Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...at trial. This argument was again raised in a subsequent motion for new trial and denied. Generally, evidence of other crimes or acts may be admitted if relevant to prove a material fact in issue. See Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla. 1988). Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,...

...propensity to commit crimes, rather than on proof that he committed the charged offense. Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122, 124 (Fla. 1987). In affirming the trial court in this case, the Third District found the "evidence admissible as relevant under Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)." Robertson, 780 So.2d at 110. Section 90.404(2)(a) is the codification of the Williams rule and provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. Section 90.404(2)(b)1 also requires that the State file a notice of intent to rely on evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct: When the state in a criminal action intends to offer evidence of other criminal offenses under paragraph (a), no fewer t...

...nce properly may be admitted as Williams rule evidence is a highly individualized, factually intensive inquiry. Moreover, even if the evidence is admitted pursuant to the Williams rule, a cautionary instruction is required when requested pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b)(2) so that the jury is specifically apprised of the limited purpose for which the jury is to consider the evidence: When the evidence is admitted, the court shall, if requested, charge the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence is received and is to be considered....

...After the close of the evidence, the jury shall be instructed on the limited purpose for which the evidence was received and that the defendant cannot be convicted for a charge not included in the indictment or information. Because the State never filed a notice of intent pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b) and because the State never indicated it intended to introduce this evidence as Williams rule evidence, the admissibility of the evidence in question was never litigated within the parameters of section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Thus, the Third District reasoned, and the State now contends, that the evidence of the prior threat was admissible to prove "absence of mistake or accident," which is one of the permissible purposes for the admission of "similar fact evidence" under the Williams rule, as codified in section 90.404(2)(a)....

...-47, we deem it necessary to also explain why the evidence was impermissible impeachment under the facts of this case. We begin with the interplay between Williams rule evidence and the rule regarding the impeachment of witnesses. As we have stated, section 90.404(2)(a) codifies Williams, and excludes prior crime evidence that is not relevant, and thus offered only to prove propensity or bad character. However, section 90.404(1), provides: CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY.—Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion, except: (a) Character of accused.—Evidence of a pert...

...by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait. (b) Character of victim— . . . . (c) Character of witness.—Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in ss. 90.608-90.610. (Emphasis supplied.) The only section referred to within section 90.404(1)(c) that is pertinent in this case is section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides: Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: . . . . (5) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. Thus, even if the prior crime evidence is not relevant under section 90.404(2)(a), a testifying defendant may nonetheless open the door to the prior crime evidence by (1) offering a trait of the defendant's good character, see § 90.404(1)(a) (character of accused), or (2) inaccurately testifying to material facts, see § 90.404(1)(c) (character of witness), § 90.608(5) (contradiction on relevant facts)....

...Thus, even though Robertson offered himself as a witness, and consequently was "subject to impeachment just like any other witness," Jordan, 144 So. at 670, Robertson did not open the door to a rebuttal of any character trait through evidence of an alleged prior crime. See § 90.404(1)(a); Foy, 155 So....

...fired the shot that killed Nelson. See Geralds, 674 So.2d at 99. [10] Thus, Robertson did not open the door to evidence that he allegedly threatened his ex-wife six years before with an assault rifle by testifying inaccurately to material facts. See § 90.404(1)(c); § 90.608(5); Geralds, 674 So.2d at 99....

...laim that the defendant opened the door by answering the impermissible questions. It is critical for the courts to enforce this restriction on impeachment because the failure to do so would allow the State to circumvent the procedural requirement of section 90.404(2)(b)(1), which requires pretrial notice to the defendant when the State intends to introduce evidence of prior crimes....

...3d DCA 1982); State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla.1964). [4] See Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 194 n. 6 (Fla.1997); Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122, 124 (Fla.1987). [5] See Duffey v. State, 741 So.2d 1192, 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ("Under section 90.404(2)(a), the remoteness of a prior crime is one aspect of its relevance, its tendency to prove or disprove a material fact in issue."); see also Heuring, 513 So.2d at 123 (when faced with claim that prior crimes are too remote to be rele...

...he trial." We thus conclude that this evidence met the standard for admission set out in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), and continuously reaffirmed by this *532 Court. See also § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Smith's last contention concerning the testimony of Estes is that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence one of Estes' statements containing inadmissible evidence of Smith's drug use. We agree that the evidence of Smith's bad character should not have been presented to the jury. § 90.404, Fla....

...We agree with Smith and find error. A defendant's testimony that he or she knew about specific acts of violence committed by the victim is relevant to show, as asserted here, the reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension to support a self-defense claim. §§ 90.404(1)(b)(1), .405(2), Fla....

...[2] Pliego could not remember whether the encounter involved vaginal or oral intercourse. [3] Testimony from other witnesses established that Johnston was in Nugent's house sometime before January 15, 1997. [4] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959); § 90.404, Fla....

...that the trial court erred by admitting Williams rule evidence of the other five homicides committed prior to the charged crime. The separate counts for each homicide were severed for trial on Conde's own motion in July 1995. Thereafter, pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (1995), the State gave notice in the Dunn trial of its intent to rely upon "other act" evidence of the other five murders....

...vant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of ... intent, ... plan, ... identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...rom the G.M. investigation was matched to DNA evidence from the serial murder investigation, and search warrants for Conde's apartment were obtained. Conde objected to the proffered evidence, arguing that it was a collateral crime inadmissible under section 90.404(b), Florida Statutes, and lacking in the necessary relevancy to the context of the charged crime to justify admission as "inextricably intertwined." The trial court concluded that it would allow the evidence, but limited it, instructing: You will be able to introduce information about a call from the neighbors....

...Having answered the certified question, we turn to the merits of this cause. Frederick A.R. Heuring was convicted and sentenced for the sexual battery of his stepdaughter, Melody, when she was between the ages of seven and twelve, in violation of sections 794.011(2) and (4)(e), Florida Statutes (1977-1983). Pursuant to section 90.404(2) and (4)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), the state filed a notice of intent to offer similar fact evidence that Heuring sexually battered his daughter, Anita, when she was between the ages of seven and fifteen....

...at 245-46, 444 P.2d at 99-100, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 427-28 (footnotes omitted). In addition to the above requirements, the evidence must be relevant to a material fact in issue such as identity, intent, motive, opportunity, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident. See § 90.404(2)(a)....

...cing statute violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). [2] The " Williams rule" takes its name from Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), and is codified at section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...t presented information about a collateral crime, wrong, or act that was not relevant to a material issue of fact, contrary to Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), and codified in subsection 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...1332, 79 L.Ed.2d 726 (1984); State v. Statewright, 300 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1974); Bryant v. State, 235 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1970); Mackiewicz v. State, 114 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 965, 80 S.Ct. 883, 4 L.Ed.2d 879 (1960). The examples given in Williams and in subsection 90.404(2)(a) are not an exclusive list of the purposes for which such evidence can be found relevant....

...Likewise the "thoroughbred killer" statement may have suggested Jackson had killed in the past, but the boast neither proved that fact, nor was that fact relevant to the case sub judice. The testimony is precisely the kind forbidden by the Williams rule and section 90.404(2)....

...The potential prejudice it posed to this defendant's case, however, was substantial. The only relevance of this testimony was to establish the criminal propensity and character of Swafford. It therefore falls within the rule of exclusion contained in the final clause of section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and should never have been heard by the jury....

...583, 70 L.Ed.2d 486 (1981); Smith v. State, 365 So.2d 704, 706 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 177, 62 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979). Accordingly, I would reverse appellant's conviction and order a new trial. EHRLICH, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...to the commission of a separate crime. The test of admissibility is relevancy. The test of inadmissibility is a lack of relevancy. Id. at 659-60. More recently, in Hayes v. State, 660 So.2d 257 (Fla.1995), we observed that: The Evidence Code, under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), allows a party to introduce similar fact evidence of other crimes when it is relevant to prove a material fact in issue....

...In Williams, this Court held that "[i]f found to be relevant for any purpose save that of showing bad character or propensity," " relevant evidence will not be excluded merely because it relates to similar facts which point to the commission of a separate crime." 110 So.2d at 662, 659. The rule has since been codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), which provides that "[s]imilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, ......

...1708, 131 L.Ed.2d 568 (1995). In other words, in determining whether to rely on the circumstances of a collateral offense in finding an aggravating factor other than "prior conviction of a violent felony," [2] a trial court should look to the Williams [3] rule, as codified in section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1993), [4] for guidance....

...h the "prior violent felony" aggravator in accordance with this Court's decision in Rhodes v. State, 547 So.2d 1201, 1204-05 (Fla. 1989). [3] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [4] Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,...

...See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1550 20 While such information regarding prior bad acts generally is not admissible solely to prove propensity or bad character, conflict-free counsel could have used it to prove things such as motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, or identity. See Fla. Evid.Code § 90.404(2)....

...Evidence of collateral crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant is admissible if it is relevant to a material fact in issue; such evidence is not admissible where its sole relevance is to prove the character or propensity of the accused. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...question of the relevancy of this type of evidence should be cautiously scrutinized before it is determined to be admissible." 110 So.2d at 662. This rule concerning the admissibility of similar fact evidence has been codified by the Legislature as section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1995). Later, in Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744 (Fla.1988), we made it clear that the admissibility of other crimes evidence is not limited to crimes with similar facts. We stated that similar fact evidence may be admissible pursuant to section 90.404, and other crimes or bad acts that are not similar may be admissible under section 90.402. We reiterated the distinction between "similar fact" evidence and "dissimilar fact" evidence in Sexton v. State, 697 So.2d 833, 837 (Fla.1997). Thus, section 90.404 is a special limitation governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence. But if evidence of a defendant's collateral bad acts bears no logical resemblance to the crime for which the defendant is being tried, then section 90.404(2)(a) does not apply and the general rule in section 90.402 controls....

...Griffin points to six instances where the State introduced evidence that Griffin characterizes as Williams rule evidence. He claims that the State made this evidence a "feature" of the trial, and contends that the State failed to provide notice of its intent to rely on the evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes (1991)....

...(1991). "Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,...

...denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). If the State wishes to introduce Williams rule evidence in a criminal action, it must provide the defendant notice, at least ten days before trial, of the acts or offenses it intends to offer. § 90.404(2)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (1991). In the past, there has been some confusion over exactly what evidence falls within the Williams rule. The heading of section 90.404(2) is "OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS." Thus, practitioners have attempted to characterize all prior crimes or bad acts of an accused as Williams rule evidence. This characterization is erroneous. The Williams rule, on its face, is limited to " [s]imilar fact evidence. " § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...er, burglary, and two counts of grand theft. He received a thirty-year sentence and testified against Griffin. [2] Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to admit testimony relating to the robbery of Mr. Pasco in his home pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Second, the State contended that the convictions were necessary to establish motive. The trial court denied Anderson's motion. During the guilt phase of the trial, State witness Lisa White, Anderson's probation officer, testified that Anderson was on probation for *398 eleven counts of attempted sexual battery on Keinya. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,...

...State, 528 So.2d 353 (Fla.1988), to support his position. In Garron, a first-degree murder defendant challenged testimony concerning previous sexual misconduct: The next issue raised by appellant involves the admission of certain "similar fact" evidence pursuant to the Florida Evidence Code, section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1981), and Williams v....

...The insanity defense is a policy question that has plagued courts, legislatures, and governments for decades. It is unnecessary to similarly plague injuries. The next issue raised by appellant involves the admission of certain "similar fact" evidence pursuant to the Florida Evidence Code, section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1981), and Williams v....

...ling his wife and stepdaughter in that he was attempting to prevent his wife from taking the stepdaughters away to avoid his improper advances. Any analysis of the admissibility of similar fact evidence must necessarily begin with a close reading of section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence *358 is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a) (emphasis added)....

...committed reversible error during the cross-examination of Gore and during closing argument. II. QUESTIONING ON COLLATERAL CRIMES A. Child Abuse Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to introduce Williams [3] -rule evidence, pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1995), concerning Gore's similar crimes against Corolis and Roark....

...Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Robert J. Krauss, Bureau Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals and John M. Klawikofsky, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent. PARIENTE, J. In this case we address a certified question of great public importance: Does section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), violate due process when applied in a case in which identity is not an issue? McLean v. State, 854 So.2d 796, 803-04 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer this question in the negative and hold that section 90.404(2)(b) comports with the requirements of due process of law when used as a conduit for evidence that corroborates the victim's testimony that the crime occurred rather than to prove the identity of the alleged perpetrator....

...In so holding, we conclude that due process is satisfied by weighing the probative value of the evidence of prior acts of child molestation against its potential for unfair prejudice, which is compelled by section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2005). Application of section 90.403 in determining admissibility ensures that section 90.404(2)(b) does not open the door to introduction of any and all propensity evidence in sexual molestation cases. Where necessary to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial, the trial court should either exclude the evidence or substantially limit its presentation so that it does not become a feature of trial. Further, under section 90.404(2)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (2005), when such evidence is admitted, the trial court shall, if requested, give an appropriate cautionary instruction and shall repeat the instruction in its final charge to the jury....

...To corroborate J.N.'s testimony, the State sought to introduce evidence of McLean's prior sexual molestation of another boy, whose last name was Chambers. The State relied on Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), and its progeny, as well as recently enacted section 90.404(2)(b)....

...McLean again until he testified at this trial, did not know the victim in this case, and had never met the victim's family prior to this trial. McLean, 854 So.2d at 798-99. Addressing the State's assertion that Chambers' testimony was admissible under section 90.404(2)(b), the trial court concluded that in enacting this new statute the Legislature was attempting to overrule or modify Saffor v. State, 660 So.2d 668 (Fla.1995), and Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.1987). The trial court also concluded that the Legislature intended section 90.403 to apply to evidence admissible under section 90.404(2)(b), requiring an evaluation of whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. The trial court ruled that section 90.404(2)(b) governed the admissibility of Chambers' testimony and rejected McLean's argument that the statute violated his due process rights....

...The trial court denied a motion for new trial and entered judgment on only the conviction of lewd molestation. [2] McLean was sentenced to thirty years' *1254 imprisonment and designated a sexual predator. On appeal to the Second District, McLean challenged the constitutionality of section 90.404(2)(b)....

...McLean also argued that even if the statute is constitutional, the trial court erred in admitting the collateral crime evidence in this case. See McLean, 854 So.2d at 800. The Second District rejected each of these arguments and affirmed McLean's conviction and sentence. See id. at 802-03. However, because this Court adopted section 90.404(2)(b) "in a divided opinion that did not address constitutional issues," [3] and because of the provision's implications "in many serious felony trials throughout the state," the Second District certified the question as a matter of great public importance. Id. at 803. ANALYSIS Section 90.404(2)(b) provides that in a case in which a "defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." The Second District held that section 90.404(2)(b) does not violate due process when applied in a case in which identity is not an issue because the new statute does not simply open the courthouse to all propensity evidence....

...The testimony is introduced with a cautionary instruction to the jury, which is repeated in the final charge. The case law still requires that such testimony not become a central feature of the trial. McLean, 854 So.2d at 802. The Fourth District Court of Appeal adopted the Second District's reasoning in McLean and held section 90.404(2)(b) constitutional. See Ortiz v. State, 869 So.2d 1278, 1279 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), notice invoking discretionary jurisdiction filed, No. SC04-751 (Fla. Apr. 26, 2004). The constitutionality of section 90.404(2)(b) is a question of law reviewed by this Court de novo....

...ns for child molestation specifically. We examine the statute and review the federal case law that upholds the constitutionality of similar federal rules of evidence. We then explain why we answer the certified question in the negative and hold that section 90.404(2)(b) comports with due process when applied in a case where identity is not an issue....

...unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2005); see also Williams, 621 So.2d at 415 ("[E]vidence of other crimes that is relevant and therefore not barred by section 90.404(2)(a), may be excluded under section 90.403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice.")....

...nt.") (quoting Randolph v. State, 463 So.2d 186, 189 (Fla.1984)). Finally, at the time the evidence is admitted the trial court shall, if requested, "charge the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence is received and is to be considered." § 90.404(2)(c)(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); see also Robertson, 829 So.2d at 908. This cautionary instruction shall be repeated to the jury at the close of evidence. See § 90.404(2)(c)(2)....

...However, in both familial and nonfamilial cases, the required showing of similarity must be made on a case-by-case basis, and the collateral act evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. B. Section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes The provision now codified at section 90.404(2)(b) was enacted by the Legislature in 2001....

...be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. 2. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "child molestation" means conduct proscribed by s. 794.011 or s. 800.04 when committed against a person 16 years of age or younger. § 90.404(2)(b). The Second District concluded that there is "no question" that in enacting section 90.404(2)(b) "the legislature was attempting to alter or overrule the application of existing case law and to simplify the rules of admissibility in child molestation cases." McLean, 854 So.2d at 801....

..."[L]egislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis. In determining the Legislature's intent, we look first at the *1259 statute's plain language." Reynolds v. State, 842 So.2d 46, 49 (Fla.2002) (citations omitted). Section 90.404(2)(b) broadly provides that evidence of the defendant's commission of other acts of child molestation is admissible regardless of whether the charged and collateral offenses occurred in the familial context or whether they share any similarity. To this extent, section 90.404(2)(b) abrogates our decisions in Heuring, Rawls, and Saffor....

...ive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." § 90.403. As the State conceded at oral argument, evidence that is admissible under section 90.404(2)(b) remains subject to weighing under section 90.403....

...Rule 413 applies to criminal trials for sexual assault, rule 414 applies to criminal trials for child molestation, and rule 415 applies to civil trials in which a claim is predicated on the alleged commission of a sexual assault. Rule 414 is very similar to section 90.404(2)(b) and provides in pertinent part: In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child *1260 molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant....

...Sumner, 204 F.3d 1182, 1187 (8th Cir.2000) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior act evidence under rule 414 where "the prior acts were relatively recent in time and were substantially similar to the charged assaults"). D. Due Process and Section 90.404(2)(b) Collateral crime evidence violates a defendant's right to due process if it is so prejudicial that it denies the defendant a fair trial....

...timony to become a feature of the trial. Finally, if requested, the trial court shall give an appropriate cautionary instruction both at the time the evidence is presented and in its final charge to the jury. E. This Case McLean asserts that even if section 90.404(2)(b) is constitutional, the trial court erred in admitting the prior acts of child molestation under section 90.403....

...We commend the trial court for carefully performing its important gatekeeping function and urge all trial courts to very carefully exercise their gatekeeping authority in order to guard the due process rights of defendants. CONCLUSION We answer the certified question in the negative and hold that section 90.404(2)(b) does not violate due process when applied in a case in which the identity of the defendant is not an issue and the provision is used to admit evidence to corroborate the alleged victim's testimony....

...The State has not challenged this ruling on appeal." McLean, 854 So.2d at 800 n. 4. [3] See In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 825 So.2d 339, 341-42 (Fla.2002) (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [4] This rule is codified at section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), which provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent,...

...that the sawed-off portion of the barrel and the stock were seized in appellant's home on the day of the bank robbery. Appellant raises six issues for our consideration. Appellant first argues that evidence of other crimes was introduced contrary to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1983), and Williams v....

...State, 188 So.2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), cert. discharged, 198 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1967); C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 803 (2d ed. 1984). The evidence here was direct testimony, the admissibility of which turned on its relevancy to some point at issue. Section 90.404(2) is entitled "Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts," as is Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) on which our rule is based....

...Goslin's child sex offender profile, he necessarily sexually abused his daughter. Establishing that a defendant has a certain character trait in order to show he acted in conformity with that trait on a certain occasion is forbidden by the rules of evidence. § 90.404(1), Fla....

...question of the relevancy of this type of evidence should be cautiously scrutinized before it is determined to be admissible." 110 So.2d at 662. This rule concerning the admissibility of similar fact evidence has been codified by the Legislature as section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1995). Later, in Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744 (Fla.1988), we made it clear that the admissibility of other crimes evidence is not limited to crimes with similar facts. We stated that similar fact evidence may be admissible pursuant to section 90.404, and other crimes or bad acts that are not similar may be admissible under section 90.402. We reiterated the distinction between "similar fact" evidence and "dissimilar fact" evidence in Sexton v. State, 697 So.2d 833, 837 (Fla.1997). Thus, section 90.404 is a special limitation governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence. But if evidence of a defendant's collateral bad acts bears no logical resemblance to the crime for which the defendant is being tried, then section 90.404(2)(a) does not apply and the general rule in section 90.402 controls....

...tole the victim's truck. Monlyn v. State, 705 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1997). [5] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). [6] Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). Evidence of other criminal acts is only admissible if it meets the requirements of section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1999), which codifies Williams....

...ror was harmless. The state's theory was that Pope killed Alice shortly after his release from jail because he blamed her for his incarceration resulting from the battery. Originally, the court ruled that the battery and arrest were admissible under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1993), [4] to prove motive and premeditation....

...They were both drunk at the time of the incident. Pope was incarcerated for the battery from Labor Day until less than a month before he killed Alice. The trial court did not admit evidence of his arrest, incarceration, or the reason he struck Alice. [4] Section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1993), states in relevant part: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.— (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. [5] Section 90.404(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (1993) (emphasis added), states: 2....

...Defense counsel objected to the admission of this testimony on the ground that it was too remote in time to be relevant, but the trial court ruled it admissible as it went toward lack of mistake, identity and motive. Correll argues that this testimony violated section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1985), which prohibits the introduction of similar fact evidence when it is used solely to prove bad character or propensity....

...State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). Williams proscribes the admission of evidence pertaining to bad character or propensity before the defendant places his character in issue before the jury. See also § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...See, e.g., Ray, 755 So.2d at 610; Zack, 753 So.2d at 25. Evidence of a defendant's bad acts is inadmissible if solely relevant to demonstrate the bad character of the accused or the propensity of the accused to engage in criminal conduct. See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 663 (Fla.1959); see also § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Therefore, collateral-crime evidence, such as bad acts not included in the charged offenses, is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, but is inadmissible when *292 the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...e firearm and the victim's vehicle to Wright and to map a geographical nexus of the murder. Multiple statements that Wright "certain[ly] doesn't have any problems shooting people" lean toward an impermissible propensity-toward-violence argument. See § 90.404(2)(a) (classifying as inadmissible evidence that is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity)....

...in time by as many as 15 days, are connected acts or transactions in an episodic sense. Additionally, it is likely that even if severed, evidence of one homicide would be relevant and admissible in a separate trial of the other homicide, pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes, on the issue(s) of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, or knowledge....

...State, 513 So.2d 213, 215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), dismissed, 520 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1988): While most cases generally involve the offer of similar fact evidence by the prosecution against a defendant in a criminal case, there is nothing in the language of [section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)] which precludes the use of evidence offered by a defendant in a criminal case, or by a party in a civil action....

...449, 39 N.W.2d 887 (1949); State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 388 A.2d 587 (1978). We agree with the Third District Court in Moreno that where evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its admission. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...o prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...[2] In his third claim, Coolen contends that the knife threat to Jamie Caughman constituted "collateral crimes" evidence that was being introduced to show his propensity to confront people with a knife. Thus, he argues, testimony relating to this incident was inadmissible under section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1993). [3] However, subsections 90.404(1) and 90.404(2) do not govern the admissibility of this evidence....

...Dugger, 555 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla.1990) ("The purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support of the points on appeal. Merely making reference to arguments below without further elucidation does not suffice to preserve issues, and these claims are deemed to have been waived."). [3] Section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes (1993), provides that character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove that a person acted in conformity with his or her character on a particular occasion. Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1993), provides that similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible when relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity....

...denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). Where the State wishes to introduce Williams rule evidence in a criminal action, it must provide the defendant notice, at least ten days prior to trial, of the offenses or acts it intends to offer. § 90.404(2)(b)1., Fla....

...State, 561 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1990), we answered the first part of this question in the affirmative, holding that a defendant may introduce similar fact evidence of other crimes or "reverse Williams rule evidence" for exculpatory purposes if relevant. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...We see no abuse of discretion in this ruling. Accordingly, we quash the opinion of the district court of appeal on this issue. We do not disturb the balance of the opinion under review. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Further, this Court has explained that reverse Williams -rule evidence "requires the same showing of relevance as evidence offered by the prosecution." Kimbrough v. State, 700 So.2d 634, 637 (Fla.1997); see also Ehrhardt, supra, § 404.9 at 180-81. That is, section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statites (1995), applies without regard to whether the evidence is offered by the State or a criminal defendant....

...Although Hayes was arrested for simple assault, the charge was later dropped. In this case, Hayes sought, by a motion in limine, to exclude this evidence. The trial judge denied the motion but subsequently recognized a continuing objection by Hayes to preserve the issue for appellate review. The Evidence Code, under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), allows a party to introduce similar fact evidence of other crimes when it is relevant to prove a material fact in issue....

...the murder occurred while the defendant was in police custody. In addressing the matter, this Court stated that where evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its admission. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

...Foster claims that admission of this evidence was error because the evidence's sole relevancy was to establish Foster's bad character or propensity to commit crimes. See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); § 90.404, Fla.Stat....

...GUILT PHASE Williams Rule Evidence In his first claim, Durousseau asserts that the trial court erred in admitting Williams rule evidence of two other murders. Prior to trial, the State filed a "Notice of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Evidence," pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1999), indicating that the State wished to introduce similar fact evidence at trial that Durousseau had also murdered Kilpatrick and McCallister....

...unusual facts to establish modus operandi sufficient for proving identity, (3) the danger of any unfair prejudice far outweighed any probative value, and (4) the collateral crime evidence became an impermissible feature of the trial. As codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), "[s]imilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." However, such evidence is "inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

...t to prove premeditation to refute defendant's defense that she acted in self-defense). Second, we hold that the collateral crime evidence did exhibit unique similarities that established a modus operandi sufficient for proving identity. Pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), evidence of other crimes, acts or wrongs is admissible to prove identity....

...Nor is there any indication that the conduct ceased to be a characteristic of Durousseau. Next, we conclude that the probative value of the collateral crime evidence substantially outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice. Relevant similar fact evidence that is admissible under section 90.404(2) is subject to the requirements of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...motive, intent, identity, or the absence of mistake or accident on the part of the defendant and you shall consider it only as it relates to those issues. Let's proceed. At the close of the evidence, a similar limiting instruction must be given. See § 90.404(2)(b)2, Fla.Stat....

...o avoid similar crime evidence becoming a feature of the trial." Additionally, the trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury as to the proper purpose of the evidence prior to its admission and at the close of the evidence as required under section 90.404(2)(c)2....

...t, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or general pattern of criminality so that the evidence of the prior offenses would have a relevant or a material bearing on some essential aspect of the offense being tried." Id. at 662. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Jackson's defense counsel interrupted the testimony to object to the line of questioning on relevancy grounds, and was overruled. [1] Jackson argues that the testimony had no valid probative value and only tended to show bad character or propensity, and therefore is inadmissible. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Likewise the "thoroughbred killer" statement may have suggested Jackson had killed in the past, but the boast neither proved that fact, nor was that fact relevant to the case sub judice. The testimony is precisely the kind forbidden by the Williams rule and section 90.404(2)....

...t things you used to do, Unc?" And he say, you know, "I used to be a killer. and I am a thoroughbred killer. I know how to kill somebody and do it right." And this was all the time. This was his main brag word. That he was a thoroughbred killer. [2] Section 90.404(2) reads: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS....

...Under the Williams rule, similar fact evidence is generally admissible, even though it reveals the commission of another crime, as long as the evidence is "relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Section 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...eld. McDONALD, J., concurs. NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.) cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); the Williams rule is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...State, 441 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), review denied, 451 So.2d 851 (Fla. 1984). We also do not agree with Wuornos' contention that the nature of the similar crimes evidence was so disturbing that its relevance was outweighed by the potential for prejudice. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...he merits of issue five pending our receipt of a new sentencing order. Ferrell's first issue asserts that the trial court violated Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), as codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1992), when it allowed into evidence testimony concerning the collateral crime....

...Ferrell's conviction for first-degree murder is affirmed, and a new sentencing order will be submitted to this Court within thirty days of the date of this opinion. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), reads: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge...

...At trial, over Peek's objection, the trial court held that evidence of Peek's admission and conviction of a subsequent rape was similar in circumstances to the charged crime and therefore that this collateral crime evidence was admissible pursuant to our decision in Williams v. State , [1] and the Florida Evidence Code, section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Accordingly, we vacate Peek's convictions and sentence and remand the cause for a new trial. It is so ordered. BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents. NOTES [1] 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] Section 90.404(2)(a) codifies Williams v....

...Kight contends that this collateral crime evidence was admitted merely to show bad character or propensity to commit crimes contrary to the principles set forth by this Court in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) and codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Likewise, the testimony of Ramon Arguello, an acquaintance of appellant, that appellant had once held a pistol to a Arguello's chest and had threatened to kill him should not be admitted. These statements concerning these crimes and acts are inadmissible pursuant to section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1989), because the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character....

...[8] In Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), we held that similar fact evidence, such as testimony concerning a collateral crime, is not admissible if it goes only to show a defendant's bad character or propensity. Id. at 662. Williams has been codified as section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), which is known as the Williams rule and provides: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opport...

...(1995); § 90.402, Fla. Stat. (1995). Here, the evidence was not relevant to whether or not Moore committed the murder, so it was error to admit it. Evidence which tends only to show bad character or propensity is not relevant and should not be admitted. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Under the Williams rule evidence of other crimes, wrongs and acts is admissible if it is relevant to and probative of a material issue even though the evidence may indicate the accused has committed other uncharged crimes or may otherwise reflect adversely upon the accused's character. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, (1983), codifies the ruling in Williams v....

...Relevant evidence is generally admissible unless precluded by a specific rule of exclusion. There are two categories under which evidence of uncharged crimes or bad acts will be admissible—similar fact evidence, otherwise known as Williams rule evidence, and dissimilar fact evidence. The requirements and limitations of section 90.404 govern similar fact evidence while the general rule of relevancy set forth in section 90.402 governs dissimilar fact evidence....

...his testimony, the trial court was not required to conduct a Faretta hearing, and this claim is without merit. [11] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959). [12] Our conclusion that the evidence at issue is not similar fact evidence subject to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2008), renders moot McCRAY's argument that the State exceeded the scope of its "Notice of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts" under section 90.404(2)(c)1....

...the victim. The police officer then testified that he told Hartley they knew he had robbed the victim two days before the murder. The trial judge allowed this testimony, over defense counsel's objection, as relevant Williams [2] rule evidence under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)(similar fact evidence). According to Hartley, this testimony constituted inadmissible and irrelevant prejudicial evidence regarding a dissimilar prior crime, which was introduced simply to prove propensity and bad character. Section 90.404(2)(a), provides as follows: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or...

...1317, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995); Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla.1981). Clearly, under the circumstances set forth in this record, evidence that Hartley had robbed the victim in this case two days before the murder was not similar fact evidence, and, thus, was inadmissible under section 90.404(2)(a)....

...New language is indicated by underlining, and deletions are indicated by struck-through type. It is so ordered. HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. APPENDIX [1: A Revised Instruction on Williams Rule Evidence] SIMILAR FACT EVIDENCE " WILLIAMS RULE" F.S. 90.404 Note to Judge; To be given at the time the evidence is admitted, if requested....

...." In other words, it is evidence that tends to prove an act of abuse and thus clearly is for the sole benefit of the state. In addition, section 90.803(23)(b) provides for notice of intent to use such statements only to a defendant. [3] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), codified at section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...nsity of Jaggers to commit acts of sexual abuse against children but only may be admitted if relevant to prove a material fact at issue, such as motive, intent, opportunity, plan, preparation, identity, knowledge, or lack or mistake or accident. See § 90.404(2), Fla....

...Contending that this evidence was similar fact evidence, Butler argues this evidence should have been excluded because it was used only to show Butler's propensity to commit the crime charged or his bad character and because the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by the prejudice. See §§ 90.403-90.404, Fla....

...The motion was denied as to any statements made by the defendant (paragraph one). Generally, any evidence relevant to prove a material fact at issue is admissible unless precluded by a specific rule of exclusion. See § 90.402, Fla. Stat. (1997); Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9 (Fla.2000). Collateral crime evidence, codified in section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1997), is also relevant and admissible if used to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident....

...The defense attorney objected and the trial judge told the prosecutor to stay away from the nature of the allegations. The prosecutor asked these questions to determine the officer's knowledge about the identity of the possible perpetrator. This is a proper purpose under section 90.404(2)(a)....

...g factor and "copious unrebutted mitigation"). Therefore, I would reverse the death sentence and remand for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment. NOTES [1] Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993). [2] § 90.403, Fla.Stat. (1997). [3] See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

...We should grant rehearing in this case and remand for a new trial—the outcome of which, unlike this one, we could view with confidence. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 659, 662 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); see also § 90.404(2), Fla.Stat....

...Thus, we hold that the court erred in refusing to sever the trial of the Jones robbery from that of the White robbery and kidnapping. The State makes a fall-back argument that the testimony concerning each of the criminal episodes could have been introduced in the trial of the other as similar fact evidence under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Prior to the introduction of Lucas' previous trial testimony and during the testimony of Dumas, objections were raised to testimony which Jackson describes as irrelevant evidence of collateral crimes. Jackson contends he was prejudiced by this testimony and is entitled to a new trial. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...e, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or general pattern of criminality so that the evidence of the prior offenses would have a relevant or a material bearing on some essential aspect of the offense being tried." Id. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...[that the] defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his or her participation was relatively minor."). White's second subclaim is that the facts underlying DiMarino's 1990 Maryland third-degree murder conviction should have been admitted as reverse Williams [4] rule evidence under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...question of the relevancy of this type of evidence should be cautiously scrutinized before it is determined to be admissible." 110 So.2d at 662. This rule concerning the admissibility of similar fact evidence has been codified by the Legislature as section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1995). Later, in Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744 (Fla.1988), we made it clear that the admissibility of other crimes evidence is not limited to crimes with similar facts. We stated that similar fact evidence may be admissible pursuant to section 90.404, and other crimes or bad acts that are not similar may be admissible under section 90.402. We reiterated the distinction between "similar fact" evidence and "dissimilar fact" evidence in Sexton v. State, 697 So.2d 833, 837 (Fla.1997). Thus, section 90.404 is a special limitation governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence. But if evidence of a defendant's collateral bad acts bears no logical resemblance to the crime for which the defendant is being tried, then section 90.404(2)(a) does not apply and the general rule in section 90.402 controls....

...1986), "[c]ollateral crimes evidence ... is not relevant and admissible merely because it involves the same type of offense." Although sexual battery on an underage child is a reprehensible offense, it is not so unique in itself that it should be uniformly admissible under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Both statutes also require the court to make specific findings of fact on the record as to the basis for its ruling. §§ 92.53(7), .54(5). [3] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [4] Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparatio...

...to five months later. [State]: And what was the basis of those problems? Lynn: He was jealous that I was with Marlin [McGhee]. This was the extent of Lynn's testimony regarding Dennis's jealousy. The admission of this evidence was clearly improper. Section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1997), as to the admissibility of character evidence provides: (1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY.—Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion, except: *763 (a) Character of accused....

...issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.) (specifying limited circumstances when evidence of similar crimes may be admitted), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). However, the nature of the evidence here, as in Sireci and Straight, is not evidence of similar wrongs addressed in Williams and section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1985), but is analogous to evidence of flight....

...Second, Victorino challenges Graham's testimony that after leaving the park, Victorino and his associates ran into the opposition group at Victorino's residence and Victorino fired one gunshot at the group during a car chase. We reject the claim that this evidence was similar fact evidence subject to the requirements of section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...� 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2004). "Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, ... but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...(2004). Admissible evidence of uncharged crimes falls into two categories: "`similar fact' evidence and `dissimilar fact' evidence." Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9, 16 (Fla.2000). Similar fact evidence is governed by the requirements and limitations of section 90.404, and dissimilar fact evidence is governed by the general rule of *99 relevancy set forth in section 90.402. As we explained in Sexton v. State, 697 So.2d 833, 837 (Fla.1997): [S]ection 90.404 is a special limitation governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence. But if evidence of a defendant's collateral bad acts bears no logical resemblance to the crime for which the defendant is being tried, then section 90.404(2)(a) does not apply and the general rule in section 90.402 controls....

...act evidence. Graham's testimony regarding the planned fight and the shooting incident is evidence of acts that "bear[ ] no logical resemblance to the crime [of murder] for which [Victorino] [was] being tried." Sexton, 697 So.2d at 837. Accordingly, section 90.404(2) does not apply....

...The crux of a Bruton violation is the introduction of statements which incriminate an accused without affording him an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Looney v. State, 803 So.2d 656, 671 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted). [8] Our conclusion that the evidence at issue was not similar fact evidence subject to section 90.404(2) renders moot Victorino's arguments that the State failed to comply with the ten-day notice requirement pursuant to section 90.404(2)(c)(1) and that the trial court erroneously introduced this evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a)....

...The testimony of Parks and Owens was admitted for the limited purpose of establishing intent, motive or plan, and the jury was instructed accordingly. Evidence of the type offered through Parks and Owens is admissible when relevant to prove intent, motive or plan. Fla. Evid.Code § 90.404(2)(a)....

...r trial, Cole, 701 So.2d at 853. This Court *59 reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Id. We note that Smith correctly does not assert that this evidence was admitted in violation of section 90.404(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (2001). [2] The record does not reflect that the State intended to introduce this evidence as similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under section 90.404(2)(a)....

...d give this testimony; as is seen in the cross-examination, the witness did not testify to this statement in his deposition. [3] Smith's claim is thus not that the denial of the motion for mistrial was error because there was an express violation of section 90.404(2). Rather, Smith's claim is that the denial conflicted with this Court's prior cases that recognize prejudicial error in the admission of testimony of "the kind forbidden by the Williams rule [4] and section 90.404(2)." Jackson, 451 So.2d at 461. However, we find that the issue in the present case is unlike the issue that was before this Court in Jackson. In Jackson, the issue concerned a State witness's testimony that came expressly within section 90.404(2)(a)....

...Jackson's defense counsel interrupted the testimony to object to the line of questioning on relevancy grounds, and was overruled. Jackson argues that the testimony had no valid probative value and only tended to show bad character or propensity, and therefore is inadmissible. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...In his third claim, Coolen contends that the knife threat to Jamie Caughman constituted "collateral crimes" evidence that was being introduced to show his propensity to confront people with a knife. Thus, he argues, testimony relating to this incident was inadmissible under section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1993). However, subsections 90.404(1) and 90.404(2) do not govern the admissibility of this evidence....

...This evidence is admitted for the same reason as other evidence which is a part of the so-called " res gestae "; it is necessary to admit the evidence to adequately describe the deed. In addition to Wigmore's logical argument, it seems that both the language of Section 90.404(2)(a) and of Williams indicates that the rule applies to evidence of discrete acts other than the actions of the defendant committing the instant crime charged....

...not subject to scrutiny under the Williams rule, does not give proper consideration to the fact that the admission encompassed many other crimes irrelevant to this case. Thus, it must be analyzed under case law interpreting both sections 90.403 and 90.404, Florida Statutes (2001). The majority chooses not to analyze the remark under section 90.404, see majority op....

...'... may have suggested Jackson had killed in the past, but the boast neither proved that fact, nor was that fact relevant to the case sub judice." Id. at 461. We concluded that the "testimony is precisely the kind forbidden by the Williams rule and section 90.404(2)." Id....

...n; (6) the trial court erred by relying upon an unproven statement, containing the nonstatutory aggravating circumstance of future dangerousness, in finding the CCP aggravating factor; and (7) Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional. [2] Section 90.404(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provides: When the state in a criminal action intends to offer evidence of other criminal offenses under paragraph (a) [similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts relevant to proving a mat...

...This Court first considered reverse Williams rule evidence in Rivera v. State, 561 So.2d 536, 539 (Fla.1990), where it stated: [W]here evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its admission. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Weighed against the potential prejudice, the probative value of Huggins' prior felony record was slight. The prior record was relevant only on the narrow issue of the credibility of Huggins' statement as to why he shaved his pubic region. The State did not attempt to introduce the prior record under section 90.404, Florida Statutes (2004), which governs the admission of evidence of other crimes, demonstrating its irrelevance for any purpose but impeachment....

...s infant grandchild, who was Joel Good's son. In support of his argument, Sexton contends that the trial court improperly admitted this evidence of collateral bad acts in violation of Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), which is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). Saffor v. State, 660 So.2d 668, 670 (Fla.1995). Section 90.404(2)(a) provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident, but is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. The State counters that evidence of Sexton's collateral bad acts was not proffered and admitted as similar fact evidence under section 90.404(2)(a), but rather as "dissimilar fact" evidence under section 90.402, which simply states that all relevant evidence is admissible except as provided by law....

...facet of Willie's life to such an extent that Willie would kill at his father's direction. It is true that these collateral acts were not similar to the murder for which Sexton was tried in this case and therefore could not have been admitted under section 90.404(2)(a). See Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353, 358-59 (Fla.1988). Indeed, the State did not proffer this evidence under section 90.404(2)(a). However, the fact that this evidence was not admissible under section 90.404(2)(a) does not mean that it was not admissible at all....

...The requirement that similar fact crimes contain similar facts to the charged crime is based on the requirement to show relevancy. This does not bar the introduction *837 of evidence of other crimes which are factually dissimilar to the charged crime if the evidence of other crimes is relevant. Thus, section 90.404 is a special limitation governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence. But if evidence of a defendant's collateral bad acts bears no logical resemblance to the crime for which the defendant is being tried, then section 90.404(2)(a) does not apply and the general rule in section 90.402 controls....

...On direct appeal, Saffor argued that the trial court erred by admitting the Williams rule [1] testimony regarding the attempted *670 lewd assault. He asserted that the collateral sex crime was not sufficiently similar to the charged offense to constitute similar-fact evidence under section 90.404(2)....

...s the certified question. Saffor argues that the niece's testimony was inadmissible under the Williams rule because the collateral crime was insufficiently similar to the charged offense and that such evidence only proves depraved sexual propensity. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), which codifies the Williams rule, provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, int...

...To deprive ten-year-old Jason of this reasonable opportunity to corroborate his story is not called for under the applicable law and flies in the face of society's search for the truth. I would approve the district court decision rather than giving Saffor a whole new trial. WELLS, J., concurs. NOTES [1] § 90.404(2), Fla. Stat. (1989); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] We note that the list of instances in section 90.404(2) is non-inclusive and is not statutorily limited to the instances specifically enumerated therein.

...This appeal followed. Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of "an unrelated rape and burglary incident ... purportedly to prove identity." The collateral crime evidence, which was admitted pursuant to and in compliance with section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1979), was introduced only to show bad character or propensity, and showed nothing unique or unusual about him or his supposed modus operandi, asserts appellant....

...[10] Specifically, he alleges that statements made by O'Brien and Panoyan that appellant had previously killed a child were introduced solely to demonstrate bad character and propensity for violent behavior in violation of the Williams [11] rule as codified by section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...hree years. According to this testimony, Panoyan feared appellant, and that fear was due in part to Panoyan's knowledge that appellant had previously killed a baby. In ruling that the testimony was admissible, the trial court correctly observed that section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, was not applicable to its introduction....

...Rather, O'Brien's testimony was offered to recount an admission by appellant in which appellant explained why he believed Panoyan would not identify him as the assailant in this case. We agree with the trial judge that this testimony was relevant to the issue of Panoyan's credibility. Moreover, we find that section 90.404(2)(a) does not bar O'Brien's testimony because his testimony was relevant to an issue other than bad character or propensity....

...er circumstances similar to those present in this case. Williams maintains that admission of this other crime evidence was error because the testimony only served to prove bad character or a propensity to assault women and thus is inadmissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...atter of consequence other than bad character or propensity. See Bryan, 533 So.2d at 746; Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 404.09 (1993). The broad rule of admissibility based on relevancy, commonly known as the Williams rule, is codified at section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...o prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. Section 90.404(2)(a)....

...se it has a tendency to suggest the commission of another crime and thus necessarily is prejudicial to the defendant. Bryan, 533 So.2d at 747; Williams, 110 So.2d at 660. However, evidence of other crimes that is relevant and therefore not barred by section 90.404(2)(a), may be excluded under section 90.403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice....

...and proper cautionary instructions were given. Thus, because the challenged testimony is relevant to a material fact in issue and its probative value clearly outweighs the potential for undue prejudice, there is no bar to its admission under either section 90.404(2)(a) or section 90.403....

...otentially capable of coercing Fields to lie. [6] We find that the trial court ruled correctly when it denied relief in this claim, because Robinson could not show how this character evidence was going to be admitted for anything but propensity. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Squires argues that this testimony introduced prejudicial evidence of his alleged criminal activity unrelated to the charges brought at trial and served no purpose but to illustrate his bad character. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...alleged trait in issue. The trial court properly allowed the *211 state to rebut these assertions of non-violent character by showing that Squires had fired deadly weapons at persons other than the victim. Lewis v. State, 377 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1979); § 90.404(1)(a), Fla....

...In so ruling, the court cited the familiar principle that evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion, except when such evidence is offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait. § 90.404(1)(a), Fla....

...two minutes, and then threw her up in the air and into the water. The defendant argues that such testimony is inadmissible because (a) the state did not provide him with a notice of intent to offer evidence of other criminal offenses as required by section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), and (b) such testimony lacks relevancy because the acts committed on Sarah are dissimilar to the acts claimed to have been committed on the victim, thereby serving only to show bad character and propensity to commit the crime charged....

...f collateral crime evidence, and such evidence is admissible for different reasons and under a different section of the Evidence Code, section 90.402, Florida Statutes (1987). Therefore, the state need not comply with the ten-day notice provision of section 90.404(2)(b) as a prerequisite to offering inseparable crime evidence....

...tatements to them after Lucas's body was found which indicated that he may have killed someone and needed to avoid police and leave town. [4] See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Pittman asserts that the trial court erroneously permitted the State to introduce evidence of threats Pittman made against his former wife and the Knowles family, an attack on a prison informant, and testimony that Pittman had once made a gas bomb. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), states: "Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,...

...However, the court reversed and remanded on the second issue. The court found that there was no evidence presented that the charged offense arose in a familial or custodial setting. Therefore, the court held that instruction was an erroneous statement of the law because section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), does not list victim corroboration as a proper purpose for similar-fact evidence, and Heuring only authorizes use for corroboration in a familial or custodial situation. The court also held that the instruction was not harmless error. The Williams rule, codified at section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,...

...lleged victim. Accordingly, we quash the district court's decision *1355 and remand with directions to reinstate Rawls' conviction and sentence. It is so ordered. OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. NOTES [1] § 90.404(2), Fla....

...Thus, the trial court correctly denied relief without a hearing on this claim. Johnson also claims that the police withheld exculpatory character evidence regarding the customer victim. According to the victim's girlfriend, he was the type of person who would have resisted the robbery attempt. Under section 90.404(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime may be offered by the accused....

...s harmless. Affirmed. NOTES [1] The trials of Sias and Bartsch were severed when Bartsch agreed to testify on Sias' behalf in a separate trial. [2] The crime in the present case was committed after the effective date of the Florida Evidence Code. By Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1979), the legislature has codified the Williams Rule, and thus, similar fact evidence of other crimes "is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." Despite recent ex...

...The jury found the defendant guilty of selling cocaine and marijuana to Ms. Edwards, and not guilty of possession of a concealed firearm. The defendant appeals the trial court's ruling permitting the State to introduce evidence of the prior hand-to-hand transaction without providing ten days notice pursuant to section 90.404(2)(c)1, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...he five transactions. Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the uncharged drug transactions because the State failed to file the required ten-day notice of its intent to introduce Williams [1] rule evidence or evidence of other crimes. [2] § 90.404(2)(c)1, Fla....

...3d DCA 1998), it initially ruled that only the third and fourth uncharged hand-to-hand transactions were admissible because they took place within fifteen minutes of the charged offense, thereby linking them in time and in circumstances. The trial court concluded that notice was not required pursuant to section 90.404(2)(c)1 as the uncharged crimes were not Williams rule evidence, but rather, relevant evidence inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses....

...section 90.402 because the evidence was inextricably intertwined with the crime charged. Under either theory, since the evidence was admitted as relevant evidence pursuant to section *1212 90.402, rather than as "other criminal offenses" pursuant to section 90.404, the ten-day notice requirement did not apply....

...Thus, the prerequisite to admissibility is relevancy. Evidence of bad acts not included in the charged offenses is generally referred to as "collateral crimes evidence." Collateral crimes evidence includes (1) similar fact evidence, which is governed by section 90.404, and is commonly referred to as " Williams rule evidence," [4] and (2) all other relevant evidence, admissible pursuant to section 90.402. Similar fact evidence under section 90.404 is evidence totally unrelated to the charged offenses (and is referred to in the federal system as "extrinsic evidence") and is admissible to prove a material fact in issue, such as motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Because 90.404 evidence is extrinsic (unrelated to the charged offense), the State is required to provide the defendant with notice of its intent to rely on this evidence at trial....

...he events leading up to the charged crime(s), Griffin, 639 So.2d at 970; Vail, 890 So.2d at 376. Relevant evidence admitted under section 90.402 does not require notice. See Hunter, 660 So.2d at 251 ("Inseparable crime evidence is admitted not under 90.404(2)(a) as similar fact evidence but under section 90.402 because it is relevant."); Griffin, 639 So.2d at 968 (holding that "evidence which is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged, is not Williams rule evidence," and concluding that...

...ence was relevant); Kelly v. State, 552 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)(holding that evidence of aggravated assault committed the evening before the crime charged is admissible as inseparable crime evidence, therefore, the notice requirement of section 90.404 is inapplicable); Tumulty v....

...ith the ten-day notice provision"). Thus, relevant evidence is generally admissible except where prohibited by law, unless the probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect. Similar fact evidence of other crimes requires notice pursuant to section 90.404(2)(c)1, while all other relevant evidence, even if it relates to uncharged criminal acts, does not require notice....

...As the evidence was offered to prove a material fact in dispute, and because it provided the trier of fact with a complete picture of the events in question, we conclude the evidence was properly introduced as relevant evidence under section 90.402, Florida Statutes (2003). See Williamson, 681 So.2d at 695 (holding section 90.404(2)(a) inapplicable where evidence was not admitted to show the defendant had a propensity to commit the crime charged based on the fact he had committed a similar crime; rather evidence was relevant to establish the credibility of a ma...

...GERSTEN, WELLS, SHEPHERD, SUAREZ and CORTIÑAS, JJ., concur. COPE, C.J. (dissenting). Respectfully, the evidence of the prior uncharged hand-to-hand drug transaction was not admissible as inseparable crimes evidence, nor was it admissible as Williams rule evidence [6] under paragraph 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...Aleman, 592 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1979) (citation omitted). Here, the surveillance officer observed a fifteen-minute episode of hand-to-hand street drug sales, after which D.M. was arrested. We do not think that the first three sales qualify as "other criminal offenses," § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...In sum, these authorities stand for the proposition that evidence of other uncharged crimes is admissible only if the evidence qualifies as inseparable crimes evidence, or alternatively, if the evidence falls into one of the categories specified in paragraph 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, as Williams rule evidence....

...DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). Accordingly there should be a new trial. GREEN, FLETCHER and RAMIREZ, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] The Williams rule is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). [3] Section 90.404(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1997), dealing with the ten-day notice, has since been renumbered as section 90.404(2)(c)1, Florida Statutes (2003). [4] Similar fact evidence is referred to as Williams rule evidence, and as codified provides: Section 90.404(2)(a): (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.— (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. Section 90.404(2)(c)1 provides: When the state in a criminal action intends to offer evidence of other criminal offenses under paragraph (a) ....

...No notice is required for evidence of offenses used for impeachment or on rebuttal. [5] The terms "inseparable crimes evidence" and "inextricably intertwined evidence" are used interchangeably and refer to the same legal theory. [6] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), now codified as § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Rule testimony of an incident of sexual abuse committed by appellant on the child, V.L. However, we find that the similar fact testimony of V.L. in this case was clearly relevant to prove a material fact in issue — motive or intent, as required by Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...I agree with Judge Ervin, for the reasons stated in his opinion, that appellant's alternative objection based on the Frye test was likewise well taken. I likewise agree with Judge Wolf's opinion that testimony of this nature is in all events inadmissible under sections 90.401, 90.403 and 90.404 of the Florida Evidence Code for the reasons he discusses, although it should be noted that this specific ground apparently was not presented to the trial court....

...of the evidence, section 90.403, F.S. (1989); and (3) it is an indirect attempt to prove the guilt of an accused by demonstrating that he possesses a character trait that will cause him to act in conformity with that trait in a particular instance, section 90.404, F.S....

...ial evidence, the analysis would be equally valid in Florida. In addition, it is impermissible to present evidence of an individual accused's character or character trait to prove that the person acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion. § 90.404(1), Fla....

...So.2d 286 (Fla. 1991); Francis v. State, 512 So.2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (error to allow state's expert witness to opine that defendant had personality characteristic of being attracted to children, because such character evidence was violative of Section 90.404(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), precluding the admission of such evidence unless offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait); Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony as to Criminal Defendant's Propensity Toward Sexual Deviation, 42 A.L.R....

...the argument that the evidence was not material. [38] It is unnecessary to determine whether the evidence of psychological profiles of sexual abusers complies with Frye because the evidence in the instant case would be inadmissible under §§ 90.401-90.404, Fla....

...s reputation must be demonstrated. First, in a self-defense case, “evidence of the victim’s character trait of violence ... may be offered on the issue of who was the aggressor.” Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 404.6 (2012 ed.). Under section 90.404(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2012), “evidence of a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible when it is offered by the accused to prove that the victim acted in conformity with” his character....

...Jorgenson contends that the State made his drug dealing a feature of the trial. Jorgenson also argues that this evidence was not relevant to prove any material issue in this case. *427 Drug dealing is not similar to the crime for which Jorgenson was tried in this case and therefore could not have been admitted under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...However, this did not preclude the evidence from being admitted on a different basis. In Sexton, we addressed the standard for the admissibility of similar crime and bad act evidence when the evidence is not similar to the crime committed in the instant case: However, the fact that this evidence was not admissible under section 90.404(2)(a) does not mean that it was not admissible at all....

...The requirement that similar fact crimes contain similar facts to the charged crime is based on the requirement to show relevancy. This does not bar the introduction of evidence of other crimes which are factually dissimilar to the charged crime if the evidence of other crimes is relevant. Thus, section 90.404 is a special limitation governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence. But if evidence of a defendant's collateral bad acts bears no logical resemblance to the crime for which the defendant is being tried, then section 90.404(2)(a) does not apply and the general rule in section 90.402 controls....

...ameliorated in a structured environment, thus allowing Jorgenson to be rehabilitated and make a positive contribution in prison. [4] In a previous deposition, Detective Warren testified that Jorgenson appeared to be under the influence of drugs. [5] Section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1993), entitled "Character evidence; when admissible," states: (1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY.—Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion, except: (a) Character of accused....

...he circumstances surrounding his impending death. [2] In addition to the pure relevancy argument advanced above, we agree with the trial court's admission of this evidence under the "Williams Rule" as clearly relevant to establishing modus operandi. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987) provides that: [S]imilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, know...

...Assuming that Germain's allegations are true, the facts that Norvell unethically made himself a beneficiary under his client's will and then decided to remove her from life support does not tend to prove that he coerced Germain to execute the June 18 Affidavit. The referee did not abuse his discretion in excluding it. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Sims argues that the trial court erred in admitting Lynn's testimony to prove that he violated parole without clear and convincing evidence of his drug possession. We reject this argument. Lynn's testimony was not offered as collateral crime evidence under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1993), [6] as Sims asserts....

...[4] The motion in limine stated in pertinent part: "The State will establish that ... the defendant, a parolee, in possession of drugs, shot and killed Stafford and then escaped." [5] Without objection from Sims, the state adduced evidence that a police dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the car. [6] Section 90.404 states in pertinent part: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.— (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prep...

...sufficiently similar to the instant case to have been admitted. Ferrell also contends that the crime was not relevant to the proof of any issue at trial. We disagree on both counts. As we stated in Hartley v. State, 686 So.2d 1316 (Fla.1996): Under [section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)], evidence of other crimes is *1329 admissible only if it is "similar fact evidence." Griffin v....

...1317, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995); Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla.1981). Clearly, under the circumstances set forth in this record, evidence that Hartley had robbed the victim in this case two days before the murder was not similar fact evidence, and, thus, was inadmissible under section 90.404(2)(a)....

...Hamilton now claims that this inquiry was an improper attempt to show that he was a liar. We disagree. The record shows that the prosecutor's inquiry constituted a fair exploration of the accuracy of Hamilton's statement as it related to the facts and circumstances of the crime. Cf. § 90.404, Fla....

...Appellate courts should hesitate to establish rules pertaining to discretion of the tribunal which really has the situation before it." [1] See Knox v. State , fn. 9 infra; Dodson v. State, 334 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. den. 341 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 1976); Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977); In Re: Florida Evidence Code, 372 So.2d 1369 (Fla....

...urder and was extremely prejudicial by implying that Peterson had committed a previous murder. See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2009). He further contends that evidence regarding other uncharged crimes is admissible only if it fits under the provisions of section 90.404(2), Fla....

...Defense counsel, after consulting with Remeta in a holding cell outside the courtroom, waived Remeta's presence during preliminary questioning of the jury venire. Before trial, the state filed a notice of intent to offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...d to hear numerous witnesses testify about the offenses committed in Texas and Kansas as this testimony was inadmissible under Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), and under sections 90.404(2) and 90.403, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...g to kill him. We find that this evidence of collateral crimes was relevant to establish identity and intent and was therefore properly admitted. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...The evidentiary rule governing admissibility of similar fact evidence of another criminal offense was set forth by this Court in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), and subsequent cases, and codified into section 90.404(2)(a) of the Florida Evidence Code....

...However, the defendant is not on trial for a crime which is not included in the indictment." Is that what you want me to give? MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: As I just read it? MR. JOHNSON: That's fine. THE COURT: You want me to give it at this time? MR. JOHNSON: Yes, sir. [3] The pertinent portion of section 90.404(2)(a) reads: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mist...

...The evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses did not bring before the jury unrelated bad acts of the appellant, rather it served to link the appellant to the victim circumstantially. Neither is this character evidence, which is offered to show that appellant acted in conformity with past character, as proscribed in section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...tion. Appellant's fifth contention of error as to his conviction concerns the admission of collateral crime evidence under the Williams rule. See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...lead to the murder that resulted from the pilot holding the airplane and demanding $125,000 for his services. The appellant claimed evidence of the earlier smuggling operations was irrelevant collateral crime information that was inadmissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...for admitting such evidence is similar to that for admitting so-called "res gestae" evidence — it is necessary in order adequately to describe the deed. Ehrhardt says it is thus relevant and admissible under section 90.402, and does not fall under section 90.404(2)(a)....

...State, 585 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1991), upon which Caruso relies, is distinguishable because evidence concerning the use of drugs in that case was unrelated to the murder. In a related claim, Caruso argues that the State violated its notice obligation as set forth in section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), with respect to the collateral crimes evidence, and that the judge's inquiry failed to satisfy the requirements of Richardson v....

...1971). As stated above, the collateral crimes evidence established the context in which the criminal acts occurred, Caruso's state of mind at the time, and his motive for the killings. Thus, there was no requirement that the State give notice under section 90.404(2)(b) or that the court conduct a Richardson hearing....

...stimony that Caruso's parents said they were afraid of their son; (4) introducing bad character evidence that Caruso stole and attempted to pawn his father's chainsaw; (5) failing to conduct an adequate inquiry regarding State's alleged violation of section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987); (6) failing to conduct adequate inquiry and denial of continuance with respect to an alleged discovery violation; (7) introducing officer's conclusion about facts only the killer would know; (8) introduc...

...this case was the fourth one, as to which Tumulty says she had no participation. She contends that the evidence relative to the first three drug smuggling transactions was collateral crime evidence, which was not relevant and thus inadmissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...This evidence is admitted for the same reason as other evidence which is a part of the so-called " res gestae "; it is necessary to admit the evidence to adequately describe the deed. In addition to Wigmore's logical argument, it seems that both the language of Section 90.404(2)(a) and of Williams indicates that the rule applies to evidence of discrete acts other than the actions of the defendant committing the instant crime charged....

...[5] Harmon first alleges that the state was improperly permitted to introduce evidence of numerous collateral crimes and bad acts in violation of Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) and section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...He contends that there was nothing particularly unusual about the modus operandi involved and that the effect of such testimony was simply to demonstrate the propensity of appellant to commit such acts, thereby *1344 demonstrating bad character; consequently the use thereof is barred by Section 90.404, Florida Statutes....

...e issues in the case. Its sole purpose was to insinuate that appellant has a criminal character or has engaged in violent or criminal conduct. It is axiomatic that unless a defendant places his character in issue it may not be attacked by the state. § 90.404(1)(a), Fla....

...[6] Since Gatto will be entitled to another trial on his claim that he was maliciously prosecuted by the defendants, we will not consider the error he asserts that evidence regarding his involvement in a prior shoplifting incident was wrongfully admitted at trial. Such evidence is not, per se, inadmissible, see, e.g., Section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1977), and we therefore leave it to the trial court to determine at retrial whether the appropriate predicate for its admission has been established....

...its admissibility." Vannier v. State, 714 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (in murder prosecution, exclusion of evidence that might have tended to show that decedent committed suicide rather than was murdered was not harmless error). According to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which codified Williams, 110 So.2d at 654: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, inte...

...iminal case, there is nothing in the language of the statute which precludes the use of evidence offered by a defendant in a criminal case, or by the parties in a civil action. Cf. Moreno v. State, 418 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (construing § 90.404(2) as applying "only to the use of similar crime evidence by the state against the defendant in a criminal trial," and relying instead upon § 90.402 "relevant evidence" rule as proper basis for admissibility of erroneously excluded evidence of "similar crime" committed by State's key witnesses). Professor Ehrhardt has addressed the misleading use of the term "similar fact evidence": [E]vidence of collateral crimes or acts is admissible under section 90.404(2)(a) not because it is similar to the crime or act in issue, but because it is relevant to prove a material fact or issue in the instant case other than the defendant's propensity or bad character....

...The State was obligated to provide Gore – no fewer than ten days before the trial date – with “a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or information.” Fla. Stat. § 90.404(2)(c)....

...testified that she had consensual sexual intercourse and other sexual contact with Audano a few times over a two-month period. Audano unequivocally denied each of her accusations. The state sought to corroborate B.H.'s story with an eight-year-old uncharged accusation against Audano that the state sought to introduce under section 90.404(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), the Williams Rule....

...In determining the admissibility of collateral crime evidence, the trial court must make two determinations: (1) whether the evidence is relevant or material to some aspect of the offense being tried, and (2) whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by any prejudice. See §§ 90.402, 90.403 and 90.404(2), Fla....

...in his or her particular case. Id. at 1001. This type of character analysis is not utilized in any other type of criminal proceeding, as evidence offered solely to show the accused's bad character or propensity for criminal conduct is inadmissible. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...After the trial court sentenced Appellant, this appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS A. Exclusion of Evidence of Appellant's Reputation for Sexual Morality On appeal, Appellant argues that the exclusion of the evidence of his reputation for sexual morality was error because it was admissible under section 90.404(1)(a) and 90.405, Florida Statutes (2008). The State agrees that sections 90.404(1)(a) might support Appellant's theory of admissibility, but it contends that section 90.405 presents an "insurmountable bar" to the admission of evidence that a person does not have the character trait necessary to commit acts of child molestation, as this trait is not susceptible to proof by reputation evidence....

...e case law, and its interpretation of those authorities is subject to de novo review. Id. As a general rule, all relevant evidence is admissible unless it is specifically excluded by a rule of evidence. Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988). Section 90.404(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion, except ......

...404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except... [e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same.") with *825 § 90.404(1), Fla....

...ove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Appellant proffered outside the jury's presence testimony from two witnesses regarding specific instances regarding the victim's violent and/or abusive conduct when she was under the influence of alcohol. The trial court excluded this testimony pursuant to the provisions of Section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1987). Section 90.404 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY....

...Except as provided in s. 794.022 [rules of evidence in sexual battery chapter], evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait... . The Law Revision Council Note to section 90.404 comments that the statute intended to limit the use of character evidence when offered for the purpose of inferring that a person acted in conformity with his character during the occasion in question and that it is basically a codification of existing case law. 6B Fla. Stat. Ann. 355 (1979). Although Professor Ehrhardt, in discussing section 90.404, does not explicitly state that evidence of the aggressive nature of the victim's character is admissible only in cases in which self-defense is raised, he observes that such use is the basis on which such evidence is most frequently offered....

...5th DCA 1986); Pino v. *721 Koelber, 389 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Banks v. State, 351 So.2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1977). Moreover, federal courts, in interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 404, upon which section 90.404 is modeled, similarly allow the admission of character evidence only when the accused has raised the issue of self-defense....

...did not show how the victim's character was pertinent, that is, he did not rely on the defense of self-defense or raise an issue concerning who was the initial aggressor. Even if one assumes that the proffered character evidence was admissible under section 90.404, it nonetheless would have been inadmissible under Section 90.405, Florida Statutes (1987), which prescribes the means by which character may be proven....

...ence has nothing to lose from a prejudicial trial, it does apply to a party-witness, such as appellant Erp, who is accused of bad acts in a civil action, the same as to a defendant accused of crime. 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 877 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970); § 90.404(1)(a), Fla....

...d then infer that defendant possessed a propensity to commit violent acts. It is axiomatic that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity to commit a crime. See § 90.404, Fla....

...The murder victim, Marvin Sutton, and another individual tried to rob Jameson of money and drugs he was carrying while selling drugs for Pusey. It was in retaliation for the robbery attempt that Jameson, Pusey, and an individual named Coley all took part in Sutton’s murder. Under Florida Statute § 90.404(2), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity....

...We find no error. Damren next claims that the court erred in failing to give the requested standard jury instruction concerning "similar fact" evidence in relation to the prior crime discussed above. We disagree. Although a limiting instruction is required under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1993), for "similar fact" evidence, none is required under section 90.402 for "relevant" evidence....

...ires that the common law be followed. See, Note, Florida's Sexual Battery Statute: Significant Reform But Bias Against the Victim Still Prevails, 30 U.Fla.L.Rev. 419, 432-433 (1978). The Florida Evidence Code has not changed the law in this respect. Section 90.404(1)(b)(1) provides: (1) Character evidence generally....

...Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in its apparent determination that the witness was competent to testify. VI. The defendant also contends that the trial court should have excluded evidence of a collateral offense against another child. Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes, provides that collateral crime evidence may be admitted when relevant to prove a material fact in issue such as "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acciden...

...Although the defendant gave the children money in each case, that is the only additional point of similarity. The collateral offense against S.Y. proves no more than the defendant's propensity to commit offenses of the same general type, an issue expressly prohibited by section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes....

...*1225 I The state's motion in limine, granted by the trial court, prevented the defendant from presenting similar fact evidence to show that the state's witnesses and not the defendant were the aggressors. The ruling was based on a misapplication of Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1979) which codifies the holding in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [1] Neither Williams v. State, supra , nor Section 90.404(2) which codifies Williams states any new rule of law....

...2d DCA 1974) (where a hearing on the voluntariness of defendant's confession was made in the presence of the jury after which it was ruled that the statements were inadmissible, a new trial was required). The judgment below is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial. NOTES [1] Law Revision Council Note — 1976, § 90.404, Florida Statutes Annotated (1979): "Section 90.404(2)(a) was amended by the Committee Substitute adopted by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary-Criminal to closely paraphrase the language used in Williams v....

...First, Bruce Lazarowicz claims that it was error for the trial court to admit "similar fact" evidence over defense objection because prior incidents of sexual misconduct with the victim were irrelevant and offered solely to show his bad character and propensity, contrary to section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1987), which codified the holding in Williams v....

...1977) (admissible in prosecution under section 794.011 as relevant to manner in which defendant exercised his parental authority over victim); Summit v. State, 285 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (admissible to show character of defendant as to motive and intent); § 90.404(2), Fla....

...cts relevant to a material fact in issue except where the sole relevancy is character or propensity of the accused is admissible unless precluded by some specific exception or rule of exclusion." 110 So.2d at 663. The rule has since been codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), which provides: Similar fact evidence ......

...t and penalty phase closing arguments, resulting in fundamental error. [6] In McDuffie v. State, 970 So.2d 312 (Fla. 2007), this Court explained: The "Williams rule" takes its name from Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), and is codified at section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Every defendant is entitled to present any evidence that tends to support the defendant’s theory of defense. See Vannier v. State, 714 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). “[W]here evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt, it is error to deny its admission. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...The jury convicted Lawrence as charged and recommended that he be sentenced to death. After finding that seven aggravators and no mitigators had been established, the trial judge imposed a death sentence. Prior to trial, the state filed eight notices of its intent, pursuant to subsection 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989), [2] to offer similar fact evidence of other crimes....

...received and that the defendant cannot be convicted for a charge not included in the indictment or information. [3] A single witness testified to this. [4] A single witness testified to this. [5] Several witnesses mentioned Lawrence's drug use. [6] § 90.404(2)(b)(2), Fla....

...rison testimony. This claim is procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal. [13] Duckett alleges that after ten days of exposure the pencil should have been in a more deteriorated state. [14] The Williams rule, codified as section 90.404, Florida Statutes (2002), "provides that similar fact evidence of other crimes is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, but is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." Cartwright v....

...between the dates in the information will have jeopardy attach and he would not be able to be retried under double-jeopardy principles. Appellant sought through the motion in limine to exclude evidence of other criminal offenses, arguing that under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1983), and Williams v....

...be affected, and evidence of an alleged chemical poisoning of a neighbor (other than the Carrs) to cause the neighbor to move out. [11] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); see also § 90.404(2), Fla....

...During the second visit, he continued to question her about her sex life. Then, he slid his hand up her skirt and inserted his finger into the witness' vagina, telling her that this would make her "feel good." She did not return. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's admission of the prior act testimony. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,...

...NOTES [1] A more complete factual statement with respect to both killings may be found in that opinion. [2] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [3] The Williams rule is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985): Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,...

...be evidence of something more than loud or profane language or a belligerent attitude. See also L.A.T. v. State, 20 Fla.Law Weekly D416 (Fla. 3d DCA Feb. 15, 1995). Appellant's conviction for disorderly conduct is reversed. 2. Similar fact evidence Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), states, (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS....

...268, 272, 34 So.2d 429, 431 (1948); Bobb, 647 So.2d at 882-85. If the State had intended to introduce substantive evidence of the specific prior offense, it would have had to comply with the requirements of Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), and its progeny. See generally § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...emove items from the store. The defense objected to this "Williams Rule" evidence (specific act testimony) on the ground that it had not received notice of the State's intent to use it at trial. The *1158 court held the testimony admissible based on Section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), which obviates the need for such notice when the testimony is offered for purposes of rebuttal or impeachment, and the jury heard the witness' testimony....

...It was not error to allow the witness' testimony for the purpose of impeaching Dickey's statements based on lack of notice. The witness' testimony clearly impeached his credibility and therefore no notice was required. See Tuff v. State, 408 So.2d 724, 729-30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...These internal police records were not admissible; therefore, appellate counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to raise this issue. As a general rule, evidence of a victim's character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion. § 90.404(1), Fla....

...be admissible when it is demonstrated to be relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as intent, or absence of mistake or accident, but is inadmissable when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity for misconduct. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...up and down; "climbing the ladder," characterized by a vertical attempt to swim, along with splashing; and witnessing a victim swimming weakly. The County argued that the results of the mock drowning drill were inadmissable as similar fact evidence, § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Hodges and Officer Kelley, as well as the prosecutor, and the judge on at least one occasion, referred to both boys by the same name ("Mat"), so that at times the jury could well have been confused as to which "Mat" the witnesses or parties were referring. The admissibility of similar fact evidence is governed by section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which states: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. To meet the strict standard of relevance and admissibility prescribed by section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989), the charged offense and the collateral offense "must be not only strikingly similar, but they must also share some unique characteristics or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses." Heuring v....

...Nelson was relevant to prove his intent to commit the crimes of aggravated battery, aggravated assault and battery. It was also relevant to prove his intent to terrorize her as charged in the kidnaping count of the Information. Accordingly, this evidence was admissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ral crime involved "domestic violence," they were inextricably intertwined. This conclusion was incorrect. Evidence of an uncharged crime is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense, and therefore admissible independent of the provisions of section 90.404(2)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, "where it is impossible to give a complete or intelligent account of the crime charged without referring to the other crime." Nickels v....

..., see, Wilson v. State, 490 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), and we conclude on the basis of the record as a whole that the issue of the admissibility of the collateral crime evidence was adequately preserved for review. The Florida Evidence Code (at § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...This same abuse of discretion standard applies to review of Williams rule evidence. See Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 195 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S.Ct. 1535, 140 L.Ed.2d 685 (1998); Traina v. *1117 State, 657 So.2d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,...

...The trial court held that evidence of Thompson's earlier conviction for sexual battery and kidnapping was similar in circumstances to the charged crime and, therefore, that this collateral crime evidence was admissible pursuant to our decision in Williams and the Florida Evidence Code, section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...very violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and the admission of other crime evidence under Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. den., 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), and Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...During Roberts' case-in-chief, Sheila testified that when she and the men were in the van on the afternoon of the crimes, she was told to get on the telephone and attempt to broker a deal for several ounces of cocaine. We reject the claim that this evidence constitutes Williams rule evidence subject to the requirements of section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...There are two categories under which evidence of uncharged crimes or bad acts will be admissible—similar fact evidence, otherwise known as Williams rule evidence, and dissimilar fact evidence. Id. (citing Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9, 16 (Fla.2000)). The requirements and limitations of section 90.404 govern similar fact evidence while the general rule of relevancy set forth in section 90.402 governs dissimilar fact evidence....

...oes not render evidence of the conviction from which the appeal was taken or for which the pardon was granted inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of the appeal is admissible. (3) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence under s. 90.404 or s....

...Third, the victim testified that she did not recant her prior accusation against her uncle. Finally, cross-examination regarding the victim’s prior accusation would not have explained her knowledge of sex to the jury and might have caused the jury to infer that she had a propensity to lie about sexual abuse. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), expressly prohibits the use of “[sjimilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ......

...levant only to show bad character or propensity. See also Shriner v. State, 386 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1103, 101 S.Ct. 899, 66 L.Ed.2d 829 (1981); Ashley v. State, 265 So.2d 685 (Fla. 1972). The Williams holding is codified by section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), and incorporated into Florida Standard Jury Instructions....

...State, 570 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990); Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028, 109 S.Ct. 1765, 104 L.Ed.2d 200 (1989); Smart v. State, 596 So.2d 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Minick v. State, 560 So.2d 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). "Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact." §§ 90.401, 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...evance; the charged and collateral offenses must be "not only strikingly similar, but they must also share some unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses." Heuring, 513 So.2d at 124. Generally, section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), requires that the evidence must be "relevant to a material fact such as identity, intent, motive, opportunity, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident." Farrill v....

...definition of "family," which distracts them from the real task of assessing the issue-specific probative value of inherently prejudicial evidence. NOTES [1] § 800.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). A violation of this statute is a second-degree felony. [2] § 90.404(2), Fla....

...Kimbrough claims it was error to exclude the evidence, as it was properly within the scope of the Williams rule. Evidence of other crimes or acts is admissible if it is found to be relevant for any purpose, save that of showing bad character or propensity. See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959); § 90.404, Fla....

...However, we further conclude that this error was harmless and, therefore, that Peterka was not prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on direct appeal. See Jones, 794 So.2d at 584. The admissibility of character evidence is governed by section 90.404, Florida Statutes (2003). Section 90.404(1)(b)(2) provides that evidence of a victim's character trait of peacefulness is admissible when "offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the aggressor." In this case, the State elicited the...

...While it is permissible to develop this line of evidence by the use of negative testimony, see Herring v. State, 114 Fla. 156, 154 So. 187 (1934), in this instance appellant failed to do this properly. His proffered testimony was not directed at a pertinent trait of his character, as required by section 90.404(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), but was instead directed to appellant's general character....

...885, 100 S.Ct. 177, 62 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979). Alternatively it is contended that any reference to the collateral crime took place outside the jury's presence. We reject both arguments. The holding of Williams is now codified in the Florida Evidence Code as Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1979), and provides in subsection (a): Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. [3] In order to introduce evidence of another crime not only must the requirements of Section 90.404(2)(a) be satisfied, but the state must also prove by clear and convincing evidence the collateral crime and a connection between the defendant and that crime....

...l: * * * * * * THE COURT: I am going to deny the motion for mistrial, but I think there may very well be grounds on appeal, I don't know... [3] The concern of the legislature for overzealous misuse of similar crime evidence is manifested in Sections 90.404(2)(b) 1 and 2, Florida Statutes (1979), which require: 1....

...after the close of the evidence, the jury shall be instructed on the limited purpose for which the evidence was received... We note in passing, though the point was not preserved below and consequently is not an issue here, that there was no compliance with Section 90.404(2)(b)....

...The statute contemplates a pre-trial determination as to the admissibility of similar crime evidence. [4] The witness would be limited to a more direct response in explaining her inconsistent statements, i.e., fear of violent reprisal, since reference to the collateral crime would not be admissible under Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1979) and the probative value of mentioning the rape would be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....

...After reviewing the record, we conclude that this evidence was properly admitted and is relevant to prove the identity of Randall as the murderer of both Evans and Pugh. Prior to Randall's trial, the prosecution filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence of collateral crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to Williams. See § 90.404(2), Fla....

...ed the caveat that "the question of the relevancy of this type of evidence should be cautiously scrutinized before it is determined to be admissible." This rule concerning the admissibility of similar fact evidence was codified by the Legislature as section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1995). Later, in Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744 (Fla.1988), we made it clear that the admissibility of other crimes evidence is not limited to crimes with similar facts. We stated that similar fact evidence may be admissible pursuant to section 90.404, and other crimes or bad acts that are not similar may be admissible under section 90.402.......

...[5] Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts by defendant may be admitted if such evidence is relevant to prove material facts in issue such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. § 90.404(2), Fla....

...dmissible — similar fact evidence, otherwise known as Williams rule evidence, and dissimilar fact evidence. *694 Victorino v. State, 23 So.3d 87, 98 (Fla.2009) (citing Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9, 16 (Fla.2000)). The requirements and limitations of section 90.404, Florida Statutes (2009), govern similar fact evidence while the general rule of relevancy set forth in section 90.402 governs dissimilar fact evidence....

...ed in the murders of six individuals). Moreover, the threat testimony did not become a feature of Gosciminski’s trial. Thus, we reject Gosciminski’s claim that the threat evidence constitutes Williams rule evidence subject to the requirements of section 90.404(2)....

...edge of rings, an awareness of rings” and “relates back” to Gosciminski’s statement to the police that he did not notice clients’ jewelry because it was irrelevant to his job. Thus, the trial court admitted Cox’s testimony into evidence. Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2009), provides that “[similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, p...

...notice no fewer than ten days before trial of its intent to rely on Williams rule evidence and provide a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or information. § 90.404(2)(c) 1, Fla....

...The State sought to introduce evidence that Cohens and Butler attempted to rob the Flowers Bakery at 527 49th Street South at approximately 3:30 p.m. the same day. [1] The State argued that such was admissible as either Williams [2] Rule evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1995), or as inextricably intertwined evidence....

...ild." It was error for the trial court to admit evidence concerning the death of the first child. "Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Sliney argues that the evidence that he sold guns is unduly prejudicial and does not fall under any of the Williams [11] rule exceptions. In analyzing similar claims, we have noted: *287 In the past, there has been some confusion over exactly what evidence falls within the Williams rule. The heading of section 90.404(2) is "OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS." Thus, practitioners have attempted to characterize all prior crimes or bad acts of an accused as Williams rule evidence. This characterization is erroneous. The Williams rule, on its face, is limited to " [s]imilar fact evidence. " § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. This rule is set out in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006).

...tim was the aggressor", while evidence of prior specific acts of violence may be admissible to show "the reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension at the time of the slaying." Smith v. State, 410 So.2d 579, 580-581 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). See also Section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...girls was error. We reject his contention. Prior to trial the state notified Potts that it intended to use " Williams Rule" testimony, i.e., evidence of similar sexual incidents involving the victim's sister and the defendant's two younger sisters. § 90.404(2)(b)1, Fla....

...The state then called three " Williams Rule" witnesses who, over defendant's objections, testified as to similar conduct by the defendant in prior instances. Before the witnesses began to testify, the trial judge instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence was to be received and considered. § 90.404(2)(b)2, Fla....

...rove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Consequently, we find that he did not preserve the issue for appellate review. See Phillips v. State, 476 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1985). Even assuming a proper objection had been made, we find that the articles were relevant to show Maharaj's motivation in harming Derrick Moo Young. Section 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Geddes' testimony, specifically, Geddes' testimony regarding Maharaj's attempt to run Elsee Carberry off the road. Maharaj argues that this testimony is not sufficiently similar to the facts of the charged offenses to bring it within the purview of section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1987), [2] nor was the statutorily required ten-day notice given by the State....

...SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON and GRIMES, JJ., concur. BARKETT, J., concurs in result only. KOGAN, J., concurs with conviction, but concurs in result only as to sentence. McDONALD, J., concurs with conviction, but dissents from sentence. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. [2] Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1987), reads as follows: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, k...

...Subject to certain exceptions which are not applicable in the case sub judice, it is error for a witness to testify concerning a defendant's arrest for unrelated crimes. Clark v. State, 337 So.2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Whitehead v. State, 279 So.2d 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973); § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...With respect to the South Dakota incident, we do not foreclose that this incident may meet the test for evidence so similar to the charged crime that it is admissible as relevant evidence tending to show Ms. Bowen's knowledge of Hank Carr's character and past, and her intent to aid him in avoiding arrest or prosecution. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...nown by the defendant, may be admissible, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. See Palm v. State, 135 Fla. 258, 184 So. 881 (1938); Hodge v. State, 315 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Rolle v. State, 314 So.2d 167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); section 90.404(1)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...The existence of a lustful attitude toward his stepdaughter, proven by prior sexual assaults, makes it more likely or probable that the appellant possessed a similar state of mind toward his stepdaughter on the date of the alleged offense. This is relevancy beyond mere propensity. Compare Florida Evidence Code, § 90.404(2) Florida Statutes (1979), "Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts." Without further belaboring the point, we think there is ample precedent for admissibility, in this case, of evidence of the prior sex acts committed by appellant against his stepdaughter, and that our holding in this case does not conflict with Knox v....

...The state was justified in introducing testimony designed to dispel the hypothesis of innocence. Thus the evidence was relevant to prove a material fact in issue — intentional, rather than accidental, injury; the trial court properly allowed the jury to hear Erwin's and the medical examiner's testimony. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...dence was admissible if relevant and probative of a material issue other than bad character or propensity. Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028, 109 S.Ct. 1765, 104 L.Ed.2d 200 (1989). The Florida Evidence Code, § 90.404(2)(a), provides that evidence of other crimes, acts or wrongs is admissible to prove identity....

...Banks, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. ALTENBERND, Chief Judge. Ronald McLean appeals his judgment and sentence for lewd molestation. We affirm, holding that section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), which expands the use of Williams [1] rule evidence in child molestation cases, does not violate due process, at least in cases where the identity of the accused perpetrator is not an issue....

...never met the victim's family prior to this trial. Following this testimony, the trial court considered argument by counsel, as well as its own extensive, independent research. The lawyers relied upon the existing Williams rule case law, as well as section 90.404(2)(b), a new statute addressing Williams rule evidence in child molestation cases. The trial court concluded that in enacting section 90.404(2)(b), the legislature was attempting to overrule or modify the supreme court's rulings in Saffor v. State, 660 So.2d 668 (Fla.1995), and Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.1987). It also concluded that the legislature intended section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2001), to affect the admissibility of evidence under section 90.404(2)(b), so that a trial court must evaluate Williams rule evidence to determine whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect....

...McLean for the earlier alleged offenses if it had doubt about the charged offense. The discussion among the two lawyers and the trial judge is a model of professionalism; each lawyer advocating a position while assisting the court in its effort to reach a correct decision. Ultimately, the trial court decided that section 90.404(2)(b) applied in this case and that the statute was constitutional....

...It is noteworthy that the transcript of J.N.'s testimony following this determination of competency does not demonstrate any weakness, confusion, or circumstance that would suggest the trial court erred in deciding the issue of competency. III. CHALLENGES TO SECTION 90.404(2) Mr. McLean next argues that section 90.404(2)(b) is unconstitutional as a violation of due process. He further argues that application of the rule in his case violates the prohibition against applying laws ex post facto. Finally, he argues that the trial court erred in applying this statute even if it is constitutional. Section 90.404(2)(b) is a relatively new rule of evidence....

...See ch.2001-221, § 1 at 1938, Laws of Fla. This court has not previously addressed its validity or application. We conclude that the statute is constitutional, at least in a case not involving an issue of identity, and that it was properly applied in this case. Section 90.404(2)(b)1 states: In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant....

...imony because it lacked the required similarity. There is no question that the legislature was attempting to alter or overrule the application of existing case law and to simplify the rules of admissibility in child molestation cases when it enacted section 90.404(2)(b)....

...See Richard J. Sanders, "A Dangerous Bend in an Ancient Road": The Use of Similar Fact Evidence for Corroboration, 74 Fla. B.J. 40, 46 (Feb.2000). Despite limiting instructions from the trial court, juries may inevitably use evidence admitted under section 90.404(2)(b) to determine whether a defendant has a propensity to commit crimes like the charged offense....

...[6] Accordingly, we conclude that the constitutionality of this statute when addressing the issue of identity should be reviewed in another case where identity is a disputed issue. B. EX POST FACTO Mr. McLean was charged with an offense that occurred on October 19, 2000. At that time, section 90.404 did not include this special rule permitting expanded use of Williams rule evidence in cases involving child molestation. The legislature amended section 90.404 during the 2001 legislative session, and the rule became effective July 1, 2001....

...t. See Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856 (Fla.2003); Anderson v. State, 841 So.2d 390 (Fla.2003). As we have discussed earlier, it is a close call whether this evidence would have been admissible under the controlling case law prior to the amendment of section 90.404....

...CERTIFIED QUESTION Because this rule of evidence was approved by the supreme court in a divided opinion that did not address constitutional issues, and because this rule may apply in many serious felony trials throughout the state, we certify the following question of great public importance: DOES SECTION 90.404(2)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (2001), VIOLATE *804 DUE PROCESS WHEN APPLIED IN A CASE IN WHICH IDENTITY IS NOT AN ISSUE? Affirmed....

...2d DCA 1983), cited by defendant, *1023 involved the inadmissibility for impeachment purposes of a statement actually made at a guilty plea negotiation hearing. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after the state questioned defendant, in violation of the Williams Rule, section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), concerning what he refers to as collateral crimes....

...new trial will be limited to the amount of Jacobs' damages. Admission of Bad Character Evidence Evidence of a person's character or trait of character is patently inadmissible "to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion." § 90.404(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Similarly, proof of other "crimes, wrongs or acts" is forbidden when used "solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2), Fla....

...ale, H.B., alleged to have occurred on *245 August 30, 1980. By separate information, these same two defendants were charged with the same offenses said to have been perpetrated against another Haitian female, I.G., on September 5, 1980. Pursuant to Section 90.404(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1979), the State notified Joseph that it intended to introduce evidence of both offenses in the trial of each information....

...n. Joseph's defense was mistaken identity. Similar fact evidence may be used to establish identity and absence of mistake, Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); Florida Evidence Code, section 90.404(2) Florida Statutes (1979), as long as there exists " such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which there are individual manifestations....

...On the Williams Rule issue, the standard of review applicable to the consideration of whether evidence was properly admitted is abuse of discretion. Geldreich v. State, 763 So.2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The Williams Rule has been codified by the legislature in Florida Statutes section 90.404(2)(a): Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, o...

...Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(a), the State is obligated to list “the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant to any offense charged or any defense thereto, or to any similar fact evidence to be presented at trial under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes.” However, the rule does not require the State to disclose to the defense which witnesses it finds not to be sufficiently important to present during trial....

...The prosecutor also related that Ramos and a codefendant "were partners, their business was selling cocaine." Ramos made timely objections to these comments and again objected when the witness Shaler testified essentially to the same events. The state charged Ramos with a single conspiracy on a single occasion. Section 90.404(2)(a) provides: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence...

...Finally, we are unaware of any authority that permits a witness or a party to be questioned concerning crimes with which they may have been charged but of which they were not convicted. Appellee's entire line of questioning also is inadmissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Appellee failed to lay any predicate showing his questions would produce similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts relevant to proving a material fact in issue. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible if it is used solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)....

...he attorney. It also protects the [former] client by not requiring disclosure of confidences previously given to the attorney.”). 76 . That evidence of prior bad acts is generally not admissible to prove propensity or character, see Fla. Evid.Code § 90.404(2), does not alter our analysis. First, such evidence can be used for several other purposes, including opportunity, intent, knowledge, or identity. § 90.404(2)(a)....

...Juan Carlos Burgal appeals his convictions for attempted first degree murder and armed burglary. We affirm. First, the prior incidents of domestic violence by defendant-appellant Burgal against the victim were properly admitted into evidence to prove motive, intent, and premeditation. See § 90.404(2), Fla....

...dence in a civil action, but that a statement of fault made as part of or in addition to such statements, writings, or gestures shall be admissible. The committee recommends against adopting chapter 2001-221, section 1, Laws of Florida, which amends section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (Character evidence, when admissible; Other crimes, wrongs, or acts)....

...However, after hearing oral argument, and carefully *341 considering the committee's recommendation against adopting chapter 2001-221, section 1, as well as the comments that were filed, we decline to follow this recommendation and also adopt the amendments to section 90.404(2) to the extent they are procedural....

...PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur. ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I dissent from the majority's decision to adopt chapter 2001-221, section 1, which amends section 90.404(2) by creating a paragraph (b)....

...My position is consistent with this Court's recent decision declining to adopt an amendment to the Evidence Code in accordance with the Committee's recommendations based on concerns about the substance of that amendment. See In re Amendments to Florida Evidence Code, 782 So.2d 339, 342 (Fla.2000). In this case, section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes, allows for the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation when a defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation and provides that such evidence may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. [2] The majority of the Committee recommended that the Court not adopt the amendment to section 90.404(2) based upon the inherent conflicts between the new legislation and sections 90.104(2) (the court should prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury), 90.404(1) (character evidence is inadmissible to prove person acted in conformity with that character trait), and 90.404(2)(a) (similar fact evidence is inadmissible when relevant only to prove bad character or propensity). The addition of subsection (b) substantially abrogates a portion of the Williams [3] rule, as codified in section 90.404(2)(a), which provides for the admissibility of relevant similar fact evidence even though the evidence points to the commission of another crime. See Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 404.9, at 181 (2000 ed.). This amendment to section 90.404(2) also conflicts with other cases from this Court, including Heuring v....

...Comm., CS for SB 2012 (2001) Staff Analysis 4 (April 18, 2001) (stating that new paragraph (b) is "similar" to the Rule 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence); Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crim. Prev., Correct. & Safety, HB 759 (2001) Staff Analysis 5 (June 26, 2001) (stating that new paragraph (b) brings section 90.404(2) into "conformity" with Federal Rule of Evidence 414). [2] Section 90.404(2)(b) provides: (b)1....

...for a federal drug offense since that would have supported his assertion that the murders were precipitated by an argument over hauling marijuana. We reject these claims. The evidence of Beltran-Lopez's violent history is clearly inadmissible under section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1987). If Espinosa's intention was to show that Beltran-Lopez had a generally violent character, then the evidence was inadmissible under section 90.404(1)....

...icular occasion." This general rule has several exceptions, none of which applies to this evidence. If Espinosa intended to present *893 the evidence as similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, then the evidence was inadmissible under section 90.404(2)(a) since it clearly would be offered solely to prove Beltran-Lopez's bad character or propensity. The only basis for introducing evidence of Bernardo Rodriguez's conviction for a federal drug offense would be under section 90.404(1)(b)1, which permits the admission "of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused." [3] Assuming, without deciding, that evidence of the conviction should have been admitted to support Espinosa's s...

...had very little legitimate probative value for the prosecution." Id. This limited legitimate probative value was outweighed by the unfair prejudice caused by the focus of the evidence on the defendant's "bad character" or "propensity," prohibited by Section 90.404, Florida Statutes....

...Moreover, under section 90.403, the trial court may, and did, properly guard against undue prejudice, in particular, any suggestion that the prosecution did something wrong or unfair by amending the charges. C. The Jack Lee Buick Deal The State cross-appeals the trial court's ruling excluding this evidence under section 90.404, Florida Statutes....

...The State does not deny that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony, but argues that any error was harmless because three witnesses testified that Albert did not pick up his beer bottle and threaten Grace with it. Generally, evidence regarding a victim's character is inadmissible. See § 90.404(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). Section 90.404(1)(b) provides for an exception to this general rule for "evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused." Under this exception, a defendant may use character evidence to show that the victim of a crime was the aggressor in support of his defense of self-defense. Pino v. Koelber, 389 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (treating a civil case of assault and battery the same as a criminal case). There is a distinction between reputation evidence and evidence of specific acts admitted under section 90.404(1)(b)....

...on about Delgado's arguments with her former husband, that he had killed ten men. Delgado first contends on appeal that his statement that he had killed ten *85 men and Brown's testimony about drugs should have been excluded as irrelevant. We agree. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...ar" and fail to "share some unique characteristics or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses," Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122, 124 (Fla. 1987), and such evidence is not relevant to prove any material fact in issue. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...this case. Furthermore, he argues, he pleaded guilty in the earlier case but denied his guilt in the instant case. Appellant contends that the two incidents are not so uniquely similar as to make the evidence of the earlier incident admissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), [2] codifying the so-called Williams rule. [3] On the contrary, he argues, the sole probative value of this similar fact evidence is to show his propensity to commit the crime charged, not to prove any material fact in issue, and section 90.404(2)(a) explicitly prohibits the admission of evidence solely to prove propensity....

...prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The sponsor *162 note to this section explains that "nothing that fails to meet the tests of §§ 90.401 and 90.403 may be admitted." Accordingly, section 90.404(2)(a) recognizes the interplay of section 90.401 and 90.403 by specifying that "similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue." Since similar fact evidence of other crimes is inherently prejudicial to a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial, such evidence is admissible under section 90.404(2)(a) only to prove a material fact in issue, that is, a material fact that is genuinely in dispute. In view of the obvious conflicting nature of the interplay between sections 90.403 and 90.404(2)(a), there appears to be some inconsistency in the reported decisions involving the admission of similar fact evidence of other crimes in cases of sexual battery against children....

...than the defendant. The supreme court then stated that, "in addition to the above requirements, the evidence must be relevant to a material fact in issue such as identity, motive, opportunity, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or fact," citing section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes. 513 So.2d at 124 (emphasis added). A critical aspect of the test of admissibility under section 90.404(2)(a) is not only whether the charged and collateral offenses are "strikingly similar" and "share some unique characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses," but also whether such evidence tends to prove a material fact issue that is in dispute....

...ssaulted her when the victim was not present. The supreme court approved the decision on the authority of Heuring. See also In the Interest of C.G., 506 So.2d 1131 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Thus, it is readily apparent that the test of admissibility under section 90.404(2)(a) and Heuring is primarily one of relevancy to prove disputed issues of material fact....

...f not guilty (which denies each essential element of the charged offense), but must be determined from the particular facts and circumstances involved in each case, i.e., has the defendant put such fact in issue. This construction and application of section 90.404(2)(a) brings it into complete harmony with the purpose of sections 90.401 and 90.403....

...We have carefully reviewed the record to determine in what respects the evidence of the Georgia incident was relevant to prove any material fact in issue, and how the prior criminal episode tended to prove such disputed issue of fact. Obviously, the Georgia episode was not admitted to prove each of the issues described in section 90.404(2)(a). The trial court never ruled which disputed issue of fact the evidence was admitted to prove, and simply instructed the jury that the evidence could be considered in connection with each of the issues described in section 90.404(2)(a)....

...nt had previously taken advantage of a similar opportunity to commit a sexual offense on a young girl, the only reasonably permissible inference to be drawn from that fact is the defendant's propensity to commit an offense, an improper purpose under section 90.404(2)(a)....

...would be confronted with a permissible inference based on the Georgia incident pointing to guilt; but two isolated incidents totally unrelated in any respect and separated by 12 years simply do not prove a scheme or plan in the sense contemplated by section 90.404(2)(a)....

...That single similarity alone without some other unique characteristic is simply insufficient, however. We have not been referred to any authority for the proposition that sexual battery on underage children is so unique in itself that it is uniformly admissible under section 90.404(2)(a). Thus, we hold on this record that the evidence of the Georgia episode is not demonstrably relevant to any material fact in issue and fails to satisfy the "strict standard of relevance" set forth in Heuring and section 90.404(2)(a)....

...The state simply has not satisfactorily explained how and why the evidence of the Georgia episode tends to prove a material fact in issue with respect to the charged offense. The admission of the evidence of the Georgia offense violated sections 90.403 and 90.404(2)(a)....

...d counsel went into the court room to select a jury. At this hearing, the court took up several matters that had to be considered out of the presence of the jury. The substance of the collateral crime testimony being offered by the state pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989), was made known to the trial judge through the deposition of the collateral crime witness....

...instructed the jury on the limited purpose of the collateral crime evidence it was about to hear without any request for such instruction being made on the record by defense counsel, although such an instruction is to be given only if so requested. § 90.404(2)(b)1.2., Fla....

...e's contention that appellant waived his objection to this evidence, not only because the state improperly attempts to insert this issue for the first time on motion for rehearing, but also because this contention is not supported by the record. [2] Section 90.404(2)(a) provides: "Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of...

...ded merely because *314 it relates to similar facts which point to the commission of a separate crime. The test of admissibility is relevancy. The test of inadmissibility is a lack of relevancy." (Emphasis in original.) Williams has been codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), which provides that a party may introduce similar crime evidence when it is relevant to prove a material fact in issue like identity, preparation, motive, intent, opportunity, plan, absence of mistake or accident, or knowledge....

...o children. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion except when such evidence is offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait. § 90.404(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). We disagree with the state's argument on appeal that the testimony concerning the appellant's marriage was admissible as similar fact evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). Section 90.404(2)(a) provides that similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence...

...force women to submit" and to show a "modus operandi" or a "common scheme or plan." Appellant claims the evidence was prejudicial and used only to prove bad character or propensity. The "similar fact rule" or "Williams rule," [1] is now codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979): Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,...

...esign (plan), or intent, or to prove identity. Of course, when such evidence is offered for one proper purpose there is danger of the jury improperly considering it for an improper purpose, so a cautionary or limiting jury instruction is proper. See § 90.404(2)(b)2, Fla....

...cannot be used as evidence. The similar fact evidence in this case was relevant only to prove bad character or propensity, but was inadmissible for that purpose for all of the policy reasons discussed above, and because case law [8] and the statute (§ 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...COBB, J., concurs. SHARP, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] See § 90.405, Fla. Stat. (1979); 1 Wigmore on Evidence, § 193, at 642 (3d Ed. 1940). [3] Section 90.404(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1979), attempts to eliminate some of the surprise if the similar facts evidence relates to another criminal offense by requiring the State to furnish the defendant with a description of the other criminal offe...

...Edelstein, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. GROSS, J. Mark Duffey appeals his convictions of second degree murder and grand theft. We affirm, and write primarily to address Duffey's claim that similar fact evidence of another crime was wrongfully admitted at trial under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...trial court sustained the defendant's objections and gave curative instructions. The error, if any, was not prejudicial. See § 924.051(7), Fla. Stat. (1997). Finally, Duffey challenges the admissibility of Maria Cicocca's testimony at trial. Under section 90.404(2)(a), similar fact evidence of other crimes "is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as ......

...ack on Cicocca relevant to Duffey's state of mind in the completed murder of Helenius. Duffey argues that the 12 year hiatus between the Cicocca attack and the Helenius murder made the evidence of the earlier crime too remote to be admissible. Under section 90.404(2)(a) the remoteness of a prior crime is one aspect of its relevance, its tendency to prove or disprove a material fact in issue....

...o pretrial orders suppressing evidence. State v. Palmore, 495 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 1986); State v. Brea, 530 So.2d 924 (Fla. 1988); State v. Everette, 532 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (allowing appeal from order preventing "other crimes" evidence under section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes)....

...been pending since 1989, and the record contains numerous written stipulations for continuance and waivers of speedy trial. [2] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), since codified at § 90.404(2), Fla....

...10 (11th Cir.1997) (misconduct occurring twelve years earlier was too remote in time to be relevant). *647 UPS contends that the trial court's post-trial ruling on Findeisen's testimony was not an abuse of discretion because this testimony was inadmissible as improper character or propensity evidence. We agree. Under section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes, evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion. Similarly, under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, similar fact evidence of other "crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible when used "solely to prove bad character or propensity." The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of other ba...

...Curiously, UPS did not argue at trial that the admission of Findeisen's testimony was discretionary. Instead UPS argued *650 that the testimony was simply not admissible by rule because it amounted to character or propensity evidence, which is generally, if not always, excluded under section 90.404(1)....

...at the time of the accident, citing State v. Wadsworth, 210 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1968). As to the evidence of prior crimes, we note that section 90.610 of the evidence code specifically forbids the use of such evidence for impeachment of credibility. Also, section 90.404 states a general prohibition against using evidence of past crimes solely to prove bad character or propensity....

...ot be said that the evidence was relevant. Consequently, the trial judge abused her discretion by allowing the testimony over appellant's continuing relevancy objection. We consider that such evidence was inadmissible as well under the provisions of Section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes (1989), which precludes a party from introducing "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his character ......

...and appellant did not enter the girls' bedroom alone. Appellant corroborated his wife's testimony and further stated that he did not have an opportunity to commit the offenses because the girls slept in the same room eighty-five percent of the time. Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge...

...In Coler, the evidence was offered to prove the state of mind or intent which is not a material fact in a sexual battery charge. In the case before us, the similar fact evidence was used to establish opportunity to commit the crimes, which was permissible under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1985) and relevant since it proved a material fact in issue....

...But the admission of evidence of the sexual abuse of the victim's sister did not show the opportunity, preparation, plan, motive, etc., to sexually abuse the victim at a later time. Neither intent [1] nor identity [2] was at issue. The similar fact evidence was introduced to show propensity, which is expressly prohibited by section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), and Williams v....

...assaults upon children has enormous probative value against a defendant in such a case. That is the reason that prosecutors use it and the reason trial and appellate courts have allowed it, despite the express prohibition against it in the statute (§ 90.404(2)(a)) and in Williams....

...of proving it can justify propensity evidence against the long-honored policy of excluding it." I agree with that observation. But that, it seems to me, is a problem that can only be addressed and resolved by the Florida Legislature and amendment of section 90.404(2)(a) to provide such an exception....

...ot be excluded merely because it relates to similar facts which point to the commission of a separate crime. The test of admissibility is relevancy. The test of inadmissibility is a lack of relevancy. Id. at 659-60 (emphasis omitted). As codified in section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2009), “[sjimilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, p...

...ant evidence will not be excluded merely because it relates to similar facts which point to the commission of a separate crime. The test of admissibility is relevancy. The test of inadmissibility is a lack of relevancy. Id. at 659-60. As codified in section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2006), "[s]imilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, pla...

...r these jurors were being excused solely for reasons of their race, which is the only basis for finding a Neil violation. II. Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting, as similar fact evidence of a collateral crime pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1991), both testimony relating to the robbery of an elderly couple that occurred some four years previously and documents showing that Appellant had pleaded guilty to that offense....

...This robbery occurred in an area of town far removed from the area where the prior offense was committed. Appellant contends that these incidents lacked sufficient similarity and uniqueness *492 to allow the admission of any evidence of the earlier offense under section 90.404(2)....

...Moreover, although the trial court also ruled that the similar crime evidence was admitted to prove absence of mistake or accident, there was no material issue of fact relating to either of these facts. Yet, similar crime evidence is admissible under section 90.404(2) only if it relates to a material fact in issue. The similar crime evidence admitted in this case proved only that Appellant had a bad character or propensity to commit robbery, purposes expressly prohibited by section 90.404(2)....

...The state counters that the *1064 evidence was properly presented to the jury as relevant to the issue of the defendant's identity and to his knowledge of the presence of a controlled substance in the items sold to the undercover officer. The Williams rule has been codified in section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1985), which provides, in pertinent part: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS....

...835 (1891); Sanchez v. State, 445 So.2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Hager v. State, 439 So.2d 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). However, this rule of admissibility is merely an exception to the rule that evidence of the character of the victim is ordinarily irrelevant, see § 90.404, Fla....

...elve. The victim testified that she did not want her mother to know about her father's acts because she was afraid. Evidence of prior, similar sex acts with a minor victim is admissible, where the relevancy test is met, to show a pattern of conduct. Section 90.404(2), Fla....

...to prove a material fact in issue, including proof of intent, plan, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. It is inadmissible when the evidence is offered solely to prove bad character or the propensity of the defendant to commit a crime. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...If the evidence of a similar act of the accused is offered only to show that he or she is of bad character or is likely to commit the crime charged, it is not relevant to a material fact, and thus not admissible. Where child molestation is involved, however, section 90.404(2) broadens the admissibility of similar fact evidence to some extent. Subsection 90.404(2)(b)1....

...In the present case, and without discussing the facts in detail, we conclude that the trial court was correct in finding that the similar fact evidence was offered by the State to establish intent, plan and absence of mistake or accident. Even though section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes allows evidence of other acts of child molestation to be admitted for any matter to which it is relevant, relevancy remains the threshold question to be considered....

...But evidence of other crimes is inadmissible where its sole relevancy is to attack the defendant's character or to show the defendant's propensity to commit a crime. State v. Vazquez, 419 So.2d 1088 (Fla. 1982); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); § 90.404, Fla....

...but stated that she knew Grier kept records about other women. We review the trial court's admission of Williams rule evidence for an abuse of discretion. Stav v. State, 860 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The trial court admitted the collateral crimes evidence under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, permitting admission of prior acts as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake. The statute tests the relevancy of collateral crime testimony, albeit within strict guidelines. Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122, 124 (Fla.1987). Even if a trial court finds that the collateral crime evidence is admissible *100 under section 90.404(2), the court must also take a second step and weigh the danger of unfair prejudice against the probative value of the evidence....

...of L.R.'s and L.H.'s testimony was, he claims, out-weighed by unfair prejudice. Nevertheless, because the relevancy and prejudice issues are interrelated, we will address both parts of the inquiry. [3] In McLean, the supreme court considered whether section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes, violates due process....

...e prior acts; and (4) the role of intervening circumstances. 934 So.2d at 1262. We note that the trial court considered these factors when it permitted L.R. and L.H. to testify at trial, although that court based its order admitting the testimony on section 90.404(2)(a).

...evant and inadmissible. However, we do not agree; and in a civil case, we recently held to the contrary. Carr v. Phillips, 540 So.2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Moreover, in criminal cases, prior similar acts by the defendant are admissible pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a)....

...The trial court overruled these objections. Houston continues to maintain that the introduction of the evidence of the earlier two attacks was erroneous. We disagree. In general, evidence that is relevant to prove a fact in issue is admissible in accordance with section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2002), generally referred to as the *427 Williams rule....

...bvious danger of prejudicing a jury against a criminal defendant based on the bad character of the accused. Specific instances of such conduct is admissible under the statute, however, to prove identity, motive, or any of the other matters listed in section 90.404(2)....

...Defendant first claims that the trial court erred by allowing the state to present evidence that defendant left notes on Martin's car and attempted to speak with her several times prior to the night of the incident. Classifying this as evidence of "stalking," defendant argues that its admission violated section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...State, 827 So.2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). A party may be permitted to introduce collateral crime evidence when it is relevant to prove a material fact; however, this type of evidence is inadmissible when it is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...How Midtown obtained the contract had nothing to do with how it performed under the contract. Local Contractors, however, argues that if Midtown would cheat in the manner in which it *581 obtained the contract, it was more likely to cheat in its performance. Section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes (1999), states that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion." Propensity for cheating would clearly be inadmissible. Character evidence is only admissible if the party places its character in evidence, and even then, it is only admissible by way of reputation evidence. See § 90.609, Fla. Stat. (1999). Likewise, it is inadmissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), which states: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS OR ACTS.— (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opport...

...e both asphyxiated; their bodies were found in the same general area; and pantyhose was discovered in the vicinity of their bodies."). Affirmed. FARMER and LEVINE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 658-63 (Fla. 1959); see also § 90.404(2), Fla....

...This evidence was also admissible as specific instances of conduct to show Pancoast's character for violence once that character trait was placed at issue, as well as Lusk's knowledge of that character trait and Lusk's state of mind in believing his actions were necessary to defend against Pancoast's actions. See § 90.404, Fla....

...State, 619 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), review denied, 629 So.2d 132 (allowing impeachment on a collateral matter without prior Williams rule notice). Impeachment evidence was properly admitted after Allred "opened the door" by testifying that he had never hit any woman. § 90.404(2)(b), Fla....

...xcept as impeachment evidence when he testifies and even there the exception is clothed with many safeguards. See § 90.610, Fla. Stat.; See also, Ehrhardt, Using Convictions to Impeach Under the Florida Evidence Code, 10 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 235 (1982). Section 90.404, Florida Statutes, directly excludes evidence of a defendant's trait of character to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion (i.e., on the occasion of the offense charged). One exception to this last rule of exclusion is the so-called Williams Rule [4] codified in section 90.404(2)(a), which authorizes the admissibility of similar fact evidence " when relevant to prove a material fact in issue." The use of that exception to the general rule is subject to so much danger to a fair trial on the material facts tha...

...uded as a matter of law. Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1987) [7] and Beasley v. State, 503 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), approved, 518 So.2d 917 (Fla. 1988), surely do not mean that case law has effectively, and unconstitutionally, amended section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), to make admissible all similar fact evidence that corroborates the testimony of a child victim in every case charging a child sex crime in a familial setting without regard to (1) the strong policy reaso...

...rove "any material fact in issue" nor to corroborate the stepdaughter's testimony as to the charged act and constitutes prejudicial similar fact evidence of propensity and bad character not admissible under the Williams Rule exception as codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...State, 499 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Goodling v. State, 482 So.2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Ballance v. State, 447 So.2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). [3] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959); cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); see also § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...NOTES [1] The new Florida Evidence Code is not applicable to this case because this action accrued before the effective date of the code. § 90.103(2), Fla. Stat. (1979). Yet, both of the conclusions we have reached to reverse this case coincide with the result which the code would dictate. §§ 90.404(1), 90.405, Fla. Stat. (1979). Apparently, however, the code would even preclude reputation evidence of Pino's propensity for violence because his character is not an issue in the case. § 90.404(1), Fla....

...*332 F04-30281 (robbery date: September 28, 2004); [4] and Case No. F04-30282 (robbery date: August 26, 2004). [5] Based on an examination of the casings, a firearms expert determined that the bullet casings recovered from all three robberies were fired from the same weapon. [6] Pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2005), the State filed a notice of intent to rely on evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts....

...rule of evidence to its analysis. The trial court's written order quoted Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), presumably intending to apply it by analogy. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), however, has no application in this case. The applicable rule is section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), which states: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, pr...

...dence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. This section codifies the general rule of admissibility of similar fact evidence enunciated in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959). See Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9, 16 (Fla.2000). Section 90.404(2)(a) is a general rule of admissibility....

...ndant is adopted and applied to cross-examinations of both witnesses and defendants. We have considered and reject the other points raised on appeal. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence is affirmed. GUNTHER and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 90.404 replaced the remaining part of section 90.08 pertaining to evidence of prior convictions as evidence of character....

...Squires argues that this testimony introduced prejudicial evidence of his alleged criminal activity unrelated to the charges brought at trial and served no purpose but to illustrate his bad character. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 [80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86] (1959); § 90.404(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

...By attempting to demonstrate his non-violent character, Squires had placed this alleged trait in issue. The trial court properly allowed the state to rebut these assertions on non-violent character by showing that Squires had fired deadly weapons at persons other than the victim. Lewis v. State, 377 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1979); § 90.404(1)(a), Fla.Stat....

...material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident; it is inadmissible when relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...any time prior or subsequent to the present charges." Sims argued that the testimony was not relevant to the offenses at issue and would substantially prejudice him. He also argued that the State had not given notice of "similar fact" evidence. See § 90.404(2)(c)1, Fla....

..."Our view of the proper rule simply is that relevant evidence will not be excluded merely because it relates to similar facts which point to the commission of a separate crime. The test of admissibility is relevancy." Id. at 659. This rule is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), which provides that the state may introduce similar fact evidence of other crimes or acts when it is relevant to prove a material fact in issue like identity, preparation, motive, intent, opportunity, plan, absence of mistake or accident, or knowledge....

...two projects, and the manner in which these difficulties impacted Southern Landmark's ability to perform under the contract in the present case. The evidence was pertinent to Newberry Square's motive, knowledge, and intent and thus admissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, as it reflected the totality of the circumstances and the course of dealing between the parties as related to the dispute in the present case....

...FERGUSON, Judge. Petitioner, State of Florida, brings on for review by Writ of Certiorari [1] a trial court decision which grants the respondent's motion in limine and prohibits petitioner from introducing similar fact evidence of other acts as is permitted by Section 90.404(2)(a), *1121 Florida Statutes (1981) [2] , in carefully limited situations....

...ngs. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution and Rules 9.030(b)(2)(A) and 9.030(b)(3) of the Florida Appellate Procedure. See State v. Steinbrecher, 409 So.2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). [2] Sec. 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Defense counsel asserted below that this evidence was admissible to "establish that Ms. Jorquera is a drug dealer and my client is an innocent bystander." The trial court properly rejected this argument. Evidence of the co-defendants' drug dealing history was inadmissible under sections 90.404(1) and (2), Florida Statutes....

...nce and as similar fact evidence since it was offered solely to prove the co-defendant's bad character or propensity). Generally, any evidence relevant to prove a material fact at issue is admissible unless precluded by a specific rule of exclusion. Section 90.404, Florida Statutes, is the evidentiary rule of exclusion pertinent to appellant's proffer. In this case, if appellant sought to introduce evidence that Jorquera was a drug dealer to prove that she, and not he, was Martelo's sole supplier, then this evidence was clearly inadmissible under section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes....

...ere. If appellant intended to present this evidence as similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove that the two women followed their usual inclination to engage in drug exchanges together, then the evidence was inadmissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which codifies the Williams Rule....

...is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. Here, appellant failed to demonstrate how evidence of the co-defendants' previous joint criminal activity was probative as to any of the issues enumerated in section 90.404(2)....

...And so I challenge the conclusion that under the Evidence Code a defendant cannot be allowed to add to that doubt by producing evidence that two co-defendants recently committed a number of similar crimes and were therefore more likely to have done the crime on trial. Reading section 90.404(2) to categorically exclude such defensive Williams rule evidence is to wrench the rule from its purposive moorings—namely, that it would be a denial of due process to convict a defendant of a specific crime charged merely because he is thought generally likely to commit such sins....

...issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...pensity of the accused is admissible unless precluded by some specific exception or rule of exclusion. This rule we hold applies to relevant similar fact evidence ... even though it points to the commission of another crime'." [e.s.] Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.404, Law Revision Council Note (West 1976)....

...The quality of the evidence proffered in the current case thus moves beyond simple propensity and partakes of that essential ingredient of all relevant evidence—namely, a capacity "tending to prove or disprove a material fact." § 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2003). The court reads section 90.404 as if it were unhinged from its purpose....

...s money. Appellant was unable to return the money initially for the stated reason that she had used the money to cover checks written by her husband, but after a few weeks did make a full refund to Mr. Jossi. The "similar crimes" rule of evidence is Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) which provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl...

...We, therefore, hold that a defendant is entitled to a "Richardson -type" inquiry when the state fails to comply with the notice requirement under section 90.803(23)(b). In support of our holding, we observe that the notice requirement here is similar to that under section 90.404(2)(b) relating to similar fact evidence....

...State, 494 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1986). Appellant contends that the testimony relating to the bank robbery does not fit within the rule of admissibility set forth in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), or section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1985), and that the admission of such evidence constituted reversible error....

...d not render the testimony identifying appellant as the bank robber relevant and admissible "to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1985). Because the state has failed to show any basis for admission of this testimony under Williams or section 90.404(2)(a), we hold that it was error for the trial court to admit the testimony regarding appellant's participation in the bank robbery....

...ness' credibility be by "evidence in the form of reputation," and that the evidence only refer to the witness' "character relating to truthfulness." Evidence of a defendant's pertinent character trait is inadmissible unless offered by the defendant. § 90.404(1)(a), Fla....

...He also contends that the acts described by the victim's sister had neither a sufficient "level of uniqueness" nor sufficient "identifiable points of similarity" to qualify as similar fact evidence. He argues that the testimony of the victim's sister was therefore inadmissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), and Williams v....

...Garde salon who testified that they gave Bricker one hundred dollars to not report the license violations. During closing argument, the state again made reference to the Avant Garde salon to show a common scheme by which Bricker received the bribes. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that: [s]imilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, kno...

...The jury found the defendant guilty as charged, and he was later sentenced. In the defendant's appeal he raises several grounds. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the State to introduce the 1992 attack. We disagree. Pursuant to Williams, as codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), "[s]imilar fact evidence of other *164 crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including ... proof of motive, . . . intent,. . . or absence of mistake or accident." § 90.404(2), Fla....

...rove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Goldstein passed out. When Mr. Goldstein returned home, he saw his wife lying on the kitchen floor and said, "Oh, no, not again." Then he picked up a knife and said, "I ought to kill her. She would be better off dead." The Williams rule is now codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981): "[s]imilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, ......

...ct upon a child. It subsequently served appellant with a notice, pursuant to section 90.803(23)(b) of the Florida Evidence Code, stating that it intended to offer at trial the alleged child victim's out-of-court statements; and a notice, pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b) of the Florida Evidence Code, stating that it intended to offer at trial similar fact evidence of another crime, wrong or act....

...The State petitions this court for a writ of certiorari quashing a pretrial order of the trial court in this criminal proceeding. The order is entitled, "Order on Defense's Notice of Intention to Introduce Similar Fact Evidence Including Prior Convictions of Shantavious Wilson [Pursuant to FSA 90.404(2)(a) or Reverse Williams Rule Evidence]." Although we are not entirely convinced that we would have entered this order at this stage of the proceedings, we conclude that our limited certiorari powers do not give us authority to quash this order....

...Wilson with his car. Mr. Storer characterizes this evidence as "reverse Williams rule" evidence. Accordingly, he filed a notice of intent to introduce similar fact evidence at trial that is comparable to the notice the State is required to file under section 90.404(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...Wilson died. II. THE NATURE OF THIS PROPOSED EVIDENCE We are not convinced that this evidence is actually "reverse Williams rule" evidence. Williams rule evidence is evidence of prior crimes or bad acts of the defendant presented by the State under section 90.404(2)(a), as character evidence of the accused, when relevant to prove a material fact in issue....

...State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959). There is extensive case law governing Williams rule evidence. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 404.9 (2004 ed.). Before the State can introduce Williams rule evidence, it must file a pretrial motion under section 90.404(2)(c)(1), giving notice of its intent to use the evidence at trial....

...State, 513 So.2d 213, 215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), dismissed, 520 So.2d 583 (Fla.1988): While most cases generally involve the offer of similar fact evidence by the prosecution against a defendant in a criminal case, there is nothing in the language of [section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)] which precludes the use of evidence offered by a defendant in a criminal case, or by a party in a civil action....

...Because Mr. Storer is not intending to introduce this evidence to suggest that someone else ran over Mr. Wilson, we doubt that it falls within the case law on reverse Williams rule. Instead, this is an issue involving the character of the victim under section 90.404(1)(b)(1). [3] Such evidence is generally inadmissible by a defendant except when introduced to prove a relevant "trait." See § 90.404(1)(b)(1), Fla....

...Storer may likewise wish to present evidence relevant to his theory. Two procedural matters affect our analysis in this case. First, although Mr. Storer filed a notice of intent to rely upon this evidence, it is noteworthy that the statutes and rules of procedure do not require him to file this notice. Section 90.404(2)(c)(1) only applies to the State. Moreover, since it appears that this evidence is not reverse Williams rule under section 90.404(2), but evidence of the character of the victim under section 90.404(1), this pretrial ruling *758 is a matter that did not need to be resolved prior to trial under the standard rules of procedure....

...2d DCA 2002) (holding that the trial court's decision to admit Williams rule evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); Traina v. State, 657 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (exclusion of reverse Williams rule evidence was not abuse of discretion). The same is true for decisions under section 90.404(1)(b)....

...s of cross-examination. [2] The relationship between and among sections 90.403, .404, and .405, Florida Statutes (2003), is worthy of consideration. It would appear that a trial court makes a decision to admit evidence on an issue of character under section 90.404 but that the method of proving the issue of character is resolved under section 90.405....

...At least in this case, the trial court has not yet ruled on the exclusion of any specific item of evidence under section 90.403. [3] Mr. Storer's counsel did not rely exclusively on the theory of reverse Williams rule evidence at the hearing but also argued the admissibility of this evidence under section 90.404(1)(b)(1)....

...I and II, but choose not to impose a sentence on Count III of the information. This timely appeal then ensued. Evidence of other crimes is admissible if it is probative of a material issue other than the bad character or propensity of an individual. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), which expresses this view, restates the law as determined by the Florida Supreme Court in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959). Section 90.404(2)(a) lists proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident as some of the issues to which the evidence of collateral occurrences may be relevant....

...sible under Section 90.402, Florida Statutes, simply as relevant evidence. This, in fact, has been the view adopted by our federal courts. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (the counterpart to Section 90.404(2)(a)) applies only to evidence of crimes and acts extrinsic to the charged offense....

...Leichtman, 742 F.2d 598 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771 (11th Cir.1984). Without deciding the question of whether "inseparable crime evidence" is admissible under Section 90.402, which generally provides that relevant evidence is admissible, or under Section 90.404(2), which specifically provides for the admissibility of similar fact evidence to prove a material fact, we hold the collateral crime evidence at issue herein was so inextricably intertwined with the crimes charged that an intelligent...

...and intent. Burr, 466 So.2d at 1053. A conviction for other crimes, wrongs, or acts has never been a prerequisite for the admission of evidence of those acts, so long as the evidence is relevant to some issue other than bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Collateral Crimes The trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of N.B. and P.W. concerning their rapes. Collateral crimes evidence is admissible to prove identity, among other things, so long as its sole purpose is not to prove propensity or bad character. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...never asked for a curative instruction, for the statement to be stricken, or for a mistrial. Wilson v. State, 436 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1983). Similar Fact Evidence We affirm the trial court's ruling on the similar fact evidence of D.R. and R.P. based on section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes, which provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden...

...alleged that Gray used his position as teacher to isolate them from other students so that Gray could fondle them, have them fondle him or have them perform oral sex on him. This similar fact evidence was relevant to a material fact as required by section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes, because it established plan, scheme and opportunity by which Gray could have sexually abused students using his position as their teacher and using the physical set up of the classroom....

...We likewise find no error in the trial court's addition of the phrase "pattern of criminality" in giving the standard Williams rule [1] instruction as it appears in Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. While "pattern of criminality" is not one of the permissible uses of Williams Rule evidence listed in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), that list is not exhaustive, but only illustrative....

...there was any error in allowing its introduction. We note, initially, that there was no request for a limiting instruction at the time the evidence concerning the sexual molestation of the older child was introduced, and none was given by the court. Section 90.404(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes, requires such preliminary instruction only if requested....

...1978) (to be fundamental, the error must amount to a denial of due process); but see, Anderson v. State, 549 So.2d 807 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), rev. denied, 560 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1990). Evidence of similar facts is admissible for limited purposes, such as proof of identity, intent, and motive. Section 90.404(2)(b)(2), Florida Statutes....

...isparity may be disregarded entirely). The judgments of conviction and sentences are AFFIRMED. MINER and WOLF, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); codified at section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes.

...d in allowing the state to comment on the defendant's failure to assert self-defense when she had given a statement (at the time of arrest). We find that the trial court reversibly erred by admitting evidence prohibited by the Florida Evidence Code, section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989), but affirm as to the other issues....

...The state responds that the appellant did place her character at issue by testifying that she fought in self-defense and was actually trying to get to a phone to report the victim's behavior and threats, implying that she would walk away from a fight. The general rule expressed in section 90.404(1) is that the state may not offer testimony during its case in chief of the accused's past character to prove that the accused committed the crime in question....

...In this case, the appellant took the stand and testified, When I came out of the house, I was going to my sister's house to call the police and tell them to get her [victim] to leave my house. She swung at me with a knife... . Me and her went to fighting because I swung back at her. The appellant is permitted by section 90.404(1)(a), Florida Statutes, to offer evidence of "a pertinent trait" of her character....

...Black's Law Dictionary defines character evidence as "evidence of a person's moral standing in the community based on reputation." Black's Law Dictionary at 211. "Character" apparently relates to the attributes of a person which may be gleaned from a consistent pattern of behavior. See generally, Ehrhardt Florida Evidence § 90.404....

...When reviewing erroneous rulings on evidentiary matters, we examine the entire record to determine if the error is harmless. Each of the evidentiary rulings discussed above impermissibly allowed evidence proving only LaMarr's bad character or propensity for violence. This was improper. See § 90.404.2(a) Fla....

...If the question was an attempt to offer collateral crime evidence, it was improper. "Collateral crime evidence, or Williams Rule evidence, may be admitted when relevant to prove a material fact in issue such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. See § 90.404(2), Fla....

...Public Defender, for appellee. Before BARKDULL, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. We review an order granting a motion in limine to restrict the state, after a notice of *1125 intention to rely on "other crimes" evidence, pursuant to Section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Fla....

...to become delinquent by giving them alcohol, in violation of section 827.04(3). [1] We hold that Foburg's convictions were tainted by the improper admission of Williams [2] rule evidence. Accordingly, we reverse Foburg's convictions and remand this cause for a new trial. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), sets forth the basis for admission of Williams rule evidence: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive...

...The charged and collateral offenses must be not only strikingly similar, but they must also share some unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses." In addition to this similarity requirement, "[a] critical aspect of the test of admissibility under section 90.404(2)(a) ......

...The only purpose served by the State's introduction of the Williams rule evidence was to imply that because Foburg had committed similar acts seventeen to twenty years ago, he must have committed the acts with which he was now charged. Propensity is an improper basis for the admission of Williams rule evidence. § 90.404(2)(a); Heuring, 513 So.2d 122; Thomas, 599 So.2d 158; Duncan v....

...course of the previous year. These events, the defendant suggests, were too remote in time to be relevant. He further argues that these prior instances of misconduct were insufficiently similar to the charged offenses to satisfy the requirements of § 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, referred to here as the Williams rule....

...Additionally, a careful review of the record convinces us that *1100 the Williams rule evidence did not become the feature of the trial. Next, the defendant suggests that the collateral crimes introduced by the state were not sufficiently similar to be admissible under the caselaw interpreting § 90.404(2)(a)....

...rcumstances. [1] Layman raises twelve issues on appeal. [2] Layman first claims that the court erred in failing to give limiting instructions on evidence of collateral crimes introduced by the State. Although a limiting instruction is required under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1991), for "similar fact evidence," [3] none is required under section 90.402 for "relevant" evidence....

...ssisted suicide; 8) in failing to renew the offer of counsel before sentencing; 9) in finding CCP present; 10) in considering lack of remorse in sentencing; 11) in imposing a disproportionate sentence; and 12) in giving a faulty CCP instruction. [3] Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1991), provides in relevant part: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation...

...and is to be considered. After the close of the evidence, the jury shall be instructed on the limited purpose for which the evidence was received and that the defendant cannot be convicted for a charge not included in the indictment or information. § 90.404(2), Fla....

...he Child Protection Team. Despite Billie's objections that the information sought to be introduced was irrelevant and/or intended only to establish his propensity for violence and bad character in complete disregard of the Williams Rule criteria and Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes, the trial court permitted introduction of all of the evidence....

...we find that the evidence admitted as Williams Rule evidence, with the exception of the testimony relating to the "hammer incident," was improperly admitted. The test for admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts or other crimes is relevance. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...nothing more. See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (1997); see also Hebel v. State, 765 So.2d 143 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Williams v. State, 621 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla.1993); Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744 (Fla.1988); Evans v. State, 693 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which codified Williams v....

...issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Nevertheless, limitations on the admission of relevant evidence have been established. For example, evidence submitted to show a defendant's propensity toward commission of the offense or to show the defendant's bad character, with nothing more, is inadmissible. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...The evidence of that event, and the determination of what, if anything, it proved, presented a question of fact for the jury's consideration. In sum, the prior bad act evidence submitted in the instant case, with the exception of the "hammer incident," was not relevant to prove a material issue. See § 90.402, Fla. Stat.; § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...4th DCA 1997) ("To open the door to evidence of prior bad acts, the defense must first offer misleading testimony or make a specific factual assertion which the state has the right to correct so that the jury will not be misled.")(emphasis added). Cf. § 90.404(1)(a) & (c), Fla....

...king. My point is that if the detective's testimony rests on a faulty scientific basis, nothing prevents the defense from raising this issue for a determination prior to the retrial. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959) codified as § 90.404, Fla.Stat....

...He concluded that the evidence was "relevant as similar fact evidence and that the probative value [was] not outweighed by the prejudicial effects [sic]." The parties agree that we are obligated to affirm unless we conclude that this ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. Our disposition of this case is governed by section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), and our supreme court's interpretation of that statute in McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248 (Fla.2006). Section 90.404(2)(b) authorizes the admission of collateral crime evidence in child molestation prosecutions for any relevant purpose, including to corroborate the victim's testimony by showing that the accused had a propensity for such criminal conduct....

...We therefore conclude that the internal affairs file should not have been admitted into evidence. As relates to Trooper Gipson herself, we do not see a plausible theory on which any of the disciplinary history would be admissible as similar acts evidence under section 90.404, Florida Statutes....

...occasion, except: .... (b) Character of victim. — 1. Except as provided in s. 794.022 [the rape shield law], evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait. .. . § 90.404, Fla....

...Does he have a reputation in the Parramore community? A. Right. Q. Do you know what that reputation is? PROSECUTOR: I'm going to object, Your Honor. THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection... . *859 The court ruled that the officer's reputation in the community was not admissible under section 90.404 of the Evidence Code because the officer was neither a "victim" nor an "accused." Section 90.404(1) provides: Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion, except: (a) Character of accused....

...The trial court adjudged Wrobel guilty and sentenced him to 18 months imprisonment. Wrobel timely appeals. The appellant argues that a defendant in a criminal trial has the right to introduce evidence to show his good character. This argument is based on section 90.404(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979): Character evidence; when admissible....

...It is clear that nothing under section 90.405 nor in the case law of Florida authorizes the defense to introduce evidence of the absence of prior criminal convictions as a substitute for reputation testimony, even when it has been pre-determined under section 90.404 that evidence of character or a trait of character is admissible under the facts of a given case....

...ed him a fair trial. We find reversible error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which "Williams' Rule" evidence was introduced at the time such evidence was presented to the jury. The Florida Evidence Code, Section 90.404(2)(b)2., provides that when evidence of other crimes is admitted, "the court shall, if requested, charge the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence is received and is to be considered." Recognizing that some aspects of the...

...of section 90.803(23) was harmless. See Cook v. State, 531 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Salter v. State, 500 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The evidence of prior similar acts by appellant against his stepdaughter was properly admitted pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...But the evidence did not serve only such a limited purpose, as it also corroborated the testimony of the other victim. And as Heuring recognizes, such evidence may be admitted when relevant to issues of intent, motive, and absence of mistake as provided in section 90.404(2)(a)....

...cluded the portion of the tape regarding insurance fraud despite Ford Credit's objection that it was relevant as it related to the conduct of MCI's business affairs. The trial court correctly excluded the insurance fraud conversation. See Fla. Stat. § 90.404(1) (2000)....

...Markings, so that Markings could qualify under that County's disadvantaged business enterprise program. Initially, we question whether this point was preserved for appeal. Counsel for the defense objected to the sufficiency of the notice required by section 90.404(2)(b)1 only in passing, and said merely that the evidence was improper. Section 90.404(2)(b)1 provides: When the state in a criminal action intends to offer evidence of other criminal offenses under paragraph (a), no fewer than 10 days before trial, the state shall furnish to the accused a written statement of the acts o...

...an express requirement of the statute. To the extent State v. Zenobia, 614 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) appears to require specific reasons or explanations of what the jury might deduce from the collateral crime evidence, we respectfully disagree. Section 90.404(2)(a) provides that fact similar evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and identity....

...necessary representations which had to be made in order to obtain an advantageous business status for Markings. We agree with Quinn this evidence was damaging to his case, but it was also *955 relevant and we think admissible against him pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a)....

...It has been established that the State cannot introduce evidence attacking the character of the accused unless the accused first puts his good character in issue. See Wadsworth v. State, 201 So.2d 836 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), quashed on other *886 grounds, 210 So.2d 4 (Fla.1968), § 90.404(l)(a), Fla....

...Testimony in the new penalty phase revealed that the child was Burnell's nephew, but Burnell was raising him as her own and trying to adopt him. In any event, Lowe was improperly offering Sailor's prior act of misconduct solely to prove Sailor's bad character or propensity. See § 90.404(1), (2)(a), Fla....

...t. The victim was sexually assaulted in her house, taken outside by the intruder, and sexually assaulted again. At trial the court admitted, over appellant's objection, evidence of other crimes, under Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), and section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...In Cohens a codefendant, Butler, and Cohens were charged with the shooting death of a clerk at a gas station. The state sought to introduce evidence that Cohens and Butler attempted to rob the Flowers Bakery half an hour earlier. The state argued the evidence was either Williams [2] rule evidence under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2003), or was inextricably intertwined....

..."Evidence that suggests a defendant has committed other crimes or bad acts can have a powerful effect on the results at trial." Bozeman v. State, 698 So.2d 629, 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (citing Czubak ). Evidence of collateral crimes or bad acts is admissible only when relevant to prove a material fact at issue. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...ossession or control: (A) a list of the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant to any offense charged or any defense thereto, or to any similar fact evidence to be presented at trial under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes....

...nces of the Alabama murder in addition to the description thereof found in the inadmissible confession. As to the second contention, similar fact evidence of other crimes is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as intent. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...1st DCA 1981), absolute factual identity is not required. Townsend v. State, 420 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). There were sufficient factual similarities herein so as to render evidence of the Beason murder admissible, if relevant to the proof of one of the material facts set forth in Section 90.404(2)(a)....

...[1] The victim did not know the perpetrator. [2] The victim was clearly not the sole eyewitness, and corroborative evidence was readily available and produced by the state. Thus, in this case, the trial court should have applied the traditional collateral crime rule as codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991): *397 Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden...

...administered. The consequences now may include not only harm to the child but criminal prosecution as well. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES Appellant next asserts that it was error for the court to admit evidence of the October 1985 incident. Section 90.404(2)(a) of the Florida Evidence Code provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledg...

...: Current Issues in Law, Medicine, Mental Health and Protective Services (1987); Comment, Other Crimes Evidence to Prove the Corpus Delecti of a Child Sexual Case, 40 U. Miami L.Rev. 217 (1985). Florida's version of the above mentioned federal rule, section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Evidence Code, is as follows: (2) Other Crimes, Wrongs, Or Acts....

...Yes, I was. I was hanging out with him. Evidence of the dangerous character of the victim is admissible to show, or as tending to show, that the defendant *458 acted in self defense. See Smith v. State, 606 So.2d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); see also § 90.404(1)(b), Fla....

...all found at the same time, and goes directly to the defendant's intent." Defense counsel objected on the basis that the state had failed to provide the defense with the proper notice of intent to introduce collateral crime evidence, as required by section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...We agree with appellant that the the two separate charges of grand theft were not so linked together in time and circumstance with the instant grand theft charge so as to constitute inseparable crimes, admissible under section 90.402, Florida Statutes, without need for compliance with the 10-day notice requirement under section 90.404(2)(b)1....

...We do not discuss the child's hearsay statements regarding this count because they would clearly be inadmissible at retrial on count one. [2] U.S. Const. amend. VI. [3] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) (codified in section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1991)).

...The probative value of this evidence, however, appears to us to be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Arguably, the primary thing the tape shows is that Mr. Huck could lose his temper with a woman. If so, it is improper character evidence. See § 90.404(1), Fla....

...trial. An order granting a new trial for errors of law should be reversed when, on appeal, it is determined such matters were either not error or were harmless error. State v. Lewis, 543 So.2d 760 (Fla.2d DCA), rev. den., 549 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1989). Section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1985) provides that similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or...

...Finally, we note that the victim's testimony concerning the uncharged incidents was brief and was not made a feature of the trial. The state in this case failed to provide notice of its intent to offer similar fact evidence at trial as required by section 90.404(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Paille has failed to establish actual prejudice or unfair surprise. See Davis v. State, 537 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Accordingly, we find the admission of the similar fact evidence to be harmless error in spite of the state's failure to give notice under section 90.404(2)(b)1....

...The question plainly called for hearsay. 4) The trial court sustained the state's objection to questions to Biggs asking for the reputations of Levey and Peters "in the community as police officers" and her own experience with these officers behaving in certain ways. Under section 90.404(1)(b)1, Florida Statutes (2006), the aggressive nature of a victim's character is admissible only in cases where a defendant alleges self-defense....

...as raised the issue of self-defense. See Dupree, 615 So.2d at 721 ( citing United States v. Greschner, 647 F.2d 740 (7th Cir.1981)). Here, Love did not claim self-defense. Also, Love's question did not call for a "pertinent trait of character" under section 90.404(1)(b)1; a reputation as a "police officer" is not a character trait like peacefulness or honesty....

...State, 944 So.2d 1189, 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Nardone v. State, 798 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The first issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain so-called Williams Rule collateral-crime evidence. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...ntent, in that Appellant showed a pattern of insinuating himself into the role of caretaker and then seizing the opportunity to molest the victim sexually because the victim would be unable or unlikely to report the inappropriate sexual conduct. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...not become an inflammatory feature of the trial. The court delayed the ultimate ruling on admissibility and ordered the attorneys not to mention the Williams Rule evidence during jury selection and opening statements without a showing of good cause. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), states: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.— (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. Section 90.404(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2005), states: In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is ad...

...In the Williams Rule proceedings, the trial court afforded counsel for the State and for Appellant generous opportunities to argue the facts and the law. The State presented ample reasons from which the court could conclude that the collateral-crime evidence was admissible under section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), which is a general rule of admissibility, subject to certain exceptions, rather than a general exclusionary rule. See Williams, 110 So.2d at 658. Additionally, the State argued the applicability of the somewhat relaxed standard of admission enunciated in section 90.404(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2005), and fully discussed in McLean....

...crimes when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, common scheme or a general pattern of criminality. The Williams Rule is codified at § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...1st DCA 1984) (reversing for "fundamental injustice" under rule 9.140(f)). The trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See LaMarca v. State, 785 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Fla.2001); Bryan v. State, 947 So.2d 1270, 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Section 90.404, Florida Statutes (2007), Florida's codification of the Williams rule, provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact *738 in issue such as motive, opportunity, intent, prep...

...evidence would be to establish the bad character or criminal propensity of Defendant. Even if the lower general standard in § 90.402[,] Fla. Stat.[,] were applied, the prior crime would still not be relevant." B. Analysis of the Williams Rule Issue Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), which codifies Williams v....

...Contrary to the trial court's analysis, if the State had been able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Berube had murdered C.D., evidence concerning that crime would have been the only one of the three crimes the State sought to admit that might have been relevant and admissible under section 90.404(2)(a).

...vidence regarding David's purported bad character as circumstantial evidence of his conduct on the night of his death. We agree with the Smiths for a number of reasons and believe this error requires reversal. First, as the Smiths correctly contend, section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes (1997), provides that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion," except in three circumstances: (a) Character of accused....

...a person acted in conformity with his or her character, i.e., to prove the person's conduct. The probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 404.3 at 154 (1999 ed.). Furthermore, section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1997), only recognizes the exceptions delineated in subsections (1)(a) and (b) in criminal cases. The use of the words "accused" and "prosecution" in subsections (1)(a) and (b) makes it clear that section 90.404 limits the applicability of those exceptions to criminal cases....

...ilar fact evidence" pursuant to section 90.402(2)(a). Hooligan's responds that the evidence concerning David's propensity toward violence was admissible, as it was relevant to prove David's opportunity, intent, and plan to harm Riano, as provided by section 90.404(2)(a). We disagree with Hooligan's. Section 90.404(2)(a) states: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS OR ACTS....

...State, 662 So.2d 419, 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). The evidence regarding David's unrelated bad acts was not relevant or essential to prove a material fact. It served solely to demonstrate David's bad character and propensity for violence, which, under section 90.404(2)(a), is not permissible....

...ng David was improperly admitted by the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's final judgment and remand this case for a new trial on the issue of apportionment of damages, the relief sought by appellants. NOTES [1] Ehrhardt states, "Section 90.404 and Federal Rule 404 only recognize the exceptions in criminal cases; an exception should not be read into the statute when the statute clearly provides to the contrary." EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 404.3, at 156.

...eeks to prove by such evidence. Hence, we think the kind of notice used here should be grounds for the exclusion of the evidence, simply because of the insufficiency of the notice. Beyond that, however, the trial judge's written order excluding this section 90.404(1)(a) evidence contains particularized findings, holding that none of the grounds in the statute apply here....

...of the crime. The brothers do not challenge the validity and accuracy of these eyewitness identifications. Rather, they argue that the trial court erred in admitting a "similar fact" incident, otherwise known as Williams' Rule evidence, pursuant to Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Richman was purportedly administering treatment for joint pain relating to fibromyalgia, as was the case with victims C.G. and A.G., or for a cluster migraine headache possibly relating to lupus, as was the case with victim D.B. On July 5, 2001, citing sections 90.402 and 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), the State filed notice of its intention to introduce collateral crime evidence at trial "for the purpose of showing proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, absence of mistake or accid...

...testimony that an offense occurred and to rebut the defendant's contention that the victim's testimony is fabricated. The admissibility of similar fact evidence is determined by the interaction of the rules set forth in sections 90.402, 90.403, and 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...s admissible, except as provided by law." § 90.402. Once it is determined that similar fact evidence is relevant to "prove a material fact in issue," the evidence may be excluded only if it "is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity," § 90.404(2)(a), or if its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence," § 90.403....

...re must be some additional showing of similarity in order for the collateral sex crime evidence to be admissible." Id. at 672. The court in Heuring, Rawls, and Saffor thus unequivocally states that the strict standard of relevance for evidence under section 90.404(2)(a)—a standard requiring not only striking similarity but also unique distinguishing characteristics—is the standard generally applicable outside the context of intrafamilial sex crimes....

...A major thrust of the opinion is its criticism of those who "disregard the basic principle of the admissibility of all relevant evidence having probative value in establishing a material issue." Id. NOTES [1] We note that the specific holding of Heuring has effectively been superseded by the adoption of section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides that prior acts of child molestation are admissible in any criminal case where the defendant is charged with child molestation and that such evidence "may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." See also McLean v. State, 854 So.2d 796 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (upholding the constitutionality of section 90.404(2)(b) in child molestation cases where identity is not an issue)....

...Appellant contends that the testimony of Renee Gamble was irrelevant and highly prejudicial in that it tended to prove only his bad character and propensity to commit sex crimes. He also argues that the acts described by Renee Gamble were not sufficiently similar, even if relevant, to qualify for admission under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1979), and Williams v....

...2d DCA 1974), in which this court pointed out that proof of modus operandi is not an end in itself. In State v. Rush, 399 So.2d 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), we acknowledged the difficulty of reconciling the proving of a pattern of criminality with the dictates of section 90.404(2) and recommended that the Evidence Code be amended to explicitly admit similar fact evidence in child sexual molestation cases....

...All evidence connected the cards with Acquaviva. Therefore, we do not find that the testimony about the credit cards should be considered evidence of a crime committed by defendant other than the crime for which he was on trial, admission of which is controlled by section 90.404(2)(a)....

...First, we find that, under the facts of this case, the trial court properly excluded the discovery deposition from evidence. See Rodriguez v. State, 609 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1992). Second, we find that the trial court erred in admitting the Williams Rule evidence of the 1971 fire. The Williams Rule has been codified under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999) which states: (2) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts....

...of law. In fact, it is a close call. The state has not made it clearly appear on this petition for common law certiorari that the trial judge had only one course left open to him. CERTIORARI DENIED. LETTS, DELL and FARMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 90.404(2), Fla....

...ken identification of the appellant. We agree with the trial court that the introduction of such evidence was inadmissible, on the ground that the evidence sought to be introduced was not sufficiently analogous to constitute "similar fact" evidence. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that similar fact evidence is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue....

...The fact that another victim in another case misidentified the appellant has no relevancy to the credibility of the identification testimony of the witnesses in the present case. Our affirmance of the trial court's ruling, however, is not based on the assumption that similar fact evidence under section 90.404(2) may only be offered by the prosecution against the defendant. There is case law supportive of such a position. In Moreno v. State, 418 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), the Third District held that section 90.404(2) "applies only to the use of similar crime evidence by the state against the defendant in a criminal trial." (e.s.) We cannot agree with the Third District's interpretation of section *215 90.404(2)....

...Public Supermarket, Inc., 387 So.2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), a civil action for assault and battery, false arrest and imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, the court held that evidence of the plaintiff's prior shoplifting incident was not, per se, inadmissible, citing section 90.404....

...We have examined Jacobson's other points on appeal and find them to be without merit. Affirmed. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). This rule has now been codified in the Florida Evidence Code § 90.404(2), Fla....

...3d DCA 1980). 4. There was no objection to the admission of collateral crimes evidence which the defendant now attacks. Nevertheless, the acts testified to were similar to those charged, and would have been properly admitted under standards imposed by section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989), or case law....

...." [6] We note, parenthetically, that this evidence was also inadmissible under the Williams rule, which derives its name from Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), and is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ndant on trial committed the uncharged crime. Audano v. State, 641 So.2d 1356, 1358-60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Moreover, "[t]he Williams rule, on its face, is limited to `similar fact evidence.'" Griffin, 639 So.2d at 968 (emphasis in original) (quoting section 90.404(2)(a))....

...crime. Thus, we conclude that the threat in this case, under the circumstances in which it was made, also constituted impermissible evidence of a collateral crime. [8] Nor, again, was this collateral crime admissible as Williams rule evidence under section 90.404(2)(a)....

...court to admit "similar fact" evidence over defense objection because prior incidents of his sexual misconduct with the victim and with his stepson were irrelevant and offered by the State solely to show his bad character and propensity, contrary to section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1987). Section 90.404, which codified the holding in Williams v....

...The existence of a lustful attitude toward his stepdaughter, proven by prior sexual assaults, makes it more likely or probable that the appellant possessed a similar state of mind toward his stepdaughter on the date of the alleged offense. This is relevancy beyond mere propensity. Compare Florida Evidence Code, § 90.404(2) Florida Statutes (1979), "Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts." 394 So.2d at 232....

...ended. Even if the evidence was improperly admitted, the State argues, the error was harmless. The Williams rule violation is plain. Relevant evidence of similar crimes may not be admitted merely to prove bad character or propensity to commit crime. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...ermination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Heath v. State, 648 So.2d 660, 664 (Fla.1994). However, a trial court's discretion is limited by the rules of evidence. See Nardone v. State, 798 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), which codifies the Williams rule, [1] provides that similar fact evidence of other crimes is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, but is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity....

...Generally, such evidence is admitted to show "motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or general pattern of criminality." Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1994) (quoting Williams, 110 So.2d at 662)). The Williams rule has been codified at section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), which provides as follows: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunit...

...As a general rule, similarity is of particular importance when the similar fact (or collateral crime) evidence is being admitted to show identity, absence of mistake, or common plan or scheme. Id. The Legislature has adopted a relaxed standard of admissibility for similar fact evidence in child molestation cases. See § 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2007); McLean, 934 So.2d at 1258-59. Section 90.404(2)(b) states, "In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be consid...

...fendant's *815 commission of other acts of child molestation is admissible regardless of whether the charged and collateral offenses . . . share any similarity." McLean, 934 So.2d at 1259. Even under the relaxed standard of admissibility codified at section 90.404(2)(b), however, evidence of other acts of child molestation is subject to relevancy requirements and the section 90.403 balancing test....

...a material fact in issue. Such evidence is not admissible where its sole relevance is to prove the character or propensity of the accused." Nordelo v. State, 603 So.2d 36, 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), citing Czubak v. State, 570 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla.1990); § 90.404(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

...ave been me." He argues that the statement amounts to the introduction of evidence of Mims' propensity to sell drugs and a prior criminal offense. We agree that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce Mims' statement to the officer. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), provides as follows: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, int...

...2d DCA 1990), this court held that the appellant's boast that he had killed ten men and a witness's testimony about the appellant's drug use were irrelevant in a murder prosecution and should have been excluded. In discussing similar fact evidence under section 90.404(2)(a) and the Williams [1] rule, this court explained, "The fact that the evidence of collateral crimes comes from prior statements of the defendant does not exempt it from the Williams rule." Id....

...2d DCA 2002). A party may introduce collateral crime evidence when it is relevant to prove a material fact in issue like identity; however, collateral crime evidence is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...rove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003); see also Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959). In Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.1987), superseded by statute on other grounds, § 90.404(2)(b), Fla....

...ot to tell anyone about these conversations. The only fundamental difference between the two events was that A.A. rejected Macias' proposition while A.B. did not. Macias also contends that a conversation alone cannot be a "crime, wrong or act" under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). He argues that other-act evidence of verbal statements requires an accompanying physical act to be admissible under the Williams rule. However, section 90.404(2)(a) embraces a more expansive interpretation of the terms "act" and "wrong." See, e.g., Britton v....

...Respondent's motion was based on the lack of sufficient similarities in the incidents involving the two minor girls so as to bring them within the application of the rule of admissibility laid down in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), and codified in the Florida Evidence Code, section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...However, we do not feel that a simple denial of certiorari is adequate in this case and feel compelled to comment further. The trial court in this case felt compelled by Duncan to grant the motion in limine and also to sever the two counts and require them to be tried separately. Section 90.404(2), which codifies Williams and Duncan, also dictates the ruling entered by the trial court....

...However, since the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code, any change must now come from the legislature and not from the courts. The issue that concerned the trial judge and that troubles the public is the prohibition *529 by the Williams Rule and section 90.404(2) of the use of similar fact evidence to prove propensity in child sex molestation cases....

...It must be apparent from this opinion that had this cause come to this court following a conviction of the defendant after the similar fact evidence was admitted, absent the Florida Evidence Code we would probably have overruled Duncan and affirmed. Since that is not the posture of this case and in view of section 90.404(2), we cannot say that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law....

...ing information: (A) a list of the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant *776 to any offense charged or any defense thereto, or to any similar fact evidence to be presented at trial under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes....

...[6] Richardson subsequently was convicted of second degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. [7] Although not raised in the state's pretrial motion, admissibility of this evidence was argued by the state at the hearing. [8] The Williams rule is codified at section 90.404(2), which provides that Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 90.404(2) also requires the court, if requested, to instruct the jury that the state is introducing such evidence for the limited purpose of proving the material fact in issue. § 90.404(2)(b)(2), Fla....

...failed to instruct the jury on the possible penalties which could be imposed. [1] Holland v. State, 400 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Prior to petitioner's first trial, the state filed notice of intent to introduce similar fact evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979) and Williams v....

...the collateral crime charge had been nolle prossed. The district court also held that any error concerning these issues was harmless. On rehearing, the court of appeal certified these issues as questions of great public importance. Florida Statutes section 90.404(2)(a) (1979) provides that "[s]imilar fact evidence *209 of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identit...

...I fully concur with the holding of the majority that the evidence of petitioner's commission of an unconnected crime was relevant and admissible as evidence of "similar fact" criminal activity under Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) and section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...dicate that Bolin voluntarily consented to disclosure by Coby of what she knew about Bolin's alleged criminal activities, then there was not a waiver. We address also the point raised in this appeal regarding collateral crime evidence. As set out in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or abs...

...icinity. Our review of the record in this case causes us to conclude that the evidence presented concerning the murders of Natalie Holley and Stephanie Collins was not relevant to prove any of the material facts regarding the issues as delineated in section 90.404(2)(a). We note that the trial judge during the trial expressed grave reservation about the admissibility of this evidence, and in the retrial this evidence should not be admitted during the guilt phase on the basis of section 90.404(2)(a) and Williams v....

...For the harmless error rule to apply, the State must prove that there is "`no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.'" Mims, 872 So.2d at 456 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986)). The Williams rule has been codified in section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2001). When determining whether evidence is admissible under section 90.404(2), the trial court must make a number of fact-specific determinations....

...occurred November 29, 1984, four days following the sexual batteries. The state claims that the evidence was relevant for the purpose of showing that Thompson planned the rapes, because he had used gloves during both the bank robbery and the rapes. Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989), a codification of the Williams rule, permits evidence of other crimes to prove identity if there are "similar facts." The fact that the perpetrator in each crime in the case at bar wore gloves hardly consti...

...bout his prior arrests. Under Florida's new evidence code, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion except under certain limited circumstances. § 90.404(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). One exception permits, in a criminal case, the admission of evidence of a pertinent character trait of the accused offered by him, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait. § 90.404(1)(a)....

...3d DCA 1981) (five similar robberies within nine days). Thus, I believe that Paul controls. Since appellant freely admitted coming into contact with the undercover officer, but denied selling drugs, identity was never at issue. Consequently, the "Williams" rule, now codified as Section 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Even if the testimony might provide some support for the appellant's explanation as to why he fled after seeing the police at his residence, this is not of probative value for the prosecution as it favors the defense. And while it tends to reflect bad character or propensity, such proof is precluded under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...After a hearing on the matter, the trial court found the five-year-old competent and available to testify. The court further found sufficient safeguards of reliability because the statements could be corroborated by the grandmother's testimony. The State then filed a "Notice Pursuant to Florida Statute 90.404(2)(a) and/or (b)." The State argued that the collateral act evidence (the incident with the five-year-old) was relevant because of the similarities of the two incidents: 1) the same location; 2) the same relationship between the defendant and...

...State, 798 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In child molestation cases, "evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation *1194 is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." § 90.404(2)(b)1., Fla....

...inion in which to file comments with the Court. [3] It is so ordered. *813 LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. APPENDIX 2.4 SIMILAR FACTEVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS EVIDENCE "WILLIAMS RULE" § 90.404(2)(a) Fla....

...roborate the testimony of (name of child)] and you shall consider it only as it relates to [that] [those] issue[s]. However, the defendant is not on trial for a crime, wrong, or act that is not included in the [information] [indictment]. Comment See section 90.404(2)(b), Fla....

...Proof that the defendant intentionally selected the victim is required by the case law. See State v. Stalder, 630 So.2d 1072 (Fla.1994). This instruction was adopted in 1997 [697 So.2d 84] and amended in 2000 [765 So.2d 692] and 2007. 3.8(a) SIMILAR FACT EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS EVIDENCE "WILLIAMS RULE" § 90.404(2)(a) Fla....

...ly as that evidence relates to proof of [motive] [opportunity] [intent] [preparation] [plan] [knowledge] [identity] [the absence of mistake or accident] on the part of the defendant [or] [to corroborate the testimony of (name of child)]. Comment See § 90.404(2)(b) Fla....

...atting" down on a front porch, with a companion, near several bags of marijuana. Evidence of an uncharged criminal act is inadmissible when it merely shows the bad character or propensity of the accused. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959); § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...The admission of these testimonial statements violated Battle's constitutional rights. Secondly, Battle argues that evidence regarding his alias is inadmissible as other crimes evidence offered only to show his bad character or propensity to commit crimes. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...ossession or control: (A) a list of the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant to any offense charged or any defense thereto, or to any similar fact evidence to be presented at trial under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes....

...The court adjudicated Flores a habitual violent felon and sentenced him accordingly. This appeal followed. Flores first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the introduction of two uncharged crimes as Williams rule evidence to establish identity pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida *569 Statutes (1999)....

...We therefore conclude that this carjacking charge must be reduced to grand theft of an automobile. For all of these reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. NOTES [1] See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), codified at § 90.404, Fla....

...5th DCA 1989). Based on the evidence below, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the father's single act "clearly and certainly" predicted future neglect. Reversed. BLUE, C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur. NOTES [1] See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...t the trauma was consistent with child abuse. Appellant argues that the trial court should have admitted the testimony as Williams Rule evidence. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1987), codified the rule enunciated in Williams: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,...

...sue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.” § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...f the trial. The admissibility of collateral crime evidence is within the discretion of the trial court as limited by the rules of evidence. LaMarca v. State, 785 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Fla.2001); Nardone v. State, 798 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepar...

...And after you came back, I asked the question of the Defendant, "Have you ever sold drugs to anyone?" She said, "Yes." She changed her testimony. She lied right before you on the witness stand. Unfortunately, the trial court was mistaken in its view of the law. Putting aside the "Williams Rule" which is now codified as Section 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...oes not render evidence of the conviction from which the appeal was taken or for which the pardon was granted inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of the appeal is admissible. (3) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence under s. 90.404 or s....

...State 5 Carlisle contends the trial court reversibly erred by limiting his ability to cross-examine the victim regarding her prior recantation and by limiting his ability to *484 testify regarding the recantation. Carlisle further contends the evidence was admissible under sections 90.404(2) and 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, and that the trial court’s limitation of his ability to cross-examine the victim -violated the Confrontation Clause....

...The Court addressed the potential admissibility of the prior false accusation under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (showing the witness is biased), and the Confrontation Clause. 7 Id. at 1096-1100 . A concurring opinion briefly discussed the application of section 90.404(2)(a) ('Williams rule evidence)....

...Even with the risk that the jury may have erroneously considered the issue of the victim’s propensity to lie about sexual abuse, the exclusion of the evidence was nevertheless improper under the circumstances because the impeachment could have established that the victim had a motive to lie. Section 90.404(2) (Reverse Williams Rule Evidence) The evidence of the victim’s recantation was also admissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), as reverse Williams rule evidence. Justice Pariente noted in her concurring opinion that the evidence of recanted allegations of sexual abuse “might be admissible ... under section 90.404(2)(a).” Pantoja, 59 So.3d at 1100 (Pariente, J., concurring in result)....

...issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). For evidence to be admissible under section 90.404(2)(a), the evidence must have probative value to show a material fact, and the evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its unduly prejudicial nature....

...The court found the impeachment would be improper under 90.610 because that section allowed impeachment only by prior convictions. Id, .After Carlisle and his wife adopted the victim and her brother, Carlisle’s wife gave birth to triplets. . "Collateral crimes evidence includes similar fact evidence, which is governed by section 90.404, Florida Statutes, and is commonly referred to as ‘Williams rule evidence.’ ” Pulcini v....

...Neither of these sections would be a basis for finding evidence of the victim’s recantation admissible in the instant case. While the state was correct that the evidence was not admissible under section 90.610, that section specifically notes that ”[n]othing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence under s. 90.404 or 90.608.” § 90.610(3), Fla....

...view. We find no error in the trial court's denial of appellant's motion in limine regarding appellant's conduct in text messaging, tickling, and telling H.S. to "take it out in trade." These acts were not evidence of collateral crimes, subject to a section 90.404(2)(a) or (b) analysis, but were relevant evidence admissible as a part of, or inextricably intertwined with, the crime charged....

...The arguments concerning the admissibility of these books and the closing arguments indicate that the State introduced these books to prove character. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is generally inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion. See § 90.404(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). None of the exceptions to the general rule of inadmissability of character evidence applies in this case. The State is not trying to rebut character evidence offered by the accused. See § 90.404(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). Nor is the fact that Mr. Killian possessed these books proper Williams rule [5] evidence. See § 90.404(2)....

...enforcement officer was not relevant. The officer testified that Holland tried to grab his service revolver during a struggle. Collateral crimes are relevant to prove a material fact in issue such as motive, intent, absence of mistake, or identity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...han twice himself but, I haven't talked to all of them. I *544 haven't checked with all seven examiners. Preliminarily, we observe that this testimony does not constitute evidence of other crimes such that it would have to come into evidence through section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Is the state entitled to use "other crimes, wrongs or acts" (" Williams Rule") to show this old intent — evidence that was then inadmissible for the crime on trial as being unrelated to its elements but is now relevant to the new fact in issue? See § 90.404(2), Fla....

...eet at a particular time and place. As the summer wore on, he told her that he wanted to talk to her more before meeting her. He never met her and discontinued conversations after October. Thereafter, the state filed charges against him. Pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes, the state filed a pre-trial notice of intent to offer evidence of similar crimes, wrongs, or acts....

...hat Canion had a reputation in the community as a violent drug dealer, in order to support his theory that he had shot Canion in self-defense out of fear for his own life. Appellant argues that this evidence, which was excluded, was admissible under section 90.404(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1997) as a character trait of the victim, in order to prove that the victim was acting in conformity with that character trait at the time....

...has committed. Such facts are so inherently prejudicial that Florida's evidence code law generally bars the admission of such facts except in extremely limited circumstances not involved here. Czubak v. State, 570 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990) (citing § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...s well. He testified that he had handled "between 10 and 15 capital cases" before representing Henry, and "probably 5 of these went to trial as death penalty cases." Two or three of the death penalty cases resulted in a sentence of death. [10] See §§ 90.404(2)(a), 90.610, Fla....

...rove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404, Fla....

..., and during the early morning hours of August 17, 2008; activities which occurred prior to the shooting of Weed and Hardy-Batt. Prior to trial, the State advised by a second amended notice its intent to introduce "similar fact" evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes....

...ricably intertwined with the crime charged, however, is not Williams rule evidence. Griffin v. State, 639 So.2d 966, 968 (Fla.1994); see Floyd v. State, 18 So.3d 432 (Fla.2009). Williams rule evidence is evidence of other conduct, which, pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, is similar to the charged offense and is relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts (i.e., Williams rule evidence) is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or a defendant's propensity to commit a crime. § 90.404(2)(a). Appellant's participation in a drug transaction and then kidnapping was not "[s]imilar fact evidence" for purposes of section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and thus should not have been admitted as such....

...n his car. The jury in this prosecution heard the tape of the statement Insko made to the police in connection with the Lewis incident. Insko allegedly committed the present crime in November 2001. Effective July 1, 2001, [3] the legislature amended section 90.404 to add the following provision: In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. § 90.404(2)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). Child molestation is defined as "conduct proscribed by s. 794.011 or s. 800.04 when committed against a person 16 years of age or younger." § 90.404(2)(b)(2). In this case Insko was charged under section 800.04(6)(a)(2) and (b) and the victim was thirteen at the time of the incident; thus section 90.404(2)(b) applies. By enacting section 90.404(2)(b), the legislature intended to relax and simplify the rules concerning admissibility of Williams rule evidence in child molestation cases....

...The jurors found him guilty of the lesser-included third-degree felony of lewd and lascivious conduct by a defendant under the age of eighteen. § 800.04(6)(c). [2] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959). [3] Ch. 01-221, § 2, at 1939, Laws of Fla. [4] In McLean we held section 90.404(2)(b) constitutional in cases where identity was not in dispute....

...fact evidence. Collateral crime evidence, or Williams Rule evidence, may be admitted when relevant to prove a material fact in issue such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. See § 90.404(2), Fla....

...We concur with the State and quash this part of the pretrial order as well. For the stated reasons, we grant certiorari and quash the indicated portions of the two pretrial orders. Certiorari granted. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), codified as § 90.404, Fla....

...GALLEN, THOMAS M., Associate Senior Judge. Roy Joseph Seavey seeks review of his judgment and sentence for lewd or lascivious molestation. Seavey argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting collateral crimes evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...idence was not relevant, was more prejudicial than probative, and was improperly featured at his trial. Our first inquiry is whether the collateral crimes evidence in this case was relevant and, if so, whether it was more prejudicial than probative. Section 90.404(2)(b)(1) provides, "In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be c...

...Thus, it was permissible for the State to support the detective's credibility. [11] Petitioner cites to Grant v. State, 194 So.2d 612 (Fla.1967); Russell v. State, 233 So.2d 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); Rahmings v. State, 425 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). [12] Under Florida Statute 90.404(2), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity....

...01, Fla. Stat (2007). While "[s]imilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue," it is "inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...unsatisfied with being a beneficiary in the Will, considered herself entitled to additional cash. [3] This turned the otherwise irrelevant and generic fact of being the beneficiary in a Will into the very "bad act" evidence deemed inadmissible under section 90.404, Florida Statutes (2007). It became a prejudicial sword wielded by the State to convict the defendant. As a bad act and subject to the requirements of section 90.404, the State was required to prove "that the defendant committed the collateral acts by clear and convincing evidence." See McLean v....

...Appellant challenges his conviction for sexual battery on a child under 12 years of age. He asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a collateral crime because the prior criminal act was not sufficiently similar to the charged offense so as to constitute similar-fact evidence under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...[4] In determining the admissibility of collateral crime evidence, the trial court must make two determinations: (1) Whether the evidence is relevant or material to some aspect of the offense being tried, and (2) whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by any prejudice. See §§ 90.402, 90.403, and 90.404(2), Fla....

...c or combination of characteristics setting them apart from other offenses. Heuring, 513 So.2d at 124. I concur, however, with Judge Wolf's opinion in certifying the question posed therein as one of great public importance. ALLEN, Judge, dissenting. Section 90.404(2)(a) provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of m...

...es against children in the familial setting. As the majority acknowledges, neither Heuring nor Beasley directly says that propensity evidence will be admitted in such cases. Indeed, such a holding would squarely conflict with the express language of section 90.404(2)(a), prohibiting admission of similar fact evidence solely to prove propensity....

...denied, 529 So.2d 693. [10] Frankly, I think that the supreme court in Heuring could have reached the same result in applying its more relaxed standard to the admission of similar-fact evidence within a familial-type context by following the parameters of Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and thereby adopting the rule that such evidence is relevant under the theory that it tends to show that the defendant, because of such relationship, was afforded the opportunity to sexually assault the child-v...

...e for a traffic violation. The State of Florida procured a fourcount indictment charging the Escobars, inter alia, with Estefan's murder. Subsequently, the State filed a notice of intent to offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...At the hearing on the State's notice of intent to rely on evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, the trial judge denied admission of the warrants, the evidence of the California shoot-out, and the statement made to Bonilla finding that the evidence sought to be introduced was inadmissible under the "Williams Rule," section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...We likewise grant certiorari and quash the order excluding evidence of the California shoot-out and of the warrants against Douglas Escobar. Case No. 90-1378: Certiorari granted; order quashed. Case No. 90-1303: Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. NOTES [1] Section 90.404(2) provides: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of...

...The court also heard legal argument on Appellant's motion to exclude the similar fact evidence and the State's motion to permit the evidence. In denying Appellant's motion and granting the State's motion, the lower court relied on the legislature's expansion of the evidence admissible under section 90.404, Florida Statutes, in child molestation cases....

...Generally, similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts, is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, "including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). It is, however, inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. Id. When child molestation is involved, section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2006), broadens the admissibility of similar fact evidence, and provides that "evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." As we recently explained, even in child molestation cases, however, relevancy remains the threshold consideration for the admission of the evidence: Even though section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes allows evidence of other acts of child molestation to be admitted for any matter to which it is relevant, relevancy remains the threshold question to be considered....

...See McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 1258 (Fla.2006). We think he got it right. *998 Triplett v. State, 947 So.2d 702, 703-04 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). In McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 2006), the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 90.404(2)(b) from a due process challenge. The court held that section 90.404(2)(b) does not violate due process when applied in a case in which identity is not an issue and the collateral evidence is used solely to corroborate the victim's testimony, provided that the trial court properly performs its critical...

...6 year sentence he did not actually serve, including any gain time and any administrative gain time." The defendant appeals his convictions and sentences on the grounds that: (1) The State erroneously introduced evidence of other crimes pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, without giving the 10 day notice required by section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes; (2) His constitutional double jeopardy rights were violated by his conviction of both armed burglary and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony when both offenses related to a single factual even...

...rtion of the 6 year sentence he did not actually serve, including any gain time and any administrative gain time." Kelly argues the trial court erred in the following regards: (1) The State erroneously introduced evidence of other crimes pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, without giving the 10 day notice required by section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes; (2) His constitutional double jeopardy rights were violated by his conviction of both armed burglary and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony when both offenses related to a single factual even...

...a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but [that] is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...ible. Evidence of collateral crimes, wrongs or acts committed by a defendant is admissible if relevant to a material fact in issue and is inadmissible where its sole relevance is to prove the character or propensity of the defendant to commit crime. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...o buy drugs. Kohn testified that appellant admitted that Glorea suffered a fractured skull during the fight. Also during the case in chief, the State presented testimony of three witnesses pursuant to Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), and section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Accordingly, we conclude, further, that the trial court abused its discretion in joining the cases for trial. The state contends that any error was harmless because some of the testimony concerning each of the criminal episodes could have been introduced in the trial of the other as similar fact evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...s a category two (permissive) lesser included offense only where possession is also charged. Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) 300 (1989). [2] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). See § 90.404(2), Fla....

...nd identified Nshaka without hesitation. Nshaka was charged by information with burglary of a conveyance with a battery and strong arm robbery. The State filed a written notice of intent to offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts, pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...o the current case, could be used by a jury to charge a defendant. Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 913-14 (Fla.2002). However, the Williams Rule, from the 1959 Supreme Court of Florida case Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), codified by section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...An information had previously been filed against appellant for the December 17 offense, but the charge was thereafter nolle prossed. Appellant contends that testimony as to his participation in the December 17 offense, which was admitted into evidence pursuant to § 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and Williams v....

...exercised for reasons unrelated to the likelihood of conviction or the prosecutor's judgment as to the accused's guilt or innocence of the charged offense. A nolle pros is thus unlike an acquittal and does not preclude the admissibility, pursuant to § 90.404(2)(a) and Williams, of evidence as to the accused's involvement in the offense alleged in the nolle prossed information....

...treme caution"___ as gleaned from the witness's four years of experience observing the doctor treating various cats. Evidence of a trait of a person's character is inadmissible to prove that he acted "in conformity with it on a particular occasion." § 90.404(1), Fla....

...ence of the prior crime. We disagree. The general rule regarding similar fact evidence is that evidence of any facts relevant to a material fact in issue is inadmissible where the sole relevancy is to prove the accused's bad character or propensity. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983); Williams v....

...Kennett, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. BENTON, J. On this direct appeal from convictions and sentences for aggravated child abuse and child neglect, Alisha Nicole Vice argues the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce "similar fact evidence" on the purported authority of section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...The test of admissibility is relevancy. The test of inadmissibility is a lack of relevancy." (emphasis in original)). See also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 404.9 at 221 (2009 ed.). The evidence in the present case was "relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...The threshold issue in the present case is relevance. See Ehrhardt, supra, § 404.9, at 221-22 ("Evidence which is admissible under this theory is frequently called `similar fact evidence.' However, evidence of collateral crimes or acts is admissible under section 90.404(2)(a) not because it is similar to the crime or act in issue, but because it is relevant to prove a material fact or issue in the instant case other than the defendant's propensity or bad character....

...(who was also present at the hospital on April 5) testified at trial. [5] The present case does not involve any allegation of sexual molestation. Although the law governing Williams rule evidence has been altered in the context of child sexual molestation cases, see § 90.404(2)(b)1., Fla....

...We find that by these statements, the prosecutor impermissibly suggested guilt by association with the co-defendants who had pled guilty to similar charges and further, impermissibly argued that defendant had committed similar prior acts of fraud, without having first laid a proper predicate, in violation of section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), and the Williams rule....

...Every defendant is entitled to present any evidence that tends to support the defendant's theory of defense. See Vannier v. State, 714 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). "[W]here evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its admission. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...On this record, we cannot say that the loss of Wilson's testimony was harmless error. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. WARNER and CIKLIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The state also offered similar fact evidence about a 2000 incident at the library. See § 90.404(2), Fla....

...Accordingly, the convictions and sentence are REVERSED and the case REMANDED for a new trial. THOMPSON, J., concurs. NIMMONS, J., dissents without opinion. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. den., 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), now codified at section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes: "Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab...

...The so-called " Williams Rule" states a general rule of admissibility of relevant evidence even though the evidence may indicate that the accused has committed other uncharged crimes or may otherwise reflect adversely upon the accused's character. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes [1] , purports to codify the Williams Rule....

...As to Count 3, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. We have considered appellant's other points and find them to be without merit. AFFIRMED. SHIVERS and JOANOS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 90.404(2)(a) provides: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS....

...oad familial context. By Livingston's standard the misjoinder in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since, according to Heuring, the jury would have learned of the other offenses in separate trials under the similar fact evidence rule. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...od to refer to perjury. Ultimately, Glushko declined to press charges or cooperate in the case, claiming she had no memory of the events from that date. The state filed a notice of intent to offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, regarding appellant’s threats to injure Glushko....

...1st DCA), review denied, 419 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1982). [2] Accordingly, we affirm the conviction below and acknowledge conflict with Hall. AFFIRMED. W. SHARP, J., concurs. GOSHORN, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] The appellant's other issue — whether the ten day notice provision of section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987) applies to facts leading up to, and inseparable from the charged offense — is devoid of merit....

...actions taken against you in your year as a corrections officer involving any violence to any inmates?" Officer Wiggins answered, "No." The trial court erred in admitting evidence of Officer Wiggins's reputation when his reputation was not at issue. Section 90.404(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that: (1) Character evidence generally....

...lar crimes, and of appellant's recent release from prison do not appear to be accurate statements. First of all, the prosecution's presentation of similar fact evidence is generally not contingent on whether or not the defendant takes the stand. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...existence of harmless error. For the above reasons, I would reverse appellant's conviction and remand the case for new trial with directions that the proffered evidence be admitted. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959) (codified at section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997))....

...The Board of Governors of The Florida Bar unanimously approved the Committee's recommendations. The proposed amendments were published for comment in The Florida Bar News; none were received. In chapter 2008-172, section 9, Laws of Florida, the Legislature amended section 90.404(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes. [1] This statute, in general, governs admission of character evidence in a criminal trial. Subsection 90.404(2)(b) provides that, in a criminal case where the defendant is charged with "a crime involving child molestation," evidence related to the defendant's commission of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation" is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. Subsection (2)(b)2 defines the specific acts that are considered "child molestation" in this context, when committed against a person sixteen years old or younger. Chapter 2008-172, section 9, amends subsection 90.404(2)(b)2 to expand the definition of "child molestation" to include conduct prohibited under section 847.0135(5), Florida Statutes....

...that were raised in these proceedings."). Our adoption of the amendment is effective retroactively to the date the amendment became law. It is so ordered. CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 90.404(2)(b)2, as amended, provides as follows: For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "child molestation" means conduct proscribed by s....

...character of the accused. It is deemed relevant if it tends to establish a plan, scheme, or design, or to identify defendant, or to demonstrate a plan or pattern followed by defendant in committing the type of crime charged in the case being tried. Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes, 1979, sets forth the pertinent rule of evidence involved here....

...dmission before the jury that the former offense was actually committed by her, the court erred by allowing the evidence. We disagree. The State is only required to give notice of its intent to rely on Williams rule evidence pursuant to section *428 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...e of a general similarity. Those circumstances are so unusual as to point directly to the same daycare worker and we find those circumstances to be relevant. We also find that the record supports the State's position that it carried its burden under section 90.404(2)(b)1, by furnishing a timely written statement of acts or offenses described with the particularity required of an indictment or information....

...he trial judge, and to the extent that those matters may have extended the time of trial, it was unavoidable. We find no error and affirm. AFFIRMED. SHARP, W. and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959) (codified at section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1997)).

...The consolidation for trial of offenses that do not arise out of the same act or transaction results in the consideration of evidence of irrelevant other crimes, which simply tends to prove bad character or propensity on the part of the defendant. This violates the spirit of Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1981), and is a sound reason for showing that the failure of the court to grant Puhl's motion for severance resulted in deprivation of a fair trial....

...ctorino v. State, 23 So.3d 87, 98 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9, 16 (Fla. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similar fact evidence, also known as Williams-rule evidence, “is governed by the requirements and limitations of section 90.404, [Florida Statutes (2004)],” id....

...which permits “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... when relevant to prove a material fact in issue,” such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. (quoting § 90.404, Fla....

...However, he argues that the admission of Officer Blackman's testimony "did nothing toward showing method of operation," but showed only consent which is impermissible under this court's reasoning in Hodges v. State, 403 So.2d 1375 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), rev. den., 413 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1982). The Williams rule, as codified by section 90.404(2)(a) [2] provides that similar fact evidence which reveals the commission of a collateral crime is admissible if it tends to show a relevant fact at issue, such as a common scheme and plan, and not just bad character or propensity....

...She says she did not; the defendant says she did. At trial, the State produced a female witness named S.M. who testified that a similar incident involving herself and the defendant occurred about 13 1/2 months before the event involving the defendant and V.B. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, i...

...that such similar fact evidence was always relevant — only too relevant and too persuasive — if the correct and prevailing view in Florida is to be that the similar fact evidence is now admissible, not as an exception under the the Williams Rule (§ 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Admission of such legally immaterial evidence was unfairly prejudicial to the defendant and his convictions should be reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.); cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] Section 90.404(2)(a) states: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mis...

...ls within this rule of exclusion of unduly prejudicial evidence; thus, the similar fact evidence rule is a rule of exclusion and constitutes an exception to the rule of admissibility of relevant evidence; fourth, while the Williams rule (codified as § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...vidence of a prior incident of child molestation to be heard by the jury. In criminal cases dealing with child molestation, a defendant's commission of other acts of child molestation may be considered for its bearing on any matter that is relevant. § 90.404(2)(b), Fla....

...Turning to the merits of this second issue, pursuant to section 90.401, Florida Statutes (2000), relevant evidence "is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact." "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided by law." § 90.402, Fla. Stat. (2000). Section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion," except when addressing the character of the accused, the character of the victim, or the character of a witness....

...Stat. (2000). Specific instances of conduct may serve as proof of a person's character or a trait of that character when the character or the trait is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense. § 90.405(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). As set forth in section 90.404(1), evidence of Farnham's character or a trait of his character, such as violating company policies by continually taking shortcuts, is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with his character on a particular occasion, such as the day of the accident....

...[2] We affirm Irons' conviction but vacate his sentence for the reasons discussed below. The evidence of the collateral crimes (sexual battery and attempted sexual battery of another witness) was admissible under the Williams rule. [3] Williams has been codified as section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes and provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden...

...answered "yes ma'am." Our examination of the entire record has caused us to conclude that this challenged evidence was not properly admitted, and the error was so harmful that a new trial is mandated. Improper Admission of Evidence Our resolution of the evidentiary issue focuses upon the application of evidence code sections 90.404 and 90.403, Florida Statutes (2005). Section 90.404(2)(b)(1) provides that in a criminal case where a defendant is charged with a "child molestation" crime, evidence that the defendant committed "other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible." "Child molestation," for purposes of this evidentiary *1174 section, is conduct "proscribed by s. 794.011 or s. 800.04" and when committed against a person sixteen years of age or younger. § 90.404(2)(b)(2)....

...brief, or salacious or accidental. Similarly, the challenged evidence on this record does not establish the commission of a crime or wrong. The evidence established only that K.Z. was touched. The scarcity of detail precludes its admissibility under section 90.404(2)(b)....

...(4) Presence or lack of intervening circumstances: The charged acts are so dissimilar from what T.F. described, an "intervening circumstance" analysis is really not feasible. Because of substantial differences between the charged acts and T.F.'s testimony, the evidence should not have been permitted pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b)....

...We have discussed the negligible probative value of the testimony pertaining to the touching incident and its tendency to establish bad character or propensity. A proper weighing process pursuant to section 90.403 would have required its exclusion. Section 90.404(2)(b), however, allows evidence described as the "commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation" to be admitted when relevant. Sections 90.404(2)(b)(1) and .402 allow the admission of relevant evidence that tends to prove or disprove a material fact....

...Because Mr. Foreman denied that the events ever took place, no issues were raised as to identity, mistake, or accident. At best, the touching evidence tended solely to prove Mr. Foreman's bad character or propensity to interact improperly with K.Z. See § 90.404(2)(a)....

...NOTES [1] Count 1 of the information alleged "union with and/or penetration of the sexual organ of K.Z. by the mouth and/or tongue" of the appellant. Count 2 alleged "penetration of and/or union with the vagina of K.Z. by the penis" of the appellant. [2] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959); § 90.404(2)(b), Fla....

...Admission of Collateral Crimes The appellant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting her statement that she had been robbing other houses. Relevant evidence of other crimes is only admissible to prove a material fact in issue, such as intent. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...have reduced the charge to trespass since the state failed to present any evidence of intent to commit an offense upon entry; and that the trial court improperly sentenced appellant to fifteen years incarceration followed by ten years of probation. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985) codifies the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Williams. Section 90.404(2)(a) provides: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS....

...which sets them apart from other offenses. ... . In addition to the above requirements, the evidence must be relevant to a material fact in issue such as identity, intent, motive, opportunity, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident. See § 90.404(2)(a)....

...On appeal the state apparently argues that the only admissible evidence on the issue of self-defense is character evidence which is governed by section 90.405, Florida Statutes. Character evidence is generally inadmissible except in the circumstances set forth in section 90.404, Florida Statutes, and when admissible, it may be proven by the methods set forth in section 90.405....

...Here, the assertion that Wightman committed the similar acts of molestation multiple times on different undetermined dates was not necessary for an understanding that the two discrete acts charged in the information took place at any time. The State next argues that the evidence was admissible under section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...But in order to invoke this section at trial, the State was required to give the defendant ten days before trial "a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or information." § 90.404(2)(c)(1). And, any collateral crime evidence admitted under section 90.404(2)(b) is subject to a section 90.403 analysis for the danger of unfair prejudice....

...ing evidence of prior acts of molestation when offered to corroborate the victim's testimony). Because Wightman was not given the pretrial notice and the other due process safeguards discussed in McLean were not employed, *77 the State cannot invoke section 90.404(2)(b) to justify the admission of other-crime evidence in this case....

...Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. WARNER, J. Appellant challenges his conviction for attempted sexual battery on the ground that the trial court erred in admitting evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides a relaxed standard for admission of other acts of child molestation where a crime involving child molestation is charged....

...We affirm appellant's conviction and sentence. During appellant's trial for sexual battery of his stepdaughter in the home, two other children testified that appellant had molested them when they spent the night at his home. Appellant objected, claiming that section 90.404(2)(b) was unconstitutional for violating both due process and ex post facto provisions of the constitution and permitting the introduction of irrelevant evidence. The trial court denied the motion and admitted the testimony. Appellant was convicted of three counts of attempted sexual battery. Section 90.404(2)(b)1 provides that in criminal cases where a "defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be consi...

...rocess. Id. As identity is not an issue in this case, we also hold, under the reasoning of McLean, that the statute is constitutional. Appellant also raises an ex post facto claim because he was accused of offenses occurring prior to the adoption of section 90.404(2)(b)....

...ecessary to establish his guilt, all remained unaffected by', the enactment of" the statute. Id. (quoting Hopt v. People, 110 U.S. 574, 589-90, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884)). This same reasoning was applied in McLean to reach the conclusion that section 90.404(2)(b) does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a procedural change....

...Williams rule evidence. It did not become a feature of the trial. The trial court did not err in admitting this evidence. We affirm the remaining issues without further discussion. We also certify the same question regarding the constitutionality of section 90.404(2)(b) as was certified in McLean....

...ce. The charged and collateral offenses must be not only strikingly similar, but they must also share some unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses." 513 So.2d at 124. Generally, as set out in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), the evidence must be relevant to a material fact such as identity, intent, motive, opportunity, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident....

...e ages of six and nine and that the offense in both was oral/vaginal union. As explained in Moore, "[a]lthough sexual battery on an underage child is a reprehensible offense, it is not so unique in itself that it should be uniformly admissible under section 90.404(2)," 659 So.2d at 414 (quoting Feller v....

...Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). Especially when identity is not the issue authorizing the admissibility of the Williams rule evidence and the evidence is introduced to establish one of the other issues under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), I frankly doubt that I have *702 the expertise to determine what prior specific behavior is validly predictive of subsequent sexual misconduct....

propensity to commit crime, in violation of section 90.404(2)(a)- of the Florida Statutes. The State counters

...issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity." § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...e evidence is relevant or material to some aspect of the offense being tried, and (2) whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by any prejudice." Audano v. State, 641 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (citing §§ 90.402, 90.403 and 90.404(2), Fla....

...r was not qualified to give. See § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (1989); Quinn v. Millard, 358 So.2d 1378, 1382 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Affirmed. NOTES [*] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); see § 90.404(2), Fla....

...Appellant objected to this collateral crime evidence, because it was offered solely to show appellant's bad character when appellant had not placed his character in issue. See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...404.16 (2d Ed. 1984), which state that the reason for admitting such evidence is that it forms "part of the so-called `res gestae' : it is necessary to admit the evidence to adequately describe the deed." He further notes that "both the language of section 90.404(2)(a) and of Williams indicates that the rule applies to evidence of discrete acts other than the actions of the defendant committing the instant crime charged." Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence at 138....

...State, 596 So.2d 1034, 1035 (Fla.1992)). Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, permits cross-examination to "attack the credibility of a witness by . . . [s]howing that the witness is biased." The state argues that the evidence which Martino sought to admit is inadmissible under section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes, which provides that "[e]vidence of a person's character or trait of character is inadmissible to probe action in conformity with it on a particular occasion....

...." Martino, however, asserts that he did not seek to cross-examine Novosel on his "character or trait." Rather, he sought to bring to the jury's attention Novosel's motive for testifying adversely to Martino. We do not address whether the ruling should be sustained under section 90.404(1) because, in any event, a trial court could well conclude that the questioned proffer is not relevant or material, as it does not, taken alone, demonstrate that the witness had a pattern or practice of avoiding or minimizing his own risk by placing blame on others....

...hat the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict). We next address Valley's argument that the trial court erred in allowing testimony and evidence relating to the November 23rd robbery and the December 23rd incident with Officer Powser. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), codifies the standard for admission of collateral crime evidence as established in Williams v....

...rejudicial effect. Our review of the admissibility of Detective Carney's statement is for an abuse of discretion. See Mims v. State, 872 So.2d 453, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The issue here does not deal with similar fact evidence of other crimes under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2004), but with evidence of dissimilar collateral bad acts....

...used to refer to evidence of bad acts that is not included in the charged offenses. Collateral crimes evidence includes: (1) similar fact evidence (commonly referred to as Williams rule evidence), and (2) all other admissible relevant evidence. Id. Section 90.404, Florida Statutes (2008), governs the admissibility of Williams rule evidence. Under section 90.404, similar fact evidence is evidence that is unrelated to the charged offenses....

...State, 898 So.2d 1164, 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Thus, evidence tending to prove that Elmer moved in with Ann after CJ.’s twelfth birthday was relevant and should have been admitted. 8 Elmer further contends the trial court erred in the admission of similar fact evidence. Section 90.404(2)(b)l., Florida Statutes (2010), provides, “In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant’s commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestatio...

...The test for admitting evidence of other crimes is relevance. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 660 (Fla.1959). In Bolden's case the State argued that the evidence concerning the other burglaries was relevant to prove identity and opportunity. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Appellants contend that the evidence as it was adduced had little, if any, relation to brake wear, but instead showed Marks to be a generally reckless and negligent driver in contravention of the Florida Evidence Code's provision that character evidence is inadmissible when relevant solely to prove propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...State, 498 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). However under all the circumstances we do not conclude that that impropriety by itself in this case was sufficiently egregious to require reversal. Affirmed. SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., LEHAN and THREADGILL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1983); Williams v....

...Gen., Miami, for appellee. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. As to the admission of evidence of appellant's involvement in a marijuana transaction, such evidence was admissible as inseparable crime evidence, not subject to the ten day notice provision required under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...[3] The trial court refused to allow this defense witness to testify before the jury because he considered such testimony character evidence inadmissible to prove that appellant acted in conformity with this character trait (honesty) on the particular occasions in question, citing Section 90.404, Florida Statutes....

...unduly prejudicial collateral crimes evidence. We reverse. The State charged Mr. Corson with molesting six-year-old A.E. at Mr. Corson's home. The State filed a notice of intent to use Williams [1] rule evidence of previous child molestation. Under section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2004), In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant....

...State, 827 So.2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Macias v. State, 959 So.2d 782, 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). As we explained in Foreman v. State, 965 So.2d 1171, 1173-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), relevancy is the threshold question of whether testimony proffered under section 90.404(2)(b)(1) is admissible....

...at 1174 (quoting McLean, 934 So.2d at 1259). In Foreman, no sufficient nexus existed between a prior touching incident and the charged crimes of capital sexual *767 battery. Id. at 1175. "At best, the touching evidence tended solely to prove ... bad character or propensity...." Id. (citing section 90.404(2)(a))....

...the similar fact instance. Thus, the incident with Scott is not uniquely factually characteristic of the incident with Brad and, therefore, is not probative of the instant criminal charge. Accordingly, the events with Scott are not admissible under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1995); see Williams v....

...failures, the evidence of the other products’ failures showed causation, or rebutted Mohawk’s causation theory, only to the extent, that it showed. Mohawk has a propensity to produce bad carpet. Introducing evidence for this purpose is improper. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...[2] Since we conclude that the hearsay related by Chillura was properly admitted, we need not decide whether the court's blanket acknowledgement here cures defense counsel's earlier failure to object to the court's findings regarding Chillura. [3] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959) (codified in section 90.404(28)(c), Florida Statutes (1991)).

...t upon a child under the age of 16 years, and lewd act in the presence of a child under the age of 16 years. [1] We affirm. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting similar fact evidence to prove the defendant's identity pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Because the defendant alleged the shooting was accidental, and that he had never used a gun in a threatening manner toward anyone close to him, we conclude this evidence was properly admitted for both impeachment purposes, and relevancy *108 under Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), to show the defendant's "motive, intent, and absence of mistake." We affirm....

...2d DCA 1988). See also Howard v. State, 228 Ga.App. 775, 492 S.E.2d 683 (1997) (evidence defendant shot prior girlfriend 12 years earlier held admissible to impeach testimony regarding gun use). We also find this evidence admissible as relevant under Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides: "Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, kno...

...Such a determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Heath v. State, 648 So.2d 660 (Fla.1994). Keeping these standards in mind, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. Section 90.404(2)(a) prohibits the introduction of similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, where such evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or to show the defendant possesses a propensity for criminal behavior. Section 90.404(2)(a) specifically allows the admissibility of similar fact evidence to prove a material fact in issue, such as "intent" and "absence of mistake or accident." Accordingly, a trial judge has the discretion to admit similar fact evidence when it is relevant as to a non-character aspect in the case....

...Judge Gersten, joined by Judges Cope, Goderich and Green, posits that it constitutes legitimate impeachment because defendant opened the door to this area of inquiry by lying. [9] The majority of this Court holds that the evidence was nevertheless admissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...For the following reasons, this analysis is inappropriate in this case. The state never filed a notice of intent to rely on evidence of defendant's prior misconduct in this case. Consequently, the admissibility of the evidence in question was never litigated within the parameters of section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...State, 237 So.2d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970) (offenses occurring four years prior to the offense charged were not too remote). In most instances, these cases offer little analysis on the issue. In Duffey, the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that "[u]nder section 90.404(2)(a) the remoteness of a prior crime is one aspect of its relevance, its tendency to prove or disprove a material fact in issue." 741 So.2d at 1197....

...In short, the present record does not allow for an affirmance based on the Tipsy Coachman doctrine. B. The Inadmissibility of the Evidence under the Williams Rule. The majority takes the position that the evidence in question here was admissible under section 90.404(2)(a)....

...tablish that the defendant had a propensity to commit violent crimes with firearms—a clearly impermissible purpose. I therefore conclude that evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct against his former wife was not admissible in this case under section 90.404(2)(a), either in the state's case-in-chief or as impeachment or rebuttal under section 90.404(2)(b)....

...[13] As explained below, the facts of Grubb were different than those in the present case. In Grubb, the accused was charged with a completed crime of violence and the prior bad act also involved a completed crime of violence and not just a threat. [14] Section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), requires that the state provide the defense with notice of intent to rely on similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts, ten days before trial....

...thin the ten-day window period, the court struck the defendant's demand for a speedy trial and reset the trial date for March 1, 1999. In taking this action, the trial court concluded that the State's notification was timely, in accordance *473 with Section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (1997), and that the defendant's acknowledgment that he could not adequately prepare constituted a waiver of his demand. We disagree. Section 90.404(2)(b)(1)'s application to the instant facts is limited....

...ffenses under paragraph (a), no fewer than 10 days before trial, the state shall furnish to the accused a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or information. § 90.404(2)(b)(1), Fla....

...s possession and control: (A) a list of names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant to any offense charged or any defense thereto, or to any similar fact evidence to be presented at trial under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes ......

...vance. (Emphasis added.) Heuring at 124. The Heuring court also held: [To be admissible] the evidence must be relevant to a material fact in issue such as identity, intent, motive, opportunity, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident. See § 90.404(2)(a)....

...s involving sexual assaults allegedly committed in a familial context. Although the logic for this distinction is somewhat difficult to understand, [7] the effect of Heuring is not. The supreme court has now extended the Williams rule far beyond the section 90.404(2)(a) concept in cases involving familial relationships and has made it applicable any time the similar fact evidence tends to corroborate the victim's testimony....

...never around these children, that he was not left alone with them and that he never had, or exercised, any custodial authority over them, the majority's "assumption" that the evidence of the other three alleged victims qualifies for admission under section 90.404 seems inescapable....

...d on the other children while there. This, in turn, assumes that evidence regarding other acts of the defendant's sexual misconduct is not truly necessary to impeach the defendant's version of events. [1] Such an analysis unduly restricts the use of section 90.404. By assuming the "bad act" testimony is inherently unfairly prejudicial, section 90.403 will always permit its exclusion unless some compelling need can be shown to outweigh the unfair prejudice. This is not how section 90.404 should work....

...or his propensity to force himself on women. Williams v. State, 621 So.2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1993). "Williams rule" evidence is available to establish a variety of material facts in issue, including opportunity, preparation, plan, or absence of mistake. § 90.404, Fla....

...It is proper, for example, to use similar fact evidence to rebut the defense by showing a common plan or scheme to seek out and isolate victims likely not to complain or to complain unsuccessfully because of the circumstances surrounding the assaults. 621 So.2d at 417. The majority can find no category enumerated in section 90.404, other *102 than "opportunity," that is relevant to the issues in this case....

...The reasons given by the lower court do not warrant blanket exclusion in limine. Consistent with the evidence actually adduced at trial, certain of the evidence that has been excluded in limine may or may not be admissible in trial. W. SHARP, J., concurs. NOTES [1] Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...o be an uncharacteristic lack of webbed feet which prevents the declaration, with total certainty, that it is a duck. While it is true that the proffered acts and circumstances relating to all the young girls are somewhat similar, one section of the 90.404(2)(a) requirement appears to be missing: "when relevant to prove a material fact in issue....

...barring evidence to show propensity. Perhaps it is significant that in codifying the Williams rule into the evidence code, the legislature did not list proof of a "pattern of criminality" as a valid basis for offering similar fact evidence. Because section 90.404(2) is not all inclusive, this does not mean that such proof is necessarily inadmissible....

...It is true that a portion of the proffered testimony is relevant to rebut the accused's lack of opportunity defense. But the relevant portion of the proffered testimony does not depend on any " Williams rule" analysis for admission. The witnesses are competent (without 90.404(2)(a)) to testify that they also were left alone in the accused's presence....

...h he had opportunity, he would not have molested the young victims as charged in the informations because he has no sexual interest in five-year-old girls, then the evidence that he molested other five-year-old girls would have been admissible under section 90.404(2)(a) because it would be relevant to a material fact in issue. But this was not his defense. [1] The majority evidently assumes such testimony is not foreclosed by the court's very broad order. The breadth of the order is in part attributable to the prolix nature of the state's Notice of Intent to Offer Section 90.404(2) Evidence....

...The trial court's ruling on the admissibility of collateral crime evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Macias v. State, 959 So.2d 782, 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing Stav v. State, 860 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)); Cadet v. State, 809 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Section 90.404(2)(b)(1) provides that "[i]n a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." The term "child molestation" is defined as conduct proscribed by section 794.011 or section 800.04 when committed against a person sixteen years of age or younger. § 90.404(2)(b)(2)....

....011 or 800.04, Florida Statutes. See Foreman v. State, 965 So.2d 1171, 1173-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs because they were not relevant and were not admissible under section 90.404(2)(b)(1) as collateral acts of molestation....

...ered a lewd or lascivious act. Thus, when appellant forced his minor daughter to expose her genitals in a lewd way for his camera, he committed lewd or lascivious conduct, which qualifies as "other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation" under section 90.404(2)(b)(1)....

...Accordingly, the photographs were admissible and could be considered for any relevant purpose, including to show motive, intent, plan, or absence of *1281 mistake, as well as to corroborate J.K.'s claims of sexual abuse against appellant. See Mendez v. State, 961 So.2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that section 90.404(2)(b) authorizes the admission of collateral crime evidence in child molestation prosecution for any relevant purpose, including to corroborate the victim's testimony by showing that the accused had a propensity for such criminal conduct)....

...Furthermore, the probative value of the photographs was not outweighed by any prejudicial effect upon appellant. Regardless of whether appellant's conduct falls within the child molestation activity proscribed by section 800.04, we do not find that the photographs constitute "collateral crimes" evidence, such that section 90.404(2)(b) governs their admissibility....

...Turning next to appellant's point on appeal regarding the admission of J.K.'s testimony about the incident she witnessed between appellant and her younger sister, S.K., we conclude that the trial court properly evaluated and admitted this evidence under section 90.404(2)(b) and McLean v....

...Eisenmenger, Robert R. Berry of Eisenmenger & Berry, P.A., Melbourne, for Respondent. PER CURIAM. The State petitions for certiorari review of an order suppressing Williams rule evidence. See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), codified at Fla. Stat. § 90.404(2) (1999)....

...4th DCA 1974); Clark v. State, 378 So.2d 1315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.1980). NOTES [1] The defendant has not argued, nor do we address, the issue of the state's failure to comply with Florida Evidence Code, section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Similar fact evidence of other crimes is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...acter evidence to show that the victim of a crime was the aggressor and that the accused acted in self-defense.'" Williams v. State, 982 So.2d 1190, 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Hedges v. State, 667 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)); see also § 90.404(1)(b)1., Fla....

...hen he was shot, replete with bullet hole. The trial court did exclude a twenty-minute video reenacting the pursuit route. The State correctly recognizes that none of this collateral crime evidence was admissible under the Williams rule, codified at section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), because it was not similar fact evidence....

...Craig supports the constitutionality of the procedure used, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to require C.C. to testify in the presence of the jury. During trial the state introduced the testimony of C.C.'s aunt as Williams rule evidence and pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b). Section 90.404(2)(b)1....

...The state argued at trial that this evidence was admissible pursuant to the statute, because similarity was no longer a criterion for admissibility of such evidence in child abuse cases. However, the state was wrong. In McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 2006), the court held section 90.404(2)(b) constitutional and reconciled it with section 90.403 which requires the court to weigh the probative value of evidence with its prejudice....

...the defendant's claim of self defense. In other words, it was relevant for those reasons and was therefore not made inadmissible as tending to show only that the accused was a bad or violent person. On that basis I join in the affirmance. NOTES [1] Section 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Evidence about predisposition to commit a crime is only relevant in this limited circumstance where the defendant puts his lack of predisposition at issue. We decline to extend its relevancy to a situation where the defendant has not specifically raised the entrapment defense. To do otherwise would be to ignore section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1991), and the Williams rule....

...Grier v. State, 27 So.3d 97, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Evidence of bad acts not included in the charged offenses is generally referred to as "collateral crimes evidence." Collateral crimes evidence includes similar fact evidence, which is governed by section 90.404, Florida Statutes, and is commonly referred to as "Williams rule evidence." See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959). As defined by section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2005): (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, pl...

...LEVINE, J., and GREENHAWT, SUSAN F., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] "Larry" was not called as a witness by either party. [2] For the purposes of paragraph (b), the term "child molestation" includes lewd or lascivious offenses committed upon or in the presence of persons less than 16 years of age. § 90.404(2)(b)2....

...showered and masturbate. The jury found Downs guilty of capital sexual battery and he was sentenced to life in prison. This appeal follows. The State argues that the evidence concerning the shower incidents was not offered as similar fact evidence under section 90.404(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2008), but instead was evidence that was inextricably intertwined with the crime charged....

...At best, the evidence arguably demonstrated the context out of which the crime charged arose but that connection seems very tenuous given the other evidence presented. The shower evidence appears to be evidence of separate crimes or acts of child molestation, admissible if at all, pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2008)....

...However, even under this relaxed standard of admissibility, to introduce similar fact evidence, the State must give a defendant "a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or information" at least ten days before trial. § 90.404(2)(c)1., Fla....

...equency of the prior acts; and (4) the presence or lack of intervening circumstances. This list is not exclusive. The trial courts should also consider other factors unique to the case. McLean, 934 So.2d at 1262. Similar fact evidence admitted under section 90.404(2)(b), like all evidence, is subject to a section 90.403 analysis for the danger of unfair prejudice....

...Finally, if requested, the trial court shall give an appropriate cautionary instruction both at the time the evidence is presented and in its final charge to the jury. McLean, 934 So.2d at 1262. In the instant case, Downs was not provided the pretrial notice required by section 90.404(2)(c)1. or the other due process safeguards required by McLean . Thus, the State cannot rely on section 90.404(2)(b) to justify the admission of evidence of other crimes in this case....

...The testimony was permissible and did not contravene Lowder. D.M. next argues that the trial court erred by overruling the defense objection that the State had failed to give the ten-day notice that it intended to offer evidence of other criminal offenses, see § 90.404(2)(b)1, Fla....

...Aleman, 592 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1979) (citation omitted). Here, the surveillance officer observed a fifteen-minute episode of hand-to-hand street drug sales, after which D.M. was arrested. We do not think that the first three sales qualify as "other criminal offenses," § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...ue of guilt or innocence. See Diaz v. State, 467 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Malcolm v. State, 415 So.2d 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see generally Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Williamson to the crime, as well as DNA evidence reflecting that he was, indeed, the perpetrator. In addition, the State offered into evidence testimony concerning certain of the appellant's earlier crimes as similar fact evidence pursuant to Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959). [1] See § 90.404(2), Fla....

...nd also identified Mr. Williamson as the perpetrator of those attacks. The facts surrounding the 1990 crimes and the crimes for which Mr. Williamson was charged in the present case were quite consistent, and met the requirements for admissibility of section 90.404(2)....

...ty, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.” DeLuise v. State, 72 So.3d 248, 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...in Alachua County and/or Orange County, Florida. At a hearing and over a defense objection, the prosecutor told the trial court what information the State sought to introduce from the victim as Williams Rule evidence. See Williams, 110 So.2d at 654. Section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), states: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.— * * * (b)1....

...This section shall not be construed to mean that evidence of the existence of available third-party benefits is inadmissible. At the commencement of trial, the hearing allowed a full evaluation of the Williams Rule evidence the State intended to introduce. Defense counsel acknowledged that the applicable version of section 90.404(2)(b), supra, allows the introduction of propensity evidence, yet the trial court still must accord with due process by performing an adequate balancing test to assess probative value versus unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and unnecessary cumulative evidence....

...reason, so long as some basis exists in the record to support the judgment. See Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 906 & n. 2 (Fla.2002). The trial judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel demonstrated a clear understanding of the requirements of section 90.404(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2005), as enunciated further in McLean....

...Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Mark S. Dunn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. COBB, Judge. This appeal raises one issue: Is the state's failure to strictly comply with the ten-day notice requirement of section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (1991) in respect to similar-fact evidence, fatal per se to admissibility of that evidence? That section provides: When the state in a criminal action intends to offer evidence of other criminal offenses unde...

...which provides that rulings or proceedings in criminal cases that are not prejudicial or harmful do not require reversal. . .. (Emphasis added). Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771, 774 (Fla. 1971). This principle recognized in Richardson applies with equal force to section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes, which, while enacted by the legislature, has, to the extent it is procedural, been adopted by our supreme court....

...Fromang on waiving double jeopardy on counts III and IV, and Mr. Fromang immediately moved for the waiver. The court then asked Mr. Fro-mang if he would waive the ten-day notice requirement for Williams Rule evidence, and Mr. Fromang readily agreed to do so. See § 90.404(2)(d)l., Florida Statutes....

...The trial judge admitted these videos, finding them relevant to establish appellant’s ownership of the thumb drive. These videos were relevant to prove a material fact in issue-appellant’s identity as the owner of the child pornography also contained on the thumb drive. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Rhodes said she and appellant were discussing sex and young girls, and that appellant commented: "If you're old enough to bleed, you're old enough to breed." The trial court denied the defense's motion, and Ms. Rhodes testified to the statement at trial. It was error to admit this testimony. This issue is governed by section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes, [1] which states, in pertinent part: CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY....

...Reversed and remanded for new trial. MINER, WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] It is worth noting that this is not " Williams Rule" evidence under Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) and section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes....

...Thus, if error occurred, we conclude it was harmless based on the balance of the evidence submitted in this case. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); § 90.404, Fla....

...in that the evidence did not rebut any issue presented during the defendant's case-in-chief. We cannot agree with appellant's position. We find that the evidence relating to the ceiling fans was properly admissible as evidence of a collateral crime. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), governs the admissibility of similar fact evidence....

...The statute clearly provides that "[s]imilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible" (emphasis added), and it does not attempt to limit admission of such evidence to only those collateral crimes charged prior to the offense for which an accused is being tried. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...of those offenses. NOTES [1] Appellant's conviction of burglary is not challenged on appeal. [2] This rule was established by Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), and is codified in Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985).

...In the circumstances, we find appellant has failed to make the requisite showing for disclosure of the informant's identity. Next, appellant has challenged the ruling which allowed the state to file an amended statement of particulars setting forth similar fact evidence not referenced in the first statement filed. Section 90.404(2) Florida Statutes, provides in part: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge...

...1982); Hoffman v. State, 397 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1981). In this case, the state served a notice of similar fact evidence on May 12, 1986, approximately three weeks before trial. Although the notice was in compliance with the 10-days-before-trial requirement of section 90.404(2)(b)1., it did not describe the offenses the state intended to offer with the particularity required by the statute....

...ave aided appellant's defense, that possibility is not sufficient to compel disclosure. See Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.220(c)(2). With regard to the third point, we find that the timing of the amended statement of particulars constituted defective notice. See § 90.404(2)(b)1., Fla....

...The instructions as set forth in the appendix shall be effective when this opinion becomes final. It is so ordered. POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. APPENDIX 2.4 EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS -WILLIAMS RULE” § 90.404(2)(a), (2)(b), (2)(c), and (2)(d)2, Fla....

...However, the defendant is not on trial for a crime, wrong, or act that is not included in the [information] [indictment]. Comments * Evidence that is admitted to corroborate the testimony of a victim is allowed only in child molestation and sexual offense cases. See section 90.404(2)(b), Fla. Stat., effective July 1, 2001, in child molestation eases. See 90.404(2)(c) Fla....

...Stat., effective July 1, 2011, for cases involving sexual offenses. This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 2000 [ 765 So.2d 692 ], and 2007 [ 965 So.2d 811 ], [g€Q7-325,-Corrected Opinion, August 30, 2007] and 2013. 3.8(a) EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS “WILLIAMS RULE” § 90.404(2)(a), (2)(b), (2)(e), and (2)(d)2, Fla....

...However, the defendant cannot be convicted for a crime, wrong, or act that is not included in the [information] [indictment]. Comments * Evidence that is admitted to corroborate the testimony of a victim is allowed only in child molestation and sexual offense cases. See section 90.404(2)(b), Fla. Stat., effective July 1, 2001, in child molestation cases. See 90.404(2)(c) Fla....

...ing or harming her. Defendant argues that this evidence was irrelevant to the issues at trial and was prejudicial because it portrayed defendant as having violent characteristics. The state argues that the testimony was properly admitted pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), to show defendant's intent....

...probation. Jensen argues the admission of evidence of the eight previous burglaries against the same victim and residence had some marginal value in proving intent, but that the prejudicial impact of such evidence far outweighed any probative value. Section 90.404(2)(a) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs and acts is admissible if it is probative of a material issue other than the bad character or propensity of an individual....

...State , the supreme court stated there is a general rule of admissibility of relevant similar fact evidence even though the evidence points to the commission of another crime. In this case the similar fact evidence was presented to prove intent. Evidence is admissible under § 90.404(2) to show intent, which generally is an ultimate issue in the case....

...Although a key was not used during the latest burglary, in light of the supreme court decision in Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1988), this distinction is not a crucial point upon which to deny the admission of evidence. In Bryan, the supreme court held that § 90.404(2) does not bar the introduction of other crimes which are factually dissimilar to the crime charged if the evidence of other crimes is relevant....

...e allegations which led to appellant's 1996 felony conviction. At trial he claimed that it tended to prove the character of the victim to make false allegations, while on appeal he claims that it was admissible as evidence of bias. At trial he cited section 90.404(1)(b) of the Florida Evidence Code which permits admission of evidence of a pertinent trait of the character of a victim....

...xtent that he reasonably believes such force is necessary. [3] Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). [4] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); § 90.404, Fla....

...In Feller, the court explained that Heuring requires greater similarity between the offenses than many trial judges had realized: Although sexual battery on an underage child is a reprehensible offense, it is not so unique in itself that it should be uniformly admissible under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...es (1985) did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws when it was applied to a crime that occurred before the effective date of the statute. Id. at 214-15 ; see also McLean v. State, 854 So.2d 796, 803 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that section 90.404(2)(b), involving a type of similar fact evidence, could be applied in a trial of a crime that occurred before the effective date of the statute)....

...is admissible to prove the victim's dangerous character when the defendant knew of the victim's violent acts or of his violent reputation at the time the alleged offense occurred. See Hedges v. State, 667 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also § 90.404, Fla....

...The state counters that Shermer opened the door when he testified to being uninterested in sex during the time he was allegedly molesting S.J. The standard of review for admissibility of evidence is abuse of discretion, limited by the rules of evidence. Nardone v. State, 798 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes, provides: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion." In Killian v. State, 730 So.2d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), the court held that where the defendant was charged with sexual battery against his nine-year-old niece, sexually explicit books recovered in the defendant's house were inadmissible under section 90.404(1) to show that the defendant acted in accordance with a particular character trait. Here, the pornography and sexual objects found in Shermer's house could not be admitted at trial under section 90.404(1). Under section 90.404(1)(a), however, "[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait" is admissible....

...He asserts that the trial court committed two errors: by summarily rejecting his request to exercise his right of self-representation and by admitting collateral crime evidence. We conclude that the trial court properly admitted the collateral crime evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), and affirm as to this issue....

...The collateral evidence is sufficiently similar to meet the standard of Saffor v. State, 660 So.2d 668 (Fla.1995), and warrants admissibility to corroborate the victim's testimony. It is permissible to consider the relationship of the victim and the perpetrator as a point of similarity under a section 90.404 analysis....

...seek available witnesses. There were available witnesses frequenting the Pine Street Inn who could testify that Lola and Vivian had established reputations for violence and aggressive behavior, which supported Williams's version of the incident. See section 90.404(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (1979), which provides that evidence of a pertinent character trait of a "victim" offered by the accused is an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility....

...State, supra , and it is not our place to second guess that judgment. See also Downs v. State, 453 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 1984). In second guessing trial counsel's strategy, *1130 the majority opinion is in direct conflict with Strickland, Songer, Downs and other similar decisions. I would affirm. NOTES [1] § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...t as a matter of law. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [4] In fact, the only physical evidence of injury was that to the back of Floyd's head, where Vivian admittedly struck him with a tire iron. [5] Section 90.404(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (1979), states as follows: (1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY....

...n him, the ten-day notice was not required. The trial court ruled that the testimony would be admitted as relevant to the issue of knowledge, and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice. We disagree. The statute applicable, section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in part: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS....

...Speed alone does not constitute reckless conduct unless the speed is shown to be grossly excessive. Santisteban, 72 So.3d at 197 . Rubinger begins by arguing that the evidence at issue is character evidence and, therefore, is inadmissible to prove culpable negligence under section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Therefore, the State argues that the trial court did not err in permitting the introduction of Rubinger’s post-accident behavior. *663 We reject Rubinger’s claim that the evidence at issue is character evidence. While we agree that such evidence is not admissible under section 90.404(1), the evidence in this case was not character evidence because it was not relevant to establish Rubinger’s character or a trait of her character....

...Accordingly, the trial court’s admission of the irrelevant, prejudicial evidence of Rubinger’s behavior after the accident was not harmless. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand this matter for a new trial on the charge for which Rubinger was convicted. Reversed and Remanded. WARNER and CONNER, JJ., concur. . Section 90.404(1) provides, "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion....”

...As such, it was relevant and not solely related to propensity or bad character. We again take this opportunity, as we did in State v. Rush, 399 So.2d 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), to call upon the Legislature of Florida to consider a change in " Williams Rule" evidence as codified in section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1984), as it pertains to child sexual molestation cases....

...During trial in the instant matter, C.W. identified Hernandez in court. In evaluating, analyzing and then ultimately admitting the testimony of C.W., the trial court made the following findings: The Court, as I said before, I am guided by the rule in this case is 90.404(b)....

...is v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980). In this case, the trial court failed to apply the correct legal rule by admitting Williams rule evidence under a standard "in the light most favorable to the State." The Williams rule is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...e defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. § 90.404(2)(b)1, Fla....

...them apart from other offenses. Id. at 124. In addition, the evidence must be relevant to a material fact at issue in the cause at trial, such as identity, intent, motive, opportunity, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. (citing § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...uch evidence was attributable to defensive efforts and thus did not require reversal), review denied, 584 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1991). Considering next the merits of the second issue, although the standard Williams Rule instruction [2] essentially tracks Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, the judge modified the standard instruction over defendant's objection by adding the following underscored language regarding victim-corroboration: The evidence which has been admitted to show similar crimes, w...

...However, the defendant is not on trial for a crime that is not included in the information. (Emphasis added.) Because there was no evidence in the case below that the charged offense arose within a familial or custodial setting, the instruction was an incorrect statement of the law, because section 90.404(2)(a) does not list victim corroboration as a proper purpose for similar-fact evidence, and Heuring only authorizes use for corroboration in a familial or custodial situation....

...7 and 9 years of age. [1] Each count of the information alleged that appellant forced K.T. to take appellant's penis into his mouth. Pre-trial, the state served notice of intent to rely in part on evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes....

...s that the similar fact evidence admitted below involved children of the opposite sex. He argues that the acts themselves were different and took place at different times and places. Thus, he concludes that the evidence was improperly admitted under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes....

...e value of that evidence was substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. Relying on Ables, supra, he maintains only that the incidents described by the two little girls were not sufficiently similar to those described by K.T. to be admissible under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes....

...nt, should not be admitted if its probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. 533 So.2d at p. 746 (Emphasis in original). In light of the above considerations, we find that the testimony of R.T. and C.C. was admissible under both section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes and the general rule of relevance....

...in order of seriousness, appellant here would argue that since he was charged with a category 10 offense against one child, evidence that he committed, say, a category 1, 3 or 7 offense against another child in the family would be inadmissible under section 90.404(2) because of factual dissimilarity between the offenses. To adopt appellant's reasoning that sexual encounters between a family member and his child victims must be virtually factually identical in order to be admissible under section 90.404(2) would require us to ignore the plain meaning of the word "similar"....

..."Similar" means: "nearly corresponding, resembling in many respects, somewhat like, having a general likeness." Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Edition. "Similar" does not mean "exactly the same." See Anderson v. State, supra . As used in section 90.404(2), it merely requires that the offenses share some like characteristics....

...Accordingly, we find that the testimony of each of the female children was relevant to corroborate the testimony of the male victim *920 of the charged offenses, whose credibility was necessarily a paramount issue, and that their testimony was sufficiently "similar" to be admissible under section 90.404(2)....

...The incident with Z.H. was not uniquely factually characteristic of the incident with M.S., and, therefore, it was not probative of the charge for which Corpus was being tried. Consequently, evidence of Z.H.'s encounter with Corpus was not admissible under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The State seeks a writ of certiorari to quash the trial court's order which precluded the State from presenting evidence of Wright's prior acts of domestic violence against the victim. We conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by applying section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2008), to exclude the evidence....

...her out of the car for several hours. On November 8, 2010, the trial court issued its order denying the admission of the other crimes evidence. With respect to the victim's testimony, the trial court ruled that it failed to meet the requirements of section 90.404(2) because it was relevant "solely to prove bad character evidence or propensity." II....

...Orders which prevent the State from effectively prosecuting its case demonstrate irreparable harm, see Pettis, 520 So.2d at 253, but in order to obtain relief, the State must also prove that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law, State v. Gillespie, 227 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). Section 90.404(2)(a) provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, id...

...Sexton v. State, 697 So.2d 833, 836-37 (Fla.1997) (quoting Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988)). Thus "if evidence of a defendant's collateral bad acts bears no logical resemblance to the crime for which the defendant is being tried, then section 90.404(2)(a) does not apply and the general rule [of relevancy] in section 90.402[ [3] ] controls." Id....

...Applying Dennis to the facts of this case, we believe that the evidence of Wright's prior acts of domestic violence and threats is relevant to the issues of motive and intent. Although the prior acts may not bear a striking similarity to the charged offense of armed kidnapping so as to be admissible pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), they are generally relevant pursuant to section 90.402....

...ctim killed). Accordingly, we believe that under the facts of this case, the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect. We therefore hold that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it applied section 90.404(2)(a) to bar the victim's testimony in this case....

...001), and raises four issues: three evidentiary rulings of the court and one sentencing issue. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We find no basis to reverse the court's evidentiary rulings on (a) admitting evidence of prior bad acts pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001); (b) limiting cross-examination of the Williams [1] rule witness; or (c) denying Mr....

...similar fact evidence of three separate incidents. The similar facts of the first two incidents were properly admitted to prove identity and modus operandi and otherwise satisfied the chief purposes of the rule allowing that evidence. See Fla. Stat. § 90.404(2)(a) (1997)....

...We find that neither issue constitutes reversible error, and as such, we affirm. Appellant was charged with having sexual activity with the victim in 2008. The state filed a motion to allow similar fact evidence of “other acts involving child molestation” pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b)l., Florida Statutes (2008)....

...rities, from the facts and circumstances” and that the circumstances were “almost exact, for a lack of a better word.” In a written order, the trial court determined that the Williams rule evidence was admissible as similar fact evidence under section 90.404(2)(a) and as child molestation evidence under section 90.404(2)(b)l....

...We review the admission of Williams rule evidence under the standard of abuse of discretion. Tripoli v. State, 50 So.3d 776, 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). The trial court’s discretion, however, “is restricted by the rules of evidence.” Trapp v. State, 57 So.3d 269, 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). The trial court relied on section 90.404(2)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (2008), to justify admission of the collateral victim’s testimony. Section 90.404(2)(a) and (b) state the following: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparati...

...For the purposes of this paragraph, the term “child molestation” means conduct proscribed by s. 794.011, s. 800.04, or s. 847.0135(5) when committed against a person 16 years of age or younger. *1202 Appellant contends that the Williams rule evidence was not sufficiently similar to the charged offense under section 90.404(2)(b) as to make it more probative than prejudicial. “Section 90.404(2)(b) broadly provides that evidence of the defendant’s commission of other acts of child molestation is admissible regardless of whether the charged and collateral offenses occurred in the familial context or whether they share any similarity.” McLean, 934 So.2d at 1259 ....

...of the prior acts; and (4) the presence or lack of intervening circumstances. This list is not exclusive. The trial courts should also consider other factors unique to the case. Id. at 1262 . We find that the collateral act was admissible only under section 90.404(2)(b)....

...that both victims had been in a relationship with appellant and both were in the company of mutual friends immediately prior to the act. We recognize that there appears to be an issue with whether the Williams rule victim qualified as a child under section 90.404(2)(b)....

...Suarez’s reputation in the community for carrying firearms unless the defendant could first demonstrate that, prior to the shooting, he was aware of Mr. Suarez’s reputation in the community for carrying firearms. Generally, evidence regarding a victim’s character is inadmissible. See § 90.404(1), Fla....

...im’s reputation or of specific instances of the victim’s conduct. See § 90.405, Fla. Stat. (2009). There are, however, important distinctions and evi-dentiary requirements between reputation evidence and evidence of specific acts admitted under section 90.404(l)(b)....

...sue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.” § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...evidence is relevant or material to some aspect of the offense being tried, and (2) whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by any prejudice.” Audano v. State, 641 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (citing §§ 90.402, 90.403 and 90.404(2), Fla....

...C. Following his conviction, Bruce appeals the admission of an attempted sexual battery he allegedly committed as similar fact evidence. We affirm. The State filed a notice of its intent to offer similar fact evidence from two witnesses, pursuant to section 90.404(2)(c), Florida Statutes....

...guing its admission merely established bad character or propensity to commit the crime charged. Additionally, he argues the two incidents were not similar and because the offenses did not involve children, the relaxed requirement of similarity under section 90.404(2)(b) did not apply. Section 90.404(2)(a) provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, id...

...Afterwards, he called both women expressing his love, then anger when they rejected his advances. The fact that Bruce did not raise consent or identity as a defense does not mean its admission only established bad character or propensity which would have required exclusion. See § 90.404(2)(a); Williams v....

...Richman, 861 So.2d at 1200. [3] See also Shapiro v. State, 696 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). In McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 1251 (Fla.2006), the supreme court held that the admission of a prior collateral act of child molestation, pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes, [4] did not violate *1230 a defendant's due process rights when the evidence was used to corroborate a victim's testimony, rather than prove identity....

...The supreme court concluded that due process was "satisfied by weighing the probative value of the evidence of prior acts of child molestations against its potential for unfair prejudice." Id. The supreme court recognized that relevancy under section 90.402 was not abrogated by the adoption of section 90.404(2)(b) and the relevancy of such evidence exists in its similarity to the charged offense....

...Further, when the evidence is admitted, the trial court must still instruct the jury, when requested, on the limited purpose for which it can be considered, and must prevent the evidence from becoming a central feature of the trial. In prosecuting Bruce, the State sought to admit the similar fact evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), rather than section 90.404(2)(b)....

...ere remote in time. See also Thomas v. State, 599 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (standing for the proposition that collateral crime evidence is not admissible to establish opportunity or common scheme unless either is a disputed issue at trial). [4] Section 90.404(2)(b) provides: 1....

...ense charged in the present case — the trial court ruled that such evidence was “not the proper way to get in reputation evidence.” There is, to be sure, “a distinction between reputation evidence and evidence of specific acts admitted under section 90.404(l)(b).” Grace v....

...But to prove the defendant’s apprehension was reasonable in the present case was the very purpose for which the defense offered evidence of specific acts. Generally, evidence of acts evincing a “person’s character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion.” § 90.404(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). Pursuant to section 90.404(l)(b), however, “evidence of *1003 prior specific acts of violence by the victim is admissible to reveal the reasonableness of the defendant’s apprehension at the time of the incident” when self-defense is raised....

...$60.50 which had been cashed at a Publix in a different county. There was no evidence to connect appellant to those two checks. The two checks were admitted under Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959) as evidence of collateral crimes. See also § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...On the contrary, it seems to us that the testimony was irrelevant to any issue in the case. Instead, it seems relatively clearly to have been intended to bear on appellant's propensity for violence. This is precisely the type of character evidence that section 90.404(1) of the Florida Evidence Code is intended to prohibit....

...The Williams Court stated, "[o]ur view of the proper rule simply is that relevant evidence will not be excluded merely because it relates to similar facts which point to the commission of a separate crime. The test of admissibility is relevancy." Id. at 659. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), codified this rule, which provides: Similar fact evidence ......

...Defense counsel explained that the witnesses' testimony would contradict the victim's deposition statements denying these bad acts, and therefore demonstrate that she lies. Character testimony regarding a victim's reputation for truthfulness is admissible. §§ 90.404(1)(b), 90.609, Fla....

...Whether or not she had hit him on prior occasions was collateral and not relevant to the issue. This testimony was being introduced only to show bad character and would not be admissible as, generally, evidence regarding a victim's character is inadmissible unless relevant to the issue being tried. § 90.404(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). However, paragraph 90.404(1)(b) does provide an exception for evidence of a pertinent character trait of the victim....

...with respect to the proposed testimony of the victim's relatives concerning her reputation for truthfulness. As the majority correctly states, character testimony concerning a victim's reputation for truthfulness is admissible in a criminal case. §§ 90.404(1)(b), 90.609, Fla....

...edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.” Johnson v. State, 112 So.3d 564, 565-66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (internal citation omitted); see also § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...This evidence does not tend to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident with respect to the specific charge being prosecuted; rather, it tends only to prove bad character. Fla. Stat. § 90.404(2)(a) (1985)....

...tencing errors. REVERSED AND REMANDED. BARFIELD, J., and PEARSON, TILLMAN (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), codified by Florida Statutes § 90.404.

...Nardelli's crime was similar enough to the facts of this case to make it relevant to Mr. Newby's defense and, as a result, that the evidence should have been admitted.4 In its classic form, the Williams rule, which was first codified at section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1976), allows the State to introduce similar fact evidence of other crimes or acts by the defendant to prove a relevant matter in the prosecution of the crimes for which he or she is on trial....

...denying defendant's motion in limine to exclude testimony concerning defendant's use of an alias. His use of an alias was relevant. He gave the alias to the officers who questioned him about the burglary and thereby concealed his true identity. See § 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...including the recapture period specified in rule 3.191(p)(3). The court set the defendant’s case for trial on June 5, 2017. On June 2, 2017, the circuit court entered an order sustaining the defendant’s objection to the state’s notice of intent to offer evidence under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2016). On June 5, 2017, the day set for trial, the state filed its “Motion to Stay Trial Proceedings, Extend Speedy Trial Limits and Continue the Case Pending Final Disposition of the Petition for Writ of Ce...

...The robbers carried one or two guns and a broomstick. These fact similarities are sufficient to establish a unique crime pattern pursuant to Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) and codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...t, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or general pattern of criminality so that the evidence of the prior offenses would have a relevant or a material bearing on some essential aspect of the offense being tried." Id. at 662. See Section 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...We affirm the trial court's denial of the other two grounds in the defendant's motion. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. COHEN and JACOBUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959) (authorizing admission of similar fact evidence); see also § 90.404(2), Fla....

...The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found the defendant guilty on all charges. The first two issues on appeal concern the propriety of admitting evidence of the September robbery at the defendant’s trial for the October robberies. Similar crime evidence, also known as Williams 1 rule evidence, is codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), and may be admitted at trial when it is relevant to prove a material fact in issue....

...Daniels, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Donna A. Gerace, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. KAHN, J. The issue in this case is whether section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), allowed the admission of certain evidence by the trial court....

...orney asked her whether the 1988 incident involved "some sexual activity by Mr. Melvin Woodard against you when you were 12 years of age[.]" Appellant had moved in limine to exclude this testimony, but the trial court denied the motion, finding that section 90.404(2)(b) did not require a showing of similar acts, "just that there are children involved and . . . molestation." This was error. In McLean v. State, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 90.404(2)(b) "as a conduit for evidence that corroborates the victim's testimony that the crime occurred rather than to prove the identity of the alleged perpetrator." 934 So.2d 1248, 1251 (Fla....

...The statute reads: In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. § 90.404(2)(b)1., Fla....

...g burn marks. Thus, this alleged testimony, by itself, does not exculpate or aid Duckett and its absence from the trial was not prejudicial. [22] The Williams rule comes from Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), and is codified in Fla. Stat. § 90.404(2)(a): Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or abs...

...ed by undue prejudice. The standard of review for admission of evidence is abuse of discretion; but that discretion is limited by the rules of evidence. Nardone v. State, 798 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The Williams rule has been codified in section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, pre...

...nce and were otherwise relevant and admissible to establish premeditation, we find that the statements were properly admitted. Collateral crime evidence “is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.” § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Relevant evidence is generally admissible unless precluded by a specific rule of exclusion. There are two categories under which evidence of uncharged crimes or bad acts will be admissible — similar fact evidence, otherwise known as Williams rule evidence, and dissimilar fact evidence. The requirements and limitations of section 90.404 govern similar fact evidence while the general rule of relevancy set forth in section 90.402 governs dissimilar fact evidence....

...lton in a collateral crime. We do not find these statements constitute Williams rule evidence. Because Hilton’s statement was relevant to prove premeditation, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. See § 90.404(2), Fla....

...Gen., Tallahassee, and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PARKER, Judge. In this appeal, the appellant, Aaron J. Edmond, argues that the trial court improperly admitted collateral crime evidence pursuant to Williams v. State [1] and section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Additionally, while the prosecutor in this case asked if Serrano cried, he did not argue to the jury that Serrano lacked remorse for these murders. Cf. Robinson v. State, 520 So.2d 1 (Fla.1988). Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. (d) Bad Character Section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that generally “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion.” See also Young v. State, 141 Fla. 529 , 195 So. 569, 569 (1939) (“[A] defendant’s character may not be assailed by the State in a criminal prosecution unless good character of the accused has first been introduced.”). Moreover, section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes, explains that “[sjimilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ......

...The so-called Williams rule states a general rule of admissibility of relevant evidence even though the evidence may indicate that the accused has committed other uncharged crimes, or may otherwise reflect adversely upon the accused's character. Id. Section 90.404(2)(a) codifies the Williams rule, and lists several purposes *1103 for which such evidence is admissible, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident....

...disqualify the evidence under Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1983). Parents' final argument against the commitment evidence is that the court violated the statutory prohibition against using evidence of similar wrongdoing to show propensity. See Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...she was in her late teenage years and as an adult. The state has done nothing to dispel the dominancy of the similar acts over the crime charged. We thus have no alternative to reversing for a new trial. STONE and WARNER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...State, 614 So.2d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 1993); Correll v. State, 523 So.2d 562, 566 (Fla.1988). Even if Morrell had objected, the testimony was relevant to more than Morrell's bad character or propensity to commit a crime. See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959). Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), allows the trial court to admit evidence of a defendant's prior acts when it is relevant to prove a material fact such as opportunity, preparation, or plan....

...that the verdict could not have been affected by the error." Ciccarelli v. State, 531 So.2d 129, 132 (Fla. 1988). We are unable to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission was harmless. Reversed. POLEN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...creased price for the cocaine because of a prior stop he had experienced on the Interstate during which "they didn't catch him, or he wasn't caught." We agree with Freeman's claim that such testimony was "other crimes" evidence within the meaning of section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1987), and thus was subject to the requirements of section 90.404(2)(b)1....

...State, 36 So.3d 613, 628 (Fla.2010). A court “considers both similarities and dissimilarities between the collateral crimes and the charged offense when reviewing whether ‘a sufficiently unique pattern of criminal activity [justifies] admission’ ” under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...s in jeopardy of being “convicted twice for the same offenses”). IV. Conclusion For the reasons expressed above, we affirm Corbett’s convictions. Affirmed. WALLACE and BLACK, JJ., Concur. . Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 663 (Fla.1959); see § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Appellant was not charged, however, with that offense in this case. On this occasion, in the same apartment, the informant again observed appellant cooking crack, but another man handed her the drugs and took her money. The trial court admitted the evidence of the prior transaction under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), reasoning that under Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), this was the type of signature collateral crime which would be admissible to establish identity, i.e., that it was the appellant who committed the present crime. Section 90.404(2)(a) provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, id...

...of lack of intent. In this case, as in Damren, the evidence of the prior crime was admissible to refute appellant's theory that he was there as an innocent bystander. Because that was appellant's theory of defense, the evidence was admissible under section 90.404(2)(a) as relevant to proving intent and knowledge....

...At the hearing, the State asserted the existence of yet another witness whom the prosecutor was trying to locate. Although not entirely clear from the record, it appears that both witnesses purportedly would offer Williams [1] rule evidence, pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...llateral transaction. In Spivey, the defendant was actually charged with both offenses, two distinct victims were involved, and the sole issue decided was whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for severance. Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes, provides: Other crimes, wrongs, or acts — *1073 (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of ......

...Instead, the evidence served merely to bootstrap the undercover officer's credibility, in a case where credibility was obviously the key issue, and further suggested appellant's propensity as a drug dealer. I would respectfully suggest that this sort of "identity" evidence is not contemplated by § 90.404(2)....

...There must be identifiable points of similarity which pervade the compared factual situations ... [I]n order for the similar facts to be relevant the points of similarity must have some special character or be so unusual as to point to the defendant. This court has clearly recognized an interplay between § 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1989), and § 90.403, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The court observed that under § 90.403, relevant evidence should be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Recently, this court has had occasion to further examine, and reaffirm, the relationship between § 90.403 and § 90.404(2)....

...fair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.' The sponsor note to this section explains that `nothing that fails to meet the tests of §§ 90.401 and 90.403 may be admitted.' Accordingly, section 90.404(2)(a) recognizes the interplay of section 90.401 and 90.403 by specifying that `similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue.' Since similar fact evidence of other crimes is inherently prejudicial to a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial, such evidence is admissible under section 90.404(2)(a) only to prove a material fact in issue, that is, a material fact that is genuinely in dispute....

...The charged and collateral offenses must be not only strikingly similar, but they must also share some unique characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses. (emphasis in original) 1992 WL 83071 [*]3, 17 FLW at D1124, quoting Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d at 124. The case law leads to the inescapable conclusion that § 90.404(2) provides no meaningful guide for admissibility, unless the trial court is required in each instance to weigh the probative value of the proposed similar fact evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice, as required by § 90.403....

...dentity (which it did not logically do), but to demonstrate Bennett's criminal propensity. The rule requiring more than a mere general similarity is quite easily explained when one considers, even for a moment, the relationship between § 90.403 and § 90.404(2), discussed above....

...case. This difference is but a difference in opportunity, as noted in Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 193 (Fla. 1997). The facts surrounding the 1979 offense and conviction are sufficiently similar to be admissible as Williams Rule evidence under section 90.404. [3] See Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186 (Fla.1997); Titel v. State, 788 So.2d 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). However, where child molestation is involved, section 90.404(2) broadens the admissibility of similar fact evidence....

...We also disagree that the evidence regarding the 1979 offense is too remote in time because it occurred twenty-two years prior to the instant offense. The remoteness of a prior crime is one aspect of relevance, which tends to prove or disprove a material fact. Duffey v. State, 741 So.2d 1192, 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); § 90.404(2)(a)....

...We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence challenged in this appeal. AFFIRMED. HARRIS and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 800.04, Fla. Stat.(2001). [2] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959). [3] Section 90.404(2) provides: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan knowledge, id...

...State, 67 So.3d 332, 336 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Likewise, this court reviews a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of Williams rule evidence for abuse of discretion. McWatters v. State, 36 So.3d 613, 628 (Fla.2010). The Williams rule is codified in section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes, and states: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...(2007). Even if we were to hold that the testimony regarding the ax incident was Williams rule evidence, it was improperly admitted by the trial court because the State did not provide proper notice of its intent to use such evidence, as is required by section 90.404. 1 *943 Although the evidence at issue in this appeal is not admissible as Williams rule evidence because of the State’s failure to provide proper notice under section 90.404, we have held that: [Ejvidence of uncharged crimes which are inseparable from the crime charged, or evidence which is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged ......

...�s counsel a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or information. No notice is required for evidence of offenses used for impeach *943 ment or on rebuttal.” § 90.404(2)(c)l., Fla....

...ant, which occurred while her mother was away from the home. Appellant claims that this self-corroborating testimony was admitted in violation of Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.1987), and Saffor v. State, 660 So.2d 668 (Fla.1995). We disagree. Section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes, provides that collateral crimes evidence may be admitted when relevant to prove a material fact in issue such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but is inadmissible when relevant solely to prove propensity....

...Appellant in the family home. The fact that Appellant lured the victim into his bedroom and committed the act each time, only after the victim's mother was sent away from the home, is relevant to prove opportunity, preparation, and plan pursuant to section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes....

...DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 794.011(2), Fla. Stat. (1989). The victim was 11 years old. [2] § 800.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Therefore, we only address the issue of whether the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of H.K. and M.M. Evidence of other crimes or acts is admissible if it is found to be relevant for any purpose, save that of showing bad character or propensity. See Williams; § 90.404, Fla. Stat. (1997). Section 90.404, which codified the holding in Williams, provides that similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted when relevant to prove a material fact in issue such as "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, know...

...We cannot say that the charged offense and the collateral offenses were sufficiently similar to meet the test of admissibility in this non-familial case. The collateral offenses prove "no more than appellant's propensity to commit offenses of the same general type, an issue expressly prohibited by section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes." See Barton v....

...commission of a separate crime, but evidence of other crimes is inadmissible where its sole relevancy is to attack the character of the defendant or to show the defendant's propensity to commit a crime. State v. Vasquez, 419 So.2d 1088 (Fla. 1982); § 90.404, Fla....

...ncidents similar to this incident with the description being the same." Appellant immediately moved for a mistrial, which was denied. The jury convicted appellant of armed robbery. The officer's testimony was impermissible collateral crime evidence. § 90.404(2), *624 Fla....

...retrieved. No money or cocaine were found on Hawks. Hawks was charged by information with unlawful possession with the intent to deliver or sell cocaine. Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intention to use similar fact evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ith this instruction which was inappropriate for the crime charged. Deposition of Williams' Rule Witness The State obtained an order allowing introduction of similar fact evidence pursuant to Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), codified as, section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...ce. Pate v. State, 529 So.2d 328, 329 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 536 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1988); Kruse v. State, 483 So.2d 1383, 1388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Hodges v. State, 403 So.2d 1375, 1377 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), rev. denied, 413 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1982); § 90.404(2), Fla....

...dant's own statements made to undercover police during the subject cocaine negotiations in this case, that the defendant was involved in drug trafficking generally. We conclude that the evidence was admissible as proper similar crimes evidence under Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983); the defendant's statements made during the commission of the charged crimes were relevant to prove the defendant's criminal intent and knowledge in this case....

...At trial, over appellant's objection, the trial court admitted evidence of alleged abuse which occurred in California. Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or crimes is relevant to prove a material fact at issue if the evidence is not being admitted solely to prove bad character or propensity. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...n over defense objection. The ex-wife testified that six years earlier, the defendant had become angry with her and brandished a loaded AK-47 at her and their daughter. [1] The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of shooting his girlfriend. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1998) provides that evidence of collateral crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant is admissible if it is relevant to a material fact in issue; such evidence is not admissible where its sole relevance is to prove the character or propensity of the accused....

...g, although clearly permissible, see Art. I, § 16(b), Fla. Const.; § 921.143, Fla. Stat. (1997), and definitely relevant to sentencing, is not relevant to the issue presently before this Court. Moving now to the substantive issue before the Court, section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), requires that the state provide the defense with notice of intent to rely on similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts, ten days before trial....

...Nevertheless, the fact that the state did not seek to introduce the evidence during its case-in-chief is not dispositive on the issue of admissibility, as strategic considerations may have taken part in the decision. The dissent takes the position that the evidence in question here was proper under section 90.404(2)(a)....

...tablish that the defendant had a propensity to commit violent crimes with firearms—a clearly impermissible purpose. I therefore conclude that evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct against his former wife was not admissible in this case under section 90.404(2)(a), either in the state's case-in-chief or as impeachment or rebuttal under section 90.404(2)(b). [6] *99 Before moving on to the other aspects of my analysis, I stop to observe that under section 90.404(2)(a), no evidence of collateral crimes is admissible unless the trial court is persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that such crimes were, in fact, committed....

...State, 641 So.2d 1356, 1358-59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Chapman v. State, 417 So.2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). This requirement is the same whether the collateral crimes are presented in the state's case-in-chief after compliance with the notice requirement of section 90.404(2)(b), or whether they are introduced for impeachment or rebuttal....

...Here, the critical issue at trial was whether the defendant accidentally shot Maria. The question by the prosecutor was relevant to show the defendant's "motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or general pattern of criminality." See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Specifically, the question was relevant to the defendant's claim that he was "cleaning" the gun which "accidentally" discharged while arguing with Maria, as opposed to "threatening" Maria with the gun when she was shot and killed. [13] Therefore, I would find the prosecutor's question was proper under Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). For similar reasons, I would find the ex-wife's impeachment testimony was also proper, and that no notice was required by the State under Section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ntent (culpable mental state) and the lack of accident, in this case. I would find the impeachment testimony in the present case was similarly admissible. [14] Two bills have been introduced, one in the House and one in the Senate, which would amend Section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1999), and specifically provide that evidence of prior acts of domestic violence by a defendant is admissible in certain criminal prosecutions involving domestic violence. See H.B. 1585 (2000)(introduced by Representative Betancourt) and S.B. 2244 (2000)(introduced by Senator Meek). The significance of this proposed amendment to Section 90.404, from an evidentiary standpoint, is profound because oftentimes the outcome of a domestic violence prosecution cannot rest upon the credibility of the victim who either recants, fails to appear or, as in the present case, is dead....

...Evidence of a deceased victim's violent character is admissible when self-defense is asserted if there is an issue as to either the conduct of the deceased or the reasonableness of the defendant's belief as to imminent danger from the deceased. See § 90.404(1)(b), Fla....

...As to the second issue raised on appeal, we affirm the trial court's determination that the photograph line-up utilized by law enforcement was not impermissibly suggestive. AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; REMANDED for new trial. PALMER and LAWSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959). [2] Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2007) provides: (2) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts....

...However, the State asserts that the error is harmless because each of the alleged criminal episodes could have been introduced in the trial of the other as similar fact evidence under the Williams Rule, an issue not addressed in Dupree. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959); § 90.404(2), Fla....

...rule and was admissible to prove modus operandi and identification. It is also suggested that error was committed in admitting the collateral crime evidence regarding the kidnapping during the second robbery because the notice of intent required by section 90.404(2)(b)1 (1983) described only the robbery and not the kidnapping....

...ble, even when it points to the commission of another crime, "except where the sole relevancy is character or propensity of the accused." Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 663 (Fla.1959). The Williams rule is codified in the Florida Evidence Code as section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2006), which states in part: (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.— (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limite...

...rime charged. See Williams v. State, 621 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla.1993). A matter of consequence is “any material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” § 90.404(2), Fla....

...counts of lewd and lascivious molestation of A.C. in violation of section 800.04(5)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2013). Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to introduce Williams rule evidence of the defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation under section 90.404(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2013). Specifically, the State sought to introduce the testimony of J.R., the defendant’s 1 Williams v....

...The defendant was sentenced, and this appeal followed. Analysis The defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the Williams rule evidence to corroborate A.C.’s testimony. Section 90.404(2)(b) provides that prior acts of child molestation are admissible in a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child molestation,4 and “may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” Section 90.404(2)(b) “broadly provides that evidence of the defendant’s commission of other acts of child molestation is admissible regardless of whether the charged and collateral offenses occurred in the familial context or whether they share any similarity.” McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1259 (Fla. 2006). However, despite the relaxed standard of admissibility in child molestation cases under section 90.404(2)(b), the Florida Supreme Court noted in McLean that 4 As used in section 90.404(2)(b), “child molestation” includes, among other crimes, the sexual battery counts charged under section 794.011(8)(b) and the lewd and lascivious counts charged under section 800.04(5)(c)2. See § 90.404(2)(b)2. 10 the evidence of other acts of child molestation must be relevant and that the evidence “remains subject to weighing under section 90.403.”5 Id....

...molestation is not so prejudicial that the defendant is convicted based on the prior sexual misconduct. McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1259. The McLean Court set forth several requirements that must be satisfied prior to the admission of other acts of child molestation under section 90.404(2)(b)....

...arged offenses were allegedly committed twenty years apart, the intervening time is insufficient to render the collateral crimes evidence inadmissible. See McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1263 (affirming introduction of a collateral child molestation under section 90.404(2)(b) that occurred fifteen years prior to the charged offenses); Delatorre v. State, 45 So....

...of evidence that the defendant sexually assaulted his younger sister twenty years earlier); Seavey, 8 So. 3d at 1177 (finding that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the collateral crimes evidence [admitted under section 90.404(2)(b)] was relevant and that its probative value outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice,” even though the collateral crimes occurred sixteen and twenty-five years prior to the charged crime of child molestation); Triplett v....

...vidence of the defendant’s sexual assaults upon J.R. Conclusion Based on the above analysis, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the collateral crimes evidence under section 90.404(2)(b) where the evidence was relevant to corroborate A.C.’s testimony; the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; the trial court, as requested, gave the jury a cautiona...

...Defense counsel objected to the admission of this testimony, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible because (1) the evidence was not offered to prove a relevant fact at issue, and (2) the state had failed to file written notice of its intent to use similar fact evidence as required by section 90.404(2)(b)1, of the Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The state responds by arguing that the testimony was relevant and thus admissible; however, the state fails to respond to the claim that the evidence was inadmissible because the state had failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement. See § 90.404(2)(b)1., Fla....

...Having found no merit to any of the claims of reversible error raised by Mr. Adside in this appeal, we affirm his convictions and sentences. AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] § 810.06, Fla. Stat. (1995). [3] § 856.021, Fla. Stat. (1995). [4] Section 90.404(2) of the Florida Evidence Code provides: 90.404 Character evidence; when admissible....

...nish to the accused a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or information. No notice is required for evidence of offenses used for impeachment or on rebuttal. § 90.404(2), Fla....

...u not take the boy's pants down and lay him on the floor and attempt to stick your penis in his anus?" He said, "Yes, but I was drinking." I said, "But that's what you did, isn't it?" He said, "Yes, it is." The Williams rule [1] has been codified at section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), and reads as follows: (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,...

...in the instant case, and the collateral crimes were committed outside the familial context: Evidence of other crimes or acts is admissible if it is found to be relevant for any purpose, save that of showing bad character or propensity. See Williams; § 90.404, Fla.Stat. (1997). Section 90.404, which codified the holding in Williams, provides that similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted when relevant to prove a material fact in issue such as "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, know...

...her bolstering or anticipatory rehabilitation. [1] In the present case, the answer given was "No. I'd never been arrested before." Thus, the issue here involves the bolstering of the witness's character and not anticipatory rehabilitation. [2] *1246 Section 90.404(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that: (1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY.—Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion, except: ....

...Before COPE, GERSTEN and GREEN, JJ. COPE, J. Mireille Vincent appeals her conviction for second degree murder in the stabbing death of her boyfriend. We affirm. The question presented on this appeal is whether the trial court erred by admitting similar fact evidence under subsection 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...The defense position was that the victim, who was intoxicated, had fallen or walked into the wall with the knife pointed at his chest and inflicted the stab wound by accident. Prior to trial the State filed a notice of intent to rely on evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. See § 90.404(2)(c)1., Fla....

...Charles' mother called the police but Charles refused to cooperate and did not seek medical treatment. The court ruled that the similar fact evidence was admissible to establish that the stabbing of the victim David had not occurred through accident or a mistake. The defense argues that the court misinterpreted subsection 90.404(2), Florida Statutes....

...ue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. Id. § 90.404(2)(a) (emphasis added)....

...The evidence was relevant, probative, and not unfairly prejudicial. Affirmed. NOTES [1] The victim was referred to as David or Dave during the trial. [2] The legislature subsequently amended the Evidence Code to address this issue as relates to child molestation cases. See § 90.404(2)(b), Fla....

...directed at the arresting officer was admissible as Williams Rule evidence because it was relevant to prove Gould’s “intent” to commit the crime of attempted second degree murder of a law enforcement officer, a material issue in the case. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla....

...Evidence of other crimes is properly admissible when such evidence tends to disprove a defendant’s theory of defense or attempt to explain his intent. See Miller v. State, 667 So.2d 325, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s admission of other crimes evidence. See § 90.404(2)(a)....