Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is only proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact, and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. 4 Plaintiff also asserted a workers’ compensation retaliation claim under Fla. Stat. § 440.205, a Title VII race discrimination claim, and interference and retaliation claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)....

...Smith, 413 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), passes upon questions of great public importance. Piezo Technology v. Smith, 414 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The issue in this proceeding is the scope of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979). That statute states: No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law. § 440.205, Fla....

...Petitioner Smith, the claimant in the workers' compensation hearing below, was injured in two separate accidents while working for her employer, Piezo Technology. The first accident occurred in May 1979; the second happened in November 1979. Subsequent to the first accident but prior to the second, section 440.205 took effect July 1, 1979....

...rom the November 1979 injury and awarded her no benefits as a result of that accident. That order was not appealed. In a November 1980 order issued after a hearing on petitioner's allegations of retaliatory discharge, the deputy commissioner found a section 440.205 violation based on the November 1979 accident. He reasoned that the July 1980 order did not preclude him from considering a section 440.205 violation inasmuch as the statute is not predicated upon a showing that monetary benefits are due the injured worker. The deputy commissioner then found that the employer had improperly terminated the petitioner as a result of her attempts to claim further workers' compensation benefits, thereby violating section 440.205....

...However, that court also further stated that "a deputy commissioner is without jurisdiction to make such a determination [of wrongful discharge] unrelated to any pending claim for benefits otherwise due under Chapter 440." 413 So.2d at 122 (emphasis supplied). The district court then concluded that section 440.205 did create a cause of action for wrongful discharge and that that action was proper in the circuit court. Upon suggestion by petitioner, the district court then certified the following questions of great public importance: 1. WHETHER § 440.205, FLORIDA STATUTES (1979) CREATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" IN RETALIATION FOR AN EMPLOYEE'S PURSUIT OF A WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM; 2. IF § 440.205 DOES CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE," WHETHER SUCH ACTION IS COGNIZABLE BEFORE A DEPUTY COMMISSIONER; 3. IF § 440.205 DOES CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE," BUT SUCH ACTION IS NOT COGNIZABLE BEFORE A DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, WHETHER SUCH ACTION IS COGNIZABLE IN THE CIRCUIT COURT. 414 So.2d at 1128. We answer the certified questions by holding that section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), creates a statutory cause of action for a wrongful discharge in retaliation for an employee's pursuit of a workers' compensation claim and such action is not cognizable before a deputy commissioner but rather is cognizable in a court of competent *184 jurisdiction....

...Thus, because the legislature enacted a statute that clearly imposes a duty and because the intent of the section is to preclude retaliatory discharge, the statute confers by implication every particular power necessary to insure the performance of that duty. Mitchell v. Maxwell, 2 Fla. 594 (1849). We hold, therefore, that section 440.205 does create a statutory cause of action....

...1st DCA 1980), overruled on other grounds, Belam Florida Corp. v. Dardy, 397 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). While he may have "full power and authority" to hear and determine questions pertaining to compensation and benefits, such authority must be exercised only "in respect to such claims." § 440.25(1). A section 440.205 wrongful discharge is not a claim for compensation or benefits as those terms are used in Chapter 440. See §§ 440.02(11) and (12); § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (1979). We thus hold that a wrongful discharge action is not cognizable by a deputy commissioner within Chapter 440. [3] *185 A section 440.205 action is likewise not a proper proceeding under Chapter 120. We do not believe that the deputy commissioner can be granted "agency status" for the purpose of section 440.205 adjudications. Section 440.021, Florida Statutes (1979), specifically exempts workers' compensation proceedings from the Administrative Procedure Act. We do not see the validity of any argument favoring otherwise. In conclusion, then, we hold that section 440.205 does create a cause of action for retaliatory discharge....

...o the employee personally or to a dependent of the employee, would be protected and provided full access to the courts. ADKINS, J., concurs. NOTES [1] The legislature could have specifically designated the forum for adjudicating claims arising under section 440.205 and provided the relief to which an aggrieved party is entitled for a violation thereof....

...[2] Decisions holding otherwise are disapproved to the extent of conflict with the opinion herein. See Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Dean, 416 So.2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). [3] Language in the opinion below that implies the deputy commissioner does have jurisdiction of a section 440.205 claim that is related to a pending claim for benefits otherwise due under Chapter 440 is dicta and is disavowed by this Court....

...be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan.... 11 Florida Statute § 440.205 is most closely analogous to § 510 of ERISA in that it prohibits the discharge of an employee in retaliation for the employee's claim or attempted claim for compensation under Florida's workers' compensation law. The question then is which Florida statute of limitations to apply to actions analogous to those under § 440.205: the four year statute for actions founded upon statutory liability, FLA.STAT....

...for benefits denied by a wrongful discharge. See Coats & Clark, 865 F.2d at 1241 ; Weitz, 913 F.2d at 1551 n. 12. 12 The Florida Supreme Court recently applied Florida's four year limitations period to wrongful discharge claims under Florida Statute § 440.205....

...It held that an earlier Florida Supreme Court decision, Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So.2d 513 (Fla.1970), did not govern the question of the appropriate statute of limitations for wrongful discharge suits brought pursuant to Florida statute § 440.205 because Goehring was decided before § 440.205 was enacted....

...utes. The court in Scott declared that it had not intended that federal courts rely upon Goehring so as to apply the two year statute to wrongful discharge claims. 524 So.2d at 643 . Instead it applied the four year statute for actions brought under § 440.205....

...former employer of plaintiff's deceased husband, who was discharged allegedly because he refused to surrender his hospital and disability benefits, was governed by four-year limitations period for wrongful discharge actions brought under Fla. Stat. § 440.205). 6 courts considering this limitation issue in the context of a section 502(a)(1)(B) suit have applied the state statute of limitations for actions on a written contract."); see also Massachusetts Mut....

...Plaintiff filed this cause of action alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., (Counts I-III), the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), Fla.Stat. §§ 760.01-11 [2] (Count IV), the Florida Workers' Compensation Act, Fla.Stat. § 440.205 (Count V), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VI)....

...The circuit court in Bearelly found that an action filed pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act is a tort claim that is subject to section 768.28(6) based on the decision reached in Scott II. See 2002 WL 982429 at *1. Scott II involved a retaliatory discharge claim brought under an entirely different statute, section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), a provision of the Workers' Compensation Law....

...Scott II, we then held that damages for emotional distress were available because the claim was tortious in nature. See 572 So.2d at 903. However, *1081 neither of these cases involved the issue of whether a retaliatory discharge claim brought under section 440.205 is subject to the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28....

...ion of the Workers' Compensation Law has no presuit notice requirements, no designated forum for adjudicating claims, no provision for the type of relief to which an aggrieved party is entitled, and no reference to any portion of section 768.28. See § 440.205, Fla. Stat. (2003). Therefore, we conclude that the Second District erred in relying on the reasoning in Bearelly and cases that interpreted section 440.205 to hold that claims filed under the Florida Civil Rights Act are subject to section 768.28(6)....

...Any answer filed shall be mailed to the aggrieved person by the person filing the answer. Both the complaint and the answer shall be verified. [4] We recognize that the First and Third District Courts of Appeal have concluded that because a retaliatory discharge claim brought pursuant to section 440.205 is tortious in nature under Scott I, it is subject to the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28....

...Lloyd, Fort Pierce, amicus curiae for Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers. SHAW, Justice. We have for review Otis Elevator Co. v. Scott, 503 So.2d 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), in which the court certified the following as a question of great public importance: Are actions for wrongful discharge brought pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), governed by Broward Builders Exchange, Inc....

...Goehring, 231 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1970). 503 So.2d at 943. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and answer the question in the negative. Scott obtained a verdict against Otis Elevator Company for wrongful employment termination in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law....

...o "all suits for wages or overtime, however accruing, as well as to suits for damages and penalties accruing under the laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime." Goehring, 231 So.2d at 515. The instant action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 is not a "suit for wages" for the purposes of section 95.11(4)(c)....

...Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 130, at 1029 (5th ed. 1984). Florida does not recognize a common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge. See Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1983). The legislature, however, enacted section 440.205 subsequent to Goehring, creating distinct limited statutory cause of action a for retaliatory discharge in the area of workers compensation. Claims under section 440.205 must be brought within the four-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(3)(f) for statutory causes of action....

...which is prohibited under Section 760.10. As discussed in Part I of this Opinion, the "charge" of prohibited conduct was Mrs. Russell's charge of sexual harassment as delineated in Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002). Second, according to Section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2002), an employer cannot discharge an employee in response to an employee's valid claim or attempt to claim Workers' Compensation benefits....

...Aggrieved at-will employees must await legislative action before bringing such suits before the courts. [1] Accordingly, the order under review which dismissed plaintiff's cause for failure to state a cause of action is Affirmed. NOTES [1] We note that the legislature has already responded to Segal by enacting section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...We review Otis Elevator Co. v. Scott, 551 So.2d 489, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), in which the court certified the following as a question of great public importance: ARE DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AVAILABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF IN AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.205, FLORIDA STATUTES? We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. Scott was terminated as an employee of Otis on September 25, 1980. Scott brought suit against Otis on September 10, 1984, contending that he had been wrongfully discharged in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), which states: 440.205 Coercion of employees....

...n the basis that Scott's suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for actions to recover wages or overtime. *903 Otis Elevator Co. v. Scott, 503 So.2d 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). This Court quashed that decision, holding that claims under section 440.205 are controlled by the four-year statute of limitations for statutory causes of action....

...1988). Upon remand, the Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the remaining issues on appeal. That court once again reversed the judgment but upon different grounds and remanded for a new trial. In its opinion, the court held that a claim under section 440.205 by itself did not authorize the recovery of damages for emotional distress....

...In a split decision, the court denied a motion for rehearing but certified the question which gives us jurisdiction. In Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1983), we held that while Florida does not recognize a common-law tort for retaliatory discharge, section 440.205 created a statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge. Then, in our earlier opinion in the instant case, we distinguished the limitations provision applicable to suits for wages or overtime by analogizing claims under section 440.205 to suits for intentional tort in which there could be recovery for emotional distress in addition to lost wages....

...859, 103 S.Ct. 131, 74 L.Ed.2d 113 (1982); Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.1981); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D.Ind. 1982); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 169 W. Va. 673, 289 S.E.2d 692 (1982). Section 440.205 reflects the public policy that an employee shall not be discharged for filing or threatening to file a workers' compensation claim....

...nd it necessary to refer briefly to two other aspects of the opinion of the district court of appeal. First, we do not believe it was necessary for Scott to prove that reinstatement was not a viable alternative in order to recover lost future wages. Section 440.205 does not authorize the court to order reinstatement of the employee and, at most, evidence that Otis may have offered *904 to rehire Scott would be defensive in nature....

...Although I concede that the question as answered in the majority opinion is a permissible extension of Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1983), and Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1988), I would hold that the damages arising from a violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), do not include a claim for emotional distress. I would equate a section 440.205 discharge of an employee to a breach of a contract for employment and allow only those damages that normally flow from a breach of contract action....

...easure of damages is the amount of compensation agreed upon for the remainder of the period, less the amount that the employee earned or might have earned. 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages §§ 31-35 (1988). This is an appropriate remedy for wrongful discharge. Section 440.205 came into being as part of chapter 79-40, Laws of Florida, a massive amendment to the prior workmen's compensation laws....

...[1] The remedies in the workers' compensation law are restricted to lost wages, lost earning capacity, and medical benefits. Nowhere are intangible benefits such as mental distress explicitly allowed. I therefore conclude that, when the provision leading to section 440.205 was included in chapter 79-40, there was no intent by the legislature to include mental distress as an element of damages....

...[2] Everyone is handicapped when the legislature creates a cause of action previously unknown and fails to specify the damages or penalties as a consequence thereof. I strongly suggest that the legislature review our interpretation of the damages available for a breach of § 440.205 to assure that this Court has forged the appropriate remedy for its violation.

...We reversed the district court’s holding in Byrd . In doing so, we characterized the essential nature of the plaintiff’s section 510 claim as one for benefits denied by wrongful discharge. Id. at 159 . Based on that characterization, we reasoned that “Florida Statute § 440.205 is most closely analogous to § 510 of ERISA in that it prohibits the discharge of an employee in retaliation for the employee’s claim or attempted claim for compensa *139 tion under Florida workers’ compensation law.” Id. A four-year statute of limitations governed claims under section 440.205....

...ischarged. Notarian filed a claim which he successfully pursued. He was discharged by Plantation. He sued Plantation and the Kayes, challenging his termination from employment. Notarian's complaint, composed of three counts, alleged the violation of section 440.205, Florida *1035 Statutes (1985), the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and insufficient notice of loss of employment....

...FADSIF settled Notarian's claim and he, in turn, assigned his lawsuit against Plantation to FADSIF. [2] Prior to the assignment to FADSIF, however, the trial court granted the Kayes' motion for partial summary judgment as to a wrongful discharge under section 440.205, the claim of insufficient pre-termination notice, and the prayer for attorney's fees associated with the intentional infliction of emotional distress....

...Scarfone, 468 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 478 So.2d 54 (Fla. 1985). The remaining elements of the complaint, however, present a different picture. Turning first to the cause of action grounded upon the conduct offending the proscription found in section 440.205, we are aware of the judicial policy treating the discharge of an "at-will" employee as nonactionable irrespective of the employer's motive....

...very event which occurred. Unlike the employee at-will, Notarian occupied a special status arising from the legislative purpose to insure unfettered access to the workers' compensation statute and to sanction a cause of action upon the violation of section 440.205....

...of damages allowable in the circumstances. See Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., P.A., 490 So.2d 993 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. LETTS and DELL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.205, Coercion of employees....

...lted in an excessive verdict. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial, we affirm. Plaintiff sued UPS for allegedly retaliating against him for filing workers' compensation claims, in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...employment. The plaintiff, Russell Schwalier, sued his employer, Cintas Corporation, alleging that he was fired from his job because he had filed a workers' compensation claim. A retaliatory discharge, such as the one alleged here, is prohibited by section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...Ross withdrew this complaint and the Commission issued a notice of dismissal on December 11, 1996. Mr. Ross did not file his lawsuit against Jim Adams Ford until July 21, 2000. His complaint contained two counts. In count II, he alleged that he had been terminated in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. See § 440.205, Fla....

...The trial court dismissed this count because it was filed more than four years after Mr. Ross's termination and was barred by the statute of limitations provided for statutory claims in section 95.11(3)(f). See Scott v. Otis Elevator, 524 So.2d 642 (Fla.1988) (holding four-year period for statutory actions applies to section 440.205 claims)....

...Before SHEPHERD and SALTER, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. SHEPHERD, J. Ricardo Ortega appeals a summary final judgment rendered against him in an action where he claims Engineering Systems Technology, Inc., unlawfully discharged him in retaliation for making a valid workers' compensation claim. See § 440.205, Fla....

...Borja denied ever receiving the second of the two DWC-4 forms furnished to him by Cooper, and could not recall receiving the report issued by Dr. Reyes on April 12, 2007. Both forms were found in his files. ANALYSIS In order to prevail on a retaliatory discharge claim under section 440.205 of the Florida Workers' Compensation Laws, Chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes, the employee must prove: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the employee's protected activity....

...the failure of a workers' compensation carrier to provide an employer with a Division of Workers' Compensation Form DWC-4, unequivocally advising the employer that Ortega was released to work, provides a complete defense to a retaliation claim under section 440.205 of the Florida Statutes....

...equitable relief. The district court properly dismissed the action as time-barred. 707 F.2d at 1315. However, in Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1988), our supreme court ruled that an action for wrongful discharge brought pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes [2] is not covered by section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes. The court explained: The instant action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 is not a "suit for wages" for the purposes of section 95.11(4)(c)....

...Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 130, at 1029 (5th ed. 1984). Florida law does not recognize a common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge. See Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1983). The legislature, however, enacted section 440.205 subsequent to Goehring, creating distinct limited statutory cause of action for retaliatory discharge in the area of workers compensation. Claims under section 440.205 must be brought within the four-year statute of *1372 limitations set forth in section 95.11(3)(f) for statutory causes of action....

against Plaintiff in violation of Fla. Stat. § 440.205 (Count III), misclassified Plaintiff in paying

...re renders a clear statement of its intent to do so. Maguire v. American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus, 442 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), pet. for rev. den., 451 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1984). Compared, for example, to the language found in Section 440.205 [3] ( see Smith, supra ), Section 240.513(3)(b)2 can hardly be said to constitute a "clear statement" of another legislative exception to the at will doctrine carved out for former employees of the old Shands....

...classified as permanent does not change operation of the at will doctrine where, as here, the employee's term of employment remains indefinite. Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), cert. den., 188 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1966). [3] Section 440.205....

...initiated a workers' compensation claim. According to the allegations of her amended complaint, she was constructively discharged from her position by the City as a retaliatory measure *1244 for filing the workers' compensation claim in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ry discharge and for breach of covenant of good faith dealing was error because neither of these counts was subject to the notice requirements of section 768.28(6)(a) since neither sounded in tort. Ms. Ostens assertion that her statutory claim under section 440.205 for retaliatory discharge is not tortious, is erroneous....

...ida Supreme Court in Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642, 643 (Fla.1988), observed that "[r]etaliatory discharge is tortious in nature." Recently, citing to Scott, the first district squarely held that an action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 is clearly a tort within the meaning of section 768.28 and that pre-suit notice is therefore required....

...[4] A cause of action for wrongful discharge may be maintained where the ground for discharge has been condemned by the legislature. See Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Admin., 427 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1983) (recognizing statutory action under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), for wrongful discharge where discharge is in retaliation for employee's pursuing workers' compensation claim)....

...— Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ... . (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS. — ... . (f) An action founded on a statutory liability. In Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1988), the claim was predicated upon a violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides that no employer shall discharge an employee because of his attempt to claim workers' compensation. In rejecting the contention that the suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, we stated: The instant action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 is not a "suit for wages" for the purposes of section 95.11(4)(c)....

...Michael Miller of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, Orlando, for appellants. Donna L. Bergh of Walker, Buckmaster, Miller & Ketcham, Orlando, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Employer/carrier appeals a workers' compensation order which found that claimant was wrongfully discharged contrary to the provisions of § 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...We conclude that a deputy commissioner is without jurisdiction to make such a determination unrelated to any pending claim for benefits otherwise due under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and we therefore reverse. The order determining that employer Piezo Technology violated § 440.205, Florida Statutes, is based on findings (1) "that the employer improperly terminated Geraldine Smith as a result of her attempts to claim further workmen's compensation benefits" instead of the alleged reason of excessive absenteeism; (2) that the deputy had "jurisdiction to hear this cause pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 440.205, § 440.25, and § 440.45," and (3) that a prior order denying additional benefits for the claim in question "does not preclude the undersigned from considering a violation of Fla. Stat. § 440.205 inasmuch as that statute is not predicated upon a showing that monetary benefits are due the injured worker." Section 440.205, Florida Statutes, provides that: No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law. The legislative history of § 440.205 shows that the bill was at one time drafted with explicit provisions for sanctions and jurisdiction in the circuit court....

...We conclude however that a wrongful discharge action is clearly not cognizable by a deputy commissioner within the parameters of Chapter 440. Although deputy commissioners are authorized by § 440.25(1) to "hear and determine all questions" in respect to a claim for compensation, the request for a § 440.205 wrongful discharge finding in the case before us is neither a claim for "compensation" nor "benefits" as those terms are used in Chapter 440....

...on; however, § 440.021 establishes that deputy commissioners are exempt from Chapter 120 and shall not be considered an agency or a part thereof. We find no authority for imbuing a deputy commissioner with "agency status" for the limited purpose of § 440.205 adjudications, and we therefore conclude that such adjudications may not be made under § 120.565, since that statute expressly requires agency action....

...WENTWORTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., dissents w/opinion. ERVIN, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. It is my view that the deputy does in fact have jurisdiction to entertain a claim alleging wrongful discharge. By looking only to the words of Section 440.205, it is difficult for one to glean the extent of the legislative purpose behind its enactment....

...d. The statute's history is a curious one: as first introduced in the Senate as Senate Bill 188, Journal of the Senate, p. 68 (April 3, 1979), it contained various amendments to Chapter 440, yet it made no provision relating to the subject matter of Section 440.205. That same day a committee substitute was *124 passed with minor amendments, none of which referred to Section 440.205. Id. at pp. 68-71. The bill was then referred to the House. On April 10, 1979, the House adopted amendments to the bill and passed it as amended. One of those amendments introduced a provision which eventually became Section 440.205....

...Although that committee recommended adoption, the full Senate refused, requesting instead that the House recede from its amendments or appoint a conference committee. Upon the House's refusal, a conference committee was appointed, which ultimately amended the bill passed by the House. One of the amendments eventually became Section 440.205, and, as finally enacted, retained only Section 1 of the House's amended bill and deleted all provisions for damages, injunctions, civil penalties and attorney's fees as provided in the amended House bill. Journal of the Senate, pp. 263-296 (April 26, 1979); Journal of the House of Representatives, pp. 323-352 (April 24, 1979). After considering the above history, I can only conclude that the legislature's enactment of Section 440.205, which eliminated all but Section 1 of the House's amended bill, does not reflect any intention that there be created a civil cause of action in the circuit court....

...the division at any time after a specific benefit becomes due and is not paid, and the deputy commissioner shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions in respect to such claims. The claimant's request for a finding under Section 440.205 is neither a "claim for compensation", nor a "claim for benefits", see Section 440.19. Indeed, Section 440.205 does not provide for any compensation or benefits....

...as provided for in this chapter." Section 440.02(11). Additionally, compensation or benefits allowable under Chapter 440 are generally predicated upon accidental injuries. See Section 440.02(18). Any case involving a wrongful discharge, pursuant to Section 440.205, on the other hand, would necessarily require proof of an intentional act. Although I find nothing in Section 440.205 explicitly conferring on a discharged employee the right to file a claim for benefits before a deputy commissioner, I do not think one can logically conclude that the statute fails to afford an aggrieved person the right to litigate a wrongful discharge in any forum....

...1st DCA 1981). I think it necessary to look, then, to the Administrative Procedure Act (Chapter 120) as a means of resolving the question of jurisdiction. Section 440.021, Florida Statutes (1979), does not expressly exclude determinations made under Section 440.205 from Chapter 120 proceedings....

...Compensation to conduct administrative hearings and issue orders under the APA which do not infringe upon the jurisdiction of deputy commissioners. Additionally, a reading of Section 440.44(2) [2] reinforces my belief that a wrongful discharge under Section 440.205 should only be resolved administratively....

...The Division, operating through the deputy commissioners, is the proper body — rather than the circuit courts — to decide issues relating to wrongful discharges. In my judgment, broad statutory powers repose special expertise in the Division to hear such cases as well as to apply and interpret the provisions of Section 440.205....

...For example, the Division, an arm of the Department of Labor and Employment Security, is entrusted with a variety of labor and employment matters. See Chapters 443, 446, 447 and 450. On the other hand, circuit courts are not specifically provided jurisdiction to determine the employment violation involved in Section 440.205 as, for example, are courts of competent jurisdiction authorized to hear actions alleging wage rate discrimination based on sex....

...Moreover, as a practical matter, deputy commissioners have no doubt frequently been exposed to instances of retaliatory discharge (but with no power to prevent it) which surfaced in connection with compensation hearings. In short, the determination of wrongful discharge under Section 440.205 is very closely related to the mainstream of workers' compensation law in Chapter 440. I consider also that the deputies' specific authorization to make findings under Section 440.205 lies in Section 120.565, providing: Each agency shall provide by rule the procedure for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory statements....

...If a hearing is held it shall be conducted pursuant to Section 120.57 on an expedited basis, or as otherwise agreed upon by the agency and the parties. We are not asked whether the deputy commissioner can properly act as agency head to determine a violation under Section 440.205....

...Florida Real Estate Comm'n., 358 So.2d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. den., 365 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1978). Additionally, we are specifically authorized to review any order of a deputy commissioner. See Section 440.271. In my judgment, were we to allow the deputy to issue a finding under Section 440.205, there would not result — as the e/c argues — an unfeasible and unprecedented bifurcation of an action between an administrative body and the circuit court....

...Hotel Corporation of America, 144 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1962); Girard Trust Company v. Tampashores Development Co., 95 Fla. 1010, 117 So. 786 (1928). [4] See Segal v. Arrow Industries, 364 So.2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). [1] Professor Alpert has also taken the position that "[Section 440.205] should provide the impetus to Florida's recognition of a cause of action." L....

...stem operates efficiently with maximum benefit to both employers and employees. [3] There appears to be no legal barrier foreclosing a deputy commissioner from acting as the agency head for the purpose of making a declaratory statement in construing Section 440.205....

...denied, 316 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1975); R.E. Ledford Const. Co. v. King, 381 So.2d 330, 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). There is also no reason why the Division could not delegate agency head status to the deputy commissioner for the limited purpose of resolving a Section 440.205 claim....

...ic] filing period [set forth in the EEOC Notice of Right to Sue]," id. ¶ 6. The Florida legislature has waived the sovereign immunity of the State of Florida and its subdivisions from tort actions, including those filed pursuant to Florida Statutes section 440.205....

...rom retaliating against workers who apply for or receive workers [sic] compensation benefits," id. ¶ 61. In light of these allegations, the Court construes Count III as alleging a violation of the Florida Workers' Compensation Act, Florida Statutes section 440.205, which provides that "[n]o employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation...

...Since that is the gist of the plaintiff's case, it follows that this dispute must be submitted to the judge of compensation claims within the workers' compensation system. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442 So.2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Plaintiff argues, however, that his claim falls within section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1993), which states: "Coercion of employees....

...is attempting to coerce him into settling his workers' compensation claim by not respecting his physical limitations and by claiming to have work which he can perform, when such work is not actually available. Plaintiff alleges that his claim under section 440.205 falls within the scope of Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla.1983). We disagree. In Smith, the Florida Supreme Court held that "section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), creates a statutory cause of action for a wrongful discharge in retaliation for an employee's pursuit of a workers' compensation claim and such action is not cognizable before a deputy commissioner but rather is cognizable in a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. at 183-84 (footnote omitted). In Smith, the employee had actually been discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim. Id. at 183. The Florida Supreme Court held that section 440.205 creates a cause of action for retaliatory discharge....

...This dispute is squarely within the grant of jurisdiction to the judge of compensation claims under subsection 440.15(6). In order to read the various parts of chapter 440 harmoniously with each other, we conclude that a dispute that falls within the scope of subsection 440.15(6) is outside the coverage of section 440.205....

...Devine of Coffman, Coleman, Andrews & Grogan, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee. LAWRENCE, J. Janice Kelley and Sherry Williams (appellants) seek review of the trial court's order dismissing their complaint with prejudice for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The dismissal was with prejudice because the time for curing the defect had expired when the order of dismissal was entered. We affirm. Appellants argue that the presuit notice under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1997), was not required because section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1997), contains an implicit waiver of the notice requirement. We disagree. Section 440.205 contains no language which lends any significant support to appellants' argument. An action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 is clearly a "tort" within the meaning of section 768.28 and presuit notice is therefore required....

...all be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan.... Florida Statute § 440.205 is most closely analogous to § 510 of ERISA in that it prohibits the discharge of an employee in retaliation for the employee’s claim or attempted claim for compensation under Florida’s workers’ compensation law. The question then is which Florida statute of limitations to apply to actions analogous to those under § 440.205: the four year stat *160 ute for actions founded upon statutory liability, FLA.STAT....

...benefits denied by a wrongful discharge. See Coats & Clark, 865 F.2d at 1241 ; Weitz, 913 F.2d at 1551 n. 12. The Florida Supreme Court recently applied Florida’s four year limitations period to wrongful discharge claims under Florida Statute § 440.205....

...It held that an earlier Florida Supreme Court decision, Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So.2d 513 (Fla.1970), did not govern the question of the appropriate statute of limitations for wrongful discharge suits brought pursuant to Florida statute § 440.205 because Goehring was decided before § 440.205 was enacted....

...utes. The court in Scott declared that it had not intended that federal courts rely upon Goehring so as to apply the two year statute to wrongful discharge claims. 524 So.2d at 643 . Instead it applied the four year statute for actions brought under § 440.205....

...directed verdict only where no proper view of the evidence could sustain a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. See Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So.2d 315, 329 (Fla.2001); McQueen v. Jersani, 909 So.2d 491, 492-93 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Section 440.205 of the Florida Statutes provides that no employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the workers' compensation law. Ms. Andrews' complaint alleged that she was discharged because of her attempt to claim benefits under the workers' compensation law. In order to establish a prima facie retaliation case under section 440.205, the plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements: (1) a statutorily protected expression; (2) an adverse employment action; and, (3) a causal connection between participation in the protected expression and the adverse action....

...The central contention before the Court, then, is the proper construction of Fla.Stat. § 61.1301(2)(j)(2). The Magistrate found the remedy of punitive damages available because this remedy appears to be available under a different retaliatory discharge statute, Fla.Stat. § 440.205, and the Florida legislature has explicitly excluded the remedy in some statutes....

...asonable attorney's fees and costs incurred." Defendant urges that this listing be read as all inclusive and the Court concurs. The significance of the listing of remedies may be understood better by examining other statutes. For example, Fla. Stat. § 440.205 protects employees from discharge or other retaliation "by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." The Florida Supreme Court in Scott intimated that punitive damages may be available for suits brought pursuant to § 440.205....

...Because the Court will sustain the objections, the motion will be properly construed as a motion to dismiss and granted in that form. The Court treats the posture of the motion as a limitation on the arguments available to defendant in its appeal. [2] "The scope of damages permitted under ... section 440.205 ......

...n. On remand, the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court concerning the availability of damages for emotional distress, a question not yet answered. It is noteworthy that the Florida Supreme Court described § 440.205 as a "distinct limited statutory cause of action for retaliatory discharge in the area of workers compensation." 524 So.2d at 643....

...As the Archdiocese argues, similar questions could affect the special relationship between a priest and his church or the ability of a priest to receive and maintain church confidences. Another impermissible infringement upon a priest's employment relationship and the church's internal governance could arise pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2006), which protects an employee from a retaliatory discharge in response to the employee's filing of a valid workers' compensation claim....

...4th DCA 1987), we felt compelled to reverse because of the broad language in Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1970), but certified the following question as being of great public importance: Are actions for wrongful discharge brought pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), governed by Broward Builders Exchange, Inc....

...ON APPELLEE'S MOTIONS FOR REHEARING, CERTIFICATION AND REHEARING EN BANC PER CURIAM. We deny the motions except for certification, which we grant, concluding the following to be a question of great public importance: ARE DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AVAILABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF IN AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.205, FLORIDA STATUTES? In denying the motion for rehearing, we reaffirm that this court applied in this case the clear abuse of discretion standard and determined that the exclusion of the witness by the trial court was erroneous. GLICKSTEIN, J., and KLEIN, HERBERT M., Associate Judge, concur. ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. ANSTEAD, Judge, dissenting in part. The scope of damages permitted under the retaliatory discharge statute, section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), remains an open question in Florida....

...However, I now conclude that damages for emotional distress as well as other damages usually associated with the commission of an intentional tort may be recoverable under the statute. My conclusion is predicated on the Florida Supreme Court's comparison of the statute with tort actions allowed in other jurisdictions. Section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), provides: No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Worker's Compensation Law. In Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators, Inc., 427 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1983), the supreme court held that, although Florida does not recognize a common law tort for retaliatory discharge, section 440.205 created a statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge. In Scott v. Otis Elevator Company, 524 So.2d 642, 643 (Fla. 1988) the supreme court held that the enactment of section 440.205 created a cause of action for retaliatory discharge that "is tortious in nature." 524 So.2d at 643....

...ther than negligence, and allow recovery for emotional distress and punitive damages, as well as lost wages. The court noted that, although Florida did not recognize a common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge, the legislature had enacted section 440.205 so as to create a "distinct limited statutory cause of action for retaliatory discharge in the area of workers compensation." Scott, at 643....

...ining the extent of a plaintiff's damages, a court should utilize tort damages. Cagle, 726 P.2d at 436. I believe the holding in Scott that wrongful termination is tortious in nature, means that an employer who terminates an employee in violation of section 440.205 exposes itself to liability for those damages generally awardable to the victim of a tort....

...A few days later Climatrol offered Pericich another less physically demanding position which Pericich had previously requested. Nevertheless, Pericich failed to respond to or accept the offer. Instead, Pericich brought an action against Climatrol, claiming the company had violated section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1987), which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee "by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation ......

...ich was discharged for legitimate business reasons, i.e., he was no longer able to perform his job. A summary final judgment was entered in favor of Climatrol and Pericich appealed. We affirm. In its judgment the trial court correctly concluded that section 440.205 only prohibits the retaliatory discharge of an employee "by reason of" the filing of a workers' compensation claim....

...Having found that Pericich's allegations fail to raise any triable issues of material fact, the summary final judgment in favor of Climatrol is affirmed. Because of our disposition, we find it unnecessary to address other points raised on appeal. Affirmed. NOTES [1] Section 440.205 states: "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." [2] See A....

...nsibilities. They caution an employer, however, not to take immediate action against an employee following a work-related injury or immediately upon the employee's return to work after suffering a work-related injury, since such action would violate section 440.205.

...Jackson County Tax Collector, 745 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), and the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Osten v. City of Homestead, 757 So.2d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). [1] The issue is whether workers' compensation retaliation claims brought against the State under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2004), are subject to the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (2004). [2] For the reasons expressed below, we hold that the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28(6) do not apply to causes of action brought against the State under section 440.205....

...Charlene Bifulco worked for PBFS as an admitting registrar from July 2002 until May 2004, when her employment was terminated. Bifulco filed suit against PBFS, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...to section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes[,] was fatal to [her] claim." Id. In doing so, the trial court relied on the decision of the First District in Kelley , which affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of a complaint for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 because the plaintiff had not complied with the presuit *1257 notice requirements of section 768.28(6). The First District in Kelley held that "[a]n action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 is clearly a `tort' within the meaning of section 768.28 and presuit notice is therefore required....

...On appeal, the Fifth District reversed the trial court's summary judgment. Bifulco, 997 So.2d at 1258. The Fifth District explained its reasoning for holding that the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28(6) are inapplicable to claims under section 440.205: The sole purpose for the enactment of section 768.28 was to waive sovereign immunity for breaches of common law torts....

...City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912, 917 (Fla.1985). The condition precedent of presuit notice, created by section 768.28, was only intended to apply to suits for which immunity was waived by enactment of the statute, to wit: common law torts. A claim for violation of section 440.205, although perhaps tort-like in nature, is not a claim sounding in common law tort....

...urt's summary judgment was reversed. Stating that Kelley was "wrongly decided," the Fifth District acknowledged conflict with the First District in Kelley and the Third District in Osten . [4] We granted review to resolve this conflict. II. ANALYSIS Section 440.205 of the Workers' Compensation Law creates a cause of action for employees who are subject to retaliatory treatment by their employers for attempting to claim workers' compensation. Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof'l Adm'rs, 427 So.2d 182, 183-84 (Fla.1983). Specifically, section 440.205 provides the following: No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law....

..." subject to liability was "a waiver of sovereign immunity independent of the waiver contained in section 768.28"). Moreover, the Legislature's choice not to refer to section 768.28 within chapter 440 is additional evidence that claims brought under section 440.205 are not subject to the presuit notice requirements of *1258 section 768.28(6)....

...768.28 apply to each such corporation, which is deemed to be a corporation primarily acting as an instrumentality of the state...."). By contrast, the Legislature has made no indication that it intends the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28(6) to apply to causes of action brought under section 440.205....

...CONCLUSION Because chapter 440 contains a waiver of sovereign immunity independent of the waiver contained in section 768.28, we hold that the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28(6) do not apply to retaliatory discharge actions brought against the State under section 440.205....

...o the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. [2] There have been no changes to section 440.205 or section 768.28(6) since the claims arose in the case under review or the conflict cases....

...scovered this fact upon arriving at Sears on January 4, 2001. Plaintiff alleges that Swanson knew she would not be coming to work until the pain of her foot condition had lessened. Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 440.205 in the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Martin County Florida, and the action was removed to this Court on diversity grounds on February 16, 2001....

...Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Defendant moves for summary judgment based on Plaintiff's failure to provide evidence of intent that Defendant terminated her in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim in violation of Fla. Stat. § 440.205....

...This provision of the Florida Statutes provides "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Worker's Compensation Law." Fla. Stat. § 440.205....

...Janet Rease appeals a final judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Anheuser-Busch, Inc., in her action for damages against Anheuser-Busch for terminating her employment because she pursued workers' compensation benefits. Her action was premised on section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...er week. After unsuccessfully pursuing a grievance against Anheuser-Busch, [2] Rease commenced the present action on August 1, 1991, when she filed a complaint alleging that Anheuser-Busch terminated her employment on August 5, 1987, in violation of section 440.205....

...ed to introduce evidence of Rease's receipt of workers' compensation wage-loss benefits. Rease argued that such evidence was an improper consideration of a collateral source and was irrelevant to the ultimate issue of whether Anheuser-Busch violated section 440.205....

...collateral source, that Anheuser-Busch's status as being self-insured does not change the collateral nature of the benefits, and that the payment of workers' compensation benefits was not probative of whether she had been terminated in violation of section 440.205, since the obligation to pay wage-loss benefits continues even after the employee is terminated....

...As the court in Robbins stated, "[T]he fact that limiting statutes bar the bringing of a cause of action on stale facts does not, alone, render those same facts inadmissible as evidence of motive to prove another valid cause of action." 613 So.2d at 581. A violation of section 440.205 is considered an intentional tort, [5] and Anheuser-Busch's state of mind was relevant to the issue of liability....

...There, the proposal was relevant to the defendant's liability as alleged in the lawsuit. But in the present case, the July 9, 1991, letter did not relate to the controversy embodied in the present lawsuit involving charges of improper conduct in violation of section 440.205....

...Obviously, the statement embodied in the letter to the effect that Anheuser-Busch considered Rease to be terminated is an admission on the company's part and highly probative of the issue of whether Rease, in fact, had been terminated from her employment for purposes of the application of section 440.205. Thus, the letter was critical to Rease's case, and its exclusion constituted prejudicial error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. REVERSED and REMANDED. KAHN and BENTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.205 provides that "[n]o employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." [...

...McCoy appeals an order awarding attorneys' fees to Pinellas County pursuant to section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes (2003). The fees were awarded after Ms. McCoy voluntarily dismissed her action under chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2003), the Florida Civil Rights Act, and section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2003), in order to comply with Pinellas County's demand that she abide by the notice provisions of section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...She amended her complaint to include a claim for retaliation. When the 180-day claims period under section 760.11(3) expired without action by the Commission, Ms. McCoy filed her lawsuit alleging two counts: a claim for violation *1261 of chapter 760 and a separate claim for violation of section 440.205, which provides a cause of action for retaliatory discharge arising from a workers' compensation claim....

...See Maggio v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 899 So.2d 1074 (Fla.2005). Under Maggio, there was no need to dismiss this lawsuit. Admittedly, the case law does require that a notice under section 768.28 must be submitted in order to pursue a claim under section 440.205....

...olation of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See id. at 6 & ¶ 26. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants fired him in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim, in violation of Florida Statute § 440.205....

...It therefore is recommended that the Court grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II in its entirety. Count III In Count III, Plaintiff claims that Defendants fired him in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim, in violation of Florida Statute § 440.205....

...That statute provides: "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." Fla. Stat. § 440.205....

...Employers still retain their traditional right to terminate employees for legitimate business reasons, such as unsatisfactory job performance or excessive absenteeism. Pericich v. Climatrol, Inc., 523 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Similar to a Title VII claim, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of § 440.205 retaliation by demonstrating: (1) a statutorily protected expression; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the protected expression and the adverse action....

...Notably, the Third District Court of Appeal explicitly wrote that a plaintiff must establish that fact "at a minimum . ." Russell 887 So.2d at 379. Additionally, in setting forth that "causal connection" standard (as well as other standards related to the prima facie case and to the entire § 440.205 cause of action), the Third District Court of Appeal exclusively relied on and quoted numerous Eleventh Circuit decisions regarding Title VII and related federal-law retaliation claims, which strongly suggests that the same standards for establishing a causal connection for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim apply to a § 440.205 claim....

...mpensation claim at the time they terminated Plaintiffs employment. *1230 Nevertheless, as discussed infra, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish a causal connection, and therefore a prima facie case, pursuant to Florida Statute § 440.205....

...individuals working for the company on December 15, 2004. If Defendants fired Plaintiff in order to avoid paying him the Christmas bonus, then Defendants did not fire him for filing his workers' compensation claim and Plaintiff cannot succeed on his § 440.205 claim because that statute "only prohibits the retaliatory discharge of an employee `by reason of the filing of a workers' compensation claim." Pericich v....

...Climatrol, Inc., 523 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). In other words, even if Defendants fired Plaintiff for some improper motive other than because he filed a workers' compensation claim, that improper motive cannot form the basis of Plaintiffs § 440.205 claim....

...jection (by Plaintiffs counsel): "Object to the form. Answer if you know." A (by Plaintiff): Yes. Edwards Dep., at 131-32. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the "causal connection" element of his prima facie case for a violation of Florida Statute § 440.205, and even if Plaintiff had met his burden of establishing a prima facie case, Defendants have proffered legitimate reasons for firing Plaintiff and Plaintiff has not submitted evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that...

...Additionally, Plaintiff failed to cite legal authority in support of almost all, if not all, of his legal arguments. Plaintiff cited only one legal decision in his Response, and it was to support the uncontested (by Defendants) and non-controversial proposition that Florida Statute § 440.205 provides a cause of action for retaliatory discharge for pursuing a workers' compensation case. See D.E. # 48, at 6 n. 13 (citing Smith v. Piezo Technology of Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla.1983)). Although the question of whether Florida Statute § 440.205 provides a cause of action for retaliatory discharge for pursuing a workers' compensation case may have been a disputed issue prior to the Supreme Court of Florida's 1983 decision in Smith, now—twenty-three years later—that is an unassai...

...of the statute. See Audio Visual Innovations, Inc. v. Spiessbach, 119 So. 3 3d 522, 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). A claim for workers’ compensation benefits is distinct from a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2012). The arbitration agreement is valid as applied to the retaliation claim in this case....

...Here, AMS never sought to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The only claim that AMS sought to arbitrate is the plaintiff’s claim in the underlying lawsuit for retaliatory discharge in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...Here, the arbitration agreement was not so outrageously unfair as to shock the judicial conscience. The agreement did not deprive the plaintiff of any statutory cause of action. As discussed above, arbitration of a retaliatory discharge claim does not defeat the remedial purpose of section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...ations period. We conclude that it did. Suit was filed in the present case on September 10, 1984, almost four years after appellee was fired, the time at which the cause of action occurred. Both parties agree that this action was brought pursuant to Section 440.205 Florida Statutes (1979), which states: No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate or cause any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law....

...In his complaint appellee requested actual, compensatory and punitive damages, but received only past and future wages and benefits. In our opinion, the present case is governed by Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So.2d 513, (Fla. 1970), decided prior to the enactment of Section 440.205, in which the Florida Supreme Court stated that Section *943 95.11(7)(b), [1] the predecessor of 95.11(4)(c) was the applicable statute of limitations for recovery of wages under a contract: As to the argument concerning the Fair Labo...

...While there was no contract here, we believe that we are compelled to follow the above case because of its broad language. Nevertheless, because of the absence of any contract in the present case, we certify the following question as being of great public importance: Are actions for wrongful discharge brought pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), governed by Broward Builders Exchange, Inc....

WALLACE, Judge. Philip Hornfíscher challenges a final summary judgment entered in favor of his former employer, the Manatee County Sheriffs Office (the MCSO), on Mr. Horn-fischer’s claim for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...e did not assume his new duties. After an administrative hearing, the MCSO notified Mr. Hornfischer that his employment was terminated on May 24, 2007. In October 2010, Mr. Hornfischer filed an action against the MCSO for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205....

...es even the slightest doubt that an issue might exist, summary judgment is improper.” Holland v. Verheul, 583 So.2d 788, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). III. THE APPLICABLE LAW Mr. Hornfischer’s claim against the MCSO is based on an alleged violation of section 440.205....

...n and the employee’s protected activity were causally related. Ortega v. Eng’g Sys. Tech., Inc., 30 So.3d 525, 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (citing Russell v. KSL Hotel Corp., 887 So.2d 372, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)). In order to establish a claim under section 440.205, the employee’s pursuit of workers’ compensation need not be the only reason for a discharge....

...1st DCA 1988). “The statute prohibits any discharge ‘by reason of an attempt to claim compensation even if there may also be other reasons for the discharge.” Id. In addition, proof of a discharge is not essential to a recovery under the statute. Section 440.205 creates a cause of action for intimidation or coercion even in the absence of a discharge. Chase v. Walgreen Co., 750 So.2d 93, 97-98 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Finally, the employee need not establish a specific retaliatory intent in order to prevail. Allan, 535 So.2d at 639 . In considering employee claims for retaliatory discharge under 440.205, courts use the following framework: Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by proving the protected activity and the negative employment action are not completely unrelated, the burden then shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action....

...ent of the actions, statements, and credibility of the participants, and the drawing of appropriate inferences informed by one’s life experience and understanding of human nature. For this reason, employee actions for a retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 are often ill suited to final disposition on a motion for summary judgment....

...Morello, P.A., Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Eric R. Eide, of Grower, Ketcham, More', Rutherford, Noecker, Bronson, Siboni & Eide, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee. GRIFFIN, J. Brenda Diana Chase ["Chase"] appeals a final order of dismissal of her claim for damages pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Chase rose from a seated position to a standing position and injured her back. Chase filed another claim. Chase returned to work with some physical restrictions. Although still employed by Walgreen, Chase filed a one-count complaint on August 6, 1998, alleging that in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1993), she suffered retaliatory adverse employment action as a result of filing a valid worker's compensation claim....

...ges for mental anguish, humiliation, and embarrassment." Walgreen filed a motion to dismiss Chase's complaint for failure to state a cause of action, urging that because she remained employed with the defendant, she had no claim. Walgreen urges that section 440.205 only authorizes a claim where there has been a discharge from employment....

...on of the Judge of Compensation Claims The court entered a final order of dismissal with prejudice on January 29, 1999. In its order, the court summarized the parties' legal arguments as follows: 3. The primary argument of the Defendant is that F.S. § 440.205 provides a cause of action for wrongful termination, but does not provide a cause of action for allegations of threats, intimidation, or coercion absent the termination, discharge, or constructive discharge of the Plaintiff....

...The court agreed with the defendant as a matter of law and concluded that Chase failed to state a cause of action: 5. I have fully considered the case law cited by the parties. I have noted the Supreme Court of Florida decisions which have referenced F.S. § 440.205 as providing a cause of action for wrongful discharge....

...rcion or intimidation where there was not a corresponding termination or discharge from employment. The recent case of Montes de Oca v. Orkin Ext. Co., 692 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), cited by the Defendant, supports the more limited scope of F.S. § 440.205 advocated by the Defendant....

...o actual termination), I am also constrained by the rule of law that statutory causes of action in derogation of the common law must be construed narrowly. Accordingly, I find that the case law cited by the Defendant supports its assertion that F.S. § 440.205 provides a cause of action only for retaliatory discharge or termination....

...coercion even in cases where the Plaintiff continues to be employed with that employer. 7. As the complaint alleges that the Plaintiff continues to be employed with the Defendant, I find that the complaint does not state a cause of action under F.S. § 440.205. The question presented appears to be a question of first impression in Florida; namely, whether section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1993), entitled "Coercion of Employees," creates a cause of action for retaliatory "intimidation or coercion" absent a discharge. It is clear that the statute creates a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla.1990); Smith *96 v. Piezo Tech. and Prof'l Adm'rs, 427 So.2d 182, 183 (Fla.1983). Section 440.205, entitled "Coercion of Employees," provides as follows: No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law....

...In other words, "[i]f the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must derive legislative intent from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended." Id. Chase argues that the plain meaning of section 440.205 prohibits four distinct adverse employment actions and is not limited to discharge or threatened discharge....

...Walgreen argues that the third district has addressed the issue at bar in Montes de Oca v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 692 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 699 So.2d 1374 (Fla.1997). Specifically, Walgreen argues that the third district declined the opportunity to extend the application of section 440.205 beyond retaliatory discharge....

...He was also offered a position within his restrictions but was later informed that the position was no longer available. Id. Orkin refused to make further worker's compensation payments on the ground that the plaintiff refused to return to work. Id. Plaintiff then filed suit alleging, inter alia, violation of section 440.205....

...uch work is not actually available." Id. The third district disagreed. The third district distinguished the supreme court's holding in Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182, in which the supreme court had held that section 440.205 created a cause of action for retaliatory discharge and that the circuit court rather than the JCC had jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim under the statute....

...This dispute is squarely within the grant of jurisdiction to the judge of compensation claims under subsection 440.15(6). [3] In order to read the various parts of chapter 440 harmoniously with each other, we conclude that a dispute that falls within the *99 scope of subsection 440.15(6) is outside the coverage of section 440.205. Id. Under those circumstances, the court declined the plaintiff's request to extend the application of section 440.205 beyond retaliatory discharge: Plaintiff in essence asks us to expand the holding of Smith beyond retaliatory discharge, so that in every case in which there is a dispute under subsection 440.14(6), the employee would be allowed to file a companion civil action in circuit court alleging intimidation or coercion....

...By relying on Montes de Oca and the retaliatory discharge cases, the lower court erroneously entered summary judgment against the plaintiff. [4] REVERSED and REMANDED. W. SHARP, J., concurs. COBB, J., dissents, with opinion. COBB, J., dissenting. The issue in this case is whether section 440.205, Florida Statutes, creates a statutory cause of action, separate and apart from the context of a workers' compensation claim, for an individual against his employer when that individual's employment is ongoing....

...laim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law. The trial court, in a thoughtful final order of dismissal, explained its reasoning: 1. The Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant alleging a violation of § 440.205 Florida Statutes (1997)....

...A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was held in chambers on January 8, 1999. Counsel for each party was present at the hearing and provided the court with copies of case law relied upon in support of their respective arguments. 3. The primary argument of the Defendant is that F.S. § 440.205 provides a cause of action from wrongful termination, but does not provide a cause of action for allegations of threats, intimidation, or coercion absent the termination, discharge, or constructive discharge of the Plaintiff....

...n for threats to discharge, intimidation, or coercion in addition to actual termination or discharge itself. 5. I have fully considered the case law cited by the parties. I have noted the Supreme Court of Florida decisions which have referenced F.S. § 440.205 as providing a cause of action for wrongful discharge....

...or intimidation *100 where there was not a corresponding termination or discharge from employment. The recent case of Montes de Oca v. Orkin Ext. Co., 692 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), cited by the Defendant, supports the more limited scope of F.S. § 440.205 advocated by the Defendant....

...o actual termination), I am also constrained by the rule of law that statutory causes of action in derogation of the common law must be construed narrowly. Accordingly, I find that the case law cited by the Defendant supports its assertion that F.S. § 440.205 provides a cause of action only for retaliatory discharge or termination....

...coercion even in cases where the Plaintiff continues to be employed with that employer. 7. As the complaint alleges that the Plaintiff continues to be employed with the Defendant, I find that the complaint does not state a cause of action under F.S. § 440.205. As pointed out by the trial court, the Florida Supreme Court has rendered two opinions discussing section 440.205....

...thus, because the legislature enacted a statute that clearly imposes a duty and because the intent of the section is to preclude retaliatory discharge, the statute confers by implication every particular power necessary to ensure the performance of that duty.... We hold, therefore, that F.S. § 440.205 does create a statutory cause of action. Smith at 184. The supreme court addressed section 440.205 again in the case of Scott v. Otis Elevator Company, 572 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1990). The primary issue in the Scott case was whether the plaintiff could recover damages for emotional distress under section 440.205, Florida Statutes. In deciding this issue, the court referred back to its decision in Smith in stating: "... we held that while Florida does not recognize a common-law tort for retaliatory discharge, section 440.205 created a statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge." 572 So.2d at 903. The court then went on to state: "Section 440.205 reflects the public policy that an employee shall not be discharged for filing or threatening to file a workers' compensation claim." Id. In the Smith and Scott cases, the Supreme Court of Florida has clearly stated that section 440.205, Florida Statutes is a "retaliatory discharge" statute and made no reference to the statute covering other retaliatory or adverse actions absent a discharge. In fact, the supreme court in Smith stated "... the intent of the section is to preclude retaliatory discharge. ..." 427 So.2d at 184 (emphasis added). The Third District Court of Appeal was faced with the issue of expanding the scope of section 440.205 in the case of Montes de Oca v. Orkin Exterminating Company, 692 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In Montes de Oca, the plaintiff brought several claims against the employer, including a claim under section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...The court stated that: *101 Plaintiff asserts that Orkin is attempting to coerce him into settling his workers' compensation claim by not respecting his physical limitations and by claiming to have work which he can perform, when such work is not actually available. Plaintiff alleges that his claim under Section 440.205 falls within the scope of Smith v....

...Southwest Gulfcoast, Inc., doing business as Southwest Forest Industries, seeks review of a circuit court order denying its motion to dismiss appellee's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The question before us is whether Allan's cause of action, based on section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1983), alleging he was wrongfully discharged by Southwest Forest for filing a workers' compensation claim, is preempted by section 301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A., section 185....

...ation law can be enforced, as well as state/federal relations in respect to the administration of that law. For the reasons hereafter expressed, we affirm the appealed order upon the conclusion that section 301 has not preempted state enforcement of section 440.205. Allan's complaint, filed March 28, 1985, alleged that he was an employee and that Southwest Forest was an employer within the meaning of section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...Additional defenses alleged were that: (1) The complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted (without specifying explicit grounds and substantial matters of law to be argued); (2) Southwest Forest had in no way violated Allan's rights under section 440.205 but, rather, Allan "gave false information to the Defendant during its investigation of this matter," and thus Allan "was discharged for good and sufficient cause" and not "to deter or prevent Allan or other employees from filing legi...

...Specifically, the labor agreement provides that discharge from employment must be "based on just and sufficient cause." Thus, Southwest Forest contends, any complaint regarding Allan's discharge is a matter to be adjusted as a grievance under the agreement, and Allan's state action "in tort" under section 440.205 is preempted by section 301 as construed by the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers....

...denied, Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Garibaldi, 471 U.S. 1099, 105 S.Ct. 2319, 85 L.Ed.2d 839 (1985); Peabody Galion v. A.V. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir.1981). Only Baldracchi, of all the cases coming to our attention, involves a statutory provision similar to section 440.205, and that case found no preemption in respect to the employee's enforcement of the statute in a state court action against the employer....

...Any agreement by an employee to waive his right to compensation under chapter 440 is declared invalid by statute. § 440.21, Fla. Stat. (1983). Similarly it *227 would be illegal for the parties to a collective bargaining agreement to attempt, by that agreement, to waive the employee's right under section 440.205 not to be discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim....

...that "it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract." 471 U.S. at 212, 105 S.Ct. at 1912, 85 L.Ed.2d at 216. Section 440.205, as do the other provisions in chapter 440, "confers non-negotiable state law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract"; therefore, these workers' compensation rights, by definition, cannot be...

...scharge claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the labor contract. Reference to the agreement's provision that discharge from employment must be "based on just and sufficient cause" is not necessary because the statutory right under section 440.205 exists independently of the agreement and cannot be modified or waived by the agreement. In short, Southwest Forest fails to show how the enforcement of section 440.205 will conflict with federal labor contract law or frustrate the federal scheme if enforced in appellee's state court action....

...For the foregoing reasons, federal preemption does not apply in this case. The appealed order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is AFFIRMED. JOANOS, J., concurs. CAWTHON, VICTOR M., Associate Judge, dissents. NOTES [1] Section 440.205 provides: Coercion of employees....

...Reiner of Broussard, Cullen, Pearson Wise & Simms, Orlando, for Appellee. KELLY, Judge. The appellant, Lana J. Hodges, filed suit against the appellee, Citrus World, Inc., d/b/a Florida Natural Growers, under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law, section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...t. A few days later, Hodges received a letter from Citrus World confirming that her employment had been terminated. Because Hodges believed that Citrus World had retaliated against her for seeking workers' compensation benefits, she filed suit under section 440.205. Citrus World filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that there were no material issues of fact because Hodges had admitted that her discharge was not a result of Citrus World's alleged violation of section 440.205 but was a result of Hodges' violation of the "three-day rule." Citrus World pointed to Hodges' deposition in which she testified that, during the course of her meetings with Citrus World regarding the end of her employment, (1) Citrus...

...2d DCA 1958). Here, because issues of material fact remain, summary judgment was improperly granted. Accordingly, we reverse the final summary judgment in favor of Citrus World and remand for further proceedings. FULMER and STRINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2000), provides the following: "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under...

...Thomas Harper and Michael W. Bishop, of Haynsworth, Baldwin, Miles, Johnson, Breckenridge & Harper, Jacksonville, for appellee. WENTWORTH, Judge. Appellant seeks review of a final judgment entered in accordance with a jury verdict determining that appellee did not violate section 440.205, Florida Statutes, in terminating appellant's employment....

...Appellant has demonstrated no other error below, and we therefore affirm the order appealed. Appellant filed a multiple count complaint seeking both compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that appellee wrongfully terminated his employment in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...ment. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and appellee appealed to this court. In that appeal, Southwest Gulfcoast Inc. v. Allan, 513 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the jurisdictional ruling was affirmed. The appellate opinion suggests that section 440.205, Florida Statutes, operates independently of the collective bargaining agreement, and that the question of whether appellant was discharged in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes, is properly addressed in the state forum....

...ion" for pursuing a worker's compensation claim. Emphasizing that this need not be the only reason for appellant's discharge, the court directed the jury to determine whether the desire to retaliate was a substantial factor in appellant's discharge. Section 440.205, Florida Statutes, provides that: No Employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Worker's Compensation Law....

...As the court recognized, this enactment does not require that the employee's pursuit of worker's compensation benefits be the only reason for a discharge. The statute prohibits any discharge "by reason of" an attempt to claim compensation, even if there may also be other reasons for the discharge. And while section 440.205 has been characterized as a "retaliatory discharge" provision, see Smith v....

SILBERMAN, Judge. Audio Visual Innovations, Inc. (AVI), seeks review of the order denying its motion to compel arbitration of Michael G. Spiessbach’s claim for retaliatory discharge which was filed pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2011). AVI argues that the trial court erroneously determined that arbitration would defeat the remedial purposes of section 440.205....

...And AVI claims that it was entitled to arbitration because it otherwise satisfied all the elements of arbitrability. We agree with both points and reverse. In April 2012, Spiessbach filed a complaint alleging that AVI’s termination of his employment was a retaliatory discharge in violation of section 440.205....

...rbitration under the dispute resolution agreement that Spiess-bach had signed when he was hired. After conducting a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying AVI’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that “[t]he remedial purposes of Section 440.205, Fla....

...OP Winter Haven, Inc., 86 So.3d 456, 474 (Fla.2011). Because AVI has not produced a transcript of the hearing on Spiessbach’s motion to compel, we are unable to conclusively determine which provisions of the agreement the court found defeated the remedial purposes of section 440.205....

...Spiessbach directs our attention to the agreement’s provisions regarding payment of the arbitrator’s fees and expenses and the arbitrator’s authority to award attorney’s fees and costs. We disagree that these provisions defeat Spiessbach’s remedies under section 440.205....

...mployee relating to or arising out of the individual’s employment.” But Spiessbach argues that his claim falls under the agreement’s exclusion for “any legal action by Employee for workers’ compensation benefits.” Spiessbach asserts that section 440.205’s statutory protection from retaliatory discharge provides for “workers’ compensation benefits.” The resolution of this issue turns on whether a retaliatory discharge action filed pursuant to section 440.205 is an action “for workers’ compensation benefits” as contemplated by the agreement. Section 440.205 is contained in chapter 440, which is entitled “Workers’ Compensation.” Chapter 440 sets forth a legislative intent “to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker and to fac...

...An employee seeking “any benefit that is ripe, due, and owing” initiates this procedure by filing “a petition for benefits” with the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims. § 440.192(1). However, this procedure is completely separate from a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205, which is resolved by the filing of a complaint in circuit court. See Smith v. Piezo *527 Tech. & Prof'l Adm’rs, 427 So.2d 182, 183-84 (Fla.1988). In Smith , the supreme court determined that claims brought pursuant to section 440.205 must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and rejected the argument that such claims should be brought before the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims like claims for disability and medical benefits under chapter 440. Id. at 185 . In so ruling, the court expressly determined that “[a] section 440.205 wrongful discharge is not a claim for compensation or benefits as those terms are used in Chapter 440.” Id....

...ived. See Price v. Fax Recovery Sys., Inc., 49 So.3d 835, 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). C. Conclusion In conclusion, the trial court erred in denying AVI’s motion to compel arbitration on the basis that arbitration would defeat the remedial purposes of section 440.205....

...written agreement to arbitrate, the existence of an arbitrable issue, and the absence of waiver. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions for the trial court to grant AVI’s motion. Reversed and remanded. KELLY and MORRIS, JJ„ Concur. . Section 440.205 provides that "[n]o employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law.”

...t, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. including: (I) disparate treatment based on *1342 his Haitian origin; (II) hostile work environment; (III) retaliation under Title VII; and (IV) retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim pursuant to Fla. Sta. § 440.205....

...rida on March 2, 2004. In Complaint II, Piquion alleged a claim for retaliation under Title VII resulting from the filing of his original discrimination charge and a claim for retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim pursuant to Fla Stat. § 440.205....

...ture did not intend for the provisions of section 768.28 to apply to a cause of action under the Act. *87 We note that the supreme court also briefly contemplated in Maggio whether its prior characterization of a claim of retaliatory discharge under section 440.205, Florida Statutes, as being "tortious in nature," Scott v....

...City of Homestead, 757 So.2d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Kelley v. Jackson County Tax Collector, 745 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), but the supreme court declined to "determine the correctness of these decisions" because that question was not before the court for decision. Observing that section 440.205 is clearly distinguishable from the Florida Civil Rights Act in that section 440.205 has no presuit notice requirements, no designated forum for adjudicating claims, no explication of the types of relief to which an aggrieved party is entitled, and no reference to any portion of section 768.28, the supreme court concluded that section 440.205 decisional law does not lend support to the argument that claims filed under the Florida Civil Rights Act are subject to the requirements of section 768.28(6). We likewise conclude that the Public Whistle-blower's Act is distinguishable from section 440.205, and therefore the decisions construing section 440.205 are not persuasive in resolution of the issue addressed in this case....

...o not exceed an employee's regular (pre-injury) salary. The fact that language—even language conferring rights on employees—appears in chapter 440 is not itself sufficient to create jurisdiction in a judge of compensation claims. In deciding "that section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), creates a statutory cause of action for a wrongful discharge in retaliation for an employee's pursuit of a workers' compensation claim," Smith v....

...We agree that the final summary judgment was improperly granted and reverse. The issue of Edenfield's wrongful termination from his employment was not factually foreclosed by the record before the trial court. Edenfield filed a complaint alleging B & I terminated his employment in August 1991 in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...l summary judgment because there remains a factual issue on the question of wrongful termination. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.205 provides that "[n]o employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law."

Juback contends Michaels violated Fla. Stat. § 440.205 by coercing and intimidating him after his injuries

...Massey, Saju, Massey & Duffy, LLC, Ocala, FL, for Plaintiff. Amy Karch Traub, Patrick F. Clark, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for Defendant. ORDER HODGES, District Judge. This is an action pursuant to Florida's Whistleblower's Act, § 448.102(3), Fla. Stat., and Workers' Compensation Law, § 440.205, Fla....

...Count one alleges that Georgia-Pacific violated Florida's Whistle-blower's Act, § 448.102(3), Fla. Stat., by retaliating against him for having complained of unsafe working conditions. Count two alleges that Georgia-Pacific violated Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, § 440.205, Fla....

...has failed to create an issue of fact that the proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for his termination was merely pretext for unlawful retaliation. B. The Workers' Compensation Retaliation Claim The Plaintiff's second claim is brought under § 440.205, Fla....

...Stat., Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, which provides: No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law. The prima facie case of under § 440.205 is essentially the same as § 448.102(3)....

...Pelzner, Schwedock, Finkelstein & Klausner and Robert D. Klausner, Miami, for Ronald J. Dean. Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and JORGENSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. The order under review which approved a cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employment contract under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979), is reversed upon the reasoning found in Judge Ervin's dissent in Piezo Technology and Professional Administrators, Inc....

...1992)(section 510 action brought against former employer of plaintiff’s deceased husband, who was discharged allegedly because he refused to surrender his hospital and disability benefits, was governed by four-year limitations period for wrongful discharge actions brought under Fla. Stat. § 440.205). 8 limitations periods for civil enforcement actions brought under 29 U.S.C....

...Rayboun, of Whibbs & Whibbs, P.A., Pensacola; Mary Ann Stiles, of Stiles, Taylor & Grace, P.A., for Associated Industries of Florida, Inc., Atlanta, for Appellee. LEWIS, J. Appellant, James W. Bruner, seeks review of the trial court's Final Summary Judgment in which the court found that section 440.205, Florida Statutes, does not provide for a civil cause of action for an employee who is discharged by his or her employer for having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer. Appellant first argues that the plain language of section 440.205 provides for such a cause of action. In his second argument, appellant argues that, if section 440.205 is ambiguous with respect to the issue on appeal, legislative intent and public policy support such a cause of action. Concluding that section 440.205 provides for a civil cause of action when an employer discharges an employee for having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer, we reverse the Final Summary Judgment and remand for further proceedings....

...Appellant subsequently became employed with appellee, GC-GW, Inc., d/b/a Jackson-Cook. However, shortly after hiring appellant, appellee discharged him because he was a "W/C Risk" due to his having filed a workers' compensation claim against Ceco Corporation. [1] Appellant subsequently filed suit against appellee pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes, alleging that appellee wrongfully discharged him based upon his previous workers' compensation claim. After filing its answer, appellee filed a motion for final summary judgment, asserting that section 440.205 does not provide for such a cause of action. In its Final Summary Judgment, the trial court agreed with appellee that appellant had no right of action against appellee pursuant to section 440.205....

...In noting that this is a case of first impression in Florida, the trial court *1246 found that appellee, as the subsequent employer, had done nothing to hinder, thwart, or prohibit appellant from obtaining benefits flowing from his previous compensable injury. According to the court, appellant's interpretation of section 440.205 belied the historical and primary purpose of chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and its effort to insure that employers and carriers comply with their responsibility to provide compensation to workers injured on the job....

...hat an important public policy would be advanced by a ruling for either party. In noting that it was constrained from recognizing or creating a new cause of action, the court denied appellant's motion for rehearing. This appeal followed. Pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2000), "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensati...

...retaliatory discharge, the statute confers by implication every particular power necessary to insure the performance of that duty." Id. at 184; see also Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla.1990) (holding that an employer who violates section 440.205 commits an intentional tort, thereby exposing itself to liability for damages for emotional distress because "[s]ection 440.205 reflects the public policy that an employee shall not be discharged for filing or threatening to file a workers' compensation claim")....

...ed in favor of granting access to the remedy provided by the Legislature); see also Broward v. Jacksonville Med. Ctr., 690 So.2d 589, 591 (Fla.1997) ("Florida's workers' compensation laws are remedial in nature...."). Appellee would have us construe section 440.205 as providing for a civil cause of action only as to an employer against whom a workers' compensation claim is filed....

...guage to the statute, which is something that we are not at liberty to do. See Hayes v. State, 750 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999) ("We are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature."). We, therefore, conclude that section 440.205, which is clear and unambiguous, provides for a civil cause of action against an employer who discharges an employee for having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer. We note, however, that even if we were to find section 440.205 ambiguous with respect to the issue at hand, legislative intent and public policy would still lead us to the same result. In support of its argument that the intent of chapter 440 supports its interpretation of section 440.205, appellee contends that section 440.105(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2000), reveals the limitations of section 440.205....

...indicates that the Legislature knows how to deal with employers who discharge an employee for having filed a past claim or employers who refuse to hire a job applicant for having filed a past claim. Appellee concludes then that, because the Legislature did not amend section 440.205 at the time it enacted section 440.105(2)(a)2., the Legislature did not intend for there to be a civil cause of action against an employer who discharges an employee for having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer....

...Furthermore, simply because the Legislature did not provide for a civil cause of action for refusal to hire in this context does not mean that the Legislature did not intend for there to be a civil cause of action against an employer who discharges an employee for having filed a past workers' compensation claim. We find that section 440.205 is not only intended to punish employers who discharge an employee for having filed a *1248 workers' compensation claim but is also intended to insure that employees do not have to fear reprisal from their employers when they file a workers' compensation claim. Interpreting section 440.205 as appellee would have us do would have a chilling effect on an employee's decision to file a meritorious workers' compensation claim for fear of being discharged from a subsequent position merely because that employee filed a claim against a previous employer. Moreover, contrary to appellee's suggestion during oral argument, interpreting section 440.205 as providing for a civil cause of action against employers who discharge employees for having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer would not serve to encourage employees to file workers' compensation claims. Rather, such an interpretation is consistent with what we find to be the legislative intent and public policy concerns behind section 440.205....

...ing an employee because of the concern that the previous workers' compensation claim may have a negative impact upon workers' compensation insurance rates. See Allan v. SWF Gulf Coast, Inc., 535 So.2d 638, 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (noting that, while section 440.205 has been characterized as a retaliatory discharge provision, a specific retaliatory intent is not required by the express statutory language); see also Humphrey v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 192 F.Supp.2d 1371, 1374 (S.D.Fla.2002) (holding that in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under section 440.205, a plaintiff must show that he or she engaged in statutorily protected activity, i.e., filing a workers' compensation claim, that an adverse employment action, such as discharge, occurred, and that the adverse action was causally related to the plaintiff's protected activities)....

...da's public policy. Thus, appellee's reliance on Nelson is misplaced. [4] Notably, Associated Industries of Florida, as amicus curiae, relies upon the Florida Civil Rights Act ("the Act") in support *1251 of its argument that we should not interpret section 440.205 as providing for a civil cause of action for employees who are discharged because of having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer and argues that the Act governs conduct by an employer based upon the status o...

...he risk of not finding future employment). Nor would, as Associated Industries contends, our interpretation lead to the creation of a protected class of employees based solely on the employees' prior accident history. As the Third District has held, section 440.205 cannot be interpreted to prohibit the discharge of an employee for any reason once the employee has filed or pursued a workers' compensation claim. See Pericich v. Climatrol, Inc., 523 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Likewise, section 440.205 does not prohibit the discharge of an employee for any reason simply because that employee filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer. In both instances, an employee must still prove that he or she was discharged from employment by reason of his or her valid workers' compensation claim. Accordingly, because section 440.205 clearly provides for a civil cause of action against an employer who discharges an employee for having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer, we REVERSE the trial court's Final Summary Judgment and REMAND for further proceedings....

...*1252 WOLF, C.J., specially concurs with written opinion; KAHN, J., dissents with written opinion. WOLF, C.J., Concurring. I concur fully in the excellent opinion of Judge Lewis. I write to note the scope of our decision today. We have determined that a cause of action exists under section 440.205, Florida Statutes, when a subsequent employer discharges an employee and the discharge is substantially based on the filing of a prior valid workers' compensation claim....

...� 440.105(2)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2002). Although refusal to hire would certainly violate the same public policy identified by the majority, it would not subject an employer to a civil cause of action. Given this admitted bit of confusion, I would read section 440.205 narrowly, as in derogation of the common law....

...4th DCA 1986) (concluding that non-compensatory damages were not available under Florida Human Rights Act). While not raised by the Plaintiff, this Court is aware that the Florida Supreme Court in Scott intimated that punitive damages may be available in a retaliatory discharge action under Florida Statutes Section 440.205. [3] Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642, 643 (Fla.1988). However, Scott involved a different statutory construction issue than that in Section 448.103, because the legislature was silent in Section 440.205 on what remedies were available....

...Edenfield, 609 So.2d 27, 29 (Fla.1992); Dahl v. Eckerd Family Youth Alternatives, Inc., 843 So.2d 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Hutchison v. Prudential Ins. Co., 645 So.2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Such statutes are normally broadly construed. See Martin County, 609 So.2d at 29. [3] Section 440.205 creates a cause of action for retaliatory discharge if an employer fires or threatens to fire an employee for that employee filing or attempting to file a valid worker's compensation claim. Fla. Stat. § 440.205....

...Borque asserts that after he sought treatment Trugreen management questioned his injury and threatened to give away his route. A month later he was fired. In March 2003 Borque retained an attorney and sued Trugreen in Florida state court for wrongful discharge under Fla. Stat. §§ 440.205 and 440.15 alleging that Trugeen terminated his employment because he pursued a claim for workers’ compensation benefits....

...Florida enacted the Workers’ Compensation Law to provide an injured employee with an efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits at a reasonable cost to the employer. Barry v. Burdines, 675 So.2d 587, 589 (Fla. 1996). Employers cannot punish employees for pursuing their rights under this scheme. Section 440.205 provides that “[n]o employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law.” Fla. Stat. § 440.205. If an employer violates this section, the employee has a cause of action for retaliatory discharge....

... Borque’s third argument addresses the question left unresolved by Edenfield - the reach of the general release. Under Florida law it is unclear whether the general release signed by Borque was intended to encompass his retaliatory discharge claim under §440.205....

...The Florida Supreme Court made clear in Smith that mere reference to rights and benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law is insufficient to waive a claim for retaliatory discharge. Smith, 427 So.2d at 184. In Smith the court held that a “Section 440.205 wrongful discharge claim is not a claim for compensation or benefits” under the Workers’ Compensation Law....

...Moreover the general release provision in § 440.20(11)(c) refers only to a waiver of “all rights to any and all benefits.” Fla. Stat. § 440.20(11)(c). Accordingly a general release of benefits under § 440 does not necessarily release a retaliatory discharge claim under § 440.205 without evidence of intent by the claimant to do so. The language in the settlement agreement here does not clearly manifest such intent....

...Julie Atha seeks review of the order dismissing her second amended complaint against her former employer, Allen P. Van Overbeke, D.M.D., P.A., with prejudice. The trial court determined that Atha failed to plead a facially sufficient violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2011), for workers' compensation retaliation. We conclude that the complaint as a whole pleaded a legally sufficient violation of section 440.205 and reverse. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(b) provides that in order to be legally sufficient, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See also Ferguson Enters., Inc....

...a consideration of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint and is required to accept those allegations as true. Id. The court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action is reviewed de novo. Id. Section 440.205 provides, "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." To establish a prima facie case of workers' compensation retaliation under section 440.205, the plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) a statutorily protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action....

....... 18. [Van Overbeke's] action of discharging [Atha] was in retaliation for [Atha] engaging in her statutorily protected right to workers' compensation benefits and in violation of Section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2011). Taken in conjunction with the ultimate facts alleged in the remainder of the second amended complaint, Atha's allegations can be read to establish that Van Overbeke was aware of her request f...

...questionable nature of the reasons offered for [the plaintiff's] discharge, together with the e-mails reflecting a negative attitude by the [defendant's] agents toward [the plaintiff] and his claims"). Atha thus pleaded a legally sufficient violation of section 440.205, and the trial court erred by dismissing her second amended complaint with prejudice. Reversed and remanded. CASANUEVA and SLEET, JJ., Concur. 1 In light of our decision, we need not...

...SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge (dissenting). I would affirm because the record establishes beyond question that Flores was not discharged "by reason of [a] valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law," as required by section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...3d DCA 2004). There was no evidence whatever that any comp. claim was ever made or even contemplated, much less that one had anything at all to do with Flores's otherwise well-deserved firing. On Rehearing Denied PER CURIAM. The applicable statute provides: 440.205. Coercion of employees No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law. § 440.205, Fla....

...In response, Plaintiff filed a two count suit against Defendant claiming that Defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. *1391 § 12101 et. seq., and that the Defendant violated the Florida Workers' Compensation Law, Fla.Stat. § 440.205 (1990) (Dkt....

...Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff could not file a workers' compensation claim because Defendant fired him sometime around October 24, 1993, retroactive to October 15, 1993, before the claim was filed. The Florida Workers' Compensation Law, Fla.Stat. § 440.205 (1990), states that an employer cannot discharge an employee because the employee makes or attempts to make a valid claim under the law....

...vices for Halifax Hospital Medical Center, a special taxing district of the State of Florida. Appellant had been employed by PBFS until her employment was terminated, allegedly in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim, in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2007). Section 440.205 prohibits an employer from discharging an employee "by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." The sole basis for the summary judgment was the trial...

...In ruling that presuit notice was required for Appellant's workers' compensation retaliation claim, the trial court relied on Kelley v. Jackson County Tax Collector, 745 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). In Kelley, *1258 our sister court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 because the plaintiff had failed to comply with the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28. The First District stated that an "an action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 is clearly a `tort' within the meaning of section 768.28 and presuit notice is therefore required....

...City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912, 917 (Fla.1985). The condition precedent of presuit notice, created by section 768.28, was only intended to apply to suits for which immunity was waived by enactment of the statute, to wit: common law torts. A claim for violation of section 440.205, although perhaps tort-like in nature, is not a claim sounding in common law tort. Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642 (Fla.1988), upon which the court relied in Kelley, does not hold to the contrary. There, the supreme court held that a violation of section 440.205 is governed by the four year statute of limitations because the claim is "tortious in nature." Id. at 643. We do not interpret Scott to hold that a section 440.205 claim, a creature of statute, is tantamount to a common law tort for all purposes....

...City of Homestead, 757 So.2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). [2] We have not overlooked Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1990) ( "Scott II" ). In that case, our high court concluded that damages for emotional distress were available in a section 440.205 claim. Although it labeled the 440.205 claim as an "intentional tort," we interpret that reference to mean nothing more than a section 440.205 claim is analogous to an intentional tort for purposes of determining what damages may be awarded.

...A collective bargaining agreement between Southern Bell and the Communication Workers of America covered the terms of his employment. On March 22, 1984, Southern Bell fired Rintone. On September 30, 1986, Rintone filed suit against Southern Bell in a Florida state court, alleging wrongful discharge under Fla. *1221 Stat.Ann. § 440.205 (West 1981)....

...eek Corporation and against Plaintiff Colin Bruley, and close the file. NOTES [1] On November 16, 2007, plaintiff's claim against The Oaks' property owner, LBK, LP, was dismissed. (Doc. 1-2 at 7 (Notice of Dropping Party).) [2] See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 440.205 (2007) (for discharge in retaliation to filing a worker's compensation claim); Fla....

...defendant, Aqua Life Corp., d/b/a Pinch A Penny #43 (“the appellee”). This case commenced in circuit court on August 31, 2010, and included two causes of action: (1) a claim alleging worker’s compensation retaliation filed pursuant to section 440.205 of the Florida Statutes; and (2) for unpaid overtime wages in violation of the Federal Fair Labor Standard Act....

...ida (“County”), alleging interference with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), see 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., as well as retaliation for exercising her FMLA and state law workers’ compensation rights, see Fla. Stat. § 440.205 ....

...Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318 , 1332-33 (11th Cir.1998) (indicating that an employee’s own evaluation and opinion is insufficient to establish pretext). For similar reasons, Gillman’s claim of workers compensation retaliation under Florida law also fails. See Fla. Stat. § 440.205 (“No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law.”)....

for compensation benefits,” as proscribed by § 440.205, Florida Statutes. Cited for reversal on this

DAVIS, Chief Judge. Jose Hernandez challenges the trial court’s nonfinal order granting Colonial Grocers, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration in his action against Colonial in which he alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 1 and section 440.205, Flori *409 da Statutes (2010), of the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act....

...Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla.1983). In Smith, among other things, the Florida Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether an employee who allegedly had been retaliatorily discharged for pursuing a workers' compensation claim had a cognizable cause of action under section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...at 184 (quoting Girard Trust Co., v. Tampashores Dev. Co., 95 Fla. 1010, 1015-16, 117 So. 786, 788 (1928)). Smith is materially distinguishable from the present case because the legislature failed to create any remedy whatsoever for a violation of section 440.205....

...and, upon terminating him, filed suit to evict the Rivera family from the mobile home. The Riveras left the property before the eviction suit was heard. Francisco nonetheless counterclaimed alleging retaliatory employment termination in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1991)....

alleged that he was fired in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1995), because he had filed

BARFIELD, J. James Eads appeals the summary judgment entered for Traffic Control Devices, Inc. on his claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...BACKGROUND FACTS Appellee, Diane Murphy, filed a complaint against Retail Detail claiming disability discrimination under Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (count one), unlawful retaliation under the same Act (count two), and retaliation under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2020) (count three)....

claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Section 440.205, Fla.Stat. (1991). Feather Sound’s request

...Judith Lane of Smith, Hood, Perkins, Loucks, Stout & Orfinger, P.A., Daytona Beach, for Appellee. PETERSON, J. John Smalbein appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of the Volusia County School Board (VCSB). Smalbein contends that he has a "valid claim" under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1995), and the VCSB wrongfully retaliated against him for having filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits....

...Smalbein argued that validity was not the equivalent of compensability and that the JCC's determinations were not binding on the trial court in the instant retaliation action. The trial court agreed with VCSB and granted the summary judgment now on appeal. Smalbein argues that the term "valid claim" under section 440.205 [2] should not be construed as a requirement that the workers' compensation claim be compensable. We agree. Neither section 440.205, nor Chapter 440, defines the term "valid." Where a term is not defined by the Legislature, courts should construe the term to give effect to both the literal and usual meanings of the word as well as the meaning which would give effect to the objectives and purpose of the statute. To give meaning and effect to the purpose of Chapter 440 and especially section 440.205, we construe the words "valid claim" to mean a meritorious claim....

...mpensation before the filing and adjudication of the suit for retaliation. In some instances, that construction could result in retaliation against employees with no fear of liability when the four-year statute of limitations for filing a suit under section 440.205 expires before a compensation claim is resolved. See generally Scott v. Otis Elevator, 524 So.2d 642 (Fla.1988) (four-year statute of limitations applies to claims under section 440.205)....

...We reject as meritless VCSB's defense that the trial court was bound under the theory of collateral estoppel to the factual findings of the JCC. Clearly, collateral estoppel would not apply to preclude the trial court from making its own factual determinations for the reason that the JCC lacks jurisdiction over claims under section 440.205....

...SUMMARY JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED. SHARP, W., and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Although not dispositive of this case, we note that during the pendency of this appeal, the First District Court of Appeal remanded Smalbein's case to the JCC for reconsideration. [2] Section 440.205, Florida Statutes provides: "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Worker's Compensat...

pursuant to provision of workers’ compensation act, F.S. 440.205). FORM 4. MODEL FORM OF VERDICT FOR STATUTE

ERVIN, Judge. We affirm all issues except that wherein appellants claim that Bobby Carra-way, an employee of Superior Brands, could not be individually liable under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1989), and as to this issue we reverse the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to dismiss, 1 and remand with directions that Carraway be dismissed as a party. As the supreme court explained in Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla.1990), Florida does not recognize a common-law tort for retaliatory discharge; instead, the legislature created section 440.205 to allow a statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge. A statute in derogation of the common law must be construed narrowly. Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla.1977); Jenks v. State, 582 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 589 So.2d 292 (Fla.1991). Section 440.205 merely provides: No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law....

provision in the statutes for such an award. See § 440.205, Fla.Stat. (1985). We disagree with appellant’s

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge. The plaintiff below appeals from a final order dismissing a complaint against his employer, the City of Hialeah, with prejudice. The action, brought under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1987), 1 claimed that the City had wrongfully terminated his employment because he had filed a valid workers’ compensation claim several years before....

...-, 108 S.Ct. 1877 , 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), which, along with Southwest Gulfcoast, Inc. v. Allan, 513 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), is controlling here, the Supreme Court squarely held that an action under an Illinois statute virtually identical to section 440.205 is not precluded by the National Labor Management Relations Act nor the conflict resolution procedures provided by the applicable collective bargaining agreement....

...We find no merit in the appellee’s other arguments for affirmance. The contention that, for diverse alleged reasons, the plaintiff may not be able factually to support his complaint may not be considered on a motion to dismiss. REVERSED. . This section provides: 440.205 Coercion of employees....

...not defeat the remedial purpose of the statute. See Audio Visual Innovations, Inc. v. Spiessbach, 119 So. 3d 522, 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). A claim for workers’ compensation benefits is distinct from a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2012). The arbitration agreement is valid as applied to the retaliation claim in this case....

...Here, AMS never sought to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The only claim that AMS sought to arbitrate is the plaintiff’s claim in the underlying lawsuit for retaliatory discharge in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...Here, the arbitration agreement was not so outrageously unfair as to shock the judicial conscience. The agreement did not deprive the plaintiff of any statutory cause of action. As discussed above, arbitration of a retaliatory discharge claim does not defeat the remedial purpose of section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 440.205, Fla....

...ppeals a final judgment entered in favor of Rudolf Amaya following a jury’s verdict awarding Amaya back pay and front pay on his claim that Caterpillar unlawfully retaliated against him for filing a workers’ compensation claim in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2008) (“retaliation claim”)....

PER CURIAM. In this action for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2001), the trial court entered summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff made neither a “valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law” so as to invoke the protection of the statute. *629 § 440.205, Fla....

...PORTANCE PER CURIAM. Upon suggestion by appellee and, pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), the decision in this case, 413 So.2d 121 is certified to the Supreme Court as presenting the following questions of great public importance: 1. WHETHER § 440.205, FLORIDA STATUTES (1979) CREATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A “WRONGFUL DISCHARGE” IN RETALIATION FOR AN EMPLOYEE’S PURSUIT OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIM; 2. IF § 440.205 DOES CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR “WRONGFUL DISCHARGE,” WHETHER SUCH ACTION IS COGNIZABLE BEFORE A DEPUTY COMMISSIONER; 3. IF § 440.205 DOES CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR “WRONGFUL DISCHARGE,” BUT SUCH ACTION IS NOT COGNIZABLE BEFORE A DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, WHETHER SUCH ACTION IS COGNIZABLE IN THE CIRCUIT COURT....

...Clearly, the wage loss award was improper insofar as it awarded benefits after Reed left the employ of Southern Freightways. This portion of the award apparently was predicated on the employer’s allegedly wrongful firing of Reed, an act that would be prohibited by Section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979) if it came “by reason of” Reed’s claim for compensation....

...The notice stated that appellee was submitting the case of Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So.2d 642 (Fla.1988). Appellee attached a copy of the case, stating the “Scott court, applying a principle pertinent to this case, held that a cause of action for wrongful discharge provided statutorily (in Section 440.205, Fla.Stat....

...We agree that summary final judgment for the appellee was properly entered because the facts are not in dispute and the proof is uncontradicted that the employer did not discharge the appellants by reason of any attempt to *973 claim workers’ compensation benefits. See § 440.205, Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. Richard Burt sued his former employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), alleging that UPS unlawfully took adverse employment action against him in retaliation for his making a valid workers’ compensation claim, in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

..., a claim of age discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), and Count II, a claim of disability discrimination under the FCRA. Baptist did not make any argument with respect to Count III, a claim of wrongful termination under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2014), otherwise known as Florida’s Workers’ Compensation law....

...(“Caterpillar”), appeals a final judgment entered in favor of Rudolf Amaya following a jury’s verdict awarding Amaya back pay and front pay on his claim that Caterpillar unlawfully retaliated against him for filing a workers’ compensation claim in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2008) (“retaliation claim”)....

...March 23, 2007) (damages for emotional distress recoverable in whistle-blower action pursuant to F.S. 448.103); Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So.2d 902 (Fla.1990) (damages for emotional distress recoverable in retaliatory discharge action pursuant to provision of workers’ compensation act, F.S. 440.205)....

PER CURIAM. Wavernita Hubbard, the appellant, sued her former employer, the City of Boca Raton, alleging that her employment had been terminated in retaliation for filing workers’ compensation claims, in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

PER CURIAM. Troy Giroux appeals a final summary judgment in his action for unlawful discharge under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1995), which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee by reason of such employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits....

retaliatory termination, in contravention of section 440.205, Florida Statutes.2 Pursuant to mediation,

...Perkins and Paige S. Newman of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. LEVINE, C.J. An employee appeals a final summary judgment entered in favor of the employer on the employee’s claim of retaliatory discharge under section 440.205, Florida Statutes....

...The employee claimed that the other employees were lying about the incident. He further testified that the managers did not give him a reason for terminating his employment. Following his termination, the employee filed a claim for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205....

...While [the employee] argues that he is nevertheless entitled to a presumption of retaliation based on the circumstantial evidence of temporal proximity between the filing of the Petition for Benefits and his termination, this Court finds he is not as Fla. Stat. § 440.205 requires a showing of a statutorily protected activity, an adverse employment action and a causal connection between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action....

...an attempt to file a claim or seek benefits under Florida’s 2  Workers’ Compensation Act. Accordingly, as [the employee] has not asserted a prima facie case of retaliation pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 440.205, [the employer] is entitled to final summary judgment in its favor on [the employee’s] Complaint. We review an order granting summary judgment de novo....

...la v. Homeowners Choice Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2527 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 16, 2019). Statutory construction is a question of law subject to de novo review. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003). Section 440.205, states: “No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law.” (emphasis added)....

...rse employment action; and 3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Koren v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 97 So. 3d 215, 219 (Fla. 2012) (citation omitted). “In order to establish a claim under section 440.205, the employee’s pursuit of workers’ compensation need not be the only reason for a discharge.” Hornfischer v....

...The employee effectively sought benefits under the statute. Thus, the employee’s attempt to claim compensation brought his actions under the protection of the retaliation statute. Under the trial court’s interpretation, an employer could circumvent section 440.205 by terminating employment immediately after a workplace injury and before the employee even has a chance to file a claim for benefits....

...The trial court ruled that Silvers had “offered no evidence of O’Donnell’s motivation or timing of the decision to terminate Plaintiff relative to his filing a workers compensation claim.” Silvers brought suit against O’Donnell for violation of section 440.205, Fla....

...Morande of Carlton Fields, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee. FORST, J. Appellant Mathieu Francois (“Francois”) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for appellee JFK Medical Center Limited Partnership (“JFK Medical”) on Francois’s section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2020), workers’ compensation retaliation claim....

...d used excessive force against a patient. Francois was terminated with no mention of his injury or of a potential or actual workers’ compensation claim. Francois then sued, alleging he was fired in retaliation for his work-related injury under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2020)....

...This timely appeal followed. Analysis On appeal, Francois argues the trial court erred by applying the business judgment rule. Specifically, he argues that this Court did not apply the business judgment rule in another section 440.205 case, Salus v....

...Here, Francois has the ultimate burden of persuasion as the plaintiff in a workers’ compensation retaliation claim. Ortega v. Eng’g Sys. Tech., Inc., 30 So. 3d 525, 529–30 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Amends. to Rule 1.510, 317 So. 3d at 77. 1. Workers’ Compensation Retaliation Claims Section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2020), creates a cause of action against an employer who fires an employee because they sought workers’ compensation....

...2017) (no evidence decision-makers knew of protected activity meant insufficient evidence of pretext); Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A] reason is not pretext for [retaliation] ‘unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that [retaliation] 3 Section 440.205 states: “No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law.” § 440.205, Fla....

...An employee may be fired for erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, so long as they were not fired for retaliation. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000); see Pericich v. Climatrol, Inc., 523 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (“[S]ection 440.205 only prohibits the retaliatory discharge of an employee ‘by reason of’ the filing of a workers’ compensation claim.”). 2....

...And we can find no persuasive reason not to apply the business judgment rule given its implicit acceptance in our previous decisions and its prevalence in the Eleventh Circuit. Therefore, the business judgment rule applies to workers’ compensation retaliation claims under section 440.205. 3....

...Francois’s Workers’ Compensation Retaliation Claim The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jackson v. Agency for Persons with Disabilities Florida, 608 F. App’x 740 (11th Cir. 2015), is instructive. 6 There, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a similar section 440.205 retaliation claim. The employee in Jackson claimed she was fired for an eye condition that entitled her to workers’ compensation benefits....

...valid claims for workers’ compensation benefits. Over a year after her injury, the County formally dismissed Guyton for long term absenteeism. Upon her dismissal, Guyton sued the County in a one-count complaint, alleging that the County violated section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2018), because it terminated her employment “by reason of” her valid claim for workers’ compensation benefits following her on-the-job injury....

...une 2018). During the proceedings below, the trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of Guyton, finding that Miami-Dade discharged 1 Section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2018), provides: “No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers...

...2d DCA 2014) (observing: “Generally speaking, an employer does not announce or state in writing that it is discharging an employee because he or she has filed a workers' compensation claim” and, consequently, “employee actions for a retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 are often ill suited to final disposition on a motion for summary judgment”)—we affirm 4 the trial court’s denial of the County’s motion for summary judgment.2 And because the evide...

that the employer fired appellee in violation of § 440.205, Fla.Stat. (1979), is vacated. For lack of substantial

PER CURIAM. Appellees successfully brought an action against a pooled self-insurance fund to which they belonged. The fund had denied them a defense in an action that alleged wrongful discharge of an employee in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes, and aggravation of an injury that arose out of and in the course of employment and for which the employee had a valid workers’ compensation claim....

the employer fired appellee in violation of Section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1979) because there was

commissioner’s finding that the employer violated Section 440.205, Florida Statutes, by terminating the claimant’s

...We reversed the district court's holding in Byrd. In doing so, we characterized the essential nature of the plaintiff's section 510 claim as one for benefits denied by wrongful discharge. Id. at 159. Based on that characterization, we reasoned that "Florida Statute § 440.205 is most closely analogous to § 510 of ERISA in that it prohibits the discharge of an employee in retaliation for the employee's claim or attempted claim for compensation under Florida workers' compensation law." Id. A four-year statute of limitations governed claims under section 440.205....