Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...several pieces of property from Case’s place of business, including six aluminum rims. Case was charged with passing a forged or altered instrument, Fla. Stat. § 831.02, larceny of more than $300 but less than $2000, id. § 812.014, and as an accessory after the fact, id. § 777.03. Case was held at the Seminole County jail for approximately ten hours. Case posted bond at 3:30 p.m....

...allegedly having failed to report child abuse in violation of Florida Statute § 415.513, having made allegedly false reports to law enforcement authorities in violation of Florida Statute § 837.05, and allegedly being an accessory after the fact in violation of Florida Statute § 777.03....

...415.504, and where it is uncontested that Savaiko had no reason to doubt that those acts had been performed, Savaiko had no arguable probable cause to arrest Hogan pursuant to that statute. b) Accessory After the Fact Savaiko also arrested Hogan for violating Florida Statute § 777.03, which at the time of the arrest stated in relevant part, "Whoever ......

...arrest could have existed under this statute. She does not indicate who Hogan was allegedly helping, or what crime that person allegedly committed. Also, we cannot determine whether the underlying crime was a misdemeanor, which would fall outside the scope of the plain language of § 777.03. This record makes clear that there was no arguable probable cause to arrest Hogan on this charge. c) Making False Reports Finally, Savaiko charged Hogan pursuant to Florida Statute § 837.05, which states, "Whoever knowingly g...

...at 68]. 4 Savaiko claimed in her search warrant affidavits that the laws violated were Florida Statutes § 794.023, sexual battery by multiple perpetrators; § 794.011(2), sexual battery on a child under twelve years of age by an offender under 18 years of age; § 777.03, accessory after the fact; § 777.011, aiding and abetting commission of a crime; § 415.513, failing to report child abuse or neglect; § 827.05, negligent treatment of children. 5 There was some discussion at oral argument, and som...

...maintains or assists the principal or accessory before the fact, or gives the offender any other aid, knowing that he had committed a felony or been accessory thereto before the fact, with intent that he shall avoid or escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment.... § 777.03, Fla....

...Therefore, he contends, his conviction for conspiracy must be vacated. The crime of conspiracy is defined as an agreement, express or implied, between two or more people to commit an unlawful act. See Robinson v. State, 610 So.2d 1288 (Fla.1992); see generally § 777.03(3), Fla....

...Nor does this case concern whether the legislature intended separate punishments for a single act that technically is proscribed by more than one statute. See Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987). Our decision in this case rests solely on our construction of the crime of being an accessory after the fact. Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1985), defines an accessory after the fact as one who maintains or assists the principal or accessory before the fact, or gives the offender any other aid, knowing that he had committed a felony or been accessory the...

...g an intent to punish as an accessory after the fact only those persons who have had no part in causing the felony itself but have merely hindered the due course of justice. See Perkins, supra, at 765. In conclusion, we find the legislature intended section 777.03 to apply only to persons not principals in the underlying offense....

...ission of such offense. [2] Although failure to report a crime does not make one an accessory after the fact, any aid given to a known felon or misdemeanant with the intent to hinder his or her being apprehended, tried, or punished will qualify. See § 777.03, Fla....

...For the foregoing reasons, I dissent as to the sentence. NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] Jon was later found not guilty in a separate trial. [3] As a family member, Jon could not be guilty as an accessory after the fact. § 777.03, Fla....

...Appellant argues that because appellant was neither the natural father nor stepfather of the victim at the time of the alleged offense, no familial or custodial relationship existed between him and the victim as charged in the information. He relies primarily upon the following language in Section 777.03, Florida Statutes: "Whoever, not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity to the offender, maintains or assists the principal or accessory before the fact, ..., shall be deemed an accessory after the fact, ......

...." He continues that had he been charged as an accessory after the fact to a crime committed by the victim, he could not have established any defense to such a violation as he did not fall within any of the classes of relationships listed in the statute. He argues that the language of section 777.03 is therefore relevant in determining appellant's relationship to the victim, or lack thereof, in a prosecution under section 794.011(4)(e). We decline to construe the two statutes in pari materia along the lines appellant urges us to adopt. We consider that it was the legislature's intent, in drafting the above language in section 777.03, to limit the defense to a very narrow class of persons....

...Obviously, if the legislature had intended to restrict the provisions of section 794.011(4)(e) to persons related to the victim by consanguinity (blood relationship), or affinity (marital relationship), it could have employed the same language used in section 777.03, but it did not....

...This case graphically demonstrates the desirability and the necessity in this type of situation for the State Attorney to charge the defendant not only as a principal under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979), but, in the alternative, as an accessory after the fact pursuant to Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Although the flight from the police is strong evidence that appellant might have been an accessory after the fact, it does not show the specific intent to aid and abet. And as the brother of the principal, appellant is excluded by law from prosecution as an accessory after the fact. § 777.03, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...e. The law anticipates and recognizes that close relatives will aid one another in a time of strife and need, even if illegal. For example, a brother is immune from prosecution as an accessory after the fact to a felony committed by his brother. See section 777.03, Florida *245 Statutes....

...The initial question is whether the state presented sufficient evidence at trial to sustain the conviction of Mary Spioch for conspiracy to commit premeditated murder. The crime of conspiracy consists of an express or implied agreement between two or more persons to commit any criminal offense. § 777.03(3), Fla....

...The final point upon which we comment involves Jackson's claim that the trial court's unwillingness to grant his request for an instruction that the state's witness, Paulette Sewell, was an accomplice, and hence an accessory after the fact within the meaning of section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), was erroneous....

...ge of Jackson's involvement. She housed him that night, at Jackson's behest she placed a telephone call to his then dead associate, *1096 and she lied to the police — acts indicating a purpose to assist Jackson in avoiding detection in violation of section 777.03. See Gawronski v. State, 444 So.2d 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Nevertheless, the mere fact that Sewell was potentially liable for violating section 777.03 is of no consequence in assessing whether Jackson was improperly denied the instruction....

...arge. Appellant was not an aider or abettor and was, therefore, not a principal in the first degree. The State appears to concede that point, but argues that in any event he was an accessory after the fact, and therefore violated a law (specifically section 777.03, Florida Statutes), thereby violating Condition 5 of his probation....

...Bowen as an accessory after the fact to three separate criminal episodes involving the four deaths. It is helpful to consider some of the basic requirements and limitations of this criminal offense before examining the evidence in detail to determine whether the State proved its case against Ms. Bowen. Section 777.03(1), Florida Statutes (1997), defines the crime of accessory after the fact as follows: Any person not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, by consanguinity or affin...

...pes detection, arrest, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact. The degree of the crime of accessory after the fact is linked to the degree of the underlying crime of the principal, generally being one degree below the principal's crime. § 777.03(2), Fla....

...Severin, 250 Neb. 841, 553 N.W.2d 452 (1996) (holding that defendant had sufficient knowledge of crime when police officer explained that principal was wanted for specific felony and principal admitted to defendant that she knew she was wanted by police). Because section 777.03(2) links the degree of Ms....

...Bowen's crime to the severity of the crime committed by Carr, the State must prove that Ms. Bowen knew of the specific crime alleged. This was not always the case. Prior to 1995, accessory after the fact was a third-degree felony, regardless of the severity of the underlying crime. § 777.03, Fla....

...pport a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a manslaughter occurred, or that Ms. Bowen knew a manslaughter had occurred. [10] It should be noted that Ms. Bowen was charged with being an accessory after the fact to escape based upon sections 777.03 and 944.40, Florida Statutes (1997), not based upon section 843.12, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...This case graphically demonstrates the desirability and the necessity in this type of situation for the State Attorney to charge the defendant not only as a principal under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979) but, in the alternative, as an accessory after the fact pursuant to Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Steven L. Bolotin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SCHWARTZ, JJ. *611 SCHWARTZ, Judge. Ruiz appeals from his conviction on a charge of being an accessory after the fact to murder, in violation of Section 777.03, Florida Statutes, (1977)....

...r gives the offender any other aid, knowing that he had committed a felony or been accessory thereto before the fact, with intent that he shall avoid or escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment, shall be deemed an *612 accessory after the fact. § 777.03, Fla....

...an accessory after the fact. A person is an accessory after the fact where he maintains, assists or gives an offender any aid, knowing that he committed a felony with the intent that he shall avoid or escape detection, arrest, trial, or punishment. Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1977) [1] and Bush v....

...Since Schramm's statements were not made during an official proceeding, his conviction for violation of Section 837.02, Florida Statutes (1977) is reversed. We also considered Schramm's remaining point on appeal and conclude that no reversible error has been made to appear. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. NOTES [1] "777.03 Accessory after the fact....

...The defendant first consulted with an attorney, Sid Fleischman, for advice on what she could legally do to help her husband. Fleischman advised the defendant that, as the escapee's wife, she would be exempt from criminal liability under the family member exception of section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1997), the "accessory after the fact" statute....

...UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. NOTES [1] While not stated, we assume this part of the order to mean "appeal" from the determination of the presumptive release date. [2] The murder was apparently committed by sharp blows to the victim's head, thereby shattering his skull. [3] Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1979) says: Whoever, not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity to the offender, maintains or assists the principal or...

...The four-count second amended information charged that between June 22, 1989, and December 1, 1989, Feagle committed perjury by inconsistent statements (Count I), in violation of section 837.021(1), Florida Statutes (1989), and served as accessory after the fact (Counts II through IV), in violation of section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...empted accessory after the fact. A person is an accessory after the fact where he maintains, assists or gives an offender any aid, knowing that he committed a felony "with intent that he shall avoid or escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment." Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...s, was incompetent. Chapman v. State, 389 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). However, we do not think double jeopardy is involved in this context. An accessory after the fact contains a completely different bundle of elements than the crime of robbery. Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1983), provides: Whoever, not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity to the offender, *89 maintains or assists the pri...

...To prove the offense of accessory after the fact against Gawronski, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he maintained, assisted, or gave Twelves aid, knowing that Twelves had committed the attempted robbery, with the intent that Twelves avoid or escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment. § 777.03, Fla....

...There are numerous common examples of this: the use of a weapon or firearm (§ 790.07(1) and (2), Fla. Stat. (1983)); the carrying of a concealed weapon (§ 790.01, Fla. Stat. (1983)), the commission of a burglary (§ 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1983), and the use of accessories after the fact (§ 777.03, Fla....

...b), Florida Statutes (1997); one misdemeanor count of conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence, in violation of section 918.13(1)(b) and section 777.04, Florida Statutes (1997); and one misdemeanor count of accessory after the fact, in violation of section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1997), all charges relating to an election in the City of Miami....

...he felon). See generally, Potts v. State, 430 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1982); Blackburn v. State, 314 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In 1957, the Florida Legislature eliminated such distinctions (except for accessory after the fact, which still exists, see § 777.03, Fla. Stat....

...and/or voter fraud, in violation of s. 104.041, Fla. Stat., or been accessory thereto before the fact, with intent that said EVELYN HERBELLO and/or said RODOLFO HERBELLO and/or JOSE JOAQUIN DEGOTI, SR., shall avoid or escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment, in violation of s. 777.03, Fla....

...SCHWARTZ, C.J., and LEVY, J., concur. COPE, J. (dissenting). An accessory after the fact is one "who knows that a crime has been committed and who helps the offender try to escape arrest or punishment." Black's Law Dictionary 14 (7th ed.1999) [1] ; see § 777.03, Fla....

...Under Florida law, the State must prove that a specific person committed a felony; that the defendant knew that the offender had committed the felony; and that the defendant assisted the offender with intent that the offender escape punishment. See § 777.03, Fla. Stat. (1997). These requirements are spelled out in the Standard Jury Instruction, which reads as follows: ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT F.S. 777.03 Before you can find the defendant guilty of being an accessory after the fact, the State must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1....

...property, Section 812.031, Florida Statutes (1975), since there was no showing this Appellant knew of any robbery or otherwise participated except in "making the get-away with the fruits." This is also a possible accessory-after-the-fact situation. Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1975)....

WEBSTER, J. In this direct criminal appeal, appellant seeks review of his conviction, following a jury trial, for accessory after the fact to second-degree murder with a firearm, in violation of section 777.03(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...at issue. We address the issue regarding the information because it is one of first impression. We also certify to our supreme court a question which we believe to be of great public importance. *760 In language that essentially tracks that found in section 777.03(1), Florida Statutes (2005), the information charged appellant as follows: ERIC ANTHONY BAKER, JR., on or about April 16, 2006, and April 17, 2006, in the County of BAY and State of Florida, did unlawfully maintain or assist Daryl Cort...

...the intent that Daryl Cortez Black should avoid or escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment and the defendant was not in relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, to the offender in violation of Section 777.03, Florida Statutes....

...ntally defective because it failed to allege a criminal offense and failed adequately to allege the charge against him, resulting in a deprivation of his right to due process of law. His argument is that, although the information essentially tracked section 777.03(1), it was fundamentally flawed because it failed also either to allege the elements of the offense allegedly committed by the principal (second-degree murder with a firearm) or to make reference to the statute that proscribes that offense (i.e., section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes)....

...4th DCA 2000) (quoting from DuBoise ). Here, the information did not “wholly omit[] to allege one or more of the elements of the crime” of accessory after the fact. On the contrary, it alleged all of the elements of that offense, essentially tracking the language of section 777.03(1)....

...e following question, which we believe to be of great public importance: WHEN CHARGING THE OFFENSE OF ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT, DOES FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OCCUR IF, ALTHOUGH THE INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION ALLEGES THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE AS SET OUT IN SECTION 777.03 AND IDENTIFIES THE OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE PRINCIPAL OR ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT, IT FAILS ALSO EITHER TO ALLEGE THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE PRINCIPAL OR ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT, OR TO CITE THE STATUTE THAT PROSCRIBES THAT OFFENSE? Affirmed....

..."Although Florida has abolished the common law distinctions between principals, aiders and abettors, and accessories before the fact, accessory after the fact remains a separate offense." Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1988) (footnote omitted). See § 777.03, Fla....

...First, we note that a charge that a defendant is an accessory after the fact requires an allegation that the defendant rendered some form of assistance to an offender with the intent "that the offender avoids or escapes detection, arrest, trial[,] or punishment." § 777.03, Fla....

...The jury asked, “How do we answer element one Accessory After the Fact when Corey Graham Jr., has not been found guilty thru trial?” Element one of this count required the jury to find that “a first degree murder and robbery were committed by Corey Graham, Jr.” (emphasis supplied). See § 777.03, Fla....

...ON OF SUCH MEDIA COVERAGE?" GODERICH, J., concurs. NOTES [1] The charges are (1) fabricating physical evidence in violation of section 918.13, Florida Statutes; (2) conspiracy to do same; and (3) acting as an accessory after the fact in violation of section 777.03, Florida Statutes....

...m his convictions and sentences for all three offenses. AFFIRMED. HARRIS, J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents, with opinion. COWART, Judge, dissenting. The defendant (appellant) entered a plea of guilty to accessory after the fact to armed robbery. (§§ 777.03, Fla....

...eopardy protection right involved, affirmatively and intentionally waived and relinquished that known right by consenting to the trial court granting the State's motion to vacate and set aside the defendant's plea to the accessory offense. NOTES [1] § 777.03 and § 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla....

...nse. Id. at 626 . The court noted that convictions for both offenses do not violate double jeopardy principals and that its decision was based only on its construction of the statute defining the crime of accessory after the fact. Id. at 625 (citing § 777.03, Fla....

...Simple assault is not a felony. S.W.'s conduct was not felonious unless he was guilty of aggravated assault. The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that C.J.P. helped S.W. leave the cul-de-sac, but not that he did so "knowing that [S.W.] had committed a felony." § 777.03, Fla.Stat....

...The single issue of merit in this appeal challenges the adjudication of the defendant as both a principal and an accessory after the fact in the commission of an attempted robbery. We hold that he may not be convicted and sentenced for both offenses. Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1985) provides: Whoever ......

...Bowen responded by telling Detective Keene that her boyfriend’s name was Joe Bennett. Subsequently, Bowen gave Detective Keene other names, including Boo, Earl Carr, and Hank, but she did not give the entire name Hank Earl Carr. The crime of accessory after the fact is defined by section 777.03(1), Florida Statutes (1997), as: Any person not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity to the offender, who maintains or assists the prin...

amended in 2008. 3.5(c) ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT § 777.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of being

...involving “Obstruction of Justice,” rather than under chapter 3, which contains -2- instructions for “Final Charge to Jury,” because accessory after the fact is a specific crime. Additionally, an italicized note referencing section 777.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2018), is relocated to the comment section, resulting in a new paragraph....

...2d DCA 2001) to conclude that the State must specify the felony that the defendant knew about and concealed. This instruction was adopted in 2018. - 18 -  3.5(c)21.18 ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT § 777.03(1) Fla....

...ild abuse, neglect of a child, aggravated child abuse, aggravated manslaughter of a child under 18 years of age, or murder of a child under 18 years of age, it is a defense if the court finds that the defendant was a victim of domestic violence. See § 777.03(1)(b), Fla....

...2nd DCA 2001). If the felony alleged is child abuse, neglect of a child, aggravated child abuse, aggravated manslaughter of a child under 18 years of age, or murder of a child under 18 years of age, the court may need to determine whether the defendant is a victim of domestic violence. See § 777.03(1)(b), Fla....

...unsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal. His claim rests on the contention that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to argue that he was, at best, an accessory after the fact to the robbery underlying his felony murder conviction. See § 777.03, Fla....

HURLEY, Judge. This appeal concerns the constitutionality of section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), a law which permits certain family members to aid a related fugitive without fear of criminal prosecution. The trial court invalidated the statute, finding it void for vagueness 1 and violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 2 We reverse. Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), states in pertinent part: Whoever, not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity to the offender, maintains or ass...

...State, 345 So.2d 724, 725 (Fla.1977). Second, “[w]ords used by the legislature are to be construed in their ‘plain and ordinary sense.’ ” Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853, 860 (Fla.1977) (quoting Pedersen v. Green, 105 So.2d 1 (Fla.1958)). Applying these principles to section 777.03, we hold that “consanguinity” and “affinity” are synonymous with “blood” and “marriage.” These everyday definitions preserve the underlying legislative purpose of safeguarding the family unit from conflicting loyalties...

...and sisters and step-children. In other words, the phrase “by consanguinity or affinity” is merely a substitute for a cumbersome listing of “in-laws” and “step-relatives” who are entitled to the statute’s protection. Thus, we hold that section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), is not void for vagueness; its list of protected relatives is sufficiently definite so that people of common understanding and intelligence need not guess at its meaning....

...e a more precise line could be drawn to effectuate the act’s underlying policy. Hamilton v. State, 366 So.2d 8 (Fla.1978). Rather, the court must limit its inquiry to whether there is a rational basis for the statutory classification. In our view, section 777.03 fully satisfies this test....

...The statute represents a legislatively determined balance between two competing societal interests. The first is society’s interest in apprehending suspected offenders. The second is society’s interest in safeguarding the family unit from unnecessary fractional pressures. Section 777.03 achieves a balance between these two goals by restricting its application to a select group of family members and by conferring immunity so that these individuals need never choose between love of family and obedience to the law....

...Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 , 94 S.Ct. 1536,1540 , 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974), or that the line drawn includes some who do not merit inclusion. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2568 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). Put another way, section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), is not defectively underinclusive because some relatives who might be motivated to aid an offender because of family ties are not exempted from prosecution. Conversely, the statute is not fatally overinclusive because some immunized family members might render assistance to an offender for reasons other than familial affection. In the final analysis, it must be remembered that section 777.03 does not involve a fundamental familial right. Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 , 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1936 , 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977). If the Legislature had chosen not to enact section 777.03, no one could maintain that there is a constitutionally protected right to hide or give other assistance to a fugitive simply because of a blood or marital relationship. This is the crux of today’s decision. Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), immunizes criminal conduct....

...November 3, 1982. *63 Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Trela J. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant. Robert C. Furr of Robert C. Furr, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellee. HURLEY, Judge. This appeal concerns the constitutionality of section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), a law which permits certain family members to aid a related fugitive without fear of criminal prosecution. The trial court invalidated the statute, finding it void for vagueness [1] and violative of the Equal Protection Clause. [2] We reverse. Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), states in pertinent part: Whoever, not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity to the offender, maintains or ass...

...State, 345 So.2d 724, 725 (Fla. 1977). Second, "[w]ords used by the legislature are to be construed in their `plain and ordinary sense.'" Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853, 860 (Fla. 1977) (quoting Pedersen v. Green, 105 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1958)). Applying these principles to section 777.03, we hold that "consanguinity" and "affinity" are synonymous with "blood" and "marriage." These everyday definitions preserve the underlying legislative purpose of safeguarding the family unit from conflicting loyalties and, at the same time, obviate the "absurdities" envisioned by the trial court....

...step-brothers and sisters and step-children. In other words, the phrase "by consanguinity or affinity" is merely a substitute for a cumbersome listing of "in-laws" and "step-relatives" who are entitled to the statute's protection. Thus, we hold that section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), is not void for vagueness; its list of protected relatives is sufficiently definite so that people of common understanding and intelligence need not guess at its meaning....

...se a more precise line could be drawn to effectuate the act's underlying policy. Hamilton v. State, 366 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1978). Rather, the court must limit its inquiry to whether there is a rational basis for the statutory classification. In our view, section 777.03 fully satisfies this test....

...The statute represents a legislatively determined balance between two competing societal interests. The first is society's interest in apprehending suspected offenders. The second is society's interest in safeguarding the family unit from unnecessary fractional pressures. Section 777.03 achieves a balance between these two goals by restricting its application to a select group of family members and by conferring immunity so that these individuals need never choose between love of family and obedience to the law....

...Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974), or that the line drawn includes some who do not merit inclusion. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2568, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). Put another way, section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), is not defectively underinclusive because some relatives who might be motivated to aid an offender because of family ties are not exempted from prosecution. Conversely, the statute is not fatally overinclusive because some immunized family members might render assistance to an offender for reasons other than familial affection. In the final analysis, it must be remembered that section 777.03 does not involve a fundamental familial right. Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1936, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977). If the Legislature had chosen not to enact section 777.03, no one could maintain that there is a constitutionally protected right to hide or give other assistance to a fugitive simply because of a blood or marital relationship. This is the crux of today's decision. Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), immunizes criminal conduct....

...or efficacy. No principle is more firmly embedded in our constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and balances." Moore v. State, 343 So.2d 601, 603-04 (Fla. 1977). To summarize, we reverse the order of dismissal because we find that section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1981), is neither unintelligibly vague in violation of the Due Process Clause, nor irrationally conceived in violation of the Equal Protection Clause....

escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment.” Section 777.03 Florida Statutes (1979). Although the evidence

REMANDED. DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. . See § 777.03, Fla.Stat. (1991).

...316.193; (11) An addition in instruction 3.04(c) ENTRAPMENT, deleting the last paragraph of the instruction and substituting the following: “On the issue of entrapment, the State must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped”; (12) A new instruction on ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT, F.S. 777.03; (13) A new definition of the words “obtains or uses” as set forth in section 812.012, F.S....

...Even if the state had presented evidence that the defendant had helped to clean up the car, such evidence, at best, would have shown the defendant would have been liable as an accessory after the fact, which is different from principal liability. See § 777.03(1)(c), Fla....

...This case graphically demonstrates the desirability and the necessity in this type of situation for the State Attorney to charge the defendant not only as a principal under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979) but, in the alternative, as an accessory after the fact pursuant to Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...If appellant’s version of the facts surrounding the robbery is true, he is not guilty of the robbery, but only of acting as an accessory after the fact to the robbery. That offense is a third-degree felony and carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison. § 776.03, Fla.Stat. (1973) (current version at § 777.03, Fla.Stat....

...Criminal gang members who actually conspire to commit a criminal offense may be prosecuted for conspiracy. § 777.04(3). Persons *360 who assist or aid a criminal gang member (or anyone else) in committing a crime are subject to prosecution as accessories after the fact. § 777.03(1)....

BLUE, Judge. F.M. appeals from an adjudication of delinquency for accessory after the fact. Section 777.03, Fla.Stat....

which defendant was charged and convicted is section 777.03(1), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides

...Immediately prior to trial, the ap-pellee, State of Florida, filed an amended information which added a second count charging appellant with being an accessory after the fact. Pertinent parts of count II of the amended information alleged that the appellant, in violation of section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1983), gave or offered aid to Richard Campos knowing that he had committed a felony, to wit: murder in the second degree, with the intent that Campos *451 avoid or escape detention, arrest, trial, or punishment....

...ory after the fact. After the trial court imposed judgment and sentence, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant contends that the state failed to establish one of the material elements of the crime of accessory after the fact under section 777.03....

...the intent that he escape arrest or' punishment for the crime that he has committed. Ruiz v. State, 388 So.2d 610 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Appellant claims that the state did not establish the second of these elements. Because of the peculiar wording of section 777.03, the lack of familial relationship between the principal and the party charged as an accessory after the fact is a material element of the crime....

...At a minimum, the State presented sufficient evidence to prove Turner was an accessory after the fact to the crime of armed robbery when he hid the firearm in the cushion of his seat and received a “cut” of the $2300 taken at gunpoint from Atilus. 9 See § 777.03, Fla....

...Elder contends he was improperly sentenced on counts II through IV in case no. 91-1886 and on counts IV and V in case no. 91-2846 because the offenses of attempted robbery, sections 777.04(4)(b), 812.13(1), (2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991), and accessory after the fact, section 777.03, are second and third degree felonies with maximum penalties of fifteen and five years, section 775.082(3)(e), (d), respectively....

...First, we note that a charge that a defendant is an accessory after the fact requires an allegation that the defendant rendered some form of assistance to an offender with the intent “that the offender avoids or escapes detection, arrest, trial[,] or punishment.” § 777.03, Fla....

...He was convicted of burglary (Section 810.02, Florida Statutes) and grand theft (Section 812.-014, Florida Statutes) of NAPA Auto Parts Store based on his involvement as an aider and abettor. He also pled nolo contendere to the charge of accessory to shooting into an occupied dwelling (Section 790.19, Florida Statutes, Section 777.03, Florida Statutes)....

...t fairly and reasonably infer therefrom.” Id. Wilson argues that the state presented no evidence to support his conviction as an accessory after the fact. The state responds that Wilson’s knowledge of the robbery could be inferred from the facts.Section 777.03(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), provides: Any person ......

...In addition, the state had to show that the defendant intended to aid the principal (Valentine) to “avoid or escape detention, arrest, trial or punishment,” which is “an essential element which must be proved before there can be a conviction under Section 777.03.” Helms v....

...We conclude that Ruiz—a case involving an application of the corpus delicti rule after trial and a jury’s guilty verdict—was not controlling on the pretrial record presented here, and we reverse the order below. Mr. Edwards was charged with being an accessory after the fact, pursuant to section 777.03(c), Florida Statutes (2012), as the getaway driver for co-defendant Leon Sheldon following the co-defendant’s commission of a strong arm robbery. Mr....

The defendant was charged with violation of Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1975), which provides: Whoever

...Rule 3.191(a)(2), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We reverse. Appellee was arrested on July 21, 1978 for first-degree murder and was charged by indictment filed August 28,1978 with being an accessory after the fact to a felony, in violation of Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1977)....

“knowing that [S.W.] had committed a felony.” § 777.03, Fla.Stat. (1993). Insofar as pertinent here,

fact to second degree murder in violation of section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1993).1 He entered a plea