Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ts entirety. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND IN THE PRESENT CASE In December 1995, the State of Florida (the State) filed an information against Curtis Leon Heggs (Heggs), charging him *622 with committing an armed robbery on November 2, 1995, in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...On appeal, Lockley argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under the career offender provision, United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 4B1.1(a) (Nov. 1, 2008), because his prior conviction for attempted robbery in violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 812.13(1) and 777.04(1) was not a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2. We review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines....

...disregard the label placed on the state crime and look to whether the conduct necessarily proven as a prerequisite for Lockley’s conviction under Florida law is a natural equivalent to the offense as envisioned by the Guidelines’ drafters. Id. at 1330–31. If Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) follows the generic definition of robbery with only minor variations, or is narrower than the generic offense, we will uphold the district court’s application of the career offender enhancement....

...If, however, Florida’s definition is broader than generic robbery, Lockley’s prior conviction cannot serve as a predicate, under the categorical approach, for the enhancement. Id. at 599–602, 110 S. Ct. at 2158–60. As explained below, we find that § 812.13(1) is the equivalent of the generic form of robbery. As a result, we cannot do as Lockley asks. Section 812.13 defines “robbery” as the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1)....

...And, “[t]he fear contemplated by the statute is the fear of death or great bodily harm.” Magnotti v. State, 842 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). For our purpose, then, commission of robbery in violation of Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) necessarily requires that the defendant (1) commit a taking of money or other property from another person or in the custody of another person (2) with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the person of the money or proper...

...use that force or violence, or by causing the person to fear death or great bodily 3 The Florida Standard Jury Instructions mirror the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1997), which found two ways to commit robbery under § 812.13(1): a taking by means of either “(1) force or violence,” or “(2) intimidation by assault or putting in fear.” Id....

...purposely puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury . . . .”). Recognizing this distinction, Lockley would have us find that the Florida robbery statute at issue here is non-generic. In particular, he argues that the “putting in fear” language of § 812.13(1) should be read broadly to mean any act of intimidation, not merely those that place the victim in imminent danger. He believes construing the statute in that manner removes § 812.13(1) from the realm of generic robbery....

...Whitson, 597 F.3d 1218, 1220, 1220 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1349–51 (11th Cir. 2008)). 10 threatening the imminent use of force.”) (emphasis added). A comparison of Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) to this generic definition convinces us that they are clear equivalents. Regardless, § 812.13(1) also satisfies the narrower, minority definition. “Putting in fear,” per Florida law, involves an act causing the victim to fear death or great bodily harm....

...ic,6 and 6 Lockley does not argue that Florida’s attempt statute is non-generic, nor would he be successful if he did. But because the crime as charged in Lockley’s case was attempted robbery in violation of both Fla. Stat. §§ 812.13(1) and 777.04(1), we feel compelled to address the issue. Attempt under Florida law requires the defendant to commit “any act toward the commission of such [crime], but fails in the perpetration or is intercepted or prevented in the execution thereof.” Fla....

...pt, as both require an “overt 11 Lockley’s attempted robbery conviction categorically qualifies as the second predicate offense for the career offender enhancement. The bare elements of § 812.13(1) also satisfy the elements and residual clauses of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). We have previously discussed the elements of § 812.13(1)....

...All but the latter option specifically require the use or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. And, once again, we find it inconceivable that any act which causes the victim to fear death or great bodily harm would not involve the use or threatened use of physical force. Section 812.13(1) accordingly has, as an element, the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G....

...Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2009) (interpreting the ACCA); see also Harris, 586 F.3d at 1287 (applying Harrison’s analysis to the residual clause of the career offender enhancement). Again, we answer these questions applying the categorical approach to § 812.13(1) described above. Harris, 586 F.3d at1288. Interpreting § 812.13(1)’s “putting in fear” language as we must, the relevant category of crime includes those offenses that involve the use or threatened use of force or violence. As such, this form of robbery clearly presents a “serious potential risk of physical injury.” See United States v. Wilkerson, 286 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that a conviction under § 812.13(1) is a “violent felony” under the ACCA); cf....

...United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 170 L. Ed. 2d 490 (2008), to hold that a non-overt act conspiracy to commit robbery is a “crime of violence” as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)). And the risk of physical injury posed by a violation of Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) is comparable in degree to the enumerated crimes of burglary and extortion, both of which by nature involve a heightened danger of violent confrontation (even if such confrontation is not the usual course of the offense). See, e.g., James v....

...“violent felony” pursuant to the residual clause of the ACCA). We therefore reaffirm the holding of Wilkerson as applied to Florida’s definition—which includes an overt act requirement—of attempted robbery. 7 In this regard, we distinguish § 812.13(1) from its less-serious counterpart, Fla. Stat. § 812.131(1), which concerns “robbery by sudden snatching.” Pursuant to this companion statute, “robbery by sudden snatching” is committed whenever a defendant takes money or other property from the victim’s person, with intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the victim or the owner of the money or other property, when, in the course of the taking, the victim was or became aware of the taking. Fla. Stat. § 812.131(1). Section 812.131(1) goes on to state that no force “beyond that effort necessary to obtain possession of the money or other property” or resistance by the victim must be proven to satisfy the definition. Fla. Stat. § 812.131(1)(a), (b). So while § 812.131(1) attends to pick-pocketing or other similar activity (so long as the victim is in possession of the money or property and realizes he is being victimized), § 812.13(1) concerns a far more aggressive and potentially violent form of robbery....

...the person or custody of another, with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.13, Fla....

with a firearm, in violation of Florida Statutes § 812.13, and (3) sale of cocaine, in violation of Florida

...The effect of Section 812.028(3), Florida Statutes, is not provided for in the current instructions. The amendments shown in Exhibit 5 are intended to incorporate that statute. 12. The robbery instruction on page 155 of the manual needs to conform to Section 812.13, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 87-315, Laws of Florida....

...812.012(7) "Traffic" means: to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of property; and to buy, receive, possess, obtain control of or use property with the intent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of that property. EXHIBIT 6 ROBBERY F.S. 812.13 Before you can find the defendant guilty of Robbery, the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Elements 1....

...ttempt property — 812.016 Dealing in stolen None None property — trafficking — 812.019(1) Dealing in stolen 812.019(1) Attempt property — managing trafficking — 812.019(2) Robbery with a firearm Robbery with a weapon Attempt or deadly weapon — 812.13(2)(b) — 812.13(2)(a) Robbery — 812.13(2)(c) Grand theft 1st degree — 812.014(2)(a) Petit theft Grand theft 2d degree — 812.014(2)(e)(d) — 812.014(2)(b) Grand theft 3d degree — 812.014(2)(c) Battery — 784.03 Aggravated battery — 784.045 Assault — 784.011 Aggravated assault — 784.021 Extortion — 836.05 See Davis v. State, 277 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) *1238 Robbery with a weapon Robbery — 812.13(2)(c) Attempt — 812.13(2)(b) Petit theft Grand theft 1st degree — 812.014(2)(e)(d) 812.014(2)(a) Grand theft 2d degree 812.014(2)(b) Grand theft 3d degree 812.014(2)(c) Battery — 784.03 Aggravated battery — 784.045 Assault — 784.011 Aggravated assault — 784.021 Extortion — 836.05 See Davis v. State, 277 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) Robbery — 812.13(2)(c) Petit theft Attempt — 812.014(2)(c)(d) Grand theft 1st degree — 812.014(2)(a) Grand theft 2d degree — 812.014(2)(b) Grand theft 3d degree — 812.014(2)(c) Battery — 784.03 Assault — 784.011 Aggravated assault — 784.021 Extortion — 836.05 See Davis v....

...still constituted a robbery because it involved "the taking of ... property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla....

...State, 525 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1988) (evidence that defendant wrestled officer's weapon away and fired fatal shot into officer's head supported felony murder instruction based on robbery), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S.Ct. 1354, 103 L.Ed.2d 822 (1989). Under section 812.13, the force, violence, or intimidation may occur prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property so long as both the act of force, violence, or intimidation and the taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events....

...Felony Murder/Robbery Robbery is defined as "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of *133 the taking there is use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). An act is considered "`in the course of the taking' if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitutes a continuous series of acts or events." § 812.13(3)(b)....

...z’s conviction would still fall within the guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence. Gonzalez was convicted under Florida’s robbery statute, which has an element “the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 812.13(1) (West 1976)....

...Coincidentally, in 1989 the Commission amended the definition of a crime of violence by deleting reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16 . The amended definition tracks the definition of a “violent felony” found in 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B). 5 . In relevant part Fla.Stat.Ann. § 812.13(1) (West 1976) reads: (1) “Robbery” means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...*244 firearm in violation of section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1995), one count of attempted first-degree murder in violation of sections 782.04(1)(a)(1) and 777.04(1), Florida Statutes (1995), one count of robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), and two counts of first-degree murder in violation of section 782.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...first entering the van and again when he forced the Victim to withdraw money from the bank. The Victim was again battered when the perpetrator hit her on the head because the children were screaming while she performed oral sex on him. The perpetrator committed robbery under section 812.13 when he demanded the Victim’s money and rings and when he took the money she had withdrawn from her bank accounts....

...'s van. See id. After exiting the residence with these items, Hayes and the two others used the keys to steal the van, which was parked outside of the victim's residence. See id. On appeal, Hayes asserted that his convictions for armed robbery under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1997), [2] and grand theft of a motor vehicle under section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1997), [3] were obtained *698 in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy because both convictions resulted from the same criminal episode....

...is distinguishable "because the same property was charged as having been taken as a result of both the robbery and the theft (i.e., a motor vehicle and vehicle keys) and there was only one `taking' of that property charged and proven at trial." 709 So.2d at 157. [2] Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1997), provides in pertinent part: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily...

...Consequently, we hold that Georgia's robbery by sudden snatching is not a qualified offense for purposes of Florida's habitual felony offender statute. The petitioner, Kenneth Robinson, was charged by information with two counts of armed robbery, in violation of sections 812.13 and 775.087, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...rom the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.13(1), Fla.Stat....

...State, 561 So.2d 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Walker v. State, 546 So.2d 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); S.W. v. State, 513 So.2d 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); and R.P. v. State, 478 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 491 So.2d281 (Fla.1986). [2] Florida's robbery statute is section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...The district court also directed the trial court to correct its judgment to accurately reflect Robinson's current offense as a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. Id. We do not address those issues here. [9] After Royal, the Florida Legislature amended section 812.13, Florida Statutes, to provide that robbery occurs if force or intimidation is used "prior to, or contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if [the force or intimidation] and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." Ch....

...nst Towler. The source of the dispute has centered on whether the underlying information’s allegations that Towler committed robberies while carrying a knife were sufficient to charge Towler with robbery with a "deadly weapon.” See Fla. StatAnn. § 812.13 (West Supp.1992)....

...Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Before KRAVITCH and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and LYNNE * , District Judge. JOHNSON, Circuit Judge: 1 The petitioner, Oscar Brown Boykins, was convicted of robbery in violation of Fla. Code Ann. Sec. 812.13 and sentenced to life imprisonment....

...The district court affirmed both convictions and certified the following question of great public importance: In the wake of State v. Gibson, 452 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1984), may an offense proscribed by section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes, ever be considered a lesser included offense of the proscription of section 812.13(1) and (2), Florida Statutes? Id. at 800. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We find it appropriate to restate the question as follows: Did the legislature intend that a defendant could be convicted of the offense of armed robbery under section 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes, and the offense of displaying a firearm or carrying a concealed firearm, under section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes, when the offenses resulted from a single act? We find, in accordance with our recent decision in Carawan v....

...t one, and possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense, as charged in count two, and sentenced for each offense. Hall contends, while he may have been properly convicted of first-degree robbery while carrying a firearm under sections 812.13(1) and 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), he cannot also be convicted of displaying or carrying a firearm under section 790.07(2). The state, on the other hand, contends that our decision in Gibson controls and allows a conviction for both offenses. The elements of robbery with a firearm are set forth in section 812.13: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...State, 468 So.2d 971 (Fla. 1985), concluding that a defendant could not be simultaneously convicted of both sale and possession, in addition to trafficking. In the instant case, Hall was charged with both committing a robbery while carrying a firearm, under 812.13(1) and (2)(a), and the use and display of a firearm and the carrying of a concealed firearm while committing a felony, under 790.07(2)....

...We hold the legislature had no intent of punishing a defendant twice for the single act of displaying a firearm or carrying a firearm while committing a robbery. To hold otherwise would mean that, for every offense of robbery in which a defendant uses or carries or displays a firearm, in violation of section 812.13, there would also be a violation of section 790.02(2). Robbery, under section 812.13(1), becomes the enhanced offense of armed robbery under 812.13(2)(a) by reason of the element of carrying or displaying a firearm....

...nd prescribe their punishment and that there was no double jeopardy bar to "separate prosecutions and punishment of separate statutory crimes arising *681 in the same course of events." Id. at 558. We then examined the statutory elements of sections 812.13(1), (2)(a)-(b), and 790.07(2), Florida Statutes (1977), and determined that they defined separate criminal offenses....

...ding one year”); United States v. Cure, 996 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (11th Cir. 1993) (concluding that prior conviction for crime committed when defendant was under seventeen satisfied 2 Defendant’s robbery convictions were under Fla. Stat. § 812.13. 5 ACCA’s requirements because defendant was adjudicated as an adult under Florida law and sentenced for a term exceeding one year). Finally, Defendant argues that the district court’s application of the ACCA violated Apprendi v....

...is to slide back into the Carawan [6] analysis which the Legislature rejected in its 1988 amendment to section 775.021. See State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1989). SHAW and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.014(2)(c)4, Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Counts I and II are both life felonies. See §§ 782.04(1)(a), 777.04(4)(b), 775.087(1)(a), 782.051(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Count III is a first-degree felony. See §§ 784.045(1)(a)1, 775.087(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). Count IV is a first-degree felony punishable by life in prison. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...erty. We reaffirmed that: Robbery is "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla....

...(1989) (emphasis added). An act is considered "`in the course of the taking' if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

...We have long recognized that it is the element of threat or force that distinguishes the offense of robbery from the offense of theft. Royal v. State, 490 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla.1986), receded from on other grounds, Taylor v. State, 608 So.2d 804 (Fla.1992); Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157 (1922). Under section *397 812.13, the violence or intimidation may occur prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property so long as both the act of violence or intimidation and the taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events....

...Gibson, Public Defender, and Thomas Lukashow, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent. BELL, J. If an automobile is used in the course of committing a robbery, may the offender be deemed to have "carried" the automobile as a "firearm or other deadly weapon" under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2001)? We have for review Burris v....

...gged along the pavement. After the strap broke, the victim lost her hold on the purse and Burris drove away with the purse, leaving the victim behind with cuts, scratches, and bruises. The State charged Burris with robbery with a deadly weapon under section 812.13(2)(a)....

...On appeal, the Fifth District held that an automobile could not be carried as a deadly weapon under the robbery statute. Burris, 825 So.2d at 1037. In the companion cases of Nation and Jackson, the First District Court of Appeal held that an automobile could be carried as a deadly weapon under section 812.13(2)(a) where the codefendants used the automobile to run down and incapacitate a pedestrian and then stole the victim's wallet. Nation, 668 So.2d at 285; Jackson, 662 So.2d at 1371. II. DISCUSSION The narrow issue before this Court is whether an automobile may be "carried" as a deadly weapon under section 812.13(2)(a) of the robbery statute so as to allow an enhanced conviction....

...ertain intent. Lee County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Jacobs, 820 So.2d 297, 303 (Fla.2002). Instead, the statute's plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent. Id. Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (2001), provides: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property ......

...(2)(a) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by [a maximum sentence of life imprisonment].... Id. (emphasis added). Under the express language of section 812.13(2)(a), the punishment for robbery is enhanced if the offender "carried a firearm or other deadly weapon" while committing the robbery....

...In Jackson and Nation, the First District confronted codefendants who made the same basic argument Burris made to the Fifth District. The appellants argued that because it is physically impossible for anyone to carry an automobile in the course of committing a robbery, the enhancement under section 812.13(2)(a) for carrying a "firearm or other deadly weapon" was inapplicable. In rejecting this argument, the First District read the verb "carry" as synonymous with "possess." It did so because it interpreted the legislative intent behind section 812.13(2)(a) as to deter the possession of deadly weapons by persons committing robberies. Specifically, the First District stated: We agree with the trial court that the intended meaning of the word "carry," as used in section 812.13(2)(a), must be sought by use of logic and common sense....

...One of the principal meanings ascribed to it is "to wear, hold, or have around one," in the sense of possessing. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 319 (2d ed.1987) (unabridged). We are of the opinion that ascribing such a meaning to "carry," as used in section 812.13(2)(a), is perfectly consistent with the obvious intent behind the statutory provision....

...See, e.g., State *411 v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla.1981) ("legislative intent is the polestar by which the court[s] must be guided" in statutory construction, even when at odds with "the strict letter of the statute"). It seems to us that the clear intent behind section 812.13(2)(a) is to deter the commission of robberies by persons possessing deadly weapons, and thereby to reduce the likelihood of death or serious injury to victims and bystanders....

...Finding no sign of legislative intent to apply an unusual meaning of "carry" and also recognizing the legislatively prescribed rule of lenity in section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (2001), the Fifth District concluded that Burris could not have carried the automobile as a deadly weapon under section 812.13(2)(a)....

...Rodale, The Synonym Finder (1978), equate "possess" with "carry." "Possess" is never ascribed as synonymous with "carry" when an inanimate object, such as an automobile, is carrying a person. These sources uniformly support only one conclusion about the plain and ordinary meaning of "carry" as used in section 812.13(2)(a)....

...not carry automobiles." Burris, 825 So.2d at 1037. So, when an offender drives an automobile during the commission of a robbery, the automobile is carrying the offender—the offender is not carrying the automobile. The State argues that in enacting section 812.13(2)(a), the Legislature intended to deter robbers from either having or using a deadly weapon and that a restrictive interpretation of "carry" would circumvent legislative intent....

...st District essentially adopted this argument in Jackson and Nation to support its conclusion that "carry" is synonymous with "possessing." As previously quoted, the First District in Jackson stated its understanding of the legislative intent behind section 812.13(2)(a) as: "to deter the commission of robberies by persons possessing deadly weapons, and thereby to reduce the likelihood of death or serious injury to victims and bystanders." 662 So.2d at 1372....

...weapon to enhance a homicide crime, in part because "[a] paved surface is not commonly understood to be an instrument for combat against another person." Houck, 652 So.2d at 360. As we have previously held, there is a clear legislative intent within section 812.13(2)(a) to enhance the punishment of not only those persons who use but also those persons who merely carry "firearms or other deadly weapons" when they commit a robbery....

...As the State argues here, and as accepted by the First District, we could infer that the Legislature would intend to deter a robber from using an automobile as a weapon and, thus, that the statute should penalize a robber who uses an automobile as a weapon. However, this interpretation would extend the reach of section 812.13(2)(a) beyond its express language based solely upon a very broad inference rather than any clear indication of legislative intent....

...To construe the statute in a *414 way that would extend or modify its express terms would be an inappropriate abrogation of legislative power. Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984). Just as the Fifth District did, we believe the plain language of section 812.13(2)(a) and the statutory rules of lenity (as discussed below) dictate that we resolve this issue in favor of the defendant....

...n of "carry" in the robbery statute may produce an unreasonable result. A statute's plain and ordinary meaning controls only if it does not lead to an unreasonable result. Lee County, 820 So.2d at 303. The State asserts that if the plain language of section 812.13(2)(a) is held to exclude automobiles as deadly weapons, then an offender may be charged with robbery with a deadly weapon if the offender carries brass knuckles during the offense but not if the offender runs over a victim with a car as the defendants did in Nation and Jackson....

...alternatives under which it could charge an offender who uses an automobile or other nonportable weapon during a robbery and injures a victim or bystander. [4] For example, the State could charge such an offender with one count of robbery *415 under section 812.13(2)(c) (enhanced by section 775.087(1)) and with a second count of aggravated battery under section 784.045, Florida Statutes (2002)....

...In addition to the plain and ordinary meaning of "carry" and the fact that this definition does not lead to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent, the legislatively prescribed rule of lenity supports an interpretation of section 812.13(2)(a) that excludes automobiles as a "firearm or other deadly weapon" that an offender may carry....

...As discussed above, the plain and ordinary meaning of "carry" precludes an automobile from being "a firearm or other deadly weapon" that an offender "carries" in the course of committing a robbery. Thus, Burris is entitled to the construction most favorable to him, i.e., that he cannot be charged under section 812.13(2)(a) with robbery with a deadly weapon based on his use of an automobile while committing a robbery. CONCLUSION In conclusion, we hold that an automobile may not be "carried" as a deadly weapon under section 812.13(2)(a) of the robbery statute so as to allow an enhanced conviction....

...re did not intend the results mandated by the statute's plain language, then the appropriate remedy is for it to amend the statute. Id. at 126 (citations omitted). As in Overstreet, we decline to ascribe an unusual meaning to "carry" or add words to section 812.13(2)(a) in order to obtain a result beyond the statute's plain language....

...pon or firearm." Id. § 775.087(1) (emphasis added). [4] The State also has a new, separate offense created by the Legislature to directly address the sudden snatching of purses and other objects from victims. In 2001, the Florida Legislature passed section 812.131, Florida Statutes (2001) (robbery by sudden snatching), which expressly addresses the type of offense committed by Burris....

...murder theory. We agree. Robbery is "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla.Stat....

...State, 652 So.2d 346, 350 (Fla.1995). "Property is taken from the person or custody of another' if it is sufficiently under the victim's control so that the victim could have prevented the taking if she had not been subjected to the violence or intimidation by the robber." Id. Under section 812.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), the violence or intimidation may occur prior to, contemporaneously with, or subsequent to the taking of the property so long as both the act of violence or intimidation and the taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events....

...rom the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.13(1), Fla.Stat. (1999). The phrase "in the course of the taking" means the theft "occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." § 812.13(3)(b), Fla.Stat....

...Offense Categories Offenses have been grouped into nine (9) offense categories encompassing the following statutes: *850 Category 1: Murder, manslaughter: Chapter 782 (except subsection 782.04(1)(a)) and subsection 316.1931(2) Category 2: Sexual offenses: Chapters 794 and 800 and section 826.04 Category 3: Robbery: Section 812.13 Category 4: Violent personal crimes: Chapters 784 and 836 and section 843.01 Category 5: Burglary: Chapter 810 and subsection 806.13(3) Category 6: Thefts, forgery, fraud: Chapters 322, 409, 443, 509, 812 (except section 812.13), 815, 817, 831, and 832 Category 7: Drugs: Chapter 893 Category 8: Weapons: Chapter 790 Category 9: All other felony offenses d....

...| 487-546 | 25 | | | (22-27) | |-----------|---------------------------------| | 547-582 | 30 | | | (27-40) | |-----------|---------------------------------| | 583+ | Life | --------------------------------------------- *856 (c) Category 3: Robbery: Section 812.13 I....

...-------------------------------| | 386-445 | 30 | | | (27-40) | |-----------|---------------------------------| | 445+ | Life | --------------------------------------------- (f) Category 6: Thefts, forgery, fraud: Chapters 322, 409, 443, 812 (except section 812.13), 815, 817, 831 and 832 I....

...scoring victim injury, and 3) improperly departed from the recommended sentence. [*] Contrary to Hansbrough's contention, the trial court could, if supported by valid reasons for departure, impose a sentence of seventy-five years for armed robbery. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...4th DCA 1985) (premeditation is an inherent component of any robbery), review denied, 476 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1985); Carney v. State, 458 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (same), approved on other grounds, 476 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1985). 2) Reason five — use of a dangerous weapon is inherent in armed robbery. See § 812.13; Mischler....

...[10] Finding no reversible error, McCloud's convictions and sentences for robbery and manslaughter are affirmed. OVERTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, and BOYD, JJ., concur. SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., dissent. NOTES [1] Fla. Const. art. V, § 3(b)(1). [2] § 812.13, Fla....

...The burglary statute is satisfied when the defendant "remains in" a structure with the intent to commit an offense therein. Hence, the unlawful entry is not a requisite element. § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). Further, the record would support a finding that the defendant also committed a robbery. § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Baker and an accomplice were arrested after an armed robbery. Baker was charged with: Count I, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, section 784.021(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), because he pointed a shotgun at the robbery victim; Count II, armed robbery, section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), because he and the accomplice took money and property from the robbery victim; and Count III, attempted murder as a principal in the first degree, sections 777.011, 777.04(1), 782.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), because his accomplice shot a bystander during the robbery....

...We don't contest any of that. It's all true, so even if I had a legal objection, we're not—it's the identification of the perpetrator as being a black male wearing a stocking cap. That's still—we're limiting our objection to those two statements. [17] Section 812.13, Florida Statutes, defines robbery as follows: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.13(1), Fla....

...fying the above question. Dale contends that a BB gun "is not a deadly weapon per se," and that "on the deadly weapon continuum, a BB gun is more like a toy gun or fake gun." The State, on the other hand, argues that a BB gun is a deadly weapon. [1] Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1995), defines the crime of robbery, and provides in relevant part: (2)(a) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first d...

...provided in [the penalty statutes]. (c) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in [the penalty statutes]. § 812.13, Fla. Stat. (1995). Although section 812.13 fails to define the terms "firearm" and "weapon," the definitions for these terms contained in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions are a correct statement of the law: A "firearm" is legally defined as (adapt from F.S....

...cy. The district court affirmed the sentence, but certified the following question: Is a sentence of imprisonment for a term of years greater than the life expectancy of the sentenced person lawful under Section 813.011, Florida Statutes (1973), and Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975)? 358 So.2d at 11....

...There was sufficient independent evidence of the robbery to corroborate Fal-lada's confessions. Florida law defines robbery as "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault or putting in fear." Fla.Stat. § 812.13(1)....

...to permanently deprive. Judge Cobb in his dissent to Baxley and the fourth district in McNeill have also reached this conclusion, and we approve McNeill. In Bell v. State, 394 So.2d 979 (Fla. 1981), the third district certified a question regarding section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975), the robbery statute, in which that district court equated the intent to permanently deprive an owner of his property to the specific intent required by section 812.13. By relying on Bell and Allen, several district courts have been led to the opposite conclusion from what we reach in this opinion. See, e.g., Baxley; Dunmann; Faison; Hilty. While section 812.13 deals with a similar subject, we do not find that chapter 77-342 had an impact on that section. By the same token section 812.13 has no impact on the sections involved in this opinion....

...All of McMillan's arguments are founded upon his assertion that he was charged with armed robbery with a weapon rather than armed robbery with a firearm. McMillan was charged by information as follows: [1] COUNT ONE CHARGE: ARMED ROBBERY WITH A WEAPON, in violation of F.S. 812.13(1) & (2)(b) SPECIFICATIONS OF CHARGE: In that GERALD CHRISTOPHER MCMILLAN ......

...The determinative questions are whether the information charged every element of the offense of robbery with a firearm and whether it misled McMillan. The specifications of the information alleged each essential element of the crime of armed robbery with a firearm. See §§ 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla....

...action rule." The "single transaction rule," however, has been legislatively eliminated from the law of Florida. § 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (1977); [3] Borges v. State, 415 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1982). *556 The offense of robbery while armed is defined in section 812.13(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides as follows: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...property that may be the subject of larceny; (2) from the person or custody of another; (3) by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear; and (4) that the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon in the course of committing the robbery. § 812.13(1), (2)(a), Fla....

...classified categorically as a “violent felony” within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B). Florida law defines the offense of robbery as the taking of another’s property by “the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1)....

...er predicated on robbery. Robbery is "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla.Stat....

...Property is taken from "the person or custody of another" if it is sufficiently under the victim's control so that the victim could have prevented the taking if he or she had not been subjected to the violence or intimidation by the robber. See id. Under section 812.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), [4] the violence or intimidation may occur prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property so long as both the act of violence or intimidation and the taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events....

...tim's body when he was found. The prosecutor argued to the jury that cab fare was "due and owing" the victim and that a finding of robbery could be based on that circumstance alone. We do not find this to satisfy the elements of the robbery statute. Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes provides: "`Robbery' means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault or putting in fear." The force, violence, assault or putting in fear must be contemporaneous or precedent to the taking....

...c intent to deprive the owner of the robbery taken. [1] The court certified the question, "Whether specific intent (i.e., the intent to permanently deprive the owner of property) is still a requisite element of the crime of robbery as now defined by Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975)." The common law elements of the crime of robbery are a taking, the use of actual or constructive force, the absence of consent on the part of the victim, and the intent to deprive the owner of the property....

...SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, ENGLAND and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] `Robbery' means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13, Fla....

...no such error was committed. The issue in this case is common to all, or nearly all, robbery convictions secured in Florida between 1976 and 1980. It arises because the standard jury instruction given by the trial court on the crime of robbery under Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975), as amended by Chapter 74-383, § 38, Laws of Florida, although generally approved by the supreme court itself, see Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 327 So.2d 6 (Fla....

...Similarly unavailing is Bates' argument that the state failed to prove armed robbery because, since he claims that he took the ring after the victim's death, the state did not show that it had been taken "by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Weekly D2645, 724 So.2d 139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that improper imposition of public defender lien is neither fundamental nor serious, patent sentencing error). BAIN'S SENTENCES Bain pleaded guilty to robbery without a weapon, a second degree felony. See § 812.13(2)(c), Fla....

...1(1)(a), Fla. Stat., and aggravated battery, § 784.045(1)(b), but is such a favorite cause for enhancing punishment that it is often compounded by provisions within the statutory prohibition of the basic crime (see section 810.02(2) as to burglary, section 812.13(2) as to robbery, and section 794.011(3) as to sexual battery); by separate enhancing statutes ( see § 775.087); or by separate criminal statutes ( see § 790.07)....

...To convict for armed robbery, the state had to prove that Fowler took "money or other property" from Jerkins "by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear" and "in the course of committing the robbery ... carried a firearm or other deadly weapon." § 812.13, Fla....

...property, to-wit: U.S. money, the property of Hampton Harvey Jerkins as owner or custodian, from the person or custody of Hampton Harvey Jerkins and in the course of committing said Robbery, carried a firearm, to-wit: rifle, in violation of Sections 812.13 and 775.087(2), Florida Statutes." [3] Because Fowler testified in the instant case, we do not consider what the phrase, "the version of events related by the defense," McArthur, 351 So.2d at 976, encompasses in a case wherein the defendant exercises his right to remain silent....

...but no convictions for the resulting attempted murder charges were secured. Although the appellants' actions in firing shots at the pursuing officer cannot literally be considered an element of the offenses appellants pled to, Section 810.02(3) and Section 812.13(c), nevertheless these actions taken shortly after the burglary and robbery, presumably while making their escape from the scene, may arguably be viewed as "relating to" these offenses....

...orce while fleeing a retail store after committing a theft, were properly convicted of robbery. We find conflict with Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157 (1922). [1] We quash the district court decision and find that, in defining "robbery" in section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1983), the legislature did not alter the common law requirement that "force, violence, assault, or putting in fear" must occur prior to or contemporaneous with the taking of property....

...ictim gives instant and uninterrupted protest or pursuit in an effort to thwart a taking, and the offender then assaults the victim in order to complete the taking of the property and make good an escape, the offense is robbery. This construction of Section 812.13 ......

...A theft can occur under sections 812.014(1) and 812.015(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1983), regardless of whether the goods are successfully removed from the store premises. [2] *46 The question for resolution is whether the offense of robbery, as defined by section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1983), has occurred when, after completing a theft, the defendant employs "force, violence, assault, or putting in fear" while fleeing the premises from which the goods were taken....

...is a felony of the second degree... . (3) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing the robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission. In our prior decisions, this Court has interpreted section 812.13 as being consistent with the common law, which defines robbery as "the felonious taking of money or goods of value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence, or putting him in fear." Williams v....

...The violence or intimidation must precede or be contemporaneous with the taking of the property. 84 Fla. at 86, 93 So. at 159 (emphasis added; citations omitted). See also Colbey v. State, 46 Fla. 112, 35 So. 189 (1903). We reject the state's argument that subsection (3) of section 812.13 broadens the common law definition of robbery set forth in subsection (1)....

...hing punishment by reference to the type of force used to perpetrate the robbery. Because they did not employ force prior to or while taking the store merchandise, we hold that petitioners cannot be properly convicted of robbery with a firearm under section 812.13....

...rial court. We disagree. Robbery is "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. " § 812.13(1), Fla....

...(1989) (emphasis added). An act is considered "`in the course of the taking' if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

...We have long recognized that it is the element of threat or force that distinguishes the offense of robbery from the offense of theft. Royal v. State, 490 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla. 1986), receded from on other grounds, Taylor v. State, 608 So.2d 804 (Fla. 1992); Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157 (1922). Under section 812.13, the violence or intimidation may occur prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property so long as both the act of violence or intimidation and the taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events....

...Nestor over in order to take the man's wallet and at some point rummaged through Mrs. Nestor's purse, removing any valuables. The violent murders and the taking of the couple's property clearly were part of a continuous series of acts or events as provided under section 812.13....

...the murder), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834, 112 S.Ct. 112, 116 L.Ed.2d 81 (1991). We also find no merit to Jones' contention that Mrs. Nestor was not robbed because no property was "taken from her person or from her immediate custody or control." Under section 812.13(1) the taking must be "from the person or custody of another." However, the property that is the subject of the taking need not be in the actual physical possession or immediate presence of the person....

...a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in section 775.082, section 775.083, or section 775.084. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 812.13 (West 1976)....

...Appellant was charged in an eight count indictment: (I) first degree murder of Deputy Yahl, section 782.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes; (II) second degree murder of Yorkcavage, section 782.04(3), Florida Statutes; (III) first degree robbery of Johnson, section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes; (IV) attempted robbery of Purolator Security, section 777.04(1), Florida Statutes; (V) kidnapping of Johnson, section 787.01, Florida Statutes; (VI) attempted first degree murder of Spurlin, section 777.04(1),...

Stat. §§ 812.13 (1), (2)(c), & 774.04. Section 812.13(1) defines "robbery" as "the taking of money

violence, assault, or putting in fear." Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1). These four alternatives constitute different

...State, 431 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA), cause dismissed, 436 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1983). We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and approve the decision below. Petitioner Spivey pled guilty to the charge of armed robbery. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...The district court has certified to us its decision, reported at 349 So.2d 688 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), as involving a question of great public interest: Is a sentence of imprisonment for a term of years greater than the life expectancy of the sentenced person lawful under Section 813.011, Florida Statutes (1973), and Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975)? We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), and answer this question in the affirmative. Petitioner was convicted of robbery and was sentenced to imprisonment for 125 years. Our present robbery statute, Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975, 1977), [1] states: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be *12 the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...total sentence which must be served prior to an inmate's becoming eligible for parole. Of course, compliance with the mandatory minimums, set forth in Sec. 775.087, Fla. Stat. (1977), is necessary. [1] § 813.011, Fla. Stat. (1973), now appearing in § 812.13(2), Fla....

...the time of the homicide. Robbery is "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Property is taken from "the person or custody of another" if it is sufficiently under the victim's control so that the victim could have prevented the taking if she had not been subjected to the violence or intimidation by the robber. See id. Under section 812.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), [9] the violence or intimidation may occur prior to, contemporaneously with, or subsequent to the taking of the property so long as both the act of violence or intimidation and the taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events....

...constituted a robbery because it involved "the taking of ... property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." Under section 812.13, the force, violence, or intimidation may occur prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property so long as both the act of force, violence, or intimidation and the taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events....

...1987) relating to the doctrine of lenity and the "single evil" analysis of legislative intent. In the recent case of Hall v. State, 517 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1988), the Florida Supreme Court, applying Carawan, held that convictions for both armed robbery under section 812.13(2)(a) and possession of a firearm while committing a felony per section 790.07(2) cannot stand for the single act of displaying or carrying a firearm while committing a robbery....

...However, jurors Diaz and Miranda differ from Polk-Cohen because both believed that their relatives had been fairly treated. We find no abuse of discretion. On the remaining issue we find no double jeopardy violation in appellant's convictions of robbery under section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1997) and a felony causing bodily injury under section 782.051(1), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ROBBERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON The counts of robbery and attempted robbery in this case arise from Mr. Mitchell's actions at the home of his wife. Simple robbery is the taking of property from a person through the use of force and is a felony of the second degree. § 812.13(1), (2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1993). If the robber carries a "weapon," the offense becomes a first-degree felony. § 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993). If the robber carries a "firearm or other deadly weapon," the offense increases to a first-degree felony punishable by life in prison. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...ences for his convictions for robbery with a firearm" because, according to Frazier v. State, 877 So.2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), "under the PRR statute the mandatory sentence for robbery is thirty years in prison." McDonald, 912 So.2d at 77 (citing §§ 812.13(2)(a), 775.082(9)(a)(3), Fla....

...hrase `felonies punishable by life,' used in [the PRR statute], provides for a mandatory life sentence for prison releasee reoffenders who commit either life felonies or first-degree felonies punishable by life." 808 So.2d at 213-14. [7] Pursuant to section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), armed robbery is a felony punishable by life. See § 812.13(2)(a) ("If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s....

...still constituted a robbery because it involved "the taking of ... property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). Under section 812.13, the force, violence, or intimidation may occur prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property so long as both the act of force, violence, or intimidation and the taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events....

the possibility of death. Within this system, section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), of which Peters

...ority's position. In Burris we interpreted the "robbery with a deadly weapon" statute, which increased the penalty for robbery if in the course of the robbery the offender "carried a firearm or other deadly weapon." Burris, 875 So.2d at 409 (quoting § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001)). The question was whether a defendant who had used a car (as a deadly weapon) in the course of a robbery could be convicted under section 812.13(2)(a) of "carry[ing] a firearm or other deadly weapon" in the course of a robbery....

...There was no other sense of the word "carry" that the natural and common understanding of the word, in the context of the statute as a whole, could sustain. Burris, 875 So.2d at 412 ("These sources uniformly support only one conclusion about the plain and ordinary meaning of `carry' as used in section 812.13(2)(a).")....

...we could infer that the Legislature would intend to deter a robber from using an automobile as a weapon and, thus, that the statute should penalize a robber who uses an automobile as a weapon. However, this interpretation would extend the reach of section 812.13(2)(a) beyond its express language based solely upon a very broad inference rather than any clear indication of legislative intent.......

...tial to the punishment," and the judge exceeds his proper authority. 124 S.Ct. at 2537 (citations omitted). The State charged Calloway with committing robbery with a firearm, a first-degree felony punishable by life in prison, on August 4, 1998. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...5th DCA 1980), which expressly and directly conflicts with Growden v. State, 372 So.2d 930 (Fla. 1979), and Huff v. State, 350 So.2d 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), on the same point of law. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Reddick was convicted of robbery with a firearm pursuant to section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we conclude that double jeopardy does not bar convictions and punishments for robbery and carjacking. FACTS Petitioner James Cruller was convicted of robbery without a firearm in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1995), and carjacking without a firearm in violation of section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The standard for determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions for offenses arising from the same criminal transaction is whether the Legislature "intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes." M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996). Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines "robbery" as the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. Section 812.133(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines "carjacking" as the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the o...

...or robbery and carjacking, where the offenses are predicated on a single underlying criminal transaction. See State v. Anderson, 695 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla.1997). As the First District explained in Ward: Armed carjacking with a firearm is proscribed by section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995).... [A]ll of the elements of that offense are subsumed by the offense of armed robbery with a firearm. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Fryer v. State, 732 So.2d 30, 32 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (concluding that robbery constitutes a lesser included offense of carjacking). I agree with the First District's conclusion that the robbery and carjacking statutes contain the same statutory elements. Section 812.13(1) defines "robbery" as the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. Moreover, section 812.133(1) defines "carjacking" as the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle,...

...the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. The only difference between the two offenses of robbery and carjacking is that robbery involves the taking of "money or other property which may be the subject of larceny," § 812.13, Fla. Stat.; whereas, carjacking is limited to "the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny." § 812.133, Fla....

...652 So.2d at 448. After an accomplice struck the victim, the defendant drove off with his car. See id. The Third District held that under the circumstances the defendant properly was "convicted and sentenced for both armed robbery of the personal effects under section 812.13(2)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1993), and the armed carjacking of a different item, the vehicle, which is forbidden by a different statute, section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)." Id....

...As indicated above, the circuit *1137 court sentenced Clem to sixty years for the offense of robbery with a weapon and Dorch to six years for manslaughter. The State concedes that Clem's sixty year sentence is invalid, since robbery with a weapon is a first degree felony ( See section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)), and as such is punishable by imprisonment for not more than thirty years ( See section 775.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1979))....

...Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Patti Englander and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee. PER CURIAM. Information alleged that appellant committed robbery and that in the course of committing the robbery, he carried a firearm, contrary to Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). Appellant was convicted of robbery while carrying a weapon, Section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment....

...The evidence adduced by the State established that during the commission of the robbery appellant carried a cigarette lighter which was shaped like a gun. We do not believe the cigarette lighter constituted a "weapon" for the purposes of the aggravated penalty provided for in Section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1975). Robbery is a second degree felony punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen years. Sections 812.13(2)(c); 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975). The Legislature has provided that if a firearm or other deadly weapon is utilized in the robbery, then the offense is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life. Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). Further, if a weapon is utilized during the course of the robbery, the offense is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty years. Sections 812.13(2)(b), 775.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...d not so establish. The cigarette lighter was merely pointed at the victim as if it were a gun. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence for robbery while armed with a weapon is reversed and the cause is remanded for entry of judgment of robbery under Section 812.13(2)(c) and for imposition of sentence thereunder....

...Torrence was charged in a three count information with armed burglary, [1] attempted robbery, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. In charging attempted robbery (count II), the information alleged as follows: CHARGE: Attempted Robbery, in Violation of F.S. 812.13 & 777.04....

...as owner or custodian, from the person or custody of Richard Graves, Jr., and in the course of *393 committing said Robbery, carried a firearm, to-wit: a handgun. (emphasis supplied) The use of the phrase "carried a firearm" was apparently intended to bring into operation the enhanced felony provision in section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides "If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree ..."....

...1981), aggravated assault is listed as a category two offense to the crime of robbery. [4] In Vitko the court, in reversing the conviction for aggravated assault, did not mention whether the defendant objected to the aggravated assault instruction. [5] See § 812.13, 777.04(4)(b) and 784.021, Fla....

...State, 396 So.2d 241 (Fla.3d DCA 1981), as passing on a question of great public importance. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(4), FLorida Constitution, and disapprove in part and approve in part the instant decision. A two-count information charged Monroe with robbery with a firearm under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1977), and unlawful possession of a firearm while committing a felony under section 790.07, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...ry. We have so held in Toney v. State, 456 So.2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), Hendry v. State, 460 So.2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), and now in the instant case. We decided to consider this question en banc. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.331(c)(1). The robbery statute, section 812.13(1), provides: "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...ion of section 794.041(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991)); Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153 (Fla.1994) (involving grand theft of an automobile, in violation of section 812.014(2)(c)(4), Florida Statutes (1989), and robbery with a weapon, in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989)); Johnson v....

...V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons set forth below, we answer the certified question in the affirmative. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Michael Knight (Knight) was charged in an information filed by the State Attorney with armed robbery with a firearm pursuant to section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which states, "If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s....

...She testified that she was fearful of being killed because she could identify the robbers but also stated that she would have the same fear had they been strangers to her, and the presence of some degree of force or the placing of the victim in fear is itself an element of robbery. § 812.13, Fla....

...the following statutes: Category 1: Murder, manslaughter: Chapter 782 [except subsection 782.04(1)(a)], and subsection 316.193(3)(c) 3, and section 327.351(2) Category 2: Sexual offenses: Chapters 794 and 800 and section 826.04 Category 3: Robbery: Section 812.13 Category 4: Violent personal crimes: Chapters 784 and 836 and section 843.01 Category 5: Burglary: Chapter 810 and subsection 806.13(3) Category 6: Thefts, forgery, fraud: Chapters 322, 409, 443, 509, 812 (except section 812.13), 815, 817, 831, and 832 Category 7: Drugs: Chapter 893 Category 8: Weapons: Chapter 790 and section 944.40 Category 9: All other felony offenses d....

...The following August he pled guilty to violating that probation. The court revoked Daniels' probation, adjudicated him guilty, and imposed three years' probation on the same terms as the original probation. In September 1986 the State charged Daniels and Clifford Berry with robbery with a deadly weapon. § 812.13, Fla....

...State, 475 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1090, 106 S.Ct. 1480, 89 L.Ed.2d 734 (1986); Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1978). Because the district court decided this issue and because it is an important issue we, too, will address it. Subsection 812.13(1) defines robbery as "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." The criminal intent necessary for larceny is animus furandi, Long v....

...r person of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom. (b) To Appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto. Ch. 82-164, § 1, Laws of Fla. Although the legislature did not change the word "larceny" in section 812.13, "larceny" no longer exists; "theft" has replaced it....

...and we hold that the specific intent to commit robbery is the intent to steal, i.e., to deprive an owner of property either permanently or temporarily. We therefore recede from the dicta in Dunmann to the effect that chapter 77-342 had no impact on section 812.13, 427 So.2d at 169, and from the parenthetical in the certified question in Bell, "(i.e., the intent to permanently deprive the owner of property)." 394 So.2d at 979....

...While there is strong circumstantial evidence that the defendant possessed the firearm at the actual scene of the crime, [3] it is unnecessary for this court to address whether that evidence was sufficient to support imposition of the mandatory minimum. Section 812.13(3)(a), Florida Statutes, states: An act shall be deemed `in the course of committing a robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission. § 812.13(3)(a), F.S....

...Appellant argues that Apprendi, which was decided after this case was tried, requires that his release be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and that he is therefore entitled to a new trial. The statutory maximum sentence for robbery with a deadly weapon is a term not exceeding life imprisonment. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...fact which the other does not. A conviction of first degree murder under Fla.Sta. Section 782.04 does not require a robbery but may be based upon premeditation or one of seven statutorily enumerated felonies. Conversely the robbery statute, Fla.Sta. Section 812.13, does not require proof of a killing....

...After all, juries, like judges, have the authority to dispense mercy. [4] To label a jury as irrational or lawless in so acting reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of a jury's responsibilities. NOTES [1] Robbery with a firearm is a felony of the first degree, punishable by a term of years not exceeding life. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Also, section 775.084(1)(b) designates specific offenses that will trigger an enhancement. Each of these offenses is defined by Florida law. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 806.01 (defining arson); Fla. Stat. § 794.011 (defining sexual battery); Fla. Stat. § 812.13 (defining robbery)....

...earm or other deadly weapon, nevertheless, was vicariously guilty (as a principal in the first degree under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1981)) of armed robbery because a co-perpetrator carried a firearm or other deadly weapon as prohibited by section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...was improper because the statutory maximum for his crime is thirty years. The court concluded that Denson's claim was without merit, finding that "[t]he life sentence imposed by this court was legal and proper given that the then effective statute, Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, considered the robbery to be a `felony of the first degree punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life.'" The court further noted that Denson had previously raised the claim of his illegal...

...Furthermore, appellant's conviction pursuant to Section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes, cannot stand under the rationale of Hall v. State, 517 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1988). In *1135 Hall, the defendant was charged with committing a robbery while carrying a firearm, under Section 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes, and the use and display of a firearm and the carrying of a concealed firearm while committing a felony, under Section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes....

...of robbery." Smithson also complains that the instruction "virtually directed the jury to return a guilty verdict." We find no merit in these arguments. Robbery requires proof of a taking by "the use of force, violence, assault or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla....

...ith robbery." AFFIRMED. COBB and ANTOON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] There was apparently a 2:00 a.m. cut-off time on beer sales. [2] Agnihotri was apparently out back, checking on a shed, when Smithson first entered the store. [3] §§ 775.087(2)(a) and 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Gen., and Laura Rush, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. ZEHMER, Judge. Ronald Anthony Thomas appeals his convictions of first degree murder for violating section 782.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), and armed robbery with a firearm for violating section 812.13....

...The state urges that to allow violent self-help as a defense, even if the defendant has a good faith belief in his right to recover such property, would conflict with the statutory provision that the money or property of another which is the subject of a robbery charge under section 812.13(1) means property "in which a person has an interest upon which another person is not privileged to infringe without consent, whether or not the other person also has an interest in the property." § 812.012(4), Fla....

...fense. One of the stated purposes for doing so is "[t]o proscribe conduct *1026 that improperly causes or threatens to cause substantial harm to individual or public interest." § 775.012(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). The offense of "robbery" is defined in section 812.13 to mean "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." This definitio...

...conviction. We now hold that a defendant is properly assessed legal constraint points to each offense for which he is sentenced where he was under legal constraint at the time of the offense. AFFIRMED. DANIEL, C.J., and SHARP, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(c) Florida Statutes (1987)....

...of aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of section 784.021(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count I), kidnaping with a firearm in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1999), (count II), car jacking with a firearm in violation of section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count III), robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count V), and possession of a firearm during the *1173 commission of the other four felonies in violation of section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes (1999), (count IV)....

...armed robbery. Depasquale contends he was improperly convicted of first degree armed robbery, alleging the state failed to establish that he used a weapon during the commission of the crime. We affirm. The statute under which appellant was charged, section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that the use of a weapon during the commission of a robbery constitutes armed robbery in the first degree punishable by imprisonment not to exceed thirty years....

...a common pocket knife." See also section 790.001(6), Florida Statutes (1981). Appellant maintains that because section 790.001(13) fails to include a BB gun among the enumerated items listed as weapons, a BB gun is not a weapon within the context of section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...State, 522 So.2d 88, 89 n. 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Current views of the Supreme Court of Florida on double jeopardy support our holding. See Hall v. State, 517 So.2d 678, 678 (Fla. 1988) (defendant cannot be convicted of both "the offense of armed robbery under section 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes, and the offense of displaying a firearm or carrying a concealed firearm, under section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes, when the offenses resulted from a single act"); Carawan v....

...ly carrying one. At the time, there were about fifteen other customers in the line. "Robbery requires proof of a taking by `the use of force, violence, assault or putting in fear.'" Smithson v. State, 689 So.2d 1226, 1228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)(quoting § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (1993)). Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provides: *965 "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the p...

...nses"). The statutory elements of robbery consist of: a taking of money or property from the person or custody of another; by force, violence, assault or putting in fear; with intent to deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property. § 812.13, Fla....

...In my view petit theft is a necessarily lessor included offense of robbery and grand theft is a permissive lessor offense of robbery. NOTES [1] "`Robbery' means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla....

...three participants actually had possession of the single gun employed in the robbery, if any one of them carried the firearm during the commission of the crime, all of them are guilty as principals under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1981). See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...hing is so close as to be within ready reach and is under the control of the person. " [e.s.] The jury convicted defendant of robbery by sudden snatching, and he now appeals. The state argues that the text of the robbery by sudden snatching statute, section 812.131(1) ("from the victim's person"), does not require that the item be taken from the actual, physical possession of the victim....

..."In the course of the taking" can be subsequent to the taking. In the instant case, although the victim was unaware of the taking at the time of the taking, the victim did become aware of the taking as the defendant was fleeing after the taking. This fact satisfies the statutory requirement of section 812.131, Florida Statutes, as it was a " continuous series of acts or events. " § 812.131(3)(b)(emphasis supplied). For these reasons, the conviction should be affirmed. NOTES [1] See § 812.131(1), Fla....

...In order to satisfy this definition, it is not necessary to show that: (a) The offender used any amount of force beyond that effort necessary to obtain possession of the money or other property; or (b) There was any resistance offered by the victim to the offender or that there was injury to the victim's person."). [2] Section 812.13(1) defines "robbery" as "the taking of money or other property...from the person or custody of another." [e.s.] In Jones v....

...or in another building on his property, it is nevertheless in his personal possession; and if he is deprived thereof, it may well be said it is taken from his person." Id. (quoting from Wood v. State, 98 Fla. 703, 124 So. 44, 46 (Fla.1929)). [3] See § 812.131(1)(a) and (b) ("In order to satisfy this definition [of robbery by sudden snatching], it is not necessary to show that: the offender used any amount of force beyond that effort necessary to obtain possession of the money or other property;...

...However, after further discussion, he denied the motion. The state, while conceding throughout the proceedings that robbery was a specific intent crime, argued that the indictment need not allege the specific intent if it tracked the language of the robbery statute, section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...PH MAXIUM (sic) HARRIS not being the true owner of the said property, no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon being carried in the course of the robbery, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, to-wit: Florida Statute 812.13(2)(c)....

...dult sanctions and the requirement for the court to make certain findings before imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile. Although the facts of the instant case concern section 39.111, the rationale of this opinion also applies to section 39.059. [2] § 812.13, Fla....

...nd another man. Based on the description furnished by the victim and other circumstantial evidence, Cabal and the codefendant were found guilty of robbery with a mask. The codefendant is not a party to this appeal. Cabal was adjudicated guilty under section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides that the offense of robbery is a second-degree felony....

...(1991), are to be imposed per case and not per count. The imposition of felony costs above $200 in the judgment and sentence is error. The case is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED. HARRIS, C.J., and DIAMANTIS, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(c), Fla....

...satisfied and there is no one charge that is greater than the other on that, and there is nothing in the instruction that says they can't. The jury subsequently rendered a verdict finding Defendant "guilty of Robbery as charged in the information. F.S. 812.13(1), (2)(c)." Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on the trial court's instruction to the jury that it Could find Defendant guilty of only one of the lesser offenses listed on the verdict form....

...n place, the legislature amended the statute to expressly provide that force used subsequent to the taking *923 can convert a theft into a robbery so long as the force and the act of taking are both part of a continuous series of acts or events. See § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

...775.084. (3). . . . (b) An act shall be deemed "in the course of the taking" if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events. § 812.13, Fla....

in that in proving a charge of robbery under section 812.13, the State must also prove the elements of

...r working, a 14 year old brother. There was no evidence of involvement with drugs or alcohol. Appellant was charged as an adult with armed robbery, a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...already resolved by the first." Brown, supra, 432 U.S. at 167 n. 6, 97 S.Ct. at 2226 n. 6, 53 L.Ed.2d at 195 n. 6. There are then different standards to be applied to cumulative sentences and successive prosecution actions. [1] The robbery statute, § 812.13, Fla....

...He was charged in Count III with conspiracy to commit robbery, but the indictment does not allege that he conspired to carry a firearm during the course of committing this offense. Since the underlying substantive offense charged in Count III did not state an essential element of robbery in the first degree, § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). “[T]o prove attempted armed

...Appellant next argues that while he does not appeal from his conviction for such offense, the trial court erred in imposing a three year mandatory minimum sentence on his conviction for robbery while armed with a firearm. We disagree and affirm on this point. Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes condemns as robbery "the taking of money or other property — from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault or putting in fear". Section 812.13(3)(b) defines what is meant by "in the course of the taking"....

...after the fact, and conspiracy. On June 1, 1986, a state grand jury returned an indictment charging Chateloin and Rodriguez with first-degree murder in violation of Florida Statutes § 782.04, armed robbery in violation of Florida Statutes § 812.13, conspiracy to commit armed robbery and kidnapping in violation of Florida Statutes §§ 812.13, 787.01, 775.087, and 777.04, and possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense in violation of Florida Statutes § 790.07....

...Accordingly, we affirm Freeny's conviction and sentence for robbery with a firearm, except for the portion of the sentence imposing the three year minimum mandatory sentence pursuant to section 775.087, which we vacate. AFFIRM in part; VACATE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE. GOSHORN, C.J., and DIAMANTIS, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...nment. Although Smith did not object below to this error, the error is fundamental. Smith, 785 So.2d at 626 (citation omitted). The respondent was convicted of false imprisonment under section 787.02(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), and robbery under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1997). Section 787.02(1)(a) defines false imprisonment as forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against her or his will. Section 812.13 defines robbery as the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or ot...

...180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), codified in section 775.021, reveals that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated because the statutory elements of false imprisonment are different from the elements of robbery. Compare § 787.02, Fla. Stat. (1997), with § 812.13, Fla....

...The parties have not briefed this issue and we thus do not address any matter associated with the enactment of chapter 87-110. [6] We thus disapprove the opinion in Sias v. State, 487 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), to the extent it conflicts with this opinion. [7] Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1987), defines robbery as the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...We need not determine whether the widow's testimony was erroneously admitted because we hold that Monlyn was not prejudiced by its admission. Even if the habit evidence were erroneously admitted, the trial court correctly found that the crime of robbery was established in this case. *836 Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), defines the crime of robbery as the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive...

...Bryant, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael J. Kotler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge. We affirm appellant's fifteen-year sentence for armed robbery under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...� the robbing of the insurance carrier" would not be actionable. At the least, upon remand the trial court should be allowed to review its decision in light of Milkovich and determine what portion of the publication, if any, is actionable. NOTES [1] Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes, defines "Robbery" as "the taking of money or other property ......

...titled to possession of the said money or other property, to wit: lawful money of the United States of America, and during the course of the aforesaid offense, the said MELVIN LEE VITKO did carry a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife; contrary to Chapter 812.13, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida....

...We also reverse the order assessing costs to appellant, and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. HOBSON, Acting C.J., and OTT, J., concur. NOTES [1] Apparently the author of the language used in the attempted robbery count of the information was attempting to track Section 812.13(2)(a) wherein one carrying a firearm or other deadly weapon during a robbery would be treated, if convicted, as having committed a robbery of the first degree, so that had appellant been convicted of attempted robbery of that degree th...

...uired to sentence in a particular way. Reversed and Remanded. WARNER, J., and EHRLICH, MERRILEE, Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] In Florida, robbery with a firearm "is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years." § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...nhancement of the assault." See Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, page 257a (2d ed.). Since robbery with a firearm or other deadly weapon is a first degree felony which carries an enhanced sentence of life *1293 imprisonment, see section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, then the lesser degrees provided for under section 812.13 must be considered necessarily included offenses to the offense charged, regardless of the extent of evidence supporting the greater offense....

...Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and C. Michael Barnette, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. COBB, Judge. The defendant, Curtis Louis Jones, was found guilty after jury trial of robbery in the second degree per Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), a crime designated as a second degree felony....

...e's witnessing employees. It was not until the next day that the deputy learned of appellant's real name. Appellant first contends that he cannot be convicted of robbery where the taking was completed before any force was used. Robbery is defined by § 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1985) as: ......

...Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant. Allen P. Allweiss, St. Petersburg, for appellee. HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge. Appellee/defendant, John Cook, was charged with robbery in violation of Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...rged kidnapping. [1] We reverse the order of the trial court denying Davis' motion to set aside the *949 prison sentence imposed on Count II [2] upon a holding (1) the crimes of (a) robbery during the course of which the defendant carried a firearm, § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Rehearing Denied January 10, 1984. *237 Bruce A. Nants, Orlando, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Shawn L. Briese, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. COBB, Judge. Appellant, Rene Rodriquez, was charged by information with robbery under section 812.13(2), Florida Statutes (1981) (Count I), and with grand theft, second degree, under section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1981) (Count II)....

...We reaffirm that holding and, therefore, reverse the defendant's conviction for grand theft. The conviction and sentence for robbery is affirmed. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. ORFINGER, C.J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents with opinion. COWART, Judge, dissenting: Rodriquez was charged in count one with robbery (§ 812.13(2)(c), Fla....

...ntence, as was done in Hegstrom, the majority opinion, claiming to follow Bell, again changes directions and reverses Rodriquez' grand theft conviction. V. THIS CASE — THE VIEW OF THE DISSENT. One essential constituent element of statutory robbery (§ 812.13(1), Fla....

...Fla. Stat.) and the penalty provided is greater than for petit theft. The taking of the property of another by force is even more harmful to society than the taking of property of special value or character and the penalty is even greater (robbery, § 812.13, Fla....

...away) elements of common law larceny in favor of one alternative act element relating to one who "obtains or uses." However, statutory robbery appears to still require a "taking" and to have other aspects of common law robbery. The robbery statute (§ 812.13(1), Fla....

...formation that a weapon was used. The court said: The Court erred in sentencing Chapola to life imprisonment because he was merely charged with robbery; the jury found him guilty as charged; and the Court adjudicated him guilty of this charge. Under Section 812.13(2)(c), which is applicable to this case, the Court could sentence *248 Chapola to no more than 15 years imprisonment....

...Public Defender, and William Liston, Legal Intern, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Calvin L. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before HENDRY, SCHWARTZ and NESBITT, JJ. NESBITT, Judge. The defendant appeals his adjudication and sentence for: (1) robbery with a firearm contrary to Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1977) (Count I); and (2) display of a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Section 790.07, Florida Statutes (1977) (Count II)....

...Appellant confessed to writing the note, presenting it to the teller, and taking the money, but argues on appeal that his conviction should be reversed because the State failed to show an essential element of robbery, i.e., that the victim was placed in fear of death or great bodily harm. Robbery is defined in section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1979) as "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...*1301 SCHEB, Judge. Defendant, William D. Fleming, contends that the court improperly sentenced him for robbery by imposing a sentence in excess of that recommended by the new sentencing guidelines. Defendant pled guilty to the offense of robbery under section 812.13(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...1st DCA 1977), which held that the mere showing of the theft of a gun after entering a structure, standing alone, was insufficient to establish burglary while armed. [3] Cf. Growden v. State, 372 So.2d 930 (Fla. 1979), in which subsections (b) and (c) of Section 812.13(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), were held to be lesser included offenses of Section 812.13(2)(a).

...[2] For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial court based on the established Florida Supreme Court precedents of Tillman and Steinhorst. NOTES [1] Royal v. State, 452 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). [2] Apparently in response to Royal, the 1987 Florida Legislature amended section 812.13, effective October 1, 1987, to provide: (b) An act shall be deemed "in the course of the taking" if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute...

...If he was so prejudiced, such would be grounds for vacating the sentence. In count three, Bell was adjudicated guilty of committing robbery without a firearm, and in count four of robbery with a firearm. The judgment states that each is a violation of Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and each is listed as a first-degree felony. To the contrary, however, robbery without a firearm is a second-degree felony pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c), for which a defendant may be sentenced to "a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years" under Section 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...the movant's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, or (2) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for herein and has been held to apply retroactively. [2] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Nor do we believe that any of the decisions cited by the parties involve sufficiently analogous facts. The issue is of some considerable importance to appellant because, when "no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon" is "carried" during the commission of a robbery, the robbery is a second-degree felony. § 812.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1989). However, if a "weapon" is "carried" during the commission of a robbery, the robbery becomes a first-degree felony [§ 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989)]; and, if "a firearm or other deadly weapon" is "carried" during the commission of a robbery, the robbery becomes a first-degree felony, "punishable by a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...aning establishment. Therefore, the trial court should have granted appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to that portion of the charge. Its failure to do so constitutes reversible error. We believe that, to secure a conviction pursuant to Section 812.13(2)(a) or (b), Florida Statutes (1989), for armed robbery while carrying a "firearm or other deadly weapon" or for armed robbery while carrying a "weapon," respectively, the state must present evidence which would be legally sufficient...

...[However, t]hat implication cannot amount to proof of the possession." Ryder v. State, 464 So.2d 1324, 1325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Thus, in Bates v. State, 561 So.2d 1341 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), the defendant was charged with robbery while carrying "a firearm or other deadly weapon," in violation of Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...a bludgeon, for instance), but merely claimed that it was a gun, the "nut driver" was not a "weapon" at all. Therefore, it reversed the conviction and remanded for the entry of a judgment finding the defendant guilty of unarmed robbery, pursuant to Section 812.13(2)(c). Accord McCray v. State, 358 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) [cigarette lighter shaped like a gun, which was merely pointed at the victim as if it were a gun, is not a "weapon" for purposes of Section 812.13(2)(b)]....

...obbery while carrying a "deadly weapon." Because the evidence presented was legally insufficient to establish that appellant carried any type of "weapon" when he committed the robbery, we reverse appellant's conviction for armed robbery, pursuant to Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989); and we remand to the trial court with directions that it enter a judgment of guilt for the offense of unarmed robbery, pursuant to Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), and that it then resentence appellant in accordance with that judgment....

...Robinson v. State, 547 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). "As a general rule, Florida courts have utilized the statutory definition of `weapon' provided in section 790.001(13) to determine whether a particular object constitutes a `weapon' for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b)." Streetman v....

...D670, 1992 WL 42453 (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 9, 1992). Considerable confusion has been caused by the fact that Section 790.001(13) appears to include within the definition of "weapon" all "deadly weapon[s] except a firearm or a common pocketknife"; whereas Section 812.13 seems clearly to imply that there is a significant difference between a "weapon" and a "deadly weapon," without defining either.

...Failure to do so is reversible error. Parker; Bryant. Accordingly we reverse the judgment in case number 97-1578 and remand for a new trial. The sentences in case number 97-1997 are affirmed. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED. DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13, Fla.Stat....

...In Hall, which involved the crimes of armed robbery and carrying a concealed firearm while committing the robbery, the supreme court, after an analysis of Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987), stated: In the instant case, Hall was charged with both committing a robbery while carrying a firearm, under 812.13(1) and (2)(a), and the use and display of a firearm and the carrying of a concealed firearm while committing a felony, under 790.07(2)....

...We hold the legislature had no intent of punishing a defendant twice for the single act of displaying a firearm or carrying a firearm while committing a robbery. To hold otherwise would mean that, for every offense of robbery in which a defendant uses or carries or displays a firearm, in violation of section 812.13, there would also be a violation of section 790.02(2).[ [5] ] Robbery, under section 812.13(1), becomes the enhanced offense of armed robbery under 812.13(2)(a) by reason of the element of carrying or displaying a firearm....

...STANDARD OF REVIEW "A double jeopardy claim based upon undisputed facts presents a pure question of law and is reviewed de novo." Pizzo v. State, 945 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 2006) (citing State v. Florida, 894 So.2d 941, 945 (Fla.2005)). MERITS McKinney was convicted for violations of sections 812.13(2)(a) and 812.014(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (2007), *854 and alleges that these convictions violate the proscription against double jeopardy....

...does not prohibit McKinney's convictions for robbery with a firearm and grand theft." McKinney, 24 So.3d at 684. We agree. Next, we address McKinney's contention that his convictions are exempt under section 775.021(4)(b)1. by comparing the elements of the crimes for which McKinney was convicted. Section 812.13, Florida Statutes provides, in relevant part: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive...

...(2)(a) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 812.13, Fla....

...Section 812.014, Florida Statutes (2009), defines grand theft as to knowingly obtain or acquire the property of another with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive that person of that property or appropriate it to the taker's use. In contrast, section 812.13, Florida Statutes (2009), defines robbery as the intentional taking of the property of another—by force, violence, or fear—with the purpose of permanently or temporarily depriving the owner of that property. Robbery with a firearm is robbery committed with a firearm. See id. § 812.13(2)(a)....

...Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Gary L. Printy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. WENTWORTH, Judge. This is an appeal of a final judgment of conviction and sentence imposed on a nolo plea by appellant to two counts of unarmed robbery, pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, with the understanding that a guideline sentence would be imposed....

...Appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to imprisonment for nineteen years, less time served. In his motion for relief, appellant seeks discharge on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because Section 813.011, Florida Statutes (1973) had *257 been amended and transferred to Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...A sentence not authorized by law is always subject to collateral attack. Skinner v. State, 366 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Since the indictment did not charge that appellant was armed with either a firearm, a deadly weapon or a weapon, he could only be found guilty of a second-degree felony under Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The case is remanded to the trial court to resentence appellant for a second-degree felony, and appellant shall be present before the court for such re-sentencing. Judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. Sentence SET ASIDE and remanded for resentencing. COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] 812.13, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...She was then raped and robbed by both men. Wicker was subsequently charged and convicted of three separate counts: burglary (section 810.02(2), Florida Statutes (1981)); involuntary sexual battery (section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1981)); and robbery (section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981))....

...[1] Unlike the situation in Palmer, the supreme court had ruled at the time of Harris's conviction that such dual convictions were proper. In Hall, at 679, the court has changed the substantive law as it relates to convictions both for armed robbery under section 812.13, Florida Statutes, and for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under section 790.02, arising out of the same criminal act....

...Since the robbery which is the subject of the conspiracy was not alleged to have involved the use of a firearm or deadly weapon, the sentence of fifteen years imprisonment was excessive. Chapola v. State, 347 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Robbery without the use of a firearm or a deadly weapon is a second degree felony. § 812.13(2)(c), Fla....

...State, 568 So.2d 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). The defendant, pro se, has now filed a second 3.850 motion raising some matters not now cognizable by this court but the motion does raise one issue we are compelled to address. THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM — AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that armed robbery is a felony of the first degree punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life....

...Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Sean Daly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. DANIEL, Judge. This is an appeal from judgment and sentence for the crime of robbery with a weapon, sections 812.13(1) and 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), and assault, section 784.011, Florida Statutes (1985). Appellant robbed a convenience store, pointing a pistol [1] at the clerk in the process. He was charged, by information, in count one with committing robbery, section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1985), while carrying a deadly weapon, section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985) and in count two with aggravated assault, section 784.021(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...ession of a firearm while committing a felony cannot stand for the single act of displaying or carrying a firearm while committing a robbery. It necessarily follows, then, that appellant's conviction for the crimes of robbery with a weapon, sections 812.13(1) and 812.13(2)(b), and assault, section 784.011, cannot stand inasmuch as, under the factual circumstances here presented, assault is a necessarily lesser included offense of robbery with a weapon....

...The distinction between the two crimes, according to Sanchez, is one of force. We agree that the element of force appropriately distinguishes the two crimes: force utilized in the course of the taking is a necessary element of robbery, but it is not a necessary element of petit theft. See § 812.13(1), Fla....

...idered "`in the course of the taking' if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." Jones, 652 So.2d at 349 (quoting § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

...Burglary requires the entering or remaining in a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein. See § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). None of these elements are required for the robbery offense. On the other hand, robbery includes a taking, which is not required under burglary. See § 812.13(1), Fla....

...utes: Category 1: Murder, manslaughter: Chapter 782 (except subsection 782.04(1)(a)), subsection 316.193(3)(c)3, and subsection 327.351(2). Category 2: Sexual offenses: Chapters 794 and 800, section 826.04, and section 491.0112. Category 3: Robbery: Section 812.13....

...Category 6: Thefts, forgery, fraud: Sections 192.037 and 206.56, chapters 322 and 409, section 370.142, section 415.111, chapter 443, section 493.3175, sections 494.0018, 496.413, and 496.417, chapter 509, subsections 585.145(3) and 585.85(2), section 687.146, and chapters 812 (except section 812.13), 815, 817, 831, and 832....

...Allen, Public Defender, David A. Davis, Asst. Public Defender, and Pamela D. Presnell, Legal Asst., Tallahassee, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Henri C. Cawthon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. BARFIELD, Judge. Appellant was charged with robbery under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The question before the court is whether the allegations in the information sufficiently allege the elements of grand theft as a lesser included offense of a charge of robbery. A charge of robbery necessarily includes the elements of a charge of petit theft in that in proving a charge of robbery under section 812.13, the State must also prove the elements of petit theft under section 812.014(2)(c)....

...DOLLARS ($100.00), said property being the subject of larceny, the property of CINDY GABRIEL, as owner or custodian, from the person or custody of CINDY GABRIEL, with the intent to permanently deprive CINDY GABRIEL of said property, in violation of 812.13 Florida Statutes....

...After some argument on the motion, the trial court denied the motion, adjudicated S.W. delinquent of robbery, and committed him to the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. This appeal follows. II The crime of robbery is defined by Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1983), as "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault or putting in fear." A robbery under this statute embraces all...

...removed the necklace and bracelet from the child's person — but that no prima facie showing was established below that this taking was accomplished by "force [or] violence" or by "assault or putting in fear," an essential element of robbery under Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Moreover, the threat itself was directed against someone other than the alleged victim in this case, and therefore could not possibly prove up the alleged robbery as charged in the petition for delinquency. C In sum, then, the state failed to establish an essential element of robbery under Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1983) — namely, that the taking of the jewelry herein was by "force, violence, assault or putting in fear"; for that reason, we reverse the delinquency adjudication for robbery under review....

...t 2320 Northeast 33rd Street, Lighthouse Point, property of Leroy and Lois Eger, with intent to commit the offense of Robbery therein, and in the course thereof did make an assault upon Lois Eger, contrary to F.S. 810.02(1) and F.S. 810.02(2), and F.S. 812.13(2)(b)[.]

...One of the shots hit West in the head, causing him to fall to the ground. The man took both of the victims' money and jewelry and Rumph's purse. He then took West's keys and drove off in West's pick-up truck. Thompson was arrested and charged with two counts of robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), and one count of attempted felony murder in violation of section 782.051(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...After an accomplice struck the victim, the defendant drove off with his car. We hold, contrary to the appellant's sole contention, that, under these circumstances, he was properly convicted and sentenced for both armed robbery of the personal effects under section 812.13(2)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1993), and the armed carjacking of a different item, the vehicle, which is forbidden by a different statute, section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...We affirm Newton's habitual offender sentences as to counts V-VIII. Newton was sentenced as an habitual offender on four counts of armed robbery, a felony of the first degree punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment, pursuant to section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Sufficient competent evidence exists to sustain a conviction "[i]f, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . . ." Id. The elements of the crime of robbery are set forth in section 812.13, Florida Statutes. Prior to 1987, Florida law "interpreted section 812.13 as being consistent with the common law ....

...[and required that] `[t]he violence or intimidation [associated with robbery] must precede or be contemporaneous with the taking of the property.'" Royal v. State, 490 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla.1986) (quoting Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157, 159 (1922)). Before being amended by the legislature, section 812.13 defined "robbery" as follows: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. Effective October 1, 1987, however, the robbery statute was amended by the inclusion of the phrase "when in the course of the taking" in subsection 812.13(1) and the addition of section 812.13(3)(b). See Ch. 87-315, § 1, Laws of Fla.; §§ 812.13(1), (3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...or commission. (b) An act shall be deemed "in the course of the taking" if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events. § 812.13, Fla....

..., the State was required to demonstrate that there was a "taking of money or other property . . . from the person or custody of another" and that "in the course of the taking, there [was] the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." See § 812.13, Fla....

...d stolen the getaway car a short time before the incident involving the Victim, but he also stated that the car was later stolen from him by someone else. Thomas maintained that he was not involved in the incident that caused the Victim's death. [2] Section 812.13 was again later amended in 1992....

...Gen., Tallahassee, and W. Brian Bayly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. COWART, Judge. The defendant took money from a grocery clerk by threatening him with a knife. Based on this one act, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery (§ 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...no rational basis for such a limitation. In fact, "[a]s a general rule, Florida courts have utilized the statutory definition of `weapon' provided in section 790.001(13) to determine whether a particular object constitutes a `weapon' for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b) [the armed robbery statute]." Streetman v....

the commission of the offense in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999). 2

...Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge. Appellant was charged with two counts of robbery while carrying a "firearm or other deadly weapon" under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...We believe that a fair reading of the foregoing colloquy indicates that the appellant preserved his objection to the failure to give his requested instructions. Substantively, we find that the court erred in refusing to give the requested instruction on robbery while carrying a weapon under section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...State, 433 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), petition for review denied, 444 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1984), reversed a conviction for robbery with a deadly weapon on the same ground. The court pointed out that even though there was no evidence of the lesser offense contemplated by section 812.13(2)(b), the court was obligated to instruct on that crime because it was a necessarily lesser included offense....

...oth of these were category 2 lesser *557 included offenses which were alleged in the information and supported by the evidence. However, the failure to charge on these latter crimes was harmless because the court did instruct on simple robbery under section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), which was one step removed from the crime of which appellant was convicted....

...I dissent from that portion of the majority's opinion which requires the reduction of the offense to simple assault. NOTES [1] Cf. McCray v. State, 358 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), involving a conviction of robbery "while carrying a weapon," contrary to Florida Statutes § 812.13(2)(b)....

...The remaining offenses are also designated as felonies of the first degree. However, subsection 775.082(3)(b) also authorizes "a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment" where specifically provided for by statute. Armed robbery is one such specially designated offense. Section 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...See State v. Anderson, 536 So.2d 1166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). When deciding such a motion, the court must refrain from resolving fact disputes, and it must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. See State v. Diaz, 627 So.2d 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines the offense of robbery as the taking of money or property from another with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the person or owner of the money or property "when in the course of the t...

...ransaction or episode, double jeopardy bars separate convictions and sentences unless each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. See M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996). Armed carjacking with a firearm is proscribed by section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). The state concedes that all of the elements of that offense are subsumed by the offense of armed robbery with a firearm. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...transaction). Accordingly, double jeopardy precludes convictions for both offenses. Armed robbery with a firearm and armed carjacking with a firearm are both first-degree felonies punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life. §§ 812.13(2)(a) & 812.133(2)(a), Fla....

...After an accomplice struck the victim, the defendant drove off with his car. We hold, contrary to the appellant's sole contention, that, under these circumstances, he was properly convicted and sentenced for both armed robbery of the personal effects under section 812.13(2)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1993), and the armed carjacking of a different item, the vehicle, which is forbidden by a different statute, section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. WALDEN, Judge. The defendant appeals his convictions on the charges of burglary, kidnapping, sexual battery, and robbery. The amended information charged the appellant with robbery with a "... deadly weapon, to wit: a knife, contrary to ..." Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...to use the knife in a manner likely to produce death or great bodily harm. The defendant's motion was denied and he was subsequently convicted of all counts charged and on the robbery conviction the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 812.13(2)(a), supra....

...n for acquittal. See M.M. v. State, 391 So.2d 366 (Fla.1st DCA 1980), cert. denied , 411 So.2d 384 (Fla. 1981); McCray v. State, 358 So.2d 615 (Fla.1st DCA 1978). However, the evidence does support the lesser crime of robbery with a weapon [1] under Section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

Appellant to the statutory maximum of life in prison. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). The court also imposed

...r whether the trial court erred in refusing to give a modified version of the standard jury instruction defining the term "weapon." We conclude that no error occurred and affirm. Appellant was charged with armed robbery with a weapon in violation of section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes, arising out of the following incident....

...While Williams is clearly guilty of unarmed robbery, we agree with his argument that the state failed to meet its burden of proving armed robbery. The information charged Williams with robbery during the course of which he carried a weapon, to-wit: hot coffee, in violation of sections 812.13(1) and (2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991). The question is whether the state proved that hot coffee is a "weapon" under section 812.13(2)(b). Florida courts have generally utilized the statutory definition of "weapon" provided in section *1243 790.001(13) to determine whether a particular object consititutes a "weapon" for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b)....

...However, the evidence presented in this particular case was insufficient to establish that the coffee was a weapon under the robbery statute, and therefore, we reverse the armed robbery conviction. We remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment for second degree robbery pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c)....

...Following his arrest, Bates admitted that he held a "nut driver" under the rag. Bates was charged with robbery in the first degree, a crime dependent upon the offender commiting the act while carrying a firearm or other deadly weapon, punishable by a term of years not to exceed life. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). There is no dispute that Bates was not carrying a firearm when he committed the robbery. The question, however, is whether the nut driver is a "deadly weapon" as those words are used in section 812.13(2)(a)....

...Following the principal of ejusdem generis, the nut driver does not fit the statutory definition of a weapon. Bates' conviction for armed robbery with a deadly weapon is reversed. This matter is remanded for entry of a judgment of second degree robbery pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. July 18, 1984. Carl S. McGinnes, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Andrea Smith Hillyer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. SMITH, Judge. Appellant appeals from two convictions for robbery with a firearm, Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...pon. Whitehead v. State, 446 So.2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), rev. denied, 462 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 1985). The same analysis does not apply to the robbery convictions, however, because use of a weapon is an essential element of the crime of armed robbery. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...DeCastro first urges as reversible error the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that criminal intent (the intent to permanently deprive) is an element of the offense of robbery. The point lacks merit because this court in Bell v. State, 354 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) held that as defined under Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975) robbery is a general intent offense and, therefore, specific intent is no longer a requisite element....

...HOBSON, Judge. The state charged James Manford Peck in a two-count information with 1) kidnapping (of six persons), in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1981), and 2) robbery with a firearm (of one of the six persons), in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...[1] Under the circumstances of this case we disagree because application of the direct file statute did not substantively alter Hubbard's situation to his disadvantage. See Prince v. State, 398 So.2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Robbery with a deadly weapon is a crime punishable by life imprisonment, Section 812.13(2)(a), so the state attorney at the time of the commission of the crime could have initiated indictment proceedings to have the defendant tried as an adult....

...Based on the undisputed facts, defendant moved to dismiss the charge for failure to state a prima facie case of guilt. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4). Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(d), the state demurred citing recent amendments to section 812.13(1) and (3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) which provide, in sum, that the force used in the course of taking property may be subsequent to the taking if the force and the act of taking "constitute a continuous series of acts or events." A...

...ith a shotgun. There was no evidence upon which to base a finding that the shotgun was not a firearm. Robbery with a deadly weapon and robbery with a weapon carry the same penalty as the offense charged. Each offense is a felony of the first degree. Section 812.13(1), (2)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...The jury subsequently found appellant guilty of robbery with a weapon, and this timely appeal ensued. We reverse. As a general rule, Florida courts have utilized the statutory definition of "weapon" provided in section 790.001(13) to determine whether a particular object constitutes a "weapon" for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b)....

...Consequently, we are not persuaded by the federal cases cited above. For the reasons previously discussed, we reverse appellant's judgment and sentence for robbery with a weapon and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment and sentence for simple robbery under section 812.13(2)(c)....

...ge must instruct on the lesser included offense of sale and possession if evidence exists of these offenses. (Emphasis supplied). Id. at 1061; see also Foster v. State, 448 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (Cowart, J., concurring specially). NOTES [1] § 812.13(1), (2)(a), Fla....

...1), Fla. Stat.; enhancing punishment for certain offenses committed while carrying or using any weapon; § 775.087(2), Fla. Stat.; providing for a three year minimum mandatory sentence as to certain offenses committed by one possessing a firearm and § 812.13, Fla....

...Perez and the co-perpetrator were charged with armed robbery. Robbery is defined as "the taking of money or other property ... from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (1987) (emphasis added). The robbery charge was enhanced to a first degree felony by reason of carrying a firearm. Id. § 812.13(2)(a)....

...Manuel pleaded guilty as charged to these offenses in an open plea to the court. When he committed these offenses, Mr. Manuel was only thirteen years old. Mr. Manuel's robbery with a firearm conviction was a first-degree felony punishable by life, see § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...f each can possibly be committed without committing the other. Rotenberry v. State, 468 So.2d 971, 976 (Fla. 1985). An armed robbery is 1) the taking of money or property 2) by force, violence, assault or putting in fear 3) while carrying a firearm. Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Therefore, these offenses are separate as well. It was not error to deny Larkins' motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of armed robbery of Wirth. The fact that Larkins did not display his gun is immaterial. Carrying a weapon during a robbery is sufficient to enhance the charge. Section 812.13....

...We reverse the robbery sentences as unauthorized. The indictment for the two armed robbery counts reads, in relevant part, that "during the commission of this felony JOHN S. LANE carried, displayed or used a firearm, to wit: a handgun, contrary to Section 812.13(1) and (2)(a) and 775.087 of the Florida Statute." Section 775.087, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: (2) (a) 1....

...ly weapon, since both discharge a pellet through the use of air pressure and are capable of causing death or injury. We hold, therefore, that an air pellet pistol, depending upon its use, can be considered to be a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Brummer, Public Defender and Bruce A. Rosenthal, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Anthony C. Musto and Steven R. Jacob, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee. Before HENDRY, NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ. NESBITT, Judge. The appellant, pursuant to Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1977), challenges his adjudication of delinquency arising out of robbery charges filed against him....

...ted to serve as a Fifth District panel. [1] On June 14, 1995, Lett entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to the charge of robbery with a weapon, a first-degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding thirty years pursuant to section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...The appellant, Elton Hale, appeals from the trial court's order sentencing him beyond the sentencing guidelines' presumptive range as a result of the determination, reached in accordance with section 775.084, Florida Statutes, that he is a habitual offender. Hale was convicted of robbery, violative of section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Menser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. DAUKSCH, Judge. This is an appeal from a robbery conviction. The principal question is whether the evidence supports a conviction for robbery or the lesser included offense of theft. Robbery is defined in section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes, as: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, defines the lesser of the forms of robbery as: (2)(c) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Finally, section 812.13(3) described what the legislature meant when it used the words "in the course of committing the robbery" in section 812.13(2)(a), (b) and (c), Florida Statutes, and it says: (3) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing the robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission....

...into mitigating evidence and, as a result, failed to discover and present to the jury the mitigating evidence a 1 Fla. Stat. § 782.04(1)(a). 2 Id. §§ 782.04(1)(a), 777.04(1), 775.087. 3 Id. § 812.13(2)(a). 4 Id....

...COWART, Judge, concurring in part; dissenting in part: Appellant was charged with: (1) aggravated assault (that is, assault with a deadly weapon without intent to kill, § 784.021(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979)); (2) armed robbery (a robbery in which the offender carried a firearm, § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...February 17, 1983) [1983 FLW 76] held that all of the elements of the offense of display of a firearm during the commission of a felony (a violation of section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes, (1981)) were included within the elements of the offense of armed robbery (a violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)), therefore, the section 790.07(2) offense was a lesser included offense of the section 812.13(2)(a) offense, as was held in State v....

...sed for the lesser included offense. However, this case involves the question of whether aggravated assault (§ 784.021(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1981)) not display of firearm (§ 790.07(2), Fla. Stat. (1981)) is a lesser included offense of armed robbery (§ 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...*1100 Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 29, 1992. PETERSON, Judge. Can a defendant be convicted of both robbery, under section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), and aggravated battery, under section 784.045(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), when the course of conduct giving rise to the charges did not involve a weapon and involved a single incident or event? Does...

...tensive surgery. Foster appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated battery, alleging violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions in that the convictions were based upon the same conduct. The robbery statute, section 812.13(1), defines the offense as a "taking of money ......

...from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." The statute does not distinguish between the variable degrees of force, violence, assault, or fear that is used in accomplishing the crime. Section 812.13(2) elevates this second-degree crime to one of the first degree if the offender carries a firearm or other deadly weapon while committing the robbery. No weapons were used in the instant case. Section 812.13(3)(b) defines the words "in the course of the taking" used in subsection (1) of the statute defining robbery....

...The judgment and sentence for both offenses of robbery and aggravated battery are affirmed. AFFIRMED. W. SHARP, J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents with opinion. COWART, Judge, dissenting. I. THE QUESTION: The legal question in this case is: When an accused is charged with the offense of robbery (§ 812.13, Fla....

...Common law larceny and statutory theft (§ 812.014, Fla. Stat.) are strictly crimes against property alone. Assault (§ 784.011, Fla. Stat.) and battery (§ 784.03, Fla. Stat.) are strictly crimes against persons. However, both common law robbery and statutory robbery (§ 812.13(1), Fla....

...However, the result in Royal motivated the legislature to amend the robbery statute to extend the scope of the force element beyond its original purpose (to accomplish a taking) and to include force used to retain possession of taken property or to accomplish an escape from *1108 the crime scene. ( See § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

...State, 592 So.2d 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), this court agreed and followed Kurtz. See also Davis v. State, 590 So.2d 496 (Fla.3d DCA 1991) where the Third District applied Cleveland and held that the defendant could not be convicted for both an armed robbery (§ 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Stat.). However, use a simple assault to commit a petty larceny and — zip — by joining and merging the two severable events into a double-based factual criminal "episode" or "transaction" the result becomes in law the compound offense of robbery (§ 812.13, Fla....

...Stat.) punishable at least as a second degree felony punishable by 15 years confinement (§ 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat.). When the presence of another "aggravating" element is involved (the use of a firearm or deadly weapon), the result is a first degree felony offense (armed robbery) (§ 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...[12] In 1977 the Florida Legislature (Ch. 77-342, § 4, Laws of Florida) eliminated a "taking" (manucaption) as an essential element of the omnibus theft statute (§ 812.014(1), Fla. Stat.) and the supreme court has recently held that the reference in the robbery statute (§ 812.13(1), Fla. Stat.) to larceny does not mean common law larceny but statutory theft (§ 812.014(1), Fla. Stat.) [in effect holding that in explicitly amending the theft statute the legislature impliedly amended the robbery statute (§ 812.13(1), Fla....

...elonious taking. See Statute of 21 Henry VIII, Ch. 7 (1530) and § 812.012(2)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (1989). [13] "He who hath taken by force, seems to be the more iniquitous thief." [14] 2 Burdick, The Law of Crime, § 598 (1946). [15] Id. at § 599, and § 812.13(1), Fla....

...f 5 days in a secure detention facility and perform 100 hours of community service. (emphasis added). [2] T.M.'s basic premise surely cannot be that no adults who commit offenses with the use of a firearm are subjected to mandatory prison terms. See § 812.13 (1995) (robbery committed with firearm punishable by mandatory imprisonment for a term of years); § 775.087(2) (adult's commission of enumerated felonies with possession of firearm shall be sentenced to minimum term of 3 years imprisonment)....

...4th DCA 1977)), which allegedly conflicts with a decision of the district court of appeal, second district ( Huff v. State, 350 So.2d 123 (Fla.2d DCA 1977)), on the same point of law. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The essential issue is whether subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 812.13(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ce of a weapon as well as the presence of a deadly weapon. Furthermore, the robbery statute clearly delineates three stages or degrees of robbery in descending order: robbery with a deadly weapon, robbery with a weapon, and robbery without a weapon. Section 812.13(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Kontos of James G. Kontos, P. A., Melbourne, for Appellee. ORFINGER, R.B., J. The State of Florida appeals the trial court's ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict finding Dana Dion Hawkins guilty of robbery in violation of section 812.13(1) and (2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...The property taken was of some value, and; 4. The taking was done with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive the victim of his or her right to the property or any benefit from it or to appropriate the money or property to his own use or to the use of someone else. § 812.13(1), Fla....

...That conviction was not appealed by either party. [2] "In the course of the taking" means that the act occurred before, during or after the taking of the property and that the act and the taking of the property constitute a continuous series of acts or events. § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

...of America in denominations to the State Attorney unknown of the value of more than one hundred dollars, and in the course of committing the robbery was armed with a certain firearm or other deadly weapon, to-wit: a gun, contrary to Florida Statute 812.13(2)(a), COUNT FOUR The Grand Jurors of the State of Florida, inquiring in and for the body of said County of Palm Beach, upon their oaths do present that CLEO DOUGLAS LeCROY and JON MICHELE LeCROY on the 4th day of JANUARY, 1981, in the County...

...another, to-wit: GAIL HARDEMAN, a .38 caliber revolver of a value of more than one hundred dollars, and in the course of committing the robbery *356 was armed with a certain firearm or other deadly weapon, to-wit: a gun, contrary to Florida Statute 812.13(2)(a), ......

...P. 3.131(d)(2); Keane v. Cochran, 614 So.2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). V. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. NOTES [1] State v. Arthur, 390 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1980). [2] Robbery with a firearm is punishable by life imprisonment see § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...evidentiary hearing be conducted unless additional record attachments to a subsequent denial refute this facially sufficient claim. *1169 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. BLUE, A.C.J., and GREEN and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(b), Fla....

...Allen, Public Defender, and David P. Gauldin, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Joseph W. Stanco, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. NIMMONS, Judge. The defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery under Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, kidnapping under Section 787.01(2), and two counts of sexual battery under Section 794.011(5)....

...urt shall be divested of jurisdiction under this statute and the charge shall be made and the child shall be handled in every respect as if he were an adult.... The indictment against Ringel alleged that he committed an armed robbery in violation of Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). In that section, armed robbery is declared to be a felony in the first degree, punishable by "imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." Ringel claims he could not be indicted as an adult because Section 812.13(2)(a) does not provide for punishment "by death or by life imprisonment" as required in Section 39.02(5)(c). He claims that "a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment" does not include "life imprisonment." Two reasons for this view are advanced: first, that a sentence under 812.13(2)(a) must be limited to a term of years, i.e., 20, 30, 40, 50, etc....

...ted that the legislature, in providing a sentence of a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment, intended "that life imprisonment be the upper limit of the punishment imposed." Likewise, it is our opinion that the maximum penalty provided under Section 812.13(2)(a) is life imprisonment, not a term of years....

...We believe that was the legislative intent prior to the amendment in 1969, and we feel that the phrase "punishable by life imprisonment" should also be construed to mean cases where life imprisonment is the maximum punishment provided. Since life imprisonment is the maximum penalty provided in Section 812.13(2)(a) we find the motion to dismiss should have been denied....

...prisonment? In all other respects the petition for rehearing is denied. ALDERMAN, C.J., and ANSTEAD and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Johnson v. State, 314 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1975). The case involved a violation of Section 813.011, the predecessor of Section 812.13, and other offenses....

...While we find no merit in either contention and affirm, we shall address the issue regarding compliance with section 39.09(3)(e). R.G.S. has an extensive history of serious crime for his brief sixteen years. In the instant case, he was adjudicated guilty of one count of robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1989), and two counts of grand theft in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1990)....

...on the basis that it was able to obtain the record from appellant's prior appeal). Section 790.001(13), Florida Statutes (1985), excludes "a common pocketknife" from its definition of "weapon." However, the validity of an armed robbery charge under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1985), does not necessarily turn on whether the weapon used meets the definitional criteria of section 790.001(13)....

...acity to inflict harm." Id. at 1082. The court continued, however, that Florida courts have utilized the statutory definition of "weapon" provided in section 790.001(13) to determine whether a particular object constitutes a "weapon" for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b)....

...of "weapon" under Section 790.001(13), Florida Statutes. The problem with the defendant's contention is that Section 790.001(13)'s "common pocket knife" exemption from the definition of "weapon" has no application in an armed robbery *455 case under Section 812.13(2)....

...PER CURIAM. Defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender. He claims error in his sentence. We affirm based on the following analysis. Defendant's basic premise is that the robbery with a deadly weapon statute, § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...State, 564 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), to support this theory. We find that neither the applicable statutes nor Barber supports his argument. First, the robbery statute on its face permits sentencing under the habitual offender statute. Even though conviction under section 812.13(2)(a) is a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment, the trial judge is required to enter a guidelines sentence....

...s compounded by permitting that portion of the instructions to be taken into the jury room without the entire instructions). [3] REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. GOSHORN, GRIFFIN, JJ., and McNEAL, R., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(c), Fla....

...his case with directions that the trial court order a judgment of acquittal as to this count only. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). REVERSED and REMANDED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977). [2] Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...The crime of robbery is defined as "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Glenn Johnson seeks review of a trial court's order entered after an evidentiary hearing on three claims presented in his timely filed rule 3.850 motion. We affirm and write concerning Johnson's third point. Appellant was charged with strong arm robbery, a second degree felony. See § 812.13(2)(c), Fla....

...However as noted above, since there is no sentencing scoresheet in the record, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing with a properly prepared scoresheet. AFFIRMED in part; Sentence VACATED; REMANDED for resentencing. THOMPSON, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...In opposition to appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the count charging robbery with a weapon, the state argued below, as here, that although the starter pistol did not meet the statutory definition of a firearm, it was a weapon for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b) because it could have been used as a bludgeon....

...ect of the jury instruction is without merit. It is true that Florida courts have generally utilized the statutory definition of "weapon" provided in section 790.001(13) to determine whether a particular object constitutes a "weapon" for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b)....

...5th DCA 1983); Paul v. State, 421 So.2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); and MRR v. State, 411 So.2d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); compare Gomez v. State, 496 So.2d 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (toy gun was a "weapon" for purposes of armed robbery with a weapon conviction under section 812.13(2)(b) where the toy gun was used to strike the robbery *876 complainant several times); Fletcher v....

...5th DCA 1985) (razor blade a deadly weapon when it was held to the victim's throat in an attempted armed robbery). We therefore reverse the conviction for robbery with a weapon, and direct entry of a judgment of conviction for the lesser offense of simple robbery pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...ung shot, billie tear gas gun, chemical weapon or device, or other deadly weapon except a firearm or a common pocket knife. [1] The judgment incorrectly lists attempted robbery without a weapon as a second-degree felony. It is a third-degree felony. § 812.13(2)(c), 777.04(4)(c), Fla....

...Under current case law this was a single criminal episode. Mr. Church was convicted of three counts of armed robbery with a firearm. The trial court sentenced him to three consecutive ten-year terms and announced that a ten-year mandatory minimum would apply to each count. Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (2002), provides that robbery with a firearm is a first-degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life....

...We affirm the trial court's order denying Collins' claims on the armed robbery with a weapon count and the armed robbery with a firearm count. Armed robbery with a firearm is a first-degree felony punishable by life and is thus susceptible to an enhanced sentence as a habitual violent felony offender. See §§ 812.13(2)(a), 775.084(b)1, Fla. Stat. (1993); Cooper v. State, 800 So.2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Armed robbery with a weapon is a first-degree *662 felony. See § 812.13(2)(b), Fla....

...Based on the following briefly stated legal analysis, (1) we reverse the second-degree murder conviction and sentence and remand with directions to discharge the defendant as to this count in the information, and (2) we affirm the armed robbery conviction as a conviction for armed robbery with a weapon [§ 812.13(2)(b), Fla....

...ence adduced below that a non-deadly "weapon," to wit: a toy gun, was carried by the defendant's accomplice in the course of committing the charged robbery, which evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for armed robbery with a "weapon" under Section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...This is so because the toy gun, as used, qualifies as a "weapon" under the above statute because it was used to strike the robbery complainant several times — although, as the state concedes, the complainant received no serious injuries therefrom and, consequently, the toy gun, as used, was not a "deadly weapon" under Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...he latter is of no moment as to the conviction for murder. The statute defines robbery as the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault or putting in fear. § 812.13(1), Fla....

...he taking of the property for there to be a robbery; otherwise there would be no distinction between theft and robbery. The supreme court would not accept the reasoning that because the expression "in the course of committing the robbery" is used in section 812.13(3), where punishments are distinguished according to the type of force used to perpetrate the robbery, there had been a change in the definition of the crime....

...The time for appeal did not begin to run until the resentencing order was entered. The appeal is timely. Turning to the merits, we agree with the State that the trial court was in error in granting relief on counts two and three. Count two was armed robbery with a deadly weapon, a knife, in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1989). Robbery with a deadly weapon is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment. Id. § 812.13(2)(a)....

...6(3), Florida Statutes (1981) which authorizes retention for the purpose of reviewing the defendant's release on parole during a period up to one-third of the sentence imposed. Watson received a sentence of 99 years in prison, a valid sentence under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides for a maximum penalty of "a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." In Alvarez v....

...harge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Because the trial court impermissibly allowed evidence of Morrow's other misdeeds to become a feature of the trial, we reverse. Morrow originally was charged with one count of armed robbery, see § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Application of this test to appellant's situation compels the conclusion that appellant's girlfriend was "available" as well as "competent." Therefore, it was appropriate for the prosecution to comment on this weakness in appellant's alibi defense. As indicated initially, appellant was convicted of both robbery (§ 812.13(1) & (2)(a), Fla....

...elements of that offense are included within the elements of first-degree robbery. If this were a matter of first impression we would be inclined to the view that section 790.07(2) defines an offense that is lesser included in the offense defined in section 812.13(1) and (2) where one criminal act underlies both charges....

...(2) Whoever, while committing or attempting to commit any felony or while under indictment, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use any firearm or carries a concealed firearm is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, and s. 775.084. 812.13 Robbery....

...The essence of the distinction between the two offenses, as we understand the language of the case, is that the constituent statutory element required to be proved to convict for a violation of section 790.07(2) and not required to be proved to convict for a violation of section 812.13(1) and (2) is "use and display" of the firearm....

...We draw from all of the foregoing the following conclusion which we limit in immediate application to the two statutes directly involved here. Because a violation of section 790.07(2) may be established by proof that the offender either used and displayed a firearm OR carried a concealed firearm, and because a violation of section 812.13(1) and (2) also has dual aspects (used, displayed, threatened, attempted OR carried a concealed firearm) neither offense can be a lesser included offense of the other unless the allegations of the charging instrument specifically defin...

...he following question as one of great public importance: IN THE WAKE OF STATE V. GIBSON, 452 So.2d 553 (FLA. 1984), MAY AN OFFENSE PROSCRIBED BY SECTION 790.07(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, EVER BE CONSIDERED A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THE PROSCRIPTION OF SECTION 812.13(1) AND (2), FLORIDA STATUTES? The appellant here, as indicated earlier, is similarly charged with violations of both section 812.13(1) and (2) and section 790.07(2)....

...charges both; i.e., that appellant did "display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use a firearm, or carry a concealed firearm, to-wit: a handgun while committing or attempting to commit a felony, to-wit: robbery, contrary to F.S. 790.07(2) and F.S. 812.13." As in Gibson, although on a different level of analysis, we find that appellant was convicted of armed robbery and use and display of a weapon while engaged in a criminal offense and that, under the circumstances present here, neither crime is a lesser included offense of the other....

...For the forgoing reasons the order of the trial court is in all respects affirmed. Affirmed. NOTES [1] The trial court's imposition of habitual felony offender status is not under appeal, thus, we assume that the trial court properly habitualized defendant. [2] Defendant was convicted of robbery under section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of years not exceeding 30, and such offender shall not be eligible for release for 10 years. [4] Section 810.02 Florida Statutes (1) "Burglary" means entering or remaining in a structure or conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.... [5] Section 812.13 Florida Statutes (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner...

957 So.2d 605, 613 (Fla.2007) (“Pursuant to section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), armed robbery

...d 6, and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; QUASHED in part; REMANDED. HARRIS, J., and STROKER, R.J., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] § 782.04(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] § 812.13, Fla....

...me of Robbery, did cause great bodily harm to Glen Moore, a human being, by intentionally kicking and striking him repeatedly which could have caused the death of the said Glen Moore, contrary to F.S. 782.04(1)(a), F.S. 777.011, F.S. 777.04(1) and F.S. 812.13(2)(c)....

...Section 777.04(1), Florida Statutes, provides, "A person who attempts to commit an offense prohibited by law and in such attempt does any act toward the commission of such offense, but fails in the perpetration or is intercepted or prevented in the execution thereof, commits the offense of criminal attempt. . . ." Section 812.13(2)(c) provides the elements of the crime of robbery....

...We conclude that no fundamental error occurred and affirm his conviction for attempted murder. As to the conviction for robbery, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. In the information, White was charged with violating section 812.13(1), (2)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), which provides: "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily depr...

...1972); Clements v. State, 320 So.2d 44 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Phillips v. State, 313 So.2d 428 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). In our view, the defendant's sentence of life imprisonment for unarmed robbery exceeded the statutory maximum for such crime as provided in Section 812.13(2)(c), 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), and, therefore, such sentence should have been vacated and a new sentence imposed within the statutory maximum....

...The defendant was charged by information with unarmed robbery, found guilty thereof by a jury, and adjudged guilty based on the jury verdict. Specifically, the information charging the defendant with robbery contained no allegations that the robbery was committed with a "firearm", "deadly weapon" or "weapon." See: §§ 812.13(2)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (1975). Under the authority of Chapola v. State, 347 So.2d 762 (Fla.1st DCA 1977), the defendant was charged with and convicted of unarmed robbery as a second degree felony under Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), and could only be sentenced to a maximum of fifteen years in the state penitentiary under Section 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...udgment be corrected to reflect this offense as a second-degree felony. In all other respects, the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. PETERSON, C.J. and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 810.02(2)(b), (1989). [2] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

...miss Count II of the amended information on the grounds that because it is physically impossible for anyone literally to carry an automobile in the course of committing a robbery, the state had failed to allege a violation of the applicable statute, section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...1st DCA 1995), a companion case that involved one of appellant's co-defendants, deciding that armed robbery could be legally carried out by using an automobile to run down the victim before robbing him. Jackson determined that a logical and common sense definition of the word "carry," the past tense of which is used in section 812.13(2)(a), includes the terms "`to wear, hold, or have around one,' in the sense of possessing," [1] and that such definition embraces driving an automobile. I cannot agree with the rationale of the Jackson decision. Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1993), defines robbery as follows: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily...

...ther property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. If the robbery is accomplished without the use of a firearm, deadly weapon or other weapon, it is proscribed as a second degree felony. § 812.13(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1993). This, in my judgment, is the only robbery offense for which appellant can be lawfully convicted. Section 812.13(2)(a) aggravates simple robbery to a first degree felony under the following specified circumstances: (2)(a) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree.......

...[2] *287 Finally, my conclusion that the act complained of here is not properly encompassed within the armed robbery statute is supported by applying several well-acknowledged statutory maxims. One in particular, ejusdem generis, is altogether relevant to the language used in section 812.13(2)(a)....

...For all of the above reasons, I would certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance: WHETHER THE ACTS OF DRIVING AN AUTOMOBILE IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO RUN THE VICTIM DOWN AND THEREAFTER ROBBING THE VICTIM CONSTITUTE ARMED ROBBERY BY CARRYING A DEADLY WEAPON UNDER SECTION 812.13(2)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES (1993)? NOTES [1] Jackson, 662 So.2d at 1371....

...4th DCA 1988), in which the district court certified a question as one of great public importance. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. On June 9, 1986, Terrance Love was charged with two counts of armed robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), and one count of possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense in violation of section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...elevant to their determination of the defendant's guilt. The dispositive issue hereunder is whether specific intent (i.e. the intent to permanently deprive the owner of property) is still a requisite element of the crime of robbery as now defined by Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975) which reads: "812.13 Robbery "(1) `Robbery' means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." The law is well established that it is within the po...

...essor, a felonious taking or intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property was an essential element of the offense. Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157 (1922); Bailey v. State, 199 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967). However, in enacting Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975), the legislature omitted the word "felonious" thereby expanding the definition of robbery to include any taking and eliminating the requirement of specific intent....

...We further deem it appropriate to certify this decision to the Supreme Court as one involving a question of great public interest, such question being: Whether specific intent (i.e. the intent to permanently deprive the owner of property) is still a requisite element of the crime of robbery as now defined by Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...r aided in the commission of an intentional act which could have resulted in the victim's death but which act is not an essential element of the underlying offense. The deadly act cannot be an essential element of the underlying felony. According to section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes: (1) Robbery means: the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with *412 intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. Furthermore, section 812.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes, states: (b) An act shall be deemed "in the course of the taking" if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events....

...Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. THOMPSON, Judge. Robinson Crump appeals his judgment and sentence adjudicating him guilty of attempted robbery with a firearm pursuant to Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...nstruction he requested was "error that is per se reversible." Reddick v. State, 394 So.2d 417, 418 (Fla.1981). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. Appellant was charged with and convicted of "strong arm robbery," [1] in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (2008)....

.... . from the person or custody of [the victim], with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the said property, and in the course of the taking did use force, violence, assault, or putting in fear, contrary to Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes." The robbery victim was a college student walking to her apartment when Mr....

...Appellant does not argue otherwise. But he contends he was entitled to the jury instruction defense counsel below requested on the permissive or category two lesser-included offense of "robbery by sudden snatching," the third-degree felony proscribed by section 812.131, Florida Statutes (2008)....

..." but also of the offense of "robbery by sudden snatching." [4] allegation that a robbery was accomplished *817 by putting the victim in fear necessarily alleges that the victim "in the course of the taking, . . . was or became aware of the taking." § 812.131(1), Fla....

...Nonetheless, I am constrained to concur in the majority opinion reversing the conviction. NOTES [1] Called "strong arm" (or, less frequently, "strong-armed") robbery—to differentiate it from armed robbery, a first-degree felony— the offense of second-degree robbery in violation of section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), occurs where "in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon." [2] Theft is a necessarily included offense in every robbery case....

...If the robbery victim was surprised from behind and rendered unconscious by the robber unawares, taking of money or other property from the victim could be accomplished by use of force or violence, and support a conviction for robbery in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes, but would not support a conviction of robbery by sudden snatching where the victim did not become aware of the taking in the course of the robbery....

...leged disjunctively. Legally, it is, of course, "impossible to know on which . . . [theory] . . . the jury's verdict rests." Horn v. State, 677 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). [4] To prove the crime of robbery by sudden snatching in violation of section 812.131(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), a third-degree felony, "the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:" (1) "(Defendant) took the (money or property described in the charge) from the person of [the victim]...

...ls from the sentence imposed *861 on Newmones. [2] Newmones' challenges to his conviction have no merit, but we agree with the state that Newmones should be resentenced to a life term. Newmones was convicted of robbery with a firearm, a violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides that this crime is a felony of the first degree "punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment...." [3] Newmones was also qualified as a prison releasee reoffender, pursuant to section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes....

...eprived of the power to render a habitual offender sentence in a case he or she felt was appropriate, where the prosecutor (for various or whatever reason) took no action. AFFIRMED. GOSHORN, C.J., and MUSLEH, V.J., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13, Fla....

...Rehearing Denied June 4, 1985. Larry D. Simpson, of Davis, Judkins & Simpson, Tallahassee, for appellant. Wallace Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. ZEHMER, Judge. Caroline Ann Fox appeals an order adjudging her guilty of robbery, in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1981), contending that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was guilty as charged....

...nd lesser included offense. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Spencer was accused of robbing a gas station while using a pistol on August 25, 1982. A two-count felony information was filed against him. Count I alleged armed robbery, contrary to section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

This comment was adopted in 2013. 15.1 ROBBERY § 812.13, Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Robbery, the

...by it in a sentencing guideline scoresheet. See also Cofield v. State, 602 So.2d 586, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Trimble v. State, 511 So.2d 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). [3] § 813.011, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1974). [4] § 813.011, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1974), and § 812.13, Fla....

...Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Davis G. Anderson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. BOARDMAN, Chief Judge. Appellant, John Huff, was charged with robbery with a deadly weapon in violation of Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...ce of a weapon as well as the presence of a deadly weapon. Furthermore, the robbery statute clearly delineates three stages or degrees of robbery in descending order: robbery with a deadly weapon, robbery with a weapon, and robbery without a weapon. Section 812.13(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Upon further analysis, as discussed infra, we conclude that the apparent conflict arises in statutory construction, and when the proper construction is made in this case, the appearance of conflict is resolved. We therefore dismiss the petition for review. Respondent was convicted on two counts of armed robbery. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...At the resentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison for attempted robbery with a firearm over objections that the new sentence was excessive and violated the double jeopardy prohibition. Contrary to the trial court's interpretation, Section 812.13(2)(a) and Section 777.04(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), classifies attempted robbery with a firearm as a second degree felony for which the maximum punishment is fifteen years in prison....

...ictim with numerous cuts, scratches, and bruises. Based on information received from witnesses to the crime, Burris was arrested and charged by information with robbery with a deadly weapon. Specifically, the information alleged that in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), by force, violence, assault or putting in fear, Burris took the victim's purse with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the victim of her right to it, "and in the course of committing said robbery, Daniel Jacob Burris did use a deadly weapon, to-wit: an automobile." (emphasis added). To the extent relevant for purposes of this appeal, section 812.13, Florida Statutes (2001) provides: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person...

...cond degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. (emphasis added). Burris filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the information was defective because it failed to allege that he "carried" a deadly weapon as required by section 812.13(2)(a); rather, the information alleged that he "used" a deadly weapon, *1036 specifically an automobile....

...[2] In denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court properly relied on Jackson v. State, 662 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), wherein the first district court said: We agree with the trial court that the intended meaning of the word "carry," as used in section 812.13(2)(a), must be sought by use of logic and common sense....

...One of the principal meanings ascribed to it is "to wear, hold, or have around one," in the sense of possessing. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 319 (2d ed.1987) (unabridged). We are of the opinion that ascribing such a meaning to "carry," as used in section 812.13(2)(a), is perfectly consistent with the obvious intent behind that statutory provision....

...See, e.g., State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla.1981) ("legislative intent is the polestar by which the court[s] must be guided" in statutory construction, even when at odds with "the strict letter of the statute"). It seems to us that the clear intent behind section 812.13(2)(a) is to deter the commission of robberies by persons possessing deadly weapons, and thereby to reduce the likelihood of death or serious injury to victims and bystanders....

...displays, or uses any weapon or firearm, except for *1038 felonies in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element. [4] Because we conclude that the question of whether an automobile can be "carried" as a weapon within the meaning of section 812.13(2)(a) is dispositive, we need not address Burris's claim regarding the information's failure to precisely track the statute....

...For the foregoing reasons, we remand this matter with directions to enter a judgment of guilt as to robbery, [5] and to resentence Burris accordingly. We also certify conflict with Jackson and Nation. CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS; CONFLICT CERTIFIED. GRIFFIN and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001). [2] § 812.131, Fla....

...o not address the implications, if any, of the Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), as modified by Harris v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002). [5] § 812.13(1), Fla....

...look in his eyes. Other store employees described the victim's demeanor immediately after the incident as "upset" and "real panicky." Robbery is the taking of the property of another through the "use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13, Fla....

...2d DCA 2001). Here, Fortner correctly contends that his prior convictions were improperly scored. The judgments used by the State to score Fortner's prior record reflect that Fortner was previously convicted of four counts of robbery with a firearm under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), eight counts of robbery with a weapon under section 812.13(2)(b), one count of simple robbery under section 812.13(2)(c), and one count of carrying a concealed firearm under section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...NOTES [1] See In re Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sentencing Guidelines), 439 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1983). [2] See State v. Brusven, 327 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Minn. 1982). Minnesota uses a guideline sentencing concept. [3] Compare theft (§ 812.014, Fla. Stat.) with robbery (§ 812.13, Fla....

...Gen., Tallahassee, and Pamela D. Cichon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The defendant appeals an order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing her on probation, entered pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere, for robbery, section 812.13, Florida Statutes, claiming error in the denial of her motion to dismiss [1] the information....

...Once inside, the defendant removed the merchandise from her person and threw it to the floor. The defendant was then instructed to accompany the two store employees to the store's security office. Only then did the defendant begin to resist and she struggled with one of the employees. The legislature amended section 812.13(1), (3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) effective October 1, 1987, to provide, in sum, that in robbery, the force used in the course of taking property may be subsequent to the taking if the force "and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." In Rumph v....

...of law, the count failed to allege that offense; and that the reasons expressed by the trial court are insufficient to support the departure sentence imposed. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm. To the extent relevant for purposes of this appeal, section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1993), reads: *1371 (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the pe...

...property, of the value of $300 or more the property of Herbert Findley as owner or custodian, from the person or custody of Herbert Findley and in the course of committing said Robbery, carried a deadly weapon, to wit: an automobile, in violation of Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...(Emphasis added.) Appellant filed a motion to dismiss directed to the second count, asserting that, because "it is a physical impossibility for anyone to carry an automobile in the course of committing any robbery," the count "fail[ed] to allege a violation of Section 812.13(2)(a)." At the hearing on the motion, appellant's counsel argued that, pursuant to a plain reading of section 812.13(2)(a), the state is required to allege and prove that a defendant "carried a ......

...Rather, as in the trial court, he contends that, because it is not physically possible for one to "carry" an automobile, the charge of armed robbery with a deadly weapon was legally insufficient, and should have been dismissed. We agree with the trial court that the intended meaning of the word "carry," as used in section 812.13(2)(a), must be sought by use of logic and common sense....

...One of the principal meanings ascribed to it is "to wear, hold, or have around one," in the sense of possessing. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 319 (2d ed. 1987) (unabridged). We are of the opinion that ascribing such a meaning to "carry," as used in section 812.13(2)(a), is perfectly consistent with the obvious intent behind that statutory provision....

...Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla. 1981) ("legislative intent is the polestar by which the court[s] must be guided" in statutory construction, even when at odds with "the strict letter of the statute"). It seems to us that the clear intent behind *1372 section 812.13(2)(a) is to deter the commission of robberies by persons possessing deadly weapons, and thereby to reduce the likelihood of death or serious injury to victims and bystanders....

...a deadly weapon in the circumstances just cited, he or she may not be convicted of that offense when a motor vehicle is actually used as a deadly weapon to run down the victim, thereby facilitating the robbery. We decline the invitation to construe section 812.13(2)(a) in a way which would produce such an absurd and unreasonable result....

..., suffers from the same infirmity. We disagree. The verdict form reflects that the defendant was convicted of robbery with a weapon. This was based on his use of the tire iron mentioned previously. Robbery with a weapon is a first degree felony. See § 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993). The judgment correctly so classifies this offense. However, there is a clerical error in the judgment, because the offense at conviction reads "812.13(2)(a)(b)." The judgment should be amended by striking the reference to paragraph (a)....

...ed to go to trial, no burden to disprove vindictiveness arose. Rather, Martin failed to meet his burden of showing the trial judge acted with actual vindictiveness in imposing the sentence. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, C.J., and PALMER, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...1st DCA 1981); and Hill v. State, 293 So.2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), Brown argues that under the facts outlined above there was only a single criminal transaction or episode and he can therefore be sentenced for only one count of robbery. As defined in Section 812.13(1), Fla....

by information with “Robbery with a firearm, F.S. 812.13, 775.087, 777.011, punishable by life felony”

...efendant's sentences. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, REMANDED. GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] A second degree felony under sections 812.03(2)(a) and 777.04, Florida Statutes (1991). [2] A first degree felony punishable by life under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991)....

control by committing robbery with a weapon. See § 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). This offense carried

...Gen., Tallahassee and Nancy Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. *932 DIAMANTIS, Judge. Defendant pled guilty to grand theft of a motor vehicle, section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1989), and nolo contendere to robbery with a firearm, section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Thus there was only one crime committed. Accordingly, we quash the less serious felony (grand theft) and affirm the more serious offense (armed robbery) and remand for resentencing. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED for Resentencing. COBB and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13, Fla....

...given counsel in arguing his case to the jury and ordinarily arguments restricted to thirty minutes or less are considered suspect. Turning to the instant case, the defendant herein was charged with a serious felony punishable by life imprisonment. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...and Mark S. Dunn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant. Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Harvey J. Sepler, Asst. Public Defender, for appellee. Before BASKIN, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ. BASKIN, Judge. In March 1987, Travis Hicks pled guilty to robbery. § 812.13, Fla....

...xcess of $100.00 lawful currency of the U.S. of America, the property of Handy Andy Food Store, 2626 North Magnolia, Ocala, Marion County, Florida, as owner or custodian, from the person or custody of Lloyd A. Ammons, in violation of Florida Statute 812.13." Section 812.13, Fla....

...Jury Inst. In Crim. Cases, Second Ed., pages 185-186. The jury returned a verdict finding Chapola guilty of robbery as charged in the information. The Court adjudicated Chapola guilty of robbery but sentenced him to life imprisonment. The terms of Section 812.13 must be substantially followed in charging robbery, and, where it is aggravated by a defendant being armed with a dangerous weapon, this fact must be alleged....

...It does not charge him with armed robbery. He was not found guilty of armed robbery. He was not adjudicated guilty of armed robbery. But the life sentence is based on a judgment of guilt of armed robbery. When a charge of robbery includes the aggravating circumstances stated in Section 812.13(2)(a) or Section 812.13(2)(b), the jury should be given standard instruction 2.17, felony aggravated by weapon....

...The trial court did not give this instruction nor was it required to give it. The Court erred in sentencing Chapola to life imprisonment because he was merely charged with robbery; the jury found him guilty as charged; and the Court adjudicated him guilty of this charge. Under Section 812.13(2)(c), which is applicable to this case, the Court could sentence Chapola to no more than 15 years imprisonment....

...Chapola went to trial on the *764 allegations in the information and the Court properly charged the jury on the allegations and proof thereof at trial. The judgment of guilt is affirmed. The sentence is set aside and this case is remanded to the trial court for sentencing of the defendant as provided by Section 812.13(2)(c)....

...NOTES [1] McGuire was also charged with Attempted First Degree Murder of a Law Enforcement Officer and Resisting Arrest With Violence, but these charges were dismissed. [2] § 782.04(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] §§ 782.04(1)(a), 777.04(1) & 775.087, Fla. Stat. (1987). [4] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...uirements of Richardson. In view of the precedential cases cited above, we are compelled to reverse the judgment and remand this case for a new trial. REVERSED and REMANDED. SHARP and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.045, Fla. Stat. (1979). [2] § 812.13(2)(b), Fla....

conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon, under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), arguing that

...The ignition key having become bent and useless appellants fled on foot and were apprehended. The pistol was found in the automobile but there was no evidence that it had been carried into the store. Appellants were found guilty of robbery while carrying a deadly weapon and appeal. Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides: "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault or putting in fear....

...COBB, C.J., and DAUKSCH, ORFINGER, FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr. and SHARP, JJ., concur. COWART, J., dissents with opinion. COWART, Judge, dissenting: The majority en banc [1] opinion is in accord with the cases cited but those cases deviate from the true meaning of statutory robbery, section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1983), and from common law robbery and cases establishing a clear and meaningful distinction between common law larceny and robbery....

...avoid arrest, and not in an effort to secure the property. The testimony does not, therefore, support the conviction for an attempt to rob, and the court below erred in denying the motion for a new trial. (emphasis added) Id. In the robbery statute, section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes, the adjectival prepositional phrase "by force, violence, assault or putting in fear" relates to, modifies and limits the word "taking" which is the object of the sentence....

...cess of discussing a drug deal and when the victim pursued the defendant to regain the money, the defendant and his allies beat and knocked down the victim. This court, in holding the facts sufficient to support a conviction for robbery, referred to section 812.13(3) and explained that the statutory definition of robbery includes not only the act of forcibly taking, but it also includes the use of force `in flight after ... the commission.' Id. at 1043. Andre erroneously interprets the redundant language in section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes "in the course of committing the robbery" as combining with section 812.13(3) (which defines that phrase to include flight after the commission of a "robbery") to effectively amend and modify the common law definition of robbery in section 812.13(1) so as to (a) eliminate the requirement for a taking by force or fear in the definition of robbery itself and to (b) permit the substitution of "force or fear" that may occur after a non-violent taking *1104 and during a flight after commission of a theft as a result of efforts to regain possession of the stolen property or to apprehend the thief. Section 812.13(3) does not add an element to the offense of robbery as defined in 812.13(1). Section 812.13(1) is a complete definition for unarmed robbery and an information charging unarmed robbery under section 812.13(1) does not have to allege additional language from 812.13(2)(c) to the effect that in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon or other weapon. This very contention was disposed of fifty years ago in Martin v. State, 100 Fla. 16, 129 So. 112 (1930). Therefore the language "in the course of committing the robbery" contained in section 812.13(2)(c) and its definition in 812.13(3) has nothing to do with alleging or proving a charge of unarmed robbery under 812.13(1). Section 812.13(2)(c) merely prescribes the penalty for unarmed robbery as it is defined in section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes....

...I would certify the following to be questions of great public importance: (1) Are the words "obtaining" in the omnibus theft statute (§ 812.014(1), Fla. Stat.) and "the taking possession of" in the retail theft statute (§ 812.015(1)(d), Fla. Stat.) and "the taking" in the robbery statute (§ 812.13(1), Fla....

...Does the use of force or fear in retaining property peacefully taken or obtained, or in an attempt by the wrongful taker to escape, rather than in the physical taking of the property, supply the element of force or fear essential to a robbery under section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes? NOTES [1] The curious legal scholar will wonder why this case was considered en banc....

...ably, that the offense could not have been committed in an outdoor market). The state's position, that a robbery occurred because an assault was committed by defendant to prevent the victim's further pursuit after the taking, is clearly supported by Section 812.13(3), Florida Statutes (1981) [2] which provides that: "[a]n act shall be deemed `in the course of committing the robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission. " [e.s.]. Section 812.13(3) changes the common law rule that in order for there to be a robbery, violence or intimidation must precede or be contemporaneous with the taking of property, and may not be used only in an effort to escape, Colbey v....

...victim gives instant and uninterrupted protest or pursuit in an effort to thwart a taking, and the offender then assaults the victim in order to complete a taking of the property and make good an escape, the offense is robbery. This construction of Section 812.13, supra, we think, is precisely what the legislature intended....

...The title of the robbery statute, Chapter 74-383, Laws of Florida, describes the law as "An Act relating to the criminal law ... defining the crimes of and providing the penalties for robbery... ." The common law definition of robbery, set forth in subsection (1) of section 812.13, has remained unchanged since the days of Blackstone....

...have already reached a contrary conclusion, I must dissent. In my view the offense constituted a theft under Florida law. I would therefore reduce the conviction to theft. I concur in the remainder of the opinion. NOTES [1] The applicable statute is Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. * * * * * * (3) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing the robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission. [2] Section 812.13(3), Florida Statutes (1981) was enacted in 1974 as part of Chapter 74-383, Laws of Florida, and took effect on July 1, 1975....

he contends that, applying the wording of section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (2011), the State failed

...Only a few grounds for departure remain viable, and for how long we cannot say. [5] Since the trial judge did not have the benefit of this recent case law at the time of sentencing, we vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing. VACATE SENTENCES; REMAND. COBB, C.J., and UPCHURCH, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Section 775.082(9)(a)1g, Florida Statutes (2002) of the Act includes a robbery committed within three years after being released from prison, but does not refer to robbery by sudden snatching. There is a difference, in that robbery requires the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear, section 812.13, while robbery by sudden snatching does not. § 812.131(1)....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. PETERSON, J. Darryle T. Cook appeals the imposition of consecutive three-year minimum mandatory sentences for two counts of robbery with a firearm and mask under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1996)....

...On the scoresheet under the heading "prior record" there were three robbery convictions, one of which was from Georgia. The trial court classified these convictions as second degree felonies, determining the Georgia conviction to be identical to robbery under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...he intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-2 (1993). The trial court ruled this was equivalent to robbery and classified it as a second degree felony. Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1997), provides: "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person...

...Although not raised by Holybrice, we note that the trial court may have also improperly scored the other two robberies. Rule 3.703(c) states that the offense severity ranking is to be determined by examining section 921.0012, Florida Statutes (1997). The robberies were determined to be second degree felonies under section 812.13. The type of robbery that is a second degree felony in section 812.13(2)(c) is listed as a level 6 offense in section 921.0012(3)....

...[3] Accordingly we affirm the conviction and sentence in all respects except the three-year minimum mandatory sentence imposed pursuant to section 775.087(2), which we vacate. AFFIRMED in part; Minimum Mandatory Sentence VACATED. COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...At resentencing, the trial court can elect to sentence Pope to a consecutive sentence or enhance his sentence as a habitual offender, but it cannot do both. Anderson v. State, 637 So.2d 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED for resentencing. DAUKSCH and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...rt of the rules. The Florida Bar: Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure (3.701, 3.988 — Sentencing Guidelines), 451 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1984). In this case, appellant was convicted and sentenced for the crime of robbery with a weapon in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes. Section 812.13 provides: 812.13 Robbery....

...(3) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing the robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission. In Royal v. State, 490 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1986), the supreme court reaffirmed its prior decisions which interpreted section 812.13 as consistent with the common law definition of robbery, i.e., "the felonious taking of money or goods of value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence, or putting him in fear." 490 So.2d at 46....

...At the very least, it is a jury question whether the automobile was used as a weapon. *999 The dissent's discussion of Jackson v. State, 662 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), is not without interest and if we were faced with deciding whether a car could be "carried" as a weapon within the meaning of Section 812.13(2)(b), we might or might not embrace the First District's view....

...He was sentenced to twenty years in prison on each count. Jenkins appeals only the finding of the enhancer (automobile) which increased the robbery count from a second degree felony to a first degree felony. The issue in this case is whether an automobile can ever be a weapon under the provisions of section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes, and, if so, whether the State proved that the automobile was a weapon based on the "purpose" of its use in this purse snatching incident....

...on the bench, had disregarded the argument made below and determined on his own, because of our decision in Houck v. State, 634 So.2d 180 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), approved, 652 So.2d 359 (Fla.1995), that the automobile simply could not be a weapon under section 812.13....

...However, I do not believe that the mere use of an automobile to assist in the commission of a crime, without showing a purpose to injure or intimidate the victim by the use of the automobile, makes that automobile a weapon even under the Jackson interpretation of the statute. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(b), Fla....

...—hand held weapons—and has left it to the State to prosecute one who uses a vehicle to intentionally injure another under the attempted murder or aggravated battery statutes. [5] In this case, the automobile was alleged merely to be a weapon under section 812.13(2)(b). Had the offender carried a firearm then under section 812.13(2)(a) an even greater enhancer would have applied.

...The weapons statute, 790.07, is styled "Persons engaged in criminal offenses, having weapons." Subsection (2), the relevant provision, requires proof that the accused (1) committed a felony, (2) using a firearm. Aggravated battery is a felony. See § 784.045(2). A firearm is a deadly weapon. See § 812.13(2)(a)....

...*825 James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Ann N. Radabaugh, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge. Appellant was convicted of robbery in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...one of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? COBB and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...The state filed a cross-appeal in this matter challenging an evidentiary ruling issued by the trial court. Because we affirm the trial court's order of adjudication, review of this issue is unnecessary. Adjudication AFFIRMED; commitment REVERSED; cause REMANDED. HARRIS, GRIFFIN and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(c), Fla....

...im] in fear, rob, steal and take away ... certain personal property ..., and in the course of committing said robbery the said Jerry Blow carried a firearm." [emphasis supplied] This charge is in the language of the robbery statute, Florida Statutes § 812.13....

...4th DCA 1991). A comparison of the statutory elements of armed robbery and grand theft reveal that each requires an element that the other does not, suggesting that the legislature intended dual convictions. See § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988); § 812.13, Fla....

...We also recognized removal of the habitual offender statute from the sentencing guidelines in order to impose enhanced penalties. As we stated in Westbrook, 574 So.2d at 1188: First, the robbery statute on its face permits sentencing under the habitual offender statute. Even though conviction under section 812.13(2)(a) is a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment, the trial judge is required to enter a guidelines sentence....

...Owens argued that the evidence did not establish the force necessary to prove robbery, and that the charge should be reduced to theft. To sustain a conviction for robbery, the State must prove that the theft was accomplished by "force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Therefore, Owens's conviction must be for a crime specified in section 812.014(3), Florida Statutes (1997). Reversed and remanded. THREADGILL, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, MONTEREY (Senior) Judge, concur. NOTES [1] The legislature abolished this requirement when it enacted section 812.131, Florida Statutes (1999), "Robbery by sudden snatching." To convict a defendant of that new crime, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the accused used more force than necessary to obtain the property or that the victim offered any resistance. Section 812.131 became effective on October 1, 1999....

...We affirm. Defendant-appellant Steve Lyons was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and *696 one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The amended information specified that the conspiracy count was being charged under sections 777.04 and 812.13, Florida Statutes (1991), as a second degree felony....

...f conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon. There were no instructions on lesser included offenses. The jury verdict form contained two choices: "Not Guilty" or "Guilty as Charged in the Information: Conspiracy to Commit Robbery F.S. 777.04/812.13." There was no objection to the verdict form....

...on. Defendant argues that the verdict must be treated as having found him guilty only of conspiracy to commit robbery. He contends that the conspiracy count must be reduced from a second degree felony to a third degree felony. See §§ 777.04(4)(c), 812.13(2)(c), Fla.Stat....

...Further proceedings on this point should be initiated by written motion filed by the state. Defendant must be represented by counsel at such proceedings. Affirmed. NOTES [1] Since armed robbery is a first degree felony punishable by life imprisonment, id. § 812.13(2)(a), the conspiracy charge is a second degree felony....

...uced at trial. (Emphasis supplied). In order to conduct the statutory analysis mandated by section 775.021(4)(a), it is necessary to look at the statutory language contained in the charges against appellant. Appellant was charged with armed robbery, section 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes; attempted first-degree murder, section 782.04(1)(a) and 777.04 (attempt statute); and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony, to wit: attempted first-degree murder, section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes. The statutes which are relevant to the double jeopardy analysis read as follows: Section 812.13(1) and (2)(a): (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...ry with firearm convictions were scored as first degree felonies punishable by life, and Appellant's prior conviction for attempted third degree murder was scored as a second degree felony. Attempted robbery with a firearm is a second degree felony, § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Gardner, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Charlie Crist, Attorney General; Elizabeth Fletcher Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee. WOLF, C.J. Clark appeals from a judgment and sentence for robbery, a second degree felony, pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes....

...This statute was later amended and entitled "Attempted felony murder." § 782.051, Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1998). Our analysis proceeds under the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the offenses. [3] §§ 784.045(1)(a)1., 775.087(1)(a), Fla.Stat. (1997). [4] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

approach here, we must examine whether Fla. Stat. § 812.13 required the use, attempted use, or threatened

...If appellant withdraws his plea the state shall have the option of prosecuting appellant on the original charge. Bell v. State, 262 So.2d 244 (Fla.4th DCA 1972). REMANDED for further proceedings. DAUKSCH, C.J., and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...The defendant argues that since, as was held in Royal v. State, 490 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1986), the crime was completed when the weapon was taken, the defendants did not carry a firearm "in the course of committing the robbery" within the meaning of the armed robbery statute, section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). [1] Because of the particular language of the statute in question, we must disagree. Section 812.13 provides: 812.13 Robbery....

...an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission. Since it is clear, indeed conceded, [2] that — unlike Royal in which only a theft was initially involved — a strong-arm robbery was committed in the taking of the proceeds, 812.13(1), and that Brown "carried a firearm," 812.13(2)(a), "in flight after the ... commission" of that robbery, 812.13(3), his conduct fell within the unequivocal reach of the armed robbery provision....

...Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Steven A. Dean, appeals from an order denying his motion to set aside three sentences. We affirm in part and reverse in part. On June 26, 1980, appellant pled guilty to two charges of robbery, violations of section 812.13(2)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (1979), with the understanding that the court would sentence him as a youthful offender. Sentencing was held on September 26, 1980. At that time, appellant was charged with, and pled guilty to, a third robbery offense under section 812.13(2)(a)....

...senger side. Hill complied. Howard sped from the parking lot and, while holding the gun to Hill's neck, took Hill's cash, a wedding band and a bracelet. After driving two blocks, Howard let Hill out of the car, and he was apprehended within an hour. Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines robbery as the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. (Emphasis added.) Section 812.133(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines carjacking nearly identically, replacing the emphasized language with the words "a motor vehicle." Section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), precludes multiple convictions when one offense co...

...from the person or custody of another, [2] with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, [3] when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.133(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 812.133(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), further provides that "[a]n act shall be deemed `in the course of the taking' [under element 3] if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." (Emphasis added.) Appellant focuses on the third element of section 812.133(1), arguing that his taking of the taxicab was an afterthought to the use of force against Laroche....

...ey." Id. at 570 n. 5. This case is distinguishable from Flores because appellant's beating of Laroche intertwined with the taking of the taxicab in time and place, so that the use of force occurred "in the course of the taking" within the meaning of section 812.133(3)(b)....

...Appellant turned off the car's ignition, engaged the victim about not paying the fare, beat the victim, took his glasses, and drove the taxicab away as the victim watched. Thus, the "use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear" occurred "prior to" the taking of the property in a "continuous series of acts or events." § 812.133(3)(b), Fla....

...ence involved in taking the keys may have . . . occurred `prior to' stealing the car, it took place within a logically interrelated `continuous series of acts or events,' and thus `in the course of the taking' of the vehicle itself as provided in subsection 812.133(3)(b)." Id....

...erson or custody of another, [2] with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, [3] when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). As with the carjacking statute, section 812.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), provides "[a]n act shall be deemed `in the course of the taking' [under element 3] if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of...

...ich will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive... ." Since the element of carrying a "firearm or other deadly weapon" is essential to establish the *189 first degree felony crime of robbery, section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), Ridley's convictions cannot stand....

...ail, or even a drill and drill bit at the crime scene would transform Ridley's type of starter pistol into a weapon defined by section 790.001(6). We recede from any dictum to the contrary in Harpham. We remand this case for entry of judgments under section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), and for imposition of sentences thereunder. SENTENCES AND JUDGMENT VACATED AND REMANDED. COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

robbery statute does not use the word "armed.” Section 812,13, Florida Statutes, sets forth the offenses

...Rebecca Springer, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before COPE, GODERICH, and FLETCHER, JJ. PER CURIAM. Finding no merit in the defendant's contentions on appeal, we affirm his convictions and sentences for robbery without a firearm in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1995) and carjacking without a firearm in violation of section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...COBB, Judge. At issue here is the proper construction and application of Florida's robbery statute, as revised by the 1987 legislature in response to the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Royal v. State, 490 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1986). Robbery is defined by section 812.13, (1) and (3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989) [1] as: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...Nevertheless, we must agree with the trial judge that the continuity of Santilli's progression from the store to his forceful act against the officer with his car outside the store justified submission of the robbery offense to the jury pursuant to the provisions of section 812.13(1) and (3)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...ery, murder. By "generic definition," we refer to the offense as described by its essential statutory elements, exclusive of aggravating factors. For instance, robbery is, by generic definition, a felony which can be committed without a firearm. See § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (1983). Use of a firearm in the commission of the robbery is but an aggravating circumstance. See § 812.13(2)(a)....

from another person or from their custody. See § 812.13(1), (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). Hence, the robbery

...tims have been emotionally ravaged and psychologically traumatized." The state contends we erroneously rejected "emotional trauma" as a valid ground for departure from the guidelines sentence for robbery. The state argues that robbery, as defined by section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1985), carries no element of emotional trauma and that it is wrong to equate "inherent component" of the crime with "element" of the crime....

...reme court has held that a court cannot "use an inherent component of the crime in question to justify departure." State v. Mischler, 488 So.2d 523, 525 (Fla. 1986). Thus, the question is whether emotional trauma is an inherent component of robbery. Section 812.13 defines robbery as the "taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear " (emphasis added)....

...See Blackmon v. State, 696 So.2d 918, 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(gun lacking a firing pin fit definition of a "firearm"). For some reason not revealed in the record, the state did not charge Stanley with robbery with a "firearm or other deadly weapon" under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), but instead charged him with robbery with a weapon under section 812.13(2)(b). A conviction for robbery with a firearm or other deadly weapon is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life, see § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997), while robbery with a weapon is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty years. See § 812.13(2)(b), Fla....

...See Williams v. State, 651 So.2d 1242, 1242-43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)("Florida courts have generally utilized the statutory definition of `weapon' provided in section 790.001(13) to determine whether a particular object constitutes a `weapon' for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b)") (citation omitted)....

...State, 446 So.2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Hartman v. State, 403 So.2d 1030, 1030-31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); McCray v. State, 358 So.2d 615, 616-17 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). However, in Dale v. State, 703 So.2d 1045, 1046 (Fla.1997), the supreme court stated that, "[a]lthough section 812.13 fails to define the terms `firearm' and `weapon,' the definitions for these terms contained in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions are a correct statement of the law...." Under the standard jury instructions, a "firearm" is legally defined in accordance with section 790.001, the weapons and firearms statute....

...The jury instruction states: "[a] `weapon' is legally defined to mean any object that could be used to cause death or inflict serious bodily harm." Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 156(a). While Dale may throw into doubt the use of chapter 790 to define a "weapon" under section 812.13(2)(b), we conclude that under either definition appellant's conviction must be reduced....

...In pertinent part the court stated: In opposition to appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the count charging robbery with a weapon, the state argued below, as here, that although the starter pistol did not meet the statutory definition of a firearm, it was a weapon for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b) because it could have been used as a bludgeon....

...ect of the jury instruction is without merit. It is true that Florida courts have generally utilized the statutory definition of "weapon" provided in section 790.001(13) to determine whether a particular object constitutes a "weapon" for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b)....

...5th DCA 1983); Paul v. State, 421 So.2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); and MRR v. State, 411 So.2d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); compare Gomez v. State, 496 So.2d 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)(toy gun was a "weapon" for purposes of armed robbery with a weapon conviction under section 812.13(2)(b) where the toy gun was used to strike the robbery complainant several times); Fletcher v....

...5th DCA 1985)(razor blade a deadly weapon when it was held to the victim's throat in an attempted armed robbery). We therefore reverse the conviction for robbery with a weapon, and direct entry of a judgment of conviction for the lesser offense of simple robbery pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...However, the state elected to charge him with robbery with a weapon *1278 but failed to offer the proof that would be necessary to convict him of this charge. We therefore reverse and remand for entry of a judgment of conviction for the lesser offense of robbery pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c)....

felonies. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995); § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). In his reply brief,

812.133(2)(a), and robbery with a firearm, section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2011). Accordingly

...ictim in fear in the course of the taking; (3) intended to permanently or temporarily deprive the victim of the right to the property; and (4) carried a firearm in the course of committing the robbery. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 219. See also § 812.13, Fla....

...We agree that had the prior crime been overturned or had he not been incarcerated in prison for that crime, the enhanced punishment statute would not be applicable. But the burden of showing those exceptional facts were on Smith. *705 AFFIRMED; CONFLICT and QUESTION CERTIFIED. PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla....

...Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. COWART, Judge. This is another case involving a departure from a guideline sentence. Appellant robbed a bank telling the teller "I'm a desperate man — Get me the money — This is a holdup." Appellant pled guilty to robbery (§ 812.13(1), Fla. Stat.), not armed robbery (§ 812.13(2)(a) or (b), Fla....

...Appellant did not actually use force or violence but only implied its possibility. As robberies go, this was a less dangerous and hence less atrocious type of unarmed robbery. There is absolutely no evidence that appellant "carried" a weapon or firearm at the time of the robbery (see § 812.13(2)(a) and (b), Fla....

...COWART, Judge, concurring specially: Appellants, Madry and Banks, entered a victim's hotel room and took property from him by threatening him with a knife. On these facts appellants claim double jeopardy prohibits their conviction for the two offenses of armed burglary (§ 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981)) and armed robbery (§ 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...e based on a single set of interrelated facts and circumstances and the allegations and proof of facts overlap, as when the "dangerous" weapon with which the burglar is armed (§ 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat.) is also the "deadly" weapon that is carried (§ 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Jorandby, Public Defender, and Susan D. Cline, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Dawn S. Wynn, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We affirm appellant's sentence as an adult. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...egree. The statute says: "If in the course of committing robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...SMITH, Jr., SHAW and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The indictment, in separate Counts, charged the offenses of murder and robbery; two entirely different crimes, neither of which necessarily commands the use of a weapon or firearm as an essential element. § 812.13 Robbery....

...Quarles, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Evelyn D. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. COBB, Judge. Appellant Canty was adjudicated guilty of armed robbery in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1979) and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment with the trial court retaining jurisdiction over the first one-third of the sentence....

...ences for armed robbery. The primary issue in this case is whether or not the proofs at trial were sufficient to create a prima facie case to enable the jury to determine that appellants "carried a firearm or other deadly weapon" within the scope of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Appellants also argue that the information in this case was fatally defective because it failed to allege an intent to permanently deprive the victim of his property. The information claimed that the appellants did "in violation of Florida Statute § 812.13(2)(a), by force, violence, assault or putting in fear, take away from the person or custody of [the victim] certain property......

...The other testified that a nail and hammer would suffice. Both said the pistol might explode if it was drilled and fired. There was no testimony that there was a nail or drill, or other item which could clear the metal from the gun, at the crime scene. Conviction under section 812.13(2)(a) requires proof that the offender carried a "firearm or other deadly weapon." Section 790.001(6), Florida Statutes (1981), defines "firearm" as: *377 [A]ny weapon (including a starter gun) which will, is designed to, or may readil...

...emical weapon or device, or any other deadly weapon except a firearm or a common pocket-knife. Because a pistol is excluded from the definition of "weapon," and it was not used or sought to be used as a bludgeon in this case, [2] it can only satisfy section 812.13(2)(a) by qualifying as a "firearm." We think the proofs in this case were insufficient to show that the starter pistol used in the crime was a firearm....

...State, 391 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The pistol used in this case is analogous to a fake firearm or toy. See McCray v. State, 358 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Although the proofs in this case were insufficient to support appellants' conviction under section 812.13(2)(a), they were sufficient under section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1981). Because the latter is a lesser included offense of the former, we remand this case for entry of judgment of robbery under section 812.13(2)(c), and for imposition of sentence thereunder....

...In Rucker v. State, 553 So.2d 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), rev. denied, 563 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1990), this court held that a sentence of 450 years was excessive and the maximum imprisonment for armed robbery, a first degree felony, was only thirty years. Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), provided that armed robbery, a felony in the first degree was punishable by a term of years "not exceeding life imprisonment." This court apparently held that under these statutes, the defendant could on...

...In Salas, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping, a first degree felony. This court upheld the sentence of ninety-nine years due to the fact that section 787.01(2) specifically allows for a sentence of "a term of years not exceeding life[.]" [4] This is identical language as the authority set forth in section 812.13(2)(a) that allowed a sentence of a term of life for the first degree felony of armed robbery....

...a pattern of increasingly serious criminal activity. [3] It appears that this court made its decision on the grounds that the offenses were improperly characterized as life felonies which allow for a term of imprisonment for life. § 775.082(3)(a). Section 812.13 clearly designates the offense of armed robbery as a first degree felony, but specifically provides for life imprisonment....

...In such an instance, only a conviction for the greater charge may stand. State v. Pinder, 375 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1979); Jenrette v. State, 390 So.2d 781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Since the two offenses for which defendants stand convicted, armed robbery under Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1977) and possession and display of a firearm under Section 790.07, Florida Statutes (1977), involve the same criminal act as a necessary element of each offense, the defendants' convictions and sentences for possession of a firearm may not stand....

...The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser offense of attempted armed robbery with a weapon. A prima facie case for robbery requires proof that the accused took the victim's property with the intent to permanently deprive the victim of that property. § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Steven Groves, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before NESBITT, COPE and FLETCHER, JJ. PER CURIAM. Julian Blanco appeals a judgment of conviction and sentence for robbery with a weapon in violation of section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes. We reverse the conviction and sentence and remand with directions to adjudge the defendant guilty of simple robbery under section 812.13(2)(c), and for resentencing....

...Blanco carried or used a "weapon" during the robbery. Florida courts have generally utilized the statutory definition of "weapon" provided in section 790.001(13)[ [1] ] to determine whether a particular object constitutes a "weapon" for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b).......

...Consequently, Blanco's motion for judgment of acquittal, on this point, should have been granted. Blanco's other point on appeal is without merit and we do not address it. Thus, we reverse the armed robbery conviction and vacate Blanco's sentence. We remand with directions to adjudge Blanco guilty of unarmed robbery under section 812.13(2)(c) and to resentence him accordingly....

...with danger, we can find no abuse of discretion in the admission of Mr. Black's conversations with his former lawyer under the peculiar circumstances of the present case. Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...State, 436 So.2d 36 (Fla.1983), he contends that "evolving attitudes in Florida and across the United States call for less government intrusion into our lives" and invites this court to adopt pre- Booth law, an invitation we decline. AFFIRMED. PETERSON, C.J., and W. SHARP, J., concur. NOTES [1] See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

...Public Defender, Green Cove Springs, for appellant. No appearance for appellee. PER CURIAM. On the court's own motion, we consider whether the order being appealed has been rendered so that the appeal may proceed. A jury found appellant guilty of armed robbery in violation of section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes....

...nses in question meet the requirements for one of the exceptions to the statute. I would vacate the firearms convictions, affirm the other convictions, and remand to the trial court for recalculation of the recommended guidelines sentence. NOTES [1] Section 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (1987), defines "robbery" as: "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." Section 812.13(2)(a), provides: "If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree......

...Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Joseph A. Tringali, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We affirm appellant's conviction and sentence for robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), rejecting his contention that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that appellant's knowledge of the codefendant's use of the firearm was not required in order to convict appellant....

...ith a firearm. We find no error in the instruction. First, if any one participant in a robbery carried a firearm during the commission of the crime, all of the participants are guilty as principals under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1993). See § 812.13(2)(a)(1993); Hicks v....

...Denizard pleaded guilty to attempted armed robbery with a deadly weapon (a floor jack handle). Attempted armed robbery with a deadly weapon is classified by statute as a second-degree felony bearing a maximum penalty of up to fifteen years' imprisonment. See §§ 812.13(2)(a), 777.04(4)(c), 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2007). However, here the trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years' incarceration because it reclassified the crime to a first-degree felony. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...offender sentencing. However, a plain reading of that subsection requires reclassification only where the use of a weapon or firearm was not an essential element of the crime. In the instant case, appellant was convicted of armed robbery pursuant to section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), which states: (2)(a) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s....

...*1085 Because the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial. We have considered the appellant's other issues on appeal and find them to be without merit. Reversed. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(c), Fla....

...been robbed at gunpoint, Olsen's conviction for robbery with a firearm is vacated and the matter is remanded for a new trial. We find no other errors. *424 JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL. COBB and PALMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(a) (1997).

...We therefore strike the aggravated battery causing great bodily harm conviction. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. THOMPSON, CJ., and SAWAYA, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.045(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (1999). [2] § 784.045(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (1999). [3] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...failed to allege intent to permanently deprive the victim of his property. Bell v. State, 394 So.2d 979 (Fla. 1981). We think the information was not fundamentally defective in this regard as it alleged Collins "did, in violation of Florida Statute 812.13(2)(a), by force, violence, assault or putting in fear, take away from the person or custody of Kevin Louis certain property......

...Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Edwin H. Duff, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. SHARP, Judge. Burley appeals his judgment and sentence for the offense of robbery in violation of section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. DANIEL, Judge. Defendant Michael Arthur Keith, a juvenile, has taken this appeal from his judgment and sentence of six years imprisonment imposed by the trial court after defendant pleaded guilty to committing the offense of robbery, section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Wagner, of Berk, Wagner & Montante, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles A. Stampelos, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. DOWNEY, Judge. Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for the offense of robbery with a firearm in violation of Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975) and sentence of twenty years imprisonment....

...had never intended to rob the victim and had only stabbed him in self-defense. One of the differences between a robbery and a theft is that in a robbery, "in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Cunningham, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Sylvia H. Alonso, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. POLEN, Judge. This is an appeal from a conviction of robbery in violation of section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...State, 890 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Finally, we must address one final matter. In his motion, McDonald claimed that he was improperly given mandatory life sentences for his convictions for robbery with a firearm, a first degree felony punishable by life. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...youthful offender, are matters that could have and should have been raised on direct appeal. [3] They are not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) proceeding. See Lee v. State, 679 So.2d 1158 (Fla.1996). AFFIRMED. PETERSON and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla....

...y weapon or firearm, ... the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: (a) in the case of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony. (Emphasis added). Brown was charged with "carrying" a firearm, which is all that section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), requires by way of proving armed robbery....

...Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED. DAUKSCH, J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents with opinion. *315 COWART, Judge, dissenting: The use of a weapon or firearm is not an essential element of armed robbery § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...especially in view of the fact that guideline sentencing was elected as to these two armed robberies which were committed before October 1, 1983, and the special sentencing discretion authorized by section 921.005(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...[2] in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...r Appellant. Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lori N. Hagan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. MONACO, J. The appellant, Robert L. Brothers, III, was convicted at jury trial of robbery, in violation of section 812.13(2)(c), Florida *1125 Statutes (2002), based largely on circumstantial evidence....

...We conclude that the consecutive resentencing represented an impermissible increase in the original sentence, and, therefore, reverse and remand for resentencing. We otherwise affirm. Mr. Williams was found guilty following a jury trial of robbery with a weapon, to-wit: hot coffee, in violation of section 812.13(1) and (2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991). His successful appeal resulted in reversal of the armed robbery conviction and entry of judgment for second degree robbery pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c)....

...fendant create a `wellfounded fear' in the victim." Id. at 1039. The court, therefore, held that the causing of fear and resulting psychological trauma is by statutory definition an inherent component of the crimes of assault and aggravated assault. Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1985), defines robbery as "the taking of money or other property from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault or putting in fear....

...arising from the same criminal transaction. Robbery involves the "taking of money or other property . . . from the person or custody of another . . . when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault or putting in fear." § 812.13, Fla....

...It is then reclassified to a life felony for use of a firearm pursuant to section 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002). As to the conspiracy to commit armed robbery charge, if an offender carries a *526 weapon during the commission of a robbery, the robbery constitutes a first degree felony pursuant to section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...was adjudicated delinquent based upon the trial court's determination that R.P. committed a robbery when he reached into the front of an elderly woman's dress and snatched her purse. R.P. correctly argues that absent evidence of "force, violence, assault, or putting in fear," § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Warner appeals all denials. We reverse and remand as to Ground 5 and the related subclaim of Ground 6. We affirm as to all other grounds and subclaims. [1] Warner was charged with five offenses arising out of a single criminal episode: robbery, in violation of section 812.13(1), (2)(c), Florida Statutes (2002); grand theft, § 812.014(1), (2)(c)(1); grand theft auto, § 812.014(2)(c)(6); kidnapping, § 787.01(1)(a)(2), Fla....

...Green's judgment and sentence for robbery with a firearm. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. CASANUEVA and SALCINES, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Robbery with a firearm is a first-degree felony punishable by up to life imprisonment. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...perty which might be the subject of larceny from the victims, with intent to permanently or temporarily deprive them of that property, when in the course thereof, there was use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear, with bodily injury. See § 812.13, Fla....

...We affirm in part and reverse in part. Defendant-appellant Wright was charged with committing four robberies between April 19 and April 22, 1993. There were four separate victims on four separate dates. The crimes were charged as second degree felonies. See § 812.13(2)(c), Fla....

...Gen., Tallahassee, and Sylvia H. Alonso, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. *213 PER CURIAM. The appellant was found guilty of armed robbery. The judgment indicates incorrectly that this is a life felony when it is, in fact, a first degree felony. § 812.13(1), (2)(a), Fla....

...lied with. We agree with Judge Schwartz that a defendant is not entitled to a "speedy dismissal," but only to a "speedy trial." Having failed to ask for that remedy, Dabkowski is not entitled to it. AFFIRMED. COBB and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...t the HFO designation. Wilson claims his scoresheet was improperly calculated because it incorrectly scored his primary offense as a level nine offense when it should have been scored as a level eight offense. Wilson pleaded guilty to a violation of section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1996). On the resentencing scoresheet, Wilson's primary offense was erroneously listed as a violation of section 812.13(2)(a) and erroneously scored as a level nine offense. Wilson's primary offense — a violation of section 812.13(2)(b) — should have been scored as a level eight offense....

...Fine's second issue on appeal concerns the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of robbery. Fine argues that there was insufficient evidence that, in the course of the taking of the money from McDonald's, there was "the use of force, violence, assault or putting in fear," as required by section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...State, 605 So.2d 874, 875 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), quashed on other grounds, 630 So.2d 527 (Fla.1993). Therefore, we are compelled to reverse Hutchinson's judgment and sentence for robbery with a weapon and remand for entry of a judgment and sentence for robbery under section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...ction 784.08(2), Florida Statutes, we vacate the sentences imposed for the aggravated batteries and remand for resentencing. The state's second amended information charged the appellant with two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon in violation of § 812.13(2)(a) and two counts of aggravated battery upon an elderly person in violation of § 784.08....

...tute, § 775.084(4)(b)1, noting, in addition, that each sentence carries a mandatory minimum 3-year term pursuant to § 784.08(1). The appellant first argues that because robbery with a deadly weapon is a first degree felony punishable by life under § 812.13(2)(a), he was not subject to sentencing as a habitual violent felony offender therefor because § 775.084(4)(b) does not provide for an extended term of imprisonment for first degree felonies punishable by life....

...Gen., and Mark J. Berkowitz, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before HUBBART, NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ. BASKIN, Judge. Defendant Fischer was charged with one count of burglary of an occupied dwelling, § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1983), one count of armed robbery, § 812.13, Fla....

...during the commission *146 of the burglary and the robbery verdict failed to specify that he possessed a deadly weapon during the commission of the robbery. We agree with Fischer's contention solely as to the burglary conviction. Sections 810.02 and 812.13, Florida Statutes (1983), provide that unarmed burglary without an assault and unarmed robbery are second degree felonies....

...ults an occupant or, if in the course of committing a robbery, a defendant carries a deadly weapon, the offense is reclassified as a first degree felony, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment. §§ 810.02(2), 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...The discharge fact-finding, however, was not a part of the finding of guilt as to attempted robbery and is not an element of that crime, nor was it charged in the robbery count. Dallas was convicted of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, a violation of Florida Statutes Sections 777.04 and 812.13(2)(a)....

...The elements of robbery with a deadly weapon are: (1) taking of money or other property; (2) with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive; (3) in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear; and (4) the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon. § 812.13(2), Fla....

...The offense of attempted felony murder requires that the jury find not only that the defendant attempted the robbery, but also that he committed an intentional act apart from one which was an essential element of the attempted robbery. Robbery, as defined in section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes, is "the taking of money or other property ... with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." According to section 812.13(3)(b), "[a]n act shall be deemed `in the course of the taking' if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." (Emphasis supplied). See Mahn v. State, 714 So.2d 391, 396 (Fla.1998) (interpreting section 812.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes)....

...Maultsby points out that the statutory elements of a robbery are: the taking of money or other property from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault or putting in fear with intent to deprive the person or the owner of the money or property. § 812.13, Fla....

Fla. Stat. (2008)), and one count of robbery (§ 812.13(1), (2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008)). During voir dire

...Daniels, Public Defender; Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Douglas Gurnic, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Curtis Dale appeals his conviction for armed robbery with a deadly weapon in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), arguing that under the facts of the instant case the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that Dale's use of a BB gun met the statutory definition of a deadly weapon....

...ONSTITUTE A SEPARATE CRIMINAL OFFENSE? We also note that the trial court's written judgment incorrectly designates Meeks' offense of attempted armed robbery with a firearm as a "first-degree felony" when, in fact, it is a "second-degree felony." See § 812.13(2), Fla....

...degree felony); Arthur v. State, 391 So.2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (citing Whidden and agreeing that attempted robbery with a firearm is a second degree felony). Robbery with a deadly weapon is a first degree felony punishable up to life in prison. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

Cir. 2011), that a robbery under Florida Statute § 812.13(1) met ACCA’s “elements clause” definition, that

...Hall was convicted of and sentenced for armed robbery while carrying a firearm and possession of a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, the robbery. In analyzing the two crimes, the supreme court stated: In the instant case, Hall was charged with both committing a robbery while carrying a firearm, under 812.13(1) and (2)(a), and the use and display of a firearm and the carrying of a concealed firearm while committing a felony, under 790.07(2)....

...We hold the legislature had no intent of punishing a defendant twice for the single act of displaying a firearm or carrying a firearm while committing a robbery. To hold otherwise would mean that, for every offense of robbery in which a defendant uses or carries or displays a firearm, in violation of section 812.13, there would also be a violation of section 790.02(2).[ [8] ] Robbery, under section 812.13(1), becomes the enhanced offense of armed robbery under 812.13(2)(a) by reason of the element of carrying or displaying a firearm....

...n. [1] On June 5, 1980, the trial court appointed petitioner, a private lawyer, to represent Dale Warman, a criminal defendant charged in seven separate informations with the crimes of robbery. Each information charged an unarmed robbery pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...to enhance the penalty under the provisions of Section 775.087, Florida Statutes, for the use of a firearm. Section 775.087 does not apply to an offense which already provides an enhanced penalty for the use of a firearm, as does armed robbery under Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...part opinion, the defendant or defendants must take the property from the person or custody of the person with force, violence, assault, or by putting the victim in fear 63 during the course of the taking. § 812.13....

...the crimes of robbery, robbery by sudden snatching and carjacking each provide that the offense shall be classified as a higher- degree offense if “in the course of committing” the crime the offender carries a firearm or deadly weapon. See §§ 812.13(2)(a), 812.131(2)(a), 812.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat....

...the commission of” the felony. 105  An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing the robbery” if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission. § 812.13(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing a robbery by sudden snatching” if the act occurs in an attempt to commit robbery by sudden snatching or in fleeing after the attempt or commission. § 812.131(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing the carjacking” if it occurs in an attempt to commit carjacking or in flight after the attempt or commission. § 812.133(3)(a), Fla....

...The appellant further alleges that his conviction could not be enhanced pursuant to section 775.087, Florida Statutes (1977), because the use of a weapon is an essential element of attempted armed robbery. [1] The trial court, concluding that the appellant's sentence was proper under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1977), denied the motion. In this respect, the trial court erred. Section 812.13, Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...empted robbery without a weapon. Whidden, 374 So.2d at 545. The offense of attempted armed robbery continues to be a lesser degree felony in accordance with section 777.04, Florida Statutes. Id. Indeed, this Court has specifically held that sections 812.13 and 777.04, Florida Statutes, operate together to classify attempted armed robbery as a second-degree felony. Pooley v. State, 403 So.2d 593, 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Thus, while the appellant was properly subjected to the provisions of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, by virtue of the jury's finding that he carried a firearm during the course of the attempted robbery, the crime should have been reclassified to a second-degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years under the attempt statute....

...We do find, however, that a sentencing error was committed by including points for victim injury, resulting in an improper presumptive guidelines range. Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing. This court has held that the crime of robbery, defined in section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1985), does not include victim injury as an essential element....

...d with directions to the trial court to enter a judgment for unarmed robbery and to re-sentence Appellant on that count. We affirm the conviction and sentence in Count Two. The State charged Appellant with robbery with a "deadly weapon," contrary to section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2001) (Count One); resisting an officer without violence, contrary to section 843.02, Florida Statutes (Count Two); and possession of a concealed weapon by a felon, contrary to section 790.23(1), Florida Statutes (Count Three)....

...easonably infer from the evidence. See Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002). We must determine whether the facts adduced in the State's case support the conviction for robbery with a "weapon." Count One charged robbery with a deadly weapon. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Subsection (2)(b) of the robbery statute addresses offenders who, in the course of committing the robbery, carried a "weapon." "Florida courts have generally utilized the statutory definition of `weapon' provided in section 790.001(13) to determine whether a particular object constitutes a `weapon' for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b)." Williams v....

...We AFFIRM the conviction and sentence for resisting an officer without violence, REVERSE the conviction and sentence for robbery with a weapon, and REMAND for the trial court to impose judgment and to re-sentence Appellant for unarmed robbery pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), in Count One....

...He is off the streets for the rest of his life, as far as I am concerned." We agree with the appellant and the state that the sentencing court erred in reclassifying the appellant's robbery with a firearm conviction as a life felony instead of as a first degree felony punishable by life. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...(1982) ("If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment. . . ."); McDonald v. State, 957 So.2d 605, 613 (Fla. 2007) ("Pursuant to section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes ....

...2007) ("[F]or motions filed under rule 3.800(a), we hold that if the [sentencing] court could have imposed the same sentence using a correct scoresheet, any error was harmless."). Here, regardless of the classification error, the sentencing court could have imposed the same ninety-nine year sentence under section 812.13(2)(a)....

...Ms. Alley's subjective feelings are pertinent only insofar as they bear on whether or not the circumstances she found herself in would ordinarily induce fear "of death or great bodily harm" in the mind of a reasonable person. Robbery is defined in section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1979) as "the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...rce to remove the money, and in the process to cause slight injury to Ms. Wilson's hand. The robbery statute requires a showing that defendant, during the course of taking money or other property, used "force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13, Fla....

...any person present with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property. (b) Robbery in the third degree is a Class C felony. (Acts 1977, No. 607, p. 812, § 3307.) The substantively similar Florida Statute on robbery is section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1997), and provides: *630 (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive...

...Both the Florida and Alabama robbery offenses require the taking of another's property by force or threat of force, and the penalty for both offenses is imprisonment exceeding one year. Specifically, the penalty under Florida's robbery statute as a second degree felony is 15 years. §§ 812.13(2)(c); 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...State, 12 F.L.W. 2375 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 7, 1987). (2) Threats on the life of the victim of the armed robbery. The taking of money or property from a victim by "force, violence, assault, or putting in fear" is an inherent element of the crime of robbery. § 812.13, Fla....

...and the cause is remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE REVERSED. HERSEY, C.J., and HURLEY and DELL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1983). [2] § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1983). [3] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...nst Towler. The source of the dispute has centered on whether the underlying information’s allegations that Towler committed robberies while carrying a knife were sufficient to charge Towler with robbery with a "deadly weapon.” See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 812.13 (West Supp.1992)....

...Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Joy B. Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. ANSTEAD, Judge. The appellant, Terry K. Arthur, was charged by information and convicted of attempted robbery with a firearm "contrary to Florida Statute 812.13 and 777.04." Of the points raised on appeal, the only one we believe to have merit concerns the legality of the life sentence imposed....

...Arthur contends that since he was convicted of attempted robbery with a firearm under the attempt statute, Section 777.04(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), he was guilty of only a second degree felony so that the court was precluded from imposing a life sentence. The state maintains that the life sentence was proper under Section 812.13(2) and (3), Florida Statutes (1977). The robbery statute provides as follows: 812.13 Robbery- (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...om the statute's literal meaning. State ex rel. Washington v. Rivkind, supra; State v. Nunez, 368 So.2d 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Although it is arguable whether the legislature intended to include attempted robbery with a weapon within the purview of Section 812.13, we believe we are bound to construe any ambiguity in favor of the appellant. We also note that the state itself in the information alleged a violation of Section 777.04, the attempt statute, as opposed to relying solely on Section 812.13(2)(a) and (3)....

...The state filed a cross-appeal in this matter challenging an evidentiary ruling issued by the trial court. Because we affirm the trial court's order of adjudication, review of this issue is unnecessary. Adjudication AFFIRMED; commitment REVERSED; cause REMANDED. COBB, COWART and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 812.13(2)(c), Fla.Stat (1989).

first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). *97Decisions regarding

...Becker, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Angela D. McCravy, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. ORFINGER, J. Angela D. Malone appeals her conviction of robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...00-96, she is not prejudiced by an illegal sentence in this case. Accordingly we vacate D.M.'s commitment in Case No. 00-110, and remand for the imposition of a sentence within the statutory maximum. Commitment VACATED; REMANDED for resentencing PETERSON and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 812.13(2)(a), 777.04, Fla. Stat. (2000), a second degree felony. [2] § 784.03, Fla. Stat. (2000). [3] § 812.13(c), Fla....

...The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and defendant was adjudicated guilty, only as to the lesser included offense of grand theft. He appeals. We reverse. A charge of robbery unavoidably includes the elements of the crime of petit theft, making petit theft a necessarily included offense of robbery. Compare § 812.13 with § 812.014(1), (2)(d), Fla....

...Because the third and fourth requirements, as stated above, were not met in this case, we conclude that the defendant's waiver of a unanimous jury verdict below was invalid, and, accordingly, reverse for a new trial. I The defendant Deric Flanning was charged by information below with robbery with a firearm, § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989), entered a plea of not guilty, and was tried by a six-person jury. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court, upon a defense motion for judgment of acquittal, reduced the charge to robbery with a non-deadly weapon. § 812.13(2)(b), Fla....

...Armed robbery requires: (1) a taking of money or property which may be the subject of larceny; (2) by force, assault, or putting in fear; (3) with the intent to permanently deprive the victim of the money or property; and (4) where the offender carried a weapon. § 812.13, Fla....

...ion. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of relief on this issue. The trial court was correct in denying relief on appellant's second claim. Armed robbery is a felony of the first degree punishable by a term of years not exceeding life. § 812.13, Fla....

...evisions. Thus, a reader of the Laws of Florida for 1974 could overlook the substantive changes in the robbery statute. To make matters more confusing, the Division of Statutory Revision changed the section number for robbery from section 811.011 to section 812.13 when it published the 1974 Supplement to Florida Statutes 1973....

...See Sanders v. State, 386 So.2d 256, 257 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (holding that "[s]ince the indictment did not charge that appellant was armed with either a firearm, a deadly weapon or a weapon, he could only be found guilty of a second-degree felony under Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (Supp.1974)")....

...d personal possession of the weapon during the commission of the felony. (Emphasis added). Thus the supreme court reads section 775.087(1) as enhancing the potential sentence of an individual rather than creating a new distinct, substantive offense. Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, classifies a robbery, which without the presence of a weapon (or firearm) would be a felony of the second degree, as a felony of the first degree "[i]f in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a weapon." (Emphasis added)....

...ing the offense, the offender was wearing a ... mask." Here, both the classification (robbery) and the reclassification (the mask general reclassification) of the offense is based on the offender's, as opposed to the defendant's, conduct. Concerning section 812.13(2)(b), this court has held that if two individuals participate in a robbery in which only one arms himself, both are guilty of the enhanced offense....

...with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. - 28 - § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. BOARDMAN, Chief Judge. Appellant/defendant, James C. Harris, Jr., was charged by information with robbery with a weapon. Section 812.13, Florida Statutes. After a jury trial he was found guilty of third-degree robbery (without the use of a weapon). Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes....

...The second is whether the court erred by sentencing him to a mandatory three years. Since appellant was charged with and tried for robbery with a weapon which is a felony punishable by life imprisonment he was entitled to ten peremptory challenges. *856 Bell v. State, 338 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Section 812.13, Florida Statutes; Fla.R.Crim.P....

...e mandatory minimum provision at sentencing. Accordingly, we recede from Salyer and reaffirm the law as set forth in Allen. AFFIRMED. *84 MONACO, C.J., GRIFFIN, SAWAYA, ORFINGER, TORPY, LAWSON, EVANDER, COHEN, and JACOBUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...We affirm in all respects, but we remand for correction of a scrivener's error appearing in the written judgment. The written judgment erroneously lists Appellant's crime as a life felony, rather than a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...aining in a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein. § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). None of these elements are required for the robbery offense. On the other hand, robbery includes a taking which is not required under burglary. See § 812.13(1), Fla....

...We find no merit in this issue, and further note that if there was error in the trial court's discretionary ruling on this matter, there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the jury's verdict. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). [2] § 812.133(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). [3] § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). [4] § 316.1935, Fla. Stat. (2000). [5] In reaching this conclusion, we note a distinction between the home invasion robbery of section 812.135(1), which subsumes the offense of a burglary by requiring, as an element, an entry into a dwelling with the intent to commit a robbery, and the carjacking offense of section 812.133(1), which merely requires the taking of a motor vehicle by force and does not require entry with an intent to commit an offense therein. See McAllister, above, in which the court ruled the offense of burglary is a subsumed offense of home invasion robbery. [1] Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). [2] §§ 812.133(1) and (2)(b); 775.087(1), Fla....

defendant with robbery with a weapon pursuant to section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2009). That statute

...Jorandby, Public Defender, and Preston Mighdoll, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. DAUKSCH, Judge. In this case the Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to the charge of robbery while carrying a firearm as proscribed in Section 812.13(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Mashburn is correct that he should not have been adjudicated and sentenced for robbery with a firearm. On remand, he is to be resentenced for the offense of robbery with a weapon. REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing. COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

information with one count of robbery pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2014). The information

...We affirm the convictions without discussion, however, we find that the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant and, accordingly, reverse and remand for resentencing. The appellant was charged with four counts of robbery with a firearm (counts I-IV), in violation of section 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), aggravated battery with a firearm (count V), in violation of section 784.045, Florida Statutes (1991), and grand theft of a motor vehicle (count VI), in violation of section 812.014(2)(c)4, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The appellant, Darrin Bartholemew Hamm, challenges his judgment and sentence. Although we affirm the appellant's conviction, we reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing. The appellant was charged by information with robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; REMANDED. MONACO, J., and PLEUS, R.J., Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] A violation of double jeopardy constitutes fundamental error which may be raised for the first time on appeal. Vasquez v. State, 778 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). [2] § 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006). [3] § 812.133(1) and (2)(a), Fla....

...DAUKSCH, J., concurs specially, with opinion. DAUKSCH, Judge, concurring specially. In my opinion the trial court properly admitted into evidence the Williams rule testimony. NOTES [1] § 810.02(2)(a), Fla.Stat.(1995). [2] § 784.021(1)(a), Fla.Stat.(1995). [3] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla.Stat.(1995)....

...argues that his designation as a serious or habitual juvenile offender is improper because robbery by sudden snatching is not a qualifying offense under section 985.03(48), Florida Statutes (2003). We agree and reverse. T.N. entered a plea of no contest to the charge of robbery by sudden snatching, which is prohibited by section 812.131, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...The State argues that the general reference to robbery in subsection (48)(a)(3) includes the offense of robbery by sudden snatching. Robbery by sudden snatching and robbery are two separate offenses prohibited by two separate statutes. Robbery by sudden snatching is prohibited by section 812.131, which provides: (1) "Robbery by sudden snatching" means the taking of money or other property from the victim's person, with intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the victim or the owner of the money or other property, when, in the course of the taking, the victim was or became aware of the taking....

...r property; or (b) There was any resistance offered by the victim to the offender or that there was injury to the victim's person. If the offender did not carry a firearm or other deadly weapon, as in this case, the offense is a third-degree felony. § 812.131(2)(b). Robbery is prohibited by section 812.13, Florida Statutes (2003), which provides: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the...

...f the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. If the offender did not carry a firearm or other deadly weapon, as in this case, the offense is a second-degree felony. § 812.13(2)(c). Prior to the enactment of section 812.131, in order for a snatching to have constituted a robbery under section 812.13, the defendant must have used "`more than the force necessary to remove the property from the person,'" or enough force to overcome the victim's resistance. Owens v. State, 787 So.2d 143, 143-44 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (quoting Robinson v. State, 692 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla.1997)). The enactment of section 812.131 provided for a felony conviction for those robberies in which the defendant did not use force but "snatched" the property from the victim's person. Robbery by sudden snatching is one felony degree lower than robbery. Compare § 812.131(2) with § 812.13(2)....

...the statute. Id. at 1133. The Fourth District held that the crimes were too different *880 for robbery by sudden snatching to be included under the offense of robbery because "robbery requires the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear, section 812.13, while robbery by sudden snatching does not." Id.; see also Brooks v....

...The court analyzed the elements of both crimes and determined that the offense of robbery by sudden snatching in Georgia was not substantially similar to the offense of robbery in Florida due to the absence of a force requirement in the Georgia statute. Id. Section 812.131 was enacted after Robinson was decided, and it is comparable to the Georgia statute as interpreted by case law in Georgia....

...Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Mary E. Marsden, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. BERANEK, JOHN R., Associate Judge. Appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm pursuant to Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977). The trial court sentenced appellant to a term of imprisonment from three years to ten years. Appellant asserts the court erred in failing to give his requested charge on robbery with a weapon pursuant to Section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Defendant asserts error claiming no instruction was given on robbery with a weapon. Despite his defense of alibi, he argued to the trial judge that perhaps the jury would think the gun was really a stick or some other weapon which was not a firearm. Section 812.13(2), Florida Statutes (1977), establishes three categories of circumstances in subsections (a), (b), and (c) which may be involved in robbery as follows: (a) Robbery with a firearm or other deadly weapon; (b) Robbery with a weapon (not a firearm or deadly weapon); (c) Robbery without any weapon or firearm....

first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). The day after Preston’s

...The question is not whether force was used, but when it was used in relation to the taking. A conviction for the crime of robbery requires proof that money or other property was taken from the victim and that the offender used force or violence "in the course of the taking." See § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). The temporal relationship between the use of force and the taking of the property is addressed in section 812.13(3)(b), which provides that "[a]n act shall be deemed `in the course of the taking' if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." As this definition reveals, the statute is not limited to situations in which the defendant has used force at the precise time the property is taken. On the contrary, section 812.13, Florida Statutes incorporates the modern view that a robbery can be proven by evidence of force used to elude the victim or to retain the victim's property once it has been taken....

...As explained in the Comments to the Model Penal Code, "[t]he thief's willingness to use force against those who would restrain him in flight suggests that he would have employed force to effect the theft had the need arisen." Model Penal Code § 222.1, comment at 104 (1980). Based on the language of section 812.13, the Florida courts have held that the crime of robbery can be proven by evidence that the defendant used force against the victim after the taking has been completed....

...Likewise, whether the *820 victim would have been wiser to allow the defendant to drive away with her property is irrelevant. The robbery statute merely requires proof that the force and the act of the taking were part of a "continuous series of acts or events." See § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

...87(1), Florida Statutes; assaults and batteries upon an officer or firefighter are used to enhance criminal penalties under section 784.07, Florida Statutes; and the carrying of a weapon or firearm enhances the penalty for robbery [7] under sections 812.13(2)(a) and (2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...derlying offense. " [emphasis added]). See also the separate opinion in Bing v. State, 492 So.2d at 836. [5] In Hall v. State, 517 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1988), it was held that a conviction and punishment for committing a robbery while carrying a firearm (§ 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...unauthorized and void. Because the principal crime appellant committed was robbery with a firearm, which carries a life sentence, his sentence including the combination of incarceration and suspended probation, does not exceed the statutory maximum. § 812.13(2)(a)....

...years of probation is vacated. AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part. COBB, J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents with opinion. COWART, Judge, dissenting. The defendant was convicted of five separate offenses: (1) Case 87-5018 — robbery with a firearm (§ 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...tencing on that count. We affirm Tribbitt's remaining convictions and sentences without discussion. In count I of the Fourth Amended Information, the State charged Tribbitt with the attempted armed robbery of Tiffany Simo on May 4, 2006, pursuant to section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...a weapon during the attempted robbery of Ms. Simo. Our review is to determine whether there is competent, substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Crain v. State, 894 So.2d 59, 71 (Fla.2004); F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226, 230 (Fla.2003). Section 812.13 sets forth the different degrees of robbery as follows: (2)(a) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s....

...(Emphasis added.) Chapter 812 does not define "weapon"; thus "Florida courts have generally utilized the statutory definition of `weapon' provided in section 790.001(13) to determine whether a particular object constitutes a `weapon' for purposes of section 812.13(2)(b)." Williams v....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. June 12, 2009. Douglas R. Brown, pro se, Appellant. Hon. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Joshua R. Heller, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant was convicted of robbery under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1997), and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment as a habitual violent felony offender....

...The instant appeal stems from the trial court's denial of appellant's "Motion To *1198 Dismiss" his conviction and sentence on the basis that the original information charging him with robbery failed to invoke the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction because section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1997), was unconstitutional for failing to include the enacting clause language set forth in Article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution....

...Once the laws passed by the legislature are codified for publication in the Florida Statutes, the requirements and restrictions of Article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution, do not apply. See Santos v. State, 380 So.2d 1284, 1285 (Fla.1980). Thus, section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1997), is not unconstitutional due to the absence of the "enacting clause" language....

in that in proving a charge of robbery under section 812.13, the State must also prove the elements of

...State, 737 So.2d 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Cook v. State, 737 So.2d 569 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), cert. granted, No. SC96399, 761 So.2d 327 (Fla. Feb. 21, 2000). AFFIRMED in part; REMANDED in part for resentencing. ANTOON, C.J., and GRIFFIN, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13, Fla....

...Michael Andrew Carter appeals his conviction and sentence for robbery with a weapon. We affirm. Mr. Carter correctly notes, however, that the written judgment mistakenly reflects a conviction for robbery with a firearm or deadly weapon instead of robbery with a weapon. See § 812.13(2)(a), (b), Fla....

...We take this opportunity to clarify the Cook opinion: although the opinion did not reflect it, the offense in that case in fact was the life felony of attempted first degree murder with a firearm. [2] Robbery with a firearm is a first degree felony, see § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...on remand to supply the requisite proof. See Johnson v. State, 576 So.2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Reversed and remanded for resentencing. THREADGILL, C.J., and FRANK and LAZZARA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 775.084(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993). [2] See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...3d DCA 1984) (where prosecutor stated that he could have called additional witnesses to testify to defendant's guilt, error neither harmless nor curable in light of questionable identification by victims). Next we consider the sentence imposed in count III. Section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), declares that robbery with a weapon is a first degree felony, punishable by a maximum term of thirty years imprisonment....

...A life sentence is proper only upon a finding that the perpetrator of the robbery carried a deadly weapon in the course of committing the robbery. Miller v. State, 370 So.2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Chapola v. State, 347 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...ring January and February 1987. He was tried by jury and convicted of one count of RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act), section 895.03(3), Florida Statutes (1985), and twelve counts of robbery with a deadly weapon, violations of section 812.13(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

robbery with a weapon, a first degree felony, section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2007). In order to

requirement as stated in the carjacking statute. See § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). . We note that a party

conviction under .the Florida robbery statute, Fla. Stat. 812.13(1), is a “crime of violence” under section

...Odom, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. A jury convicted Jermaine Thomas of robbery by snatching in violation of section 812.131(1), Florida Statutes (2002), and fleeing and eluding in violation of section 316.1935(2), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...of physical force or violence against an individual." Affirmed in part and Reversed in part. STEVENSON, C.J., GUNTHER and MAY, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING STEVENSON, C.J. After being convicted of robbery by sudden snatching in violation of section 812.131(1), Florida Statutes (2002), and fleeing and eluding in violation of section 316.1935(2), Florida Statutes (2002), appellant, *47 Jermaine Thomas, was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual felony offender for both crimes....

...n 775.082(9)(a)1.g. of the PRR statute. This court reversed the PRR sentence, holding "robbery by sudden snatching" was not the equivalent of the enumerated "robbery" because "robbery requires the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear, section 812.13, while robbery by sudden snatching does not." 891 So.2d at 1133 (citing Brown v....

...The trial judge instructed the jury that the State was required to prove Thomas "took property from the person or custody of [the victim]." The statute defining the crime provides that "`[r]obbery by sudden snatching' means the taking of money or other property from the victim's person ...." § 812.131(1), Fla....

...for robbery and attempted carjacking do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. WELLS, C.J., dissenting. I dissent. The majority's decision fails to deal with the reasoning of the district court, which I conclude is correct. The district court held: Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, classifies a robbery, which without the presence of a weapon (or firearm) would be a felony of the second degree, as a felony of the first degree "[i]f in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a weapon." (Emphasis added)....

...he offense, the offender was wearing a ... mask." Here, both the classification (robbery) and the reclassification (the mask general reclassification) of the offense is based *876 on the offender's, as opposed to the defendant's, conduct. Concerning section 812.13(2)(b), this court has held that if two individuals participate in a robbery in which only one arms himself, both are guilty of the enhanced offense....

...te of the law. Appellant's second ground for relief alleged that he received an illegal sentence because the trial court sentenced him to 60 years' imprisonment for armed robbery, a first degree felony, contrary to the express provisions of sections 812.13(2)(a) and 775.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...1990), in making this argument. Section 775.082(3)(b) provides that a first degree felony is punishable "by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." Section 812.13(2)(a) defines armed robbery as a felony of the first degree "punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s....

...Although the decisions in Rucker and Robinson obviously appear to support Appellant's position, the fourth district ruled to the contrary in Salas v. State, 589 So.2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), when it affirmed a 99-year sentence for kidnapping, also a first degree felony punishable under a statutory scheme similar to that of section 812.13(2)(a)....

...State, 584 So.2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 592 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1991); Crabtree v. State, 624 So.2d 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). In Alvarez, the supreme court held constitutional against a vagueness challenge the sentencing provisions of the 1977 version of section 812.13(2)(a) (containing language identical to the 1981 version applicable herein), and affirmed the imposition of a 125-year sentence for robbery....

...assault on a law enforcement officer, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.07; (2) robbery, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 3  Case: 11-15407 Date Filed: 02/27/2013 Page: 4 of 14 812.13; and (3) burglary of a structure, in violation of Fla....

...district court did not err in finding that this conviction was a predicate offense under the ACCA.3 B. Robbery On appeal, Gandy does not challenge the district court’s finding that robbery, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 812.13, is a predicate offense under the ACCA. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s finding that this conviction was a predicate offense. C....

...Bodiford of Bodiford Law, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Danilo Cruz-Carino, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. CRENSHAW, Judge. Andre Bryant appeals his judgment and sentence for robbery with a firearm or deadly weapon in violation of section 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...th intent to permanently or temporarily deprive LORI CLINE of said property." The case proceeded to trial. After the State and Bryant rested their cases, the following instructions on robbery were given to the jury without objection: 15.1 Robbery, F.S. 812.13 To prove the crime of Robbery, the State must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: *593 1....

...The audio tape that was played to the jury without objection echoed the comment of the police officer during his testimony. As the state concedes, appellant should be resentenced under a corrected scoresheet. The primary offense was incorrectly scored. Appellant was convicted of robbery while wearing a mask under section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...Appellant was convicted of attempted armed robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, the attempted armed robbery. He alleges a double jeopardy violation. It is not. We find that defendant was properly convicted of and sentenced for the two crimes of attempted armed robbery with a firearm, sections 812.13(1) and (2)(a) and 777.04, Florida Statutes (1989) and use of a firearm while committing a felony, section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...parately punished." State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613, 616 (Fla. 1989). Both of the primary statutes in the instant case contain unique elements, while the element of a firearm or weapon is common to both statutes. However, the element that is unique to section 812.13 is that the firearm or weapon usage must relate to a robbery, whereas section 790.07, on the other hand, applies to any felony....

...Garcia ran out of the store and through the parking lot. In a nearby parking lot, Garcia slowed down and pointed a handgun at the pursuing security guard. Garcia was later arrested and admitted that he possessed a BB pistol which he threw in a canal. The weapon was not recovered. Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1991), the robbery statute, states that the "force [violence, assault, or putting in fear] used in the course of taking property may be subsequent to the taking if the force [violence, assault, or putting in fear] `and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events.'" Simmons v. State, 551 So.2d 607, 608 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (quoting in part § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

...Kilcrease, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. RYDER, Judge. The appellant was found guilty of second degree robbery in violation of section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1985)....

to it. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 15.1; § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). To prove the crime of robbery

...A jury found appellant guilty of conspiracy to commit a felony (armed robbery), § 777.04(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1983), a second degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years, § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1983), and robbery without a firearm, as a lesser included offense, § 812.13, Fla....

...The court held that, as the owner of the property, Brent had custody of whatever was located on the property. This was error. One of the essential elements of robbery is that the person who is placed in fear or assaulted must either own or have custody of the property being taken. See Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) (2000) ("`Robbery' means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money o...

...(1989). Defendant argues that count two was also a life felony on which habitualization would be improper. Again, the defendant is incorrect. Count two was robbery with a firearm. That crime is a first degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. Id. § 812.13(2)(a)....

and EVANDER, JJ., concur. 1 . § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). 2 . §

...e prosecutor, even if inappropriate, could not have affected the result of this case. Hence, I find no harmful error and, if different, no fundamental error. NOTES [1] §§ 782.04(1)(a)1; 777.04(1), 775.0823(2); 775.087(1)(a), (2)(a), Fla. Stat. [2] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. [3] § 784.021(1)(a), Fla. Stat. [4] § 782.051(1), Fla. Stat. [5] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...The offense of carjacking is "the taking of a motor vehicle ... with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." Id. § 812.133(1). The defendant committed carjacking at the lover's lane when he and the codefendant took the vehicle at gunpoint. Later, upon reaching the automatic teller machine, defendant and the codefendant stole the victim's money. See id. § 812.13(2)(a)....

...pecial conditions, it should orally pronounce those special conditions. See State v. Williams, 712 So.2d 762 (Fla. *589 1998); Jackson v. State, 685 So.2d 1386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). REVERSED in part; REMANDED. DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...The state concedes that the information against the defendant did not charge armed robbery and that the evidence at trial did not establish an armed robbery. Instead, the state takes the position that it intended to charge the defendant with a simple robbery under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1985), and use the allegation of threat to use a firearm as grounds for enhancement of the robbery from a second degree felony to a first degree felony under the provisions of section 775.087(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Section 775.087(1) provides for enhancement of the degree of a felony if during the commission of the felony the defendant *506 "threatens to use any weapon or firearm." However, that statute begins with the phrase, "unless otherwise provided by law." Section 812.13(2)(c) specifically provides that "if in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the second degree." Accordingly, we find that the enhancement statute, section 775.087, does not apply in this case because of the express provision of section 812.13(2)(c)....

...uidelines offense of robbery with a deadly weapon, notwithstanding that Davis had earlier pleaded to a reduced charge of robbery with a weapon. Both the offense with which he was charged and the offense to which he pleaded are first degree felonies. § 812.13(2)(a) and (b), Fla....

...That results in a guidelines maximum range of 181.25 months or 15.1 years incarceration. The 15 year prison sentence Perez received is therefore legal. AFFIRMED; REMANDED for Correction of Scoresheet. THOMPSON, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 782.04(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (1995) [2] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...In his sworn motion, Harris alleges that he took the victim's bicycle as she entered a store. She came outside and confronted him, and Harris apologized and gave the bicycle back. He argues that he at no time used any "force, violence, assault, or putting in fear" necessary to support a robbery offense. § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). See also § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

...Allen, Public Defender, Phil Patterson, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., John M. Koenig, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. *312 MINER, Judge. In this appeal, appellant argues that his convictions for armed robbery under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), and for display of a firearm during commission of a felony under section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes (1987), violated his right to be free from double jeopardy....

..., and take away from the person or custody of Mary Lee Grantham, certain property, to-wit: money, and in the course of committing said robbery carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, to-wit: a pistol, contrary to Florida Statute 812.13....

...d in stature to become the "controlling polestar" of intent in double jeopardy analysis. See State v. Smith, supra, at 616. In the instant case, appellant was charged with the offense of robbery while armed with a firearm. This offense is defined in section 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes, as follows: (1) "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear....

...use a firearm during the commission of a felony. It is clear that each of these offenses contains at least one constituent statutory element that the other does not. Id. at 556-7. Apparently, Gibson found that the substantive elements of robbery in section 812.13(1) did not need to be proved in order to establish the firearm offense....

...defendant twice for the single act of displaying a firearm or carrying a firearm while committing a robbery. To hold otherwise would mean that, for every offense of robbery in which a defendant uses or carries or displays a firearm, in violation of section 812.13, there would also be a violation of section 790.02(2) [sic]. Robbery, under section 812.13(1), becomes the enhanced offense of armed robbery under 812.13(2)(a) by reason of the element of carrying or displaying a firearm....

...r right to the property or any benefit from it, or appropriate the property to the defendant's own use or to the use of any person not entitled to it. 5) The defendant carried a deadly weapon (or firearm) in the course of committing the robbery. See § 812.13, Fla....

...er). We reverse the sentence and conviction for grand theft. Because vacating the conviction for grand theft does not affect Ward's sentence, he need not be resentenced. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. PALMER and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Although the information charged Nesbitt with separate robberies of two different victims, it described the purse that was taken from them as the property of only one of the victims. If Nesbitt took a single purse, there could only be a single "taking" and, consequently, only a single armed robbery. See § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Because we find that the trial court erred in its denial of Brown’s motion to suppress, we vacate the judgment and sentence and remand with directions that the motion be granted. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Brown was charged under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, with armed robbery of the Beachcomber Jewelry Store located in Key West, Florida. Witnesses of the robbery described one robber wearing a beanie hat with blue gloves....

...ement of battery. Hamrick v. State, 648 So.2d 274, 276 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); see also Dunbar v. State, 879 So.2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Phillips v. State, 834 So.2d 272, 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2), Fla....

...r [2] sentence imposed on his 2008 conviction for attempted robbery with a firearm exceeds the maximum penalty allowed by law on that charge. The State properly concedes error. Robbery with a firearm is a first-degree felony, punishable by life. See § 812.13(1),(2)(a), Fla....

...Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Joy B. Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. DOWNEY, Judge. This is a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence of thirty years' imprisonment for the offense of robbery pursuant to section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...f another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). “If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree. . . .” § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

robbery with a firearm or other deadly weapon, § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000), a first-degree felony

a weapon, which is a third-degree felony. See § 812.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009); § 777.04(4)(d), Fla

...11, 14 (D.Mass.1994) ("[t]he trial judge must be alert to clever defendants ... claiming that the trial judge either failed to restrict or overly restricted the role of standby counsel"). Aycock's second point on appeal is also without merit. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, C.J., GRIFFIN and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(b), Fla....

...arate and independent intent for each transaction. 430 So.2d at 447. This holding is consistent with the definition of robbery, which is, in pertinent part, the taking of property from the person or custody of another by putting that person in fear. § 812.13(1), Fla....

used force, violence, assault, or intimidation. § 812.13(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). To prove attempted robbery

...asis that he has a propensity to commit this type of crime. This leads us to conclude that the evidence should have been excluded, and its inclusion was not harmless error. REVERSED and REMANDED. GOSHORN, GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13, Fla....

was properly convicted of armed robbery under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). The State need

...If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction. Id. at 803 (citations omitted). The statutory definition of robbery is set out in section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (2001): "Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the ow...

...e 1998 Criminal Punishment Code"). Pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code, the five concurrent life sentences received here by Logan were not departure sentences. Accordingly, the trial court was not required to file written departure reasons. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...and during the commission of such *752 felony the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens to use, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm ... the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: (a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony."), armed robbery, § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Stat. (1999) ("If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm ... then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment."), and armed carjacking. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla....

as the person in the robbery video. Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes, defines robbery as follows:

an overt act capable of accomplishing the goal. § 812.13, Fla.Stat. (1993); § 777.04, Fla.Stat. (1993);

...[3] § 775.087(2) Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] The trial court may, in its discretion, run this minimum mandatory sentence consecutive to the minimum mandatory twenty five year sentence imposed for capital murder in Count I. See Downs v. State, 616 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1993). [5] § 812.13(2)(a) Fla. Stat. (1986). [6] See supra note 4. [7] The use of a firearm is an inherent element of armed robbery with a firearm, Section 812.13, Florida Statute (1986), although the trial court may impose a minimum mandatory sentence, it may not reclassify, by degree, defendant's offense pursuant to Section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...On remand it shall not be necessary to have the appellant present for resentencing. Convictions AFFIRMED; sentences AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part; cause REMANDED with directions. DAUKSCH and PETERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Appellant's sentence is a legal sentence. Appellant plead guilty to a life felony, which, pursuant to § 782.04, Florida Statutes, was punishable by a term of years not exceeding forty years or life imprisonment. Appellant also plead guilty to armed robbery pursuant to § 812.13, Florida Statutes, which is a first degree felony punishable by a term of years not exceeding thirty years or life imprisonment....

3d DCA 1989) (legislative intent in amending section 812.13 was to “repeal” rule in Royal). In Royal, when

second-degree robbery charge in case number 09-CF-772. See § 812.13(1), (2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). The police affidavit

...Terry Wickham appeals from a final order of the Parole and Probation Commission setting his presumptive parole release date. The record indicates that he was convicted of robbery and in the course of committing the robbery carried a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, contrary to Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...aggravated for the use of a firearm when one is convicted of armed robbery. In fact, Baker holds to the contrary. If there is some way in which the firearm is used which distinguishes it from simply being "carried," which is all that is required by Section 812.13(2)(a), and the Commission specifies that use with a written explanation which contains "individual particularities" which distinguish the aggravating circumstance relied on from the factors which determine the offense characteristic and the salient factor score, then aggravation may be appropriate....

...ntent to temporarily or permanently deprive KIMBERYLY K. MOWRY, of a right to the property or a benefit therefore, and in the course thereof utilized force, violence, assault or put the said KIMBERLY K. MOWRY in fear, in violation of Florida Statute 812.13(1) and (2)(c)....

...elling, value of $100 or more but less than $300, a lesser included offense, based upon an information which does not allege the elements of the lesser included offense. Defendant was charged with a single count of strong arm robbery. See Fla. Stat. 812.13(1) and (2)(c) and July 16, 2007 Amended Information....

...Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel's failure to object to the inclusion in the jury instructions of the lesser-included offenses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. REVERSED and REMANDED. GRIFFIN and COHEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 812.13, Fla....

...e person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other *195 property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(a), Fla....

...permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. -6- § 812.13(1), Fla....

...The robbery statute further provides that “[a]n act shall be deemed ‘in the course of the taking’ if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events.” § 812.13(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). Under the robbery statute, “[a]n act shall be deemed ‘in the course of committing the robbery’ if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission.” § 812.13(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). In addition, the punishment for robbery is enhanced where “in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm.” § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Specifically, Rockmore’s victim testified that Rockmore threatened him with a gun while fleeing with stolen property. Though Rockmore’s version of the facts differed, the victim’s testimony is competent, substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that Rockmore committed robbery with a firearm. See § 812.13(1), - 10 - (2)(a), Fla....

...ses the majority cites, Rockmore was entitled to defend against his robbery charge by arguing that his abandonment of the stolen property broke the nexus between the taking of the property and the use of force required by the robbery statute. See § 812.13(1), (3)(b), Fla....

...money or other property of some value, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.13(1), Fla....

...in the standard jury instruction, an act is deemed “in the course of the taking” if it “occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events.” § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

...jury that, if the defendant abandons the property prior to threatening or using force, the defendant has not committed a robbery because the taking and use of force were not “a continuous series of acts or events,” as required by the statute. § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

on Count I, armed robbery in violation of section 812.-13, Florida Statutes (1985); eight years on Count

...and in the course of the taking there was the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear, and in the course of committing the robbery carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm in violation of Florida Statutes 812.13(1) and 812.13(2)(a). The trial court denied the motion finding that the defendant did not establish an illegal sentence that could be remedied under Rule 3.800(a). The court noted that the information charged that the defendant “carried” a firearm....

...tory sentence under the 10-20- Life statute, section 775.087(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes (1999). As we explained in Grant v. State, 138 So. 3d 1079, 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), the legal definition of “carrying” a firearm (within the meaning of section 812.13(2)(a) for a robbery conviction) is not equivalent to the legal definition of “actual possession” of a firearm for a mandatory minimum sentence under the 10-20-Life statute.2 In Grant, the defendant challenged the legality...

punishable by life. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016); § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016). Petitioner does not

...entences for all three offenses. AFFIRMED. HARRIS, J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents, with opinion. COWART, Judge, dissenting. The defendant (appellant) entered a plea of guilty to accessory after the fact to armed robbery. (§§ 777.03, Fla. Stat.; 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla....

...Stat.) Thereafter the defendant's counsel agreed to the State's motion for the trial court to vacate that plea in order for, or to permit, the defendant to be charged as a principal to first degree murder (§ 782.04(1)(a)1 and/or § 777.011, Fla. Stat.) and armed robbery (§ 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla....

...tion right involved, affirmatively and intentionally waived and relinquished that known right by consenting to the trial court granting the State's motion to vacate and set aside the defendant's plea to the accessory offense. NOTES [1] § 777.03 and § 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla....

...[2] The colloquy between defense counsel and the trial court indicates the following: THE COURT: You're asking me to vacate the plea and set it aside? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Granted... . [3] § 782.04(1)(a)1 and/or § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] § 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla....

...The trial judge adjudicated appellant guilty on both charges and sentenced him to serve ninety-nine years in prison on each, to run concurrently. The court retained jurisdiction over one third of appellant's sentences. Robbery with a weapon is a first degree felony, § 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979), punishable by a maximum sentence of thirty years. § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979). The information for this robbery did not allege the use of a firearm or deadly weapon, which would have made a life sentence permissible under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Bryson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. EN BANC GREEN, J. Jorge Luis Dominguez appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief challenging the legality of his conviction and sentence for armed robbery with a weapon, pursuant to section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1995), where the state relied solely upon the automobile that he was driving at the time of the offense to satisfy the statute's weapon requirement....

...To the extent that Dominguez I affirmed the armed robbery conviction, we now recede from that case and issue this decision in its stead. The state charged Dominguez by information with one count of armed robbery with a weapon, namely, an automobile, pursuant to section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1995), [1] and two counts of aggravated battery on a person sixty-five years of age or older with a deadly weapon pursuant to section 784.045, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Dominguez then moved for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. He argued that his sentence was illegally enhanced for carrying a weapon (i.e., an automobile) during the commission of a robbery, because it is impossible to carry an automobile, as required by section 812.13(2)(b)....

...he robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree.... (b) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree.... § 812.13, Fla....

...(b) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree.... (c) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the second degree.... § 812.13, Fla....

...The Jenkins majority affirmed the convictions based upon its conclusion that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that the automobile was used as a weapon. Id. The majority, however, specifically declined to address the issue of whether a car could be "`carried' as a weapon within the meaning of Section 812.13(2)(b)" based upon its conclusion that this issue had not been raised on appeal....

...his plea, the trial court correctly denied it because such an issue must be raised in a sworn 3.850 *1304 motion and as noted above, the two year time limit has expired. AFFIRMED. COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850(b). [2] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...On appeal from his judgment and sentence for unarmed robbery, Oliver Selwyn raises four sentencing errors. He is entitled to relief as to three. I. The information alleged that Selwyn committed robbery while carrying a firearm, which is a first-degree felony. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...Finding that the State failed to present prima facie evidence that Selwyn was armed, the trial court granted a judgment of acquittal of armed robbery. The case proceeded to a bench trial on the charge of unarmed robbery, which is a second-degree felony. See § 812.13(2)(c). The trial court orally pronounced a verdict of guilty of unarmed robbery, but the written judgment and sentence reflected an adjudication of guilt of first-degree robbery under section 812.13(2)(a)....

punishable by up to thirty years’ imprisonment. § 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). Because Lunardi was

...Romero appeals from his conviction for robbery, raising as his sole point the state's purported failure to prove an essential element of the crime charged. Romero was charged by amended information as follows: *469 ROMERO, on the 27th day of June, 1999, ..., did, in violation of Florida Statute 812.13(2)(a), by force, violence, assault or putting in fear, take away from the person or custody of MARK PROFITT or a Subway employee, certain property, to-wit: United States money current or a video cassette recorder, the property of MARK PROFITT...

...rom the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Defense counsel conceded that Love committed a theft; at issue was whether Love committed a robbery. To constitute robbery, defendant must employ "the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear" in the course of taking money or other property from a person. § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). Defendant's act may be "subsequent to the taking of the property... if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." § 812.13(3)(b), Fla....

fire.” The crime in question is covered by section 812.13(2), Florida Statutes (1993) (dealing with robbery

...irearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1), (2)(a) (1983). 23 Under Florida law, armed burglary was defined as follows at the relevant time: (1) “Burglary” means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit a...

...om the same incident. Gorday pled guilty to the misdemeanor credit card theft charge, and was adjudicated and sentenced to time served. The State then proceeded to prosecute Gorday, as a principal, in Circuit Court on the armed robbery charge, under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...ment not contained in the other; if not, they are the same offense and double jeopardy bars subsequent punishment or prosecution." M.P., 682 So.2d at 81. In this case, Gorday was charged both with armed robbery of the victim's purse, in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), and theft of the credit card found therein in violation of section 817.60(1)....

...(2)(a) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 812.13, Fla....

...ermits dual convictions for robbery and credit card theft. The statutory elements of armed robbery are essentially the taking of property of another "when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.13(1), Fla....

...Shippy of Batchelor, Shippy & Vojak, P.A., Bonita Springs, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Laura Rush, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge. Johnnie James West appeals his sentence of life in prison for robbery with a firearm, section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Spellman was charged in multiple informations with numerous counts of robbery stemming from incidents during October and November 1986. In cases 86-5834, 86-5836, 86-5837, and 86-5973 Spellman was charged with robbery pursuant to §§ 775.087(1) and 812.13(2)(c). In case 86-5838 he was charged in separate counts with robbery, battery, criminal mischief, and grand theft pursuant to §§ 775.087(1), 812.13(2)(c), 784.03, 806.13, 812.014(1)(a), (b), and 812.014(2)(b)(1), (Fla....

...rse of the robbery. No firearm was ever discovered in connection with the case, nor did the victims of the robbery actually see a weapon. The court held that § 775.087(1) could not be applied to enhance unarmed robbery, a second degree felony under § 812.13(2)(c), to a first degree felony, stating: Section 775.087(1) provides for enhancement of the degree of a felony if during the commission of the felony the defendant "threatens to use any weapon or firearm." However, that statute begins with the phrase, "unless otherwise provided by law." Section 812.13(2)(c) specifically provides that "if in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the second degree." Accordingly, we find that the enhancement statute, section 775.087, does not apply in this case because of the express provision of section 812.13(2)(c)....

...ffense, it was error to reclassify defendant's conviction for manslaughter from second-degree felony to first-degree felony pursuant to § 775.087(1)). [1] In the case at bar, as in Hamilton, Spellman was charged and convicted of robbery pursuant to § 812.13(2)(c), but his sentences *307 were enhanced under § 775.087(1) based solely on his threats to use a gun during the robberies since there was no evidence that appellant had a gun during the robberies....

...Here, both offenses contain elements requiring proof of (1) the unlawful taking of property (2) from or in the presence of another (3) against that person's will (4) by the use of force or putting in fear. Compare Robinson, 692 So.2d at 886-87, with State v. Brown, 300 N.C. 41, 265 S.E.2d 191, 195 (1980). Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (2000), defines robbery as the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. See also § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000) (enhancing the degree of the felony if a firearm or deadly weapon is carried in the course of committing the robbery); § 812.13(2)(b), Fla....

...classification, his contention that the sentence was unlawful is without merit."). The North Carolina offense of armed robbery is the equivalent of the Florida offense, because it requires proof of every element of the Florida offense, as defined in section 812.13, Florida Statutes (2000), and is punishable as a felony in North Carolina....

...See Abner, 566 So.2d at 595. The North Carolina offense requires proof not only of what would be simple robbery in Florida, but also of an additional element (possession of a firearm or dangerous weapon), which would make the offense punishable under section 812.13(2)(a) or (b)....

...at 932 (citing Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 509 So.2d 1088, 1089-90 (Fla. 1987)). NOTES [1] § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1989), vaginal penetration in count I and anal penetration in count II. [2] § 810.02(2), Fla. Stat. (1989) in count III. [3] § 812.13(2), Fla....

...r the grand theft conviction or the robbery conviction related to the purse-snatchings. [5] The sentences on the remaining offenses must then be recalculated under the guidelines. IT IS SO ORDERED. UPCHURCH, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(1) & (2)(c), Fla....

...creamed "there's your money, leave me alone." Thus, even though Copeland was unaware that the defendants would raise the section 776.085 argument, his filings in opposition to the motion actually raised a question of fact concerning the defense. See § 812.13(3)(a), Fla....

...e 1998 Criminal Punishment Code"). Pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code, the five concurrent life sentences received here by Logan were not departure sentences. Accordingly, the trial court was not required to file written departure reasons. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...record conclusively refuting the claim and otherwise affirm the denial of his post-conviction motion. Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded. POLEN, GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Home invasion robbery is a first degree felony, § 812.135(2), Fla....

...nd without the offender being or becoming armed, is a second degree felony, § 810.02(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001), punishable by up to fifteen years in prison, § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001). [4] Robbery without a weapon is a second degree felony, § 812.13(2)(c), Fla....

...uto and remand for resentencing in compliance with section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989). We certify to the supreme court the same question certified in Jones. We note that robbery with a deadly weapon is a first degree felony punishable by life. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...underlying criminal conviction. This Court consolidated the two appeals on July 27, 2015. We affirm Revenel’s conviction, but reverse the trial court’s sentencing order and remand for a new hearing to be conducted in accordance with the sentencing guidelines set forth in section 812.13(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes. I....

...prior convictions so the trial court could consider whether Revenel should be classified as a “three-time violent felony offender.” Section 775.084 of the Florida Statutes provides, inter alia, for the enhancement of the penalties set forth in the robbery statute (section 812.13) if a defendant is adjudicated a three-time violent offender. The trial court found that the State met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Revenel was a three-time violent felony offender, but nevertheless, stated that, given the language of section 812.13, the trial court had the discretion to sentence Revenel either to the minimum mandatory term of thirty years (as provided in section 812.13) or the minimum mandatory term of life (as provided in section 775.084 (4)(c))....

...der the strength of the evidence. See Evans v. State, 838 So.2d 1090, 1094 (Fla. 2002); Bell, 108 So. 3d at 648. B. Sentencing Revenel was convicted of armed robbery with a deadly weapon or firearm, a first-degree felony pursuant to section 812.13(2)(a). This section provides for “imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in . . . s.775.084.” § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...order and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. We decline the State's invitation to direct the trial court on how to conduct the new sentencing hearing, other than to say that the hearing must be consistent with the requirements set forth in section 812.13(2)(a) and, if applicable, chapter 775 of the Florida Statutes. Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. 7 

...The uncontroverted testimony given below and relied on by the trial court reveals that Bosson and his cohorts intended to steal the purse by exerting whatever force was necessary. Accordingly, the trial court could easily examine the robbery statute, section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1979), and see that the conduct amounted to robbery and that it was, therefore, intentional. Section 812.13 provides that acts committed in the course of a robbery include acts committed in flight during an attempt or the commission of the crime....

...in and has been held to apply retroactively." Etlinger argues that the supreme court's decisions in Carawan and Royal come within this aspect of the rule. In Royal the supreme court held that a person could not be properly convicted of robbery under section 812.13 if force, violence, or an assault were not used prior to or while taking the property....

...nsultation with his attorney. State v. Berry, 647 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1994). As noted above, the court thoroughly explained to Varela the effect of his waiver. We affirm the judgment and the sentence. AFFIRMED. COBB and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

with robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2001); it did not

on “Robbery.” As a result of the change in section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes which took effect on October

...Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. WARNER, Judge. The appellant was convicted of attempted second degree murder with a firearm, in violation of sections 777.04(1) and 782.04(2), Florida Statutes (1995), and robbery with a firearm, in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The State appeals the solitary issue of the trial court's withhold of adjudication on Steven Watson Joseph's conviction for armed robbery with a firearm. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. Mr. Joseph entered an open guilty plea to one count of armed robbery with a deadly weapon, a firearm, in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...HALL, Judge. A.H. appeals his adjudication of delinquency and the disposition ordered by the trial court. We affirm the adjudication but reverse the disposition and remand. The state filed a petition for delinquency charging A.H. with robbery in violation of section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1985)....

usually have cash in their pocket.”). . See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010) ("If in the course of

any person; or (b) Is or becomes armed .... ”); § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995) (“If in the course of

...Here, too, he argues that habitualization was impermissible. However, the defendant is incorrect. The judgment reflects that the defendant was convicted of armed robbery with a firearm, which is a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. § 812.13(2)(b), Fla....

against Mr. Watson for strong-arm robbery under section 812.13(1), (2)(c), Florida Statutes (2010). See Jones

...We have de novo review of this legal issue. Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 807 (Fla. 2008). The jury in the first trial found the defendant guilty of robbery with a firearm. This conviction carried a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...3  Our supreme court has held that the statutory enhancement found in section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2007), does not apply to defendants who do not actually possess the firearm. See State v. Rodriguez, 602 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 1992). Section 812.13, however, already enhances the penalty to life imprisonment when a robbery is committed with a firearm. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...at 704 (second alteration in original) (quoting Freeny v. State, 621 So. 2d 505, 506 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)). Here, it was uncontroverted that multiple co-defendants possessed firearms during the robbery. The jury convicted the defendant of robbery with a firearm as a principal. Section 812.13 provided for a life sentence without the need to rely on section 775.087....

...Charles Hawkins appeals an order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The verdict form reflects that defendant-appellant Hawkins was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon, which is a first degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

first-degree felony punishable by life in prison, see § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005), and false imprisonment

case would result in manifest injustice). See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). The trial court separately

force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” § 812.13(1) Fla. Stat. (2013). Larceny, in turn, has been

...The trial court found that between the commission of the two offenses, Turner had time to change his clothes, apparently after the dye pack activated, and he also had time to hide the money in the console of the vehicle. AFFIRMED. PALMER and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(1)(c), Fla....

sentenced to thirty- five years in prison under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), which allows

HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opinion. . § 812.13, Fla. Stat. (1991), a first degree felony and

800 and section 826.04 Category 3: Robbery: Section 812.13 Category 4: Violent personal crimes: Chapters

guilty of robbery with a firearm, a violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1995). The court sentenced

800 and section 826.04 Category 3: Robbery: Section 812.13 Category 4: Violent personal crimes: Chapters

Hargrett was charged with robbery under section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (2010). At trial, the

contains an element not found in the other. See § 812.13, Fla. Stat. (2014) (stating that robbery “means

C.J., and DAUKSCH and ANTOON, JJ., concur. . § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). . § 810.02(2)(a),

weapon though the weapon is not identified. See § 812.13(2)(b), Fla.Stat. The 1967 robbery offense should

judgments listed only the robbery statute, id. § 812.13, as the statute of conviction, and that the charging

...Appellant also requests this court to reverse and remand for resentencing on his four convictions for robbery with a firearm. In Florida, armed robbery is a first degree felony “punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.” § 812.13 (2)(a), Fla....

application of the habitual offender statute. . See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1983).

make restitution is not an element of robbery. § 812.13(1), Fla.Stat. (1979). Cf. Bell v. State, 394 So

sentence for robbery with a deadly weapon, under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). While we find

appellant committed a robbery contrary to Section 812.-13(2)(a) (Count II). Appellant was found guilty

degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). Accordingly, habitualization

strong-arm robbery, a second-degree felony under section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1985), punishable

with robbery with a firearm, in violation of Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1977), and with use of a

deadly weapon.” The statute was designated as section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Appellant was convicted

permanently deprive that person of the property. § 812.13, Fla. Stat. (2020); § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2020)

legislature had enacted a new robbery statute, § 812.13, Fla.Stat. (1975),2 with an effective date of

found him guilty of robbery, in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1991). The trial court sentenced

Taylor guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). Taylor now challenges

Taylor guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). Taylor now challenges

AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . § 812.13(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). . § 316.1935(2), Fla

permanently deprive that person of the property. § 812.13, Fla. Stat. (2020); § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2020)

for two counts of unarmed robbery pursuant to section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), and that it

crimes of robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1981), and possession of

felony, punishable by up to life in prison. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). Based on his

during the course of the robberies “contrary to F.S. 812.13(2)(a).” Defendant was adjudicated guilty on May

of the crime of robbery as now defined by Section 812.-13, Florida Statutes (1975).” Bell, 394 So.2d

Stat. (1987); Armed Robbery, four (4) counts, § 812.13(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987); Attempted Armed Robbery

Thompson guilty of robbery in violation of section 812.-13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). Immediately

charged with armed robbery, in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes. The recommended guidelines

property either permanently or temporarily.”); § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). Appellant relies on Thomas

...elief that the victim possessed appellant's cell phone. See Daniels v. State, 587 So.2d 460, 462 (Fla.1991) ("[T]he specific intent to commit robbery is the intent to steal, i.e., to deprive an owner of property either permanently or temporarily."); § 812.13(1), Fla....

...1st DCA 1992), this court reversed a conviction for armed robbery with a deadly weapon because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the defendant possessed a weapon, deadly or otherwise, during the course of a robbery. This court held: We believe that, to secure a conviction pursuant to section 812.13(2)(a) or (b), Florida Statutes (1989), for armed robbery while carrying a "firearm or other deadly weapon" or for armed robbery while carrying a "weapon," respectively, the state must present evidence which would be legally sufficient...

claims that he should have been charged under section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), carrying a