Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...) Character of accused.—Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait. (b) Character of victim— . . . . (c) Character of witness.—Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in ss. 90.608-90.610. (Emphasis supplied.) The only section referred to within section 90.404(1)(c) that is pertinent in this case is section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides: Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: ....

...onetheless open the door to the prior crime evidence by (1) offering a trait of the defendant's good character, see § 90.404(1)(a) (character of accused), or (2) inaccurately testifying to material facts, see § 90.404(1)(c) (character of witness), § 90.608(5) (contradiction on relevant facts)....

...at killed Nelson. See Geralds, 674 So.2d at 99. [10] Thus, Robertson did not open the door to evidence that he allegedly threatened his ex-wife six years before with an assault rifle by testifying inaccurately to material facts. See § 90.404(1)(c); § 90.608(5); Geralds, 674 So.2d at 99....

...State, 545 So.2d 857 (Fla.1989), preclude the use of that statement as substantive evidence in the penalty phase. Clearly, the prior inconsistent statement was admissible in the guilt phase only for purpose of impeachment and could not be used as substantive evidence against Rodriguez. See § 90.608, Fla....

...and to challenge the witness's credibility when *447 appropriate"). We have also stated, "Our evidence code liberally permits the introduction of evidence to show the bias or motive of a witness." Gibson v. State, 661 So.2d 288, 291 (Fla.1995). In relevant part, section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1997), states: Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: ......

...duction of the taped statement, the taped statement was plainly inconsistent with Harris's testimony at trial and constituted a prior inconsistent statement properly introduced for impeachment purposes only. State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306 (Fla.1990); § 90.608, Fla.Stat....

...ce between the two statements." Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 614.1, at 482 (1995 ed.). Considering the material inconsistencies in Harris's description of Gudinas' demeanor, we find that the State properly impeached its own witness. See § 90.608(1), Fla.Stat....

...See Rolle v. State, 386 So.2d 3 (Fla. 3d Dist.Ct.App.1980) (general rule is that witness may not be interrogated as to prior arrests or pending charges, but only as to prior convictions). Nor is it likely that the evidence would be admissible under Fla.Stat. § 90.608 as evidence of bias in this case, where no criminal proceeding or even an investigation had begun....

...offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1989). The State raises alternative arguments on this point, the first being that Feagle's statement was properly admitted for purposes of impeachment under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...A witness was considered adverse only where the party expected the witness to give favorable evidence and the witness surprised the party by giving evidence that was prejudicial to the party producing the witness. Adams v. State, 34 Fla. 185, 15 So. 905 (1894). By the adoption of section 90.608, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1976), as part of the new evidence code, the requirement of surprise was eliminated, but it continued to be necessary for the party attempting to impeach its own witness to show that the witness's testimony was affirmatively harmful. Jackson v. State, 451 So.2d 458 (Fla.1984); see 1976 Law Revision Council Note, § 90.608, Fla.Stat.Ann. (1979). In 1990, section 90.608 was amended to remove the necessity of showing that one's own witness had become adverse....

...The statute now reads in pertinent part: Who may impeach.—Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with his present testimony. § 90.608, Fla.Stat. (1993). By its plain language, the statute now permits a party to impeach its own witness by introducing prior inconsistent statements without regard to whether the witness's testimony is prejudicial. While section 90.608 no longer requires that a party's witness be adverse, the statute maintains the requirement that a prior statement be inconsistent with the witness's in-court testimony before the statement will be admitted for impeachment....

...Even if the jury is instructed that the facts should only be considered for purposes of impeachment, it may be impossible for the jury to disregard these facts as substantive evidence. Thus, the impeachment which appears to be permitted under the literal wording of section 90.608 can be subject to abuse. There are no cases in Florida which directly address this problem in the wake of the 1990 amendment to section 90.608....

...We are convinced that any error which occurred in the guilt phase was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We cannot reach the same conclusion with respect to the penalty phase. This case bears some analogy to Dudley v. State, 545 So.2d 857 (Fla.1989), a decision which predated *265 the 1990 amendment to section 90.608....

...First, the prosecutor's reiteration of portions of the testimony of Beakley and Denigris was a proper predicate to asking Johnson if his account and theirs could be reconciled. A witness's credibility may be attacked via testimony presenting a different view of the facts by other witnesses. § 90.608(5), Fla....

...early Monday morning. At this point the state attorney asked the court to declare Sutton a hostile witness. After a lengthy bench discussion, the trial judge declared Sutton to be adverse. This allowed the state to cross-examine and impeach Sutton, § 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1979), whereupon Sutton cleared up his confusion about when he saw Lucas and Jackson and testified he saw them early Sunday....

...A mere lapse of memory is insufficient to render a witness adverse. In a seminal decision addressing the problem of forgetful witnesses, this Court held: It is very erroneous to suppose that, under this statute [§ 1101 Rev.Stat.Fla. (1892), precursor to § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Ehrhardt, West's Florida Practice, Florida Evidence 169-70 (1977). Although we find no case on point decided *463 under the current evidence code, we perceive no reason to conclude that the principles are any less applicable, with the exception that section 90.608 no longer requires the calling party to be surprised by the prejudicial testimony....

...section 90.801(2)(a) and could not be admitted as substantive evidence here. However, introduction of a prior statement that is inconsistent with a witness's present testimony is also one of the main ways to attack the credibility of a witness. See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2001); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 608.4 (2002 ed.). "The Florida Evidence Code does not require the witness's prior inconsistent statement to be reduced to writing in order to impeach the witness under section 90.608(1)(a)." Kimble v....

...these issues. The court found the testimony inadmissible. Admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. See Heath v. State, 648 So.2d 660, 664 (Fla.1994). Pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), any party may attack the credibility of a witness based on inconsistent prior statements, criminal history, reputation for truthfulness, bias, an inability or lack of opportunity to observe or remember the events, or proof by other witnesses that the witness recalled material facts incorrectly. See § 90.608(1)(a)-(e), Fla....

...Calling such a court witness, however, rests within the trial court's discretion. Brumbley v. State, 453 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1984). Although the court did not make Pierson its own witness, it did declare him an adverse witness, thereby allowing the defense to place his credibility in doubt by attempting to impeach his testimony. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...ose's mental health expert, Dr. Toomer, during cross-examination. Generally, matters affecting the credibility of a witness may be inquired into on cross-examination. See Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 195-96 (Fla.1997). As a form of impeachment, section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1997), provides, for example, that any party may attack the credibility of a witness by showing that the witness is biased....

...oss-examination. See Moore, 485 So.2d at 1282 (Overton, J., concurring specially); Everett v. State, 530 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Moreover, to interpret section 90.803(23) otherwise would allow that section to be used to avoid the provision of section 90.608(1) that prohibits a party from impeaching his or her own witness....

...conduct, citing Rogers v. State, 511 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988); Hitchcock v. State, 413 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 960, 103 S.Ct. 274, 74 L.Ed.2d 213 (1982). See also §§ 90.608 and 90.609, Fla....

...stantive evidence in its case, rather than solely as impeachment evidence as the majority suggests. Although I agree with the majority that the inconsistent statements would not be admissible for purposes of impeaching the state's own witnesses, see § 90.608(1), Fla....

...r truthfulness. Rogers v. State, 511 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988); Hitchcock v. State, 413 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 960, 103 S.Ct. 274, 74 L.Ed.2d 213 (1982). See also §§ 90.608 and 90.609, Fla. Stat. (1985) and C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 801.6 (2d. ed. 1984). Section 90.608(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1985) provides that the character of a witness is subject to attack in accordance with the provisions of section 90.609, which states that "[a] party may attack or support the credibility of a witness, includin...

...1988) (the trial court has wide discretion in ruling on admissibility of evidence). Nor do I find that this impeachment evidence was probative of any motive, bias, or intent on the part of this witness and therefore also was not admissible on those grounds. See § 90.608, Fla....

...LAZZARA: Then I object to that question, I'm sorry. THE COURT: Okay, I'll overrule the objection. BY MR. KIBBEY: Q Do you understand the question as to those three areas? What — what did you tell him during your deposition? This is clearly impeaching one's own witness in contravention of Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Dallas admitted to hearing rumors of abuse in the relationship, but stated many relationships had those kind of problems. The purpose of the prosecutor's cross-examination of Theodore Dallas was to test his credibility concerning the relationship between Butler and Fleming. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), provides: 90.608 Who may impeach.—Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...That agent, Robert Dean Love, also testified at trial. Love testified that the car was found in June of 1996 and that he received the letter and key from Detective Stafford. Love further testified that he went to see the burned-out car and the key he was provided by Stafford opened the vehicle. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), provides that "[a]ny party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: ......

...The State responds that the questions were proper because the same State Attorney's office had prosecuted them and was responsible for their sentences, and the State had no recourse against the witnesses if they committed perjury. A. APPLICABLE LAW Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2001), states that a party may attack the credibility of a witness by showing that the witness is biased....

...s been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted...." Importantly, section 90.610(3) explicitly provides that the admissibility of evidence under section 90.608 is not affected by the limitations contained in section 90.610(1)....

...If the witness admits the conviction, "the inquiry by his adversary may not be pursued to the point of naming the crime for which he was convicted." Fulton, 335 So.2d at 284 (citations and footnote omitted). In Howard v. State, 397 So.2d 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), a case concerning section 90.608(2), the Fourth District Court of Appeal allowed the State to introduce evidence of a defense witness's prior conviction of obstructing justice....

...The State argued that the mandatory life sentence was relevant because it showed that there was nothing the State could do if Birchard committed perjury. The State's line of questioning and argument to the court demonstrates that the State believed the question to be proper under section 90.608(2)....

...ng perjury. Essentially, they could lie with impunity. Because Birchard and Stafford had a potential motive to lie at trial, the State's questions concerning their life sentences and immunity from perjury sanctions were relevant and admissible under section 90.608(2)....

...ircumstances surrounding the charges. We find, under the circumstances presented here, that this prior inconsistent statement was used to buttress, not impeach, the credibility of the state's own witness and, used as such, it was not in violation of section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...idence adduced from the witness by other parties, and to challenge the witness's credibility when appropriate. Contrary to the form generally used in *91 direct examination, counsel on cross-examination is authorized to lead and impeach a witness. §§ 90.608, 90.612, Fla. Stat. (1987). [10] Florida law has long followed the general rule that parties may not cross-examine and impeach their own witnesses. § 90.608, Fla....

...[11] "This rule resulted from a belief that the party who calls a witness to testify vouches to the court and jury for the credibility of that witness." [12] C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 608.2, at 298 (2d ed. 1984). A narrow exception evolved for the cross-examination and impeachment of "adverse" witnesses. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...905, 908 (1894); see generally Ehrhardt, supra, § 608(2), at 299-302. If the witness proves adverse, the calling party may lead and impeach the witness with prior inconsistent statements, provided the trial court first finds that the live testimony was affirmatively harmful to the calling party. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Classifying a witness as hostile merely authorizes counsel to ask leading questions to induce an otherwise credible witness to testify — not to impeach. Allowing counsel to lead falls far short of authorizing counsel to challenge the credibility of the witness. See §§ 90.608, .612, Fla....

...m's body. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 545 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 1989). [9] Section 90.615(1) of the Florida Statutes (1987) provides: 90.615 Calling witnesses by the court. — (1) The court may call witnesses whom all parties may cross-examine. [10] Section 90.608 of the Florida Statutes (1987) provides: 90.608 Who may impeach....

...wise require: (a) A party may not ask a witness a leading question on direct or redirect examination. (b) A party may ask a witness a leading question on cross-examination or re-cross examination. [11] Federal law follows a different rule. Compare §§ 90.608,.612, Fla. Stat. (1987), with Fed. R.Evid. 607, 611. [12] rule against a party impeaching his own witness, sometimes called the `voucher rule,' is retained in Section 90.608(1)....

...Have you ever engaged in any homosexual activities with Stephen Sias? ... . "A. Yes, I have. *1218 ... . "Q. How long have you been roommates? "A. About four years." It is axiomatic that a party may attack the credibility of a witness called by the opposition by showing that the witness is biased. See § 90.608(1)(b), Fla....

...Initially, we agree with Gibson that Roxanne's state of mind and possible motive for testifying were permissible subjects for inquiry. Our evidence code liberally permits the introduction of evidence to show the bias or motive of a witness. In relevant part, section 90.608(2) states: Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (2) Showing that the witness is biased. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...State, 202 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Moore v. State, 186 So.2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). Evidence that a witness has received a lighter sentence in exchange for his or her testimony goes to the bias of the witness and is therefore a proper subject for impeachment. § 90.608, Fla....

...er interview but currently could not remember. Hamilton now claims that the above dialogue constituted improper testimony because the impeachment served as "mere subterfuge" for getting the prior inconsistent statement before the jury. See generally § 90.608, Fla....

...This ruling by the trial judge was clearly not an abuse of discretion. The defense's proposed evidence does not fall under any of the express ways allowed to attack a witness's credibility — it does not deal with a prior inconsistent statement, bias, character or ability to observe, remember, or recount. See § 90.608, Fla....

...Accordingly, we find no error here. Under Ortagus' fourth contention, he argues the trial court erred in forbidding him to cross-examine the victim's wife, Mrs. Fowler, as to the statement she allegedly made to prospective juror Wilds that "she didn't know anything," since Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1983), allows a party to attack a witness' credibility with prior inconsistent statements....

...in a proceeding in which he could be subjected to the penalty of perjury. Mincey's prior statement does not qualify because it was not made under oath. Nor would the state have been justified in eliciting Mincey's prior inconsistent statement under Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, which allows a party calling a witness, who proves adverse, to introduce a prior inconsistent statement....

...1st DCA 1981) (Smith, R., specially concurring); compare McNeil v. State, 433 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (testimony of witness exculpating defendant was prejudicial to state and witness was therefore adverse — thus, prior unsworn statement was properly admitted for impeachment purposes under Section 90.608 but inadmissible as substantive evidence under Section 90.801(2)(a)); and Mazzara v. State, 437 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (prior statement not admissible under Section 90.801(2)(a) but admissible under Section 90.608(2))....

...tempt. Moreover, Appellant could have used the deposition to impeach the victim even if it could not be used as substantive evidence, but the record in this case reflects that Appellant never attempted to use the deposition for any purpose. See e.g. § 90.608, Fla....

...The State then asked whether she had previously told Detective Linton that the composite did, in fact, resemble Hannon. The testimony of Detective Linton, regarding Acker's statement that the composite looked like Hannon, was proper impeachment of Acker's testimony. § 90.608, Fla....

...nt and that there was no proof that DeGuglielmo acted on behalf of the State in calling Warren or that DeGuglielmo attempted to influence Warren's opinion. The trial court's ruling to exclude this testimony on this basis was error. In relevant part, section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1999), states: "Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by... [s]howing that the witness is biased." Denying a defendant the opportunity to present evidence that a witness is biased not only violates section 90.608(2), it also implicates a defendant's constitutional right to cross-examination which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution....

...witness and to impeach him through use of prior inconsistent statements regarding identification of defendant as perpetrator denied due process). The Florida Evidence Code addresses the proper methods of impeachment to attack a witness' credibility: 90.608 Who may impeach.—Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of the witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...(4) Showing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which the witness testified, (5) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. § 90.608, Fla....

..., whereupon the prosecutor's objection was inexplicably sustained. The appellate court concluded that by so ruling, the trial court had erroneously prevented Nelson from impeaching McKenzie. Specifically, the erroneous ruling was found to contravene section 90.608, Florida Statutes, because it deprived the defense of the opportunity to conduct a full cross-examination of McKenzie, a crucial State witness, in an effort to impeach the witness by showing his bias and improper motive....

...otives, interest, or animus as connected with the cause or the parties thereto, upon which matters he may be contradicted by other evidence." The above case law and philosophy relating to impeachment is incorporated into the Florida Evidence Code in section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides in part: 90.608 Who may impeach....

...s about which he testified. (e) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. [emphasis added] Contradictory testimony that falls within the first category (as set out above) is admissible under section 90.608(1)(e). With regard to the second category, evidence of bias (and implicitly corruption) is allowed under section 90.608(1)(b), evidence of lack of competency is allowed under section 90.608(1)(d), and evidence of the witness' general immoral character is allowed under 90.608(1)(c) but limited to evidence of the witness' reputation for untruthfulness by section 90.609 or evidence of a prior conviction by section 90.610....

...bstantially adopting the substance of Fed. R.Evid. 611(b). Section 90.612(3), Florida Statutes (1981), now provides generally for leading questions only on cross-examination and recross-examination and the topic of who may impeach is now provided in section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...§ 90.612(3)(b), (1981). There is also a general principle that a party who calls a witness as his own vouches for that witness' credibility. It is for this reason that there is a traditional rule against impeaching a party's own witness. Fla. Stat. § 90.608(1), (1981)....

...CONTRADICTION: In a similar practical vein, a party should be able to present all available evidence that tends to support the party's case without regard to the fact that it may tend to impeach because it may contradict previous testimony of a witness called by that party (Fla. Stat. § 90.608(1)(a), (1981)), [6] or because it proves that material facts are not as testified to by some previous witness called by the party....

...entrapped by the testimony before the calling party could introduce a prior inconsistent statement of that witness. Although presenting a prior statement of the witness inconsistent with his present testimony is a general method of impeachment, see § 90.608(1)(a), Fla....

...r the purpose of getting the prior statement before the jury for its consideration as substantive evidence. [9] In any event, the previous requirement of surprise in order to introduce prior inconsistent statements has now been eliminated by present section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...ling party the adverse party gives testimony prejudicial (unfavorable) to the calling party (either on direct examination by the opposing party, on cross-examination or in the adverse party-witness' case in chief), notwithstanding the restriction in section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1981), against a party impeaching his own witness, the calling party may not only contradict but may also impeach the adverse party-witness by attacking his character by evidence as to bad reputation for truthfulness (§ 90.609) and prior conviction of crime (§ 90.610). In summary, section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1981), recognizes the general rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1981), recognizes one limited exception permitting impeachment of any adverse witness (which includes an adverse party) by contradiction by other evidence or by a prior inconsistent statement....

...This should also apply to a party-witness who by improper impeachment, in addition to damage to character, stands to risk the consequence of an unfair trial and of a judgment and an award of damages based on prejudice against the person of the party rather than on the relevant facts and law. Notwithstanding that present section 90.608(2) eliminates the necessity of surprise in order to use prior inconsistent statements to impeach an adverse witness, we believe the following statement from Foremost Dairies, Inc., of the South v....

...Indeed, a recent authority states: The Adverse-Party Witness called by you must not be confused with the merely Adverse (Hostile or Unwilling) Witness discussed in the preceding Section of this Chapter. The right to impeach the Adverse-Party Witness derives from Fla.R. Civ.P. 1.450(a) and not from Florida Evidence Code 90.608. As a result, such impeachment is not limited to the two methods approved by 90.608 (contradictory evidence, and proof of prior inconsistent statements); nor by the foundational requirements imposed by that statute....

...ala city policeman was largely the "inconsistency" in the testimony that was used as the basis for allowing the defendant to be impeached. [3] See Cox v. State, 58 Fla. 33, 50 So. 875 (1909); Bryant v. United States, 120 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.1941). [4] Section 90.608(1), Fla....

...Although some counsel favor the practice a witness cannot properly be questioned about collateral or immaterial matters for the purpose of "testing his credibility" or impeaching the witness by contradition or otherwise as to his answers. [6] See 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 902 (Chadbourne Rev. 1970). [7] § 90.608(1)(e), Fla....

...[11] In that circumstance the calling party is not bound by that party-witness' testimony and may introduce statements of the witness as described in section 90.801(2) or admissions under section 90.803(18), and such statements and admissions are incidentally considered as impeachment under section 90.608(1)(a), and may also introduce proof by other witnesses as to facts material to the issues in the cause although such material facts are not as testified to by the party-witness and are incidentally considered impeachment under section 90.608(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...put her prior statement before the jury. We agree with Street that Rocco's testimony was adverse. Therefore, under the Florida Evidence Code, Street should have been allowed to offer the prior inconsistent deposition statement to impeach Rocco. See § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Trop said that the vast majority of people with cocaine psychosis did not know right from wrong but indicated that he did not know whether Street fell within this group because he did not examine him. [5] Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971). [6] In 1990 section 90.608(2) was amended to provide that a party may impeach its own witness, even if not adverse, by introducing prior inconsistent statements....

...Given this impeachment of Walker's direct testimony on the statement, the prosecutor did not refer to it in closing argument. Appellant's only objection to Walker's statement that Anna had invited the victims into the house was that it was hearsay. Here, the testimony was being offered to impeach Anna's testimony. See *495 § 90.608(1), Fla....

...ss's cooperation with the state. See Breedlove v. State, 580 So.2d 605, 607-08 (Fla.1991); Livingston v. State, 678 So.2d 895, 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In this circumstance, the impeachment would not be pursuant to section 90.610(1), but pursuant to section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...If a jury is going to hear it, it matters not when it is *539 heard. The choice of whether the jury hears it, however, should be left to the party who has the right to submit the issue to the fact finder or to waive it. NOTES [*] Impeaching one's own witness is generally proscribed. § 90.608, Fla....

...State, 608 So.2d 784, 791 (Fla.1992). The State acknowledges the general prohibition against impeachment with the specific nature of convictions but argues to this Court, as it did to the trial court, that the nature of the conviction was necessary to establish bias. Under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2007), any party may attack the credibility of a witness by showing that the witness is biased....

...f to rehabilitation while in the community." Dickey appeals his conviction on the ground that it was error to admit the rebuttal witness' testimony because: 1) the impeached testimony was irrelevant, and it was error to allow it to be impeached, see Section 90.608(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and 2) even if it was relevant, the probative value of the impeaching testimony was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, see Section 90.403, Florida Statutes....

...at there is no evidence that Johnson was a confidential informant in this case. We do not agree with the State's contentions. The Florida Evidence Code provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by showing that the witness is biased. § 90.608(1)(b), Fla....

...It is evident from the record that the state was not seeking to impeach Grant, but rather to bolster his credibility by revealing his earlier inconsistent statements. In Bell v. State, 473 So.2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), we sanctioned that form of trial strategy, and found it not offensive to section 90.608, Florida Statutes....

...960, 103 S.Ct. 274, 74 L.Ed.2d 213 (1982) for the proposition that evidence of particular acts of misconduct cannot be introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness. See also Simmons v. Baptist Hospital of Miami, 454 So.2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). *377 Section 90.608, Fla.Evid....

...Code (1991) governs impeachment by contradiction: (1) Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: * * * * * * (5) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. (emphasis supplied). The 1979 Sponsor's note to Section 90.608 states: Where it is sought to impeach a witness on the basis of testimony given on cross-examination, the testimony must, of course, be relevant and material .....

...Detective Luchan on matters affecting his credibility. We disagree. During the trial, counsel for appellant stated that he wanted to bring out the level of professionalism of Detective Luchan for the purpose of determining his credibility. However, section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1983), provides in part: *1158 (1) Any party, except the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (a) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with his present testimony....

...which he testified. (e) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. We find that appellant's attack on Detective Luchan's professionalism was not a proper method of attacking credibility under section 90.608....

...Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the deposition statement, but denied the defense request for a limiting instruction. Florida still adheres to the common law principle that impeachment of one's own witness is proper only in very limited circumstances. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, provides in part that "[a] party calling a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his character ......

...1984), the court quoted Adams v. State, 34 Fla. 185, 195-196, 15 So. 905, 908 (1894), as the seminal case on this point. In Adams, the court held: It is very erroneous to suppose that, under this statute [§ 1101 Rev.Stat.Fla. (1892), precursor to § 90.608(2), Fla....

prior false accusation is admissible under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2002), to prove bias

...s, after; we put up a chain after the incident. Q: After the incident. A: Yes. IMPROPER IMPEACHMENT Even if admissible as an exception to section 90.407, as stated in Erp v. Carroll, 438 So.2d 31, 39 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983): Notwithstanding that present section 90.608(2) eliminates the necessity of surprise in order to use [other evidence] to impeach an adverse witness, we believe the following statement from Foremost Dairies, Inc....

...and (b) the payroll record was not relevant because the evidence failed to connect the "Enrique Juares" record to the defendant, Henry Garcia, and it was not exculpatory. We agree with Garcia, reject the state's argument, and find reversible error. Section 90.608(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes (1981), provides a party the right to impeach by offering "[p]roof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached." Thus, Garcia had the right to have Paz pro...

...Rather, it appears that the plaintiff's counsel believed— based on the discrepancies in testimony between the gynecologist and the plaintiff, the primary care physician, and the diagnostic center's records custodian—that there was a sufficient basis to attack the gynecologist's credibility. See § 90.608(5), Fla....

...I would also hold that although the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning the settlement, this error was harmless. Evidence of A-1's prior status as a defendant was admissible to attack the credibility of John Herring by showing that he was biased. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2006), expressly authorizes the introduction of evidence to attack the credibility of a witness by "[s]howing that the witness is biased." This statutory provision should not be ignored in the analysis of the evidentiary question at issue here....

...nonetheless clearly established the point that the rule of exclusion in section 768.041(3) is not invariably applied in derogation of other applicable rules or principles of law. *1087 Here, section 768.041(3) should not be applied in derogation of section 90.608(2)....

...o consider the highly probative evidence of Herring's bias was not error. By the choice of Herring as an expert witness, the plaintiff unilaterally created the situation in which a choice was required between applying section 768.041(3) and applying section 90.608(2)....

...Prior to the verdict, the court ruled that appellant violated his probation for failing to follow his curfew. The trial court erred in preventing appellant from telling about his past relationship with Golden and Melvin, since such testimony was evidence of the witness' bias, admissible under section 90.608(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995). Section 90.608(1)(b), provides that any party may attack the credibility of a witness by "[s]howing that the witness is biased." Included in the types of matters that demonstrate bias are prejudice, interest in the outcome of a case, and any motivation for a witness to testify untruthfully....

for attacking a witness’s credibility under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2009), there must be

...of diligence. See id. Concerning the second prong of the Jones test, which assesses the probable effect of the newly discovered evidence at retrial, the court noted that Hollins' testimony would be admissible on retrial as impeachment evidence under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ntruthful deposition testimony in another case. Nor did the evidence demonstrate bias, corruption, or lack of competency on the part of Parnell. Appellants contend that such evidence was admissible for the purpose of attacking Parnell's credibility. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, permits a party to attack a witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...(4) Showing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which the witness testified. (5) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. § 90.608, Fla....

..., and such rulings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Welty v. State, 402 So.2d 1159, 1162-63 (Fla.1981). A court's discretion is limited, however, by the rules of evidence. Nardone *310 v. State, 798 So.2d 870 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that "[a]ny party ......

a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2008), the prior statement

...recanting witnesses. At the outset, we note that upon laying a proper foundation, the State might have offered such portions of the tape-recorded statements as might have been appropriate for the purpose of impeaching the recanting witnesses. See §§ 90.608(1), 90.614; Brumbley v....

...ord, 576 So.2d 737. The expansive view of section 90.801(2)(c) contended for by the State would seriously erode the rule that a witness's prior inconsistent statements are admissible for impeachment purposes only and not as substantive evidence. See § 90.608(1); Delgado-Santos, 497 So.2d 1199; Ivery, 548 So.2d 887....

...Impeachment Evidence and Harmless Error Review While I concede that the trial court erred in admitting as substantive evidence the other portions of the tape-recorded statements that were inconsistent with the trial testimony, those portions were nonetheless admissible—subject to a proper limiting instruction—under section 90.608(1) to impeach the in-court testimony of the recanting witnesses....

...In rebuttal and over Bush's objection, the state presented the testimony of Blank's supervisor, who said that Blank asked to be removed from the Bush's home because Blank "felt uncomfortable" and believed "something was going on." Upon this request, Blank was removed from the Bush home. We find no error. Section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (1999), states that any party may attack the credibility of a witness by offering another witness to present proof that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached....

...The "trial court's discretion is limited by the rules of evidence." Sybers v. State, 841 So.2d 532, 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (quoting Nardone v. State, 798 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). Under the rules of evidence, Appellant could attack Junior's credibility by "showing that a witness is biased." § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Junior was properly subject to cross-examination, not only as to facts relevant to the allegations laid out in the information, but also as to facts relevant to interest, animus, or any other type of bias that might have led him to testify falsely against Mr. Childers. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2002) ("Any party... may attack the credibility of a witness by . . . (2) Showing that the witness is biased."). Entirely appropriately, Mr. Junior was also cross-examined at length about prior inconsistent statements he had made. See § 90.608(1), Fla....

...ross-examination. See Moore, 485 So.2d at 1282 (Overton, J., concurring specially); Everett v. State, 530 So.2d 413 (Fla.4th DCA 1988). Moreover, to interpret section 90.803(23) otherwise would allow that section to be used to avoid the provision of section 90.608(1) that prohibits a party from impeaching his or her own witness....

...he malpractice litigation. Indeed, it could hardly be argued otherwise, since the statements Dr. Battle had previously made, which were inconsistent with his trial testimony, were used to attempt to impeach him-a practice permitted and encouraged by section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...an adverse party. In addition, under Florida's Evidence Code, once Edwards took the stand and gave his testimony, which both parties acknowledge was adverse, Botte was entitled to offer the prior inconsistent deposition testimony as impeachment. See § 90.608(2), Fla....

...As to the evidence of prior crimes, we note that section 90.610 of the evidence code specifically forbids the use of such evidence for impeachment of credibility. Also, section 90.404 states a general prohibition against using evidence of past crimes solely to prove bad character or propensity. Although section 90.608(1)(e) does provide for the impeachment of a witness with proof that material facts are not as testified to by the witness, neither Botte nor his economist testified regarding any past conduct or juvenile crimes....

...ed homicide case which resulted in the confession and arrest of an elderly man for first degree murder, who was later determined to be innocent. The proposed cross-examination does not fit into any of the broad categories of impeachment contained in section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1999)....

..."memory, ability to observe, and overall credibility." 386 So.2d at 1212. In this case, the excluded cross-examination did not relate to the detective's ability to "observe, remember, or recount" the matters about which the detective testified. See § 90.608(4), Fla....

...Edwards that appellant had done acts which did violate the injunction. Mrs. Edwards' testimony was not admissible to impeach Mrs. Banks because Mrs. Banks could not be impeached by the Department of Professional Regulation which had called her as a witness. § 90.608, Fla....

...ithout hearing any comment from the state, the trial judge refused to allow this line of impeachment on the grounds that the state had just dismissed the charge involving this witness and therefore the witness had nothing to "let go away." [2] Under section 90.608(2), any party may attack the credibility of a witness by showing "that the witness is biased." "Our evidence code liberally permits the introduction of evidence to show the bias or motive of a witness." Gibson v....

...unsel by leading the jury to believe that the defendants were not forthright with their own expert. The defendants argued both at trial and here that this cross-examination seeking to destroy the credibility of Dr. Sullivan was improper impeachment. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), provides the means for impeaching a witness, including (a) using prior inconsistent statements; (b) showing bias; (c) attacking the character of the witness; (d) showing a defect in capacity or ability to obse...

...dence testimony that Mr. Carre had not attended Loyola University after Mr. Carre testified that he had. Appellant contends that this evidence was relevant to issues in the case and should properly have been admitted to impeach Mr. Carre pursuant to section 90.608(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...1989) (evidence of drug use for the purpose of impeachment is admissible if it can be shown that the witness is using drugs at or about the time of the testimony itself or it is expressly shown by other relevant evidence that prior drug use affects the witness's ability to observe, remember, and recount); § 90.608(4), Fla....

...We hold that the limitation on the cross examination of this important state witness was reversible error. The proposed cross examination of Romero was proper not under section 90.610 cited by the state at trial, but as evidence of bias or interest pursuant to section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...It is well settled that counsel is given wide latitude in cross-examining an opposing party's witness to show that witness's interest, inclination, bias or prejudice. See Pittman v. State, 51 Fla. 94, 41 So. 385, 394 (1906); Hair v. State, 428 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Alvarez v. Mauney, 175 So.2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); § 90.608(1)(b), Fla....

...The excluded evidence of the battery for which Pancoast was on probation at time of trial was admissible on the additional ground that it tended to show Pancoast's possible bias in attempting to curry favor with the state through his testimony. See Watts v. State, 450 So.2d 265 (Fla.2d DCA 1984); § 90.608, Fla....

...t demonstrated any abuse of discretion since the prohibited questions were not probative of any bias against appellant individually. *169 The Florida Evidence Code expressly provides that a witness's credibility may be attacked by a showing of bias, § 90.608(1)(b), Florida Statutes, although both the Code and case law permit judicial discretion in controlling the mode, order, and scope of cross-examination....

...Florida allows litigants to impeach their own witnesses, but that does not necessarily resolve the constitutional problem identified in Chambers. Although a witness may be impeached in Florida by "[a]ny party, including the party calling the witness," pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes, it is still improper under Florida law for a party to call a witness merely as a device to place the impeaching testimony before the jury....

...se counsel should have been permitted to examine Tanner before the jury in order to discredit her testimony. The specific question we address concerns defendant's right to impeach the victim's credibility by introducing testimony of other witnesses. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1979) provides, in pertinent part: (1) Any party, except the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: .... (b) Showing that the witness is biased. .... (e) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. Section 90.608(1)(b) has been construed to permit the presentation of evidence to show bias or motive....

...[3] To be exact, we find no merit in any of the other issues raised by appellant except the allowance of the state's impeachment of its own witnesses. However, we agree with the state that this error was harmless in light of all the testimony of these witnesses and of the defendant himself, and in light of the amendment to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Mosley v. State, 616 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Caton v. State, 597 So.2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). And a defendant also has the right to offer additional evidence to show the bias of prosecution witnesses. See § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Her testimony also supplies a possible motive for the shooting. She has, however, recanted the part of her statement where she said that the defendant called her and admitted shooting the victim. Under the Evidence Code, a party is allowed to impeach its own witness. § 90.608, Fla....

...ime). Furthermore, even if Pope is now recanting his trial testimony as Hunter's motion implied and would testify at a new trial, he could still be impeached at a new trial with his prior inconsistent statements given at Hunter's original trial. See § 90.608(1), Fla....

...PEARSON, Judge. The law of evidence provides — as it always has — that a party may attack the credibility of a witness called by his adversary by introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's *1156 present testimony. See § 90.608(1)(a), Fla....

...own. The trial court again denied the objection, but gave a instruction that the jury was to consider Brown's testimony only for the purpose of considering the credibility of Chad Jones and was not to use the testimony of Brown as evidence of guilt. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1997), provides that: Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's testimony. In Morton, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the "literal wording of section 90.608 can be subject to abuse." Morton, 689 So.2d at 262....

...ttacks on the credibility of a witness who is called as a device to place the impeaching evidence before the jury. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 608.2 at 379-80 (West 1999). In Morton, the court analyzed whether the impeachment was permissible under section 90.608(1) by first looking at the probative value of the testimony of the witness who is sought to be impeached....

...Clearly, Bennett's prior inconsistent statement did not qualify for admission as substantive evidence under section 90.801(2)(a). It was also inadmissible as impeachment because Bennett's failure to remember the conversation relating to a plan to kill the victim did not constitute adverse testimony as contemplated by section 90.608(2)....

...the witness is not qualified as an expert and to argue that even if he or she is qualified, the jury should not give the opinion testimony great weight. ... In addition, each of the methods of attacking the credibility of a lay witness specified in section 90.608 may be used to attack the credibility of an expert....

...The plaintiff argues in substance that the cross-examination amounted to an impermissible attack on the doctor's character. We disagree. The Evidence Code specifically allows "[a]ny party ... [to] attack the credibility of a witness by ... [s]howing that the witness is biased." § 90.608(2), Fla....

...4th DCA 1997) ("To open the door to evidence of prior bad acts, the defense must first offer misleading testimony or make a specific factual assertion which the state has the right to correct so that the jury will not be misled.")(emphasis added). Cf. § 90.404(1)(a) & (c), Fla. Stat.; § 90.608(5), Fla....

...mination of a witness in order to show interest, opportunity for observation, disposition to speak truthfully and ability to speak accurately. Killingsworth v. State, 90 Fla. 299, 105 So. 834 (1925); Cruz v. State, 437 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); § 90.608(1)(d), Fla....

...vil matter unrelated to the case. We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion not to allow the defense to question King over any concern regarding a possible forfeiture of his money, where such evidence was relevant to show bias or motive to lie. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, as well as the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantee a defendant "the right to a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses in order to show their bias or motive to be untruthful." See Chadwick v....

...It is well settled that a witness may be impeached by a prior inconsistent statement, including an omission in a previous out-of-court statement about which the witness testifies at trial, if it is material and would naturally have been mentioned. § 90.608(1), Fla....

raise questions about his or her credibility. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2006), specifies the permissible

...actor for consideration by the jury. B. Prior Arrests. The City argues that the trial court impermissibly precluded inquiry of Pineiro's eyewitnesses regarding their prior arrests by the Orlando Police Department. The City asserted that, pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2009), evidence of these prior arrests, regardless of the lack of conviction, is admissible to demonstrate the witnesses' bias against the City. Section 90.608 provides in pertinent part: Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...dence of a conviction of a prior felony or a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, which was not the situation here. However, section 90.610(3) specifically provides that nothing in section 90.610 affects the admissibility of evidence under section 90.608....

...while the patient was in acute distress and effectively assigned fault to a third physician, was not admissible as an admission against self-interest, section 90.803(18), Florida Statutes (1985), but could be used for impeachment purposes at trial. Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that prior statements by the witness which are inconsistent with his trial testimony may be introduced to attack his credibility....

...Indeed, the Florida Evidence Code codifies existing case law by permitting a party to attack the credibility of a witness by "[s]howing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which he testified." § 90.608(1)(d), Fla....

...Moreover, we are persuaded that section 90.410 was never intended to bar evidence of plea negotiations for the purpose of impeaching a witness who appears at trial to offer testimony against an accused. Rather, the admissibility of such evidence is governed by the provisions of section 90.608(1)(b) of the Florida Evidence Code, allowing a witness's credibility to be impeached upon a showing that he is biased....

...Thornes' testimony that Andrew told her he was in the bedroom with Sherry at the time of the shooting, meaning that he could not have seen the shooting as he had testified at trial. We agree with appellant that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit Mrs. Thornes' proffered testimony. Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), recognizes impeachment by prior inconsistent statement....

...Thornes' excluded testimony related to the critical issue of whether or not the prosecution's purported sole eyewitness was present at the scene of the shooting. This testimony was competent proof of a relevant and material fact and was not cumulative. § 90.608(1)(e), Fla....

...Appellant's third point argues error in this ruling because this fact shows Miller's bias and tendency to testify more favorably to the prosecutor, who then had the power to reinstate the criminal prosecution against her. A party may attack the credibility of a witness by showing that the witness is biased. § 90.608(1)(b), Fla....

a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2008), the *44prior statement

...The trial court did not address the use of the affidavit for impeachment, however, and Williamson does not explain how it could be used to impeach Baez under the rules of evidence. In theory, the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit could be introduced under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2006), to impeach Baez through prior inconsistent statements (assuming he would deny that he was given money and a transfer in exchange for testifying and told what to say) and to show his bias in favor of the State....

...Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). He does not appeal the trial court's denial of his Ring claim. [2] Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993). [3] Because Sanchez-Velasco died without perpetuating his testimony, impeachment pursuant to section 90.608(5) through "[p]roof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached,"—whether Williamson approached Baez for a knife—would be unavailable.

...1st DCA 1989), review denied, 560 So.2d 234 (Fla.1990). Alexander's statements introduced by the state demonstrated to the jury that the credibility of his recollection of the car's color may have been suspect in light of his actual observation of the entire traumatic event. See § 90.608(4), Fla....

...reputation for violence. It occurs to us initially that the question was improper because it was an effort by the state to impeach its own witness. A party is not permitted to impeach a witness called by that party unless the witness proves adverse. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...These cases highlight the existence of other statutory provisions that would allow the evidence notwithstanding section 90.610's prior conviction requirements as support for the exception's creation. Specifically, the cases justify the use of the false reporting evidence (1) to establish bias or motive pursuant to section 90.608(2) Florida Statutes; or (2) when character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense pursuant to section 90.405(2), Florida Statutes....

...The court commented that the testimony might "become the theme of the case . . . to the exclusion of what really happened." The trial court erred in preventing Love from introducing evidence about Peters's racial bias, since such testimony was admissible under section 90.608(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1996). To introduce Holborow's testimony, Love was not required to question Peters about the statement during the state's case. See Jones v. State, 678 So.2d 890, 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Alford v. State, 47 Fla. 1, 36 So. 436 (1904). Section 90.608(2)(e) provides that any party may attack the credibility of a witness by "[s]howing that the witness is biased." Where a defendant is African-American, a witness's bias against the defendant as an African-American, as well as a generalized prejudice against black persons, are proper subjects to explore under section 90.608(2)....

...ttorney occurred in Florida. Under these facts, a dismissal under Houston was certainly not required and in fact, it is doubtful if it would even be mandated under Kinney. We find the other two points raised by the appellant to be without merit. See § 90.608(1), Fla.Stat....

...ry regarding a potential bias toward black men dating Robinson. Shimer's testimony was critical. For the State, it supported what was asserted to be the unbiased testimony of Pollack who had little if any relationship with Robinson or the appellant. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, as well as the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantee a defendant "the right to a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses in order to show their bias or motive to be untruthful." See Chadwick v....

...be a hostile or court witness in order to impeach him with his prior inconsistent statement. We see no need to address this issue for retrial, because the evidence code has been amended to allow any party to attack the credibility of a witness. See section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Mr. Green was a state witness who had testified on direct examination regarding the defendant's statements made immediately after the robbery. The defense was allowed to cross-examine with the witness' prior testimony at his pretrial deposition. See § 90.608(1), Fla....

...ruits of the search. Initially, we are skeptical of the claim that nondisclosure of material bearing on the reliability of a search warrant is impeachment material cognizable under Brady. Impeachment is an attack on the credibility of a witness. See § 90.608, Fla....

...mine whether it has become cumulative or harassing. [8] In my opinion, the stated rationale for exclusion is legally incoherent. The State depends on Slocum v. State, 757 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), to rescue its position. Slocum did indeed read section 90.608 to exclude cross examination of a police officer about his interrogation technique of defendant, as compared with the technique he had used on a suspect in another case initially convicted but later determined to be innocent....

...As with this case, Slocum is a no-toe-in-the-water decision, rather than a time-to-get-out-of-the-water ruling and is therefore directly in conflict with Davis and Van Arsdall, both of which make that distinction. [9] Slocum is also contrary to Gibson which interpreted section 90.608 to liberally permit cross examination of possible motives for lying....

...The plaintiff defends the reading of the requests for admission and the denials as a legitimate effort to impeach Mr. Connally. The defendants respond by pointing out that Mr. Connally was called by the plaintiff as his own witness and, usually, one may not impeach his own witness. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...ical construction. 10 Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed.) § 611.03 at VI-166. We have no difficulty, therefore, in finding that Mr. Connally was subject to impeachment by the plaintiff. However, the means utilized for this purpose were inappropriate. Section 90.608(2) provides that in the case of an adverse witness, a party calling that witness may contradict the witness by other evidence or may prove that the witness has made an inconsistent statement at another time....

...Medical Therapy Sciences, Inc., 583 F.2d 36, 39-40 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130, 99 S.Ct. 1049, 59 L.Ed.2d 91 (1979); Sneed v. State, 397 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla. 5 D.C.A. 1981). The appellant pins his attack upon the prosecutor's interrogation of McBride to section 90.608, Florida Statutes, asserting that the questions and answers based upon McBride's prior inconsistent statements constituted impeachment outside the statute's boundaries. We certainly do not quarrel with the principle codified in section 90.608(2)....

...Defendant contended that it went to the plaintiff's "truth and veracity." The trial court admitted the evidence, but we reversed, concluding that it was "impeachment on a collateral issue, which is impermissible." Id. at 1108. In doing so, we noted that section 90.608, Florida Statutes, permits the credibility of a witness to be impeached by material facts....

...1st DCA 1990) ("it is improper to litigate purely collateral matters solely for the purpose of impeaching a party or witness"), overruled on other grounds by Ullman v. City of Tampa Parks Dep't, 625 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In light of Doremus and considering the limitations on impeachment as contained in section 90.608, Florida Statutes, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to permit impeachment of Bruscarino with her tax returns, as the issue of her income had become a collateral matter....

...not testify for the state unless he was granted total immunity. Therefore, the state attorney moved that the court call Mr. Andrews as its own witness under § 90.615, Florida Statutes, so that the state could impeach him if he testified adversely. § 90.608, Florida Statutes....

...Andrews responded that he had made the statements against the McNeils because the interrogating officer had indicated that he was more interested in arresting McNeil than Andrews. It is undisputed that Andrews' prior inconsistent statement was introduced solely for the purpose of impeaching his in-court testimony pursuant to § 90.608(1)(a)....

...We therefore hold that the absence of a written stipulation renders appellant's waiver void. Appellant's second point on appeal concerns itself with the question of the propriety of a ruling which permitted the state to impeach its own witness, who had not been shown to be an adverse witness. This was clearly error. See § 90.608(2), Fla....

...The trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to cross-examine Mr. Goff regarding this prior inconsistent statement. A party may attack the credibility of a witness, other than his own witness, by introducing statements of the witness that are inconsistent with his present testimony. § 90.608(1)(a), Fla....

...h a statement. However, the trial court ruled that the defense could not in that manner impeach the deputy's testimony. We agree with the trial court. No inconsistent prior statement of the deputy is shown to have been made justifying application of section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), of the evidence code....

...ntained a list of his court appearances for a reasonable period of time and had produced this list to plaintiff's counsel prior to trial. An expert witness' credibility may be impeached by showing bias, partiality, improper relationships or motives. § 90.608, Fla....

them to limit their testimony accordingly. See § 90.608(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999); see generally Charles

...In further support of its contention that the letter was admissible, DOT cited section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes (1997). Upon review, we reject each of DOT's contentions. We commence with the evidentiary issues, turning first to the contention that the letter was proper impeachment evidence. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), identifies who may present impeachment evidence and the proper modes of impeachment....

...State, 689 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.1997), but it also must be the witness's statement. Here, DOT sought to impeach Mr. Claussen's testimony by using a letter authored by another *82 person. Subsection (1) does not permit impeachment by use of another's statement. The remaining provisions of section 90.608 are equally unavailing in this context....

...However, in view of the deliberate misuse of the objection process by the prosecutor, we question whether that was a sufficient reaction or cure. State v. Murray, 443 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1984). REVERSED AND REMANDED. UPCHURCH, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 794.011(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1983). [2] § 90.608(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983); 90.614(2), Fla. Stat. (1983). [3] Myers v. State, 43 Fla. 500, 31 So. 275 (1901); Gelabert v. State, 407 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). [4] § 90.608(1)(d); Padgett v....

...e probably thousands a day, every single arrest could result in a suit under your theory." It is certainly true that a defendant in a criminal case has considerable latitude in cross-examination to elicit testimony showing the bias of a witness. See § 90.608(2), Fla....

...de officers. Defendant was acquitted of the battery charges. The trial court dismissed the obstruction charge on the theory that it was subsumed in the other charges. The State did not charge defendant with obstructing the Florida City officers. [2] § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Rather, his proffered testimony was that he knew nothing of the death of Mrs. Peterson and had never made any statements concerning that subject to any of the witnesses sought to be offered by Czubak. Czubak's attorney at the second trial was attempting to impeach Ragsdale under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1990), by offering the witnesses to Ragsdale's purported confessions. Although section 90.608 had been amended by Laws of Florida 90-174 to provide that a party calling a witness could impeach that party's own witness, the court excluded the witnesses offered for impeachment purposes on the basis of State v....

...Although the predicate of time, place and circumstance of the prior statement could certainly have been stated by the questioner in this instance with greater specificity, there was no objection on this score and it does not appear that the witness was misled. [8] § 90.608(1), Fla....

admissibility of the prior false accusation under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (showing the witness is biased)

that he was biased in favor of Ms. Jimenez. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2011); Steinger, Iscoe & Greene

...Although a trial court has discretion regarding the admission of evidence, that discretion is limited by the rules of evidence. Michael v. State, 884 So.2d 83, 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Those rules provide that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by showing that the witness is biased. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Appellant objected to this testimony on the grounds that it constituted impermissible hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection on the grounds that Hoffman was an adverse witness and could be impeached by evidence of his prior inconsistent Michigan statement as set forth in Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...State, 143 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1962). Admittedly, Hoffman's Michigan statement was not admissible under Section 90.801(2)(a) since it was not given under oath. Compare Webb v. State, 426 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). However, the use of the statement was proper under Section 90.608(2) as impeachment of Hoffman's in-court testimony, which differed substantially from his prior Michigan statement on relevant issues. Although Section 90.608(2) no longer requires the prosecution to be surprised when a witness proves adverse, it is clear from the record that everyone involved in this trial proceeding was surprised by Hoffman's turncoat performance on the witness stand....

...JOANOS, J., concurs. NIMMONS, J., concurs specially with an opinion. NIMMONS, Judge, specially concurring. I concur in Judge Smith's opinion. I do so with somewhat different emphasis. Prior inconsistent statements of witnesses who prove adverse within the meaning of Section 90.608 are admissible under that section for the purpose of impeachment of such witness but not as substantive evidence....

...Thus, any error in allowing testimony regarding Hoffman's prior unsworn inconsistent statements without an appropriate limiting jury instruction would be harmless. NOTES [1] Appellant has not raised on appeal any question as to whether Hoffman met the test of "adverseness" under Section 90.608(2)....

...r (2) would discredit a witness by establishing bias, corruption, or lack of competency on the part of the witness."). But a witness may be impeached by testimony tending to prove bias, even if the testimony concerns facts not otherwise germane. See § 90.608, Fla....

...The trial court had previously prohibited the state from bringing out that, or asking defendant whether, the prior statement had been made at a guilty plea negotiation proceeding. We reverse. Evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is generally permitted for impeachment purposes under the Florida Evidence Code, section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...The amendment, by omitting the words "for impeachment," showed the clear legislative intent that such inconsistent statements would no longer be permitted for impeachment purposes. Thus, the legislature clearly intended that section 90.410 be an exception to section 90.608....

...cluded. There we recognized that such questions could be used to attack the credibility of the witness by "[s]howing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which he testified." § 90.608(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...ayne specifically admitted committing the robbery himself. The court properly refused to permit the testimony but not for the reasons discussed at the trial. The testimony could have been introduced to impeach Jolly by prior inconsistent statements. § 90.608(1)(a), Fla....

...However, the trial court prevented the defense from asking Leb whether he knew that his existing *68 bond would have been revoked had he been arrested for the incident. This line of questioning was proper since it went to the motive behind Leb's initial report of the incident to the police. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that any party may attack the credibility of a witness by "[s]howing that the witness is biased." Matters that demonstrate bias include prejudice, an interest in the outcome of a case, and any motivation for a witness to testify untruthfully....

by ... [s]howing that the witness is biased.” § 90.608(2),. Fla. Stat. (2008). A party has the right

...The McGees asked Ridenour if he knew that forty-one state attorneys brought a class action in order to deal with GM's misrepresentations about the Rocket 88. The Rocket 88 incident was not one of the permissible modes of impeachment recognized by the evidence code. See § 90.608, Fla....

...to Melody on the phone that day. The trial court placed great weight on Brianna's testimony in making its finding of guilt, and Melody's testimony regarding her phone conversation with Brianna *674 would have cast doubt on Brianna's credibility. See § 90.608(5), Fla....

...This directly conflicts with the conversation on the tape. Sherill also denied that appellant had offered an explanation to her for abusing P.M., i.e., that he was not mentally or psychologically well. She testified that the tape did not refresh her recollection. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes, states that "[a]ny party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by ......

...etion as limited by the rules of evidence." Ocasio v. State, 994 So.2d 1258, 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Introduction of a prior statement that is inconsistent with a witness's present testimony is a main method to attack the credibility of a witness. § 90.608(1), Fla....

...See also, Crossley, 596 So.2d at 450. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny Bateson's motion for severance. We also hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in permitting the state to call Vicky Cash to testify in the trial. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes, provides Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...ath, to which the victim replied that he had given about three. Appellant's counsel then asked why had the victim just remembered the part about taking the money and not the wallet, and the court again sustained the "negative impeachment" objection. Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) recognizes the right to impeach a witness and attack his credibility with statements which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...When Smith testified, the prosecution asked him "did you ever tell somebody that when you're released, you will probably do the same thing again?" Smith denied making this statement and was subsequently impeached. We agree that the use of this statement to impeach was improper. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1999), sets out who may impeach and how a witness may be impeached....

...1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Caton v. State, 597 So.2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). It is thus a well-established principle in this state that a defendant in a criminal case has considerable latitude in cross-examination to elicit testimony showing the bias of prosecution witnesses. See § 90.608(2), Fla....

...(2000) *774 ("Any party...may attack the credibility of a witness by...showing that the witness is biased."); and Gibson v. State, 661 So.2d 288, 291 (Fla.1995) ("Our evidence code liberally permits the introduction of evidence to show the bias or motive of a witness."). As we only recently observed, "Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, as well as the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantee a defendant `the right to a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses in order to show their bias or motive to be...

...lmate relative to the alleged motivation of the cellmate to lie at trial. The trial court excluded the testimony of the three inmates. Defendant appeals that ruling. The credibility of a witness may be attacked by showing that the witness is biased. § 90.608(1)(b), Fla....

...Officer Pepper would have testified she had spoken casually with C.M. and had not arrested him for truancy. We reject C.M.'s contention that the officer's rebuttal testimony was improperly admitted as extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Shell Oil Co., 589 So.2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (1995), allows impeachment of a witness by "[p]roof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached." During Officer Pepper's direct testimony, evidence of C.M.'s flight after seeing the police car was probative of his guilty mind....

...muted this inference by explaining that he fled to avoid a truancy arrest. On rebuttal, the state was entitled to nullify C.M.'s explanation for his flight by showing that 15 minutes earlier he had encountered the same officer without incident. C.M.'s flight was a "material fact" within the meaning of section 90.608(5), because it was circumstantial evidence that he attempted to rob the victim, the matter placed in issue by the charging document....

...A good exposition of the rule is contained in Jackson v. State, 451 So.2d 458, 462 (Fla. 1984), quoting from Adams v. State, 34 Fla. 185, 195-96, 15 So. 905, 908 (1894): It is very erroneous to suppose that, under this statute [§ 1101 Rev.Stat.Fla. (1892), precursor to § 90.608(2), Fla....

...from the rooftop across the street were mistaken in their observations concerning him. The focus of any impeachment of the officers was to show a "defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity" to observe Grant's supposedly incriminating conduct. See § 90.608(4), Fla....

...The state properly used Ericksen's prior deposition for impeachment. However, not all of these details comprised material parts of defendant's alibi defense and therefore, the trial court erred in allowing the state to present rebuttal evidence in the form of the testimony of other witnesses. See § 90.608(5), Fla....

...Because these details comprised parts of appellant's alibi defense and were set forth by appellant during Ericksen's direct examination, they were material and the trial court properly allowed the state to present rebuttal evidence in the form of the testimony of other witnesses. See § 90.608(5), Fla. Stat. (1991). [1] NOTES [1] Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1991), provides: 90.608 Who may impeach....

...The State objected to defense counsel's attempt to impeach Drayton on the ground that the line of questioning represented "negative impeachment." The trial judge sustained the objections; it is these evidentiary rulings which Davis contends entitle him to reversal and a new trial. Florida Statutes section 90.608(1) provides that a party may attack the credibility of a witness by introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...ition. The State objected arguing that the question was improper "negative impeachment." The trial court sustained the objection. Sanjurjo was convicted of robbery and, on appeal, challenged the trial court's evidentiary ruling. This court reversed. Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) recognizes the right to impeach a witness and attack his credibility with statements which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...e affirmed. In Florida, a witness may not be impeached by any means not recognized in the Evidence Code. See Rose v. State, 472 So.2d 1155, 1157-58 (Fla.1985) (holding that a trial court properly refused to allow impeachment by a means not listed in section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1983)). Section 90.608 provides a complete list of the proper ways to attack a witness' credibility: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...tims." Id. The Second District reached this holding after concluding that such evidence is "relevant to the possible bias, prejudice, motive, intent or corruptness" of the witness. Id. Evidence that is relevant to a witness' bias is admissible under section 90.608(2). Prejudice, motive to testify, and intent in testifying are all ways of showing the witness' bias, and, thus, are also proper grounds for impeachment under section 90.608(2)....

...The defense objected to this line of questioning, arguing that the State had called Mrs. Collins to the stand solely to procure an answer regarding an "irrelevant piece of information" to be able to introduce impeaching hearsay evidence which would paint Mrs. Collins as an "uncaring, unloving person." Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1993), permits any party, including the party calling the witness, to impeach the credibility of a witness without regard to whether the testimony of the witness constitutes surprise or affirmative harm. See Banks v. State, 648 So.2d 766 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). This provision in the Florida Evidence Code in effect adopted Federal Rule 607. Thus, in construing section 90.608, Florida courts should be guided by federal decisions interpreting Federal Rule 607....

...Collins followed a proper course of action, did everything she could do, is such complete nonsense I don't even dignify it with a response. By implication—and [defense counsel] is going to say well, you can't fault the defendant for the actions or inactions of Mrs. Collins. Yes, you can. [2] Similar in substance to section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1995), rule 607 of the Iowa Rules of Evidence provides that "[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him."

...We further recognize that a trial court may not prohibit cross-examination "when the facts sought to be elicited are `germane to that witness' testimony and plausibly relevant to the theory of defense." Bertram v. State, 637 So.2d 258, 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (quoting Pace v. State, 596 So.2d 1034, 1035 (Fla.1992)). Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, permits cross-examination to "attack the credibility of a witness by ....

688 So.2d 383, 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); see also § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). In Pearce v. State, 880

...witnesses was doubtful at best. Defendant's second contention also has merit. We agree that the trial court erred in not permitting defense counsel to impeach the testimony of a key state witness with a prior inconsistent statement she had made. See § 90.608(1)(a)....

...doesn't even know his name, she a woman who wants you to believe that she's going to come into this court — and tell the truth about Bill... . Although the witness's affair alone might be relevant to show the bias of the witness in accordance with section 90.608(1)(b), Florida Statutes, whether the witness slept with the victim without knowing his last name is impermissibly calculated to show bad character and question the witness's morals....

...The letters also support Minus's theory of defense that his relationship with T.B. was *352 not completely over as she claimed, but he remained her "best friend" and she planned to stay involved in his life. This could qualify as an impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement. See § 90.608(1), Fla....

...lso Dias v. State, 812 So.2d 487, 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ("statement can be admitted as impeachment although it would constitute hearsay if offered as such for impeachment purposes.") This statement qualifies as a prior inconsistent statement under section 90.608(1)....

...f Civil Procedure, the court should have declared the witness adverse merely because he was employed as the superintendent of streets and roads for the City. Furthermore, appellant failed to move to have this witness declared adverse on the basis of section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1989) and, therefore, this argument is not before the court....

...This evidence was highly prejudicial and harmful and its admissibility was objected to and constitutes reversible error. The defendant's conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED. COBB, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that "any party, except the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (a) introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with his present testimony."

...At the conclusion of its deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence to life imprisonment, claiming the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the ex-wife regarding the prior incident. Florida Statute Section 90.608(5), provides that once a defendant takes the stand and testifies, he or she places credibility at issue and prosecutors are allowed to impeach that credibility with "proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached." See § 90.608(5), Fla....

...uiry by lying. [9] The majority of this Court holds that the evidence was nevertheless admissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). My analysis of these issues follows. I. THE IMPEACHMENT ISSUE The impeachment argument is based on section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The objection was overruled and the trial court accepted the state's argument that the rebuttal testimony went to the defendant's truthfulness and also to discredit his explanation for fleeing when he saw the police. The appellate court affirmed, holding that "C.M.'s flight was a `material fact' within the meaning of section 90.608(5), because it was circumstantial evidence that he attempted to rob the victim ..." C.M., 698 So.2d at 1307....

...Although this case did involve character evidence, the state was allowed to impeach the defendant in a manner that would ordinarily be impermissible because the defendant opened the door to such questioning during his direct-examination. I further note that Ashcraft does not rely upon or even mention section 90.608(5)....

...the argument section of his brief, as set out in the margin below, Childers contended that the trial court’s denial of his right of cross-examination also infringed his rights under the Florida Constitution, Fla. Const. art I, § 16, Fla. Stat. § 90.608, and Florida case law.7 The denial occurred when the court ruled that he could not cross-examine Junior about the State Attorney’s Notice of Revocation and the Elliott acquittal....

...Childers argued that in Florida, “a defendant in a criminal case has considerable latitude in cross-examination to elicit testimony showing the bias of prosecution witnesses,” Shaw v. State, 831 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Fla. Stat. § 90.608 (“Any party ....

...may attack the credibility of a witness by . . . [s]howing that the witness is biased.”)); that Florida’s “evidence code liberally permits the introduction of evidence to show the bias or motive of a witness,” Gibson v. State, 661 So. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. 1995); and that “‘Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, as well as the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantee a defendant ‘the right to a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses in order to show their bias or motive to be untruthful,’” Shaw, 831 So....

...Subsection (3) provides, in relevant part, that "[l]eading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness's testimony. ... When a party calls a hostile witness, ... interrogation may be by leading questions." In addition, section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes, states that "[a]ny party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by ......

...ford him an adequate opportunity to impeach Dunbar's credibility. We agree. A party can impeach the credibility of a witness called by an adverse party by introducing that witness's prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony. § 90.608(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). The Florida Evidence Code does not require the witness's prior inconsistent statement to be reduced to writing in order to impeach the witness under section 90.608(1)(a)....

...court had just ruled that the defense could inquire about past drug dealings between McKenzie and Mr. Wilson. When the court at this point sustained the objection, it prevented the appellant from attempting to impeach McKenzie. We find, pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1989), and the authorities cited above, that this was error....

...nsistent statements. The state, however, contends that Garcia's "refreshed *837 recollection" of Ruff's threats against Cooper was not impeachment. We conclude that the primary purpose for calling Garcia was to impeach her with her prior statements. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes, states that "[a]ny party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by ......

...As his first issue, he claims that the court erred in refusing to permit him to impeach the child with her deposition testimony. An appellate court reviews decisions on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion as limited by the rules of evidence. Nardone v. State, 798 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, permits "[a]ny party, including the party calling the witness," to attack the credibility of a witness by "[i]ntroducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent *1262 with the witness's present testimony." § 90.608(1), Fla....

...alled to the stand for the purpose of interrogating her on the prior accusation. However, the defense elected not to recall her to the stand. On appeal appellant claims that the attorney's testimony would have been evidence of bias, admissible under section 90.608(2)....

...be not credible, that fact was proper impeachment evidence in Mr. Roosevelt's case. We disagree. The State contended that this was permissible because a party "may attack the credibility of a witness by . . . (2) Showing that the witness is biased." § 90.608(2), Fla....

...The Court went on to say: The defense's proposed evidence does not fall under any of the express ways allowed to attack a witness's credibility-it does not deal with a prior inconsistent statement, bias, character or ability to *296 observe, remember, or recount. See § 90.608, Fla.Stat....

...judge," Morrison v. State, 818 So.2d 432, 448 (Fla. 2002), I believe on retrial, the prosecution should not be allowed to use this e-mail on cross-examination. Impeachment of a witness's character by specific acts of misconduct is prohibited. See §§ 90.608, 609, 610, Fla....

...ian ad litem in other cases. [2] The concurrence relies on In re: Commitment of DeBolt, 19 So.3d 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). That case, however, was decided under sections 90.609 and 90.610, Florida Statutes. Tanzi , on the other hand, was decided under section 90.608, Florida Statutes, which was the section involved here....

...iff had been fired from a prior job when there was no basis for admitting the testimony other than to impeach plaintiff's testimony that he had not been fired. It was not relevant to any issue in the case. This court reversed for a new trial, citing section 90.608, Fla.Evid....

...See Morton v. State, 689 So.2d 259, 264 (Fla.1997), receded from on other grounds by Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 47 (Fla.2000). However, "a party may always impeach its witness if the witness gives affirmatively harmful testimony." Id.; see also § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2008) ("Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by ... [i]ntroducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony."). But even though section 90.608 permits a party to impeach its own witness, "it is still improper under Florida law for a party to call a witness merely as a device to place the impeaching testimony before the jury." Curtis v....

...That witness was cross-examined by counsel for Grunow and O.R. Golf, [3] and the witness's vacillation and prior drug use were specifically criticized by counsel during the Grunow and O.R. Golf closing argument (which sarcastically dubbed him the "star witness"). Section 90.608 allowed counsel for the Harrises to impeach without a showing that the witness was adverse, and regardless of whether the witness's testimony was prejudicial to the Harrises' case....

...relevant unless defense counsel planned to make a self-defense argument. We conclude that the trial court improperly granted the State's motion in limine to prohibit questioning about the prior incident involving the defendant and her son, John Jr. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2004), specifically permits a party to attack the credibility of a witness by "[s]howing that the witness is biased." "Bias or prejudice of a witness has an important bearing on his credibility, and evidence tending to show such bias is relevant." Webb v....

credibility ' of a witness by exposing a potential bias. § 90.608(2),, Fla. Stat. (2013). ■ “A jury is entitled

however, is limited by the rules of evidence. Id. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2009), allows a party

...Yet the majority holds that not a single piece of this baggage of bias may be displayed before the jury—that plaintiff cannot explore a reasonable sampling of an animus harbored by the witness against all personal injury plaintiffs and their claims, about which he wrote some years ago. Under section 90.608(2), any party may attack credibility by showing that a witness is biased....

...As to such matters inquiry may be had, and it is not within the discretion of the court to exclude it ...." [e.s.] 41 Fla. at 661, 26 So. at 1028; see also Alford v. State, 47 Fla. 1, 7-8, 36 So. 436, 438 (1904). The majority fails to recognize that section 90.608(2) lays down a rule, and a rule is the very antithesis of discretion....

...mmigration status was admissible to show her "bias" in favor of the defendants' position. We do not agree. While evidence of a witness's bias or prejudice is of course pertinent and admissible as reflecting upon his credibility in a particular case, § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Appellant was tried as a principal on battery charges along with three other co-defendants. After a mistrial was declared as to the co-defendants, Appellant sought to admit into evidence proffered testimony of two rebuttal witnesses to impeach the victim's credibility pursuant to section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...nce by the victim) is not applicable. Because Appellant did not offer the testimony in support of her self-defense claim, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the impeachment testimony as a collateral issue. Section 90.608(5) provides that any party may attack the credibility of a witness by contradictory testimony given by another witness as long as the facts testified to are not collateral to the issue....

...On the contrary, the proffer by David's counsel made it abundantly clear that no such arrest and jailing had occurred before that date. There is simply no basis for admitting the deposition testimony on grounds of impeaching credibility by prior inconsistent statements under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...that she lies. Character testimony regarding a victim's reputation for truthfulness is admissible. §§ 90.404(1)(b), 90.609, Fla. Stat. (2006). A witness may also be impeached with statements that are inconsistent with the witness' trial testimony. § 90.608, Fla....

...Thus, the introduction of such graphic, chilling evidence of an irrelevant matter was clearly error. *392 Appellant also asserts as error the admission after proffer of state witness Fred Day's testimony, which the state asserted was admissible under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes....

...y positively as to appellant's participation in the crime of tampering with the grave. Thus, his testimony, if properly admitted, was relevant to the case. However, the record does not show that Day was declared to be a witness adverse to the state. Section 90.608(2) provides for the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement of an adverse witness but makes no provision for the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement introduced by the party calling the witness when the witness has not been shown to be adverse. We note that the transcript of the proceedings show that an unreported side-bar conference was held concerning the proffer of Day's testimony. If on retrial the state elects to introduce Day's prior inconsistent statements pursuant to section 90.608(2), we caution that the record should reflect a supportable declaration of his status as an adverse witness....

recount the events of the evening in question. See § 90.608(4), Fla. Stat. (2016); Edwards v. State, 548

...Admittedly, the evidence presented on Munson's recantation was hearsay. Therefore, it was inadmissible unless it could be considered as impeachment of Munson's prior testimony. Use of inconsistent statements is a recognized method of impeaching a witness. § 90.608(1)(a), Fla....

...The spontaneous statement made by Royston to his attorney in open court that Mordenti was "not the guy" would meet the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule. See § 90.804(2)(c). The other two statements would be admissible as impeachment testimony. See § 90.608....

...irator, testified as a witness for the state and her testimony, that before she agreed to take D.J.G. to see Roussell he had agreed not to physically batter Roussell, is binding on the state and refutes the existence of the charged conspiracy. Under section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1985), it is improper for the party calling a witness to attack his or her credibility unless the witness proves adverse....

...to some matters and untruthful as to others. See Burr v. State, 466 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 879, 106 S.Ct. 201, 88 L.Ed.2d 170 (1985). The common law rule which forbids a party to impeach his own witness has been retained at § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (1985). The portions of § 90.608 relevant to this case state: (1) Any party, except the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness ....

...e court. (e.s.) McCormick suggests that the calling and examination of an attesting witness does not constitute adoption of that witness's testimony. Id. Clearly, a party calling a witness who proves adverse, does not adopt that witness's testimony. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...ial court's dual role in this case. The trial court, sitting as trier of fact, could not be expected to ignore Logsdon's self-interest in determining whether to accept her testimony in toto. I would affirm. NOTES [1] See Law Revision Council Note to section 90.608, Fla....

(Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (emphasis original) (quoting § 90.608(5), Fla. Stat. (2009)). The test for determining

this statement was admissible as impeachment. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes, permits the impeachment

former girlfriend’s testimony. ’See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (providing that' any party

...ssible so that prejudicial error was committed when the trial court refused to direct a mistrial and permitted introduction of the conviction into evidence. Section 90.610(3), Florida Statutes (1979) provides that the admissibility of evidence under Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1979) is not affected by the limitations contained in Section 90.610(1)....

...own witnesses, but that does not necessarily resolve the constitutional problem identified in Chambers. Although a witness may be impeached in Florida by “[a]ny party, including the party calling the witness,” pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes, it is still improper under Florida law for a party to call a witness merely as a device to place the impeaching testimony before the jury....

...Ray Allen Brown on recall regarding his alleged confession to Tyler, the district court concluded that because Tyler’s testimony about the out-of-court statement was inadmissible, it was likewise improper to allow Bearden to confront Ray Allen Brown about the confession. Under section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes, “[a]ny party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by ....

...There is no indication in this record that the trial judge ever made such a determination. However, because the defendant did not raise this issue below it is waived. There are only two remaining issues in this case, first, whether evidence of the defendant's alleged prior misconduct was admissible under sections 90.608, 90.609 or 90.610, Florida Statutes (1997), which also provide for impeachment with the use of character evidence....

...More significantly, the question constitutes improper impeachment. In effect, the prosecutor's question expressly asked the defendant whether he had ever previously committed an aggravated assault with a firearm. In addition to section 404(2)(a), the dissent relies on section 90.608(5), which reads as follows: Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. *100 Subsection (5) of this statute does not apply to this analysis because subsection (3) specifically addresses the issue of attacking the credibility of a witness by attacking that witness's character, which is what happened in this case. Section 90.608(3) specifically states that character can only be attacked in accordance with the provisions of section 90.609 or 90.610. In further support of its section 90.608(5) argument, the dissent relies on C.M....

...The objection was overruled and the trial court accepted the state's argument that the rebuttal testimony went to the defendant's truthfulness and also to discredit his explanation for fleeing when he saw the police. The appellate court affirmed, holding that "C.M.'s flight was a `material fact' within the meaning of section 90.608(5), because it was circumstantial evidence that he attempted to rob the victim ..." C.M., 698 So.2d at 1307....

...Although this case did involve character evidence, the state was allowed to impeach the defendant in a manner that would ordinarily be impermissible because the defendant opened the door to such questioning during his direct-examination. I further note that Ashcraft does not rely upon or even mention section 90.608(5)....

...ction 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997). Here, the ex-wife's rebuttal testimony was relevant to show the defendant's lack of truthfulness and to contradict his direct statements to the contrary that he had never threatened anyone with a gun. See § 90.608(5), Fla....

testimony was the product of possible manipulation. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2009), allows a party

of more serious injuries to her neck. Under Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2009), any party may

...Here, the trial court's order down-played the significance of Pauldo's new testimony. Pauldo's post-trial statement is not only a recantation of her identification of Smith as the shooter in a photo array and at a line-up, but it is also impeachment evidence as to the identification testimony of Lee Keith and Tommy Whitmer. § 90.608, Fla....

...the trial court’s discretion, and was not directly relevant to Stokes’ and Rollo’s performance in representing Hernandez in this case, the circuit court did not err in sustaining the State’s objection. Further, such matters are not the proper subject for impeachment under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...That provision allows impeachment with prior inconsistent statements, evidence of bias, evidence of defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity to observe, remember, or recount matters, and proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. Section 90.608(3) allows impeachment of the character of the witness by evidence of character relating to truthfulness under section 90.609(1), Florida Statutes, and relating to evidence of certain crimes under section 90.610, Florida Statutes....

wrong reason. As the state correctly notes, section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes, provides that a party

...dence against the appellant. It is true that under Section 90.801(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), prior inconsistent statements of a witness taken under oath are admissible as substantive evidence. Moore v. State, 452 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1984). However, Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1983) provides that a party may not impeach its own witness unless that witness' testimony proves adverse to the calling party....

...� 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). "Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by ... [p]roof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached." § 90.608(5), Fla....

about the events of this alleged offense.” Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2012), states that any party

...Similarly, in the present case appellant's defense was that he had paid the cabbie, but that the cabbie had kept the fare. The cabbie's admission that he had done so in the past was evidence that the cabbie had a motive to falsely accuse appellant. We conclude that this evidence should have been admitted under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides that a party may attack the credibility of a witness by demonstrating bias or motive to be untruthful. Barows v. State, 805 So.2d 120, 122 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ("section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, as well as the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantee a defendant `the right to a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses in order to show their bias or motive to be untruthful.'")....

...GENERALLY.—Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion, except: . . . . (c) Character of witness. —Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in ss. 90.608-90.610. Section 90.608 deals with "[w]ho may impeach" a witness and section 90.609 defines the "[c]haracter of witness as impeachment." The section relevant to this opinion is 90.610, "[c]onviction of certain crimes as impeachment." Significantly, the statut...

attack a witness’s credibility based on bias. § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). A treating physician, like

...ate’s attempt to withdraw Junior’s plea agreement by holding that such evidence was relevant under Florida Rule of Evidence 90.401. Childers II, 936 So. 2d at 592. The court then observed that the Florida Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 90.608, 7 gave Childers the right to “attack Junior’s credibility.” Id....

...673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). While recognizing the importance of Childers’s right to attack Junior’s credibility, the District Court of Appeal 7 Florida Evidence Rule 90.608 provides that: “[a]ny party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony. (2) Showing that the wit...

...(4) Showing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which the witness testified. (5) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached.” Fla. Stat. § 90.608. 6  Case: 08-15590 Date Filed: 11/14/2013 Page: 7 of 18 nonetheless observed that this right of confrontation is subject to limitation under Rule 90.403....

admissible on retrial as impeachment evidence under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997). However, the very

by ... [s]howing that the witness is biased.” § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). “Included in the types

testified to by the witness being impeached.” § 90.608(5), Fla. Stat. (2010). Not finding the error in

have cast doubt on Brianna’s credibility. See § 90.608(5), Fla. Stat. (2006) (providing that the credibility

guilty of the robbery, and this appeal followed. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that

State, 919 So.2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (2011), provides that

pending case were admissible to show bias under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2010). “[T]he Sixth Amendment

3d 1092, 1099 (Fla.2011)); see also § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2013) (“Any party, including the

allowed to attack a witness’s credibility” under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1987). Id. Moreover, “[i]f

...*792 Those statutes are silent as to the use that can be made of information in the PSI report once it is obtained by an authorized person, and neither statute prevents the use of statements made by an offender to a probation officer during the presentence interview for purposes of impeaching the defendant at trial. Also, section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), which allows a party to attack the credibility of a witness by introducing statements of the witness that are inconsistent with his testimony at trial, places no limits on the nature of the prior inconsi...

attack a witness's credibility based on bias. § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2014) ("Any party, including the

to show the bias of prosecution witnesses. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (1993); see also Diaz v. State

...In fact, one of the overriding purposes of cross-examination is to weaken or discredit testimony given on direct examination. Coco v. State, 62 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 931, 75 S.Ct. 774, 99 L.Ed. 1261 (1955); Frost v. State, 104 So.2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958). Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1985) permits the impeachment of a witness by evidence in contradiction of his testimony in chief....

inconsistent with the witness’s present testimony.” § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). “The inconsistent statement

Jarrett’s body had not been burned. Section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (2010), states that any

...into on cross-examination or developed in the defense case." Chadwick relies on the well established principle that a defendant in a criminal case has considerable latitude in cross-examination to elicit testimony showing the bias of a witness. See § 90.608(2), Fla....

...First, Appellant asserts that the testimony of Deputy Bentley was inadmissible hearsay. This argument must fail because it was not argued below and because the evidence was offered to impeach Maria, not to prove the truth of the matters asserted. See § 90.608, Fla....

...Here, unlike Robertson, the State's initial inquiry, relating to the nature of the relationship between Appellant and Maria, and Maria's feelings about Appellant, was permissible to show Maria's motivation to testify untruthfully about her husband's crimes. § 90.608(2), Fla....

1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citation omitted). Section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (2009), provides that

be inadmissible under section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (2008). “Section 90.608(5) provides that any

defendant, is governed by the provisions of Section 90.608(l)(b), Florida Statutes, which allows, among

particular material issue in this case.” Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, provides that Appellant

...On appeal, the State does not defend the correctness of the trial court's ruling. Indeed, a party may attack a witness's credibility by introducing a prior statement of the witness that is inconsistent with the witness's present testimony. Williams v. State, 472 So.2d 1350, 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (citing § 90.608(1)(a), Fla....

purposes of impeaching the victim’s credibility. See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2001); Marshall v. State, 68 So

...§ 90.610. See Rolle v. State, 386 So.2d 3 (1980) (general rule is that witness may not be interrogated as to prior arrests or pending charges, but only as to prior convictions). Nor is it likely that the evidence would be admissible under Fla.Stat. § 90.608 as evidence of bias in this case, where no criminal proceeding or even an investigation had begun....

Taylor and Byars lied at trial. 10. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, sets forth certain types

when offered for impeachment purposes); see also § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) ("Any party . . .

...ved to impeach his testimony. See Mendez v. State, 412 So.2d 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (whenever witness takes the stand, he places his credibility in issue); Baxter v. State, 294 So.2d 392 (Fla. 4th DCA) (same), cert. denied, 303 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1974); § 90.608(4), Fla....

...the evidence goes to the merit of the case or whether it constitutes impeachment evidence. Murrah, 773 So. 2d at 622. Here, the letter constitutes impeachment evidence because it could have been used to call into question the credibility of the victim’s testimony. See § 90.608(1), Fla....

was declared an adverse witness pursuant to Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes. Subsequently, over defense

witness by showing that the witness is biased. § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). A defendant in a criminal

witness’s credibility based on bias,” id. (citing § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2015)), the credibility of the

v. State, 48 So.3d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, (2008), lists the grounds

the statements she made in this trial, under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (Supp.1990).

...Appellant first contends that the JCC erred in admitting into evidence, over claimant's hearsay objection, Dr. Seltzer's medical records relating to claimant's 1987 industrial accident. We agree that the JCC did not err in so ruling. The documents which claimant himself signed were properly admissible under Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), which allows the introduction of a witness's prior inconsistent statements for the purpose of impeachment....

the doctor’s credibility based on bias. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). Nevertheless, this appears

witness’s credibility based on bias,” id. (citing § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2015)), the credibility of the

...4th DCA 1997) ("It is well settled that a witness may be impeached by a prior inconsistent statement, including an omission in a previous out-of-court statement about which the witness testifies at trial, if it is material and would naturally have been mentioned." (citing § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (1995), and State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 313 (Fla. 1990))). [11] For the purpose of our analysis, we need not decide whether this would have constituted proper impeachment under section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1997).

attacked by showing that the witness is biased, Section 90.608(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), appellant’s

State, 591 So.2d 922 (Fla.1991); see also section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes. Although decisions such

to attack the credibility of a witness.” Id. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (2008), allows for the

by the defendant on his direct questioning. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, has been amended since Gelabert

matters about which the witness had testified. § 90.608(4), Fla. Stat. (1991). It would appear, therefore

admissible for impeachment purposes pursuant to section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes. In response to an order

§ 39.11(l)(f), Fla.Stat. (1987). Affirmed. . § 90.608, Fla.Stat. (1987) (since modified Ch. 90-174,

not inconsistent with his trial testimony. Section 90.608(l)(a), Florida Statutes, allows any party,

the landowners to testify. We do not agree. Section 90.608 allows impeachment by “proof of other witnesses

showing that the witness is *8biased. See Fla. Stat. § 90.608 (1999). “Florida courts have recognized that a

Statutes (1981), read in pari materia with section 90.608(2) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.450(a)

inconsistent with the witness’s present testimony.” § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. “The admission or rejection of

...a professor at USF was removed entirely. Neither of the prior versions of the CV were offered into evidence or discussed during direct examination of Dr. Lloyd. While Dr. Lloyd had a reasonable explanation for the changes in his CV, the questions were nonetheless improper. Under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2013), parties can impeach a witness by: “1) introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness’s present testimony; 2) showing that the witness is biased; [or] 3) attacking the charact...

bias or motive of a witness.”). Specifically, Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2022), provides that

witness with a prior inconsistent statement. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (2000), permits any party

observation of the entire traumatic event. See § 90.608(4), Fla. Stat. (1995). Accordingly, we hold that

allowed where the witness has proven to be adverse. § 90.608(2), Fla.Stat. (1989); Austin v. State, 461 So

...his step-granddaughter. Even assuming Gaedtke's wife changed her testimony at trial, as Gaedtke suggested, the State would have been allowed to impeach Gaedtke's wife with her two prior inconsistent statements to law enforcement. See Fla. Evid.Code § 90.608(1)....

credible before he even testified at the trial. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1983), dealing with impeachment

inconsistent with the witness’s present testimony.” § 90.608, Fla. Stat. “The admission or rejection of impeaching

as to the form of the statements permitted. See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). We have previously discussed

non-hearsay and admissible to show bias under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Kearney v

Constitution, Fla. Const, art I, § 16, Fla. Stat. § 90.608, and Florida case law.7 The denial occurred when

witness’s testimony under the rules of evidence. See § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (1993); D.J.G., 524 So.2d at 1027

Brown v. State, 428 So.2d 250 (Fla.1983); Section 90.-608(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1981); and Yesbick

but refused to grant a mistrial. Although section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1991), allows impeachment

plea agreement or other deal with the state, see § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (1997), Livingston v. State, 678

punish-ment_ (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985),2 provides no

...State, 668 So.2d 954, 961 (Fla. 1996) ("for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as the legal ground for objection, exception, or motion below"). Bias is a legitimate basis for attacking the credibility of a witness, see section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1999), and the Florida Evidence Code "liberally permits the introduction of evidence to show the bias or motive of a witness." Gibson v....

proper as an effort to uncover potential bias. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). However, in the question

deposition was admissible under the provisions of section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1987), for impeachment purposes

651 So.2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). See also § 90.608(5), Fla. Stat. (2003) (providing that any party

attack a witness's credibility based on bias. § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2014) ("Any party, including the

witness being impeached. § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2014). Our reading of section 90.608 leads us to conclude

facts, see § 90.404(1)(c) (character of witness), § 90.608(5) (contradiction on relevant facts).”).

any testimony they may provide against her. See § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2025) (“Any party, including the

showing that she was biased in accordance with section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2003), which reads succinctly:

...1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Mosley v. State, 616 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Caton v. State, 597 So.2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). And a defendant also has the *1015 right to offer additional evidence to show the bias of prosecution witnesses. See § 90.608(2), Fla....

...it or criminal charge against the witness arising out of the incident, those matters may be inquired into on cross-examination or developed in the defense case. Mosley; Caton; Diaz. Chadwick v. State, 680 So.2d 567, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also § 90.608(2), Fla....

most common form of impeachment evidence. See Section 90.608(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). Appellees’

completely unrelated to the defendant’s case. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2016), provides that “[a]ny

medical records, then it must not have happened. See § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (1995). Moreover, section 90.614,

as testified to by the witness being impeached. § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (1997). This provision is a proper

doctor’s credibility within the purview of section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1989). It more nearly approaches

bias he or she might have for or against a party. § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). For example, a treating

...but rather whether the discovery may be obtained at all. I think the answer to this question is clearly yes. A treating physician, just as any other witness, may be questioned at trial concerning any bias he or she might have for or against a party. § 90.608(2), Fla....

2d 561, 569 (Fla. 2004) (citations omitted). Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (2018), allows a party

as prior inconsistent statements pursuant to section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (2019). Second, based

admissible as a prior inconsistent statement under section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (2008). If the earlier

section 90.610. The state asserts that under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), it can attack the

...not be impeached with the arrest affidavit because it was not her statement. The trial court sustained the objection. - 42 -  To impeach a witness by use of a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2008), the prior statement must be both (1) inconsistent with the witness’s in-court testimony, and (2) the statement of the witness....

...Instead, the affidavit only includes a summation by the detective of their statements and briefly states that the four witnesses “denied any knowledge or involvement” in the burglary. Thus, the statements contained in Detective Hardy’s arrest affidavit were not “statements of the witness” as contemplated by section 90.608, and therefore could not be used to impeach Richaunda’s trial testimony as argued by Wilcox. In addition, Richaunda admitted during cross-examination that she was not completely truthful to police in her initial statement, a...

...Excluded Testimony We review a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion, with the trial court’s discretion limited by the rules 2 of evidence. Lopez v. State, 97 So. 3d 301, 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). “Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, permits cross-examination to ‘attack the credibility of a witness by ....

testified to by the witness being impeached.” § 90.608(5), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). “An issue

its own witness when the witness proved adverse. § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (1987).1 However, those rules were

v. State, 139 Fla. 542, 190 So. 691 (1939). Section 90.608(l)(a), Florida Statutes. See also Williams

...of acquittal on the tampering charge. In his remaining argument, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in calling Johnny Flowers as a “court witness” pursuant to section 90.615(1), Florida Statutes, 1 in light of the 1990 amendment to section 90.608, Florida Statutes, which allows for any party, including the party calling a witness, to attack the witness’s credibility. In essence, Appellant argues that the court witness rule is no longer necessary or appropriate based upon section 90.608. However, our review of the record shows that the primary basis upon which Appellant objected to Mr....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (1993); Alexander v. State, 627 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA

Plasencia did not testify at trial, thus neither section 90.608(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), nor section

...contained in the statement, it is not hearsay." (quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 801.2 (1992 ed.))). 4 Mr. Curtis' statements to Ms. Baccile were offered, not as substantive evidence of their truth, but to impeach Mr. Curtis' credibility as a witness. See § 90.608(2), Fla....

...estimony. Pauldo's post-trial statement is not only a recantation of her identification of Smith as the shooter in a photo array and at a line-up, but it is also impeachment evidence as to the identification testimony of Lee Keith and Tommy Whitmer. § 90.608, Fla....

preclude admission of the statements at issue. See § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2005) (providing that “[a]ny party

attacked by showing that the witness is biased. § 90.608(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). A witness’ relationship

argues that the impeachment was proper under section 90.608(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1989), which allows

appropriately considered as impeaching evidence. Section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes, authorizes the impeachment

3d DCA), rev. denied, 424 So.2d 763 (Fla.1982); § 90.608(1H2), Fla.Stat. (1989). Moreover, the trial court

...Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). A party may attack a witness's credibility by "[s]howing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which the witness testified." § 90.608(4), Fla....

him to testify falsely against Mr. Childers. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2002) (“Any party ... may attack

Kimble v. State, 537 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); § 90.608(1)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987). Accordingly, the defendant’s

was being disrespectful. Pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2017), “[a]ny party, including

counsel have been permitted to do so pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1985), but refusal to allow

witness has been retained at § 90.608(1), Fla.Stat. (1985). The portions of § 90.608 relevant to this case state:

expressly for impeachment purposes pursuant to section 90.608(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987) (prior statements

through section 90.102, Florida Statutes (1987), section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1987), supersedes section

attacking the credibility of its own witness. See § 90.608(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1983). This court, in dicta

statement was admitted for impeachment purposes. See § 90.608(1), Fla.Stat. (1999); Ellis v. State, 622 So.2d

testified to by the witness being impeached.” Section 90.608(l)(e). No doubt the major difficulty appellant

under the facts of this case as impeachment. See § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2005). To the extent that the testimony

prosecutor and interrogated on direct examination, Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1979), *480because she

impeach him with prior inconsistent statements. See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat.; Morton v. State, 689 So. 2d 259

to impeach Lee through evidence of bias. See § 90.608(2). Specifically, Brown argues Lee’s husband,

...this discovery and that his relationship with Lytal Reiter is not discoverable because there is no evidence that the firm directly referred the plaintiff to Dr. Brown. A party may attack the credibility of a witness by exposing a potential bias. § 90.608(2), Fla....

Oil Co., 589 So.2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCÁ 1991). Section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (1995), allows impeachment

for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement. § 90.608(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); Henderson v. State,

inconsistent with Perry’s trial testimony. See § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (“Any party . . . may attack the

Impeachment statute Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, governs the impeachment

90.801, Fla. Stat. (2020) (defining hearsay); § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2020) (providing for impeachment

relevance." Thorne, 271 So. 3d at 184. Under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2019), a party can attack

that are inconsistent with her present testimony. § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). As we recognized in Williams

Mary Colon. Such evidence was admissible under section 90.608(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), as evidence

“impeachment” of the doctor’s direct testimony under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1999), is correct, it was

truthfulness of the witness’s testimony.” Id. And section 90.608, Florida Statutes, provides that “[a]ny party

his prior inconsistent statements pursuant to section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1989). While the appellant’s