Laws, c. 79-353. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(1) & note (West Supp.1982) 20 The attorney relied almost entirely on Dr....
...tions "automatic.") 26 Defense counsel also argued that Crumbley's testimony established the statutory mitigating circumstance that "(t)he defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person," see Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(6)(e) (West Supp.1982), but the trial judge sustained the prosecution's objection to this argument 27 Specifically, appellant claims he was convicted after being found inside a restaurant eating a hotdog while intoxicated, without having d...
...The opinion's focus on the issue of control over sentencer discretion, coupled with its statement that "the propounding of aggravating and mitigating circumstances" is the "most important safeguard" the statute employs to restrain and guide such discretion, id. at 8-9 , would have supported an interpretation of § 921.141 as limiting sentencer consideration of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances to the factors expressly described in the statute. The dissenting opinion of Justice Ervin, which leans toward a reading of Furman as condemning all discretion in capital sentencing, see id. at 13-14 (Ervin, J., dissenting), and concludes that § 921.141 allows more discretion than permissible under Furman, id. at 14, expressly interprets the statute as limiting the aggravating and mitigating circumstances judges and juries may consider to those enumerated in the statute. Id. at 17 The earliest case listed in Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141, Notes of Decisions (West 1973 & Supp.1982) specifically discussing the mitigating circumstances provision is a 1975 case....
...State,
328 So.2d 1, 5 (1976)); see note 11 supra, and the jury's recommendation may frequently be critical to the judge's decision. The judge is the ultimate decisionmaker under the Florida statute, however, and must independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence. Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141(3) (West Supp.1982)....
...to the facts underlying capital sentencing decisions, however, cf. Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582 , 606 n.28 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 976 ,
99 S.Ct. 1548 ,
59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979) (evidentiary review proper where application of §
921.141 in particular case is "patently unjust and ( ) shock(s) the conscience"), since appellant's claim is cognizable as a vagueness challenge to the statute as applied, see text infra 52 The state argues that the former Fifth Circuit decision in Spinkellink v....
...58 The trial court's findings stated this aggravating factor in terms that were arguably broader than the statutory terms; it found appellant had "created a great risk of serious bodily harm and death to many persons," whereas the statutory factor encompasses only "great risk of death." Compare Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(c) (reprinted in note 8 supra ) with note 50 supra....
...se did not support the "great risk of death" factor. In any event, we need not decide whether the trial court's finding, as stated, represents consideration of a nonstatutory aggravating factor since we have already concluded that the application of § 921.141(5)(c) to this case renders the provision unconstitutionally vague and invalidates its use as a factor supporting appellant's sentence....
CopyCited 172 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...We have reviewed the entire record of the proceedings below in order to determine whether the jury's verdict of guilt was supported by competent, substantial evidence. *905 We have also reviewed the sentencing proceeding to determine whether the sentence of death is appropriate to this case under the law. § 921.141(4), Fla....
...The court deferred sentencing until after the receipt of a presentence investigation. A copy of the presentence investigation report was furnished to appellant prior to sentencing. As aggravating circumstances, the court found that appellant committed the murder while under a sentence of imprisonment, § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1975), that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery, id. § 921.141(5)(d), that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, id. § 921.141(5)(f), and that the murder was *910 especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 167 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Appellant refused to name the party from whom the marijuana was to be purchased. The jury found Provence guilty of first degree murder and recommended that he be sentenced to life imprisonment. The judge sentenced appellant to death, however, apparently finding the existence of two aggravating circumstances under Section 921.141(5)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes, and no mitigating circumstances under subsection (6)....
...Appellant was entitled not to a perfect trial but to a fair one, and he received it in the court below. However, we agree with appellant that the trial court erred in sentencing him to death. The judge's order does not specifically enumerate which aggravating circumstances under Section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes, induced him to override the jury's recommendation of mercy and to sentence Provence to die....
...onal parameters of the trial judge's discretion in the area of sentencing are wide indeed. See Specht v. Patterson,
386 U.S. 605, 608,
87 S.Ct. 1209,
18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967); Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241,
69 S.Ct. 1079,
93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). But Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, intended as it was to meet the constitutional infirmity of capital sentencing procedures explored in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), is designed to limit the unbridled exercise of judicial discretion in cases where the ultimate penalty is possible. Section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes, states that "[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following" and then proceeds to list eight circumstances, (a)-(h)....
CopyCited 161 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 17270, 1995 WL 417614
...The trial court found two aggravating circumstances — the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel” and was “committed for pecuniary gain” — and a single mitigating circumstance — Medina had “no significant history of prior criminal activity.” See Fla.Stat. § 921.141....
...ts of the claim, absent a showing of cause and prejudice, Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 86-87 ,
97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506 ,
53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). 3. Factual and procedural background. Before his trial began, Medina filed a motion to declare Fla.Stat. §
921.141 14 unconstitutional....
...“heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating factor or object to the constitutionality of the instruction as given. On direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Medina argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare Fla. Stat. § 921.141 unconstitutional....
...Medina also argued that the statute was vague and overbroad. Medina did not, however, attack the specific instruction given to the jury. Citing Peavy v. State,
442 So.2d 200 (Fla. *1114 1983), the Florida Supreme Court found that the issue of the constitutionality of the Fla. Stat. §
921.141 had previously been decided against Medina’s contentions....
...whom found him competent to stand trial; the trial court held a competency hearing during which various types of evidence were presented; and the trial court specifically found Medina competent to stand trial on the day before the trial began. 14 . Section 921.141 is one of Florida’s death penalty statutes. In addition to providing for separate sentencing proceedings, defining the roles of the jury and the judge, and providing for automatic review by the Florida Supreme Court, the statute defines aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Fla.Stat. § 921.141 (1993). At issue here is the provision that one aggravating factor to be considered is whether "[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(h).
CopyCited 160 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 533
...the credibility of the state's star witness; and 3) those emphasizing a statement made out of the presence of the jury concerning the petitioner's preference for the death penalty. First, we note that under the current capital felony sentencing law, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1985), a murder trial proceeds in two stages, a guilt phase followed by a sentencing proceeding....
...1985). Whereas, in Florida it is the trial judge who is the ultimate "sentencer." See Thompson v. State,
456 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1984). The jury's recommendation, although an integral part of Florida's capital sentencing scheme, is merely advisory. See §
921.141(2), Fla....
...(c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. (d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence ... [5] See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(d), supra note 4. [6] § 921.141(5), Fla....
CopyCited 160 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 78 A.L.R. Fed. 515, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 21452
...State,
329 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla.1976). In the sentencing phase of a capital offense prosecution, "evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant." Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec.
921.141(1) (West 1985)....
CopyCited 157 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 124379
...air opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. However, this subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Florida. § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis supplied). Under section 921.141, the linchpin of admissibility is whether the defendant has a "fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements." The Court has consistently found that the defendant had no opportunity to rebut the out-of-court statements of codefendants who were not available to testify....
...'s allowing a police officer to testify concerning prior threats made by the defendant to a witness. Although we have not previously required a showing of necessity as a threshold requirement for the admission of penalty phase hearsay admitted under section 921.141(1), we note that in Spencer, the witness was deceased, thereby giving rise to a good-faith reason for not calling the witness....
...z. See §
90.608, Fla. Stat. (1997). The question here is whether the statement could be used as substantive evidence in the penalty phase even though it was not permissible to use the statement as such in the guilt phase. As noted previously, under section
921.141(1), hearsay evidence is admissible in the penalty phase so long as it is relevant and the defendant has the opportunity to rebut it....
...We made a similar finding in Dudley. However, in neither of those cases did we address the fact that hearsay evidence is admissible in the penalty phase as substantive evidence so long as it is relevant and the defendant has the opportunity to rebut it. See § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Under section 921.141, the appropriate test for determining whether hearsay evidence is admissible is whether the evidence is relevant and probative of the defendant's guilt....
...So long as the prejudicial nature of the hearsay does not outweigh its probative value and the defendant has an opportunity to rebut the hearsay, it is admissible. In this case, the prior inconsistent statement was properly used in the guilt phase for impeachment purposes only. Under section 921.141, it was admissible as substantive evidence in the penalty phase because it was relevant and probative to the aggravating circumstances of both CCP and that the murder was committed to avoid arrest....
...... Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. *49 § 921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 155 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...This is an appeal from a sentence of death entered upon a plea of guilty to first degree murder in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County. Appellant pleaded guilty to charges of rape and first degree murder in the death of Margaret Anne Strack. Pursuant to Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, a penalty trial was held in circuit court with the result that the jury recommended by vote of eleven to one that Elledge be put to death....
...nalty was appropriate punishment for the killing of Margaret Anne Strack. As indicated above, at the conclusion of the sentencing trial the jury rendered its advisory sentence recommending by an 11-to-1 vote that defendant receive the death penalty. Section 921.141(2), Florida Statutes. On March 27, 1975, the trial judge entered his written sentence of death which included his findings in support of that sentence. Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes....
...It should be noted that appellant's trial counsel stipulated to the admissibility of the existence of the prior conviction for the Nelson murder. It is asserted here, however, that because the Nelson murder occurred after the killing in the instant case, the crime does not qualify as an aggravating circumstance under Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...It is clear that the Legislature referred to "previous convictions" and not "previous crimes." It is apparent that the appellant had at the time of the trial in this case been convicted of the Nelson murder. In Provence v. State,
337 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1976), we held that it was improper to consider under Section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, two armed robbery charges pending against Provence which predated the commission of the murder for which he was being tried....
...tunity to rebut any hearsay statements. However, this subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the constitutions of the United States or of the State of Florida... ." (Emphasis supplied) § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. The testimony of Mrs. Nelson obviously related to the aggravating circumstance delineated in Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes....
...If it be appropriate to admit the testimony, then clearly it was appropriate for the prosecutor to comment upon it in arguing for the death penalty. We do not perceive it to have been the intent of the Legislature that sentencing proceedings under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, be as antiseptic as appellant contends....
...rested entirely on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. It seems unlikely that it would do so since the capital-sentencing statute explicitly provides that `[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following [eight specified factors].' § 921.141(5) (Supp. 1976-1977). (Emphasis added.) There is no such limiting language introducing the list of statutory mitigating factors. See § 921.141(6) (Supp....
...The absence of mitigating circumstances becomes important, because, so long as there are some statutory aggravating circumstances, there is no danger that nonstatutory circumstances have served to overcome the mitigating circumstances in the weighing process which is dictated by our statute. Section 921.141(2)(b) and (3)(a), Florida Statutes....
...estae of the Strack murder. It is only conduct surrounding the capital felony for which the defendant is being sentenced which properly may be considered in determining whether the defendant "knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons." Section 921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes....
...ented from the recommendation of death. [2] As was adduced at the Strack penalty trial, Elledge was sentenced to life imprisonment for the Nelson murder. There had been no disposition of the Gaffney murder charge at the time of the Strack trial. [3] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 154 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2005 WL 168510
...f the aggravating circumstance that the homicide was committed during a sexual battery. Each will be addressed in turn. First, contrary to Fitzpatrick's assertion, the trial court's admission of Fitzpatrick's grand theft conviction was not in error. Section 921.141(5)(a) of the Florida Statutes (2001) allows the trial court in sentencing to consider the following aggravating circumstance: "The capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under sentence of impriso...
...on community control or on felony probation." Fitzpatrick was not only previously convicted of a felony, grand theft, but he was on probation for grand theft at the time of the murder. The trial court, therefore, was within its authority pursuant to section
921.141(5)(a) of the Florida Statutes (2001) to admit the grand theft conviction as an aggravating circumstance. See Jackson v. State,
530 So.2d 269, 273 (Fla.1988) ("Evidence of the particular offense for which appellant was on parole may be admitted to establish the aggravating factor permitted by section
921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes...."). Further, Fitzpatrick contends that the trial court erred in admitting the grand theft conviction to demonstrate Fitzpatrick was on parole for purposes of satisfying section
921.141(5)(a) of the Florida Statutes when his eligibility for this aggravator could have been accomplished by using his conviction for aggravated battery....
...tzpatrick's family history, and Fitzpatrick's employment history. The trial court not only instructed the jury on the aggravators and mitigators but specifically instructed the jurors that they could consider the mitigating circumstances outlined in section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (2001), if established by the evidence, and the trial court articulated each mitigator for the jury....
...ast *525 person seen with Romines alive. This Court has determined that when the facts contained in the record are sufficient to support the finding of sexual battery, they also stand sufficiently strong to support the aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(d) of the Florida Statutes....
...he victim's death). Consistent with this Court's precedent, we conclude that the facts contained in the record were sufficient to support the finding of sexual battery, and also stood sufficiently strong to support the aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(d) of the Florida Statutes....
...State,
774 So.2d 649, 673 (Fla.2000) (quoting Porter v. State,
564 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990)). Here, the trial court found four aggravating factors: (1) Fitzpatrick was under sentence of imprisonment, conditional/control release, when the murder in this case was committed (great weight), see §
921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001); (2) Fitzpatrick had previously been convicted of a violent felony to some person when he committed the murder in this case (moderate weight), see §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001); (3) Fitzpatrick committed the murder in this case while he was committing an involuntary sexual battery on the victim (little weight), see §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2001); and (4) Fitzpatrick committed the murder in this case in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel fashion (great weight), see §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2001). The trial court gave little weight to the statutory mitigator involving the victim's participation in Fitzpatrick's conduct, see §
921.141(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001), and gave no weight to Fitzpatrick's adult age, see §
921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. (2001). The trial court did accept and weigh mitigation under the statutory catchall provision, see §
921.141(6)(h), Fla....
...a.m. [10] Fairbanks did indicate that Fitzpatrick carried an extra T-shirt in his truck everyday. [11] The trial court considered and rejected as not established the following mitigating factors: Fitzpatrick had no significant criminal history, see § 921.141(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001); Fitzpatrick was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, see § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001); Fitzpatrick's role was minor, see § 921.141(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (2001); Fitzpatrick acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person, see § 921.141(6)(e), Fla. Stat. (2001); Fitzpatrick's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act was impaired, see § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2001); evidence that Fitzpatrick was abused, see § 921.141(6)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 153 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 31386790
...In any noncapital situation, before a sentence is imposed, the trial judge must comply with the requirements of the sentencing guidelines as codified in sections 921.001-921.005, Florida Statutes (2001). And in a capital case, the trial judge must follow the sentencing procedures outlined in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2001)....
...ing is done by a judge, as it is in Florida. Regardless of the jury's collective or individual advisory recommendation, Florida's death sentencing statute states that it is the trial court that "shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death." § 921.141(3), Fla....
...be heard in person. Second, after hearing the evidence and argument, the trial judge should then recess the proceeding to consider the appropriate sentence. If the judge determines that the death sentence should be imposed, then, in accordance with section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), the judge must set forth in writing the reasons for imposing the death sentence.......
..., as we hold here, the jury's recommendation is merely advisory; the trial judge is the sentencer and must base the sentence on an independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, notwithstanding the jury recommendation. Second, under section 921.141, the jury's advisory recommendation is not supported by findings of fact....
...the jury's recommendation, and is given final authority to determine the appropriate sentence." Id. Of course, Florida's statutory scheme also vests authority in the trial judge to "override" the jury's advisory recommendation in some instances. See § 921.141(3), Fla....
...en convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter event such person shall be punished by death....
...the statutes are otherwise identical regarding the prerequisites to the imposition of the maximum penalty. In Florida, section
782.04(1)(a) defines first-degree murder as *720 a capital felony and section
782.04(1)(b) provides that the procedure in section
921.141 shall be followed to determine a sentence of death or life imprisonment....
...of the death penalty." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied); see Ariz.Rev.Stat. §§ 13-1105(C), 13-703(6) (2001). Similar to the Arizona statute at issue in Ring, Florida's death statute explicitly cross-references the statutory provisions of section
921.141, which requires additional findings by a judge, not by a jury, as the precondition for imposition of the death penalty. Section
775.082(1), Florida Statutes, provides: A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s.
921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole. (Emphasis supplied.) Section
921.141(3) states, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court...
...ators. Life is the maximum penalty available under Arizona law for the defendant's crime based solely on the jury's verdict of guilt of first-degree murder. Similarly, in Florida, a first-degree murder verdict without additional findings pursuant to section 921.141 subjects a defendant to no more than a life sentence....
...Second, I would immediately require that trial courts utilize special verdicts that require the jury to indicate what aggravators the jury has found and the jury vote as to each aggravator. [63] Mandating a special verdict form can be accomplished within the dictates of section 921.141(2), which provides: (2) ADVISORY SENTENCE BY THE JURY.After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based upon the following matters: *724 (a) Whether sufficient aggravating...
...ed. Consistent with the current standard penalty-phase instructions, after finding the aggravators the jury should then make an advisory recommendation to the trial judge by majority vote as to whether the defendant should be sentenced to death. See § 921.141(2)-(3). By requiring a special verdict on aggravating circumstances, this Court will not only assist trial judges in administering section 921.141, but also enhance the quality of our own constitutionally mandated review of death sentences in a manner that anticipates the likely effect of Ring and its progeny....
...The relevant statutory provision from that time provided: A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in finding by the court *729 that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter event such person shall be punished by death....
...der "`[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist ... which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and ... [b]ased on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death'") (quoting § 921.141(2)(b)-(c), Fla....
...e same status as an element of the offense and requires only a majority vote. See Alvord v. State,
322 So.2d 533 (Fla.1975) (upholding the requirement that a jury's advisory sentence need only be rendered by majority vote, not unanimously). See also §
921.141(3), Fla....
...tory minimum sentences for certain reoffenders previously released from prison. (1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s.
921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole. §
775.082, Fla. Stat. (2001). [31] See §
921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). [32] See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11. [33] See §
921.141(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). [34] See, e.g., Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975) ("A jury recommendation under our trifurcated death penalty statute should be given great weight."). [35] See §
921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2001). [36] See id. [37] See §
921.141(4), Fla....
...[63] Based on the views I have expressed, I believe the finding as to the aggravators should be unanimous. This requirement would be consistent with Ring and not inconsistent with our present statute, which only refers to a majority vote as to a life or death recommendation. See § 921.141(3)....
CopyCited 152 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 296, 2013 WL 50208
...The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of ten to two, and the
trial court sentenced Evans to death for the first-degree murder conviction. The
trial court found two aggravating circumstances: (1) Evans had previously been
convicted of violent felonies, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b), and (2) the crime was
8
Case: 10-14920 Date Filed: 01/04/2013 Page: 9 of 72
committed while Evans was on probation, id. § 921.141(5)(a)....
...McClaren testified that a “concussion” is a form of a
closed head injury and is a “very common experience in life.”
Dr. Carpenter and Dr. Dee also parted ways with Dr. McClaren about
whether Evans met the criteria for the two statutory health mitigators, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(b), (f)....
...Indeed, the state trial court’s order left little doubt that it
completely discounted Mr. Evans’s evidence of brain damage:
The Court finds more credence in the testimony of [the state’s expert]
than in the testimony of the defense doctors presented. Although all
7
See Fla. Stat. §§ 921.141(6)(b) (“The capital felony was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”), and (6)(f) (“The capacity of
the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to...
CopyCited 152 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 40365
...e for an alternative means for the jury to be advised of available mitigating evidence. In determining whether the court erred in this case in giving the jury's recommendation great weight, we must consider the role of the advisory jury. Pursuant to section 921.141(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the jury's advisory sentence must be based on "[w]hether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5)" and "[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist." § 921.141(2)(a)-(b), Fla.Stat....
...ontained in the PSI or other matters of record. Article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution states in relevant part that the Supreme Court "shall hear appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty." Additionally, section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1999), states in relevant part that "[t]he judgment and conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida." Clearly, the people of this state, through the Const...
...be based on the defendant's guilty plea. Although the defendant may have a right to plead guilty, the defendant has no corresponding "right" after conviction to have the death penalty imposed based on a waiver of the right to present mitigation. See § 921.141(1), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 151 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1472909
...of such an instruction does not make this restraint improper. I. Defendant's Right to Testify England also claims that the trial judge abused his discretion in not permitting England to fully testify on his own behalf during the penalty phase. Both section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.780 provide that a defendant will be permitted to present evidence of a mitigating *405 nature that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant....
...ce the evidence outside the presence of the jury and seek a ruling from the court at that time, subject to impeachment and the State's Williams rule evidence against England. [17] Ultimately, the trial judge refused to admit the evidence. *406 Under section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), a trial judge is permitted to consider as mitigating evidence in the penalty phase that a defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony and that his participation was relatively minor....
CopyCited 149 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 137914
...by the evidence, that "the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without a[ny] pretense of moral or legal justification." This standard instruction, which mirrors the language of section 921.141(5)(i), was upheld by this Court in Brown v....
...9 (Fla.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 986,
112 S.Ct. 597,
116 L.Ed.2d 621 (1991) (not error to refuse to give merger instruction where trial court merged aggravating factors into one). We also find no merit to Jackson's contention that it was error to apply section
921.141(5)(j) in this case since the murder occurred before the effective date of this aggravating factor....
...NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. [2] Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496,
107 S.Ct. 2529,
96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808,
111 S.Ct. 2597,
115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). [3] §
921.141(5)(j), Fla. Stat. (1991). [4] §
921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1991). [5] §
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). [6] §
921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...though insufficient to reduce the degree of homicide, nevertheless rebuts the otherwise cold and calculating nature of the homicide. [9] Bundy v. State,
471 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 894,
107 S.Ct. 295,
93 L.Ed.2d 269 (1986). [10] §
921.141(5)(g), Fla. Stat. (1991). [11] §
921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1991). [12] §
921.141(5)(j), Fla....
CopyCited 148 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 252160
...1676,
95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987); (9) the trial court erred in its assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors; (10) the trial court erred in failing to declare section
922.10, Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional; and (11) the trial court erred in failing to declare section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional....
...See Gordon v. State,
704 So.2d 107 (Fla.1997); Larzelere v. State,
676 So.2d 394 (Fla.1996). First, Stephens argues the trial court improperly considered the same felonies used to support the felony murder conviction as prior felony convictions under section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1997)....
...State,
701 So.2d 76 (Fla.1997); Ferguson v. State,
90 Fla. 105,
105 So. 840 (1925). Additionally, the statute was amended by the Legislature in January 2000 to allow for execution by either electrocution or lethal injection, the choice being that of the defendant. Constitutionality of Section
921.141 Finally, Stephens argues section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1997), is unconstitutional. There is no merit to this argument. See, e.g., Brown v. State,
721 So.2d 274, 277 n. 6, 283 (Fla.1998) (rejecting multiple claims that section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1991), is unconstitutional under the Florida and United States Constitutions); Hunter v....
CopyCited 148 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 82927
...and the trial court erred in finding to the contrary. However, the state did meet its burden in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...tence on the defendant compared to others found *1064 guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 877,
103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742,
77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (footnote omitted). Since premeditation already is an element of capital murder in Florida, [4] section
921.141(5)(i) must have a different meaning; otherwise, it would apply to every premeditated murder. Therefore, section
921.141(5)(i) must apply to murders more coldblooded, more ruthless, and more plotting than the ordinarily reprehensible crime of premeditated first-degree murder....
...[2] As to both counts of murder, the trial court found aggravating circumstances that: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to that person (these two murders and the accompanying aggravated assault), § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985); and (2) the capital felonies were committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a burglary, id. § 921.141(5)(d). The trial court found two additional aggravating circumstances as to the murder of Williams: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, id. § 921.141(5)(h); and (2) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 143 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 269
...The facts as shown by the evidence presented at the trial will be briefly stated below. After the jury returned the verdicts of guilt, the second phase of the trial was held for the purpose of determining the sentences to be imposed upon the defendant for the two murders. See § 921.141, Fla....
...sent to this Court. Our capital felony sentencing law requires the "certification by the sentencing court of the entire record" to the Supreme Court for purposes of the mandatory appellate review of judgments upon which death sentences are imposed. § 921.141(4), Fla....
...Appellant was on trial on two counts of first-degree murder. With regard to each of the offenses charged, the possible penalties were limited to either a sentence of death or life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for twenty-five years. §§
782.04,
921.141, Fla....
..., and questions the appropriateness of the sentences of death under all of the circumstances. Regarding the murder of John Eubanks, the trial court found the following aggravating circumstances. (1) The murder "was committed for financial gain". See § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1981). (2) The murder was "especially wicked, atrocious or cruel". See Id. § 921.141(5)(h). (3) The murder was "committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." Id. § 921.141(5)(i). The trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance: that appellant "had no significant history of prior criminal activity." Id. § 921.141(6)(a)....
...lton Farmer, the trial court found aggravating *868 circumstances as follows. (1) At the time of his conviction of the murder, appellant "had previously been convicted of another capital offense, to-wit, the premeditated murder of" John Eubanks. See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). (2) The murder was "committed for financial gain." See Id. § 921.141(5)(f). (3) The murder "was especially wicked, atrocious, or cruel." See Id. § 921.141(5)(h). (4) The murder "was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." Id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
...Farmer, the conviction for the murder of Eubanks. Appellant argues that the statutory aggravating circumstance, "The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person," § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...s recommendation. He considered the recommendation and specifically found that the Tedder standard was met. Under the capital felony sentencing law followed in the State of Florida, the recommendation of the jury is not binding but is advisory only. § 921.141(2), Fla....
CopyCited 138 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 513570
...During the penalty phase proceedings for capital felonies, "[a]ny such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements." § 921.141(1), Fla....
...emand. Santos v. State,
629 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1994). Moreover, based on our second Santos opinion, I believe death clearly cannot be proportional in this instance. I therefore dissent as to the remand, but otherwise concur with the majority. NOTES [1] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] §
921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1991). [4] §
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). [5]
921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 138 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...2257,
72 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982). The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment or to declare that death was not a possible penalty. III. The defendant raises a number of constitutional challenges to sections
775.082(1),
782.04(1), and
921.141, Florida Statutes, (1981)....
...ature. Also, when a statutory sentence is not cruel and unusual on its face it will be upheld against an attack based on separation of powers grounds. Sowell v. State,
342 So.2d 969 (Fla. 1977). Second, the defendant attacks the constitutionality of section
921.141, arguing that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances contained in the statute are impermissibly vague and overbroad....
...Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 976,
99 S.Ct. 1548,
59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979); Foster v. State,
369 So.2d 928 (Fla.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 885,
100 S.Ct. 178,
62 L.Ed.2d 116 (1979); Alvord v. State . The defendant's claim that the mitigating factors contained in section
921.141(6) are constitutionally deficient because limited by statute is without merit....
...The defendant has failed to establish or demonstrate that this Court's position on the death penalty statutes should be disturbed. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to declare sections
775.082(1),
921.141 and
782.04(1) unconstitutional....
...alty. We will first consider the mitigating factors due to their relatively straightforward import. The trial judge found that the defendant was twenty-one years old at the time of the crime and had no significant history of prior criminal activity. § 921.141(6)(a) and (g), Fla....
...found as a mitigating factor. Next we review the aggravating circumstances found to exist in this case. Aggravating Circumstances 1. The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a burglary and sexual battery. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...Pubic hair found at the crime scene was miscroscopically matched with those of the defendant. These facts and others contained in the record in this case are clearly sufficient to support the findings of burglary and sexual battery. As such they also stand sufficiently strong to support the aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(d)....
...Defendant's argument with respect to the unconstitutional effect of "automatic" aggravating circumstances solely in the felony murder context is inappropriate in this case. 2. The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
...Defendant admitted knowing the victim. Plainly the defendant killed to avoid identification and arrest. Proof of the requisite intent to avoid detection is strong in this case. See Riley v. State,
366 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1978). 3. The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. §
921.141(5)(f), Fla....
...f rape in conjunction with the murder. Brown v. State,
381 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1118,
101 S.Ct. 931,
66 L.Ed.2d 847 (1981). There was adequate proof of rape. 4. The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...her life, and we cannot say that the trial court's finding of heinousness is at material variance with the facts. 5. The capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 137 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...The Supreme Court has acknowledged that attorneys are in the best position to determine when a conflict of interest exists. See Cuyler,
446 U.S. at 347 ,
100 S.Ct. at 1717 13 The trial judge found that petitioner had no significant history of prior criminal activity, see Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec.
921.141(6)(a) (West 1985) and that petitioner was only twenty-one years of age. See Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec.
921.141(6)(g) 14 The trial judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that a capital felony was committed while petitioner was engaged in burglary and sexual battery, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec.
921.141(5)(d), that the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec.
921.141(5)(e), that the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec.
921.141(5)(f), that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec.
921.141(5)(h), and that the capital felony was a homicide committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec.
921.141(5)(i) 15 This information was contained in a presentence investigation report which was considered by the judge 16 We note that the Supreme Court recently ruled in Booth v....
CopyCited 134 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 324080
...Therefore, because there was evidence presented that supported the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator, it was not error for the trial court to have instructed the jury. [10] Constitutional Challenge As the thirteenth issue on appeal, Hunter challenges the constitutionality of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1993), on numerous grounds, including: (1) the cold, calculated, and premeditated circumstance and the form it takes as a jury instruction is unconstitutionally vague; (2) the felony murder circumstance fails to nar...
...is unconstitutional; (15) Florida law creates a presumption of death; (16) Florida law unconstitutionally instructs juries not to consider sympathy; and (17) electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment. We find the following numbered challenges to section 921.141, which were preserved for review, to lack merit: (2), [11] (3), [12] (4), [13] (9), [14] (10), [15] and (12)....
...GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In addition to the eight contemporaneous convictions in this case, Hunter also has prior convictions for aggravated battery (2), shooting or throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle, and attempted armed robbery. [2] See § 921.141(5)(b), (d), Fla....
CopyCited 130 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2012 WL 1370848, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 8067
...The
court found four aggravating factors, one statutory mitigating factor and numerous
nonstatutory mitigating factors. The four aggravators were: (1) the crime was
committed while Morris was on parole from a previous felony (robbery), Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(5)(a), which the trial court accorded moderate weight; (2) Morris was
previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence (robbery),
id. § 921.141(5)(b), which the court accorded moderate weight; (3) the crime was
committed for pecuniary gain, id. § 921.141(5)(f), which the court gave great
weight; and (4) the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, id. §
921.141(5)(h), which the court gave great weight.
5
The trial court also found the statutory mitigator that Morris had a
substantially impaired capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law,
id. § 921.141(6)(f), and gave this mitigator moderate weight....
CopyCited 128 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...nding in aggravation that the homicide was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel and that it was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. [13] On appeal Jent claims (1) that subsection
921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1979), is an unconstitutional attempt to govern practice and procedure, (2) that the new aggravating factor improperly places a burden of proof on a defendant, and (3) that the trial court improperly restricted the consideration of mitigating evidence. We find no merit to any of these claims. In Dobbert v. State,
375 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 912,
100 S.Ct. 3000,
64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980), the appellant attacked section
921.141 in its entirety as an unconstitutional incursion into this Court's power over practice and procedure....
...editation in the sentencing phase of the trial. We do not agree that this will occur. As we stated in State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 943,
94 S.Ct. 1950,
40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), the aggravating circumstances set out in section
921.141 must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt....
...ound for granting a new trial. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.600(a)(3). [12] We note that a state attorney was not present at the interviews which produced these affidavits and that neither Carroll nor Marvin was represented by counsel during the interviews. [13] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 127 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7098, 2015 WL 1926218
...a sexual battery and the
count of sexual battery. Following the penalty phase, the jury recommended death
by a vote of seven to five. The trial court found four aggravating circumstances:
Preston had a prior violent felony conviction, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b); the
murder was committed immediately after Preston committed robbery and while he
was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping, id. § 921.141(5)(d); the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, id. § 921.141(5)(h); and the murder was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
...In his direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Preston raised five claims,
including a claim that the evidence of premeditation presented at his trial was
2
The trial court also found that the murder was committed in conjunction with a robbery for
pecuniary gain, id. § 921.141(5)(f), but did not consider this factor because it overlapped with
the aggravating factor involving the commission of a robbery.
7
Case: 12-14706 Date Filed: 04/29/2015 Page: 8 of 38
insufficient (Ground 2)....
...In April 1991, the trial court impaneled another penalty phase jury and
conducted a now third penalty phase trial. In that proceeding, the state urged the
jury to find four aggravating factors: the murder was committed during the
commission of a kidnapping, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d); the murder was committed
9
Case: 12-14706 Date Filed: 04/29/2015 Page: 10 of 38
for the purpose of avoiding arrest, id. § 921.141(5)(e); the murder was committed
for pecuniary gain, id. 921.141(5)(f); and the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
...The district court denied Preston relief on all of
them. Preston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 6:08-CV-2085-ORL-31GJK,
2012 WL
3
The trial court found Preston’s age at the time of the murder to be a statutory mitigating factor,
Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(g), and found as nonstatutory mitigation that he had a difficult childhood,
a good prison record, potential for rehabilitation, he had expressed remorse, and he was a loving
son with “positive qualities.”...
CopyCited 124 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 674581
...ny was committed while Brooks was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Finally, the court considered Brooks' family background, including the death of his mother [9] and father, as a statutory mitigating circumstance under section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...tencing proceeding; (2) whether the trial court erred in finding the merged robbery/pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance; (3) whether the trial court erred in finding that Darryl Jenkins' conduct did not constitute a mitigating circumstance under section 921.141(6)(c), Florida Statutes; (4) whether Brooks' death sentence is disproportionate; and (5) whether the trial court erred in denying Brooks' request to bifurcate the penalty phase of the trial....
...State,
733 So.2d 980, 984-85 (Fla.1999); Archer v. State,
613 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1993). Nevertheless, we will proceed to make an independent determination of whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Brooks' first-degree murder conviction. See, e.g., §
921.141(4), Fla....
...olence"; that they "commit violent, brutal crimes of violence"; and that they have a "character of violence." This was penalty-phase argument. The jury was evaluating aggravating circumstances for purposes of the evaluation of defendant's character. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes, provides: "[e]vidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant....
...rror. [10] The court noted that prior to an amendment passed by the Legislature in 1996, see chapter 96-302, section 1, at 1355, Laws of Florida, Brooks' family background would have been considered as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. Compare § 921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 124 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 53956
...844,
88 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the state sought to reassure the jurors that the jury role was to make an advisory recommendation to the judge and that the judge had the ultimate responsibility for sentencing to death. Florida's death penalty statute, section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), provides that the jury shall hear the evidence on aggravation and mitigation and render an advisory sentence based on whether there are sufficient aggravating circumstances to warrant a death sentence, and, i...
...se the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Consequently, the Maryland statute was held to be invalid insofar as it required victim impact information to be considered in capital punishment cases. [4] Florida's death penalty statute, section 921.141, limits the aggravating circumstances on which a sentence of death may be imposed to the circumstances listed in the statute. § 921.141(5)....
...death sentencing. [5] The first question is whether appellant's failure to object to the introduction of the victim impact evidence is a procedural bar to raising the issue on appeal. Victim impact is not one of the aggravating factors enumerated in section 921.141....
...ght to the jury's recommendation of death. Ross; LeDuc; Tedder. For the following reasons we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentencing judge would have imposed the death penalty in the absence of the victim impact evidence. First, under section 921.141, the sentencing judge's consideration of aggravating circumstances on which a death penalty may be based is limited to those enumerated in the statute....
...Thus, Tedder itself does not rely on or test the Tedder rule. In Tedder we gave no reasoned explanation of why a jury recommendation was entitled to great weight, we merely concluded that it was and cited Florida's death penalty statute as authority. Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1973 and thereafter) provides that "notwithstanding" the jury recommendation the trial court will weigh the evidence of aggravation and mitigation and "shall" enter a sentence based on that weighing....
...pose of the advisory recommendation of the jury under our death penalty statute is to apprise the trial judge and appellate court of the jury's reaction to the evidence of aggravation and mitigation as a matter of information. Short of a revision of section 921.141 to place the sentencing responsibility upon the jury and to require factual findings on which to base appellate review, the jury recommendation does not carry the great weight assigned to it by Tedder....
...mendation of the jury and the recommendation included in the presentence investigation and determined that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist and that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1983), requires that a death sentence be based upon specific circumstances....
CopyCited 122 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge. Adams v. State,
341 So.2d at 769 . The six aggravating circumstances relied upon by the trial judge were (1) the commission of the homicide by a person under sentence of imprisonment, Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141(5)(a); (2) the commission of the homicide by an individual previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person, id. §
921.141(5)(b); (3) the commission of the homicide during the course of a robbery, id. §
921.141(5)(d); (4) the commission of the homicide to avoid arrest, id. §
921.141(5)(e); (5) the commission of the homicide for pecuniary gain, id. § 921.-141(5)(f); and (6) the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel nature of the homicide, id. §
921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 119 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...or veracity and non-violence. We held in State v. Dixon [6] that the rules of evidence are to be relaxed in the sentencing hearing, but that evidence bearing no relevance to the issues was to be excluded. The sole issue in a sentencing hearing under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), is to examine in each case the itemized aggravating and mitigating circumstances....
...8] and we are not free to expand the list. 2. Instructions as to aggravating circumstances. The trial judge instructed *1140 the jury to consider whether this murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel," an aggravating circumstance listed in Section 921.141(5)(h)....
...While we agree that Deputy Wilkerson was not murdered in the "especially heinous" manner contemplated by the statute, we do not believe it was error for the trial judge to instruct the jury on every aggravating and mitigating circumstance listed in Section 921.141, in the absence of trial counsels' acquiescence to the omission of one or more circumstances....
...Accordingly, the judgment of guilty of murder in the first degree and robbery is affirmed, and the sentence of death is approved. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Cooper argues as a matter of law that Section 921.141, Fla....
...450,
184 So. 88 (1938). [6]
283 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973). The general standard of relevance is explained in Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Campbell,
104 Fla. 274,
139 So. 886 (1932). [7] The legislative intent to avoid condemned arbitrariness pervades the statute. Section
921.141(2) requires the jury to render its advisory sentence "upon the following matters: (a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (6); (b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (7), which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist... ." (emphasis added). This limitation is repeated in Section
921.141(3), governing the trial court's decision on the penalty. Both sections
921.141(6) and
921.141(7) begin with words of mandatory limitation....
CopyCited 118 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...We reject appellant's contention that his jury was impermissibly constituted. Appellant's principal argument to us is that a death sentence is not warranted for his crime, first because the trial judge considered matters outside the list of enumerated factors prescribed by Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), and second because the statutory mitigating circumstances outweigh in significance the statutory aggravating factors. In his written findings, the trial judge described six aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance. Two of the aggravating circumstances clearly must be disregarded as not having been listed in Section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...There was nothing atrocious (for death penalty purposes) done to the victim, however, who died instantaneously from a gunshot in the head. As to this aspect, the case is similar to Cooper v. State,
336 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 1976), where we ruled that a like killing was not heinous and atrocious within the meaning of Section
921.141(5)(h). A fourth and fifth finding were that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and during the course of a robbery, invoking Sections
921.141(5)(d) and (f)....
...These findings are duplicative in this case, and should constitute only one aggravating circumstance. Provence v. State,
337 So.2d 783, 786 (1976). The final aggravating circumstance identified by the trial judge was that the murder *22 was committed to eliminate a witness and thereby avoid lawful arrest. Section
921.141(5)(e)....
...Proof of the requisite intent to avoid arrest and detection must be very strong in these cases. Here, of course, it was. The one mitigating factor found to exist in this case was appellant's lack of any significant history of prior criminal activity. All other mitigating factors in Section 921.141(6) were properly found to be absent....
...Appellant's convictions are affirmed, as are his life and 15 year sentences. The case is remanded, however, for the sole purpose of allowing the trial judge to reconsider the imposition of the death sentence for the murder of Peter Enea, Sr., in accordance with Section 921.141 as construed in this opinion....
...ithout misunderstanding the evidence or the law. Under these circumstances the trial court's adjudication of guilt should be quashed. I dissent. NOTES [1] Our jurisdiction to review the death sentence is found in Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const., and § 921.141(4), Fla....
CopyCited 115 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 1194257
...Card challenges the testimony given by the victim's granddaughter, Courtney Brimmer, at the Spencer hearing, [11] and the testimony of the victim's husband, Ed Franklin, and daughter, Cindy Brimmer, introduced during the resentencing proceeding. [12] Section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1999), allows the State to introduce "victim impact" evidence, which shows "the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." Damren v. State,
696 So.2d 709, 713 (Fla. 1997) (quoting section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993)); see Bonifay v....
...808, 827,
111 S.Ct. 2597,
115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). There are certain limits to the introduction of victim impact testimony. Witnesses providing victim impact testimony are prohibited from giving characterizations and their opinions about the crime. See §
921.141(7) ("Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as a part of victim impact evidence."); Payne, 501 U.S....
...e testimony came during the Spencer hearing and outside the presence of the jury. In addition, having reviewed the testimony of Ed Franklin and Cindy Brimmer, we conclude that neither witness provided improper victim impact testimony in violation of section 921.141(7)....
...1998), this Court condemned a similar argument that invited jurors to disregard the law "based on a reflexive fear that, regardless of the law, [the defendant] might someday be eligible for parole" and released from prison. [7] Aggravating circumstances are limited to those specifically listed under section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1999). Victim impact evidence is not listed as an aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5) that may be considered and weighed by juries....
CopyCited 115 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1998 WL 904306
...In the penalty phase of a capital trial, any evidence "which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements." § 921.141(1), Fla....
...n to give her a rough time, and that he was raised to have respect for the elderly. But cf. Dragovich v. State,
492 So.2d 350, 355 (Fla.1986) (hearsay reputation evidence that the defendant was an arsonist known as "The Torch" was inadmissible under section
921.141(1) because the testimony was "not susceptible to the fair rebuttal contemplated by the statute")....
CopyCited 113 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 31386234
...idual circumstances of the offender and the offense." United States v. Fell,
217 F.Supp.2d 469, 476 (D.Vt.2002). At the time of Furman, Florida's sentencing statute did not contain specific standards for the imposition of the death penalty. [14] See §
921.141, Fla....
...2978,
49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion) (striking a mandatory death sentence statute and holding that the "consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense" is a "constitutionally indispensable part" of any capital sentencing scheme). [14] Section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1971), provided: A defendant found guilty by a jury of an offense punishable by death shall be sentenced to death unless the verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by a majority of the jury....
CopyCited 111 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 22349638
...efore January 15, 1997. [4] Williams v. State,
110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959); §
90.404, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996). [5] The aggravating factors were: (1) defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996), and (2) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. [6] The only statutory mitigating factor was that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. §
921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 111 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1999 WL 628787
...Peede also alleges that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of two other important statutory mitigators that was available through mental health testimony: (1) substantial impairment of capacity to conform conduct to the requirements of law, see § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (1997); and (2) acting under extreme duress. See id. § 921.141(6)(e)....
CopyCited 108 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2012 WL 2053300, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11684
...This time, the
trial court found that the State had “proven beyond every reasonable doubt” two
aggravating factors: that (1) Lucas was previously convicted of a felony involving
the use or threat of violence to the person (the attempted murders), Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(b); and (2) the first-degree murder of Piper was especially heinous,
atrocious and cruel (“HAC”), Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h)....
...ge issued his sentencing
order expressly reflecting that Lucas’s voluntary consumption of alcohol and
drugs, including PCP, was considered in the sentencing calculus under two
statutory and one non-statutory mitigating circumstances, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6).
Specifically, the trial judge noted that the extreme mental and emotional
disturbance mitigator, id. § 921.141(6)(b), was supported by Dr....
...ingestion of alcohol, marijuana, and other drugs including PCP which may have
diminished his inhibitions, but did not destroy his cognitive function.” The court
thus afforded “very little weight” to this mitigator.
As for the capacity-to-conform mitigator, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f), the
sentencing judge found that “the defendant had voluntarily ingested alcohol and
26
other drugs such as PCP which may have reduced his inhibitions and increased his
impulsiveness....
CopyCited 104 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determinations.” Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584, 608, n.6 ,
122 S.Ct. 2428 ,
153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). First, the sentencing judge conducts an evidentiary hearing before a jury. Fla. Stat. §
921.141 (1) (2010). Next, the jury renders an “advisory sentence” of life or death without specifying the factual basis of its recommendation. §
921.141(2). “Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death.” §
921.141(3)....
...ntencing scheme applies equally to Florida’s. Like Arizona at the time of Ring, Florida does not require the jury to make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty. Rather, Florida requires a judge to find these facts. Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (3)....
...ires that “the trial court alone must find ‘the facts ... [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’ and ‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.’ ” Id. at 621-22 (quoting § 921.141(3), Fla....
...Florida Asay and the State fundamentally disagree as to the meaning of Hurst v. Florida. The State asserts that only one aggravator must be found by the jury to satisfy Hurst v. Florida, pointing to lan *15 guage in the Hurst v. Florida opinion that supports this interpretation. Asay, on the other hand, asserts that under section 921.141, Florida Statutes the jury must find both that “sufficient aggravators” exist and that there are insufficient mitigating factors because those are the “facts” required to be found before the death penalty can be imposed....
CopyCited 103 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 432561
...instruction for the aggravating circumstance that the victim of the capital felony "was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability" is unconstitutionally vague and its application, in this instance, is an error. Under the authority of section 921.141(5)(m), Florida Statutes (1997), [14] the trial court instructed the jury to consider the victim's vulnerability as an aggravating circumstance, and the court found it proved....
...The objection at trial must attack the instruction itself, either by submitting a limiting instruction or making an objection to the instruction as worded. See also Downs v. State,
740 So.2d 506, 517 (Fla.1999) (holding claim that three statutory aggravators (i.e., those found in section
921.141(5)(b), (f), and (i)) were unconstitutionally vague was procedurally barred on appeal "[b]ecause defense counsel did not object to these instructions during trial [footnote omitted] or propose alternative instructions")....
...nced was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (4) the victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to an advanced age or disability. Morrison did not present evidence of any of the statutory mitigating circumstances listed in section 921.141(6)(a)-(g), Florida Statutes (1997)....
...subsequently withdrawn. In the instant case, the State maintained that Morrison never had consent to enter the victim's apartment. Thus, the jury was never asked to consider a "legally inadequate" theory of burglary as was at issue in Delgado. [14] Section 921.141(5)(m), Florida Statutes (1997), states: AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCESAggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: ....
CopyCited 97 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 101552
...State,
383 So.2d 320 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Swafford's remaining arguments pertain to the death sentence. First, he contends that the court erred in finding the murder to have been "committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest." §
921.141(5)(e), Fla....
...1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1056,
103 S.Ct. 1508,
75 L.Ed.2d 937 (1983); Griffin v. State,
414 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 1982). *277 Next, Swafford argues that the trial court erred in finding the murder to have been "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...s murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Swafford also claims that the trial court erred in finding the murder to have been "committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 96 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 633729
...he heavy object at the end of the rope. [2] Soraya Butler, Elizabeth Beiro, Carl Voeller, and Frances Watkins. [3] The trial court found the following statutory aggravators: (1) the defendant has been convicted of prior violent and capital felonies, section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1993); (2) the murders were committed during the commission of a kidnapping, section 921.141 (5)(d); (3) the murders were committed to avoid arrest, section 921.141(5)(e); and (4) the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 96 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...denied, ___ U.S. ___,
115 S.Ct. 111,
130 L.Ed.2d 58 (1994); Hodges v. State,
595 So.2d 929 (Fla.), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___,
113 S.Ct. 33,
121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992). Both the Florida Constitution in Article I, Section 16, and the Florida Legislature in section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993), instruct that in our state, victim impact evidence is to be heard in considering capital felony sentences....
...1950,
40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), or otherwise interferes with the constitutional rights of the defendant. Therefore, we reject the argument which classifies victim impact evidence as a nonstatutory aggravator in an attempt to exclude it during the sentencing phase of a capital case. Rather, we believe that section
921.141(7) indicates clearly that victim impact evidence is admitted only after there is present in the record evidence of one or more aggravating circumstances. The evidence is not admitted as an aggravator but, instead, as set forth in section
921.141(7), allows the jury to consider "the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." §
921.141(7), Fla. Stat. (1993). Victim impact evidence must be limited to that which is relevant as specified in section
921.141(7)....
...Thus, with the aggravating circumstances which were before the jury and with no mitigating evidence presented to the jury, the complained-about testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's second attack on the victim impact evidence concerns the application of 921.141(7) to defendant's crime. He claims that such application was a violation of the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions since the murders were on February 7, 1992, and subsection seven of section 921.141 did not go into effect until July 1, 1992....
...is point in State v. Maxwell,
647 So.2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), in which the district court found our decision in Glendening v. State,
536 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 907,
109 S.Ct. 3219,
106 L.Ed.2d 569 (1989), to be instructive. Section
921.141(7) only relates to the admission of evidence and is thus procedural. Id. at 215. Therefore, application of section
921.141(7) in the present case does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws....
...ity of the State's case for aggravation. The only substantial appeal to the jury by defense counsel was directed to the efficacy of the death penalty, rather than the merits of its invocation in this particular case. GRIMES, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] In mitigation the court found the following statutory factors: (1) Windom had no significant history of prior criminal activity (§ 921.141(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991)); (2) the capital felony was committed while Windom was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (§ 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991)); and (3) Windom acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person (§ 921.141(6)(e), Fla....
...[4] The remaining four claims are as follows: (1) the trial court erred in its instruction on reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in denying defendant's requested special jury instructions at the penalty phase; (3) the trial court improperly rejected mitigating evidence by giving such little, if any, weight; and (4) section 921.141, Florida Statutes is unconstitutional.
CopyCited 95 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 424173
...Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Cf. Jones v. State,
652 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1995). Similarly, we reject Finney's contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. §
921.141(5)(f)....
...Accordingly, having found no reversible error, we affirm the convictions and sentences. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. SHAW, J., concurs in result only as to the conviction and concurs as to the sentence. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(b), (f), (h), Fla....
CopyCited 90 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 5192, 1988 WL 39117
...g the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere." Id. at 328-29,
105 S.Ct. at 2639 . Under the Florida capital sentencing scheme, the jury makes a sentencing recommendation and the trial judge actually imposes sentence. Fla.Stat. Sec.
921.141 (1985)....
...on the Judge of this court." This statement, properly analyzed, no more supports a finding of Caldwell error than does the earlier statement. 82 As the majority notes, the statement was technically accurate, at least in the sense that Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(3) identifies the trial judge as the actor who actually imposes sentence....
...ell violation. See Mann,
844 F.2d at 1454-55 . 116 Under Florida's sentencing scheme the jury renders an advisory sentence. The trial judge then independently weighs the evidence from the sentencing phase before entering the sentence. Fla.Stat. Sec.
921.141 (1985)....
...First, the jury must determine whether the defendant is guilty of a capital crime. Second, if the defendant is found guilty, the court conducts a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the appropriate penalty is death or life imprisonment. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(1). The sentencing phase consists of three subphases. First, the jury considers the mitigating and aggravating evidence and renders an advisory sentence to the court. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(2). Second, the trial court decides whether to accept the jury's recommended sentence. If the court decides to impose the death sentence, it must set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(3). Finally, the judgment of conviction and sentence of death is subject to automatic review in the Supreme Court of Florida. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(4) The division of authority between the jury and the trial judge under the Florida death penalty statute has been upheld against constitutional challenge....
...ld be his "job" to determine sentence is properly understood as intended to reinforce this admonition 4 It is also not dispositive to note that the references to the jury's "advisory" function were accurate in the technical sense that Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(2) contains the term "advisory." The question remains as to what meaning the jurors would have attributed to that term in light of everything else they were told....
CopyCited 88 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 539438
...efore the penalty phase proceedings. Moreover, Walker's request that the trial court determine whether it would sentence him to consecutive or concurrent life sentences for the murders is inconsistent with Florida's jury *315 override provision. See § 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1995)....
...oof for mitigators and the language about which Walker complains does not establish that the trial court failed to follow those instructions. Walker next argues that the trial court improperly rejected the substantial impairment statutory mitigator, § 921.141(6)(f), where Dr....
...[11] We note also that the Legislature has remedied any possible uncertainties harbored by penalty phase juries regarding a defendant's ineligibility for parole when it amended section
775.082(1) to provide that defendants facing the death penalty pursuant to section
921.141 for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1995 shall be punished by death or life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole....
CopyCited 88 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1998 WL 207909
...urder for which Barnes was prosecuted and convicted. [7] Accessory after the Fact Donaldson contends that the trial court erred in admitting and considering evidence of his prior conviction of accessory after the fact as a prior violent felony under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...he underlying crime. Accordingly, we find as a matter of law that a conviction for accessory after the fact to a crime of violence may not be used as a vehicle to implicate the defendant as a principal in the prior underlying crime of violence under section 921.141(5)(b)....
...State,
678 So.2d 315 (Fla.1996); Merck v. State,
664 So.2d 939 (Fla.1995) (resentencing required where State improperly introduced juvenile adjudication as evidence of prior violent felony conviction); Trotter v. State,
576 So.2d 691 (Fla.1990). Accordingly, we conclude that while section
921.141(5)(b) permits the State to present evidence of a prior violent felony conviction as an aggravating circumstance, it specifically limits the evidence to that of a violent crime for which the defendant is actually convicted....
...In addition, the error was magnified by the State's improper argument to the jury that if it found that Donaldson was convicted of a prior violent felony then it could consider that fact as a second and independent aggravating factor, the first being Donaldson's contemporaneous conviction of a capital felony, contrary to section 921.141(5)(b)....
...We find it was error for the trial court to admit and consider Cisneros' deposition testimony where, as here, he did not testify in either the guilt or penalty phase of the trial. HAC Next, as to claim five, Donaldson argues the trial court erred in finding the murder heinous, atrocious, and cruel (HAC) under section 921.141(5)(h)....
...e murders. [12] *188 Murder Committed During Course of Felony Donaldson also contests the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the aggravator that the murders were committed during the course of a kidnapping, one of the enumerated felonies under section 921.141(5)(d) of the Florida Statutes....
...However, based upon our rejection of the heinous, atrocious and cruel aggravator and on our conclusion that Donaldson's conviction of accessory after the fact may not be used as the vehicle with which to introduce the circumstances of the underlying substantive crime in satisfying section 921.141(5)(b), we reverse his sentences of death and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to hold a new penalty phase proceeding before a new jury in accord with this opinion....
...[7] The only witness offered by the State during the penalty phase regarding the murders sub judice was Wendy Kane who merely corroborated testimony already introduced at trial. She testified that Donaldson "had called and told [Campbell] to walk out to the street where he could come by and shoot her." [8] Under section 921.141(5)(b), the State may present evidence establishing that "[t]he defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." [9] Our ruling on this issue moots the appellant's numerous claims challenging the actual evidence offered by the State on this issue, much of which evidence the State acknowledged it had itself not found credible. [10] Donaldson also claims that section 921.141(5)(h) and the standard jury instruction for the HAC aggravator are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad....
CopyCited 87 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 132928
...Anderson's testimony that Floyd had told him that he had murdered a woman during the course of burglarizing her home was admissible. §
90.803(18), Fla. Stat. (1983). This testimony was relevant to establishing the aggravating circumstance of murder *1231 committed during a burglary, section
921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1983), which must be proved beyond every reasonable doubt....
...To be admissible in the penalty phase, state evidence must relate to any of the aggravating circumstances. Trawick v. State,
473 So.2d 1235, 1240-41 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1143,
106 S.Ct. 2254,
90 L.Ed.2d 699 (1986); Elledge v. State,
346 So.2d 998, 1001-02 (Fla. 1977); §
921.141(1), Fla....
...The sentence should be reduced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for twenty-five years. BARKETT, J., concurs. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. [2] The murder was committed for pecuniary gain, section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1983), and the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 87 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 14472
...Lastly, Fletcher testified that a treatment center in Oklahoma "wouldn't have anything to do" with Zack because he "wouldn't conform to any treatment program." To the extent that this testimony was hearsay, it was admissible in the penalty phase so long as the defendant had a fair opportunity to rebut it. See § 921.141(1), Fla....
...Further, a review of this record in light of Parks convinces us that the State's argument [10] concerning sympathy was a proper admonition for the jurors to consider the mitigation evidence without resort to their emotions. AggravatorFelony Probation In October of 1996, the Legislature amended section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes, making the commission of murder by a defendant on felony probation an aggravating factor....
...The cases cited by the majority which hold that probation is not incarceration are not applicable to one who is sentenced to community control. I am satisfied that one sentenced to community control is under sentence of imprisonment within the definition of subsection 921.141(5)(a)....
...See State v. Hootman,
709 So.2d 1357 (Fla.1998), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Matute-Chirinos,
713 So.2d 1006 (Fla.1998). However, four other aggravating factors support the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, any error in retroactively applying section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1997), to Zack was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt....
CopyCited 87 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...if a conviction is had and a death sentence imposed. Id. For these reasons, we declined jurisdiction to hear the appeal at that time. We now find that we do have jurisdiction of this cause and that reconsideration of the suppression issue is proper. Section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1981), mandates automatic and full review of a judgment of conviction resulting in imposition of the death penalty....
...Appellant argues that, nevertheless, lay testimony presented supports an insanity defense. We find this argument to be unsupported by the record. The fourth point raised on appeal is whether the trial court properly applied the aggravating and mitigating factors of section 921.141(5) and (6), Florida Statutes (1981), in arriving at his decision to impose the death penalty. The trial judge found four aggravating and no mitigating factors under the death penalty statute. *945 The first circumstance found applicable was section 921.141(5)(b), which reads: The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or the threat of violence to the person....
...y this Court. Ruffin v. State,
397 So.2d 277, 282 (Fla.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 882,
102 S.Ct. 368,
70 L.Ed.2d 194 (1981). Furthermore, the death penalty statute itself puts a defendant charged with a capital felony on notice that the provisions of section
921.141(5) will be applied. Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582, 609-10 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 976,
99 S.Ct. 1548,
59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979). The second aggravating factor applied was section
921.141(5)(d)....
...Appellant does not contest the applicability of this aggravating factor and we find it to be supported by the evidence. The trial judge found as his third applicable aggravating circumstance that the capital felony (murder) was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. § 921.141(5)(h)....
...tly.
336 So.2d at 1136. We emphasized the instantaneousness and painlessness of the death and stated that additional acts which make a killing "heinous" were absent. Id. at 1141. The fourth aggravating circumstance found by the lower court was under section
921.141(5)(i) which reads: (i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification....
...See also Justus v. State,
438 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1983). We must reject appellant's argument. The level of premeditation needed to convict in the guilt phase of a first-degree murder trial does not necessarily rise to the level of premeditation required in section
921.141(5)(i) [1] ....
...denied,
457 U.S. 1111,
102 S.Ct. 2916,
73 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1982), where we stated that the level of premeditation needed to convict in the penalty phase of a first-degree murder trial does not necessarily rise to the level of premeditation required in section
921.141(5)(i).
CopyCited 86 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 471
...Therefore, because the record reveals no other mitigating factors and clearly reflects the appellant's prior history of violent criminal behavior, I would affirm the appellant's death sentence for the first-degree premeditated murder of his father, and be consistent with our earlier cases. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1981) [2] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). [3] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 86 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1999 WL 506968
...At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury recommended death and the trial judge sentenced Larkins to death. The trial judge found two aggravating factors: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony (two convictions in 1973-manslaughter and assault with intent to kill), see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991), and (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, see id. § 921.141(5)(f)....
...Upon remand, the trial court again found the same two aggravating circumstances as before. However, the trial court also found two statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, see § 921.141(6)(b), and (2) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform form his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired, see § 921.141(6)(f)....
CopyCited 85 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 142087
...NOTES [1] Several weeks after the victim's disappearance police found the truck abandoned in Tampa. [2] The court found the following aggravating factors: (1) Sochor was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989); (2) the killing was committed while Sochor was engaged in the commission of a felony, § 921.141(5)(d); (3) the killing was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h); and (4) the killing was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 85 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...A copy of the pre-sentence investigation report was provided to counsel for both parties before the sentencing hearing. The judge found four aggravating circumstances. She found that appellant was previously convicted of a felony involving violence, section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), that the murder of James Stone was committed "while the defendant was engaged ... in the commission of" the felony of robbery, id. § 921.141(5)(d), that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, id. § 921.141(5)(f), and that the murder was heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 85 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...As an aggravating circumstance, the capital felony, that is, the murder of Toni Annette Wright, a black female, age seven (7) years, was committed while the defendant, Robert Lewis Buford, was engaged in the commission of the crime of sexual battery. F.A. 921.141(5)(d)....
...name of "Fat Boy", however, the Court specifically rejects this testimony as being an untrue and a total fabrication. 2. As a further aggravating circumstance the Court finds that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. F.A. 921.141(5)(h)....
...In the Court's experience of seven (7) years as an Assistant Prosecuting Attorney and six (6) months on the bench, I am not aware of a case where a defendant's conduct more clearly falls within the definition of heinous, atrocious, and cruel. 3. The other aggravating circumstances: F.S. 921.141(5)(a); 921.141(5)(b); 921.141(5)(c); 921.141(5)(e); 921.141(5)(f); 921.141(5)(g), are inapplicable in this case. As to mitigating circumstances involving both the charge of first degree murder and the charge of sexual battery, the Court makes the following findings: 1. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. F.S. 921.141(6)(a), and this a mitigating factor. 2. As to F.S. 921.141(6)(b), there is no evidence that the capital crimes were committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance....
...The defendant's mother testified that for several weeks prior to the crime the defendant had been using alcohol and marijuana extensively but the Court finds that this alcohol and marijuana usage do (sic) not result in extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 3. As to F.S. 921.141(6)(c), there is absolutely no evidence that the victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or that she consented to the act. 4. As to F.S. 921.141(6)(d), the defendant attempted to establish by his testimony that he was merely an accomplice to these offenses and that his participation was relatively minor, however, he did "admit" to having sexual intercourse with this seven (7) year old child, and as the Court has stated above, his testimony that this so called "Fat Boy" was an accomplice is rejected as being untrue. 5. As to F.S. 921.141(6)(e), there is no evidence that the defendant was under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of any person. 6. As to F.S. 921.141(6)(f), there is no believable evidence that the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or that his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. On the contrary, the fact that the defendant sought to eliminate Toni Annette Wright because she would be in a position to identify him supports a finding that the defendant appreciated the criminality of his conduct. 7. As to F.S. 921.141(6)(g), the defendant was nineteen (19) years at the time of these offenses and his age is therefore, a mitigating circumstance....
...tim was eleven (11) years of age or younger and the defendant was over eighteen (18) years of age, the Court makes the following findings of fact: 1. As an aggravated circumstance, the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. F.A. 921.141(5)(h). In support of this finding the Court readopts the findings contained in paragraph 2 above. 2. The other aggravating circumstances to-wit: F.S. 921.141(5)(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f)(g), are inapplicable to this charge....
...In any event, he could only have elicited evidence of his general reputation in the community, not specific instances of non-violence. Prevatt v. State,
82 Fla. 284,
89 So. 807 (1921); Reddick v. State,
25 Fla. 112,
5 So. 704 (1889). Defendant next contends that section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1977), is unconstitutional because it restricts the mitigating circumstances to be considered to those enumerated in the statute....
CopyCited 85 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 359036
...[4] The murders were found to be (1) especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (2) committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest; (3) committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner; and (4) committed during the commission or the attempt to commit robbery or burglary. § 921.141(5)(d), (e), (h), (i), Fla. Stat. (1983). [5] Harvey's penalty phase claim 9 to the extent it pertains to ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit as a matter of law. [6] § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 84 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 574741
...At the outset, we reject Cole's request that we should recede *851 from our holding in Windom v. State,
656 So.2d 432, 438 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
116 S.Ct. 571,
133 L.Ed.2d 495 (1995), in which we found that victim-impact evidence was admissible pursuant to section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993), once there is present in the record evidence of one or more aggravating circumstances described in section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1993). Cole also claims that the evidence introduced in this case exceeds the proper boundaries of section
921.141(7)....
...Fallon testified that John was a good student who was respected for his scholastic abilities as well as his personality. Based upon our review of the record concerning Fallon's testimony, we find that this testimony was limited to that which was relevant under section 921.141(7), and therefore we find no reversible error....
...aggravators and mitigators. In support of this claim, Cole raises several issues. First, Cole claims that the trial court erred in instructing and finding the aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...State,
636 So.2d 1304, 1307 (Fla. 1994). In light of Cole's failure to raise a contemporaneous objection, we find procedurally barred Cole's issue twelve that the trial court erred in its imposition of restitution. Last, we summarily reject Cole's issue *856 fourteen that section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1993), is unconstitutional....
...on both premeditated and felony murder; (12) whether the trial court erred in imposing an order of restitution which included travel expenses for a State witness; (13) whether Cole's sentences on the noncapital offenses are illegal; and (14) whether section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1993), is constitutional....
CopyCited 84 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 490142
...Based upon the trial court's finding that Kilgore was acting under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, I find that the death penalty is disproportionate under our case law. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(a), Fla.Stat. (1995). [2] Id. § 921.141(5)(b). [3] Id. § 921.141(6)(b). [4] Id. § 921.141(6)(f)....
CopyCited 84 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 166238
...The Harris brothers are Gudinas' first cousins. [6] His lengthiest treatment was a five-month program. He also spent nine days in a psychiatric ward during this time. [7] The trial court found the following statutory aggravators: (1) the defendant had been convicted of a prior violent felony, section 921.141(5)(b), Fla.Stat. (1995); (2) the murder was committed during the commission of a sexual battery, section 921.141(5)(d); and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h). The court found one statutory mitigator: the defendant committed the murder while under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, section 921.141(6)(b)....
CopyCited 83 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 205896
...[2] In Nibert's first appeal, we said there was no evidence that Snavely had been robbed, and the evidence did not support the trial court's finding that the murder had been committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. Nibert v. State,
508 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1987). [3] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1983). [4] Id. §
921.141(6)(f). [5] Id. §
921.141(6)(b).
CopyCited 83 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...or robbery, are affirmed. The sentence of death for his murder conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing by the trial court. ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; § 921.141(4), Fla....
...[11] Menendez's challenge to the death penalty statute based on Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586,
98 S.Ct. 2954,
57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), was recently resolved adversely to his position in Songer v. State,
365 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1978) (on rehearing). [12] §
921.141(5), Fla....
...nd has not observed one scintilla of remorse displayed, indicating full-well [ sic ] to this court that the death penalty is the proper punishment to be imposed in this particular case. [13] Elledge v. State,
346 So.2d 998, 1002-03 (Fla. 1977). [14] §
921.141(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (1975). [15] §
921.141(5)(d) and (f), Fla. Stat. (1975). The trial judge was correct in considering the fact that the murder occurred during the course of a robbery and for pecuniary gain as a single aggravating circumstance. Provence v. State,
337 So.2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976). [16] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1975). [17] §
921.141(5)(e), Fla....
CopyCited 81 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 348838
...The jury found Franqui guilty as charged and recommended the death penalty for the first-degree murder conviction by a nine-to-three vote. The trial court followed the jury's recommendation and found four aggravators: (1) prior violent felony convictions, see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995); (2) murder committed during the course of an attempted robbery, see id. § 921.141(5)(d); (3) murder committed for pecuniary gain, see id. § 921.141(5)(f); and (4) murder committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. See id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
...pted first-degree murder must be reversed. See Griffin v. United States,
502 U.S. 46,
112 S.Ct. 466,
116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991). Sentencing Phase Franqui claims that the trial court erred in finding the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator. See §
921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...Thus, the instruction given in this case was not unconstitutionally vague. As his next claim, Franqui argues that the trial court erred in failing to find the non-statutory mitigators of marginal or retarded intelligence and brain damage and the statutory mitigators of age and impaired capacity. See § 921.141(6)(f), (g), Fla....
...As to the statutory mitigators, Franqui argues that the trial court should have found that he failed to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and that his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. See 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...Accordingly, the court rejects the existence of this statutory mitigating circumstance. Upon review, the record supports the trial court's conclusion. Franqui also claims that the court should have found his age, 21, at the time of the crime as a statutory mitigator. See id. § 921.141(6)(g)....
...ence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors, it is truly of a mitigating nature." Id. at 419 (footnote omitted) (citing Rogers v. State,
511 So.2d 526 (Fla.1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1020,
108 S.Ct. 733,
98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988)); see also §
921.141(3), Fla....
CopyCited 81 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The defendant was tried alone and convicted on all counts. After an advisory sentencing hearing the jury recommended death. The judge followed that recommendation. Four issues are raised on appeal. One is patently without merit. The death penalty in Florida as prescribed in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1977), has been upheld repeatedly against arguments that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or violates the constitutional guaranties of equal protection and due process....
...Florida,
428 U.S. 242,
96 S.Ct. 2960,
49 L.Ed.2d 918 (1976); Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1978). A second issue raised by defendant was that the trial court had failed to provide written findings in support of the sentence of death. §
921.141(3), Fla....
...al court's findings in aggravation and mitigation. Harvard v. State,
375 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1977). That court found: In support of this determination, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact relative to aggravating circumstances, consistent with Section
921.141(5) Florida Statutes....
...k of concern for human life or dignity but also that of a consciousless or pitiless individual. A careful consideration of all matters presented to the Court compels the following Findings of Fact relating to mitigating circumstances as specified by Section 921.141(6) Florida Statutes: (a) The defendant does have a significant history of prior criminal activity....
...2036,
68 L.Ed.2d 384 (1981), we held that: Persons who are under an order of probation and are not at the time of the commission of the capital offense incarcerated or escapees from incarceration do not fall within the phrase "person under sentence of imprisonment" as set forth in section
921.141(5)(a)....
CopyCited 80 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1998 WL 303859
...murder was committed during the course of a robbery and committed for pecuniary gain (merged into one aggravator); and (3) the murder victim was a law enforcement officer and the murder was committed to avoid arrest (merged into one aggravator). See § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (e), (f), (j), Fla....
...If Officer Bauer had not been engaged in his duties as a law enforcement officer at the time he was shot, then the possible penalties could be death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. See §
775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). [12] Section
921.141(5)(j), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that it is an aggravating circumstance if "[t]he victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his [or her] official duties." [13] Our disposition of...
CopyCited 80 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 5333274
...") B. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Jones presents three claims for habeas corpus relief, arguing that: (1) Florida's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584,
122 S.Ct. 2428,
153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); (2) section
921.141, Florida Statutes and the standard penalty phase jury instructions improperly shifted the burden of proof to Jones to prove that death was inappropriate; and (3) the standard penalty phase jury instructions dilute the jury's responsibility by labeling their verdict as advisory and not binding....
...Fontaine; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and prepare mitigation, as raised in this appeal; (5) Defendant was denied his constitutional rights under Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68,
105 S.Ct. 1087,
84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985); (6) section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2003), violates the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (7) that he was shackled in front of and in view of the jury, as raised in this appeal; (8) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutoria...
CopyCited 79 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 300665
...prevent the State from presenting evidence about the victim, evidence of the impact of the murder on the victim's family, and prosecutorial argument on these subjects, if permitted to do so by state law. Subsequently, the Florida Legislature enacted section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2005), which permits the prosecution to introduce and argue victim impact evidence....
...Even though victim impact evidence is admissible in a death penalty case, it is limited to evidence "designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." § 921.141(7), Fla....
CopyCited 78 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 368410
...was committed to either avoid arrest or hinder the enforcement of laws; 3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and 4) the victim of the murder was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties. § 921.141(5)(d), (e), (g), (h), (j), Fla....
...The judge found two statutory mitigating circumstances: the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla....
CopyCited 78 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Specifically, appellant points to numbers (1) and (2) in the judge's findings and argues that the fact that the murder was committed only minutes before the commission of two other felonies is not one of the eight statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances found in section 921.141, Florida Statutes. We disagree. Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975) provides as an aggravating factor: (b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person....
...1977) to support his contention that the nature and character of the attempted murders is irrelevant: It is only conduct surrounding the capital felony for which the defendant is being sentenced which properly may be considered in determining whether the defendant "knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons." Section 921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes....
...Other witnesses testified to appellant's abnormal appearance and behavior on the evening of the shooting. Appellant contends that this testimony proves that he was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the commission of the offense (section 921.141(6)(b)) and could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct. (Section 921.141(6)(f))....
...The jury and the *1154 judge heard the testimony, and apparently concluded that the testimony should be given little or no weight in their decisions. We find nothing in the record which compels a different result. We have considered and rejected the appellant's contentions that section 921.141, Florida Statutes violates Lockett v....
CopyCited 77 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 197024
...This argument, however, fails to recognize that Mrs. Jones's solicitation of these two other individuals occurred well before Bradley came on the scene. Therefore, it would not have been appropriate to admit this evidence since Bradley was in no way involved at that time. [11] See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...ion that Mrs. Jones took a shower after Bradley left her home. He also contends that Mr. Jones had a head injury which was not consistent with the impact of the stick. The jury properly rejected this hypothesis. See Woods,
733 So.2d at 986. [14] See §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1995). [15] See supra pp. 744-46. [16] See §
921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1995). [17] See §
921.141(5)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 77 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 1628780
...ence. As to the aggravated battery conviction, the sentencing order indicates that the trial court did not, and indeed could not, rely on this conviction to support this aggravator since aggravated battery is not one of the felonies enumerated under section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1999)....
...t of the prior conviction of a violent felony aggravator, and then relied on a kidnaping and burglary conviction, also committed within the same criminal episode, in support of the felony murder aggravator). Particularly Vulnerable Victim Aggravator Section 921.141(5)(m), enacted on May 30, 1996, allows for the finding of an aggravating circumstance where: The victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability, or because the defendant stood in a position of familial or custodial authority over the victim....
...Additionally, by not establishing a bright-line age requirement in connection with this aggravator, it appears that the legislature intended to make this aggravating circumstance fact-sensitive, requiring more than a birth certificate date to establish this aggravator. Cf. § 921.141(5)( l ) (making it an aggravator where the "victim of the capital felony was a person less than 12 years of age")....
...Weight Assigned to Mitigating Evidence Defendant also takes issue with the weight given by the trial court to the statutory mental mitigator that the "felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
...ant, the Court feels compelled to include another statutory factor for discussion. That being that the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. This is under Florida Statute 921.141(7)(b) [sic]....
...ainst constitutional attack: *143 The aggravating circumstance which has been most frequently attacked is the provision that commission of an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel capital felony constitutes an aggravated capital felony. Fla.Stat. s 921.141(6)(h), F.S.A....
CopyCited 76 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1998 WL 574303
...evidence to be presented to the jury. Specifically, appellant claims that the testimony of Sharon Coon, the victim's mother, exceeded the scope of testimony allowed under Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808,
111 S.Ct. 2597,
115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), and section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995)....
...for the murder was the elimination of the witness. Sliney,
699 So.2d at 671; Preston v. State,
607 So.2d 404, 409 (Fla. 1992). Regarding this aggravator, the trial court found the following: The aggravating circumstance specified in Florida Statute
921.141(5)(e) was established beyond a reasonable doubt in that the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest....
...We find that the trial court applied the correct rule of law and that its factual findings regarding this aggravator are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Appellant also challenges the trial court's finding of HAC. The trial court found as follows: The aggravating circumstance specified by Florida Statute Section 921.141(5)(h) was established beyond a reasonable doubt in that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel....
...Next, appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was CCP. The trial court's order sets out the basis for its finding: The aggravating circumstance specified by Florida Statute Section 921.141(5)(i) has been established in that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification....
...Regarding the shot to the torso, the expert testified that Coon was probably shot in the back because there was a bullet hole in the back of the shirt and the bullet was found inside the shirt near the left front pocket. The expert could not state with reasonable medical certainty in which order the bullets were fired. [5] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). [6] § 921.141(5)(d, f), Fla. Stat. (1995) (merged). [7] § 921.141 (5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1995). [8] § 921.141 (5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1995). [9] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 76 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1998 WL 670384
...[5] APPEAL Brown raises five issues on appeal, all of which pertain to the penalty phase of the trial. [6] Although Brown does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of first-degree murder, we must, nevertheless, make an independent determination that the evidence is adequate. See § 921.141(4), Fla....
...3) the death penalty is disproportionate; (4) the jury instructions improperly denigrated the jury's true role in sentencing the defendant to death, violating the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (5) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1991), is unconstitutional under the Florida and United States Constitutions. [7] See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...[8] According to the expert on blood pattern interpretation, the victim was likely lying in his bed at the time he was initially stabbed and moved to the point in the room where his body ultimately was found upon collapse from substantial blood loss. [9] See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...by the name of Beaufort Adams; that Brown's mother was beaten by Mr. Adams and eventually started abusing drugs and alcohol; and that Brown's mother was sentenced to prison for murder when Brown was twenty-four or twenty-five years of age. [12] See § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). [13] See § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 76 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 325
...In connection with the armed sexual battery and armed kidnapping convictions, Roberts was sentenced to concurrent life sentences. In accordance with the jury's recommendation, the trial court imposed the death penalty finding four aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant had been previously convicted of a violent felony, section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes; (2) at the time of the commission of the capital felony the defendant was under a sentence of imprisonment, section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes; (3) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of or the attempt to commit a sexual battery, section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes; and (4) the *888 capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes....
...Sentencing Phase As his sixth point on appeal Roberts argues that the death penalty was improperly applied in his case. [2] First, Roberts contends that the trial court erred in finding that the murder of Napoles was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...d), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 920,
105 S.Ct. 303,
83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984). Roberts also challenges the trial court's finding that the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of or attempt to commit a sexual battery. §
921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...The murder was merely an early link in a chain of events calculated to set the stage for the sexual battery. We also reject Roberts' claim that the trial court erred in failing to find as mitigating factors that: 1) the murder was committed while Roberts was under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance, section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), and 2) his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, section 921,141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyCited 75 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...me reasons as expressed in his previous order. [2] *699 On this appeal from resentencing, two points are raised. First, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to impanel a jury and conduct a new sentencing trial in accordance with Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975)....
...It is the appellant's view that when the United States Supreme Court vacated the appellant's original sentence of death the sentence was thereby rendered void. Appellant submits that any subsequent sentence, to be lawfully imposed, must be preceded by another advisory sentencing before a jury under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975)....
...1197,
51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), and the sentence of death is affirmed. ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. ON REHEARING Appellant has filed a motion for rehearing asserting that Florida's death penalty statute, Section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Lockett v....
...Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Lockett, expressly stated that irrelevant evidence may be excluded from the sentencing process.
98 S.Ct. at 2965 n. 12. Cooper is not apropos to the problems addressed in Lockett. As concerns the exclusivity of the list of mitigating factors in Section
921.141, the wording itself, [1a] and the construction we have placed on that wording in a number of our decisions, indicate unequivocally that the list of mitigating factors is not exhaustive....
...State,
344 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 1977); Chambers v. State,
339 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1976); Meeks v. State,
336 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 1976); Messer v. State,
330 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1976); and Halliwell v. State,
323 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1975), among others. Obviously, our construction of Section
921.141(6) has been that all relevant circumstances may be considered in mitigation, and that the factors listed in the statute merely indicate the principal factors to be considered....
...I trust that the above information will be helpful in disposition in this case. If additional information is needed, please advise. Sincerely, /s/ Michael C. Dippolito, District Supervisor [2] THIS CAUSE coming on this day to be considered pursuant to the provisions of Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, after (1) conviction of the defendant Carl Ray Songer, a/k/a Robert Berry, of Murder in the First Degree, by a duly impaneled jury and his adjudication of guilt of such offense, (2) the rendition by such jury at the...
...f such capital felony the defendant was under such sentence of imprisonment; and based thereon concludes that the death sentence should be imposed upon said defendant. DATED this 17th day of August, 1977. /s/ JOHN W. BOOTH, Circuit Judge [1a] Unlike Section 921.141(5), which provides that "[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited," Section 921.141(6) provides that "[m]itigating circumstances shall be" those enumerated....
CopyCited 75 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 726875
...After a penalty phase hearing, the jury recommended the death sentence for each murder by a vote of 12 to 0. The trial court followed this recommendation and sentenced Henyard to death. The court found in aggravation: (1) the defendant had been convicted of a prior violent felony, see section 921.141(5)(b); (2) the murder was committed in the course of a felony, see section 921.141(5)(d); (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, see section 921.141(5)(f) and, (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, see section 921.141(5)(h). The court found Henyard's age of eighteen at the time of the crime as a statutory mitigating circumstance, see section 921.141(6)(g), and accorded it "some weight." The trial court also found that the defendant was acting under an extreme emotional disturbance and his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired, [2] see section 921.141(6)(b),(f), and accorded these mental mitigators "very little weight." As for nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, the trial court found the following circumstances but accorded them "little weight": (1) the defendant functions at th...
...court erred in allowing the state at the penalty phase to present evidence of his prior juvenile adjudication for armed robbery with a weapon which the trial court specifically relied on to find the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance. See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...erck's prior juvenile adjudication in North Carolina for assault with a deadly weapon. Id. at 943-44. The jury recommended death and the trial court followed the recommendation, finding Merck's juvenile adjudication to be an aggravating factor under section 921.141(5)(b). Id. at 941, 943. We reversed the death sentence and explained: [W]e agree with Merck that the juvenile adjudication was not a conviction within the meaning of section 921.141(5)(b), Florida *252 Statutes (1993)....
...This is expressly mandated in section 39.053, Florida Statutes (1993).... Despite correctly sustaining the objection to the admissibility of the North Carolina judgment, the trial court erred in stating in her sentencing order, "This is also a proper aggravating factor under [section] 921.141(5)(b)." We find the inclusion of this juvenile adjudication similar to the erroneous inclusion of community control as an aggravating factor in Trotter v....
...As noted in Trotter, penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the one against whom a penalty is imposed. Id. at 694. We therefore conclude as we did in Trotter, that a resentencing before a jury is required. ... We acknowledge that there was other substantial evidence to support the aggravating factor in section 921.141(5)(b)....
...on of law shall not be deemed a conviction...." Thus, Henyard's prior juvenile adjudication for robbery with a weapon is not a "conviction" for a prior violent felony. Consequently, in light of our recent decision in Merck, and the plain language of section 921.141(5)(b), which requires that the defendant be "previously convicted" of a violent felony for it to be considered in aggravation, we find the trial court erred in relying upon Henyard's juvenile adjudication for robbery to support the prior violent felony aggravating factor....
...Consequently, the testimony of the State's witness concerning blood-splatter evidence was proper to rebut Henyard's continued assertion that he did not actually kill the Lewis girls. Moreover, testimony concerning the close proximity of the defendant to the victim was relevant to show the "nature of the crime." See § 921.141(1), Fla....
...Lewis was taken to the Orlando Regional Medical Center where she underwent surgery for gunshot wounds and a rape examination. Vaginal swabs collected for the rape test showed the presence of semen which, when compared with Henyard's DNA, provided for a match in a statistical probability of 1 in 809 million persons. [13] Section 921.141(5) states: AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: ....
...For each death sentence, the trial court considered the contemporaneous conviction for the kidnapping of the other sister under the prior violent felony aggravating factor, and considered the victim's kidnapping under the murder in the course of a felony aggravating factor. See § 921.141(5)(d)....
CopyCited 74 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Elledge v. State,
346 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1977). Finally, defense counsel stated that, taking the above into consideration, he had decided to use his brief to attack the convictions rather than the sentences, even though he disagrees with the sentences. Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, however, directs this Court to review both the conviction and sentence in a death case, and we will do so here on our own motion....
...1979), and we therefore strike the court's finding of avoid or prevent arrest in aggravation of the younger child's murder. In the sentencing order the trial court stated: "The Court finds that there are no statutory mitigating factors existent in this cause... ." The mitigating evidence was not restricted to that listed in section 921.141, however, and we find the court's failure to mention nonstatutory mitigating evidence to be merely inartful drafting of the sentencing order....
CopyCited 74 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 1588020
...Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Cf. Jones v. State,
652 So.2d 346 (Fla.1995). Similarly, we reject Finney's contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. §
921.141(5)(f)....
...tempted robbery] approached the victim on the evening in question to rob him, and, in fact, did rob him"). Upon review of the entire record in this case, we find that Beasley's convictions are supported by substantial, competent record evidence. See § 921.141(4), Fla....
...e the imposition of death and which can be satisfied by life imprisonment in light of the totality of the circumstances present." In capital cases, "it is this court's responsibility to insure that the trial judge remains faithful to the dictates of Section 921.141, Florida Statutes in the sentencing process." Randolph v....
...State,
722 So.2d 177, 186 (Fla.1998)(quoting from State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.1973), in interpreting the terms "heinous, atrocious, [or] cruel"). [14] Many of the mitigating factors which the trial court found to exist were presented by defense counsel pursuant to section
921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes, which provides that mitigating circumstances shall include "[t]he existence of any other factors [not enumerated in
921.141(6)(a)-(g)] in the defendant's background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty." This amended provision of the death penalty statute was in effect during the penalty phase of Beasley's trial....
...committed for financial gain (merged with the felony murder aggravator); and the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (very great weight). The court found, and weighed, the following factors as statutory mitigating factors pursuant to section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes: failure to complete college and failed marriage (little weight); good manners and good personality (little weight); good son (little weight); good student, athlete, and active in extracurricular activities in...
CopyCited 74 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 585
...is instance. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the following motions: to preclude challenge for cause of the potential jurors; to vacate the death penalty because the aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), are impermissibly vague and overbroad; to allow individual voir dire and sequestration of the jurors during voir dire; to strike death as a possible penalty and dismiss the indictment because it failed to all...
...s the finding that no mitigating circumstances exist. Appellant admits that the trial court was justified in finding, as an aggravating circumstance, that he was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...n Kansas, are both felonies involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Appellant contests the finding, as an aggravating circumstance, that the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a burglary. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...'s apartment. See Brown v. State,
473 So.2d 1260 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
106 S.Ct. 607,
88 L.Ed.2d 585 (1985). Appellant contests the application of the aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...Nevertheless, we choose to address appellant's contention that four mitigating circumstances apply to his case. Appellant cites several factors to support his contention that the capital felony was committed while he was under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance, section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...The trial court did not err in refusing to find that the taking of L.S.D. warrants mitigation in light of the fact that Johnston gave numerous statements full of discrepancies, and, in short, his credibility was rightfully questioned. Although evidence does exist to support a finding of mitigation pursuant to section 921.141(6)(b) and (f), the trial court properly considered all of the evidence, including past mental disorders, and did not err in failing to find that Johnston's actions reached the level required to find mitigation under subsections (6)(b) and (f)....
CopyCited 74 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 241044
...The trial court's sentencing order does not expressly consider any nonstatutory mitigating evidence. In its preface to the pertinent portion of the order, the trial court states as follows: The Court now analyzes each of the mitigating circumstances specified by the Legislature in Section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1989)....
...It is the assignment of weight that falls within the trial court's discretion in such cases. The reasons for this conclusion are self-evident. If any group was intended to be included within the statutory mitigating factor of age, it must be those who were minors at the time of the commission of their crimes. § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
...rued so as to render it potentially meaningless, Snively Groves, Inc. v. Mayo,
135 Fla. 300,
184 So. 839 (1938), and nothing in the statute reflects any intention that a court should have discretion to render the statute applicable to no one at all. §
921.141(6)(g), Fla....
...I also agree with Ellis that the holdings of Justus and similar cases cannot be squared with the plain language of article X, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. [9] Second, I find persuasive Ellis' argument that this Court has misconstrued paragraph (b) of subsection 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1989)....
CopyCited 74 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 44
...Appellant acknowledges that details of prior felonies involving the use or threat of violence to the person are properly admitted in the penalty phase of a capital trial and that hearsay testimony is admissible provided the defendant has a fair opportunity to rebut it. § 921.141(1), Fla....
...The certified copies disclosed that appellant had pleaded guilty to the kidnap and rape charges in one case and had entered a plea of no contest to the charges filed in the other incident. This evidence alone is sufficient to establish the aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1985) (prior convictions for felonies involving use or threat of violence to the person). We find no prejudice to Tompkins resulting from the officers' testimony. Appellant next asserts that the trial court's finding of an aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(b) was improperly based on hearsay evidence, and that the trial judge gave this aggravating circumstance undue weight....
...ation). Finding no reversible error in either the guilt or penalty phases of appellant's trial, we affirm both the conviction and sentence imposed. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). [2] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1985). [3] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1985). [4] § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 73 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1299617
...Montz's degree of attention was high, judging from the accuracy of his description of the car, and his level of certainty was high as well. VII. The Constitutionality of Florida's Death Penalty Statute In his next issue on appeal, Simmons argues that Florida's death penalty statute, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2003), is unconstitutional under Ring v....
...itted during the course of kidnapping and sexual battery, and HAC. A. Previous Felony Conviction Involving the Use or Threat of Violence to the Person Simmons had previously been convicted of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. Further, section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), states that an assault involving the threat of violence qualifies as an aggravating factor for purposes of imposing the death penalty....
...These facts, coupled with the eyewitness testimony placing Tressler in Simmons' car screaming for help the night of December 1, 2001, constitute substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that Simmons committed the murder while engaged in a kidnapping *1122 and sexual battery under section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (2001)....
CopyCited 73 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...f unequal treatment of a person convicted of first-degree murder caused during the commission of certain dangerous felonies. In such a situation the individual enters the sentencing hearing with one aggravating circumstance already in existence, see section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1977), while in contrast the individual who has committed murder with a premeditated design to take the life of his victim has no such aggravating circumstance held against him....
...2960,
49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), upholding the constitutionality of Florida's death statute, in the context of a claim which was similar to the eighth amendment claim raised by the defendant in the instant case. Furthermore, the fact that the mitigating circumstances listed in section
921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1977), are not exclusive removes much of the force of the defendant's equal protection argument....
...We will first review the trial court's findings on the existence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, *337 and then determine the propriety of the trial court's death sentence following the jury recommendation of life. The trial judge found that all eight of the aggravating circumstances listed in section 921.141(5)(a) (h), Florida Statutes (1977), applied to the defendant. The trial judge found that none of the mitigating circumstances listed in section 921.141(6)(a) (g) applied and, in imposing the death sentence, concluded that no mitigating circumstances existed which could possibly outweigh the aggravating circumstances....
...ing circumstances to the facts of this case and failed to consider certain mitigating circumstances. First, the defendant argues that he was not under a "sentence of imprisonment" at the time the capital felonies were committed within the meaning of section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), because they were not committed while he was incarcerated or after he had escaped from incarceration....
...586,
15 So.2d 293 (1943). Therefore, we find that the trial judge properly applied this aggravating circumstance. Second, the trial judge properly found that the defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. §
921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...We reject the defendant's contention that the trail judge relied on nonviolent drug-related convictions in making this finding. Third, the defendant asserts that the trial judge improperly injected considerations not actually present in deciding that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons under section 921.141(5)(c)....
...State,
377 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1979); Kampff v. State,
371 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 1979). Fourth, the defendant concedes and we sustain the existence of the statutory aggravating circumstance that the capital felony was committed during the commission of a serious felony listed in section
921.141(5)(d), which in this case was a robbery. Nevertheless, we hold that this same circumstance cannot also constitute the basis for finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance listed in section
921.141(5)(f) (capital felony committed for pecuniary gain), as was done by the trial judge here....
...2929,
53 L.Ed.2d 1065 (1977), we disapproved such a doubling up of aggravating circumstances based on the same aspect of a *338 defendant's criminal conduct. See also Hargrave v. State, supra . Next, the defendant argues that the trial judge improperly applied section
921.141(5)(e) (capital felony committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or effect an escape from custody) to him because he could not have been attempting to avoid arrest when he was not aware that his cohorts had planned all along to kill the victims....
...Again, however, we disapprove of the trial judge's use of these same incidents as a basis for also finding that the capital felonies were committed for the purpose of hindering the lawful exercise or enforcement of the criminal laws of the state. See § 921.141(5)(g)....
...Valentine's Day Massacre." Next, the defendant maintains that the trial judge overlooked the mitigating circumstances that "[t]he defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor" (section 921.141(6)(d)) and that "[t]he defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person" (section 921.141(6)(e))....
...denied,
365 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1978); Gibbs v. State,
344 So.2d 621 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Hamilton v. State,
303 So.2d 656 (Fla.2d DCA 1974). [7] Subsequent to defendant's trial, subsection (5)(i) has been added to the list of aggravating circumstances set forth in section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1979)....
...ner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. [8] Indeed the death statute specifically lists as a mitigating circumstance the situation where the defendant played only a minor role as an accomplice in the commission of a capital felony. § 921.141(6)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 73 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...Although it is entitled to "great weight,” the jury's recommendation is not binding upon the trial court. Instead, the trial court conducts its own sentencing hearing and ultimately decides for itself whether the imposition of the death penalty is appropriate. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (1)-(3); Bolender v....
...213 ,
148 L.Ed.2d 150 (2000). 8 . Florida law provides that a mitigating circumstance exists where "[t]he defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his or her participation was relatively minor." Fla. Stat. Ann. §
921.141 (6)(d)....
CopyCited 73 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 73786
...applicable instructions to the jury. Bryant v. State,
601 So.2d 529, 533 (Fla.1992). In this case, appellant presented no evidence that the "capital felony was committed while [he] was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." §
921.141(6)(b), Fla.Stat....
...Neither defense counsel nor the State pursued the matter further. Unlike the majority, I believe the court erred in failing to give the requested instruction that these prior convictions, which were for noncapital, nonviolent offenses, could not be used as an aggravating circumstance. See generally § 921.141(5)(b), Fla.Stat....
...State,
660 So.2d 685 (Fla.1995), I do not agree with the majority's decision to strike the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor. NOTES [1] The facts surrounding the murder are detailed in our original opinion. See Geralds,
601 So.2d at 1158-59. [2] §
921.141(5)(d), Fla.Stat. (1993). [3] Id. §
921.141(5)(h). [4] Id. §
921.141(5)(i). [5] Id. §
921.141(6)(g)....
...tigating circumstance that the defendant expressly conceded does not exist. Id. at 978. [10] It appears that defense counsel erroneously assumed that the state could impeach Geralds on cross-examination with the number of his prior convictions. [11] § 921.141(6)(b), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 73 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 2200, 1994 WL 28486
...le Porter was engaged in the commission of a robbery for pecuniary gain, that the murders were committed for the purposes of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, and that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5)(d), (e), (h) (West 1993)....
...THE REMAINING CLAIMS Porter raises four other claims on appeal. Those claims are (1) that the jury override *562 resulted in an arbitrary, capricious and unreliably imposed sentence of death in violation of Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908 (Fla.1975); (2) that the statutory aggravating factor of Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141(5)(h) (that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel) is facially vague and overbroad, with neither the sentencing court nor the Florida Supreme Court adopting a constitutionally adequate narrowing construction in contravention of Maynard v....
CopyCited 72 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...tances. 14 In regard to statutory mitigating factors, Funchess claims that there was evidence available to support the fact that at the time the crimes were committed he was suffering from extreme mental and emotional disturbance. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(b) (1985 Supplement)....
...8 24 Appellant next contends that counsel was ineffective for not requesting an explanatory instruction regarding the mitigating factor of "no significant history of prior criminal activity" or the aggravating factor regarding the "heinous, atrocious and cruel" nature of the felony. See Fla.Stat. Secs. 921.141(6)(a) and (5)(h)....
...effective at resentencing in not objecting to the trial judge's application of the following aggravating factors to the same aspect of the alleged crime: murder in the course of a robbery, and murder to avoid arrest and prosecution. See Fla.Stat. Secs. 921.141(5)(d) and (e)....
...crimes and had admitted serious crimes only in connection with the instant case, the trial court and the Florida Supreme Court should have found that the aforementioned mitigating circumstance existed. The applicable statute, however, Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(a), does not limit the sentencer's consideration to evidence of prior convictions; rather, a court may consider any criminal activity in deciding whether the circumstance exists....
...sory sentencing jury and the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, and after weighing the foregoing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, this Court finds that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5) of Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, and this Court further finds that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances....
CopyCited 72 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 55641
...He also carefully analyzed the possible statutory and nonstatutory mitigating evidence. It is apparent that the only statutory mitigating circumstance that might have been deemed applicable was that the crime "was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
...I concur with Justice Barkett's very thoughtful and sensitive analysis of the case at hand where the defendant opts, not as a matter of trial strategy, but for personal *806 reasons, to waive, in effect, the development and offering of evidence in mitigation. I join this position principally because of section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes which provides in pertinent part that "the judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida." So long as this Court has this legislatively mandated...
...evidence]" begs the question. Majority opinion at 804. The fact remains that in an adversarial context no one presented or advocated a mitigating position for the defendant. It seems to me that logic and law dictate the necessity for such advocacy. Section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1985), provides for automatic, mandatory review of every judgment and sentence of death by the Supreme Court of Florida....
CopyCited 72 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 75283
...However, we do find error in the introduction of the tape recorded statement of the Nevada victim. While hearsay evidence may be admissible in penalty phase proceedings, such evidence is admissible only if the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. § 921.141(1), Fla....
...l their vote in open court. We therefore find the communication in this case was not harmless error. Rhodes next challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact in support of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyCited 71 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 570659
...ence of death. We also affirm the life sentence imposed under the habitual felon statute for Heath's armed robbery conviction. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. NOTES [1] See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 71 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ndered, finding the *3 defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree. Thereafter, the defendant was adjudicated guilty by the Court, and the jury after hearing additional matters, retired to consider an advisory sentence pursuant to Florida Statute 921.141(2)....
...upon the defendant. This Court, independent of, but in agreement with, the advisory sentence rendered by the jury does hereby impose the death penalty upon the defendant LENSON A. HARGROVE, [sic] and in support thereof as required by Florida Statute 921.141(3), submits this, its written findings upon which the sentence of death is based. The findings of the Court are as follows: 1. That the aggravating circumstances found by the Court to be present and listed by the Court with the lettering as set forth in Florida Statute 921.141(5), are as follows: (d) That the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the attempt to commit a robbery....
.../s/ GENE WILLIAMS CIRCUIT JUDGE On this appeal appellant urges three points for reversal. Each relates only to the sentence imposed. We restate the points in the order of our treatment of them: (i) whether the imposition and execution of the sentence of death under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (ii) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant without the benef...
...the defendant has no significant history of criminal activity." We come now to that part of our function of review under this State's death statute which is different from the scope of this Court's review in all other proceedings. We are mandated by Section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1975), automatically to review not only the judgment of conviction, but also the sentence of death....
...However, this Court's role is not and should not be to cast aside that careful deliberation which the matter of sentence has already received by the jury and the trial judge, unless there has been a material departure by either of them from their proper functions prescribed by Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), or unless it appears that in view of other decisions concerning imposition of the death penalty the punishment is too great. State v. Dixon, supra. In the instant case appellant maintains there has been just such a departure by the trial judge in (i) finding two aggravating circumstances arising out of the single act of attempted robbery (those set forth in Section 921.141(5)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes [1975]); (ii) finding that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (iii) failing to find the existence of three mitigating circumstances disclosed by the evidence. The asserted mitigating circumstances are: (a) Section 921.141(6)(b) defendant was under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (b) Section 921.141(6)(f) the defendant's capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law or appreciate the criminality of his act was substantially impaired; and (c) Section 921.141(6)(e) defendant was substantially dominated by another person....
...I concur in the majority opinion affirming appellant's guilt. The aggravating circumstances found by the trial court are supported by evidence in the record. As to mitigating circumstances, the trial judge found two: (a) Hargrave's youth at the time of the crime (he was eighteen), Section 921.141(6)(g), and (b), no significant history of prior criminal activity, Section 921.141(6)(a). As recognized by the majority, there might be added, since there is competent evidence of them in the record, two other mitigating circumstances: that Hargrave's appreciation of the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired, Section 921.141(6)(f), and that he was under the substantial domination of another person, Section 921.141(6)(e)....
...Of course, no report is necessary where the specific sentence is mandatory, e.g., the sentence of death or life imprisonment in a verdict of first degree murder. (emphasis added) This comment was written in 1972, prior to Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) and prior to enactment of Section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1973)....
...State,
322 So.2d 485 (Fla. 1975) at 488: P.S.I. reports are provided for in Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.710. Rule 3.710 vests the trial court with the discretionary power to request a P.S.I. report in cases wherein the trial court possessed discretion as to the imposition of sentence. Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, vests the trial court with the limited discretion to impose either the death penalty or life imprisonment even if the jury recommends to the contrary. Thus, the discretionary nature of Section
921.141 brings it within the ambit of Rule 3.710....
...If presentence investigation reports are to be mandatory for anyone, surely they should be mandatory where one faces the ultimate penalty. NOTES [1] Even the trial judge had second thoughts about the "substantial impairment" circumstance. See Finding No. 4, p. 3, of the majority opinion. [*] Section 921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 69 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...egree murder. Imposition of the Death Sentence In imposing the death penalty, the trial judge found the following aggravating circumstances: (a) the crime was committed while the appellant was under sentence of imprisonment for larceny of a firearm [section 921.141(5)(a)]; (b) the appellant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the threat of violence to the person, specifically robbery [section 921.141(5)(b)]; (c) the appellant, in committing the crime of murder, further committed the offense of arson and thereby knowingly created a risk of death to other persons [section 921.141(5)(c)]; (d) at the time of committing the offense of first-degree murder, the appellant had committed burglary in the home of the victim [section 921.141(5)(d)]; (e) the crime for which the appellant was sentenced was heinous, atrocious, and cruel because of the total factual circumstances that resulted in the death of this sixty-seven-year-old victim [section 921.141(5)(h)]; (f) the appellant returned to the Tarpon Springs Correctional Facility where he attacked an unarmed counselor and stabbed him twenty times in the course of two attacks [section 921.141(5)(b)]....
...261,
54 L.Ed.2d 173 (1978), on the asserted grounds that our statute limits consideration of mitigating factors. We have previously rejected this contention in our decision in Clark v. State , which expressly held that the statutory mitigating factors as stated in section
921.141(6) are not exclusive....
CopyCited 69 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...We there rejected the argument that our capital felony statute was unconstitutional because it allowed the discretionary imposition of death penalties. We said in Dixon: "Discretion and judgment are essential to the judicial process... . "Thus, if the judicial discretion possible and necessary under Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., can be shown to be reasonable and controlled, rather than capricious and discriminatory, the test of Furman v....
...State,
313 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1975). Its aggravating circumstances, however, are distinguishable from those here. The imposition of life sentences in similar cases is not absolutely controlling. Were they to be ignored, however, our death penalty statute, Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, could not be upheld under the requirements of Proffitt v....
CopyCited 68 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 251
...ce; unless waived by defendant in writing." This provision made the pre-trial conference a crucial stage. The defendant was not present, nor did he waive his presence in writing. The majority opinion emasculates this provision of the rule. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(h) and (i), Fla. Stat. (1981). [2] § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1981). [3] § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1981). [4] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1981). [5] § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 68 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30495, 1998 WL 826871
...receive a life
sentence. On April 18, 1980, the trial judge overrode the jury's recommendation after finding that
the aggravating factors surrounding Mills's crime outweighed the absence of statutory mitigating
factors pursuant to Florida Statute § 921.141, and sentenced Mills to death.3
On direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Mills raised the following issues: (1)
whether sufficient evidence supported his felony murder conviction; (2) whether he received
ineffective assista...
...er the substantial domination of another;
(6) Mills's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was substantially impaired; (7) Mills's age at the time of the crime. See
Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (1979)....
...See Mills,
476 So.2d at 175-77.
The Florida Supreme Court then analyzed the trial judge's override of the jury's
recommendation at Mills's sentencing. It found that the trial judge had found the existence of no
mitigating factors and the following six aggravating factors pursuant to Florida Statute §
921.141:(1)
under sentence of imprisonment; (2) previous conviction of violent felony; (3) great risk of death
to many persons; (4) felony murder; (5) pecuniary gain; and (6) heinous, atrocious or cruel....
...First, several Florida procedural rules, of both statutory and case law origin,
constrain trial judges from imposing the death penalty in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner. Among these significant safeguards is § 921.141(3) of
the Florida Statutes, which requires trial judges to independently review the
evidence and make detailed written findings regarding aggravating and mitigating
circumstances before imposing the death penalty....
...n, including nonstatutory
mitigation. The trial court's sentencing order concluded, "[i]t is the finding of this Court after
weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that there are sufficient aggravating
circumstances as specified in 921.141 and insufficient mitigating circumstances therein that a
sentence of death is justified."12 Also, as the district court found, the trial court's order denying
12
At the time of Mills's sentencing, Florida Statute § 921.141(3) required that the trial judge
set forth explicit findings as to only the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances....
CopyCited 67 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 575323
...ourt has previously rejected the claim concerning the unconstitutional application of Florida's felony murder aggravator, [21] I write separately to express my disagreement with the reasoning of the majority opinion. This aggravator, as contained in section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), may well be unconstitutional when applied to a defendant convicted of felony murder....
...esent and prior death recommendations; 4) underweighing the mitigating circumstance of impoverished background; 5) proportionality; 6) the felony murder aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional; 7) the death penalty is cruel and unusual. [9] See § 921.141(6)(e), Fla....
...e worked in the fields at an early age. [16] See Huff v. State,
569 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990) ("[D]iscretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court."). [17] See §
782.04, Fla. Stat. (1993). [18] See §
921.141(5)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 67 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 296970
...rvision. The similarities between parole and control release are greater than their differences. We therefore hold that a defendant under control release at the time he or she committed the murder was under a sentence of imprisonment for purposes of section 921.141(5)(a)....
...interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.
384 U.S. at 476-77. [3] §
921.141(5)(a), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 67 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 792796
...felony convictions; (2) the murder was committed during the course of an attempted robbery and for pecuniary gain (merged into one aggravating circumstance); and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP). See § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (f), (i), Fla....
...opsy report and render an appropriate opinion. Dr. Valerie Rao, an associate medical examiner with the Dade County Medical Examiner's Office, reviewed the report and the file prepared by Dr. Hougen and testified at trial, over defense objection. [5] Section 921.141(2), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence based upon several matters, including "[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstanc...
CopyCited 66 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...clusions as testified to in the advisory jury sentencing hearing were inaccurate. The panel majority concluded that 37 [t]his evidence, if true, suggests the existence of three statutory mitigating circumstances under Florida law. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(b) ("The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance."); Sec. 921.141(6)(e) ("The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person."); Sec. 921.141(6)(f) ("The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.")....
...have sentenced the petitioner to death. 108 Under Florida law, the jury, based on the evidence presented to it during the sentencing phase of a trial, renders an advisory sentence to the court, recommending life imprisonment or death. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(2) (Supp.1990)....
...This recommendation is based on the jury's evaluation of the statutory aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances presented by the state and the defendant. Id. The court then reviews the jury's recommendation, reweighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, id. Sec. 921.141(3); in so doing, the sentencing judge may consider evidence not presented to the jury, see, e.g., Cochran v....
...ed the "substantive offense" as including the elements of murder plus two other elements--the existence of a statutory aggravating factor and the lack of sufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating factors. See Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(2) (West 1985)....
...ence of a totally controlling, extreme drug addiction which would have led to his mind being totally controlled by the presence or absence of drugs. In my professional opinion, this would qualify under mitigating circumstances for the F.S.1985, Sec. 921.141(6)(b)" [the extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigating circumstance]....
...At that instant, my opinion is that, due to his drug abuse and combined emotionality of the moment, Marvin's [Johnson's] capacity to appreciate the criminality of his behavior or to conform to the requirements of the law were substantially impaired. This set of circumstances would qualify under F.S.1985, Sec. 921.141(6)(e) and (f) [the extreme duress mitigating circumstance and the capacity to appreciate the criminality or to conform to the law mitigating circumstance]....
...12 147 The significance of the new evidence is obvious. It is fair to say that there was no such mitigating evidence at sentencing. The sentencing judge so found. Now the proffered evidence indicates the presence of three statutory mitigating circumstances. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(b) ("The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance"); Sec. 921.141(6)(e) ("The defendant acted under extreme duress or under substantial domination of another person"); Sec. 921.141(6)(f) ("The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired")....
...hearing before the advisory jury and the sentencing hearing before the trial judge 3 The five aggravating circumstances identified were: (1) at the time of the murder, Johnson was under a sentence of imprisonment, but had escaped, see Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(a); (2) Johnson had previously been convicted of two felonies involving the use or threat of violence to the person, see Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(b); (3) Johnson knowingly created a great risk of death to the other three persons present in the drugstore at the time of the murder, see Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(c); (4) the murder was committed during the commission of an armed robbery, see Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(d); (5) the manner in which Johnson killed his victim was "atrocious and cruel and was committed to reek revenge upon [the victim] for having defended his life and property in a completely lawful manner," see Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(h)....
...542 ,
70 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981). 5 The court held that the trial judge erred in finding an aggravating circumstance based upon Johnson having created a great risk of death to many persons. "Three people are not 'many persons' as we have interpreted that term in the context of section
921.141(5)(c)." Johnson v....
...The other four aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge were upheld. Under Florida law, the sentencing court may impose a sentence of death if the defendant is convicted of first degree murder, accompanied by at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141 (Supp.1991) 6 In his first federal habeas proceeding, Johnson was represented by three volunteer attorneys, at least one of whom was also court-appointed....
...4 Furthermore, the majority's analysis is likely to produce anomalous results that could not have been intended by the Supreme Court. For example, under the majority's eligibility theory, a criminal defendant made death-eligible by a conviction for felony-murder during the guilt phase of trial, see Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(5)(d), would be forever unable to obtain relief from a procedural default regardless of the extent, nature, or gravity of an error at the sentencing phase. The majority's test would force this result even if every prosecution witness at the sentencing phase lied on the stand or every statutory mitigating factor listed in Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(6) was supported by actual fact but had not been presented by incompetent counsel. Indeed, even a circumstance as egregious as a jury which had been bribed could not circumvent the unimpeachable statutory aggravating factor that the murder was committed in the course of a felony listed in Sec. 921.141(5)(d)....
CopyCited 66 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...counsel that instructed the court reporter not to record his closing argument, and in the absence of fundamental error appellant may not now raise the matter on appeal. Contrary to appellant's argument in his third point on appeal, we have held that section 921.141, Florida Statutes, does not violate the requirements of article V, section 2(a), Florida Constitution, by attempting to govern practice and procedure....
...appellant, violated the *901 corpus delicti principle. However, that principle, which requires some independent proof of a crime other than a confession before one may be convicted, does not mandate the reversal suggested, for the following reasons. Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1979), lists the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered in determining an appropriate sentence in a capital case. Section 921.141(6)(a) provides that lack of a significant history of prior criminal activity is to be considered a mitigating factor....
...1950,
40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), and the particular need for accuracy when a life is at stake, appellant argues that there must be competent, independent proof of significant prior criminal activity in order to negate the mitigating circumstance established by section
921.141(6)(a)....
...The appellant asserted that the trial court had acted improperly, that on the basis of our decision in Provence v. State,
337 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 969,
97 S.Ct. 2929,
53 L.Ed.2d 1065 (1977), previous convictions are required to negate section
921.141(6)(a). We upheld the trial court, however, observing: [Appellant] misconstrues the holding of Provence. That case construed Section
921.141(5)(b) which requires previous conviction of another capital felony involving the use or threat of violence... . Section
921.141(6)(a) makes no reference to conviction and, hence, Provence has no application to the instant case....
...Thus in the case sub judice, as in Washington, the trial court, on the basis of confessions made by the appellant, properly found that the appellant had a significant history of prior criminal activity which negated the otherwise applicable mitigating circumstance of section 921.141(6)(a)....
...that the appellant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and/or that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See sections 921.141(6)(b) and (f)....
...2954,
57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the decision of whether a particular mitigating circumstance in sentencing is proven and the weight to be given it rest with the judge and jury. Lucas v. State,
376 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 1979). The appellant cites several cases in which the mitigating circumstances of sections
921.141(6)(b) and/or (f) were applied as a result of evidence pertaining to the defendant's state of mind....
...Other witnesses testified to appellant's abnormal appearance and behavior on the evening of the shooting. Appellant contends that this testimony proves that he was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the commission of the offense (section 921.141(6)(b)) and could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct. (Section 921.141(6)(f))....
...still be justified. As we noted in Dixon: When one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found, death is presumed to be the proper sentence unless it or they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating circumstances provided in Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7), F.S.A. [Now § 921.141(6)] Id....
CopyCited 66 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Daves III, of Burdick & Daves, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. ADKINS, Chief Justice. Again we consider the constitutionality of the Florida murder statute, Fla. Stat. §
782.04 and §
921.141, F.S.A., which we upheld in State v....
...The victim's blood type was A; defendant's blood type is O. The only defense raised by appellant at the trial was alibi. He denied involvement in the crime. After finding the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, the jury in a separate sentencing proceeding pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., recommended the death penalty. The trial judge then made his written findings of fact required by Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3)(b), F.S.A....
...elony was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. This appeal is from the judgment of guilt and sentence to death. Defendant first contends that Fla. Stat. §
782.04, F.S.A., taken in conjunction with *436 the penalty provisions found in Fla. Stat. §
921.141, F.S.A., is unconstitutional and violates the dictates of Furman v....
...Even after the final appeal is laid to rest, complete discretion remains in the executive branch of government to honor or reject a plea for clemency. See Fla. Const., art. IV, § 8, F.S.A., and U.S. Const., art. II, § 2. "Thus, if the judical discretion possible and necessary under Fla. Stat. §
921.141, F.S.A., can be shown to be reasonable and controlled, rather than capricious and discriminatory, the test of Furman v. Georgia, supra , has been met. What new test the Supreme Court of the United States might develop at a later date, it is not for this Court to suggest."
283 So.2d 1, pp. 6 and 7. The procedure outlined in Fla. Stat. §
921.141, F.S.A., is such that the discretion is controlled and channeled until the sentencing process becomes a matter of reasonable judgment rather than an exercise in discretion at all....
...easant." That same rationale applies with full force herein. The pictures were admissible. After the defendant was adjudicated guilty of the capital felony of first degree murder, a separate sentencing proceeding was conducted pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., which provides: "(1) Separate Proceedings On Issue Of Penalty....
..."(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime." Several witnesses were called by the defendant who testified as to his good character. The jury recommended the death penalty. The trial judge then made his written findings of fact required by the following provisions of Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3)(b): "(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in subsection (7), to outweigh the aggravating circumstances....
...the wounds, damage and injury occasioned to that pathetic child's body. It is inexpressibly cruel." The court concurred in the jury's sentence of death. *444 As we noted in State v. Dixon, supra , the most important safeguard provided by Fla. Stat. §
921.141, F.S.A., is the propounding of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which must be determinative of the sentence imposed. We thoroughly analyzed these circumstances in Dixon , and no further elaboration is necessary. We repeat, however, that: "The aggravating circumstances of Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6), F.S.A., actually define those crimes when read in conjunction with Fla. Stat. §§
782.04(1) and 794.01(1), F.S.A. to which the death penalty is applicable in the absence of mitigating circumstances. As such, they must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before being considered by judge or jury... . "Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(d), F.S.A., provides that the commission of a capital felony as part of another dangerous and violent felony constitutes not only a capital felony under Fla....
...Such a determination is, in the opinion of this Court, reasonable... . "The aggravating circumstance which has been most frequently attacked is the provision that commission of an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel capital felony constitutes an aggravated capital felony. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(h), F.S.A....
...h is unnecessarily tortuous to the victim. "When one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found, death is presumed to be the proper sentence unless it or they are overriden by one or more of the mitigating circumstances provided in Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7), F.S.A....
CopyCited 66 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 165227
...s retried for Ashe's murder. We conclude as a matter of Florida law that Wright may not again be subjected to the death penalty for this crime. *1032 Double jeopardy principles apply to the penalty phase of capital punishment trials in Florida under section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes (1985), because the Florida procedure is comparable to a trial for double jeopardy purposes....
...OVERTON, J., concurs in result only with conviction and concurs with sentence. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. [2] There is a factual dispute as to whether Wright had any legal right to enter or remain in the residence at the time of the murder. [3] See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1985). [4] See id. § 921.141(5)(i). [5] See id. § 921.141(5)(d). [6] See id. § 921.141(5)(b)....
CopyCited 64 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 497, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 1416, 2009 WL 2778107
...Avoid Arrest Aggravator The avoid arrest aggravating circumstance, which is also referred to as witness elimination, applies when the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or to effectuate an escape from custody. See § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
...trong and not based on mere speculation. See Consalvo,
697 So.2d at 819. Foremost, Wright conceded that this aggravator applied by stating in his supplemental amended memorandum in support of the imposition of a life sentence: 5) Witness Elimination §
921.141(5)(e)....
...etainee and aggravated battery. In the former, Wright, along with several other inmates, attacked another detainee. In the latter, Wright attacked a jail detention deputy. [14] A defendant may seek to show the mitigating circumstances that (1) under section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), the "capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," or that (2) "the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired," pursuant to section 921.141(6)(f)....
CopyCited 64 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 3630
...The concern of these cases is that the sentencing jury and court consider all relevant mitigating evidence. That concern was satisfied in this case. 106 B. Aggravating Circumstances. 107 1. "Cold, Calculated, and Premeditated" 108 Petitioner attacks Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(i) both on its face and as applied to this case....
...d guilty of murder"); Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420 ,
100 S.Ct. 1759 ,
64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). The constitutionality of this aggravating circumstance is an issue of first impression in this circuit. 109 The Florida Supreme Court has held that Sec.
921.141(5)(i) does narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty because it requires a "heightened" level of premeditation....
...2916 ,
73 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1982). 110 This aggravating circumstance, as so construed, provides adequate guidance both to the sentencing court and to the advisory jury. While most capital murders require premeditation, the Florida courts have construed Sec.
921.141(5)(i) to require a greater degree of premeditation and cold-bloodedness than is required to obtain a first degree murder conviction....
...remeditation as an aggravating circumstance in the absence of some quality setting the crime apart from mere ordinarily premeditated murder"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,
106 S.Ct. 607 ,
88 L.Ed.2d 585 (1985). Given this limiting construction, Sec.
921.141(5)(i) is a facially valid aggravating circumstance because it genuinely narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty....
...In Drake, on the other hand, there was no eyewitness and the defendant did not confess to the details of the killing. The only evidence was that the victim was found with her hands tied behind her back. Thus, the court found there was insufficient basis in the record to justify application of Sec. 921.141(5)(i)....
...Similarly, while the line between "ordinary" premeditation and the "heightened" cold, calculated premeditation is a thin one, petitioner has not shown that the state has applied this factor in an unconstitutionally arbitrary manner. 113 The application of Sec. 921.141(5)(i) in this case is consistent with its application in prior cases....
...orm fellatio on him and after attempting to kill and murder Deborah Miller subsequent to the kidnapping of each of these victims." Record, Vol. IV, at D-29. Petitioner argues that if the "avoid lawful arrest" aggravating circumstance, Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(e), applies in this case, it would apply in every case where the murder followed another crime and where the victim saw the accused's face....
...broad in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862 ,
103 S.Ct. 2733 ,
77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). 116 In Doyle v. State,
460 So.2d 353 (Fla.1984), the Florida Supreme Court discussed the parameters of the Sec.
921.141(5)(e) aggravating circumstance....
...The state supreme court held that the aggravating circumstance was improperly found on these facts. "[W]here the victim is not a law enforcement officer, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the dominant motive for the murder was the elimination of witnesses." Id. at 358 . As construed by Doyle, Sec.
921.141(5)(e) certainly narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Accord Adams v. Wainwright,
764 F.2d 1356, 1365-66 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,
106 S.Ct. 834 ,
88 L.Ed.2d 805 (1985). 117 The issue, then, is whether Sec.
921.141(5)(e) was arbitrarily or irrationally applied in this case....
...oved beyond a reasonable doubt that the dominant motive of the killing was the avoidance of lawful arrest. 118 We follow the Florida court's conclusions. As we discussed in Adams,
764 F.2d at 1366 , Doyle does not stand for the proposition that Sec.
921.141(5)(e) is, as a matter of law, inapplicable in cases where a murder follows a rape....
...n to kill his victim. The "avoid lawful arrest" aggravating circumstance is not overly broad as applied to the facts of this case. 119 3. "Especially Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel" 120 Finally, petitioner challenges the application of Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(h)....
...her person; (6) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and (7) the age of the defendant at the time of the crime. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(6)....
...First, the jury must determine whether the defendant is guilty of a capital crime. Second, if the defendant is found guilty, the court conducts a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the appropriate penalty is death or life imprisonment. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(1). The sentencing phase consists of three subphases. First, the jury considers the mitigating and aggravating evidence and renders an advisory sentence to the court. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(2). Second, the trial court decides whether to accept the jury's recommended sentence. If the court decides to impose the death sentence, it must set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(3). Finally, the judgment of conviction and sentence of death is subject to automatic review in the Supreme Court of Florida. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(4) The division of authority between the jury and the trial judge under the Florida death penalty statute has been upheld against constitutional challenge....
CopyCited 63 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 417286
...The jury in that case convicted Witteman of the same three charges: first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, and robbery with a deadly weapon. The jury then recommended a life sentence. The trial court concurred and sentenced Witteman to life for first-degree premeditated murder. [5] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1993). [6] § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1993). [7] § 921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. (1993). [8] § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 63 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 49776
...However, there were other felonies involving the use or threat of violence of which Rivera stood convicted and which were not on appeal. They include the October 1980 crimes of burglary with intent to commit battery and of indecent assault on a female child under the age of fourteen. [4] § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), (i), Fla....
...(1985) (previous conviction of felony involving the threat or use of violence; murder committed during the commission of an enumerated felony; murder especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and murder committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner). [5] § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 62 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 1430739
...to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved."). Even if appellant's claim were preserved, we would find that it is without merit. Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1997), permits the State to introduce victim impact evidence once the prosecution has provided evidence as to the existence of one or more aggravating factors....
...ating circumstances. This evidence may be considered to demonstrate the victims uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victims death. This instruction mirrors the language of the statute, see § 921.141(7) ("Such evidence shall be designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death."), and complies with the parameters this Court set in approving victim impact evidence....
...A loss to the family is a loss to both the community of the family and to the larger community outside the family."); Windom v. State,
656 So.2d 432, 438 (Fla. 1995) ("Victim impact evidence must be limited to that which is relevant as specified in section
921.141(7)."). Accordingly, we find no error. Proportionality Although appellant does not argue the proportionality of the death sentence in this case, this Court must nevertheless conduct a proportionality review. See §
921.141, Fla....
...on-style); Routly v. State,
440 So.2d 1257 (Fla.1983) (finding HAC where victim was bound during robbery, carried from own house, thrown into trunk of his own car, and driven out of town through back roads in middle of night before being shot). [25] Section
921.141(7) provides: VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE.Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence....
CopyCited 61 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...State,
26 Fla. 484,
7 So. 880 (1890). III. SENTENCE We come now to the question of sentencing. The trial judge found two aggravating circumstances that in committing the capital felony the appellant had created a great risk of death to many persons, section
921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Id. §
921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 61 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 27892
...ree calendar years. However, in State v. Enmund,
476 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1985), this Court upheld the imposition of consecutive twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentences for two murders committed in the same criminal episode. We reasoned that because section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), required that a person sentenced to life in prison for commission of a capital felony serve twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole, this meant that a minimum mandatory was the statutorily required penalty for each capital felony....
CopyCited 60 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 1027308
...y concerning the events which resulted in the [prior] conviction assists the jury in evaluating the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime so that the jury can make an informed recommendation as to the appropriate sentence."); § 921.141(1), Fla....
...ircumstances exist ... (b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and (c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. § 921.141(2), Fla....
...Therefore, on its face, Apprendi is inapplicable to this case. Id. at 537. Additionally, all of the individual facets of Cox's claim have previously been rejected. This Court has held that since all of the possible aggravating factors are detailed in section 921.141(5) of the *725 Florida Statutes, "there is no reason to require the State to notify defendants of the aggravating factors it intends to prove." Vining v....
CopyCited 60 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The jury recommended death and the trial judge concurred in that recommendation. In support of his finding of fact that the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in or attempting to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit a rape or kidnapping (Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d)), the judge stated: That the capital felony was committed while the Defendant was engaged in or attempting to engage in or in the flight after committing kidnapping, is proven beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt by Defe...
...on January 23, 1978, and by Trisa Gail Thornley's aunt and uncle, Lawson and Theresa Hopper, and the victim's sister, Tracy Thornley, who stated that the victim, Trisa Gail *855 Thornley, did not return home from school that day as she usually did. For additional support that 921.141(6) [sic] (d), Florida Statutes, is proved beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, is the evidence proving that the capital felony was committed while the Defendant was engaged in or attempting to engage in or flight after committin...
...rt's role after a death sentence has been imposed is "review," a process qualitatively different from sentence "imposition." It consists of two discrete functions. First, we determine if the jury and judge acted with procedural rectitude in applying section 921.141 and our case law....
...d by chapter 74-121, section 1, Laws of Florida. Acts which would have constituted rape or attempted rape would constitute a sexual battery or attempt to commit sexual battery by virtue of section
794.011, Florida Statutes (1977). The word "rape" in section
921.141(5)(d) had not yet been changed to "sexual battery"....
...The trial judge did not err in finding defendant's acts constituted an aggravating factor. Defendant next argues that the trial judge erred in finding that the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
CopyCited 60 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1027108
...fective assistance during the penalty phase by failing to request that the jury be instructed on two statutory mitigating circumstances that the murder was committed while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, see § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999), and that his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See § 921.141(6)(e), Fla....
...da Constitution, and trial counsel was ineffective in holding discussions with the court outside the presence of Morris without a personal waiver; (VII) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Morris to testify at the penalty phase; (VIII) section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1997), is facially vague and overbroad in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (VIII)(A) the jury instruction on the aggravator of murder committed during the course of a robbery is unconstitutional...
CopyCited 59 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 2612083
...ngs for Imposition of Death Penalty Hudson challenges the trial court's findings of HAC and CCP, as well as its weighing of the sentencing circumstances. Hudson also argues that the trial court failed to make specific written findings required under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (2001), in order to impose a sentence of death....
...59,
169 L.Ed.2d 50 (2007). No error has been shown in either the rejection of the statutory mitigators or in the weighing of the nonstatutory mitigators. Hudson also contends that the trial court failed to make the specific written findings required under section
921.141(3), Florida Statutes (2001), expressly stating that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist and that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances....
...asoned judgment," id., and meets the requirements of the statute under the analysis set forth in Williams and Holmes. Thus, we deny relief on this claim. VIII. Constitutional Challenge to Capital Sentencing Hudson challenges the constitutionality of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2001), based on Ring v....
...State,
846 So.2d 1114, 1127 (Fla.2003) (citing Card v. State,
803 So.2d 613, 622 (Fla.2001)). However, Hudson has not identified any preserved error in closing argument that would be included for consideration in conjunction with the unpreserved claims. [9] Both (1) and (2) were found based on section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2001)....
...Hudson does not challenge the trial court's finding of two separate aggravating circumstances based on the same statutory subsection. However, because the record shows that the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping, which qualifies as a separate aggravator under section 921.141(5)(d), the aggravating circumstance set out in (2) is supported....
CopyCited 59 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 1508567
...Accordingly, because Sexton did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review, Sexton's claims pertaining to the victim impact testimony are procedurally barred unless the victim impact testimony constitutes fundamental error. On the merits, section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995), [9] allows the State to introduce "victim impact" evidence, which shows "the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." Damren v....
...t testimony is admissible, such testimony has specific limits. Those witnesses providing victim impact testimony are prohibited from giving characterizations and their opinions about the crime. See Payne,
501 U.S. at 826-27,
111 S.Ct. 2597; see also §
921.141(7), Fla....
...ife was also taken in a senseless act of violence." We agree that the testimony relating to the death of the infant and Boron's characterizations and opinions about the murder of the child exceeded the scope of victim impact testimony as provided by section 921.141(7), because Boron did not limit her testimony to Joel's "uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by" Joel's death....
...SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE The parties did not specifically raise the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Sexton of first-degree murder. Nevertheless, it is this Court's independent obligation to review the record for sufficiency of evidence. See Brown v. State,
721 So.2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998) (citing §
921.141(4), Fla....
...to have the witnesses read prepared statements that could be edited and reviewed by both the State and Sexton. Accordingly, we reject Sexton's claim that it was an abuse of discretion to deny his request to videotape the victim impact testimony. [9] Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: Victim impact evidence.Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence....
CopyCited 59 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ree aggravating circumstances: The Court does find, as an aggravating circumstance, that the capital felony, the murder of HUGH C. FAZENDE, was committed while the Defendant was engaged in committing a burglary on the victim's premises, as stated in Section 921.141(5)(d)....
...ow in the house; thereafter, while he was wearing gloves, he stole approximately $100.00 from the deceased's house, and thereafter waited on the scene for approximately one hour to see if any neighbors might show up after hearing two shotgun blasts. Section 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 59 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1381880
...ned during the penalty phase trial. Based on the foregoing analysis, Reynolds' claim is denied. E. Penalty Phase Jury Instructions Reynolds next takes issue with the instructions to the jury prior to penalty phase deliberations. Reynolds claims that section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes (2003) and the standard jury instructions based thereon unconstitutionally place a higher burden of persuasion on the defense to establish that life is the appropriate sentence than is placed on the State to demonstrate that death is the appropriate sentence....
...stances exist that would justify the imposition of the penalty and, second, whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, if any. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11 (emphasis supplied); see also § 921.141(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). Additionally, Reynolds claims that similar language found in section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes (2003), the statutory section upon which the above instruction is based, also renders that statutory section unconstitutional....
...State,
613 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla.1993) (quoting Tillman v. State,
471 So.2d 32, 35 (Fla.1985)). Contrary to the State's assertion, we conclude that at least a portion of this claim was preserved for appellate review. Prior to trial, Reynolds filed a motion to have section
921.141 declared unconstitutional asserting that it violated this Court's holding in Arango v. State,
411 So.2d 172 (Fla.1982), which required that the State show that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Therefore, it does appear that Reynolds' claim regarding the constitutionality of section
921.141 of the Florida Statutes (2003) was presented to the trial court and, therefore, was properly preserved for review. Despite the fact that his challenge to section
921.141 of the Florida Statutes (2003) was adequately preserved, it does not appear that Reynolds' claim with regard to the specific penalty phase jury instruction was properly presented to the trial court....
...However, Reynolds urges this Court to adopt the logic of the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 102 P.3d 445 (2004), cert. granted,
544 U.S. 1060,
125 S.Ct. 2517,
161 L.Ed.2d 1109 (2005), recede from our prior holdings, and declare section
921.141 and the standard jury instruction thereon unconstitutional....
...Contrary to the Kansas statute, Florida's capital sentencing statute and the jury instruction thereon, although containing similar language as to the balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, does not require that a death sentence be rendered in the event of "equipoise." See § 921.141(2), Fla....
...The trial court considered *1161 the following aggravating factors with respect to both Robin and Christina Razor: (1) Reynolds was previously convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person (great weight), see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003); (2) Reynolds committed the murder while engaged in or an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt to commit any burglary (great weight), see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003); (3) Reynolds committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest (great weight), see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003); and (4) Reynolds committed the murder in this case in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel fashion (great weight), see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003). With respect to Christina Razor's murder, the trial court also considered the additional aggravating circumstance that the victim was a person less than twelve years of age (great weight), see 921.141(5)( l ), Fla....
CopyCited 59 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 1774414
...(2005). Initially, the State contends that none of these Crawford claims were preserved for appellate review by a proper objection. Franklin filed pretrial motions to prohibit the State from using hearsay evidence at the penalty phase as provided in section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2005), [6] and to have the statute declared unconstitutional for violating his right to confront witnesses....
...ions in a capital sentencing proceeding. Id. "[A]ny relevant evidence as to a defendant's character or the circumstances of the crime is admissible [during capital] sentencing [proceedings]." Stano v. State,
473 So.2d 1282, 1286 (Fla.1985); see also §
921.141(1), Fla....
...prevent the State from presenting evidence about the victim, evidence of the impact of the murder on the victim's family, and prosecutorial argument on these subjects, if permitted to do so by state law. Subsequently, the Florida Legislature enacted section 921.141(7), which permits the prosecution to introduce and argue victim impact evidence....
...Even though victim impact evidence is admissible in a death penalty case, it is limited to evidence "designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." § 921.141(7), Fla....
...nt that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused." Art. I, § 16, Fla. Const. In Windom v. State,
656 So.2d 432, 438 (Fla.1995), this Court rejected an argument that the victim impact evidence procedure outlined in section
921.141(7) constituted an impermissible nonstatutory aggravator that should be excluded during the sentencing phase of a capital case....
...s and mitigators" or "otherwise interfere[ ] with the constitutional rights of the defendant." Id. In this case, the testimony of the victim's family members and coworker did not exceed the proper bounds of victim impact evidence as provided in both section 921.141(7) and Payne....
...; he bought clothes, school supplies, and glasses for neighborhood children; his family misses him; and Lawley's sister Carolyn, who had been living with him, has been left without a home or income. This evidence is within the purpose of section *98 921.141(7), which allows the jury to consider "the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." See, e.g., Huggins v....
...uires a majority of the jury to agree on which aggravating circumstances exist. Under the current law, for example, the jury may recommend a sentence of death where four jurors believe that only the "avoiding a lawful arrest" aggravator applies, see § 921.141(5)(e), while three others believe that only the "committed for pecuniary gain" aggravator applies, see § 921.141(5)(f), because seven jurors believe that at least one aggravator applies....
...ggravating circumstances and accompanying jury instructions "are more appropriately crafted in a rules proceeding than in an individual capital case." Id. at 546. Accordingly, the majority concluded that "unless and until a material change occurs in section 921.141, the decisional law, the applicable rules of procedure, or the standard instructions and verdict form," verdict forms detailing the jurors' votes on specific aggravating circumstances are impermissible....
...for her role in the crimes (given little weight). [5] The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. [6] Section 921.141(1), which governs the penalty phase proceedings that are held after a defendant is adjudicated guilty of a capital felony, provides in pertinent part that evidence "relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendan...
CopyCited 59 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...nce, asserting that: (a) the trial judge improperly retroactively applied the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in "a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification" as set forth in section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1979), which became effective July 1, 1979, thirty days after the murder was committed; (b) the trial court improperly held the appellant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct could be consid...
...n effect, is a doubling up; and (f) the trial court erred by limiting the jury consideration of mitigating factors. We find each of these contentions to be without merit, and only the first requires discussion. We find no error in the application of section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes, which became effective July 1, 1979, adding as an aggravating circumstance: (i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification....
...violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws as set forth in Weaver v. Graham,
450 U.S. 24,
101 S.Ct. 960,
67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), and in State v. Williams,
397 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1981). However, the addition by the legislature of paragraph (i) to section
921.141(5), in fact only reiterates in part what is already present in the elements of premeditated murder, with which petitioner was charged and which the evidence clearly supports....
...cessary to raise issues in later post-conviction *422 relief proceedings under Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 concerning whether trial counsel provided this appellant with reasonably effective assistance of counsel in the trial now here on review. Section 921.141(4) requires that the "judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court ......
...SUNDBERG, C.J., concurs as to the conviction and dissents as to the sentence with an opinion, with which ENGLAND and McDONALD, JJ., concur. SUNDBERG, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the affirmance of the conviction. I feel, however, that the retroactive application of section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1979), violates the state and federal prohibitions against ex post facto laws. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the sentence of death. The trial court's use of section 921.141(5)(i) as an aggravating circumstance directly contravenes two recent decisions, Weaver v....
...The second requirement is met because the likelihood of receiving a death sentence is increased by the addition of the new subsection. [3] A finding of this additional aggravating circumstance could shift the balance toward death. *423 Based on the fact that section 921.141(5)(i) was unconstitutionally applied to the defendant, the judge improperly considered a non-statutory aggravating circumstance....
CopyCited 59 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 9837
...The trial judge refused to abide by the recommendation and imposed a death sentence. The trial court's written findings of fact in support of the sentence of death set forth the following aggravating circumstances: that the murder was committed during the course of a felony, section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1983); that the murder was committed to avoid arrest, section 921.141(5)(e); and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel, section 921.141(5)(h)....
...to render "an advisory sentence to the court" and that "[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death." §§ 921.141(2), (3), Fla....
CopyCited 59 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...This contention is without merit. Menendez v. State,
368 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 1979). See Clark v. State,
379 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1979); Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 976,
99 S.Ct. 1548,
59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979). Section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1975), sets out the aggravating factors to be considered in determining the propriety of the death sentence....
...State,
365 So.2d 149 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 88,
100 S.Ct. 175,
62 L.Ed.2d 714 (1979), with Burch v. State,
343 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1977), and Jones v. State,
332 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1976). In his second sentencing challenge, Hitchcock claims that the rape portion of section
921.141(5)(d) is so vague and confusing as to be unconstitutional because the crime of "rape" no longer exists in this state....
...conduct when measured by common understanding and practices." United States v. Petrillo,
332 U.S. 1, 8,
67 S.Ct. 1538, 1542,
91 L.Ed. 1877 *748 (1947). Accordingly, we find no merit to appellant's contention on this point. Hitchcock next claims that section
921.141 unconstitutionally limits the consideration of mitigating factors and that he was improperly limited in presenting mitigating evidence....
...At sentencing, however, defense presented only one witness. There is nothing in the record indicating that the trial judge limited the defense's presentation. Rather, it appears that the defense itself chose to limit that presentation. Hitchcock's final claims that section 921.141 is unconstitutional on its face, that the death penalty is inconsistently applied, and that there are no standards for weighing aggravating and mitigating factors have been discussed elsewhere....
...A person can know right from wrong and therefore be responsible for his actions but at the same time have impaired judgment and inability to conform his behavior to the requirements of law. This latter situation presents mitigating circumstances as to his sentencing. § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...ound sufficient aggravating factors to outweigh any mitigating evidence. [7] Ch. 74-121, Laws of Florida, amended ch. 794, Fla. Stat., to replace the former rape statute with the crime of sexual battery. See §
794.011, Fla. Stat. The word "rape" in §
921.141(5)(d) has not yet been changed to "sexual battery."
CopyCited 58 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 21467248
...The court did not suggest that the jury should give these mitigating factors any less weight than if the court had instructed the jury in the language of the corresponding statutory mitigators. [9] We therefore find no error in the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on the statutory mitigators found in section 921.141(6)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes (2002)....
...im had assumed the risk of harm, justifying a finding of this mitigating circumstance. We stated: By its plain language, the statute permits this factor only where: *44 The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act. § 921.141(6)(c), Fla.Stat....
...gator of victim participation in or consent to the murder inapplicable. Additionally, Pope's failure to promptly seek medical treatment did not make him either a participant in the deadly attack or evince his consent to the murder. A construction of section 921.141(6)(c) making the failure to seek medical care tantamount to consent to or participation in the murder would be no more justified than the construction of the provision we rejected in Wuornos....
...ating circumstance need not be found by the jury to be a plausible extension of Ring, I have concluded that a strict reading of Ring does not require jury findings on all the considerations bearing on the trial judge's decision to impose death under section 921.141, Florida Statutes *51 (2002)....
...sachusetts conviction of armed robbery, the existence of which was established by introduction of a certified copy of the conviction below. [13] Armed robbery is a felony that inherently "involv[es] the use or threat of violence to the person" under section 921.141(5)(b)....
...ies that before the death penalty may legally be imposed, the trial judge is required to find "[t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist" and "[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." § 921.141(3)(a)-(b), Fla....
...[6] This Court denied Duest's motion to relinquish jurisdiction during this appeal in which he sought leave to pursue his Brady claim in the trial court. [7] "The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). [8] "The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired." § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...or emotional disturbance; .... 6. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of [his] [her] conduct or to conform [his][her] conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.... Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11. [10] § 921.141(6)(c), Fla....
...ior conviction exists, the Sixth Amendment demands that a jury perform this task. Id. Likewise, Florida's sentencing scheme requires additional findings beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction before it can be used as an aggravating circumstance. Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2002) permits the finding of an aggravating circumstance where "[t]he defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." Hence,...
CopyCited 58 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 141445
...We agree that the trial court improperly considered his contemporaneous convictions for sexual battery of the murder victim and arson to support the aggravating factor of prior felony conviction involving the use or threat of violence to the person. § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...victim. We do not believe this factor was established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Harmon v. State,
527 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1988). Next, Holton claims that the trial judge failed to consider the statutory mitigating circumstance of impaired capacity. §
921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...battery and arson; (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (4) the capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral and legal justification. § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), (i) Fla....
CopyCited 58 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 5397, 1988 WL 39115
...Under the Florida statutory scheme, the jury weighs the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented during the sentencing phase of the defendant's trial, and then makes a recommendation of either life imprisonment or death. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(2) (1985). 5 That recommendation, the attorney general asserts, is always subject to rejection by the trial judge, who must under Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(3) independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances before entering a sentence....
...In analyzing the role of the jury, however, we cannot operate in a vacuum. Rather, we must look to how the Supreme Court of Florida, the final interpreter of the death penalty statute, has characterized that role. A. 9 A review of the case law shows that the Supreme Court of Florida has interpreted section
921.141 as evincing a legislative intent that the sentencing jury play a significant role in the Florida capital sentencing scheme. See Messer v. State,
330 So.2d 137, 142 (Fla.1976) ("[T]he legislative intent that can be gleaned from Section
921.141 [indicates that the legislature] sought to devise a scheme of checks and balances in which the input of the jury serves as an integral part."); see also Riley v....
...State,
420 So.2d 578 (Fla.1982) 2 The operation of the Florida capital sentencing scheme is explained in part II. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Here, on petitioner's direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial judge had improperly found two aggravating circumstances under Fla.Stat. Sec.
921.141(5) and had failed to specify with sufficient clarity his conclusions regarding mitigating factors, as required by Fla.Stat. Sec.
921.141(6)....
...Wainwright,
738 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1126 ,
106 S.Ct. 1652 ,
90 L.Ed.2d 195 (1986); Rogers v. McMullen,
673 F.2d 1185, 1188 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1110 ,
103 S.Ct. 740 ,
74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983). 5 Section
921.141 provides: (1) Separate proceedings on issue of penalty.--Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.......
...In light of the prosecutor's repeated suggestions throughout the proceedings that the jury's role was unimportant, we are satisfied that when the jurors heard the trial judge say "as you have been told," they understood the reference to be the prosecutor's portrayal of their role 1 See Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141 (1985)....
CopyCited 57 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 248413
...The impact of this failure to obtain the New York file is amplified by the fact that Parker made no attempt to argue that under New York law, a youthful offender adjudication is not a "conviction" and, therefore, does not satisfy the prior violent felony conviction aggravator under Florida's death penalty statute. See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...a conviction for purposes of the prior violent felony aggravator. See Merck v. State,
664 So.2d 939, 944 (Fla. 1995) (holding that an out-of-state juvenile adjudication is not a conviction as defined under North Carolina or Florida statutes) (citing §
921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...entire conviction and replace it with the youthful offender adjudication. [8] Thus, under New York law, Green's youthful offender adjudication is not a conviction and, therefore, does not support the prior violent felony conviction aggravator under section 921.141(5)(b)....
...State,
615 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1993), had not been decided at the time of Green's sentencing procedure; however, the trial judge used a comparable procedure by having oral arguments on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances on November 7, 1990. [5] Under section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), the prior violent felony conviction aggravator is established if the State proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that "[t]he defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony invo...
...That case involved a prior juvenile conviction, rather than a youthful offender adjudication. In Merck, we held that an out-of-state juvenile adjudication is not a conviction as defined under North Carolina or Florida statutes.
664 So.2d at 944 (citing §
921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...We distinguished Campbell, stating that Campbell involved juvenile "convictions" rather than delinquency "adjudications." We explained: Our decision in this case is not to be read to mean that "convictions" of individuals who are juveniles which otherwise come within section 921.141(5)(b) are eliminated from consideration because the individuals are juveniles....
CopyCited 56 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The evidence does not establish that Fetch was killed for pecuniary gain, especially since the jury acquitted appellant on the armed robbery charge and the state had previously dropped the burglary charge. Further, we find that this crime was not "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 943,
94 S.Ct. 1951,
40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974). Finally, we conclude that this was not a murder committed in a "cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." §
921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 56 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 84110
...ship and prevented him from seeing the baby. Much of this testimony was accepted by the trial court as mitigating evidence. [4] The trial court also properly found that appellant's age at the time of the crime, eighteen, was a mitigating factor. See § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
...EHRLICH, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur as to guilt but dissent as to the sentence. The trial judge has been entrusted by the legislature with the awesome responsibility to impose sentence in death penalty cases. § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (1987). The jury's responsibility, likewise imposed by the legislature, is to make a nonbinding recommendation. § 921.141(2), Fla....
...238,
92 S.Ct. 2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Spaziano v. State,
433 So.2d at 512; Douglas v. State,
373 So.2d 895 (Fla. 1979). It would also violate the legislative directive that the jury's determination should be "advisory," a recommendation and nothing more. §
921.141(2), (3), Fla....
CopyCited 56 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 12572
...As you have been told, the final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed is the responsibility of the judge; however, it is your duty to follow the law that will now *857 be given you by the court and render to the court [an] advisory sentence... . Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) (for § 921.141, Fla....
...Nor did the court ever withdraw or correct its misleading statements or accurately describe the jury's role. Id. at 1482-83 (citations omitted). We disagree with this interpretation of our death penalty instructions. Fortunately, Mann has been set aside pending rehearing en banc. We find the phraseology of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1985), which expressly directs that the jury responsibility is "advisory," was apparently not taken into account and that our standard jury instructions appear to have been considered out of context....
...It is difficult to understand the reasoning of these opinions when "advisory" is the statutory term for the jury's role and the United States Supreme Court has accepted Florida's jury role as "advisory." Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447,
104 S.Ct. 3154,
82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). A simple reading of section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1985), explains why the prosecutor and defense counsel stated to the jury that its role was to render an advisory sentence....
...roceedings. Before you ballot you should carefully weigh, sift and consider the evidence, and all of it, realizing that human life is at stake, and bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your advisory sentence. Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) (for § 921.141, Fla....
...The trial court is to conduct its own weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and, "[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury," is to enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death; in the latter case, specified written findings are required. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (1983)....
...SHAW, Justice, specially concurring. I agree fully with the majority view that under Florida's death penalty system the jury's recommendation on the sentence to be imposed is only advisory and that the responsibility for determining the sentence rests on the trial judge. § 921.141, Fla....
...First, the rule that a jury's recommendation of life will be followed unless the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ [3] is inconsistent with Florida's death penalty statute, section 921.141, which places no measurable weight on the jury recommendation....
...As a matter of law, as we hold here, the jury's recommendation is merely advisory; the trial judge is the sentencer and must base the sentence on an independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, notwithstanding the jury recommendation. Second, under section 921.141, the jury's advisory recommendation is not supported by findings of fact....
CopyCited 54 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Lucie County, rendered a judgment of conviction. The jury recommended that Mr. Kampff be sentenced to death, and the court followed the jury's recommendation. This Court has appellate jurisdiction to review the judgment and the sentence. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; § 921.141(4), Fla....
...lant's guilt was adjudicated. The appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's findings as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the propriety of the sentence of death. As is required by the capital felony sentencing law, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), the trial judge issued written findings of fact in support of the sentence: FINDINGS UPON WHICH SENTENCE OF DEATH IS IMPOSED The jury having rendered an advisory sentence in which a majority of the jurors recommended the Court impose a sentence of death, and the Court having concurred with the opinion reached by a majority of the jurors, now therefore, pursuant to the mandate of Florida Statute 921.141 requiring that the determination of the Court to impose a sentence of death be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings, it is hereby found and determined that aggravati...
..., was the evidence produced during the first part of the trial. Therefore, examination of the whole record is required and when examined the record discloses the only listed aggravating circumstances which have any application here are as follows: F.S. 921.141(5) (c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons....
...The other that Appellant asked her if she would miss her mother if anything happened to her. When advised his former wife was dead, Appellant's reply was "good." The undersigned, after searching and sifting the evidence for mitigating circumstances as set forth in F.S. 921.141(6), finds none to be delineated here as directed by the Order for Clarification....
...tablish the following two mitigating circumstances: (a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. (b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. § 921.141(6), Fla....
CopyCited 53 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26138, 2007 WL 3307014
...I am not.”
The evidence of these out-of-court statements by the victim was introduced
at the sentence stage to prove the statutory aggravating circumstance that the
murder “was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(g).
The prosecutor relied on this evidence for that purpose, and in sentencing Hodges
to death the trial court cited it in finding that the aggravating circumstance existed.
(The court also found that an additional aggravating circumstance applied, because
the murder “was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without
any pretense of moral or legal justification.” See id. § 921.141(5)(i).)
Under the Florida capital punishment statute, this hearsay evidence was
admissible at the sentence stage. Id. § 921.141(1) (any evidence the trial court
deems probative “may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the
exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair
opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements”); see also Chandler v....
...commit suicide, he was mentally
competent to be sentenced. Hodges was present during all of the judge phase of
the sentence proceeding. Under Florida law, the judge and not the jury actually
imposes the sentence in a capital case. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2)–(3).
The Florida Supreme Court rejected Hodges’ claim that by conducting the
last part of the jury phase of the sentence proceeding in his absence the trial court
had violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be present at all critical
stages of the trial....
CopyCited 53 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 399853
...fendant was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping; the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; and the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. See § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (f), (i), Fla.Stat. (1993). [3] The trial court found that Foster's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. See § 921.141(6)(f), Fla.Stat....
...the proceedings; (10) the trial court erred in considering separately that the murder was for pecuniary gain and that the murder occurred during the course of a kidnapping; (11) a new trial is warranted because of prosecutorial misconduct; and (12) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1993), is unconstitutional....
CopyCited 53 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 385504
...efutably established by the nature of this crime: a contract killing which took place over a period of days. Because the *419 jury heard this inflammatory and improper testimony, Bonifay asserts a new sentencing hearing is required. We do not agree. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1995), sets forth the standard for admissibility in penalty proceedings....
...did not prevent the State from presenting evidence about the victim, evidence of the impact of the murder on the victim's family, and prosecutorial argument on these subjects. [12] Id. at 827,
111 S.Ct. at 2609. Subsequently, the legislature enacted section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...was committed while Bonifay was engaged in a robbery; the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; and the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. See § 921.141(5)(d), (f), (i), Fla....
...ry in which someone was stabbed several months prior to the murder, and Bonifay had committed a burglary and grand theft in Escambia County; and Bonifay's age at the time of the crime, seventeen years old, which the trial court gave some weight. See § 921.141(6)(a), (g)....
...orm his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. However, the trial court found that the evidence did not support this mitigator and that even if the evidence established the mitigator, it was entitled to little weight. See § 921.141(6)(f)....
...Moreover, the court discussed the evidence in respect to the mitigators that Bonifay committed the crime while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that Bonifay acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. These mitigators were given no weight. See § 921.141(6)(b), (e)....
CopyCited 53 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 1469327
...son's motion for mistrial; (5) whether the trial court erred in denying Hutchinson's motion for judgment of acquittal; (6) whether the trial court erred in denying Hutchinson's motion for a new trial; (7) whether the trial court erred in considering section 921.141(5)(1), Florida Statutes (2000), as an aggravating circumstance; (8) whether the trial court erred in finding that Hutchinson committed the murder of the children during the course of an act of aggravated child abuse; (9) whether the t...
...Further, Hutchinson failed to show that the jurors were not impartial. The trial judge, therefore, did not abuse his discretion, and the denial of Hutchinson's motion for mistrial was proper. 7. The Victim's Age as an Aggravating Factor At sentencing, the trial court considered the "youth" aggravator, section 921.141(5)(1), Florida Statutes (2000), as it applied to each of the children....
...g circumstances. The trial court found two statutory aggravators for the murders of Logan and Amanda: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony (the other murders), and (2) the victim was less than twelve years of age. See § 921.141(5)(b), (1), Fla....
...Three statutory aggravators were found by the trial court for the murder of Geoffrey: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony (the other murders); (2) the victim was less than twelve years of age, which merged with the aggravated child abuse aggravator; and (3) HAC. See id. § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), (1)....
...the point that it no longer provides constitutionally adequate guidance to the sentencer as required by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For HAC to apply, the capital felony must be " especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...cific aggravating circumstance. In determining the circumstances in which HAC applies, it is essential to consider the constitutional function served by all of the aggravating factors found in *962 Florida's death penalty statute, including HAC. See § 921.141(5), Fla....
...gravator was merged with the "aggravated child abuse" aggravator. [4] While the sentencing order uses the conjunction "and," the statute provides that this aggravating factor is applicable if the murder "was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 53 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 34696
...84,
42 L.Ed.2d 77 (1974). [2] We reject the State's argument that this issue is not cognizable on appeal because Koenig failed to move to withdraw his plea in the trial court. This Court is required to review the judgment of conviction in death penalty cases. §
921.141(4), Fla....
CopyCited 53 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 123883
...State,
456 So.2d 885 (Fla.1984). Accordingly, we affirm Singleton's conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur in result only. NOTES [1] See §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). [2] See §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1999). [3] See §
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). [4] See §
921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (1999). [5] See §
921.141(6)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 52 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 573
...We conclude that the circuit judge has no authority to interfere with the prosecutor's discretion in proceeding with this cause as a death penalty case. If we allowed the circuit judge to make pre-trial determinations of the death penalty's applicability, we would be modifying the death penalty's statutory scheme. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1985), mandates that the decision to impose the death penalty must be made in a separate proceeding after an adjudication of guilt....
CopyCited 52 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1999 WL 462608
...NOTES [1] This Court affirmed Gordon's conviction and sentence in Gordon v. State,
704 So.2d 107 (Fla.1997). The facts in this case, as presented to the jury through testimony and physical evidence, were fully set forth in that opinion. See id. at 108-10. [2] See §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1995). [3] See id. §
921.141(5)(f). [4] See id. §
921.141(5)(h). [5] See id. §
921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 51 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 1130695
...jury may consider, it may well be inadequate to provide for the type of individualized assessment of mitigation that the Supreme Court has mandated. The fact that the aggravation to be considered by a jury is highly specific underscores the problem. Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2000), clearly identifies fourteen aggravating factors, which include everything from the nature of the crime and criminal record of the accused to the age and frailties of the victim....
...4 (Fla.1990) (listing nonstatutory mitigators. which include but arc not limited to, abused or deprived childhood, contribution to community, remorse and potential rehabilitation, disparate treatment of equally culpable codefendant, and charitable and humanitarian deeds). [18] Section 921.141 also lists several factors the jury may consider in mitigating the punishment for murder. The last factor permits the jury to consider any "other factors in the defendant's background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty." § 921.141(6)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 51 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 3028248
...Steele,
921 So.2d 538 (Fla.2005), the Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466,
120 S.Ct. 2348,
147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona do not require a finding that the Florida capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional. In Steele, we not only concluded, consistent with prior caselaw, that section
921.141, Florida Statutes, does not require jury findings on aggravating circumstances, we specifically held that it is a departure from the essential requirements of law to use a special verdict form detailing the jury's determination on the aggravating circumstances....
...es during the penalty phase on any information which formed the basis for their opinions including a prior murder [8] *1007 committed by Coday. This ruling conforms with our decision in Valle v. State,
581 So.2d 40 (Fla.1991). In Valle, we said that section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes, allows for broader admissibility of evidence during the penalty phase of a trial....
...cular case is disproportionate or is otherwise being imposed arbitrarily. The Florida Legislature also revised the Florida death penalty statute and instituted a bifurcated procedure in this State. See ch. 72-724, § 9, Laws of Fla. (now codified as § 921.141, Fla....
...omicide. BELL, J., concurring. I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in failing to find that Coday's capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as a statutory mitigating circumstance. See § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...ntroverted by any other competent evidence. Finally, like the majority, I conclude that given the quantum of the uncontroverted expert testimony in support *1019 of this mitigating circumstance, the trial judge abused his discretion in rejecting it. Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (2002), mandates that a trial court must support the imposition of a death sentence with "specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances of subsections (5) and (6) and upon the records of the trial...
...or, in the alternative, a sentence of life imposed. Accordingly, reform bringing Florida closer to the mainstream of capital sentencing states in regard to jury findings could take one of several paths. I again encourage the Legislature to reexamine section 921.141 in light of Ring, Steele, article I, section 22, and this case....
CopyCited 51 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1999 WL 184502
...The courts and the State must be able to do better, and any explanation *440 of why we are unable to do so is insufficient. NOTES [1] The trial court found the following statutory aggravators: (1) Knight was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995); (2) the murders were committed while Knight was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping, § 921.141(5)(d); (3) the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, § 921.141(5)(e); (4) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain, § 921.141(5)(f); (5) the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), § 921.141(5)(h); and (6) the murders were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP), § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 51 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 620797
...Although Jones has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, there clearly is competent, substantial evidence to support his convictions. PENALTY PHASE In connection with the penalty phase of his trial, Jones claims that the automatic application of the "during the course of a felony" aggravator, section 921.141(5)(b), fails to adequately narrow the class of felony murders eligible for the death penalty....
...Accordingly, having found no reversible error, we affirm the convictions and sentences. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Jones previously was convicted of attempted robbery, robbery, two counts of robbery with a firearm, and robbery with a firearm and kidnapping. [2] §§ 921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), Fla. Stat. (1991), respectively. [3] § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 50 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The Appellant contends that the Legislature did not intend for such evidence as the above or for presentence investigation reports (P.S.I.) to be considered by the trial judge in determining the sentence to be imposed. These contentions are without merit. Section 921.141(1) provides that in the proceeding to determine the sentence that "......
...Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements." Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1)....
...opinion filed September 3, 1975). P.S.I. reports are provided for in Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.710. Rule 3.710 vests the trial court with the discretionary power to *489 request a P.S.I. report in cases wherein the trial court possesses discretion as to the imposition of sentence. Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, vests the trial court with the limited discretion to impose either the death penalty or life imprisonment even if the jury recommends to the contrary. Thus, the discretionary nature of Section 921.141 brings it within the ambit of Rule 3.710. Section 921.141 did not amend or repeal Rule 3.710, which was adopted by this Court pursuant to its constitutional authority....
...mendment. In re Clarification of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
281 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1973). See Carmel v. Carmel,
282 So.2d 9 (Fla.3d Dist. 1973); Lyden v. State,
281 So.2d 591 (Fla.4th Dist. 1973). We must presume that the Legislature enacted Section
921.141 with deliberation and with the full knowledge of the existence of this Court's constitutional authority to adopt the rule, and of its (Legislature's) power to repeal the rule by a two-thirds vote....
...ROBERTS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part: "I would affirm the trial court as to Judgment of Guilty and sentence." NOTES [1] Article V, Section 3(b) (1), Florida Constitution: "(b) Jurisdiction. The supreme court: (1) Shall hear appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty ...;" [2] Section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes: "Review Of Judgment And Sentence....
...State,
244 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1971); State v. Wright,
265 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1972); Bauldree v. State,
284 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1973). [7] Reddish v. State,
167 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1964); Calloway v. State,
189 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1966). [8] Sections
775.082,
775.04 and
921.141, Florida Statutes, inter alia. [9] State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. den.,
416 U.S. 943,
94 S.Ct. 1950,
40 L.Ed.2d 295. [10] Section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes: "(5) Aggravating Circumstances....
...(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. (g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws. (h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." [11] Section 921.141 (6), Florida Statutes: "(6) Mitigating Circumstances....
CopyCited 50 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Appellant argues that the trial court erred by rejecting the jury's sentencing recommendation of life imprisonment and by imposing a sentence of death upon the appellant. Since this Court has the responsibility to determine independently whether a death sentence has been imposed in a manner constitutionally correct, section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1981), we review the trial court's findings of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine if that court properly imposed the death sentence....
...The trial judge's findings were based on no material extraneous to the record, and all considerations by that court were made available to the appellant and to the State, and each party had ample opportunity to respond thereto. *1075 The trial judge correctly found three of the statutory aggravating circumstances listed in section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1981)....
CopyCited 50 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Stano waived a sentencing jury, and, after a three-day sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to death on each charge. On appeal Stano argues that the trial court improperly imposed the death penalty and erred in denying his motion to preclude imposition of the death penalty and that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), is unconstitutional....
...stances, Stano claims that the trial court erred in failing to find the statutory mitigating factors of being under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and impaired capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. § 921.141(6)(b), (f)....
...State,
453 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1984) (abduction and killing without reason), and Jones v. State (no provocation, no justification). In his last point on appeal Stano presents, in summary fashion, a grab bag *895 of challenges to the constitutionality of section
921.141, both on its face and as applied....
CopyCited 50 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 197003
...his prior "gross misdemeanor" conviction from the state of Nevada. Indeed, this is an issue of first impression before this Court. As more fully explained below, we determine that such conviction does not qualify as an aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1999). Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that an aggravating circumstance may be established where "[t]he defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." As...
...tutes. In the present situation, however, the Legislature has not provided for any type of comparison and has specifically provided that only a " felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person" may establish an aggravating factor under section 921.141(5)(b). § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...ter of law for the purposes of establishing the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance under the present statute. Accordingly, Carpenter's prior "gross misdemeanor" conviction does not here constitute a "felony" aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(b)....
...tion and remand for a new trial. Should Carpenter once again be found guilty of first-degree murder, the State may not rely upon Carpenter's prior "gross misdemeanor" conviction from the State of Nevada to establish an aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes....
...ectly notes, the elements of this Nevada crime are equivalent to the elements of Florida's aggravated battery crime, a felony. I conclude that the trial court correctly held this Nevada conviction qualified as a prior violent felony aggravator under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...ay be used when determining applicable Florida crime). Where I depart from the majority is in their conclusion that an out-of-state crime must be considered a felony in that jurisdiction before it qualifies as a prior violent felony aggravator under section 921.141(5)(b)....
...I conclude that this is not in accord with article X, section 10 of the Florida Constitution. Article X, section 10 is an explicit definition of the term "felony" from which neither this Court nor the Legislature may depart. I would conclude that Carpenter's Nevada conviction may be used as an aggravator under section 921.141(5)(b) during a new penalty phase because, as the majority already has noted, Carpenter's Nevada *1208 conviction for battery causing substantial bodily harm is equivalent to the Florida felony for aggravated battery....
...or which Carpenter has not been convicted. Conclusion I would sustain the first-degree murder conviction but would remand for a new penalty phase. Upon remand, I would allow the Nevada conviction to qualify as a prior violent felony aggravator under section 921.141(5)(b), pursuant to the express provision of article X, section 10, Florida Constitution....
CopyCited 50 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 194554
...The jury found Crump guilty of first-degree murder, and recommended a death sentence by a vote of eight to four. The trial judge found in aggravation that: 1) Crump had previously been convicted of a capital felony or threat of violence to another person, pursuant to section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1989); and 2) Crump committed the capital felony in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without moral or legal justification, pursuant to section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1989). The trial judge found in mitigation that: 1) Crump committed the capital felony while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, pursuant to section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1989); 2) Crump's ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, pursuant to section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (1989); and 3) "[a]ny other aspect of [Crump's] character or record, and any other circumstance of the offense as evidenced by expert and lay testimony in the case." The trial judge followed the jury recommendation and imposed a death sentence....
...We find the second issue dispositive, and therefore decline to address the other issues. Crump argues that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any moral or legal justification. Section 921.141(5)(i)....
...amend. IV. [4] The sentencing order provides in pertinent part: The defendant, while in possession of a restraint device, invited the victim into his truck, bound her wrists, and after manually strangling her, dumped her nude body near a cemetery. [5] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). [6] § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). [7] § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 50 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 1862663
...by the Broward County Sheriff's Office. Following arguments and memoranda by the parties, the trial court sentenced appellant to death. In doing so, the trial court found one aggravating factor: the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla.Stat....
...m defense counsel's questioning that this was, in fact, what he sought to elicit from the witness's testimony. Thus, we do not find that this issue has been adequately preserved for appellate review. See Lucas. Additionally, we note that even though section 921.141(1) relaxes the evidentiary rules during the penalty phase of a capital trial, the statute clearly states that the defendant must have an opportunity to fairly rebut the hearsay evidence in order for it to be admissible....
CopyCited 50 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 215
...In short, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that Ferry suffers from an extreme mental illness. The trial court judge correctly recognized this in his sentencing order by finding as mitigating factors that Ferry was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance (section 921.141(6)(b)) and that Ferry's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired (section 921.141(6)(f))....
...irst-degree arson, but vacate the sentences of death and remand for the imposition of life sentences in accordance with the jury's recommendation. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(b), (c), (d), (h) and (i), Fla. Stat. (1985). [2] § 921.141(6)(b) and (f), Fla....
CopyCited 49 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...the course of the commission of the offense for which he was convicted created a great risk to serious bodily harm and death to many persons. AS TO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES: The Court finds that the enumerated mitigating circumstances set forth in F.S. 921.141[6](7) are primarily negated, in that, (A) The Defendant, CHARLES WILLIAM PROFFITT, was convicted in 1967 of Breaking and Entering without permission....
CopyCited 49 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 101
...NOTES [1] Although Medina does not appeal his conviction of and sentence for auto theft, they are supported by the record, and we also affirm that conviction and sentence. [2] Several of the issues raised here have been decided previously against Medina's contentions: 1) Whether § 921.141, Fla....
...2257,
72 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982). 5) Whether the court erred by failing to have the state notice Medina of the aggravating factors it would rely on. Tafero v. State,
403 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 983,
102 S.Ct. 1492,
71 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982). 6) Whether §
921.141 is unconstitutional as being procedural rather than substantive....
CopyCited 49 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 17093
...r writ of habeas corpus: (I) impermissible nonstatutory aggravating circumstances were considered raised as claim VII in Hildwin's 3.850 appeal; (II) the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" and "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstances as set forth in section 921.141, Florida Statutes, are unconstitutionally vague the challenge to the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravator raised as claim X in Hildwin's 3.850 appeal; (III) the instructions on third-degree murder and manslaughter were *111 con...
...ncing judge is already biased in favor of imposing the death penalty where there is "any" basis for doing so. Such a mindset is the very antithesis of the proper posture of a judge in any sentencing proceeding. SHAW and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). [2] § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1985). [3] § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1985). [4] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...t Hildwin had a substance abuse problem, and that Hildwin was a pleasant child and is a nice person. [8] We note that the trial court "found the testimony of the mental health experts offered at the 3.850 hearing most persuasive and convincing." [9] § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). [10] § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 49 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 60801
...ing circumstances). Based on the cited cases, we find no error in the trial court's ruling. Issue four asserts that the sentencing order's failure to document the requisite findings of fact for mitigating and aggravating circumstances as required by section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...your soul. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Orlando, Orange County, Florida this 21 day of April, 1993. In Campbell v. State,
571 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990), we specifically addressed the difficulty our State courts have in applying the directive of section
921.141(3)....
...petency or finding of incompetency by the court, judge. I don't consider this case to be complicated at all. I don't feel incapable in handling it by myself, but in looking through the best interest of my client, I feel I should make the motion. [3] Section 921.141(3) provides, in part, that: In each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of the court shall be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances in subsections (5) and (6) and upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings....
CopyCited 48 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...We have also reviewed the evidence pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(f), and we conclude that no new trial is required. Defendant's next arguments concern the imposition of death by the trial court, despite the jury recommendation of life. The trial court in his written findings of fact pursuant to section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1981), found five aggravating circumstances applicable. The first aggravating circumstance found applicable was section 921.141(5)(d) (the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, etc.)....
...§
812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). And, even had the requisite elements for robbery and burglary not been present, the defendant concedes his commission of a kidnapping; therefore, the other offenses are mere surplusage. The court below also found as applicable section
921.141(5)(e) (the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody)....
...Therefore, this added fact does not weaken the finding that the defendant killed the victim to eliminate the witness to the robbery/kidnapping, and has no significance in the instant case. See also Welty v. State,
402 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 1981). The defendant's next contention, that the application of section
921.141(5)(f) (capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain) was improper due to doubling of the aggravating factors of robbery and pecuniary gain under Provence v....
...___,
103 S.Ct. 2111,
77 L.Ed.2d 315 (1983); Stevens v. State,
419 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
103 S.Ct. 1236,
75 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983). As his next point of error defendant asserts that the trial court improperly found as applicable section
921.141(5)(h) (that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel)....
...d and is indistinguishable from the terror and fear felt by the victims in Knight, Adams, Steinhorst, White, and Smith. We therefore hold that the heinous, atrocious or cruel factor was properly applied by the court below. The trial court also found section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1981) (cold, calculated and premeditated manner), to be applicable in this case....
...We hold that the court was not required to find appellant's age to be a mitigating factor, and find no basis for reversal on this issue. Simmons v. State,
419 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1982). Defendant further asserts that the court improperly found as inapplicable section
921.141(5)(a) (lack of significant criminal history); we find no merit to this contention. Booker v. State,
397 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 957,
102 S.Ct. 493,
70 L.Ed.2d 261 (1981). We also find no merit to defendant's contention that section
921.141(5)(b) (defendant was under influence of extreme mental disturbance), was improperly not applied by the court below....
CopyCited 48 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 271193
...ation and has waived notice and hearing). Disallowing the reimposition of special conditions of probation not previously announced is also consistent with the sentencing policy announced in Pope v. State,
561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990), and the mandate of section
921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1995)....
...Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(11) provides: "Any sentence outside the permitted range must be accompanied by a written statement delineating the reasons for the departure." [4] As in Pope, a trial court does not get a second bite at the apple when it fails to file written findings in a death case. Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1995), requires a trial court, in the event it imposes a sentence of death, to set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based....
CopyCited 48 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 1469337
...of Tuttle (given great weight); that the murder was committed while engaged in kidnapping (given great weight); and that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated without any pretense of moral or legal justification (given great weight). See § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (i), Fla....
...wford's murder was committed while Pearce was engaged in or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of kidnapping. Pearce argues that the trial court erred in finding this aggravating circumstance as it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that it is an aggravating circumstance if "[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice, in the commission of ......
...ission during the course of a kidnapping in this case. CCP Aggravating Circumstance The trial court concluded that Crawford's murder was "committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 48 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 1147291
...Such evidence, "designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death," is admissible once the prosecution has provided evidence of one or more aggravating circumstances. § 921.141(7), Fla....
...1. Statutory Mental Mitigators Hoskins asserts that the trial court erred in rejecting two statutory mental mitigators: that "the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004); and that "the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired." § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...actors against the aggravating factors is the trial judge's function). Accordingly, we reject this claim. 3. The "Avoid Arrest" Aggravator Hoskins claims that the trial court improperly found and instructed the jury on the "avoid arrest" aggravator. § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
...rom a representative cross section of the community" because the trial court permitted the court clerk to excuse certain jurorsas procedurally barred. Hoskins,
702 So.2d at 205-06. [2] The trial court found each mitigating circumstance pursuant to section
921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (2004), "any other factors in the defendant's background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty." The trial court also found mitigating circumstance (8) pursuant to section
921.141(6)(g), "[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime." Thus, the trial court found one statutory mitigator and fifteen nonstatutory mitigators....
CopyCited 47 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 514605
...The judge found two aggravating circumstances: 1) Spencer was previously convicted of a violent felony, based upon his contemporaneous convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and attempted second-degree murder; and 2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). § 921.141(5)(b), (h), Fla.Stat....
...in Spencer's background, including drug and alcohol abuse, paranoid personality disorder, sexual abuse by his father, honorable military record, good employment record, and ability to function in a structured environment that does not contain women. § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 47 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2012 WL 1672183, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9794
... The trial judge adopted the jury’s sentencing recommendations. In so
doing, the judge found four aggravating circumstances surrounding Walters’s
murder: (1) Pope was previously convicted of another capital felony (the murders
of Di Russo and Dorantz), Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b); (2) the capital felony was
committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest (for the murders of Di Russo
and Dorantz), id. § 921.141(5)(e); (3) the capital felony was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel (in part because Pope failed to show any remorse), id. §
921.141(5)(h); and (4) the capital felony was a homicide committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner (because Pope spent two days with Walters
before murdering her), id. § 921.141(5)(i). The judge found one mitigating
circumstance, the “catchall” provision, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(h), because Pope
had served in Vietnam and was honorably discharged from the Marines....
...McCollum,
130 S. Ct. 447, 455 (2009).
Nor did the jury hear that, according to Pope’s experts, his behavior at the
time of the murders satisfied two statutory mitigating circumstances -- (1) extreme
emotional or mental disturbance, see Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(b); and (2) diminished
41
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, see id. §
921.141(6)(f) -- or that several non-statutory mitigating circumstances, including
his impoverished and abusive childhood and his capacity for rehabilitation,
applied....
CopyCited 47 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 75310
...In that case, the Court relied upon its early decision in Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420,
100 S.Ct. 1759,
64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), to hold that Oklahoma's aggravating factor of "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" was unconstitutionally vague. Smalley argues that because Florida uses the same words (section
921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1987)), Florida's aggravating factor also is unconstitutionally vague under the eighth amendment....
CopyCited 47 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 377601
...*653 Burns also challenges the prosecutor's reference to this evidence in closing argument. In support of his claim that this evidence was improperly admitted, Burns makes several arguments that previously have been rejected. We have rejected Burns' contention that the admission of victim impact evidence pursuant to section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993), violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws....
...Archer v. State,
673 So.2d 17, 21 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
117 S.Ct. 197,
136 L.Ed.2d 134 (1996); Windom v. State,
656 So.2d 432, 439 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
116 S.Ct. 571,
133 L.Ed.2d 495 (1995). We have also repeatedly upheld section
921.141 against claims that the capital sentencing statute improperly regulates practice and procedure....
...Rather, we ordered a new sentencing proceeding because we could not say that the erroneously admitted guilt-phase testimony did not affect the sentencing recommendation. [15] Our holding thus did not preclude the introduction of victim impact evidence which is admissible pursuant to section 921.141(7) in the resentencing proceeding....
...use the State introduced victim impact evidence. We do not find merit in this kind of quid pro quo assertion. Victim impact evidence that informs the jury about the specific harm caused by the crime in question is relevant and authorized pursuant to section 921.141(7)....
...district court in that state. Songer,
544 So.2d at 1012 (Ehrlich, J., concurring). [8] The statutory mental mitigators are: (1) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, §
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993); and (2) the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, §
921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 47 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 85
...ay. We deny the habeas petition and affirm the denial of the rule 3.850 motion. Johnson was charged with the crimes of murder in the first degree and armed robbery. The accusations were tried by a jury and Johnson was convicted on both counts. Under section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1977), a separate sentencing proceeding was held and the jury thereafter recommended death as the appropriate sentence for the murder....
...shing mitigating circumstances or negating aggravating circumstances for the purpose of establishing the appropriateness of a sentence of life imprisonment as opposed to a sentence of death, as these are the only issues at a sentencing hearing under section 921.141....
CopyCited 47 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1999 WL 628777
...o submitted to the trial court. [1] On April 12, 1995, the trial court sentenced appellant to death. The court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1995); (2) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, see id. § 921.141(5)(f); and (3) the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, see id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 110905
...Judges should be ever vigilant that every litigant gets that to which he or she is entitled: "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." State ex rel. Davis v. Parks,
141 Fla. 516, 519-20,
194 So. 613, 615 (1939). NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. [2] §
921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1975). [3] Id. §
921.141(5)(b). [4] Id. §
921.141(5)(d)....
CopyCited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 357
...(Crim.) 3.07 "Instruction upon Discharge of Jury", such an instruction is clearly improper prior to the conclusion of the jury's duties. The trial court found two aggravating circumstances: 1) the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery, section 921.141(5)(d), and 2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h), and two-non statutory mitigating circumstances: 1) Kight once apprehended a robber and 2) codefendant Hutto could not receive the death penalty because of his plea to second-degree murder....
...itigating circumstances. Kight argues that "unrefuted" evidence of his mental retardation and deprived childhood established: 1) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, section 921.141(6)(b); 2) the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another, section 921.141(6)(e); and 3) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially *933 impaired, section 921.141(6)(f)....
CopyCited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 395, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 1568, 2011 WL 2637418
...and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused.” The admission of victim impact evidence is governed more specifically by section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2006), which states: Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence to the jury....
...ctim’s death. Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as part of victim impact evidence. “Victim impact evidence must be limited to that which is relevant as specified in section 921.141(7).” Windom v....
...The statement described how the children felt orphaned by the loss of their mother and how they would feel her absence at future holidays and family gatherings. Evidence describing the impact of a victim’s death on members of the victim’s family is appropriate under section 921.141(7): Clearly, the boundaries of relevance under the statute include evidence concerning the impact to family members....
...Accordingly, we reject this claim of error. CCP Turning to the trial court’s sentencing order, Baker, argues that the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s conclusion that the murder was CCP is supported by competent and substantial evidence. HAC Baker next argues that the trial court erred in finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 32, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 111, 2015 WL 268111
...- 13 -
weight); and (4) Marquardt had previously been convicted of another felony
involving the use or threat of violence, based on a conviction for aggravated
burglary in Wisconsin (assigned some weight). See §§ 921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), (i),
Fla....
...First, the trial
court found that Marquardt’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially
impaired, based on his commitment to a mental health facility for separate criminal
charges in Wisconsin (assigned some weight). See § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...Marquardt being
a law abiding citizen who was close to his family before there were reported
instances of criminal activity (assigned minimal weight), and the fact that he was
never previously violent toward anyone (assigned minimal weight). See
§ 921.141(6)(h), Fla....
...urders were committed while Marquardt
was engaged in the commission of a burglary (great weight); and (4) Marquardt
had previously been convicted of another felony involving the use or threat of
violence (aggravated burglary) (some weight). See §§ 921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), (i),
Fla....
...would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty based on Marquardt being a
law abiding citizen who was close to his family before there were reported
instances of criminal activity (minimal weight) and was never previously violent
toward anyone (minimal weight). See §§ 921.141(6)(f), (h), Fla....
CopyCited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 4335487
...Blake argues that this case is "distinguishable from those defendants who are on supervision from prior prison sentences or for violent offenses against persons." While it is true that none of Blake's prior offenses involved violence, it is also true that section 921.141(5)(a) does not require violence for this aggravator to apply. See § 921.141(5)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 85110
...n. The evidence demonstrates the heightened premeditation necessary to sustain this aggravating circumstance. SHAW, C.J., and HARDING, J., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. [2] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] Id. § 921.141(5)(e). [4] Id. § 921.141(5)(h). [5] Id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
...osecutor to have information which may be relevant to the offense charged, and to any defense with respect thereto." Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.220(b)(1)(i). [8] We note that the brand name of the knife used in the attack was never an "issue" at trial. [9] See § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 559883
...ee murder of Lorraine Pezza. The jury recommended the death sentence by a vote of eleven to one. The trial court found two aggravating factors: (1) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a burglary, see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla.Stat. (1995); and (2) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, see id. § 921.141(5)(e)....
...Accordingly, finding no reversible error during the guilt phase of the trial, we affirm Consalvo's convictions. Penalty Phase Appellant claims that the victim-impact testimony of the victim's brother should not have been admitted and that the prosecutor used the victim-impact evidence improperly. We disagree. Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995), which establishes the permissible bounds of victim-impact evidence, states: Such evidence shall be designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death....
...Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as part of victim impact evidence. After reviewing the testimony of the victim's brother, we conclude that it did not violate the dictates of section 921.141(7)....
...ertain non-statutory mitigating circumstances and the court applied an improper standard in evaluating the "turbulent family background" mitigating circumstance; (16) The trial court erred in finding the "avoid arrest" aggravating circumstance; (17) Section 921.141 (5)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), which delineates the "felony murder" aggravator, is unconstitutional; (18) Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995), which authorizes the introduction of victim-impact evidence, is unconstitutional; (19) Death by electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment; and (20) The death penalty is not proportionally warranted in this case....
...State,
574 So.2d 108, 111 (Fla.), cert, denied,
502 U.S. 841,
112 S.Ct. 131,
116 L.Ed.2d 99 (1991). [6] See, e.g.. Hunter v. State,
660 So.2d 244, 253 & n. 11 (Fla.1995), cert, denied, ___ U.S. ___,
116 S.Ct. 946,
133 L.Ed.2d 871 (1996). [7] We have explicitly upheld the constitutionality of section
921.141(7) in Maxwell v....
CopyCited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 1338488
...d. at 537. Therefore, " Apprendi preserves the constitutionality of capital sentencing schemes like Florida's." Id. This Court's decision in Mills forecloses Looney's claim and, therefore, it is denied. Victim Impact Evidence Looney next argues that section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), allowing the admission of victim impact evidence, is a usurpation of this Court's rulemaking authority vested in it by the Florida Constitution. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. [23] We find Looney's argument is without merit. In Maxwell v. State,
657 So.2d 1157 (Fla.1995), this Court addressed the following question certified to be of great public importance: "Is section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes, allowing victim impact evidence, unconstitutional?" This Court answered in the negative and, thus, specifically upheld the constitutionality of section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993). See Maxwell,
657 So.2d at 1157. Moreover, in rejecting various arguments attacking the constitutionality of section
921.141(7), this Court has stated: "We have also repeatedly upheld section
921.141 against claims that the capital sentencing statute improperly regulates practice and procedure." Burns v....
...State,
699 So.2d 646, 653 (Fla.1997) (finding admission of victim impact evidence is relevant and statute does not violate ex post facto *676 laws or equal protection). [24] Nevertheless, Looney argues because this Court, in Windom v. State,
656 So.2d 432, 439 (Fla.1995), declared section
921.141(7) to be "procedural," the Legislature's enactment must necessarily infringe upon this Court's rulemaking authority....
CopyCited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 122170
...tal felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery; (3) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest; and (4) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. § 921.141(5)(a), (d), (e), (h), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 377595
...ent or confession which is offered against the accused in a criminal action, and which is made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused, is not within this exception. Ch. 90-174, § 4, at 744-45, Laws of Florida. [3] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] § 921.141(5)(j), Fla....
CopyCited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 6553
...SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., and EHRLICH, Senior Justice, concur. McDONALD, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. [2] Murder committed by person under sentence of imprisonment, section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1983); previous conviction of a violent felony, section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1983); murder committed in course of sexual battery and kidnapping, section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1983); murder committed to avoid arrest, section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1983); murder especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1983); and murder committed in cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1983)....
CopyCited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 48
...Finally, defendant objects to the trial court's findings with respect to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: 1) the defendant had been previously convicted of armed robbery and assault with intent to commit murder, section 921.141(5)(b); 2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery, section 921.141(5)(d); 3) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, section 921.141(5)(f); 4) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h); 5) the capital felony was a homicide which was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, section 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 297027
...s established by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt without reference to this additional language. Kormondy also argues the court erred in its consideration of mitigating evidence and in writing an internally inconsistent sentencing order. Under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (2000), trial judges are required to consider and weigh all aggravation and mitigation offered by the parties and record their findings....
...Therefore, it cannot be determined from the record that the defendant was deprived of his opportunity to cross-examine or impeach the witness. Victim Impact Evidence Kormondy argues that the trial court allowed the State to present improper victim impact evidence to the jury. Both the caselaw from this Court and section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2000), allow for the introduction of victim impact evidence. Section 921.141(7) provides: Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence....
...Moreover, this issue did not become such a feature of the sentencing proceeding so as to make its admission fundamental error. Kormondy misinterprets Windom as barring testimony about the effect the victim had on his community. In fact, Windom simply reemphasizes that *54 victim impact testimony, as outlined in section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes, is permissible, but is to be limited to the victim's uniqueness and the loss to the community caused by the victim's death....
CopyCited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2009 WL 2612524
...The prosecutor's comments were based on victim impact evidence admitted during the penalty phase. Victim impact evidence is admissible, but its purpose is "to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." §
921.141(7), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also Wheeler v. State,
4 So.3d 599, 607 (Fla.2009), petition for cert. filed, No. 08-11026 (U.S. May 28, 2009); Franklin v. State,
965 So.2d 79, 98 (Fla.2007); Huggins v. State,
889 So.2d 743, 765 (Fla. 2004). Section
921.141 specifically states that "[c]haracterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as a part of victim impact evidence." §
921.141(7), Fla....
...ited States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584,
122 S.Ct. 2428,
153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), does not allow a system in which the jury may render an advisory nonunanimous verdict. We address each claim in turn. Hayward asserts that section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2008), Florida's capital sentencing statute, does not authorize a bare majority advisory sentence and that a bare majority jury recommendation of death is unreliable, thereby depriving him of due process. [13] Hayward's claim has no merit for two reasons. First, section
921.141(3) makes specific reference to a sentencing recommendation by "a majority of the jury," and we have previously recognized that Florida's capital sentencing statute "allows the death penalty to be imposed even though the penalty-phase jury may determine by a mere majority vote" whether to recommend death....
...Because we have previously rejected this same claim and found the standard instruction sufficiently instructs the jury as to premeditated design, this claim is without merit. As his last constitutional challenge, Hayward contends that Florida's capital sentencing scheme under section 921.141, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional based on Ring because it does not require that the finding of aggravators be made by a unanimous jury....
CopyCited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 40358
...murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel). Appellant's ninth point asserts that two of the four aggravating factors were improperly found. Specifically, he argues that at the time of his crime he was not under sentence of imprisonment as intended in section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). We disagree. We have held that a finding that an appellant was under sentence of imprisonment and thus subject to the aggravating factor provided by section 921.141(5)(a) is supported by evidence that he was on parole at the time he committed murder....
...onvicted of violent felonies; the capital felony was committed while engaged in a burglary; and the capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(a), (b), (d), (i), Fla....
CopyCited 44 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 603489
...re was in possession of a firearm two days after the victim's death; (5) it was error to admit a copy of codefendant Clemons' written statements to police into evidence; (6) it was error to admit victim impact evidence which did not comport with the section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995); and (7) it was error to allow the State to use mitigation as nonstatutory aggravation during penalty phase closing arguments....
...evidence about the *551 victim and the impact of the murder on the victim's family wherever state law permitted its admission. Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 827,
111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609,
115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). Accordingly, the legislature enacted section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993), stating that victim-impact evidence would be allowed where it showed "the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." See Ch....
CopyCited 44 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 108367
...Because neither argument has merit, we deny relief. See Rutherford v. Moore,
774 So.2d 637, 643 (Fla.2000) (holding that appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless argument on direct appeal). 2. Constitutionality of Section
921.141(5) In his second habeas claim, Rogers asserts that section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (2005), Florida's death sentencing statute, is unconstitutional because it authorizes the use of an underlying felony as an aggravator supporting the death sentence and improperly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that the death penalty is not the appropriate penalty....
...uld have given the statutory mental mitigating circumstances at least great or significant weight and should have found the mitigating circumstance that the murder was committed while "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," § 921.141, Fla....
...da death sentencing statute as applied violates the United States Constitution under Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466,
120 S.Ct. 2348,
147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584,
122 S.Ct. 2428,
153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); (2) whether section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (2005), is facially vague and overbroad in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, whether such unconstitutionality is reversible error because the jury did not receive adequate guidance in violation of...
CopyCited 44 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 66656
...In this case, I would remand for further proceedings on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and, after that *86 issue is properly resolved, address the issues on the merits. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. [2] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1985). [3] Id. § 921.141(5)(i). [4] Id. § 921.141(5)(d). [5] Id. § 921.141(6)(a)....
CopyCited 44 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 112875
...ie Lee Parker (Parker's sister who is suffering from Alzheimer's and is therefore incompetent to testify), Rosie Lee Parker (Parker's sister), and Gloria Marshall and Martha Rahming (both former teachers). This Court has recognized that "even though section 921.141(1)[ [8] ] relaxes the evidentiary rules during the penalty phase of a capital trial" a party cannot introduce hearsay evidence unless the opposing party has a fair opportunity to rebut the hearsay....
...However, as previously explained, because the new penalty phase was a new proceeding, neither the trial court nor this Court is precluded from applying case law rendered after the original sentencing. [7] Parker does not argue that his statement to Detective Powers on May 7 was involuntary. [8] Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2003), provides that "[a]ny such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorde...
...Defense counsel also clearly stated that the objection still stood after the trial court explained that it would correct the misstatement. [12] In his tenth issue on appeal, Parker also asserts the murder in the course of a felony aggravator as specified in section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in this case because it provides for an automatic aggravating circumstance and neither "narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty" nor...
...Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 877,
103 S.Ct. 2733,
77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). We previously rejected this argument in Blanco v. State,
706 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla.1997). Further, we note that Parker's convictions for both kidnapping and robbery undermine his argument that section
921.141(5)(d) provides for an automatic aggravating circumstance in his case....
CopyCited 44 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ll his attorney. We therefore conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the finding that appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to have counsel present during his confession. With respect to his sentence, appellant argues that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1979), is ambiguous and should be construed so as to make a jury recommendation of a life sentence binding upon the trial judge....
...urt... . (3) FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCE OF DEATH. Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death... . § 921.141(2), Fla....
...denied,
449 U.S. 1118,
101 S.Ct. 931,
66 L.Ed.2d 847 (1981). Appellant also argues that the court erred in finding that the crime was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. See §
921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1979). We agree. As we stated in State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 943 [
94 S.Ct. 1951,
40 L.Ed.2d 295] ... (1974), the aggravating circumstances set out in section
921.141 must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt....
...and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in not finding as mitigating circumstances that he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distress, under section 921.141(6)(b), and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, under section 921.141(6)(f)....
CopyCited 44 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 68952
...tors applied: 1) the murders were committed during a kidnapping; 2) the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and 3) the murders were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. Section 921.141(5)(d), (h), (i), Florida Statutes (1989). The court further found that the factors of 1) the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many people; and 2) the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest "may well apply." Section 921.141(5)(c), (e), Florida Statutes (1989). In mitigation, the court found: 1) Jackson had no significant history of prior criminal activity, section 921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1989); 2) Jackson had a good upbringing and no serious problems with the law; and 3) Jackson had led an exemplary life, was a good son, and had been helpful to his friends, the Bentleys, who testified on his behalf....
...ing, or caring, how many police officers, medical personnel, and/or firemen would respond *109 to the scene. Had the fireman reached the fuel tanks, an explosion may well have created a risk of death to many persons. The term "great risk" as used in section 921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), means more than a mere possibility; it means a likelihood or high probability of death to many people....
CopyCited 44 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 39 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 219, 2014 WL 1408552, 2014 Fla. LEXIS 1211
...the police, who apprehended Gonzalez.
During a penalty phase proceeding, the trial court has the discretion to admit
evidence with regard to the details of a defendant’s previous conviction for a
felony involving the use or threat of violence. See § 921.141(1), (5)(b), Fla....
...Rather, the State may present any evidence that the trial
court “deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant
and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances enumerated in subsections (5) and (6)” of the statute. See §
921.141(1), Fla....
...While the prosecutor’s argument about the contemporaneous murder
convictions was not as artful as it could have been, it is obvious that the prosecutor
cited the murders as additional evidence supporting the prior violent felony
aggravator, which is entirely proper. Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes
(2009), provides that it is an aggravating circumstance if “[t]he defendant was
previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person.” We ha...
CopyCited 43 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 26364, 1994 WL 510463
...When he graduated from High School, then his mother gave him 48 hours to leave home. Psychiatric Evaluation by Fausto A. Natal, M.D., Psychiatrist, April 25, 1980, at 2. Following the trial, the judge entered a written order as required by Florida Statutes section 921.141 15 stating his findings and his reasons for the sentencing override....
...rocious and cruel; and, (5) that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner, without any pretense of moral or legal justification. With regard to mitigation, the judge’s order recited: As to the mitigating factors under Section 921.141(6) the Court finds that the Defendant has not contended nor has he proven [any of the statutory mitigating circumstances]....
CopyCited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The jury rendered a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree and, during the sentencing phase of the proceedings, returned an advisory sentence of death. Appellant was sentenced to death by the trial judge who, in his findings of fact in support thereof, noted the following aggravating circumstances pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975): (1) that appellant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person [subsection (5)(b)]; (2) that appellant had knowingly created a great risk of death to many p...
...that this ultimate penalty be imposed. See McCaskill v. State,
344 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 1977); Douglas v. State,
328 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1976); State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973). The trial court found that three aggravating circumstances enumerated in section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1975), were present. We concur in the sentencing judge's determination that appellant satisfied the criteria of section
921.141(5)(b) in that he previously had been convicted of assault with intent to commit manslaughter....
...By using the word "many," the legislature indicated that a great risk of death to a small number of people would not establish this aggravating circumstance. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that the appellant created a great risk of death to many persons.
371 So.2d at 1009. The finding under section
921.141(5)(h) was predicated upon the fact that appellant shot the victim in the chest and, as the latter attempted to flee, shot him several more times in the back....
...Because we have found no reversible error with respect to the conviction of appellant, we hereby affirm the judgment of guilty of murder in the first degree. However, because the trial judge imposed the sentence of death after having improperly found the aggravating circumstances enunciated in sections
921.141(5)(c) and (h), Florida Statutes (1975), to exist, that sentence must be vacated. See Elledge v. State,
346 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1977). Accordingly, this cause is remanded to the trial judge solely for the purpose of resentencing the appellant without taking into consideration the aggravating circumstances delineated in sections
921.141(5)(c) and
921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1975)....
CopyCited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 721612
...CCP. The court did not consider the other twoduring the course of a robbery/burglary/kidnapping and pecuniary gain. After reviewing the record for mitigation, the court assigned little weight to two factors under the statutory catchall provision, section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (2003), specifically Buzia's interaction with the community and his work record....
...Prior Violent Felony Aggravating Circumstance In his first claim, Buzia challenges the trial court's finding of the prior violent felony aggravator. He argues that his contemporaneous guilty verdict for the attempted murder of Mrs. Kersch was not a "conviction" under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2003)....
...This claim lacks merit anyway. Section 921.0011(2), Florida Statutes (2001), defines "conviction" as a "determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld. " (Emphasis added.) "The word `convicted' as used in section 921.141(5)(b) means a valid guilty plea or jury verdict of guilty for a violent felony; an adjudication of guilt is not necessary...." McCrae v....
...Furthermore, we have upheld death sentences where the prior violent felony aggravator was the only one present. See, e.g., LaMarca v. State,
785 So.2d 1209, 1217 (Fla.2001); Ferrell v. State,
680 So.2d 390, 391 (Fla.1996). *1217 The court assigned little weight to two factors under the statutory catchall provision, section
921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (2003), specifically Buzia's interaction with the community and his work record....
CopyCited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 108542
...NOTES [1] The trial court found two aggravating circumstances: the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of a robbery; and the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. See § 921.141(5)(d), (i), Fla.Stat. (1993). [2] The trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance, Archer had no significant history of prior criminal activity, which the trial court gave significant weight. See § 921.141(6)(a), Fla.Stat....
...ry instructions; and 2.09, submitting the case to the jury. Archer also claims the trial court erred in not giving the jury the miscellaneous instructions 3.01, principals, and 3.01(a), principalswhen active participant hired by defendant. [4] See § 921.141(6)(g), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Therefore, the advisory sentence of the jury should be followed." Ross correctly points out that the third step in Florida's statutory scheme requires the reasoned judgment of the trial judge to be interposed between the emotions of the jurors and a death sentence. Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1975), provides: (3) FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCE OF DEATH....
...urt to reconsider its sentence in light of this opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. The case is remanded, however, for the sole purpose of allowing the trial court to reconsider the imposition of the sentence of death in accordance with section 921.141 [1] and consistent with this decision and with Provence v....
...ors. Death is not an appropriate penalty. The sentence of death should be vacated and a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for twenty-five years should be imposed. NOTES [1] Although not challenging the constitutionality of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), Florida's Death Penalty Statute, in his brief, Ross has filed notice of supplemental authority citing Lockett v....
CopyCited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 517365
...r of committed during the course of a robbery likewise cannot stand. We find no merit to Knowles' contention that a contemporaneous conviction of murder cannot be used to establish the aggravating factor of prior conviction of a violent felony under section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1991). See Pardo v. State,
563 So.2d 77, 80 (Fla. 1990) (contemporaneous conviction of violent felony may qualify as aggravating factor under section
921.141(5)(b) if the two crimes involved multiple victims or separate episodes), cert....
...ch of the murders). *67 However, we agree with Knowles that the trial court erred in failing to find uncontroverted mitigating circumstances. Although urged by defense counsel, the trial court failed to find that Knowles' capacity was impaired under section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (1991), or that Knowles was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance under section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1991)....
...ecommendation would have; 12) the court erred in failing to find certain mitigation; and 13) the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the state had to prove that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. [5] § 921.141(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (1991). [6] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 326690
...In any case, after examining the challenged testimony, we find any error to be harmless at most. [6] Ex Post Facto Violation in Use of Aggravator In issue seven, Rose argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of and rely upon the aggravator that the victim was twelve years old pursuant to section 921.141(5)( 1 ), Florida Statutes (1997)....
...violation of ex post facto principles, requiring a new penalty phase or alternatively a reduction of his sentence to life. Below, the State was allowed to argue that "the victim of the capital felony was a person less than twelve years of age." *800 § 921.141(5)( l ), Fla....
...nd the invocation of the improper aggravator had had no possible effect on the sentencing proceedings. Recently in Lukehart v. State,
762 So.2d 482, 501 (Fla.2000), we decided a similar issue wherein the Court found that the Legislature, in amending section
921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes, to include the phrase "or on probation," altered the substantive law by adding an entirely new aggravator to be applied upon the defendant....
...We find no error in the trial court's harmless error analysis. Prior Violent Felony Aggravator In issue 8 Rose argues the court gave undue weight to the prior violent felony aggravator because the predicate felony did not involve a threat of violence. Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, provides: "The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or another felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." We have held that the "finding of a prior violent felony co...
...apping counts. See Rose,
425 So.2d at 523. Hence, that legal issue has already been decided. HAC Aggravator In issue ten Rose argues the trial court erred in finding that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. As provided by section
921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes, the fact that a capital felony is especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel is an aggravator....
...Victim Impact Testimony In issue twelve Rose argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony from family members of the decedent and in allowing the decedent's mother to remain in the courtroom throughout the sentencing phase proceedings over defense objection. Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1997), provides: Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence....
...However, by itself, this was harmless. See James,
695 So.2d at 1234. [7] Rose also submitted his age at the time of the crime as a statutory mitigator. We conclude that the trial court properly rejected this mitigator. Rose was thirty-one years old at the time. [8] See §
921.141(5)(a), Fla.Stat. (1997). [9] See §
921.141(5)(b), Fla.Stat. (1997). [10] See §
921.141(5)(d), Fla.Stat. (1997). [11] See §
921.141(5)(h), Fla.Stat. (1997). [12] See §
921.141(5)( l ), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Appellant's argument on this issue is without merit. Finding no error at the guilt-or-innocence phase of the trial, we affirm the judgment of conviction. III. SENTENCE Appellant contends that his sentence of death is invalid because Florida's capital felony sentencing law, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), under which sentence was imposed, is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution....
...y appropriate. Neary v. State,
384 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1980); Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975). As aggravating circumstances, the trial court judge found that at the time of the capital felony, the appellant was under sentence of imprisonment, §
921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1975), that appellant had previously been convicted of crimes involving the use or threat of violence, id. §
921.141(5)(b), that in committing the capital felony, appellant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons, id. §
921.141(5)(c), and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Id. §
921.141(5)(h)....
...ed felon. We hold that none of these crimes falls within the meaning of this aggravating circumstance as defined by the statute. Only previous conviction of "another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence" will satisfy section 921.141(5)(b)....
CopyCited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 1057708
...We find Johnson distinguishable and in light of the totality of the circumstances of this case as compared to the facts of other capital cases, we conclude that the death penalty is proportionate in this case. [12] V. Ring v. Arizona In his last issue on appeal, Douglas argues that Florida's death penalty statute, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1999), is unconstitutional under Ring v....
...sis for declaring Florida's statute facially unconstitutional. See, e.g., Lawrence v. State,
846 So.2d 440, 451 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
124 S.Ct. 394,
157 L.Ed.2d 286 (2003); Butler v. State,
842 So.2d 817, 834 (Fla.2003). *1264 Further, section
921.141 is constitutional as applied in this case because one of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court is that the murder was committed in the course of a sexual battery....
...I agree that Douglas is not entitled to relief under Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584,
122 S.Ct. 2428,
153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), but disagree with the majority's reasoning on this issue because *1265 I conclude that the murder in the course of a felony aggravator contained in section
921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), was unconstitutionally applied to Douglas in violation of both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution....
...as the former exposes a defendant to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the latter increases the maximum permissible sentence to death.") (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.). Thus, under Ring the aggravating circumstances in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2003), are alternative elements of the greater offense of capital murder....
CopyCited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 721089
...fact independently engaged in the statutorily mandated weighing process. In Patterson v. State,
513 So.2d 1257, 1261 (Fla.1987), we condemned the practice of a trial judge delegating to the State the responsibility of preparing the sentencing order. Section
921.141, Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), [1] requires a trial judge to independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances....
...be heard in person. Second, after hearing the evidence and argument, the trial judge should then recess the proceeding to consider the appropriate sentence. If the judge determines that the death sentence should be imposed, then, in accordance with section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), the judge must set forth in writing the reasons for imposing the death sentence....
...ce presented. Under these circumstances, I would vacate the sentence of death and remand this case for resentencing before the trial judge, to include a determination as to whether or not the antisocial personality disorder was mitigating. NOTES [1] Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2000), mandates the same independent weighing as its predecessor statute.
CopyCited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 399225
...the expiration of the twenty-five-year minimum mandatory. Gore's third argument is that the trial court erred in finding that his prior conviction for armed trespass of a conveyance constituted a felony involving the use or threat of violence under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1991)....
...In Johnson v. State,
465 So.2d 499 (Fla.1985), we held that the offense of burglary is not per se a crime involving violence or threat of violence. We continued: [W]hether a previous conviction of burglary constitutes a felony involving violence under section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), depends on the facts of the previous crime....
...unding a defendant's prior crime of armed trespass satisfy the requirements of this aggravating factor. In Johnson, we concluded that it was error to instruct the jury that burglary is a felony involving the use or threat of violence for purposes of section 921.141(5)(b) without making it clear that the circumstances surrounding the particular burglary are dispositive....
CopyCited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 920230
...At the resentencing proceeding, twelve of Van Ness' friends and family members testified about the impact of her murder. Both the Florida Constitution and the Florida Statutes instruct that victim impact evidence is to be heard in considering capital felony sentences in our state. See art. I, § 16, Fla. Const.; § 921.141(7), Fla....
...The jury was instructed that the evidence could not be considered as an aggravating circumstance, but should only be considered "insofar as it demonstrates [Van Ness's] uniqueness as an individual human being and the result of loss to the community and its members by her death." This instruction is entirely consistent with section 921.141(7) and complies with the guidelines that we explained in Windom....
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25275, 1995 WL 529100
...At the sentencing phase of the trial, the judge instructed the jury concerning five statutory aggravators that the jury could weigh against any mitigating circumstances. One of the aggravators was that the murder was “especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel” (the “HAC factor”). See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp.1995)....
...TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, dissenting, in which KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, join: I. During the penalty phase of the Florida capital sentencing scheme, the jury weighs the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances and recommends either a sentence of death or life imprisonment. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(2)....
... influenced the jury’s death recommendation. After the jury makes its recommendation, the trial judge weighs the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and imposes the sentence, providing written findings to support a death sentence. 1 See id. § 921.141(3). The statute characterizes the jury’s recommendation as an “advisory sentence.” See id. § 921.141(2)....
...attempted commission, of the crime of kidnapping; (2) for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest; (3) for pecuniary gain; (4) and in a "cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5)(d), (e), (f), (i) (West Supp.1995). 2 . Florida has a trifurcated death-sentencing procedure. First, the jury weighs aggravating and mitigating circumstances and by majority vote recommends a sentence of life or death. Fla. Stat.Ann. § 921.141(2) (West 1985). Second, the trial court reweighs aggravators and mitigators and sentences the defendant, making written findings as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances if the court imposes the death penalty. Id. § 921.141(3)....
...recommendation great weight. Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975). Third, the death-sentenced defendant may appeal by right to the Florida Supreme Court, which itself may reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Fla. Stat.Ann. §
921.141(4); State v....
...Florida law could be changed to eliminate the "great weight” requirement either by a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida or by legislation. During the 1995 legislative session, bills were introduced in both the House (H.B. 1319) and the Senate (S.B. 1846) to amend § 921.141 such that the jury's recommendation would be purely advisory and the trial judge would owe no deference to the jury. H.B. 1319, which passed both the House and the Senate, amended § 921.141(2) to clarify that the jury renders “a nonbinding advisory recommendation” rather than “an advisory sentence,” and amended § 921.141(3) to read as follows: Following the return of the jury's nonbinding advisory recommendation, the court shall make an independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine the appropriate sentence....
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Thus, we agree with the trial court that there are no mitigating circumstances sub judice. As for Appellant's objection to the trial court's consideration of the presentence investigation report, we find no error in that consideration, which in fact is authorized by Rule 3.710, Rules of Criminal Procedure, that supplements Section 921.141, Florida Statutes. We observe that Appellant did not object to such consideration and that he received a copy of the PSI and had the opportunity to rebut it prior to sentencing. While it is true that Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, does not provide specifically for the consideration of a PSI report, it is our view that the statute should not be so strictly construed as to prevent the consideration of a document authorized by the Rules to be considered....
...[4]
104 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1958). [5] Harrell v. State,
245 So.2d 302 (Fla.App. 1971). [6] State v. Jones,
204 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1967). [7] State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. den. in consolidated case (Hunter),
416 U.S. 943,
94 S.Ct. 1950,
40 L.Ed.2d 295. [8] Section
921.141(3), Florida Statutes, now Section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes. [9] Section
921.141(4), Florida Statutes, now Section
921.141(6), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 78752
...The following two aggravating factors were found in connection with both murders: 1) the murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment because Asay was on parole; and 2) Asay had been previously convicted of a capital felony based on the contemporaneous murder conviction. § 921.141(5)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (1987). In connection with the McDowell murder, the court found a third aggravating factor, that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, without any pretense of any moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1987). Asay's age of twenty-three at the time of the offenses was found in mitigation as to both murders. § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Knight, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. SUNDBERG, Justice. Appellant, a 29-year-old male, appeals his conviction for first degree murder and robbery and sentence of death. This Court has jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and Section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes....
...Additionally, we believe counsel for the defendant was effectively deprived of establishing an important mitigating circumstance when he was not afforded the opportunity to present psychiatric testimony to the jury during the sentencing portion of the proceedings. Subsection 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes, provides as a mitigating circumstance that "[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." Counsel for the appellant represented to...
...The expression by the trial court that the verdict of the jury is merely advisory and that he could consider psychiatric reports at the time he performed the actual sentencing, in our opinion, violates the legislative intent which can be gleaned from Section 921.141, Florida Statutes. It is clear that the Legislature in the enactment of Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, sought to devise a scheme of checks and balances in which the input of the jury serves as an integral part. The validity of the jury's recommendation is directly related to the information it receives to form a foundation for such recommendation. Subsection 921.141(1), Florida Statutes, provides in part: "......
...excluded may be considered. We recognize that this will result in a hearing before a different jury from that which heard the evidence upon which the verdict of guilty was rendered. However, we find authority for such procedure in that portion of Subsection 921.141(1), Florida Statutes, which states: "......
...If the trial jury has been waived or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose, unless waived by the defendant... ." Also, by Chapter 74-379, Laws of Florida, effective October 1, 1974, the following language was added to Subsection 921.141(1), Florida Statutes: "......
...sses our conclusion that the proper course in this analogous situation is to impanel a special jury to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and make its recommendation to the trial court for proper sentencing pursuant to Section 921.141, Florida Statutes....
...The judgments of guilt of robbery and of first degree murder are affirmed but the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to conduct further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (1973)....
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 67 A.L.R. 4th 917
...aggravating circumstance and that it was not supported by evidence. This argument is without merit because the judge's oral comment was not a part of the formal written findings of fact in support of the sentence of death prepared in accordance with section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...r Burglary at the time of this offense having been sentenced to four (4) years in the Department of Corrections on March 14, 1978." Appellant says that this is not a clear finding of the statutory aggravating circumstance authorized by section *1266 921.141(5)(a) and that the factual support for the finding was deficient in that it was based on a presentence investigation report rather than direct documentary evidence. It is well settled that a person on parole from a sentence of imprisonment continues to be under sentence of imprisonment for purposes of section 921.141(5)(a)....
...ting circumstance. Appellant next argues that the court committed several errors in connection with the finding that "defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." § 921.141(5)(b)....
...That information, which the defendant had the opportunity to (but did not) explain, rebut, or deny, showed the arson conviction to have been based on a violent incident. Appellant's argument that his aggravated battery conviction could not be considered in support of the section 921.141(5)(b) aggravating circumstance because the offense occurred after the capital felony is without merit....
...1229,
103 S.Ct. 3571,
77 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1983). Next appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the capital felony was committed in the course of the crimes of burglary and rape as a basis for *1267 the statutory aggravating circumstance of section
921.141(5)(d)....
...ave to find entry with intent to commit theft. Appellant is correct in the conclusion that the jury verdicts did not represent a finding that appellant committed rape. This conclusion, however, does not undermine the validity of the finding that the section 921.141(5)(d) aggravating circumstance was present....
...e that finding of the heinousness factor is adequately supported. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...h should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Id. at 910. In overruling the recommendation of the jury, the trial judge found that there were several aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provides: Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if...
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2012 WL 3517146, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17352
...the murders of
Nick and Ralph Grandinetti.
The trial court imposed a sentence of death for each conviction. The trial
court found two aggravating factors applicable to both murders: the murders were
committed for pecuniary gain, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(f), and the murders were
“committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of
moral or legal justification,” id. § 921.141(5)(i). The trial court also found that the
murder of Nick Grandinetti was “especially heinous, atrocious, [and] cruel.” Id. §
921.141(5)(h). The trial court found two statutory mitigators: Ponticelli had no
significant history of previous criminal activity, id. § 921.141(6)(a), and Ponticelli
was 20 years old at the time of the offense, id. § 921.141(6)(g)....
...Mills’s hypothetical penalty phase testimony as
speculative and declined to find the existence of either statutory mitigator about
mental health. The court rejected the argument that Ponticelli had been “under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” when he killed the
brothers, id. § 921.141(6)(b). And the court rejected the argument that Ponticelli’s
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law had been substantially impaired, see id. § 921.141(6)(f).
D....
...State (Ponticelli I),
593 So. 2d 483 (1991),
the court rejected Ponticelli’s argument that the trial court erred when it rejected
the two statutory mitigators about mental health. With regard to the extreme
mental or emotional disturbance mitigator, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(b), the state
supreme court agreed with the trial court that Dr....
...drug use on the evening of the murders.” Id. With regard to whether Ponticelli’s
16
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was substantially impaired, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f), the
state supreme court determined that “there was no evidence that Ponticelli was
using cocaine at the time of the murders” and that “Ponticelli’s actions on the
night of the murder evinc[ed] that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct was not impaired.” Ponticelli I, 593 So....
...at
1408.
As in Cullen, “[t]he State presented extensive aggravating evidence.” Id.
The state proved that three statutory aggravators applied to Nick Grandinetti’s
death: Ponticelli committed the murder for pecuniary gain, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(f); Ponticelli committed the murder in a “cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification,” id. §
921.141(5)(i); and the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, [and] cruel,” id.
§ 921.141(5)(h)....
...Mills also testified that the two
statutory mental health mitigators should apply regardless of whether Ponticelli
used cocaine on the night of the murders. Despite this evidence, the court found
only two statutory mitigators—Ponticelli had no significant history of previous
criminal activity, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(a), and Ponticelli was 20 years old at the
66
time of the offense, id. § 921.141(6)(g). The court rejected the mental health
statutory mitigators, see id. § 921.141(6)(b), (f), and found no nonstatutory
mitigators.
Ponticelli relied on the same mitigation theory during collateral review, and
it is unlikely that a jury or sentencing court would have found his improved
version of a cocaine psychosis more persuasive the second time around for two
reasons....
...al. See
Ponticelli III,
941 So. 2d at 1092–99. During the penalty phase of Mr. Ponticelli’s
jury trial, the trial court found two statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) he has
no significant history of prior criminal activity, see Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(a); and
(2) he was twenty years old at the time of the offense, see id. §
921.141(6)(g). The
Florida Legislature’s affirmative inclusion of age and lack of criminal history
among its eight statutory mitigating circumstances, see id. §
921.141(6)(a)–(h),
75
together with the sentencing court’s finding that these mitigators applied, establish
that these aspects of Mr....
...Ponticelli’s behavior and the changes in his personality shortly before,
during, and after the offense were consistent with cocaine addiction; (2) Mr.
Ponticelli was suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance because
of his repeated cocaine use around the time of the offense, see Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(b); and (3) Mr. Ponticelli’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct was substantially impaired, see id. § 921.141(6)(f).
The force of this testimony was significantly limited, however, because of
the cursory nature of Dr....
...y aspect of his or her character or
record . . . .” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Second, it is significant
because it supports the existence of two mental state statutory mitigating
circumstances under Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b), (f)....
...of nine to three for the murders of both Nick and Ralph Grandinetti. The trial
88
court found two aggravating factors applied to the murder of each man: (1) the
homicides were committed for pecuniary gain, see Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(f); and
(2) the homicides were “committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner
without any pretense of moral or legal justification,” which is referred to as the
CCP aggravator, see id. § 921.141(5)(i). The trial court also found that Nick
Grandinetti’s murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” a factor often
referred to as the HAC aggravator. Id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 102057
...tence to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for twenty-five years from the date of the sentence, less any jail time served. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] Section 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] Section 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla....
CopyCited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 183081
...permissible testimony on lack of remorse. See Robinson v. State,
520 So.2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1988). After reviewing the record, we find this comment to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Valle v. State,
581 So.2d 40, 46 (Fla. 1991). Sireci's claim that section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1987), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied is without merit. Similarly, we find no merit in the claim that the Court violates the separation of powers *455 doctrine in defining the operative terms of section
921.141....
CopyCited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 154230
...actor is not applicable in the present case. On review of the record, we conclude that there was evidence which tended to establish that the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. § 921.141(6), Fla....
...Because this was not a jury override, the principles of Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975), are inapplicable. The evidence in this record supports the trial court's judgment of death, and this killing should not be dismissed as just another crime of passion. SHAW, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1985). [2] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1985). [3] §
921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1985). [4] §
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). [5] §
921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 670571
...denied,
510 U.S. 1077,
114 S.Ct. 892,
127 L.Ed.2d 85 (1994). We find no error. Branch claims that the court erred in allowing the State to introduce during the penalty phase a photograph of Morris taken several weeks before she was killed. We disagree. Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, provides for the introduction of victim impact evidence: Once the prosecutor has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence. Such evidence shall be designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death. §
921.141(7), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 273937
...requirements of Campbell v. State,
571 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1990), and also failed to consider statutory and non-statutory mitigating evidence. We agree. Larkins emphasizes that he produced substantial evidence of mitigation, especially mitigation under section
921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides that: "The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." For example, Dr....
...What is sacrificed is a just result in this case. Further sacrificed is the legislative intent that there be a reduction in the delay resulting from court procedures between a capital murder conviction and the execution of a capital sentence. NOTES [1] See § 921.141(5)(b), (f), Fla....
CopyCited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 1344834
...(2) the defendant had prior convictions for violent felonies; and (3) the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery. The trial court found the following statutory mitigating circumstances pursuant to section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (1997):(1) disruptive home life and child abuse (given significant weight); (2) hard-working employee (given significant weight); and (3) mental health problems that did not reach the level of section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1997) (given great weight)....
CopyCited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...2036,
68 L.Ed.2d 342 (1981), we held that: Persons who are under an order of probation and are not at the time of the commission of the capital offense incarcerated or escapees from incarceration do not fall within the phrase "person under sentence of imprisonment" as set forth in section
921.141(5)(a)....
...She was left in a partially nude condition in the area where the crime was committed to be thereafter fed upon by insects and other predators. Physical evidence would substantiate that following the attack upon Belinda Worley the defendant went back to the car and shot Brian Glenfeld through the head. See § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat. (1977). The only possible mitigating circumstance involved the defendant's mental state and *637 his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. § 921.141(6)(b) and (f), Fla....
...turbance, so we have no alternative but to return this case to the trial judge for resentencing. As we stated in Mines v. State,
390 So.2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 1,
101 S.Ct. 1994,
64 L.Ed.2d 681 (1981): Under the provisions of section
921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1975), there are two mitigating circumstances relating to a defendant's mental condition which should be considered before the imposition of a death sentence: "(b) The capital felony was committed while the defen...
...He even referred to the "M'Naghten Rule" which is the traditional rule in this state for determination of sanity at the time of the offense. It is clear from Mines that the classic insanity test is not the appropriate standard for judging the applicability of mitigating circumstances under section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 1786712
...The memorandum included the statutory mental mitigator of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and the seven nonstatutory mitigators requested, including Butler's long-term substance abuse problem. The record indicates the trial judge considered and weighed all of the mitigating evidence offered by the defense. Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), requires specific findings as to both aggravating and mitigating factors....
...I write only to comment upon the "nonunanimous advisory sentence" section of Justice Pariente's concurring and dissenting opinion. Of course, the reason for the nonunanimous jury is that this is what has been mandated by Florida statute since 1972, § 921.141(3), Fla....
...Frankly, prior to Apprendi and Ring, there would have been no reason to re-examine our precedent in this area. Further, in rejecting the constitutional challenge to a nonunanimous advisory sentence in Alvord, this Court relied on Watson v. State,
190 So.2d 161 (Fla.1966), which construed a predecessor to section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2002), that required imposition of a death sentence for first-degree murder unless the jury then recommended mercy....
...This Court reasoned in Watson that requiring a unanimous vote for a jury recommendation would reduce a defendant's chances of mercy.
190 So.2d at 166. Alvord does not discuss the distinction between the statute construed in Watson which was subsequently invalidated by Furman v. Georgia and section
921.141, which expanded the jury's role by giving it an affirmative voice in imposing death....
...[7] Although Dennis Tennell discussed Butler's use of beer and cocaine on the night of the murder and Antonio Strappy indicated Butler appeared as if he had been using drugs, neither said Butler was in any way incapacitated that night. [8] See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; § 921.141(4), Fla....
CopyCited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1096646
...rt on the victim impact issue. Despite the fact that the trial court allowed the defendant to speak, the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of this evidence was based on the trial court's belief that the admitted evidence was admissible under section 921.141(7), Florida *870 Statutes (2000). [6] This is evident by the fact that after listening to the proffers, the trial court placed limitations on the testimonies of two of the victim impact witnesses. In addition to the provision for this type of testimony in section 921.141(7), this Court has held that victim impact evidence is relevant even though it does not address any aggravating circumstance or rebut any mitigating circumstance....
...State,
705 So.2d 1337, 1350 (Fla. 1997). We are not persuaded by Schoenwetter's arguments that the standard jury *877 instructions given have somehow changed this point of law. We therefore find that the death sentences were not erroneously imposed. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION
921.141, FLORIDA STATUTES Schoenwetter argues that section
921.141, Florida Statutes, allows the trial court to sentence him to death without a unanimous death recommendation, in contravention of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The issue of whether section
921.141 is unconstitutional, in whole or in part, has been addressed repeatedly by this Court....
...mitigation to outweigh the aggravation. We should wait no longer to correct this longstanding problem. NOTES [1] The trial court cited to Taylor v. State,
855 So.2d 1, 31 (Fla.2003), for this proposition. [2] Cited by the trial court as set forth in section
921.141(5) & (6), Florida Statutes (2000)....
...and his younger sister; (9) while in the tenth grade, the defendant and his mother lived with the mother's boyfriend who physically and emotionally abused the defendant. [5] Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [6] Section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes, specifically provides: Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence....
CopyCited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 215022
...nce proposed by appellant. GRIMES, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] The sentencing order found that Bryant was previously convicted of other felonies involving the use or threat of violence to the person and that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. § 921.141(5)(b), (f), Fla....
CopyCited 39 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 1259395
...evel of confidence in our criminal justice system from all parties. *918 Avoid Arrest Aggravator As to the penalty phase, Foster asserts in issue four that the trial court erred both in finding and submitting to the jury the avoid arrest aggravator. Section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1997), provides the following aggravator: "The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody." In Consalvo v....
...Further, the consideration of a defendant's prior record is limited to convictions and the convictions are themselves limited to "another capital felony or ... felony involving the use or threat of violence *919 to the person." Perry v. State,
395 So.2d 170, 174-75 (Fla.1980) (quoting section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, and citing Provence v....
...umstances and provided sufficient written support. See Thomas v. State,
693 So.2d 951, 953 (Fla. 1997). Finally, with regard to mitigation, Foster claims error in the trial court's rejection of Foster's age at the time of the killing as a mitigator. Section
921.141(6)(g), Florida Statutes (1996), expressly includes the age of the defendant at the time of the crime as a mitigating circumstance....
...rs probation, one hundred hours of community service and restitution. As to the other members, the record does not indicate whether there was any plea agreement or any jail or prison sentences. [4] Spencer v. State,
615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993). [5] See §
921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1997). [6] See §
921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1997). [7] Even though Foster referred to the 23 mitigators as nonstatutory, the trial court treated them as statutory pursuant to section
921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (1997)....
CopyCited 39 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 913235
...rm of twenty-five years. Thus, we find no merit to this issue. Mungin argues in Issue 6 that the trial judge should have specifically instructed the jury that Mungin's age at the time of the crimetwenty-fourcould be considered in mitigation. See § 921.141(6)(g), Fla.Stat....
...We should grant rehearing in this case and remand for a new trialthe outcome of which, unlike this one, we could view with confidence. NOTES [1] Williams v. State,
110 So.2d 654, 659, 662 (Fla.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 847,
80 S.Ct. 102,
4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); see also §
90.404(2), Fla.Stat. (1991). [2] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla.Stat. (1991). [3] §
921.141(5)(d), (f), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 39 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 55 U.S.L.W. 2247
...Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in finding that two of the aggravating factors found were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. First, we agree that the court erroneously found that the murder had been committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1981), since the evidence failed to establish the requisite proof of an intent to avoid arrest or detection through the killing....
...*164 We affirm the trial court's finding, however, that appellant's announcement of his intention to commit a murder and the subsequent execution-style shooting sufficiently established a cold, calculated and premeditated murder with no pretense of any moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 39 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ir and in refusing to recuse himself; (2) holding that Section
782.04(3), Florida Statutes (1975), the second-degree felony murder statute, applied to the facts of this case; and (3) misapplying the aggravating and mitigating circumstances listed in Section
921.141, Florida Statutes....
...ourt so finds, that the aggravating circumstances far outweigh the mitigating circumstances in this case and, therefore, the jury's recommendation of the death penalty is appropriate in the case of the defendant, MARK MIKENAS, and it is so ordered." Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, requires the trial judge to logically consider the relationship between aggravating circumstances listed therein and mitigating circumstances and arrive at a sentence based upon reason. In State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), we said: The fourth step required by Florida Statute
921.141, F.S.A., is that the trial judge justifies his sentence of death in writing, to provide the opportunity for meaningful review by this court....
...Not only is the sentence then open to judicial review and correction, but the trial judge is required to view the issue of life or death within the framework of rules provided by the statute. [At 8.] Among those matters listed as mitigating circumstances is subsection (6)(a) of 921.141, which provides: "The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity." The Legislature intended absence from the criminal arena to be weighed favorably for a defendant in a capital case....
...sness in its imposition." (Emphasis supplied.) Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 258,
96 S.Ct. 2960, 2969,
49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). In capital cases, it is this court's responsibility to insure that the trial judge remains faithful to the dictates of Section
921.141, Florida Statutes in the sentencing process....
...Also, the felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or for the purpose of effecting an escape from custody. Defendant admitted upon cross-examination that he had been convicted of a crime "six or seven" times. Appellant says that in considering the aggravating factors listed in Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), the trial judge considered prior criminal activity when, in fact, the history of prior criminal activity should be considered only as a mitigating circumstance. Section 921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...To say that the prior criminal activity must be listed under mitigating circumstances rather *612 than aggravating circumstances is merely placing form over substance. In State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), we said: "The fourth step required by Fla. Stat. §
921.141, F.S.A., is that the trial judge justifies his sentence of death in writing, to provide the opportunity for meaningful review by this Court....
...soned judgment rather than unbridled discretion. There is no requirement these findings of fact be in any particular form, as long as it appears the trial judge viewed the issue of life or death within the framework of the rules provided by statute. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1975), in prescribing the manner in which the sentencing procedure should be conducted, provides in part: "In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence,...
...gating circumstances concerning the acts committed. In fact, one of the statutory mitigating circumstances is the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f), F.S.A....
CopyCited 39 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15828, 2007 WL 1892061
...2d 853, 862-63 (Fla.
2001) (per curiam) (“Jennings V”).2
Following his conviction, Jennings’s trial entered the penalty-phase
component of a bifurcated proceeding before the same judge and jury, as provided
by Florida law. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1)....
...statutory aggravating
circumstances and the defendant’s evidence of any relevant mitigating
circumstances. The jury’s recommendation need not be unanimous, nor need the
jury reveal what aggravators or mitigators it has considered. Fla. Stat. §
921.141(2)....
...rote to Muszynski referring to his confession to
Kruger, testimony that his clothes were wet from the canal, and evidence of abrasions to his penis
from the rape. Jennings V,
782 So. 2d at 856 n.4.
4
921.141(3)(b)....
...ruel. [“HAC”]3
3. That the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any
pretense of moral or legal justification. [“CCP”]
See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d), (h), (i).
Jennings’s attorney sought to establish three statutory mitigating
circumstances to weigh against these aggravators: (1) that Jennings was “under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” (2) that Jennings’s ability
to “appreciate the criminality of his ....
...§
3
We continue the practice of referring to the “especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel”
aggravator as “HAC,” short for “heinous, atrocious, and cruel,” the formulation used by most
states.
5
921.141(6)(b), (f), (g).4 To support the mitigating circumstance that Jennings
suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, his attorney introduced
the testimony of two mental health experts who diagnosed Jennings with having
passive aggressive, impulsive, and antisocial personality disorders....
...that only two distinct sets of facts and circumstances were given aggravating weight
21
The availability of the aggravator also could have permitted the State to introduce new
evidence tending to show CCP at the penalty phase. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1)....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...This cause consists of consolidated appeals from sentences of death entered upon pleas of guilty to murder in the first degree in three cases, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit for Dade County. Our jurisdiction to review this case is based on Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and Section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...The court conducted an extensive voir dire examination of appellant with respect to the factual basis of each charge, in response to which appellant essentially reiterated the substance of his sworn confessions to police. Appellant expressly waived his right to a jury during the sentencing phase of his trial under Section 921.141(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1975), and specifically requested the Court to determine punishment without a jury....
...counts of attempted murder in the first degree; and fifteen years imprisonment for conspiracy to commit robbery. The sentences in each case were to run consecutively. The judge's order included his findings in support of each sentence as required by Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1975). The findings with respect to the Daniel Pridgen case were: 1. The murder ... was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. Section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes....
...himself. During the administration of the knife wounds, the victim was alive and in a position to feel the pain of each wound. 2. The murder ... was committed while the defendant was engaged in another dangerous and violent felony, to-wit: robbery, Section
921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes, and the capital felony was plainly committed for pecuniary gain, Section
921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes. The evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing indicates that the defendant stole money and a firearm from the victim's apartment. Moreover, the defendant, through counsel, has conceded the applicability of Sections
921.141(5)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes, to the instant case. Under ... Provence v. State,
337 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1976), this court has treated the aggravating circumstances of Sections
921.141(5)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes, as one factor in determining that the sentence of death is appropriate. 3. The murder ... was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest and to hinder the enforcement of the laws of this State. Section
921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes....
...The victim of the robbery was plainly stabbed to death to allow the defendant *663 to avoid detection and thereby prevent his arrest for these crimes. 4. A careful consideration of all matters presented to the court impels the conclusion that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances under Section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes, to outweigh the aggravating circumstances set out above....
...As to the mitigating factors contemplated by law, the court makes the following findings: a. While there was no evidence admitted of prior convictions of the defendant, he readily admitted that he had carried on a course of burglaries and had stolen property for a significant period of time, thus eliminating Section 921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes, as a mitigating circumstance....
...The defendant was not suffering from the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance during the perpetration of the crimes outlined above and the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to requirements of law was not substantially impaired. Sections 921.141(6)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes. c. The victim was not a participant in the defendant's conduct and he plainly did not consent to being brutally stabbed to death. Section 921.141(6)(c), Florida Statutes....
...on was nevertheless of major consequence to the murder of the victim. In no way could it be said that the defendant's participation was relatively minor or that he was acting under extreme duress or substantial domination of another person. Sections 921.141(6)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes....
...The defendant's age of twentysix at the time of his criminal conduct cannot be considered a mitigating factor, especially when viewed in the context of the defendant's acts in planning and perpetrating these crimes and in disposing of the proceeds. Section 921.141(6)(g), Florida Statutes. In support of its sentence in connection with the Birk incident, the court made the following findings: 1. The murder ... was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. Section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes....
...This activity took place after the defendant broke into the victim's home and robbed her in the presence of her three elderly sisters-in-law. 2. The murder ... was committed while the defendant was engaged in other dangerous and violent felonies, to-wit: burglary and robbery, Section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes, and the capital felony was plainly committed for pecuniary gain, Section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes. Moreover, the defendant, through counsel, has conceded the applicability of Section 921.141(5)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes, to the instant case. [The court again treated Section 921.141(5)(d) and (f) as one aggravating circumstance.] 3. The murder ... was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest and to hinder the enforcement of the laws of this State. Section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes....
...This was clearly for the purpose of avoiding detection and thereby preventing his arrest for these crimes. 4. During the defendant's criminal activities he knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons by stabbing and *664 shooting the victim's sisters-in-law. Section 921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes....
...The third living victim was shot in the back of the head and was stabbed to such an extent that she continues to have difficulty breathing as a result of lung damage. 5. A careful consideration of all matters presented to the court impels the conclusion that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances under Section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes, to outweigh the aggravating circumstances set out above. The court made the same findings in this case with respect to the mitigating circumstances under Section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1975), as were made in the Daniel Pridgen case. As to the kidnapping and robbery and murder of Frank Meli, the court found that: 1. The murder ... was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes....
...During the administration of the knife wounds, the victim was alive and in a position to feel the pain of each wound... . 2. The murder ... was committed while the defendant was engaged in other dangerous and violent felonies, to-wit: kidnapping for ransom and robbery, Section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes, and the capital felony was plainly committed for pecuniary gain, Section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes....
...The evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing indicates that the defendant disposed of the proceeds of the crime by buying a motorcycle, paying off the co-defendants, and by entertaining himself at the dog track and at a bar. Moreover, the defendant, through counsel, has conceded the applicability of Sections 921.141(5)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes, to the instant case. [The court again treated Section 921.141(5)(d) and (f) as a single aggravating circumstance.] 3. The murder ... was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest and to hinder the enforcement of the laws of this State. Section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes....
...him in a crude four-foot grave was to avoid detection and thereby prevent his arrest for these crimes. 4. A careful consideration of all matters presented to the court impels the conclusion that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances under Section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes, to outweigh the aggravating circumstances set out above. The court made the same findings as to the mitigating circumstances under Section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1975), as were made in the other cases....
...On his appeal of the judgments of guilty and sentences as to each of these three cases, the appellant raises two points for vacating the sentences of death: (i) Whether the trial court erred in each of the above-styled causes in sentencing him to death by electrocution as provided by Section
921.141 and Section
775.082, Florida Statutes (1975); and (ii) Whether imposition and carrying out of the sentence of death under Sections
921.141 and
775.082, Florida Statutes (1975), constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the *665 United States. We will consider appellant's points on appeal in inverse order. The assertion that imposition and carrying out of a sentence of death under Sections
775.082 and
921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court as well as this Court....
...As to each case he submits that the court impermissibly found and considered certain aggravating circumstances whereas the court erred in failing to find and consider certain mitigating circumstances. As to each case appellant asserts that it was error to find that the homicide was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...bed. The atrocity of the episode cannot be gainsaid. Cf. Funchess v. State,
341 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1977). Appellant next urges that it was error to find that the capital felonies were committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. Section
921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...Furthermore, the participants, after the killing, wrote matters on the walls of the house in order to leave the impression that Pridgen was murdered by a homosexual lover. This action could only have been calculated to serve as a device to mislead police authorities and thereby avoid detection. Nonetheless, even if Section
921.141(5)(e) is not supported by the evidence in the case of the Pridgen homicide, two well-founded additional aggravating factors [Section
921.141(5)(d) and (h)] and no mitigating factors were present. Under such circumstances the death penalty is appropriate. Elledge v. State,
346 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1977); State v. Dixon, supra. Appellant additionally submits that Section
921.141(5)(e) should be taken in conjunction with the finding under subsection (d) [capital felony committed while defendant engaged in committing robbery and kidnapping] and subsection (f) [capital felony committed for pecuniary gain] of Section
921.141(5)....
...Meeks v. State,
339 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1976) (robbery); Knight v. State, supra (kidnapping). We come now to Washington's assault upon the trial judge's sentences, alleging his failure to consider the presence of two mitigating circumstances specified by Section
921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1975), plus an additional circumstance which he maintains should have been considered in mitigation. He first assails the judge's failure to find the lack of a significant history of prior criminal activity. Section
921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...stolen merchandise to Katrina Birk and her husband. He reiterated in open court that he was selling "hot merchandise" to Katrina Birk. Appellant asserts that under the rule announced in Provence, supra, previous convictions are required to negative Section
921.141(6)(a). Washington misconstrues the holding of Provence. *667 That case construed Section
921.141(5)(b) which requires previous conviction of another capital felony involving the use or threat of violence. We held: "Clearly the language of that subsection excludes the possibility of considering mere arrests or accusations as factors in aggravation. " (Emphasis supplied)
337 So.2d at 786. Section
921.141(6)(a) makes no reference to conviction and, hence, Provence has no application to the instant case. Washington next asserts that his age (26 years) should have been considered as a mitigating factor. Section
921.141(6)(g), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...ENGLAND, Chief Justice, concurring. I concur in all aspects of today's decision except the Court's conclusion that Washington's conduct in each of the three criminal episodes reflected an attempt to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest within the meaning of Section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...As construed today, this aggravating factor would be applicable in virtually every capital case. In fact, examples of situations in which this additional factor might have tipped the balance from life to death quickly come to mind. Under the Court's "body-concealing" rationale as to the Meli episode, Section
921.141(5)(e) would have added an additional aggravating factor in Halliwell v. State,
323 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1975), and in Burch v. State,
343 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1977). Under the Court's "ruse-to-mislead-the-police" rationale as to the Pridgen killing, Section
921.141(5)(e) would have added an additional aggravating factor in Elledge v....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 253353
...al court is unconstitutionally vague. Furthermore, Klokoc's counsel asserts that, even if it is constitutional, it is not supported by the evidence since a pretense of moral or legal justification was present for this crime. We reject the claim that section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutionally vague....
...Furthermore, we find that the state's cross-appeal, arguing that the aggravating factor of pecuniary gain is applicable in this instance, is without merit. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...We have considered the entire record of the proceedings below in order to determine whether the jury's verdict of guilt was supported by substantial, competent evidence. We have further reviewed the sentencing proceeding to determine whether the sentence of death is appropriate to this case under law. § 921.141(4), Fla....
...investigation report we find no merit to appellant's contention. In imposing the death penalty the trial judge found three aggravating circumstances applicable: (1) prior conviction of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to some person. Section 921.141(5)(b); (2) capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws. Section 921.141(5)(g); (3) murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of any moral or legal justification. Section 921.141(5)(i)....
...by the record. They have been considered and are hereby approved. Appellant shot and killed Szafranski while the officer was travelling from an unrelated investigation, in uniform, and on active duty. This Court has upheld the *578 applicability of section 921.141(5)(g) where, as in the instant case, the victim was killed while performing a legitimate governmental function....
...state of mind. The appellant killed without provocation on the part of the victim and without notice. The record is devoid of any evidence tending to justify the slaying. Accordingly the trial judge properly found this aggravating factor pursuant to section 921.141(5)(g)....
...Appellant's attack on the trial judge's finding of the first statutory aggravating factor deserves further comment. One of the statutory aggravating circumstances that a trial judge may consider in determining whether or not to impose the death penalty is set out in section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1981): "The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or the threat of violence to the person." (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar, prior to sentencing, ap...
...nd thereafter violently resisted arrest. We find that the judgment of the conviction expressly disclosed the violent nature of the prior felony and that the trial judge properly considered the conviction as a statutory aggravating factor pursuant to section 921.141(5)(b)....
...State,
420 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1982) (defendant's record did not sufficiently disclose a conviction of violent crime). While appellant's conviction (battery of a law enforcement officer) alone substantiates a finding of an aggravating factor pursuant to section
921.141(5)(b), the trial judge offered additional factual circumstances in support stating: V....
...As a juvenile he was committed for the unlawful shooting of another innocent person. The trial judge continued to state that while appellant's juvenile shooting offense and the resisting arrest charge were not reduced to felonies within the meaning of section 921.141(5)(b), and could not be accepted as such, these circumstances were being offered in support of the statutory aggravating circumstances found....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Therefore we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. We come now to the propriety of the sentence of death. The trial judge found that the murder was committed in the commission of or flight after committing rape and kidnapping, an aggravating circumstance *1064 under section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1977); that it was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, id., § 921.141(5)(e); that it was committed for pecuniary gain, id., § 921.141(5)(f); and that it was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Id., § 921.141(5)(h)....
...Evidence presented at the guilt phase of the trial established that the murder was the ultimate result of a closely connected chain of events that included kidnapping and sexual battery. Thus the court was correct to conclude that the aggravating circumstance in section 921.141(5)(d) [3] applied....
...177,
62 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979); Knight v. State,
338 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1976). Appellant argues that the trial judge erred in failing to find the existence of mitigating circumstances. He argues that the court should have found that he had no significant history of prior criminal activity. §
921.141(6)(a), Fla....
...Appellant argues that the court should have found that due to intoxication and extreme mental or emotional disturbance, his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. § 921.141(6)(b), (f)....
...Therefore the court did not err in declining to find these factors. See Meeks v. State,
336 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 1976). Appellant argues that the trial court should have found that his participation in the crime was relatively minor and that he acted under the substantial domination of another person. §
921.141(6)(d), (e)....
...[2] Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, evidence of an offer or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, later withdrawn, or of statements made in connection therewith, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. [3] Section 921.141(5)(d) reads: "The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglar...
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 548
...state had failed to prove sexual battery and burglary beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore, neither could serve as an additional bases for finding the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed during the commission of a felony under section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 681384
...I concur with the majority's resolution of all of Hill's claims of error as to his guilt and *908 penalty phase proceedings save one: that the trial court did not err in finding a statutory aggravator that requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Hill was not acting with a "pretense" of moral justification. In section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1995), the legislature has set out guidelines which the trial courts of our state must consider in determining whether death or life imprisonment is the appropriate penalty once a defendant is convicted of capital murder....
...In this scheme, the legislature has provided that one of the factors that could be considered in aggravation is that: "the capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." § 921.141(5)(i)(emphasis added)....
...1548,
103 L.Ed.2d 852 (1989), we noted that the word "pretense" means "`something alleged or believed on slight grounds: an unwarranted assumption.'" Id. at 225 n. 2 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1797 (1981)). Thus, we interpreted the section
921.141(5)(i) "pretense" clause in a manner consistent with its plain meaning....
...lly defined by the legislature has been established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The legislature obviously meant something when it imposed the "without pretense" condition as a qualification for invocation of the aggravating factor set out in section 921.141(5)(i)....
...If there was not "a pretense of moral ... justification" here, it is doubtful whether these words could ever have any real meaning or application. Inexcusable though his conduct may be, it is undisputed that Hill acted under a pretense of moral justification; and a pretense is all section 921.141(5)(i) requires in order to preclude the application of this particular aggravator....
...79-353, Laws of Fla. The staff analysis for this statute does not address or discuss the "pretense" clause contained in the statute. Accordingly, we must assume that the legislature meant what it said when it explicitly used the word "pretense" in section 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 1286619
...ying Walker's motion to suppress his statement to Brevard County law enforcement officers on the grounds that his statement was involuntary; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Walker's motion to declare Florida's capital sentencing scheme, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2004), unconstitutional because a judge rather than a unanimous jury determines death penalty aggravators; (3) whether the trial court committed reversible error when it denied Walker's motion for judgment of acquit...
...ay not reverse it on appeal." Orme,
677 So.2d at 263. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Walker's motion to suppress. 2. Constitutionality of Florida's Capital Sentencing Scheme Walker claims that Florida's capital sentencing scheme, section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2004), is unconstitutional under Apprendi and Ring because it allows a judge rather than a unanimous jury to sentence a capital defendant to death....
...each finding. (a) Committed During the Course of a Kidnapping First, the trial court found that "the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice, in the commission of . . . any . . . kidnapping" pursuant to section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (2004)....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Equally meritless is the contention that it was error to exclude the testimony of a priest who had witnessed an execution by electrocution. While it is settled that an advisory jury and trial judge may consider evidence of mitigating factors beyond those enumerated in section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1977), [13] the evidence must be relevant to the sentencing inquiry. We do not believe that a descriptive account of an electrocution would aid the jury or judge in their effort to apply section 921.141 fairly and correctly....
...[12] TT 641-56. [13] See Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586,
98 S.Ct. 2954,
57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Proffitt v. Florida, supra ; Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 976,
99 S.Ct. 1548,
59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979). [14] §
921.141(5)(b) and (d), Fla....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 197014
...and we affirm on this issue. B. Mitigation The defense additionally claims that the trial court erred in failing to find that the "capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." § 921.141(6)(b), Fla.Stat....
...y giving "some weight" to the statutory mitigating circumstance that the "capacity of *995 the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his [or her] conduct or to conform his [or her] conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired." § 921.141(6)(f), Fla.Stat....
...Thereafter, defense counsel did not object when the judge struck the emotional or mental disturbance mitigator instruction. Although the trial court did not find that Rogers committed the murder while Rogers was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, see § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat., the court did give the standard jury instruction for the mitigating circumstance that Rogers' ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See § 921.141(6)(f), Fla.Stat....
...Misdemeanor Testimony In his next claim of error, Rogers asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard testimony from two State witnesses during the penalty phase regarding Rogers' prior aggravated assault conviction from California. Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), provides the State with a mechanism to establish an aggravating circumstance where a defendant "was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence...
...he pecuniary gain or HAC aggravators; (3) the trial court erred by failing to find applicable the mitigating circumstance that the "capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," § 921.141, Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 12544
...h River. The fact that Jackson had ample time during this series of events leading up to the murder of Milton to reflect on his actions and their attendant consequences was sufficient to evidence the heightened level of premeditation necessary under section 921.141(5)(i)....
...We have considered the appellant's sentence in light of similar cases and find it appropriate. Finding no error warranting reversal, the convictions and the sentences are affirmed. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). [2] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1985). [3] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 435
...of admissibility. Id. The essence of appellant's claim here is that the photograph was not relevant to prove any aggravating or mitigating factor and should, therefore, not have been admitted. The issue, however, is broader than framed by appellant. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides in pertinent part that in capital sentencing proceedings, "evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime." We find that the photograph in question here clearly comes within the purview of the statute....
...NOTES [1] We also note that appellant's counsel during his closing argument urged the jury to recommend a life sentence based, in part, on the fact that his client had been on death row for over three years since he was originally convicted, without receiving one disciplinary report. [2] § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. [3] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. [4] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 500174
...or his crime. Hence, the trial court's limitation on the cross-examination of DiMarino erroneously prevented White from using the facts underlying DiMarino's Maryland crime to impeach DiMarino's asserted minimal involvement in Crawford's murder. See § 921.141(6)(d), Fla....
...for his crime. Hence, the trial court's limitation on White's cross-examination of DiMarino erroneously prevented the presentation of collateral evidence relevant to discrediting the view that DiMarino played a minimal role in Crawford's murder. See § 921.141(6)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 360893
...en convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in finding by the court that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter event such person shall be punished by death....
...te hearing and finds that the defendant is death eligible. The plain language of section
775.082(1) is clear that the maximum penalty available for a person convicted of a capital felony is death. When section
775.082(1) is read in pari materia with section
921.141, Florida Statutes, there can be no doubt that a person convicted of a capital felony faces a maximum possible penalty of death. [4] Both sections
775.082 and
921.141 clearly refer to a "capital felony." Black's Law Dictionary defines "capital" as "punishable by execution; involving the death penalty." Black's Law Dictionary 200 (7th ed.1999)....
...stance. See id. This Court rejected the defendant's argument that the application of community control as an aggravating factor violated the doctrine of law of the case, explaining: In light of the specificity and promptness of the 1991 amendment to section 921.141(5)(a), and in view of our prior caselaw giving retroactive application to other aggravating circumstances effecting a refinement in the law, reliance on Trotter would result in manifest injustice to the people of Florida by perpetuating an anomalous and incorrect application of the capital sentencing statute....
...Florida,
428 U.S. 242,
96 S.Ct. 2960,
49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), which observed that the jury's recommendation is advisory only and that the sentence is to be determined by the judge, and held that jury sentencing is not constitutionally required. [4] Section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1979), provides: Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment as authorized by s....
CopyCited 37 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 1362862
...In reviewing aggravating factors on appeal, this Court "review[s] the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each *117 aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding." Willacy v. State,
696 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla.1997). Section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1999), provides an exclusive list of aggravating factors, expressly stating that "[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to" those aggravators. This Court has stated that section
921.141 "is designed to limit the unbridled exercise of judicial discretion in cases where the ultimate penalty is possible." Provence v....
...use of an elderly person or disabled adult resulting in great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; arson; burglary; kidnapping; aircraft piracy; or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 37 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 286355
...morse; (7) defense counsel's inquiry of a material issue was improperly restricted; (8) improper prosecutorial closing argument; (9) improper principal instruction was given; (10) the prosecutor's conduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial; (11) section 921.141 Florida Statutes (1991) should have been held unconstitutional; (12) trial judge erred in instructing the jury that parole is equivalent to imprisonment or community control; (13) trial court erred in allowing prosecutor to inquire in...
CopyCited 37 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 39
...In entering his plea of guilt, Muehleman answered the following question from the court as follows: Q: You also give up the right to appeal any error that may have been committed *313 thus far in the proceedings, you understand that? A: Yes, sir. Nevertheless, we follow the mandate of section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1985), that "[t]he judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida," and turn to an examination of the alleged errors now raised....
...In fact, having carefully reviewed the record, we find Muehleman's plea of guilty to charges of first-degree murder to have been freely and voluntarily given and amply supported by a factual basis in the record. LeDuc v. State,
365 So.2d 149 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 885,
100 S.Ct. 175, 62 *
315 L.Ed.2d 114 (1979); §
921.141(4), Fla....
...dence, and, unless an abuse of discretion can be shown, its rulings will not be disturbed." First, the report's status as hearsay did not itself require exclusion from the jurors' consideration in the context of the penalty phase of a capital trial. § 921.141(1), Fla....
...He contends that the jury should not have heard of these crimes involving an assault on his mother, burglary, theft, and possession of drugs when the defense had waived the mitigating factor of "no significant history of prior criminal activity." § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
...1671,
51 L.Ed.2d 751 (1977)). The propriety of prosecutorial comments must be examined in context. A statement found out of place and prejudicial when made to a jury evaluating the defendant's guilt may quite properly bear on the aggravating circumstances set forth in section
921.141(5)....
...or make the slaying appear to be less reprehensible than it actually was. We find that the statements complained of were highly relevant in establishing the following aggravating factors: the commission of the murder during the course of a robbery, section 921.141(5)(d); its commission for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, section 921.141(5)(e); the especially heinous, atrocious and cruel nature of the crime, section 921.141(5)(h); and its cold, calculated and premeditated nature, section 921.141(5)(i)....
...We find the instant case readily distinguishable from Van Royal, in which we were forced to conclude from a number of circumstances that "this Court cannot assure itself that the trial judge based the oral sentence [of death] on a well-reasoned application of the factors set out in section 921.141(5) and (6) [, Florida Statutes (1981)] and in Tedder v....
CopyCited 37 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 10604
...nd Glock. The trial judge, in accordance with the jury recommendation, imposed the death penalty on both appellants, finding no mitigating circumstances and the following three aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed to avoid arrest [section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1983)]; (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain [section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1983)]; and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification [section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1983)]....
CopyCited 37 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 205517
...and therefore find the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Lastly, we reject as meritless Power's claims that (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel and a full appellate review due to inaccuracies in the trial transcript; (2) section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1989), which defines the statutory aggravating circumstance of heinous, atrocious, and cruel, and the standard jury instruction on this factor, are unconstitutionally vague; [10] and (3) Florida's capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional....
...*865 Accordingly, we affirm Power's conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. [2] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] Id. § 921.141(5)(d). [4] Id. § 921.141(5)(h). [5] Id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 481638
...astro was denied a fair trial by the unnecessary presentation of a gruesome autopsy photograph made of the victim's arm; (10) the statutory aggravating factor of an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel murder is unconstitutionally vague; and (11) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1987), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...new trial is not required. The defendant's final two points concern the imposition of the death penalty. In overruling the jury recommendation of life, the trial court found that four aggravating circumstances were applicable in this case; sections 921.141(5)(b) (previous conviction of felony involving threat of violence), (5)(e) (committed to avoid arrest), (5)(h) (heinous, atrocious or cruel), (5)(i) (cold calculated manner), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...As to mitigating circumstances, the trial court enumerated the statutory mitigating circumstances and found none of them applicable in the instant case. The court made the specific finding of fact that defendant was the "dominant party during the commission of the crime," thus negating section 921.141(6)(e), Florida Statutes (1981) (that the defendant was under the influence of duress or substantial domination of another person). As to section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1981) (previous conviction of felony involving use or threat of violence to the person), the trial court properly found this aggravating circumstance to be applicable, and it is not argued as error in this appeal. The trial court, however, misapplied section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1981) (crime was committed for purpose of avoiding an arrest or effecting an escape from custody)....
...This argument may have merit if the facts supported a finding that a previous aggravated battery had occurred, and that the motive for the homicide was to avoid arrest. However, the trial court did not so find, nor do we find evidence in the record to support such a conclusion. As to section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1981) (crime was especialy heinous, atrocious, or cruel), we hold that this factor is not applicable in the instant case....
...Compared with the cases cited and others on this subject we find that the section 5(h) aggravating factor is without factual justification. See also Middleton v. State,
426 So.2d 548 (Fla. 1982); Simmons v. State,
419 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1982). The last aggravating circumstance found by the trial court, section
921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1981), "ordinarily applies in those murders which are characterized as executions or contract murders, although that description is not intended to be all-inclusive." McCray v....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 2130222
...The circuit court found that resentencing counsel's performance was not deficient because the testimony was admissible to establish the existence of two aggravating factors: commission in the course of the enumerated felony of sexual battery and HAC. See § 921.141(5)(d), (h) (1977), Fla....
...neral prejudice requirement, and we have found none. [14] During a penalty phase, any "evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received ... provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements." § 921.141(1), Fla....
...Because Hitchcock did not raise irrebutable hearsay as a possible ground for objecting to Driggers' testimony before the circuit court or on appeal to this Court, we do not address whether the victim's statements were admissible in the instant case. [15] Section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1977), lists "rape" as an enumerated felony for purposes of that aggravating factor....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13227, 2010 WL 2488422
...ce. Id. at 384-85. On
remand, the trial court conducted another hearing and found two aggravating
circumstances (Spencer’s previous conviction of another felony involving violence
based on the contemporaneous convictions, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b);
and the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel nature of the murder, pursuant to Fla.
Stat. § 921.141(5)(h)), and three mitigating circumstances (the murder was
committed while Spencer was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b); Spencer’s capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired, pursuant to pursuant to Fla.
Stat. § 921.141(6)(f); and there were a number of non-statutory mitigating factors
7
in Spencer’s background) before again imposing a capital sentence.
Spencer appealed the sentence, and the Florida Supreme Court found no
merit to that challenge....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Because the objection was not raised at the trial level, we decline to entertain it here. Lineberger v. Domino Canning Co.,
68 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1953); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Charles,
69 Fla. 27, 32,
67 So. 572, 573 (1915); Frank v. Ruwitch,
318 So.2d 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). [7] §
921.141(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (1975). [8] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1975). [9] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1975). [10] Due to our disposition of this issue, we intimate no view as to the validity of the judge's finding under section
921.141(5)(g)....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 424438
...le; and the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel based upon the medical examiner's testimony that it took fifteen to thirty minutes for death to occur and that Cribbs would have been conscious for fifteen minutes after being stabbed. §§ 921.141(5)(a), (f), (h), Fla....
...o per se bar." Florida's legislature has specifically provided for the admission of victim impact evidence "to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." §
921.141(7), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1992). Even though section
921.141(7) did not become effective until eight months after the instant offense occurred, its application in this case does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. See Windom v. State,
656 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1995) (finding that section
921.141(7) only relates to admission of evidence and is procedural and thus does not violate prohibition against ex post facto laws)....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 1328
...untary waiver. Hamblen,
527 So.2d at 804. I would require the same hearing in this case. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. [2] The trial court found that Anderson previously had been convicted of another capital felony, section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), and treated as one aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, id. section
921.141(5)(f), and in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. Id. §
921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 382162
...Thus, the failure to record any portion of the statements made by the court and the attorneys at the charge conferences is harmless. Songer v. Wainwright,
423 So.2d 355, 356 (Fla. 1982). *1080 The absence of transcribed bench conferences did not violate the mandate of section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), and the fact that bench conferences were not reported did not prejudice the appeal....
...This argument is without merit, as discussed in claim 1 of his motion for 3.850 relief, in that none of the cases Turner relies on is such a "jurisprudential upheaval" in the law as to require retroactive application on collateral attack. Witt. Second, Turner argues that the legislative intent behind section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), requires this Court to reconsider the propriety of finding the contemporaneous murder of Shirley Turner a "prior violent felony." This argument is also without merit....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The trial court concurred with the jury's recommendation and imposed the death sentence pursuant to detailed findings of fact set forth in the record on the various aggravating and mitigating circumstances involved in this homicide and with this defendant. Pursuant to Florida Statute 921.141, the Court finds the following aggravating circumstances exist: Florida Statute 921.141, subparagraph 5, subparagraph (b)....
...Subparagraph (h), the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. The Court finds no other aggravating factors to have been proven beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. The Court finds the following mitigating circumstances exist: Florida Statute 921.141, subparagraph 6, subparagraph (b)....
...Appellant apparently raped her when she was dead or dying. When appellant was arrested at the bus station that evening, his pants were still covered with blood. Blood-soaked money, some of which had been taken from the taxi driver, was found in his pockets. [2] § 921.141(5)(b), (f), and (h), Fla....
...(1973) state: (b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. (f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. (h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. [3] § 921.141(6)(b), (e), and (f), Fla....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 26360
...Such matters are not judged from hindsight. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 ,-,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 ,
80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694 (1984). It should be noted that mental and emotional conditions are statutorily permitted mitigating considerations. Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141(6)(b)....
...law was at its very height. Cf. Songer v. Wainwright,
769 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir.1985). Defense counsel, prosecutor and trial judge were all interpreting the statute in light of erroneous or misleading language in the statute itself, compare FLA.STAT.
921.141(2), (3) (describing task of jury and sentencing judge as balancing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances “as enumerated” in statute) with FLA.STAT.
921.141(5), (6) (aggravating circumstances “shall be limited” to eight categories, while mitigating circumstances “shall be” those contained in listed categories), and decisions of the Florida Supreme Court, including State v....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ent to commit murder on the ground that appellant's counsel had "opened the door" to such questioning. After the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the felony-murder count, but recommended a life sentence. As required by section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1975), the trial judge made findings of fact wherein he rejected the recommendation of the jury and entered a judgment calling for the death sentence....
...The Court feels that this action upon its part is dictated by the facts and circumstances gleaned from the trial record and that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in Subsection 6 to greatly outweigh any mitigating circumstances as set forth in Subsection 7 of Section 921.141, Florida Statutes....
...Appellant argues further that the trial court violated the principles espoused in Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975), in overruling the advisory verdict of the jury for a life sentence. During the sentencing phase of the proceedings the court found three aggravating circumstances under section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1975): (1) that appellant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person [subsection (b)]; (2) that the crime was committed while appellant was engaged in the commission of a rape [subsection (d)]; and (3) that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel [subsection (h)]. The finding of the second aggravating circumstance under section
921.141(5)(b) was clearly proper....
...III, 499-512.) The rape occurred either shortly before or immediately following Ms. Mears' death. The agony and horror which this elderly woman must have suffered prior to her death is evident. As we acknowledged in State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d at 9, section
921.141(5)(h) applies to "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim." The killing in this case falls squarely within this category when viewed in the context of prior decisions of this Court where we have approved a finding of this aggravating circumstance....
...1977) (victim stabbed while begging for mercy and then killed by shots to the head); Adams v. State (victim beaten with fire poker past point of submission and until grossly mangled.) The appellant further contends that the trial judge improperly found under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), that he had been previously "convicted" of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person....
...McCrae contends that he had not been convicted of his prior offense against Gertner and Smith because the judge had not adjudicated him guilty. We reject this contention and find the plea of guilty to a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person is a conviction which may be used in aggravation under section 921.141(5)(b) and was so intended by the legislature....
...court, it is the conviction and the only remaining step is the formal entry of judgment and the imposition of sentence. Further, in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed, a court must consider the various circumstances set forth in section 921.141....
...dication of guilt should be treated differently than a plea of guilty with court adjudication. Both contain an unrefuted factual determination that the defendant committed this prior criminal offense. In interpreting "conviction" for the purposes of section
921.141(5)(b), we reject any analogy to the habitual offender statute set forth in section
775.084....
...
346 So.2d at 1001. The fact that an adjudication of guilt is a prerequisite, as a technical element of the offense, to a conviction under the habitual offender statute, is thus of no analogous value to the instant case. The word "convicted" as used in section
921.141(5)(b) means a valid guilty plea or jury verdict of guilty for a violent felony; an adjudication of guilt is not necessary for such a "conviction" to be considered in the capital sentencing character analysis. The final sentencing issue concerns the appellant's attempt to prove in mitigation under section
921.141(6)(b) that he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time the *1155 crimes were committed....
...Based on the authority of Robinson v. State,
373 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1979), and Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238,
89 S.Ct. 1709,
23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), I agree that a plea of guilty to a violent felony properly may be considered as an aggravating circumstance under section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1977)....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 149681
...aggravating circumstance of cold, calculated, and premeditated. Issues 4 and 5 are without merit and warrant little discussion. The aggravating factors to be considered in determining the propriety of a death sentence are limited to those set out in section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1987)....
...State,
579 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1991). For the reasons stated above, we affirm the convictions and the sentence of death. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
941.45, Fla. Stat. (1987). [2] §
921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). [4] §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1987). [5] §
921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 35 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 645, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 1954, 2009 WL 4061285
...Victorino's challenge fails on both grounds. *104 Citing Espinosa v. Florida,
505 U.S. 1079,
112 S.Ct. 2926,
120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), Victorino first contends that Florida's HAC aggravator is constitutionally infirm because it is overbroad and vague. See §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...emeditated. C. Mental Mitigation Victorino claims he was under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime and that the trial court erred by refusing to consider and failing to find this statutory mental health mitigator. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 35 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 656648
...ents only); (3) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain; (4) the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (5) the murders were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(d), (e), (f), (h), (i), Fla....
...five aggravators apply to Clements' murder and two apply to Toombs. Turner says in his brief that he accepts this characterization. The trial judge found one statutory mitigating factor: Turner has no significant history of prior criminal activity. § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 35 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 323, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 854, 2010 WL 2195709
...Indictment Miller first contends that under Florida law and Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 490,
120 S.Ct. 2348,
147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), [2] an indictment must allege the required factual findings in support of a death sentence, which are stated in section
921.141(3)....
...at under Apprendi, this includes the factual findings the trial court must make during the penalty phase of Florida's bifurcated capital proceedings. Specifically, Miller maintains that the indictment must expressly contain the statutory language of section 921.141(3), which provides: (3) Findings in support of sentence of death.Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life im...
...otice that he or she is charged with a capital felony punishable as provided by the statute. See Sireci v. State,
399 So.2d 964, 970 (Fla.1981), overruled on other grounds by Pope v. State,
441 So.2d 1073, 1077-78 (Fla.1983). In Sireci, we held that section
921.141(5) specifically defines the aggravating circumstances that *216 may be considered by the judge and the jury, thereby rebutting any contention that a defendant lacked notice of the aggravating circumstances on which the State would rely. Applying this reasoning in Hitchcock v. State,
413 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1982), we concluded that because "[t]he statutory language [of section
921.141(5)] limits aggravating factors to those listed,......
...State,
841 So.2d 362, 378 (Fla.2003); Porter v. Crosby,
840 So.2d 981, 986 (Fla.2003). Miller contends that his constitutional challenge differs from the challenges we previously rejected because it is based on inclusion in the indictment of the findings of fact required under section
921.141(3), rather than the aggravating circumstances provided in section
921.141(5)....
...ictment or the result of that analysis. Like the potential aggravating circumstances, the weighing process that must be performed by the trial judge when considering whether to impose a death sentence is also articulated in the Florida Statutes. See § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2005). A defendant charged by indictment with first-degree murder is on notice that he or she is accused of a capital offense which is punishable as provided by statute, which necessarily includes section 921.141(5)....
...ime does not automatically render an information so defective that it will not support a judgment of conviction). The instant indictment adequately placed Miller on notice of the specific crime with which he was charged and the findings specified in section 921.141(3)....
...statute would require the indictment to include the allegations that " sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5)," and that "there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." § 921.141(3) (emphasis supplied)....
...Moreover, the defendant may invoke "[t]he existence of any other factors in the defendant's background that would mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty." The State, on the other hand, is limited to the specific aggravating factors listed in section
921.141(5). Therefore, even if it could be required, pretrial notice of *218 specific nonstatutory mitigation could prove unwieldy. State v. Steele,
921 So.2d 538, 543-44 (Fla. 2005) (citations omitted) (quoting §
921.141(6)(h), Fla....
...Accordingly, it would be illogical to require the State to demonstrate that "there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances" at that stage of the proceeding, which would be necessary if we were we to adopt the position maintained by Miller. § 921.141(3)....
...Unanimous Jury Finding of Sufficient Aggravating Circumstances and Insufficient Mitigating Circumstances Next, Miller contends that Apprendi requires that a unanimous twelve-person jury make the findings of fact necessary to determine eligibility for the death penalty. In his view, these findings are specified in section 921.141(3); therefore, a constitutional interpretation of Florida's capital sentencing scheme requires the jury to unanimously determine that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist and that insufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Miller's argument cannot prevail under the factual circumstances of this case. Even if this Court were to determine that the statute requires a unanimous jury to conduct the findings of fact articulated in section 921.141(3), the death sentence in this case satisfies Miller's interpretation of the application of Apprendi in Florida....
...Miller's attempt to distinguish his argument from those previously rejected by this Court is attenuated and unpersuasive. Under Florida's bifurcated capital proceeding, the jury considers the sufficiency of the aggravators and the insufficiency of the mitigating circumstances when issuing an advisory sentence under section 921.141(2). The plain language of section 921.141(3) refers to the duty of the trial court with regard to the required written findings for imposing a death sentence. Miller has failed to provide a persuasive argument in support of the penalty phase jury making findings with regard to the trial court's weighing process specified in section 921.141(3). Accordingly, we deny relief on this issue. Separation of Powers Miller also asserts that this Court is violating the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers by not requiring a jury to make the findings specified in section 921.141(3), and by holding that only one aggravating circumstance is "sufficient" to justify imposition of the death penalty in contradiction to the statute's unambiguous use of the plural term "circumstances." In State v....
...to the lesser offense of manslaughter. During a penalty phase proceeding, the trial court has the discretion to admit evidence with regard to the details of a defendant's previous conviction for a felony involving the use or threat of violence. See § 921.141(1), (5)(b), Fla....
...See Rhodes,
547 So.2d at 1204; Delap v. State,
440 So.2d 1242, 1255-56 (Fla.1983); Elledge v. State,
346 So.2d 998, 1001-02 (Fla.1977). Rather, the State may adduce any testimony that the trial court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant. See §
921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 35 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 82924
...fies the death sentence." [7] Thompson challenges the court's finding that the aggravating circumstance of cold, calculated, and premeditated murder, is supported by the facts in this case. We agree with Thompson. Many times this Court has said that section 921.141(5)(i) of the Florida Statutes (1987), requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of "heightened premeditation." We adopted the phrase to distinguish this aggravating circumstance from the premeditation element of first-degree murder....
...r about Janice's whereabouts; and Thompson filed a motion for a more definite address on September 23, 1988, claiming that, "[i]n order to prepare a defense, it is necessary for Defendant to locate [Janice] to discuss her knowledge of the case." [5] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1987). [6] Id. § 921.141(6)(a)....
CopyCited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...During the sentencing procedure, the prosecuting attorney argued that defendant was a person "under sentence of imprisonment." The trial judge found as *772 an aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed "while the defendant was under sentence of imprisonment." § 921.141(5)(a), Fla....
...ing the use or threat of violence to some person. C. The murder of Jacqueline Smith by the Defendant, Raymond R. Stone, was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. D. The Court does not consider the remaining aggravating circumstances enumerated in Section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes, applicable to the Defendant......
CopyCited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 97
...ed during the commission of three felonies; 2) committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing arrest; 3) committed for pecuniary gain; 4) especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; and 5) committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. § 921.141(5)(d), (e), (f), (h), (i), Fla. Stat. (1981). In mitigation the court found that Bates had no significant history of prior criminal activity. § 921.141(6)(a)....
...[*] *495 The evidence showed and the trial judge found that the murder was committed while appellant was engaged in the commission of kidnapping and attempted sexual battery. Both kidnapping and sexual battery are among the serious crimes listed in section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), defining an aggravating circumstance under the Florida Capital Felony Sentencing Law....
...After studying, considering and weighing all the evidence in the case, the Court makes the following findings of fact as to the aggravating circumstances. 1. The murder was committed while the Defendant was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping and an attempted sexual battery. [F.S. 921.141(5)(d)]....
...The crime of kidnapping was accomplished when the victim was forcibly removed from the office. The victim was then sexually assaulted and robbed of a ring worn on her left ring finger. 2. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. [F.S. 921.141(5)(e)]....
...To avoid being identified by the victim of his criminal acts the defendant felt it necessary to eliminate the only witness. His plan might have been successful had not law enforcement personnel responded so quickly. 3. The murder was committed for pecuniary gain. [F.S. 921.141(5)(f)]. The Court is aware of the prohibition of considering both the robbery as an aggravating circumstance and whether the crime was committed for pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance. However, the aggravating circumstance of F.S. 921.141(5)(d), already discussed herein, is considered applicable because the murder was committed during the course of a kidnapping and an attempted sexual battery....
...The fact that this crime was committed, at least partially, for pecuniary gain is without doubt. The defendant robbed Janet Renee White of her ring. The ring was found in the defendant's pocket upon his arrest. 4. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel [F.S. 921.141(5)(h)]....
...ehend. This Court finds that this crime was extremely wicked and vile. It was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. 5. The murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification [F.S. 921.141(5)(i)]....
...The Court has taken into account the testimony of the defendant and the defendant's father. The Court finds that the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. The Court has considered all the possible mitigating circumstances listed under Florida Statute 921.141(6) and any others that might apply....
CopyCited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The trial judge made these findings of fact in support of the death sentence: As to Count One of the Indictment, wherein the Defendant was convicted of First Degree Murder, the Court makes the following findings of fact: 1. As an aggravated circumstance under Florida Statute 921.141(5) (a) The capital felony of Murder in the First Degree was committed by Anthony Ray Peek while he was on probation on two charges of Burglary, one count of Grand Larceny and two charges of Petit Larceny, having been placed on said probation on November 15, 1976, for a period of five (5) years....
...the conviction for the felonies contained in the Information in Case No. CF77-1658 involved the use or threat of violence to the victim. (c) The Court finds that the facts of this case do not support the aggravated circumstances in Florida Statutes 921.141(5)(c) in that the Defendant did not knowingly create a great risk of death to many persons, other than the victim....
...(d) The capital felony, the murder of Erna L. Carlson, was committed while the Defendant was actively engaged in the commission of the sexual battery of Erna L. Carlson. (e) This Court finds that the facts of this case do not support the aggravated circumstances in Florida Statutes 921.141(5)(e) in that this capital felony was not committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody....
...g the *498 victim's purse, obtaining the keys to a motor vehicle, the property of Erna L. Carlson, and then stealing said motor vehicle. (g) This Court finds that the facts of this case do not support the aggravated circumstances in Florida Statutes 921.141(5)(g) in that the capital offense was not committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws....
...othing and bedclothes wound around her neck and tied to the headboard of a bed. According to expert medical opinion, the victim suffered tremendous excruciating pain while being raped and killed. 2. As to mitigating circumstances in Florida Statutes 921.141(6) (a) The Court finds that the Defendant, ANTHONY RAY PEEK, did have a history of prior criminal activity and, therefore, rejects Florida Statutes 921.141(6)(a) as a mitigating circumstance. (b) The Court finds that this capital offense was not committed while the Defendant was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance and, therefore, rejects Florida Statutes 921.141(6)(b) as a mitigating circumstance. (c) The victim, Erna L. Carlson, was not a participant in the Defendant's acts of Burglary, Grand Larceny, Sexual Battery and Murder in the First Degree, and this Court expressly rejects this subsection, Florida Statutes 921.141(6)(c) as a mitigating circumstance. (d) The Defendant acted alone in the commission of these offenses and the Court expressly rejects subsection 921.141(6)(d), Florida Statutes, as a mitigating circumstance. (e) The Defendant, ANTHONY RAY PEEK, did not act under extreme duress or under the domination of any other person and the Court expressly rejects subsection 921.141(6)(e) as a mitigating circumstance. (f) The Defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was not substantially impaired, and the Court expressly rejects subsection 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes, as a mitigating circumstance. (g) Finally, the age of the Defendant, ANTHONY RAY PEEK, has been considered as required by subsection 921.141(6)(g) of the Florida Statutes....
...The trial judge expressly considered but rejected appellant's age as a mitigating factor. The record supports his finding. *499 Appellant contends it was error to regard appellant's probationary status as being within the aggravating circumstance set forth in section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), which allows consideration as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the capital felony was "committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment." The appellant asserts that a grant of probation is...
...on parole. Persons who are under an order of probation and are not at the time of the commission of the capital offense incarcerated or escapees from incarceration do not fall within the phrase "person under sentence of imprisonment" as set forth in section 921.141(5)(a)....
...Consequently, this aggravating circumstance was improperly found in the instant case. The trial court further found as an aggravating circumstance that appellant had been convicted of felonies "involving the use or threat of violence to the person." § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1977). Appellant urges that since these prior convictions were on appeal at the time of sentencing, they cannot be considered "convictions" for purposes of section 921.141(5)(b)....
...ance of a conviction valid at the time of sentencing, that is subsequently reversed and vacated by an appellate court. The appellant next contends the trial court was also in error in finding that the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. § 921.141(5)(f), Fla....
...tor beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's findings with respect to the two remaining aggravating circumstances are fully justified by the record. It is unrefuted that the capital felony was committed during the commission of a sexual battery. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1977). Further, the medical testimony clearly establishes that Mrs. Carlson's horrible suffering at the hands of her attacker was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...While I am not unmindful of the atrocities committed upon the victim in this case and the principle of law that even in a capital case a conviction may be based wholly upon circumstantial evidence, nevertheless, pursuant to the obligation imposed upon me by section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1977), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(f), I have reviewed the evidence in this cause and determine that the interest of justice requires a reversal....
...His testimony was nothing more than impeachment. Accordingly, based on the evidence in this record, I feel compelled to reverse the judgment of conviction. Furthermore, I dissent from several conclusions reached by the majority with respect to application of section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1977). First, I reject the majority's conclusion that section 921.141(5)(a) permits consideration of a defendant's probation status at the time of commission of a homicide....
...f imprisonment and probation. Compare chapter 948, Florida Statutes (1979) (probation) with chapter 947, section
947.16, Florida Statutes (1979) (sentence). It cannot be presumed that the legislature was unmindful of this distinction when it enacted section
921.141(5)(a)....
...intent to that body which is so contrary to its consistent delineation between sentence and probation. Second, I cannot accept the proposition that a nonfinal conviction of a violent felony may be considered as an aggravating *501 circumstance under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1977)....
...This question has not previously been addressed directly by the Court. But see McCrae v. State,
395 So.2d 1145 (Fla. Oct. 30, 1980) ( plea of guilty, as opposed to a nonfinal conviction, to a violent felony without adjudication of guilt an aggravating circumstance under section
921.141(5)(b))....
...For aid in determining what constitutes a "conviction" under this section, I would utilize the interpretation of that term under section
775.084, Florida Statutes (1975), our habitual offender statute, because the purposes of both that statute and section
921.141(5)(b) are similar-to enhance punishment due to prior criminal convictions....
...State,
335 So.2d 876 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Coleman v. State,
281 So.2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). In view of the similarity in underlying philosophy between the two statutes, and in view of the awesome finality of the death penalty, I would hold that for purposes of section
921.141(5)(b) a prior conviction may not be utilized in aggravation until direct appellate review has concluded....
...is bottomed should not be lightly regarded. Because of the unique attributes of the death penalty, we have engaged in a narrow construction of chapter 921 when a question as to its meaning has arisen. See Elledge v. State,
346 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1977) (section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1975), construed to permit only consideration of enumerated factors as aggravating circumstances). Adherence to this rule of construction indicates to me that finality of conviction for purposes of section
921.141(5)(b) should be at least as stringent as for section
775.084, where the consequences are not nearly so grave....
...ENGLAND, J., concurs in so much of this dissent as would reverse appellant's conviction. NOTES [1] "It is quite simply a hallmark of our legal system that juries be carefully and adequately guided in their deliberations." Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 193,
96 S.Ct. 2909, 2934,
49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). [2] Section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that during the sentencing proceeding, "evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence... ." [3] See, e.g., §
921.141(6)(a), (6)(d), (6)(g), Fla. Stat. (1977). [4] The judge subsequently corrected this finding to show that appellant was nineteen at the time of the crime, although his conclusion that Peek's age was not a mitigating circumstance did not change. [5] §
921.141(6)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The trial judge found that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery and that the capital felony was especially heinous and atrocious. He found that sufficient aggravating circumstances existed as enumerated in Section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1975), that justified a sentence of death....
...As stated in State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d at 9, When one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found, death is presumed to be the proper sentence unless it or they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating circumstances provided in Fla. Stat. §
921.141(7), F.S.A....
CopyCited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 133910
...The jury returned a verdict of guilty and recommended death on a 7 to 5 vote, and the judge concurred in the recommendation. In sentencing Banda to death, the court found only a single aggravating factor, that the murder was cold, calculated, premeditated, and without pretense of moral justification. See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...gal justification, and (b) that the sentence is not proportional. We agree. Florida law requires that, before a murder can be deemed cold, calculated, and premeditated, [1] it must be committed "without any pretense of moral or legal justification." § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...Thus, the sole aggravating factor was improperly found by the court below, since the state has not met its burden of proof. Accordingly, we must vacate the sentence. The death penalty is not permissible under the law of Florida where, as here, no valid aggravating factors exist. § 921.141(3), Fla....
CopyCited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 2755802
...This Court has previously approved the use of victim-impact evidence in penalty-phase proceedings, see Windom v. State,
656 So.2d 432 (Fla.1995), and the record in this case reveals that the evidence introduced by the State fell within the purpose of section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2002), which allows the jury to consider "the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." In Huggins' sixth point of appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal....
...In Huggins' final point of appeal, he argues that Florida's death penalty sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584,
122 S.Ct. 2428,
153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and that the trial court's use of special verdict forms in the penalty phase was inconsistent with the requirements of section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2002), and violated his constitutional rights....
...gatories on the aggravating factors submitted to a jury are advisable following Ring. See Globe v. State,
877 So.2d 663, 679-80 (Fla.2004) (Pariente, J., specially concurring). The findings on the aggravators and the mitigators are not prohibited by section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2003)....
...circumstances a jury or any individual juror may have determined existed"). As I stated in my concurring opinion in Bottoson: By requiring a special verdict on aggravating circumstances, this Court will not only assist trial judges in administering section 921.141, but also enhance the quality of our own constitutionally mandated review of death sentences in a manner that anticipates the likely effect of Ring and its progeny....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 1424534
...dal act because there was no felony separate from the instant homicide. Lukehart contends that the rationale of Mills v. State,
476 So.2d 172, 177 (Fla. 1985), should be applied to this claim because aggravated child abuse is an enumerated felony in section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1995)....
...At the time of this crime, the first aggravator listed in Florida's death penalty statute provided in relevant part: (5) Aggravating circumstances Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: (a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control. § 921.141(5)(a), Fla....
...At the time of the murder, the aggravator provided in subsection (5)(a) did not apply to persons on probation. See Ferguson v. State,
417 So.2d 631, 636 (Fla.1982); Bolender v. State,
422 So.2d 833, 837 (Fla. 1982); Peek v. State,
395 So.2d 492, 499 (Fla.1980). Thereafter, the Legislature amended section
921.141(5)(a) to add "or on probation," ch....
...could consider as an aggravator the fact that Lukehart was on felony probation. In his sentencing order, the judge found felony probation as one of three aggravating circumstances. Lukehart contends in this appeal that the Legislature's amendment of section 921.141(5)(a) to add probation to the list of statutory aggravators was a substantive change in the law, not a mere refinement of the law as this Court found the "community control" aggravating circumstance to be in Trotter v....
...the meaning of the "under sentence of imprisonment" aggravator. As to probation, Lukehart argues that until May 30, 1996, the death penalty statute contained no mention of probation as an element of the "under sentence of imprisonment aggravator" at section 921.141(5) and, in fact, Florida case law specifically held that probation was not an aggravator....
...increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes. See Lynce v. Mathis,
519 U.S. 433,
117 S.Ct. 891,
137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997); *925 Dugger v. Williams,
593 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1991). We agree. We conclude that the Legislature, in amending section
921.141(5)(a) to include the phrase "or on probation," altered the substantive law by adding an entirely new aggravator to be considered in determining whether to impose a death sentence....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Regarding the sentence of death imposed in this case, appellant argues that it is improper because the jury recommended life imprisonment and the judge failed to give it adequate consideration and failed to properly weigh all the circumstances. Pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1979), the trial judge found as aggravating circumstances that appellant had been convicted of another capital felony (the murder of Walsworth), id. § 921.141(5)(b); that the murder of Bettis was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest or preventing prosecution for the murder of Walsworth, § 921.141(5)(e); that it was committed to disrupt or hinder the exercise of a governmental function, § 921.141(5)(g); that it was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h); and that it was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, § 921.141(5)(i). The sentencing court found that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the two mitigating circumstances found to exist: that appellant had no significant record of prior criminal activity, § 921.141(6)(a), and that he was only twenty years of age at the time of the capital felony, § 921.141(6)(g)....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 528
...d to the state attorney the responsibility to prepare the sentencing order, because the judge did not, before directing preparation of the order, independently determine the specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances that applied in the case. Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1985), requires a trial judge to independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether the death penalty or a sentence of life imprisonment should be imposed upon a defendant....
...f the case against the standard criminal activity which can only be developed by involvement with the trials of numerous defendants. Thus the inflamed emotions of jurors can no longer sentence a man to die... . The fourth step required by Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., is that the trial judge justifies his sentence of death in writing, to provide the opportunity for meaningful review by this Court....
...In Nibert, we addressed a claim that the trial court instructed the state attorney to prepare the sentencing order. In that case, however, we found that "[t]he record reflects that the trial judge made the findings and conducted the weighing process necessary to satisfy the requirements of section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1985)."
508 So.2d at 3-4....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Finding no merit in any of appellant's challenges to the convictions, we affirm them. We come now to consideration of the sentencing proceeding and sentences of death. Appellant presents a series of arguments with regard thereto. Appellant argues that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1977), violates due process by arbitrarily establishing a presumption that death is the appropriate sentence in a felony murder situation, because the existence of the underlying felony can be used to aggravate the capital felony....
...Moreover, we recently rejected this argument when it was presented by an appellant who has *890 standing to raise it. White v. State,
403 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1981). The judge found that appellant had twice previously been convicted of a violent felony, section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1977); that in committing the crimes appellant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons, Id. §
921.141(5)(c); that the crime was committed for the purposes of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest and disrupting law enforcement, Id. § 921.145(5)(e) & (g); that the crimes were committed during the course of a robbery and for pecuniary gain, Id. §
921.141(5)(d) & (f); and that the capital felonies were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Id. §
921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 444292
...These findings and reasons should be discussed as they relate to the particular juvenile whose case is under review and in the context of each of the criteria in section 39.059(7)(c). This Court has previously examined two other sentencing schemes where written findings are required by statute: section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1991), findings in support of a sentence of death, and section 921.001(6), Florida Statutes (1991), reasons delineating a departure from a guidelines sentence....
...See Parker v. State,
546 So.2d 727, 728-29 (Fla. 1989). The similarity exists because of the need to ensure that statutory safeguards are strictly maintained when trial judges treat individuals substantially more severely than is customary. In interpreting section
921.141(3), this Court has held that the written findings supporting a sentence of death must be issued concurrent with the oral sentencing pronouncement....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 228421
...[2] While Johnson was tried separately for the murders of Tequila Larkins and Lee Arthur Lawrence, a single hearing was held on the motion to suppress Johnson's confession to both murders. [3] Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [4] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987). [5] Id. §
921.141(5)(c). [6] Id. §
921.141(5)(d). [7] Id. §
921.141(5)(f). [8] Id. §
921.141(5)(i). [9] Id. §
921.141(6)(b). The trial court could not understand how Johnson's grief would lead him to become a hired killer and, therefore, stated that there was insufficient evidence to support this mitigator. [10] Id. §
921.141(6)(g)....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 273, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 1343, 2011 WL 2374188
...The trial court denied this motion because defense counsel could not provide a factual basis other than their observation that Rigterink displayed an unusual, off-putting lack of emotion during his trial. Further, the court found that defense counsel had not complied with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.202. [N.3] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003). [N.4] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...y involving the use or threat of violence to a person (i.e., the contemporaneous murder of victim Jarvis) (great weight); (2) Rigterink murdered victim Sousa to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest (great weight); [n.5] and (3) HAC (great weight). [N.5] § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
...late teens; (b) stolen from his former employer; and (c) driven with a suspended driver's license. The trial court also found and considered twelve nonstatutory mitigators. [n.7] Rigterink later filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court. [N.6] § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
...The trial court denied the defense's motions and overruled its objections. [6] On August 22, 2005, at the beginning of the trial proceedings, the defense also renewed all pretrial motions and objections and requested favorable rulings. The trial court denied the defense's motions and overruled its objections. [7] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003). [8] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003). [9] § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003). [10] § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 461, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 1125, 2009 WL 2045416
...Accordingly, Marek has not demonstrated that testimony about Wigley's confession would be admissible in the guilt phase of a retrial. Based on the foregoing, the postconviction court did not err in concluding that Marek is not entitled to a new guilt phase. *996 3. Penalty Phase Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2008), expressly provides for the admission of hearsay testimony in the penalty phase of a death case: In the [penalty phase] proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant t...
...Further, some of Wigley's statements contradicted his own previous statements and others conflicted with otherwise unchallenged trial testimony, such as his claim that he not Marek talked the victim into getting into the truck. In addition, under section 921.141, the State could submit the sworn statement Wigley made shortly after the murder....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28074
...Grounds for Relief In this third petition for federal habeas corpus relief, Petitioner alleges essentially three grounds which he claims entitle him to relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) concealment of material facts on voir dire; and (3) unconstitutional application of Fla.Stat. § 921.141(6) at the initial sentencing hearing to limit the mitigating circumstances to the statutorily enu *873 merated factors....
...Blackburn,
653 F.2d 942, 947 (5th Cir.1981), particularly in a successive petition. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ends of justice would not be served by readdressing Petitioner’s claim that members of the jury were not impartial. The third ground for relief is that Fla. Stat. §
921.141 (6) was unconstitutionally applied at the first sentencing hearing in 1975 to limit the mitigating circumstances considered on Petitioner’s behalf to factors enumerated in (a) through (g) of Fla.Stat. §
921.141(6)....
...ising the jury that circumstances in mitigation were not limited to the statutory list. The only difference in the claim presented in the present petition is that counsel alleges mitigating circumstances were limited to those enumerated in Fla.Stat. § 921.141(6) without couching the issue in ineffective assistance terms....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 157
...m his conduct to the requirements of law. 2. The Defendant was twenty-two years of age at the time of the murder. Turning to Watts' challenges to his sentence of death, we agree that this murder was not especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, under section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1987)....
...ted error in connection with his sentencing under Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496,
107 S.Ct. 2529,
96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), overruled, Payne v. Tennessee, ___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 2597,
115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). Therefore, we do not reach this issue. [3] §
921.141(5)(b), (d), (f), (h), Fla....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 668166
...Accordingly, we find that the death sentence is the appropriate penalty in this case and affirm the convictions and sentences imposed upon Whitton by the trial court. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). [2] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). [3] § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). [4] § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). [5] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 445
...[2] We urge the trial courts of this state to refrain from allowing a jury to begin deliberations at 9:00 p.m., particularly in capital proceedings. [3] Committed while appellant was on parole from a sentence of imprisonment in the Ohio State Penitentiary. § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. 2) Previous convictions of three violent felonies in Ohio; two separate armed robberies and shooting with intent to kill a police officer. § 921.141(5)(b). 3) Committed for pecuniary gain; hired to commit murder for $5,000. § 921.141(5)(f). 4) Committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of governmental functions or enforcement of laws; hired to commit murder to prevent the victim from testifying as a state witness in a criminal case. § 921.141(5)(g). 5) Committed in cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The appellant and co-defendant Sampson Armstrong were tried together and convicted of the first-degree murders and robbery of Thomas and Eunice Kersey. After returning verdicts of guilt the trial jury heard evidence on the issue of sentence pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), and recommended the death penalty for both defendants....
...such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user, shall be murder in the first degree and shall constitute a capital felony, punishable as provided in §
775.082. (b) In all cases under this section, the procedure set forth in §
921.141 shall be followed in order to determine sentence of death or life imprisonment....
...section
782.04(1)(a). *1371 The judgment of conviction of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery is therefore affirmed. III. Sentence We come now to the consideration of the sentences of death imposed on the appellant pursuant to section
921.141, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974). The appellant has presented a number of arguments in his brief, only a few of which we find merit consideration. Appellant contends that section
921.141 improperly restricts the jury and judge to the consideration of the mitigating circumstances enumerated in the statute....
...As an aggravated circumstance, the capital felony, that is, the murders of Thomas Henry Kersey, aged 86 years and his wife Eunice Maye Kersey, aged 74, were committed while the defendant Enmund was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of or an attempt to commit an armed robbery. FS 921.141(5)(d). *1372 2. As a further aggravating circumstance, the Court finds that the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. FS 921.141(5)(f)....
...Kersey with money, and the testimony amply indicates that the armed robbery of April 1, 1975, was planned ahead of time by the defendant Enmund. 3. As a further aggravating circumstance, the Court finds that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. FS 921.141(5)(h)....
...Sampson Armstrong, each fired into the bodies of Mr. and Mrs. Kersey. 4. As a further aggravating circumstance, the Court finds that the defendant Enmund was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. FS 921.141(5)(b)....
...the United States District Court, Southern District of Georgia, establishing that on April 10, 1957, the defendant Enmund was convicted of two (2) separate offenses of robbery by the use of violence. 5. The other aggravating circumstances to-wit: FS 921.141(5)(a); 921.141(5)(c); 921.141(5)(e); and, 921.141(5)(g), are inapplicable in this case. As to mitigating circumstances involving the defendant Earl Enmund, the Court finds that none of the statutory mitigating circumstances applied to this defendant: 1. In particular, the Court has considered FS 921.141(6)(a), and finds that the defendant has previously been convicted of the felony of robbery. 2. As to FS 921.141(6)(b), there is absolutely no evidence or suggestion that the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 3. As to FS 921.141(6)(c), there is absolutely no evidence that the victims *1373 were a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act. 4. As to FS 921.141(6)(d), the evidence clearly indicates that the defendant was an accomplice to the capital felony and that his participation in the capital felony was major. The defendant Enmund planned the capital felony and actively participated in an attempt to avoid detection by disposing of the murder weapons. 5. As to FS 921.141(6)(e), there is absolutely no evidence that defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. 6. As to FS 921.141(6)(f), there is absolutely no evidence that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. 7. As to FS 921.141(6)(g), the defendant was 42 years of age at the time of this offense....
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Appellant's fourth point on appeal is that the trial court erred, at the sentencing phase of the trial, by finding applicable the aggravating circumstance that he had previously been convicted of another felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...Appellant's prior convictions for attempted murder and rape warranted application of the aggravating factor in question. The fifth issue raised is whether the presence of the victim's three children during the murder warranted the finding that appellant created "a great risk of death to many persons." See § 921.141(5)(c), Fla....
...denied,
454 U.S. 882,
102 S.Ct. 364,
70 L.Ed.2d 191 (1981), and so that particular aggravating circumstance was not applicable in the case at bar. We do agree, however, with the trial court's finding that this murder was heinous, *379 atrocious, and cruel. See §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...of other cases addressing this point, heinous, atrocious, and cruel. We also disagree with appellant's argument that the murder was not "committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any basis of moral or legal justification." See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...Nothing indicates that she provoked the attack in any way or that appellant had any reason for committing the murder. There was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find this circumstance applicable. Nor was there an improper doubling of aggravating factors. As appellee notes, the factor in section 921.141(5)(h) pertains to the nature of the killing itself, while section 921.141(5)(i) relates more to the killer's state of mind, intent, and motivation....
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The statutory procedure for the imposition of the death sentence, upheld by the United States Supreme Court, Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242,
96 S.Ct. 2960,
49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1972), specifically and expressly limits the aggravating circumstances to those set forth in section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...ravating circumstance under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We find no due process violation in this procedure. [2] The appellant next contends that the trial court failed to properly consider the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in section 921.141(5), (6)....
...d by driving at a high rate of speed to a real estate office where he took a woman hostage and threatened her life. We have previously held that this type of conduct does not fall within the aggravating type of conduct intended by the legislature in section 921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes....
...State,
346 So.2d 998, 1004 (Fla. 1977), this Court held: "It is only conduct surrounding the capital felony for which the defendant is being sentenced which properly may be considered in determining whether the defendant `knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.' Section
921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes." It is clear from this record that at the time appellant stabbed the victim no one else was around....
...anoid type. This condition was severe enough to require the trial judge to initially find the appellant incompetent to stand trial until his mental condition could be brought under control by medication at the state hospital. Under the provisions of section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1975), there are two mitigating circumstances relating to a defendant's mental condition which should be considered before the imposition of a death sentence: "(b) The capital felony was committed while the defen...
...d by the medical evidence in this cause. Burch v. State,
343 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1977), and Jones v. State,
332 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1976). The trial court erred in not considering the mitigating circumstances of extreme mental or emotional disturbance under section
921.141(6)(b) and the substantial impairment of the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct under section
921.141(6)(f)....
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 528459
...vidence consisting of divorce papers and a quitclaim deed executed by appellant; (4) the jury's verdict is not supported by competent, substantial evidence; (5) the mitigating circumstances mandate that appellant's death sentence be vacated; and (6) section 921.141 is unconstitutional....
...State,
497 So.2d 863, 871 (Fla. 1986). Accordingly, we find that the trial court appropriately found and evaluated the mitigating and aggravating circumstances and that the death sentence is proportionate in this case. Finally, appellant challenges the constitutionality of section
921.141, Florida Statutes....
...NOTES [1] A videotape of Clyde Decker's deposition to perpetuate testimony was presented to the jury because Clyde was unavailable to testify at trial. [2] Clyde Decker's account of the events was generally consistent with that of Robert Decker, so we do not recount the details of his testimony here. [3] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993). [4] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1993). [5] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1993). [6] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1993). [7] See § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla....
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 180595
...III, IV, and V. We find that each is supported by competent substantial evidence. We reverse the conviction for sexual battery. Penalty Phase Jones asserts several errors pertaining to the imposition of the death penalty. First, Jones contends that section 921.141(2), Florida Statutes (1987), and the federal constitution require jurors to use a special verdict form and to unanimously agree upon the existence of the specific aggravating factors applicable in each case....
...relatives. The judge summoned Juror McKinney and counsel to a side-bar conference. There is no record evidence that Jones objected at trial to Juror McKinney's service on the panel or was precluded from conferring with his counsel or the court. [8] § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1987). [9] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1987). [10] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 301364
...The court found the following four aggravating circumstances to be present in this case: (1) the murder was committed during a robbery; (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (4) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated. § 921.141(5)(d), (f), (h), (i), Fla....
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 31519866
...ounsel's objections, portions of several presentence investigation reports from Evans' prior convictions. The reports were introduced for the purpose of proving the details of the prior violent felonies of which Evans had been convicted. Pursuant to section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1999), hearsay testimony is admissible to establish these details, provided the defendant has a fair opportunity to rebut the hearsay. See § 921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ct that he was an inmate does not make his life any less precious than any citizen in a free society. It is the Court's opinion there are very strong aggravating circumstances under this condition. [6] State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973). [7] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1979). [8] §
921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1979). [9] The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, §
921.141(5)(a), and the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony, §
921.141(5)(b)....
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...eration and was found to be without any compelling weight. Appellant argues that the trial judge erred in finding that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification under section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...eapons and that he shared in the premeditated intent to kill the two victims according to a pre-arranged plan. In Combs v. State,
403 So.2d 418, 421 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 984,
102 S.Ct. 2258,
72 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982), this Court said that section
921.141(5), paragraph (i) "in effect adds nothing new to the elements of the crimes for which appellant stands convicted but rather adds limitations to those elements for use in aggravation, limitations which inure to the benefit of a defenda...
...d, calculated and ... without any pretense of moral or legal justification." See
403 So.2d at 421. Appellant argues that the trial judge erred in failing to find the mitigating factor that appellant acted under the substantial domination of Hawkins. §
921.141(6)(e), Fla....
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 101538
...say. The exclusionary rules of evidence are inapplicable to sentencing proceedings in capital cases except where failure to apply the rules would result in a violation of the state or federal constitution. We find no such violation in this instance. § 921.141(1), Fla....
... (1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter event such person shall be punished by death....
...se offenders sentenced pursuant to the guidelines. [3] We find no error in the jury instruction which correctly stated the law. The trial court committed error in failing to provide written findings in support of its imposition of the death penalty. Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1985), requires that the court make such findings in writing....
...concurs. BARKETT, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur in the conviction, but dissent as to the sentence. In this case we again must face a death penalty imposed in the absence of contemporaneous written findings, as required by section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 416715
...It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. NOTES [1] Esty and his friends engaged in a sport called "boffoing" which involved sword fights with padded swords made from PVC pipe. [2] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1991). [4] § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 45123
...Shere's last claim attacks the trial court's penalty-phase instructions and findings. Initially, Shere argues that the court erred by instructing the jury to consider whether the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function or law enforcement. See § 921.141(5)(g), Fla....
...The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on a circumstance that was supported by the evidence. Shere also argues that the trial court erred by finding the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...on where Snyder was shot ten times. See, e.g., Francis,
473 So.2d at 677; Lara,
464 So.2d at 1173. We are not convinced, however, that the evidence supports the trial court's finding as to the circumstance of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...[3] One of the statements was recorded, and that recording was played to the jury. Detective Alan Arick related to the jury the contents of Shere's other statements. [4] Heidi Greulich said that subsequent to the murder, she and Shere married, and she testified under the name Heidi Greulich Shere. [5] See § 921.141(5)(g), Fla. Stat. (1987). [6] See id. § 921.141(5)(h). [7] See id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
...ected above. [18] The trial judge's name was "McNeal." [19] The trial court found that the murder was "especially evil, wicked, atrocious, or cruel." We find no merit in Shere's claim that the trial court's failure to precisely track the language of section 921.141(5)(h) of the Florida Statutes (1987) created confusion on these facts.
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ch caused dyslexia, and had emotional problems; that he had been enrolled in handicapped classes; and that his mental condition was chronic. Under our death sentence process, two mitigating circumstances relating to mental condition are set forth in section 921.141(6)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes (1983). In considering these statutory mitigating *359 circumstances, the trial judge found as follows: B. The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. [§ 921.141(6)(b).] CONCLUSION There is no mitigating circumstance under this paragraph. ... . F. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. [§ 921.141(6)(f).] FACT There has been evidence that the defendant had in the past held jobs and attended school....
...The sentencing order reflects that the trial judge "misconceived the standard to be applied," as did the judge in the Ferguson cases, when he utilized the tests for sanity at the time of the offense and competency to stand trial in determining the applicability of section
921.141(6)(b) and (f). See
417 So.2d at 638;
417 So.2d at 645. I conclude that mitigating circumstances under section
921.141(6)(b) and (f) were established in this record by unrefuted testimony....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 598487
...d and the trial court expressly considered testimony concerning Merck shooting in the face a laundromat operator in Sylva, North Carolina, when Merck was 14. In her sentencing order, the trial court found as an aggravating factor the following: 1. F.S. 921.141(5)(b): The defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person....
...the face with a rifle, the bullet lodging in her head. There apparently was no provocation for the assault. The defendant, TROY MERCK, JR., was convicted and adjudicated a delinquent for this offense. This is also a proper aggravating factor under F.S. 921.141(5)(b)....
...We accept the trial court's conclusion and approve the procedure followed by the trial judge in conducting the remainder of the jury proceeding. However, we agree with Merck that the juvenile adjudication was not a conviction within the meaning of section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...8, General Statutes of North Carolina (1993). Despite correctly sustaining the objection to the admissibility of the North Carolina judgment, the trial court erred in stating in her sentencing order, "This is also a proper aggravating factor under F.S. 921.141(5)(b)." We find the inclusion of this juvenile adjudication similar to the erroneous inclusion of community control as an aggravating factor in Trotter v....
...We find this case to be unlike Jones v. State,
440 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1983), because we cannot find that the trial court's inclusion of the North Carolina delinquency adjudication was surplusage. We acknowledge that there was other substantial evidence to support the aggravating factor in section
921.141(5)(b)....
...jury. We distinguish Campbell v. State,
571 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1990), because that case involved "juvenile convictions." Our decision in this case is not to be read to mean that "convictions" of individuals who are juveniles which otherwise come within section
921.141(5)(b) are eliminated from consideration because the individuals are juveniles....
...I write to express my concern about an issue which is unclear in the record. Merck was sentenced to four years in prison on October 9, 1989, six years in prison on October 31, 1989, and five years in prison on March 28, 1990. The murder for which he is here convicted occurred on October 12, 1991. Why then was section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), not applicable to Merck at the time of this murder? *945 I do note that if Merck was on parole, or if his order of probation included as a condition a term of incarceration and this murder was committed while Merck was or should have been incarcerated, he would have been under a sentence of imprisonment within the meaning of section 921.141(5)(a)....
...denied, ___ U.S. ___,
113 S.Ct. 1619,
123 L.Ed.2d 178 (1993). If the explanation is that Merck was out of jail because of an early release program, this case highlights why truth in sentencing is critical to the proper administration of justice. NOTES [1] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1993). [2] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 29521
...le the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," and "[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired." § 921.141, Fla....
...I agree with the majority's conclusion that Stewart's conviction should be affirmed. Likewise, I agree that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the statutory mitigating factors. However, I would commute Stewart's sentence to life imprisonment under the authority of section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1983). Section 921.141(3) requires that the trial judge make "specific written findings of fact" based upon the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. To this date, the trial court has never provided any written findings to support the imposition of the death penalty. Under these circumstances, section 921.141(3) requires that "the court shall impose [a] sentence of life imprisonment." See also Stewart v....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...We disagree, for here, unlike Enmund, both the sentencing order and the record indicate that the defendant (Squires) was personally responsible for the murder of Jesse Albritton. The finding from which Squires argues was made in respect to the factor enumerated in section 921.141(6)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), where the trial court stated: D....
...y and kidnapping) both to support his felony-murder conviction and as an aggravating circumstance in the penalty phase and therefore violated due process and equal protection principles. He argues that one convicted of felony-murder is prejudiced by section 921.141(5)(d) for that person enters the sentencing phase with one statutory aggravating circumstance already established against him....
...We see no reason to recede from our position as enunciated in these decisions. Therefore, we reject Squires' arguments as being without merit. Our decision remains notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Enmund v. Florida . Enmund did not invalidate section 921.141(5)(d); rather, it prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on one who was vicariously guilty of felony-murder, but neither killed nor intended to kill the victim....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15553, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 935
...Langford to purchase crack cocaine.
After a trial, a jury found Trotter guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon and
first-degree murder and recommended a sentence of death by a nine-to-three vote.
A Florida statute contained an exhaustive list of aggravating circumstances, Fla.
Stat. § 921.141(5) (1985), and the trial court found four of them applied to Trotter:
(1) “[t]he crime was committed while under sentence of imprisonment”; (2) “the
defendant had previously been convicted of a felony involving use or threat of
vi...
...at
692 & n.3. The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed
the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Trotter to death. Id. at 692.
The trial court found that Trotter was a “person under sentence of
imprisonment,” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(a) (1985), because, when the murder
occurred, Trotter was serving a sentence of “community control” for a prior
conviction of robbery and burglary....
...The first statute
amended the list of aggravating circumstances. The amendment provided that it is
an aggravating circumstance that “[t]he capital felony was committed by a person
under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control.” Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(a) (1991) (emphasis added); see Trotter II, 690 So....
...2d at 1237. The
5
second statute provided that, after introducing evidence of an aggravating
circumstance, “the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim
impact evidence.” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7).
At Trotter’s resentencing, an advisory jury recommended a sentence of death
by a vote of eleven to one....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 45, 2017 WL 372058, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 192
...his impulses.
The trial court issued its sentencing order on October 1, 2010. The court
concluded that the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence
of six aggravating circumstances: prior conviction of a capital felony, §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997) (great weight); capital felony committed in the
9. Spencer v. State,
615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
- 25 -
course of a kidnapping, §
921.141(5)(d) (great weight); capital felony committed
for the purpose of avoiding arrest, §
921.141(5)(e) (great weight); capital felony
committed for pecuniary gain, §
921.141(5)(f) (great weight); capital felony was
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), §
921.141(5)(h) (exceptionally great weight);
and capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner
(CCP), §
921.141(5)(i) (extremely great weight).
The court found one statutory mitigating circumstance, Calloway’s age at
the time of the murders, section
921.141(6)(g), Florida Statutes, and gave it some
weight....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 188306
...In this instance, the trial court rejected without explanation the unrebutted testimony of Santos' psychological experts. On its face, this evidence suggests that two statutory mitigating factors may be present. These are that Santos was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), and that Santos was substantially impaired in his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...Second, Rogers requires a determination of whether the facts "are of a kind capable of mitigating the defendant's punishment." Here, I believe there can be no believable dispute. The unrebutted testimony of the experts establishes that Santos was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987), and that Santos was substantially impaired in his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 503
...o the murder of Moore, and four aggravating and no mitigating circumstances to the murder of Bryant. The five aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge are: (1) the capital felonies were committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1983); (2) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony, section 921.141(5)(b); (3) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, section 921.141(5)(f); (4) the capital felonies were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h); and (5) the capital felonies were homicides and committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, section 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 236207
...[3] Phillips places much emphasis on counsel's statements that Phillips was an "idiot." Counsel explained that this statement did not reflect his feelings about Phillips' mental capacity, but rather about his tendency to take actions which sabotaged his own case, such as bragging about the crime to other inmates. [4] § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla. Stat. (1981). [5] § 921.141(5)(i), (h), Fla....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 730708
...tence be prepared prior to the oral pronouncement of sentence for filing concurrent with the pronouncement." [8] The trial court found the following statutory aggravators: (1) the murder was committed during the commission of a burglary and robbery, section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1993); (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, section 921.141(5)(f); (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), section 921.141(5)(h); and (4) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP), section 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 225
...We reject Nibert's argument that the death penalty was unlawfully imposed because the judge did not actually prepare the order of findings in support of the death sentence. The record reflects that the trial judge made the findings and conducted the weighing process necessary to satisfy the requirements of section 921.141, *4 Florida Statutes (1985)....
...Nevertheless, we overturned the trial court's finding that the homicide had been committed in a cold and calculated manner, stating that: The level of premeditation needed to convict in the guilt phase of a first-degree murder trial does not necessarily rise to the level of premeditation required in section 921.141(5)(i)....
...ere was no evidence that the victim was in fact robbed before being stabbed. Although the evidence does support premeditated murder, it cannot support the heightened premeditation necessary under our law for the statutory aggravating circumstance of section 921.141(5)(i)....
...McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J. (Ret.), concurs in the conviction, but dissents from the sentence. NOTES [1] It is undisputed that there was no evidence to indicate that Nibert did, in fact, rob the victim on the night of the murder. [2] Section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1985). [3] Section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1985).
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 66650
...112,
34 L.Ed.2d 141 (1972). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and death sentence, and remand for resentencing for the sexual battery consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1981). Two additional aggravating circumstances were found: the defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving violence to the person; the murder was committed in the commission of a sexual battery. Id. §
921.141(5)(b), (d)....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...[1] Because the appellant was engaged in the commission of a felony when Lt. Spurlin was shot, the accidental nature of the shooting is irrelevant. We find no error. Following the entry of appellant's plea, a jury was impaneled. The jury recommended to the trial court that a sentence of death be imposed. See section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes....
...al. We reject both contentions on the basis of Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242,
96 S.Ct. 2960,
49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). A more serious question is raised by appellant's contention that the trial judge improperly considered subsections (d) and (f) of section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1975), as two separate aggravating circumstances for purposes of arriving at a sentence....
...circumstances to place on the scale to weigh against the valid mitigating circumstances. In this case, the trial judge found the existence of five aggravating circumstances: (1) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. (Section 921.141(5)(c).) (2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. (Section 921.141(5)(d).) (3) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. (Section 921.141(5)(e).) (4) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. (Section 921.141(5)(f).) (4) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. (Section 921.141(5)(h).) Only one mitigating factor was established: no significant history of prior criminal activity. (Section 921.141(6)(a).) Absent the factor of pecuniary gain, there remain ample statutory aggravating factors to outweigh the one in mitigation....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 311853
...trial court erred in failing to conduct an adequate inquiry of jurors as to their exposure, just before penalty phase deliberations, to news articles relating Steverson's alleged post-guilt-phase confession to a corrections officer; and (5) whether section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), Florida's felony murder aggravator, and the corresponding jury instruction, are unconstitutional....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2005 WL 2782589
...sentencing phase of a capital case."); Allen v. State,
662 So.2d 323 (Fla.1995) (same). Additionally, Perez's contention that because the rules of evidence precluding the admissibility of hearsay do not apply to penalty phase proceedings pursuant to section
921.141(1) of the Florida Statutes, those proceeding are constitutionally inadequate also lacks merit....
...oceeding if there is an opportunity to rebut."); Lawrence v. State,
691 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 1997) (same); Chandler v. State,
534 So.2d 701 (Fla.1988) (holding that admission in sentencing proceeding of hearsay testimony did not render subsection (1) of section
921.141 of the Florida Statutes unconstitutional)....
...However, Perez does not direct our attention to any specific statements in the record that he contends are testimonial in nature and, therefore, the holding in Crawford is inapplicable to Perez's current claim. Instead, Perez specifically asserts that section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes cannot pass constitutional muster because it allows for the admission of hearsay statements in penalty phase proceedings....
...Based on the foregoing, we deny Perez's claim. III. Victim Impact Evidence Perez contends that the trial court erred when it refused to allow the defense to present evidence that Martin and the entire family opposed the death penalty. This claim is meritless. Section 921.141(7) of the Florida Statutes (2001) provides: Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence....
...Such evidence shall be designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death. Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as a part of victim impact evidence. § 921.141(7), Fla....
...ing HAC to Perez contributed to the sentence of death entered in this case. See State v. DiGuilio,
491 So.2d 1129, 1139 (Fla.1986). With the striking of the HAC aggravator, two aggravating circumstances remain prior violent felony conviction, see §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat (2001); and the merged aggravators of commission while engaged, or an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit or in flight after committing or attempting to commit a robbery or a burglary of a dwelling, see §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2001), and commission for pecuniary gain, see §
921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (2001). The trial court also found that one statutory mitigating circumstance had been established, extreme mental or emotional disturbance, see §
921.141(6)(b), Fla....
...Because future dangerousness is a prohibited nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, the trial court should not factor this determination into its assessment of the weight assigned to these mitigating circumstances on remand. A sentencing court is limited to the statutory aggravating circumstances listed in section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 527421
...We find no error. As his third issue, appellant claims that the trial court engaged in impermissible doubling of aggravators by finding that the murder was both heinous, atrocious, or cruel and committed during the commission of a felony listed in section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1991)....
...State,
604 So.2d 794, 798 (Fla.1992) (improper doubling where murder was found to be both committed during the course of a burglary and for pecuniary gain where purpose of burglary was pecuniary gain). The two aggravators at issue here are not merely restatements of one another. While section
921.141(5)(d) focuses simply on whether the defendant was engaged in the commission of one of the statute's enumerated felonies, the HAC aggravator focuses on a different aspect of the capital felonyits impact on the victim....
...either by the desire to inflict a high degree of pain or utter indifference to or enjoyment of the suffering of another."). Thus, the HAC aggravator considers the circumstances of the capital felony from the unique perspective of the victim, whereas section 921.141(5)(d) does not....
...mmission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual battery, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...uate the robbery. Therefore, a robbery committed by assault and restraint is just as much a felony involving the threat of violence as is a robbery committed through battery or the display of a weapon. We therefore conclude that, for the purposes of section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), robbery is as a matter of law a felony involving the use or threat of violence....
...ating circumstance based on the evidence. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to find several mitigating circumstances from the evidence. He argues that the judge should have found the absence of a significant criminal history. § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
...accusations, and two charges of violation of parole. Appellant contends that the trial judge should have found that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform it to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. Id. § 921.141(6)(f)....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 182810
...3) capital felony committed for pecuniary gain; (4) capital felony was heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (5) capital felony was a homicide committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(b), (e), (f), (g), (i), Fla.Stat. (1991). The trial judge found two statutory mitigating factors: (1) no significant history of criminal activity and (2) Farina's age (sixteen) at the time of the crime. § 921.141(6)(a), (g), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 527, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 1631, 2010 WL 3781991
...alth mitigating circumstances. Prior to sentencing, Ault proposed the following statutory mitigation: (1) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law was substantially impaired, see § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2007); and (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, see § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
...1987) (finding evidence that the defendant was a model prisoner during his previous commitment constituted a valid mitigating factor). Second, the trial court failed to provide "specific written findings of fact based upon ... the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings." § 921.141(3), Fla....
...Under Florida law, in order to return an advisory sentence in favor of death a majority of the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance listed in the capital sentencing statute. See State v. Steele,
921 So.2d 538, 540 (Fla.2005) (citing §
921.141(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004)). The jury must also find that any aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. See id. (citing §
921.141(2)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...course of which he used violence, and then used that fact as an aggravating factor in his sentencing order. One of the aggravating circumstances that a trial judge may consider in determining whether or not to impose the death penalty is set out in section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1979): "The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." Mann had been convicted in Mississippi of the crime of burglary, an offense that, standing alone, would not fall within the foregoing definition....
...nce. Must the conviction itself have inherently included a prior jury's determination of violence, or is it enough to show a prior conviction and let the sentencing jury find, based upon the evidence, whether that prior conviction included violence? Section 921.141(5)(b) does not contain the "during which" language utilized by the trial judge....
...he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he committed this atrocity and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. § 921.141(6)(b), (f)....
...clarity so that we can properly review them and not speculate as to what he found; this case does not meet that test. We also find that the trial court improperly found the homicide to have been committed in a cold, calculated, premeditated manner. § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...It is so ordered. ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In the sentencing order the trial court indicated that a kilogram of cocaine was worth $65,000. [2] The court found the following circumstances listed in § 921.141(5) applicable: (a) the crime was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; (c) the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons; (d) and (f) the crime was committed during the perpetration of a robbery and...
...al justification. [3] Thompson had previously been severed by the state because of his mental condition. [4] The trial judge based his presumption on a recent adjudication by a federal district court that Thompson was incompetent to stand trial. [5] § 921.141(5)(b)....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 609
...NOTES [1] In 1976, this general rule permitting court witnesses was codified and can now be found in the Florida Evidence Code, section
90.615, Florida Statutes, to wit:
90.615 Calling witnesses by the court (1) The court may call witnesses whom all parties may cross-examine. [2] See §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1985). [3] See §
921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Const. The appellant and co-defendant Earl Enmund were tried together and convicted of the first-degree murders and robbery of Thomas and Eunice Kersey. After returning verdicts of guilt the trial jury heard evidence on the issue of sentence pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), and recommended the death penalty for both defendants....
...Having given careful consideration to appellant's arguments, and having reviewed the record to determine the sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm the judgment of conviction. III. Sentence We come now to the consideration of the sentences of death imposed on the appellant pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975)....
...As an aggravated circumstance, the capital felony, that is, the murders of Thomas Henry Kersey, aged 86 years and *961 his wife Eunice Maye Kersey, aged 74, were committed while the defendant Armstrong was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of or an attempt to commit an armed robbery. FS 921.141(5)(d). 2. As a further aggravating circumstance, the Court findings that the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. FS 921.141(5)(f)....
...ahead of time by the co-defendant Enmund and that the defendant Armstrong participated in the planning and preparation. 3. As a further aggravating circumstance, the Court finds that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. FS 921.141(5)(h)....
...Kersey were each shot while in the prone position, it is only reasonable to conclude, and the Court so finds, that the co-defendant Enmund and the defendant Sampson Armstrong, each fired into the bodies of Mr. and Mrs. Kersey. 4. The other aggravating circumstances to-wit: FS 921.141(5)(a); 921.141(5)(b); 921.141(5)(c); 921.141(5)(e); and 921.141(5)(g), are inapplicable in this case. As to mitigating circumstances involving the defendant Sampson Armstrong, the Court makes the following findings: 1. The Court has considered FS 921.141(6)(a), and finds that the defendant has previously been convicted of, and was on parole for, a felony at the time of the instant offenses, to-wit: Breaking and Entering. 2. As to FS 921.141(6)(b), the defendant Armstrong attempted to establish that he was under the dominance of the co-defendant Enmund and the co-defendant Jeanette Armstrong, his wife, however, this attempt failed and there is no believable evidence that the capital felony was committed while the defendant Armstrong was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. *962 3. As to FS 921.141(6)(c), there is absolutely no evidence that the victims were a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act. 4. As to FS 921.141(6)(d), the evidence clearly indicates that the defendant was an active accomplice to the capital felony and that his participation in the capital felony was major. As stated in paragraph 3 of the aggravating circumstances, the evidence leads to the reasonable conclusion that the defendant Armstrong fired into the prone bodies of Mr. and Mrs. Kersey. 5. As to FS 921.141(6)(e), there is no believable evidence that defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. (See paragraph 2 above) 6. As to FS 921.141(6)(f), there is absolutely no evidence that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. 7. As to FS 921.141(6)(g), the defendant was 23 years of age at the time of this offense and this constitutes the only possible mitigating circumstance as to the defendant Armstrong....
...Neal about Armstrong's statement to him. By that account, the shootings were indeed spontaneous and were precipitated by the armed resistance of Mrs. Kersey. The judge also found support for the finding of this factor in the fact that the murders were premeditated. Nothing in section 921.141, as it stood at the time of the crimes and the trial of this case, nor in the decisions of this Court construing it, supports the proposition that the factor, heinous, atrocious, or cruel is established by the existence of premeditation....
...and Mrs. Kersey as witnesses to the armed robbery." A purpose to eliminate witnesses has been said to support the finding that a capital felony "was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody." § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 75302
...proportionally unwarranted; (2) application of the death penalty to the mentally ill (but not legally insane) is cruel and unusual punishment; (3) alleged violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320,
105 S.Ct. 2633,
86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). [2] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). [3] §
921.141(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (1981). [4] §
921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1981). [5] §
921.141(5)(g), Fla. Stat. (1981). [6] §
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). [7] §
921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...This is substantiated by the findings of the trial judge. Having had the additional benefit of a presentence investigation report, she determined that there were no mitigating circumstances. Counsel is not required to manufacture facts or arguments where none exist. We reject appellant's contention that Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutional on the basis of State v....
...A more serious question is raised by appellant's contention that the trial judge improperly weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in arriving at a sentence. Three circumstances were listed in aggravation: [5] 1. The murder was committed during the commission of an armed robbery. Section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1975). 2. The murder was committed for pecuniary gain. Section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1975). 3. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1975)....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 381
...stand trial. On the day the sentencing proceedings began, defense counsel moved for a continuance and appointment of a psychiatrist and psychologist, claiming their testimony was necessary to demonstrate certain mitigating circumstances set forth in section 921.141(6)(b), (e), and (f), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...ue of appellant Valle's rehabilitation; thus, as in Stewart, any other evidence on this issue was merely cumulative. As for appellant's contention that the trial court erred in not finding the statutory mitigating circumstances set forth in sections 921.141(6)(b) and (f), neither the jury nor the trial court is compelled to find mitigating circumstances as long as they consider them....
...prosecutor's remarks in closing argument. See Shriner v. Wainwright,
715 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir.1983). Appellant's final argument on appeal is that the trial judge erred in finding that this murder was especially heinous, atrocious, *806 and cruel. See §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...In addition to this aggravating circumstance, the trial judge also found that two other aggravating factors were applicable to this murder, i.e., that the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody, section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1983), and the capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws, section 921.141(5)(g), Florida Statutes (1983)....
...o aggravating factors that are properly applied here. When one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found, death is presumed to be the proper sentence unless it or they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating circumstances provided in section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1983)....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...d instructions, so that the jury's recommendation was valid and a new jury recommendation was not required. Therefore, the trial court's decision on remand not to convene a jury was in keeping with our mandate and was proper. Appellant contends that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutional in that the effect of the aggravating *315 circumstances therein is to create a presumption that death is the appropriate penalty for persons convicted of first-degree murder on the theory of felony murder. He argues that one convicted of one of several kinds of felony murder enters the sentencing process with one statutory aggravating circumstance already established against him by virtue of section 921.141(5)(d)....
...The state accordingly responds to this argument by saying that appellant may not attempt to reopen this issue which was settled in the initial appeal. [2] We agree and adhere to our earlier conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
..., with care taken to prevent the detection of the murder, does not establish that the murder itself was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest, as when a witness is killed to prevent him from identifying the perpetrator of an antecedent crime. § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The burden of showing that the trial judge abused his discretion lies with the defendant. Dixon v. State,
287 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Morgan v. State,
142 So.2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). The trial court was correct in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes, contemplates the possibility of the waiver of a trial jury during the sentencing procedure....
...The defendant could have at any time instructed his attorney or the court of his desire to have a jury impaneled for the sentencing portion in his case. It does not appear from the record that any such instruction was ever given. The waiver was voluntarily offered by defendant, was proper, and was within the dictates of Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes....
...Furthermore, this Court in State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), stated: When one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found, death is presumed to be the proper sentence unless it or they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating circumstances provided in Fla. Stat. §
921.141(7), F.S.A....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...With the rendition of the Furman decision on July 24, 1972, the classification of capital offenses was, in effect, abolished [4] subjecting all former capital crimes to prosecution within a two year period. [5] This situation remained in effect until our Legislature re-enacted a death penalty statute. Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (1972) which re-vitalized the classification of "capital crimes", effective October 1, 1972, as later amended by Laws of Florida Chapter 72-724, effective December 8, 1972....
...tal case' by that name because there is no `capital offense' for which they can do so." The Court was obviously dealing with the procedure for commencing criminal actions during the interim period. [10] Subsequent to the effective date of Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A....
...(1972) [11] the definition of capital crimes was re-vitalized. The requirement of Fla. Const., Art. I, § 15, which commands that indictment in "capital cases" shall only be by indictment by a grand jury, was once again controlling. In Manucy, petitioner was charged after the effective date of Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A....
...oes not mean that a person cannot now be indicted or informed against and thereupon tried for what has heretofore been delineated as a `capital crime'." Id. at 504. [11] October 1, 1972. We are not unmindful of the subsequent amendment to Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., Laws of Florida, Ch. 72-724, however this statute was not in effect at the time of filing of the information and Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...I join in the denial of the Motion for Stay and the denial of the Appellant's Motion to Vacate and Set Aside or Correct Sentence only because I am bound by duty to uphold the law as defined by this Court and the United States Supreme Court. If I alone were determining the constitutionality of Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, I would find the statute unconstitutional on its face....
...But that question has been decided to the contrary by the United States Supreme Court in Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242,
96 S.Ct. 2960,
49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) and by this Court in State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973). Now that the question of the statute's application is clearly presented, I would also find Section
921.141, Florida Statutes to be unconstitutional as applied....
...This statutory scheme insulates the discretion exercised by the trial court from review by any higher court, including the Supreme Court of Florida which is charged with the duty of insuring that the death penalty is imposed strictly in accordance with the dictates of Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, and that those convicted of murder receive equal treatment under the law....
...State,
332 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1976). Provence v. State,
337 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1976). Thompson v. State,
328 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1976). Obviously this Court has had great difficulty in applying the present statute. The aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated in Section
921.141(5), (6) are so ill defined and vague as to escape reasonable and consistent application.
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...In that case we held that once a jury returns a verdict of first degree murder, the trial judge is exempt from the *756 mandatory presentence requirements of the rule. Finally, we must determine whether or not appellant was appropriately sentenced. § 921.141(4), F.S....
...obbery, and Assault With Intent to Commit Murder in the First Degree. Thereafter, the defendant was adjudicated guilty by the Court and the jury, after hearing additional matters, retired to consider an advisory sentence, pursuant to Florida Statute 921.141(2)....
...The jury returned, and in open Court recommended that this Court impose the death penalty upon the defendant. This Court independent of, but in agreement with, the advisory sentence rendered by the jury does hereby impose the death penalty upon the defendant, RONALD JACKSON, and in support thereof, as required by 921.141(3), submits this, its written findings upon which the sentence of death is based....
...The trial judge who sentenced both defendants specifically found that Jackson was "the dominating factor and not the dominated." Under our present statutory scheme, the presence of this additional mitigating circumstance justifies the unequal sentences imposed on these defendants. Section 921.141(6)(e)....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 33 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 871, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 2053, 2008 WL 4809695
...a Grone, Maureen McQuade, and David Stinson that Blackmon killed the victim. Before addressing each claim individually, we first address whether the testimony of Miller, Carter, Grone, McQuade, and Stinson would be admissible at a new penalty phase. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides, in pertinent part, that in a separate sentencing proceeding *40 evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defend...
...im would have been found to be meritless. See Reed v. State,
875 So.2d 415 (Fla.2004). As a result, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. Habeas relief is denied on this claim. Constitutionality of Section
921.141 Lowe next asserts that Florida's capital sentencing law, section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2007), is unconstitutional for various reasons. We find that there is no merit to any of Lowe's arguments. First, Lowe argues that subsection
921.141(1) is unconstitutional because it allows the use of hearsay during the penalty phase, and he argues that the use of this evidence violates his right to confront and cross-examine his accusers and violates his right to remain silent. However, there is nothing in section
921.141(1) that denies a defendant the right to confront and cross-examine the State's witnesses, nor is there language within the subsection that requires a defendant to give up his right to remain silent. See Chandler v. State,
534 So.2d 701 (Fla.1988). Lowe also argues that section
921.141 is unconstitutional because it allows the exclusion of jurors for their views on capital *46 punishment. There is nothing in section
921.141 that discusses whether jurors should be excluded for their views on capital punishment....
...Furthermore, the issue of whether a juror should be excluded based on his or her views on capital punishment is determined on an individual basis depending on what a particular juror says in answer to voir dire questioning. Lowe finally argues that section 921.141 is unconstitutional because it allows the death penalty to be imposed under a theory of felony murder without a finding that the defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim....
...State,
341 So.2d 765, 767-68 (Fla.1976) ("[Felony murder is] an exception to the general rule that murder is homicide with the specific intent of malice aforethought. Under the felony murder rule, state of mind is immaterial. Even an accidental killing during a felony is murder."). The issue of whether section
921.141 is unconstitutional, in whole or in part, has been addressed repeatedly by this Court. This Court has consistently found section
921.141 to be constitutional....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 317
...mprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Cotton already had been convicted of first-degree murder in a separate trial. [2] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1987). [4] § 921.141(5)(g), Fla. Stat. (1987). [5] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1987). [6] § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
...of us among the living. The pain, torture, and humiliation for a law enforcement officer of his credentials would have been immeasurable. The Court finds that this capital crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. [Emphasis added.] [12] See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). [13] See § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 259, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 1346, 2011 WL 2374834
...The trial court did not err in finding this aggravator. During a penalty phase proceeding, the trial court has the discretion to admit evidence with regard to the details of a defendant's previous conviction for a felony involving the use or threat of violence. See § 921.141(1), (5)(b), Fla....
...See Rhodes,
547 So.2d at 1204; Delap v. State,
440 So.2d 1242, 1255-56 (Fla. 1983); Elledge v. State,
346 So.2d 998, 1001-02 (Fla.1977). Rather, the State may adduce any testimony that the trial court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant. See §
921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...nviction pursuant to a guidelines scoresheet. [9] It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. [2] See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] Id. § 921.141(5)(d). [4] Id. § 921.141(5)(h). [5] Id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 392870
...As previously indicated, the jury in this case rendered a seven-to-five recommendation for death without providing any indication as to whether the recommendation was a seven-to-five vote on each murder or a seven-to-five vote for one of the murders and a recommendation of life for the other. Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1991), which governs the penalty phase proceeding in a capital case, provides that a jury is to render to the court an advisory sentence of either life imprisonment or death. § 921.141(2). The statute clearly addresses this advisory sentence as it pertains to a single murder. See § 921.141(1), (2) ("Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony ......
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 6536
...extreme mental illness,"
507 So.2d at 1376, and where the trial judge "correctly recognized this [mental illness] in his sentencing order by finding as mitigating factors that Ferry was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (section
921.141(6)(b)) and that Ferry's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired (section
921.141(6)(f))." Ferry,
507 So.2d at 1376....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Supreme Court of Florida. February 17, 1977. Rehearings Denied March 31, 1977. *30 Walter B. Dunagan, Daytona Beach, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. PER CURIAM. By direct appeal pursuant to Section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1975), we have before us for review a conviction of Benjamin Huckaby for the rape of a child under the age of eleven, [1] for which the jury recommended and the trial judge imposed a sentence of death....
...1973). [7] The appellate courts of this state have rarely been called upon to interpret this statute, and this Court has not been required to explain how the trial courts of this state are to apply it within the context of the death penalty statute, Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1973)....
...[1] Both the Legislature and this *35 Court have recognized that "death is a unique punishment in its finality and its total rejection of the possibility of rehabilitation." [2] In order to limit that penalty to only those persons who have committed the most aggravated capital offenses, the Legislature in Section 921.141 has specifically listed the factors to be considered in sentencing....
...us, including evidence that the defendant had been adjudged a mentally disordered sex offender, confined for his illness and certified back to the court as having been cured by a program of professional treatment. A delayed sentence proceeding under Section 921.141 thus serves both the purposes of Chapter 917 treatment rather than confinement and of the death penalty statute....
...Only post-conviction proceedings are now authorized. Ch. 74-379, §§ 3, 4, Laws of Florida. This would not, however, prevent the special hearing between a conviction and the separate advisory hearing on sentencing. [2] State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973). [3] Sections
921.141(6)(b) and (f), Fla. Stat. (1973). [4] In most cases this sequence will result in the sentencing hearing being held before a jury specially impaneled for that purpose, as now authorized by Section
921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (1975). See Messer v. State,
330 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1976). Sentence review would be available here. Section
921.141(4), Fla....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 451
...NOTES [1] Section
90.106, Florida Statutes (1983) provides: A judge may not sum up the evidence or comment to the jury upon the weight of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, or the guilt of the accused. [2] Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [3] §
921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1983). [4] §
921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1983). [5] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1983). [6] §
921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 418
...BOYD, Chief Justice. This case is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of crimes including first-degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of death for the capital offense. *1180 We have jurisdiction of the appeal. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; § 921.141, Fla....
...onspiracy to commit murder in the first-degree. At the sentencing phase, the state presented no additional evidence. The state and defense stipulated that the statutory mitigating factor of lack of a significant history of criminal activity existed. § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
...1671,
51 L.Ed.2d 751 (1977). Next appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding the existence of several aggravating circumstances. The judge found as aggravating circumstances that appellant had previously been convicted of a violent felony, section
921.141(5)(h); and that it was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, section
921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 563, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 1815, 2012 WL 4125813
...In pronouncing Martin’s sentence, the trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of three aggravating circumstances: (1) the capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under a sentence of felony probation, § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008) (great weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while Martin was engaged in the commission of a robbery, § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2008) (great weight); and (8) the crime for which Martin was found guilty was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...The trial court found that the first mitigator was not proven by the defense. Martin was twenty-one years old at the time of the crime and demonstrated, during his police interview and trial, a level of “sophistication, intelligence, and understanding [to] directly rebut [this] claim.” See § 921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. (2008). With regard to other factors in Martin’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty, see § 921.141(6)(h), Fla....
...Krop’s deposition, it does not appear to have overlooked any material evidence in reaching its conclusion. Accordingly, we deny any relief on this issue. *322 Constitutionality Martin challenges the constitutionality of Florida’s death sentencing scheme delineated in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2008)....
... See Floyd v. State,
913 So.2d 564, 577 (Fla.2005). The aggravating circumstance of under-sentence-of-imprisonment also includes a person who was “previously convicted of a felony ... or placed on community control or on felony probation.” See §
921.141(5)(a), Fla....
...Thus, the trial court did not act improperly when it found this aggravator even without a specific jury recommendation. See Floyd,
913 So.2d at 577 . Martin also contends that the trial court’s finding of a felony-murder aggravator does not support his death sentence. We disagree. Section
921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (2008), states that an aggravating circumstance is established where the “capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged ......
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Our concern was that the requirements of Provence v. State,
337 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 969,
97 S.Ct. 2929,
53 L.Ed.2d 1065 (1977), be met. Provence requires that a conviction is essential for consideration of prior crimes under the aggravating factor in section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1977)....
...lledge had a significant history of criminal activity, crimes which were either noncapital or nonviolent. [4] Such an argument is clearly obfuscatory as it is apparent that this initial finding concerned the lack of the mitigating circumstance under section 921.141(6)(a), *1024 Florida Statutes (1977), [5] because the findings that directly follow the initial finding also concern lack of mitigating circumstances....
...any error that may have deprived appellant of any protections offered by the judicial process. Accordingly the sentence of death is affirmed. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), reads: "The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." [2] State's Exhibit No....
...Court, having already adjudged you to be guilty of Murder In The First Degree on March 17th, 1975, that you, WILLIAM DUANE ELLEDGE, be sentenced to Death. [4] Appellant seeks to characterize the initial finding as the aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), which concerns prior convictions for capital or violent felonies....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 1241060
...State,
531 So.2d 124, 127 (Fla.1988), noted: At the outset, it must be remembered that there is a different standard for judging the admissibility and relevance of evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case, where the focus is substantially directed toward the defendant's character. See §
921.141(1), Fla....
...in a character analysis of *90 the defendant to ascertain whether the ultimate penalty is called for in his or her particular case. Thus, evidence that would not be admissible during the guilt phase could properly be considered in the penalty phase. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1997), relating to sentencing proceedings, provides that evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and shall include ma...
...ant.... Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. § 921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 22669486
...For all these reasons, we conclude that Zakrzewski has not demonstrated that his guilty pleas were involuntary, and we affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim. III. APPRENDI AND RING In his last issue on appeal, Zakrzewski argues that Florida's death penalty statute, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2002), is unconstitutional pursuant to Apprendi v....
...1070,
123 S.Ct. 662,
154 L.Ed.2d 564 (2002), and King v. Moore,
831 So.2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1067,
123 S.Ct. 657,
154 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), this Court denied relief under Ring. Subsequently, this Court has rejected postconviction challenges to section
921.141 based on Apprendi and Ring....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 83561
...NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. [2] This effort was not wholly successful, however. A fingerprint expert identified a fingerprint discovered on the right front door of the taxi as Gillam's. [3] See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1987). [4] See id. § 921.141(5)(f). [5] See id. § 921.141(5)(d). [6] See id. § 921.141(6)(g)....
...parent from the context. See §
90.104, Fla. Stat. (1987). [9] We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring certain testimony as beyond the scope of the witness's expertise. See §
90.702, Fla. Stat. (1987). [10] See §
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). [11] See id. §
921.141(6)(f). [12] See id. §
921.141(6)(e).
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 178136
...[2] When Melton was tried for Carter's killing, he had already been convicted of an unrelated armed robbery and murder. These prior convictions were not relevant to the guilt phase of the instant case, but were part of the penalty phase. [3] In addition, section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1991), does not provide for separate juries in a case such as Melton's....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 464268
...Gudinas was convicted of the first-degree murder and sexual battery of Michelle McGrath. A jury recommended death and the trial court sentenced him to death. The trial court found the following statutory aggravators: (1) the defendant had been convicted of a prior violent felony, section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1995); (2) the murder was committed during the commission of a sexual battery, section 921.141(5)(d); and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h). The court found one statutory mitigator: the defendant committed the murder while under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, section 921.141(6)(b)....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...We find that the appellant was not denied a fair trial by exclusion of the hearsay evidence. SENTENCE The trial court made the following findings of fact as to the aggravating circumstances of the case: 1. The murder was committed while the Defendant was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping. (F.S. 921.141(5)(d))....
...business of approximately $1,197.00. The crime of kidnapping was accomplished when the victim was forced at knife-point to leave the premises of Western Union. 2. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. (F.S. 921.141(5)(e))....
...The evidence has established that Janis Franklin knew the defendant and would clearly have been able to identify him as the robber of the Western *22 Union. For that reason she was driven to an isolated area and murdered. 3. The murder was committed for pecuniary gain. (F.S. 921.141(5)(f)). The Court is aware of the prohibition of considering both the robbery as an aggravating circumstance and whether the crime was committed for pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance. However, the aggravating circumstance of F.S. 921.141(5)(d), already discussed above, is considered applicable because the murder was committed during the course of a Kidnapping....
...the Court from considering the pecuniary gain aspect of the crime. The fact that this crime was committed for pecuniary gain is without doubt. The defendant took $1,197.00 at knife-point. 4. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. (F.S. 921.141(5)(h))....
...me upon Janis Franklin with no feelings for her suffering and even with a degree of enjoyment in slashing her throat. 5. The murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. (F.S. 921.141(5)(i))....
...ith one aggravating circumstance already established. This Court concluded that this would not be the case because the level of premeditation needed to convict in a first-degree murder trial does not necessarily rise to the level of premeditation in section 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 399962
...Sims next argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the murder was committed during the course of a felony because it duplicates an element of the underlying offense and fails to narrow the class of defendants subject to the death penalty. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...First, the trial judge instructed the jury on the "extreme duress" mitigator: Among the mitigating circumstances you may consider, if established by the evidence, are that the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. [§ 921.141(6)(e), Fla....
...(Emphasis added.) But in his sentencing order, the judge stated that the mitigating factor Sims alleged was the "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" mitigator, to wit: "The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
...ircumstance which was not alleged by the state and for which the jury received no instruction. The court found that: "The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws," § 921.141(5)(g), Fla....
...s inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. [7] Avoiding arrest aggravator: "The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody." § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
...h this factor without proof of the requisite intent to avoid arrest and detection." [9] Killing a law enforcement officer aggravator: "The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties." § 921.141(5)(j), Fla....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 79
...In his third point, appellant argues that the trial judge erred in determining that three aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances applied to this homicide. The court found that appellant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence in *1180 accordance with section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...State,
376 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 1979). Appellant's fourth point challenges the trial judge's determination that the homicide was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function or the enforcement of laws under the provisions of section
921.141(5)(g), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...We find this aggravating circumstance properly applies under the facts of this case. In his fifth point, appellant argues that the trial judge improperly determined that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification under the provisions of section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1981)....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 40375
...ting circumstances. See id. at 1335-36. [9] As we recently noted in Patton, a distinction exists between the adoption of proposed orders after a postconviction evidentiary hearing and the adoption of proposed sentencing orders, which are governed by section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1999), and require the trial court to determine independently specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances that applied in the case....
...
513 So.2d at 1262; Nibert,
508 So.2d at 4. Thus, the instant case is distinguishable from Patterson and its progeny in that Valle challenges the submission of proposed findings in a hearing denying postconviction relief, a procedure not governed by section
921.141....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 23162540
...and improperly inculpated James Hitchcock. 4. Lastly, the evidence would also show that James Hitchcock was innocent of the death penalty by showing that even if he was involved in the death of the victim James Hitchcock was a minor participant. See Section 921.141(6)(d), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 681, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 2067, 2009 WL 4841038
...On March 15, 2006, the trial judge sentenced Smith to death for the murder. The trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of six statutory aggravators: (1) Smith committed the felony while he was on probation, see § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) (moderate weight); (2) the murder was committed while Smith was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery or kidnapping, see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003) (significant weight); [9] (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC), see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); (5) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), see § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); and (6) the victim was under twelve years of age, see § 921.141(5)( l ), Fla....
...Neither a jury nor a sentencing court should be precluded from considering as an aggravating circumstance that the murder occurred during the commission of a second violent felony simply because the defendant murdered a child and the additional felony includes an age component. Section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (2004), lists sexual battery not sexual battery upon a child under the age of twelveas a qualifying crime for application of this aggravating circumstance, and these two aggravators are not "merely restatem...
...upon the "same essential feature or aspect of the crime." Banks,
700 So.2d at 367. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it found and applied both of these aggravators to the murder here. We deny relief on this claim. G. Constitutionality of Section
921.141(5)(l), Florida Statutes (2004) Smith next asserts that the statutory aggravating circumstance that the victim of the murder was under twelve years of age is unconstitutional....
...nges have previously been asserted, this is the first case in which such an issue has been properly preserved. See Stephens v. State,
975 So.2d 405, 426 (Fla. 2007) (appellate counsel not ineffective for failure to challenge the constitutionality of section
921.141(5)( l ) where trial counsel did not object during trial); Lukehart v. State,
776 So.2d 906, 925 (Fla.2000) (constitutional challenge to section
921.141(5)( l ) procedurally barred where defendant failed to object during trial to the jury instruction on constitutional grounds)....
...2001) ("[T]o be constitutional, an aggravating circumstance must `not apply to every defendant convicted of murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder.'" (quoting Tuilaepa v. California,
512 U.S. 967, 972,
114 S.Ct. 2630,
129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994))). With regard to the contention that section
921.141(5)( l ) violates due process because it does not require the State to establish that Smith targeted the victim based upon her age, this assertion is also without merit. In Woodel v. State,
804 So.2d 316, 325 (Fla.2001), this Court considered the constitutionality of section
921.141(5)(m), which establishes an aggravating circumstance for consideration when the victim of the capital felony is particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability....
...l characteristics of the victim, and not to whether she was targeted because of those qualities"). Finally, although the "under twelve" aggravator does not expressly require that the victim be "particularly vulnerable," the absence of these words in section 921.141(5)( l ) does not render this subsection constitutionally deficient....
...eir age and vulnerability ...."); see also Leon v. State,
498 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) ("All children under the age of twelve are, by definition, children of tender age who are particularly vulnerable to acts of child abuse."). We hold that section
921.141(5)( l ) is constitutional....
...be heard in person. Second, after hearing the evidence and argument, the trial judge should then recess the proceeding to consider the appropriate sentence. If the judge determines that the death sentence should be imposed, then, in accordance with section 921.141, Florida Statutes ......
...See ch. 93-406, § 9, at 2924, Laws of Fla. The session law provided that the definitions under section 921.0011 applied to the entire chapter. See id. ("921.0011 DefinitionsAs used in this chapter...."). Chapter 921, entitled "Sentence," included section 921.141(5)(b), which provides as an aggravating circumstance that "[t]he defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." Thus, under the plain language of section 921.0011, the 1993 definition of "conviction" applied to section 921.141(5)(b), and a plea, regardless of whether adjudication was withheld, constituted a conviction....
...Smith was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance during the commission of these crimes or that Smith's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See § 921.141(6)(b),(f), Fla....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20655, 2006 WL 2328625
...The trial court found
the following aggravating factors: (1) Henyard had been convicted of prior violent
felonies, specifically a second capital felony and six non-capital felonies involving
violence, including his 1989 juvenile conviction, see Fla. Stat. 921.141(5)(b); (2)
Henyard had murdered Jamilya and Jasmine Lewis during the course of kidnaping
them, see Fla. Stat. 921.141(5)(d); (3) Henyard committed the murders for
pecuniary gain, see Fla. Stat. 921.141(5)(f); and (4) the murders were especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel, see Fla. Stat. 921.141(5)(h).
The state trial court found one specific statutory mitigating factor: the fact
that Henyard was only eighteen at the time of the crimes. See Fla. Stat.
921.141(6)(g)....
...established that
Henyard was the shooter of the Lewis children.
Although the state trial court characterized these as non-statutory mitigating factors,
some of them arguably reflect upon statutory mitigating factors, in particular Fla. Stat.
921.141(6)(b) (“The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”) and Fla. Stat. 921.141(6)(f) (“The capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to
the requirements of law was substantially impaired.”).
31
on ma...
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 132269
...ury instructions. The State cross-appeals the trial court's findings that 1) Duncan was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the murder; 2) Duncan was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder, section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1989); and 3) Duncan's ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired, section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (1989)....
...We also agree with the State that there was no evidence to support the statutory mental mitigating factors urged by the defendant. In State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 943,
94 S.Ct. 1950,
40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), we explained that extreme mental or emotional disturbance as used in section
921.141(6)(b), is interpreted as "less than insanity but more than the emotions of an average man, however inflamed." We went on to explain that substantial impairment of the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, as used in section
921.141(6)(f), refers to mental disturbance that "interferes with but does not obviate the defendant's knowledge of right and wrong." Id....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 517
...many persons in the commission of the crime, that the crime was committed while engaged in the commission of a kidnapping, robbery and rape, and that the killing was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. In his written findings in conformity with section 921.141(3), the court found that none of the statutory mitigating factors applied but did find Delap's behavior at trial and in prison and the possibility of remorse as mitigating factors....
...nstant case. The prosecutor told the jury that it should "consider the mitigating circumstances and consider them by number." In the sentencing order the trial judge referred to "insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in Florida Statute 921.141(6) to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." The judge observed that he was mandated to apply the facts to certain enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Minerva and David J. Busch, Asst. Public Defenders, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Michael M. Corin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. OVERTON, Justice. We have jurisdiction, pursuant to Fla. Const., Art. V, § 3(b)(1), and Fla. Stat. 921.141(4), to entertain this direct appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County imposing the death penalty upon the appellant....
...ea of guilty to the offense; (2) the facts were sufficient to support the plea. At the time of sentencing, the defendant offered no statement in his own behalf. The court thereupon imposed the death sentence, setting forth the reasons as required by § 921.141, F.S....
...t choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant. Sentencing Proceedings Regrettably, the record fails to reflect whether defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the trial court advised the defendant-appellant that he had a right under § 921.141, F.S., to have a jury impaneled to render *20 an advisory opinion as to whether he should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment....
...iver. We hold that the record must affirmatively show that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived the right to have a sentencing jury render its opinion on the appropriateness of the death penalty, granted him by the express provision of § 921.141, F.S....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...uggesting a sentence of death in this case are not so clear and convincing that reasonable people could not believe life imprisonment justified. ADKINS and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This weighing of circumstances is directed in these cases by Section 921.141, Fla....
...1973). [2] The Court here correctly notes that the evidence regarding appellant's alleged use of drugs was conflicting. [3] Proffitt v. State, ___ U.S. ___,
96 S.Ct. 2960,
49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). [4] State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973). [5] Section
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1975). [6] Section
921.141(6)(c), Fla....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29547, 1999 WL 1020518
...Gerald Mussenden, a clinical psychologist, testified
1
Under the Florida capital sentencing scheme, a defendant found guilty of capital murder receives a
separate hearing to determine whether the appropriate penalty for his crime is life imprisonment or death.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(1) (West 1996)....
...After the presentation of evidence and the arguments of counsel, the
judge instructs the jury to consider whether certain statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances exist
in the case, and if so, whether those aggravating circumstances are outweighed by any mitigating
circumstances that may be present. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(2)....
...Notwithstanding the recommendation of the jury, however, the
trial court in a subsequent sentencing proceeding independently weighs the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and renders the final determination as to life or death. Fla. Stat. Ann. §
921.141(3)....
...duties if the motive for the capital felony was related, in
whole or in part, to the victim's official capacity.
(l ) The victim of the capital felony was a person less than 12 years of age.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5).
5
circumstances, Trogolo argued that Glock had no significant history of prior criminal activity; the felony was
committed while Glock was under the influence of extreme mental o...
...his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and that while Glock was chronologically
twenty-two years of age, his emotional or psychological age was much younger, and thus the "age of the
defendant" should be considered in his favor. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6).7
As for nonstatutory mitigators, Trogolo argued that Glock's history of childhood abuse should be
weighed in his favor....
...asked the jury to "[k]eep [Glock] where his family can still love him. They can love him in prison."
By a vote of eleven to one, the jury recommended that Glock be put to death. Because the Florida
capital sentencing scheme does not require it do so, see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(2), the jury did not advise
the court on which aggravating and mitigating circumstances it found were established during the trial....
...escape from custody; it was committed for pecuniary gain; and that the capital felony was a homicide and
that it was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, without any pretext of moral or legal
justification. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5)(e), (f), (i). The court also found that Glock had established
a mitigating circumstance in that he had no significant history of prior criminal activity. See Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 921.141(6)(a). In its written findings, the court specifically found that Glock had not established that he
"was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" when he committed the crime, Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(b), because "there was no credible evidence whatsoever to support a finding that
either of these defendants suffered from any disturbance [sic] that would mitigate a calculated, premeditated
murder." Further, the court specifically found that Glock had not established that he was under the
"substantial domination of another person" when he committed the crime. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(e).
B.
Following the imposition of sentence, Glock appealed his murder conviction and death sentence....
...Glock, Senior's, activities or wondering what
Bobby's involvement was in that.
17
Evidence of domination would support a finding that "[t]he defendant acted under extreme duress or
under the substantial domination of another person." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(e); this statutory mitigating
circumstance was not found by the sentencing judge at trial.
18
Dr....
...Petitioner argues that had the court had this evidence before it at sentencing, the
statutory mitigating circumstance that "the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(b), as well as numerous
nonstatutory mitigators, would have been established....
...Of the seven listed
statutory mitigating circumstances, two are indicators of the defendant's rehabilitative potential. These are:
"(a) [t]he defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;" and "(g) [t]he age of the defendant
at the time of the crime." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(a), (g)....
...legislature has deemed worthy of codification.
18
of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was substantially impaired." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)....
...oning of the rehabilitation argument is of no moment, because with
the additional evidence of abuse and mental disorder, the court would have found the statutory mitigating
circumstance of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance," Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(b), and numerous
nonstatutory mitigators....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 233894
...Lazaro was a physically abused and neglected child, and that was the cause of his death. The jury found Cardona guilty of both offenses and recommended death by a vote of eight to four. The trial court followed the recommendation. In aggravation, the court found the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1991). In mitigation, the court found that at the time of the murder Cardona was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance due to her "fall from riches to rags" and daily use of cocaine. § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). The court also found that during her ingestion of cocaine, Cardona's ability to conform her conduct to the requirements of law may have been substantially impaired. § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...The court imposed a consecutive sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment for the aggravated child abuse. Cardona appeals her convictions and sentences. The State cross-appeals the court's refusal to instruct the jury on and to find the aggravating factor of committed during a kidnapping. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 318688
...445,
126 L.Ed.2d 378 (1993), and find Fennie's remaining claims to be without merit. *100 Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and death sentence imposed by the trial court. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. NOTES [1] §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] §
921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] §
921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1991). [4] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1991). [5] §
921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1999 WL 176045
...He argues: (1) there was improper weighing and evaluation of mitigating evidence in that the mitigation outweighed the aggravation; (2) the prosecutor's "mercy is inappropriate" comment was a misstatement of the law; (3) the victim impact evidence did not comply with section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995), and should have been prohibited under Booth v....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2005 WL 425415
...e a son, trying to come help a friend *740 who complained of being sick." This does not amount to nonstatutory aggravation as Orme complains. Rather, the statement shows the victim's uniqueness as an individual. Such statements are permissible under section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1999) (allowing the State to introduce victim impact evidence, which shows "the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death"); see also Damren v. State,
696 So.2d 709, 713 (Fla.1997) (quoting section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993)); Bonifay v....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...us, atrocious, or cruel, and that the finding that it was committed for pecuniary gain must be stricken as an improper doubling of aggravating factors. Only one argument has merit. Appellant's action did create a great risk of death to many persons. Section 921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1973)....
...that they were in no risk of being killed. A gun battle in a confined area certainly created a "likelihood" or "high probability" that someone, bystanders or police officers, would be hit and killed. See Kampff v. State,
371 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 1979); Section
921.141(5)(c) was applicable. Also properly applied was the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed after commission of a rape. Section
921.141(5)(d). Appellant argues that because the crime of "rape" was repealed in 1974, no such offense existed at the time of this killing and so section
921.141(5)(d), which specifically refers to "rape", cannot be applied to him....
...State,
412 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1982), and Hitchcock v. State,
413 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1982). Likewise without merit is appellant's speculation regarding improper doubling of aggravating circumstances. There was no finding that the killing was committed during a robbery, (section
921.141(5)(d)), and so the application of section
921.141(5)(f), relating to capital felonies committed for pecuniary gain, was permissible. There is merit, however, to appellant's argument regarding the finding that the killing was heinous, atrocious, and cruel. See section
921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 130205
...structions to grant Hall a new trial. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping, § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989); the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, § 921.141(5)(f); the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h); and the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21439, 2010 WL 4056039
...e judge instructed the jury on the
potential aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The aggravating
circumstances included whether: (1) the capital felony was committed while the
defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d);
(2) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(e); (3) the capital felony was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h); and (4) the capital felony
was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense
of moral or legal justification. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(i). The mitigators in turn
included these considerations: (1) Kokal’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(f); (2) Kokal’s age at the time of the murder, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(g);
and (3) his character. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(h).
After deliberating, the jury unanimously recommended death....
...It also found
that “the defendant, Gregory Kokal did actually kill Jeffrey Russell.”
9
On November 14, 1984, the state trial court conducted a motion and
sentencing hearing of its own, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3), which requires
trial judges to independently review the evidence and make detailed written
findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances before imposing the
death penalty....
...al mitigating circumstances available in the
statute. The trial court then reached the following pertinent conclusions:
• In rejecting the “extreme mental and emotional disturbance”
mitigating circumstance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b), the judge
10
found that “the defendant was at all material times in complete
control of his mental and emotional faculties acting deliberately
and with pre-meditation.”
• In rejecting the “substantially impaired” capacity mitigating
circumstance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f), the judge recognized
that the defendant had “testified that during the evening prior to
the death of Russell ....
...his
conduct to the requirements of law and with an ability to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct.”
• In finding the “capital felony [during] . . . the commission of . .
. a robbery” aggravating circumstance, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(d), the judge found that the evidence “proves
beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of Jeffrey Russell took
place during the commission of the robbery of” Russell; and
that Kokal knowingly participated in the robbery and “actually
committed the murder.”
• In finding the “capital felony [to] avoid[] . . . arrest”
aggravating circumstance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(e), the judge
found that Russell “was beaten severely about the head and
shoulders during the robbery” and “[a]t the time of the murder, .
....
...eliminated the victim’s
identification and testimony at trial”; and Kokal told Mosley
“that he had shot Russell because, ‘dead men tell no lies.’”
• In finding the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravating
circumstance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h), the judge found that
“the victim was severely beaten about the head and neck[,] ....
...death march,’
Russell was beaten again and as he begged for his life, the
murder took place.”
• And in finding the “cold, calculated, and premeditated”
aggravating circumstance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(i), the judge
found that “Russell was assaulted and battered after he alighted
from the truck upon arrival from the beach[,] ....
...have greatly affected his cognitive abilities.
In short, in Dr. Crown’s opinion, Kokal was suffering from two statutory
mitigating factors at the time of the crime: Kokal was under the influence of an
extreme mental and emotional disturbance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b), and Kokal’s
capacity was diminished to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
4
Crown conceded, however, that Kokal underwent a physical examination and x-rays
after the near-drowning experienc...
...5
This signifies that Kokal may be attentive to some details and inattentive to others,
particularly when there are distractions.
15
his conduct to the requirements of the law, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f)....
...Virzi had received Kokal’s records, and was
made aware of Kokal’s near-drowning and severe automobile accident. Virzi
added that, based on the records supplied to him in post-conviction, he found the
presence of at least one statutory mental health mitigator at the time of the crime,
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b).
Specifically, when Virzi was asked whether he had an opinion based upon a
reasonable degree of medical probability as to whether Kokal suffered from a
diminished capacity at the time of the crime, he answered that the info...
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 191723
...evidence of Kight's low functional age of 8-10. The trial court denied trial counsel's request that the jury be instructed on the statutory mitigating factor of the age of the defendant at the time of the offense, believing that the plain meaning of section 921.141(6)(g) is chronological age and that defense counsel would have full opportunity to argue Kight's low functional age in connection with statutory mitigating factors: 1) that Kight's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was impaired and 2) that Kight was under the substantial domination of another....
...ability that if counsel had raised this claim the outcome of Kight's appeal would have been different, as required under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). While the jury was not given an instruction under section
921.141(6)(g), it was given instructions setting forth the following statutory mitigating factors: 1) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, section
921.141(6)(b); 2) the defendant acted under extreme duress or the substantial domination of another, section
921.141(6)(e); and 3) the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, section
921.141(6)(f)....
...Further, even if the claim had been preserved, it was meritless because it is clear from the sentencing order that these facts, among others, were the basis for the trial court's finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel under section 921.141(6)(h)....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 66651
...NOTES [1] Several weeks after the victim's disappearance police found the truck abandoned in Tampa. [2] The court found the following aggravating factors: (1) Sochor was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989); (2) the killing was committed while Sochor was engaged in the commission of a felony, § 921.141(5)(d); (3) the killing was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h); and (4) the killing was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 66658
...2055,
104 L.Ed.2d 728 (1989), we noted that "there is a different standard for judging the admissibility and relevance of evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case, where the focus is substantially directed toward the defendant's character." We stated that section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1987), allowed for broader admissibility of evidence during the penalty phase....
...their recommendation. We find no error. Valle next argues that the judge should not have instructed the jury on, nor found, the aggravating factor that the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties under section 921.141(5)(j), Florida Statutes (1987)....
...by its application. At the time Valle committed this crime the legislature had established the aggravating factors of murder to prevent lawful arrest and murder to hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws. §§ 921.141(5)(e), (g), Fla....
...te reversible error. Therefore, we affirm Valle's sentence of death. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Valle v. Florida,
476 U.S. 1102,
106 S.Ct. 1943,
90 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986). [2] §§
921.141(5)(b), (e), (g), (i), (j), Fla....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 795
...tatement. It is a simple matter to remand and obtain written reasons. This seems to be the view that has been adopted by our supreme court in other areas of the law requiring a written finding of fact or a written reason for a decision. For example, section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1983), regarding imposition of the death sentence, provides: In each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of the court shall be supported by specific written findings of fact base...
...in support of the sentence of death into the record at the time of sentencing. We have previously held that "[s]uch dictation, when transcribed, becomes a finding of fact in writing and provides the opportunity for meaningful review, as required by 921.141, Florida Statutes." Thompson v....
...Nevertheless, we find it prudent to require that written findings of fact be entered into the record on appeal and grant appellee's motion to relinquish jurisdiction and to supplement the record. Accordingly, this cause is temporarily remanded to the trial court so that written findings of fact as required under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1981), may be prepared by the trial court and entered as a supplement to the record on appeal....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16075, 1992 WL 164705
...one day. On April 24, 1983, the trial court accepted the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Duest to death. The trial court found four aggravating factors to exist, including the “prior crimes of violence” circumstance listed in Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5)(b), and none of *475 the statutory mitigating factors listed in Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(6)....
...We REMAND the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 . Florida is a "weighing" state. In the sentencing phase of a capital trial, the jury must determine (1) whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5), (2) whether mitigating circumstances, both statutory and nonstatutory, exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances, and (3) based on this calculus, whether death is the appropriate sentence. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.-141(2). Unlike other weighing states such as Mississippi, however, the sentence reached by a Florida capital jury is purely advisory. Under Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(3), the trial court, the sentencer under Florida law, must itself ultimately weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether death is the appropriate sentence....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 21543546
...Thus, we affirm the trial court's denial of Belcher's request to read the special jury instruction. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FLORIDA'S DEATH PENALTY SCHEME Belcher challenges the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to declare sections
782.04 and
921.141, Florida Statutes (2002), unconstitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the U.S....
...ation that the Supreme Court has mandated. Id. at 921. I concurred in that opinion, and continue to believe that in a proper case, in which the evidence is insufficient to warrant an instruction on the statutory mitigating circumstances contained in section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (2002), an instruction that the jury may consider a specific circumstance in mitigation may nonetheless be warranted....
...or proposition that other aggravating circumstances are not exempt. Notably, in the instant case, the aggravating circumstance that the majority does not conclude to be exempt is that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 1900
...At this proceeding, the State informed the trial court of its belief that the trial court was bound to find that the two statutory mental mitigating factors existed: extreme emotional disturbance, and substantial inability of the defendant to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. See § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...e process. Such a rule, the Court wrote, is repugnant to the fourteenth amendment guarantee that the prosecution bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of an offense. In Dixon we held that the aggravating circumstances of section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1973), were like elements of a capital felony in that the state must establish them....
...These standard jury instructions taken as a whole show that no reversible error was committed. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. One aggravating circumstance was found applicable here: the homicide was considered "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1979). Appellant established in mitigation his total lack of prior criminal activity. § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
...The record, however, clearly reveals that the venireman could not render an impartial decision as to appellant's guilt. See Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510,
88 S.Ct. 1770,
20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). [2] Jurisdiction vests under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution, and section
921.141(4) of the Florida Statutes (1979).
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ce imposed on Clark. Against no statutory mitigating circumstances, the trial court found the following five aggravating circumstances: 1. The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. 2. The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of a burglary and a robbery. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. 3. The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. 4. The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. 5. The capital felony was a homicide committed by the defendant in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...This argument is without merit since any robbery is, as a matter of law for purpose of the capital penalty aggravating circumstance, a felony involving the use or threat of violence. Simmons v. State,
419 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1982). Finally, Clark has presented an attack upon the constitutionality of section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1981), concerning the death penalty....
...Clark lacks standing to present these constitutional arguments since the trial court properly found no mitigating circumstances and two aggravating circumstances other than that the homicide occurred during the commission of a robbery. We take this opportunity, however, to make abundantly clear our view that § 921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 28590
FAY, Circuit Judge: Stephen Todd Booker appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus challenging his sentence of death imposed pursuant to Florida Statute Section 921.141 (1977)....
...y and the oral arguments of counsel. The trial judge considered the statutory aggravating and possible mitigating factors and sentenced Booker to death for the murder of Lorine DeMoss Harman, 6 entering his written order in accordance with Fla.Stat. Section 921.141(3) (1977)....
...He would then settle back in the chair, face me again, and be in a word, calm. He was rational in all aspects. Nothing was not understandable with the exception of the chant. (Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Vol. IV., p. 627). 2 . Pursuant to Fla.Stat. Section 921.141 (1977), the court was required, upon the defendant’s conviction of a capital felony, to conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment....
...me of this nature. A defendant found guilty of such a crime should receive the death penalty. That’s it. (Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Vol. V., p. 850). 5 . Unlike the verdict, the advisory sentence of the jury need not be unanimous. Fla.Stat. Section 921.141(3) (1977)....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 216127
...[6] In mitigation the judge found extreme mental or emotional disturbance, to which he gave great weight. Cruse claims that the trial court erred in finding the murders to have been committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...g the course of the trial. The overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the trial court's finding. *993 Cruse also argues that the trial court erred in finding the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
...26, 1991) (factor not proven where murder arose out of a highly emotional domestic dispute). Furthermore, the factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated murder requires more than just heightened premeditation; it also requires the exclusion of any "pretense of moral or legal justification." § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...[5] Count 1 (Nabil Al-Hameli) by a vote of 11-1; Count 2 (Emad Al-Tawakuly) by a vote of 11-1; Count 3 (Ruth Green) by a vote of 10-2; Count 4 (Ronald Grogan) by a vote of 11-1; Count 5 (Gerald Johnson) by a vote of 12-0; and Count 6 (Lester Watson) by a vote of 11-1. [6] § 921.141(5)(b), (c), (i), (e), Fla....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 110770
...een this more aggravated murder and that of her husband, for which it recommended life imprisonment. This reflects a community judgment that in this particular case, under these circumstances and for this defendant, the death penalty is appropriate. Section 921.141(6)(g) recognizes age as a possible mitigating factor....
...be reviewed objectively by this Court, which I believe to be a violation of Furman and its progeny, as well as Thompson. I recognize that the death penalty statute itself requires the trial court to consider a defendant's age as a mitigating factor. § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
...NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] Jon was later found not guilty in a separate trial. [3] As a family member, Jon could not be guilty as an accessory after the fact. §
777.03, Fla. Stat. (1979). [4] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979). [5] §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1979). [6] §
921.141(5)(e), Fla....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 18857, 1989 WL 140426
...(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. (c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. (h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5) (1985)....
...rcumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. This court has not limited its consideration of mitigating circumstances to only those prescribed by statute, but has limited its consideration of aggravating circumstances to those specified in Section 921.141, Florida Statutes. Even if it were determined, that the findings of this court, of aggravating circumstances under section 921.141(5)(c) and (h) of Florida Statutes, are not in conformity with the findings of those whose ultimate responsibility it is to review and determine such matters, the undisputed and multiple findings under section 921.141(5)(a) and (b) of Florida Statutes alone, far outweigh any mitigating circumstances....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...This evidence before the trial judge was insufficient to compel a finding of the existence of the statutory mitigating circumstances related to mental disturbance, i.e., "The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" [Section 921.141(6)(b)], or "The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired" [Section 921.141(6)(f)]....
...certify but he also reaffirmed the sentence of death. [7] Although this case has had an arduous course through the courts and the articulation of the trial judge's sentencing considerations does not appear with the clarity we should like to see when Section 921.141 is being applied, nevertheless, a review of the entire proceedings convinces us that the trial judge reasonably found that the capital felonies were especially heinous, atrocious and cruel [Section 921.141(5)(h)] and that he could just as reasonably conclude that no mitigating circumstances were established....
...It is so ordered. ADKINS, BOYD, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. ENGLAND, C.J., and OVERTON, J., concur with that part of majority opinion which affirms the judgments of guilt, but dissent from that part which affirms sentences of death. NOTES [1] § 921.141(4), Fla. Stat. (1975). [2] § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (1975). [3] § 921.141(4), Fla....
...ame. [5] Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975). [6] The record is replete with evidence suggesting the utter brucality and depravity of the murder, thus amply supporting the trial judge's finding of an "especially heinous (or) atrocious" crime. §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 594
...denied,
464 U.S. 865,
104 S.Ct. 202,
78 L.Ed.2d 176 (1983), noting: There is no requirement that a court must find anything in mitigation. The only requirement is that the consideration of mitigating circumstances must not be limited to those listed in section
921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...the sentence. In light of Porter, this argument is without merit. Nor do we find merit in Floyd's contention that the proof in the record before us is insufficient to sustain a finding of the aggravating factor of heinous, atrocious, and cruel under section 921.141(5)(h)....
...ensive stab wound to the hand. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial judge erred in finding this aggravating factor. We agree, however, with Floyd's contention that the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated under section 921.141(5)(i) was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt....
...n advance to go to the victims' home and kill them). The fact that a defendant murders his victim instead of simply fleeing is not, by itself, sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated under section
921.141(5)(i). See Thompson v. State,
456 So.2d 444, 446 (Fla. 1984). The trial court also erred in finding that the aggravating circumstance of section
921.141(5)(e) (i.e., that the murder was committed to prevent arrest) was established beyond a reasonable doubt....
...en established by the evidence. This error was compounded by the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury that there were no mitigating factors. Under our capital sentencing statute, a defendant has the right to an advisory opinion from a jury. See §
921.141(2), Fla. Stat.(1985); Richardson v. State,
437 So.2d 1091, 1095 (Fla. 1983); Lamadline v. State,
303 So.2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1974). In determining an advisory sentence, the jury must consider and weigh all aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See §
921.141(2). The aggravating factors to be considered are limited to those enumerated in section
921.141(5)....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 164611
...1994) (absent fundamental error, claims not raised at trial are procedurally barred); Steinhorst v. State,
412 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1982) (same). Moreover, hearsay evidence is generally admissible in the penalty phase of a capital trial if the defendant is afforded a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence. §
921.141(1), Fla....
...As part of his fourth claim, Rhodes points out that while instructing the jury on aggravating circumstances, the trial court misspoke, and erroneously instructed the jury on a felony involving the use of a firearm rather than on a felony involving the use of violence, as provided in section 921.141(5)(b)....
...ment, which still stands.
547 So.2d at 1208. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence of death but vacate the March 20, 1992, judgment of conviction. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§
921.141(5)(a), (b), (d), Fla. Stat. (1991), respectively. [2] §§
921.141(6)(g), (f), Fla. Stat. (1991), respectively. [3] §
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). [4] §
921.141(6)(e), Fla....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 1556649
...because the record did not contain sufficient evidence of premeditation; (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defense of insanity; and (4) the trial court failed to properly apply the aggravating and mitigating factors of section 921.141(5) and (6), Florida Statutes (1981), in arriving at its decision to impose the death penalty....
...al counsel. [6] As summarized by the trial court in its order, Preston raised the following claims: (1) Preston was denied effective representation by counsel for lack of access to public records; (2) the trial outcome was materially unreliable; (3) section 921.141(5) is unconstitutional because it is facially vague and overbroad; (4) the State withheld material evidence which was exculpatory in nature; (5) Preston's counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately present evidence to rebut agg...
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 370, 2012 WL 1722581, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 963
...According to Peterson, this information is not permissible victim impact evidence because Andrews was no longer engaged in either of these activities at the time of his death so this did not establish a loss to the community. The trial court properly held such evidence is permissible victim impact evidence. Under section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2009), the State may introduce victim impact evidence, which is limited as follows: Victim impact evidence.—Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances a...
...Testimony that Andrews was previously a law enforcement officer who tried to help others and preferred working in the most difficult areas of the city clearly is relevant to “demonstrat[ing] the victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being.” § 921.141(7), Fla....
...ence. Peterson has not established that the comment at issue constitutes reversible error, especially in light of the court’s curative instruction. While victim impact evidence is not to include statements regarding the “appropriate sentence,” § 921.141(7), Fla....
...at 1208-09 . Specifically, in Buzia , the defendant made a legal challenge as to whether the prior violent felony aggravator was supported because his contemporaneous guilty verdict for the attempted murder of another victim was not a “conviction” under section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (2003)....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 490787
...For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we deny habeas relief. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and HARDING and LEWIS, JJ., concur. SHAW, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur in result only. QUINCE, J., recused. NOTES [1] In evaluating what sentence is appropriate for the commission of a capital felony, section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that the fact that a murder "was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification," can be considered in aggravation....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1766774
...The trial judge sentenced Taylor to death for the murder of Kushmer. In pronouncing Taylor's sentence, the trial court determined that the State had proven the existence of three statutory aggravators: (1) the murder was committed while Taylor was on felony probation, see § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001); (2) Taylor had previously been convicted of a felony involving a threat of violence to the person, see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001); and (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, see § 921.141(5)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1999 WL 459249
...ppellant's mitigation evidence is compared with this Court's characterization of the trial judge's evaluation. The trial court's sentencing order provides in pertinent part: *87 a. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. Section 921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes....
...significant history of prior criminal activity prior to the Barker homicide. See Scull v. State,
533 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 1988). b. The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Section
921.141(6)(b), Florida Statute....
...Thus, the court rules that this mitigating circumstance, has not been reasonably established by the greater weight of the evidence; see Campbell v. State,
571 So.2d 415 (Fla.1990); and therefore, it does not exist or apply. c. The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. Section
921.141(6)(e), Florida Statutes....
...Therefore, the court finds that this mitigating circumstance does not exist or apply. d. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform this conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. Section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes. For the same reason that he based his opinion on the mitigating circumstances under Section 921.141(6)(b) & (e), Dr....
...Eisenstein's testimony was not credible. There was no credible evidence to show that the defendant was impaired in any manner. Thus, the court finds that this mitigating circumstance does not exist or apply. e. The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. Section 921.141(6)(g), Florida Statutes....
...The court finds that, although the defendant was eighteen years old at the time of the crime the other factors as to his maturity outweigh his age and thus the court gives little weight to this mitigating factor. f. The victim was a participant in the Defendant's conduct or consent to the act. Florida Statutes 921.141(6)(c)....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 2608123
...nya Hadley and Michelle Watson. Gonzalez argues that their testimonies were irrelevant to the jury's consideration of the aggravators, and that counsel should have requested an instruction relating to the proper role of victim impact evidence. Under section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2007), victim impact evidence is permissible....
...[7] The testimonies of Hadley and *1028 Watson were properly elicited to demonstrate Officer Bauer's uniqueness as an individual human being. Contrary to Gonzalez's contention, it does not matter that neither witness was a member of Office Bauer's family because section 921.141(7) does not limit victim impact evidence to family members....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 258, 2011 WL 37824
...The jury recommended the death penalty for each murder by a vote of 11-1.
The court found four aggravating circumstances: the murders were committed (1)
while the defendant was engaged in the commission or an attempt to commit
robbery and burglary, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d) (1985); (2) for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, id. § 921.141(5)(e); (3) in a cold calculated
and premeditated manner, id. § 921.141(5)(i); and (4) the murders were especially
heinous atrocious and cruel, id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
...education and social skills, and
inability to reason abstractly, combined with low self-confidence and feelings of
inadequacy. The court rejected three statutory mitigating factors: (1) lack of
significant history of prior criminal activity, id. § 921.141(6)(a); (2) age of the
defendant, id. § 921.141(6)(g); and (3) murder committed under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, id. § 921.141(6)(b)....
...The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Harvey v. Florida,
489 U.S. 1040,
109 S. Ct. 1175,
103 L. Ed. 2d 237 (1989). The Governor signed Harvey’s
execution warrant on March 29, 1990.
8
This mitigating factor was subsequently codified in Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(h) (2008)
(“The existence of any other factors in the defendant's background that would mitigate against
imposition of the death penalty.”).
8
On August 27, 1990, Harvey filed...
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...information if the defendant fails to do so; generally, it is improper for the state to disclose that another defendant has been convicted. Thomas v. State,
202 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). While it is clear that the legislature in the enactment of section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), sought to extend the admissibility of evidence at the sentencing hearing, it did not grant the defendant or the state any greater latitude at the trial phase of the bifurcated proceeding....
...1976, a majority of the jury recommended in favor of the death penalty for the Defendant; this Court, after considering the recommendation of the jury, and after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as contained in Florida Statute 921.141, sentenced the Defendant to death on each of the two counts as contained in the indictment filed in the above-styled cause and in so doing found as follows: 1....
...This Court feels that there are no other existing mitigating circumstances; and that, additionally, the evidence as presented during the guilt phase of the trial specifically negates all but the aforementioned mitigating circumstances found in Florida Statute 921.141(6)....
...ngaged in ripping off a heroin addict. We held that the court erred in considering mere arrest and accusation as factors in aggravation. In this opinion we said: The judge's order does not specifically enumerate which aggravating circumstances under Section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes, induced him to override the jury's recommendation of mercy and to sentence Provence to die....
...Dixon,
283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973), we said: When one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found, death is presumed to be the proper sentence unless it or they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating circumstances provided in Fla. Statutes, Section
921.141(7), F.S.A....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 96024
...unning to the rear of the apartment, only to find himself trapped at the back door." First-degree murder is a heinous crime; however, this statutory aggravating circumstance requires the incident to be "especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel." See § 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1987)....
...State,
524 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1988). We next address the contention that the trial judge erred in finding the aggravating circumstance that this murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. See section
921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 746011
...uel and unusual punishment and struck down existing state death penalty statutes. See Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). The death penalty was reinstated by the Florida Legislature in a different form in 1973. See §
921.141, Fla. Stat. (1973). Compare §
921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The trial court also denied a request to strike testimony of another witness to the effect that he had learned of the fact and time of Lloyd Walker's death "from Tallahassee." After the jury verdict of guilty on all four counts was returned, the second phase of the bifurcated trial mandated by Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), was entered....
...Foreman, do seven or more of your members of your Jury agree to the verdict that has just been rendered in open Court? "FOREMAN: Yes, sir, they do. "COURT: Does that answer your question? "MR. HOWARD: Yes, Your Honor. "COURT: The Defendant will rise... ." Second, appellant argues that Section 921.141(5)(b) setting forth as an aggravating circumstance the fact that "[t]he defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person" should not be interpreted...
..., the convictions for robbery, assault to commit murder, and possessing a firearm during commission of a felony in the instant case. During the second phase of the trial, the state attorney referred to these convictions as previous convictions under Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), and also argued that the instant crime created a great risk of death to many persons, an aggravating circumstance under Section 921.141(5)(c)....
...ns did occur prior to the jury's rendering the advisory sentence, he specifically stated that subsection (b) did not apply in this case. Although it is true that contemporaneous convictions do not qualify as an aggravating circumstance vel non under Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), we agree that the effect here could not have been prejudicial....
...Finally, the trial judge confirmed the prosecutor's initial statement by expressly finding in his order that subsection (5)(b) did not apply. While we question the accuracy of the prosecutor's remarks to the effect that the jury could find the existence of an aggravating circumstance under Section 921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), we reject any contention that this argument was prejudicial to the appellant....
...ciated in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). We adhere to the position taken in State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), and in numerous subsequent cases that the statute is in fact constitutional. [1] Pursuant to Section
921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1975), and Florida Appellate Rule 6.16(b), we have reviewed the record in this case in its entirety. We adopt as our own the analysis of the able trial judge as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances: "This Court finds that the facts of this case do not support the aggravating circumstances in Fla. Stat.
921.141(6), [2] subsections (a), (b) and (c) in that this capital felony was not committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment nor had the defendant previously been convicted of a capital felony nor did the defendant knowingly create a great risk of death to many person [sic]....
..."The Court does find, as an aggravating circumstance, that the capital felony, the murder of Lloyd Walker, was committed as a part of another dangerous and violent felony, the robbery of Diane Allen at gunpoint and in flight after committing that felony, Fla. Stat. 921.141(6)(d). "The Court also finds, as an aggravating circumstance, that the capital felony was committed with the motive of avoiding and preventing arrest, was committed for pecuniary gain and to hinder the enforcement of laws. Fla. Stat. 921.141(6)(e)(f)(g). * * * * * * "Turning to mitigating circumstances, the Court finds that the defendant has no prior significant history of criminal activity. Fla. Stat. 921.141(7)(a) and therefore this fact has been considered as a mitigating circumstance. "Under Fla. Stat. 921.141(7) subsections (b) and (f), the Court finds that the defendant was suffering from no extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that *191 his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was not substantially impaired....
...According to the report, the defendant's response was that it was all right with him and that it seemed like a good idea to shoot the store employee so that in that way nobody would recognize them and blame them for it. "This fact has been considered under Fla. Stat. 921.141(7)(e)....
...r the aggravating circumstances hereinabove outlined with respect to avoiding arrest and to hinder the enforcement of law. "Further, the Court finds that the victim certainly was not a participant in nor consented to the criminal conduct, Fla. Stat. 921.141[(7)](c)(e) and that the defendant, even if found to be an accomplice, did play a major part in the capital felony. Fla. Stat. 921.141(7)(d). No mitigation exists under either of these subsections. "Finally, the age of the defendant has been considered as required by Fla. Stat. 921.141(7)(g)....
...whether a sentence of death should be upheld. Our reading of Furman, supra, convinces us that identical crimes committed by people with similar criminal histories require identical sentences. It is this uniformity and predictability of result which Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), seeks to accomplish. But there was evidence, discussed above, from which the jury in Hardwick's trial could have concluded that Meeks was the dominant figure in this criminal episode. This is a bona fide mitigating circumstance under Section 921.141(6)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Proffitt v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___,
96 S.Ct. 2960,
49 L.Ed.2d 913, Opinion filed July 2, 1976. [2] The trial court order refers to aggravating and mitigating circumstances as appearing under subsections (6) and (7), respectively, of §
921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 615, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 2572, 2011 WL 5082614
...Although the defendant was not convicted of aggravated child abuse during the guilt phase of trial, the trial court determined in its sentencing order that he had committed the elements of that offense and therefore relied on aggravated child abuse as an aggravating circumstance supporting the death penalty. See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...Caylor argues that the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating circumstance that “[t]he capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under a sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on felony probation.” § 921.141(5)(a), Fla....
...r because of his or *497 her status as a person on felony probation. It merely sets out as an aggravating circumstance that “[t]he capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and ... placed on ... felony probation.” § 921.141(5)(a)....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...As aggravating circumstances, the trial judge found that appellant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence, citing a previous conviction for assault with intent to rob and a previous conviction for robbery, section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1977); that appellant created a great risk of death to many persons, section 921.141(5)(c); that the capital felony was committed in the course of or in the attempt to commit or in flight after committing a robbery, section 921.141(5)(d); that the murder of the uniformed deputy sheriff was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest, section 921.141(5)(e); that the murder was motivated by pecuniary gain, section 921.141(5)(f); that the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the enforcement of the law, section 921.141(5)(g); and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...the sentence imposed. In the trial court's written findings, [3] upon which the sentence of death was based, the Court considered as a separate aggravating circumstance the fact that the murder of Mrs. Butler was committed for *1195 pecuniary gain [Section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1973)] while appellant was engaged in the commission of a robbery [Section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1973)]....
...OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and KARL, JJ., concur. HATCHETT, J., concurs specially with an opinion. BOYD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. HATCHETT, Justice, concurring specially. In Spenkelink v. State,
350 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1977), I expressed by belief that Section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied....
...The suspect said it was, and I asked him where he left it and he said that he left it in the car. At this point, he said, "I want a lawyer." [3] The Court finds, from the evidence, that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in Subsection (5) of Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, that justify a sentence of death, and that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in Subsection (6) of said Section 921.141, to outweigh the aggravation circumstances....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 33259
...In Rogers, we defined the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor as requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was the result of a careful plan or prearranged design. Id. at 533. Eutzy contends that this narrowing interpretation of section
921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1985), is a fundamental change in the law which under this Court's opinion in Witt,
387 So.2d 922, should be given retroactive effect....
...given little weight by the trial court, the override sentence should not be allowed to stand. Our holding in Rogers did not amount to a "jurisprudential upheaval" requiring retroactive application. The definition of the term "calculated," as used in section
921.141(5)(i), adopted in that case was merely an "evolutionary refinement" in the law, "arising from our case-by-case application of Florida's death penalty statute."
387 So.2d at 929-30 (definitions for statutory mitigating circumstances were evolutionary developments in Florida's death penalty statute)....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13369, 2015 WL 4597532
...was appointed to represent Thomas during his trial. The jury found him guilty on
all counts and recommended the death penalty by a vote of eleven to one. The
judge found five aggravating factors: (1) Thomas had previously been convicted of
murdering his mother, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b); (2) the murder was committed in
the course of a burglary, id. § 921.141(5)(d); (3) the murder was committed for
3
Case: 13-14635 Date Filed: 07/31/2015 Page: 4 of 26
pecuniary gain, id. § 921.141(5)(f); (4) the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, id. § 921.141(5)(h); and (5) the murder was committed in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 84105
...(e) For the purpose of identification of an habitual felony offender or an habitual misdemeanant, the court shall fingerprint the defendant pursuant to s.
921.241. [2] The sentence was within the guidelines range and there is no claim that it was a departure sentence. [3] §
921.141(3), Fla....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...A jury found appellant guilty of first-degree murder and recommended death. The court imposed the death sentence, after weighing two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance. Appellant does not challenge his conviction. We nonetheless have reviewed the entire record as required by section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1981), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(f)....
...State,
419 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1228,
103 S.Ct. 1236,
75 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983); Riley v. State,
413 So.2d 1173 (Fla.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 981,
103 S.Ct. 317,
74 L.Ed.2d 294 (1982); Smith v. State . We find no error. Appellant contends that section
921.141 and the standard jury instructions improperly preclude the consideration of some mitigating evidence by using modifying terms such as "extreme," "significant," "relative," and "substantial." We previously have rejected this argument....
...943,
94 S.Ct. 1950,
40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974); refusing to instruct the jury that a life recommendation could be returned even if no mitigating circumstances were found; and failing to instruct the jury on all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1981)....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 7, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 6, 2010 WL 26526
...In pronouncing McKenzie's sentences, the trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of four statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) McKenzie had previously been convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006) (eight prior convictions and the contemporaneous murder of the other victim) (great weight); (2) the murders were committed while McKenzie was engaged in the commission of a robbery, see § 921.141(5)(d) (significant weight); (3) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain, see § 921.141(5)(f) (merged with robbery aggravatorno additional weight given); and (4) the murders were cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), see § 921.141(5)(i) (great weight)....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 124508
...ture of the aggravating circumstances. He maintains that because of his robbery conviction, he was automatically eligible for the death penalty, that the jury instructions improperly shifted the burden to Cole to prove mitigating circumstances, that section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1993), is unconstitutionally vague, and that the jury instructions precluded the jurors from considering the totality of the circumstances, in violation of Hitchcock v....
...Based on the reasoning of Apprendi, according to Cole, aggravating circumstances must be charged in the indictment. Cole's final Apprendi subclaim is that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the trial court's denial of Cole's request to declare section 921.141, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional and to require a unanimous jury recommendation....
...stitution and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution." Appellant's Initial Brief at 84, Cole v. State,
701 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1997) (No. 87,337). On direct appeal, we summarily rejected Cole's argument concerning section
921.141, Florida's death sentencing statute....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 137859
...NOTES [1] The trial court found that Dillbeck was under sentence of imprisonment and had previously been convicted of another capital felony, and that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery and burglary, was committed to avoid arrest or effect escape, and was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. See § 921.141, Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] The trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance, i.e., that Dillbeck was substantially impaired, see § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 22097440
...State,
696 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla.1997)). In determining the circumstances in which the HAC aggravating factor is intended to apply, we must remember the genesis for this statutory aggravating factor, as well as all other aggravating factors found in Florida's death penalty statute. See §
921.141(5), Fla....
...ghtened sense of depravity, for which a sentence of death would be appropriate. The statutory provision listing the HAC aggravating factor provides that for this factor to apply, the capital felony must be " especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...In my view, the statutory provision defining CCP and the standard jury instruction thereon require that the heightened premeditation supporting CCP arise from the element of "premeditated design" supporting the conviction of first-degree murder under section
782.04(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes (1997). Section
921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1997), defines the CCP aggravator as follows: The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification....
...Instead, we review whether substantial competent evidence supports this finding. [7] Perhaps because of our practice of using the acronym "HAC" for this aggravator, we have not consistently recognized that the capital felony must be "especially" heinous, atrocious, or cruel, as section 921.141(5)(h) explicitly provides....
...State,
794 So.2d 1249, 1266 (Fla.2001). [11] I note that the statement in Provenzano, "if the murder was committed in a manner that was cold and calculated, the aggravating circumstance of heightened premeditation is applicable," is inconsistent with section
921.141(5)(i), which provides that CCP applies if the murder "was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner." (Emphasis supplied.) Under the statute, heightened premeditation must exist independently of whether the murder was c...
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 2827647
...ider Evans' petition for writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Evans raises six claims. We limit our discussion to two of these claims and deny relief for the reasons stated below. [25] Ring Claim Evans argues that Florida's death penalty statute, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2002), as applied to him is unconstitutional pursuant to Apprendi v....
...statutory mitigation. In addition, Evans raised six other claims in his rule 3.851 motion for the express purpose of preserving them for federal review. Evans alleged that (5) the Florida death sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied; (6) section 921.141, Florida Statutes, providing that the jury's role is advisory, violates the Eighth Amendment; (7) his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated because he may be incompetent at the time of execution;...
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 2883125
...iven some weight); (7) his employment record (given some weight); and (8) his low intelligence level (given some weight). However, the trial court also found one aggravating circumstance in that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...de by Blackwood; (6) whether the court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigator of extreme disturbance because Dr. Block-Garfield applied an incorrect standard in her analysis; (7) whether the court erred by failing to make the determination under section 921.141(3) that the HAC aggravator was sufficient to justify the death penalty; (8) whether the trial court erred in failing to find Blackwood's age at the time of the crime, thirty-eight years, to be a mitigating circumstance; and (9) whethe...
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 74590
...The judge found that the purported drug informant was killed to hinder or disrupt the exercise of a governmental function and that another killing was committed for pecuniary gain. The court specifically rejected the state's argument that the final four episodes of killing could qualify as prior capital felonies under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1987). *79 As to mitigation, the court found that Pardo had no prior significant criminal history (section 921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1987)), and was under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance (section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1987))....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 463873
...ntary guilty plea; (9) the intent to torture element of the HAC aggravator was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (10) the murder during the course of an enumerated felony aggravator is an unconstitutional automatic aggravating circumstance; (11) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1989), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad....
...See Schwab,
636 So.2d at 7-8; see also Atwater v. State,
788 So.2d 223, 227 (Fla.2001) (citing Hudson v. State,
708 So.2d 256, 262 (Fla.1998) (finding murder during commission of enumerated felony aggravator not unconstitutional automatic aggravator)). Claim eleven, that section
921.141 is unconstitutional, is without merit because the statute withstands a challenge of vagueness and overbreadth....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 233896
...The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances applicable to both murders: (1) previous conviction of a violent felony (the contemporaneous killings); (2) the murders were committed during the commission of a burglary; and (3) the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel. § 921.141(5)(a), (d), and (h), Fla. Stat. (1991). As to Carter, the court found the additional aggravating factor that the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest. § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Wike's guilt, but was used to familiarize the jury with the underlying facts of the case. As we noted in Teffeteller, had this jury been the same panel that originally determined Wike's guilt, it would have been allowed to hear this evidence. Under section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1993), in a capital sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime....
...Wike also argues that the trial judge's findings in mitigation were ambiguous. In finding that the murder was committed to avoid arrest, the trial judge stated: The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. Section 921.141(5)(e)....
...State,
607 So.2d 404, 409 (Fla.1992). As to the aggravating circumstance of CCP, the trial judge found: *823 The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. Section
921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...[1] This Court found no merit to Ferrell's claims regarding the admission of evidence of a collateral crime, the failure to appoint co-counsel, and the denial of requested special jury instructions. Id. at 369-70. However, we determined that the sentencing order was inadequate as to the requisite findings required under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1992)....
...The statute requires "[i]n each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of the court shall be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the [aggravating and mitigating] circumstances in subsections (5) and (6)." § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2004). Further, the court must set forth in writing that "sufficient aggravating circumstances exist" and that "there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." Id. § 921.141(3)....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...had made during interrogation; these statements had been suppressed during the guilt phase of the trial. The trial judge decided to admit these statements into evidence under the more liberal evidentiary standard of the penalty phase established in section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...In regard to appellant's first contention, we find no reversible error. The trial judge, in allowing certain previously-suppressed statements of appellant to be introduced during the penalty phase through the testimony of Sergeants Vail and Burnsed, acted under the authority of section 921.141(1)....
...the penalty phase deprived him of the life recommendation benefit in a tie vote situation. The trial judge in this instance instructed the jury in accordance with the Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal) Penalty Proceedings-Capital Cases, F.S. 921.141 (rev....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 540716
...[2] We reject without discussion issue 2 (no merit); issue 4 (not preserved); issue 6 (no merit); issue 8 (no merit); issue 11 (no merit); issue 12 (not preserved); issue 13 (no merit); issue 14 (no merit); issue 15 (no merit); issue 16 (not preserved); issue 17 (not preserved); and issue 18 (not preserved). [3] See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). [4] See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1987). [5] See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1987). [6] See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 2987627
...be heard in person. Second, after hearing the evidence and argument, the trial judge should then recess the proceeding to consider the appropriate sentence. If the judge determines that the death sentence should be imposed, then, in accordance with section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), the judge must set forth in writing the reasons for imposing the death sentence....
...State,
774 So.2d 649, 673 (Fla.2000) (quoting Porter v. State,
564 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990)). The jury in this action recommended the death penalty by a vote of eleven to one. The trial court found four aggravating factors: (1) HAC (great weight), see §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2001); (2) Troy was previously convicted of another felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person (considerable weight), see §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001); (3) Troy committed the capital felony while under a sentence of imprisonment or community control (considerable weight), see §
921.141(5)(a) Fla. Stat. (2001); and (4) Troy committed the murder while engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery and sexual battery (considerable weight), see §
921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...(2001). In mitigation, the trial judge found that two statutory mitigating circumstances had been established: (1) The capital felony was committed while Troy was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (moderate weight), see § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001); and (2) Troy's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired (considerable weight), see § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 688787
...editated; (2) the trial court failed to consider, find, and weigh statutory and nonstatutory mitigation contained in the record; (3) the death *504 sentence is disproportionate in this case; (4) the prosecutor made improper arguments in closing; (5) section 921.141(7), which permits the introduction of impact evidence, is unconstitutional; (6) the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence a video of Jackson's hypnotic regression; (7) the trial court erred in refusing Jackson's request...
...The Court, however, for the reasons, also listed below, rejects these arguments. 1. The crime for which the Defendant is to be sentenced was committed while the Defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Florida Statutes 921.141(6)(b)....
...The defense suggested the defendant suffered a flashback of a childhood rape. The Court believes this testimony to be non-credible. 2. The capacity of the Defendant to appreciate the criminality of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. Florida Statutes 921.141(6)(f)....
...State,
679 So.2d 720, 724-25 (Fla.1996). Next, Jackson challenges the constitutionality of the victim impact evidence introduced in the penalty proceeding. We have in the past rejected the contention that the introduction of victim impact evidence pursuant to section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995), violates a defendant's constitutional rights....
...e victim of a cold, calculated and highly premeditated murder. There are numerous cases where we have rejected a CCP finding under similar circumstances. In Thompson v. State,
565 So.2d 1311 (Fla.1990), we stated: Many times this Court has said that section
921.141(5)(i) of the Florida Statutes (1987), requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of "heightened premeditation." We adopted the phrase to distinguish this aggravating circumstance from the premeditation element of first-degree murder....
...A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. After Payne, Florida chose to allow the admission of victim impact evidence. Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995), which permits victim impact evidence to be heard in capital sentencing proceedings, is now applicable to the instant case....
...A victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence, however, remain inadmissible. Payne,
501 U.S. at 830 n. 2,
111 S.Ct. at 2611 n. 2. [2] Jackson and her husband were separated. [3] §
921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1995). [4] §
921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1995). [5] §
921.141(5)(j), Fla. Stat. (1995). [6] §
921.141(5)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 1066593
...[2] Griffin testified to have worn a ski mask while Lopez wore a hooded jacket which helped him cover his face. However, Hall testified that Griffin told her that he did not wear a mask because he needed to be recognized by McCallops in order to be let into Service America. [3] See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). Note that the finding of prior capital offense with respect to each murder here is based on the conviction of the other count of first-degree murder. [4] See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997). [5] See § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1997). [6] See § 921.141(5)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 50189
...dge erred in summarily concluding that no mitigating circumstances were present. Harmon contends the death sentence must therefore be vacated, in light of the jury's recommendation of life. [6] The first aggravating circumstance found applicable was section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), that Harmon was previously convicted of a felony which involved the use or threat of violence to another person....
...The trial court's reference to the statement contained in the doctor's report was unnecessary to this finding. We hold that the trial court properly applied this aggravating factor. Harmon argues that the trial judge's finding that the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1985), is not supported by the evidence....
...State,
458 So.2d 755, 758 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1045,
105 S.Ct. 2062,
85 L.Ed.2d 336 (1985). The third aggravating circumstance found by the trial court was that the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner, section
921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1985)....
...The evidence does not establish this factor beyond a reasonable doubt. See Peavy v. State,
442 So.2d 200 (Fla. 1983). The final aggravating factor found by the trial court was that the capital felony was committed in order to avoid a lawful arrest, section
921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1985)....
...Accordingly, we affirm Harmon's conviction, but vacate his sentence of death and remand for the imposition of a life sentence in accordance with the jury's recommendation. It is so ordered. OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. McDONALD, C.J., concurs in the guilt, but dissents from the penalty. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). [2] § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1985). [3] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1985). [4] § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 852
...Again, where the victim of a killing is a law enforcement *1146 officer on active duty, that fact is properly considered an aggravating circumstance supporting the imposition of the death penalty. See Jones v. State,
440 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1983) (an aggravating circumstance under Section
921.141(5)(g), Florida Statutes, is that capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws); Tafero v....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 80, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 137, 2009 WL 196310
...The court found that that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) and gave that aggravator great weight. The trial court also found that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, and gave this aggravator great weight. See § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
...Thus, the trial court combined in this one "avoid arrest" aggravator two other statutory aggravators-that the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in official duties and that the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the enforcement of law. See § 921.141(5)(g), (j), Fla. Stat. (2005). Finally, the trial court found in aggravation that Wheeler was previously convicted of a violent felony, based on his convictions of the contemporaneous violent felonies involving the other victims in this case. See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...The State has cross-appealed this ruling. In mitigation, the trial court found and accorded some weight to the statutory mitigator that the murder was committed while Wheeler was under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). The court also found in mitigation that Wheeler's capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, and accorded it some weight. See § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...In addition to the constitutional provision, Florida statutes also allow the admission of victim impact evidence within certain parameters as outlined in Payne. [5] As the Court explained in Sexton v. State,
775 So.2d 923 (Fla.2000): On the merits, section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995), allows the State to introduce "victim impact" evidence, which shows "the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." Damren v....
...State,
850 So.2d 383, 407 (Fla.2002) (declining invitation to recede from Windom, reiterating that the statutory procedure for addressing victim impact evidence does not impermissibly affect the weighing of aggravators and mitigators, and rejecting argument that victim impact evidence should be limited to a Spencer hearing); §
921.141(7), Fla....
...emorseminimal weight; (9) Wheeler will live the rest his life paralyzedsome weight; (10) drug and alcohol useminimal weight; (11) Wheeler was under stress from job loss, his relationship with Heckerman, and damage to his homesome weight. See § 921.141(6)(h), Fla....
...appropriate and requiring mitigation to outweigh the aggravation in order to obtain a life sentence; and (5) whether Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584,
122 S.Ct. 2428,
153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). [5] Section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2006), provided: VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE.Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence to the jury....
...sary in order to preserve the issue for appeal where a prior "definitive ruling" has been obtained. See ch. 2003-258, § 1, Laws of Fla. This statute does not apply here because it does not apply to claims of error in prosecutorial argument. [7] See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...ntroduce the three items of mitigating evidence listed above. Petitioner contended that the third item of mitigating evidence, concerning Ellis' influence over him, was admissible to establish the mitigating circumstance enumerated in Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(d) (1973), which states that a defendant's "relatively minor" participation in a "capital felony committed by another person" shall be a mitigating circumstance....
...The State, in response, argued that the proffered item of evidence was insufficient to establish this statutory mitigating circumstance. 4 With respect to the first two items of mitigating evidence, which petitioner conceded did not relate to any mitigating circumstance enumerated in section 921.141(6), petitioner contended in his brief that they were nevertheless admissible because "[t]he underlying rationale of the death penalty is that an individual has shown by their [sic] actions that they [sic] are beyond rehabilitation....
...It was error not to allow the Appellant to present evidence that he was not beyond rehabilitation." 5 The State responded that the trial court correctly excluded these items of evidence because they did not tend to establish any of the mitigating circumstances contained in section 921.141(6)....
...The court held that the trial court properly excluded the proffered evidence because it was unrelated to any of the statutorily enumerated mitigating circumstances, implicitly holding that the United States Constitution forbade the introduction of such mitigating evidence: 6 The sole issue in a sentencing hearing under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), is to examine in each case the itemized aggravating and mitigating circumstances....
...The jury may recommend a sentence of death if it finds that "sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated" in the death penalty statute, but neither a jury decision of life imprisonment nor of death is binding upon the trial court. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141 (1973) 3 Ellis was killed during an exchange of gunfire with the police, who attempted to capture him and petitioner following their robbery of a grocery store 4 Sec. 921.141 lists seven mitigating circumstances: (6) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.--Mitigating circumstances shall be the following: (a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...In Florida, to recommend a sentence of death for the crime of first-degree murder, a majority of the jury must find that the State has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance listed in the capital sentencing statute. See § 921.141(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). It must also find that any aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances, also listed in the statute, that may exist. See § 921.141(2)(b), Fla....
...The district court granted the petition in part and denied it in part. The court quashed that portion of the order requiring advance notice of the aggravating factors, relying on this Court's precedent holding that the list of aggravators provided in section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (2004), is sufficient, and that Ring does not require specific pretrial notice....
...r. Moreover, the justification for it is stronger now than when we decided Hitchcock and Sireci. At the time we decided those cases, the capital sentencing statute contained only six aggravators. Since then, the Legislature has added eight more. See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (2004) (murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated); § 921.141(5)(j) (victim was law enforcement officer engaged in performance of duties); § 921.141(5)(k) (victim was elected or appointed public official engaged in performance of duties); § 921.141(5)( l ) (victim was less than twelve years of age); § 921.141(5)(m) (victim was especially vulnerable because of advanced age or because defendant stood in position of familial or custodial authority); § 921.141(5)(n) (perpetrator was criminal street gang member). Other aggravators have been given broader scope. For example, the aggravating factor in section 921.141(5)(a) now applies to defendants who commit murder while on probation or community control, not merely while under a sentence of imprisonment....
...96-290, § 5, Laws of Fla. (adding community controllees); ch. 91-270, § 1, Laws of Fla. (adding probationers). Also, aggravated child abuse and elder abuse have been made crimes qualifying a capital defendant for the "prior violent felony" aggravator in section 921.141(5)(d)....
...1996) (holding that a jury is not compelled to recommend death where aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors). Moreover, the defendant may invoke "[t]he existence of any other factors in the defendant's background that would mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty." § 921.141(6)(h), Fla....
...., concurring in result only) (quoting Campbell v. State,
571 So.2d 415, 419 n. 4 (Fla.1990), receded from in part by Trease v. State,
768 So.2d 1050 (Fla.2000)). The State, on the other hand, is limited to the specific aggravating factors listed in section
921.141(5)....
...y the jury? Again, because of the narrow standard of review, we must determine whether the order violates a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. We begin to answer this question by reviewing the applicable law. Section 921.141 does not require jury findings on aggravating circumstances, and we have held that Ring does not require special verdicts on aggravators....
...The State also argues that because we have held that a special verdict is not required and have not ruled any aspect of Florida's capital sentencing statute unconstitutional under Ring, the trial court's action constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law. We think the State's argument well taken. Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2004), establishes the obligations of the judge and jury concerning aggravating circumstances during a capital penalty phase: (2) Advisory sentence by the jury.-After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliber...
...s upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts: (a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5), and (b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. § 921.141(2)-(3), Fla....
...uires a majority of the jury to agree on which aggravating circumstances exist. Under the current law, for example, the jury may recommend a sentence of death where four jurors believe that only the "avoiding a lawful arrest" aggravator applies, see § 921.141(5)(e), while three others believe that only the "committed for pecuniary gain" aggravator applies, see § 921.141(5)(f), because seven jurors believe that at least one aggravator applies....
...Even if they did not impose an additional substantive burden, specific jury findings on aggravators without guidance about their effect on the imposition of a sentence could unduly influence the trial court's own determination of how to sentence the defendant. Under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes, the trial court must independently determine the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the weight to be given each....
...Even if Ring did apply in Floridaan issue we have yet to conclusively decide we read it as requiring only that the jury make the finding of "an element of a greater offense." Id. That finding would be that at least one aggravator exists-not that a specific one does. But given the requirements of section 921.141 and the language of the standard jury instructions, such a finding already is implicit in a jury's recommendation of a sentence of death....
...process is "ineffective or arbitrary." Id. at 258,
96 S.Ct. 2960. Were we to permit the special penalty-phase verdict ordered in this case, the disparity in procedures from case to case could result in a determination that the State is administering section
921.141 arbitrarily, contrary to the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments....
...nce and the trial court's role in determining whether to impose a sentence of death. To maintain consistency in our capital sentencing procedures, any changes should be made systematically. [2] Therefore, unless and until a material change occurs in section 921.141, the decisional law, the applicable rules of procedure, or the standard instructions and verdict *548 form, a trial court departs from the essential requirements of law in requiring a special verdict form that details the jurors' votes on specific aggravating circumstances....
...da's sentencing laws and federal constitutional law. The development in Florida's sentencing law to which I refer is the 1994 revision to section
775.082(1), Florida Statutes, which now provides that the alternative sentence to the death sentence of section
921.141 is life imprisonment without eligibility of parole....
...2002) (Pariente, J., concurring in result only). I explained the benefits of obtaining this type of information from a penalty-phase jury: By requiring a special verdict on aggravating circumstances, this Court will not only assist trial judges in administering section 921.141, but also enhance the quality of our own constitutionally mandated review of death sentences in a manner that anticipates the likely effect of Ring and its progeny....
..., these findings are not statutorily prohibited. The special verdict enhances juror fact-finding, informs trial court sentencing, and facilitates appellate review. For these reasons, and because special verdicts are not specifically prohibited under section 921.141 or our rules of procedure, the trial court's requirement of a special verdict in this case does not, in my view, constitute a *556 departure from the essential requirements of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice....
...that the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without possibility of release, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly."). [7] See Ala.Code §§ 13A-5-45, 13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 (1994); Del.Code Ann., tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp.2004); § 921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 5170547
...Defense counsel followed through with the motion and did not put on any evidence of Poole's prior criminal history. However, the prosecutor still improperly presented inadmissible evidence of Poole's prior criminal activity under the guise of witness impeachment. Under section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2007), the State is only permitted to present evidence of those aggravators listed under subsection 5, which does not include a defendant's convictions for nonviolent felonies....
...tigator as proven if there was evidence to demonstrate that Poole did, in fact, have brain damage. Because the prosecutor's comments were either not improper or did not constitute fundamental error, we deny relief on this claim. Constitutionality of Section 921.141 Poole asserts that Florida's death penalty statute violates the Sixth Amendment because it does not require express unanimous findings of aggravating circumstances by the jury....
...or is implicit in the jury's recommendation of death. First, the Court's decision in Ring does not require a finding that Florida's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional. In Steele, we not only concluded, consistent with prior case law, that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2007), does not require jury findings on aggravating circumstances, but we specifically held that it is a departure from the essential requirements of law to use a special verdict form detailing the jury's determination on the aggravating circumstances....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 438
...nd Glock. The trial judge, in accordance with the jury recommendation, imposed the death penalty on both appellants, finding no mitigating circumstances and the following three aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed to avoid arrest [section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1983)]; (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain [section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1983)]; and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification [section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1983)]....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 102094
...[3] The jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four. Davis v. State,
586 So.2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. 1991). The trial court found four aggravating and no mitigating circumstances. Id. at 1040 & n. 2. The aggravating circumstances found in accordance with section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1985), were that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated; was heinous, atrocious, or cruel; was committed while under sentence of imprisonment; and appellant was previously convicted of a capital felony or felony involving the use or threat of violence....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 191
...[5] The state also used peremptory challenges against seven white prospective jurors. [6] On appeal Rios Ruiz claimed that removing these three spectators denied him a fair and public trial. [7] The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances under § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat. (1983): 1) committed by person under sentence of imprisonment, § 921.141(5)(a); and 2) committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function or the enforcement of laws, § 921.141(5)(g). We find these aggravating factors amply supported by the record. The trial court found Woods' age (18 years) to be a mitigating circumstance. § 921.141(6)(g)....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 164610
...[3] In view of the race-neutral reasons for excusal which were already on the record, the court did not err in declining to conduct a Neil inquiry. Taylor next argues that it was error for the trial judge to consider evidence which had not been provided to the jury and which had not been properly admitted under section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 236
...See also State v. Poston, 199 Iowa. 1073, 1074, 203 N.W. 257, 258 (1925) ("character is what a man actually is, while reputation is what his neighbors say he is"). The state's position is that the reputational evidence at issue here is admissible, as section 921.141(6)(a) contemplates as a mitigating factor, prior criminal activity as opposed to prior criminal convictions....
...and rebutting a mitigating factor, the result of such evidence being employed will be the same: improper considerations will enter into the weighing process. The state may not do indirectly that which we have held they may not do directly. Further, section 921.141(1) provides, in part, that all legally obtained, probative evidence, including hearsay, is admissible during the penalty phase, "provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements." We find that the...
...Therefore, we vacate the sentence of death and remand for resentencing before a new jury. It is so ordered. BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] §
921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 313762
...Gamble asserts that his sentence of death is disproportionate since his murdering of Kuehl is not the most aggravated and unmitigated of crimes. We find this assertion meritless. In Dougan v. State,
595 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
113 S.Ct. 383,
121 L.Ed.2d 293 (1992) we stated that: Under subsection
921.141(2) death may be the appropriate recommendation if, and only if, at least one statutory aggravating factor is established....
...131,
116 L.Ed.2d 99 (1991); Lara v. State,
464 So.2d 1173, 1179 (Fla. 1985). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's denial of Gamble's requested instructions. We also find no merit in Gamble's final issue that Florida's death penalty statute, section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1993), is unconstitutional....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...part on information not available to the jury or the defendant in imposing the death sentence, contrary to Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349,
97 S.Ct. 1197,
51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), and also relied upon nonstatutory aggravating factors, in violation of section
921.141, Florida Statutes....
...t disclosing that information to Spaziano and providing an opportunity to present evidence in response. Under the standards set down in Gardner, we must find clear error in the use of the confidential portion of the presentence investigative report. Section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes, limits the factors in aggravation which may be considered by the trial judge in imposing the death sentence....
...ich "the defendant was previously *1123 convicted." Provence v. State,
337 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1976). Further, these underlying convictions are also limited to "another capital felony or ... felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." §
921.141(5)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...We hold it was properly allowed in evidence as an exception to *6 the hearsay rule. See generally Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1368 (1962). The other points raised by the appellant concerning his conviction are without merit. Our final responsibility under the Florida death sentence law, Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, is to review the death sentence. The trial jury recommended the death sentence upon a ten-to-two vote. The trial court found the aggravating circumstances outweighed those in mitigation, and imposed the death sentence. [2] Under the provisions of Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute must be found to exist before a death sentence may be imposed....
...wenty-five years. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. ROBERTS (Retired), J., not participating. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. [2] " FINDINGS OF THE COURT "Pursuant to Fla. Stat. Section 921.141(3)(b) the Court makes these findings of fact relative to the imposition of the Sentence of Death....
...f the noted infection that existed in these parts of her body; penetration may have occurred on prior occassions [sic] within the preceeding [sic] week. "With respect to the mitigating circumstances the Court finds that of those listed in Fla. Stat. 921.141(6) only Subsection (a) would apply, to-wit: "(a) The defendant has no significant history of criminal activity....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...g that a life sentence be imposed. The trial judge adjudicated defendant guilty. After carefully considering and weighing all the evidence presented during the trial and sentencing proceedings, the trial judge, pursuant to the safeguards afforded by Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, entered written detailed findings of fact in support of the death penalty specifically stating as follows: "[T]he undersigned concludes and determines that aggravating circumstances exist, to-wit: The capital felony...
...2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), a decision whose ultimate impact remains to be seen. As previously expressed in my dissenting opinions in State v. Dixon (Fla. 1973),
283 So.2d 1, and Spinkellink v. State,
313 So.2d 666, I have weighed Florida's new death penalty statutes, Sections
921.141,
782.04, and
775.082, F.S., in the light of Furman and I find them constitutionally wanting....
...ke issue with their application in determining Appellant's sentence. Appellant first contends the trial judge erred in considering a presentence investigation report containing matter not properly admissible as aggravating circumstances specified in Section 921.141(6)....
...[1] The record shows that prior to imposing sentence upon Appellant the trial judge ordered a presentence investigation report pursuant to Rule 3.710, Cr.P.R. Appellant argues that in considering the PSI report the trial judge vitiated the sentence by taking the process out of the bounds of Section 921.141, more specifically that Section 921.141 limits the judge to consideration of the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated and that the PSI report included matters which were detrimental to Appellant yet were not among the aggravating circumstances in the statute....
...The prior arrests and convictions section included arrests over a ten-year period, none of which resulted in a conviction "of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person," an aggravating circumstance provided in Section 921.141(6)(b)....
...They feel he should not be let to roam the streets for what he did to his wife. They stated that the subject had a long line of assault charges on his wife, that should be taken into count [sic] about this subject." Neither is such opinion one of the aggravating circumstances specified in Section 921.141(6)....
...pressly enumerated in the statute, in effect re-introducing the element of discretion in the trial judge which was abhorrent to a majority of the United States Supreme Court in Furman and which a majority of this Court saw barred by the operation of Section 921.141 in Dixon ....
...d mental state at the time of the crime induced by an unusually large amount of alcohol. The record shows uncontroverted evidence that Appellant had been drinking virtually all day and all night prior to killing his wife at some time after midnight. Section 921.141(7) (f) provides as a mitigating circumstance that "[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to *679 conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired." In Dixon this Court said: "Mental disturbance which interferes with but does not obviate the defendant's knowledge of right and wrong may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7)(f), F.S.A....
...Accordingly, I would affirm Appellant's conviction and vacate Appellant's sentence of death with directions to impose a sentence of life imprisonment in accordance with the recommendation of the jury. BOYD, J., concurs. NOTES [1] I note that Chapter 72-724, Laws of Florida, amending § 921.141, F.S., provided for 7 subsections including (6) Aggravating circumstances and (7) Mitigating circumstances. However, § 921.141, F.S....
...ng circumstances, but retains references in subsections (1) and (3) (b) to subsections (6) Aggravating circumstances and (7) Mitigating circumstances. References thereto in my opinion assume the correctness of Chapter 72-724 and the incorrectness of § 921.141 as printed.
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1998 WL 54478
...In his first argument, Williams claims that the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating circumstance that Williams was under a sentence of imprisonment at the time of the murder. Specifically, Williams contends that confinement to a secure juvenile facility is not imprisonment under section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...This argument raises an issue of first impression. In its sentencing order, the trial court found as an aggravating factor the following: The Defendant committed the capital felony while under a sentence of imprisonment pursuant to Florida Statute 921.141(5)(a)....
...The State reasons that because section 39.061, Florida Statutes (1995), makes escape from a secure juvenile detention facility or residential commitment facility a third-degree felony, the legislature must have intended juvenile confinement to be considered a sentence of imprisonment under section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...prisoned. We do not agree. In accord with the plain language of the statute and prior case law, we hold that confinement to a juvenile facility pursuant to an adjudication of delinquency is not a "sentence of imprisonment" as contemplated under *686 section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528,
91 S.Ct. 1976,
29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to jury trial). Accordingly, we conclude that juvenile confinement is not a "sentence of imprisonment" as contemplated in section
921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...was among the most aggravated and least mitigated of murders. See State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973). Accordingly, I would remand this case to the trial court for a new penalty proceeding with the caveat that the jury not be allowed to consider section
921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), as an aggravating circumstance....
...ximum of thirteen roundstwelve in a clip and one in the chamber. [4] The charge of carrying a concealed firearm was not connected with the murder charge and was consolidated for trial purposes only. Williams does not challenge this conviction. [5] § 921.141(5)(a), Fla....
...was a fugitive from Louisiana. Williams had been confined to the Louisiana Training Institute (LTI), a secure juvenile facility. After attaining majority age (seventeen) in Louisiana, Williams escaped from the LTI and has been a fugitive since. [6] § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1993). [7] Williams claims that: (1) the trial court erred in finding that confinement to a juvenile detention facility was a "sentence of imprisonment" under section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1993); (2) his death sentence is disproportionate; and (3) the court erred in allowing the prosecutor's improper comments regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
..."There is evidence in the record that the convicted Defendant was involved in some trouble and was sentenced to serve time in another prison system of another State, however, as trial Judge, I felt that this was not sufficient to come into play under Section (5) of 941.141 [921.141], F.S.A. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES "A. After a careful examination of all the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Section (6) of 941.141 [921.141], F.S.A., I do find that there may have been, remotely, one which would apply....
...roper procedure (Rule 3.210). We find that the trial court did not err in failing to discharge appellant either pursuant to Rule 3.191(d)(3) or Rule 3.191(b)(1), Fla.Cr.R.P. Appellant's contention that the imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, as punishment for a capital offense committed before December 8, 1972, is prohibited by Article I, Section 10, Constitution of Florida, prohibiting ex post facto laws is without merit....
...rror. However, although having determined that appellant's conviction resulted from a fair trial, and should be sustained, we find that the sentence of death was not properly imposed by the trial court pursuant to the specified safeguards set out in Section 921.141, Florida Statutes....
...The jury was deprived of testimony highly relevant to their evaluation of mitigating circumstances the testimony of the psychiatrists, who had testified during trial, relative to whether Miller acted under the influence *68 of extreme mental disturbance (Section 921.141(6)(b)) or whether his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired (Section 921.141(6)(f))....
...and thereafter the court recessed for dinner. Defense counsel moved the court to recess until Monday to allow subpoenas to be issued to witnesses available to testify regarding Miller's mental and emotional condition at the time of the crime, factors specifically mentioned as mitigating in Section 921.141 (6), Florida Statutes....
...Defense counsel indicated a desire to call the psychiatrists who had testified during the trial concerning Miller's ability to distinguish between right and wrong in order to question them on the very different issues of whether Miller acted under the influence of extreme mental disturbance (Section 921.141(6)(b)) or whether his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired (Section 921.141(6)(f))....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 242396
...On remand, the trial court again sentenced Crump to death. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court found in aggravation that Crump had previously been convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and three counts of aggravated battery. § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 106349
...The transcript was not carried into the jury room and there is no suggestion it became the focal point of inquiry. Finding no reversible error in the guilt phase, we affirm the conviction. The trial judge found three aggravating circumstances in imposing the death penalty: section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1985), the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; section 921.141(5)(d), the capital felony was committed in the course of committing attempted sexual battery; and section 921.141(5)(f), the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 31026973
...hich does *62 not connote the same degree of blame or fault as first-degree murder. It is the crime for which the defendant is convicted that determines his or her culpability, and in this case that decision has been made by the trier of fact. Under section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1987), a defendant is eligible for a sentence of death only if he or she is convicted of a capital felony....
...'s penalty-phase instructions and findings. Initially, Shere argues that the court erred by instructing the jury to consider whether the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function or law enforcement. See § 921.141(5)(g), Fla....
...The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on a circumstance that was supported by the evidence. Shere also argues that the trial court erred by finding the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(I), Fla....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 634, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 2636, 2011 WL 5217091
...He alleges that such evidence would have established that at the time of the murder, he was unable to conform his actions to the requirements of law and was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance — the two statutory mental health mitigators. See § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla....
...that Hoskins suffered either a reduced ability to control impulsive behavior or an emotional disturbance. In fact, based on this and other evidence, the sentencing court rejected the extreme mental or emotional disturbance statutory miti-gator. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 3377079
...ty. Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not object to such comments because he did not find anything objectionable or improper about these comments. We agree that the prosecutor's comments on victim impact were permissible under section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2006). [7] In Bonifay v. State,
680 So.2d 413, 419-20 (Fla.1996), we held that victim impact comments were proper because the boundaries of relevance under [section
921.141(7)] include evidence concerning the impact to family members....
...1676,
95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987); (9) the trial court erred in its assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors; (10) the trial court erred in failing to declare section
922.10, Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional; and (11) the trial court erred in failing to declare section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional. [6] Huff v. State,
622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993). [7] Section
921.141(7) states: Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence to the jury....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 228418
...Further, counsel for both the State and the defendant read the standard instruction to the jury. We find the error harmless. Damren next asserts that the court erred in allowing Miller's wife [6] and daughter [7] to read prepared statements to the jury *713 during the penalty phase. We disagree. Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993), allows the State to introduce "victim impact" evidence, showing "the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." The statements of Miller's wife and daughter comport with this statute....
...State,
645 So.2d 377 (Fla.1994), wherein the out-of-court statements of the murder victim (describing a prior attack and threat by the defendant) were admitted in the penalty phase via the in-court testimony of a police officer. We found it sufficient under section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), that "Spencer was ......
...confront the co-defendant. Id. at 813-14. Engle applies with equal force here, where *715 the jury considered similar inadmissible and prejudicial evidence before recommending the death penalty. Id. at 94 (footnote and citations omitted). Moreover, section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1995), expressly states that there is a limit to the type of hearsay evidence that can be admitted in the penalty phase of a capital trial: Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be r...
...[8] Chittam gave Hedley a detailed account of the events at the mine that night. Mosley and Waldrup overheard fragments of Chittam's conversation with Hedley. Hedley testified in detail as to what Chittam said, and Mosley and Waldrup testified briefly as to what they overheard. [9] See § 921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...This case is here on direct appeal from the first degree murder conviction of Leon Aldridge and the imposition of a sentence of death. The trial court's sentence was preceded by a death sentence recommendation of a jury. Our jurisdiction to review this case is based on Article V, § 3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution, and Section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...It very well may be true that appellant is the murderer, but the evidence submitted at the trial fails to constitute proof of guilt beyond and to the exclusion of reasonable doubt. Under the statute of this State prescribing the procedures for imposition of sentences for capital felonies, Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, this Court is not permitted to approve a sentence of death until each case is weighed by the criteria stated in the statute....
...the death penalty rather than incarcerating him for the minimum 25 years under our life sentence statute. This request, of course, has no bearing on our decision. We have a duty to review the record in every case where the death penalty is imposed. § 921.141(4), Fla....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...1980), we said: Equally meritless is the contention that it was error to exclude the testimony of a priest who had witnessed an execution by electrocution. While it is settled that an advisory jury and trial judge may consider evidence of mitigating factors beyond those enumerated in section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1977), the evidence must be relevant to the sentencing inquiry. We do not believe that a descriptive account of an electrocution would aid the jury or judge in their effort to apply section 921.141 fairly and correctly....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 1836848
...ion on felony murder and the law of principals; (19) failure to request an Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782,
102 S.Ct. 3368,
73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), jury instruction; (21) failure to present evidence of a statutory mitigating circumstance pursuant to section
921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990); (22) failure to present statutory mitigating circumstances pursuant to section
921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990); (23) failure to present statutory mitigating circumstances pursuant to section
921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990); (24) failure to present mental health testimony to rebut the State's claim that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner; (25) waiver of the presentencing investigation report; and (31) cumulative error....
...The trial court reasoned that even if Kontos had moved to recuse Judge Yawn, the motion would have been denied because there were no grounds requiring recusal. Therefore, the postconviction trial court ruled that Kontos was not ineffective for failing to make a futile request. [12] See § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2004). [13] See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 63433
...pital felony was committed while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and 2) his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla.Stat (1983)....
...There were no facts revealed during the rule 3.850 hearing which were not presented to the judge and jury at trial. In *912 fact, in a concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Overton in which Justice McDonald concurred Justice Overton concluded "that mitigating circumstances under section
921.141(6)(b) and (f) were established in this record by unrefuted testimony."
460 So.2d at 359....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Rehearing Denied September 24, 1979. *509 Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, and Lex M. Taylor and John F. Laurent, Lakeland, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Pursuant to the provisions of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), and article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, this appeal is before us to review, inter alia, a judgment of guilt of murder in the first degree and imposition of sentence of death thereon....
...sentence of death. It is so ordered. ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur. ENGLAND, C.J., dissents. NOTES [1] The trial court's findings in support of the death penalty were as follows: "As to Aggravating Circumstances in Florida Statute 921.141(5)....
...nty, Florida, Case No. CR76-69... . All of the above convictions were for felonies involving the use or threat of violence to the victims. c.) The Court finds that the facts of this case do not support the aggravating circumstance in Florida Statute 921.141(5)(c) in that the defendant did not knowingly create a great risk of death to many persons, other than the two victims....
...Anderson and Betty Anderson, his wife, the rape of Betty Anderson and the Burglary of the home of Charles L. Anderson and Betty Anderson. e.) This Court finds that the facts of this case do not support the aggravating circumstance in Florida Statute 921.141(5)(e) in that this capital felony was not committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody....
...everal items of guns, firearms and other items of personal property all the property of Charles L. Anderson and Betty Anderson, his wife. g.) This Court finds that the facts of this case do not support the aggravating circumstance in Florida Statute 921.141(5)(g) in that the capital offense was not committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws....
...police. The defendant, DANIEL MORRIS THOMAS, according to testimony of the victim, Betty Anderson, was entirely indifferent to the suffering he inflicted on the Andersons and apparently enjoyed it. "As to Mitigating Circumstances in Florida Statute 921.141(6). a.) The Court finds that the defendant, DANIEL MORRIS THOMAS, has a significant history of prior criminal activity both as a juvenile and adult and therefore rejects Florida Statute 921.141(6)(a) as a mitigating circumstance. b.) Under Florida Statutes 921.141(6)(b) the Court finds that this capital offense was not committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance....
...tion. c.) The victims, Charles L. Anderson and Betty Anderson, his wife, were not participants in the defendant's acts of Burglary, Robbery, Sexual Battery and Murder in the First Degree. This Court expressly rejects this subsection, Florida Statute 921.141(6)(c), as a mitigating circumstance. d.) The defendant acted alone in the commission of these offenses and the Court expressly rejects this subsection, Florida Statute 921.141(6)(d), as a mitigating circumstance. e.) The defendant, DANIEL MORRIS THOMAS, did not act under extreme duress or under the domination of any other person and the Court expressly rejects Florida Statute 921.141(6)(e) as a mitigating circumstance. f.) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was not substantially impaired and the Court expressly rejects Florida Statute 921.141(6)(f) as a mitigating circumstance. g.) Finally, the age of the defendant, DANIEL MORRIS THOMAS, has been considered as required by Florida Statute 921.141(6)(g)....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...sted by Dixon, Alford and Songer. The Supreme Court of Florida stated that the only factors relevant to sentencing under the Florida statute were the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances: 21 The sole issue in a sentencing hearing under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), is to examine in each case the itemized aggravating and mitigating circumstances....
...Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 ,
92 S.Ct. 2726 ,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). 22
336 So.2d at 1139 (footnote omitted). 23 The court in Cooper accompanied the text above with the following footnote: 24 The legislative intent to avoid condemned arbitrariness pervades the statute. Section
921.141(2) requires the jury to render its advisory sentence "upon the following matters: (a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (6); (b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (7), which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist...." (Emphasis added). This limitation is repeated in Section
921.141(3), governing the trial court's decision on the penalty. Both sections
921.141(6) and
921.141(7) begin with words of mandatory limitation....
...41 The Supreme Court in Hitchcock further noted that the trial judge, in imposing sentence, expressly weighed only those mitigating factors enumerated in the death penalty statute: 42 [T]he sentencing judge found that 'there [were] insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in Florida Statute 921.141(6) to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.' He described the process by which he reached his sentencing judgment as follows: 'In determining whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment, this Court is mandated to...
...the Court can go outside of those criteria." The court accepted this argument, ruling it could consider only "certain factors" in sentencing petitioner, as to which a presentence report would be irrelevant. 51 The court rejected the applicability of Section 921.141(6)(f) of the Florida Statutes which provided as a mitigating circumstance that "[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially im...
...In imposing the death sentence, the court did not indicate in its findings whether it had considered nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. The court stated only that "there [were] insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in Florida Statute 921.141(6) to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." At no time during the sentencing process did Hitchcock object to the court's treatment of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 132, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 151, 2009 WL 217966
...The trial court denied this motion because defense counsel could not provide a factual basis other than their observation that Rigterink displayed an unusual, off-putting lack of emotion during his trial. Further, the court found that defense counsel had not complied with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.202. [3] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003). [4] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003). [5] § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003). [6] § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...as rendered finding the defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree. "Thereafter, the defendant was adjudicated guilty by the Court and the jury after hearing additional matters retired to consider an advisory sentence pursuant to Florida Statute 921.141(2)....
...irms his sentence of death. I would commute appellant's sentence to life imprisonment on two grounds. First, I cannot agree with the prior and present judgment of this Court as to the constitutionality of the Florida death penalty statutes, Sections
921.141,
782.04 and
775.082, F.S., in the light of Furman v....
...State,
313 So.2d 675, now pending. Second, it appears to me that the trial judge, in overruling the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment and in sentencing appellant to death, took into consideration and relied upon aggravating circumstances not expressly provided by Section
921.141(6), including robbery charges pending against appellant of which he has not yet been convicted, appellant's demeanor and conduct at the trial for which he has not yet been charged or convicted, and appellant's allegedly incurable drug addiction. Although Section
921.141(1) permits at the sentencing hearing the introduction of any evidence as to any matter that the trial judge deems relevant to sentencing regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, as I read the statute, Section
921.141(3) limits the trial judge as to the sentence to be imposed to the aggravating circumstances expressly enumerated in Section
921.141(6) and the mitigating circumstances expressly enumerated in Section
921.141(7). Furthermore, this Court said in Dixon: "The most important safeguard presented in Fla. Stat. §
921.141, F.S.A., is the propounding of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which must be determinative of the sentence imposed....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 1628473
...Here, according to Woodel, there is no evidence to support the idea that the Moodys were particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability. The Legislature enacted this aggravator during the 1996 session, and it became effective October 1, 1996. [9] Section 921.141(5)(m), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...We direct that the trial court comply with the procedural requirements for the entry of a new sentencing order that we outlined in Jackson v. State,
767 So.2d at 1160-61. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] See §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). [2] See §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). [3] See §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). [4] See §
921.141(5)(m), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). [5] See §
921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). [6] See §
921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 22304578
...Additionally, the Court finds that the sentence of the Defendant was pronounced immediately after the jury provided its recommendation. ( See Transcript of Sentencing, attached). Florida Statutes require that the sentencing judge independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Fla. Stat. 921.141 (1985)....
...g and mitigating circumstances."
777 So.2d at 352. This Court noted that the record supported the trial court findings that "the record contains no oral findings independently made by the trial judge, which satisfies the weighing process required by section
921.141(3), nor did defense counsel know that the State prepared a sentencing order to which he failed to object." Id....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...the conviction lest such weaker or frivolous issues detract from meritorious issues concerning the sentencing phase. Jones v. Barnes,
463 U.S. 745,
103 S.Ct. 3308,
77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). We have, nevertheless, reviewed the conviction as required by section
921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1981), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(f)....
...We find no reversible error and that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. We affirm the conviction. Appellant argues four issues. The first is that the trial court erred in finding that a prior conviction of resisting arrest with violence was an aggravating circumstance in accordance with section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...There is no requirement that the state go behind the conviction to show the particulars of the conviction. Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...ere the trial judge has overridden a jury recommendation of life imprisonment and imposed the death penalty. McCampbell v. State,
421 So.2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 1982), and cases cited therein. Here, there remained two aggravating circumstances, sections
921.141(5)(b) and (d), which the jury and the judge could properly consider....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 525895
...and consecutive to Counts 1-5, 7, 10, 11, and 16; and Count 16 (possession of cocaine): five years consecutive to Counts 1-5, 7, 10-12, and 14. The trial judge imposed the death penalty consecutively to the sentences for the noncapital offenses. [2] § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1989). [5] §§ 921.141(5)(e), (g), (j), Fla....
...found that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated; (13) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on three aggravating circumstances that could only be treated as a single aggravating circumstance; (14) the aggravating circumstance of section 921.141(5)(j) is unconstitutional because it establishes victim status as a factor for imposing the death penalty; (15) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury adequately on mitigating circumstances; (16) Pietri's death sentenc...
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 589314
should be imposed, then, in accordance with section 921. 141, Florida Statutes (1983), the judge must set
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 368913
...Accordingly, we affirm Arbelaez's convictions for first-degree murder and kidnapping and his death sentence. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] §
921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989). [5] §
921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 106355
...titled to automatically return a death sentence as a result of his conviction for felony murder; and the jury was misled as to its proper role for reasons expressed in Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320,
105 S.Ct. 2633,
86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). [3] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1987). [4] Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83,
83 S.Ct. 1194,
10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). [5] This Court has previously ruled that Caldwell is not applicable in Florida. Combs v. State,
525 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1988). [6] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). [7] §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1985). [8] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 59660
...nd twenty-seven years' incarceration on the sexual battery count, to run concurrent with the sexual battery term. No sentence was imposed on the conviction for grand theft. [3] Murder during commission or flight after commission of a sexual battery, section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1987); murder committed to avoid or prevent lawful arrest, section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1987); murder committed for pecuniary gain, section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1987); murder especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...McDONALD, Justice, dissenting. I would grant a stay of execution and direct the trial judge to afford the defendant an opportunity to present evidence that the jury and the trial judge were insufficiently apprised of the "mental mitigating factors" set forth in section 921.141(6)....
...lurred to require an evidentiary hearing under the formula set forth in Meeks v. State,
382 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1980), as modified by Knight v. State,
394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981). NOTES [*] The legislature has provided three "mental mitigating factors" in §
921.141(6)....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 1901425
...it against him and things of that nature. Woodel provides no direct authority as to why White's statements would be improper other than alleging that this was irrelevant and highly inflammatory, constituting a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2005), which governs the penalty-phase proceedings, provides in pertinent part that evidence "relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant" is admissible "regardless of its admissibility...
...The court's role is to consider the quality of the factors to be weighed, not the quantity of those factors. Accordingly, the court considers the nature and quality of the aggravators and mitigators that it has found to exist. The court allowed the introduction of Victim Impact testimony pursuant to Fla. Stat. 921.141....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5824, 2009 WL 722557
...The trial court found
the following aggravating circumstances applicable to both murders: (1) the
previous conviction of a violent felony (the contemporaneous killings); (2) the
murders were committed during the commission of a burglary; and (3) the murders
were heinous, atrocious, or cruel. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(a), (d), (h) (1991).
3
As to victim Carter, the court found the additional aggravating factor that the
murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest. See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(e) (1991)....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The court denied this request. ISSUES ON APPEAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to ensure the reporting and transcription of all of the proceedings below. He argues that the requirement in section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1977), of "certification by the sentencing court of the entire record," together with the constitutional requirement of uniformity in capital sentencing which appellate review is designed to ensure, mandate that...
...The state responds by pointing out that all of the court reporter's notes of proceedings *9 before the trial court were transcribed, made a part of the record, and forwarded to the supreme court for review. The state argues that this complied with section 921.141(4) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200....
...tter to the attention of the jury. The trial court's ruling should not be held to require reversal unless "clearly erroneous and prejudicial." Id. at 662,
122 So. at 115. SENTENCE Appellant contends that his sentence of death must be vacated because section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1977), pursuant to which the sentence was imposed, is unconstitutional....
...e and procedure, which are exclusively the province of this Court under the rule-making power assigned to it by article V, section 2(a), Florida Constitution. This argument is without merit. The aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated in section
921.141 are substantive law. Vaught v. State,
410 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1982); State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, Hunter v. Florida,
416 U.S. 943,
94 S.Ct. 1950,
40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974). The aggravating circumstances of Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6), F.S.A., [ sic ] actually define those crimes when read in conjunction with Fla....
...§§
782.04(1) and 794.01(1), F.S.A. to which the death penalty is applicable in the absence of mitigating circumstances. As such, they must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before being considered by judge or jury. Id. at 9. To the extent that section
921.141 pertains to procedural matters such as the bifurcated nature of the trial in capital cases, it has been incorporated by reference in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.780, promulgated by this Court, and is therefore properly adopted. See The Florida Bar, Re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
343 So.2d 1247, 1263 (Fla. 1977). Appellant contends that section
921.141 is unconstitutional as applied to him because the judge and jury were precluded from giving proper consideration to the evidence he offered in mitigation of his crime. He argues that the procedure utilized at his sentencing trial pursuant to section
921.141 prevented the judge and jury from assigning the proper weight to his mitigating evidence and that this violated principles of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments developed in Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586,
98 S.Ct. 2954,
57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). We have specifically held, however, that section
921.141 and the procedure utilized thereunder are in keeping with the principles of Lockett....
...1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 969,
97 S.Ct. 2929,
53 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1977), which hold that only convictions, and not mere accusations, may be presented to establish the statutory aggravating circumstance of previous conviction of violent crime. See §
921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred in its evaluation of the circumstances of this case and that the sentence of death is simply inappropriate. The judge found that at the time of the murder, appellant was under sentence of imprisonment, § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1977); that appellant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence, id., § 921.141(5)(b); and that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, id., § 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 219836
...phase because he considered it to be inadmissible hearsay. Garcia correctly points out, however, that the exclusionary rules of evidence, including the rule barring use of hearsay statements, are inapplicable in the penalty phase of a capital trial. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1979), provides in part: In the [penalty] proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and shall include matte...
...BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The judge found that the murders were committed during the course of a robbery, were committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest, and were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. See § 921.141, Fla....
...ggravator, so the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Espinosa v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___,
112 S.Ct. 2926,
120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), is inapplicable. [2] The judge found that Garcia had no significant history of prior criminal activity. See §
921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2015 WL 108623, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 307
...It placed “great weight” on the statutory
aggravating circumstance that “the murder was cold, calculated, and
10
Case: 12-15188 Date Filed: 01/08/2015 Page: 11 of 48
premeditated.” Id. (applying Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(i)). The court put “moderate
weight” on the aggravating circumstance that Lynch “had previously been
convicted of a violent felony.” Id. (applying Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b))....
...e only
moderate weight because Morgan was the first victim killed. The court also found
the aggravating circumstance that Lynch had committed the murder “while . . .
engaged in committing one or more other felonies.” Id. (applying Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(5)(d))....
...Lynch contended that two more statutory mitigating factors should apply —
that he had committed the murders while “under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance” and that his capacity “to conform his . . . conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b),
(f)....
...ination that a death sentence was
warranted centered on the terror that Caday had experienced before she died. The
court placed “great weight” on the fact “that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or
cruel.” Id. at 368 (applying Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h))....
...minutes before her mother arrived and then shot her mother dead in front of her.
Caday was screaming hysterically during Lynch’s first phone call to his wife.
The court found that Lynch had been “previously convicted of a violent
felony,” id. (applying Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b)), and it placed “great weight” on
that aggravating circumstance because Caday was the second victim killed in a
multiple murder. The court also found the aggravating circumstance that Lynch
had killed Caday while he “was engaged in committing one or more other
felonies,” id. (applying Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d)), because Caday was a minor.4
But it decided that the factor should receive only moderate weight because Caday’s
“killing was an afterthought” and would have been second-degree murder but for
the felony murder rule.
4...
...Because it is dispositive, we will focus on the question of whether the
underlying Fourth Amendment issue has merit. 9
9
We note that Florida law provides for the exclusion of evidence from a sentence hearing in
a capital case if it was acquired through an unconstitutional search or seizure. See Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(1); Harich v....
...large part on the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating circumstance,
while the death sentence imposed for Caday’s murder was based in large part on
the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance. See Lynch,
841 So. 2d
at 368; Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(h), (i)....
...circumstance that Lynch “had previously been convicted of a violent felony” and
the aggravating circumstance that he had committed the murder “while . . .
engaged in committing one or more other felonies.” Lynch,
841 So. 2d at 368
(applying Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(b) & (d)).
Against the three aggravating circumstances supporting each death sentence,
the only statutory mitigating circumstance was the one for “no significant history
of prior criminal activity.” See id....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 1331
...rnesto Najarro Rivas and Isilia Leticia Paguada Martinez. A superseding indictment returned July 19, 1989 listed the victim's names as Frank Najarro and Leticia Paguada. [3] Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [4] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). [5] §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989). [6] §
921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1989). [7] §
921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1989). [8] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1989). [9] §
921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 8972
...Because we find that his death sentence must be vacated due to an error in issuing the written sentencing order, we discuss only that claim. Perez argues that the trial judge failed to provide written findings concurrently with the oral pronouncement of the sentence as required by section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1991)....
...egree murder conviction. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. NOTES [1] Perez also appeals his convictions and sentences for kidnapping and two counts of aggravated assault. [2] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...n; (5) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that if a verdict of guilty were returned, it should be for the highest offense which had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (6) photographs of Devlin's body were improperly admitted. [11] Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1991), provides in part: In each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of the court shall be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the [aggravating and mitigati...
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 5375, 1991 WL 44203
...atutory aggravating factor. The entire argument, in fact, was directed toward the issue of whether the fact that Jones killed a police officer was relevant to the statutory aggravating factor of hindering or disrupting law enforcement, see Fla. Code § 921.141(5)(g), or other statutory aggravating circumstances....
...eeks prior to trial. Jones actually pled nolo contendere to the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer and was sentenced to five years in prison. The plea to this offense supplied an additional aggravating factor under Florida law. Fla.Code § 921.141(5)(b)....
...Therefore, Jones’ argument essentially boils down to the contention that it was incumbent on his counsel to object to the prosecutor’s and Sheriff Carson’s emphasis on the fact that the victim was a police officer. The fact that the victim was a police officer was relevant to a statutory aggravating factor. Fla.Code § 921.141(5)(g) provides for an aggravating factor where “[t]he capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.” The record shows that Jones’ counsel objected to the jury instruction regarding this aggravating factor....
...After carefully reviewing the record, we do not find this to be the case. Even the prosecutor’s several comments to the effect that a police officer is a symbol of order in our society were not improper as they were relevant to the statutory aggravating factor of § 921.141(5)(g)....
...Additional facts will be presented later in this opinion as they are relevant to the issues. 2 . Some of the evidence and argument was appropriate because of its relevance to the aggravating circumstance relating to disrupting and hindering the enforcement of the laws. Fla. Code § 921.141(5)(g)....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Appellant next claims that, at resentencing, the trial judge erroneously placed limitations on his presentation of evidence concerning the events which resulted in his 1969 conviction of a felony involving violence to his first wife's sister. This conviction constitutes a statutory aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....
...hat this premeditated homicide was a calculated and cold blooded execution. Such killing was done without any provocation on the part of the victim. Appellant argues that this homicide was not especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, as described in section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1979), and as interpreted by this Court, principally because there was instantaneous death from gunshot wounds with no "additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies." State v....
...Appellant was afforded a full opportunity at the resentencing hearing to present evidence about the incident, and he does acknowledge that he was convicted in 1969 of aggravated assault. This conviction clearly is a proper aggravating circumstance for the trial judge to consider. § 921.141(5)(b)....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 347763
...murder. We note that the results of the O'Brien and Van Poyck trials and any acquittals or convictions in those trials are irrelevant to the present case. See Eaton v. State,
438 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1983); Potts v. State,
430 So.2d 900 (Fla. 1982). [9] §
921.141(5)(b), (c), (e), (g), (i), Fla. Stat. (1989). [10] §
921.141(6)(e), (d), Fla....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 2873367
...ons; (B) his guilt-phase counsel was ineffective in various respects; (C) penalty-phase counsel was ineffective; and (D) special counsel had an undisclosed conflict of interest. In his accompanying petition for writ of habeas corpus Grim claims: (1) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2006), is unconstitutional; (2) the State's failure to specify aggravators in the indictment is unconstitutional; (3) the jury instructions improperly shifted the burden of proof; and (4) appellate counsel was ineffective....
...ing. Second, Grim himself indicated on the record that he did not care whether the court obtained a jury recommendation, and the sentencing order confirms as much: "The Defendant made it clear he would waive presentation before a jury as provided in section 921.141(1)....
...cted of a capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; and (3) commission while engaged in the commission of or attempt to commit a sexual battery. The trial court found three statutory mitigators (pursuant to section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (1997)):(1) disruptive home life and abuse (significant weight); (2) employment background (significant weight); and (3) mental problems that did not reach the level of section 921.141(6)(b) and (f) (great weight)....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...luntarily made. However, we agree with appellant's assertion that the trial judge improperly imposed a sentence of death in this case. As aggravating circumstances, the trial judge found that the murder created a great risk of death to many persons, section 921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1981); that it was committed during the commission of a felony, section 921.141(5)(d), and for pecuniary gain, section 921.141(5)(f); and that it was committed for avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, section 921.141(5)(e). The trial judge concluded that these three aggravating circumstances outweighed the single mitigating circumstance of appellant's lack of a significant history of prior criminal activity. See § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 1057629
...Because he has not satisfied either the deficiency or prejudice prong of Strickland, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying this claim of ineffective assistance. B. Ring Issue Howell asserts that the United States Supreme Court decisions in Ring and Apprendi render Florida's capital sentencing statute, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2003), unconstitutional....
...1070,
123 S.Ct. 662,
154 L.Ed.2d 564 (2002), and King v. Moore,
831 So.2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1069,
123 S.Ct. 662,
154 L.Ed.2d 563 (2002), this Court denied relief under Ring. Subsequently, this Court has rejected postconviction challenges to section
921.141 that relied on Apprendi and Ring.....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 94295
...See Slappy,
522 So.2d at 22. Accordingly, I dissent. KOGAN, J., concurs. NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] State v. Neil,
457 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1984), clarified, State v. Castillo,
486 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1986). [3] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). [4] Id. §
921.141(5)(d). [5] Id. §
921.141(5)(e). [6] Id. §
921.141(5)(f). [7] Id. §
921.141(5)(h). [8] Id. §
921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...be the following ...’ (listing the statutory mitigating circumstances).” Id.
107 S.Ct. at 1824 . Imposing the death sentence, the sentencing judge found that “there [were] insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in Florida Statute
921.141(6) to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” Id....
...hed by the evidence, are these: ...” [then listing the seven statutory mitigating circumstances]. Id. at 440-41. Finally, the sentencing judge made the following relevant findings: The Court has reviewed those mitigating circumstances contained in Section 921.141(6)(a) through (g), and finds that none of those mitigating circumstances are present....
...to life imprisonment. Id. at 30-31. The first sentence quoted above is very similar to the finding by the sentencing judge in Hitchcock , and clearly indicates that the judge in this case only reviewed “those mitigating circumstances contained in Section 921.141(6)(a) through (g).” Moreover, the second sentence quoted above clearly indicates that the judge examined the psychological evidence only for the purpose of determining whether Messer’s problems satisfied the statutory requirement of extreme mental or emotional disturbance....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...tion was untimely since no good cause was shown for not having filed it ten days before the trial. Sentencing in capital felony cases is based on facts established at the guilt phase of the trial as well as those brought out at the sentencing phase. § 921.141(3), Fla....
...1660,
56 L.Ed.2d 93 (1978); State v. Jones,
204 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1967). Appellant contends that the trial judge erred at the penalty phase of the trial by not instructing the jury that the mitigating circumstances it could consider were not limited to those listed in section
921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1977)....
...At the penalty phase of the trial, the state proved that appellant had previously been convicted of robbery in New Mexico and that he was on parole at the time of the murder. The judge found as aggravating circumstances that the capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1977), that appellant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence, id. § 921.141(5)(b), that the capital felony was committed during the course of a robbery, id. § 921.141(5)(d), that the capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws, id., § 921.141(5)(g), and that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 85, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 172, 2010 WL 375049
...Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 54,
124 S.Ct. 1354,
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (holding that testimonial statements are inadmissible against a defendant unless the witness appears at trial or, if unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination). [15] Section
921.141(1) provides in pertinent part as follows: In the [penalty phase] proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and shall include matt...
...nd (6). Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. § 921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 256873
...We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. [2] See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] Id. § 921.141(5)(b)....
...The trial judge supported this factor in Robert Sturmfels' death with the contemporaneous convictions for the offenses involving the Rectors and Georgette Sturmfels; and in Georgette Sturmfels' death, with the contemporaneous convictions involving the Rectors and Robert Sturmfels. [4] Id. § 921.141(5)(d). [5] Id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 53
...uld be employed. I do agree with the majority that a jury must be instructed on Enmund principles whenever the defendant is a non-triggerman. BARKETT, J., concurs. NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1983). [3] §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1983). [4] §
921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1983). [5] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 698344
...[4] The jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to one. The court found the following aggravating factors: (1) Henry had previously been convicted of another capital felony; [5] and (2) the murder was committed during the course of a kidnapping. § 921.141(5)(b), (d), Fla....
...[6] The court gave some weight to the following statutory mitigating factors: (1) the murder was committed while Henry was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (2) Henry's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 639
...Regarding the penalty phase of the trial, appellant argues that the aggravating factors found by the trial court were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. He first challenges the factor that the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person, section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), contending that the record of conviction for a robbery that occurred ten years previously cannot support this circumstance. This argument is without merit. [1] Appellant argues that it was error for the trial court to find that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery, section 921.141(5)(d), in that there was no proof of a robbery in this case....
...State,
453 So.2d 786 (Fla.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1098,
105 S.Ct. 608,
83 L.Ed.2d 717 (1984). The heinous, atrocious and cruel factor is supported by the record in this case. Appellant also challenges the cold, calculated and premeditated factor. §
921.141(5)(i)....
...death penalty. Under our constitution, this Court hears appeals from all final judgments imposing the death penalty. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. It is our duty to independently determine whether imposition of the death penalty is warranted. See § 921.141(4), Fla....
...o the level of certainty that should support imposition of the death penalty. NOTES [1] Just as the robbery supports this aggravating factor, it also negates the existence of the mitigating factor of lack of significant history of criminal activity. § 921.141(6)(a). [2] The issue was not raised below or on this appeal, but we note that the trial court's instruction on the § 921.141(5)(h) factor substituted "wicked, evil" for "heinous." We find no reversible error.
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 976,
99 S.Ct. 1548,
59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979). With regard to the murder of Glen Lundgren, the trial judge found three statutory aggravating circumstances: that the appellant was previously convicted of a felony involving violence, §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1975), that at the time of the capital felony, the appellant was on parole under a sentence of imprisonment, §
921.141(5)(a), and that the capital felony was committed in the course of a robbery. §
921.141(5)(d)....
...The judge found no mitigating circumstances. With regard to the murder of Keith Kirchaine the judge found the above-listed aggravating circumstances plus two more: that the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest and prosecution, § 921.141(5)(e), and that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. § 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 50580
...ry's recommendation of life imprisonment in violation of Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975). In support of this claim Zeigler argues that an override is improper absent a detailed showing supported by specific written findings as required by section
921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....
...as well as the evidence Zeigler presented of his church and community involvement and his good character. Initially, we reject Zeigler's implication that the death sentence in this case is not supported by specific written findings as required under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....
...OVERTON, McDONALD, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. SHAW, C.J., and BARKETT, J., concur in result only. NOTES [1] Zeigler received two life sentences for murdering the Edwardses. [2] Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393,
107 S.Ct. 1821,
95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). [3] §
921.141(5)(b), (e), (f), (h), Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] §
921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 490
...Terry Van Royal, Jr., appeals his convictions of three counts of first-degree murder and sentences of death on each count. We have jurisdiction, [1] and affirm the convictions, but vacate the sentences of death and remand for entry of life sentences in accordance with section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the judge sentenced appellant to death for each conviction, commenting that he had never seen, or heard of, a more brutal crime. The judge did not, however, set forth in writing, or orally for the record, the reasons for imposing the death penalty as required by section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...tered its written findings as to aggravating and mitigating factors in support of the death penalty. Appellant argues that we lack jurisdiction to review this case because the trial court below did not enter the written findings of facts required by section 921.141(3) and urges that we remand the case to the trial court for imposition of a life sentence in accordance with section 921.141 and appellate review by the appropriate district court of appeal. We agree in part and disagree in part with appellant. First, as to jurisdiction, we are satisfied that the trial court's oral pronouncement of a death *628 sentence is sufficient to bring the case under our jurisdiction within section 921.141(4) and article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution....
...appeal showed that the trial judge had pronounced a sentence of death. These three cases differ significantly, however, in other respects from the case at hand and these differences persuade us that appellant is entitled to a vacation of sentences. Section 921.141(3) provides in pertinent part: In each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of the court shall be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances in subsections (5) and (6) and upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings....
...to memorialize it. This is even more true when, as here, we are faced with a jury override. Without these findings this Court cannot assure itself that the trial judge based the oral sentence on a well-reasoned application of the factors set out in section 921.141(5) and (6) and in Tedder v....
...are not inclined to do so when the record is inadequate and not merely incomplete. See committee notes to rule 9.200. We affirm the convictions and vacate the death sentences. The case is remanded for imposition of life sentences in accordance with section 921.141....
...sentence, not on the merits of the case per se, but on the failure of the trial judge to follow the statutory requirements. The duties and responsibilities of a trial judge with respect to sentencing of a capital *629 felony are clearly set forth in section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...rhetorical question is obvious and in the negative. Since the entry of this order came within a matter of days after the defendant had served his motion to dismiss and to vacate the death sentence because of the trial judge's failure to comply with section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes, it can be argued with some degree of persuasion that it was the defendant's aforesaid motion to dismiss that awakened the trial judge to the fact of his obvious dereliction and that his sentence was not the resul...
...775.082." The trial judge, for reasons not disclosed in the record, egregiously failed to perform his statutory duty in the sentencing process. We must do ours and vacate the death sentences and remand for the imposition of life sentences in accordance with section 921.141....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 571, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 1637, 2010 WL 3909803
...to a denial of due process." Bailey v. State,
998 So.2d 545, 554 (Fla.2008) (quoting Johnson v. State,
969 So.2d 938, 955 (Fla.2007)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____,
129 S.Ct. 2395,
173 L.Ed.2d 1307 (2009). We hold that no error was established here. Section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that in the penalty phase of a capital trial, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances ....
...That is morethat is one more future I cannot afford to lose. Abdool maintains that this passage was inflammatory and denied him due process and a fair proceeding. We review this claim for an abuse of discretion. See Schoenwetter v. State,
931 So.2d 857, 869 (Fla.2006). Section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2008), provides: Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described *222 in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence to the jury....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...1977); Hoy v. State,
353 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1977); Dobbert v. State,
328 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1976); Douglas v. State,
328 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1976); Sawyer v. State,
313 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1975); Gardner v. State,
313 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1975). BOYD, J., concurs. NOTES [1] §
921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1977). [2] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 541
...uld have departed from the guidelines sentence based on the valid reasons in the absence of reason one. Albritton v. State,
476 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1985). Appellant's next issue concerns the imposition of the death penalty. In his written findings under section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1985), the sentencing judge found no mitigating circumstances and five aggravating circumstances: (1) section
921.141(5)(a), the capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; (2) section
921.141(5)(b), appellant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; (3) section
921.141(5)(d), the capital felony was committed while the appellant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit a sexual battery and burglary with assault; (4) section
921.141(5)(h), the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (5) section
921.141(5)(i), the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any *185 pretense of moral or legal justification....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 670568
...A presentence report was subsequently completed and filed with the court. On April 12, 1995, the trial court sentenced appellant to death. The court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1995); (2) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, see id. § 921.141(5)(f); and (3) the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, see id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Booker's 3.850 motion alleged five grounds for relief: A) competency of trial counsel; B) prosecutor's inflammatory closing argument during sentencing; C) arbitrariness of Florida's death penalty; D) constitutionality of electrocution; and, E) constitutionality of aggravating circumstance, section 921.141(5)(h) (heinous, atrocious, or cruel), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...denied sub nom. Hunter v. Florida,
416 U.S. 943,
94 S.Ct. 1950,
40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), we stated that review by this Court guaranteed that a similar result would be reached under similar circumstances in other cases. This Court's interpretation of section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1981), was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Proffitt v....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 589
...basket. A jury found appellant guilty of first-degree murder and recommended the death penalty. The trial judge imposed the death sentence, finding three aggravating factors: that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1983); that the murder was committed to hinder law enforcement, section 921.141(5)(g); and that the murder was cold, calculated and premeditated, section 921.141(5)(i)....
...1943,
90 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986), there is nothing to indicate that the trial judge relied on any of the prosecutor's comments in making his sentencing decision. In sentencing appellant to death, the trial judge found three aggravating factors to apply. Appellant argues that application of both subsection
921.141(5)(e) (committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody) and subsection (5)(g) (committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement...
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user, shall be murder in the first degree and shall constitute a capital felony, punishable as provided in §
775.082. (b) In all cases under this section, the procedure set forth in §
921.141 shall be followed in order to determine sentence of death or life imprisonment....
...We are, in fact, hopelessly deadlocked on an equally divided vote. Two members Justices Adkins and Overton would affirm the sentence of death. Two other members Chief Justice England and Justice Boyd would not impose that sentence, the former favoring a remand for resentencing under section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1977), and the latter favoring a reduction of the appellant's sentence to life imprisonment....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 194552
...ortly thereafter, from which she never emerged. She was removed from life support systems on March 3, 1989. [2] Trepal has not challenged these convictions. We find competent substantial evidence in the record to support them and we affirm them. [3] § 921.141(5)(b), (c), (i), Fla. Stat. (1987). [4] Id. § 921.141(6)(a)....
...Trepal's guilt may arise from the evidence, it may arise from conflicts in the evidence, or it may arise from lack of evidence. If you have a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty. If you have no reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. [14] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). [15] § 921.141(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (1987). [16] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 299
...Lucas' trial, as well as Harvard's, took place prior to the filing of this Court's opinion in Songer v. State,
365 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 956,
99 S.Ct. 2185,
60 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1979). Although Lucas' original judge cannot now say what he thought section
921.141 required, the record shows that he instructed the jury only on the statutory mitigating circumstances....
...Notwithstanding the "raging gun battle,"
376 So.2d 1153, this episode involved only the victim and her two friends. There has never been any evidence that Lucas' conduct endangered more than the three people directly involved. Three people simply do not constitute "many persons" as meant in section
921.141(5)(c)....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...e up his mind about the defendant's guilt or innocence. The judge denied a defense motion for mistrial on the basis of juror misconduct. The jury found appellant guilty of first degree murder, and after the second phase of the trial held pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), recommended the death penalty....
...Second, he contends that the court's refusal to allow defense *498 counsel to recall Mrs. Buchanan for further cross-examination in the nature of impeachment was erroneous. Third, he argued that, in light of subsequent juror misconduct, it was reversible error for the trial court to deny a motion to sequester the jury. Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), has been authoritatively upheld as constitutional on both state and federal grounds....
...e must conclude that it did not yield anything further. We come now to the matter of appellant's sentence of death. The trial judge carefully set forth his analysis of the applicability of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances under section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), to the facts of this case....
...[1] He found that none of the *501 mitigating circumstances but all of the aggravating circumstances were present. While we agree that none of the mitigating circumstances are applicable, it is our conclusion *502 that the court erred in finding the existence of two of the aggravating circumstances, those listed in sections 921.141(5)(a) (defendant under sentence of imprisonment when capital felony committed) and (5)(b) (defendant previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person), Florida Statutes (1975). We note also that the trial judge found as separate aggravating factors that the homicide was committed while appellant was engaged in the attempted commission of the crime of robbery [section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1975)], and that the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain [section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1975)]....
...Buchanan was that Officer Ilyankoff, after being wounded twice, was shot a third time when he posed no danger to Ford's escape and was in fact trying to cooperate with the armed appellant. We therefore make the specific finding that the killing was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" under section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...We have not overlooked the testimony favorable to appellant's character and prior behavior presented by the defense in mitigation during the sentencing trial. We do not pretend to know what motivated Alvin Bernard Ford to take the life of Dimitri Walter Ilyankoff. Our duty under section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), as upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Proffitt v....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...t Jacobs' three accomplices were afraid of him constituted introduction of a nonstatutory aggravating factor. He contends that his appellate counsel erred in not raising this issue on appeal. We find this contention to be without merit in as much as section 921.141(1) provides for liberal admissibility of relevant evidence at the sentencing phase....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 21953
...ict court and REMAND with instructions to grant the writ in accordance with this opinion. 2 During proceedings held in late January, 1985, the state trial judge made statements, for the first time, indicating that he interpreted Florida Statute Sec. 921.141(6) at the time of petitioner's trial as limiting consideration of mitigating evidence to those "enumerated items." This was followed by statements reflecting that in sentencing petitioner he thus did not give consideration to any evidence dealing with nonstatutory mitigation....
...heir consideration to only the mitigating circumstances enumerated in the statute. The instruction given at the penalty phase of Songer's trial stated "[m]itigating circumstances by statute are," then listed the items contained in Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141 (1975)....
...provided a system whereby the possible aggravating and mitigating circumstances are defined, but where the weighing process is left to the carefully scrutinized judgment of jurors and judges. 23
283 So.2d at 7 . Later in the opinion the court reasoned: 24 The most important safeguard presented in Fla.Stat. Sec.
921.141, F.S.A., is the propounding of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which must be determinative of the sentence imposed....
...26 Finally, before discussing each mitigating circumstance enumerated in the statute, the court said: 27 When one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found, death is presumed to be the proper sentence unless it or they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating circumstances provided in Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(7), F.S.A....
...28
283 So.2d at 9 . 29 The reasonableness of the trial judge's and Songer's counsel's view of the statute was further born out in Cooper v. State,
336 So.2d 1133 (Fla.1976). The Florida Supreme Court in Cooper stated:The sole issue in a sentencing hearing under Section
921.141 ......
...After testing the sufficiency of the statutory aggravating circumstances and weighing all statutory aggravating evidence against the relevant mitigating evidence, the jury returns a recommendation of either life imprisonment or the death penalty. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(2) (1985)....
...The state and the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death". (Above underlining by the Court) 4 He also subsequently gave an affidavit in which he stated in pertinent part: 8 That at the time of the defendant's sentencing hearing, Florida Statute 921.141 was relatively new....
...igating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (7) which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist, and (c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(2) (1975) (emphasis supplied)....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 63091
...[2] The mental health mitigators are: "The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" and "[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired." § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 688782
...Hence, Pooler's plea for a life sentence is supported not only by our prior treatment of similar cases like Farinas, but also by the presence of substantial mitigation not found in Farinas. KOGAN, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] The sentencing order uses the conjunction "and." [2] § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (1995). [3] § 921.141(6)(e), Fla....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 228420
...[6] While Johnson was tried separately for the murders of Tequila Larkins and Lee Arthur Lawrence, a single hearing was held on the motion to suppress Johnson's confession to both murders. [7] Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [8] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987). [9] Id. §
921.141(5)(c). [10] Id. §
921.141(5)(f). [11] Id. §
921.141(5)(i). [12] Id. §
921.141(6)(b). [13] Id. §
921.141(6)(g)....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 49940
...State,
565 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1988); Fitzpatrick v. State,
527 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1988). Consequently, rather than remanding for a new penalty phase proceeding, I would sentence Bryant now to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. KOGAN, J., concurs. NOTES [1] §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] §
921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] §
921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1989). [5] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1989). [6] For example, the instant case involves section
921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1989) (capital felony committed while defendant under influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance), and section
921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (1989) (defendant's capacity to appreciate criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to requirements of law was substantially impaired).
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 3704038, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14334
...The trial court imposed the jury’s
recommendation, finding no statutory or non-statutory mitigating circumstances,
and three statutory aggravating factors: (1) Taylor was previously convicted of a
felony involving the use of violence, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b); (2) the homicide
9
Case: 12-12112 Date Filed: 07/28/2014 Page: 10 of 30
was committed during a sexual battery, id. § 921.141(5)(d); and (3) the capital
felony was especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel, id. § 921.141(5)(h).
B.
On direct appeal, Taylor raised three claims relating to the guilt phase of
trial, including whether the trial court erred in barring the testimony of Birch’s
three sisters....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 348
...Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. SHAW, Justice. Kokal appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence imposing the death penalty. We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and conduct our review in accordance with section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1983), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(f)....
...death penalty be imposed and specifically found that Kokal had personally killed the victim. Appellant raises three issues for our review. The first concerns imposition of the death penalty. The trial judge found four aggravating circumstances under section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1983): the murder was committed while engaged in a robbery subsection (5)(d); the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest subsection (5)(e); the murder was especially...
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 86180
...n capital sentencing proceedings under a provision of the Florida statute governing such proceedings. The Booker court, relying on Dobbert v. State,
375 So.2d 1069 (Fla.1979), rejected the challenge under article V, section 2(a), to the provision in section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1977), permitting the admission of hearsay evidence. Booker,
397 So.2d at 918. In Dobbert,
375 So.2d at 1072, the court had held that a similar challenge under article V, section 2(a), was "without merit." See also Burns v. State,
699 So.2d 646, 653 (Fla.1997) ("We have ... repeatedly upheld section
921.141 against claims that the capital sentencing statute improperly regulates practice and procedure.")....
...Such was the case in State v. Maxwell,
647 So.2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The decision of the Maxwell court was based on both Booker on which the State relies in the instant caseand Glendening on which Cartwright relies. In Maxwell, the trial court had determined that section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes, which permits victim impact evidence in capital sentencing proceedings, was unconstitutional on several grounds, including for violating the prohibition on ex post facto laws and as a violation of the separation of powers....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 6545
...A resentencing hearing was held wherein the defense was allowed to introduce mitigating evidence. We have jurisdiction to review the sentence of death imposed upon resentencing. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. The trial court found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1985); and (2) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any moral or legal justification, section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1985)....
...Under the circumstances of this case, the court did not err in finding that this murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Douglas argues that the aggravating factor of "cold, calculated, and premeditated" cannot be applied retroactively to this crime which occurred prior to the addition of this factor to section 921.141, and further, that it is not supported by the facts of the instant case....
...2916,
73 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1982), modified, Preston v. State,
444 So.2d 939 (Fla. 1984), "[t]he level of premeditation needed to convict in the [guilt] phase of a first-degree murder trial does not necessarily rise to the level of premeditation in subsection (5)(i)." Section
921.141(5)(i) limits the use of premeditation to those cases where the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the premeditation was "cold, calculated ......
...and the majority agrees that this aggravating circumstance is present just as it did in its earlier opinion. Douglas v. State,
328 So.2d at 22. The majority also correctly finds that application of the cold, calculated, and premeditated factor under section
921.141(5)(i), which was added as an aggravating factor in 1979, is not constitutionally proscribed in this case....
...ulated manner." Douglas v. State,
328 So.2d at 22. True, in order for the aggravating circumstance at issue to be applicable, the homicide must also have been committed in a "premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." §
921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...871,
97 S.Ct. 185,
50 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). This language, however, was only in support of our finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. "Cold, calculated, and premeditated" was not added to the list of aggravating factors set forth in section
921.141, Florida Statutes, until 1979. Ch. 79-353, § 1, Laws of Fla. [2] Although not so found by the trial judge, the facts also clearly supported the finding that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in kidnapping under section
921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1985). [3] Of significance to me is the fact that defendant waived consideration of section
921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes, i.e., that he has no significant history of prior criminal activity....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 8447
...Through an oversight, the jury was not instructed on the underlying felony of trafficking. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty of first-degree murder, which would normally be followed by the presentation of aggravating and mitigating evidence to the jury in accordance with section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1981)....
...The district court affirmed the first-degree murder conviction holding that failure to instruct on the lesser included offense was harmless error, reversed the life sentence on its finding that the judge misapplied Enmund, and remanded for resentencing in accordance with section 921.141....
...Accordingly, it was held to be a violation of double jeopardy to reopen the sentencing phase and to impose the death penalty. The state attempts to distinguish Rumsey and Bullington by arguing that the judge did not conduct a penalty phase as required by section 921.141 and that the life sentence was thus illegal....
...Even though the ruling was erroneous, the procedure was correct. Having so ruled, it would have been a futile exercise to present evidence of aggravation and mitigation to the jury or to pronounce a "but for" Enmund death sentence. Life imprisonment is a legal sentence under section 921.141 and we are not faced with a sentence contrary to statute....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2005 WL 977018
...The jury in this action recommended the death penalty by a vote of ten to two. The trial court considered the following aggravating factors: (1) Green was previously convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person (great weight), see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002); (2) Green committed the murder for pecuniary gain (great weight), see § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (2002); and (3) Green committed the murder in this case in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel fashion (great weight), see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...ve life sentences. This was not a fair procedure and the defendant should be entitled to a resentencing untainted by the one-sided and incomplete response to the jury's critical question. NOTES [1] Spencer v. State,
615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993). [2] See §
921.141(6)(h), Fla....
...death sentences, but was not. See Harvey v. Dugger,
656 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Fla.1995). Therefore, this claim with regard to the 1987 death sentences is improperly before this Court which is now reviewing Green's 2002 penalty phase proceeding. [5] See §
921.141(6)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 44345
...Wayne, the state has demonstrated the existence of this aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. In Magill v. State,
428 So.2d 649 (Fla.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 865,
104 S.Ct. 198,
78 L.Ed.2d 173 (1983), we recognized that there is no mechanical litmus test for determining the presence of a section
921.141(5)(h) circumstance....
...[4] Testimony from Jack Wayne, Leonard Wayne's son, revealed that Leonard Wayne was legally blind and did not drive. He testified that his father did possess a driver's license but he did not know whether it was valid. [5] This finding substantially conforms to section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes, which defines as an aggravating circumstance a "capital felony [which] was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." See Melendez v....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 113505
...I agree with the other assessments of claimed error. NOTES [1] 1) Previous conviction of a violent felony, i.e., the contemporaneous attempted murder; 2) commission during the course of a kidnapping; and 3) both cold, calculated and premeditated, and heinous, atrocious or cruel. See § 921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 656651
...voiding a lawful arrest, for pecuniary gain, and to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function; and the murders were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(b), (e), (f), (g), (i), Fla. Stat. (1989). The judge found the statutory mitigating circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity. § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 651, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 1935, 2010 WL 4483506
...State,
949 So.2d 1021, 1037 (Fla.2006) (quoting Fennie v. State,
855 So.2d 597, 609 (Fla.2003)). The State may present victim impact evidence which shows "the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." §
921.141(7), Fla....
...to the torturous manner of Diana's death. We thus conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports *796 the trial court's finding of the HAC aggravator. Apprendi and Ring Claims Finally, McGirth argues that Florida's capital sentencing scheme, section 921.141, Florida Statutes, violates his federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair jury trial....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2001 WL 521307
...State,
699 So.2d 619 (Fla.1997). [15] Accordingly, *1263 we affirm appellant's conviction for first-degree murder. Penalty Phase Prior Violent Felony Aggravator Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating factor that section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1993) (convicted of a prior violent felony) was proven....
...ault are felonies involving the use or threat of violence to another person." Appellant argues in this appeal that the crimes charged in the information, sexual activity with a child and lewd assault, are not necessarily violent crimes as defined in section 921.141(5)(b)....
...Appellant concludes that when the crime is not violent per se the court must look at the facts of the case, relying upon our decision in Lewis v. State,
398 So.2d 432 (Fla.1981) (crimes of breaking and entering with intent to commit felony, escape, grand larceny, and possession of firearm by convicted felon did not support section
921.141(5)(b) aggravator, which refers to life-threatening crimes in which the perpetrator comes in direct contact with a human victim). Whether the trial court was correct in concluding that sexual activity with a child and lewd and lascivious assault are per se crimes of violence is an issue of first impression. Section
921.141(5)(b) reads: "The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." We have held that this aggravator attaches only to "life-threatening crimes in which the perpetrator comes in direct contact with a human victim." Johnson v....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...entence of law that you be sentenced to death in the electric chair." *650 As to the immediacy of the imposition of sentence, appellant questions whether: "... the constitutional standard of due process (was) violated and the intent and meaning of F.S. 921.141 F.S.A....
...525 (1941); Evers v. State,
280 So.2d 30 (Fla.App. 1973). As to appellant's second point, dealing with the rejection of the jury's recommendation of mercy and the immediate imposition of the death sentence, we must look to the language and intent of Florida Statutes Section
921.141, F.S.A., as amended by Chapter 72-724, Laws of Florida (1972)....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 296, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 466, 2009 WL 775393
...health mitigation *917 evidence in the penalty phase. Appellant argues that counsel failed to present evidence that appellant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crimea statutory mitigator. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 109221
...he prosecutor erroneously exploited the jurors' religious beliefs; (6) the evidence did not support the pecuniary-gain aggravator; (7) the judge should have considered Lawrence's cocaine use on the night of the murder as a mitigating factor; and (8) section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes *1072 (1993), allowing for the introduction of victim-impact evidence is unconstitutional....
...judge, we reject his claim. [5] Likewise, we reject Lawrence's final claim, based on our recent decision in Windom v. State,
656 So.2d 432 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
116 S.Ct. 571,
133 L.Ed.2d 495 (1995). In his appeal, Lawrence challenges section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993), on several constitutional bases....
...At trial, however, he objected to the statute on only a single basis. [6] He argued that victim-impact evidence was not admissible in his resentencing because it was not admissible at the time of the original sentencing proceeding. In Windom, we upheld section 921.141(7) against a similar ex post facto challenge....
...Although we find the trial judge erred in his determination as to Gardner's unavailability, we do not find that the error was harmful in this proceeding. Because Gardner was not unavailable her testimony amounted to hearsay. Lawrence's objection to Gardner's prior testimony was thus ultimately a hearsay objection. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1993), states that in the penalty proceeding evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and shall include matters relati...
...NOTES [1] The facts of this case are set out in Lawrence v. State,
614 So.2d 1092 (Fla.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 833,
114 S.Ct. 107,
126 L.Ed.2d 73 (1993). [2] This Court rejected the following aggravators: (1) the murder was committed during the commission of a kidnaping and robbery, §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989); (2) the murder was committed to avoid arrest, §
921.141(5)(e); (3) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel, §
921.141(5)(h); and (4) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, §
921.141(5)(i). Lawrence,
614 So.2d at 1096. The following aggravators remained: (1) the murder was committed while under a sentence of imprisonment, §
921.141(5)(a); (2) previous conviction of a prior violent felony, §
921.141(5)(b); and (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, §
921.141(5)(f). Lawrence,
614 So.2d at 1096. The Court concluded that the felony-murder aggravator, §
921.141(5)(d), although still supported by the simultaneous robbery, had to be considered in conjunction with pecuniary gain as a single aggravating factor....
...[3] In aggravation, the trial judge found: (1) the capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; (2) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use of violence toward another person; and (3) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. § 921.141(5)(a), (b),(f), Fla....
...[4] Lawrence argued that the capital felony was committed while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. § 921.141(6)(b),(f), Fla....
...f it finds necessary, propose a new sentencing-phase instruction which defines this term. [6] We address only the basis on which Lawrence objected to the introduction of victim-impact evidence at trial. We find the other challenges Lawrence makes to section 921.141(7) are procedurally barred....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 117260
...KOGAN, Justice, dissenting. Mental mitigating evidence is among the most compelling that can be presented. This is only underscored by the fact that Florida's capital sentencing statute itself expressly recognizes two mitigators that directly measure mental state. § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla. Stat. (1989). In addition, the statutes recognize two other factors that touch on mental state: one dealing with emotional duress or an overborne will, and one that gauges emotional immaturity or infirmity due to age. § 921.141(6)(e), (g), Fla....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 55643
...914,
107 S.Ct. 314,
93 L.Ed.2d 288 (1986). Under Tedder and the sentencing statute, the trial court must weigh independently the aggravating and mitigating factors and can override the jury only based on written findings detailing this weighing process. §
921.141(3), Fla....
...2954,
57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), and its progeny, see, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393,
107 S.Ct. 1821,
95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104,
102 S.Ct. 869,
71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), and the relaxed evidentiary standards of a capital sentencing. See §
921.141(1), Fla....
...emotional disturbance unquestionably constitute valid mitigating factors. Eddings,
455 U.S. at 115,
102 S.Ct. at 877. Impairment caused by appellant's alleged brain damage or any other factor is recognized by Florida statute as a mitigating factor. §
921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (1985). Similarly, appellant's lack of a prior criminal record, recognized in mitigation by the court below, also is a statutory mitigating factor. §
921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 101172
...State,
561 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1990), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 20, 1990) (No. 90-5512). I concur in the judgment of guilt but dissent as to the necessity of resentencing. KOGAN, J., concurs. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. [2] §
921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1985). [3] §
921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1985). [4] §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 414, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 1016, 2009 WL 1954796
...The trial court then entered its Order Imposing Sentence of Death for the murder of Orlando Rosello. In the sentencing order, the court considered four aggravating factors, but found only three to be proven: (1) Gill was under a life sentence for the murder of Beverly Moore at the time the Rosello murder was committedsection 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2002)which was given great weight; (2) Gill had a prior capital felony conviction for the Beverly Moore murdersection 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2002)which was given great weight; and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated mannersection 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (2002)which was given great weight....
...y conviction involving the Beverly Moore murder, we note that evidence was presented of five other prior violent felony convictions, including attempted murder. The trial court rejected a finding that the murder was heinous, atrocious or cruel under section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (2002), primarily because Rosello was asleep when the attack occurred and when he awoke, he struggled only briefly. The trial court then considered all the mitigation that was presented, including mental mitigation in both this case and the Beverly Moore case, and found two statutory mitigators: (1) Gill was under extreme emotional or mental disturbance section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2002)which was given substantial weight; and (2) Gill's ability to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the law was impairedsection 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (2002) which was given great weight....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...After the jury rendered an advisory sentence of death, the trial court imposed the sentence of death and made the following findings in support of this sentence: This Court finds that the Facts and the evidence do not support the Aggravating Circumstances in F.S. 921.141(5)(a), (b), (c), (e) and (g) in that this Capital Felony was not committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, nor has the Defendant been previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of...
...The Court does find, as sufficient Aggravating Circumstances, that the capital felony was committed while the Defendant was fleeing the scene after committing arson in the deceased's trailer, and said flight from the scene was accomplished in the deceased's 1971 Chevrolet Van, as enumerated in F.S. 921.141(5)(d); that the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain in that the evidence showed that the Defendant had asked the deceased many times for money for his religious cult, and after the homicide a sum of money was missing from the deceased's trailer and was found in the Defendant's possession, F.S. 921.141(5)(f); and that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel in that the deceased had a total of twenty seven (27) stab wounds on his body, both anterior and posterior, on his head, thigh and fingers, 921.141(5)(h)....
...Turning now to Mitigating Circumstances, the Court finds only that the Defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity, in that he has never been arrested nor convicted of any offense, according to his Mother's testimony in Court today at the Advisory Sentence Proceedings, F.S. 921.141(6)(a). The Court finds inapplicable Subsections (b) through (g) of F.S. 921.141(6) in that the evidence does not show that the capital felony was committed while the Defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, nor that the victim was a participant in the Defendant's conduct or consent...
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 963825
...At the time of this crime, the first aggravator listed in Florida's death penalty statute provided in relevant part: (5) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: (a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control. § 921.141(5)(a), Fla....
...At the time of the murder, the aggravator provided in subsection (5)(a) did not apply to persons on probation. See Ferguson v. State,
417 So.2d 631, 636 (Fla.1982); Bolender v. State,
422 So.2d 833, 837 (Fla. 1982); Peek v. State,
395 So.2d 492, 499 (Fla.1980). Thereafter, the Legislature amended section
921.141(5)(a) to add "or on probation," ch....
...ion it could consider as an aggravating circumstance the fact that Merck was on felony probation. In her sentencing order, the judge found felony probation as one of three aggravating circumstances. Merck contends that the Legislature's amendment of section 921.141(5)(a) subsequent to the instant crime to add probation to the list of statutory aggravators was a substantive change in the law, not a mere refinement of the law as this Court found the "community control" aggravating circumstance to be in Trotter v....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 2638, 1989 WL 16113
...nce was substandard in a sixth amendment sense. The district court examined these at length and found them meritless. We likewise find no merit in them, and reject Jones’ ineffective assistance claim without further discussion. 3 . Florida Statute section 921.141(6) provides: Mitigating circumstances shall be the following: (a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity....
...(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. (f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. (g)The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. Fla.Stat. § 921.141(6) (1985)....
...umstances [in this case].” 5 . In Hitchcock , the trial judge instructed the jury that “[t]he mitigating circumstances which you may consider shall be the following....” The court then read the statutory mitigating factors set out in Fla.Stat. § 921.141(6)....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...denied, ___ U.S. ___,
103 S.Ct. 189,
74 L.Ed.2d 153 (1982). By failing to object at trial Peavy has waived this point on appeal, but, had he objected, he would have lost on the merits. Turning to the sentencing portion of his trial, Peavy claims that section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1981), is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied....
...The record is quite sparse on this and Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104,
102 S.Ct. 869,
71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), seems to dictate such consideration. NOTES [*] Peavy claims that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are vague and overbroad, that §
921.141 violates the mandate of Lockett v....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 14759, 1990 WL 120747
...Dugger,
481 U.S. 393 ,
107 S.Ct. 1821 ,
95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), requires us to reconsider our earlier holding in Johnson I that the trial judge did not impermissibly limit his consideration of mitigating evidence to only those factors set forth in Fla.Stat. Sec.
921.141(6)....
...Yarbrough's preliminary conclusions as testified to in the advisory jury sentencing hearing were woefully inaccurate. More importantly, this evidence, if true, suggests the existence of three statutory mitigating factors under Florida law. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(b) ("The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance."); Sec. 921.141(6)(e) ("The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person."); Sec. 921.141(6)(f) ("The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.")....
...Additionally, Dr. Yarbrough opined that there was no evidence to suggest that Johnson lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. This testimony effectively withdrew two statutory mitigating factors from consideration. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(b) ("The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance."); Sec. 921.141(6)(f) ("The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.")....
...ould have been established as would evidence that Johnson was the victim of physiological brain disorders. These facts, in marked contrast to the Dr. Yarbrough's sentencing testimony, very well could have supported a finding that both Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(b) and Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(f) were present in this case....
...on had consumed significant amounts of drugs in the days immediately prior to the offense. Indeed, Dr. Yarbrough now concludes that Johnson was suffering from extreme duress as contemplated by the statutory mitigating circumstances of Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(e)....
...you?," and shot him in the chest. ... Though others were present in the pharmacy, Summitt was the only eyewitness to the robbery and murder. Id. at 1480 (quotation and citation omitted). 2 The trial judge, pursuant to Florida law, see Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(3) (1977), issued written findings in which he found that five statutory aggravating factors existed and that no mitigating circumstances were present. The five aggravating circumstances identified were: (1) Johnson was under a Tennessee sentence of imprisonment at the time of the murder, Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(a); (2) Johnson had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(b); (3) Johnson created a great risk of death to three other persons present at the drugstore at the time of the murder, Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(c); (4) the capital murder was committed during the commission of an armed robbery, Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(d); and (5) the manner in which Johnson killed his victim was cruel and atrocious, Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(h)....
...882 ,
102 S.Ct. 364 ,
70 L.Ed.2d 191 (1981) 4 The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge erred in concluding that Johnson's actions, by creating a risk of death to three persons, were sufficient to meet the requirements of Fla.Stat. Sec.
921.141(5)(c)....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...fe sentence upon the petitioner. The State appealed from that order. During the pendency of that appeal, various changes occurred in the law governing sentencing in capital cases: Chapter 72-72, Laws of Florida, became effective, amending Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A. and later, Chapter 72-724, Laws of Florida, amended Chapter 72-72. This last amendment to Florida Statute § 921.141, F.S.A., was upheld by this Court in Dixon v....
...on the issue of penalty under the new statute. After the District Court denied a petition for rehearing, petition for writ of certiorari was filed with this Court. The District Court ruled that sentence could be imposed pursuant to Florida Statutes § 921.141, F.S.A., as amended by Chapter 72-724, Laws of Florida, even though said act was passed subsequent to the commission of the offense, saying: "When measured against ex post facto principles discussed above, it is clear that invocation of th...
...then constitutional, the Disrict Court stated simply that: "... [W]e are bound to reverse the order setting aside appellee's death sentence and remand with directions that appellee be given a new trial on the issue of penalty only in accordance with Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which has recently been upheld by our Supreme Court in State v. Dixon, supra." Under such a remand, two problems become apparent which have not been considered: whether the new penalty provision, Section
775.082 as amended by Chapter 72-724, Laws of Florida, specifically mentioned by Section
921.141, is applicable; *307 and, what authority empowers the trial court to impanel a second jury to hear the evidence and recommend the penalty. As to the first of these two questions, under the latest statement of Section
921.141, F.S.A., the statute provides: "(1) Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death o...
...of one or more of the jurors to function, the court shall dismiss the jury and order a new jury impaneled to determine the issue of penalty." Unfortunately when the Legislature enacted Chapter 72-724 which resulted in a "[s]ubstantial rewording" of Section 921.141, the provision permitting the trial judge to impanel a new jury to determine the issue of penalty was omitted....
...is still under discussion by the court, without the intervention of any other business." [6] Thus in this case, the original jury cannot now be re-impaneled for the sole determination of the issue of punishment, nor does it appear from the statute, § 921.141, that a new jury may be so impaneled: "......
...NOTES [1] Whether the trial court erred in ordering that the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner be set aside and vacated and imposing the sentence of life imprisonment? [2]
408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). [3] State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1973). [4] Id. [5] Section
921.141(2)(a) (1972)....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 182647
...ing be held within 120 days of this opinion becoming final. It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, J., concurs in conclusion only as to guilt phase and concurs in penalty opinion. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(a), Fla.Stat. (1995). [2] Id. § 921.141(5)(b) (prior felonies of lewd assault upon a child, robbery, and first-degree murder). [3] Id. § 921.141(5)(d). [4] Id. § 921.141(5)(f). [5] Id. § 921.141(6)(b). [6] Id. § 921.141(6)(f). [7] Id. § 921.141(6)(g)(age of twenty at time of crime and "normal" intelligence)....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 583, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 1806, 2009 WL 3461148
...For purposes of clarity, the proposed phrase "enormity of a crime" has been changed to "gravity of a crime" and the proposed phrase "injury to a victim" has been changed to "harm to a victim." Second, the term "crime" in the enumerated aggravating circumstances instruction has been changed to "capital felony," pursuant to section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (2008). Third, the designation of an offender as a sexual predator has been added to the list of aggravating circumstances, pursuant to section 921.141(5)(o), Florida Statutes (2008)....
...ikely than not," and we have made the appropriate changes in the instruction. Further, consistent with the other amendments, the term "crime" in the enumerated mitigating circumstances instruction has been changed to "capital felony" to conform with section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (2008)....
...First, a provision has been added instructing jurors that if one or more aggravating circumstances are established, jurors should then consider all the evidence tending to establish one or more mitigating circumstances and give that evidence such weight as they feel it should receive. Second, pursuant to section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2008), an instruction addressing "victim impact evidence" has been added, and this instruction provides that although victim impact evidence was presented to the jury, the jurors "may not consider this evidence a...
...weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is imposed." Sec. 921.141, Fla....
...e, as did Justice Cantero before me, that there be changes to the death penalty statute to allow for the use of special verdict forms. See Steele,
921 So.2d at 545-46. LABARGA and PERRY, JJ., concur. APPENDIX 7.11 PENALTY PROCEEDINGS CAPITAL CASES
921.141, Fla....
...ony. 6. Your recommendation should not be influenced by feelings of prejudice, or by racial or ethnic bias, or by sympathy. Your recommendation must be based on the evidence, and on the law contained in these instructions. Aggravating circumstances. § 921.141(5), Fla....
...If you have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of an aggravating circumstance, you should find that it does not exist. However, if you have no reasonable doubt, you should find that the aggravating circumstance does exist and give it whatever weight you determine it should receive. § 921.141(5), Fla....
...The crime capital felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed while [he] [she] the defendant was [engaged] [an accomplice] in [the commission of] [an attempt to commit] [flight after committing or attempting to commit] the crime of any Check § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...ood in a position of familial or custodial authority over the victim. With the following aggravating factor, definitions as appropriate from §
874.03, Fla. Stat., must be given. 14. The capital felony was committed by a criminal street gang member. §
921.141, Fla....
...ider that as supporting only one aggravating circumstance. If you find the aggravating circumstances do not justify the death penalty, your advisory sentence should be one of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Mitigating circumstances. § 921.141(6), Fla....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 51 A.L.R. 4th 1231
...State,
446 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1984); White v. State,
446 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 1984); Maxwell v. State,
443 So.2d 967 (Fla. 1983). We find no error on this point. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the statutory mitigating factors of section
921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and section
921.141(6)(e), the defendant acted under extreme duress or under substantial domination of another person....
...he sets the fire, he is overwhelmingly taken by the impulse. In Mines v. State,
390 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 916,
101 S.Ct. 1994,
68 L.Ed.2d 308 (1981), wherein the defendant suffered from schizophrenia, we held that subsections
921.141(6)(b) and (f) are *734 the two statutory mitigating circumstances relating to a defendant's mental condition that should be considered when there is evidence of a defective mental condition before imposing a death sentence....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 21191876
...ol and that he graduated from high school. Thus, trial counsel is not deficient for failing to obtain records that counsel had no reason to believe contained any favorable mitigating information. In addition, collateral counsel provided Szmurlo with Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1999), the statute governing aggravating and mitigating circumstances....
...understood that he was looking for anything of significance from a psychiatric standpoint that would have rendered [Pace's] judgment to be deficient. Although Szmurlo was not aware of the statutory definition of mitigating circumstances pursuant to section 921.141(6), Fla....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 281
...We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. Although appellant's convictions of first-degree murder and other offenses were entered pursuant to appellant's pleas of guilty, he is entitled to an appeal by virtue of having been sentenced to death. § 921.141(4), Fla....
...It is the sentence of the Court that the defendant die by electrocution. There is an automatic review by the Supreme Court so the proceedings will be stayed. Appellant raises several challenges to his convictions. Although pleas of guilty normally vitiate the right of appellate review of convictions, section 921.141 applies in all cases of "conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony." § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (1977). Section 921.141(4) provides: "The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida." Thus appellant is entitled to appellate review not only of his sentence of death but also his first-degree murder conviction....
...rest and was obtained while he was illegally held without a prompt probable cause determination. Although appellant, being under a sentence of death, is entitled to "review" of not only his sentence of death but also his judgment of conviction under section 921.141(4), we nevertheless hold that by entering pleas of guilty he waived, abandoned, or failed to preserve for review the question of the admissibility of his confession....
...This observation was a part of the judge's findings on aggravating circumstances. Furthermore, the state was allowed to present detailed testimony to the jury about the surviving victim's shooting, the injuries she received, and the pain she suffered. Section 921.141(5)(h) provides that there is an aggravating circumstance where "[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Acts committed independently from the capital felony for which the offender is being sentenced are not...
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...However, the court later ruled that the confession was a sufficient basis to establish that sexual battery had occurred for purposes of finding that the murder was committed while engaged in or following a sexual battery, an aggravating circumstance under section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1981). In proceedings held under section 921.141 for determination of the appropriate sentence upon conviction of a capital felony, aggravating circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before they may properly be considered by judge or jury....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 275179
...The trial court found the following aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed while Derrick was engaged in the commission of a robbery; (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest; and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. § 921.141(5)(d), (e), (h), Fla....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 421, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 1019, 2009 WL 1955209
...son's motion for mistrial; (5) whether the trial court erred in denying Hutchinson's motion for judgment of acquittal; (6) whether the trial court erred in denying Hutchinson's motion for a new trial; (7) whether the trial court erred in considering section 921.141(5)(1), Florida Statutes (2000), as an aggravating circumstance; (8) whether the trial court erred in finding that Hutchinson committed the murder of the children during the course of an act of aggravated child abuse; (9) whether the t...
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2054, 2009 WL 242362
...committed the murder during a robbery; (4) Pace committed the crime to avoid
arrest; and (5) he committed the murder for financial gain.4 Hall, in response,
argued that the prosecutor had exaggerated the aggravating circumstances. He
4
See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5) (1989) (listing aggravating circumstances in effect at the
time of Pace’s trial).
7
urged the jury to have mercy on Pace because Pace was a human being and a good
person with a good h...
...ce
v. State,
596 So. 2d 1034, 1035-36 (Fla. 1992), and the Supreme Court of the
5
The record does not indicate the length of the jury’s deliberation at the close of the
penalty phase of trial.
6
See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6) (1989) (listing mitigating circumstances in effect at the time
of Pace’s trial)....
...history, the results
of the psychological tests Dr. Larson administered, and Dr. Szmurlo’s clinical
observations of Pace—and was unable to identify a psychiatric mitigating
12
At the time of Pace’s sentencing, Fla. Stat. § 921.141 governed sentencing in death
penalty cases. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6) (1989)....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1987 WL 2371
...the fact that the trial judge felt himself limited to considering the statutory mitigating factors. The sentencing order stated: "The Court finds, from the evidence, that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5) of section 921.141, Florida Statutes, that justify a sentence of death, and that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in Subsection (6) of said Section 921.141, to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." (Emphasis added.) The fact that the judge, the ultimate sentencing authority, did not consider nonstatutory mitigating evidence settles the issue because there was some nonstatutory mitigating evidence that the court could have considered....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 264
...___,
104 S.Ct. 1430,
79 L.Ed.2d 754 (1984). IV. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES Aggravating Factors Griffin challenges all five of the aggravating factors found by the trial judge. 1. Prior conviction for felony involving the use of violence. §
921.141(b)(b), Fla....
...t to support the aggravating factor. A contemporaneous conviction may properly be considered in the penalty phase. Hardwick v. State,
461 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1984). However, just as murder during commission of a robbery, an aggravating circumstance under section
921.141(5)(d), cannot be doubled to support the aggravating circumstance of murder for pecuniary gain under section
921.141(5)(f), *781 Oats v....
...While the bare conviction is enough to support the aggravating factor, we do not have to decide whether this circumstance alone would support a sentence of death since we find one other factor also applicable. 2. The murder was committed while engaged in or fleeing from a robbery. §
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1981). That this factor is supported by the record is incontrovertible. Gorham v. State,
454 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1984). 3. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest. §
921.141(5)(e), Fla....
...v. State,
366 So.2d 19, 22 (Fla. 1978) (sufficient evidence to support factor when robbery victim knew defendant well and accomplice expressed concern for subsequent identification before the killing). 4. The murder was committed for financial gain. §
921.141(5)(f), Fla.State. (1984). As the judge properly noted, this factor merges with the second, that the killing was committed during a robbery. Oats v. State,
446 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1984). 5. The murder was cold, calculated and premeditated. §
921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 56464
...is to be considered. After the close of the evidence, the jury shall be instructed on the limited purpose for which the evidence was received and that the defendant cannot be convicted for a charge not included in the indictment or information. [3] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). [4] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1987). [5] § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1987). [6] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1987). [7] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1987). [8] § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 159, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 358, 2010 WL 813677
...ine Robinson. The trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of four statutory aggravators: (1) Zommer had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005) (the three convictions for crimes against Edgardo Fuentes, which the trial court treated as one prior violent offense) (significant weight); (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005) (great weight); (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2005) (great weight); and (4) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), see § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...unconstitutionally failed to contain allegations that "sufficient aggravating circumstances exist" to justify imposition of the death penalty and "insufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh the aggravating circumstances"; and (3) under section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2005), sufficient aggravating circumstances must be found to exist before a defendant is death-eligible, and by requiring only "one or more" aggravating circumstances to support a death sentence, the Florida courts...
...Ring, does not need to be found by a jury. See, e.g., Frances,
970 So.2d at 822 (citing Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 490,
120 S.Ct. 2348); Jones v. State,
855 So.2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003). Zommer next contends that under Apprendi and sections
775.082 [7] and
921.141(3), [8] Florida Statutes (2005), sufficient aggravating circumstances and insufficient mitigating circumstances must be charged in the indictment....
...State,
841 So.2d 362, 378 (Fla. 2003). We articulated the basis for this holding in Vining v. State,
637 So.2d 921, 927 (Fla.1994): The aggravating factors to be considered in determining the propriety of a death sentence are limited to those set out in section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1987)....
...notice of the aggravating factors that the State will present at sentencing...."). Like the available aggravating circumstances, the weighing process that must be performed by the factfinder when considering whether to impose a death sentence is also articulated in the Florida Statutes. See §
921.141(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2005). If the specific aggravators sought need not be charged in the indictment to satisfy due process, see Vining,
637 So.2d at 927, the weighing process that occurs under section
921.141 similarly does not need to be provided in the indictment for it to pass constitutional muster....
...the boat thieves well enough to recognize them. [7] Section
775.082(1) provides: (1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s.
921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole. [8] Section
921.141(3) provides: (3) Findings in support of sentence of death.Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonm...
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...felt all the remaining aggravating circumstances were applicable. After the jury returned with its advisory recommendation of a death sentence, the trial judge issued his written findings of fact. The judge found that the aggravating circumstance in section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), was proven....
...f violence to the person." Id. The judge grounded this finding on the two attempted murder convictions and three kidnapping convictions in this case. The judge also found that, "The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons." § 921.141(5)(c), Fla....
...er men, along with his holding others hostage at gunpoint, causing numerous armed deputies to proceed to his location. The judge also found that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in commission of the felony of kidnapping, id., § 921.141(5)(d), based on the proven facts of the case. The judge found further that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing his arrest by Deputy Heist. Id., § 921.141(5)(e). The judge found that section 921.141(5)(f), that "the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain" applied in that the entire incident grew out of appellant's attempt to use hostages to aid him in the robbery of a bank. Regarding the statutory mitigating circumstances of section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1979), the judge found that none of them had been shown....
...Statutory mitigating circumstance (6)(a), lack of a significant history of criminal activity, was negated, the judge found, by appellant's serious acts of delinquency while a juvenile. The judge found that there was no extreme mental or emotional disturbance under section 921.141(6)(b), and found that testimony showed the defendant to have been in complete control of his behavior. The judge found that there was no consent or participation by the victim, id., § 921.141(6)(c), no major participation or domination by an accomplice, id., § 921.141(6)(d), (e), and no impairment of appellant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his acts or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Id., § 921.141(6)(f)....
...Because appellant's prior criminal activity as a minor was significant, the judge properly found this not to be a mitigating factor. Appellant also argues that his emotional condition should have been considered as a mitigating circumstance under subsections 921.141(6)(b), (e), and (f), Florida Statutes (1979)....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The trial judge, specifying in detail the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, agreed that the death sentence was appropriate. The trial judge's written findings in support of the death sentence reflect, as follows: "This Court finds that the facts of this case do not support the aggravating circumstances in Fla. Stat. 921.141(6)[(5)], subsections (a) and (c), in that this capital felony was not committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, nor did the defendant knowingly create a great risk of death to many persons. "As an aggravating circumstance, the Court finds that the defendant had previously been convicted of a capital felony Fla. Stat. 921.141(6)[(5)](b)....
...The Court finds as an aggravating circumstance, that the capital felony, the murder of Chevis Thompson, was committed as a part of another dangerous and violent felony, the robbery of Chevis Thompson, and in flight after committing that felony. Fla. Stat. 921.141(6)[(5)](d). "The Court also finds, as an aggravating circumstance, that the capital felony was committed with the motive of avoiding and preventing arrest, was committed for pecuniary gain and to hinder the enforcement of laws. Fla. Stat. 921.141(6)[(5)](e)(f)(g). "Turning to mitigating circumstances, the Court finds that the defendant does have a prior significant history of criminal activity. Fla. Stat. 921.141(7)[(6)](a). This fact has been considered as not being a mitigating circumstance. "Under Fla. Stat. 921.141(7)[(6)] subsections (b) and (f), the Court finds that the defendant was suffering from no extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was not substantially impaired....
...The psychiatrists both conclude that the defendant was sane at the time of the examination and at the time of the offense. "Further, the Court finds that the victim certainly was not a participant in nor consented to the criminal conduct. Fla. Stat. 921.141[(6)](c)(e). No mitigation exists under either of these subsections. "Finally, the age of the defendant has been considered as required by Fla. Stat. 921.141(7)[(6)](g)....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Finally, appellant objects to the trial court's findings with respect to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) that both murders were committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); (2) that appellant had previously been convicted of a capital felony, id., § 921.141(5)(b); (3) that the murders were committed in the course of the felonies of burglary and robbery, id., § 921.141(5)(d); (4) that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest and while effecting an escape, id., § 921.141(5)(e); (5) that they were committed to disrupt or hinder the enforcement of law, id., § 921.141(5)(g); (6) that the murder of one of the victims, the officer, was heinous, atrocious, and cruel, id., § 921.141(5)(h); and (7) that the murder of the officer was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, id., § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 33542
...denied,
459 U.S. 1055,
103 S.Ct. 474,
74 L.Ed.2d 622 (1982). White complains that the standard jury instructions in use at the time of his trial, and given in his case, restricted mitigating circumstances to those set forth in the sentencing statute. §
921.141(6), Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 382710
...The weight to be given aggravating factors is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to the abuse of discretion standard. Sexton v. State,
775 So.2d 923, 934 (Fla.2000). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the aggravators. Under section
921.141(3), Florida Statutes (2002), the trial court must independently determine the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the weight to be given each....
...clarity. Specifically, Carter claims that the court abused its discretion by not expressly considering the jury's recommendation of life for the murder of Smith when sentencing Carter to death for the murders of Pafford and Reed. We disagree. Under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (2002), the trial court is required to make independent findings on aggravation, mitigation, and weight, "supported by specific written findings of fact." § 921.141(3), Fla....
...f the offense, except when the consumption, injection, or use of a controlled substance under chapter 893 was pursuant to a lawful prescription issued to the defendant by a practitioner as defined in s.
893.02. §
775.051, Fla. Stat. (2002). [3] See §
921.141(5)(d), (i), Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 734611
...proposes an alternative instruction at trial and raises the issue on appeal."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
117 S.Ct. 197,
136 L.Ed.2d 134 (1996). During pretrial, Jones submitted two motions regarding the CCP aggravator. One was a motion to declare section
921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1993), unconstitutional, on the grounds that the statutory CCP aggravator was vague, overbroad, arbitrary and capricious on its face and as applied....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 726878
...control specifically, speaking instead of "sentence of imprisonment" broadly: (5) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. Aggravating circumstances shall [include] the following: (a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment. § 921.141, Fla....
...gravating and four mitigating circumstances, we remand to a jury for resentencing. *1237 Trotter,
576 So.2d at 694 (footnote and citations omitted). Immediately following our decision in Trotter, the legislaturein its next regular sessionamended section
921.141(5)(a) to specifically address community control: (5) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. Aggravating circumstances shall [include] the following: (a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control. §
921.141, Fla....
...Again, we disagree. An intervening act of the legislature refining a portion of Florida's death penalty statute may be sufficiently exceptional to warrant modification of the law of the case. In light of the specificity and promptness of the 1991 amendment to section 921.141(5)(a), and in view of our prior caselaw giving retroactive application to other aggravating circumstances effecting a refinement in the law, reliance on Trotter would result in manifest injustice to the people of Florida by perpetuating an anomalous and incorrect application of the capital sentencing statute....
...[9] See Trotter v. State,
576 So.2d at 691, 696 (Fla.1990) (McDonald, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part with Grimes, J., concurring) ("I am satisfied that one sentenced to community control is under sentence of imprisonment within the definition of subsection
921.141(5)(a).") [10] There is nothing illogical or unclear about our prior ruling, and nothing ambiguous about the term "imprisonment." We held that imprisonment does not include community control....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...We therefore find this point to be without merit. Although appellant has not raised any objections concerning the judge's findings with regard to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we are required to review the sentence of death to ensure that it has been properly imposed. § 921.141(4), Fla. Stat. (1981). In his sentence the trial judge found as aggravating circumstances that appellant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use of violence, section 921.141(5)(b); that the capital felony was committed during the commission of a felony, section 921.141(5)(d); that it was committed for pecuniary gain, section 921.141(5)(f); that it was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h); and that it was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, section 921.141(5)(i)....
...Here the evidence showed that appellant killed Donald Klein intentionally and deliberately but there was no showing of any additional factor to establish that the murder was committed in "a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1987 WL 2753
...but is not a final judgment for purposes of state post-conviction relief. The evidence here on previous crimes was probative on the aggravating factors of cold, calculated and premeditated and witness elimination. This evidence was admissible under section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides in pertinent part: In the [sentencing] proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and...
...1984) (no evidence to set murder apart from usual holdup murder). Moreover, during the penalty phase, the only material facts in issue are the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors provided by law. The aggravating factors are strictly limited by section 921.141, Florida Statutes. Under section 921.141(5), only one aggravating factor exists that in any way concerns collateral criminal activity, and it expressly is limited to prior convictions of felonies involving violence. See § 921.141(5)(b)....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...State,
303 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1974), have agreed that the defendant may waive the advisory jury proceeding. The trial judge, pursuant "Whether a trial court in a capital case is required to accept a defendant's valid waiver of an advisory jury pursuant to Florida Statute
921.141(2) resulting in a judicial determination of sentence without benefit of a jury's recommendation in light of the guidelines toward uniformity in sentencing enunciated in Proffitt v....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 571672
...Because the exclusion of Pasby's testimony denied petitioner a fair trial on the issue of punishment, the sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Id. at 97,
99 S.Ct. 2150 (footnotes omitted). In addition to Green, which is based upon due process considerations, section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1997), provides: [E]vidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (5) and (6)....
...Blackwood v. State,
777 So.2d 399, 411-12 (Fla.2000). Thus, the fact that the trial court denied the admission of this evidence simply because it constituted hearsay was erroneous. Garcia could have used Pardo's testimony to show his minor participation, section
921.141(6)(d), Florida Statutes, or that he was acting under the substantial domination of Pardo, section
921.141(6)(e), Florida Statutes, or both....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 492
...Appellant next makes attacks on several of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the trial court in support of his death sentence. The circumstances challenged by appellant are that he knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons, section 921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1983); that the capital felony was committed while appellant was engaged in the crime of arson, section 921.141(5)(d); that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h); and that the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, section 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 4876759
...to have him evaluated by a mental health professional, and failed to conduct an adequate investigation into his background to provide statutory and nonstatutory mitigation; (3) the Florida death sentencing statute as applied is unconstitutional; (4) section 921.141, Florida Statutes, is facially vague and overbroad in violation of the United States Constitution and the unconstitutionality was not cured; (5) his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated as he ma...
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...itigating ones and again sentenced appellant to death. This appeal of the resentencing followed. As his first point on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...ndered it no longer clear to a person of average intelligence. Appellant supports his argument by reference to several cases which involve what he considers similar factual situations, yet which reach different results regarding the applicability of section 921.141(5)(h)....
...959,
99 S.Ct. 364,
58 L.Ed.2d 352 (1978), and Fleming v. State,
374 So.2d 954 (Fla. 1979), were killed by one gunshot, the situations in which the killings occurred were distinguishable. The surrounding circumstances in Raulerson warranted finding section
921.141(5)(h) applicable, while those in Fleming did not....
..., it will be stricken. Otherwise, assuming that it is warranted in light of earlier cases and that the trial judge used the reasoned judgment which is so necessary, the finding will not be disturbed. We have provided guidance for determining whether section 921.141(5)(h) is applicable....
...nstead. He argues that the mitigating factors are quite compelling while the aggravating ones are either inapplicable or insignificant. We do not agree. The findings in aggravation were approved in our opinion in Magill I. The factors established in section 921.141(5) must be proven by the state before they can be applied by the court in sentencing....
...Appellant further argues that if by any chance the trial judge meant for this finding to be the basis for the aggravating circumstance that appellant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence against a person under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), then the trial judge erred because this finding refers to the "same aspect" which is the basis for finding that the crime was committed during a felony....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2005 WL 1577414
...A presentence report was subsequently completed and filed with the court. On April 12, 1995, the trial court sentenced appellant to death. The court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1995); (2) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, see id. § 921.141(5)(f); and (3) the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, see id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1987 WL 47314
...rs. Turner challenges three of these aggravating factors. [3] First, Turner asserts that he was not charged with burglary and that the facts do not support the finding that Brown was murdered while Turner was engaged in the commission of a burglary. Section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1983), does not require that a defendant be charged or convicted of the enumerated felonies, it requires only that the aggravating circumstances be proven beyond a reasonable *51 doubt....
...It is clear that Turner had an intent to commit an offense when he broke into the house and, on the evidence, the jury and judge would be justified in finding that the intended offense was the murder of his estranged wife and Brown. Turner next argues that the murder was not especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...wn in a telephone booth where, despite her pleas, he stabbed and cut her to death. Finally, Turner argues that the murder of Brown was not committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...due weight to the jury's recommended death sentence. [2] Contrary to Turner's claim, the record indicates no defense stipulation regarding premeditation. [3] He does not deny that he had been previously convicted of the murder of his estranged wife. § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14874, 2011 WL 2899623
...27
In his written findings as to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the judge found six aggravators and no mitigators. The judge found: (1) the
defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony, § 921.141(5)(b),
Fla. Stat. (1981); (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was
engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of a kidnapping,
§ 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1981); (3) the capital felony was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from
custody, § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1981); (4) the capital felony was committed
for pecuniary gain, § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1981); (5) the capital felony was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1981); and
(6) the capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification,
§ 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1981). The judge specifically rejected the statutory
substantial domination mitigator. § 921.141(6)(e), Fla....
...hat the
mitigating circumstance of domination exists and this opinion is rejected by the
Court as being not reliable and is not believed.” The judge further rejected the
statutory mitigator of the age of the defendant at the time of the crime,
§ 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
...Cooper
asserts this evidence entitles him to both statutory and non-statutory mitigation.18
As to statutory mitigation, the unpresented mitigating evidence would
support a finding that Cooper is entitled to the mitigator of age of the defendant at
the time of the crime, § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
...The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing
would support a finding of the statutory mitigator of age at the time of the crime.
The unpresented mitigating evidence would also support a finding that
Cooper is entitled to the statutory mitigator of substantial domination,
§ 921.141(6)(e), Fla....
...Merin testified as to Cooper’s capacity to
be dominated by older males, the sentencing judge explicitly rejected this
mitigating factor because he did not have an independent evidentiary basis for Dr.
18
Cooper asserts he is entitled to the statutory mitigator of substantial impairment,
§ 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 100
...s defense counsel reasonably believed, and this belief was shared by the trial judge and the prosecutor, that Florida law at that time precluded the admission of any mitigating character evidence other than that enumerated in the applicable statute, section 921.141(6), Florida *231 Statutes (1983)....
....850 motion. Furthermore, the issue of the presentation of mitigating evidence under Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586,
98 S.Ct. 2954,
57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), was addressed by this Court in Songer II on rehearing where we held that neither the wording of section
921.141 nor our previous decisions precluded the introduction of nonstatutory mitigating evidence....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 5053
...The sentencing order recites that Elledge has been convicted of felonious assault in Colorado and has spent most of his life in prison for various other crimes. There is no evidence in the record to support these facts and it was error to find them. Elledge claims that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1973), is unconstitutional, attacking, among other things, the constitutionality of the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" instruction....
...[2] The capital felony was committed during a rape; the capital felony was committed to avoid arrest; the capital felony was heinous, atrocious, or cruel; the defendant was previously convicted of other capital felonies (the murders of Gaffney and Nelson). See § 921.141(5), Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...death sentence be vacated, that the cause be remanded for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment, and that the matter be directed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal for further appellate review. As grounds therefor the appellant cites section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1981) which reads in pertinent part: In each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of the court shall be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances...
...Appellee, State of Florida, agrees that no separate written findings of facts are contained in the record on appeal but, instead, moves this Court to temporarily relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court so that the written findings required under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1981), may be prepared by the trial court and the record on appeal supplemented with these written findings....
...It must be stressed that the trial judge did dictate his findings in support of the sentence of death into the record at the time of sentencing. We have previously held that "[s]uch dictation, when transcribed, becomes a finding of fact in writing and provides the opportunity for meaningful review, as required by 921.141, Florida Statutes." Thompson v....
...Nevertheless, we find it prudent to require that written findings of fact be entered into the record on appeal and grant appellee's motion to relinquish jurisdiction and to supplement the record. Accordingly, this cause is temporarily remanded to the trial court so that written findings of fact as required under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1981), may be prepared by the trial court and entered as a supplement to the record on appeal....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ather. The jury recommended that the appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment. Contrary to the recommendation the judge imposed death as the sentence. He found that two of the aggravating circumstances listed in our capital felony sentencing law, Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, were present: that the appellant had previously been convicted of a felony involving violence or the threat of violence, and that the rapes were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel....
...We mention Huckaby only to indicate that there is authority for the proposition that an offender's history and background may be deemed relevant to the existence of mitigating factors such as that of substantial impairment of capacity to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct or to conform to the requirements of law. Section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (1977); cf....
...h and to impose two separate sentences of life imprisonment, in accordance with Section
775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1973). It is so ordered. ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. NOTES [*] §§
794.011(2),
775.082(1),
921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 3809389, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14953
...into a church with intent to
steal, for which he received probation. Based on these convictions, the State
argued that the statutory mitigating circumstance of “no significant history of prior
criminal activity” did not apply. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(a).
The State contended that the jury should find four aggravating
circumstances. First, the murder was committed during a burglary. See Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(5)(d)....
...Second, the murder was “for financial gain, that [Wright] was in
the process of stealing money from Lima Paige Smith, and it was at that point in
time that . . . he looked up, he saw her in the doorway or in the hallway, knew that
she would recognize him,” and killed her. See id. § 921.141(5)(f). Third, the
murder was “committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner,” see id.
14
Case: 13-11832 Date Filed: 08/04/2014 Page: 15 of 59
§ 921.141(5)(i), and, fourth, the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel,” see id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
...offenses had not involved violence towards a person and, thus, Wright did not have
a significant criminal history. Pearl asked the jury to find the mitigating
circumstance of “influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” See Fla.
Stat. § 921.141(6)(b)....
...d not find any statutory mitigating
circumstances. The trial court found these four statutory aggravating
circumstances: (1) the murder was committed while Wright was engaged in the
commission of the rape of Ms. Smith and burglary, see Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d);
(2) the murder was committed “for the avowed purpose of preventing [Wright’s]
arrest on burglary charges,” see id. § 921.141(5)(e); (3) the murder was “especially
heinous, atrocious and cruel,” see id. § 921.141(5)(h); and (4) the murder was
committed “in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of
moral or legal justifications,” see id. § 921.141(5)(i). The trial court also found
that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, see id. § 921.141(5)(f), but this
circumstance merged with the “while in commission of another violent felony”
aggravating circumstance.
V....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 1899964
...ed of another capital felony; (3) Dillbeck committed the murder during the course of a robbery and burglary; (4) Dillbeck committed the murder to effect escape; and (5) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Id. at 1028 n. 1 (citing § 921.141, Fla. Stat. (1989)). [4] The trial court found that Dillbeck's capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. Id. at 1028 n. 2 (citing § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 416719
...and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. SHAW, J., concurs in result only. KOGAN, J., recused. NOTES [1] The trial court found the following aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the capital felony was committed by a person under a sentence of imprisonment, § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991); (2) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving a threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b); (3) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery, § 921.141(5)(d); (4) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 225, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 647, 2010 WL 1707218
...However, Pate claims “can and must be raised on direct appeal.” Id. at 1572. Accordingly, this claim is procedurally barred because Nelson raised no such claim in his direct appeal. *34 HABEAS PETITION Nelson raises seven claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which can be summarized as follows: (1) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1997), is facially vague and overbroad; (2) he is incompetent to proceed and also may be incompetent at the time of execution in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; (3...
...umulative effect of the errors in Nelson’s trial; and (5) the Florida capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied and on its face. We deny several of Nelson’s claims without further discussion. First, we deny Nelson’s claims that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1997), is facially vague and overbroad and that the Florida death sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied because they were not raised on direct appeal and are procedurally barred....
...igation and preparation of the penalty phase by failing to call a witness to establish statutory mitigation in the penalty phase; (5) trial counsel failed to request the court to instruct the jury on statutory mitigation in the sentencing phase; (6) section 921.141, Florida Statute (1997) is facially vague and overbroad causing the death sentence to be premised on a fundamental error; (7) Nelson is incompetent to proceed; (8) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the court instr...
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 117990
...ian's conviction, which we affirm. As to the penalty, Christian first argues that the trial court erred in finding that the homicide "was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
..., overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced Christian to death. One of the statutory aggravating factors is that the homicide "was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...de the jury's recommendation. NOTES [*] Committed by person under sentence of imprisonment; previous conviction of violent felony; heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and cold, calculated, and premeditated with no pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(a), (b), (h), (i), Fla. Stat. (1987). [1] Committed by person under sentence of imprisonment; previous conviction of violent felony; heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and cold, calculated, and premeditated with no pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(a), (b), (h), (i), Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 23131
...d abandoned during collateral state proceedings. Before us he alleges that (1) the trial judge misled the jurors into believing they could not consider alleged mitigating factors not specified in Florida’s capital sentencing statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(6), (2) the trial court improperly applied the statutory list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to the evidence, (3) his counsel was ineffective at trial and on appeal and (4) the Florida Supreme Court violated his due process rights by soliciting ex parte non-record material while reviewing his appeal....
...of well-established Florida law. E.g., Provence v. State,
337 So.2d 783 (Fla.1976). The court improperly found from the death of Stone followed by the taking of his wallet both that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery, Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141(5)(d), and that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, § 921.-141(5)(f)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 181921
...s. BARKETT, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I agree that a guidelines sentence must be imposed for the armed robbery conviction. However, I also would impose a life sentence for the murder conviction in accordance with the dictates of section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1985), and for all the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Stewart v....
...State,
549 So.2d 171, 176-77 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
110 S.Ct. 3294,
111 L.Ed.2d 802 (1990) (citation omitted). [2] The court found that Stewart had previously been convicted of a violent felony and that the present murder had been committed during a robbery. See §
921.141(5), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] The court found as mitigating circumstances: extreme disturbance, impaired capacity, age, see section
921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1989), and childhood trauma....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 568
...the first-degree murder, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for resentencing of appellant for the attempted first-degree murder. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). [2] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1985). [3] § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1985) [4] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1985). [5] § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 120208
...In Grossman we then considered whether a defendant's failure to object to the introduction of the victim impact evidence was a procedural bar to raising the issue on appeal. We held: Victim impact is not one of the aggravating factors enumerated in section 921.141....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 233151
...We find that the theory advanced by Wuornos is insufficient as a matter of law to establish this particular mitigating factor. By its plain language, the statute permits this factor only where: The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act. § 921.141(6)(c), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 54467
...because the claim has been waived. We again affirm Ponticelli's convictions and sentences of death. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. HARDING, J., did not participate in this case. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(h), (i), Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 109154
...ed in the commission *72 of, or an attempt to commit, a sexual battery; (3) murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (4) murder committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), (i), Fla....
...he unreliable hearsay testimony. Wilber had attended parts of both out-of-state trials and had reviewed case files from those crimes. Florida's death penalty statute allows the introduction of hearsay testimony during capital sentencing proceedings. § 921.141(1), Fla....
...gives rise to a violation of a defendant's confrontation rights, or the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value." Rhodes v. State,
547 So.2d 1201, 1205 (Fla. 1989). The testimony supported the aggravating factor of prior violent felony. See §
921.141(5)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 396766
...n
90.803(23) in the present case does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
536 So.2d at 215. Similarly, in Windom v. State,
656 So.2d 432 (Fla.1995), the defendant was charged with murder, and at the time he committed the offense, section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes, had not been enacted. This statute allows the jury to consider victim impact evidence so that consideration may be given to the "victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death." §
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 149, 2012 WL 652790, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 454
...kidnapping charge; (6) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator; (7) whether his death sentence is proportional; and (8) whether the trial court erred in sentencing Kopsho to death because section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2009), unconstitutionally allows the trial court to proceed without, among other things, a unanimous death recommendation from the jury in contravention of the sixth amendment....
...State,
547 So.2d 1201, 1204 (Fla.1989) (“Testimony concerning the events which resulted in the [prior] conviction assists the jury in evaluating the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime so that the jury can make an informed recommendation as to the appropriate sentence.”); §
921.141(1), Fla....
...had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated); (3) the defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated); and (4) the murder was committed with no pretext of legal or moral justification. § 921.141(5)(i); Pearce v....
...nd no prior criminal history); Lemon v. State,
456 So.2d 885, 888 (Fla.1984) (holding death penalty proportionate where two aggravating factors, prior violent felony and HAC, outweighed the mitigating effect of defendant’s emotional disturbance.). Section
921.141 We have held that it is not unconstitutional for a jury to recommend death on a simple majority vote....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 314, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 1521, 2011 WL 2566348
...ign to commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated); (3) the defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated); and (4) the murder was committed with no pretext of legal or moral justification. McWatters,
36 So.3d at 640-41 (citing §
921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...ight. [2] Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584,
122 S.Ct. 2428,
153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). [3] The majority's ruling takes us further away from Florida's death penalty statute, which provides that the trial court must weigh mitigators against aggravators. See §
921.141(3) (instructing the trial court to set forth written finding that the mitigators do not outweigh the sufficient aggravators)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...re was actual and substantial disadvantage to the defendant. III. Failure to Require Resentencing When Evidence Insufficient on Some Aggravating Circumstances After receiving instructions on all eight aggravating circumstances provided in Fla. Stat. § 921.141 , Ford’s jury recommended the death penalty....
...le police and, as noted in the discussion of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he was not prejudiced by admission of the statement. V. Standard by Which Aggravating Circumstances Must Outweigh Mitigating Factors Florida Statute § 921.141(3)(b) requires the sentencing court, in imposing the death penalty, to state in writing its finding “[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” Petitioner contends that because th...
...orida. Under the Florida bifurcated death penalty statute, the sentencing proceeding is entirely separate from trial on the capital offense. Indeed, in certain circumstances the state judge can summon different jurors for the latter phase. Fla.Stat. § 921.141(1)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...dings, determined that there were sufficient aggravating circumstances which outweighed the mitigating factors to justify the recommended sentence. The trial judge sentenced William Lanay Harvard to death, entering the formal judgment as required by Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes....
...The law requires that similar punishment be given for similar crimes. Just as four members of the jury who voted against an advisory sentence of death, I feel application of the death penalty is inappropriate after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as required under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes....
...pportunity to explain, contradict, and argue regarding the relevance, materiality, and import of the confidential information and military history, as well as other matters properly considered by the trial court concerning appellant's sentence under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1977)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 118152
...Moreover, Henderson was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder in this case and previously had been convicted of two counts of first-degree murder in Putnam County. Each of these convictions support the weighty aggravating factor of prior conviction of a capital felony under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2012 WL 4449126
...stence of four statutory aggravating factors in the murder of Robin Razor: (1) Reynolds had previously been convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery in incidents prior to those associated with the present case, see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003); (2) Reynolds committed the capital felony while he was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt to commit a burglary of a dwelling, see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003); (3) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003); and (4) the capital felony was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel fashion, see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...As to the murder of Christina Razor, the trial court found that the State had proven the existence of five statutory ag-gravators: (1) Reynolds had previously been convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery in incidents prior to those associated with the present case, see § 921.141(5)(b); (2) Reynolds committed the capital felony while he was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt to commit a burglary of a dwelling, see § 921.141(5)(d); (3) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e); (4) the capital felony was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel fashion, see § 921.141(5)(h); and (5) the victim of the capital felony was a person less than twelve years of age, see § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...ved the presentation of such evidence, but considered and weighed any mitigation of which it was aware. The trial court found the following nonstatuto-ry mitigating circumstances to be applicable to the murders of both Robin and Christina Razor, see 921.141(6)(h), Fla....
...rom that produced at trial could have been offered to help Reynolds. Unlike the psychiatrist, the social worker had a different view that Reynolds qualified for a statutory mitigator — that he exhibited extreme mental or emotional disturbance. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 505
...the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. The mental anguish suffered by the victim and the other circumstances surrounding the murder, for which there is ample record support, are sufficient to support the trial court's finding under section 921.141(5)(h)....
...e car and her throat was cut. We found the fact that "the appellant had ample time during this series of events to reflect on his actions and their attendant consequences," sufficient to evidence the heightened level of premeditation necessary under section 921.141(5)(i)....
...[2] Scott was sentenced to fifteen years for robbery to be served consecutively with a sixty-year sentence for kidnapping. Scott raises no challenge to these convictions and sentences. After reviewing the record, we find both the convictions and sentences to be proper. [3] § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (f), (h) & (i), Fla. Stat. (1985). [4] § 921.141(6)(f) & (g).
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16655, 2015 WL 5474275
...The District Court’s original denial of relief on this claim is AFFIRMED.
2
To recommend the imposition of a death sentence in Florida in 1986, the jury was
required to find: one or more of the enumerated aggravating circumstances set out in Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5); that sufficient mitigating circumstances outweighing the aggravating circumstances
did not exist; and that the defendant should be sentenced to death. See id. § 921.141(2) (1985).
3
Case: 97-2319 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 4 of 48
Hardwick’s three prior felony convictions “involving the use or threat of violence
to the person.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b) (1985)....
...3 The prosecutor’s arguments
regarding the other four statutory aggravating circumstances were based on the
evidence introduced during the guilt phase of the trial, and consisted of the
following: Hardwick murdered Pullum while “kidnapping” him, see id.
§ 921.141(5)(d); the murder was committed for “pecuniary gain,” see id.
§ 921.141(5)(f); the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” see id.
§ 921.141(5)(h); and the murder was committed in a “cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification,” see id.
§ 921.141(5)(i)....
...rwise. His strategy was to present
Hardwick’s case solely via his closing argument to the jury. That argument
consisted of an attempt to undermine the statutory aggravating circumstances the
3
All future references to Fla. Stat. § 921.141 refer to the 1985 version of the statute.
4
Case: 97-2319 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 5 of 48
State presented and an appeal for mercy based on Hardwick’...
...P. 3.111, as recognized in McKenzie v. State,
29 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 2010), the
4
One of the mitigating circumstances set out in Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is
“[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime.” Id. §
921.141(6)(g).
5
Case: 97-2319 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 6 of 48
Florida Supreme Court affirmed Hardwick’s conviction and sentence, id....
...murder, Hardwick’s capacity “to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
28
Case: 97-2319 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 29 of 48
law was substantially impaired.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f)....
...ional statutory mitigating
circumstances: that Hardwick acted “under the substantial domination of another person”; and
that he committed the murder “while . . . under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(e), (b)....
...Even though the two offenses occurred later in time than the murder, the convictions
were handed down prior to Hardwick’s murder trial. These two convictions could thus be
counted for the purposes of the prior violent felony conviction aggravator. See Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(5)(b) (“The defendant was previously convicted of ....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 561, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 1665, 2009 WL 3126337
...Based on the mitigating evidence that Malnik presented at the penalty phase and the Spencer hearing, the sentencing court found both ADD and borderline personality disorder as nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and childhood deprivation as a statutory mitigating circumstance under the catch-all provision of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1997)....
...Pagan only raises three of those issues in this appeal. [9] The statute provides, in pertinent part, that mitigating circumstances shall include "[t]he existence of any other factors in the defendant's background that would mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty." § 921.141(6)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE The trial court and the Florida Supreme Court found as an aggravating circumstance to justify imposing the death sentence that the homicides were “especially heinous, atrocious and cruel.” This is drawn from § 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes....
...ct as the trigger man.
403 So.2d at 336 . Later, at p. 339, the Supreme Court rejected the contention by White that “[t]he defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor’ (section
921.141(6)(d)) and that ‘[t]he defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person’ (section
921.141(6)(e)).” Id. at 339 . *1486 The federal district court considered this argument by White. First it noted that the trial judge, in his written findings relating to mitigating circumstances as specified by §
921.141(6), Fla.Stat.Ann., concluded that “No mitigating circumstances exist which could possibly outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” The federal habeas judge concluded that the state courts had not ignored the evidence of the extent of W...
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...We affirm appellant's sentence of death. On July 15, 1982, this Court affirmed appellant's convictions for first-degree murder but reversed and remanded the causes to the trial court for resentencing upon a proper consideration of the mitigating circumstances under § 921.141(6)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes (1977), relating to appellant's mental state and his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct....
...Judge Klein denied that motion referring to this Court's indication that another advisory jury would not be necessary. On May 27, 1983, Judge Klein entered his findings in support of the death sentence, resentencing appellant to death. With regard to mitigation under § 921.141(6)(b) and (f) the trial court stated that "there is some evidence to indicate that the felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental disturbance and that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the...
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 404, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 1570, 2011 WL 2637448
...Moreover, when this Court has previously rejected a substantive claim on the merits, trial counsel is not ineffective because he or she failed to present the same meritless argument. See Melendez v. State,
612 So.2d 1366, 1369 (Fla.1992). To ensure fairness in a capital case, section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2010), provides a trial court with the authority to remove a juror during the penalty phase and replace him or her with an alternate juror if that juror displays an “inability” to continue....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 73550
...Spivey's final point is that the judge erred in overriding the jury's recommendation of life. In overriding the jury recommendation, the judge found two aggravating circumstances: Spivey had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence, section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1983); and Spivey committed the murder for pecuniary gain of $20,000, section 921.141(5)(f)....
...alid. The evidence is overwhelming that Mr. Spivey's services to commit the murder were engaged for $20,000, and while only $17,500 was paid to him, nonetheless he received money for his dastardly *1097 deed. The aggravating circumstance provided by section 921.141(5)(f) would certainly be applicable as to the uncontradicted pecuniary benefit received by defendant....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1717
...tted the murder for which he is now to be
sentenced." Sentencing Hearing at 1029. The Florida Supreme Court has strictly interpreted
prior felony convictions that qualify as an aggravating circumstance at sentencing in a capital
case. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b) (1985) (“The defendant was previously convicted of another
capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.”)....
...that none of these crimes falls within the meaning of this aggravating
circumstance as defined by the statute. Only previous conviction of “another
capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence” will satisfy
section 921.141(5)(b)....
...Whether these crimes, committed within 24 hours of Pullum’s death, had
resulted in felony convictions prior to Hardwick’s trial for Pullum’s murder is determinative of
whether they qualify as an aggravating circumstance. The Florida Supreme Court has explained
that, under § 921.141 (5)(b), “[i]t is clear that the Legislature referred to ‘previous convictions’
and not ‘previous crimes.’” Elledge v....
...support a death sentence and no mitigating circumstances to weigh against the aggravating
factors, death is presumed to be the appropriate penalty.” Blanco v. State,
452 So. 2d 520, 526
(Fla. 1984) (per curiam).
Florida’s death penalty statute, section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), provides
that the jury shall hear the evidence on aggravation and mitigation and render an
advisory sentence based on whether there are sufficient aggravating
circumstances to warrant a d...
...(emphasis added).
"Florida is a weighing State; the death penalty may be imposed only where
specified aggravating circumstances outweigh all mitigating circumstances."149
149
While “Florida’s death penalty statute, section 921.141, limits the aggravating
circumstances on which a sentence of death may be imposed to the circumstances listed in the
statute,” Grossman, 525 So....
...” Walker v. State,
707 So. 2d
300, 318 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam) (citing cases) (second and third emphases added).
74
Parker v. Dugger,
498 U.S. 308, 318,
111 S.Ct. 731, 738 (1991) (citing Fla. Stat. §
921.141(3) (1985)) (emphasis added)....
...he
essential ingredient in the constitutionality of our death penalty statute.” Porter v. State,
723 So.
2d 191, 196 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam); see State v. Dixon,
283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973) (“The most
important safeguard presented in Fla. Stat. §
921.141, F.S.A., is the propounding of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances which must be determinative of the sentence imposed.”).
75
treatment that would result from actual reweighing of t...
...criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the
crime.
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6) (1985).
78
as expert testimony, like that given at the 3.850 proceeding.154 This omission kept
from the judge and jury knowledge that, at the time of the murder, Hardwick could
have lacked the judgment to conform his conduct to the requirements of law....
...er was
“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” because Hardwick seemed unknowing as to how to
proceed when his efforts to cause Pullum to produce the missing quaaludes were unsuccessful,
and he showed remorse following the killing. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h)....
...avator seems inapplicable to
Hardwick, who, in a drunk and drugged state, made threats upon the discovery that his quaaludes
were missing, and witnesses testified that he generally had his gun with him; it was not procured
to kill Pullum. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(i); cf....
...Additionally, the reference to Bartley,
who advised and urged Hardwick, who was in a drunk and drugged condition, to kill Pullum,
implicates the statutory mitigating factor that Hardwick acted “under the substantial domination
of another person.” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(e)....
...It is also noteworthy that, during the weekend
prior to Pullum’s murder, Hardwick’s pregnant wife had told him that she planned to leave him,
which relates to the statutory mitigator of committing the capital felony “while the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” Id. § 921.141(6)(b).
165
3.850 Proceeding at 976.
83
medical examiner's report.166 To a reasonable degree of psychological certainty,
166
Id....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...ointed by the court at petitioner’s request violated petitioner’s fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and sixth amendment right to counsel, even though petitioner did not contemporaneously object; and (3) whether Fla.Stat. 921.141(5)(h) (1975), which defines a killing that is “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” as an aggravating circumstance, was applied in an unconstitutionally vague manner in violation of the eighth amendment....
...g psychological opinions based on statements a defendant has given in the absence of Miranda warnings when the defendant himself plans to make his mental abilities an issue. IV. We come to petitioner’s final claim. Petitioner claims that Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(h) (1975), which defines a killing that is “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” as an aggravating circumstance, was applied by the trial court and the Supreme Court of Florida in an unconstitutionally vague and overbroad manner....
...during which the state and the defense present evidence that either militates in favor of imposing the death penalty (termed aggravating circumstances), or that militates against imposing that penalty (termed mitigating circumstances). See Fla.Stat. § 921.141(1)-(3) (1975). Weighing the evidence presented in aggravation and mitigation, the jury arrives at a sentencing recommendation that is then reviewed by the trial court. Fla.Stal. § 921.141(3) & (4) (1975). The statutory aggravating circumstances in effect at the time of petitioner's trial, found in Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5), (1975), were: (5) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.— Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: (a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment....
...(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws. (h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The statutory mitigating circumstances in effect at the time of petitioner’s trial, found in Fla.Stat. § 921.141(6), (1975), were: (6) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES....
...n of another person. (f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. (g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 6 . Fla.Stat. § 921.141(4) (1975) provided for automatic direct review of a judgment of conviction and sentence of death to the Supreme Court of Florida. On direct appeal, petitioner raised, among others, the third claim that he raises here; he contended that the trial court applied Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(h), which defines a killing that is "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” as an aggravating circumstance, in an over-broad and vague manner....
...At the beginning of the trial’s penalty phase, the court instructed the jury on aggravating circumstances. Then, after stating "the mitigating circumstances which you may consider," the court listed the seven mitigating circumstances of Fla.Stat. § 921.141(6) (1975)....
...This circuit has held that Lockett is to have retroactive effect. Songer v. Wainwright,
769 F.2d 1488, 1489 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (en banc). 16 . The statute prefaced the list of aggravating circumstances with the statement that they “shall be limited to the following: ..." Fla.Stat. §
921.141(5) (1975); see supra note 5. The list of mitigating circumstances was preceded by the *1190 statement that "[mjitigating circumstances shall be the following: ...” Fla.Stat. §
921.141(6) (1975); see supra note 5....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 8964
...As my previous testimony indicated, the results of any discussions with counsel about my views of the orders would be included in the record. The orders would then have been issued as provided to me. The orders were customarily provided to me prior to the sentencing hearing under Fla. Stat. § 921.141....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16944, 1990 WL 205196
...nd Glock. The trial judge, in accordance with the jury recommendation, imposed the death penalty on both appellants, finding no mitigating circumstances and the following three aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed to avoid arrest [section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1983)]; (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain [section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1983)]; and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification [section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1983)]....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 7557, 1991 WL 66347
...denied,
488 U.S. 871 ,
109 S.Ct. 187 ,
102 L.Ed.2d 156 (1988); Zeigler v. Dugger,
524 So.2d 419 (Fla.1988). Additionally, the trial court’s sentencing order referred to “insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in Subsection (7) of said Section
921.141_” R.S....
...esented "fundamental error.” 8 . In Hitchcock , the trial judge instructed the jury that "[t]he mitigating circumstances which you may consider shall be the following....” The court then read the statutory mitigating factors set out in Fla.Stat. § 921.141(6)....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 303, 2012 WL 1345485, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 754
...Snelgrove’s Statement to Law Enforcement Snelgrove argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present a videotape of Snelgrove’s interrogation in rebuttal to Snelgrove’s mental health evidence. 9 For the reasons that follow, we disagree. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2008), “provides ‘wide latitude ......
...nd (6). Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. A trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence under section 921.141 is reviewed for abuse of discretion....
...quire into the history utilized by the expert to determine whether the expert’s opinion has a proper basis.” Parker v. State,
476 So.2d 134, 139 (Fla.1985). Moreover, because of the broader admissibility of evidence during the penalty phase, see §
921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 92586
...d 4) it was error to deny the requested special penalty phase instructions. We reject each of these claims. In connection with each of the murders, the trial court found in aggravation the convictions of the other three capital felonies, pursuant to section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, (1989)....
...l to give requested special penalty phase instructions three through eight. The only instruction which merits discussion is requested instruction eight which was an expanded instruction on the aggravating instruction on heinous, atrocious, or cruel, section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1989)....
...[2] We need not determine whether the question concerning counsel made after the statement was given was also an equivocal request for counsel because no further interrogation occurred. [3] Because all the homicides were tried together the underlying facts of the capital offenses were part of the record in this case. [4] Section 921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). [5] These factors include: 1) Slawson's capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (1989) and 2) the murders were committed while Slawson was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Also, a police officer was allowed to testify as to the details of a robbery and aggravated battery occurring in 1978 for which the defendant was convicted. In the sentence proceeding, testimony about the details of a prior felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person is properly admitted. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1981), authorizing *608 the proceedings to determine the sentence, says: Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rul...
...The trial court found the defense of insanity had not been raised and there was no indication or evidence that the defendant was incompetent. The court also found that the prior psychiatric evaluation had determined that the defendant was competent. Section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), states that a felony committed while defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance is a mitigating factor. Section 921.141(6)(f) states that if the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, a mitigating factor arises....
...We explained these mitigating factors in State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 943,
94 S.Ct. 1950,
40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), as follows: Extreme mental or emotional disturbance is a second mitigating consideration, pursuant to Fla. Stat. §
921.141(7)(b), F.S.A., which is easily interpreted as less than insanity but more than the emotions of an average man, however inflamed. * * * * * * Mental disturbance which interferes with but does not obviate the defendant's knowledge of right and wrong may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance. Fla. Stat. §
921.141(7)(f), F.S.A....
...other sentence hearing before a jury empaneled for that purpose. A special jury should be empaneled to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and make its recommendation to the trial court for proper sentencing pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1981)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 503
... and gave it very little weight. According to Geralds, the reference to relevancy indicates that the trial court did not properly weigh the mitigating evidence because mitigating evidence need not be relevant to the crime. We reject this argument. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1993), provides that “evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant.” (Emphasis supplied.) While a defendant has the ri...
...ct-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.’ ” Farina,
937 So.2d at 619 (quoting Smith v. Texas,
543 U.S. at 44 ,
125 S.Ct. 400 ). 27 In this case, the reference to relevancy does not invalidate the trial court’s analysis because section
921.141(1) and case law require that mitigating evidence be relevant to the circumstances of the offense at issue, Ger-alds’ character, or his prior record....
...corpus. It is so ordered. CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. PERRY, J., did not participate. . The facts surrounding the murder are detailed in our original opinion. See Geralds I,
601 So.2d at 1158-59 . . §
921.141 (5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1993). . Id. §
921.141 (5)(h). . Id. §
921.141(5)6). . Id. §
921.141(6)(g)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...rather than his sentences. We recognized this and reviewed the imposition of the death sentences on our own as statute requires that we do. Davis v. State,
461 So.2d 67 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
105 S.Ct. 3540,
87 L.Ed.2d 663 (1985); §
921.141, Fla....
...t bringing this issue to our attention. Simply reading the sentencing order, however, dispels this claim. The trial court held that no evidence had been presented to show that Davis was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1999 WL 820574
...was committed during a robbery and was committed for pecuniary gain (which the court merged into one factor); and the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). See § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (f), (i), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990). The court found the statutory mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, see § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2013 WL 5567079
...hs. Victo-rino does not argue that the evidence im-permissibly became a feature of the trial but that trial counsel should have objected because such evidence should be per se inadmissible. The postconviction court did not err in denying this claim. Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that in a capital case, once the prosecution has provided evidence of one or more aggravating factors, the prosecution may present victim impact evidence and that: Such evidence shall be designed...
...e shall not be permitted as a part of victim impact evidence. Evidence of a family member’s grief and suffering due to the loss of the victim is evidence of “the resultant loss to the community’s members by the victim’s death” permitted by section 921.141(7), and the admission of such evidence is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Payne v....
...See Franklin v. State,
965 So.2d 79, 97 (Fla. 2007) (finding evidence that the victim’s family was devastated and that the victim’s friends were “hurt pretty bad” did not exceed the proper bounds of victim impact evidence as established by section
921.141(7) and Payne); see also Abdool v....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...or compliance with basic jurisdictional norms. 4 Under Florida law, following a defendant's conviction on a capital murder charge, a phase of the trial is conducted to determine whether the sentence will be life imprisonment or death. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(1)....
...ances outweigh any mitigating circumstances found to exist. Based upon this recommendation, the sentencing judge imposes sentence. The "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" (HAC) capital felony is one statutory aggravating factor. Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(5)(h) Section 921.141 also provides that the Supreme Court of Florida automatically review all cases in which the sentence of death is imposed....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 143780
...At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended the death sentence by a ten-to-two vote. In imposing the death sentence for each of these murders, the trial judge found that each murder was (1) heinous, atrocious, or cruel, pursuant to section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1989), and (2) committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, pursuant to section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1989)....
...the statement falls within no known exception to the hearsay rule. We do find that the statement could have been properly admissible during the penalty phase of the proceeding under the relaxed rules of evidence for the penalty phase proceeding. See § 921.141(1), Fla....
...l as defined in Robinson, Williams, and Dixon. If we applied this aggravating factor under these circumstances, we would in effect be applying it to most, if not all, first-degree murders. Such a holding could result in a constitutional challenge to section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1989)....
...that Cannady believed Boisvert had raped his wife. For this aggravating factor to apply to Boisvert's murder, the murder must have been "committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 166314
...Accordingly, for the reasons expressed here and in our earlier decision, we affirm Happ's sentence of death. It is so ordered. OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW and GRIMES, JJ., concur. BARKETT, C.J., and KOGAN, J., concur in result only. HARDING, J., did not participate in this case. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. [2] See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1998 WL 134039
...irst-degree murder based on a crime alleged to have occurred on February 17 or 18, 1996. Following the grand jury's indictment, the State filed a written notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. In it, the State declared its intent to rely on section 921.141(5)(m), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), [2] which the legislature enacted into law on May 30, 1996, and which permits the introduction of evidence of the victim's advanced age for the jury's determination as to whether the death penalty may be imposed. Based on the newly enacted subsection, the State sought to present evidence that the victim was eighty-nine years of age, used a cane or walker, and was visually or hearing impaired. In response, Hootman filed a motion to prohibit application of section 921.141(5)(m) on the grounds that such application to his crime would violate the ex post facto provisions of both the United States and the Florida Constitutions. Hootman argued that because the alleged offense occurred prior to the statute's enactment it could not be retroactively applied against him. The trial court agreed and, in a written order, precluded the State from relying on section 921.141(5)(m)....
...On appeal, the district court, without deciding the issue, certified it as one having an effect on the proper administration of death penalty cases throughout the state and requiring immediate resolution by this Court. Hootman,
697 So.2d at 1261. We accepted jurisdiction and for the reasons expressed hold that section
921.141(5)(m) of the Florida Statutes may not be retroactively applied against Hootman....
...s merely procedural. We regard it as a substantive provision that cannot be applied retroactively. It was error to do so, thus we must remand the case for resentencing. 911 S.W.2d at 563-64. In the instant case, there is no doubt that application of section 921.141(5)(m) would be retroactive in effect since Hootman's alleged conduct occurred before the statute was enacted. It is equally apparent that section 921.141(5)(m) disadvantages Hootman by altering the definition of the criminal conduct that may subject him to the death penalty and increasing the punishment of a crime based upon the new aggravator. Under section 921.141(5)(m), the State may proffer evidence that "[t]he victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability" in seeking the death penalty. See § 921.141(5)(m), Fla....
...to which the death penalty is applicable." Indeed, the severity of the death penalty and the role of the judge and jury in considering the prescribed aggravating circumstances make aggravating circumstances a critical part of the substantive law of capital cases. Before the legislature enacted section 921.141(5)(m), advanced age of the victim had not been part of any of the previously enumerated factors. In enacting section 921.141(5)(m), therefore, the legislature altered the substantive law by adding an entirely new aggravator to be considered in determining whether to impose the death penalty....
...he elements of the offense or to the other applicable aggravating factors. The penalty phase juries were not given additional detrimental information to consider in making its sentencing recommendations. In contrast, the application of newly enacted § 921.141(5)(m) is neither a refinement in an existing aggravating factor nor a reiteration of an existing element to a crime. Unlike the situations involved in the cases relied upon by the State, section 921.141(5)(m) constitutes a substantial change in the substantive law on capital punishment since the trier of fact and the court may now consider the victim's advanced age as the sole determining factor in finding an aggravating circumstance....
...Thus, consideration of the advanced-age aggravator undoubtedly disadvantages Hootman by exposing him to a penalty of death and cannot be said to be a mere procedural change in the law. Accordingly, we approve the decision of the trial court [6] and hold that section 921.141(5)(m) may not be retroactively applied against Hootman since the newly amended section was not in effect at the time of the alleged offense and substantially alters the substantive law of capital punishment in Florida....
...It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur. NOTES [1] The following facts are taken from the district court's opinion in State v. Hootman,
697 So.2d 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). [2] Section
921.141(5)(m) provides that an aggravating circumstance applies to a capital felony when: "The victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability, or because the defendant stood in a position of familial or custodial authority over the victim." §
921.141(5)(m), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 121612
...The following issue is dispositive of Layman's penalty phase claims. The legislature has established a procedure for imposing death: The court must (1) determine whether aggravating and mitigating circumstances are present, (2) weigh these circumstances, and (3) issue written findings. [921.141] (3) FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCE OF DEATH....
...es in subsections (5) and (6) and upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings. If the court does not make the findings requiring the death sentence, the court shall impose sentence of life imprisonment in accordance with s.
775.082. §
921.141, Fla....
...hours later. The trial court's actions were a clear violation of Florida law for several reasons. First, the court failed to make specific findings concerning aggravating and mitigating *376 circumstances prior to pronouncing sentence. See Grossman; § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). Second, the court failed to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances prior to pronouncing sentence. See § 921.141(3), Fla....
...e. Stewart,
549 So.2d at 176. The message could not be more direct, and the line could not be brighter. The goal of the rule is clearly laudable. However, I do not find the rule as to when the written findings are to be prepared or filed mandated by section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1991)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 348108
...ht-line rule requiring a record waiver of the right to testify during the penalty phase; (11) whether the trial court erred in allowing defense counsel to proceed even though counsel stated that he was not qualified to try the case; and (12) whether section 921.141, Florida Statutes, is constitutional....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 65508
...kill the victim by Dudley. We are unable to find that the error in this instance was harmless because of the argument and use of this evidence to emphasize the aggravating circumstance that this murder was cold and calculated under the provisions of section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 1472231
...Once the jury has rendered its recommendation, the trial judge, " notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, " shall set forth in writing specific aggravators and mitigators, balance the aggravators and mitigators, and render a sentence. Fla. Stat. § 921.141....
...Final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed rests solely with the judge of this court; however, the law requires that you, the jury, render to the court an advisory sentence as to what punishment should be imposed upon the defendant. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) (for § 921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 75280
...The statute states that the court can impose a sentence of death only "after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances" and only after finding that "there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." § 921.141(3), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1997 WL 377587
...ent or confession which is offered against the accused in a criminal action, and which is made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused, is not within this exception. Ch. 90-174, § 4, at 744-45, Laws of Florida. [4] Section 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). [5] Section 921.141(5)(j), Fla....
...r first-degree murder; (12) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress his statements; (13) the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty as to appellant; (14) the trial court erred by denying appellant's motion to declare section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1989), unconstitutional....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 248555
...Because we reverse Green's sentence, we only address the following two claims: (1) that the trial court erred in finding the avoid arrest aggravator; and (2) that the death sentence is disproportionate. [2] 1. Avoid Arrest Aggravator Green challenges the trial court's finding of the statutory "avoid arrest" aggravator. See § 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
...nd mitigating circumstances. Id. Without the avoid arrest aggravator, Green's death sentence rests on a single aggravating circumstance: that Green had been contemporaneously convicted of another violent felony the attempted murder of Phipps. See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 127, 2012 WL 572977, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 407
...use) and then by applying the aggravating circumstance based on the aggravated child abuse. Id. at 197 . He contended that “because the single act of stabbing [the child] formed the basis of both the aggravated child abuse aggravating factor under section 921.141(5)(d) of the Florida Statutes and the first-degree felony murder charge, the court should have found that the aggravated child abuse allegation ‘merged’ with the more serious homicide charge.” Id....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 12573
...be considered when a current report exists. Burch's final point concerns the override of the jury's advisory recommendation that life imprisonment, not death, be imposed. In the sentencing order, the judge found three aggravating circumstances under section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1981): section 921.141(5)(a), capital felony committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; section 921.141(5)(b), previous conviction of felony involving the use of violence to another person; and section 921.141(5)(i), capital felony committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. The judge found in mitigation that as a result of voluntary consumption of PCP, the defendant's ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired, section 921.141(6)(f), but gave this impairment little weight because the degree of impairment was speculative and remote and could not be conclusively established....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 268004
...en convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s.
921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter event such person shall be punished by death. In 1994, section
775.082(1) was amended to read: (1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s.
921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and: (a) If convicted of murder in the first degree or of a capital felony under s....
...life imprisonment is ineligible for parole irrespective of the category of capital crime committed. Ch. 95-294, § 4, Laws of Fla. Accordingly, this Court, on its own motion, amends the standard instructions on "Penalty ProceedingsCapital Cases F.S.
921.141" to reflect the amendments to section
775.082....
...Underscoring indicates new language; strike-through type indicates deletions. The amendments to the instruction shall be effective when this opinion becomes final. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. APPENDIX PENALTY PROCEEDINGSCAPITAL CASES F.S. 921.141 Note to Judge Give la at the beginning of penalty proceedings before a jury that did not try the issue of guilt....
...Your advisory sentence should be based upon the evidence [that you have heard while trying the guilt or innocence of the defendant and evidence that has been presented to you in these proceedings] [that has been presented to you in these proceedings]. F.S. 921.141(5) The aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited to any of the following that are established by the evidence: Note to Judge Give only those aggravating circumstances for which evidence has been presented....
...Note to Judge When the victim is a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, state attorney, assistant state attorney, justice, or judge, "eligibility for release" should be inserted in place of "possibility of parole for 25 years." See F.S.
775.0823. F.S.
921.141(6) Should you find sufficient aggravating circumstances do exist, it will then be your duty to determine whether mitigating circumstances exist that outweigh the aggravating circumstances....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1987 WL 3658
...mitigating factors. The trial judge in this case in the proceedings below, instructed the jury in precisely the identical manner. Using the same language, the court expressly precluded the jury from considering any factors except those enumerated in section 921.141(6)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 416723
...[2] See Groover v. State,
458 So.2d 226 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1009,
105 S.Ct. 1877,
85 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985). [3] The trial judge found as to both murders the aggravating circumstances that Parker had been previously convicted of another violent felony, §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981); the murder was committed during a robbery, id. §
921.141(5)(d); the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, id. §
921.141(5)(f); the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, id. §
921.141(5)(h); and the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated, id. §
921.141(5)(i). The judge also found that Sheppard was murdered to avoid lawful arrest, id. §
921.141(5)(e)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 31797
...Thus, in pronouncing sentence, he stated: Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the Jury, this court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, finds that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in Florida Statutes 921.141(5) and there are insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in subsection 6 of that statute to outweigh the aggravating circumstances....
...in order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908, 910 (1975). In following the statute (Fla. Stat.
921.141), the trial judge is directed to weigh the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances when determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed in light of all the facts adduced....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 537, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 2288, 2011 WL 4467599
...Accordingly, there is no basis that would disqualify this jury from rendering a penalty recommendation. Accordingly, the trial court did not err, and we deny relief on this claim. Florida’s Death Sentence Statute Knight’s final claim challenges the constitutionality of Florida’s death sentencing scheme as set forth in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2000)....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 1424544
...dence; (6) the circuit court erred in dismissing without an evidentiary hearing Mann's claim that the rules prohibiting juror interviews are unconstitutional; (7) the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing concerning Mann's claim that section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (8) the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing regarding Mann's claim that he was denied his right to effective mental heath assistance as required under Ake v....
..., see Harvey v. Dugger,
656 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Fla.1995); claim six, see Young v. State,
739 So.2d 553, n. 5 (Fla.1999); and claim seven, see Teffeteller v. Dugger,
734 So.2d 1009, 1016 (Fla.1999); Thompson v. State,
759 So.2d 650 (Fla.2000). [3] See §
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). [4] See §
921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18367
...Notwithstanding this powerful presentation of mitigating evidence, the jury recommended by a vote of 9-3 that Pittman receive the death penalty for each of the three murders. In its sentencing order, the trial court found as aggravating circumstances that each murder was heinous, atrocious, and cruel, Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (6)(h); that Pittman had committed the murders having a previous conviction for a felony involving a threat of violence, Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (6) (b); and that the murders were committed after Pittman had committed two previous capital felonies, Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (6)(b)—i.e....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 567
...On remand, the trial court heard arguments of counsel, reconsidered the sentencing question, and again sentenced Phillip Atkins to death. Atkins now seeks appellate review of that sentence. He is entitled to such an appeal and this Court has jurisdiction thereof. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; § 921.141, Fla....
...The court heard arguments of counsel on both sides of the issue. The record shows that after the hearing, the judge called a court recess to reflect upon what he had heard. Subsequently the court issued findings of fact regarding the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as required by section 921.141. The findings read in pertinent part as follows: 1. As an aggravating circumstance, the capital felony, that is, the murder of Antonio Castillo, a six year old child, was committed while the defendant was engaged in the crime of kidnapping. [§ 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...(1981).] The defendant was found guilty of kidnapping by the jury and, in the view of the Court, there was a sufficient basis for the jury to reach that verdict. 2. As an aggravating circumstance, the Court finds that the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. [§ 921.141(5)(e), Fla....
...The Court finds that the killing was to prevent the child from disclosing the defendant's act to the parents, which disclosure would undoubtedly have led to his arrest. 3. As a further aggravating circumstance, the Court finds that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. [§ 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...The other statutory aggravating circumstances are not applicable in this case. As to the mitigating circumstances, the Court makes the following findings: 1. The defendant's history of prior criminal activity for which he has been convicted is not significant. [§ 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
...The Court does find that this history of homosexual contact with minors diminishes the weight to be given to this mitigating factor. 2. The next question on mitigation is whether the crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. [§ 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
...ay. The Court cannot find that the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 3. There is absolutely no evidence that the victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct, or that he consented *1203 to the act. [§ 921.141(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (1981).] 4. The defendant was not an accomplice in the crime, nor was his participation minor. He was the principal actor. [§ 921.141(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (1981).] 5. There is no evidence that the defendant was under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of any person. [§ 921.141(6)(e), Fla. Stat. (1981).] 6. As to F.S. 921.141(6)(f), there is evidence that the ability of the defendant to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired....
...s of the law was substantially impaired, and this is a mitigating circumstance. The Court finds that he did have the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. 7. The age of the defendant at the time of the offense was twenty six years. [§ 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The courts and the State must be able to do better, and any explanation of why we are unable to do so is insufficient. NOTES [1] The trial court found the following statutory aggravators: (1) Knight was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995); (2) the murders were committed while Knight was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping, § 921.141(5)(d); (3) the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, § 921.141(5)(e); (4) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain, § 921.141(5)(f); (5) the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), § 921.141(5)(h); and (6) the murders were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP), § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 88739
...mitigation. In the resentencing order the trial judge specifically adopted the discussion of mitigating evidence contained in his original sentencing order. In that order the judge discussed the reasons why each statutory mitigating factor listed in section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1989), did or did not apply in this case....
...ry mitigating circumstances had been proven. Accordingly, we affirm Cook's sentence of death. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Rolando's murder is the previous capital felony. [2] § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (f), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 244, 2016 WL 3010795, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 1124
...n convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole, unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in section 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter eyent such person shall be punished by death....
....The post-1994 statute, which was in effect until the recent legislative changes in response to Graham and Miller became effective on July 1, 2014, provided: A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according' to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and: (a) If convicted of murder in the first degree or of a capital felony under s....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 230
...ed to death by the trial judge. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Spaziano's conviction but vacated the death sentence and remanded for resentencing on the grounds that the trial court relied upon nonstatutory aggravating factors in violation of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), and that it did not comply with the requirements of Gardner v....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 1877439, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8853
...nding that Anderson never intended a murder to occur
would eliminate the aggravating circumstance that the murder “was committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.” See
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(i).
20
Case: 11-13921 Date Filed: 05/12/2014 Page: 21 of 65
alcohol and marijuana in the past as potential mitigation, believing that such
evidence would like...
...One of Anderson’s former employers testified that he
had been a model employee. Anderson’s mother testified that he was a wonderful
child who had helped her immensely as her health declined. He was never abused
29
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(i).
30
Id. § 921.141(5)(f).
31
Id. § 921.141(5)(a).
32
Id....
...capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain (moderate weight); (3) that the
capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and
under sentence of imprisonment or placed on Community Control or on felony
34
Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2), the jury was tasked with the following
responsibility:
After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory
sentence to the court, based upon the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist ....
...murder, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the attempted murder of
Marisha Scott, life imprisonment for robbing the bank with a firearm, and five
years’ imprisonment for the grand theft of Cunningham’s revolver.
35
Under Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6),
Mitigating circumstances [are]:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or...
...he influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance”; and (2) that his “capacity . . . to
appreciate the criminality of his . . . conduct or to conform his . . . conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired.” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b), (f).
Presenting those mitigating circumstances to the jury, Anderson argued, would
39
Anderson presented his motion to the judge who presided over his prosecution and
sentencing....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 178115
...Rogers, Campbell, and Santos. NOTES [1] The judge found that Brown had previously been convicted of a violent felony; that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery; and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. See § 921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 47674
...State,
403 So.2d 1321, 1324 (Fla. 1981). While it is true, as this Court held on initial review of the sentence, that this evidence may not amount to proof of the statutory mitigating circumstances of diminished capacity and extreme emotional disturbance, see section
921.141(6)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes (1977), there is clearly enough testimony to allow the consideration of this evidence as a nonstatutory mitigating factor....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 45028
...The fact that the victim was a law enforcement officer attempting to enforce the laws during the incident was not only a necessary aspect of this factual situation but also critical for the State to establish the existing aggravating circumstance of "hindering the enforcement of laws," contained in section 921.141(5)(g), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...1950,
40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974). For the reasons expressed, we affirm the trial court's imposition of the death penalty. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J. and OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. [2] Section
921.141(5)(j), Florida Statutes (1987), reads as follows: "The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties." [3] We recently held, in Castro v....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1766734
...t because the evidence was relevant as to which defendant was active in what parts of the planning and implementation of the murder plan. As addressed above, we did not disapprove of the trial judge's rulings on this matter in Lawrence's case. Under section 921.141(6)(e), Florida Statutes (1997), the fact that the defendant acted under "the substantial domination of another person" is a statutory mitigating circumstance....
...codefendant Lawrence's property. See majority op. at 1217-18 (listing items). Rodgers argued that the evidence supported two statutory mitigating factors: minor participation in the murder and acting under the substantial domination of another. See § 921.141(6)(d)-(e), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1998 WL 309071
...created a great risk of death to many persons; the murder was committed while Fisher was engaged in a burglary; and the homicide was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). § 921.141(5)(b), (c), (d), (i), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 1625469
...uishable. In Garron the issue was whether a plea of no contest, followed by the withholding of adjudication of guilt, could be considered a conviction which would qualify as a statutory aggravating factor to support a sentence of death. The statute, section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1975), provided that a prior conviction of a felony involving the use of threat of violence to the person was an aggravator for the trial judge to consider in deciding whether to impose a death sentence where the jury had recommended life....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1998 WL 394168
...Accordingly, we will not accept jurisdiction, as we did in Hootman, in this case or similar cases. We discharge this case for lack of jurisdiction and remand to the district court for further proceedings. It is so ordered. HARDING, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1995). [3] § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 499, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 2649, 2012 WL 6621371
...In the sentencing order, the trial court found that the State proved the following aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt, each of which was afforded great weight: the capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under probation, meeting the requirements of section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2009); the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in robbery, sexual battery, and burglary, meeting the requirements of section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (2009); and the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, meeting the requirements of section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (2009)....
...circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty”). Under this Court’s precedent, Hampton’s argument on this point is without merit. The “under sentence of imprisonment or ... on felony probation” ag-gravator provided for in section 921.141(5)(a) was established without dispute....
...Hampton, his lawyer from Georgia, and Hampton’s probation officer from Georgia testified that Hampton was under felony probation and in violation of his probation at the time of the capital crime, removing any question as to the applicability of the aggravator provided for under section 921.141(5)(a)....
...on testimony of the forensic psychologist that he introduced at the Spencer hearing. Accordingly, Hampton argues, the trial court erred by concluding that he failed to establish the presence of statutory mental mitigation provided for under sections 921.141(6)(b) & (f), Florida Statutes (2009)....
...Under the terms of the defendant’s probation, he should not have been residing in the State of Florida, or using drugs or alcohol. Accordingly, the record supports the trial court’s finding of the existence of the aggravator provided for under section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes; and a review of the record as a whole provides no indication that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning this aggravator great weight....
...tery (as discussed above under the second and sixth issues on appeal). And a review of the record as a whole provides no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its *121 discretion in assigning great weight to the aggravator provided for under section 921.141(5)(d)....
...ina. Based on the foregoing, the record provides an evidentiary basis for a reasonable finder of fact to find that the murder of the victim was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, satisfying the requirements of the aggravator provided for under section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 4525
...The supreme court observed that the result of permitting the circuit judge to determine, pretrial, the applicability of the death penalty would be to modify the statutory scheme governing the death penalty. The decision to impose the death penalty must be made in a separate proceeding after guilt is adjudicated. § 921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 527, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 2256, 2011 WL 4389041
...gn to commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated); (3) the defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated); and (4) the murder was committed with no pretext of legal or moral justification. McWatters,
36 So.3d at 640 -41 (citing §
921.141(5)(i) (Fla....
...murder of Madeleine Leinen.” Russ claims that the trial court should have explained its findings and cites to Merck v. State,
975 So.2d 1054, 1065 (Fla.2007), and Offord v. State,
959 So.2d 187 (Fla.2007), in support of this argument. Pursuant to section
921.141(3), Florida Statutes (2007), the trial court is required to make independent findings on aggravation, mitigation, and weight, “supported by specific written findings of fact.” §
921.141(3), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11422, 1988 WL 107139
...a government function or the enforcement of laws; the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. See Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(g), (h), (i)....
...preme Court. For a full recitation of the facts of this case, see Francis v. State,
473 So.2d 672 (Fla.1985). [2] The Florida capital punishment statute provides that the jury's sentence is advisory, and may be overridden by the judge. See Fla.Stat. §
921.141(2) & (3)....
...3d DCA 1984). [7] The prosecution also argued in its closing statement that two other aggravating circumstances existed which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt: the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons, § 921.141(5)(c), and the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in or attempting to commit robbery, § 921.141(5)(d)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2017 WL 4416205, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19459
...amending Florida’s death penalty statute to require a unanimous jury finding of at
least one aggravating factor and a unanimous jury recommendation of death before
a defendant convicted of first-degree murder may be sentenced to death. See Fla.
Stat. § 921.141 (2017)....
...execution based on his § 2254 petition. Lambrix contended that his federal Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the state
court’s failure to give retroactive effect to (1) Chapter 2017-1, a revised version of
Florida Statute § 921.141 (Florida’s capital sentencing statute), and (2) the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst.
In the present case, Lambrix’s § 2254 petition claims that Chapter 2017-1
established a new substantive right to a life sentence ab...
...rmissibly successive; and (2) whether the
17
Case: 17-14413 Date Filed: 10/05/2017 Page: 18 of 26
Florida Supreme Court’s retroactivity decision—that Hurst and the new Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141 do not apply retroactively to Lambrix—violates his rights to Due
Process, Equal Protection, and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2012 WL 5200326, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22072
...give him in return for killing her
husband. See id. at 95–98. And the fact that a murder was committed for
pecuniary gain is a statutory aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant
eligible for a death sentence in Florida. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(f) (1990).
After the jury convicted Evans of first degree murder, as charged, the trial
court conducted a separate sentence proceeding in front of the jury....
...the imposition of the death penalty and whether sufficient mitigating
circumstances exist to outweigh any aggravating circumstances found to exist.”
Although Florida law provided a total of eleven aggravating circumstances at the
time Evans murdered Pfeiffer, see id. § 921.141(5)(a)–(k), the court decided that
3
Case: 11-14498 Date Filed: 10/23/2012 Page: 4 of 42
the evidence would support finding only two of them.1 The court instructed the
jury that the only aggravating circumstances it could consider were whether Evans
had committed the murder for pecuniary gain, id. § 921.141(5)(f), and whether he
had committed the murder “in a cold and calculated and premeditated manner
without any pretense of moral or legal justification,” id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
...t evidence such
weight as you feel it should receive in reaching your conclusion as to
the sentence that should be imposed.
1
Florida law currently provides a total of sixteen aggravating circumstances. See Fla.
Stat. § 921.141(5)(a)–(p) (2010)....
...Under Florida law a criminal statute applies as of the date the
offense was committed, see Bernard v. State,
571 So. 2d 560, 561 (5th DCA 1990), so in this
opinion, we cite to the Florida death penalty statute that was in effect at the time Evans
committed the murder on March 24, 1991, see Fla. Stat. §
921.141 (1990), even though the
statute has since been amended in some aspects....
...416 (2002).
Seeking postconviction relief in state court, Evans filed a motion under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, asserting six claims for relief, including
for the first time a claim that Florida’s capital sentencing statute, Fla. Stat. §
921.141, violates the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Ring v....
...2428 (2002),
and Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466,
120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000). Evans v. State,
995 So. 2d
933, 939–40 (Fla. 2008).
On the sixth claim, Evans argued to the state collateral court that the capital sentencing
procedures in Fla. Stat. §
921.141 violated his Sixth Amendment right under Ring to have a
unanimous jury determine his guilt on all elements of capital first degree murder....
...’s allocation of
sentencing functions between the jury and judge in capital cases. Under Florida
law, after a jury convicts a defendant of a capital felony, the trial court must
conduct a separate sentence proceeding before the jury. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1)
(1990)....
...[statutory] aggravating circumstances exist . . . ; (b) [w]hether sufficient mitigating
circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances . . . ; and (c)
[b]ased on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life
imprisonment or death.” Id. § 921.141(2)(a)–(c)....
...the facts:
(a) That sufficient [statutory] aggravating circumstances
exist . . . , and
(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
Id. § 921.141(3)(a)–(b)....
...e in
sentencing. Just three years ago the Court reiterated that point, stating: “In
Florida, the sentencing judge makes the determination as to the existence and
weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the punishment, Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(3), but he must give the jury verdict of life or death ‘great weight.’”
Porter v....
...because the
trial judge in his case, not the jury, ultimately found the facts that authorized the
20
Case: 11-14498 Date Filed: 10/23/2012 Page: 21 of 42
death penalty. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3)(a) (requiring the trial judge to find that
“sufficient [statutory] aggravating circumstances” exist)....
...input about the existence of aggravating circumstances that was lacking in the
Arizona procedures the Court struck down in Ring. It is not just that a Florida jury
renders an advisory verdict addressing the existence of aggravating circumstances,
see Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2)(a), but also that the sentencing judge must give the
jury’s sentencing verdict “great weight,” see, e.g., Tedder, 322 So....
...judge-only capital sentencing procedure violated the Sixth Amendment, controls
this case is the Hildwin decision in which the Supreme Court rejected that same
contention. See Hildwin,
490 U.S. at 640–41,
109 S.Ct. at 2057 (considering the
procedures prescribed by Fla. Stat. §
921.141 (Supp....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 152678
...This Court affirmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing before a jury because the trial judge failed to give a requested instruction on the statutory mitigating circumstance of impaired capacity even though evidence concerning impairment was presented. See § 921.141, Fla....
...BARKETT, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion. BARKETT, Chief Justice, specially concurring. I agree with the majority's analysis on all the issues in this case, but continue to adhere to my original view that Stewart's sentence should have been commuted to life imprisonment pursuant to section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides that "[i]f the court does not make the findings requiring the death sentence, the court shall impose sentence of life imprisonment." See Stewart v....
...The clear and unambiguous language of the statute therefore mandates that we should have reduced Stewart's sentence to life. NOTES [1] The judge found that Stewart had been convicted of a prior violent felony and the present crime was committed during a robbery. See § 921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 39 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 174, 2014 WL 1243782, 2014 Fla. LEXIS 1030
...mining the sentence. The trial court then made findings regarding the mitigation that could be analyzed and weighed. The trial court found that the statutory mitigator of age — Yacob was twenty-two— was established but ascribed it no weight. See § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
...Contrary to the view espoused by the dissenting-in-part opinion that the state constitutional conformity clause precludes us from engaging in proportionality review because this review is not required by the Eighth Amendment, we conclude that our proportionality review flows from Florida’s capital punishment statute — section
921.141, Florida Statutes. This statute provides that every judgment of conviction and sentence of death “shall be subject to automatic review” by this Court. §
921.141(4), Fla. Stat. (2008). Section
921.141 further provides that this review “shall be heard in accordance with rules promulgated” by this Court. Id. Forty years ago, in State v. Dixon,
288 So.2d 1,10 (Fla.1973), this Court interpreted section
921.141 as including proportionality review of death sentences, concluding that this Court’s automatic, mandatory, and statutorily required review of death penalty cases “must begin with the premise that death is different.” Fitzpatrick v....
...ory appellate jurisdiction. Thus, proportionality review is a unique and highly serious function of this Court, the purpose of which is to foster uniformity in death-penalty law. Id. (citation omitted). This Court has also explained that in enacting section
921.141, “the legislature intended the death penalty to be imposed ‘for the most aggravated, the most indefensible of crimes.’ ” Fitzpatrick,
527 So.2d at 811 (quoting Dixon,
288 So.2d at 8 )....
...bed as the “reasonable and controlled, rather than capricious and discriminatory” discretion necessary to uphold Florida’s capital sentencing scheme as constitutional is “[r]e-view of a sentence of death by this Court, provided by Fla. Stat. § 921.141 .” Dixon, 283 So.2d at 7, 8....
...State,
841 So.2d 390, 407 (Fla.2003) (“Due to the uniqueness of the penalty, this Court addresses the propriety of all death sentences in a proportionality review.”). This requirement is embodied in the rules promulgated by this Court for review of death penalty cases, *549 see §
921.141(4), Fla....
...sed on the armed robbery conviction. The jury voted ten to two to recommend death. The trial court initially found two aggravators — that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery and that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. See § 921.141(5)(d), (f), Fla....
...” Francis v. State,
808 So.2d 110, 136 (Fla.2001). Accordingly, there is only a single aggra-vator in this case. With regard to mitigation, the trial court found that Yacob’s age (twenty-two) supported the finding of the statutory age mitigator, §
921.141(6)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...5) whether the
trial court erred in denying Hutchinson’s motion for judgment of
acquittal; (6) whether the trial court erred in denying Hutchinson’s
motion for a new trial; (7) whether the trial court erred in considering
section 921.141(5)(1), Florida Statutes (2000), as an aggravating
circumstance; (8) whether the trial court erred in finding that
Hutchinson committed the murder of the children during the course of...
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 73144
...[3] Rivera does not attack the propriety of the guilt phase of his trial. However, he raises six issues concerning the penalty phase, only three of which merit our discussion. [4] The first concerns "whether the trial court erred in limiting the consideration of mitigating circumstances to factors enumerated under section 921.141 solely and not advising the jury that it could consider non-statutory mitigating circumstances......
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 424449
...Carey Haughwout of Tierney & Haughwout, West Palm Beach, for petitioner. Carolyn V. McCann, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Ft. Lauderdale, for respondent. WELLS, Justice. We have for review a district court decision presenting the following question certified to be of great public importance: IS SECTION 921.141(7), FLORIDA STATUTES, ALLOWING VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL? State v....
...We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. In accordance with our decision in Windom v. State,
656 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1995), we answer the question in the negative and approve the Fourth District's decision upholding the constitutionality of section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1707
...(Of course, under our primary holding, none were necessary. Contra Evans. ). In our view, the youth of the defendant does constitute a sufficient mitigating circumstance. State v. D'Alexander,
496 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); State v. Mihocik,
480 So.2d 711 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) and cases cited; see §
921.141(6)(g) (age of defendant mitigating circumstance as to death penalty)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 592, 2013 WL 3466777, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 1421
...State,
841 So.2d 362, 368 (Fla.2003)). a. During the Course of a Kidnapping Allen asserts that the trial court erred in finding the aggravating circumstance that the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping. See §
921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...f a robbery as an additional aggravating factor where this Court found sufficient evidence to support the felony murder conviction based on robbery). b. HAC Allen asserts that the trial court erred in finding the aggravating circumstance of HAC. See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...s under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (2) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See §§ 921.141(6)(b), 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...The Capital Felony was Committed While the Defendant was Under the Influence of Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance Allen contends that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigator of the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
...ubstantially Impaired Allen contends that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory miti-gator that her capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See § 921.141(6)®, Fla....
...He also testified that it would be difficult for her to consistently conform her conduct to the requirements of society. Neither of these experts testified that Allen’s health condition substantially impaired her ability to conform her conduct to the requirements of law, as mandated in the express language of section 921.141(6)(f)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...As in Georgia, this system serves to assure that sentences of death will not be "wantonly" or "freakishly" imposed. Id. at 259-60,
96 S.Ct. at 2970. This Court restated the dual responsibility of the trial judge in Brown v. Wainwright,
392 So.2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1981), where we said: Florida's death penalty statute, section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1979), directs that a jury and judge, not this Court, must weigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances delineated in the statute to determine whether death is an appropriate sentence....
...This Court's role after a death sentence has been imposed is "review," a process qualitatively different from sentence "imposition." It consists of two discrete functions. First, we determine if the jury and judge acted with procedural rectitude in applying section 921.141 and our case law......
...There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that he engaged in a reasoned consideration. Lucas also argues that the court erred in not impaneling an advisory jury, in not permitting him to introduce evidence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, and in not holding section 921.141, Florida Statutes *252 (1979), unconstitutional as applied to him....
...2954,
57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), did not invalidate Florida's death penalty statute because we have always held that the list of statutory mitigating factors is not exclusive and that all relevant circumstances may be considered in mitigation. [3] It would follow that on the evidence presented, section
921.141 was not unconstitutionally applied to Lucas....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 8, 2013 WL 28243, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 1
...On December 21, 2009, the trial court sentenced Kocaker to death. The trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following statutory aggrava-tors: (1) Kocaker was on felony probation at the time of the murder, § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004) (great weight); (2) Kocaker was previously convicted of felonies involving the use of violence, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004) (a 1982 conviction for manslaughter, and eight armed robbery convictions in 1990) (great weight); and (3) HAC, § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...aker] was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;” and “[t]he capacity of [Ko-caker] to appreciate the criminality of his ... conduct or to conform his ... conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.” § 921.141(6)(b),(f) Fla....
...h a large metal door which warranted stitches. . Kocaker’s sister testified that Kocaker was sexually abused when he was younger. . Kocaker's sister reported that he was very paranoid. . Spencer v. State,
615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993). . See Fla. Stat. §
921.141 (6)(b) (2004) ("The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); Fla. Stat. §
921.141 (6)(e) (2004) ("The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.”)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 103, 2012 WL 399863, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 302
...er Lee. In pronouncing King’s sentence, the trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of four statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2007) (great weight) 6 ; (2) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), see § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (2007) (great weight); (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2007) (great weight); and (4) the murder was committed while King was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery or kidnapping, see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...The trial court concluded that King established the existence of two statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) King’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired, see § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2008) (moderate weight) 7 ; and (2) his age at the time of the offense (thirty-six years old), see § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3027, 2015 WL 821211
...to death for Bailey’s murder. The
court found the existence of three statutory aggravating factors, specifically that
the murder: (1) was committed while Everett was under a sentence of
imprisonment for a previous felony conviction, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(a); (2) was
committed while Everett was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery or a
burglary, id. § 921.141(5)(d); and (3) was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,
id. § 921.141(5)(d). The court found four statutory mitigating factors but accorded
them little to very little weight: (1) Everett’s age, id. § 921.141(6)(g); (2) the crime
8
Spencer v....
...n in any presentence or
medical report).
32
Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 33 of 87
was committed while under the influence of some type of substance, id.
§ 921.141(6)(b);9 (3) lack of significant history of prior criminal activity, id.
§ 921.141(6)(a); and (4) Everett’s family background and his drug use, id.
§ 921.141(6)(h)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...IS APPELLANT’S SENTENCE OF DEATH CONTRARY TO THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS Appellant argues that the sentencing procedure used in his case and the Florida Statute’s aggravating factor of “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” conduct are unconstitutional. Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(h) (1975)....
...urt. This court found no constitutional error in the Florida Supreme Court’s practice. Ford v. Strickland,
696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir.1983) (en banc). . These facts are gleaned from Circuit Judge Beverly’s findings of fact made pursuant to Fla.Stat.
921.141(3) (1975)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18442, 1989 WL 248505
...Therefore, it was not erroneous for the trial court to deny Petitioner's motion to suppress and to permit his statements to be admitted into evidence. Accordingly, this claim is DENIED. IV A jury can find an aggravating circumstance under Florida Statute § 921.141(5)(h) if they find that "[T]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." The Petitioner contends that the Florida Supreme Court has interpreted this statutory aggravating circumstance in an unconstitutionally overbroad manner in violation of Maynard v....
...victim." State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973). See also Halliwell v. State,
323 So.2d 557, 561 (Fla.1975); Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975); Alford v. State,
307 So.2d 433, 445 (Fla.1975). In light of the construction placed upon §
921.141(5)(h) in these cases, the provision is not constitutionally overbroad....
...norm of capital felonies. The murder must have been a consciousless (sic) or pitiless crime which was unnecessarily torturous to the victim. (Tr. 3232-33). This clarifying instruction substantially complies with the limiting construction placed upon §
921.141(5)(h) by the Florida *1123 Supreme Court as approved in Proffitt. Moreover, the Court agrees with the Florida Supreme Court that this aggravating circumstance was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Gore v. State,
475 So.2d 1205, 1210-11 (Fla.1985). Section
921.141(5)(h) is not unconstitutional as applied in this case. Accordingly, this claim is DENIED. V The Petitioner also contends that the aggravating circumstance as set forth in Fla.Stat. §
921.141(5)(i) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in this case. Section
921.141(5)(i) allows the sentencing court to find an aggravating circumstance where "the ......
...titioner argues that this aggravating factor does not genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. See Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 877,
103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742,
77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1982). The Florida Supreme Court has held that §
921.141(5)(i) requires a "heightened" level of premeditation and, therefore, does narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty....
...remeditated murder." Id. at 1268. See Combs v. State,
403 So.2d 418, 421 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 984,
102 S.Ct. 2258,
72 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals en banc has held that, given these limiting constructions, §
921.141(5)(i) sufficiently narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty....
...sincere in light of his past behavior. (R. 3213). Petitioner contends that the two references to the armed trespass unlawfully introduced the aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction of a felony involving the use or threat of violence. F.S.A. 921.141(5)(b)....
...The judge referred to the jury's 11-1 vote in favor of death, and identified several aggravating circumstances in imposing the sentence. Moreover, the basis of that sentence was thoroughly discussed and supported by specific findings which the Court later submitted as required by Florida statute § 921.141(3)....
...§
782.04(1)(a)1 or pursuant to the *1132 felony murder provision at Fla.Stat. §
782.04(1)(a)2. The Petitioner argues that if the jury rendered a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree on the basis of the felony murder statute, then a finding of the aggravating factor set forth in Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(d) (that the crime for which the defendant is be sentenced was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, inter alia, sexual battery or kidnapping) was "automatic" at the penalty phase in violation of Lowenfield....
...[11] Petitioner's counsel stated: if any of you decided that David Gore ... was guilty of first-degree murder because Freddy had done it and that was felony murder ... I submit to you that these aggravating circumstances that Mr. Stone is arguing for, many of them don't apply. (R. 3222-26). F.S.A. § 921.141(5)(h) and (i) list the two aggravating factors that Petitioner argued did not apply: (h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 113409
...The testimony also reflected that Castro knew the Diazes and referred to them as "Momma" and "Poppa." The jury, by a vote of seven to five, recommended that the judge impose the death penalty. In sentencing Colina to death for the murder of Cecilia Diaz, the trial judge found two aggravating circumstances, specifically: 1. F.S. 921.141(5)(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain....
...The evidence is undisputed that this offense was carefully planned and the intent was to obtain money or items of value by the Defendant. After the murder of Cecilia Diaz, the Defendant and Co-Defendant ransacked the home looking for valuables and money. 2. F.S. 921.141(5)(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel....
...The Co-Defendant's testimony indicates she moaned and struggled, thereby causing the Defendant to continue his tortuous bashing, until her skull was in pieces, to assure her death. In sentencing Colina to death for the murder of Angel Diaz, the trial judge found three aggravating factors: 1. F.S. 921.141(5)(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. The Defendant's prior conviction for the murder of Cecilia Diaz established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of this aggravator. 2. F.S. 921.141(5)(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant and his codefendant were engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit robbery....
...they did not know the Co-Defendant. The Co-Defendant testified that the reason the Defendant said "he had to" kill them was because "they know me" and therefore, the murder was a factor in the Defendant's flight after commission of the felony. 3) F.S. 921.141(5)(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 31801
...Accordingly, the conviction for first-degree murder is affirmed but the death sentence is vacated. The cause is remanded for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility of parole for twenty-five years. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(f). [2] § 921.141(5)(i). [3] § 921.141(6)(a).
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 257, 2013 WL 1760428, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 822
...or. Generally, the State is not required to provide notice of aggravating circumstances that it intends to prove. See Lynch v. State,
841 So.2d 362, 378 (Fla.2003). Given that the State is limited to the statutory aggravating circumstances listed in section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes, this Court has rejected the argument that the death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it fails to require specific notice. See id. (citing §
921.141(5), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 169527
...[2] The court also found that the capital felony was committed while under sentence of imprisonment; appellant previously had been convicted of a capital offense or felony involving the use or threat of violence; and the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. § 921.141(5), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 580, 2012 WL 4125816, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 1814
...s, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). The trial court found that the defense failed to prove the existence of any statutory mitigating circumstances. More specifically, the trial court concluded that the defense failed to establish the mitigator provided in section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (2007), which is that the defendant suffered from a mental illness that substantially impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law....
...viewpoint of the defendant. Thus, Oyola’s mental health does not factor into an assignment of weight to the HAC aggravator; rather, it is a possible mitigator that a trial court may weigh against the HAC aggravator when determining a sentence. See § 921.141(6)(b), (e), (h), Fla....
...Upon finding a mitigating factor, a trial court may assign it little to no weight when the effect of that circumstance has no or only a slight mitigating effect given the unique facts of the case. See id. The statutory mitigator at issue is found in section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (2007), which states, “The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.” The nonstatu...
...was impaired due to his mental illness. D’Er-rico, however, did not find or testify that Oyola’s mental health condition substantially impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, as mandated in the express language of section 921.141(6)(f)....
...State,
568 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla.1990). In this case, the trial court found that the defense failed to prove the existence of any statutory mitigating circumstances. More specifically, the trial court concluded that the defense failed to establish the statutory mitigator provided in section
921.141(6)(f), which is that the defendant’s ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2013 WL 5269865
...State,
39 So.3d 260 , 273 n. 13 (Fla.2010), in which we held that the failure to secure a ruling by the court below on a given claim waives it, Jackson has waived this claim. However, even if he did not waive this claim, we deny relief because it lacks merit. According to section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes, a court may consider only those aggravating circumstances delineated in the statute. See §
921.141(5), Fla....
...Jackson agrees that the rest of Revis’s statement was relevant and admissible; however, he claims that defense counsel’s failure to object to Revis’s “grief’ statement amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree and affirm the decision of the postconviction court to deny relief. Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes, governs the admission of victim impact evidence....
...dividual human being and the resultant loss to the community’s members by the victim’s death. Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as a part of victim impact evidence. § 921.141(7), Fla. Stat. (2005). Revis’s excerpted statement does not fall within one of the proscribed categories of victim impact evidence delineated in section 921.141(7)....
...State,
985 So.2d 510, 520 (Fla.2008); Lowe v. State,
2 So.3d 21, 33 (Fla.2008); Parker v. State,
904 So.2d 370, 380 (Fla.2005). Florida’s Death Sentencing Scheme Jackson challenges the constitutionality of Florida’s death sentencing scheme as provided in section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2005)....
...Thus, for this additional reason, Ring is not applicable. Moreover, the aggravating circumstance of under-sentence-of-imprisonment includes a person who was “previously convicted of a felony ... or placed on community control or on felony probation.” § 921.141(5)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17689, 2015 WL 5915894
...against a law enforcement official (when committed while the officer is in the line
of duty) differently than violence against civilians. And, in fact, the respective
executive branches of our federal and state governments have elected to do just
that. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(j) (listing, among the aggravating factors for
death-penalty consideration, “The victim of the capital felony was a law
enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his or her official duties.”); see
also Collier v....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 745, 2013 WL 5642073, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 2288
...’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.” Id. at 827 ,
111 S.Ct. 2597 . The admission of victim impact evidence is protected by article I, section 16, of the Florida Constitution, and is also specifically governed by section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2009), which states: Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence to the jury....
...This Court has also held that Ring does not apply where the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a felony, such as burglary. See Ellerbee v. State,
87 So.3d 730, 747 (Fla.2012), cert. denied, — U.S. -,
133 S.Ct. 844 ,
184 L.Ed.2d 667 (2013); see also §
921.141(5)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 4142744
...Accordingly, we quash the decision *1071 of the district court, answer the certified question in the negative, and remand with directions for further proceedings consistent herewith. It is so ordered. LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 1929078, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 9044
...The trial court adopted each of the jury’s recommendations. It found four
aggravating circumstances concerning the murder of Walters: (1) Pope was
previously convicted of two capital felonies, the murders of Doranz and Di Russo,
Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(b); (2) the murder was committed to avoid arrest, id.
1
Under Florida law, a Spencer hearing gives the defendant, his counsel, and the State the
opportunity to be heard and to present additional evidence to the sentencing judge after the jury
has offered its recommendation. See Spencer v. State,
615 So. 2d 688, 681 (Fla. 1993) (per
curiam).
8
Case: 13-11789 Date Filed: 05/15/2014 Page: 9 of 36
§
921.141(5)(e); (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, because
of its nature and because Pope showed no remorse, id. §
921.141(5)(h); and (4) the
murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, id.
§
921.141(5)(i). The judge found one mitigating factor, Pope’s service in Vietnam
and honorable discharge from the Marines, under the “catchall” provision, Fla.
Stat. §
921.141(6)(h)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 391, 2017 WL 1177618, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 690
...and obtained a gun for protection (little weight); (14) several other family members
and friends were murdered or died, contributing to Bradley’s emotional state (little
1. The trial court incorrectly labeled some of these mitigators falling under
section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (2011), as “statutory mitigators.”
-7-
weight); (15) Bradley has been diagnosed with mental disorders and is being
treated with psychotropic medication (little we...
...2000),
holding that a similar error was also harmless as to the penalty phase because
hearsay impeachment evidence is admissible as substantive evidence in the penalty
phase so long as the defendant has an opportunity to rebut the evidence under
section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes.
In this case, we find that any error was harmless as to the guilt phase
because there is no reasonable probability that the error contributed to the verdict.
Regardless of whether it heard Ms....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 2922664, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12240
...o testify about Lago’s statements, but
that the error was harmless. See Rodriguez I,
753 So. 2d at 44–45.
24
The court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment on the armed burglary count.
25
See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(b).
26
See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(a).
27
See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(d).
28
See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(e).
29
See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(f).
39
Case: 11-13273 Date Filed: 06/30/2014 Page: 40 of 72
calculated and premeditated....
...Circuit Court to vacate his convictions and sentences pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850. 31 In his motion, as amended, Petitioner presented
twenty-two claims for relief. 32 We consider only the federal constitutional claims
30
See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(i).
31
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 is titled “Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence,” and sets out the procedures and requirements for obtaining relief.
32
The claims were based on both state law and federal constitutional law....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 279, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 1255, 2016 WL 3348429
...stration of President Reagan. The trial court issued its sentencing order on August ■ 23, 2013. It found the existence of. three aggravating circumstances with respect .to each murder: (1) Mullens had been convicted of prior violent felonies under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (including a prior conviction for aggravated battery,, the contemporaneous murders of Uddin and Hayworth, and the attempted- murder of Barton); (2) the capital felonies were committed during the course of a robbery, section 921.141(5)(d), which merged with pecuniary gain, section 921.141(5)(f); and (3) the capital felonies were comrqitted for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest, section 921.141(5)(e)....
...The court assigned great weight to each aggravating circumstance. The court found that two statutory mitigating circumstances applied. First, the court concluded that the capital felony was committed while Mullens was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, section 921.141(6)(b), and assigned it moderate weight....
...ause Dr. Machlus did not ask Mullens about his mental state at that time. The court also found that Mullens’s capacity to appreciáte the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially -impaired, section 921.141 (6)(f), and assigned it moderate weight....
...air opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. However, this subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Florida. § 921.141(1), Fla....
...Mullens does not assert that he was denied the opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements contained within the footage, nor does he suggest that the admission of the DVDs in any way violated his rights under the Florida or United States Constitutions, which are the only evidentiary limitations expressed in section 921.141(1)....
...Unlike the capital sentencing schemes at issue in Taylor, Piper, Colwell, Moore, Downs, and Lewis , in Florida, a defendant who pleaded guilty to a capital offense retained the right to present mitigating evidence to a jury, which, prior to Hurst , would issue an advisory sentence. See § 921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2012 WL 224067
...In pronouncing Bright’s sentence, the trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following statutory aggravators: (1) He had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008) (the 1990 conviction for robbery) (great *257 weight); (2) He had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008) (the contemporaneous murder of the other victim) (great weight); and (8) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2008) (great weight). The trial court found that one statutory mitigating circumstance had been established — the murders were committed while Bright was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, § 921.141(6)00, Fla....
...In that case, the trial court first found that the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping and then that the murder was committed during the course of two sexual batteries. See id. at 111 n. 1. In concluding that the double finding of this aggravating circumstance was improper, this Court stated: Nothing in [section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes,] appears to authorize a trial court to treat this single aggravator as multiple and separate aggravators de *261 pending upon the number of felonies committed....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 108, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 179, 2010 WL 455287
...Florida law provides that "evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances." § 921.141(1), Fla....
...denied, ___ U.S. ___,
130 S.Ct. 1505, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009). The avoid arrest aggravating circumstance applies when "[t]he capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody." §
921.141(5)(e), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 537, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 1666, 2012 WL 3732823
...Aggravating Circumstances First, Hall contends that admitting evidence that he was serving two life sentences during the penalty phase amounted to inadmissible non-statutory aggravation. We disagree. The only aggravating circumstances that may be presented are limited to those set out in the death penalty statute. § 921.141(5), Fla....
...tion will not be disturbed on appellate review absent a clear abuse of that discretion. See, e.g., Brooks v. State,
918 So.2d 181, 203 (Fla.2005) (citing Ray,
755 So.2d at 610 ), cert. denied,
547 U.S. 1151 ,
126 S.Ct. 2294 ,
164 L.Ed.2d 820 (2006). Section
921.141(5) provides in relevant part: Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: (a) The capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on felony probation. §
921.141(5), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 487
...From this record we cannot say that the jury was unreasonable in recommending life imprisonment. The trial judge specifically found one statutory mitigating factor to be present, i.e., that Huddleston had no significant history of prior criminal activity. § 921.141(6)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 205529
...[2] (1) The murder was committed during a robbery; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (3) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated; (4) Scott had previously been convicted of two violent felonies; and (5) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14285
...tions (5) and (6) and upon the records of the trial and the sentence proceedings. If the court does not make the findings requiring the death sentence, the court shall impose sentence of life imprisonment in accordance with s.
775.082. Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141 (Supp....
...The Florida Supreme Court gave some support to this possibility, and to the possibility that it had likewise considered such convictions in its review of petitioner's sentence. ( Douglas 1), supra,
328 So.2d at 18. The trial judge however, in his findings of fact entered in accord with Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141(3) (Supp....
...In support of this claim counsel for petitioner in their memorandum in support of petitioner's application for stay of execution raise all known objections to the death penalty. They admit that Proffitt, supra, found the post- Furman Florida Statute, Section 921.141 et seq., Fla.Stat., to be constitutional but urge that the statutes were unconstitutionally applied in petitioner's case....
...GIVEN THE REPRESENTATION AFFORDED PETITIONER BY HIS TRIAL COUNSEL, PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND HIS FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. Capital felony trials in Florida have both a "guilt" phase and an "advisory" phase. *801 See Fla.Stat.Ann. 921.141(1) (Supp.1981)....
...d since the petitioner's failure to offer evidence to the jury at the advisory phase of the trial deprived the judge of facts which might have been found by him to be mitigating. Florida's bifurcated procedure in capital felony trials, Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141 et seq. (Supp.1981), became effective December 8, 1972. State v. Dixon,
283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), was decided July 26, 1973, with rehearing denied October 10, 1973. Id. There a panel of the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section
921.141, Fla.Stat., and discussed in detail strategy and procedure thereunder....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1978 Fla. LEXIS 4900
...This cause consists of consolidated appeals from sentences of death entered upon pleas of guilty to murder in the first degree in three cases, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit for Dade County. Our jurisdiction to review this case is based on Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and Section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...The court conducted an extensive voir dire examination of appellant with respect to the factual basis of each charge, in response to which appellant essentially reiterated the substance of his sworn confessions to police. Appellant expressly waived his right to a jury during the sentencing phase of his trial under Section 921.141(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1975), and specifically requested the Court to determine punishment without a jury....
...unts of attempted murder in the first degree; and fifteen years imprisonment for conspiracy to commit robbery. The sentences in each case were to run consecutively. The judge’s order included his findings in support of each sentence as required by Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1975). The findings with respect to the Daniel Pridgen case were: 1.The murder . . was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. Section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes....
...himself. During the administration of the knife wounds, the victim was alive and in a position to feel the pain of each wound. 2. The murder . . was committed while the defendant was engaged in another dangerous and violent felony, to-wit: robbery, Section
921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes, and the capital felony was plainly committed for pecuniary gain, Section
921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes. The evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing indicates that the defendant stole money and a firearm from the victim’s apartment. Moreover, the defendant, through counsel, has conceded the applicability of Sections
921.141(5)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes, to the instant case. Under . . . Provence v. State,
337 So.2d 783 (Fla.1976), this court has treated the aggravating circumstances of Sections
921.141(5)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes, as one factor in determining that the sentence of death is appropriate. 3. The murder . . was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest and to hinder the enforcement of the laws of this State. Section
921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes....
...As to the mitigating factors contemplated by law, the court makes the following findings: a. While there was no evidence admitted of prior convictions of the defendant, he readily admitted that he had carried on a course of burglaries and had stolen property for a significant period of time, thus eliminating Section 921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes, as a mitigating circumstance....
...The defendant was not suffering from the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance during the perpetration of the crimes outlined-above and the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to requirements of law was not substantially impaired. Sections 921.141(6)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes....
...was nevertheless of major consequence to the murder of the victim. In no way could it be said that the defendant’s participation was relatively minor or that he was acting under extreme duress or substantial domination of another person. Sections 921.141(6)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes....
...e.The defendant’s age of twenty-six at the time of his criminal conduct cannot be considered a mitigating factor, especially when viewed in the context of the defendant’s acts in planning and perpetrating these crimes and in disposing of the proceeds. Section 921.141(6)(g), Florida Statutes. In support of its sentence in connection with the Birk incident, the court made the following findings: 1. The murder . . . was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. Section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes....
...This activity took place after the defendant broke into the victim’s home and robbed her in the presence of her three elderly sisters-in-law. 2. The murder . . . was committed while the defendant was engaged in other dangerous and violent felonies, to-wit: burglary and robbery, Section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes, and the capital felony was plainly committed for pecuniary gain, Section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes. Moreover, the defendant, through counsel, has conceded the applicability of Section 921.141(5)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes, to the instant case. [The court again treated Section 921.-141(5)(d) and (f) as one aggravating circumstance.] 3. The murder . . was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest and to hinder the enforcement of the laws of this State. Section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes....
...This was clearly for the purpose of avoiding detection and thereby preventing his arrest for these crimes. 4. During the defendant’s criminal activities he knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons by stabbing and *664 shooting the victim’s sisters-in-law. Section 921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes....
...at there are insufficient mitigating circumstances under Section 921.-141(6), Florida Statutes, to outweigh the aggravating circumstances set out above. The court made the same findings in this case with respect to the mitigating circumstances under Section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1975), as were made in the Daniel Pridgen case. As to the kidnapping and robbery and murder of Frank Meli, the court found that: 1. The murder . . . was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes....
...During the administration of the knife wounds, the victim was alive and in a position to feel the pain of each wound. . 2. The murder . . . was committed while the defendant was engaged in other dangerous and violent felonies, to-wit: kidnapping for ransom and robbery, Section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes, and the capital felony was plainly committed for pecuniary gain, Section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes....
...The evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing indicates that the defendant disposed of the proceeds of the crime by buying a motorcycle, paying off the co-defendants, and by entertaining himself at the dog track and at a bar. Moreover, the defendant, through counsel, has conceded the applicability of Sections 921.141(5)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes, to the instant case. [The court again treated Section 921.-141(5)(d) and (f) as a single aggravating circumstance.] 3. The murder . . was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest and to hinder the enforcement of the laws of this State. Section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes....
...A careful consideration of all matters presented to the court impels the conclusion that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances under Section 921.-141(6), Florida Statutes, to outweigh the aggravating circumstances set out above. The court made the same findings as to the mitigating circumstances under Section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1975), as were made in the other cases....
...On his appeal of the judgments of guilty and sentences as to each of these three cases, the appellant raises two points for vacating the sentences of death: (i) Whether the trial court erred in each of the above-styled causes in sentencing him to death by electrocution as provided by Section
921.141 and Section
775.082, Florida Statutes (1975); and (ii) Whether imposition and carrying out of the sentence of death under Sections
921.141 and
775.082, Florida Statutes (1975), constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the *665 United States. We will consider appellant’s points on appeal in inverse order. The assertion that imposition and carrying out of a sentence of death under Sections
775.082 and
921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court as well as this Court....
...Furthermore, the participants, after the killing, wrote matters on the walls of the house in order to leave the impression that Pridgen was murdered by a homosexual lover. This action could only have been calculated to serve as a device to mislead police authorities and thereby avoid detection. Nonetheless, even if Section
921.141(5)(e) is not supported by the evidence in the case of the Pridgen homicide, two well-founded additional aggravating factors [Section
921.141(5)(d) and (h)] and no mitigating factors were present. Under such circumstances the death penalty is appropriate. Elledge v. State,
346 So.2d 998 (Fla.1977); State v. Dixon, supra. Appellant additionally submits that Section
921.141(5)(e) should be taken in conjunction with the finding under subsection (d) [capital felony committed while defendant engaged in committing robbery and kidnapping] and subsection (f) [capital felony committed for pecuniary gain] of Section
921.141(5)....
...Meeks v. State,
339 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1976) (robbery); Knight v. State, supra (kidnapping). We come now to Washington’s assault upon the trial judge’s sentences, alleging his failure to consider the presence of two mitigating circumstances specified by Section
921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1975), plus an additional circumstance which he maintains should have been considered in mitigation....
...len merchandise to Katrina Birk and her husband. He reiterated in open court that he was selling “hot merchandise” to Katrina Birk. Appellant asserts that under the rule announced in Provence, supra, previous convictions are required to negative Section 921.141(6)(a). Washington misconstrues the holding of Provence . *667 That case construed Section 921.141(5)(b) which requires previous conviction of another capital felony involving the use or threat of violence....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...On December 14, 1972, Bradley was informed against, rather than indicted, for the first degree murder of one Robert Feaster which allegedly occurred on October 19, 1972, subsequent to the October 1, 1972 effective date of Florida's reenactment of the death penalty in Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1972)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 22097454
...red in declining to instruct the jury on each of his thirteen proposed nonstatutory mitigators. I reiterate that in a proper case, in which the evidence is insufficient to warrant an instruction on the statutory mitigating circumstances contained in section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (2002), an instruction that the jury may consider a specific circumstance in mitigation may nonetheless be warranted....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 627, 2012 WL 4760710, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 1951
...BACKGROUND Ferguson was convicted of six counts of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to death. We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal, but remanded for resentencing for proper consideration of mitigating circumstances under section 921.141(6)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes (1977), because the trial judge improperly used a sanity-type analysis to reject these circumstances....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105843, 2009 WL 3614313
...(2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a burglary; (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; and (4) the murder was cold, calculating, and premeditated. § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (e), (i), Fla....
...bipolar disorder not otherwise specified. Ultimately, Dr. Bordini concluded that Griffin was acting under extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the murder and that he should qualify for the extreme emotional disturbance mitigator, pursuant to § 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes....
...judge made ex parte request to prosecutor to prepare sentencing memo, the memo was adopted verbatim into the sentencing order, and there were no statements by the judge that satisfied the process of weighing aggravators and mitigators as required by § 921.141(3), Florida Statutes); Patterson v....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 656605
...er without the State's prior consent. Rule 3.260, which appears under the heading "Trial" in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that a defendant may, in writing, waive a jury trial with the consent of the State. Based on its interpretation of section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1991), [1] the trial court held Hernandez could waive an advisory jury in the penalty phase without the State's consent....
...encing phases. Hernandez,
633 So.2d at 25. In addition, the Fifth District declined to apply rule 3.260 to the sentencing phase because Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.780, entitled "Sentencing Hearing For Capital Cases," specifically refers to section
921.141 but does not mention rule 3.260 or indicate that rule 3.260 conflicts with that section....
...n capital cases. As the Fifth District found: It could not have been contemplated that the rule [3.260] was also applicable to the sentencing phase of a capital murder case because the legislature did not create the bifurcated procedure set forth in section 921.141(1) until 1972. Prior to 1972, there existed no provision to have a jury impaneled for a separate sentencing proceeding in a capital case. The fate of a capital defendant found guilty without a jury rested solely with the court. § 921.141, Fla....
...w penalty-phase proceeding. Whether the defendant alone may waive an advisory jury in the penalty phase of a capital case is the issue currently before us and we hold that the State's consent is not required. For the reasons stated, we conclude that section 921.141 is not a statutory override of rule 3.260. Accordingly, we approve the Fifth District's decision in Hernandez and disapprove Ferguson to the extent it is inconsistent with this decision. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1991), provides in part: Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment as authorized by s....
...If the trial jury has been waived, or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose, unless waived by the defendant. [2] Rule 3.780 provides: (a) Evidence. In all proceedings based on section 921.141, Florida Statutes, the state and defendant will be permitted to present evidence of an aggravating or mitigating nature, consistent with the requirements of the statute....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...part from your conversation with his parole officer, did you conduct any other preparation for the penalty phase? A: No. . The trial court’s jury instructions followed the language of Florida’s death penalty statute in effect at the time. Former section 921.141 provided: (2) Advisory sentence by the jury....
...red. (g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. . The Florida statute was amended by the legislature in 1979. This amendment removed the language limiting the mitigating circumstances to the list enumerated in the statute. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (2)(b), (3)(b) (1985)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 548, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 2530
for McCloud are life imprisonment or death. See §
921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) (“Upon conviction or adjudication
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 1287190
...not the triggerman. Id. at 899. The Court considered this evidence relevant to the circumstances of his participation in the crime, which, if true, would have been valid mitigation under the "minor participation" statutory mitigator. Id. (citing to § 921.141(6)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2012 WL 739203
...rder of Kushmer. See id,.,
937 So.2d at 597 . In rendering Taylor’s sentence, the trial court determined that the State had proven the existence of three statutory aggravators: (1) the murder was committed while Taylor was on felony probation, see §
921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001); (2) Taylor had previously been convicted of a felony involving a threat of violence to the person, see §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001); and (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, see §
921.141(5)(f), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 74251
...Therefore, for the reasons stated here and in our earlier decision, we again affirm the two death sentences. It is so ordered. OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. [2] See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 948507, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4625
...e was committed while
Hitchcock was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
and whether his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform
his conduct to the law was substantially impaired. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b),
(f) (1996)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 275167
...NOTES [1] The three aggravating factors were: previous conviction of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a burglary; and the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...After examining a presentence report, the court accepted the jury’s recommendation. In its findings of fact, the court found the following statutory aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or flight after committing, the crime of robbery and rape [Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(d) ]; (2) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel [Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(h) ]; and (3) the capital felony was committed in connection with the crime of robbery which was perpetrated for pecuniary gain [ Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (5)(f) ]....
...The court, relying on the presentence report and the original jury’s recommendation, again sentenced Magill to death. Along with the aggravating factors found at trial, the court found three mitigating circumstances: (1) that Magill was seventeen years old at the time of the crime [Fla.Stat. § 921.141(6)(g) ]; (2) that Magill had no significant prior criminal record [Fla.Stat. § 921.141(6)(a) ]; and (3) that Magill’s father passed away on December 28, 1975....
...fluence of an extreme emotional or mental disturbance at the time of the crime. This testimony, from a defense witness, virtually precluded the jury from finding that Magill had established one of the statutory mitigating factors. See Fla.Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)....
...tainly indicates its belief that the statutory list of mitigating factors was exclusive. The court could have gleaned support for this proposition from Cooper v. State,
336 So.2d 1133, 1139 (Fla.1976) (“the sole issue in a sentencing hearing under section
921.141 Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...He argues: (1) there was improper weighing and evaluation of mitigating evidence because the mitigation outweighed the aggravation; (2) the prosecutor's "mercy is inappropriate" comment was a misstatement of the law; (3) the victim impact evidence did not comply with section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1995), and should have been prohibited under Booth v....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), decided June 29, 1972, which abolished the death penalty, is still upon us. Following abolition of the death penalty in Furman, prosecutors properly charged persons accused of first degree murder by information. After the Legislature *740 revitalized the death penalty by the enactment of Section
921.141, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...pro se with
standby counsel. Muhammad was convicted and waived a jury recommendation in
the penalty phase. The trial court found nothing in mitigation, and found three
aggravating factors: (1) the defendant was under a sentence of imprisonment,
§ 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); (2) the defendant had been convicted of a prior
capital felony, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat.; and (3) the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2013 WL 264437
...Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim. 3. Minor Participant Evidence Merck asserts that his penalty phase counsel was ineffective for failing to proffer testimony which would have demonstrated that Merck was a minor participant in accordance with section 921.141(6)(d), Florida Statutes....
...State,
572 So.2d 895, 899 (Fla.1990). In the penalty phase, a trial judge is permitted to consider as mitigating evidence the fact that a defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony and that his or her participation was relatively minor. See §
921.141(6)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2013 WL 221459, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 1457
...As distinguished from Arizona’s
system, Florida has a hybrid system in which the jury renders an advisory verdict
on the sentence, and the trial judge decides the ultimate sentence.” Grim v. Buss,
No. 3:08-cv-0002-MCR,
2011 WL 1299930, at *66 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2011)
(citing Fla. Stat. §
921.141).
In Evans v....
...§]
775.082.” Section
775.082 states, in pertinent part:
A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished
by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the
procedure set forth in [Fla. Stat. §]
921.141 results in findings by the
court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such
person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible
for parole.
Fla. Stat. §
775.082(1).
Section
921.141, in turn, lists the aggravating circumstances that may warrant a
death sentence....
...6 In brief, Count I notified Grim that he was (1) charged with
stabbing the victim with a knife and beating her with a hammer, and in the
process thereof did use, carry or possess a weapon, to-wit: a knife and hammer in
violation of Section[ ]
782.04 . . . , Florida Statutes.
6
Under §
921.141(5),
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.–Aggravating circumstances shall be
limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a
felony and under sentence of imprisonment or...
...§]
784.046, or a foreign protection
9
Case: 11-11890 Date Filed: 01/22/2013 Page: 10 of 10
capital murder and (2) could be sentenced to death if any of the aggravating
circumstances listed in §
921.141 were found by the court....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 415241
...Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner. Carey Haughwout of Tierney & Haughwout, West Palm Beach, for respondent. STONE, Judge. We grant certiorari and quash an order declaring unconstitutional that part of the capital sentencing statute allowing victim impact evidence, section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes....
...Respondent was convicted of first degree murder in 1981. The supreme court vacated his death sentence and ordered a new penalty phase. Maxwell v. State,
603 So.2d 490 *872 (Fla. 1992). On remand, Respondent attacked the admissibility of victim impact evidence. Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, was amended in 1992 to provide: (7) Victim Impact Evidence....
...Article I, Section 16(b) of the Florida Constitution provides that victims of crime, including the next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to be heard in criminal proceedings, to the extent that doing so does not interfere with a defendant's constitutional rights. The trial court held that section 921.141(7) was unconstitutional for several reasons, including that the statute: (1) interferes with the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors and will cause arbitrary and capricious results; (2) lacks guidance to the judge on weighi...
...The trial court also was concerned that the statute infringes on the supreme court's exclusive right to regulate procedure. But, in Booker v. State,
397 So.2d 910 (Fla.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 957,
102 S.Ct. 493,
70 L.Ed.2d 261 (1981), the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that section
921.141, Florida Statutes, is not unconstitutional on that ground. The trial court also held that the victim impact subsection violates ex post facto principles, because the amendment was adopted after the respondent's crime. However, section
921.141(7) does not purport to affect personal rights as it relates only to the admission of evidence....
...r the offense. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in ruling that the victim impact evidence statute was unconstitutional. We certify, as a question of great public importance, the question: IS SECTION 921.141(7), FLORIDA STATUTES, ALLOWING VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL? ANSTEAD and POLEN, JJ., concur....
...ON MOTION FOR REHEARING PER CURIAM. Respondent's motion for rehearing is denied. However, we withdraw the opinion issued August 10, 1994, and republish the opinion in full adding the following paragraph: We certify, as a question of great public importance, the question: IS SECTION 921.141(7), FLORIDA STATUTES, ALLOWING VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL? STONE, POLEN, JJ., and HARRY LEE ANSTEAD, Associate Judge, concur.
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 6531
...most nonexistent" mitigating circumstances. Since there is no reasonable basis for the jury's recommendation, the override should be upheld. Increasingly, in my view, where there is a life recommendation by the jury, the weighing process mandated by section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1989), is held for naught by this Court's decisions. I am gravely concerned that this Court's application of the so-called Tedder standard is rapidly making the jury the actual sentencer where there is a life recommendation. To do so, in the face of the clear language of section 921.141(3), may well render Florida's death penalty unconstitutional....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...nd the defendant an opportunity to explain, contradict, and argue regarding the relevance, materiality, and import of the confidential information, as well as other matters properly considered by the trial court concerning appellant's sentence under section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1977)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2015 WL 686047
...We agree with Oyóla that the Second Revised Sentencing Order reflects a misdirected analysis by the trial judge and denigrates mitigation evidence. We therefore reverse and remand this case for a new penalty phase proceeding. 10 *509 Improper Consideration of Nonstatutory Aggravating Factors Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, governs capital sentencing procedures. After the jury issues an advisory sentence, the judge must independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances before a sentence is ordered. § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2007). The capital sentencing statute expressly constrains the aggravating circumstances a trial judge may consider to fifteen enumerated factors. § 921.141(5), Fla....
...It also provides seven specific factors for a court to consider as possible mitigating circumstances, along with an eighth “catch-all” provision that expands the realm of mitigating circumstances to “any other factors in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty.” 11 § 921.141(6), Fla. Stat. Thus, while the statute governs both aggravating and mitigating factors, the statutory scheme allows a court to consider nonstatutory mitigating factors, but limits consideration of aggravating factors to only those listed in section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes....
...s harmful. Just as a jury should not be exposed to evidence of impermissible aggravating factors, a judge should not be permitted to consider them as part of the evaluation process. It is clear that capital sentencing must proceed in accordance with section 921.141, Florida Statutes....
...conform to the procedures dictated by statute and our jurisprudence. It is so ordered. LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, •LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and PERRY, JJ., concur. POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion. . Oyóla has a full-scale IQ score of 74. . § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). . § 921.141 (5)(d), Fla. Stat. . § 921.141 (5)(h), Fla....
...State,
970 So.2d 806, 822-23 (Fla.2007); Hernandez-Alberto v. State,
889 So.2d 721, 733 (Fla.2004)). . Although the aggravating factors that may be considered are limited by statute, the weight assigned to established factors falls within the discretion of the trial court. See §
921.141(5), Fla....
...Stat.; Globe v. State,
877 So.2d 663, 674 (Fla.2004). . During oral argument, the State conceded that a harmless error analysis was inapplicable under these circumstances. . The trial courts in Globe and Kilgore found as aggravating factors both sections
921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes, that the capital felony was committed by a prior felon and imprisoned, placed on community control, or on felony probation, and
921.141(5)(b), the capital felony was committed by a person convicted of a prior violent felony. See Globe,
877 So.2d at 668 n. 3; Kilgore,
688 So.2d at 897 nn. 1-2. This trial court did not find section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, as an aggravating circumstance....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...sentence of death; (4) determine whether any mitigating circumstances exist and
unanimously determine whether the aggravating factors outweigh those mitigating
circumstances; and (5) unanimously determine that the defendant should be
sentenced to death. See Hurst,
202 So. 3d at 57; §
921.141(2), Fla....
...to a life sentence
unless a unanimous jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of
“capital first-degree murder”—which Foster defines as “murder plus the . . .
elements the jury is required to find unanimously under revised § 921.141, Fla.
Stat.” He argues that a conviction for “capital first-degree murder” requires not
only the statutorily defined elements of first-degree murder, but the specific
unanimous penalty phase findings set forth in Hurst; section 921.141, Florida
Statutes, which was revised to incorporate the Hurst requirements; and chapter
2017-1, Laws of Florida, which amended section 921.141 to require that a jury’s
recommendation of death be unanimous....
...775.082.
-8-
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the crime of first-degree murder, of which Foster was convicted, is
defined in section
782.04 as a capital felony—this is regardless of whether the
death penalty is ultimately imposed. Moreover, section
921.141(1), “Separate
Proceedings on Issue of Penalty,” begins as follows: “Upon conviction or
adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a
separate proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment as authorized by s....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 23094766
...Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order as to this claim and remand for reconsideration. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. NORTHCUTT and CANADY, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] We note that in Elam,
636 So.2d at 1314, the aggravating circumstances provision to which the supreme court most likely referred was section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), which provided the following as an aggravating circumstance for imposition of the death penalty: "The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or thr...
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...amendment to article X, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, which was approved
by the voters of Florida on November 6, 2018, entitles him to vacatur of his death
sentence or resentencing under chapters 2016-13 and 2017-1, Laws of Florida,
which revised section 921.141, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...(3) FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCE OF DEATH.-Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court , after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death .... Id. at 857 (quoting § 921.141(2) - (3), Fla....
...As explained in detail below, we agree with the special concurrence that these types of claims categorically fail and improperly use Caldwell . This Court, however, must acknowledge the challenge in order to answer it definitively. The excerpted language from section 921.141, Florida Statutes, remained substantively unchanged between Combs and Hurst v....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7639, 2016 WL 1660403
...rk. In addition to making these observations, the judge issued a sentencing opinion formalizing the defendant’s sentence. In that opinion, the' court found as aggravating factors Clark’s previous conviction for another capital felony, Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (6)(b), that the murder of Wiliis was comhiitted during the commission of a robbery, Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (6)(d), and that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (6)(f)....
...be heard in person. Second, after hearing the evidence and argument, the trial judge-should then recess the proceeding to consider the appropriate sentence. If the judge determines that the death sentence should be imposed, then, in accordance with section 921.141; Florida Statutes (1983), the judge must set forth in writing the reasons for imposing the death sentence....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 6142
...r, Lloyd Walker, were shot. Walker later died of his wounds. The state elected to try Meeks separately for each indictment. At the penalty phase of both trials, the jurors were instructed to consider only those mitigating circumstances enumerated in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975)....
...This includes the trial of Douglas Ray Meeks in 1975. In the 1970s, because of our own erroneous interpretation of federal case law, this Court directly barred capital defendants from presenting any mitigating evidence other than that described in the narrow list contained at that time in section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...ces arguing that our precedents "indicate unequivocally that the list of mitigating factors is not exhaustive." Id. Yet, Cooper plainly and directly reveals this remark to be untrue. In Cooper, we stated: The sole issue in a sentencing hearing under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), is to examine in each case the itemized aggravating and mitigating circumstances....
...Such evidence threatens the proceeding with the undisciplined discretion condemned in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Cooper,
336 So.2d at 1139 (emphasis added). Then in a footnote we elaborated: The legislative intent to avoid condemned arbitrariness pervades the statute. Section
921.141(2) requires the jury to render its advisory sentence "upon the following matters: (a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (6); (b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (7), which *718 outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist... ." (emphasis added). This limitation is repeated in Section
921.141(3), governing the trial court's decision on the penalty. Both sections
921.141(6) and
921.141(7) begin with words of mandatory limitation....
...The reports of the two psychiatrists who examined Meeks prior to trial contain background information recognized by the trial judge in both sentencing orders, including an express finding of Meeks' low intelligence. The mental health evidence was admissible under section 921.141(6)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...first-degree murder may be imposed either consecutively or concurrently, in the trial court's discretion, for each and every homicide." Enmund,
476 So.2d at 168 (emphasis added). In spite of this language, however, the Enmund decision's reliance on section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1983); and section
775.082, *957 Florida Statutes (1983), which together provide that a person convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without eligibility of parole for 25 y...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2012 WL 4665829, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 1922
...he victim and then forcibly took his jewelry and wallet. The trial court acknowledged on the record that this stipulation was sufficient for the State to have met its burden of proving the existence of the prior violent felony aggravator pursuant to section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2007)....
...icted of a felony and under sentence of *1008 imprisonment or placed on community control or felony probation.” During the penalty phase, Kaczmar stipulated to the court that he qualified for the aggravator of “prior violent felon” pursuant to section 921.141(5)(B), for a prior robbery conviction....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 258100
...(1971) provided that a person convicted of a capital felony "shall be punished by death." Prosecution for an offense punishable by death could be commenced at any time. § 932.465(2), Fla. Stat. (1971). [3] October 1, 1972 was the effective date of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...” The sentencing phase of a capital murder trial in Florida presents a different situation than the guilt phase. In Florida, the jury has the choice of recommending a life sentence or the death penalty after finding the defendant guilty. Fla.Stat. § 921.141(2) (West Supp.1983)....
...10 Hall’s claim lacks merit. Under Florida law, an aggravating circumstance exists when a defendant has been “previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5)(b) (West Supp.1983)....
...11 Hall contends that his testimony *775 during the sentencing phase of the trial was sufficient to prove the mitigating circumstances of diminished capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and under influence of extreme emotional disturbance. 12 Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(6)(b), (f) (West Supp.1983)....
...utional magnitude. Houston,
569 F.2d at 377-78, n. 8 (1978). . In Florida, a death sentence can be recommended by the jury and imposed by the trial court when aggravating circumstances exist which outweigh the mitigating circumstances. FIa.Stat.Ann. §
921.141(2), (3) (Supp.1983). . Fla.Stat.Ann. §
921.141(6) (West Supp.1983) provides seven mitigating circumstances for the jury to consider: (6) Mitigating circumstances....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 8652, 2016 WL 2754018
...1980), that a
guilty plea, or verdict of guilty, prior to adjudication and sentencing, constituted a
- 14 -
Case: 13-15874 Date Filed: 05/11/2016 Page: 21 of 25
“conviction” for purposes of section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975),
governing aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing proceedings....
...in capital sentencing5 because it “was so intended by the [L]egislature.” Id. at
1154. This conclusion was based in large part on the fact that in determining if a
death sentence should be imposed, a court must consider the circumstances set
forth in section 921.141, Florida Statutes, which will aid the judge in “establishing
the overall character analysis of a defendant so that he [or she] may properly
determine the appropriate sentence.” Id....
...from possessing firearms, is a reasonable public safeguard “intended to protect the
public by preventing the possession of firearms by persons who, because of their
past conduct, have demonstrated unfitness to be entrusted with such dangerous
5. Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975).
- 15 -
Case: 13-15874 Date Filed: 05/11/2016 Page: 22 of 25
instrumentalities.” State v....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 126, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 444, 2015 WL 919802
...Circumstances
After consideration of sentencing memoranda submitted by both parties, the
court, on March 19, 2013, held a sentencing hearing and entered the order
sentencing Campbell to death. The court found as an aggravating factor under
section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2013), that the defendant was previously
convicted of felonies involving the use or threat of violence, including conviction
for attacking his sister-in-law and attempting to hit her on the head with a hammer
in 1998 after breaking into her apartment....
...icer with a deadly weapon during this
instant crime because Campbell rammed the officer’s vehicle at high speed with
the car he was driving. This aggravator was given great weight.
The court also found as an aggravating circumstance under section
921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (2013), that the murder was committed for
pecuniary gain because Campbell took money, credit cards, and other things of
value from the victim to use in purchasing illegal drugs. This aggravator was
given great weight.
- 24 -
The third aggravator found by the trial court, under section 921.141(5)(h),
Florida Statutes (2013), was that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel....
...second time and proceeded to gather money and other items. His own statements
indicated that after seeing the victim’s arm move, Campbell struck him again with
the hatchet. This aggravator was given great weight.
The fourth aggravator found by the court, under section 921.141(5)(i),
Florida Statutes (2013), was that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated,
and premeditated manner without pretense of moral or legal justification....
...The trial court rejected two aggravators that were argued to the jury and
upon which the jury was instructed. The trial court found that the State failed to
- 25 -
prove that the murder was committed to avoid arrest, under section 921.141(5)(e),
Florida Statutes (2013), and that the victim was particularly vulnerable due to age
or disability under section 921.141(5)(m), Florida Statutes (2013).
Mitigating Circumstances
The trial court found the statutory mitigator under section 921.141(6)(b),
Florida Statutes (2013), that the murder was committed while Campbell was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance....
...e was
previously hospitalized for attempted suicide; and that he was under the stress of
job loss and a dysfunctional relationship with his father. This mitigator was given
little weight.
The court also found the statutory mitigator under section 921.141(6)(f),
Florida Statutes (2013), that Campbell’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired....
...Bursten that Campbell
had a history of depression and drug abuse, other mental issues, and suicidal
tendencies. The court concluded that even though Campbell knew right from
wrong, the mitigator was established, but given extremely little weight.
- 26 -
Under section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (2013), providing for what is
commonly called “nonstatutory mitigation,” the trial court found several mitigators
were proven....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida
...he death penalty by the Supreme Court of Florida after it was vacated by the trial court on collateral attack violates the double jeopardy clause within the meaning of Bullington v. Missouri,
451 U.S. 430,
101 S.Ct. 1852,
68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981); that Section
921.141(5)(h) of the Florida Statutes which establishes as an aggravating circumstance that a homicide was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" was both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to the facts of this case; and fina...
...Petitioner also attacked the imposition of the death penalty urging that varying aggravating factors had been improperly applied to this case, and that other mitigating circumstances had not been considered. The trial court found that all eight aggravating circumstances listed in Florida Statute, Section 921.141(5)(a)-(h), (1977), fairly applied. The trial judge further found that none of the mitigating circumstances listed in Section 921.141(6)(a)-(g) applied, and concluded that no mitigating circumstances existed which could outweigh the aggravating circumstances. First, Petitioner argued that he was not "under sentence of imprisonment" at the time the capital felonies were committed within the meaning of Section 921.141(5)(a) because the crimes were not committed while he was incarcerated or after he had escaped from incarceration....
...erly applied this aggravating circumstance. Second, the trial judge had found, and in the view of the Supreme Court of Florida properly, that the Petitioner had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to person, Section 921.141(5)(b), (assault with intent to commit rape). Third, Petitioner asserted that the trial judge had improperly considered that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons under 921.141(5)(c)....
...to die for what might have occurred. Fourth, the trial judge found, and the appellate court sustained the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance that the capital felony was committed during the commission of another serious felony listed in Section 921.141(5)(d), in this case robbery. The Supreme Court did hold, however, that that same circumstance could not also constitute the basis for finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance listed in Section 921.141(5)(f), i.e., a capital felony committed for pecuniary gain as the trial judge had improperly done. Petitioner further argued on appeal that the trial judge had improperly applied Section 921.141(5)(e) (capital felony committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or effect an escape from custody) to him because he could not have attempted to avoid arrest when he was unaware that his cohorts had originally planned to kill the victims....
...to the crime, but again disapproved of the fact that the trial judge had used these same incidents as a basis for also finding that capital felonies were committed for the purpose of hindering the lawful exercise of enforcement of the criminal laws, Section 921.141(5)(g), criticizing the process of "doubling up of aggravating circumstances," and therefore struck this aggravating factor....
...rcumstance that the defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person, that his participation was relatively minor and that he had acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person, Sections 921.141(6)(d) and (e)....
...ial after an acquittal which the double jeopardy clause prohibits. In short we do not believe that double jeopardy has been implicated here. IV. A. Petitioner's next contention is that the trial judge and the Florida Supreme Court improperly applied Section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statute, establishing as an aggravating circumstance that a *1163 homicide was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" in the instant case....
...lly infirm because the trial court and the Florida Supreme Court failed to give weight to the non-statutory mitigating circumstance that he was a non-shooter. The trial judge made written findings relating to mitigating circumstances as specified by Section 921.141(6), Florida Statute Annotated (1985)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18667
...At the conclusion of the hearing the jury is directed to consider [w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist ... which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and ... [b]ased on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death. §§ 921.141(2)(b) and (c) (Supp....
...he sentence of death is based as to the facts: (a) [t]hat sufficient [statutory] aggravating circumstances exist ... and (b) [t]hat there are insufficient *638 [statutory] [2] mitigating circumstances ... to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. §§ 921.141(3) (Supp....
...We therefore hold that the judgment and sentence of death upon the appellant, William D. Christopher, are affirmed. Examination of the record reveals that the trial judge fully considered the evidence before him and did not limit his consideration of mitigating factors to those specifically enumerated in Fla.Stat. § 921.141....
...At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge stated that he had read the presentence investigation report which "contain[ed] very valuable information about the life that you led in the past." (R. 1233). Further, the record is clear that the trial judge considered Florida's sentencing statute, § 921.141 and the guidelines ("I'm talking about the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances in your case.") (R....
...from defense as to the test results at the penalty phase, the petitioner never proffered the results at that time. If petitioner had proffered the results of the sodium pentothal test at the penalty phase, when rules of admissibility are relaxed (F.S. 921.141(1)) such evidence would only be cumulative evidence as to the voluntariness of petitioner's confession or his innocence and guilt....
...ted in subsection (5); (b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and (c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment of death. § 921.141(2)....
...g the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts. § 921.141(3) (a) That sufficient exhausting circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5); and (b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances .... § 921.141(3) ....
...the enforcement of laws. (h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. (i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. § 921.141(5)....
...(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. (f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. (g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. § 921.141(6) [3] The statutory procedure that existed at the time of petitioner's trial provided that only statutory mitigating circumstances could be considered. Subsequently, the statute was amended in 1979 to prescribe a determination whether the statutory aggravating circumstance are outweighed by any mitigating circumstance, statutory or nonstatutory. § 921.141(3)(a) and (b) 1979 Fla.Law, c....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 149737
...Skye, Assistant Public Defender, Tampa, for Respondent. PER CURIAM. The State of Florida seeks certiorari review of a pretrial court order that bars the jury's consideration, during the penalty phase of a death prosecution, of victim impact evidence authorized by section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1997), and approved by Burns v....
...icide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused. *24 Section 921.141(7) Florida Statutes (1997), reads: VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE.Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence....
...Heggs,
658 So.2d 523, 525 (Fla.1995). Therefore, we grant the petition, quash the subject order, and direct the trial court to consider the admissibility of victim impact evidence in accordance with the requirements of article I, section 16(b), Florida Constitution; section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1997); and the Florida Evidence Code....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 61394
...On the one hand, he did not limit Jackson in the introduction of nonstatutory mitigating evidence. On the other, he did give the improper jury instruction, and his sentencing order made reference to insufficient mitigating circumstances "as enumerated" in section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 409, 2013 WL 2631159, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 1183
...great weight: (1) appellant had a prior violent felony conviction based on the aggravated battery of Roya Gordon; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (3) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). See § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). In mitigation, the trial court found the statutory mitigator of no significant history of criminal activity, giving it some weight, but rejected the statutory age mitigator. See § 921.141(6), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 375010
...State,
603 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Similarly, a prior juvenile adjudication for a violent felony may not serve as an aggravating circumstance under the death penalty statute because it is not a "conviction" as required by the statutory language. See §
921.141(5)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 12279, 2012 WL 3055004
...o comport with statutory or constitutional limitations. Instead, he focuses entirely on the alleged flaws in the procedure used to impose his sentence *1133 and specifically on the court’s failure to consider certain mitigating factors pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1995)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 413823
...lyn Giambalvo, Assistant Public Defender, Clearwater, for Respondent. LAZZARA, Judge. The State of Florida invokes our certiorari jurisdiction to review the trial court's order which prohibits the use of the newly created aggravating circumstance of section 921.141(5)(m), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), in seeking the death penalty against the respondent....
...d on or between the 17th and 18th days of February, 1996. It also filed a written notice of its intention to seek the death penalty. One of the aggravating circumstances which the State wants to utilize in its quest for the death penalty is based on section 921.141(5)(m), which the legislature enacted into law on May 30, 1996....
...as eighty-nine years of age, was suffering from immobility requiring the use of a cane or walker, and was visually and hearing impaired. The respondent in due course filed a motion to prohibit the application of the aggravating circumstance found in section 921.141(5)(m)....
...t would be judicially beneficial to refer the issue posed in the trial court's order to that court for immediate resolution so that trial courts in this state will have the benefit of a definitively uniform pronouncement regarding the application of section 921.141(5)(m) to cases in which the capital murder was allegedly committed prior to its effective date....
...Accordingly, we believe that this is another compelling reason why we should afford the supreme court the immediate opportunity to review the trial court's order. We also find it significant that in the event we decided to quash the trial court's order thus allowing the State to use the aggravating circumstance of section 921.141(5)(m), and that in the event the trial court ultimately imposes the death penalty by relying on this circumstance, our decision would not preclude the respondent under the doctrine of law of the case from raising the ex post facto issue on direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court....
...ing the propriety of the trial court's order. [2] We note that the respondent relied on a written order rendered by a trial court in a different judicial circuit of this district which also granted a defendant's motion to prohibit the application of section 921.141(5)(m) on the basis of the ex post facto prohibitions contained in the United States and Florida Constitutions. This order is in the record. According to the record, however, the State in that case did not seek review of the order but instead elected to proceed to trial. Thus, the issue of whether section 921.141(5)(m) can be retroactively applied to a capital felony committed prior to its effective date is not unique to the respondent's case.
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 409004
...ner sentenced to life, caused a substantial substantive disadvantage to the petitioner such that it constituted a violation of the ex post facto provision. Id. at 181-82. The state also cites State v. Hootman,
709 So.2d 1357, 1359 (Fla.1998)(holding section
921.141(5)(m), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), which added an aggravating factor to those factors which jury may consider to determine whether the death penalty may be imposed, could not be imposed retroactively)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 123076
...KOGAN, Justice, dissenting. I dissent for the reasons stated in Espinosa v. State (Fla. 1991) (Kogan, J., dissenting). NOTES [1] The jury recommended the death penalty for Espinosa by an eleven-to-one vote, and he, too, was sentenced to death. [2] § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (e), (h), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 38, 2017 WL 372092, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 194
...This Court has interpreted the phrase “shall be subject to” as a mandatory command and a permissive instruction in different contexts. Compare Robertson v. State,
143 So.3d 907, 908-09 (Fla. 2014) (explaining that because the Legislature has mandated in section
921.141(4), Florida Statutes (2013), that “[t]he judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida,” Florida law “re *979 quires that this Court shall automatically review...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 45, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 114, 2015 WL 268099
...Next, the trial court
addressed Sparre’s numerous actions to conceal his involvement after he murdered
Tiara Pool.10
The record also reflects that the trial court properly found that Sparre’s age
of nineteen years at the time of the crime was established under the statutory
requirements. See § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
...(except felony probation) was sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors due to
the totality of the aggravating factors that we uphold and affirm today. There is no
possibility that any erroneous finding on this issue affected the sentence
12. See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2010).
13. See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...This was error since the trial court is required by Florida’s capital
sentencing statute to ensure that the defendant is truly deserving of the death
penalty, which is not solely dependent on a defendant’s own wishes to be
sentenced to death. See § 921.141(3), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 547749
...Ironically, the judge's probing focused on a factor which, based on the record before us, might not even constitute significant mitigation in this case. [2] Furthermore, because of the weighing process involved in death penalty cases, this should not be a concern for the court until after the penalty phase becomes necessary. Section 921.141(6)(g), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that age [3] is a mitigating circumstance, although "where the defendant is not a minor, i.e., under eighteen, `no per se rule exists which pinpoints a particular age as an automatic circumstance in mitigation....
...ll be appropriate because the comments went beyond a mere adverse ruling. [6] For example, there is currently no requirement that the jury list what mitigation evidence it believed or the weight it gave any factor in rendering its advisory sentence. Section 921.141(2) requires the jury to deliberate only on which set of circumstances aggravating or mitigating cumulatively outweighed the other, § 921.141(2)(a)-(b), and "[b]ased on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death," § 921.141(2)(c)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 453, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 271, 2013 WL 627146
...Statutory Mental Mitigation Bolin asserts that the trial court erred in not finding the statutory mitigator of “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his [or her]” conduct or to conform his [or her] conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...Bolin contends that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mental mitigator that “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his [or her] conduct or to conform his [or her] conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.” See § 921.141(6)©, Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 59, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 237, 2012 WL 300885
...Florida law provides that “evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” § 921.141(1), Fla....
...State,
9 So.3d 593, 607 (Fla.2009). And this Court reviews a trial court’s decision to find an aggravator for competent substantial evidence. See id. The HAC aggravating circumstance applies when “[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” §
921.141(5)(h), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The Hitchcock Court determined that this instruction was constitutionally defective because it failed to apprise the jury that it could consider any relevant mitigating evidence that did not fall within the scope of seven "statutory mitigating factors" contained in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975)....
...nce, are these: [listing only the seven statutory mitigating factors]." Then, in its written sentencing order, the court made the following analysis: The Court has carefully reviewed those seven mitigating circumstances contained in Florida Statutes 921.141(6)(a-g)....
...The trial judge failed to consider any of this evidence, mistakenly believing that he could not do so. I cannot conclude that this was harmless error. KOGAN, J., concurs NOTES [1] The trial court in Hitchcock had stated that "`there [were] insufficient mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in §
921.141(6) [, Florida Statutes], to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.'" Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393, 395-96,
107 S.Ct. 1821, 1823,
95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (quoting trial transcript; emphasis in original). [2] The opinion was dated March 29, 1979, several months before amendments to section
921.141 took effect that eliminated language restricting mitigating factors to those listed in the statute....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2011 WL 6090069
...The next *790 morning, Buzia was arrested at a bank where he was attempting to cash a check drawn from the Kersches’ account. Id. In determining the sentence, the trial court found the following with regard to mitigation: [T]he court assigned little weight to two factors under the statutory catchall provision, section 921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes (2003), specifically Buzia’s interaction with the community and his work record....
...en in a 1994 incident. They opined that the effect of the mild impairment coupled with Buzia’s drug addiction resulted in extreme mental disturbance and the inability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, the two statutory mitigators. § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 7359860, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24506
...The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eight to four. The trial
court found three statutory aggravating circumstances: Holland was previously
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person, Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(5)(b) (2010); the capital felony was committed while Holland was
engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit the crime of robbery or an attempt to commit
the crime of sexual battery or both, id. § 921.141(5)(d); and the crime was
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an
2
Under Florida law, a Spencer hearing gives the defendant, his counsel, and the State the
opportunity to be heard and to presen...
...has offered its recommendation. See Spencer v. State,
615 So. 2d 688, 690-91 (Fla. 1993) (per
curiam).
14
Case: 12-12404 Date Filed: 12/29/2014 Page: 15 of 58
escape from custody, id. §
921.141(5)(e), which merged with the fact that the
victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the
performance of his legal duties, id. §
921.141(5)(j)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 22023448
...der at the time of appellant's offense has not been declared unconstitutional. See generally Howard v. State,
385 So.2d 739, 739-40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) ("After the Legislature revitalized the death penalty [in response to Furman ] by the enactment of Section
921.141, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1989 WL 37076
...stances. The Court need not summarize the entire sentencing proceeding. The state trial judge stated his entire consideration of mitigating circumstances in his sentencing judgment as follows: *602 Mitigating circumstances set out in Florida Statute § 921.141(6)(a, b, c, d, e, and f) do not apply in this case. Mitigating circumstances set out in Florida Statute § 921.141(6)(g) does apply in this case. The Defendant Woods was eighteen years of age at the time of the offense. Although evidence was presented at the penalty phase in an effort to show that the mitigating circumstances set out in § 921.141(6)(f) applied to the Defendant, the evidence consisted essentially of test results that indicated a low intelligence quotient of the Defendant....
...r shall be the following ...' (listing the statutory mitigating circumstances)." Id.
107 S.Ct. at 1824. Imposing the death sentence, the sentencing judge found that "there [were] insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in Florida Statute
921.141(6) to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." Id....
...a statutory mitigating factor was the judge's discussion of the evidence of mental incapacity. The judge's analysis was as follows: Although evidence was presented at the penalty phase in an effort to show that the mitigating circumstance set out in § 921.141(6)(f) applied to the Defendant, the evidence consisted essentially of test results that indicated a low intelligence quotient of the Defendant....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...However, Furman invalidated the existing death penalty statute, thus abrogating the classification "capital crimes" in Florida until revived by subsequent remedial legislation. Donaldson v. Sack,
265 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1972). Effective October 1, 1972, capital offenses were reinstated by legislative enactment. §
921.141, Fla....
...Sack, supra , which theory is inconsistent with the holding in State ex rel. Manucy v. Wadsworth,
293 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1974). The critical dates in all of these cases, including the case at bar, are July 24, 1972, the effective date of Furman v. Georgia, supra ; October 1, 1972, the effective date of Section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1972) re-enacting "capital crimes" in Florida; and the respective dates of the alleged crimes and the filing of charging documents....
...ffenses. Without receding from, or overruling, Donaldson, the Court then held in Manucy (decided before Dobbert, supra ), that an indictment by a grand jury was necessary to charge a "capital crime" if the charge was made after the effective date of Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1972), even though the crime charged occurred prior thereto and was not a capital crime because of Furman....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29734, 2005 WL 2406040
...The jury need not reveal what aggravators or mitigators it considered, and its recommendation need not be unanimous. See §
775.082, Fla. Stat. (prescribing a life sentence for first-degree murder unless the death penalty is imposed following set procedures); §
921.141, Fla....
...775.082," id., which provided that one convicted of a capital felony: shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s.
921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter event such person shall be punished by death. §
775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (1977) (emphasis added). At the time, §
921.141 did not include the CCP aggravator, thus giving rise to the issue at hand. Section
921.141(1) stated that upon adjudication of guilt for a capital felony, the court must conduct a separate sentencing "to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment as authorized by s....
...775.082." After receiving the jury's advisory verdict, the court was required to determine the sentence. If the court imposed a death sentence, it was required to set forth in writing its findings, including that "sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5)...." § 921.141(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1977). Failure to set forth the court's findings precluded the imposition of a death sentence. See § 921.141(3), Fla....
...ains that before it was added to the statute, premeditation alone was not listed as an aggravator and could not serve as such. Section
775.082 set the maximum punishment for premeditated murder at life imprisonment unless a proceeding was held under §
921.141 "to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment as authorized by s.
775.082." §
921.141(1) (emphasis added)....
...The assertion is incorrect. J.1. Claim X: Procedural Background Trial Proceedings. During a Florida penalty phase proceeding, the jury considers all evidence, determines whether aggravating and mitigating factors are present, and weighs any such factors. See § 921.141, Fla....
...in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. § 921.141(5)(d)....
...[25] The 1977 version of the relevant portion of each of the three statutes discussed here was in effect as of May 11, 1979. Two of the statutes had been amended prior to the murder. One amendment was irrelevant to the issues at hand. See Ch. 79-400 (amending §
782.04). The other was the addition of the CCP aggravator to §
921.141, which is the amendment under discussion....
...In each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of the court shall be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances in subsections (5) [aggravating factors] and (6) [mitigating factors] and upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings. § 921.141(3), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 509, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 2033, 2015 WL 5601524
...010, was
committed by a person who was on felony probation at the time of the crime.7 The
trial court found that the felony for which Cannon was on probation was a violent
felony and accordingly, assigned the aggravator great weight.
7. § 921.141(5)(a), Fla....
...3d 1046, 1066 (Fla. 2012); Muhammad v. State,
494 So. 2d 969, 976
(Fla. 1986) (“We have consistently rejected the argument that these two factors
improperly double aggravating circumstances.”); see also Rose v. State,
787 So. 2d
8. §
921.141(5)(b), Fla....
...Cannon is correct that the trial court used the violent nature of his carjacking
conviction to assign weight to the felony probation aggravator. This, however, was
not error. A finding of violence is not necessary for the finding of the felony
probation aggravator. See § 921.141(5)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 653, 2013 WL 5270444, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 2016
...3 The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to five. 4 The sentencing judge found the following three statutory aggravators, assigning each of them “great weight”: (1) Brown was previously convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011); (2) Brown was previously convicted of a felony and under a sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on felony probation when he committed the murder, § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011); and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner and without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP), § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...09-8160-CF (Fla. 4th Cir.Ct. Oct. 28, 2011) (Sentencing Order, at 6-12). As to mitigation, the sentencing court found two statutory mitigators: (1) Brown was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time he committed the murder, § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011), and gave it “some weight”; and (2) Brown’s age at the time of the murder (twenty-seven), § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118, 1989 WL 224998
...n an arbitrary or capricious manner. As his last claim in Part I of his petition, Eutzy contends that the Florida Supreme Court applied an unconstitutional construction of one of the aggravating factors enumerated in Florida's death penalty statute. Section 921.141(5)(i) of that statute allows a sentencing court to find an aggravating factor where "the ......
...was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." Eutzy claims that, in his case, the Florida Supreme Court failed to give this factor the narrow construction required both under Florida law, see, e.g., Card v. State,
453 So.2d 17, 23 (Fla.1984) (under section
921.141(5)(i), premeditation must rise to a level beyond that which is required for a first degree murder conviction), cert....
...ibed by the eighth and fourteenth amendments. As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Harich v. Wainwright,
813 F.2d 1082, 1102 (11th Cir.1987), adopted en banc in pertinent part,
844 F.2d 1464, 1469 (11th Cir.1988), the Florida Supreme Court has held that section
921.141(5)(i) requires a greater, level of premeditation and cold-bloodedness than is required to obtain a first degree murder conviction. This limiting construction permitted the Eleventh Circuit to hold, when confronted with the issue, that section
921.141(5)(i) "is a facially valid aggravating circumstance because it genuinely narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." Harich,
813 F.2d at 1102....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2013 WL 5615052, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20815
...co-defendant; (2) his good family background; (3) his learning disability; and (4)
his drug use. Garrett’s strategy was for these themes to establish statutory and
non-statutory mitigating circumstances that would result in Puiatti not receiving a
death sentence. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b), (d), (g)....
...27
Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 28 of 79
factors, specifically that the murder: (1) “was committed for the purpose of
avoiding lawful arrest, or effect escape from custody,” see Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(5)(e); (2) “was committed for pecuniary gain,” see id. § 921.141(5)(f);
and (3) “was a homicide and committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated
manner, without any pretext of moral or legal justification,” see id. § 921.141(5)(i).
The state trial court found no mitigating factors in Puiatti’s case....
...In a new penalty
phase trial, the State would not be bound by that 1984 stipulation. In fact, the State
assures us that its case in aggravation “would include the prior violent felony
aggravator for Puiatti’s [other] convictions.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b) (listing
as an aggravating circumstance “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of
another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person”).
Not only would the evidence about the p...
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
only deferred to the jury's vote, contrary to section
921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1989), and Ross
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19942, 2015 WL 7175659
...jury recommended that he be sentenced to death. Id. at 494. At sentencing, the
trial court found that two aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) Kilgore was under sentence of imprisonment at the time he
committed the murder, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(a); and (2) Kilgore had been
previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person (first-degree murder, kidnapping, trespass with a firearm, three counts of
assault with intent to commit murder in the second degree, two counts of
aggravated assault, and resisting arrest with force), Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(b).
Kilgore v. State,
688 So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam). The trial court also
found two statutory mitigating factors: (1) Kilgore acted under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(b); and (2)
Kilgore’s capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(f)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 620790
...ere enough to warrant imposition of the death penalty. On resentencing, the judge found the following two aggravating factors applicable: (1) the murder was committed during a burglary; and (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. § 921.141(5)(d), (h), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 142, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 455, 2012 WL 652793
...In the Sentencing Order, the trial court concluded that the State had proven four statutory aggravators, which it merged into three, all of which were worthy of “great weight” as follows: (1) that the capital crime was committed while the defendant was on felony probation (under section 921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2006)); (2) that the capital crime was committed during the commission of a burglary, merged with pecuniary gain (under section 921.141(5)(d) & (f)); and (3) that the capital crime was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), without any pretense of moral or legal justification (under section 921.141(5)(i))....
...We therefore affirm the proportionality of Ellerbee’s death sentence. Dellarco’s Particular Vulnerability In the fourth point on appeal, El-lerbee argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on an aggravator premised on Dellarco’s age and particular vulnerability, under section 921.141(5)(m), Florida Statutes (2006)....
...we would find the error invited and harmless. At the penalty phase proceedings conducted before the jury, Ellerbee requested that the trial court instruct the jury on the statutory mitigators of no significant history of prior criminal activity (see § 921.141(6)(a)); under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (see § 921.141(6)(b)); and the age of the defendant at the time of the crime (see § 921.141(6)(g)) — and these instructions were given to the jury....
...the contemporaneous burglary, “as charged in the indictment,” and that “[i]n the course of the burglary,” Ellerbee committed a battery while armed with a firearm. These findings, made by the jury, meet the requirements of the aggravators in section 921.141(5)(d) & (f)....
...n felony probation at the time of the murder. This fact was conceded and furthermore proven by uncon-troverted competent, substantial evidence sufficient to prevent a rational fact finder from reaching a contrary finding — making the aggravator in section 921.141(5)(a) applicable as a matter of law....
...ry “clearly satisfies the mandates of the United States and Florida Constitutions”). Accordingly, under this Court’s precedent, Ellerbee is not entitled to relief under Ring . To the extent Ellerbee argues that application of the aggravator in section 921.141(5)(d) is unconstitutional because this aggravator fails to adequately narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, we have previously rejected this argument because eligibility for this ag-gravator is “not automatic,...
...every individual eligible for first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule. See Blanco v. State,
706 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla.1997). And, addressing Ellerbee’s argument that the Sentencing Order failed to contain language identical to that required by section
921.141(3) — an argument that we have also previously rejected, see Hudson v....
...State,
992 So.2d 96, 117 (Fla.2008); see also Williams,
967 So.2d at 761—we conclude here that the Sentencing Order was entered timely and contains the written findings necessary for the imposition of the death sentence, consistent with the mandates contained in section
921.141(3)(a)-(b), Florida Statutes (2006). Finally, we find no merit in Eller-bee’s argument that the under-probation *748 aggravator in section
921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), is unconstitutional because, as argued by Ellerbee, it fails to limit the class of individuals eligible for the death penalty. Not every individual who commits first-degree murder is on probation for a prior felony. Thus, the aggravator provided for in section
921.141(5)(a) does not “automatically” apply in every instance of first-degree murder....
...Rather, this aggravator is applicable only where an individual — already on felony probation— makes the eminently avoidable decision to commit those additional acts constituting first-degree murder. Accordingly, the under-probation aggravator provided for in section 921.141(5)(a) sufficiently limits the class of individuals eligible for the death penalty, rendering its application constitutional....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Additionally, we believe counsel for the defendant was effectively deprived of establishing an important mitigating circumstance when he was not afforded the opportunity to present psychiatric testimony to the jury during the sentencing portion of the proceedings. Subsection 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes, provides as a mitigating circumstance that "[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." Counsel for the appellant represented to...
...The expression by the trial court that the verdict of the jury is merely advisory and that he could consider psychiatric reports at the time he performed the actual sentencing, in our opinion, violates the legislative intent which can be gleaned from Section 921.141, Florida Statutes. It is clear that the Legislature in the enactment of Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, sought to devise a scheme of checks and balances in which the input of the jury serves as an integral part. The validity of the jury's recommendation is directly related to the information it receives to form a foundation for such recommendation. Subsection 921.141(1), Florida Statutes, provides in part: "......
...Marshall testified that he found Messer to be coherent and that he manifested no dissociation of thinking. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict recommending that the court sentence Messer to death. The sentencing judge made the following findings: FINDINGS OF FACT Pursuant to Section 921.141(3), the Court makes the following findings of fact which constitutes the justification for the imposition of the sentence herein administered: a....
...That the Defendant was the leader of the two co-defendants, and that the sentence received by the Defendant, Brown, (which was not passed by this Court) is not a justification for this Defendant receiving a lesser sentence. f. The Court has reviewed those mitigating circumstances contained in Section 921.141(6)(a) through (g), and finds that none of those mitigating circumstances are present....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13206, 2010 WL 2557751
...believe there were no negative consequences for his bad behavior.” In support of
its decision to override the jury’s recommendation and impose a death sentence,
the state trial court stated, “Sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as
enumerated in [Fla. Stat.] section 921.141(5), and there are insufficient mitigating
offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed
or invited to enter or remain.” Fla....
...law.” Bolender v. Singletary,
16 F.3d 1547, 1570 (11th Cir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION
Florida’s statutory capital sentencing scheme was substantially the same at
the time of Marshall’s trial as it is today. See Fla. Stat. §
921.141 (1989); Fla. Stat.
§
921.141 (2010)....
...14
of the defendant,” including “matters relating to any of the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances” enumerated by statute, and arguments for or against
imposition of the death penalty. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1) (1989)....
...judge, based upon (1) whether there are sufficient statutory aggravating
circumstances, (2) whether there are mitigating circumstances that outweigh the
aggravating circumstances, and (3) consequently, whether the defendant should
receive a sentence of life imprisonment or death. Id. § 921.141(2). However,
“[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after
weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of
life imprisonment or death.” Id. § 921.141(3).8
Although the jury’s advisory sentence “should be given great weight,” the
state trial judge in Florida is permitted to override it....
...writing the
findings upon which its sentence rests, specifically the statutory aggravating circumstances that
it finds to exist and that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the statutory
aggravating circumstances. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3). The conviction and death sentence are
subject to automatic review by the Florida Supreme Court. Id. § 921.141(4).
15
differ.” Id....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15227, 2007 WL 1827095
...Sec’y for Dept. of Corr.,
342 F.3d 1233, 1244-
3
Petitioner contends that every competent lawyer would have called the doctors as witnesses
because their testimony supported three mitigating factors: (1) extreme emotional disturbance under
Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(b); (2) inability to conform conduct to the law under §
921.141(6)(f); and (3)
young age under §
921.141(6)(g)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 21467519
...There was no discussion of the waiver of a penalty-phase jury during any of these proceedings, including the penalty-phase hearing itself. The trial court sentenced Thibault to death for each of the murders, and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the armed robbery. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2002), governs the procedure to be followed in the penalty phase of a capital trial....
...It provides, in pertinent part: "If the trial jury has been waived, or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose, unless waived by the defendant." In 1974, shortly after the enactment of section 921.141, this Court stated that the defendant's right to a penalty-phase jury is an essential right of the defendant under our death legislation, though it may be waived....
...iver. We hold that the record must affirmatively show that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived the right to have a sentencing jury render its opinion on the appropriateness of the death penalty, granted him by the express provision of § 921.141, F.S....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...2016).
- 13 -
The supreme court held that the statutory maximum was death. Id. at
538. Citing section
775.082(1), the statute that makes the death penalty available for
capital felonies, and section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1979), the statute establishing
the procedure for determining whether to inflict it, the supreme court held that "there can
be no doubt that a person convicted of a capital felony faces a maximum possible
penalty of death." Id....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2013 WL 3369145, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13735
...Finally, Burns showed some remorse and spiritual growth because Burns
“consistently said that [Young’s] death was an accident,” for which he was sorry.
Yet, the court found, Burns was not “completely truthful with anyone about the
1
In relevant part, Florida Statutes section 921.141 states,
Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
....
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding
or preventing a lawful...
...unction or the enforcement
of laws.
....
(j) The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer
engaged in the performance of his or her official duties.
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5). Section 921.141 also lists statutory mitigators. “Mitigating circumstances
shall be the following: (a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity . . . .
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.” Id. § 921.141(6)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...State,
294 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1974), are apparently still unclear. At the time of the rendition of the decision in Furman , neither Chapter 72-72 nor Chapter 72-724, Laws of Florida were in effect. The statute in effect was Chapter 70-339, Laws of Florida, better known as Section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1971)....
...preme Court of the United States was to later find in Chapter 70-339. Chapter 72-72 was curative and the later act, Chapter 72-724, merely extended the procedure initially enumerated in Chapter 72-72. There is an additional change to the language of Section 921.141, F.S., propounded by the 1974 Legislature as a result of the decision in Lee ....
...that Chapter 72-72 was the first act to expressly deal with bifurcated trials on the issue of penalty. Donaldson, by its very language, does not *3 deal with bifurcated trials and therefore does not treat Chapter 72-72. "Bifurcated Trial "Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2)(a), as amended by § 1, Ch....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 7542
...We can understand the trial court's desire to save time both for itself and for the jurors. Nevertheless, the rules of procedure require the trial court to permit the state and the defendant to present evidence of an aggravating or mitigating nature, consistent with the requirements of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1987), during the penalty phase....
...In addition to its obligation to hear and consider the penalty phase evidence, the trial court must also employ the assistance of an advisory jury if the state is unwilling to waive its right to that jury. The defendant argues that, under section *464 921.141, Florida Statutes (1987), a trial court has the discretion to forgo an advisory jury at the conclusion of the guilt phase if the advisory jury is "waived" by the defendant. Section 921.141(1) states: "If the trial jury has been waived, or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose, unless waived by the defendant." In this case, the trial jury was not waived....
...The defendant did not plead guilty. It is not even clear that the defendant waived the jury for the penalty phase. See Palmes v. State,
397 So.2d 648 (Fla.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 882,
102 S.Ct. 369,
70 L.Ed.2d 195 (1981). Assuming that the language of section
921.141 permits the waiver of a jury for the penalty phase after a jury has been employed for the guilt phase, the statutory language cannot override the procedural right given to the state in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.260. That rule clearly specifies that the defendant can only waive trial by jury "with the consent of the State." The legislature has no authority to create a conflicting rule of procedure in section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1987)....
...1st DCA 1975), aff'd,
346 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1977). Rules relating to waiver of jury trial are procedural rather than substantive. State v. Garcia,
229 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1969). Thus, only the supreme court could create a rule overriding rule 3.260. We do not interpret the reference to section
921.141 in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.780 as a decision by the supreme court to override rule 3.260 during the penalty phase. We recognize that the constitutionality of section
921.141 has been repeatedly upheld in cases in which defendants argued that the statute unconstitutionally governed practice and procedure....
...lid judicial and societal purposes. We do not believe they should be lightly abandoned. Accordingly, we grant the writ of common law certiorari without formal issuance and remand for a penalty phase hearing before an advisory jury in accordance with section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 67, 2017 WL 372081, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 191
...story. Id. After the Spencer hearing, the trial court sentenced King to death. Id. The court found that the State had proven four aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel (HAC), section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (2007) (great weight); (2) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), section 921.141(5)(i) (great weight); (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest, section 921.141(5)(e) (great weight); and (4) the murder was committed during the course of a sexual battery or kidnapping, section 921.141(5)(d) (moderate weight)....
...at 221 n.6 (brackets omitted). The trial court also found the existence of two statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) King’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired, section 921.141(6)(f) (moderate weight); and (2) his age (thirty-six), section 921.141(6)(g) (little weight)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 5, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 126
...ors in the crime itself are allowed per the statute, things that you may not be allowed to hear in the first phase of the trial become relevant when you’re trying to decide what is a fair sentence. These statements mainly reflect what is stated in section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2010), which' provides that in the penalty proceeding, “evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature- of the crime and the character of the defendant and shall include...
...jury’s nine to three recommendation for death, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury also unanimously found that there were sufficient aggravating factors to impose death, or that the aggravators outweighed the mitigation. See § 921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 65, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 202, 2015 WL 463524
...a domestic violence injunction against Strong. Specifically, she argues that these
documents should have been admitted as reverse-Williams10 rule evidence during
the guilt phase and that they should have been considered admissible hearsay
during the penalty phase under section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2010)....
...Accordingly, the trial court did not err by excluding them during the guilt
phase.
The trial court also did not err by excluding these documents during the
penalty phase. Carr argues that Fulgham’s arrest report and petition for injunction
should have been admitted over the State’s hearsay objection because section
921.141(1) affords only the defendant a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay
statements during the penalty phase. However, this Court has repeatedly
recognized that the State must be given the same opportunity as the defendant to
rebut hearsay statements. See Frances v. State,
970 So. 2d 806, 813-14 (Fla. 2007)
(“While [section
921.141(1)] ‘relaxes the evidentiary rules during the penalty
phase of a capital trial, the statute clearly states that the defendant must have an
opportunity to fairly rebut the hearsay evidence in order for it to be admissible.
This rule applies to the State as well.’ ”) (quoting Blackwood v....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 498
...ry, but as to the sexual battery charge they declared him guilty of *540 the lesser included offense of sexual battery by the use of force and violence not likely to cause serious personal injury. As for the advisory opinion of the jury, pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1985), it was their recommendation that Coleman receive a life sentence for the capital felony of first degree murder....
...ing guidelines reflection, since it would act as an abstraction to the capital felony prosecution. Further, the sentencing guidelines cannot factor in the capital felony so any accumulated score and presumptive sentence would be distorted. Moreover, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1985), requires the court to take into consideration, as well as the jury for their recommended sentence to the court, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the capital crime for the purpose of sentencing. Therefore, section 921.141 for capital felonies is the functional equivalent of the sentencing guidelines for noncapital crimes....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...that Mills receive a life sentence. On April 18, 1980, the trial judge overrode the jury’s
recommendation after finding that the aggravating factors surrounding Mills’s crime outweighed
the absence of statutory mitigating factors pursuant to Florida Statute § 921.141, and sentenced
Mills to death.3
1
Under 28 U.S.C....
...he substantial domination of another;
(6) Mills’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was substantially impaired; (7) Mills’s age at the time of the crime. See
Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (1979)....
... The Florida Supreme Court then analyzed the trial judge’s override of the jury’s
recommendation at Mills’s sentencing. It found that the trial judge had found the existence of no
mitigating factors and the following six aggravating factors pursuant to Florida Statute §
921.141: (1) under sentence of imprisonment; (2) previous conviction of violent felony; (3)
great risk of death to many persons; (4) felony murder; (5) pecuniary gain; and (6) heinous,
atrocious or cruel....
...discriminatory manner:
First, several Florida procedural rules, of both statutory and case law origin,
constrain trial judges from imposing the death penalty in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner. Among these significant safeguards is § 921.141(3) of
the Florida Statutes, which requires trial judges to independently review the
evidence and make detailed written findings regarding aggravating and mitigating
circumstances before imposing the death penalty....
...ncluding
nonstatutory mitigation. The trial court’s sentencing order concluded, “[i]t is the finding of this
Court after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that there are sufficient
aggravating circumstances as specified in 921.141 and insufficient mitigating circumstances
therein that a sentence of death is justified.”12 Also, as the district court found, the trial court’s
order denying Mills’s motion for post-conviction relief noted that Mills had presented su...
...Supreme Court considered nonstatutory mitigating factors. See Mills,
476 So. 2d at 180
(McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The district court’s finding that the
12
At the time of Mills’s sentencing, Florida Statute §
921.141(3) required that the trial
judge set forth explicit findings as to only the statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 766, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 1770, 2017 WL 3774788
...s are predicated upon “good and sufficient reason,” namely Ayala’s blanket refusal to pursue the death penalty in any case despite Florida law establishing the death penalty as an appropriate sentence under certain circumstances. See generally § 921.141, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19136, 1992 WL 197359
PER CURIAM: In this capital case, the state trial judge prevented defense counsel from presenting and the jury from considering mitigating circumstances not listed in the Florida death penalty statute. Fla.Stat. § 921.141....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1983 Fla. LEXIS 3215
the commission of the crime,” thus negating section
921.141(6)(e), Florida Statutes (1981) (that the defendant
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
current capital sentencing scheme. See §
921.141, Fla. Stat. (2018). 1 Hitchcock
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2015 WL 5445655
...held before sentencing. On
March 22, 2007, the trial court entered an order sentencing Hernandez to death,
finding four aggravating circumstances and giving each great weight, as follows:
(1) the defendant was convicted of prior violent felonies (§ 921.141(5)(b), Fla.
Stat....
...tencing judge any additional
information or evidence pertinent to the appropriate sentence to be imposed and to
afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in person).
-4-
armed with a dangerous weapon (§ 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2007)); (3) the
murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest (§ 921.141(5)(e), Fla.
Stat. (2007)); and (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC)
(§ 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2007)). The trial court rejected the statutory mental
health mitigators that the murder was committed while Hernandez was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (section 921.141(6)(b),
Florida Statutes (2007)), and that Hernandez’s capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law was substantially
impaired (section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (2007)). The trial court did find
the statutory mitigator of lack of significant criminal history and gave it some
weight. See § 921.141(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). The trial court also found
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, which were given varying degrees of
weight.3 See § 921.141(6)(h), Fla....
...the loss to the community resulting from [her] death might be.” Id. at 823. We
have held that “[t]he admission of victim impact evidence is protected by article I,
section 16, of the Florida Constitution, and is also specifically governed by section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes.” Kalisz v....
...ce
of one or more aggravating circumstances, the prosecution may introduce evidence
“designed to demonstrate the victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being
and the resultant loss to the community’s members by the victim’s death.”
§ 921.141(7), Fla....
...performance by penalty phase counsel. Hernandez contends that evidence that the
victim was a hard worker, and a good citizen who paid taxes and voted was not
relevant to her uniqueness or to her loss to the community and was outside the
scope of section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes....
...that evidence was in accord with the defense theory of the case. Hernandez does
not contend that this victim impact evidence was unduly voluminous or became a
feature of the trial. Instead, he contends that it is not the type of evidence that is
permitted by section 921.141(7) and thus is not relevant and should have been
objected to by counsel. As can be seen, counsel did object to several areas of
victim impact evidence. Moreover, the victim impact evidence in this case was
proper under section 921.141(7) and under the precedent of the United States
Supreme Court and this Court.
We held in Franklin v....
...2007), that victim
impact evidence that the victim’s friends were “hurt pretty bad” by the loss, that
the victim served in the U.S. Army in Vietnam, was loving and generous and
helped family and friends, and was a good guy who helped neighborhood children
was all within the purpose of section 921.141(7) to demonstrate the uniqueness of
the victim and loss to the community....
...Everett as being more
“like family.” Because the victim impact evidence in this case was not a focus of
- 85 -
the penalty phase, was not voluminous, and was relevant and proper within the
confines of section 921.141(7), penalty phase counsel was not deficient in failing
to make more specific objections to the evidence....
...McClaren made a misstatement of law concerning
what mental conditions might rise to the level of the statutory mitigating
circumstance that the murder was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla.
Stat....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 86 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 641, 2013 WL 4873933, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19026
...Amendment because it was the trial court—with only a sentencing
recommendation from the jury—which made the necessary findings of fact to
impose the death penalty. He believes that this type of sentencing procedure,
codified at Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (1993), is unconstitutional under Apprendi v....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 39 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 561, 2014 Fla. LEXIS 2754, 2014 WL 4458689
...The jury recommended that Smith be sentenced to death for the
murder by a vote of ten to two. Id. at 851. The trial court followed the
recommendation and sentenced Smith to death. Id. at 852. Six aggravating
circumstances were found by the trial court:
(1) Smith committed the felony while he was on probation, see §
921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) (moderate weight); (2) the murder was
committed while Smith was engaged in the commission of a sexual
battery or kidnapping, see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003)
(significant weight); (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of
avoiding lawful arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great
weight); (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
(HAC), see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); (5) the
murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), see §
921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); and (6) the victim was
under twelve years of age, see § 921.141(5)(l), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 612, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 2231, 2015 WL 5853918
...Victim Impact Statements
Jordan argues that the trial court erred in admitting victim impact statements
because they were so prejudicial that they amounted to a nonstatutory aggravator
and violated his due process rights and section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes....
...to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be
imposed.” Id. at 827. The admission of victim impact evidence is
protected by article I, section 16, of the Florida Constitution, and is
also specifically governed by section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes.
Kalisz,
124 So. 3d at 210-11. Because Jordan’s crimes were committed on or
about June 25, 2009, section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2008), applies, which
states as follows:
(7) VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE.—Once the prosecution has
provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating...
...place their trust with.
I have never been able to relax when away from home out of
fear that I will receive a phone call that someone I love has been hurt.
5. The HAC aggravator is one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances
in section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (2008).
- 17 -
I know my life will never be the same....
...being available to
experience her first car, prom night, graduation, or wedding and her feeling
vigilant about the safety of her loved ones are permissible testimony in a victim
impact statement. We find that such testimony does not run afoul of section
921.141(7) or the guidelines in Payne....
...s descriptions of her feelings as she watched
her father take his last breath and his inability to breathe on his own were improper
- 18 -
direct comments on the HAC aggravating circumstance in violation of section
921.141(7) and the United States Constitution....
...He also objected to the victim impact evidence
being used to support the HAC aggravating circumstance. The trial court agreed
only to the redaction of the words “horrific” and “horrible.”
Jordan asserts that portions of Maggie’s victim impact statement
impermissibly characterize the crimes in violation of section 921.141(7)....
...ate, her experience in watching her
daughter grieve over her father, and her personal experience in grieving her ex-
husband’s death, including the mention of items that jogged her memory of how he
died. We hold that such remarks do not violate section 921.141(7) or the
- 19 -
guidelines set forth in Payne regarding victim impact statements....
...y Mitigator
Jordan contends that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigator
that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See
§ 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2008). Specifically, Jordan asserts that section
921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes, does not require an expert witness to employ the
exact wording of the statute in his or her testimony for this mitigator to apply....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...ellee upon his conviction of murdering a police officer and instead imposed a life sentence. We agree with appellant and reverse and remand for a new trial to be held on the issue of penalty only, pursuant to the newly enacted death penalty statute, Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which has recently been upheld by the Florida Supreme Court, infra....
...Thus, the motion to vacate and the order granting same erroneously assumed that the death penalty per se had been abolished by the Furman decision. During the pendency of this appeal, the legislature enacted Chapter 72-72, Laws of Florida, 1972, appearing in Florida Statutes as Section 921.141, F.S.A....
...Sheppard,
283 So.2d 1, decided July 26, 1973, the Florida Supreme Court considered the various objections to the unbridled discretion vested in pre-Furman juries and ruled that such defects or infirmities which were held to exist in Furman had been cured by Section
921.141, the new death penalty law....
...penalty is to be determined in capital felonies has been changed, we are bound to reverse the order setting aside appellee's death sentence and remand with directions that appellee be given a new trial on the issue of penalty only in accordance with Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which has recently been upheld by our Supreme Court in State v....
...or penalty which did not exist either at the time of the murder or at the time of his trial, in violation of the ex post facto principle. See Bouie v. Columbia,
378 U.S. 347,
84 S.Ct. 1697,
12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1963). However, the newly enacted statute, Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., does does not create a new and separate substantive crime....
...law and commuted all of the sentences in murder cases to life imprisonment. That action was taken pursuant to motion made by both the Attorney General and the defendants themselves. Anderson, supra, was decided before the new death penalty statute, Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., went into effect; and a reading of that decision indicates that neither the court nor the Attorney General gave any consideration to the new death penalty statute, perhaps because at the time the new statute had not yet been declared valid by the State Supreme Court....
...In the case at bar, [1] appellee must be retried as to penalty under the new statute which assures that the jury will recommend or withhold mercy, and the death penalty will or will not be imposed in the manner recently approved by our Supreme Court in State of Florida v. Dixon, supra, which held the new law, Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., to be in harmony with Furman v....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 14662, 1998 WL 821883
PER CURIAM. The state seeks certiorari review of an order finding the record evidence to be insufficient to warrant jury instructions on the aggravating circumstance of section 921.141(h), Florida Statutes (1997), that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel and section 921.141(d), Florida Statutes (1997), that the capital felony was committed while the respondent was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit a kidnapping....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...then applying the aggravating circumstance based on the aggravated child abuse.
Brooks II,
918 So. 2d at 197. Specifically, he alleged that “because the single act
of stabbing [the child] formed the basis of both the aggravated child abuse
aggravating factor under section
921.141(5)(d) of the Florida Statutes and the first-
degree felony murder charge, the court should have found that the aggravated child
abuse allegation ‘merged’ with the more serious homicide charge.” Id.
A majority of the Court...
...h the
aggravating circumstances, then your vote should be for life.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
We deny this claim for two reasons. First, the prosecutor’s statement is
consistent with both the standard advisory sentence jury instruction and section
921.141(2), Florida Statues (2002), which provides:
After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an
advisory sentence to the court, based upon the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient agg...
...uty to determine whether the
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances that you find to
exist.”) (emphasis supplied). Second, this Court has consistently rejected claims
- 67 -
that section 921.141(2) and the standard jury instruction require a defendant to
establish that life is the appropriate sentence....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 88744
...The trial court found three aggravating factors: 1) that the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony; 2) that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery; and 3) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...The trial court granted the motion and appointed a mental
health expert to determine (a) whether Akins was sane at the
time of the crime, (b) whether Akins was intellectually disabled,
and (c) whether there were mental health mitigators under
section 921.141, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2014 Fla. LEXIS 1671, 2014 WL 2118192
...attack and the identity of his attacker.
The trial court explained that in light of Larkin’s decision not to present
mitigation evidence during the penalty phase, the record was reviewed for
evidence to support any of the statutory mitigators. See § 921.141, Fla....
...defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and
defendant had an impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
The trial judge also found a number of factors under the catchall mitigation
provision, § 921.141(6), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 39 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 293, 2014 Fla. LEXIS 1461, 2014 WL 1698370
...established that Hurst was mentally retarded. The trial court subsequently entered
a sentencing order sentencing Hurst to death. In doing so, the court found as
aggravating factors that (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel,
see §
921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2012), which was assigned great weight; and (2) the
murder was committed while Hurst was engaged in commission of a robbery, see
§
921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2012), which was assigned great weight. In mitigation,
the trial court found the following two statutory mitigators: (1) no significant
history of prior criminal activity, see §
921.141(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012), which was
assigned moderate weight; and (2) Hurst’s age of 19 and his young mental age, see
§
921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. (2012), which was assigned moderate weight. The trial
3. Spencer v. State,
615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
-7-
court found as additional mitigation under section
921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes
(2012), that Hurst had significant mental issues—limited mental and intellectual
capacity with widespread abnormalities in his brain affecting impulse control and
judgment consistent with fetal alcohol syn...
...accomplice with relatively minor participation; the defendant acted under extreme
duress or substantial domination of another; or the defendant lacked the capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the
requirements of law. See §§ 921.141(6)(b), (d), (e), & (f), Fla....
...Hurst’s counsel asked for an interrogatory verdict to specify the
aggravators found and the votes on each. The motion was denied.
- 20 -
was committed in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or flight after
commission of a separate enumerated felony. See § 921.141(5)(b), (d), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...unanimously find that sufficient aggravating factors exist to impose death,
unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of death before the trial
judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, see § 921.141(2), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142798, 2010 WL 6551162
...Branch was fleeing from two outstanding arrest warrants would have come close to an aggravating factor: that a "capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody." Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(e)....
...Admission of Mr. Branch's Indiana Conviction as a Crime of Violence Under the Florida death-penalty statute, an aggravating circumstance is that the defendant was previously convicted of "a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 108, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 551, 2016 WL 1053094
...to the defendant’s wishes—show that the trial judge considered Robertson’s wish
to be sentenced to death as an aggravating circumstance.
The only matters that may be considered in aggravation in a capital
sentencing proceeding are the circumstances set forth in section 921.141(5),
Florida Statutes....
...2d 19 (Fla. 1978);
Elledge v. State,
346 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1977). Evidence in aggravation—that is,
evidence that tends to weigh in favor of a death sentence—may not be introduced
unless it relates to one of the aggravating circumstances set forth in section
921.141(5)....
...This motivation for the
murder, i.e., Robertson’s desire to be sentenced to death, was thus relevant to the
aggravating circumstance that the capital felony “was committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
justification,” § 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 4331, 2012 WL 879283
...mposed following D'Arcangelo's sentencing proceeding operated as an acquittal of the factors that would have warranted a death sentence. Florida's capital sentencing scheme did and does require a separate sentencing proceeding before the trial jury. § 921.141, Fla....
...aggravating circumstances; the existence of sufficient mitigating circumstances that outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and, based on those considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. § 921.141(2)....
...State,
488 So.2d 62 (Fla.1986). As mentioned, the penalty-phase jury's sentencing verdict is advisory. It is not binding on the trial court, which must separately weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then impose a sentence of life imprisonment or death. §
921.141(3)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 1013195, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3438
...error was harmless. The admissibility of hearsay in non-capital sentencing hearings, absent a request for a sentence enhancement, does not appear to have been addressed until now. *935 The capital sentencing statute speaks directly to the issue. See § 921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14225, 1992 WL 141360
...n under sentence of imprisonment, 2) the defendant was previously convicted of a capital felony, 3) the defendant created a great risk of death to many persons, and 4) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5)....
...ircumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The Court has not limited its consideration of mitigating circumstances to only those prescribed by statute, but has limited its consideration of aggravating circumstances to those specified in Section 921.141, Florida Statutes....
...Constitutionality of Florida’s Death Penalty Statute Lusk’s final argument is that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it mandates a sentence of death if aggravating and mitigating circumstances are of equal weight. See Florida Statutes § 921.141(3)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 1689289
...mply has no basis. *1199 I also cannot see how the majority's effort to limit its decision to prior convictions for murder that are primary aggravators makes any sense. First of all, to limit the analysis to a prior "murder" conviction is arbitrary. Section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (2005), which identifies the statutory aggravators, includes any violent felony. And how will we be able to determine that the particular aggravator was a "primary" one? Section 921.141 does not require or even permit a ranking of aggravators and in the cases I have looked at, the trial court has not suggested a relative weight to be given one aggravator over another....
...ior convictions? Suppose the prior "primary," "murder" conviction was rendered in another state? What does "effective assistance" require then? Suppose the "primary" aggravator was the defendant's status on community control or felony probation? See § 921.141(5)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2012 WL 3081313, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 15806
...State,
706 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1997) (“[I]n addition to appointing Dr.
Maulion, the court appointed, at county expense, a psychologist, a neuropsychologist, a
neurologist, and a sociologist to assist in Blanco’s defense.”).
16
Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(b) (1983) (“The capital felony was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); Id.
§
921.141(6)(f) (1983) (“The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.”).
17
The record reflects that Dr....
...20
Dr. Marina was unable to perform a neuropsychological evaluation of Blanco, and a
neurologist, though provided for in the court’s September 11, 1992 order, had apparently not
been engaged by this time.
21
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b) (1983).
22
Florida statutes defined robbery during the time period at issue as:
(1) “Robbery” means the taking of money or other property which may be the...
...The court scheduled
Blanco’s sentencing hearing for January 6, 1995. Prior to the hearing, the parties
submitted sentencing memoranda. The State argued in its memorandum that three
statutory aggravators had been established: Blanco had previously committed a
violent felony, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b) (1983); the capital felony was committed
while Blanco was engaged in the commission of armed burglary, id.
§ 921.141(5)(d) (1983); and the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, id.
§ 921.141(5)(f).27
In his memorandum, Moldof argued that two statutory mitigating
circumstances applied: the capital felony was committed while he was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, id. § 921.141(6)(b) (1983),
and Blanco’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, id. § 921.141(6)(f)
27
The State conceded that the second and third aggravating capital factors should be
considered as one because each was based on essentially the same aspect of the capital crime....
...A state court decision is “contrary to”
38
The three claims not involved in this appeal are that (1) Moldof rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel in the guilt phase of his trial, in 1982; (2) Blanco is “actually innocent” of
the Ryan murder and armed burglary; and (3) Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d), establishing the felony
murder aggravating circumstance, is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in Blanco’s case.
21
Case: 11-11993 Date Filed: 07/31/201...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 404, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 1434, 2015 WL 3999182
...After a Spencer hearing,2 the trial judge followed the sentencing
recommendations and, as to each of the two sentences of death, found three
statutory aggravators, giving great weight to each: (1) prior capital convictions for
the contemporaneous murders (§ 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005)); (2) that the
murders were committed during a burglary as specifically found by the jury
(§ 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005)); and (3) that the murders were committed in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) manner (§ 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
...and protective factors” that he contends would have supported the statutory
mitigators that the murders were committed while Carter was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance3 and that his capacity to appreciate the
3. Section 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
...ttended
college, both of which tend to negate the effect of the risk factors. Dr. Gomez
opined, however, that the study was still relevant to assess the risk factors in
Carter’s life, in spite of his higher education and older age.
4. Section 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2005).
5. Section 921.141(5)(i), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 732, 2017 WL 2982120, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 1499
...A codefendant may be rendered ineligible for the death penalty by age, intellectual disability, or' the lack of at least one aggravating circumstance established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Farina,
801 So.2d at 56 ; Henyard,
689 So.2d at 254 ; State v. Steele,
921 So.2d 538, 545-46 (Fla. 2005) (explaining that section
921.141, Florida Statutes, requires a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance to impose the death penalty)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2003 WL 60978
...se or threat of violence to the person; (2) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody; and (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). § 921.141(5)(b), (e), (h), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 5, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 1, 2015 WL 48045
...In Kormondy’s original direct appeal, we observed that Kormondy admitted
to William Long that he had shot Mr. McAdams, explaining to him that the gun
had gone off accidentally. Kormondy I,
703 So. 2d at 457. In the appeal of
11. Section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2014), provides, in pertinent part,
that in a separate sentencing proceeding
evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of t...
...Any
such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be
received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to
rebut any hearsay statements.
§ 921.141(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1988 WL 13575
...As aggravating circumstances, the trial court found Sailer’s murder “was committed for pecuniary gain” and that Daugherty “was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(b) and (f)....
...failed to object to the sentencing court’s jury instruction defining one of the statutory aggravating circumstances. The statute expresses the circumstance as follows: “The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(h)....
...on reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 695-96 ,
104 S.Ct. at 2069 ,
80 L.Ed.2d at 698-99 . The evidence strongly supported three statutory aggravating circumstances listed in Florida Statute §
921.141(5): (b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person....
..., provides substantial support for circumstance (i), a cold, premeditated homicide. Daugherty attempted to prove statutory mitigating factors through testimony that he had “acted ... under the substantial domination of another person.” Fla.Stat. § 921.141(6)(e)....
...Bonnie Heath was more than twice the age of Daugherty at the time of the Sailer killing. He introduced some evidence tending to show that she encouraged his criminal activities, including the Sailer killing. Daugherty claimed his young age, 20, mitigated his crime. Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (6)(g)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 41, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 277, 2016 WL 533898
...See, e.g., McKibben v. Mallory,
293 So. 2d 48, 52 (Fla. 1974). For
example, we held in McCrae v. State,
395 So. 2d 1145, 1154 (Fla. 1980), that a
guilty plea, or verdict of guilty, prior to adjudication and sentencing, constituted a
“conviction” for purposes of section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975),
governing aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing proceedings....
...in capital sentencing5 because it “was so intended by the [L]egislature.” Id. at
1154. This conclusion was based in large part on the fact that in determining if a
death sentence should be imposed, a court must consider the circumstances set
forth in section 921.141, Florida Statutes, which will aid the judge in “establishing
the overall character analysis of a defendant so that he [or she] may properly
determine the appropriate sentence.” Id....
...We stated, “Given the purpose of this
process, it is illogical that a plea of guilty to a serious offense involving violence
that is disposed of by a sentence that includes a withholding of adjudication of
guilt should be treated differently than a plea of guilty with court adjudication.”
Id.
5. Section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975).
- 15 -
In looking to the purpose of section
790.23(1)(a), and the evil to be corrected
by that provision, we held in 1967 that section
790.23, prohibit...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 589, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 1960, 1995 WL 716642
APPENDIX (1) PENALTY PROCEEDINGS — CAPITAL CASES F.S.
921.141 [The amendment changes only paragraph 9 of the
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2017 WL 3764377
...revealed that virtually every
time he was hospitalized from the time he was fifteen years old, cocaine or alcohol
abuse was involved. Dr. McClain opined without elaboration that Covington
qualified for both mental health statutory mitigators. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla.
- 14 -
Stat. (2014) (“The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...for each of the three counts of mutilation of
a dead body and five years for cruelty to an animal. This appeal follows.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Application of the “Particularly Vulnerable” Aggravator
Section 921.141(5)(m), Florida Statutes (2014), provides as an aggravating
circumstance that “[t]he victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable ....
...ly vulnerable” but stated
only that Covington was “in control over the conduct and discipline of both
children victims for several weeks; in effect he was a parent figure.” We disagree.
6. The same aggravating factor is now found in section 921.141(6)(m),
Florida Statutes (2016).
- 23 -
“The standard of review this Court applies to a claim regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence to support an aggravating circumstance is that of
competent, substantial evidence.” Guardado v....
...E. Validity of the Guilty Pleas
Covington does not challenge the validity of his guilty pleas, but we are
nonetheless required to review the judgment of conviction in all cases in which a
sentence of death was imposed. § 921.141(5), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...e district court and REMAND with instructions to grant the writ in accordance with this opinion. During proceedings held in late January, 1985, the state trial judge made statements, for the first time, indicating that he interpreted Florida Statute § 921.141(6) at the time of petitioner’s trial as limiting consideration of mitigating evidence to those “enumerated items.” This was followed by statements reflecting that in sentencing petitioner he thus did not give consideration to any evidence dealing with nonstatutory mitigation....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75199, 2009 WL 2515595
...The state trial court judge, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, sentenced Puiatti and dock to death. The state trial court judge found no mitigating circumstances and that the state had proven three aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed to avoid arrest [section 921.141(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1983)]; (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain [section 921.141(5)(f), Florida Statutes (1983)]; and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification [section 921.141(5)(i), Florida Statutes (1983)]....
...judiced the jury. Puiatti called his expert witness. Dr. Donald Delbeato. to support the assertion that Puiatti "acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person," a mitigating factor under Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(e)....
...Puiatti's Failure to Testify Puiatti also complains that Glock testified on his own behalf, while Puiatti could not testify because he would have been impeached with two prior convictions that were otherwise inadmissible due to his waiver of the "prior criminal activity" mitigating factor. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(a)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 214, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 871, 2015 WL 1825753
...In its sentencing order, the court found two aggravating circumstances: prior
violent felony3 based on the contemporaneous conviction for aggravated assault
(moderate weight) and that the victim was a law enforcement officer4 (great
3. § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009) (“The defendant was previously
convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to the person.”)
4. § 921.141(5)(j), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10203
...ial court limited consideration of relevant mitigating factors. Petitioner claims (1) that instructions given the jury limited its consideration of mitigating factors; (2) that the sentencing judge considered only the mitigating factors set forth in § 921.141(6), Florida Statutes; and (3) that the Florida Supreme Court limited its review of petitioner's sentence to the absence of only statutory mitigating circumstances....
...ding death. The Judge read his charge to the jury stating "The mitigating circumstances you may consider, established by the evidence, are as follows: ..." See Trial Transcript, at 900. Judge Green then read the list of mitigating circumstances from § 921.141(6), Florida Statutes....
...In Ford v. Strickland,
676 F.2d 434 (11th Cir.1982), the Court considered a similar situation in which the Florida trial judge charged the jury on aggravating circumstances, "you shall consider only the following ...," and read the statutory language, §
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1977) and with regard to mitigating circumstances said, "you shall consider the following ..." again reading the appropriate statutory language....
...personality and harsh childhood. Judge Green announced from the Bench that he found no mitigating circumstances and two aggravating circumstances: committing a capital felony during commission of a robbery and for the purposes of avoiding arrest § 921.141(5)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes (1977). See Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, at 12-13. In his written Sentence of Death, Judge Green cited as the two aggravating circumstances § 921.141(5)(b) and (d)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...s.
Most of the statements were read by the prosecutor. “Evidence of a
family member’s grief and suffering due to the loss of the victim is
evidence of ‘the resultant loss to the community’s members by the
victim’s death’ permitted by section 921.141(7), and the admission
of such evidence is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Payne v....
...State,
127 So. 3d 478, 496 (Fla. 2013).4
Two statements were offered on behalf of Washington, four
statements were offered on behalf of Branch, and four statements
4. The Florida statute governing victim impact evidence is
now codified in section
921.141(8), Florida Statutes (2020).
- 31 -
were offered on behalf of Castro....
CopyPublished | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17808, 1999 WL 1049619
...sexual battery issue on direct appeal. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the evidence did not support a good-faith basis for this line of argument, there simply was no prejudice. The sexual battery alternative, which is normally included the section 921.141(5)(d), "in the course of a felony" charge, was deleted from the charge given to the jury in this case....
...State,
547 So.2d 1201 (Fla.1989), and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. The state responded that appellate counsel was not ineffective because there was no error in admitting the testimony. Florida's capital sentencing statute, section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes, permits the presentation of hearsay evidence during the penalty phase if the defendant is "accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements." The state contended that the defendant was given a full opportunity to rebut the officer's testimony....
...ho testified as to statements). Although Breedlove argues that the Florida court's ruling infringed on his constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses, he fails to cite any case which requires a finding that Florida's capital sentencing statute, section 921.141(1), is unconstitutional because it permits hearsay *1257 testimony at the sentencing phase of a capital case....
...counsel. Florida's death penalty statute requires the jury to make a recommendation on the sentence to be imposed on a convicted capital defendant, but is silent with respect to whether the recommendation must be unanimous or by a majority vote. See § 921.141(3), Fla....
...The defense presented mental health evidence which elicited that petitioner was a mentally disordered sex offender. [14] The intent to commit sexual battery comment occurred when the prosecutor was discussing the aggravating factor, which is set forth at section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes as follows: The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery...
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2010 WL 3464410, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 13314
...ion, sentenced Brooks to death. Id. In Brooks , the court characterized Brooks’ argument as follows: [Brooks] contends that because the single act of stabbing [the child] formed the basis of both the aggravated child abuse aggravating factor under section 921.141(5)(d) of the Florida Statutes and the first-degree felony murder charge, the court should have found that the aggravated child abuse allegation “merged” with the more serious homicide charge....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...On November 30, 1977, the Court initiated this rulemaking proceeding to consider whether presentence investigation reports should be eliminated from the sentencing process in all capital cases, in light of the statutory scheme for sentencing set out in Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 454, 1990 Fla. LEXIS 1126
...with instructions to grant Hall a new trial. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. . The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping, § 921.141(5)(d), Fla.Stat. (1989); the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, § 921.141(5)(f); the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h); and the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated)”; (4)
“the defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.”
Williams v. State,
37 So. 3d 187, 195 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Franklin v. State,
965
So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007)); see §
921.141(6)(i), Fla....
... Rogers is mistaken.
In analyzing this aggravator, the trial court wrote:
It is uncontroverted that the Defendant was previously
convicted of three felonies involving the use or threat of violence to
another person. § 921.141(6)(b)....
...First, we quoted section
775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2012),
which provided:
(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be
punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence
according to the procedure set forth in s.
921.141 results in findings by
the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such
person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible
for parole.
Hurst,
202 So. 3d at 52. We then quoted section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2012),
which provided:
(1) SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS ON ISSUE OF
PENALTY.—Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant
of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sente...
...ing circumstances to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
Hurst,
202 So. 3d at 52 (some emphasis added) (some alterations in original).
Although Florida’s sentencing statutes have changed since the issuance of
Hurst, the title of section
921.141(2), Florida Statutes (2018), is “Findings and
recommended sentence by the jury,” and that subsection lists precisely what we
held in Hurst to be the “critical findings” that must be found unanimously by a jury
before a sent...
...sentence of death. If a unanimous jury does not determine that the
defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s recommendation to
the court shall be a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.
§ 921.141, Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 595, 1988 Fla. LEXIS 1070
...State,
383 So.2d 320 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Swafford's remaining arguments pertain to the death sentence. First, he contends that the court erred in finding the murder to have been “committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest.” §
921.141(5)(e), Fla.Stat....
...State,
420 So.2d 583 (Fla.1982), cert, denied,
460 U.S. 1056 ,
103 S.Ct. 1508 ,
75 L.Ed.2d 937 (1983); Griffin v. State,
414 So.2d 1025 (Fla.1982). *277 Next, Swafford argues that the trial court erred in finding the murder to have been “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” §
921.141(5)(h), Fla.Stat....
...rder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Swafford also claims that the trial court erred in finding the murder to have been “committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.” § 921.141(5)(i), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2012 WL 4377812, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136981
...Petitioner was “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” and his capacity to “appreciate the criminality of [his] conduct or to conform [his] conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired,” Fla. Stat. §§ 921.141 (6)(b), (f)....
...Although Petitioner had no significant prior criminal record, more than one victim was involved, supporting the statutory aggravating factor that the “defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person” for both murders. Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (5)(b)....
...er and was then shot and killed. The evidence, therefore, supports a finding that the murder of Caday was committed while Petitioner was engaged in burglary or kidnapping and her murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” Fla. Stat. §§ 921.141 (5)(h), (d); Henyard v....
...t by evidence of the infliction of ‘mental anguish’ which the victim suffered prior to the fatal shot.”). Likewise, ample evidence was presented that the murder of Morgan was carefully planned, supporting the CCP aggravating factor. Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (5)(I); Dennis v....
...ravating circumstances-is rejected based on the ruling of Vining v. State,
637 So.2d 921 (Fla.1994). There this Court wrote: “The aggravating factors to be considered in determining the propriety of a death sentence are limited to those set out in section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1987)....
...utionally vague). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s denial of this claim is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 5. Felony Murder as an Aggravating Factor Petitioner argues that Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, creates an automatic aggravating factor in all felony murders, resulting in the arbitrary application of the death penalty....
...at 158. Later, Petitioner said that he did not intend to hurt Morgan but he "thought [her] husband was coming up the stairs and ... had a gun.” Id. at 164. . Faison v. State,
426 So.2d 963 (Fla.1983). . Mobley v. State,
409 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 1982). . Section
921.141(6)(h), Florida Statutes, specifically states that, in addition to the statutory mitigating factors, mitigating circumstances shall include "[t]he existence of any other factors in the defendant's background *1339 that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty.” (2000)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...3d 40 (Fla.
2016) (holding that a court may not constitutionally impose a
death sentence unless the jury unanimously recommends it).1
On April 10, 2023, jury selection began in Respondents’
resentencing proceeding. On April 20, while jury selection
continued, the Governor signed into law an amended version of
section 921.141, Florida Statutes. The amended statute went into
effect immediately and provides that “[i]f at least eight jurors
determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death, the
jury’s recommendation to the court must be a sentence of death.” §
921.141(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2023). Reflecting the state of the law
under Hurst, the statute previously provided that only a
unanimous jury could make such a recommendation. See §
921.141(2)(c), Fla....
...ng the
amended statute would violate Respondents’ due process rights.
The State sought certiorari relief in this court. For the reasons
explained below, we granted the State’s petition and directed the
trial court to apply the current version of section 921.141.2
1 The court later receded from that holding....
...trial rulings] because he always has the right of appeal from a
conviction in which he can attack any erroneous interlocutory
orders.”).
Given the clear nature of the irreparable harm, we now
explain why the trial court’s refusal to apply the current version of
section 921.141 was a departure from the essential requirements
of the law.
B.
We first address how an April 2023 statutory amendment
can lawfully apply to a proceeding about events from August 2004.
The U.S....
...as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties
themselves.”). Litigants generally have no vested rights in
procedural regulations. Carmell v. Texas,
529 U.S. 513, 544 (2000)
(quoting Thompson v. Missouri,
171 U.S. 380, 385 (1898)).
Here, the amendment to section
921.141 is a
quintessentially procedural change that has no substantive effect.
“The new statute simply alter[s] the methods employed in
determining whether the death penalty [is] to be imposed; there
[is] no change in the quantum of punishment attached to the
crime.” See Dobbert,
432 U.S. at 293–94. Because the change to
section
921.141 “neither alters the definition of criminal conduct
nor increases the penalty by which the crime of first-degree
murder is punishable[,] . . . it does not constitute an ex post facto
law.” See Victorino v. State,
241 So. 3d 48, 50 (Fla. 2018).
Furthermore, it is irrelevant that the current version of
section
921.141 became law after jury selection started....
...2016) (“This
[jeopardy] principle does not refer to a venire panel being sworn in
to prepare for voir dire, but to the jury of record, which has been
selected to hear the case, being sworn in to prepare to hear
testimony.”). Here, the court did not swear the selected jury until
after the current version of section 921.141 became law....
...They maintain that they justifiably conducted jury
selection under the assumption that the old version of the statute
would apply. However, the record shows that the statutory
amendment took no one by surprise.
In their response to the State’s motion to use the current
version of section 921.141, Victorino’s lawyers acknowledged that
by March 2023, “all parties were aware that a bill was pending in
the Florida legislature seeking to change the death penalty
sentencing procedures.” Jury selection began on April 10.
Victo...
...s entire
process, the Court, State, and the attorneys for Mr. Victorino and
Mr. Hunter were generally aware of the progress of the new bill
through the Florida legislature.”
On April 17, a prospective juror asked about the looming
change to section 921.141....
...When jury selection resumed that day, the
State requested a ruling on its motion to apply the new law. The
court noted that “we all knew this was going to happen today.” The
court indicated that jury selection would continue and that it
would later decide which version of section 921.141 applied.
Hunter’s counsel agreed that the case should move forward.
After additional discussion, the State suggested conducting
voir dire about the change in the law to ensure the prospective
jurors could “still fairly impose life or death.” Counsel for Hunter
dismissed this suggestion, contending that the current version of
section 921.141 could not possibly apply to this case....
...Respondents expressed concern
that a delay would allow the State to back strike up to five selected
jurors. To alleviate this worry, the State offered to waive all its
remaining strikes. However, the court ultimately decided to
commence with swearing the jury.
In sum, this record shows that the change to section 921.141
was entirely foreseeable to all parties....
...State,
324 So. 3d 920, 928 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Standard Jury
Instructions in Crim. Cases (95-1),
657 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla.
1995)). To fulfill that role in this case, the trial court should have
granted the State’s motion to apply the current version of section
921.141.
Because the State showed a departure from the law’s
essential requirements resulting in irreparable harm, it was
entitled to certiorari relief.
LAMBERT, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
HARRIS, J., concurs...
...vating
factors outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, and unanimously
recommend a sentence of death before the
trial judge may consider imposing a
sentence of death, see § 921.141(2), Fla.
Stat....
...2004-CF-001378
2004-CF-001380
HARRIS, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I remain in full agreement with the majority’s legal analysis
and conclusion that the trial court erred in refusing to apply the
new version of section 921.141, Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...Zack attempts to establish that his “evolving standards of
decency” claim is timely in light of Hurst and the Florida
Legislature’s adoption of a less than unanimous jury
recommendation in 2023. See ch. 2023-23, § 1, Laws of Fla.
(amending section 921.141(2)(c) and 921.141(3)(a)2., Florida
Statutes (2022), which required a unanimous jury recommendation,
to permit trial courts to impose a death sentence if at least eight
jurors recommend a sentence of death) (effective April 20, 2023).
But neither applies to Zack. When Zack was sentenced in 1997, a
- 30 -
unanimous jury recommendation for death was not required. See
§ 921.141(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
mitigators: the “impaired capacity” mitigator, §
921.141(7)(f), Fla. Stat. (2022), to which it assigned
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...The District Court’s original denial of relief on this claim is AFFIRMED.
2
To recommend the imposition of a death sentence in Florida in 1986, the jury was
required to find: one or more of the enumerated aggravating circumstances set out in Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5); that sufficient mitigating circumstances outweighing the aggravating circumstances
did not exist; and that the defendant should be sentenced to death. See id. § 921.141(2) (1985).
3
Case: 97-2319 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 4 of 48
Hardwick’s three prior felony convictions “involving the use or threat of violence
to the person.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b) (1985)....
...3 The prosecutor’s arguments
regarding the other four statutory aggravating circumstances were based on the
evidence introduced during the guilt phase of the trial, and consisted of the
following: Hardwick murdered Pullum while “kidnapping” him, see id.
§ 921.141(5)(d); the murder was committed for “pecuniary gain,” see id.
§ 921.141(5)(f); the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” see id.
§ 921.141(5)(h); and the murder was committed in a “cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification,” see id.
§ 921.141(5)(i)....
...rwise. His strategy was to present
Hardwick’s case solely via his closing argument to the jury. That argument
consisted of an attempt to undermine the statutory aggravating circumstances the
3
All future references to Fla. Stat. § 921.141 refer to the 1985 version of the statute.
4
Case: 97-2319 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 5 of 48
State presented and an appeal for mercy based on Hardwick’...
...P. 3.111, as recognized in McKenzie v. State,
29 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 2010), the
4
One of the mitigating circumstances set out in Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is
“[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime.” Id. §
921.141(6)(g).
5
Case: 97-2319 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 6 of 48
Florida Supreme Court affirmed Hardwick’s conviction and sentence, id....
...murder, Hardwick’s capacity “to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
28
Case: 97-2319 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 29 of 48
law was substantially impaired.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f)....
...ional statutory mitigating
circumstances: that Hardwick acted “under the substantial domination of another person”; and
that he committed the murder “while . . . under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(e), (b)....
...Even though the two offenses occurred later in time than the murder, the convictions
were handed down prior to Hardwick’s murder trial. These two convictions could thus be
counted for the purposes of the prior violent felony conviction aggravator. See Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(5)(b) (“The defendant was previously convicted of ....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1977 Fla. LEXIS 4023
were determining the constitutionality of Section
921.141, Florida Statutes, I would find the statute
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing
proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment . . . . The proceeding shall
be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as
practicable.” § 921.141(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
vulnerable due to her advanced age or disability (§
921.141(6)(m), Fla. Stat. (2022)); the capital felony
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 12732, 2010 WL 3419813
RAMIREZ, C.J. Javier Rivas seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from vacating Rivas’ life sentence and from conducting a penalty phase proceeding pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2008)....
...tance, an untimely rule 3.850 motion. The trial court denied Rivas’ motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed. We agree with Rivas that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to vacate Rivas’ life sentence and proceed to the sentencing phase under section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2008)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...comparative proportionality review from three other provisions of Florida law
-7-
outside of article I, section 17. Specifically, Yacob held that comparative
proportionality review “flows from Florida’s capital punishment statute—section
921.141, Florida Statutes,” Yacob, 136 So....
...None of these provisions, however, requires the
comparative proportionality review that we have held to be required and codified
in our procedural rules as within the scope of our appellate review. See Fla. R.
App. P. 9.142(a)(5).
Comparative proportionality review is not referenced anywhere in the text of
section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2019)....
...Yet, Yacob read this requirement into the
portion of the statute which provides that “[t]he judgment of conviction and
sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review” by this Court “in
accordance with rules adopted by” this Court. §
921.141(5), Fla. Stat. (2019); see
Yacob,
136 So. 3d at 546 (quoting then-subsection (4) of the statute for this
proposition). In support of this conclusion, Yacob reasoned that this Court had
previously “interpreted section
921.141 as including proportionality review of
death sentences” in State v....
...of the other decisions [imposing sentences of death] and determine
whether or not the punishment is too great.”
283 So. 2d at 10. The
reasoning of Dixon, however, does not in any way tie this comparative
review to a provision of section
921.141....
...oportionality review are low to
nonexistent, as defendants do not alter their behavior in expectation of such
review. In contrast, victims and the State have strong interests in this Court’s
upholding death sentences obtained in compliance with section 921.141.
Moreover, there is no reason to continue to apply erroneous precedent that,
though well-intentioned, 5 relies on perceived deficiencies in section 921.141 that
do not exist....
...mit the result for which
the dissent argues.
- 13 -
comports with due process; it has been amended since Yacob to comply with
federal and state constitutional requirements regarding death-eligibility, see
§ 921.141(3); 6 it provides adequate safeguards against the arbitrary and capricious
imposition of the death penalty; and, since Yacob, it has been amended to exceed
what the federal and state constitutions require by mandating (in non-jury-waiver
cases) that the jury’s recommendation for death be unanimous, see
§ 921.141(2)(c)....
...rminations “are not subject to the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard of proof”) (citing Rogers,
285 So. 3d at 886). The
same fundamental-error claim is equally meritless in this case, where Lawrence
waived the right to a penalty-phase jury. See §
921.141(3)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...Victim Impact Statements
Jordan argues that the trial court erred in admitting victim impact statements
because they were so prejudicial that they amounted to a nonstatutory aggravator
and violated his due process rights and section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes....
...to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be
imposed.” Id. at 827. The admission of victim impact evidence is
protected by article I, section 16, of the Florida Constitution, and is
also specifically governed by section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes.
Kalisz,
124 So. 3d at 210-11. Because Jordan’s crimes were committed on or
about June 25, 2009, section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2008), applies, which
states as follows:
(7) VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE.—Once the prosecution has
provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating...
...place their trust with.
I have never been able to relax when away from home out of
fear that I will receive a phone call that someone I love has been hurt.
5. The HAC aggravator is one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances
in section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (2008).
- 17 -
I know my life will never be the same....
...being available to
experience her first car, prom night, graduation, or wedding and her feeling
vigilant about the safety of her loved ones are permissible testimony in a victim
impact statement. We find that such testimony does not run afoul of section
921.141(7) or the guidelines in Payne....
...s descriptions of her feelings as she watched
her father take his last breath and his inability to breathe on his own were improper
- 18 -
direct comments on the HAC aggravating circumstance in violation of section
921.141(7) and the United States Constitution....
...He also objected to the victim impact evidence
being used to support the HAC aggravating circumstance. The trial court agreed
only to the redaction of the words “horrific” and “horrible.”
Jordan asserts that portions of Maggie’s victim impact statement
impermissibly characterize the crimes in violation of section 921.141(7)....
...ate, her experience in watching her
daughter grieve over her father, and her personal experience in grieving her ex-
husband’s death, including the mention of items that jogged her memory of how he
died. We hold that such remarks do not violate section 921.141(7) or the
- 19 -
guidelines set forth in Payne regarding victim impact statements....
...y Mitigator
Jordan contends that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigator
that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See
§ 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2008). Specifically, Jordan asserts that section
921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes, does not require an expert witness to employ the
exact wording of the statute in his or her testimony for this mitigator to apply....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...ircumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The Court has not limited its consideration of mitigating circumstances to only those prescribed by statute, but has limited its consideration of aggravating circumstances to those specified in Section 921.141, Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 1 and that
Bevel’s age of twenty-two at the time of the offenses was not
mitigating. As to the proposed other factors in Bevel’s background
that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty under
section 921.141(7)(h), Florida Statutes (2021), the trial court found
1....
...he established the
applicability of the statutory mitigating circumstance that “[t]he
capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
-8-
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” section
921.141(7)(b), Florida Statutes, based on his diagnoses of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...give him in return for killing her
husband. See id. at 95–98. And the fact that a murder was committed for
pecuniary gain is a statutory aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant
eligible for a death sentence in Florida. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(f) (1990).
After the jury convicted Evans of first-degree murder, as charged, the trial
court conducted a separate sentence proceeding in front of the jury....
...the imposition of the death penalty and whether sufficient mitigating
circumstances exist to outweigh any aggravating circumstances found to exist.”
Although Florida law provided a total of eleven aggravating circumstances at the
time Evans murdered Pfeiffer, see id. § 921.141(5)(a)–(k), the court decided that
3
Case: 11-14498 Date Filed: 10/23/2012 Page: 4 of 43
the evidence would support finding only two of them.1 The court instructed the
jury that the only aggravating circumstances it could consider were whether Evans
had committed the murder for pecuniary gain, id. § 921.141(5)(f), and whether he
had committed the murder “in a cold and calculated and premeditated manner
without any pretense of moral or legal justification,” id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
...If one or more aggravating circumstances are
established, you should consider all the evidence tending to establish
one or more mitigating circumstances and give that evidence such
1
Florida law currently provides a total of sixteen aggravating
circumstances. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(a)–(p) (2010)....
...Under Florida law a
criminal statute applies as of the date the offense was committed, see Bernard v.
State,
571 So. 2d 560, 561 (5th DCA 1990), so in this opinion, we cite to the
Florida death penalty statute that was in effect at the time Evans committed the
murder on March 24, 1991, see Fla. Stat. §
921.141 (1990), even though the
statute has since been amended in some aspects....
...416 (2002).
Seeking postconviction relief in state court, Evans filed a motion under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, asserting six claims for relief, including
for the first time a claim that Florida’s capital sentencing statute, Fla. Stat. §
921.141, violates the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Ring v....
...mental health experts, and family members. The court denied Evans’ Rule 3.851
motion and his motion for a rehearing. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
On the sixth claim, Evans argued to the state collateral court that the capital
sentencing procedures in Fla. Stat. § 921.141 violated his Sixth Amendment right
under Ring to have a unanimous jury determine his guilt on all elements of capital
first degree murder....
...’s allocation of
sentencing functions between the jury and judge in capital cases. Under Florida
law, after a jury convicts a defendant of a capital felony, the trial court must
conduct a separate sentence proceeding before the jury. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1)
11
Case: 11-14498 Date Filed: 10/23/2012 Page: 12 of 43
(1990)....
...[statutory] aggravating circumstances exist . . . ; (b) [w]hether sufficient mitigating
circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances . . . ; and (c)
[b]ased on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life
imprisonment or death.” Id. § 921.141(2)(a)–(c)....
...the facts:
(a) That sufficient [statutory] aggravating circumstances
exist . . . , and
(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
Id. § 921.141(3)(a)–(b)....
...Florida, the sentencing judge makes the determination as to the existence and
weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the punishment, Fla. Stat.
16
Case: 11-14498 Date Filed: 10/23/2012 Page: 17 of 43
§ 921.141(3), but he must give the jury verdict of life or death ‘great weight.’”
Porter v....
...at 589,
120 S.Ct. at 2432, Evans contends—and
the district court concluded—that his death sentence is unconstitutional because the
trial judge in his case, not the jury, ultimately found the facts that authorized the
death penalty. See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(3)(a) (requiring the trial judge to find that
“sufficient [statutory] aggravating circumstances” exist)....
...input about the existence of aggravating circumstances that was lacking in the
Arizona procedures the Court struck down in Ring. It is not just that a Florida jury
renders an advisory verdict addressing the existence of aggravating circumstances,
see Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2)(a), but also that the sentencing judge must give the
jury’s sentencing verdict “great weight,” see, e.g., Tedder, 322 So....
...judge-only capital sentencing procedure violated the Sixth Amendment, controls
this case is the Hildwin decision in which the Supreme Court rejected that same
contention. See Hildwin,
490 U.S. at 640–41,
109 S.Ct. at 2057 (considering the
procedures prescribed by Fla. Stat. §
921.141 (Supp....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...The trial court
found these four aggravating factors “sufficient to warrant the death penalty.”
Under the catchall statutory mitigating circumstance of any factors in the
defendant’s background that would mitigate against the imposition of the death
penalty, see § 921.141(7)(h), Fla....
...State,
547 So. 2d 1201, 1204 (Fla. 1989). Such
testimony “assists the jury in evaluating the character of the defendant and the
circumstances of the crime so that the jury can make an informed recommendation
as to the appropriate sentence.” Id.; see also §
921.141(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...- 57 -
consent was clearly revoked when the victim attempted to get Middleton out of her
home and when she struggled with him down the hallway before he ultimately cut
her throat in the bedroom.
I. SECTION 921.141(5)(i), FLORIDA STATUTES (2009)
Middleton claims that the CCP aggravator is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, is incapable of a constitutionally narrow construction and has been and
is being applied in an arbitrary and inconsistent manner....
...cing judge, sitting without a
jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death
penalty.” Id. at 585. This Court has consistently rejected constitutional challenges
under Ring to Florida’s capital sentencing law, section 921.141, Florida Statutes.
See Bottoson v....
...9 -
Christensen. The “murder in the course of a felony aggravator” found by the trial
court rests on separate convictions of robbery and burglary, which satisfies the
Sixth Amendment requirements. See Johnson,
969 So. 2d at 961.
L. SECTION
921.141(5)(d), FLORIDA STATUTES (2009)
Middleton argues that the felony murder aggravator is facially
unconstitutional because (1) it does not genuinely narrow the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty, and (2) it does not r...
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...e judge instructed the jury on the
potential aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The aggravating
circumstances included whether: (1) the capital felony was committed while the
defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d);
(2) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(e); (3) the capital felony was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h); and (4) the capital felony
was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense
of moral or legal justification. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(i). The mitigators in turn
included these considerations: (1) Kokal’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(f); (2) Kokal’s age at the time of the murder, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(g);
and (3) his character. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(h).
After deliberating, the jury unanimously recommended death....
...It also found
that “the defendant, Gregory Kokal did actually kill Jeffrey Russell.”
9
On November 14, 1984, the state trial court conducted a motion and
sentencing hearing of its own, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3), which requires
trial judges to independently review the evidence and make detailed written
findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances before imposing the
death penalty....
...al mitigating circumstances available in the
statute. The trial court then reached the following pertinent conclusions:
• In rejecting the “extreme mental and emotional disturbance”
mitigating circumstance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b), the judge
10
found that “the defendant was at all material times in complete
control of his mental and emotional faculties acting deliberately
and with pre-meditation.”
• In rejecting the “substantially impaired” capacity mitigating
circumstance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f), the judge recognized
that the defendant had “testified that during the evening prior to
the death of Russell ....
...his
conduct to the requirements of law and with an ability to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct.”
• In finding the “capital felony [during] . . . the commission of . .
. a robbery” aggravating circumstance, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(d), the judge found that the evidence “proves
beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of Jeffrey Russell took
place during the commission of the robbery of” Russell; and
that Kokal knowingly participated in the robbery and “actually
committed the murder.”
• In finding the “capital felony [to] avoid[] . . . arrest”
aggravating circumstance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(e), the judge
found that Russell “was beaten severely about the head and
shoulders during the robbery” and “[a]t the time of the murder, .
....
...eliminated the victim’s
identification and testimony at trial”; and Kokal told Mosley
“that he had shot Russell because, ‘dead men tell no lies.’”
• In finding the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravating
circumstance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h), the judge found that
“the victim was severely beaten about the head and neck[,] ....
...death march,’
Russell was beaten again and as he begged for his life, the
murder took place.”
• And in finding the “cold, calculated, and premeditated”
aggravating circumstance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(i), the judge
found that “Russell was assaulted and battered after he alighted
from the truck upon arrival from the beach[,] ....
...have greatly affected his cognitive abilities.
In short, in Dr. Crown’s opinion, Kokal was suffering from two statutory
mitigating factors at the time of the crime: Kokal was under the influence of an
extreme mental and emotional disturbance, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b), and Kokal’s
capacity was diminished to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
4
Crown conceded, however, that Kokal underwent a physical examination and x-rays
after the near-drowning experienc...
...5
This signifies that Kokal may be attentive to some details and inattentive to others,
particularly when there are distractions.
15
his conduct to the requirements of the law, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f)....
...Virzi had received Kokal’s records, and was
made aware of Kokal’s near-drowning and severe automobile accident. Virzi
added that, based on the records supplied to him in post-conviction, he found the
presence of at least one statutory mental health mitigator at the time of the crime,
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b).
Specifically, when Virzi was asked whether he had an opinion based upon a
reasonable degree of medical probability as to whether Kokal suffered from a
diminished capacity at the time of the crime, he answered that the info...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,”
and “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired.” § 921.141(7)(b),
(f), Fla....
...(2019) (respectively). But in doing so, Dr. Colino
preferred to “change th[e] language” of those statutory mitigators to
instead “use the idiom of neurology.” Namely, he stated he “would
- 13 -
change” the language of section 921.141(7)(b) to say “under the
influence of significant to profound neurological
impairment/disturbance,” and of section 921.141(7)(f) to say
“conform his behavior to requirements not just of law but also to
his own knowledge of right and wrong.”
Not all the defense witnesses testified in front of the jury.
After the defense’s first five witnesse...
...the time of the crime—the court concluded the mitigator was proven
(Boatman was thirty-two years old) but gave it no weight.
The court then addressed any other factors in Boatman’s
background that would mitigate against imposition of the death
penalty. See § 921.141(7)(h), Fla....
...The gist of his argument was that in the wake of Hurst v.
Florida,
577 U.S. 92 (2016), and this Court’s decision on remand in
Hurst v. State,
202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in part by
State v. Poole,
297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), aggravators under section
921.141 are “elements” that must be charged in the indictment.
This Court has repeatedly rejected this claim, both before and
after deciding Hurst v....
...phase mostly involve hearsay and confrontation.9 They center
8. According to Carlisle, the pipe chase in Boatman’s dorm
“runs in between two corridors of cells” and “houses all the
plumbing -- basically the plumbing of the cell itself.”
9. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes, recognizes that
hearsay is admissible during the penalty phase “provided the
defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay
statements.” This Court has broadly stated on several occasions
that hearsay in the penalty phase must also satisfy the right to
confrontation....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...co-defendant; (2) his good family background; (3) his learning disability; and (4)
his drug use. Garrett’s strategy was for these themes to establish statutory and
non-statutory mitigating circumstances that would result in Puiatti not receiving a
death sentence. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b), (d), (g)....
...27
Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 28 of 79
factors, specifically that the murder: (1) “was committed for the purpose of
avoiding lawful arrest, or effect escape from custody,” see Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(5)(e); (2) “was committed for pecuniary gain,” see id. § 921.141(5)(f);
and (3) “was a homicide and committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated
manner, without any pretext of moral or legal justification,” see id. § 921.141(5)(i).
The state trial court found no mitigating factors in Puiatti’s case....
...In a new penalty
phase trial, the State would not be bound by that 1984 stipulation. In fact, the State
assures us that its case in aggravation “would include the prior violent felony
aggravator for Puiatti’s [other] convictions.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b) (listing
as an aggravating circumstance “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of
another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person”).
Not only would the evidence about the p...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 449, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 2304
...ed question in the negative. I. STATUTORY CHANGES We begin with a discussion of the Act’s changes to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme. The most important changes made to the previously existing statutes appear in sections
775.082,
782.04, and
921.141....
...th may be imposed, the trial court alone must find “ ‘the facts ... [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’ and ‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting § 921.141(3), Fla....
...urst’s death sentence on a jury’s verdict, not a judge’s factfind-ing.” Id. at 624.
202 So.3d at 53 . Section 1 of the Act amends section
775.082(l)(a), Florida Statutes, from referring to the results of the sentencing procedure set forth in section
921.141 as “findings by the court” to “a determination” that such person shall be punished by death....
...d a trial court to require advance notice of aggravating factors). Section 3 of the Act defines the facts required to be found by the jury for a sentence of death to be imposed. Section 3 contains the most substantial changes, significantly amending section
921.141, Florida Statutes. Ch.2016-13, § 3. Specifically, it changes the expression “aggravating circumstances” to “aggravating factors” throughout section
921.141. The amended section
921.141(1) limits the State to presenting evidence of only those aggravating factors of which it provided notice to the defendant pursuant to section
782.04(l)(b), as amended by section 2 of the law. Id. The amended section
921.141(2) now expressly provides that the requirements in the statute apply to cases in which the defendant has not waived his or her right to a sentencing proceeding by a jury. Section
921.141(2)(a) now requires the jury to determine whether at least one aggravating factor has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and section
921.141(2)(b) requires the jury to find the aggravating factors unanimously and to specify which aggravating factors have been found unanimously: (2) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED SENTENCE BY THE JURY.......
...d a reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one aggravating factor set forth in subsection (6). (b) The jury shall return findings identifying each aggravating factor found to exist. A finding that an aggravating factor exists must be unanimous. § 921.141(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). The revised statute also now states that if the jury does not unanimously find at least one aggravating factor, the defendant is “ineligible for a sentence of death.” Id. § 921.141(2)(b)l....
...See, e.g., Steele,
921 So.2d at 543 (“To obtain a death sentence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance, whereas to obtain a life sentence the defendant need not prove any mitigating circumstances at all”). Next, section 3 changes former subsection (3) of section
921.141, which required the court to find whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to impose death and to determine that “there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” to subsection (2)(b)2. of the new section
921.141, now requiring the jury to make a sentencing recommendation based on the weighing of whether sufficient aggravating factors exist, whether those aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist, and based on th...
...Whether aggravating factors exist which outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist. c.Based on the considerations in sub-subparagraphs a. and b., whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or to death. § 921.141(2)(b) 2., Fla....
...The change from a finding “[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances” in section 921,141(3), Florida Statutes (2015), to the jury considering whether “aggravating factors exist which outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist” in section 921.141(2)(b) 2....
...b., Florida Statutes (2016), is a change to a reciprocal, synonymous statement. The previous version of the statute also indicated that the jury’s advisory recommendation would be based on “[wjhether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist.” § 921.141(2)(b), Fla....
...Under the amended statute, the jury may recommend a death sentence so long as at least ten jurors agree that the defendant should be sentenced to death, whereas under the previous statute, a bare majority of the twelve-member jury was sufficient. Compare § 921.141(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“If at least 10 jurors determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death ...”), with § 921.141(3), Fla....
...n to the court shall be a sentence of death. If fewer than 10 jurors determine that the *638 defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s recommendation to the court shall be a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. § 921.141(2)(c), Fla....
...Finally, the law expressly eliminates the ability of the court to override a jury’s recommendation for a life sentence with the imposition of a sentence of death, while expressly allowing the court to impose a life sentence even where the jury recommends death. Id. § 921.141(3)(a) 1. (setting forth that if the jury recommends “[l]ife imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the court shall impose the recommended sentence.”); id. § 921.141(3)(a) 2....
...Section 3 also removes all reference to the jury playing an “advisory” role in the sentencing process. Ch.2016-13, § 3. As to the effective date, the Act provides, “[t]his act shall take effect upon becoming a law.” Id. § 7. The Act became a law on March 7, 2016. The amendments to section 921.141 clearly require the jury to explicitly find at least one aggravating factor unanimously....
...hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based upon the following matters: ... Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist.” § 921.141(2), Fla....
...court imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts[, including] [t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” § 921.141(3), Fla....
...s “based on” the “considerations” of whether sufficient aggravating factors exist and whether they outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist, but it does not specify whether these findings themselves must be unanimous or explicit. § 921.141(2)(b) 2., Fla....
...The statute is not explicit as to whether the requirement of a ten-to-two vote applies to the factual findings that there are sufficient aggravators and that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances or to the ultimate death recommendation. Compare § 921.141(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016), with § 921,141(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016). Consistent with our decision in Hurst, we construe section 921.141(2)(b) 2....
...mmendation requirement renders the Act unconstitutional. CONCLUSION Based on the reasoning of our opinion in Hurst, we answer both certified questions in the negative. As to the second question, we construe the fact-finding provisions of the revised section 921.141, Florida Statutes, constitutionally in conformance with Hurst to require unanimous findings on all statutory elements required to impose death....
...F01-128535 (Fla. 11th Jud.Cir.Ct. May 9, 2016) (pending before the Third District Court of Appeal in Case No. 3D16-1174), . After accepting jurisdiction and during merits briefing, this Court ordered that Perry and the State "address whether the provision within section 921.141 (2)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), Chapter 2016-13, Laws of Florida, requiring that 'at least 10 jurors determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death’ is unconstitutional.” Perry v....
..."Rex” Dimmig, II, the Constitution Project (TCP), and the American Civil Liberties Union Capital Punishment Project (ACLU-CPP) and the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida (ACLU-FL) filed amicus curiae briefs in support of Perry on the issue of whether section 921.141(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), chapter 2016-13, Laws of Florida, requiring that at least ten jurors determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death is unconstitutional under the Florida or United States Constitution....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 9810, 1994 WL 551478
...e. The State of Florida seeks our certiorari review of the trial court’s order denying its motion to compel the respondent to furnish the names and addresses of witnesses he intends to call at the capital sentencing proceeding to be convened under section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1993), should he be convicted of first-degree murder....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
exception unique to sentencing hearings. Section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2015), states that in
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...er 1, 2015. After hearing
evidence bearing on an appropriate sentence, the jury returned its penalty phase
-3-
verdict on October 9, 2015, with nine of the twelve jurors recommending death.
At the time, section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (2015), authorized a trial judge to
impose a death sentence following a death recommendation by at least seven
jurors....
...Prior to sentencing, the Florida Legislature enacted chapter 2016-13, Laws of
Florida, which became effective on March 7, 2016. The new law authorized
imposition of the death penalty, but only if at least ten jurors recommended a death
sentence. See § 921.141(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2016).
Over Tisdale’s objection that death was no longer a valid legal sentence
without at least ten jurors voting to recommend the death penalty, the trial court
imposed a death sentence under section 921.141(3) as to the murder charge,
3....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...unsel did not specifically
assert a Sixth Amendment challenge, the hearsay objection raised is closely
related to the right of confrontation.” Id. at 1097 n.5. On the merits, the court
determined that the reports were properly admitted pursuant to section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1999), which permitted such evidence in the penalty
phase for capital felonies, “regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary
rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity t...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...er 1, 2015. After hearing
evidence bearing on an appropriate sentence, the jury returned its penalty phase
-3-
verdict on October 9, 2015, with nine of the twelve jurors recommending death.
At the time, section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (2015), authorized a trial judge to
impose a death sentence following a death recommendation by at least seven
jurors....
...Prior to sentencing, the Florida Legislature enacted chapter 2016-13, Laws of
Florida, which became effective on March 7, 2016. The new law authorized
imposition of the death penalty, but only if at least ten jurors recommended a death
sentence. See § 921.141(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2016).
Over Tisdale’s objection that death was no longer a valid legal sentence
without at least ten jurors voting to recommend the death penalty, the trial court
imposed a death sentence under section 921.141(3) as to the murder charge,
3....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...convictions.
I. CCP
Colley challenges the trial court’s finding that the murders were committed
in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or
legal justification (CCP). § 921.141(6)(i), Fla....
...exhibited heightened
premeditation (premeditated); and (4) there must have been no pretense
of moral or legal justification.
Lynch v. State,
841 So. 2d 362, 371 (Fla. 2003) (citing Evans v. State,
800 So. 2d
182, 192 (Fla. 2001)); see §
921.141(6)(i), Fla....
...impaired at the time of the
murders and (2) Colley’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired, see
- 23 -
§ 921.141(7)(f), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...3 Rather, the petition asks us to revisit and undo a
3. There is no dispute that Okafor’s resentencing is to be governed by the
procedures in the existing capital sentencing statute, which are more generous to
the defendant than the constitutional baseline established in Poole. See § 921.141,
Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 17478
...Martinez, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public
Defender, for respondent.
Before ROTHENBERG, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.
LOGUE, J.
The State of Florida filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a
pretrial decision declaring Florida’s new death penalty statute, § 921.141(1),
Florida Statutes (2016), unconstitutional....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...2023-190, §§ 1, 2, Laws of Fla.
-3-
Additionally, the Committee declined to propose amendments
to rule 3.780 (Sentencing Hearing for Capital Cases). However, we
amend rule 3.780(a) to generally state “[i]n capital sentencing
proceedings” rather than citing section 921.141.
Accordingly, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure are
amended as reflected in the appendix to this opinion....
...1.5.
(21)-(31) [No Change]
Committee Note
[No Change]
RULE 3.780. SENTENCING HEARING FOR CAPITAL CASES
(a) Evidence. In capital sentencingall proceedings based on
section 921.141, Florida Statutes, the state and defendant will be
permitted to present evidence of an aggravating or mitigating
nature, consistent with the requirements of the statutes and the
notice requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedur...
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 12288, 1995 WL 689588
...rment. There was no evidence, *28 medical or otherwise, of Krueger’s impaired capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. This particular reason is very similar to one of the factors which is used in the capital punishment law. See § 921.141(6)(f)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...beyond a reasonable doubt”). Recently, in Lawrence v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly
S277, S282 n.8 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2020), we confirmed that the same claim is equally
meritless where, as here, the defendant waived the right to a penalty-phase jury.
See also § 921.141(3)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...of the victim impact
evidence here. Under Florida law, victim impact evidence is
admissible “to demonstrate the victim’s uniqueness as an individual
human being and the resultant loss to the community’s members
by the victim’s death.” § 921.141(8), Fla....
...Our decision in Spencer does
not categorically preclude the trial court from holding a Spencer
hearing and imposing sentence on the same day. Nor does Florida’s
- 35 -
death penalty statute say that a Spencer hearing and the imposition
of sentence must occur on different days. § 921.141, Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...form of those instructions and specifically state the grounds upon
which the objection is based.” (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.390(d))).
Thus, we address only whether the trial court erred in reading the
standard jury instruction because in Loyd’s view it does not
comport with section 921.141(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2021).
To recommend a death sentence, the jury must first weigh
“[w]hether aggravating factors exist which outweigh the mitigating
circumstances found to exist.” § 921.141(2)(b)2.b....
...We find that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing the music to play but that the error was harmless.
Victim impact evidence is allowed once the prosecution has
offered evidence “of the existence of one or more aggravating factors
as described in subsection (6).” § 921.141(8), Fla....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...jury recommended that he be sentenced to death. Id. at 494. At sentencing, the
trial court found that two aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) Kilgore was under sentence of imprisonment at the time he
committed the murder, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(a); and (2) Kilgore had been
previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person (first-degree murder, kidnapping, trespass with a firearm, three counts of
assault with intent to commit murder in the second degree, two counts of
aggravated assault, and resisting arrest with force), Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(b).
Kilgore v. State,
688 So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam). The trial court also
found two statutory mitigating factors: (1) Kilgore acted under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(b); and (2)
Kilgore’s capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(f)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...ggested by Dixon, Alford and Songer. The Supreme Court of Florida stated that the only factors relevant to sentencing under the Florida statute were the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances: The sole issue in a sentencing hearing under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), is to examine in each case the itemized aggravating and mitigating circumstances....
...Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 ,
92 S.Ct. 2726 ,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).
336 So.2d at 1139 (footnote omitted). The court in Cooper accompanied the text above with the following footnote: The legislative intent to avoid condemned arbitrariness pervades the statute. Section
921.141(2) requires the jury to render its advisory sentence “upon the following matters: (a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (6); (b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (7), which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist_” (Emphasis added). This limitation is repeated in Section 921.-141(3), governing the trial court’s decision on the penalty. Both sections 921.-141(6) and
921.141(7) begin with words of mandatory limitation....
...The Supreme Court in Hitchcock further noted that the trial judge, in imposing sentence, expressly weighed only those mitigating factors enumerated in the death penalty statute: [T]he sentencing judge found that ‘there [were] insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in Florida Statute 921.141(6) to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.’ He described the process by which he reached his sentencing judgment as follows: ‘In determining whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment, this Court is mandate...
...Court can go outside of those criteria.” The court accepted this argument, ruling it could consider only “certain factors” in sentencing petitioner, as to which a presentence report would be irrelevant. The court rejected the applicability of Section 921.141(6)(f) of the Florida Statutes which provided as a mitigating circumstance that “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially...
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...Willie May Glock,
1
Under the Florida capital sentencing scheme, a defendant found guilty of
capital murder receives a separate hearing to determine whether the appropriate
penalty for his crime is life imprisonment or death. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(1) (West
1996)....
...After the presentation of evidence and the
arguments of counsel, the judge instructs the jury to consider whether certain
statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances exist in the case, and if so, whether
those aggravating circumstances are outweighed by any mitigating circumstances that
may be present. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(2)....
...Notwithstanding the recommendation of
the jury, however, the trial court in a subsequent sentencing proceeding independently
weighs the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and renders the final
determination as to life or death. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(3)....
...law was substantially impaired; and that while Glock was chronologically twenty-two
years of age, his emotional or psychological age was much younger, and thus the “age
of the defendant” should be considered in his favor. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6).7
(j) The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer
engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(k) The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public
official eng...
...his official duties if the motive for
the capital felony was related, in whole or in part, to the victim’s official
capacity.
(l) The victim of the capital felony was a person less than 12 years of
age.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5).
7
The only statutory mitigating factors that Trogolo did not argue for were (a)
“[t]he victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act;” and
(b) “[t]he defendant was an accomplice in t...
...“[k]eep [Glock] where his family can still love him. They can love him in prison.”
By a vote of eleven to one, the jury recommended that Glock be put to death.
Because the Florida capital sentencing scheme does not require it do so, see Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 921.141(2), the jury did not advise the court on which aggravating and
mitigating circumstances it found were established during the trial....
...om
custody; it was committed for pecuniary gain; and that the capital felony was a
homicide and that it was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner,
without any pretext of moral or legal justification. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §
921.141(5)(e), (f), (i). The court also found that Glock had established a mitigating
circumstance in that he had no significant history of prior criminal activity. See Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(a). In its written findings, the court specifically found that
Glock had not established that he “was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disurbance” when he committed the crime, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(b),
because “there was no credible evidence whatsoever to support a finding that either
of these defendants suffered from any disrubance [sic] that would mitigate a
calculated, premeditated murder.” Further, the court specifically found that Glock had
not established that he was under the “substantial domination of another person” when
he committed the crime. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(e).
B.
10
Following the imposition of sentence, Glock appealed his murder conviction
and death sentence....
...Glock, Senior’s, activities or wondering what
Bobby’s involvement was in that.
17
Evidence of domination would support a finding that “[t]he defendant acted
under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.” Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(e); this statutory mitigating circumstance was not found by
the sentencing judge at trial.
18
stress disorder, indicating that “he’s had a history of traumatizing experiences.”18 And
Dr....
...Petitioner argues that had the court had this evidence before it at
sentencing, the statutory mitigating circumstance that “the capital felony was
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
24
emotional disturbance,” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(b), as well as numerous
nonstatutory mitigators, would have been established....
...Of the seven listed statutory
mitigating circumstances, two are indicators of the defendant’s rehabilitative potential.
These are: “(a) [t]he defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;”
and “(g) [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime.” Fla. Stat. Ann. §
921.141(6)(a), (g)....
...or under the substantial
domination of another person;” and “(f) [t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was substantially impaired.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)....
...of the rehabilitation argument is of no
moment, because with the additional evidence of abuse and mental disorder, the court
would have found the statutory mitigating circumstance of “extreme mental or
emotional disturbance,” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(b), and numerous nonstatutory
mitigators....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...Although it is entitled to “great weight,” the
jury’s recommendation is not binding upon the trial court. Instead, the trial court
conducts its own sentencing hearing and ultimately decides for itself whether the
imposition of the death penalty is appropriate. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(1)-(3);
Bolender v....
...]egardless
8
Florida law provides that a mitigating circumstance exists where “[t]he
defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person
and his or her participation was relatively minor.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(d).
16
of who the triggerman is,” death would still be appropriate....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
1425(7), Fla. Stat. (2023). In contrast, section
921.141’s 1977 version, which was at issue in Buford
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
vulnerable due to advanced age or disability.” §
921.141(2)(a), (6)(m), Fla. Stat. (2017). “[T]he finding
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 273, 1993 Fla. LEXIS 747
...Several weeks after the victim’s disappearance police found the truck abandoned in Tampa. . The court found the following aggravating factors: (1) Sochor was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla.Stat. (1989); (2) the killing was committed while Sochor was engaged in the commission of a felony, § 921.-141(5)(d); (3) the killing was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h); and (4) the killing was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyPublished | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17112
...efining the terms “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” was inadequate in that it was vague and incomplete and that the Petitioner’s requested instructions were refused. *1190 The record indicates that the trial Court instructed the jury on Section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1982)....
...is a cruel and unusual punishment in light of all the relevant facts and it thereby contravenes the requirement of proportionality. Counsel for Petitioner requested of the Court an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the death penalty under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1982), is being applied arbitrarily and capriciously as well as disproportionately in violation of Petitioner’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments....
...The Court finds that such an evidentiary hearing is wholly without merit in a federal habeas petition as the standard of review by this Court is merely to determine whether the trial court and the Florida Supreme Court performed their duty of sentencing Arango under Section 921.141 with care and concern....
...ction 921.-141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1982), Appendix A at 952-3, Appendix B at 149-150, so as to merit the penalty of death. Although the trial court found one of the statutory mitigating circumstances, Arango’s lack of prior criminal activity, Section 921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1982), the record establishes that this single circumstance was outweighed by the aggravating circumstance within the meaning of the statute....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 2017 WL 1739246
aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in section
921.141(5), and there are insufficient mitigating circumstances
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
statutory death penalty sentencing procedures of section
921.141 of the Florida Statutes during any penalty
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 616, 2017 WL 2291288, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 1154
...e at an eviden-tiary hearing to enable a full reevaluation of whether Oats is intellectually disabled. Oats,
181 So.3d at 471 . Our instruction was clear that the new intellectual disability hearing should be held before the trial court. Pursuant to section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2016), once a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder, the minimum sentence is life imprisonment without parole. See §
921.141(3), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...2161 (2017).
We further held that a unanimous jury recommendation for death is required before
a trial court may impose a sentence of death. Id. The changes to the standard
criminal jury instructions were also warranted in light of chapter 2017-1, Laws of
Florida, amending section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2016), which requires a jury
to unanimously determine that a defendant should be sentenced to death.
Because the Court authorized the interim instructions on its own motion, we
allowed sixty days in which t...
...n number
Comment
This instruction was adopted in 2017 [
214 So. 3d 1236] and amended in 2018.
7.110 PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS IN PENALTY PROCEEDINGS —
CAPITAL CASES
§
921.141, Fla....
...proven beyond a reasonable doubt. An aggravating factor is a circumstance
that increases the gravity of a crime or the harm to a victim. No facts other
than proven aggravating factors may be considered in support of a death
sentence.
Aggravating factors. § 921.141(6), Fla....
...(Defendant) knowingly created a great risk of death to many
persons.
4. The First Degree Murder was committed while (defendant) was
[engaged] [an accomplice] in [the commission of] [an attempt to
commit] [flight after committing or attempting to commit]
any
Check § 921.141(6)(d), Fla....
...ly
harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement].
- 18 -
[arson].
[burglary].
[kidnapping].
[aircraft piracy].
[unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or
bomb].
Check § 921.141(6)(d), Fla....
...then the
defendant is eligible for the death penalty, and you must make additional
findings to determine whether the appropriate sentence to be imposed is life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole or death.
Mitigating circumstances. § 921.141(7), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...Code,
372 So. 2d 1369, 1369 (Fla. 1979), clarified,
376 So. 2d 1161 (Fla.
1979).
Unsurprisingly, then, our courts have held that similar statutes establishing
and defining the right of a party to introduce evidence at trial are substantive.
Section
921.141(7), for example, gives the prosecution in a death-penalty case the
right to introduce “victim impact evidence ....
...designed to demonstrate the
victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the
community’s members by the victim’s death.” In Burns v. State, we rejected the
- 43 -
defendant’s argument that section
921.141(7) is a procedural rule that “improperly
regulates practice and procedure.”
699 So. 2d 646, 653 (Fla. 1997); see also
Looney v. State,
803 So. 2d 656, 675 (Fla. 2001) (plurality opinion) (“Looney next
argues that section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...1996), allowing the
admission of victim impact evidence, is a usurpation of this Court’s rulemaking
authority vested in it by the Florida Constitution. We find Looney’s argument is
without merit.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); Booker v. State,
397 So. 2d
910, 918 (Fla. 1981) (“[W]e have held that section
921.141, Florida Statutes
(1977), does not violate the requirements of article V, section 2(a), Florida
Constitution, because it attempts to govern practice and procedure.”); Dobbert v.
State, 375 So....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...Then the
trial court held a hearing pursuant to Spencer v. State,
615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993),
and entered a written order sentencing Evans to death. The trial court found two
aggravating circumstances: (1) Evans had been convicted of prior violent felonies,
Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(b); and (2) the crime was committed while Evans was on
probation, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(a)....
...Instead, because of Evans’s
impulse control disorder, both experts testified that he met the criteria for Florida’s
two statutory mental-state mitigators: (1) “[t]he capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance,” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b); and (2), “[t]he capacity of the defendant
to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct
to the requirements of law was substantially impaired,” id. at § 921.141(6)(f).7
See Evans II, 946 So....
...While some minor degree of brain dysfunction is certainly
a possibility given his history of head injury and emotional and
7
Florida also recognizes a third mental-state statutory mitigating circumstance, but that
mitigator is not relevant to Evans’s case. See Fla. Stats. § 921.141(6)(3)(“[t]he defendant acted
under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.”
10
behavioral problems as a child prior to the onset of criminality[,] h...
...He noted that Evans reported not drinking during the car
ride and had indicated that he was under control and otherwise knew what he was
doing. Id. at 9. As a result, Dr. McClaren concluded that Evans did not meet the
criteria for the two statutory mental health mitigators, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b) &
(f).8 Id....
...ng-term substance abuse. Id.
at 921–24. The evidence included conflicting testimony from the state’s and
defendant’s mental health experts regarding two statutory mental-state mitigating
circumstances: (1) substantial impairment, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b); and (2)
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, id. at § 921.141(6)(f)....
...unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” In Florida, the sentencing judge makes the determination as
to the existence and weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and the punishment, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3), but he must give the jury
verdict of life or death “great weight.” Porter must show that but for his
counsel’s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have
received a different sentence....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2012 WL 1860802, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10556
...Then the
trial court held a hearing pursuant to Spencer v. State,
615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993),
and entered a written order sentencing Evans to death. The trial court found two
aggravating circumstances: (1) Evans had been convicted of prior violent felonies,
Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(b); and (2) the crime was committed while Evans was on
probation, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(a)....
...Instead, because of Evans’s
impulse control disorder, both experts testified that he met the criteria for Florida’s
two statutory mental-state mitigators: (1) “[t]he capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance,” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b); and (2), “[t]he capacity of the defendant
to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct
to the requirements of law was substantially impaired,” id. at § 921.141(6)(f).7
See Evans II, 946 So....
...While some minor degree of brain dysfunction is certainly
a possibility given his history of head injury and emotional and
7
Florida also recognizes a third mental-state statutory mitigating circumstance, but that
mitigator is not relevant to Evans’s case. See Fla. Stats. § 921.141(6)(3)(“[t]he defendant acted
under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.”
10
behavioral problems as a child prior to the onset of criminality[,] h...
...He noted that Evans reported not drinking during the car
ride and had indicated that he was under control and otherwise knew what he was
doing. Id. at 9. As a result, Dr. McClaren concluded that Evans did not meet the
criteria for the two statutory mental health mitigators, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b) &
(f).8 Id....
...ng-term substance abuse. Id.
at 921–24. The evidence included conflicting testimony from the state’s and
defendant’s mental health experts regarding two statutory mental-state mitigating
circumstances: (1) substantial impairment, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b); and (2)
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, id. at § 921.141(6)(f)....
...unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” In Florida, the sentencing judge makes the determination as
to the existence and weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and the punishment, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3), but he must give the jury
verdict of life or death “great weight.” Porter must show that but for his
counsel’s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have
received a different sentence....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...Then the
trial court held a hearing pursuant to Spencer v. State,
615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993),
and entered a written order sentencing Evans to death. The trial court found two
aggravating circumstances: (1) Evans had been convicted of prior violent felonies,
Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(b); and (2) the crime was committed while Evans was on
probation, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(a)....
...Instead, because of Evans’s
impulse control disorder, both experts testified that he met the criteria for Florida’s
two statutory mental-state mitigators: (1) “[t]he capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance,” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b); and (2), “[t]he capacity of the defendant
to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct
to the requirements of law was substantially impaired,” id. at § 921.141(6)(f).7
See Evans II, 946 So....
...While some minor degree of brain dysfunction is certainly
a possibility given his history of head injury and emotional and
7
Florida also recognizes a third mental-state statutory mitigating circumstance, but that
mitigator is not relevant to Evans’s case. See Fla. Stats. § 921.141(6)(3)(“[t]he defendant acted
under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.”
10
behavioral problems as a child prior to the onset of criminality[,] h...
...He noted that Evans reported not drinking during the car
ride and had indicated that he was under control and otherwise knew what he was
doing. Id. at 9. As a result, Dr. McClaren concluded that Evans did not meet the
criteria for the two statutory mental health mitigators, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b) &
(f).8 Id....
...ng-term substance abuse. Id.
at 921–24. The evidence included conflicting testimony from the state’s and
defendant’s mental health experts regarding two statutory mental-state mitigating
circumstances: (1) substantial impairment, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b); and (2)
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, id. at § 921.141(6)(f)....
...unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” In Florida, the sentencing judge makes the determination as
to the existence and weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and the punishment, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3), but he must give the jury
verdict of life or death “great weight.” Porter must show that but for his
counsel’s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have
received a different sentence....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 219, 1996 Fla. LEXIS 1009
...ation and has waived notice and hearing). Disallowing the reimposition of special conditions of probation not previously announced is also consistent with the sentencing policy announced in Pope v. State,
561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990), and the mandate of section
921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1995)....
...Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(ll) provides: "Any sentence outside the permitted range must be accompanied by a written statement delineating the reasons for the departure." . As in Pope , a trial court does not get a second bite at the apple when it fails to file written findings in a death case. Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1995), requires a trial court, in the event it imposes a sentence of death, to set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
under - 12 - section
921.141(7)(h), Florida Statutes (2022), the trial court
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 297, 1991 Fla. LEXIS 721
...Several weeks after the victim’s disappearance police found the truck abandoned in Tampa. . The court found the following aggravating factors: (1) Sochor was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla.Stat. (1989); (2) the killing was committed while Sochor was engaged in the commission of a felony, § 921.141(5)(d); (3) the killing was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h); and (4) the killing was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, § 921.141(5)(i)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
a penalty-phase jury, argues that because section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2022), does not allow a
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...ed the
allocation of a certain weight to a mitigating circumstance.” Our precedents have
aimed to avoid imposing on trial courts overly formalistic requirements, while at
the same time ensuring that sentencing orders comply with the dictates of section
921.141(4), Florida Statutes (2019),7 and contain enough specificity to enable
meaningful appellate review.
6....
...established aggravating circumstances against the established mitigating
circumstances; and (4) provide a detailed explanation of the result of the weighing
process.” Rogers v. State,
285 So. 3d 872, 889 (Fla. 2019) (quoting Orme v. State,
25 So. 3d 536, 547-48 (Fla. 2009)).
7. Section
921.141(4) requires the following:
In each case in which the court imposes a sentence of death, the court
shall, considering the records of the trial and the sentencing
- 39 -
In th...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 579, 2017 WL 1954976, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 1063
...ext of discussing the characteristics of antisocial personality disorder was not error). Moreover, it was not improper for Dr. McClaren to explain how statements that Cozzie made to him and allegedly made to third parties impacted his diagnosis. See § 921.141(1), Fla....
...event the State from presenting evidence about the victim, evidence of the impact of the murder on the victim’s family, and prosecutorial argument on these subjects, if permitted to do so by state law. Subsequently, the Florida Legislature enacted section 921.141(7), which permits the prosecution to introduce and argue victim impact evidence....
...Even though victim impact evidence is admissible in a death penalty case, it is limited to evidence “designed to demonstrate the victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to *730 the community’s members, by the victim’s death,” § 921.141(7), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...prosecutorial comments; (3) the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors deprived Snelgrove of a fair trial; (4) trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for failing to request a colloquy regarding Snelgrove’s right to testify; (5) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2000), violates the Eighth Amendment because it is vague and overbroad; (6) Snelgrove's Eighth Amendment rights will be violated if he is incompetent at the time of execution; and (7) Florida's capital sentencing st...
...nelgrove's school records; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective *1001 for not raising on direct appeal a claim of cumulative error; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal several constitutional challenges to section 921.141, Florida Statutes, and Snel-grove’s death sentences, including whether the sentences are unconstitutional under Ring v....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...Gentner, a witness that his attorney had subpoenaed, to testify during the penalty phase.8
Bryan argues that the testimony of Dr. Gentner would have established mitigating factors,
namely, that Bryan was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance (Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(b)), and that Bryan’s capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law was substantially impaired (Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f))....
...murder scheme and his elaborate attempts to cover his tracks.
14
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court found six aggravating circumstances:
Bryan had a prior conviction for a crime of violence, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b); the capital
felony was committed while Bryan was engaged in the commission of another felony, Fla.
Stat. § 921.141(5)(d) (robbery, kidnapping); the murder was committed in order to avoid
arrest, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(e); the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, Fla.
Stat. § 921.141(5)(f); the capital murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(5)(h); and the capital felony was a homicide that was committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, Fla.
Stat. § 921.141(5)(I).12
The details of this crime are also especially heinous....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 9450, 1998 WL 233858
...Rogers
v. Zant,
13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir.1994). We conclude that Bryan's attorney made a reasonable
tactical decision not to call Dr. Larson to testify during the penalty phase of the proceedings.
suffering from extreme emotional disturbance (Fla.Stat. §
921.141(6)(b)), and that Bryan's capacity
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired (Fla.Stat. §
921.141(6)(f))....
... implementing a complicated murder scheme and his elaborate attempts to cover his tracks.
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court found six aggravating circumstances: Bryan
had a prior conviction for a crime of violence, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b); the capital felony was
committed while Bryan was engaged in the commission of another felony, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d)
(robbery, kidnapping); the murder was committed in order to avoid arrest, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(e); the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(f); the
capital murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h); and the capital
felony was a homicide that was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without
any pretense of moral or legal justification, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(I).12
The details of this crime are also especially heinous....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 228, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 730
...e requirements of Campbell v. State,
571 So.2d 415 (Fla.1990), and also failed to consider statutory and non-statutory mitigating evidence. We agree. Larkins emphasizes that he produced substantial evidence of mitigation, especially mitigation under section
921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides that: “The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” For example, Dr....
...emand with instructions for a new sentencing by the court in accord with this opinion. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. . See § 921.141(5)(b), (£), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...a paranoid person like Knight harbors “a persistent bearing of grudges that grow
and continue like a snowball rolling down a hill.”
Sosa specifically asked Lafehr-Hession whether any of Florida’s statutory
mitigating factors applied to Knight. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6) (1996).
Lafehr-Hession agreed that Knight suffered from both extreme mental or
emotional illness or disturbance and a diminished capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law....
...it’s always there.” And as to the latter, she stated that Knight was not “able to
make choices, willful choices outside of that mental illness.” On cross-
examination, though, Lafehr-Hession also acknowledged the existence of statutory
aggravating factors. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5) (1996)....
...May 29, 1998) (Sentencing Order). At the time, before a Florida court could
impose a death sentence, it had to conclude in a written order that “there [were]
insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.”
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(3)(b) (1996). The court had to consider fourteen
enumerated aggravating factors and seven mitigating factors, as well as “any other
factors in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the
death penalty.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(h) (1996).
In its sentencing order, the court found two statutory mitigating factors and
gave weight to several non-statutory factors under § 921.141(6)(h)’s catchall.
From among the enumerated factors, the court found that the killing was
committed while Knight was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, § 921.141(6)(b), and that Knight’s capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
11
Case: 18-12488 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 12 of 35
was “somewhat” impaired, § 921.141(6)(f)....
...tand-alone factor, it
gave substantial mitigating weight to that consideration in its treatment of the
mental-or-emotional-disturbance and impairment factors.
On the other side of the ledger, the court found four aggravating factors
under § 921.141(5)—(1) that Knight had previously been convicted of killing
Meehan; (2) that the Kunkel murder was committed during the course of a robbery;
(3) that it was committed for pecuniary gain; and (4) that it was cold, calculated,
and premeditated....
...those, the last was perhaps the most damning. With respect to that factor, the
sentencing court observed in its written order: “The defendant chose the ruse to
lure the victim, chose the victim, chose the time and place of the shooting and the
1
Although Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(f) (1996) required a judge to find that the defendant’s
capacity to appreciate criminality and conform conduct was “substantially” impaired, the
sentencing court here “was unable to find that [Knight’s] capacity was substantia...
...emotional distress and an impaired ability to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law, both connected to his paranoia. Second, we have the
“other factors in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against
imposition of the death penalty,” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(h) (1996)—among
them (1) that Knight had a troubled childhood, which began with his father’s
abandonment, featured a rotation of father-figures of dubious repute, and
culminated in failed remedial youth programs; (2) that despite...
...gating evidence is
stacked against the aggravating factors that the sentencing court found, all of which
remain unchallenged. First, Knight “was previously convicted of another capital
felony” for the murder of Brendan Meehan. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5)(b)
(1996). Second and third, he murdered Kunkel while in the commission of a
robbery, § 921.141(5)(d), and “for pecuniary gain,” § 921.141(5)(f). And fourth,
the execution-style murder “was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated
manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.” § 921.141(5)(i).
What the sentencing court said in 1998 remains true today: “The defendant chose
the ruse to lure the victim, chose the victim, chose the time and place of the
33
Case: 18-1...
...There, during its review, the Florida Supreme Court had eliminated
the aggravating factor that the defendant’s crime was especially “heinous,
atrocious, or cruel,” finding it unsupported by the evidence. Porter v. State,
564
So. 2d 1060, 1063 (Fla. 1990); see Fla. Stat. Ann. §
921.141(5)(h) (1996).
Accordingly, in its analysis of prejudice the United States Supreme Court
concluded that the new mitigating factors established by Porter’s postconviction
evidence, combined with the “reduced [ ] ballast on the aggrava...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 98, 1997 Fla. LEXIS 169, 1997 WL 96302
...this opinion is filed. The new language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by strike-through type. It is so ordered. OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. APPENDIX PENALTY PROCEEDINGS — CAPITAL CASES F.S. 921.141 Note to Judge Give la at the beginning of penalty proceedings before a jury that did not try the issue of guilt....
...Your advisory sentence should be based upon the evidence [that you have heard while trying the guilt or innocence of the defendant and evidence that has been presented to you in these proceedings] [that has been presented to you in these proceedings]. F.S. 921.141(5) The aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited to any of the following that are established by the evidence: Note to Judge Give only those aggravating circumstances for which evidence has been presented....
...persons; 4. The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed while [he] [she] was *1266 [engaged] [an accomplice] in [the commission of] [an attempt to commit] [flight after committing or attempting to commit] the crime of Cheek F.S. 921.141(5)(d) for any change in list of offenses [robbery] [sexual battery] [aggravated child abuse] [abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult resulting in great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement] [arson] [burglary]...
...Note to Judge When the victim is a law enforcement officer-, correctional officer, state attorney- assistant-state-attorney, justice, or judge, “eligibility for release-should-be inserted in plaee-of “possibility of parole.” — See F.S.
775.0823, F.S.
921.141(6) Should you find sufficient aggravating circumstances do exist, it will then be your duty to determine whether mitigating circumstances exist that outweigh the aggravating circumstances....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
health problems that did not reach the level of section
921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1997). Id. The nonstatutory
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...nstatutory mitigating
circumstances. Grim I,
841 So. 2d at 460. The three statutory mitigating
circumstances were: (1) disruptive home life and child abuse; (2) hard-working
employee; and (3) mental health problems that did not reach the level of section
921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1997)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 361, 2017 WL 1090546, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 648
...The sentencing procedure employed in Florida involved the presentation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to a jury, which then made a recommendation of sentence to the judge, who later made factual findings as to the aggravation, mitigation, and relative weight of each. Id.; see § 921.141, Fla....
...The analysis the Ring Court applied to Arizona’s sentencing scheme applies equally to Florida’s. Like Arizona at the time of Ring, Florida does not require the jury to make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty. Rather, Florida requires a judge to find these facts. [§ 921.141(3), Fla....
...ing factors required by law for imposition of the death penalty.”). To determine whether Jackson’s sentence violated Hurst v. Florida, we discuss only the statutes in effect at the time his sentence was issued, which were sections
775.082(1) and
921.141, Florida Statutes (2007). 7 These statutes detailed the following procedures: *784 A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s.
921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole....
...s upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts: (a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5); and (b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. § 921.141(l)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). Our review of these statutes leads to the conclusion that the facts that were necessary to impose the death penalty in Florida at the time that Jackson was sentenced are those highlighted in section 921.141(3)(a)-(b): that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist mid the existing aggravation outweighs the presented mitigation....
...2012) (citing Baker v. State,
71 So.3d 802, 824 (Fla. 2011); Douglas,
878 So.2d at 1263-64 ). However, Hurst v. Florida has indicated that a great deal of our previous Ring jurisprudence requires reconsideration, including our understanding of the previous version of section
921.141, which we now believe required findings of “sufficient” aggravating circumstances—not just a single aggravating circumstance, as the State claims. See also Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939 , 954 n.12,
103 S.Ct. 3418 ,
77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) (noting that the language in section
921.141 pertaining to “sufficient aggravating circumstances” sug *785 gests that the finding of one aggravating circumstance alone does not necessarily support the imposition of a death sentence)....
...Following these instructions, the jury returned a recommendation of death by a vote of eleven to one. The jury made no factual findings regarding whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed, or whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed which outweighed the mitigating circumstances, as section 921.141 required at the time of Jackson’s trial....
...When the jury made a nonunanimous recommendation that Jackson be sentenced to death, it did not make factual findings regarding the existence of any—let alone sufficient— aggravating circumstances, nor did it make any findings regarding the relative weight of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2007), required....
...Florida more narrowly held that certain portions of the procedure dictated in section 941.121 were unconstitutional. See
136 S.Ct. at 624 (“Florida’s sentencing scheme ... is therefore unconstitutional.” (emphasis added)). More specifically, the decision in Hurst v. Florida only invalidated those provisions of section
921.141 that permitted judicial factfinding rather than fact-finding by a jury....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...al by failing to proffer Baker’s letter of apology; (2) the trial court erred in denying Baker’s claim that Florida’s rule prohibiting defense counsel from interviewing jurors is .unconstitutional under the federal and state constitutions; (3) section 921.141 is facially vague and overbroad, the trial court’s instruction to the jury that its role was advisory was unconstitutional, and trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to litigate these claims; , (4) Florida’s de...
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 1018514, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3461
...st-degree murder. The above
argument in Mosely was made during the penalty phase, and one of the
aggravating factors relied upon by the State (and for the jury to consider) was that
the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.” See § 921.141(6)(h), Fla.
Stat....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 196, 1988 Fla. LEXIS 375, 1988 WL 23520
Citing a litany of decisions interpreting section 921.-141(5)(h), Darden urges that “the trial court's
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 151, 1993 Fla. LEXIS 332, 1993 WL 64611
...overton, McDonald, grimes, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. BARKETT, C.J., recused. . The judge found that Thomas had previously been convicted of a felony involving violence, and that the murder was committed during a robbery attempt and for pecuniary gain. § 921.141, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...e
prosecutor’s argument went too far. Ritchie’s proposed
nonstatutory mitigation put at issue his background, including his
experiences in Jamaica and his emigration. Similarly, his proposed
statutory mitigator of substantial impairment, see § 921.141(7)(f),
Fla....
...We deny relief as to both claims.
We have previously rejected facial challenges like Ritchie’s
claim that admitting victim impact evidence probative of “the
victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being and the
resultant loss to the community’s members by the victim’s death,”
§ 921.141(8), Fla....
...Windom, his arguments do not persuade us that our precedent is
“clearly erroneous.” State v. Poole,
297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020);
see also McKenzie v. State,
333 So. 3d 1098, 1105 & n.3 (Fla. Feb.
2022) (explaining that admission of the victim impact evidence
authorized by section
921.141(8) “is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Payne v....
...ure is talking to
someone that knows better. And Granville Ritchie knew better.”
On appeal, the State properly concedes that this testimony
exceeds the scope of relevant victim impact evidence.
- 38 -
See § 921.141(8) (“Characterizations and opinions about the crime,
the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted
as part of the victim impact evidence.”)....
...reject Ritchie’s argument that the trial court improperly excluded
relevant evidence. See Snelgrove v. State,
107 So. 3d 242, 254 (Fla.
- 40 -
2012) (“A trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence under
section
921.141 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).
Second, Ritchie argues that the State presented improper
rebuttal to the video....
...We cannot continue to overstate
the applicability of our procedural rules, or the requirements of
fundamental error, in order to ignore the prosecutorial misconduct
that the majority agrees occurred in this case. Lawyers, whether
requirement in section 921.141(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2017). See
ch. 2017-1, Laws of Fla. Although this Court receded from the
unanimity requirement in Poole, section 921.141(2)(c) has not been
amended.
- 56 -
prosecutors or defense attorneys, are officers of the Court and, as
such, must follow the law....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...o testify about Lago’s statements, but
that the error was harmless. See Rodriguez I,
753 So. 2d at 44–45.
24
The court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment on the armed burglary count.
25
See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(b).
26
See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(a).
27
See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(d).
28
See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(e).
29
See Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(f).
39
Case: 11-13273 Date Filed: 06/30/2014 Page: 40 of 72
calculated and premeditated....
...Circuit Court to vacate his convictions and sentences pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850. 31 In his motion, as amended, Petitioner presented
twenty-two claims for relief. 32 We consider only the federal constitutional claims
30
See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(i).
31
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 is titled “Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence,” and sets out the procedures and requirements for obtaining relief.
32
The claims were based on both state law and federal constitutional law....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...described the role assigned to the jury by local law.”) (quoting
Dugger v. Adams,
489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). Under the plain text
of Florida’s death penalty statute, a sentencing “recommendation” is
precisely what the penalty-phase jury provides. See §
921.141(2),
Fla....
...ubt the
fact that renders the defendant eligible for imposition of the death
- 23 -
sentence—i.e., the existence of a statutory aggravating
circumstance, State v. Poole,
297 So. 3d 487, 501-03 (Fla. 2020);
see §
921.141(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). Also, Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme has since been amended in additional ways,
including requiring the jury’s recommendation for death to be
unanimous, see §
921.141(2)(c), and precluding the trial court from
imposing a sentence of death if the jury recommends a sentence of
life without the possibility of parole, see §
921.141(3)(a)1....
...Despite
these changes and the fact that the guilt-phase instruction in
Allen’s case was an incomplete statement of Florida law, Florida’s
statutory scheme remains a hybrid sentencing scheme that does
not place the ultimate responsibility for sentencing the defendant
on the jury. See § 921.141(2)-(4).
Moreover, in analyzing whether the “remarks to the jury
improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law” so
as to violate Caldwell’s mandate against “mislead[ing] the jury as to
its role in the sent...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 9030, 2001 WL 725698
...into one. We affirm the judgment and sentence, and with respect to the State’s cross-appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to override the jury’s recommendation of a death sentence. See Brown v. State,
521 So.2d 110 (Fla.1988); see also §
921.141, Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 396, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 1127
...n. 5 It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, BARKETT, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. GRIMES, J., dissents with an opinion. . "Statutory mitigating evidence” is any evidence tending to prove the existence of those factors described in section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (1991)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1988 WL 63454
...In charging the jury in petitioner’s case, the trial judge allegedly violated Lockett’s command because he suggested that the only mitigating factors the jury could consider were those enumerated in the Florida death penalty statute, Fla.Stat. § 921.141 (1987)....
...gh the aggravating circumstances found to exist. The mitigating circumstances which you may consider, if established by the evidence, are these.... (Emphasis added.) The court then read to the jury the seven statutory mitigating factors set forth in section 921.141; it did not, however, instruct the jury that it could consider any other mitigating evidence present in the record....
...-,
107 S.Ct. 1821 ,
95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). . In Hitchcock , the trial judge instructed the jury that ”[t]he mitigating circumstances which you may consider shall be the following_” The court then read the statutory mitigating factors set out in Fla.Stat. §
921.141 (1987)....
...at 1824. . In Hargrave , the trial court instructed the jury that ”[t]he mitigating circumstances which you may consider, if established by the evidence, are as follows_” The court then read the statutory mitigating factors set out in Fla. *1519 Stat. § 921.141 (1987)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1989 WL 67165
...The jury rejected this version of the facts and on March 9, 1983, found Parker guilty of first degree murder for the deaths of Pad-gett and Sheppard and third degree murder for the death of Dalton. During the sentencing phase the state presented evidence of statutory aggravating circumstances, see Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5) (West 1985), and Parker presented evidence of both statutory mitigating circumstances, see id. § 921.141(6), and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances....
...rbitrary or discriminatory manner. First, several Florida procedural rules, of both statutory and case law origin, constrain trial judges from imposing the death penalty in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Among these significant safeguards is § 921.141(3) of the Florida Statutes, which requires trial judges to independently review the evidence and make detailed written findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances before imposing the death penalty....
...death penalty will be imposed in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. That court is required by law to review every death sentence to ensure that it has not been imposed arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. at 466 ,
104 S.Ct. at 3165 (citing Fla.Stat. §
921.141(4))....
...§ 2254 (d); therefore, the state trial judge’s factual findings are presumed correct. . Long had good reason to fear Parker; Parker had been imprisoned once for shooting Long. . The trial judge expressly found that the following statutory mitigating circumstances, as specified in Fla.Stat.Ann § 921.141(6) (1985), were either not present or carried no weight: (a)The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity....
...(4) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. (5) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. (6) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. See id. § 921.141(5)....
...tors touching upon this case. (emphasis added). The trial of this case occurred after Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 ,
98 S.Ct. 2954 ,
57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (requiring consideration of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances), was decided and Fla.Stat. §
921.141 was amended to require Florida trial courts to consider nonstatutory mitigating circumstances....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 290, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 1254, 2016 WL 3348432
...In
pronouncing Bright’s sentence, the trial court determined that the
State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the
following statutory aggravators: (1) He had previously been convicted
of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, §
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008) (the 1990 conviction for robbery)
(great weight); (2) He had previously been convicted of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(5)(b),
Fla. Stat. (2008) (the contemporaneous murder of the other victim)
-9-
(great weight); and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel (HAC), § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2008) (great weight).
The trial court found that one statutory mitigating circumstance
had been established—the murders were committed while Bright was
under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, §
921.141(6)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
FAY, Circuit Judge: Anthony Antone, convicted of first degree murder and upon a recommendation of the jury in accordance with Fla.Stat. Section 921.141 (1974), sentenced to death, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C....
...he state trial judge, without objection from either party, instructed the jury on aggravating factors, and then stated “the mitigating factors which you may consider are these ....” and listed the seven mitigating factors enumerated by Fla.Stat. Section 921.141 (1975)....
...the defendant at the time of the crime. . Paragraph 13 of the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment filed by Antone’s counsel states as grounds for a dismissal of the indictment that: “by limiting the circumstances in mitigation as delineated in F.S. Section 921.141, the Statute provides for cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment .......
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1974 Fla. LEXIS 3841
PER CURIAM. Petitioner was informed against for the crime of First Degree Murder after the effective date of F.S. § 921.141, F.S.A., which reimposed the designation of “capital offenses.” Fie was tried by a jury of six and found guilty of manslaughter....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2013 WL 2492838, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11729
...t, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, require that capital aggravating
factors must be found by the grand jury and charged in the indictment
in a state capital prosecution.5
2
Fla. Stat.
921.141(5)(b), “The defendant was previously convicted of another capital
felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” Heath was previously
convicted of second-degree murder. Heath,
648 So. 2d at 663. Fla. Stat.
921.141(5)(d), “The
capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any:
robbery” [or other violent felony]....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
..., applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, require that capital aggravating
factors must be found by the grand jury and charged in the indictment
in a state capital prosecution. 5
2
Fla. Stat.
921.141(5)(b), “The defendant was previously convicted of another capital
felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” Heath was previously
convicted of second-degree murder. Heath,
648 So. 2d at 663. Fla. Stat.
921.141(5)(d), “The
capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any:
robbery” [or other violent felony]....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...At a subsequent hearing, Davidson expressed his intent to
plead guilty to first-degree murder (and the other charged crimes)
and waive a penalty-phase jury. After a lengthy colloquy with
Davidson and the presentation of a detailed factual basis by the
3. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
...that
sufficient aggravating circumstances existed and that those
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. We
disagree. 8
Davidson’s argument rests upon the faulty premise that the
sufficiency and weighing determinations of section 921.141 are
subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard....
...discretion in the trial court’s handling of mitigating circumstances.
Constitutionality of Prior-Violent-Felony Aggravator
As his final argument, Davidson challenges the
constitutionality of the prior-violent-felony aggravator. See §
921.141(6)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...nviction; (2) the
murder was committed while the defendant engaged in the
commission or attempted commission of a robbery; (3) the murder
was committed for pecuniary gain; and (4) the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). See § 921.141(6)(a),
(d), (f), (h), Fla....
...3 All four witnesses testified to Fletcher’s
3. These mitigators were that Fletcher: (1) entered a plea to
first-degree murder, along with codefendant Brown (uncontested,
great weight); (2) was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance at the time of the murder, see §
921.141(7)(b) (not proven); (3) had substantially impaired capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law, see § 921.141(7)(f) (not proven); (4)
had a young age at the time of the murder, see § 921.141(7)(g)
(undisputed, was 25 at time of murder, slight weight); (5) & (6)
suffered extreme emotional and physical abandonment
(respectively) (proven on both, slight weight); (7) was unable to form
lasting, safe relationships (uncontested, sli...
...involving cocaine, methamphetamine (“meth”), and opiates.
Dr. Buffington and Dr. Rohrer also opined that Fletcher was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at
the time of the murder, a statutory mitigator under section
921.141(7)(b), due to his reported use of meth during the four days
leading up to his escape....
...causes confusion, impulsivity, and hyperexcitability; and keeps
them awake.
However, on cross, both experts agreed Fletcher’s meth use
was based on self-reporting. Brown also told police they had not
mitigate against imposing the death penalty, see § 921.141(7)(h)
(moderate weight overall).
-9-
been using drugs prior to the escape, and no drug paraphernalia
was found in their shared cell....
...Given Fletcher’s bipolar diagnosis in particular, Dr. Rohrer
opined that Fletcher had a substantially impaired capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law, a statutory mitigator under section
921.141(7)(f)....
...Supreme
Court—the Eighth Amendment does not require any jury
recommendation as to whether to impose life or death. See Poole,
297 So. 3d at 505; Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 464-65
(1984). 16 Instead, Fletcher has a statutory right under section
921.141(2)(b) to have a jury find the existence of mitigating
15....
...hat the jury
followed the law as it was instructed here. 17
17. Given the amount of unrebutted mitigation, the lower
court was concerned with the verdict form and thoughtfully
considered whether the interrogatory was mere surplusage under
section 921.141(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2022), which requires the
jury to make a recommendation based upon its weighing of any
unanimously found aggravating factors (making the defendant
death eligible) and whether those aggravators “outweigh the
mitigating circumstances found to exist.” § 921.141(2)(b)2.a.-c.,
Fla....
...overall in the sentencing order. 18 Further, the lower court found
18. The sentencing court mistakenly described this as a
statutory mitigator in the sentencing order. It may be treated as a
mitigating factor, however, under the catchall provision of section
921.141(7)(h).
- 27 -
three additional mitigators after the Spencer hearing that it afforded
slight weight....
...Fletcher asserts that victim impact statements should be
wholly inadmissible during the penalty phase of a capital murder
proceeding because the only relevant evidence to the defendant and
his sentence is the State’s evidence of statutory aggravating factors
under section 921.141(6)....
...3d at 220 (rejecting a constitutional challenge to victim impact
statements raised as a “subclaim” under challenge to Florida’s
capital sentencing scheme); see also Kalisz v. State,
124 So. 3d 185,
211 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that victim impact evidence is
admissible during the penalty phase under section
921.141, Florida
Statutes, and article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution).
Further, this Court has no authority to categorically ban the
admission of victim impact evidence from capital penalty phase
proceedings....
...Amendment in Payne, which holds that the Eighth Amendment
“erects no per se bar” to victim impact evidence.
501 U.S. at 827.
Second, “the Florida Constitution in Article I, Section 16, and
- 30 -
the Florida Legislature in section
921.141([8]), Florida Statutes [ ],
instruct that in our state, victim impact evidence is to be heard in
considering capital felony sentences.” Windom,
656 So. 2d at 438.
In other words, “[t]he admission of victim impact evidence is
protected by article I, section 16 . . . and is . . . specifically
governed by section
921.141([8]).” Kalisz, 124 So....
...2008) (“Initially, we reject this claim because
Deparvine does not specify what part of the testimony was repetitive
and therefore fails to sufficiently identify the error.”). And in any
event, the three victim impact statements are well within the
confines of what is permitted by section 921.141(8)....
...Thus, Fletcher is not entitled to
any relief on this claim.
Constitutionality of Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme
(claim 6)
As he did in his original appeal in 2015, Fletcher generally
challenges Florida’s death sentencing scheme under section
921.141 as unconstitutional, raising both facial and as-applied
challenges. Apart from his arguments on “aggravator drift” (i.e., the
21. § 921.141(8), Fla....
...Fletcher asserts that the sentencing court fundamentally erred
by instructing the jury that the defendant must establish mitigators
by a preponderance of the evidence at the penalty phase because
placing any burden of proof on the defendant is neither authorized
by section 921.141 nor the Eighth Amendment....
... circumstance each proposed factor that is mitigating in nature and
has been reasonably established by the greater weight of the
evidence.” Fletcher argues that Campbell read additional
requirements into the law of mitigation without statutory authority
from section 921.141 and was referring to standards that applied to
a judge’s findings, not a jury’s findings.
Fletcher’s claim is patently meritless....
...2019).
Further, this Court recently rejected a similar but preserved
claim in Loyd,
379 So. 3d 1080. In Loyd, this Court addressed
“whether the trial court erred in reading the standard jury
instruction because in Loyd’s view it does not comport with section
921.141(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2021).” Id. at 1092. This Court
rejected Loyd’s argument, explaining that it is a firmly established
principle in Florida law that a mitigating circumstance that must be
“found to exist” under section
921.141(2)(b)2.b....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...y 31, 2025
CASE OF: TIMOTHY W. FLETCHER V. STATE OF FLORIDA
DOCKET NO.: SC2023-0058
OPINION FILED: July 17, 2025
ATTENTION: ALL PUBLISHERS
THE FOLLOWING CORRECTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE
ABOVE OPINION:
On p. 31, line 1, “section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1993)” was
changed to “section 921.141([8]), Florida Statutes [ ]” in the first
paragraph.
On p. 31, line 6, “section 921.141(7)” was changed to “section
921.141([8])” in the first paragraph.
SIGNED: OPINION CLERK
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 3747685, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14700
...STATE’S PENALTY PHASE EVIDENCE
The penalty phase before the jury began on March 11, 1994.
A. Armed Robbery of Robert Street
At Mendoza’s 1994 trial, the State established the aggravating circumstance
that Mendoza was previously convicted of another violent felony. See Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(5)(b)....
...statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. First, Mendoza
was previously convicted of another “felony involving the use . . . of violence to
the person”—specifically, the armed robbery and battery of Street. See Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(5)(b). Second, Mendoza killed Calderon “for pecuniary gain.” See id.
§ 921.141(5)(f). Third, Mendoza committed his capital felony while he was
engaged in the commission of a robbery. See id. § 921.141(5)(d).
The State argued against the presence of any mitigating circumstances....
...not guilty; and (5)
Mendoza planned the robbery and recruited Humberto and Lorenzo.
Next, the State argued that Mendoza was not “under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance” at the time of the murder. See Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(6)(b)....
...Eisenstein acknowledged that his testing uncovered only a “mild”
neuropsychological impairment and that this finding did not rise to the level of the
statutory mitigating circumstance of “extreme” mental or emotional disturbance.
See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b)....
...ting circumstances existed:
29
Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 30 of 58
(1) Mendoza was previously convicted of a felony involving violence to the
person, see Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(a); (2) Mendoza committed a capital felony
“while engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to
commit, or in flight after committing, or attempting to commit [a] robbery,” see id.
§ 921.141(5)(d); and (3) Mendoza’s “capital felony was committed for pecuniary
gain,” see id. § 921.141(5)(f)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2012 WL 3082491, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 15832
.../31/2012 Page: 12 of 90
penalty. If aggravating circumstances were found, they would determine whether
the aggravating circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating
circumstances,11 if any, the evidence had shown.12
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5).
11
The following mitigating circumstances may counsel against the imposition of the
death penalty in Florida:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felo...
...substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(h) The existence of any other factors in the defendant’s background that would
mitigate against imposition of the death penalty.
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6).
12
Florida Statutes § 921.141(2) provides, in relevant part:
After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory
sentence to the court, based on the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumst...
...Possession of
Drug
Paraphernalia,
Enter Control
Substance Into
Jail
14
See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1)(5)(b), (d), (e), (f), and (i), and also supra note 10.
28
Case: 11-15001 Date Filed: 07/31/2012 Page: 29 of 90
(1) the defendant was previously convicted of a...
...ged aggravating circumstances,
either in testimony or argument in the penalty phase of trial.” In the previous
penalty phase, in 1994, the State had argued that the evidence established five of
the aggravating circumstances listed in Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1)(5)(b), (d), (e), (f)
and (i).23 Arnold argued that to allow the State to assert that “the capital felony
was committed during the course of a burglary, ....
...The court was not
persuaded and denied Arnold’s motion.
Following a brief recess to enable Arnold to confer with his client, the
following took place before Judge Tarbuck:
MR. ARNOLD: The defendant would announce to the State that he will not
rely on the mitigator found at [Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(a)], that is no
significant prior criminal activity or history....
...THE COURT: We will defer ruling on that until such time as the
presentation of all evidence is concluded.
MR. ARNOLD: The next one is the defendant would announce to the State .
. . that it will not rely on the mitigator found at [Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b)],
which argues that the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental
40
Case: 11-15001 Date Filed: 07/31/2012 Page: 41 of 90
or emotional disturbance....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance”; and (2)
“The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or
her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of
law was substantially impaired,” see § 921.141(7)(b), (f), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...psychological evaluation of Herard to determine if he was
-4-
Jean-Pierre murder, the State sought to prove three aggravating
circumstances: prior violent felony; cold, calculated, and
premeditated; and committed by a criminal gang member.
§ 921.141(5)(b), (i), (n), Fla....
...Indeed, the
court found the aggravators “overwhelming.”
As to mitigation, the trial court found that Herard had failed to
establish any of his five proposed statutory mitigating
circumstances: extreme emotional or mental disturbance; minor
participant; extreme duress; substantially impaired capacity; and
age. § 921.141(6)(b), (d)-(g), Fla....
...As in Poole, the
aggravating circumstances in Herard’s case include the prior violent
felony aggravator, i.e., that “[t]he defendant was previously
convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person.” § 921.141(5)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 7065, 1991 WL 134868
...on request of either the State or the defendant the judge shall include in said charge the maximum and minimum sentences which may be imposed, (including probation) for the offense for which the accused has been on trial, (emphasis added) . Sections 921.141(1), (2) and (3), Fla.Stat. (1987). The purpose of this phase is so the jury may "determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.” Section 921.141(1), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance—and varying
degrees of weight to twenty-four nonstatutory mitigators. Id. at 491
nn.1-2.
determinations.” Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2002).
However, at the time, section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1996),
provided in relevant part that a simple majority vote was sufficient
for the jury to recommend a sentence of death....
...A jury’s advisory
sentence of life imprisonment could be overridden by the trial court
“after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” so
long as the court set forth in writing its findings upon which the
sentence of death was based as to certain enumerated facts.
§ 921.141(3), Fla....
...As acknowledged in his brief, at the time of
Zakrzewski’s trial, the trial court could override a jury’s
recommendation where “the facts suggesting a sentence of death
[were] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person
could differ.” Tedder,
322 So. 2d at 910 (citing §
921.141(3), Fla.
Stat....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 9082
...er sentenced to life, caused a substantial substantive disadvantage to the petitioner such that it constituted a violation of the ex post facto provision. Id. at 181-82 . The state also cites State v. Hootman,
709 So.2d 1357, 1359 (Fla.1998)(holding section
921.141(5)(m), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), which added an aggravating factor to those factors which jury may consider to determine whether the death penalty may be imposed, could not be imposed retroactively)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...27
In his written findings as to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the judge found six aggravators and no mitigators. The judge found: (1) the
defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony, § 921.141(5)(b),
Fla. Stat. (1981); (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was
engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of a kidnapping,
§ 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1981); (3) the capital felony was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from
custody, § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1981); (4) the capital felony was committed
for pecuniary gain, § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1981); (5) the capital felony was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1981); and
(6) the capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification,
§ 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1981). The judge specifically rejected the statutory
substantial domination mitigator. § 921.141(6)(e), Fla....
...hat the
mitigating circumstance of domination exists and this opinion is rejected by the
Court as being not reliable and is not believed.” The judge further rejected the
statutory mitigator of the age of the defendant at the time of the crime,
§ 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
...Cooper
asserts this evidence entitles him to both statutory and non-statutory mitigation.18
As to statutory mitigation, the unpresented mitigating evidence would
support a finding that Cooper is entitled to the mitigator of age of the defendant at
the time of the crime, § 921.141(6)(g), Fla....
...The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing
would support a finding of the statutory mitigator of age at the time of the crime.
The unpresented mitigating evidence would also support a finding that
Cooper is entitled to the statutory mitigator of substantial domination,
§ 921.141(6)(e), Fla....
...Merin testified as to Cooper’s capacity to
be dominated by older males, the sentencing judge explicitly rejected this
mitigating factor because he did not have an independent evidentiary basis for Dr.
18
Cooper asserts he is entitled to the statutory mitigator of substantial impairment,
§ 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...nviction; (2) the
murder was committed while the defendant engaged in the
commission or attempted commission of a robbery; (3) the murder
was committed for pecuniary gain; and (4) the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). See § 921.141(6)(a),
(d), (f), (h), Fla....
...3 All four witnesses testified to Fletcher’s
3. These mitigators were that Fletcher: (1) entered a plea to
first-degree murder, along with codefendant Brown (uncontested,
great weight); (2) was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance at the time of the murder, see §
921.141(7)(b) (not proven); (3) had substantially impaired capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law, see § 921.141(7)(f) (not proven); (4)
had a young age at the time of the murder, see § 921.141(7)(g)
(undisputed, was 25 at time of murder, slight weight); (5) & (6)
suffered extreme emotional and physical abandonment
(respectively) (proven on both, slight weight); (7) was unable to form
lasting, safe relationships (uncontested, sli...
...involving cocaine, methamphetamine (“meth”), and opiates.
Dr. Buffington and Dr. Rohrer also opined that Fletcher was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at
the time of the murder, a statutory mitigator under section
921.141(7)(b), due to his reported use of meth during the four days
leading up to his escape....
...causes confusion, impulsivity, and hyperexcitability; and keeps
them awake.
However, on cross, both experts agreed Fletcher’s meth use
was based on self-reporting. Brown also told police they had not
mitigate against imposing the death penalty, see § 921.141(7)(h)
(moderate weight overall).
-9-
been using drugs prior to the escape, and no drug paraphernalia
was found in their shared cell....
...Given Fletcher’s bipolar diagnosis in particular, Dr. Rohrer
opined that Fletcher had a substantially impaired capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law, a statutory mitigator under section
921.141(7)(f)....
...Supreme
Court—the Eighth Amendment does not require any jury
recommendation as to whether to impose life or death. See Poole,
297 So. 3d at 505; Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 464-65
(1984). 16 Instead, Fletcher has a statutory right under section
921.141(2)(b) to have a jury find the existence of mitigating
15....
...hat the jury
followed the law as it was instructed here. 17
17. Given the amount of unrebutted mitigation, the lower
court was concerned with the verdict form and thoughtfully
considered whether the interrogatory was mere surplusage under
section 921.141(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2022), which requires the
jury to make a recommendation based upon its weighing of any
unanimously found aggravating factors (making the defendant
death eligible) and whether those aggravators “outweigh the
mitigating circumstances found to exist.” § 921.141(2)(b)2.a.-c.,
Fla....
...overall in the sentencing order. 18 Further, the lower court found
18. The sentencing court mistakenly described this as a
statutory mitigator in the sentencing order. It may be treated as a
mitigating factor, however, under the catchall provision of section
921.141(7)(h).
- 27 -
three additional mitigators after the Spencer hearing that it afforded
slight weight....
...Fletcher asserts that victim impact statements should be
wholly inadmissible during the penalty phase of a capital murder
proceeding because the only relevant evidence to the defendant and
his sentence is the State’s evidence of statutory aggravating factors
under section 921.141(6)....
...3d at 220 (rejecting a constitutional challenge to victim impact
statements raised as a “subclaim” under challenge to Florida’s
capital sentencing scheme); see also Kalisz v. State,
124 So. 3d 185,
211 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that victim impact evidence is
admissible during the penalty phase under section
921.141, Florida
Statutes, and article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution).
Further, this Court has no authority to categorically ban the
admission of victim impact evidence from capital penalty phase
proceedings....
...Amendment in Payne, which holds that the Eighth Amendment
“erects no per se bar” to victim impact evidence.
501 U.S. at 827.
Second, “the Florida Constitution in Article I, Section 16, and
- 30 -
the Florida Legislature in section
921.141(7), Florida Statutes
(1993), instruct that in our state, victim impact evidence is to be
heard in considering capital felony sentences.” Windom,
656 So. 2d
at 438. In other words, “[t]he admission of victim impact evidence
is protected by article I, section 16 . . . and is . . . specifically
governed by section
921.141(7).” Kalisz, 124 So....
...2008) (“Initially, we reject this claim because
Deparvine does not specify what part of the testimony was repetitive
and therefore fails to sufficiently identify the error.”). And in any
event, the three victim impact statements are well within the
confines of what is permitted by section 921.141(8)....
...Thus, Fletcher is not entitled to
any relief on this claim.
Constitutionality of Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme
(claim 6)
As he did in his original appeal in 2015, Fletcher generally
challenges Florida’s death sentencing scheme under section
921.141 as unconstitutional, raising both facial and as-applied
challenges. Apart from his arguments on “aggravator drift” (i.e., the
21. § 921.141(8), Fla....
...Fletcher asserts that the sentencing court fundamentally erred
by instructing the jury that the defendant must establish mitigators
by a preponderance of the evidence at the penalty phase because
placing any burden of proof on the defendant is neither authorized
by section 921.141 nor the Eighth Amendment....
... circumstance each proposed factor that is mitigating in nature and
has been reasonably established by the greater weight of the
evidence.” Fletcher argues that Campbell read additional
requirements into the law of mitigation without statutory authority
from section 921.141 and was referring to standards that applied to
a judge’s findings, not a jury’s findings.
Fletcher’s claim is patently meritless....
...2019).
Further, this Court recently rejected a similar but preserved
claim in Loyd,
379 So. 3d 1080. In Loyd, this Court addressed
“whether the trial court erred in reading the standard jury
instruction because in Loyd’s view it does not comport with section
921.141(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2021).” Id. at 1092. This Court
rejected Loyd’s argument, explaining that it is a firmly established
principle in Florida law that a mitigating circumstance that must be
“found to exist” under section
921.141(2)(b)2.b....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...Johnson is not entitled to relief on this claim.
C
Johnson argues that the trial court made two errors in its
sentencing order by misunderstanding two statutory mitigators: the
“impaired capacity” mitigator, § 921.141(7)(f), Fla. Stat. (2022), to
which it assigned slight weight, and the “no significant history of
prior criminal activity” mitigator, § 921.141(7)(a), to which it
assigned moderate weight....
...l human being
and the resultant loss to the community’s members by the victim’s
death. Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the
defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as a
part of victim impact evidence.” § 921.141(8), Fla. Stat. (2022).
The video Johnson challenges falls within the parameters of
section 921.141(8), Florida Statutes, and is an appropriate
demonstration of Ricky’s “uniqueness”: Ricky tells the camera
where he was born, his favorite subject in school, his favorite
sports, his favorite places to go, his favorite TV shows, and that he
wants a puppy....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...188 (2024).
Here, the jury was instructed to determine if “[t]he First Degree
Murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.” That standard
instruction tracks the statutory text. See § 921.141(6)(e), Fla....
...ncing
scheme is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
According to Jones, the elimination of proportionality review 7 and
the number and breadth of aggravating factors in section
921.141(6) results in arbitrary and unconstitutional sentences.
We have repeatedly rejected this argument and others like it.
See Cox v....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 131
quash a trial court order declaring that section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2016)—governing the procedures
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...The jury recommended the death penalty for each murder by a vote of 11-1.
The court found four aggravating circumstances: the murders were committed (1)
while the defendant was engaged in the commission or an attempt to commit
robbery and burglary, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d) (1985); (2) for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, id. § 921.141(5)(e); (3) in a cold calculated
and premeditated manner, id. § 921.141(5)(i); and (4) the murders were especially
heinous atrocious and cruel, id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
...education and social skills, and
inability to reason abstractly, combined with low self-confidence and feelings of
inadequacy. The court rejected three statutory mitigating factors: (1) lack of
significant history of prior criminal activity, id. § 921.141(6)(a); (2) age of the
defendant, id. § 921.141(6)(g); and (3) murder committed under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, id. § 921.141(6)(b)....
...The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Harvey v. Florida,
489 U.S. 1040,
109 S. Ct. 1175,
103 L. Ed. 2d 237 (1989). The Governor signed Harvey’s
execution warrant on March 29, 1990.
8
This mitigating factor was subsequently codified in Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(h) (2008)
(“The existence of any other factors in the defendant's background that would mitigate against
imposition of the death penalty.”).
8
On August 27, 1990, Harvey file...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 2017 WL 410214
...s friend for the murder. See Kaczmar,
104 So.3d at 996-97 . The sentencing court found two aggravating factors: that Kaezmar had previously been convicted of a violent felony and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). See §
921.141(5)(b), (h) (2009)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
... sentencing determinations are neither elements of an offense nor
their functional equivalent. See Wells v. State,
364 So. 3d 1005,
1014-15 (Fla.), cert. denied,
144 S. Ct. 385 (2023) (holding “that
neither the sufficiency nor weighing determination [called for by
section
921.141, Florida Statutes] is subject to the reasonable-
doubt standard”)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 378587, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 852
...ee with Petitioner that
the trial court should have severed the offending component of the statute. In reaching
this conclusion, we manifest our agreement with Petitioner’s succinct argument:
[S]ubsection (2)(c) can be severed from § 921.141, Florida
Statutes, leaving intact the legislative intent of providing a
constitutional procedure for imposition of the death penalty in
appropriate cases....
...of the illegal provision has not infected the entire enactment.
Schmitt v. State,
590 So. 2d 404, 414 (Fla. 1991). In this case,
the provision declared unconstitutional does not taint the
remainder of §
921.141(2) such that the entire statute must
fail.
In our view, this statute presents a classic case where severance is appropriate
under the four-part test adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Cramp v....
...lf provides the missing element of a completed
procedure for determining when a death sentence may be imposed.
We certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great
public importance:
CAN AND SHOULD SUBSECTION 921.141(2), FLORIDA
STATUTES, BE STRICKEN SO THAT THE REMAINING
PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE ARE EFFECTUATED
CONSISTENT WITH THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE
AND THE UNITED STATES AND FL...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...Loretta White, and armed robbery. The penalty phase began on May 2, 2005. The
jury recommended death by a vote of twelve to zero two days later, which allowed
-4-
the trial court to consider a death sentence under section 921.141, Florida Statutes
(2005)....
...Florida’s capital sentencing procedures begin with an evidentiary hearing at
which the judge and jury hear evidence relevant to the nature of the crime and the
character of the defendant, including statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2011).3 Next the jury deliberates and
renders an “advisory sentence” to the court. § 921.141(2), Fla. Stat. Finally,
“[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after
weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” must enter a sentence of
life imprisonment or death. § 921.141(3), Fla....
... Reply Brief for
Petitioner at 5.
The Court had little trouble concluding that “the analysis the Ring Court
applied to Arizona’s sentencing scheme applies equally to Florida’s.” Hurst v.
Florida,
136 S. Ct. at 621-22. Pointing to section
921.141(3), Florida Statutes
(2010), the Court noted that Florida law required the judge, not the jury, to find the
“facts” necessary to impose the death penalty....
...101, 111 (2003).
This of course describes Florida’s capital sentencing law. As the Supreme
Court itself noted in Hurst v. Florida, section
775.082(1), Florida Statutes, states
that the punishment for a capital felony is life imprisonment unless “the procedure
set forth in s.
921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be
punished by death.” The required trial court findings are set forth in section
921.141(3), Florida Statutes, which is titled “Findings in Support of Sentence of
Death.” When the Supreme Court referred to “the critical findings necessary to
impose the death penalty,” it referred to those findings as “facts” and cited section
921.141(3). Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. at 622. Tellingly, the Court did not cite
section
921.141(2), which sets out the process for the jury to render an advisory
verdict.
Section
921.141(3) requires two findings. One is an eligibility finding, the
other a selection finding. The eligibility finding is in section
921.141(3)(a): “[t]hat
sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5).” The
selection finding is in section
921.141(3)(b): “[t]hat there are insufficient
mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.”
We know that section
921.141(3)(a) is the eligibility finding because that is
what our Court said repeatedly and consistently for many decades prior to Hurst v.
State....
...- 26 -
we said: “When one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found, death is
presumed to be the proper sentence unless it or they are overridden by one or more
of the mitigating circumstances provided in Fla. Stat. s.
921.141(7).” State v.
Dixon,
283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973). Beginning with that holding, it has always
been understood that, for purposes of complying with section
921.141(3)(a),
“sufficient aggravating circumstances” means “one or more.” See Miller v....
...finding required: the existence of one or more statutory aggravating circumstances.
- 27 -
B. The Errors of Hurst v. State
This Court clearly erred in Hurst v. State by requiring that the jury make any
finding beyond the section 921.141(3)(a) eligibility finding of one or more
statutory aggravating circumstances....
...ge of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed.” Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 490 (alteration in
original) (quoting Jones,
526 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., concurring)). Only such
“facts” are “elements” that must be found by a jury. The section
921.141(3)(b)
selection finding—“that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances”—fails both aspects of the Apprendi test.
The section
921.141(3)(b) selection finding is not a “fact.” As the Supreme
Court observed in a case decided shortly after Hurst v....
...Ct. 633, 642 (2016). That
- 28 -
stands in stark contrast to the “aggravating-factor determination,” which is “a
purely factual determination.” Id. A subjective determination like the one that
section 921.141(3)(b) calls for cannot be analogized to an element of a crime; it
does not lend itself to being objectively verifiable....
...to the jury.” State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 585 (Mo. 2019); see also Hurst v.
State,
202 So. 3d at 82 (Canady, J., dissenting) (weighing of mitigators and
aggravators is a determination that “require[s] subjective judgment”).
We acknowledge that section
921.141(3)(b) requires a judicial finding “as to
the fact[]” that the mitigators do not outweigh the aggravators. But the
legislature’s use of a particular label is not what drives the Sixth Amendment
inquiry. See Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 494. In substance, what section
921.141(3)(b)
requires “is not a finding of fact, but a moral judgment.” United States v. Gabrion,
719 F.3d 511, 533 (6th Cir. 2013) (describing balancing provision in federal death
penalty statute).
In any event, even if we were to consider the section
921.141(3)(b) selection
finding to be a fact, it still would not implicate the Sixth Amendment....
...increasing the legally authorized range of punishment. As we have explained,
under longstanding Florida law, it is the finding of an aggravating circumstance
- 29 -
that exposes the defendant to a death sentence. The role of the section
921.141(3)(b) selection finding is to give the defendant an opportunity for mercy if
it is justified by the relevant mitigating circumstances and by the facts surrounding
his crime.
This passage from the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v....
...missible for judges to
exercise discretion—taking into consideration various factors relating both to
offense and offender—in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by
statute.” Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 481.
In sum, because the section
921.141(3)(b) selection finding is not a “fact”
that exposes the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the
jury’s guilty verdict, it is not an element....
...the same legislative policy choice. See Spaziano,
468 U.S. at 463; see also
Michael L. Radelet & G. Ben Cohen, The Decline of the Judicial Override, 15
Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 539, 548-49 (2019). As for Florida law, today’s decision
does not alter section
921.141, Florida Statutes (2019), which still requires a
unanimous jury recommendation before death can be imposed. If the Florida
Legislature considers changing section
921.141 to eliminate the requirement for a
unanimous jury recommendation before a sentence of death can be imposed, the
- 43 -
fact that this legislative change would make Florida an “outlier” will surely be
considered in the ensuing political debate....
...State was decided?
Fundamentally, the dissent’s argument, and the Hurst v. State holding, are
premised on a mischaracterization of the jury’s ultimate sentencing
recommendation, and the penultimate considerations leading up to that
recommendation under section 921.141, as factual determinations that constitute
elements of the charged crime....
...[and] the character and propensities of the offender,” Woodson v.
North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (quoting Pennsylvania ex.rel. Sullivan v.
Ashe,
302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)), to appropriately narrow the class of cases in which
the sentence can be imposed. Id. The procedures set forth in section
921.141 were
enacted to comply with the Eighth Amendment in this regard by requiring the State
to prove at least one statutorily defined “aggravating circumstance” before the
death penalty can be considered, §
921.141(2)(b)1., (6), and by providing for the
comprehensive consideration of mitigating circumstances. §
921.141(2)(b)2.,
(3)(a)2., (3)(b), (7)....
...Additionally, before a death sentence can be imposed, the
sentencing judge must enter a written order reflecting findings that “there are
sufficient aggravating factors to warrant the death penalty . . . [and that] the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances reasonably established
by the evidence.” § 921.141(4). Appellate review assures that these standards are
met in every case. § 921.141(5) (“The judgment of conviction and sentence of
death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida and
disposition rendered within 2 years after the filing of a notice of appeal....
...Lerner & Frederick Loewe, Camelot, act II, scene 7 (1960).
- 56 -
significant safeguard for the just application of the death penalty in Florida.
Although in 2017, in response to our decision in Hurst v. State, the
Legislature revised section 921.141(2), Florida Statutes, to require a unanimous
recommendation by the jury, nothing in the majority’s decision today requires the
Legislature to abandon the unanimity requirement....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 1835, 2009 WL 151026
...shot at the water's edge by an unknown assailant and her body dragged to the spot where the police found it. We disagree. The penalty phase proceedings are distinct from the guilt phase of a murder trial, and this distinction is clearly expressed in section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides in pertinent part: SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS ON ISSUE OF PENALTY....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...As distinguished from Arizona’s
system, Florida has a hybrid system in which the jury renders an advisory verdict
on the sentence, and the trial judge decides the ultimate sentence.” Grim v. Buss,
No. 3:08-cv-0002-MCR,
2011 WL 1299930, at *66 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2011)
(citing Fla. Stat. §
921.141).
In Evans v....
...§]
775.082.” Section
775.082 states, in pertinent part:
A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished
by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the
procedure set forth in [Fla. Stat. §]
921.141 results in findings by the
court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such
person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible
for parole.
Fla. Stat. §
775.082(1).
Section
921.141, in turn, lists the aggravating circumstances that may warrant a
death sentence....
...6 In brief, Count I notified Grim that he was (1) charged with
stabbing the victim with a knife and beating her with a hammer, and in the
process thereof did use, carry or possess a weapon, to-wit: a knife and hammer in
violation of Section[ ]
782.04 . . . , Florida Statutes.
6
Under §
921.141(5),
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.–Aggravating circumstances shall be
limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a
felony and under sentence of imprisonment or...
...§]
784.046, or a foreign protection
9
Case: 11-11890 Date Filed: 01/22/2013 Page: 10 of 10
capital murder and (2) could be sentenced to death if any of the aggravating
circumstances listed in §
921.141 were found by the court....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 261, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 244
...commits a capital felony, punishable as provided in ss.
775.082 and 921.-141.” Under section
775.082(1), a person convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment with a minimum mandatory 25 years unless a proceeding was held under section
921.141 as to whether such person shall be punished by death....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 299, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 6379
...f deadly force in either ordering or committing the shooting of the victim. Therefore, the trial court should have submitted this case to the jury for the penalty phase of the trial following Brown’s conviction for first-degree murder, pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1984 Fla. LEXIS 2553
...In his petition for rule 3.850 relief, Antone asserts that his death sentence *961 should be vacated on two grounds: (1) that he had ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of his trial, and (2) that the Florida death penalty statute, section 921.141, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional because it excluded non-statutory mitigating circumstances between July 1976 and July 1978....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...rding three postconviction
claims: competency, ineffectiveness of counsel, and whether Doty
“suffered brain damage and/or serious mental illness to a sufficient
degree” for purposes of establishing the mental-health statutory
mitigators. See § 921.141(7)(b), (f), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 39 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 31, 2014 WL 172534, 2014 Fla. LEXIS 137
...1993), prior to sentencing Smith to death for the first-degree murders of
Gibson and Keenan and to life imprisonment for the first-degree murder of
Robinson. The court gave great weight to the aggravating circumstances that
Smith was previously convicted of another capital felony, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla.
-4-
Stat. (2011), and that the capital felony was committed while Smith was engaged
in an attempt to commit robbery, § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2011), merged with
the aggravator that Smith committed the capital felony for pecuniary gain, §
921.141(5)(f), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 5, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 67, 2016 WL 156966
...of cumulative error fails.
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief on this claim.
E. Unconstitutional Capital Sentencing Statute
Appellant next argues in conclusory fashion that Florida’s capital sentencing
statute, section 921.141, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional on its face and as
applied....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...e
under this claim in his third successive motion were:
- 13 -
Ford’s death sentences are contrary to Hurst v.
Florida,
577 U.S. 92 (2016)[,] and is [sic] in violation of
Florida Statutes, section
921.141....
...m of
Kimberly Malnory at the guilt phase, the jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt the aggravator that “[t]he defendant was
previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving
the use or threat of violence to the person,” § 921.141(5)(b), Fla.
Stat....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 92, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 185, 1992 WL 18560
...sion and remanded the cause for a new sentencing proceeding. Brown,
521 So.2d at 111. We quashed that decision, holding that, even though the trial court had improperly applied Enmund , it was error to remand for a new penalty phase proceeding under section
921.141....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...He
also explained that he has never been “a good
person” but that he is an “honest person” and
believes in taking responsibility for his action.
The court then analyzed each statutory mitigator outlined in
section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2019), and ultimately found
that none applied....
...damental
error by failing to find beyond a reasonable doubt that sufficient
aggravating factors existed to warrant a death sentence and that
those factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances. According
to Bell, the weighing determinations in section 921.141 are subject
- 15 -
to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...mitigators, namely that Miller was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crimes, and that
Miller’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired. See § 921.141(7)(b), (f), Fla....
...The
court assigned each aggravator very great weight.
Regarding mitigation, the court explained that Miller “offered
three statutory . . . mitigating circumstances” as well as thirty-three
proposed other factors in Miller’s background that would mitigate
against imposition of the death penalty under section 921.141(7)(h),
Florida Statutes....
...As recognized by the trial judge, there does not appear to be
any authority for the proposition that victim impact information
“can only be presented in the State’s case-in-chief.” The statute
governing the admission of victim impact evidence, section
921.141(8), Florida Statutes, does not squarely address the issue,
although the statute arguably suggests the information will
generally be presented during the State’s case-in-chief.
§ 921.141(8), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...beyond a reasonable doubt”). Recently, in Lawrence v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly
S277, S282 n.8 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2020), we confirmed that the same claim is equally
meritless where, as here, the defendant waived the right to a penalty-phase jury.
See also § 921.141(3)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 1261, 1994 WL 51854
...Had the Defendant’s wife been murdered pursuant to this solicitation, the Defendant would have been guilty of First Degree Murder. The fact that the murder would have been committed for pecuniary gain would have been an aggravating factor in determining if the death penalty should be imposed. See Section 921.141 (5) [f], Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...nt to Hurst.... Id. at S451, 210 So.3d at at 635: As we explained in Perry, “[s]ection 3 of the Act defines the facts required to be found by the jury for a sentence of death to be imposed.” Id. Specifically, section 3 of the Act amends sections 921.141(2) and (3), Florida Statutes, to include the following language: (2) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED SENTENCE BY THE JURY....
...The court may consider only an aggravating factor that *859 was unanimously found to exist by the .jury. CL 2016-13, § 3, at 233-34, Laws of Fla. In Perry, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at S462,
210 So.3d at 639 , this Court explained that “Consistent with our decision in Hurst, we construe [this amended] section
921.141(2)(b)2....
...or exists, that sufficient aggravating factors exist to impose death, and that they outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist.” This Court in Perry, id. at S453, 210 So.3d at at 640, also concluded that the provision of the Act amending section 921.141(2)(c) “is unconstitutional because it requires that only ten jurors recommend death as opposed to the constitutionally required unanimous, twelve-member jury.” Accordingly, pursuant to our holding in Perry, the revised statutoiy s...
...rovisions of the Act can be construed constitutionally and [can] otherwise be validly applied to pending prosecutions.” Id. at S451,
210 So.3d at 635 . Importantly, however, the provision of the Act identified as problematic in Perry, which amends section
921.141(2)(c), 1 can only be constitutionally applied under our decisions in Hurst and Perry to pending prosecutions for a jury recommendation of death if twelve jurors unanimously determine that a defendant should be sentenced to death....
...dation to the court shall be a sentence of death. If fewer than 10 jurors determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s recommendation to the court shall be a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. § 921.141(2)(c), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...14, 2016), which concluded:
Based on the reasoning of our opinion in Hurst[ v. State,
202
So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016)], we answer both certified questions in the
negative. As to the second question, we construe the fact-finding
provisions of the revised section
921.141, Florida Statutes,
constitutionally in conformance with Hurst to require unanimous
findings on all statutory elements required to impose death....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 93, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 280
...robbery,3 which merged with
the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain; and (3) the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).4 The court assigned great weight to each
1. Oyola has a full-scale IQ score of 74.
2. § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007).
3. § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat.
4. § 921.141(5)(h), Fla....
...er reflects a
misdirected analysis by the trial judge and denigrates mitigation evidence. We
therefore reverse and remand this case for a new penalty phase proceeding.10
Improper Consideration of Nonstatutory Aggravating Factors
Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, governs capital sentencing procedures.
After the jury issues an advisory sentence, the judge must independently weigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances before a sentence is ordered. §
921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2007). The capital sentencing statute expressly constrains
the aggravating circumstances a trial judge may consider to fifteen enumerated
factors. § 921.141(5), Fla....
...It also provides seven specific factors for a court
to consider as possible mitigating circumstances, along with an eighth “catch-all”
provision that expands the realm of mitigating circumstances to “any other factors
in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death
penalty.”11 § 921.141(6), Fla....
...tion of the
-9-
aggravating and mitigating factors, the statutory scheme allows a court to consider
nonstatutory mitigating factors, but limits consideration of aggravating factors to
only those listed in section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes.
A common challenge to an aggravating factor found by the trial court is that
it is not supported by the record or should have been merged with some other
similar factor....
...harmless12 and has remanded for resentencing if there is any evidence that
mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty. See Riley v. State,
366 So.
2d 19, 22 (Fla. 1978) (citing Elledge v. State,
346 So. 2d 998, 1002-03 (Fla.
1977)).
trial court. See §
921.141(5), Fla....
...armful. Just as a jury should not be
exposed to evidence of impermissible aggravating factors, a judge should not be
permitted to consider them as part of the evaluation process. It is clear that capital
sentencing must proceed in accordance with section 921.141, Florida Statutes.
As we have repeatedly stressed, a trial judge’s weighing of statutory
aggravating factors and statutory and nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances is the essential ingredient in the constitutionality of our
death penalty statute....
...circumstance not found here. Globe,
877 So. 2d at 668 n.3; Kilgore,
688 So. 2d at
897 & n.2.13 Those courts did not rely on a nonstatutory aggravating factor, but
13. The trial courts in Globe and Kilgore found as aggravating factors both
sections
921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes, that the capital felony was committed by a
prior felon and imprisoned, placed on community control, or on felony probation,
- 15 -
used strong language only to describe the weight assigned to this factor....
...death penalty should be imposed,” is repeated nearly verbatim in the analysis and
then echoed in the conclusion of the sentencing order, we have more than mere
colorful language by the trial court. These statements, when read together, reflect
and
921.141(5)(b), the capital felony was committed by a person convicted of a
prior violent felony. See Globe,
877 So. 2d at 668 n.3; Kilgore,
688 So. 2d at 897
nn.1-2. This trial court did not find section
921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, as an
aggravating circumstance.
14....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
atrocious, or cruel.” Id. at 1028 n.1 (citing §
921.141, Fla. Stat. (1989)). As to mitigation, “[t]he
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...February 13, 2020
PER CURIAM.
In this direct appeal of Wayne C. Doty’s second sentencing proceeding,
Doty argues that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction that did not require
the determinations referred to in section 921.141(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2018),
to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt....
...3d at 734.
At the sentencing proceeding held after Doty’s initial sentence was vacated,
the State attempted to prove three aggravating factors. First, that Doty was
currently serving a sentence of imprisonment for a prior felony conviction.
See § 921.141(6)(a), Fla. Stat. Second, that Doty was previously convicted of a
capital felony. See § 921.141(6)(b). Third, that Doty murdered Rodriguez in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without pretense of moral or legal
justification. See § 921.141(6)(i)....
...2019), I dissent from the
majority’s use of the term “determinations” to refer to findings mandated by this
Court’s decision in Hurst v. State,
202 So. 3d 40 (2016). As I explained in Rogers:
Although Florida’s sentencing statutes have changed since the
issuance of Hurst, the title of section
921.141(2), Florida Statutes
(2018), is “Findings and recommended sentence by the jury,” and that
subsection lists precisely what we held in Hurst to be the “critical
findings” that must be found unanimously by a jury before a sentence
of death may be recommended ....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...February 13, 2020
PER CURIAM.
In this direct appeal of Wayne C. Doty’s second sentencing proceeding,
Doty argues that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction that did not require
the determinations referred to in section 921.141(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2018),
to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt....
...3d at 734.
At the sentencing proceeding held after Doty’s initial sentence was vacated,
the State attempted to prove three aggravating factors. First, that Doty was
currently serving a sentence of imprisonment for a prior felony conviction.
See § 921.141(6)(a), Fla. Stat. Second, that Doty was previously convicted of a
capital felony. See § 921.141(6)(b). Third, that Doty murdered Rodriguez in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without pretense of moral or legal
justification. See § 921.141(6)(i)....
...2019), I dissent from the
majority’s use of the term “determinations” to refer to findings mandated by this
Court’s decision in Hurst v. State,
202 So. 3d 40 (2016). As I explained in Rogers:
Although Florida’s sentencing statutes have changed since the
issuance of Hurst, the title of section
921.141(2), Florida Statutes
(2018), is “Findings and recommended sentence by the jury,” and that
subsection lists precisely what we held in Hurst to be the “critical
findings” that must be found unanimously by a jury before a sentence
of death may be recommended ....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...The trial court sentenced McKenzie to death, having found
the following aggravating factors:
(1) McKenzie had previously been convicted of another
capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to the person, see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat.
(2006) (eight prior convictions and the contemporaneous
murder of the other victim) (great weight); (2) the murders
were committed while McKenzie was engaged in the
commission of a robbery, see § 921.141(5)(d) (significant
weight); (3) the murders were committed for pecuniary
gain, see § 921.141(5)(f) (merged with robbery
aggravator—no additional weight given); and (4) the
murders were cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP),
see § 921.141(5)(i) (great weight).
29 So....
...Florida, 577
- 12 -
U.S. 92, 102-03 (2016), the Florida Legislature amended section
782.04(1)(b) as follows (underlining indicates the added language):
(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure set
forth in s.
921.141 shall be followed in order to determine
sentence of death or life imprisonment....
...evidence nor to receive it outside of the jury’s presence. “Evidence
of a family member’s grief and suffering due to the loss of the victim
is evidence of ‘the resultant loss to the community’s members by
the victim’s death’ permitted by section 921.141(7), and the
admission of such evidence is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Payne v....
...3d 478, 496 (Fla.
2013). 3 Each of the victim impact statements in this case remained
within the scope of proper victim impact evidence, and the trial
court did not err in permitting their introduction.
3. Victim impact evidence is now provided for in section
921.141(8), Florida Statutes (2020).
- 15 -
IV....
...2021) (quoting Foster v.
State,
258 So. 3d 1248, 1251 (Fla. 2018)).
VI. Constitutionality of the Prior Violent Felony
Aggravating Factor
McKenzie challenges the constitutionality of the prior violent
felony aggravating factor, as set forth in section
921.141(6)(b),
Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 47, 1990 Fla. LEXIS 204
...The Hitchcock Court determined that this instruction was constitutionally defective because it failed to apprise the jury that it could consider any relevant mitigating evidence that did not fall within the scope of seven “statutory mitigating factors” contained in section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975)....
...e, are these: [listing only the seven statutory mitigating factors].” Then, in its written sentencing order, the court made the following analysis: The Court has carefully reviewed those seven mitigating circumstances contained in Florida Statutes 921.141(6)(a-g)....
...EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, SHAW and GRIMES, JJ., concur. BARKETT, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs. . The trial court in Hitchcock had stated that ‘“there [were] insufficient mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in §
921.141(6) [, Florida Statutes], to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.'” Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393, 395-96 ,
107 S.Ct. 1821, 1823 ,
95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (quoting trial transcript; emphasis in original). . The opinion was dated March 29, 1979, several months before amendments to section
921.141 took effect that eliminated language restricting mitigating factors to those listed in the statute....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 600, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 2644
of the sentencing factors now codified in section
921.141, and sentenced the juvenile offender to concurrent
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 9105, 1990 WL 191881
...) the jury trial on phase two. There is no way we can conclude from this record that consent was obtained and we must reverse the trial judge’s ruling in this regard and remand for further proceedings on the penalty phase of this trial pursuant to section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1989)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...the proceedings; (10) the trial court erred in considering separately that the murder was for pecuniary gain and that the murder occurred during the course of a kidnapping; (11) a new trial is warranted because of prosecutorial misconduct; and (12) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1993), is unconstitutional....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 622, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 2719
...001 kidnapping, sexual battery, and stabbing and beating death in Lake County, Florida, of Deborah Tressler, a woman Simmons had befriended. Simmons was sentenced to death after a unanimous jury recommendation in the first penalty phase. Pursuant to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2003), the trial court found three aggravating factors: prior violent felony; commission of murder during the commission of, or attempt to commit, a sexual battery, a kidnapping, or both; and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel....
...is remanded to the trial court for a new penalty phase proceeding. It is so ordered. LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. PERRY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., dissent. .See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance); § 921.141(6)(f), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty. The
trial judge found four aggravating circumstances,[n.4] one statutory
mitigating circumstance,[n.5] and no nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.
[n.4] § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), (i), Fla....
...of violence; murder committed during the commission of
an enumerated felony; murder especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel; and murder committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner[ 1]).
[n.5] § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
...The jury unanimously convicted Rivera of first-degree murder during his
guilt phase trial. Rivera I,
561 So. 2d at 537. This first-degree murder conviction
is separate from the death penalty that may later be imposed after the penalty
phase—albeit a necessary prerequisite to that imposition. See §
921.141(1), Fla.
Stat....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. [n.4] §
921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), (i), Fla. Stat. (1985) (previous
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...In capital cases,
only statutory aggravating factors may be considered, and a
statutory aggravating factor is required to be proven beyond a
- 10 -
reasonable doubt before a sentence of death may be imposed. See
§ 921.141(2)(b)2., Fla....
...Both were
capital cases governed by a statute not applicable to sentencing in
the noncapital context. Under that statute, refusal to take
responsibility or show remorse is not relevant to any of the
aggravating factors for consideration in sentencing a capital
defendant. § 921.141(6), Fla....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2010 WL 117704
...’ murder. The court found that four
aggravating factors applied in Williams’ murder: (1) “[t]he defendant was
previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person,” FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(b); (2) “[t]he capital
felony was committed while the defendant was engaged . . . [in] burglary,” §
921.141(5)(d); (3) “[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel,” § 921.141(5)(h) (“HAC factor”); and (4) “[t]he capital felony was a
homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner
without any pretense of moral or legal justification,” § 921.141(5)(i)....
...Army at about age 16, at the time of the Korean War. He was awarded the
National Defense Service Medal for enlisting in a time of conflict, the U.N.
Service Medal for serving with U.N. forces in the Korean conflict, the Korean
5
FLA . STAT . § 921.141(6)(h) (indicating that mitigating circumstances include “any other
factors in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death
penalty”).
9
Service Meda...
...The post-conviction court denied relief. The Florida Supreme Court
affirmed, in a 5-2 decision, the denial of post-conviction relief. Porter v. State,
788 So. 2d 917, 928 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam).8 The Florida Supreme Court
6
See FLA . STAT . §
921.141(6)(b) (recognizing “the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance” as a mitigating factor).
7
See FLA . STAT . §
921.141(6)(f) (recognizing substantial impairment of the ability “to
conform ....
...Porter,
788 So. 2d at 925 (citations omitted).
2. Burglary13
The state trial court found that Porter committed the murder while
committing a burglary. The court found that
12
FLA . STAT . §
921.141(5)(i).
13
FLA . STAT . §
921.141(5)(d).
22
[w]hile armed with a dangerous weapon, [Porter]
committed a burglary by entering the residence of Evelyn
Williams with intent to commit a crime....
...Balancing the Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
The Florida Supreme Court determined that Porter had not met his burden to
show prejudice under Strickland. Porter,
788 So. 2d at 925. The majority found
14
FLA . STAT . §
921.141(5)(b).
23
that the trial court properly found that the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factors, even after striking the HAC factor:
There is additional postconvic...
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27122, 2008 WL 5250690
...ows’ murder. The court found that four aggravating factors applied in Williams’ murder: (1) “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person,” Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (5)(b); (2) “[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged ... [in] burglary,” § 921.141(5)(d); (3) “[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” § 921.141 (5)(h) (“HAC factor”); and (4) “[t]he capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification,” § 921.141(5)(i)....
...The Supreme Court has since held that the standard for determining a defendant’s competence to waive the right to counsel is not higher than the standard for determining competence to stand trial. Godinez v. Moran,
509 U.S. 389, 391 ,
113 S.Ct. 2680, 2682 ,
125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). . Fla. Stat. §
921.141 (6)(h) (indicating that mitigating circumstances include "any other factors in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty”). . See Fla Stat. §
921.141(6)(b) (recognizing “the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” as a mitigating factor). . See Fla. Stat. §
921.141 (6)(f) (recognizing substantial impairment of the ability "to conform ......
...[S]tandby counsel was appointed to provide legal advice upon request. The Defendant cannot now complain that "co-counsel” was ineffective. State v. Porter, No. 86-5546-CF-A, slip op. at 9-10, 13 (18th Jud. Cir. Brevard County July 12, 1995) (citations omitted). . See supra notes 6-7. . Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (5)(i). . Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (5)(d). . Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (5)(b)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...[No Change]
Court Commentary
[No Change]
RULE 3.780. SENTENCING HEARING FOR CAPITAL CASES
(a) Evidence. In all proceedings based on section 921.141, Florida
Statutes, the state and defendant will be permitted to present evidence of an
aggravating or mitigating nature, consistent with the requirements of the statute
and the notice requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.181....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
Ch. 2023-23, § 1, Laws of Fla. (codified at §
921.141(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2023)). Following this
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...3 At the time of Jennings’s trial, the jury’s sentencing determination was
advisory and required only a majority vote, but the trial court was required to
place “great weight” upon the recommendation of the jury. See Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(2) (1996); Tedder v....
...requires that, in order for the jury to recommend a death sentence, the jury
must unanimously find the existence of at least one aggravating factor and
unanimously agree that the defendant should be sentenced to death. Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(2) (2021). However, the jury’s recommendation that the defendant
be sentenced to death is still advisory, and the trial court may override the
recommendation. Id. § 921.141(3).
USCA11 Case: 21-11591 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2022 Page: 8 of 38
8 Opinion of the Court 21-11591
would be heading to California....
...if the motive for the capital felony was related, in whole or in
part, to the victim’s official capacity.
(l) The victim of the capital felony was a person less than 12
years of age.
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5) (1996).
7 In support of this aggravator, the State emphasized that the bloody shoe
prints in the restaurant led from the freezer where the victims were to the
office where the money was located.
USCA11 Case: 21-...
...dant to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6) (1996)....
...criminal activity”;
(2) he was an accomplice in the offense and his participation was relatively
minor; and (3) Jennings acted under “extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(a), (b), and (e)
(1996)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...sentence of death; (4) determine whether any mitigating circumstances exist and
unanimously determine whether the aggravating factors outweigh those mitigating
circumstances; and (5) unanimously determine that the defendant should be
sentenced to death. See Hurst,
202 So. 3d at 57; §
921.141(2), Fla....
...to a life sentence
unless a unanimous jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of
“capital first-degree murder”—which Foster defines as “murder plus the . . .
elements the jury is required to find unanimously under revised § 921.141, Fla.
Stat.” He argues that a conviction for “capital first-degree murder” requires not
only the statutorily defined elements of first-degree murder, but the specific
unanimous penalty phase findings set forth in Hurst; section 921.141, Florida
Statutes, which was revised to incorporate the Hurst requirements; and chapter
2017-1, Laws of Florida, which amended section 921.141 to require that a jury’s
recommendation of death be unanimous....
...775.082.
-8-
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the crime of first-degree murder, of which Foster was convicted, is
defined in section
782.04 as a capital felony—this is regardless of whether the
death penalty is ultimately imposed. Moreover, section
921.141(1), “Separate
Proceedings on Issue of Penalty,” begins as follows: “Upon conviction or
adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a
separate proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment as authorized by s....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Petitioner.
Daniel M. Hernandez of Daniel M. Hernandez, P.A., Tampa, for
Respondent.
BLACK, Judge.
The State seeks certiorari review of the trial court's order granting
McKinsie Lyons' motion to preclude application of section 921.141(2),
Florida Statutes (2023), in this case....
...We grant the petition.
As relevant to the State's petition, Lyons was charged with two
counts of capital felony murder in September 2018. Two months later
the State filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty. In July
2023, following enactment of amendments to section 921.141, Lyons
filed a motion seeking to prevent application of the 2023 version of
section 921.141(2) to his case. Specifically, Lyons sought to preclude
application of section 921.141(2)(c), which became effective in April 2023
and requires the jury to recommend a sentence of death if eight or more
jurors determine that death is the appropriate sentence. See ch. 2023-
23, § 1, Laws of Fla.1 The prior version of the statute, and the one that
Lyons sought to have applied, required the jury to unanimously
determine that death was the appropriate sentence before recommending
a death sentence. See § 921.141(2), Fla. Stat. (2022); ch. 2017-1, § 1,
Laws of Fla. On September 29, 2023, following a hearing, the trial court
granted Lyons' motion. The court found that "retroactive application of
the current version of section 921.141 to the instant case violates the Ex
Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions," and
the court adopted the reasoning and analysis of a Tenth Judicial Circuit
Court's order addressing the same issue.2 In a footno...
...ment also added a sentence
to subsection (3) of the statute, reiterating that the jury must
unanimously find at least one aggravating factor in order for the
defendant to be eligible for a sentence of death. Ch. 2023-23, § 1, Laws
of Fla.; see also § 921.141(3), Fla....
...The unanimity
requirement for aggravating factors is not at issue in this case.
2 That order has since been quashed.
State v. Lobato, No. 6D2023-
3201,
2024 WL 2789409 (Fla. 6th DCA May 31, 2024).
2
amendment to section
921.141(2) is procedural and not an ex post facto
law....
...162, 175-82 (1986))). Moreover, in Victorino II, relied
upon by the State, the Fifth District concluded that the jurisdictional
prongs of the certiorari standard were met where the State challenged a
trial court's order refusing to apply the 2023 version of section 921.141.
372 So....
...3d at 777.3
Having concluded that the jurisdictional prongs of the certiorari
standard are met, we next consider whether the trial court departed from
the essential requirements of law in granting Lyons' motion and refusing
to apply the 2023 version of section 921.141.
At the time the trial court entered its order, the Fifth District had
issued its Victorino II opinion, addressing the 2023 amendment to section
921.141.4 The law at the time the trial court rendered its decision was
3 Additionally, in a single sentence opinion, the Florida Supreme
Court denied the State's "petition for writ of certiorari challenging the
trial court's decision granting a proposed penalty-phase instruction ....
...laws." Lobato,
2024 WL 2789409, at *2. Because Victorino II had issued
at the time the trial court in our case rendered its decision and we
readily agree with its conclusion, as well as that of Lobato, we need not
6
clear: "[T]he amendment to section
921.141 is a quintessentially
procedural change that has no substantive effect....
...Components
Corp. v. Fla. Dep't of Transp.,
14 So. 3d 967, 973 n.4 (Fla. 2009) ("[A] trial
examine the contours of United States and Florida Constitutions'
prohibitions against ex post facto laws.
5 The Florida Supreme Court had also addressed section
921.141
in Victorino I and reiterated that "[f]or a criminal law to be ex post facto it
must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events that occurred
before its enactment; and it must alter the definition of criminal conduct
or increase the penalty by which a crime is punishable." 241 So....
...because 'in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions
bind all Florida trial courts' " (quoting Pardo v. State,
596 So. 2d 665,
666 (Fla. 1992))). The State's petition for a writ of certiorari is granted,
and the order precluding application of the 2023 version of section
921.141(2) during Lyons' trial is quashed.
Petition granted; order quashed.
ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
9
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 39 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 531, 2014 Fla. LEXIS 2582, 2014 WL 4251210
...al probation officer
engaged in the lawful performance of a legal duty as provided by section
782.065,
Florida Statutes (2013); (2) amendment of the aggravating circumstances section
of instruction 7.11 to include the aggravating circumstances in section
921.141(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2013), pertaining to domestic violence injunctions
and protective orders; (3) amendment of instructions 12.1 and 12.2 to include
language instructing the jury that the State does not have to prove the defen...
...§
782.065.
This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1992 [
603 So. 2d
1775], and 1994 [
639 So. 2d 602], and 2014.
- 17 -
7.11 PENALTY PROCEEDINGS — CAPITAL CASES
§
921.141, Fla....
...If you have
questions, I will talk with the attorneys before I answer, so it may
take some time. You may continue your deliberations while you
wait for my answer. I will answer any questions, if I can, in writing
or orally here in open court.
Aggravating circumstances. § 921.141(5), Fla....
...The capital felony was committed while the defendant was
[engaged]
[an accomplice]
in
[the commission of]
[an attempt to commit]
[flight after committing or attempting to commit]
any
Check § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...position of familial or custodial authority over the victim.
With the following aggravating factor, definitions as appropriate from
§
874.03, Fla. Stat., must be given.
14. The capital felony was committed by a criminal street gang
member.
§
921.141, Fla....
...supporting only
one aggravating circumstance.
If you find the aggravating circumstances do not justify the death
penalty, your advisory sentence should be one of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole.
Mitigating circumstances. § 921.141(6), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...mental health experts—Dr. McClain, Dr. Krop, and Dr. Rao—that
Covington suffers from bipolar disorder and that he qualified for
- 14 -
both mental health statutory mitigators. Covington,
228 So. 3d at
58; see §
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014) (“The capital felony was
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance.”); §
921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...As explained in the previous issue, counsel made a
reasonable, strategic decision not to object to the admission of
Covington’s video recorded statement and the mention of the
collateral crimes—potential child abuse and drug use—contained
therein.
Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2014), governed
admissibility of evidence at a capital penalty phase and stated that
evidence may be presented as to any matter that the
court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the
character of the defendant ....
...been admissible at the penalty phase. Further, as previously
explained, it was a reasonable, strategic decision not to object to
admission of this evidence during the penalty phase and to instead
use it as evidence of Covington’s serious mental health issues.
Because section 921.141(1) does not authorize the
introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the United
States or Florida Constitution, the two motions to suppress could
have survived Covington’s guilty pleas....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 2016 WL 4480340
the amendment to the death penalty statute, section
921.141, by virtue of chapter 2016-13, section 13,
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...the murders of
Nick and Ralph Grandinetti.
The trial court imposed a sentence of death for each conviction. The trial
court found two aggravating factors applicable to both murders: the murders were
committed for pecuniary gain, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(f), and the murders were
“committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of
moral or legal justification,” id. § 921.141(5)(i). The trial court also found that the
murder of Nick Grandinetti was “especially heinous, atrocious, [and] cruel.” Id. §
921.141(5)(h). The trial court found two statutory mitigators: Ponticelli had no
significant history of previous criminal activity, id. § 921.141(6)(a), and Ponticelli
was 20 years old at the time of the offense, id. § 921.141(6)(g)....
... Case: 11-11966 Date Filed: 08/16/2012 Page: 16 of 90
mental health. The court rejected the argument that Ponticelli had been “under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” when he killed the
brothers, id. § 921.141(6)(b). And the court rejected the argument that Ponticelli’s
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law had been substantially impaired, see id. § 921.141(6)(f).
D....
...sentences on direct appeal, Ponticelli I,
593 So. 2d 483, the court rejected
Ponticelli’s argument that the trial court erred when it rejected the two statutory
mitigators about mental health. With regard to the extreme mental or emotional
disturbance mitigator, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(b), the state supreme court agreed
with the trial court that Dr....
...hyperactivity on the evening of the murders,
although there was no evidence of drug use on the evening of the murders.” Id.
With regard to whether Ponticelli’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f), the state supreme court determined that “there
16
Case: 11-11966 Date Filed: 08/16/2012 Page: 17 of 90
was no evidence that Ponticelli was using cocaine at the time o...
...at
1408.
As in Cullen, “[t]he State presented extensive aggravating evidence.” Id.
The state proved that three statutory aggravators applied to Nick Grandinetti’s
death: Ponticelli committed the murder for pecuniary gain, Fla. Stat. §
921.141(5)(f); Ponticelli committed the murder in a “cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification,” id. §
921.141(5)(i); and the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, [and] cruel,” id.
§ 921.141(5)(h)....
...Mills also testified that the two
statutory mental health mitigators should apply regardless of whether Ponticelli
used cocaine on the night of the murders. Despite this evidence, the court found
only two statutory mitigators—Ponticelli had no significant history of previous
criminal activity, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(a), and Ponticelli was 20 years old at the
time of the offense, id. § 921.141(6)(g). The court rejected the mental health
statutory mitigators, see id. § 921.141(6)(b), (f), and found no nonstatutory
mitigators.
Ponticelli relied on the same mitigation theory during collateral review, and
it is unlikely that a jury or sentencing court would have found his improved
version of a cocaine psy...
...al. See
Ponticelli III,
941 So. 2d at 1092–99. During the penalty phase of Mr. Ponticelli’s
jury trial, the trial court found two statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) he has
no significant history of prior criminal activity, see Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(a); and
(2) he was twenty years old at the time of the offense, see id. §
921.141(6)(g). The
Florida Legislature’s affirmative inclusion of age and lack of criminal history
among its eight statutory mitigating circumstances, see id. §
921.141(6)(a)–(h),
75
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together with the sentencing court’s finding that these mitigators applied, establish
that these aspects of Mr....
...Ponticelli’s behavior and the changes in his personality shortly before,
during, and after the offense were consistent with cocaine addiction; (2) Mr.
Ponticelli was suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance because
of his repeated cocaine use around the time of the offense, see Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(b); and (3) Mr. Ponticelli’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct was substantially impaired, see id. § 921.141(6)(f).
The force of this testimony was significantly limited, however, because of
the cursory nature of Dr....
...y aspect of his or her character or
record . . . .” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Second, it is significant
because it supports the existence of two mental state statutory mitigating
circumstances under Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b), (f)....
...The trial
88
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court found two aggravating factors applied to the murder of each man: (1) the
homicides were committed for pecuniary gain, see Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(f); and
(2) the homicides were “committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner
without any pretense of moral or legal justification,” which is referred to as the
CCP aggravator, see id. § 921.141(5)(i). The trial court also found that Nick
Grandinetti’s murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” a factor often
referred to as the HAC aggravator. Id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 3974561, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15720
... Case: 13-10516 Date Filed: 08/15/2014 Page: 24 of 35
and Troy’s family and friends.
The trial court found four potent statutory aggravating factors. First and
foremost, the murder of Carroll was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” Fla.
Stat. § 921.141(5)(h)....
... Case: 13-10516 Date Filed: 08/15/2014 Page: 25 of 35
attack, his actions were manifestly pitiless and unnecessarily torturous.”
Second, Troy had been convicted of other felonies involving the use or
threat of violence. Id. § 921.141(5)(b)....
...inmate in Tennessee; and, as to Tracie Burchette, Burglary of a Dwelling While
Armed with a Dangerous Weapon, Aggravated Battery, Armed Kidnapping, and
Robbery with a Deadly Weapon. Third, Troy had murdered Carroll while on
probation for a felony. Id. § 921.141(5)(a)....
...At the time of the attack, Troy was
both on parole from Tennessee and on conditional release from the Florida
Department of Corrections.
Fourth and finally, Troy murdered Carroll during the commission of or
attempt to commit robbery and sexual battery. Id. § 921.141(5)(d)....
...Her
inner thighs had small contusions consistent with fingers attempting to pry open
25
Case: 13-10516 Date Filed: 08/15/2014 Page: 26 of 35
closed legs. The trial court also found that the murder was committed for
pecuniary gain, id. §
921.141(5)(f), though the court noted that this factor merged
with the robbery aggravator.
The mitigating factors presented at length to the jury were considerably less
significant, even though Troy called twenty-nine witnesses during the four-and-a-
half-day penalty phase. Troy,
948 So. 2d at 651. Troy’s desires to use cocaine and
to avoid his impending return to prison contributed to extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, particularly because of his drug use at the time. Id. §
921.141(6)(b).
His capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his behavior
to the requirements of law on the night of the crime was substantially impaired by
his use of marijuana, alcohol, and especially cocaine. Id. §
921.141(6)(f)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...Sentencing
Based on the evidence presented at the penalty phase and
the Spencer hearing, the state trial court found that five aggravating
factors were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Guardado was
under conditional release when he committed the murder, FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(5)(a) (2005); (2) he had been convicted of another
capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of vio-
lence—that is, armed robbery, robbery with a deadly weapon, rob-
bery, robbery with a weapon, and attempted robbery with a deadly
USCA11 Case: 22-10957 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 08/12/2024 Page: 26 of 76
26 Opinion of the Court 22-10957
weapon, id. § 921.141(5)(b); (3) he committed the murder while en-
gaged in the commission of a robbery with a weapon, id.
§ 921.141(5)(d); (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel, id. § 921.141(5)(h); and (5) he committed the murder in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, with no pretense of
moral or legal justification, id. § 921.141(5)(i).
The state trial court also found, as non-statutory mitigating
circumstances, that Guardado: (1) had entered a plea of guilty
without asking to bargain or for a favor (to which the state trial
c...
...the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” and
(2) “his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired.” See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(b), (f ) (2005).
For his second claim, Guardado alleged that his trial counsel
were deficient in not trying to remove—either for cause or through
a peremptory strike—Jurors Pennington, Hall, and Cornelius from
the jury....
...r-
dered Ms. Malone under the influence of extreme mental or emo-
tional distress, and (2) his capacity to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or conform it to the law was substantially impaired. See
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(b), (f ) (2005)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Discussion
A. Bifurcated Procedure
In Florida, murder in the first degree is a capital felony, subject to a
bifurcated procedure. See §§
782.04(1)(a) (establishing first-degree murder as a capital
offense),
775.082(1),
921.141(1), Fla....
...We note that section
775.082(1) was modified in 2014 to
address the exceptional situation of offenses committed by juveniles, which is irrelevant
here; the provision quoted is the same but is numbered section
775.082(1)(a). See ch.
2014-220, § 1, at 2869, Laws of Fla. Section
921.141(2), (3) did not change between
2010 and 2014.
-5-
proceeding to determine the appropriate sentence once the defendant ha[s] been found
guilty of a capital offense.").
A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be
punished by death if the proceeding held to determine
sentence according to the procedure set forth in s.
921.141
results in findings by the court that such person shall be
punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished
by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole.
§
775.082(1) (emphasis added); see also §
782.04(1)(b) ("In all cases under this
section, the procedure set forth in s.
921.141 shall be followed in order to determine
sentence of death or life imprisonment.")....
...Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.270; see generally Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162 (1986). A separate penalty
phase is conducted to determine the appropriate sentence—life imprisonment or
death—only after a defendant has been convicted of a capital crime. §
921.141(1);
Coday, 946 So....
...Because "[t]he
-6-
Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a
sentence of death"—"[a] jury's mere recommendation is not enough"—the Court also
struck down subparts (2) and (3) of section
921.141. Id. at 619, 620-22; see also §
775.082(1) ("A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by
death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth
in s.
921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by
death." (emphasis added)); §
921.141(2), (3) (providing that after the jury renders its
"advisory sentence" as to life imprisonment or death, the court makes the final
sentencing decision—whether life imprisonment or death—"[n]otwithstanding the
recommendation of a majority of the jury")....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
to relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida and section
921.141, Florida Statutes. He maintains that he was
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...LAWSON, J., dissents with an opinion. As we stated in Smith I , The trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of six statutory aggravators: (1) Smith committed the felony while he was on probation, see § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) (moderate weight); (2) the murder was committed while Smith was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery or kidnapping, see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003) (significant weight); (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC), see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); (5) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), see § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); and (6) the victim was under twelve years of age, see § 921.141(5)(l), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...the Hurst error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2
The kidnapping aggravating factor in Crain’s case remains valid because
kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm underlies Crain’s first-degree
felony murder conviction. See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...a sexual battery and the
count of sexual battery. Following the penalty phase, the jury recommended death
by a vote of seven to five. The trial court found four aggravating circumstances:
Preston had a prior violent felony conviction, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b); the
murder was committed immediately after Preston committed robbery and while he
was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping, id. § 921.141(5)(d); the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, id. § 921.141(5)(h); and the murder was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, id. § 921.141(5)(i)....
...ida Supreme Court, Preston raised five claims,
including a claim that the evidence of premeditation presented at his trial was
2
The trial court also found that the murder was committed in conjunction with a robbery for
pecuniary gain, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(f), but did not consider this factor because it overlapped
with the aggravating factor involving the commission of a robbery.
7
Case: 12-14706 Date Filed: 04/29/2015 Page: 8 of 38
insufficient (Ground 2)....
...In April 1991, the trial court impaneled another penalty phase jury and
conducted a now third penalty phase trial. In that proceeding, the state urged the
jury to find four aggravating factors: the murder was committed during the
commission of a kidnapping, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d); the murder was committed
9
Case: 12-14706 Date Filed: 04/29/2015 Page: 10 of 38
for the purpose of avoiding arrest, id. § 921.141(5)(e); the murder was committed
for pecuniary gain, id. 921.141(5)(f); and the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, id. § 921.141(5)(h)....
...The district court denied Preston relief on all of
them. Preston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 6:08-CV-2085-ORL-31GJK,
2012 WL
3
The trial court found Preston’s age at the time of the murder to be a statutory mitigating factor,
Fla. Stat. §
921.141(6)(g), and found as nonstatutory mitigation that he had a difficult childhood,
a good prison record, potential for rehabilitation, he had expressed remorse, and he was a loving
son with “positive qualities.”...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...(quoting Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986))).
Hutchinson vindicated this right by presenting mitigating evidence
at his penalty phase. And despite his invocation of vague
8. In their current form, these aggravators are listed in
section
921.141(6), Florida Statutes (2024).
- 15 -
constitutional principles, Hutchinson has not cited any authority
holding that the Eighth Amendment provides an absolute right to
present mitigating evidence at a...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...(quoting Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986))).
Hutchinson vindicated this right by presenting mitigating evidence
at his penalty phase. And despite his invocation of vague
8. In their current form, these aggravators are listed in
section
921.141(6), Florida Statutes (2024).
- 15 -
constitutional principles, Hutchinson has not cited any authority
holding that the Eighth Amendment provides an absolute right to
present mitigating evidence at a...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...Court’s statutory construction in Hurst v. State shows that Archer has not been
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the offense for which
he is under a sentence of death. This claim was based on the contentions that
Hurst v. State recognized (1) that section 921.141, Florida Statutes, as it existed at
the time of the Hurst v....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 5581, 2004 WL 868253
...s order regarding the-verdict form. In Vining v. State,
637 So.2d 921 (Fla.1994), the Florida Supreme Court held that because the aggravating factors to be considered in determining the propriety of a death sentence are limited to those set out in section
921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1987), there is no reason to require the State to notify defendants prior to trial or the penalty phase of the aggravating factors that it intends to prove....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
was a person less than twelve years of age. See §
921.141(b), (d)-(e), (h)-(i), and (l), Fla. Stat. (2017)
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...As to King, the trial court found
that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory aggravators that
Bright was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving
the use or threat of violence to the person, § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017) (the
1990 conviction for armed robbery and the contemporaneous murder) (great
weight), and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC),
§ 921.141(6)(h), Fla....
...t weight).
The trial court rejected the two statutory mitigating circumstances presented
by Bright with respect to each murder—that the murder was committed while
Bright was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
§ 921.141(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017), and that Bright’s capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was substantially impaired, § 921.141(7)(f), Fla....
...(2017). The trial court
considered thirty-eight nonstatutory mitigating circumstances under the catch-all
provision for the existence of any other factors in the defendant’s background that
would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty, § 921.141(7)(h), Fla....
...ce.”).
C. Especially Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravating Factor
Bright argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
finding of the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” (HAC) aggravator.
§ 921.141(6)(h), Fla....
...Mitigating Circumstances
Bright also argues that the trial court erred in rejecting the two statutory
mitigating circumstances presented with respect to both murders: (1) that Bright
committed the murders while he was “under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance,” § 921.141(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2107), and (2) that Bright’s
“capacity . . . to appreciate the criminality of his . . . conduct or to conform his . . .
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired,” § 921.141(7)(f),
Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...2003)).
a. During the Course of a Kidnapping
Allen asserts that the trial court erred in finding the aggravating
circumstance that the capital felony was committed while the defendant was
engaged in the commission of a kidnapping. See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla....
...aggravating factor where this Court found sufficient evidence to support the felony
murder conviction based on robbery).
b. HAC
Allen asserts that the trial court erred in finding the aggravating
circumstance of HAC. See § 921.141 (5)(h), Fla....
...nder the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (2) the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or
her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See §§ 921.141
(6)(b), 921.141 (6)(f), Fla....
...Influence of Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance
Allen contends that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigator of
the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla....
...Substantially Impaired
Allen contends that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigator
that her capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct or to conform her
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See §
921.141(6)(f), Fla....
...He also
testified that it would be difficult for her to consistently conform her conduct to the
requirements of society.
Neither of these experts testified that Allen’s health condition substantially
impaired her ability to conform her conduct to the requirements of law, as
mandated in the express language of section 921.141(6)(f)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...As expressed in my concur in part, dissent in part opinion in
Doty v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S66 (Fla. Feb. 13, 2020), I maintain
my dissent to the use of “determinations” instead of “findings” to
describe the requirements set forth in section 921.141(2)(b)2.,
Florida Statutes (2018)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...However, Woodbury himself expressly objected to the
court delaying the pronouncement of sentence and told the court to
proceed directly to sentencing. Thus, the asserted error was
- 44 -
B. Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance Mitigation
Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2017) lists the statutory
mitigators that, if applicable, can weigh against imposition of the
death penalty. One such statutory mitigator is when the capital
felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. See § 921.141(7)(b),
Fla. Stat. (2017). Another statutory mitigator—addressed in a
separate subsection—is when the defendant’s capacity to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law, was substantially impaired. § 921.141(7)(f),
Fla....
...at
“[t]here is no evidence that [Woodbury]’s emotional state was
anywhere close to the level of obviating his knowledge of right and
wrong.” But while the degree to which a defendant knows right
from wrong is relevant to assess whether the section
921.141(7)(f)
mitigator applies (i.e., that defendant’s capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was substantially impaired), see Duncan v.
State,
619 So. 2d 279, 283 (Fla. 1993), the section
921.141(7)(b)
mitigator (i.e., that the capital felony was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance) does not speak to a defendant’s knowledge of right and
wrong.
Nonetheless...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
specified in Florida’s death-penalty statute, see §
921.141(7), Fla. Stat. (2021) (listing seven specific
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 449, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 782
specially concurring. In light of changes to section
921.141, Florida Statutes, made by the Legislature
