Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...o amend complaint to include punitive damages once procedural requirements have been met); Tenet S. Fla. Health Sys. v. Jackson, 991 So.2d 396, 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (granting certiorari where trial court incorrectly found that presuit notice under section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2007), was not required); Martin Mem'l, 984 So.2d at 662 (granting certiorari where trial court failed to determine whether plaintiff conducted good faith investigation or whether there was reasonable basis for claim); Corbo v....

...Abbey, 16 So.3d at 1052. There, Patrick filed a notice of intent to initiate litigation on July 28, 2006. Id. Dr. Abbey received the notice "on August 2, 2006, thirty-seven days before the statute of limitations would have expired." Id. Pursuant to section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (2006), filing the notice had the effect of tolling the statute of limitations for a period of ninety days....

...llow before a medical negligence claim may be brought in court. In Williams v. Campagnulo, 588 So.2d 982 (Fla.1991), we upheld the constitutionality of the notice requirement of section 768.57(2), Florida Statutes (1985), which is currently found at section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1995), and noted: "The statute was intended to address a legitimate legislative policy decision relating to medical malpractice and established a process intended to promote the settlement of meritorious claims a...

...expert." After completing the presuit investigation pursuant to section 766.203 and prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, the claimant must notify each prospective defendant "of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice." Id. § 766.106(2)....

...ert opinion" which must be furnished to the defendant. Upon receipt of the notice of intent, the defendant has ninety days to conduct its own presuit investigation. Id. § 766.203(3). During this ninety-day period the claimant may not file suit. Id. § 766.106(3)(a)....

...Before the defendant may deny the claimant's reasonable grounds for finding medical negligence, the defendant must provide the claimant with *281 a verified written medical expert opinion corroborating a lack of reasonable grounds to show a negligent injury. Id. § 766.203(3)(b). Sections 766.106(5)-(9) and 766.204-.205 provide for informal presuit discovery after a notice of intent is issued, and require each party to provide the other with "reasonable access to information within its possession or control in order to facilitate evaluation of the claim." § 766.205(1), Fla.Stat. (1995). The unreasonable failure of any party to comply with informal discovery may justify dismissal of that party's claims or defenses. Id. § 766.106(3)(a)....

...opinion in support of claim prior to expiration of statute of limitations), dismissed, 657 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1995); Miami Physical Therapy Assoc., Inc. v. Savage, 632 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (applying Williams and holding that notice required by section 766.106 must be filed within statute of limitations); Stein v....

...er than the fact that the subsequent motion was restyled. [2] In full, section 766.206, Florida Statutes (1995), provides: (1) After the completion of presuit investigation by the parties pursuant to s. 766.203 and any informal discovery pursuant to s. 766.106, any party may file a motion in the circuit court requesting the court to determine whether the opposing party's claim or denial rests on a reasonable basis....

...to Doctors' Hospital. That's the substance of our— THE COURT: Okay. Now, you want the court reporter to have this typed up for you, Mr. Katz, so you'll know what it is or do you have knowledge of what he's talking about? . . . . MR. GRAHAM: And 76-766.106 specifies it has to be sent certified mail....

..." Id. at 48. [5] See also Patry v. Capps, 633 So.2d 9 (Fla.1994) (holding physician's acknowledged receipt of timely written notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice action that results in no prejudice to physician is sufficient notice under section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes, even though plaintiff served notice by hand rather than certified mail as required by statute)....

...Administration Medical Center of Miami” for allegedly negligent treatment in July 1997 that led to the amputation of Barnett’s lower right leg.2 Leeds indicated in his letter that it was being sent “pursuant to the requirements of Florida Statute § 766.106 and Rule 1.650 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.” In a response letter dated September 1, 1998, Steve McCormack, a staff attorney with the Office of Regional Counsel, informed Leeds, however, that “any and all claims of negli...

...The complaint alleged that the Tanners neither knew nor should have known "that the actions and inactions of the defendants fell below the standard of care recognized in the community" until December 29, 1989. The notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation required by section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1987), was filed on February 12, 1990....

...e statute of limitations has run. This automatic extension is separate and additional to any other tolling period. Novitsky v. Hards, 589 So.2d 404 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). The Tanners did not seek an extension under this statute. The other provision is section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1991), which reads as follows: (4) The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s....

...In this case, if we assume the statute of limitations began to run on April 1, 1988, the date of the stillbirth, the statute was set to expire on April 1, 1990. The Tanners filed their notice of intent to litigate on February 12, 1990. Under their interpretation of section 766.106(4), this filing extended the two-year limitations period by ninety days to June 30, 1990....

...From the date the notice of intent is filed, the plaintiff has ninety days (the amount of the *184 tolling) plus either sixty days or the time that was remaining in the limitations period, whichever is greater, to file suit. We believe the language of section 766.106(4) was intended to provide extra time to a plaintiff who files a notice of intent shortly before the limitations period expires....

...ce of a "probability" of medical malpractice. To do so would make the reference to "knowledge of the negligent act" in the Nardone rule redundant and would result in an inordinate extension of the statute. [5] That statute has now been renumbered as section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The relevant provisions of the Act, which are found in chapter 766, Florida Statutes (1991), govern standards for recovery in medical malpractice actions and provide for certain notice requirements in such actions. Specifically, Weinstock maintained that Groth failed to comply with section 766.106(2), which requires notice to the defendant in a medical malpractice action after completion of presuit screening, and before the claim is filed....

...the Act. Weinstock claims that although psychologists are not expressly defined as health care providers there are several reasons to extend the Act's notice requirements to malpractice actions against psychologists. First, Weinstock maintains that section 766.106(2) requires that notice be given to all "prospective defendants," regardless of whether they fall within the statutory definition of a health care provider: After completion of presuit investigation ......

...if any defendant is a health care provider licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, chapter 461, or chapter 466, the Department of Professional Regulation by certified mail, ... of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice. § 766.106(2) (emphasis added)....

...provisions of the Act apply to a negligence action against a nursing home if the professional medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 applied to the active tortfeasor — the agent or employee of the nursing home. Id. at 441. Section 766.106(2) does not define the "prospective defendants" to whom notice must be given....

...when its agent or employee, who is a health care provider, negligently renders medical care or services. 590 So.2d at 441. Thus, we agree with the McCullough court that the proper test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to notice under section 766.106(2) is whether the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1)....

...irmative: WHETHER THE ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF TIMELY WRITTEN NOTICE OF INTENT TO INITIATE LITIGATION FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE THAT RESULTS IN NO PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT IS SUFFICIENT NOTICE UNDER SECTION 768.57(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1987) (CURRENT SECTION 766.106(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1993))....

...We disapprove Solimando and Glineck to the extent they conflict with this opinion. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. [2] Although the parties and the courts below consistently have referred to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1989), the parties now agree that the notice provision as previously codified in section 768.57(2), Florida Statutes (1987), applies because the action appears to have accrued prior to the effective date of the 1988 amendment. See ch. 88-277, § 51, Laws of Fla (act does not apply to actions arising prior to effective date); 618 So.2d at 263 n. 2 (Altenbernd, J., dissenting). [3] Current section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1993), also provides for service by certified mail, return receipt requested....

...Fridovich, 598 So.2d at 69 & nn. 7-8. The reinstatement letters at issue were not a statutory or contractual prerequisite to foreclosure. As noted in Pledger, Florida law requires a plaintiff to send notice before filing a complaint in certain types of actions. For example, section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2006), requires a medical malpractice claimant to notify each prospective defendant by mail prior to filing a complaint....

...ether Plaintiff Thompson, has alleged any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters in her claim for negligence and violation of residents' rights when Plaintiff allegedly failed to comply with the pre-suit requirements of Fla. Stat. § 766.106 and § 400.023; and (C) whether Plaintiff Thompson, has alleged any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters in her prayer for pre-judgment interest on medical expenses actually paid when Plaintiff Thompson, has allegedly...

...e decedent is denied. B. Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion to Strike Counts I & II—Negligence and Violation of Nursing Home Residents' Rights on the Ground that Plaintiff Failed to Comply with the Pre-Suit Requirements of Fla. Stat. § 766.106 and § 400.023 1. Pre-Suit Requirements of Fla. Stat. § 766.106 A recent amendment to § 400.023 of the Florida Statutes, which is current through the end of the 2001 regular session and governs the civil enforcement of nursing home residents' rights, has clarified the instant issue....

...Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Florida recently certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of "great public importance: If a plaintiff files a lawsuit seeking to enforce only those rights enumerated in Section 400.022, must the plaintiff comply with the presuit conditions in Section 766.106." Integrated Health Care Services Inc....

...atutes. Accordingly, Defendant Kindred's Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion to Strike Counts I and II of Plaintiff Thompson's Amended Complaint on the ground that Plaintiff failed to comply with the pre-suit requirements of Fla. Stat. § 766.106 is denied....

...Soifer rendered defective clinical services or omitted to provide him necessary clinical services. Medical malpractice is defined under Florida law as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." Fla. Stat. § 766.106(1)(a) (1999)....

...l be sent by registered mail...."); § 624.155(2)(a) (civil remedy against insurer) ("As a condition precedent to bringing an action under this section, the department and the insurer must have been given 60 days' written notice of the violation."); § 766.106(3)(a) (medical malpractice) ("No suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice is mailed to any prospective defendant.")....

...n or having to prove fault in a civil trial. A defendant or the defendant's insurer is required to conduct an investigation to determine the defendant's liability within ninety days of receiving the claimant's notice to initiate a malpractice claim. § 766.106(3)(a)....

...For these many reasons I would approve the decisions of the trial and district courts. BARKETT, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. [2] The University of Miami d/b/a The University of Miami School of Medicine, a Florida Corporation. [3] Echarte filed notice of intent pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...[21] The district court correctly noted that: Here, a defendant retains causation defenses and the claimant must demonstrate reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation, § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988), through an extensive presuit investigation procedure. §§ 766.106, .203-.206, Fla....

...The DLES asserts that the existence of the presuit requirements in the Act is irrelevant in determining whether section 768.28(6) applies because under Menendez, a claimant bringing a medical malpractice claim is required to comply with section 768.28(6), despite the fact that section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2004), also provides presuit procedures for such claims....

...However, the issue in Menendez was whether the requirements of section 768.28(6) could be waived, not whether that section was applicable to medical malpractice claims. See 537 So.2d at 90. In addition, we could not have considered the effect of the medical malpractice presuit procedures contained in section 766.106 because those procedures were not enacted until 1985, which was five years after Menendez filed his medical malpractice action....

...by the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), in that the time limitations of the statute were tolled when she served a notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...was medically unnecessary and resulted in an aggravation of the injury for which she was being treated. On August 6, 1993, the appellant prepared and forwarded to appellee a notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice required by section 766.106....

...2d DCA 1994) (en banc) (decision to hear case en banc based in part on determination of whether to continue to adhere to prior opinions). Finally, we find it significant that since our judicial interpretation of the interplay between section 95.11(4)(b) and former section 768.57(4), now section 766.106(4), the legislature has continually reenacted these statutory provisions without any change in language....

...on behalf of the appellee and remand this case with instructions to reinstate appellant's complaint. Reversed and remanded with directions. RYDER, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., concur. NOTES [1] As noted in Moore, this statute has since been transferred to section 766.106(4)....

...upon a claimant. These provisions must be met in order to maintain a medical malpractice or medical negligence action against a health care provider. See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835 (Fla. 1993). In delineating the actions to which it applies, section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989), defines a "[c]laim for medical malpractice": "Claim for medical malpractice" means a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services. *949 § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...§ 766.202(6), Fla. Stat. (1989). Reading these two sections in conjunction, we conclude that chapter 766's notice and presuit screening requirements apply to claims that "aris[e] out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...address the certified question, which assumes the existence of a valid cause of action. We further decline to address whether count three of the amended complaint constitutes a medical malpractice claim that is subject to the presuit requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Southern Baptist filed a motion to dismiss count three, asserting that dismissal was warranted on several grounds, including that the impact rule precluded recovery because there was no physical impact and that Welker failed to comply with the presuit requirements of section 766.106, which are applicable to medical malpractice claims....

...act rule did not preclude the recovery of damages for emotional injuries, but certified the issue as a question of great public importance. Further, the First District concluded that Welker was not required to comply with the presuit requirements of section 766.106 because his claim was not a medical malpractice claim....

...For the same reason, we also decline to address the issue of whether, assuming count three states a valid cause of action, the claim against the hospital for vicarious liability based on the acts of the mental health counselor is subject to the presuit requirements of section 766.106....

...practice' is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care." Similarly, section 766.106(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), which pertains to the presuit notice *1033 requirements for medical malpractice claims, defines a claim for medical malpractice as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or service." In Silva v....

...s with an expert medical opinion corroborating reasonable grounds to initiate medical malpractice litigation." The trial court did not hold any evidentiary hearings, and its rulings were not based on the failure of a party to provide discovery [ see § 766.106(6)] or a determination of the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' presuit investigation [ see § 766.206(2)]....

...COWART and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Now codified as section 766.203, Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] The service of the notice of intent was a condition precedent to a malpractice action created by section 768.57, Florida Statutes (1985), which is now codified as section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Accordingly, we approve the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal with directions to remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The statute is currently numbered as section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...they did not need it. When our legislature intends to make a statutory provision a condition precedent, it explicitly says so and explains how and *314 when. For example, in the notice before filing provision of our present medical malpractice law, section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1993), it is provided that after presuit investigation, and prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, a claimant must notify prospective defendants by certified mail, return receipt requested....

...For the following reasons, we quash Hankey and approve Rothschild. At issue is the calculation of the statutory time limitations for filing a medical malpractice action under chapter 766 of the Florida Statutes. Specifically, the question is whether the ninety-day "tolling" period under section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes, plus any other extension agreed to by the parties as provided for under that subsection, suspends the running of the two-year statutory limitation period for filing suit. In Hankey, the Fifth District held that the statutory limitations period was not suspended during the tolling period provided for in section 766.106(4). In Rothschild, the Fourth District held that the running of the limitations period was suspended. We conclude that the tolling period provided by section 766.106(4) does interrupt and suspend the running of the limitations period....

...See Hankey, 719 So.2d at 988. The district court in Hankey relied on Pergrem v. Horan, 669 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), wherein three years after our decision in Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177 (Fla.1993), the Fifth District concluded that under section 766.106(4), "if the notice of intent is mailed well in advance of the end of the statute of limitations period, so that the ninety days and sixty days fall within it, the claimant must file suit before the [original two-year] statute of limitations runs." Id....

...See § 766.104(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). After the completion of this presuit investigation, and during the two-year period provided for in section 95.11(4)(b), the claimant must serve a notice of intent to initiate litigation to each prospective defendant. See § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). Importantly, as it relates to the limitations issue before us, no suit may be filed for a period of ninety days after this notice of intent is mailed to any prospective defendant. [1] See § 766.106(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). In this regard, section 766.106(4) provides: [D]uring the 90-day period, the statute of limitation is tolled as to all potential defendants....

...All of these provisions impact the running of the limitations period, and appear designed to facilitate negotiations between the parties. CALCULATING THE TIME LIMITATIONS Initially, the claimant, Patricia Hankey, maintains that the use of the word "tolled" in section 766.106(4) means that the two-year statute of limitations is suspended during the ninety-day period and during any other agreed extension....

...2d DCA 1990). In Sheffield, as was the case with the Fourth District in Rothschild, the Second District applied the plain meaning of the word "toll" to conclude that the word "tolled" in section 768.57(4), Florida Statutes (1987), the predecessor of section 766.106(4), should be interpreted to mean a "suspension" of the statute of limitations. [4] OTHER STATUTES Another way of determining the Legislature's intent in using the word "tolled" in section 766.106(4), is by examining other uses of the word in similar contexts....

...r section 95.051(1)(g)). Because the word "toll" has been consistently used by the Legislature and interpreted by the courts to mean "suspend" when used in a statutory limitations context, we conclude that it was intended to have the same meaning in section 766.106(4)....

...In essence, the clock stops until the tolling period expires and then begins to run again." Rothschild, 707 So.2d at 953. This construction is also consistent with judicial pronouncements suggesting that the purpose of the ninety-day tolling period in section 766.106 should be liberally construed to give the parties an opportunity to investigate claims, to promote presuit settlement, and to reduce the number of malpractice actions filed in the courts....

...aimant cannot lawfully file an action during the period of suspension and, hence, is deprived of that time to file suit. Accordingly, we hold the two-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(b) is suspended ("tolled") for ninety days under section 766.106(4) and any extended time agreed to by the parties under that same section. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING LIMITATIONS PERIOD Section 766.106(4) of the statutory scheme also provides that if there are less than sixty days remaining to file suit before the end date of the original two-year limitations period at the time the claimant filed the notice of intent to initiate lit...

...days remain to file suit at the time the claimant files the notice of intent. See Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177, 183 (Fla.1993). Those circumstances are not present here. *98 SECTION 766.104(2) Finally, in addition to the two scenarios involved in section 766.106(4) discussed above, a claimant can also automatically secure an additional ninety-day extension under section 766.104(2) that will be added to the end of both periods described above....

...r tolling provisions." Again, we agree with the Fourth District that the "extension" provided for under section 766.104(2) is a genuine extension of time to be added to the limitations period, rather than a tolling (suspension) as provided for under section 766.106(4)....

...In fact, we approved this interpretation of section 766.104(2) in Tanner. See id. at 182. Hence, this time period is to be tacked on to the end of the limitations period and does not run simultaneously with the separate ninety-day tolling period provided in section 766.106(4)....

...("This automatic extension is separate and additional to any other tolling period.") (citing Novitsky v. Hards, 589 So.2d 404 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)); Rothschild, 707 So.2d at 953; Kalbach v. Day, 589 So.2d 448, 449-50 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). TANNER v. HARTOG We are not unsympathetic with the Fifth District's interpretation of section 766.106(4) in Hankey and Pergrem....

...Essentially, the court applied its interpretation of the analysis we adopted in Tanner. The main issue resolved in Tanner concerned the commencement of the limitations period and is unrelated to the issues discussed here. However, in Tanner, the claimants also argued that all of the time periods provided for in section 766.106(4) were to be simply added on to the end of the basic two-year limitations period....

...Moreover, because the claimants received the notice of termination from the defendants with less than sixty days remaining before the original statute of limitations was set to expire, they also claimed they were entitled to have the sixty-day additional period under section 766.106(4) also simply added, along with the ninety days aforementioned, to the end of the two-year period....

...Specifically, we wrote: From the date the notice of intent is filed, the plaintiff has ninety days (the amount of the tolling) plus either sixty days or the time that was remaining in the limitations period, whichever is greater, to file suit. We believe the language of section 766.106(4) was intended to provide extra time to a claimant who files a notice of intent shortly before the limitations period expires....

...However, the time remaining must be computed from the date the notice of intent was filed, rather than simply adding on the extra time to the end of the limitations period.... Id. at 183-84 (emphasis added). The Fifth District in Pergrem construed our comment about the intent of the "language" in section 766.106(4) as meaning that the only purpose of the entire section was to affect claims filed "shortly before the limitations period expires." We did not intend such a result, but concede that our words may have been less than precise. It is true that the entitlement to any extra time under the sixty-day provision of section 766.106(4) is entirely dependent on when the notice of intent is filed in relation to the time remaining in the original two-year limitations period as discussed earlier. However, the ninety-day tolling provision of section 766.106(4) applies to all cases regardless of when the notice of intent is filed....

...Thus, the tolling provisions should not be limited to apply only to claims filed "shortly" before the limitations period expires. THIS CASE The Fifth District candidly acknowledged that if the limitations period was suspended under the tolling provisions of section 766.106(4), then the Hankeys' complaint was timely filed; whereas if the limitations period was not suspended, then the complaint was untimely....

...Because as of March 19, 1996, the date the notice of intent was served, more than sixty days remained until the expiration date of the original limitations period (December 6, 1994), the Hankeys were not entitled to any of the sixty days provided under section 766.106(4)....

...keys had until July 5, 1997, to file suit. [8] The suit in this case was filed on June 19, 1997; therefore, it was timely. CONCLUSION In summary, we conclude that the two-year limitations period is suspended temporarily and begins to run again under section 766.106(4) at the expiration of the stated time period or when the defendant responds to the notice of intent. The time of suspension provided under the tolling provision of section 766.106(4) is merely a "time out" that the prospective claimant was allotted by the Legislature that is not to be counted against the two-year limitations period. On the other hand, any additional times added under section 766.106(4) if the notice of intent is filed by the claimant with less than sixty days remaining in the original statute of limitations, or under the automatic ninety-day extension pursuant to section 766.104(2), are actually statutorily granted additions to the initial two years allotted by the statute....

...HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In Boyd v. Becker, 627 So.2d 481, 483-84 (Fla.1993), we held that the statute of limitations is tolled from the time the defendant receives the notice of intent, not from the time the claimant mails it. [2] The wording of section 766.106(4) makes it appear that the "60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations" language only applies when the parties have stipulated to an extension of the ninety-day tolling provision....

...However, the remainder of the definition provides: "To suspend or stop temporarily as the statute of limitations is tolled during the defendant's absence from that jurisdiction and during the plaintiff's minority." Id. [4] In 1988, section 768.57 was renumbered as 766.106. See § 766.106, Fla....

...al end date of the two-year limitations period. However, the significant issue in our Tanner computation was determining when the sixty-day provision commenced to run. We held that it commenced to run at the end of the ninety-day suspension. Indeed, section 766.106(4) explicitly provides: "Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations..., the claimant shall have 60 days...." The net effect of our calculation and suspension of the limitations period was to grant the claimants an additional thirteen days, the thirteen days being the difference between the forty-seven days remaining on the two-year statute and the sixty days provided in section 766.106(4)....

...[7] We reach this date by adding 263 days (the time remaining in the original two-year limitations period at the time when the notice of intent was filed), to July 18, 1996, (the date when the limitations period began to run again). This calculation reflects the suspension of the limitations period under section 766.106(4) and provides the claimants with the entire two-year period in which to file suit....

...equiring the plaintiff, Theresa E. McCullough, to comply with the presuit conditions of chapter 766 before proceeding with this lawsuit. We deny the writ because East Manor is a nursing home and is not itself a "health care provider" for purposes of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989). The plaintiff's complaint does not allege that any of the nursing home's agents or employees involved in this case are health care providers, nor does it allege a "claim for medical malpractice" as defined in section 766.106(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Count I of the complaint alleges simple negligence, and count II alleges a violation of section 400.022, Florida Statutes (1989), which sets forth certain rights of nursing home residents. East Manor moved to dismiss the complaint because the plaintiff had failed to comply and plead compliance with sections 766.104, 766.106, and 766.203-206....

...ew committee. § 766.101(1)(a)1.c., Fla. Stat. (1989). Thus, while we agree that a nursing home is not a health care provider, this does not mean that the provisions of chapter 766 have no relevance for nursing homes. [1] *441 East Manor argues that section 766.106 and the other presuit requirements apply to every "claim for medical malpractice" as defined to mean "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...ct." In the circuit court, Dr. Fassy and PMA argued that the Personal Representative's claim was essentially a medical malpractice action and that she had failed to follow the presuit notice and screening requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act, section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2002), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650, the Medical Malpractice Presuit Screening Rule. Citing Integrated Health Care Services, Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So.2d 974 (Fla. 2002), the circuit court noted that the test for determining whether the presuit notice requirements of section 766.106 apply is whether the plaintiff must rely on the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102(1)....

...The trial court here made its decision "according to the form of the law and the rules prescribed for rendering it." See id. The court applied the test set forth in Integrated Health Care Services, Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So.2d 974, 977 (Fla. 2002), to determine whether a defendant is entitled to section 766.106 presuit screening requirements....

...licy limits, while leaving other insureds exposed to excess judgments. [6] The court justified its conclusion by holding that the carrier's discretion, though not absolute, is determined by the expectations of the contracting parties. [7] See, e.g., § 766.106(3), Fla.Stat....

...McMillan of Adams, Coogler, Watson & Merkel, P.A., West Palm Beach, for respondent. OVERTON, Justice. James Curtis Boyd petitions for review of Boyd v. Becker, 603 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), in which the district court held that Boyd's medical malpractice action was *482 barred by section 766.106(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), the statute of limitations for medical malpractice suits. The district court acknowledged that section 766.106(3)(c) conflicts with section 766.106(3)(a) inasmuch as the former section provides a longer period in which to file suit....

...The district court also acknowledged that its decision conflicts with Barron v. Crenshaw, 573 So.2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). We find conflict and have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. For the reasons expressed, we conclude that subsections (a) and (c) of section 766.106(3) should be construed so that Boyd's lawsuit was timely filed....

...Our construction of these statutes requires that we modify Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650 to conform to this statutory interpretation. In order to understand the facts in this case, it is necessary to first examine the statutory provisions involved. The statutes at issue are sections 95.11(4)(b) and 766.106(2)-(4), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence... . § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat.(1989). The pertinent parts of section 766.106(2)-(4) read as follows: (2) After completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s....

...led during any such extension. Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. § 766.106(2)-(4), Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added). The conflict arises from the language used in section 766.106(3)(a) (measuring the ninety-day period from the date the notice of intent is mailed) vis-a-vis the language used in section 766.106(3)(c) (measuring the same period from the date the notice is received)....

...Statutes (1989). Prior to the expiration of this ninety-day extension period, on August 30, 1990, Boyd mailed to Dr. Becker a notice of intent to initiate litigation, the statutory prerequisite to filing a medical malpractice lawsuit, as required by section 766.106(2)....

...d by Dr. Becker rather than from the date the notice was mailed, Boyd filed his lawsuit. In the trial court, Dr. Becker asserted that Boyd's claim was barred by the statute of limitations and moved for dismissal. The doctor relied on the language in section 766.106(3)(a) that states: "No suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice [of intent to initiate litigation] is mailed to any prospective defendant." (Emphasis added)....

...to be considered on its merits, rather than barred by a judicial construction that applies the more limiting statutory provision. We find that the most reasonable construction of the conflicting provisions is that the ninety-day period described in section 766.106(3) should be computed from the date the putative defendant receives the notice of intent *484 to initiate litigation....

...t with this opinion. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1993), we held that the sixty-day tolling of the statute of limitations described in section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1991), need not follow an "extension" period as suggested in the statute.

...Shawanni Mobley appeals a final summary judgment in favor of the defendant below, Dr. Gilbert E. Hirschberg, on her claim for personal injuries. The basis for the ruling was that Mobley failed to comply with the medical malpractice presuit procedures. See § 766.106, Fla....

...When the dental assistant pulled at the arm to dislodge it, the machine struck Mobley in the face, causing injuries. Mobley sued for simple negligence. Hirschberg raised the affirmative defense that Mobley failed to comply with the presuit requirements of section 766.106. The trial court granted the dentist's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the case was a medical malpractice case where the patient was injured during the course of treatment. Section 766.106 imposes presuit requirements on a claim for medical negligence or malpractice....

...Such a claim is one "arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." See Burke v. Snyder, 899 So.2d 336, 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (citing J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola, 635 So.2d 945, 949 (Fla.1994)); § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...We have for review the decision in Parham v. Balis, 704 So.2d 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We accepted jurisdiction to answer the following question certified to be of great public importance: DO THE EXTENSIONS OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ALLOWED BY SECTIONS 766.104(2) AND 766.106(4), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), ALSO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF REPOSE CONTAINED IN SECTION 95.11(4)( [b]), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? Id....

...TATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 766.104(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), IN ORDER TO *947 CONDUCT THE "REASONABLE INVESTIGATION" REQUIRED BY SECTION 766.104(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), OR SERVES A NOTICE OF INTENT TO INITIATE LITIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 766.106(4), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? For the reasons expressed below, we answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision on review under the reasoning contained herein. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW In the case below, the Second District considered whether the extensions of the medical malpractice statute of limitations provided for in sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1989), likewise extend the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose residing in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...ocumentary. On December 16, 1994, Parham filed a petition, pursuant to section 766.104(2), for an automatic 90-day extension of the two-year statute of limitations. On March 17, 1995, he served notice of his intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106, and on April 17, 1995, he served an amended notice adding Musculoskeletal Institute....

...Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1992). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' contention that the repose time period was extended or tolled by their petition pursuant to Florida Statutes § 766.104 or their service of a "Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation" as required by Florida Statute § 766.106, cannot be sustained....

...While agreeing with the majority that the trial court was bound by the district precedent in Moore, Judge Fulmer disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the medical malpractice statute of repose was extended by the relevant provisions in section 766.104 and 766.106....

...Court's caselaw for the proposition that the time periods of each operate in isolation and independent of the other. Id. LAW AND ANALYSIS Resolution of this case will be determined by the interplay among sections 95.11(4)(b); [1] 766.104(2); [2] and 766.106(2), [3] Florida Statutes (1989), and the application of our prior caselaw construing various provisions of chapter 766....

...gligence claims. (Emphasis added.) We have consistently recognized the legislative intent behind chapter 766. See, e.g., Kukral, 679 So.2d at 281. As to each statute individually, we recently reiterated the purpose of the notice requirement found in section 766.106: The statute was intended to address a legitimate legislative policy decision relating to medical malpractice and established a process intended to promote the settlement of meritorious claims at an early stage without the necessity of a full adversarial proceeding....

...viding "the defendants notice of the incident in order to allow investigation of the matter and promote presuit settlement of the claim"); Stone v. Rosenthal, 665 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (explaining that purpose of 90-day notice period in section 766.106(4) "is to give a prospective defendant an opportunity to investigate the claim and avoid litigation by settling it"); Rhoades v....

...2d DCA 1989) (concluding that medical malpractice statute "evidence[s] a clear legislative intent to discourage costly and time-consuming medical malpractice litigation, to promote the culling of meritless claims, and to encourage settlement of meritorious claims"). In conjunction with section 766.106, the "reasonable investigation" requirement of section 766.104 is another component of the statutory scheme which "obviously attempts to ensure good faith and limit frivolous filings." Nowling v. Walton Regional Hosp., 711 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 719 So.2d 892 (Fla.), and review denied, 719 So.2d 894 (Fla. 1998). Operating with obvious unity of purpose, sections 766.104 and 766.106 are concerned with deterring meritless claims and promoting early and fair settlements of meritorious claims....

...la. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added). After satisfying that prerequisite but prior to filing a medical malpractice claim, a potential claimant must still notify prospective defendants of his or her intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice. § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. (1989). During the ninety days after such notice is mailed to prospective defendants, the prospective claimant may not file suit, section 766.106(3)(a), and the statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants. § 766.106(4), Fla....

...Therefore, under these statutory predicates, commencing an action in the circuit court is inextricably linked to the performance of a reasonable investigation under section 766.104(1) and other provisions of chapter 766, [6] the notification of prospective defendants under the provisions of section 766.106, and the accompanying tolling of the statute of the limitations so the prospective defendants may investigate the basis of the claim against them....

...se nor our construction of that statute in isolation. Rather, we are obligated to construe the statute of repose in conjunction with the statutory presuit requirements of chapter *952 766. The present issue arises because subsections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4) provide, respectively, an extension to and tolling of the statute of limitations within the statutory presuit and investigation framework, but are silent as to the statute of repose. This results in an inconsistency because section 95.11(4)(b) mandates that the statute of repose runs four years "from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued," but section 766.106 does not allow an action to be filed in court until a notice of intent to initiate litigation is served and the ninety-day period specified in the statute expires....

...eing forever barred by the associated statute of repose. We therefore hold that solely for the purpose of the statute of repose, an action for medical malpractice is commenced with the service of a notice of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106 or on petition to the clerk of the court filed pursuant to section 766.104(2) and that the tolling provisions of these statutes and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(d) applicable to the statute of limitations are equally applicable to the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...teed by article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. See, e.g., Kukral, 679 So.2d at 284; Patry v. Capps, 633 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla. 1994) (holding that strict compliance with statutory mode of service of notice of intent to initiate litigation per section 766.106(2) was not required); Weinstock, 629 So.2d at 838 (recognizing general rule that "restrictions on access to the courts must be construed in a manner that favors access"); Smith v....

...) when the prospective claimant files for the automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations under section 766.104(2) in order to comply with the requirement to conduct a "reasonable investigation" of possible medical malpractice under section 766.106(1), or serves a notice of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106(4)....

...This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods. No court order is required for the extension to be effective. The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run. [3] Section 766.106(4) provides, in pertinent part: The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s....

...[6] Section 766.201(2) provides that "[p]resuit investigation shall be mandatory and shall apply to all medical negligence claims and defenses." Likewise, section 766.203(2) provides that "[p]rior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to s. 766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) Any named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted...

...ce. These documents were apparently generated pursuant the pre-suit procedural requirements of Chapter 766 of the Florida Statutes. This statute governs the prosecution of medical malpractice actions in Florida. Calhoun Hospital argues Fla.Stat.Ann. § 766.106(5) insulates the documents in Plaintiff's exhibit "B" from discovery and prevents them from being used at trial....

...[1] James Savage sued appellants on June 4, 1992, alleging that he was injured by their negligent provision of physical therapy on June 7, 1990. However, prior to filing the complaint, Savage did not comply with the presuit screening requirements for medical malpractice actions required by section 766.106, Florida Statutes. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to comply with section 766.106; the trial court denied the motion....

...ssential requirements of the law. Martin-Johnson, 509 So.2d at 1100. However, the Second District has held that certiorari is the proper method to test an order denying a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the presuit notice requirement of section 766.106....

..." in enacting medical malpractice reform. Id. at 588. We join the Second District and hold that, in this narrow context, we have certiorari jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the presuit conditions of section 766.106....

..."[F]ailure to timely file a notice as required by section 768.57 [2] within the statute of limitations period requires dismissal" of the action. Williams v. Campagnulo, 588 So.2d 982 (Fla. 1991) (footnote ours). It is undisputed that Savage did not timely comply with section 766.106....

...COPE, J., concurs. NESBITT, Judge (dissenting): I respectfully dissent. Today, the court quashes a trial court order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with pre-suit notice requirements established by section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...e trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Hospital Corp. of America v. Lindberg, 571 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1990). In light of Lindberg, prohibition is no longer the appropriate vehicle to review such an order. [2] Section 768.57 has been renumbered to section 766.106, Florida Statutes. [3] Savage attempted to comply belatedly with section 766.106 by filing the required Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation over three months after the two-year statute of limitations period had expired....

...Our review requires us to determine *712 whether compliance with the requirements of the Baker Act involves the rendering of medical care or services. The test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to the benefit of the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106(1), Florida Statutes (1989), is whether the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1). Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835 (Fla.1993) (citing NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So.2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)). Under section 766.106(1)(a), a "claim for medical malpractice" is defined as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." Not every wrongful act by a health care provider amounts to medical malpractice....

...With entry of this order, any uncertainty concerning whether the order of February 21, 1991 was intended to dismiss the (first) amended complaint along with the original complaint was laid to rest. On August 24, 1992, Archer filed a second amended complaint alleging compliance with the notice requirements of section 766.106(2), and attached both a corroborating, verified medical expert opinion and an amended notice of intent....

...Archer alleged she first went to Dr. Maddux, certain requirements pertain, with regard to "[p]resuit investigation of medical negligence claims and defenses by prospective parties": (2) Prior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to s. 766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) Any named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant....

...which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence. (3) Prior to issuing its response to the claimant's notice of intent to initiate litigation, during the time period for response authorized pursuant to s. 766.106, the defendant or the defendant's insurer or selfinsurer shall conduct an investigation to ascertain whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) The defendant was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant....

...Maddux waived any objection to her failure to comply with statutory requirements when his insurance company undertook a presuit investigation of her claim, after receiving her pro se notice of intent. We do not believe the defendants' own investigation, presumably conducted in a good faith effort to comply with section 766.106(3), Florida Statutes (1993), can fairly be construed as a waiver of their right to a corroborating medical opinion....

...ppellees. MICKLE, Judge. Petitioners, defendants in a pending medical malpractice action, seek a writ of certiorari to overturn a nonfinal order denying their motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the prefiling notice requirements of sections 766.106 and 766.203, Florida Statutes....

...NOTES [1] Very recently, in Miami Physical Therapy Associates, Inc. v. Savage, 632 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), our sister court held that certiorari is the proper method to test an order denying a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with presuit notice requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes.

...nse. 2. In medical negligence actions the date inserted in the instruction will ordinarily be two years before the date on which either the notice of intent was served or the petition to extend the statute of limitations was filed. F.S. 95.11(4)(b), 766.106, and 766.104(2)....

...768.18 and 768.21 (1990), applicable to causes of action accruing after October 1, 1990, expand eligible survivor claimants in wrongful death actions by surviving parents and children, but are not applicable to claims for medical malpractice as defined by F.S. 766.106(1) (1989)....

...[2] The alleged medical malpractice of the appellees occurred in June 2005. The appellants had two years from that date to file a medical malpractice action. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). The filing of the notice of intent to sue tolled the two-year statute of limitations for 90 days. See § 766.106(4)....

...85 failure following an acute myocardial infarction stemming from his prolonged history of ischemic cardiomyopathy. Following Virgil's death, Apostolico served ORMC with a Notice of Intent to Initiate Medical Negligence Litigation in accordance with section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...Further, both elements of negligence and causation must be corroborated by a qualified expert. § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). Specifically, section 766.203(2) provides: Prior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to s. 766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) Any named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant....

...iled a lawsuit asserting a count of negligence against the Hospital in connection with her husband's death. Respondent did not comply with the presuit requirements of chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2008), which include presuit notice as set forth in section 766.106(2)(a), prior to filing the lawsuit....

...uit screening is to avoid the filing of the lawsuit in the first instance.'" Fassy, 884 So.2d at 363 (quoting Parkway, 658 So.2d at 649). Chapter 766 contains several prerequisites for filing a medical malpractice or medical negligence action. See §§ 766.106,.203 (Fla.Stat.2008). Section 766.106, for example, sets forth the requirements of presuit notice and presuit investigation by a prospective defendant. This section defines a "`[c]laim for medical negligence' or `claim for medical malpractice' [as] a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...Silverman, Sarasota, for Amicus Curiae, Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers. BARFIELD, Judge. Dr. Duffy and his medical malpractice insurer appeal a final order imposing sanctions upon the insurer under section 766.206, Florida Statutes (1989). We affirm. In August 1990, pursuant to section 766.106, Mrs....

...was presented against a health care provider that fully cooperated in providing informal discovery." Section 766.104(2) provides for a 90-day extension of the statute of limitations "to allow the reasonable investigation required by subsection (1)." Section 766.106(2) requires the claimant, after completing the presuit investigation pursuant to section 766.203 and prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, to notify each prospective defendant "of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice." Section 766.106(3)(a) provides that no suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after the notice is mailed, and requires the insurer to "conduct a review to determine the liability of the defendant" during that period....

...panel consisting of the adjustor, an attorney, and a medical expert; 3) a contractual agreement with a medical society which has a medical review committee; and 4) "any other similar procedure which fairly and promptly evaluates the pending claim." Section 766.106(3)(b) provides: At or before the end of the 90 days, the insurer or self-insurer shall provide the claimant with a response: 1. Rejecting the claim; 2. Making a settlement offer; or 3. Making an offer of admission of liability and for arbitration on the issue of damages. This offer may be made contingent upon a limit of general damages. Section 766.106(3)(c) requires that the response be provided by certified mail, and provides that failure to reply to the notice *544 within the 90-day period "shall be deemed a final rejection of the claim for purposes of this section." Section 766....

...bmission of "a verified written medical expert opinion" at the time the response is mailed, "which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds for lack of negligent injury sufficient to support the response denying negligent injury." [3] Sections 766.106(5)-766.106(9) and 766.204-766.205 provide for informal presuit discovery and require each party to provide the other with "reasonable access to information within its possession or control in order to facilitate evaluation of the claim." Section 766.206...

...r denial of the claim did not rest on a reasonable basis. The trial court's order is AFFIRMED. MINER, J., concurs. BOOTH, J., specially concurs with opinion. BOOTH, Judge, specially concurring. I concur in the result of this opinion. NOTES [1] Under section 766.106(7), either party may take the unsworn statement of the other for the purpose of presuit screening only....

...[2] The claimant's failure to produce the corroborating medical expert opinion prior to the running of the statute of limitations will not result in dismissal of the complaint as a matter of law, but it may subject the plaintiff to sanctions under section 766.106(6) and/or section 766.206(2). Stebilla v. Mussallem, 595 So.2d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. den., Mussallem v. Stebilla, 604 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1992). [3] If no written response rejecting the claim is sent within the 90-day period, the claim is deemed rejected by operation of section 766.106(3)(c)....

...d. However, this does not excuse the requirement that the defendant conduct a "reasonable investigation" and determine in good faith whether to reject the claim, failure of which may subject the defendant to sanctions under section 766.206(3) and/or section 766.106(6)....

...We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance: If a plaintiff files a lawsuit seeking to enforce only those rights enumerated in section 400.022, must the plaintiff comply with the presuit conditions in section 766.106? Integrated Health Care Services, Inc....

...defenses pursuant to this section and ss. 766.204-766.206 shall apply to all medical negligence, including dental negligence, claims and defenses.... (2) Prior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to s. 766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) Any named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant....

...ence. § 766.203(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). After the claimant completes the presuit investigation, she or he must then notify each "prospective defendant" [2] of the intent to initiate litigation prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice. See § 766.106(2)(3)(a), Fla....

...ourt agreed that this indicated a legislative intent that psychologists should not be classified as such. Id. at 837. The Court concluded that the proper test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to the presuit requirement of notice under section 766.106(2) is "whether the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1)." [5] Id....

...ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur. LEWIS, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] Bon Secours is the only defendant involved in the petition before this Court. [2] The term "prospective defendant" is not defined in the statute. [3] Section 766.106 provides in relevant part: (2) After completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s....

...During the 90-day period, the prospective defendant's insurer or self-insurer shall conduct a review to determine the liability of the defendant. Each insurer or self-insurer shall have a procedure for the prompt investigation, review, and evaluation of claims during the 90-day period. § 766.106(2)-(3)(a), Fla....

...Relevant to the instant action, section 766.202(4) requires the claimant's attorney to consult with and obtain an opinion from a medical expert. Further, section 766.203(2) requires that prior to the claimant issuing the notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to section 766.106, the claimant's presuit investigation must ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the proposed defendants were negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant and that such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant....

...ber of such practitioner defendants, noneconomic damages shall not exceed $150,000 per claimant. (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), the total noneconomic damages recoverable by all claimants from all such practitioners shall not exceed $300,000. [3] Section 766.106(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...n of anesthesia prior to surgery. The complaint was prepared and signed by a Michigan attorney (plaintiff's attorney), not licensed to practice in Florida. The attorney also signed the notice of intent to file a medical malpractice claim required by section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...NOTES [1] The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions is two years. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). However, the 90-day presuit period triggered by the filing of the notice of intent required under section 766.102(6) tolls the limitations period. Section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1999), provides: (4) The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s....

...nt shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight of the evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider ... (emphasis supplied) Section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1993) requires that presuit notice be given by a claimant to "each prospective defendant"....

...be denied unless the privilege has been abused or the complaint is clearly not subject to being amended. Fla.R. Civ.P. 1.190; Plant v. Decks, 486 So.2d 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). [2] Section 768.57, Florida Statutes (1987) was revised and transferred to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988). Former section 768.57(4) (now section 766.106(4)) was maintained intact in the revision....

...Therefore, this court has certiorari jurisdiction to review the trial court's order. III. Analysis The presuit screening requirements of chapter 766 apply to claims "arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a); see J.B....

..."Chapter 766 presuit screening is required only where the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102(1)." Fassy, 884 So.2d at 364. "The test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to the benefit of the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106(1) ....

...the petitioners. The injury alleged by Garcia was directly inflicted by the medical care — that is, physical therapy treatment — provided to her by the petitioner. Garcia's claim thus arose "out of the rendering of . . . medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a)....

...d by [the patient] was directly inflicted by the medical care-that is, physical therapy treatment-provided to her by the petitioner. [The patient’s] claim thus *1287 arose ‘out of the rendering of ... medical care or services.’ ” Id. (citing § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...HAZOURI, J. Tenet St. Mary's, Inc. d/b/a St. Mary's Medical Center (St.Mary's) petitions for writ of certiorari seeking review of an order denying its motion to dismiss the complaint of Agnes Serratore, for failure to follow the presuit requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...al negligence under section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2001); therefore, the trial court was correct in denying the motion to dismiss. The test for determining whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106 is whether the defendant is liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1)....

...It was not until seven months after the action was filed against Nurse Wang that she was served with a notice of intent and the same corroborating affidavit that had been served on Dr. Gregorian. The action against Nurse Wang was dismissed and re-filed in November 2003. See § 766.106(3)(a), Fla....

...Largies suggest. As the court in Archer v. Maddux, 645 So.2d 544, 546-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), stated when faced with a similar argument: We do not believe the defendants' own investigation, presumably conducted in a good faith effort to comply with section 766.106(3), Florida Statutes (1993), can fairly be construed as a waiver of their right to a corroborating medical opinion....

...edical negligence under Section 766.203, Florida Statutes (2000). Section 766.203, Florida Statutes (2000) provides: (2) Presuit investigation by claimant. Prior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical negligence litigation pursuant to s.766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) Any named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant....

...ce of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence. The notice given to nurse Wang by plaintiffs stated, in pertinent part: Notice is hereby sent pursuant to § 766.106 Florida Statutes of our intention to bring a medical negligence suit against you for your failure to do a follow-up PSA [prostate specific antigen] test on Mr....

...We cannot conclude that the legislature has granted a substantive jurisdictional defense to a private sector of the community by way of section 768.57 while denying that same defense to the sovereign. Id. at 1033-1034 (citations omitted). Finally, I agree that the question needs to be certified. NOTES [1] Now renumbered section 766.106, Florida Statutes by the official reviser....

...ered by the trial court in reaching its determination. We therefore decline to pass on this question. Reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the plaintiff's complaint. SCHEB, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Transferred to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.). [2] Transferred to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.). [3] Transferred to section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.)....

...He further alleged that he was admitted to the hospital that same day with a staphylococcus infection which resulted in thrombophlebitis of the arm and staph pneumonia, and that surgery was required, as was a course of antibiotic therapy and physical therapy, with permanent scarring as a result. Respondent filed an amended section 766.106 notice of intent on May 2, 1996, effectively extending the limitations period by 90 days to August 18, 1996....

...for filing a medical malpractice suit within the applicable limitations period, that the May 2, 1996, notice of intent in effect extended the limitations period until October 1, 1996, or a period of 150 days, because the 60 day extension provided in section 766.106(4) "is an unrestricted period during which the plaintiff has all rights that would have existed prior to the filing of the notice of intent" citing Kukral v....

...However, to the extent the complaint also stated a cause of action for medical malpractice, we do not agree with the trial court's assessment of the effect of the 60 day period provided for in the statute during which, after the investigation period has been concluded, a complaint may be filed. Section 766.106(4) provides: The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s.95.11....

...ther for purposes of complying with presuit requirements. We are aware that the requirements of section 766 should be construed if possible to favor access to the courts. Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278 (Fla.1996). Nevertheless, the language used in section 766.106 indicates that for purposes of complying with presuit requirements, the limitations period is intended to be tolled only the additional 90 days....

...In addition, we agree with petitioner that its own investigation of the claim did not constitute a waiver of the requirement of a corroborating expert medical opinion. See Archer v. Maddux, 645 So.2d at 546 ("[w]e do not believe the defendants' own investigation, presumably conducted in a good faith effort to comply with section 766.106(3), Florida Statutes (1993), can fairly be construed as a waiver of their right to a corroborating medical opinion")....

...As to the portion of the complaint that states a cause of action for ordinary negligence, the petition is denied. JOANOS, WOLF and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Plaintiff /respondent filed his complaint on May 17, 1996, only a few weeks after the notice of intent was given, and in violation of section 766.106(3)(a)....

...a claim for punitive damages. APPLICABILITY OF CHAPTER 766 PRE-SUIT REQUIREMENTS At the pleading stage the defendants unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the complaint due to plaintiff's undisputed failure to comply with the pre-suit requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...ugh a nursing home is not itself a health care provider under Chapter 766, Florida Statutes, see NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So.2d 439, 440-41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), it is nonetheless entitled to the benefits of the pre-suit requirements of section 766.106 when it is charged with vicarious liability for the acts of health care providers, see Weinstock v....

...'s decision in the case below and the decision of the Fourth District Court in Citron on the issue of whether the presuit affidavit, required pursuant to sections 766.203(2) and (3), Florida Statutes (1995), [1] is protected by the provisions *69 of section 766.106(5), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Cohen and Martin (two of the three petitioners herein). See id. On appeal, the Fifth District Court held that the trial court erred in allowing the defendants to use Dr. Battle's presuit affidavit for impeachment purposes, reasoning that the affidavit was protected by section 766.106(5)....

...a medical expert is not discoverable, [4] the doctor was not irreparably harmed by the plaintiff's failure to provide such an opinion. See 689 So.2d at 1289. In rejecting this argument, the court stated: "We understand the work product protection in section 766.106 not to apply to the corroborating opinion requirement in section 766.203." Id. at 1290. [5] If, by that statement, the Fourth District Court was indicating only that section 766.106(5) does not defeat the requirement of providing an affidavit as a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice action, then we agree. If, on the other hand, the Fourth District Court meant to say that the clear and unambiguous language of section 766.106(5) does not protect the corroborative affidavit itself from formal discovery and admissibility, then we must disagree....

...trial, we disapprove that decision and hold that section 766.205(4) protects the corroborative affidavit from any use by the opposing party, including impeachment of the expert witness who prepared the affidavit. Legislative History The language of section 766.106(5) was first adopted by the legislature in 1985 as section 768.57....

...*71 Responding to complaints that this was an empty requirement, the legislature, in 1988, adopted procedures for what was termed "presuit investigation." See Ch. 88-1, §§ 48-53, at 164-68, Laws of Fla. (codified at §§ 766.201-766.206, Fla. Stat. (1989)). Section 768.57 was renumbered as 766.106 and was amended to include subsection (7) dealing with informal discovery during the period after the filing of the notice of intent and the filing of the suit....

...At the heart of the presuit investigation amendments was the requirement that an expert's affidavit be obtained and that it be attached to the notice of intent to initiate litigation. See § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (1989). Section 766.205(4), which is virtually identical to section 766.106(5), was also added at that time. [6] However, the simultaneous enactment of sections 766.205(4) and 766.203(2) may indicate that the legislature intended section 766.205(4), rather than section 766.106(5), to apply to the affidavit attached to the notice of intent. This view is further supported by the observation that the old section 768.57(5), which could not have applied to the required expert affidavit as there was no such requirement while that provision was in effect, became the new section 766.106(5). Further, the original section 768.57(5) and its successor section 766.106(5) are designated as dealing with "presuit screening" while new sections 766.201-766.206 are designated as dealing with "presuit investigation." Because these designations exist today side by side, it is apparent that the legislature intended to distinguish between presuit screening, covering the period up to the serving of the notice of intent, and presuit investigation, covering the period between the serving of the notice of intent and the filing of the suit. While section 766.106(5) is the basis for the district courts' opinions at issue here, based upon the history of chapter 766, we believe that it is section 766.205(4), and not section 766.106(5), which prevents a party from using a corroborative affidavit to impeach witness testimony at trial. However, since the language of section 766.106(5) is virtually identical to that of section 766.205(4), our analysis of this issue remains the same regardless of what section is used....

...The corroborative affidavit serves the purpose of ensuring that reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence exist at the time the affidavit is prepared and submitted to the potential defendants. Petitioners also point out that the statements, discussions, written documents and reports listed in section 766.106(5) are protected not only from admissibility, but also from discoverability....

...the protection from admissibility is inapplicable to the corroborative affidavit. Petitioners' argument, however, fails to take into account the difference between the informal and formal discovery phases in a medical malpractice action. Section *73 766.106(6), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that after the prospective defendant receives the notice of intent to initiate litigation and the corroborating affidavit, "the parties shall make discoverable information available without formal discovery ." (Emphasis added.) Section 766.106(7), Florida Statutes (1995), speaks of the availability of " informal discovery " for the taking of unsworn statements during the presuit screening process....

...ermore, as a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation, courts should avoid reading a statute in a way that would render other parts of the statute meaningless. See Unruh v. State, 669 So.2d 242, 245 (Fla.1996). This rule illustrates why sections 766.106(5) and 766.205(4), Florida Statutes, apply only to work product material....

...If those statutory subsections applied to all materials generated in any way during the presuit process, there would be no need for the legislature to *75 have enacted other provisions in the statutory scheme. One broad and all-encompassing provision, such as the one given effect by the majority today, would be enough. Yet section 766.106(5) contains numerous specific provisions protecting particular material. Section 766.106(7)(a) provides that unsworn statements taken during the presuit screening process may be used only for the purpose of presuit screening and are not discoverable or admissible in any civil action for any purpose by any party. Section 766.106(7)(c) provides that reports of physical or mental examinations of a claimant taken during the presuit are "available to the parties and their attorneys upon payment of the reasonable cost of reproduction and may be used only for the purpose of presuit screening." Section 766.106(10)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that any rejected offer to admit liability or for arbitration on damages "is not admissible in any subsequent litigation." Finally, section 766.106(11) provides that where there are plural potential defendants "[n]o offer by any prospective defendant to admit liability and for arbitration is admissible in any civil action." If the Legislature intended the language in section 766.106(5) and 766.205(4) to be all-encompassing, and not limited to work product, there would be no need for these other specific discovery and evidentiary protections....

...4th DCA 1997), a pro se plaintiff failed to comply with the applicable presuit screening requirements but the trial court refused to dismiss the action with prejudice. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the required corroborating medical opinion was not discoverable because of the provisions of section 766.106(5)....

...The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments and pointed out that plaintiff had failed to consider the effect of section 766.203(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which requires that the corroborating opinion be provided to the opposing party. Id. More precisely, the court stated: We understand the work product protection in section 766.106 not to apply to the corroborating opinion requirement in section 766.203....

...In denying certiorari and hence protection from discovery of the notices, the district court declared: We agree with the trial court that the statutory notices of intent to initiate litigation that were mailed to an opposing party are not documents protected by [section 766.106] subsection 5. Id. at 1105. Further, in Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc. v. Watkins, 675 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), the Fifth District held that section 766.106(5) did not preclude discovery or use in evidence of a physician's verified medical opinion which had been attached to the notice of intent in litigation involving other parties....

...required by section 766.203(2) to be disclosed to the opposing party as corroboration of the lack of reasonable grounds for medical negligence litigation. As such, it maintained the "work product" status that is intended to be protected by sections 766.106(5) and 766.205(4)....

...Our contrary holding will allow abuses, whether intentional or neglectful, to go unchecked. As it is, the legislature provided that all participants in the presuit investigation are immune from civil liability arising from participation in the presuit investigative process. See § 766.106(5), Fla....

...That is what a search for the truth under our adversary system is all about. KOGAN, Senior Justice, concurs. NOTES [1] Sections 766.203(2) and (3) provide: (2) Prior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to s. 766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) Any named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant....

...which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence. (3) Prior to issuing its response to the claimant's notice of intent to initiate litigation, during the time period for response authorized pursuant to s. 766.106, the defendant or the defendant's insurer or self-insurer shall conduct an investigation to ascertain whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) The defendant was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant....

...as defined in s. 766.202(5), at the time the response rejecting the claim is mailed, which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds for lack of negligent injury sufficient to support the response denying negligent injury. (Emphasis added.) [2] Section 766.106(5) provides: No statement, discussion, written document, report, or other work product generated by the presuit screening process is discoverable or admissible in any civil action for any purpose by the opposing party....

...All participants, including, but not limited to, physicians, investigators, witnesses, and employees or associates of the defendant, are immune from civil liability arising from participation in the presuit screening process. [3] For the following reasons, we conclude that it is section 766.205(4), and not section 766.106(5), which protects the presuit affidavit. [4] Although the plaintiff did not explicitly so state, he apparently based this argument on section 766.106(5). See supra note 2. [5] This statement, however, should be read in light of its immediately preceding paragraph. There, the court pointed out that the protection in section 766.106 against discoverability and use by an opposing party does not defeat the requirement in section 766.203(2) of providing the corroborative affidavit. See Citron, 689 So.2d at 1289. Further, in the quote relied upon by petitioners, the court stated: "We understand the work product protection in section 766.106 not to apply to the corroborating opinion requirement ..." as opposed to the corroborating opinion itself....

...easonable investigation requirements. Section 766.206(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), requires a court to report to the state licensing authority any medical expert who provides a corroborative affidavit that lacks reasonable investigation. Although section 766.106(5) provides civil immunity to all participants in the presuit screening process, it does not preclude the other statutory sanctions provided. [8] This protection is identical to that which is provided in section 766.205(4). [9] I agree with the majority that it is section 766.205(4) and not 766.106(5) that is at issue in this case....

...eening, covering the period up to the serving of the notice of intent, and presuit investigation, covering the period between the serving of the notice of intent and the filing of the suit."). [11] In another part of the opinion, the court refers to section 766.106(5) as the section "which provides that work product generated during the pre-screening process is not discoverable." Citron, 689 So.2d at 1290. This language lends further support that the language in sections 766.106(5) and 766.205(4) only talks about work product....

...chapter 766, did not end the inquiry, because the nursing home could still be vicariously liable for a claim of medical malpractice arising out of "the rendering or failure to render, medical care or services." McCullough, 590 So.2d at 441 (quoting § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...) when its agent or employee, who is a health care provider, negligently renders medical care or services. 590 So.2d at 441. Thus we agree with the McCullough court that the proper test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to notice under section 766.106(2) is whether the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1)....

...n added to the original expiration date. Mrs. Patrick filed a notice of intent to initiate litigation on July 28, 2006, and Dr. Abbey received it on August 2, 2006, thirty-seven days before the statute of limitations would have expired. According to section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (2006), the notice had the effect of tolling the time for a period of ninety days. This extended the statute of limitations until October 31, 2006. Section 766.106(4) also provides that, if the defendant serves a notice of intent to terminate the negotiations during the extended period of time, the plaintiff *1053 shall have sixty days or the remainder of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, to file suit....

...Abbey served notice of his intent to terminate negotiations on October 31, 2006, and Mrs. Patrick received the notice on November 1, 2006. The parties do not dispute that Mrs. Patrick was entitled to an additional sixty days from November 1, 2006 to file suit. However, the trial judge evidently concluded that, because section 766.106(4) has the effect of "tolling" the statute of limitations, she was also entitled to the thirty-seven days left on the original time period before the tolling began....

...We also reject plaintiff's argument that, as regards the availability of certiorari review, the corroborating opinion from a medical expert is not discoverable and thus, impliedly, the defendant is not irreparably harmed by the failure to furnish such an opinion. He apparently bases this argument on section 766.106(5), which provides that work product generated during the pre-screening process is not discoverable....

...cal expert as defined in s. 766.202(5), at the time the notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence." We understand the work product protection in section 766.106 not to apply to the corroborating opinion requirement in section 766.203....

...undoubtedly eliminate the willingness of counselors to accept the responsibility for such matters with the economic restrictions imposed. Prior to filing a legal action, a claimant is required to notify all prospective defendants of the claims. See § 766.106, Fla....

...At times, it is often difficult to initially identify those responsible for clear injuries. Once a claimant has filed notice with the prospective defendants, there are specific time periods and limitations that must be precisely followed before the actual legal action is considered timely filed. See § 766.106, Fla....

...precedent to proceed with any claims. See §§ 766.203-766.206, Fla. Stat. (2003). Failure to follow this required presuit screening process constitutes a basis to defeat any claim even if the claim is absolutely valid and the damages enormous. See § 766.106, Fla....

...A notice of intent to initiate litigation was mailed to the defendants on January 13, 1993, at which time the plaintiffs/respondents filed a "Petition for Extension of Statute of Limitations" for 90 days to allow for a reasonable investigation under section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...Weiss, Gainesville, for Respondents. PER CURIAM. Lake Shore Hospital, Inc., petitions for a writ of certiorari seeking to review an order denying its motion to dismiss the complaint of Betsy Clarke and Charles Clarke, respondents, for failure to follow the pre-suit requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1997), before proceeding with this lawsuit....

...athroom. Because the allegations of the complaint do not seek to state a cause of action for medical negligence under section 766.102, we agree with the trial court that the complaint does not provide a basis to apply the presuit *1252 conditions of section 766.106....

...1st DCA 1996)("That conduct occurs in a medical setting does not necessarily mean it involves medical malpractice."); Liles v. P.I.A. Medfield, Inc., 681 So.2d 711, 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)("The test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to the benefit of the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106 ......

...Thompson of Thompson & Thomas, P.A., West Palm Beach, for respondent. MAY, J. The defendants petition this court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of an order denying a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for non-compliance with the medical malpractice presuit requirements of section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...2d DCA 1962) ("Mere statements of opinions or conclusions unsupported by specific facts will not suffice."). Under chapter 766, a claim for medical malpractice or negligence is defined as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a)., Fla....

...We therefore find the requisite irreparable harm. We grant the petition, issue the writ, quash the order, and remand the case to the trial court for dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint for failure to comply with the presuit screening process of section 766.106(2)....

...egligently brewing and storing the tea to such a temperature that it was unreasonably dangerous if spilled. Coral Gables Hospital answered and, as an affirmative defense, alleged that Quintanilla failed to comply with the pre-suit requirements under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2002), by failing to file a notice of intent to initiate litigation with the hospital and by failing to have his claim corroborated by a medical expert as required by the statute. Coral Gables Hospital filed its motion for summary judgment claiming that the serving of hot tea was the rendering of a medical service. Therefore, Quintanilla was required to comply with the pre-suit requirements of section 766.106, had not done so, and the statute of limitations had now run barring compliance....

...t and parcel of medical care provided by the hospital staff to patients including Mr. Quintanilla. The trial court agreed that the claim was a claim for medical malpractice and entered final summary judgment which was timely appealed by Quintanilla. Section 766.106(1)(a), defines a claim for medical negligence or medical malpractice as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." Not every wrongful act by a medical provider is medical malpractice....

...Lang-Redway, 840 So.2d 974, 980 (Fla.2002). Coral Gables Hospital argues that because the nurse used her medical judgment to agree to give Quintanilla the hot tea he requested for his cough, the actual act of serving the hot tea amounts to a medical service pursuant to section 766.106(1)(a)....

...have been necessary for a professional to testify as to the standard of care. For the above reasons, we conclude that Quintanilla's claim is not a claim for medical malpractice, but a claim for simple negligence that does not require compliance with section 766.106(1), pre-suit screening and notification....

..., Florida Statutes (2000). Respondent is the personal representative of the estate of his child, who died in May, 1998, of bronchopneumonia. Counsel for the child's parents served on the hospital a notice of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106(2)....

...to his death. The respondent's complaint alleged that the decedent's mother took him to the hospital on or about May 5, 1998. The hospital filed an amended motion to dismiss based on the plaintiffs failure to comply with the presuit requirements of section 766.106....

...The plaintiff appeals from a final summary judgment which dismissed her complaint holding that the statute of limitations barred the action. We reverse. The appellee is estopped from asserting the limitations defense because it stipulated to a sixty-day extension of the pre-suit screening period required under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...atutes § 95.11.” UBC also alleged: “[UBC] asserts that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action by [Joseph’s] failure to comply with the conditions precedent prior to the filing of this action pursuant to Florida Statutes § 766.106 and § 766.203.” UBC then moved for summary judgment on the grounds set forth in their affirmative defenses. The trial court rendered a summary final judgment in UBC’s favor. Section 766.106 imposes presuit requirements on a claim for medical negligence or malpractice....

...Such a claim is one “arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” Mobley v. Gilbert E. Hirschberg, P.A., 915 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting Burke v. Snyder, 899 So.2d 336, 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...on for medical negligence subject to presuit requirements); Garcia v. Psychiatric Insts. of Am., Inc., 693 So.2d 66 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). The test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to the benefit of the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106 is whether a defendant is liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1)....

...In Mobley , a patient sued a dentist after one of his dental assistants accidentally struck the patient in the face causing injuries. The patient sued for simple negligence. The dentist raised the affirmative defense that the patient failed to comply with the presuit requirements of section 766.106....

...Holden complied with the reasonable presuit investigation requirements of chapter 766, and therefore we reverse. In a letter dated August 10, 2007, Mr. Holden served Dr. Gu a notice of intent to initiate a medical malpractice action against him pursuant to sections 766.106(2) and 766.203(2), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...section 766.102. *400 After the presuit investigation is completed and before a complaint alleging medical negligence is filed, a claimant is required to notify each prospective defendant of his or her intent to initiate a medical negligence action. § 766.106(2)(a)....

...CASANUEVA, C.J., Concurs in result only. NOTES [1] See § 766.102(9). [2] We observe that the time for Mr. Holden to refile his complaint would have passed even if we consider the ninety-day tolling period during the service of the presuit notice. See § 766.106(4)....

...The trial court entered an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice under section 766.206(2), Florida Statutes, which requires that a medical malpractice complaint be dismissed if the court finds that the plaintiff is not in compliance with the presuit investigation requirements of chapter 766. Under section 766.106(1)(a), Florida Statutes, "claim for medical malpractice" is defined as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." A person seeking recovery for injury resulting from medical malpract...

...the injury resulted from a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care as set forth in section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes. The test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to the benefit of the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes, is whether the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes....

...(UMC), and certain attending and resident physicians employed by the Board to provide obstetrical services at UMC appeal a summary final judgment in their consolidated declaratory judgment actions against appellees, two claimant families who filed notices of intent to initiate actions pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989), for neurological damages suffered by the infant claimants allegedly as the result of medical negligence during labor and delivery at UMC....

...the patient's admission and the other infant was vaginally delivered approximately 31 hours after the patient's admission. The parties have stipulated that the notice required by section 766.316 was not given to either of these patients. Pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989), each claimant family filed a "Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation" for neurological damages allegedly caused by medical negligence....

...& B, and their survivors." On April 21, 1994, at the close of the ninety-day presuit screening process, Palmetto mailed the Bombaliers a letter offering to admit liability as to both claims and to arbitrate the issue of damages pursuant to sections 766.106(3)(b)(3) and 766.207, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Under these circumstances, there is no binding agreement to arbitrate. ... . 6. Under the presuit screening statutes, the claimants have the option of determining the number of claims and/or claimants to be joined in a single notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation. Fla. Stat. § 766.106(2) (1993)....

...Defendant failed to ensure the implementation of the Risk Management Program to include incident reporting requiring adequate investigation and analysis. The hospital moved to dismiss the negligence claim for failure to comply with the presuit notice requirement for a medical malpractice action. See § 766.106, Fla. Stat. (2009). As we explained in Mobley v. Gilbert E. Hirschberg, P.A., 915 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005): Section 766.106 imposes presuit requirements on a claim for medical negligence or malpractice....

...Such a claim is one “arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” See Burke v. Snyder, 899 So.2d 336, 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (citing J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola, 635 So.2d 945, 949 (Fla.1994)); § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...the claim could be proven only through evidence that the hospital agents fell below the prevailing standard of professional care. Id. We grant the petition for writ of certio-rari, holding that the complaint is one of “medical negligence” under section 766.106(1)(a)....

...Review is proper because to allow a party to fully litigate a suit where the proper presuit requirements were not met would frustrate the purpose of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act. See Sova Drugs, Inc. v. Barnes, 661 So.2d 393, 394 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). II. Section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2000), of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act requires a claimant to "notify each prospective defendant ......

...It is unclear from the record whether a permanent guardian of Stone's property was ever appointed. Stone died on September 27, 1991, and Appellant was appointed personal representative. Prior to filing suit against Appellees and others, Appellant mailed statutory notice letters, pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes, to each prospective defendant on August 7, 1992....

...was sent within the two-year statute. The statute was then tolled for 90 days, or from August 7, 1992, until November 5, 1992; and, as more than 60 days then remained prior to the running of the statute, the statute would have run on April 28, 1993. § 766.106(4), Fla....

...tute for a second 90-day period, precluded the court from granting summary judgment. The record does not reflect, and neither party asserts, that the parties stipulated to an extension of the 90-day notice period, as they could have done pursuant to section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes, which would have extended the tolling of the statute....

...use of action, the problem with this argument is that it overlooks the cause and effect inherent in a medical malpractice case. If the cause of an injury is effected by negligent medical care then, by definition, the complaint sounds in malpractice. § 766.106(1)(a). Chapter 766 presuit notice is required because the breach of a certain medical standard of care allegedly occurred. § 766.106(2)....

...Similarly, just because "conduct occurs in a medical setting does not necessarily mean it involves medical malpractice." Robinson v. W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 675 So.2d 226, 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Our analysis is entirely consistent with the medical malpractice definition provided in section 766.106(1)(a) — "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." Thus, the key inquiry is whether the alleged injury occurred during the rendition of medical care or services....

...The medical malpractice action against Dr. Steckler was filed on September 21, 1989. Although the plaintiff had apparently sent a presuit notice to the hospital on March 7, 1989, no notice was sent to Dr. Steckler until August 10, 1989. See § 768.57, *75 Fla. Stat. (1987); cf. § 766.106, Fla....

...Obernauer, 695 So.2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). We read these provisions in section 718.1255 to create a condition precedent to filing an action in court, and conclude that this condition precedent operates similarly to comparable provisions in other statutes. For example in section 766.106 the legislature has required that an action for medical malpractice may not be filed without giving prior notice to the health care provider....

...t. Rhodes' medical malpractice complaint alleged that Dr. Riggenbach was negligent *553 in performing this surgery, which resulted in the need for additional surgery and treatment, and ultimately caused permanent injury to Rhodes' wrist. Pursuant to section 766.106(4), Rhodes served Petitioners with a presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence....

...Groth, 629 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla.1993). Dr. Correa alleges that Count IV is also subject to the presuit notice requirements. The bare allegations do not, however, clearly set forth "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...We reverse, as the statute had not expired when the appellant filed this action. The facts in this case are not in dispute. The alleged malpractice occurred on December 16, 1993. On July 7, 1995, the appellant filed a notice of intent to initiate litigation under section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1995). Under section 766.106(4), the statute of limitations is tolled for ninety days for the purpose of investigation, and a suit cannot be filed during this period....

...ion occurred or the date it was discovered. However, Chapter 766, Florida Statutes (1995), provides a complex set of procedural requirements that both the claimant and the defendant must satisfy before bringing a medical malpractice suit into court. Section 766.106(2) requires that a claimant serve a notice of intent to initiate litigation on all potential defendants prior to filing the action. Upon receipt of this notice, a defendant must conduct his or her own presuit investigation and respond to the notice within ninety days. See §§ 766.106(3)(a), 766.203(3), Fla. Stat. (1995). During this ninety-day period, the statute of limitations is tolled. See § 766.106(4)....

...iations. The statute provides: Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. § 766.106(4)(emphasis added)....

...This ninety-day period for additional investigation is tacked onto the end of the statute of limitations period as an extension. See Pergrem v. Horan, 669 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). [1] It is not a tolling provision, and it does not run simultaneously with the tolling period of section 766.106(4)....

...notice of termination should control, but this entirely ignores the statutory language which states that the claimant shall have sixty days "or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater," in which to file suit. § 766.106(4)....

...In Mason, the claimants filed their notice of intent to initiate malpractice litigation against the physician only seven days before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Prior to the conclusion of the ninety-day presuit phase, the parties entered into an agreement to extend the ninety-day presuit period, pursuant to section 766.106(4), and subsequently extended that deadline by an additional month. Before the second extended deadline, the physician rejected the malpractice claim and the claimants filed their suit sixty-three days after receiving the rejection. Relying on section 766.106(4), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650, which was adopted to procedurally implement the statute's substance, the fifth district found that the claimants had sixty days, or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever was greater, to file their lawsuit....

...es' son, Miguel Angel Orta. In March 1999, prior to filing suit, plaintiffs' lawyers sent the doctor a records request and he did not respond. In April 1999, the plaintiffs sent a notice of intent to initiate a medical malpractice claim, pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), to which the doctor also did not respond....

...We think reversal is required by Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278 (Fla.1996). Plaintiffs correctly point out that the medical malpractice screening statute provides, "Unreasonable failure of any party to comply with this section justifies dismissal of claims or defenses." § 766.106(3)(a), Fla....

...(k) Any offer by a claimant to arbitrate must be made to each defendant against whom the claimant has made a claim. Any offer by a defendant to arbitrate must be made to each claimant who has joined in the notice of intent to initiate litigation, as provided in s.766.106....

...We conclude that the trial court erroneously determined that medical expert affidavits failed to "corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim[s]," and misconstrued the applicable statutory provisions. Accordingly, we reverse. In February 1991, pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1989), Wolfsen's attorney notified Dr....

...Stein stated that he "consider[ed] the care rendered by the hematologists to be excellent"; and that the care Wolfsen received from Dr. Applegate "appear[ed] totally reasonable." The parties participated in informal presuit discovery, as contemplated by section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...im "rests on a reasonable basis," the motion will be denied. 614 So.2d at 544-45. In the second case, Williams v. Powers, 619 So.2d 980 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), the trial court had dismissed a medical negligence claim for failure to comply with sections 766.106(2) and 766.203(2)....

...The issues raised on appeal were framed as follows in the Initial Brief: THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING, AND/OR MOTION TO VACATE AND SET ASIDE SUMMARY FINAL JUDGMENT. A. Section 766.106(5), Florida Statutes Does Not Prohibit Plaintiff From Using the Expert Affidavit of its Own Expert Witness to Contest a Motion for Summary Judgment....

...Initial Brief stating the issues on appeal as follows: THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING, AND/OR MOTION TO VACATE AND SET ASIDE SUMMARY FINAL JUDGMENT. A. Section 766.106(5), Florida Statutes Does Not Prohibit Plaintiff From Using the Expert Affidavit of its Own Expert Witness to Contest a Motion for Summary Judgment....

...She eventually consulted an attorney for assistance in determining whether a malpractice suit existed. Her attorney obtained a verified written medical expert opinion from Dr. Richard Gardner stating that the treating physicians were negligent in their care of Mrs. Faber. Pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1991), a notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice was sent to the defendants....

...[collectively "Rindley"]. We reverse the order and remand for reinstatement of the amended complaint. On December 14, 1990, Wainscott served Rindley with a notice of intent to initiate litigation and with an affidavit detailing the alleged malpractice, as required by section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...on; St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company [St. Paul] is the insurance carrier. On February 5, 1991, St. Paul acknowledged receipt of the notice and sent Wainscott a request for extensive information pursuant to the informal discovery provision in section 766.106(7)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Further, it does not appear that Rindley was prejudiced by Wainscott's delay, as the lawsuit was not filed for some months after St. Paul received Wainscott's responses to its discovery request. Ergos, 532 So.2d at 1361. Moreover, failure to comply with presuit discovery does not mandate dismissal of a claim. Section 766.106(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), states that the "[u]nreasonable failure of any party to comply with this section justifies dismissal of claims or defenses." (Emphasis added)....

...See Richardson. Thus, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Wainscott's amended complaint. We therefore reverse the order on appeal and remand the cause for reinstatement of the amended complaint. Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] Section 766.106(2) requires that a claimant notify prospective defendants of the intent to initiate a malpractice suit. No suit may be filed until ninety-days after notice is mailed to all prospective defendants. § 766.106(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] Section 766.106(7)(b) requires a party to respond within 20 days after the discovery request is received....

...ability to accurately assess the true expertise of the person giving the opinion and, consequently, to properly analyze the threat posed by the Plaintiffs' claims. In sum, since the Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the presuit requirements of §§ 766.106 and 766.203, Florida Statutes, their complaint must be dismissed pursuant to § 766.206(2)....

...The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file. NOTES [1] The parties to this action have consented to proceed before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Pizzo pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. [2] After the conclusion of the statutorily mandated presuit investigation, § 766.106, Florida Statutes requires a claimant to provide each defendant he intends to sue with a notice of his intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice....

...equired by this section shall specify whether any previous opinion by the same medical expert has been disqualified and if so the name of the court and the case number in which the ruling was issued." [5] The presuit discovery process permitted by §§ 766.106(7) and 766.205, Florida Statutes do not allow for the taking of the deposition or statements of the parties' presuit medical experts. [6] Section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes provides for an automatic 90 tolling of the two-year statute of limitations upon the claimant serving its notice intent to sue upon the Defendants....

...Before GODERICH, SHEVIN, and RAMIREZ, JJ. RAMIREZ, J. Maria and Jose Puentes appeal the dismissal of their negligence suit against appellee Tenet Hialeah Healthsystem ("Hialeah Hospital") for failure to comply with the presuit notice requirements of chapter 766.106(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...In Goldman, the injury occurred when the patient's breast implant ruptured during the taking of a mammogram by the hospital's radiologic technician. The court concluded that the technician was providing health care and that her negligence should be treated as the hospital's negligence so that compliance with section 766.106 notice requirements was required....

...The hospital would not be negligent for giving a nonhypoallergenic meal to someone whose medical condition did not require otherwise. Puentes' claim is thus an action for medical malpractice as it arises out of "the rendering of or failure to render, medical care or services." See § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...imitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.” Arn, 474 U.S. at 148 (quoting Payner, 447 U.S. at 737). Although a legislature can make pre-suit notice mandatory when it chooses, that circumstance does not apply here. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 766.106(2)(a) (providing that “prior to filing a complaint for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant”)....

...constitutes a failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of chapter 766, Florida Statutes. Chapter 766 requires plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits to give notice to all prospective defendants of the intent to pursue litigation. See § 766.106(2), Fla....

...eral applicability, such as a statute of limitations, rather than an issue specifically peculiar to medical malpractice actions." This statement is unsupportable. These cases involve whether or not the statute of limitations was tolled under chapter 766.106(4), a provision relating to medical malpractice actions and no other civil actions....

...to Chapter 415, but was a complaint for medical malpractice pursuant to Chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2007). North Shore claimed the Complaint had to be dismissed because the plaintiff had failed to comply with the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2007). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and North Shore seeks certiorari review. North Shore contends on review that the allegations of the Complaint constitute medical negligence by hospital personnel, that, therefore, pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2007), presuit notice is a condition precedent to maintaining the action, and that the trial court erred in not dismissing the Complaint....

...We state only that, based on the allegations in this Complaint, North Shore does not meet the Chapter 415 definition of a caregiver. Even if the Complaint were to allege sufficiently that North Shore were a caregiver pursuant to Chapter 415, the claim is still one for medical malpractice and not for elder abuse. Section 766.106(1)(a) defines a claim for medical malpractice as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." The question in determining if a claim is a medical malpractice claim is whether the plai...

...ng standard of care in the community for that health care provider resulting in injury. Because this is a medical negligence action, the plaintiff is required to comply with the presuit notice and 90-day investigatory period as set forth in sections 766.106(2) and 766.106(3), Florida Statutes (2007), [3] see Integrated *400 Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So.2d at 974, as conditions precedent for bringing suit. [4] As such, the trial judge was incorrect in finding that presuit notice, under section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2007), was not required....

...he responsibility for frequent and regular care of or services to a vulnerable adult on a temporary or permanent basis and who has a commitment, agreement, or understanding with that person or that person's guardian that a caregiver role exists. [3] 766.106 Notice before filing action for medical negligence; presuit screening period; offers for admission of liability and for arbitration; informal discovery; review.— ....

...ure that both the claimant and defendant must follow before a medical negligence claim may be brought in court." Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 280 (Fla.1996). In identifying those actions to which the required presuit notice and procedures apply, section 766.106(1)(a) defines a "[c]laim for medical malpractice" as a "claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." Sections 766.201-766.212, Florida Statutes (1997), concern presuit investigation and a...

...See Doe v. Young, 656 So.2d 569, 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (Cobb, J., concurring). In Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla.1993), the supreme court held that the proper test for determining whether a health care provider "is entitled to notice under section 766.106(2) is whether the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1)." Similarly, we hold that the presuit requirements of Chapter 766 are also mandatory where a c...

...This court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the claim for failure to comply with Chapter 766 presuit notice provisions. We held that the "fraudulent rendering of unnecessary medical care ... is encompassed by the term `arising out of the rendering of ... medical care or services'" within the meaning of section 766.106(1)(a)....

...The statute itself sets out to specify what claims are covered by it, and we believe that a claim of sexual misconduct by a doctor during a medical examination or procedure is a "claim arising out of the rendering of ... medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; ... [2] This statute was revised and transferred to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...allegation that fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented discovery of the negligent conduct. The issue raised in this appeal is whether the extensions of the statute of limitations allowed by sections 766.104(2) [2] and 766.106(4), [3] Florida Statutes (1989), also extend the statute of repose....

...ocumentary. On December 16, 1994, Parham filed a petition, pursuant to section 766.104(2), for an automatic 90-day extension of the two-year statute of limitations. On March 17, 1995, he served notice of his intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106, and on April 17, 1995, he served an amended notice adding Musculoskeletal Institute....

...Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla.1992). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' contention that the repose time period was extended or tolled by their petition pursuant to Florida Statutes *625 § 766.104 or their service of a "Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation" as required by Florida Statute § 766.106, cannot be sustained....

...2d DCA 1996). In Moore, this court determined that the four-year statute of repose was tolled by the service of a notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation as provided for in section 768.57(4), Florida Statutes (1987) [now transferred to 766.106(4)] because "[t]he `statute of repose' is subsumed in the general term `statute of limitations' of section 95.11(4)." Applying the same reasoning that we applied in Moore, we conclude that the 90-day extension allowed by section 766.104(2) extends both the statute of limitation and the statute of repose....

...pinion. Because our holding in this case will potentially impact many medical malpractice claims, we certify the following question as one of great public importance: DO THE EXTENSIONS OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ALLOWED BY SECTIONS 766.104(2) AND 766.106(4), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), ALSO EXTEND THE STATUTE OFREPOSE CONTAINED IN SECTION 95.11(4)(B), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? THREADGILL, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur....

...n. Therefore, I would have taken this opportunity to recede from Moore and would have affirmed the trial court's ruling. It is my view that the statute of repose in 95.11(4)(b) is neither extended nor tolled by the provisions of sections 766.104 and 766.106....

...d modify its express terms. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984). Section 95.11(4)(b) was originally enacted as part of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975. See Ch. 75-9, Laws of Fla. The provisions contained in sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4) were originally enacted as part of the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985. See Ch. 85-175, Laws of Fla. Therefore, at the time the legislature drafted the language in sections 766.104 and 766.106, respectively granting "an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations" and providing that "the statute of limitations is tolled" during the 90-day period following service of the notice of intent, section 95.11 had been in exist...

...This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods. No court order is required for the extension to be effective. The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run. [3] Section 766.106(4) provides in part: The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s....

...Those persons, *959 both natural and corporate, are in the health care business and the first question on appeal is whether the allegations of the complaint set up a medical malpractice claim requiring the plaintiff to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...r professional associations. She also sued Florence Lally, the nurse involved. Whether a plaintiff must give the requisite pre-suit notice required by the statute is fact-dependant. The statute itself defines what is a claim for medical malpractice. 766.106 Notice before filing action for medical malpractice; presuit screening period; offers for admission of liability and for arbitration; informal discovery; review.— (1) As used in this section: (a) "Claim for medical malpractice" means a claim...

...Because we conclude that (1) the third count of the amended complaint states a cause of action against appellee for negligent interference with appellant's parental rights; (2) such a claim is not one for medical malpractice, requiring compliance with the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1999); and (3) the impact rule does not preclude the recovery of damages for emotional distress incident to such a claim; we reverse the trial court's order to the extent it dismissed that count, and remand for further proceedings....

...ar statute of limitations. Finally, as to count III, it contended (among other things) that any negligence claim was barred because it was a claim for medical malpractice, and appellant had failed to comply with the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1999); and because the impact rule precluded recovery, as appellant could not claim that he sustained any physical injury as the result of an impact....

...t interference with parental rights. Appellee argues that the trial court correctly dismissed that count with prejudice because (1) it was a claim for medical malpractice, and appellant had failed to comply with the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1999); and (2) the impact rule precluded recovery, as appellant could not claim that he sustained any physical injury as the result of an impact. We disagree with both arguments. A. Appellee contends that, because it is a "health care provider" as defined in chapter 766, Florida Statutes (1999), appellant was required to comply with the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106 before filing the claim alleged in count III....

...lear from the face of the complaint that the applicable two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations had run, the trial court correctly dismissed count III with prejudice. The flaw in appellee's argument is that it overlooks the fact that the section 766.106 presuit screening requirements apply only to a "`[c]laim for medical malpractice,'" which is defined as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). In the first place, a claim is one for medical negligence for purposes of section 766.106 only if it is one as to which, to recover, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant failed to meet the "medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102(1)." Integrated Health Care Servs., Inc....

...Although section 768.50(2)(b) was repealed in 1986, our supreme court has held that we must look to the language of that statute at the time of its original enactment in 1977 to determine what "health care providers" are entitled to rely on the provisions of chapter 766, including section 766.106....

...sis facilities. Id. at 979. Mental health counselors, such as Brink, are not included. Therefore, logic dictates that a claim for negligence based on actions or inactions by Brink is not a "`[c]laim for medical malpractice,'" as that term is used in section 766.106. Because such a claim is not one for medical malpractice, by the express language of section 766.106, it is not subject to that section's presuit screening requirements....

...See generally Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835 (Fla.1993) (holding that, because psychologists were not included in the list of health care providers set forth in section 768.50(2)(b), the plaintiff did not have to comply with the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106 before filing an action against a psychologist)....

...to this case, we conclude that, because count III does not allege that either Brink or appellee was negligent in "the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services" to *1185 appellant, that count does not state a claim for medical malpractice, and the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106 do not apply. B. We can find no language in chapter 766 to suggest that appellee should be entitled to the benefit of the section 766.106 presuit screening requirements when it is alleged to be only vicariously liable for the negligence of an agent, and the negligence alleged does not constitute medical malpractice. On the contrary, section 766.106(2) would appear to require compliance with the presuit screening requirements only "prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice." Moreover, because the claim asserted by appellant in count III is not one for medical malpractice, logically the fact that appellee is alleged to be vicariously liable for Brink's negligence should have no impact on whether it is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of section 766.106....

...ndant alleged to be only vicariously liable in a situation where the active tortfeasor would not be entitled to the benefit of those provisions. Accordingly, we hold that appellant was not obliged to comply with the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106....

...Although arguably distinguishable on its facts, we note conflict with Goldman v. Halifax Medical Center, Inc., 662 So.2d 367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), which appears to reach the opposite conclusion, holding that hospitals are entitled to the benefit of section 766.106 whenever a claim is made that they are vicariously liable for negligent acts of their agents committed in the course of their employment, regardless of the nature of the negligence. IV. Appellee next argues that, even if the trial court was incorrect in concluding that count III must be dismissed for failure to comply with the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106, it correctly dismissed that count because it is barred by the impact rule....

...In the present action, the alleged act of medical malpractice clearly occurred on March 31, 1988. The plaintiffs sent letters of intent to file this action to the defendants on February 12, 1990, thus tolling the two year statute of limitation period as provided in Section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...Plaintiffs therefore had until July 12, 1990 to file this action. This appeal ensued. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether, as a matter of law, based upon the pleadings before the trial court, the two year statute of limitations as extended by the tolling period in section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1987), had expired prior to the filing of the appellants' complaint....

...Leinicke of Wicker, Smith, Tutan, O'Hara, McCoy, Graham & Ford, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. STONE, Chief Judge. We affirm a final order dismissing this medical malpractice complaint for Plaintiffs-Appellants' failure to provide the pre-suit notice mandated by section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...s. Appellee did not respond. Appellants filed a medical malpractice complaint on November 2, 1995, but did not file an affidavit of corroborating medical opinion as required by section 766.205, or a notice of their intent to file suit as required by section 766.106....

...[3] REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. GRIFFIN and TORPY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Since the limitations period purportedly ran out before the notice of intent to sue was served in this case, the extensions contemplated in section 766.106(4) would, if the appellees were correct, never have been triggered and would be irrelevant to the disposition of this case. See § 766.106(4), Fla....

...od, which rendered her permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. Loren's injury was thus compensable under NICA. In December, 1998, the Romines served a notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1998), on Dr....

...HE INJURY IN FACT RESULTED FROM AN INCIDENT INVOLVING A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER? LEHAN and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] A notice of intent to initiate litigation against a health care provider tolls the statute of limitations for a 90 day period. § 766.106(4), Fla....

...he failure to render, medical care or services,” as the Legislature’s definition of medical malpractice provides, thereby subjecting a plaintiff to the onerous presuit requirements and restrictions of the medical malpractice statutory scheme. § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...services,” as the Legislature’s definition of medical malpractice provides, thereby subjecting a plaintiff to the restrictions and requirements of the medical malpractice statutory scheme, as well as a shorter statute of limitations than for ordinary negligence claims. § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...Finally, we turn to address the conflict and facts presented in this case. I. Medical Malpractice The Legislature has defined a claim for medical negligence or medical malpractice as “a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...at 343 (Wolf, J., dissenting). - 19 -  Further, the Legislature chose to define medical malpractice as a claim arising out of the rendering of, or failure to render, “medical care or services.” § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...he trial court's order denying Tunner's motion to dismiss because the plaintiff below (Margaret Foss, personal representative of the estate of Edmund Foss) failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements for filing a medical malpractice suit. Section 766.106 requires plaintiffs to notify each prospective health-care provider by certified mail of their intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation....

...Mussallem, 595 So.2d 136, 137 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 604 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1992). Notices were not made or attempted here. We have jurisdiction. [1] The issue in this case is whether or not this lawsuit is one for "medical malpractice" as encompassed and defined by section 766.106....

...[3] The statute is not limited to negligent acts. See Phillips v. Mease Hospital & Clinic, 445 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 453 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1984). Nor is the alleged motivation for the treatment or lack of treatment relevant pursuant to section 766.106. Accordingly we grant Tunner's petition for writ of certiorari and hold that the pre-suit notice and screening requirements of section 766.106 apply to this law-suit....

...Petition for Writ of Certiorari GRANTED; Order Denying Dismissal of Complaint QUASHED. DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc. v. Barber, 638 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Miami Physical Therapy Associates, Inc. v. Savage, 632 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). [2] § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...The Hospital noted Stoll's claim involved damages that allegedly occurred in March of 1998, which was then beyond the two-year statute of limitations for medical negligence claims, and requested documentation that the statute of limitations had not run. The Hospital also asked for informal discovery as provided in section 766.106, including tax returns filed by Stoll since 1993....

...involving detection and corrective actions regarding IV infiltration" be stricken from the complaint. The Hospital claimed Stoll's counsel failed to put it on notice of other allegedly negligent acts during the pre-suit investigation as required by section 766.106(2)....

...s compliance is accomplished within the statute of limitations period. Kukral. The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action is two years. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. However, chapter 766 provides numerous extensions. See § 766.104(2); § 766.106(3)(a); § 766.106(4)....

...filing of the suit..... In his answer, Warren Hoffman made only a general denial of the allegation of compliance with all conditions precedent. The answer contained no reference to the Ingersolls' failure to comply with section 768.57 [renumbered as § 766.106].......

...To allow the Hospital to "amend" its motion to dismiss by including this new ground for relief after the statute of limitations had expired, would have unfairly prejudiced the Stolls. Ingersoll. Petition for Writ of Certiorari DENIED. GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 766.106, Fla....

...t of Appeal as one of great public importance: IS A 90-DAY EXTENSION PURCHASED UNDER SECTION 766.104(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1995), INCLUDED IN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD WHEN CALCULATING WHETHER A PLAINTIFF IS *863 ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL 60 DAYS UNDER SECTION 766.106(4) FOR FILING SUIT? See Coffaro v....

...s were consolidated. The Second District reversed the orders of the trial court, finding that Coffaro's claims were not barred by the statute of limitations because she was entitled to the benefit of both the sixty-day tolling period provided for in section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1995), and the ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations purchased pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...We approve the decision of the district court and hold that the ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations purchased under section 766.104(2) is not added to what remains of the original statute of limitations but is added after the sixty-day extension period under section 766.106(4)....

...See § 766.104(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). After the completion of this presuit investigation, and during the two-year period provided for in section 95.11(4)(b), the claimant must serve a notice of intent to initiate litigation to each prospective defendant. See § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). Importantly, as it relates to the limitations issue before us, no suit may be filed for a period of ninety days after this notice of intent is mailed to any prospective defendant [n. 1]. See § 766.106(3)(a), *864 Fla. Stat. (1997). In this regard, section 766.106(4) provides: [D]uring the 90-day period, the statute of limitation is tolled as to all potential defendants....

...ween the parties. [n. 1] In Boyd v. Becker, 627 So.2d 481, 483-84 (Fla.1993), we held that the statute of limitations is tolled from the time the defendant receives the notice of intent, not from the time the claimant mails it. [n. 2] The wording of section 766.106(4) makes it appear that the "60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations" language only applies when the parties have stipulated to an extension of the ninety-day tolling provision....

...ute of limitations applies to the ninety-day tolling provision, even when no extension has been agreed to. We approved this interpretation in Tanner. Hankey, 755 So.2d at 95. [2] The instant case involves the interplay between section 766.104(2) and section 766.106(4)....

...This period *865 shall be in addition to other tolling periods. No court order is required for the extension to be effective. The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run. (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, section 766.106(4) provides: The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s....

...(Emphasis added.) The certified question can only be answered by determining when the ninety-day extension pursuant to 766.104(2) (purchased extension) goes into effect and under what circumstances a plaintiff is entitled to the sixty-day period provided for in section 766.106(4)....

...Thus, the ninety-day period would be added to the month Coffaro had left on the original statute of limitations period, the limitations period left to the plaintiff would therefore exceed sixty days, and she would not be entitled to the sixty days under section 766.106(4)....

...the time of purchase, but is to be tacked on to the end of the statute of limitations period. Under this interpretation, she would only have thirty days left of the original limitations period and would be entitled to both the sixty-day period under section 766.106(4), and the ninety-day purchased extension under section 766.104(2)....

...r tolling provisions." Again, we agree with the Fourth District that the "extension" provided for under section 766.104(2) is a genuine extension of time to be added to the limitations period, rather than a tolling (suspension) as provided for under section 766.106(4)....

...In fact, we approved this interpretation of section 766.104(2) in Tanner. See id. at 182. Hence, this time period is to be tacked on to the end of the limitations period and does not run simultaneously with the separate ninety-day tolling period provided in section 766.106(4)....

...th left on the original two-year statute of limitations period. Because only one month remained and because the ninety-day purchased period from section 766.104(2) is not added to the month, she was entitled to the benefit of the sixty-day period of section 766.106(4)....

...ice of intent, not from the time the claimant mails it). Therefore, as of August 4(MHC), August 5 (HCHA, Dr. Pidala, Dr. Tulsiak, and EMA), and August 8(SJH), the statute of limitations was tolled for ninety days as to each respective defendant. See § 766.106(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997); see also Hankey, 755 So.2d at 100 (concluding that "the two-year limitations period is suspended temporarily and begins to run again under section 766.106(4) at the expiration of the stated time period or when the defendant responds to the notice of intent"). It is also important to note that as of the dates the notices of intent were received, fewer than sixty days remained in Coffaro's limitations period. This fact is significant for future calculations pursuant to section 766.106(4)....

...ons period. Coffaro received termination of negotiation letters from the health care providers in November 1997. Specifically, the dates are as follows: SJH—November 5; Pidala, Tulsiak, and EMA—November 7; MHC— November 14; and HCHA—November 26. Section 766.106(4) directs that when a claimant receives a notice of termination of negotiations, the claimant "shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit." Because...

...PARIENTE, J., concurring. I write to explain why I concur in the majority opinion. This case involves the interplay of the various tolling and extension periods of the medical malpractice statute of limitations, in particular, sections 766.104 and 766.106....

...Obviously the plaintiff calculated the time left according to the interpretation *868 given by the majority and the Second District. The interpretation given by the majority that the purchased extension of section 766.104(2) is added on the end of the periods of time calculated by sections 766.106(3)(a) and (4) is both reasonable and consistent with the statutory language and also entirely consistent with what we stated in Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So.2d 93 (Fla.2000). In Hankey we explained that the determination of whether the plaintiff is entitled to an additional sixty days under section 766.106(4) is determined "at the time the claimant filed the notice of intent to initiate litigation." Id. at 97. Further, in discussing section 766.104(2), we stated that the plaintiff can "also automatically secure an additional ninety-day extension under section 766.104(2) that will be added to the end of both periods described " in sections 766.106(3) and (4)....

...] at any time before the statute of limitations has expired, and because the extension is in addition to other tolling periods, we conclude that the purchased extension under section 766.104(2) is not included when computing the time remaining under section 766.106(4) for filing suit....

...bring a modicum of certainty to these calculations on which everyone can safely rely. ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs. WELLS, J., dissenting. I cannot agree with the majority because I do not believe that the majority properly applies sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...NME Hospitals, Inc., 707 So.2d 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), authored by Judge Warner. The essence of what the district court recognized in Rothschild is that the extension of the statute of limitations authorized by section 766.104(2) and the tolling period of section 766.106(4) need to be understood to be separate statutory provisions: In addition, under section 766.104(2), a claimant can essentially "buy" a ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations by petition to the circuit court and payment of a fee of $25. This ninety-day period for additional investigation is tacked onto the end of the statute of limitations period as an extension. It is not a tolling provision, and it does not run simultaneously with the tolling period of section 766.106(4)....

...[6] Applying the plain language of this statute to the instant case, it is clear that when the extension was purchased, by operation of this statute, the statute of limitations no longer expired on September 2, 1997; the statute of limitations expired ninety days later on December 1, 1997. A separate statutory provision, section 766.106(4), concerns a tolling of the statute of limitations....

...See Boyd v. Becker, 627 So.2d 481, 483-84 (Fla.1993). This provision also provides that the tolling ceases and the statute of limitations begins to run again upon the claimant's receipt of a defendant's notification of termination of negotiations. See § 766.106(4), Fla....

...When that occurs the statute provides in pertinent part: Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. § 766.106(4), Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis added). [7] Pursuant to section 766.106(4), a claimant, upon receipt of the termination of negotiations notice or the expiration of the ninety-day tolling period set forth in the statute or any agreed-to extension thereof, must then calculate the remaining days in the statu...

...This is the date the putative defendant receives the notice of intent to initiate litigation, see Boyd, 627 So.2d at 483-84, which will in most instances be on the return receipt of the mailing notice. 3. Calculate the number of days in which the statute of limitations is tolled, which would be ninety days, see § 766.106(4), unless there is an earlier receipt by the claimant of the putative defendant's notice of termination or an agreed-to extension....

...nd is extended automatically and immediately upon the payment to the clerk of the $25. See § 766.104(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). What further must be understood is that the sixty days or remainder of the period of the statute of limitations provision in section 766.106(4) is not an extension of the statute of limitations....

...s period. 618 So.2d at 183. Thus, the "60 days or the remainder" language applies even when no extension of the ninety-day tolling period has been agreed to by the parties. [3] We reiterate our prior holding that the sixty-day period provided for in section 766.106(4) is applicable even when there has been no extension of the ninety-day tolling period under section 766.106(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...[4] The computation for each health care provider is as follows: November 5(SJH) plus 150 days = April 4, 1998; November 7 (Pidala, Tulsiak, and EMA) plus 150 days = April 6, 1998; November 14(MHC) plus 150 days = April 13, 1998; and November 26 (HCHA) plus 150 days = April 25, 1998. [5] Sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4), Florida Statutes, were enacted as part of the same bill in 1985....

...Major points include... establishment of methods for case settlement and arbitration. The purpose of the bill is to reduce societal costs of medical malpractice. Further, another section of the Staff Analysis discussing the provision which would ultimately become section 766.106 states: "The purpose of this section is to encourage prompt settlement of meritorious claims." However, there is no Staff Analysis discussion concerning the provision of the bill that ultimately became section 766.104(2)....

...t both statutes refer to ninety days. But these are entirely different ninety-day periods: the first being an extension of the statute of limitations period, see § 766.104(2); and the second being a tolling of the statute of limitations period. See § 766.106(4)....

...Standard of Review As a preliminary matter, we are asked to address the standard of review applicable to voluntary binding arbitration awards pursuant to chapter 766. We first note that there are two different sets of statutes providing for arbitration of medical malpractice claims. Under section 766.106, a defendant's insurer may make an offer of admission of liability and for arbitration on the issue of damages. Section 766.106(12) provides that: "To the extent not inconsistent with this part, the provisions of chapter 682, the Florida Arbitration Code, shall be applicable to such proceedings." On the other hand, the parties may elect to submit the issue of damages to an arbitration panel in accordance with section 766.207, and review of the award will be in accordance with section 766.212. Unlike section 766.106, section 766.207 does not contain a provision applying the arbitration code in chapter 682....

...n or having to prove fault in a civil trial. A defendant or the defendant's insurer is required to conduct an investigation to determine the defendant's liability within ninety days of receiving the claimant's notice to initiate a malpractice claim. § 766.106(3)(a)....

...(k) Any offer by a claimant to arbitrate must be made to each defendant against whom the claimant has made a claim. Any offer by a defendant to arbitrate must be made to each claimant who has joined in the notice of intent to initiate litigation, as provided in s. 766.106....

...yfriend. (Emphasis added.) Under the trial court’s first reason for dismissing count II, appellant was required to file her claim within the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, as dictated by sections 95.11(4)(b) and 766.106(4), Florida Statutes....

...2002), wherein it emphasized that the provisions of chapter 766 “should be construed in a manner that favors access to courts.’” Id. (quoting Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9, 13 (Fla. 1994)). As regards the application of the statute of limitations in sections 95.11(4)(b) and 766.106(4), the supreme court in J.B....

...Accordingly, this suit is not a medical malpractice action for chapter 95 purposes and the two-year statute of limitations is inapplicable. 12 Id. (emphasis added). As for the applicability of chapter 766, the supreme court read section 766.106(1)(a), Florida Statutes (defining a claim for medical negligence), and section 766.202, Florida Statutes (defining “medical negligence” as “medical malpractice”), “in conjunction” and concluded “chapter 766’s notice and presuit screening requirements apply to claims that ‘aris[e] out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.’” Id. at 949 (citing section 766.106(1)(a))....

...requiring presuit actions by an individual plaintiff before he may bring a medical  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 2 of 36 negligence claim in Florida state court. The district court held that one of those presuit requirements in Florida Statute § 766.1065—that the plaintiff execute a written authorization form for release of protected health information—is preempted by a federal statute, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), and its accompanying regulations, see 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508, 164.512. That authorization form—required by § 766.1065 as a pre-condition to filing a medical negligence claim—allows the prospective defendant to obtain documents and conduct ex parte interviews of the prospective plaintiff’s medical providers on matters pertinent to the medical negligence claim. Fla. Stat. § 766.1065. After oral argument and careful review of the record and the parties’ submissions, we conclude that the written authorization form, required by Florida statute § 766.1065, is fully compliant with the HIPAA statute and its regulations and the state and federal law are not in conflict. Accordingly, there is no federal preemption of § 766.1065, and the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is reversed. I....

...Dulay’s treatment of Murphy fell below the prevailing standard of care and injured Murphy. See Fla. Stat. § 766.203(2). Murphy was ready to file his lawsuit but first had to comply with Florida’s numerous presuit requirements. We review the presuit requirements in § 766.106 not challenged here in order to place the challenged statute, § 766.1065, in context. II. FLA. STAT. § 766.106 Florida law requires a prospective plaintiff to give a 90-day notice of the “intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence.” See Fla. Stat. § 766.106(2)(a)- (3)(a). No suit may be filed for 90 days after notice is mailed. Id. § 766.106(3)(a). Along with this presuit notice, the plaintiff must provide “a verified written medical expert opinion from a medical expert” to corroborate his “reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation.” Id....

...plaintiff’s experts relied upon in forming their opinions; and (4) an “executed 3  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 4 of 36 authorization form” permitting the release of medical information. Id. § 766.106(2)(a). Florida law imposes requirements on the prospective defendant as well. During the 90-day period, Florida law requires the defendant or his insurer to conduct a prompt investigation, review, and evaluation to determine the liability of the defendant. Id. § 766.106(3)(a). At or before the end of the 90-day period, Florida law requires the defendant or his insurer to provide the plaintiff with a response, rejecting the negligence claim, making a settlement offer, or offering to arbitrate. Id. § 766.106(3)(b)....

...The purpose of this procedure is to encourage resolution of medical negligence actions without the expense and drawn out process of formal discovery. The plaintiff’s attorney has 30 days to advise his client regarding the defendant’s response and the attorney’s evaluation thereof. Id. § 766.106(3)(d). This Florida statute includes some procedural safeguards for parties in this presuit-screening process. For example, the statute of limitations is tolled during the 90-day period as to all potential defendants. Id. § 766.106(4). No statements, discussions, documents, or reports generated in this presuit-screening process are discoverable or admissible in any civil action. Id. § 766.106(5). We now examine the Florida statute challenged here, which is § 766.1065. 4  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 5 of 36 III. FLA. STAT. § 766.1065 Section 766.1065 took effect on July 1, 2013. See 2013 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2013-108, § 7 (S.B. 1792) (West). Section 766.1065 governs all causes of action accruing before, on, or after that date. Id. § 6(1). Section 766.1065 requires that an “authorization for release of protected health information” accompany the 90-day presuit notice required by § 766.106(2), and the authorization must be in the written form specified by § 766.1065. Fla. Stat. § 766.1065(1)....

...The form authorizes “the disclosure of protected health information that is potentially relevant to the claim of personal injury or wrongful death.” Id. The presuit notice is void if the plaintiff does not provide the authorization form. 1 Id. Section 766.1065(3) includes the precise language that a valid, written authorization must contain. The Florida legislature expressed its intent to make the presuit authorization form consistent with HIPAA. Specifically, § 766.1065(3) mandates that the authorization “shall be construed in accordance with the ‘Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information’ in 45 C.F.R. parts 160 and 164”—HIPAA’s Privacy Rule. Id. § 766.1065(3)....

...In addition, the authorization must inform the plaintiff that signing the form “is not a 1 If, after giving the authorization, a plaintiff revokes the authorization, the presuit notice “is deemed retroactively void from the date of issuance.” Id. § 766.1065(2). 5  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 6 of 36 condition for continued treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for health plan benefits.” Id. § 766.1065(3)(H). On the statutorily prescribed form, the plaintiff must include a list of all the names and addresses of “all health care providers” known who either: (1) “examined, evaluated, or treated the Patient in connection with injuries complained of after the alleged act of negligence,” or (2) “examined, evaluated, or treated the Patient during a period commencing 2 years before the incident” giving rise to the claim. Id. § 766.1065(3)(B). This authorization, however, does not apply to health care providers or information that the plaintiff certifies “is not potentially relevant” to the injury “that is the basis of the accompanying presuit notice.” Id. § 766.1065(3)(C)....

...arte interviews, stating: “This authorization expressly allows the persons or class of persons listed . . . above to interview the health care providers listed . . . above, without the presence of the Patient or the Patient’s attorney.” Id. § 766.1065(3)(E)....

...Those “persons or class of persons” include the doctor defendant, his insurer, adjuster, 6  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 7 of 36 experts or attorneys. Id. § 766.1065(3)(D)-(E). Thus, the doctor defendant’s attorney would be able to interview ex parte the treating physician of a plaintiff. 2 However, the statute does not require the treating provider to submit to a request for an interview. See id. § 766.106(6)(b)(5) (“This subparagraph does not require a claimant’s treating health care provider to submit to a request for an interview.”). The authorization form must provide that the authorization “expires upon resolution of the claim or at the conclusion of any litigation instituted in connection with the matter . . . , whichever occurs first.” Id. § 766.1065(3)(F)....

...authorization” but doing so renders the presuit notice retroactively void, and (2) the plaintiff “understands that signing this authorization is not a condition for continued treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for health plan benefits.” Id. § 766.1065(3)(G)-(H). Importantly, the last paragraph in the authorization form must warn the plaintiff “that information used or disclosed under this authorization may be 2 Section 766.106(6)(b)(5) provides that when the doctor defendant gives notice of his intent to conduct an ex parte interview, the plaintiff’s attorney must arrange the interview within 15 days after the request is made....

...Further, if a defendant takes an unsworn statement from one of the plaintiff’s treating providers, “[r]easonable notice and opportunity to be heard” must be given to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff “has the right to attend the taking of such unsworn statements.” Id. § 766.106(6)(b)(6). 7  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 8 of 36 subject to additional disclosure by the recipient and may not be protected by federal HIPAA privacy regulations.” Id. § 766.1065(3)(I)....

...release . . . violates his federal rights under [HIPAA].” 3 Murphy’s complaint contended that: (1) HIPAA’s Privacy Rule protects “personal health and medical information from uses not related to medical and health care”; (2) Florida’s § 766.1065 “authorizes 3 The complaint also named as a defendant “Adolfo C....

...procedures at variance from, and in derogation of, what is authorized by federal law” under the Supremacy Clause; and (3) therefore, “HIPAA expressly preempts these contrary procedures.” The complaint requested: (1) a declaratory judgment that HIPAA preempted § 766.1065’s presuit authorization requirement and (2) an injunction against forced compliance with § 766.1065 in the event Murphy sued Dr....

...The district court found that Murphy had retained experts already and his decision to give presuit notice depended on whether he had to authorize ex parte interviews. The district court also found that Dr. Dulay and his representatives wanted to conduct the ex parte interviews allowed by § 766.1065. The district court held that “consent given only in an authorization that is required by Florida law as a presuit condition is not voluntary.” Because the § 766.1065 authorization form was not voluntary, the district court concluded that § 766.1065 would result in disclosure of Murphy’s HIPAA-protected health information without his consent and without other safeguards in HIPAA and its regulations. Thus, § 766.1065 was contrary to the HIPAA provisions and 9  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 10 of 36 preempted....

...relevant to this case—the privacy and disclosure regulations in parts 160 and 164—exceed the scope of the Secretary’s delegated authority, or (2) that the Florida legislature could permissibly enact a statute contrary to those HIPAA regulations. Rather, they argue that § 766.1065 is consistent with both the HIPAA statute and the HIPAA regulations. Thus, we outline the relevant HIPAA regulations and then analyze whether § 766.1065 is contrary to them. 5 HIPAA, however, does not preempt state laws that provide “more stringent” privacy protections....

...and no longer be protected by [HIPAA].” Id. § 164.508(c)(2), (b)(4). In short, the HIPAA regulations mandate that an authorization contain many different elements in order to be a valid authorization. The authorization form required by § 766.1065 must have those same HIPAA elements to be valid too. The HIPAA regulations also set forth circumstances when a written authorization is invalid, specifically: (1) “[t]he expiration date has passed or the expiration event is kno...

...or benefits on an individual’s signing an authorization if the disclosure of protected health information is necessary to determine payment. See id. X. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS With this background, we examine whether § 766.1065 is contrary to HIPAA and its regulations. A. § 766.1065 Authorizations Meet HIPAA’s Requirements The HIPAA regulations expressly allow the release of protected health information upon the signing of a valid authorization. Our first task is to determine whether the presuit authorization form required by § 766.1065 meets the HIPAA requirements for a valid, written authorization. As outlined above, the HIPAA regulations include explicit details about what an authorization must contain to be valid under HIPAA. In turn, the Florida statute, in § 766.1065, provides the precise form that a presuit authorization must 23  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 24 of 36 take, ensuring that the form meets each of the required elements set forth in the HIPAA regulations. To the extent that there remains any ambiguity, § 766.1065 explicitly states that presuit authorizations “shall be construed in accordance with the [HIPAA requirements].” Fla. Stat. § 766.1065(3). Thus, the plain text of § 766.1065 makes clear that it requires presuit authorizations to meet HIPAA’s requirements. Murphy argues that the § 766.1065 authorization fails to satisfy HIPAA’s required elements for four reasons, each of which lacks merit. First, Murphy views the authorizations required by § 766.1065 as irrevocable and, therefore, in conflict with the HIPAA regulations’ requirement that an authorization be revocable. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(5). This is not so. Subsection (2) of § 766.1065 plainly contemplates a plaintiff’s ability to revoke the required authorization. See Fla. Stat. § 766.1065(2) (“If the authorization required by this section is revoked . . . .”). Further, subsection (3) explicitly requires that the authorization include the phrase “the Patient has the right to revoke this authorization in writing.” Id. § 766.1065(G). There is a consequence for revocation, though—that the presuit notice is deemed retroactively void. As a result, and if too much time passes, a plaintiff’s medical negligence claim may be barred by the statute of limitations. See id. § 766.1065(2)....

...24  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 25 of 36 any consequences; they just require that an authorization be revocable. The Florida statute requires the same. Second, Murphy argues that § 766.1065 authorizations are non-HIPAA compliant because they require a plaintiff to list health care providers to whom the presuit authorization does not apply, as well as those to whom it applies....

...medical history for any purpose. It is no defect, therefore, that the Florida presuit authorization permits disclosure of some information that may be irrelevant to the plaintiff’s medical negligence claim. Third, Murphy contends that the authorizations required by § 766.1065 do not meet the HIPAA regulations’ specificity requirement....

...at 82,517. Importantly, “[t]here are no limitations on the information that can be authorized for disclosure,” and an individual may authorize a health care provider to release all of his medical records. Id. Here, the authorization form in § 766.1065 specifically authorizes the release of health information held by health care providers that the plaintiff identifies, including those who have examined, evaluated, or treated him (or who will do so) in connection with the complained-of injury; and those who have examined, evaluated, or treated him two years prior to the injury. Fla. Stat. § 766.1065(3)(B). Murphy may not like the breadth of the authorization required by § 766.1065, but the HIPAA regulations do not require that authorizations be narrow, simply that they be specific. And in accordance with HIPAA’s requirement that a valid authorization form include “[a] description of each purpose of the requested use or disclosure,” 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)(iv), § 766.1065’s authorization form states that disclosure is authorized for the following “specific purposes”: (1) “[f]acilitating the investigation and evaluation” of the claim; (2) “[d]efending against any litigation arising out of” the claim; or (3) “[o]btaining legal advice or representation arising out of” the claim. Fla. Stat. § 766.1065(3)(A). 26  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 27 of 36 The form’s limitation on how disclosed information may be used, however, does not alter the form’s clear description of which information may be turned over. Section 766.1065’s authorization form is clear that all information in the listed doctors’ possession, both verbal and written, is subject to disclosure....

...The form is also clear that disclosed information may be used only to investigate and defend the medical negligence claim. Doctors will have no difficulty discerning the obvious purpose of a defendant’s request when presented with a signed authorization. Therefore, § 766.1065’s authorization form fully satisfies HIPAA’s requirement that the information permitted for disclosure be identified “in a specific and meaningful fashion.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)(i). Fourth, Murphy argues that § 766.1065 requires a prohibited compound authorization. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3). He reasons that a compound authorization is an authorization combined “with any other document” and that § 766.1065 requires an authorization combined with a 90-day presuit notice. However, as explained above, a compound authorization is created when “an authorization for the use and disclosure of protected health information is combined with any other legal permission.” 78 Fed....

...Accordingly, the fact that the authorization must be sent out with the presuit notice does not create an impermissible compound authorization. In summary, after reviewing the HIPAA regulations, we conclude that the authorization form required in § 766.1065 complies with HIPAA. Indeed, § 766.1065 expressly requires that an individual execute a HIPAA-compliant authorization before bringing a medical negligence claim....

...romulgated the regulations, before filing a medical negligence complaint in state court. Conditioning the use of the state courts on compliance with a federal provision (HIPAA) does not conflict with that federal provision (HIPAA). Because § 766.1065 is consistent with HIPAA’s requirements for disclosure by written authorization, it is also irrelevant whether § 766.1065 calls for procedures that satisfy the requirements of another HIPAA disclosure exception— including the exception for disclosure by judicial process. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(i)-(ii). Clearly, § 766.1065 does not provide the same privacy safeguards as those called for in the judicial-process exception....

...disclose protected health information without the written authorization of the individual” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, no other HIPAA exception for disclosure needs to be satisfied once an individual signs a valid written authorization. B. Mandatory Nature of § 766.1065 Because § 766.1065’s authorization form meets HIPAA’s required elements to be a valid authorization, Murphy is left to focus on the mandatory nature of § 766.1065. Because § 766.1065 requires HIPAA authorizations as a mandatory pre-condition to filing a medical negligence claim in Florida court, Murphy argues individuals are being coerced by the State of Florida to sign them. Murphy contends that HIPAA requires all authorizations be signed voluntarily to be valid, and thus § 766.1065 violates HIPAA....

...§ 164.508(b)(4). 30  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 31 of 36 Second, Murphy, and others like him, voluntarily choose to seek redress for grievances through Florida’s judicial system. By enacting § 766.1065, the State conditioned an individual’s ability to use a state-provided resource to advance medical negligence claims—the state judicial system—upon that individual’s executing a limited HIPAA authorization in a form that complies with HIPAA’s requirements....

...Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the presuit authorization they signed was invalid because it was involuntary, the court held “while it is true that the [plaintiffs] could not have proceeded with their suit if 10 Both Texas and Tennessee have enacted statutes similar to § 766.1065....

...32  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 33 of 36 filing suit, a plaintiff’s decision whether to file suit is still a voluntary one.” Id. at 557. 11 Fourth, Florida’s § 766.1065 statute is not preempted even if we accept Murphy’s argument that HIPAA contains an implicit requirement of voluntariness. As outlined above, the HIPAA regulations set forth numerous core elements that must be in an authorization form in order for that authorization to be valid....

...In Allen, the Georgia statute did not “expressly provide[] that the requisite authorization comply with the provisions of HIPAA” and did not require that the authorization give notice of a plaintiff’s right to revoke. 644 S.E.2d at 816. Unlike the Georgia statute, Florida’s § 766.1065 requires that authorizations conform to HIPAA’s requirements. See Fla. Stat. § 766.1065(3). Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court’s analysis suggests that, had the Georgia statute contained a provision like the § 766.1065(3)— requiring that authorizations meet HIPAA’s requirements—the court would have upheld it. See Allen, 644 S.E.2d at 816. Recently, a Florida circuit court in Escambia County ruled that HIPAA does not preempt the presuit authorization requirement in § 766.1065....

...At the same time, the Secretary acknowledges that some coercion is allowed by expressly permitting Medicaid benefits, financial incentives, and even employment to be conditioned on the execution of a HIPAA authorization. We do not find the condition imposed by § 766.1065 to be categorically different from the other conditions and incentives permitted under HIPAA....

...on in areas traditionally regulated by the states. See Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S. Ct. at 2250. 34  Case: 13-14637 Date Filed: 10/10/2014 Page: 35 of 36 C. § 766.1065 is “Not Contrary” to HIPAA In light of our above analysis, we conclude that Murphy has not shown § 766.1065 is contrary to HIPAA. 12 First, it is patently clear that § 766.1065 does not make it “impossible” for a covered entity, as defined by the HIPAA regulations, “to comply” with both HIPAA and state law. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.202(1). Section 766.1065 requires the authorization form to comply with HIPAA’s requirements....

...Once a plaintiff executes a valid HIPAA authorization as part of his presuit obligations, his physician can, consistent with HIPAA, convey relevant health information about the plaintiff to the defendant. A medical provider can simultaneously comply with state and federal requirements. Second, § 766.1065 does not stand “as an obstacle” to fulfilling “the full purposes and objectives” of HIPAA. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.202(2). One of HIPAA’s stated objectives is “reducing the administrative costs of providing and paying for health care.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(b). Likewise, § 766.1065, by allowing health care providers to investigate and potentially settle claims before litigation commences, serves to reduce the overall cost that medical negligence litigation places on Florida’s health care system. The Florida law, like HIPAA, 12 As Murphy’s counsel noted at oral argument, whether § 766.1065 violates the Florida Constitution is a state law issue that is not before us....

...XI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s declaratory judgment order in favor of plaintiff Murphy, as well as the district court’s injunction against the enforcement of Fla. Stat. § 766.1065....

...Daye said: ‘We’ve investigated, we know what we’re doing. You must cooperate with us, and it has to be done immediately.” Mr. Daye then sent the following letter on the insurer’s letterhead to Yell’s attorney: “Pursuant to Florida Statute 766.106 and 766.207 on behalf of Walton Regional Hospital, we are making an offer to admit liability as to any claim of Linda S....

...UCF is correct that the denial of a motion to dismiss can be reviewed by certiorari in certain circumstances to examine a claim that statutory pre-suit requirements have not been met. For example, a claim that a party did not comply with the pre-suit requirements of section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes, in a medical malpractice action is reviewable by certiorari....

...aims for failure of respondent to follow pre-suit procedures. A “‘[c]laim for medical negligence’ or ‘claim for medical malpractice’ means a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” See § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...Frei was filed on May 4, 1989. On May 17, 1990, appellee moved to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds of premature filing. The court granted the motion on the grounds that the suit was filed during the 90-day tolling period of section 766.106(4) in which no suit may be filed, and dismissed the action without prejudice on July 17, 1990....

...APPEAL In medical malpractice actions, the legislature has provided that upon service of a notice of intent to initiate litigation, an automatic 90-day tolling of the two year statutory limitations period occurs, during which no action may be filed. Section 766.106(4) further provides: The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in section 95.11....

...The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run. Appellant claims that she was entitled to two (2) consecutive tolling periods of 90 days each under the provisions of sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4) for a total of 180 days in which to file suit against Dr....

...ired when suit was filed against Dr. Frei. This issue was not raised in the trial court but we consider it here for reasons of judicial economy. Implicitly, this court has maintained that the two 90-day periods, of toll and extension, under sections 766.106(4) and 766.104(2), do not run simultaneously....

...More importantly, section 766.104(2) specifically states that the 90-day extension is "in addition to other tolling periods." In our view, the plain meaning of this provision contemplates that the extension begins after the "other" tolling period of 90 days mandated by section 766.106....

...issue a final judgment against appellants and, (2) when it denied their motion to join appellants' liability insurer. We affirm as to all of the issues raised by appellants; and reverse as to both of the issues raised by appellees. The substance of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1993), was originally enacted as a part of the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985. Ch. 85-175, § 14, at 1199-1202, Laws of Fla. Among its provisions is one which permits "an offer of admission of liability and for arbitration on the issue of damages" in response to a notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation. § 766.106(3)(b)3., Fla....

...In 1988, the legislature again turned its attention to medical malpractice, enacting major amendments to what is now chapter 766. Ch. 88-1, §§ 48-87, at 164-86, Laws of Fla.; ch. 88-277, §§ 26-49, at 1473-95, Laws of Fla. While these amendments changed some portions of what is now section 766.106 and added additional subsections, the substance *1194 of the provisions relating to admission of liability and voluntary binding arbitration of damages remained unchanged....

...Statutes (1993). While the motivation for enactment of those provisions is explained in section 766.201(2)(b), no reference is made to the provisions regarding admission of liability and voluntary binding arbitration of damages already set forth in section 766.106, or to the intended interplay, if any, between section 766.106 and sections 766.207 through 766.212....

...(k) Any offer by a claimant to arbitrate must be made to each defendant against whom the claimant has made a claim. Any offer by a defendant to arbitrate must be made to each claimant who has joined in the notice of intent to initiate litigation, as provided in s. 766.106......

...out the terms of the arbitration award... . Such orders are enforceable by the contempt powers of the court; and execution will issue, upon the request of a party, for such judgments. As should be apparent from the foregoing, much of that portion of section 766.106 relating to voluntary binding arbitration of damages is inconsistent, and irreconcilable, with the provisions of sections 766.207 through 766.212. Adding to the confusion created by the inconsistencies between section 766.106 and sections 766.207 through 766.212 is the fact that the parties elected not to follow either procedure in all details....

...very important provisions would not — no hearing officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings participated in the arbitration, and the arbitration was not conducted according to the rules promulgated by the Division. Instead, as provided by section 766.106(10)(b), appellants and appellees each selected one arbitrator, and those two then decided upon the third....

...for purposes of s. 120.68," and provides, as in administrative matters, for review by a district court of appeal, rather than by a circuit court. We conclude, instead, that, for purposes of this appeal, we will refer to the applicable provisions of section 766.106 and, "[t]o the extent not inconsistent ..., the provisions of chapter 682, the Florida Arbitration *1197 Code." § 766.106(12), Fla....

...they were entitled to enforcement pursuant to that section. As discussed above, we have concluded that the parties are precluded from relying, on appeal, on the arbitration scheme set out in sections 766.207 through 766.212. Instead, we will look to section 766.106 and, to the extent not inconsistent with section 766.106, the Arbitration Code. We find nothing in section 766.106 to suggest that the provisions of the Arbitration Code relating to confirmation of awards not be applied....

...elieve appellants of liability for such payments. Instead, appellants remain contingently liable, which contingency will mature should any future payment not be timely made. We have also previously concluded that, to the extent not inconsistent with section 766.106, the provisions of the Arbitration Code apply in this case....

...In relevant part, section 682.15 states that, "[u]pon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other judgment or decree." We see no inconsistency between section 682.15 and section 766.106....

...1973), and violate claimant's right of access to the courts. The University treated Patricia Echarte, a minor, for a brain tumor. As a result of the University's allegedly negligent acts, Patricia's right hand and forearm had to be amputated to save her life. Pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Those benefits do not obtain under the statutes in issue. Here, a defendant retains causation defenses and the claimant must demonstrate reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation, § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988), through an extensive presuit investigation procedure. [20] § 766.106,.203-.206, Fla....

...y accept the offer of voluntary binding arbitration within 30 days. However, in no event shall the defendant be required to respond to the request for arbitration sooner than 90 days after service of the notice of intent to initiate litigation under s. 766.106....

...(k) Any offer by a claimant to arbitrate must be made to each defendant against whom the claimant has made a claim. Any offer by a defendant to arbitrate must be made to each claimant who has joined in the notice of intent to initiate litigation, as provided in s. 766.106....

...Section 768.21(8) provides that adult children cannot recover damages pursuant to section 768.21(3) "for lost parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury" when liability is premised on a claim for medical malpractice as defined in section 766.106(1)....

...This is an appeal from a final order dismissing appellant's complaint for the unreasonable failure to comply with a presuit discovery request. We affirm. On August 11, 1993, Melanson served on Agravat a notice of intent to initiate a medical malpractice action against him. See § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. On August 23, 1993, Agravat sought informal presuit discovery through a written request to produce. See § 766.106(7), Fla....

...When no response was provided, Agravat allegedly investigated as best he could and denied the claim in late October, 1994, about two weeks before the expiration of the ninety day period. Apparently appellant sought a stipulation to extend the ninety days, as permitted by statute, see § 766.106(4), Fla....

...The dates mentioned in the notices of intent are June 2, 1988, when Mrs. Corbin was hospitalized and June 3, 1988, when no postoperative arteriogram was performed to assure proper clip placement. On January 3, 1991, Southern filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it, for failure to comply with section 766.106, Florida Statutes, and/or failure to bring the suit within the applicable statute of limitations. The motion pointed out many of the above stated facts. It quoted the pertinent part of section 766.106, which requires notice of intent to initiate litigation to all defendants in medical malpractice suits, with suit not to be filed for a period of ninety days after the notice is mailed to any prospective defendant....

...The appellants, Arturo and Stephanie Pavolini, appeal the trial court's order of dismissal of their derivative claims in the underlying medical malpractice action filed by Maria Pavolini, Arturo's wife and Stephanie's mother. The order of dismissal is based on the failure of the appellants to give separate notice pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1999) of their intent to join in the action to litigate their derivative claims for loss of consortium. [1] We reverse. The issue in this case is whether an individual who seeks to pursue a derivative claim for loss of consortium in a medical malpractice action must either provide notice of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes, or join in the notice provided by the injured party....

...Thus we must first determine whether a person with a derivative claim for loss of consortium is a claimant under the Act who presents a claim for *413 medical negligence. The pre-suit investigation statute provides that "[p]rior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to s. 766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) [a]ny named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the care and treatment of the claimant; and (b), [s]uch negligence resulted in injury to the claimant....

...The summary judgment is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH, J., concurs. PLEUS, J., dissents, with opinion. PLEUS, J., dissenting. The issue in this case is whether the presuit notice requirements of section 766.106(2), require a spouse's or a child's derivative claim to be separately or distinctly noticed....

...Her husband Arturo and daughter Stephanie joined in the suit asserting derivative claims. The presuit notice did not list Arturo or Stephanie as potential claimants. Within the 90-day evaluation period, the *415 health care providers rejected Maria's claim in accordance with subsection 766.106(3)(b)1. The trial judge dismissed the third amended complaint as to Arturo and Stephanie and this appeal followed. I dissent because I agree with the trial judge that section 766.106 requires separate and distinct notice of such derivative claims....

...The burden is on the medical malpractice claimant to make a "reasonable investigation" to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence. The second purpose is evaluation and settlement. Once the claimant's investigation is complete, subsection 766.106(2) requires that the claimant serve all potential defendants with a notice of intent to initiate litigation....

...nt. There is no rule that all spouses and children of injured persons automatically qualify for a loss of consortium award or damages under 768.0415. It should also be noted that Chandler was based on the court's interpretation of the predecessor to section 766.106, which was section 768.57, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...After Chandler, section 768.57 was renumbered and a substantial new portion was added under the heading "informal discovery." A careful reading of the added portion on informal discovery leads one to the inescapable conclusion that Chandler is no longer good law. Throughout subsection 766.106(7), references are made to "parties." Without being listed as "parties" in the notice of suit, it would be impossible to impose any sanctions on Arturo or Stephanie for noncompliance....

...had a husband and a daughter. From that knowledge, they presumably can assume Arturo and Stephanie will be plaintiffs in the suit. The problem with that argument is a practical one. The investigative scope granted to a prospective defendant under subsection 766.106(7) to evaluate the claim is expressly limited to "parties" and requires that "the parties shall make discovery information available without formal discovery....

...rogatories, request documents and make other relevant inquiries? Only the primary claimant has an obligation to provide access to information about the claim. With notice, however, each prospective party must give access to pertinent information. Subsection 766.106(2) is unambiguous and defines who must take what action, when it must be done, and how....

...Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 596 So.2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Therefore, for ease of discussion, we refer to both the husband's claim and the minor child's claim as a claim for loss of consortium. [2] The provisions of this statute are now contained in section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...The claim was not resolved in the screening process, so the plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court against the defendants, Dr. Walker and his professional association. The complaint was filed on November 13, 1998, within the sixty-day tolling period set by section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes....

...y the medical malpractice of the defendants. As a prerequisite to filing a suit for medical malpractice, the prospective claimant must conduct a presuit investigation and serve notice of intent to initiate litigation on all potential defendants. See § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). The suit may not be filed for a period of ninety days after the date of service of the notice. See § 766.106(3)(a), Fla....

...During this period of time, the parties have an opportunity to evaluate the relative merits of the claims and defenses and to either settle the claim or refer it to arbitration. One critical aspect of the legislative scheme is that timely compliance with the presuit process tolls the statute of limitations. See § 766.106(4), Fla....

...We conclude that the statutory presuit screening requirements apply to an action for contribution that is based on a claim of medical malpractice. By the terms of section 766.203(1), all claims of medical malpractice are subject to the mandatory presuit screening procedure. Section 766.106(1)(a) defines a claim for medical malpractice as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." This definition makes no distinction between a medical malpractice claim that is asserted...

...itted medical malpractice and that they should be required to share in the loss. It follows that the claim, though asserted in a suit for contribution, is "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...rson or his representative claiming damage by reason of injury, death, or monetary loss, on account of alleged malpractice ... shall submit such claim ..." See § 768.44(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1975). The phrase "monetary loss" was not carried forward in section 766.106, the current version of the statute....

...who is forced to pay for medical bills or by a joint tortfeasor who has settled for more than his or her fair share of the loss. The statute was simply reworded. If anything, we think the current statute applies more clearly to contribution claims. Section 766.106(1)(a) defines a claim for medical malpractice as a claim arising out of the rendering of medical care or services....

...defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care." When section 95.11 and 766.106 are read together, the definition of medical malpractice is broader, not narrower, than the definition in the former statute, section 768.44(1)(a)....

...The court reasoned that: The statutory procedures are intended to be applied preliminary to a determination of liability. Where there has been a determination of liability on the professional negligence claim, an action for contribution is not properly deemed to be within the statutory definition of sections 766.104 and 766.106....

...uch extension. Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. [Transferred to section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.).] [4] See Universal Engineering Corp....

...He did not serve a written response to the notice of intent, nor did he file a corroborating written medical expert opinion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found, as a matter of fact, that Dr. Estevez had not made a reasonable investigation as required by sections 766.106(3)(a) and 766.203(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...The defendants contend that the trial court erred by striking their pleadings, including their affirmative defenses, on the alleged inadequacy of their presuit screening investigation where Dr. Estevez had conducted a reasonable investigation. We disagree. Section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1993), reads, in pertinent part, as follows: (3)(a) No suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice is mailed to any prospective defendant....

...Estevez did not request nor receive any written medical expert opinions to corroborate his opinion that he was not negligent. Consequently, we find, as the trial court did, that these activities on the part of Dr. Estevez clearly did not comply with the plain meaning of the procedures described in sections 766.106(3)(a)(1)-(3), Florida Statutes (1993), for conducting a reasonable investigation, nor were they sufficient to constitute "[a]ny other similar procedure which fairly and promptly evaluates the pending claim," as required by section 766.106(3)(a)(4), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Therefore, where the undisputed evidence as established by the testimony of Dr. Estevez clearly demonstrated that the defendants did not make a good faith rejection of the malpractice claim against them and that they had unreasonably failed to comply with section 766.106(3)(1)-(4), Florida Statutes (1993), the trial court *1270 granted the plaintiff the appropriate relief as prescribed by the statute, § 766.106(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), and properly struck the defendants' pleadings, including their affirmative defenses....

...Haufe, and count V alleged the vicarious liability of Gulf Coast. Prior to filing suit, Allen conducted a presuit investigation pursuant to section 766.203, Florida Statutes, and thereafter served a notice of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106(2)....

...Norsworthy, 598 So.2d at 109. REVERSED. PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Appellants on October 5, 1987 filed notice of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to then section 768.57, Florida Statutes (1987). The statute was transferred to section 766.106, Florida Statutes, in 1988 and currently provides: (4) The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in Section 95.11....

...NOTES [1] Plantar fasciitis is an "irritation and swelling of the thick tissue on the bottom of the foot." Available at Medline Plus, Medical Encyclopedia, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007021. htm#Definition (last visited Oct. 14, 2008). [2] Pursuant to section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (2006), the statute of limitations is tolled during the ninety-day presuit period, and the claimant has sixty days or the remainder of the statute of limitations period, whichever is greater, within which to file the medical malpractice lawsuit....

LEWIS, J. This case involves a Florida constitutional challenge to the 2013 amendments to sections 766.106 and 766.1065 of the Florida Statutes....

...the negligence resulted in injury to the claimant. § 766,203(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). Following that investigation, a claimant must give each prospective defendant pre-suit notice of intent to initiate litigation and make certain disclosures. § 766.106(2)(a), Fla....

...In .addition, the presuit notice must include an executed authorization form that is provided in section 7661065 of the Florida Statutes. Id. That executed authorization form is titled “Authorization for Release of Protected Health Information.” § 766.1065, Fla....

...the claimant is required to authorize the release of protected verbal and written health- information that is potentially relevant to the claim of medical negligence in the- possession óf the' health care providers listed in the notice disclosures. § 766.1065(3)B.1.-2., Fla. Stat. However, this authorization is not a blanket authorization—it excludes health care providers who do not possess information that is potentially relevant to the ' claim. § 766.1065(3)0....

...Nevertheless, the claimant is required'to name these providers and provide the dates of treatments rendered by others. Id. As part of this presuit machinery unique to medical malpractice claims, “the parties shall make discoverable information available without , formal discovery.” § 766.106(6)(a), Fla....

...give an, un-sworn statement; (2) produce requested documents, things, and medical records; (3) submit to a physical or mental examination; (4) answer written questions; and (5) authorize treating health care providers to give unsworn statements. See § 766.106(6)(b), Fla. Stat. The statutory scheme further provides, however, that “work product generated by the presuit screening process is not discoverable or admissible in any civil action for any purpose by the opposing party.” § 766.106(5), Fla. Stat. But, failure to participate in informal discovery “is grounds for dismissal of claims or defenses ultimately assert^ ed.” § 766.106(6)(a), Fla....

...rview. If the •claimant’s attorney fails to schedule an interview, the prospective, defendant or his or her legal representative may attempt to conduct an interview without further notice to the claimant or the claimant’s legal representative. § 766.106(6)(b)5., Fla....

...This authorization expressly allows the persons or class of persons listed in subsections D.2.-4. above to interview ■ the health care providers listed in subsections B.1.-2. above, without the presence of the Patient or the Patient’s attorney. § 766.1065(3)E., Fla....

...er to whom presuit notice was given) or employed by or on behalf of any health care provider(s) listed in subsections B.1.-2. above, regarding the matter of the presuit notice accompanying this authorization dr the care and treatment of the Patient. § 766.1065(3)D.2.-4., Fla....

...Specifically, in 2013, the Legislature added a third express purpose for the release of the protected health information: “Obtaining legal advice or representation arising out of the medical negligence claim described in the accompanying presuit notice.” § 766.1065(3)A.3., Fla....

...-Stat.; Ch. 2013-108, § 4", at 6, Laws of Fla. Before the amendments, the stated purpose of the mandatory authorization was twofold—to facilitate the investigation and evaluation of the claim, or to defend against any litigation arising out of the claim. § 766.1065(3)A.l.-2., Fla....

...2013-108, § 4, at 6, Laws of Fla. Further, as was true before the 2013 amendments, it remains true today that these conditions imposed by the . Legislature are nonnegotiable. Specifically, “If the authorization required by this section is revoked, the presuit notice under s. 766.106(2) is deemed retroactively void from the date of issuance, and any tolling effect that the.presuit notice may have had on any applicable statute-of-limitations period is retroactively rendered void.” § 766.1065(2), Fla....

...bvious that a state statute is authorizing the invasion here. With regard to the access to courts challenge, on June 24, 2014, the trial court granted Dr. Myers’ motion for summary judgment. The trial court reasoned that the predecessor statute to section 766.106 was held to be valid under the applicable provision of the "Florida Constitution....

...Id, The court below did not acknowledge or even address the concept of non-relevant matters and privacy rights related thereto. Therefore, the district court upheld the constitutionality of the statutes. This review follows. ANALYSIS Weaver contends that the Legislature’s passage of certain amendments to sections 766.106 and 766.1065 of the Florida Statutes are unconstitutional for several reasons....

...shed Florida’s constitutional right to privacy. Requiring claimants to authorize clandestine, ex parte secret interviews is far from the least intrusive means to accomplish those stated goals. 5 The ex parte secret interview provisions of sections 766.106 and 766.1065 fail to protect Florida citizens from even accidental disclosures of confidential medical information- that falls outsidé the scope of the claim because there would be no one present on the claimant’s behalf to ensure that the potential d...

...Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326 , 389 S.E.2d 41, 46 (1990); Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 722, 727 (Tenn. 2006); Kirkland v. Middleton, 639 So.2d 1002, 1004 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Horner v. Rowan Companies, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 597, 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994). While section 766.106 provides that a treating health care provider may have the right to refuse to be secretly interviewed ex parte, as noted by the Arizona Court of Appeals with .regard to a similar statute, a provider may nonetheless feel pressured to '...

...These latter methods will provide defense counsel with the same information that they would obtain in an -me parte conference ... without jeopardizing that physician’s fiduciary obligation to his patient. Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 148 Ill.App.3d 581 , 102 Ill.Dec. 172 , 499 N.E.2d 952, 965-66 (1986). Under section 766.106(6)(b), the other informal discovéry tools available are un-sworn statements of the parties and treating health care providers (all with the claimant’s counsel allowed to be present), written questions, production, of documents and things, and physical and mental examinations....

...ant will be subject to the amendments’ no-notice interview provision because it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to schedule time with a doctor within fifteen days or seventy-two hours absent a critical, life-threatening situation. See § 766.106(6)(b)5., Fla....

...titutional conditions doctrine forbids burdening the Constitution’s enumerated rights by coercively withholding benefits from those who exercise them.”). However, such' unconstitutional conditioning and coercion is exactly what the amendments to section 766.106 and 766.1065 have done here....

...The vulnerable state in which a medical malpractice claimant is placed is a sufficiently important and significant impediment to seeking relief from a Florida court. 8 This our Constitution simply does not allow. 9 ’ Having determined that the 2013 amendments to sections 766.106 and 766.1066 of the Florida Statutes are unconstitutional, we now must undertake consideration as to whether to sever the unconstitutional portions....

...ovisions are stricken. Id. at 493 (citing Moreau v. Lewis, 648 So.2d 124, 128 (Fla. 1995)). Noting the limited nature of our holding today and our severance principles, we make two strikes from the amended statutes. First, wé strike in its entirety section 766.1065(3)E., Florida Statutes (2013), which contains the constitutionally infirm language: “This authorization expressly allows the persons or class of persons listed in subsections D.2.-4. above to interview the health, care providers listed in subsections B.1.-2. above, without the presence of the Patient or the Patient’s attorney.” § 766.1065(3)E., Fla. Stat. Second, we strike the last sentence from- section - 766.106(6)(b)5., Florida Statutes (2013), which contains the constitutionally infirm language: “If the claimant’s attorney fails to schedule, an interview, the prospective defendant or his or her legal representative may attempt to conduct an interview without' further notice to the claimant or the claimant’s legal representative.” § 766.106(6)(b)5., Fla....

...s caused by medical malpractice, whether in the wrongful death or personal injury context, on the claimant’s waiver of the constitutional right to privacy. Therefore, we strike certain unconstitutional language from the 2013 amendments to sections 766.106 and 766.1066 of the Florida Statutes which authorized secret, ex parte interviews....

...ild that was authorized pursuant to statute). . Further, although not at issue here, requiring potential claimants to list by name health care providers who do not have information potentially relevant to the claim, and provide dates of service, see § 766.1065(3)C., in and of itself reveals irrelevant private medical information....

...negligence, courts must determine from the allegations “whether the claim arises out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” Doe v. Baptist Primary Care, Inc., 177 So. 3d 669, 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citations omitted); see also § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...malpractice case. The hospital argues that the trial court erred in allowing one of the counts in the complaint to remain because it is based on entirely different conduct of the hospital than the conduct alleged in the presuit screening required by section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ore the filing of suit in order to foster the disposition of these cases outside of court. See §§ 766.101-.316, Fla. Stat. (1993). There can be no doubt that this policy, particularly including the "informal discovery" provided by the statute, see § 766.106(7), Fla....

...McCullough, 590 So.2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), we hold that a plaintiff who chooses to allege only a statutory claim under section 400.022 and does not also allege a common law claim for medical negligence is not required to comply with the presuit requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...There is no dispute that the plaintiff complied with the presuit conditions contained in section 400.023(4), Florida Statutes (1997). The defendants contend, however, that the plaintiff must also comply with the more elaborate presuit requirements in section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1997). [2] The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that a personal representative in this type of lawsuit does not need to comply with section 766.106 "under any circumstances." Such a ruling is subject to certiorari review....

...2d DCA 1986), review denied, 511 So.2d 299 (Fla.1987); Central Fla. Reg'l Hosp. v. Hill, 721 So.2d 404 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). We cannot predict with certainty that the presuit conditions of chapter 766 will never apply in this type of suit. In this case, we rule merely that the presuit conditions of section 766.106 have no application to this complaint....

...First, a nursing home provides "health care and protective and support services" to its residents using a large staff comprised of both licensed and unlicensed employees. Attempting to extract the "medical care and services" aspect of any such *1111 claim for presuit review under section 766.106 seems largely unworkable....

...In this case, the statutory rights created in chapter 400 are not common law rights. Florida's policies favoring access to courts, however, weigh against interpreting the presuit conditions in chapter 766 to regulate statutory rights not mentioned in chapter 766. Nothing in section 766.106 compels this court to read that statute in an expansive manner to include claims filed under section 400.022(1)( l )....

...ur analysis. Accordingly, we certify the *1112 following question of great public importance: IF A PLAINTIFF FILES A LAWSUIT SEEKING TO ENFORCE ONLY THOSE RIGHTS ENUMERATED IN SECTION 400.022, MUST THE PLAINTIFF COMPLY WITH THE PRESUIT CONDITIONS IN SECTION 766.106? The trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law....

...Pergrem's theory was that Horan was negligent for having failed to perform diagnostic tests and studies to confirm her diagnosis of diverticulitis, and that he failed to order appropriate consultations. She notified Horan of her intent to sue pursuant to the requirements of section 766.106(2)....

...for medical malpractice, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant.... The notice was dated December 9, 1993, and was received on December 13, 1993. Horan rejected Pergrem's claim by a letter dated March 9, 1994, received by Pergrem on March 10, 1994. Section 766.106(3)(a) provides that no suit can be filed for a period of ninety days after the notice of intent is mailed, while the investigation required by the statute is proceeding. At or before the end of the ninety day period, the claimed-against party, or its insurer, must reject the claim, make a settlement offer, or admit liability and offer to arbitrate damages. [3] The rejection letter in this case was timely. Section 766.106(4) further provides that during the ninety day settlement investigation period, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants....

...the ninety days and sixty days fall within it, the claimant must file suit before the statute of limitations runs. In this case, Pergrem would have faced the close of the two year statute of limitations on October 7, 1994. She had no extension under section 766.106(4) since the ninety day period plus the sixty day period ended in May of 1994, well before the expiration of the statute of limitations....

...to file suit: October 7, 1994 plus 90 days = January 1995. Since her complaint was filed November 2, 1994, her lawsuit against Horan was timely. REVERSED. HARRIS and ANTOON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 95.11, Fla.Stat. (1991). [2] §§ 766.104(2) and 766.106(4), Fla.Stat. (1991). [3] § 766.106(3)(b), Fla.Stat....

...Although we deny the motion for rehearing, we withdraw our per curiam affirmance and substitute the following opinion. The McPhersons appeal a final judgment entered after a defense verdict in a medical malpractice action. We address three issues in this opinion: (1) the trial court's rulings under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2002); (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the McPhersons' motions for mistrial and for new trial due to an improper closing argument; and (3) whether the trial court erred in granting the defense motion to tax costs, which was filed three months after the final judgment....

...Phillips failed to comply with the presuit screening requirements of Chapter 766, "the only appropriate sanction" was to strike his pleadings. However, the law does not support such an automatic, draconian response to every Chapter 766 noncompliance. Section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2002) provides the statutory framework for the presuit process in medical malpractice cases. After completing the presuit investigation, but before filing suit, a claimant must notify each prospective defendant, by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation. See § 766.106(2)(a). No suit may be filed for a period of ninety days; during this period, the prospective defendant's insurer "shall conduct a review ... to determine the liability of the defendant." § 766.106(3)(a)....

...No such review was conducted here. At or before the end of the ninety days, the insurer "shall provide the claimant with a response," either rejecting the claim, making a settlement offer, or making an offer of admission of liability and for arbitration on the issue of damages. § 766.106(3)(b)1.-3....

...Phillips did not comply with the portion of the statute which states that, "[u]pon receipt by a prospective defendant of a notice of claim, the parties shall make discoverable information available without formal discovery. Failure to do so is grounds for dismissal of claims or defenses ultimately asserted." § 766.106(6)(a)....

...it requirements is an extraordinary sanction justified only in extreme situations. The language of the statute demonstrates the discretion and flexibility accorded to a trial judge in fashioning a remedy for failing to comply with Chapter 766. While section 766.106(3) imposes mandatory obligations upon a defendant, it also states that, "[ u ]nreasonable failure of any party to comply with this section justifies dismissal of claims or defenses." § 766.106(3)(a)4....

...loyees and third persons. Petitioners did not allege any medical malpractice claim against the hospital. The hospital moved to dismiss the complaint based on petitioners' failure to comply with the presuit notice and screening period requirements of section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...COBB, J., concurs specially with opinion. COBB, Judge, concurring specially. I would deny the petition for certiorari review because the ruling of the trial judge was correct in requiring compliance by the plaintiffs with the notice requirements of section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...In April 2007, appellee Donna Shield went to appellant Dr. Roger Gordon, a surgeon at Strax Rejuvenation, for an abdominoplasty and lipectomy. By July 2008, Shield sent Gordon and Strax a notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice, pursuant to section 766.106. In September 2008, Gordon and Strax requested from Shield information relating to her claim pursuant to section 766.106 as well as a request for production pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650....

...Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So.2d 961, 969-70 (Fla.2000). For example, the statute requires that prior to filing a claim for medical negligence, a claimant must notify the prospective defendants of her intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice. § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. During the presuit investigation period, the claimant may not file suit; however, both parties "shall make discoverable information available without formal discovery." § 766.106(6)(a), Fla....

...About five months after defendants denied the claim, and before the statute of limitations had run, plaintiff sent defendants a second notice of intent accompanied by the affidavit of a neurosurgeon. Shortly after that, plaintiff gave the unsworn statement contemplated by section 766.106(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...We reverse because we conclude that at the time Wilkinson withheld information she was under no statutory duty to engage in presuit discovery. In 1988, the Florida Legislature adopted sections 766.201 through 766.212, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), and strengthened section 766.106....

...As a component of this presuit investigation, the claimant must obtain an expert medical opinion corroborating such injury. § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (1991). The claimant must then notify the prospective defendant, by certified mail, of the intent to initiate litigation. § 766.106(2). The defendant has 90 days from this notice to determine if there are reasonable grounds to believe the claimant was not injured by the defendant's negligence. § 766.106(3). During this period, the parties are required to cooperate in "informal" discovery. § 766.205. The claimant is allowed to file a lawsuit only after the 90 days has expired or after the defendant has denied the claim. § 766.106(3)....

...We conclude a claimant is not obligated to engage in informal discovery before the "notice of intention to initiate medical malpractice litigation" is mailed. Likewise, a prospective defendant is under no statutory obligation to investigate a claim before receiving that notice. § 766.106(3)(a)....

...discovery requirements and remand for further proceedings. Wilkinson raised one other issue in this appeal which we affirm without discussion. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 766.106 was formerly section 768.57, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...y with the medical malpractice presuit requirements. The Second District disagreed, holding: [A] plaintiff who chooses to allege only a statutory claim under section 400.022 ... is not required to comply with the presuit requirements of section *494 766.106.......

...ights created by chapter 400. Id. at 1109. The court explained: Florida’s policies favoring access to courts ... weigh against interpreting the presuit conditions in chapter 766 to regulate statutory rights not mentioned in chapter 766. Nothing in section 766.106 compels this court to read that statute in an expansive manner to include claims filed under section 400.022(l)(i)....

...ssential requirements of law when he found respondent's cause of action did not sound in medical malpractice, but instead in ordinary negligence, thus eliminating the necessity that respondent comply with the presuit requirements of chapter 766. See § 766.106(2), Fla....

...required to affect substantial justice. See Dobress v. North Shore University Hospital, 178 Misc.2d 205, 678 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (1998). Petition for Writ of Certiorari GRANTED; Order to Bifurcate QUASHED. PETERSON and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 766.106, Fla....

...LaRiviere, as personal representative (the estate), filed a medical malpractice suit against the district, Dr. Feldman, and Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS). The estate sent the notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation, required by section 766.106(2)(a), Florida Statutes, to the district's office....

...Former section 768.57(5) provided: No statement, discussion, written document, report, or other work product generated by the presuit screening process is discoverable or admissible in any civil action for any purpose by the opposing party. § 768.57(5), Fla. Stat. (1987) (now codified at § 766.106(5), Fla. Stat. (1989)). The present section 766.106(5) contains this same language, which is clear and unambiguous....

...Paul Jacobs of Weiss, Jacobs & Straus, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellants. Jeffrey Fulford and W. Lee King of Bobo, Spicer, Ciotoli, Fulford & Bocchino, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellees. DELL, Judge. The trial court, in a medical malpractice action, concluded appellants failed to comply with section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1988), and entered a summary final judgment in favor of appellees....

...Zacker claims he should have known of his "injury." In the alternative, appellants argue the trial court erred when it concluded as a matter of law that the mailing of the July 25, 1990 notice of intent to initiate litigation did not satisfy the requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1988). We affirm the trial court's determination that the statute of limitations began to run on August 13, 1988. Univ. of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1991). We reverse the trial court's determination that appellants failed to comply with section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1988). In Boyd v. Becker, 603 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), this court held, "Under these provisions [section 766.106(3)(a) and rule 1.650(d)(2), (3)(A)] the ninety day tolling of the limitations period occurs from the date the notice of intent was mailed." Id. at 1373. This court acknowledged conflict with Barron v. Crenshaw, 573 So.2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), in which the Fifth District stated: [T]he ninety-day period within which the response to a notice of claim is to be made under section 766.106 begins on the day after a notice of claim is received. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). Based upon Boyd, appellants satisfied the requirements of section 766.106 when they mailed the notice of intent to initiate litigation before the expiration of the statute of limitations....

...PETERSON, Judge. The narrow issue presented in this petition for writ of certiorari is the precise calculation of the ninety-day time period within which a prospective defendant or insurer may respond to a notice of claim for medical malpractice under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...tion to dismiss respondents' complaint for medical malpractice. We have jurisdiction pursuant to rule *18 9.130(a)(3)(C)(v), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, since the non-final order determined that Barron was not entitled to arbitration under section 766.106(3)(b)(3), Florida Statutes....

...enial of the motion to dismiss. The Crenshaws mailed their notice of claim on December 12, 1989, and it was received by Barron the following day. On March 13, 1990, Barron mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, a response as required by section 766.106(3)(b) and (c) in which was included an offer of admission of liability and a request for arbitration on the issue of damages....

...as an exhibit to the complaint. It is the order denying petitioner's motions that prompted him to apply for certiorari or prohibition. The narrow issue before the court has not been the subject of a previous reported case, and there is no doubt that section 766.106 gives mixed signals as to the precise calculation of time periods contemplated by the legislative drafters. For example: (1) Section 766.106(3)(a) provides that no suit may be filed for a period of ninety days after notice of the claim is mailed and that during the 90-day period the prospective defendant's insurer or self-insurer shall conduct a review to determine liability. (2) Section 766.106(3)(b) requires that at or before the end of the ninety days the insurer or self-insurer shall provide the claimant with a response to the notice of claim. (3) Section 766.106(3)(c) requires the prospective defendant or insurer or self-insurer to reply by certified mail to the notice within ninety days after receipt of the notice of claim....

...Both of these dates are independently ascertainable by all of the parties. We, therefore, interpret the words "provide" in paragraph (b) and "reply" in paragraph (c) to mean the date of mailing by certified mail, and that the ninety-day period within which the response to a notice of claim is to be made under section 766.106 begins on the day after a notice of claim is received....

...all run until the end of the next day which is *19 neither a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. The petitioner made the argument that rule 1.090(a) and (e), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, should be applicable to the computation of time under section 766.106, but we reject that suggestion....

...Rule 1.090(e) allows the addition of five days to a prescribed period of time that begins when a "notice" or "paper" is served by mail. Rule 1.080(b) prescribes that service is complete upon mailing. The ninety-day period for mailing a response under section 766.106(3)(c) does not begin until after receipt of the notice of claim....

...Steele, M.D., P.A., seek a writ of certiorari to overturn a nonfinal order denying their motion to dismiss a medical malpractice action by respondent, Cecil L. Davis, Jr., as guardian ad litem for the alleged malpractice victim, Anna Nicole Carlson, a minor, for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes. Steele argues that the notice letter which was provided to comply with section 766.106 advised him only of a claim by Pamela Carlson, the mother of Anna Carlson, and that, since a separate notice was not provided on behalf of the child as an individual claimant prior to the running of the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint on her behalf should be dismissed....

...Rosa Gonzalez Mieles appeals an order granting South Miami Hospital's motion to dismiss her medical malpractice complaint. We reverse. Prior to filing her malpractice claim against South Miami Hospital, Mieles served her Notice of Intent upon the hospital as required by section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...es the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. (citation omitted). Discussion Defendants argue that Count II fails because Plaintiff fails to meet the pre-suit notice requirements for medical negligence claims under Fla. Stat. § 766.106 (2009) and that Counts III and IV fail because the underlying wrong in a negligent supervision and negligent training claim must be based on an injury resulting from a common law tort. Defendants are correct. I Defendants argue that Plaintiff's negligent supervision claim in Count II should be dismissed for failure to comply with the pre-suit requirements under Fla. Stat. § 766.106. This statute requires notice ninety days prior to filing claims for "medical malpractice" or "medical negligence" or any claims "arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." See Fla. Stat. § 766.106(1)-(3). *1331 Defendants argue that Plaintiff's negligent supervision claim is subject to the pre-suit notice requirements under Fla. Stat. § 766.106 because it arises out of the rendering of medical services. Courts have consistently held that similar claims arising from lab tests and blood-related procedures are subject to the pre-suit requirements under Fla. Stat. § 766.106....

...v. Fotea, 937 So.2d 146, 147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that claim for improper commitment under the Baker Act resulting from erroneous blood and urine tests "clearly ar[ose] out of the rendering of medical services" and was subject to Fla. Stat. § 766.106); Lifesouth Cmty. Blood Ctrs., Inc. v. Fitchner, 970 So.2d 379, 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that claim for negligent screening of donor blood arose from the rendering of a medical service and was subject to Fla. Stat. § 766.106)....

...ood sample, Ilana suffered significant bruising on her arm." These allegations are necessary to and inextricably intertwined with Plaintiff's negligent supervision claim, which is, therefore, subject to the pre-suit notice requirements of Fla. Stat. § 766.106....

...These are not common law causes of action"). In the alternative, even if Plaintiff was correct that, as alleged, the underlying injury resulted from the common law tort of negligent taking of a blood sample, these claims would fail for lack of notice under Fla. Stat. § 766.106 as with the negligent supervision claim in Count II....

...e incidents of medical malpractice within a sixty-month period, §§ 458.3311; 459.0151; 461.0131, Fla. Stat. (2007), requires healthcare facilities to implement patient safety plans, id. § 395.1012, modifies pre-suit notification requirements, id. § 766.106, and requires mediation for malpractice cases, id....

...The taking of unsworn statements of minors is subject to the provisions of rule 1.310(b)(8). The taking of unsworn statements is subject to the provisions of rule 1.310(d) and may be terminated for abuses. If abuses occur, the abuses shall be evidence of failure of that party to comply with the good faith requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...rved in the certificate of service. Failure of a party to comply with the above time limits shall not relieve that party of its obligation under the statute but shall be evidence of failure of that party to comply with the good faith requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...nce coverage available, rather than on the medical condition of their patients. The trial court concluded that the presuit notice provisions of chapter 766 applied and dismissed the action. We affirm. Presuit notices of intent to sue are required by section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1995). Section 766.106(2) states in part that: "After completion of presuit investigations pursuant to s....

...Siegler, 273 A.D. 817, 76 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1948) (consent to surgery obtained by fraud invalid; surgery so performed constitutes assault on patient). But the legislature has used different locutions in prescribing the applicability of these statutes. [3] Unlike section 766.106, which applies to all claims arising out of the rendering of medical care or services, section 766.203 applies to actions for damages based on death or personal injury resulting from medical negligence....

...Yet, obviously, the current action has nothing to do with death or personal injury. Rather plaintiffs simply allege that medical services were rendered as part of a scheme to collect more than the medical condition required. A literal reading of the statutory text seems to suggest that section 766.106 requires presuit notice but that section 766.203 does not apply to require presuit screening. Because this is manifestly absurd given the internal structure and logic of the medical malpractice law, we conclude that both statutes must apply. Moreover, section 766.106(2) rather clearly states that the notice shall be given "[a]fter completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s....

...ees' failing to follow a medical standard of treatment. Therefore, no purpose is served by conducting pre-suit investigations and screening procedures. Not every wrongful act by a medical professional constitutes malpractice requiring application of section 766.106, Palm Springs Gen....

...tration apply only to death or personal injury resulting from the negligence of a health care provider, § 766.107. Therefore, considering the allegations most favorably to Plaintiffs, it was error to enter a judgment on the pleadings. NOTES [1] See § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...The petitioner, Naomi Blom, seeks cer-tiorari relief with respect to two orders abating her claims against an individual physician, Dr. Lonsdorfer, and a hospital, Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., because of her failure to comply with the medical malpractice pre-suit requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...alled twice leaving messages to that effect. On August 3, 2001, Wishnov's counsel sent a certified letter denying the claim for failure to comply with presuit discovery requirements. On August 7, 2001, one day after the ninety day period provided by section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2000) expired, and the statute of limitations had run, plaintiff's counsel provided the information requested, with a cover letter acknowledging it was late....

...(2008). On November 3, 2008, the plaintiffs mailed a notice of intent to initiate litigation to Dr. Fahel, attaching the corroborating medical affidavit of Mark Khilnani, M.D., a board certified emergency physician, which was dated October 31, 2008. § 766.106(2), Fla....

...Khilnani executed the affidavit, he contacted the plaintiffs’ counsel in an attempt to withdraw his affidavit because he felt he was not qualified to act as an expert witness. During the ninety-day period in which Dr. Fahel had to respond to the plaintiffs’ notice of intent to initiate litigation, see § 766.106(3), .203(3), Fla....

...Reform Act and thus she was not required to comply with the notice requirements of the Act. Chapter 766 governs standards for recovery in medical malpractice actions and provides for certain notice requirements to health care providers. For example, section 766.106 provides for notice before filing an action and a pre-suit screening period. This section applies to any "claim for medical malpractice" which is defined as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). Compliance with this statute is a condition precedent to maintaining a suit against a health care provider. NME Hospitals, Inc. v. Azzariti, 573 So.2d 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Although it defines a claim for medical malpractice, section 766.106 does not define a "health care provider." In NME Properties, Inc....

...[3] Thus, Suzanne was not required to meet the statutory notice requirements of the Act and the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint for failure to do so. REVERSED and REMANDED. HARRIS and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 768.40(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985); § 766.106, Fla....

...The appellee contends that it began to run on March 21, 1990, when the appellant first began to believe the medical staff was improperly treating his injury. On June 26, 1992, appellant's notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation was served as required by section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1991), and section 768.28(7), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ERVIN and JOANOS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Additionally, under the presuit investigation requirement for medical negligence actions, a plaintiff's notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. § 766.106(4), Fla....

...rginia Insurance complied with the medical malpractice presuit screening requirements of sections 766.104 [1] and 766.203, [2] Florida Statutes (1997). On May 14, 1998, Virginia Insurance served an "intent to litigate" against Walker, as provided in section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...The circuit court granted Walker's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute of limitations in section 768.31(4)(d) had not been tolled during the time that Virginia Insurance was attempting to comply with the presuit screening procedure in section 766.106 and thus the complaint for contribution was not timely....

...4th DCA 1999). On appeal, the First District disagreed with the Fourth District's reasoning in Wendel, reversed the summary judgment, and certified conflict with the decision in Wendel. In Wendel, the Fourth District concluded that the plain language of section 766.106, which defines those claims subject to the presuit screening procedure, does not encompass claims for contribution....

...In Walt Disney, the Fourth District concluded that Disney World's claim for contribution against Memorial Hospital was subject to the medical malpractice mediation requirements. Id. at 599-600. In Wendel, however, the Fourth District concluded that section 766.106 "more narrowly defines those claims subject to presuit screening procedures than did its predecessor [statute which was at issue in Walt Disney ]." Wendel, 726 So.2d at 380....

...there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant. § 766.104(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Even after satisfying this prerequisite, a potential claimant must follow the procedures outlined in section 766.106, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), before filing a medical malpractice action. Section 766.106(2) requires notice to all prospective defendants *808 of the claimant's intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice; section 766.106(3) provides that the suit may not be filed for ninety days after this notice is mailed to the prospective defendants; and section 766.106(4) tolls the statute of limitations during this ninety-day period as to all potential defendants....

...In order to make this determination, we must first examine the legislative intent in enacting these provisions. Legislative intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 609 So.2d 1315, 1317 (Fla.1992). Section 766.106(1)(a), which outlines the presuit procedures for medical malpractice actions, defines a claim for medical malpractice as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." Section 768.31(2)(...

...ation); Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 387 So.2d 932 (Fla.1980) (involving an action for contribution by a vehicle passenger against the driver and his insurer). Likewise, the phrase "claim for medical malpractice" in section 766.106(1)(a) necessarily includes contribution claims based on medical malpractice because such a contribution claim would "aris[e] out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care." Moreover, in order to properly proceed unde...

...ence claims."). Thus, the legislative intent of both statutes is to avoid lengthy litigation of claims and the associated costs of such litigation. See, e.g., Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 280 (Fla.1996) (explaining that the notice requirement in section 766.106(2) "established a process intended to promote the settlement of meritorious claims at an early stage without the necessity of a full adversarial proceeding")....

...ms and applies to " all medical negligence ... claims and defenses." § 766.203(1), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added). This statute further provides that prior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to section 766.106, a claimant must "conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe" that the defendant was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant and that this negligence resulted in injury to the claimant....

...894, 557 N.E.2d at 877 (concluding that medical malpractice statute of repose governs actions for contribution for injuries arising out of patient care because the suit for contribution "exposes insurance companies to the same liability as if the patient [had] brought a direct action against the insured"). As provided in section 766.106(3)(a), a medical malpractice claimant may not file suit for a period of ninety days after notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed to the prospective defendants. During this time period, the insurer must conduct a review to determine the liability of the defendant. § 766.106(3)(a). By the end of this ninety-day period, if not before, the insurer must either reject the claim, make a settlement offer, or make an offer to admit liability and submit to arbitration on the issue of damages. § 766.106(3)(b)....

...ied preliminary to a determination of liability. Where there has been a determination of liability on the professional negligence claim, an action for contribution is not properly deemed to be within the statutory definitions of sections 766.104 and 766.106." Id....

...(b) Rights of action involving the state or its agencies or subdivisions, or the officers, employees, or agents thereof, pursuant to s. 768.28 and defenses thereto. (2) Prior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to s. 766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) Any named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant. . . . . (3) Prior to issuing its response to the claimant's notice of intent to initiate litigation, during the time period for response authorized pursuant to s. 766.106, the defendant or the defendant's insurer or self-insurer shall conduct an investigation to ascertain whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) The defendant was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant. [3] As provided in section 766.106(2), after the presuit investigation required by section 766.203 is complete a claimant must notify each prospective defendant, and the Department of Health if any prospective defendant is a licensed health care provider, of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice. [4] Section 766.106(4) further provides that this ninety-day period may be extended by stipulation of the parties and that the statute of limitations is tolled during any such extension....

...elf but is consistent with other presuit notice statutes. In particular, in statutes in which notice of intent to sue must be given by mail, it is the mailing of the notice—not the receipt of the notice—that triggers the countdown. See, e.g., § 766.106(2)(a), (3)(a), Fla....

...ninety days the statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice action against the hospitals, clinics, and doctors involved in Samantha’s birth. See § 766.104(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). After filing their notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice, see § 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2013), the Garcias filed suit against those hospitals, clinics, and doctors in November 2013. The statute of limitations for medical malpractice is two years “from the time the incident giving rise to the a...

...The statutory limitation in this case relates only to the amount of damages recoverable by DeYoung. In no way does it limit DeYoung's right to proceed with this litigation. Petition for Writ of Certiorari DENIED. HARRIS, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 766.106(2), Fla....

...Plaintiff gave the required notice of intent of initiating a medical malpractice claim only to Dr. Lester and Cardiac Surgery Associates. When he filed this lawsuit, plaintiff sued Dr. Stadlan as well, and the trial court dismissed as to Dr. Stadlan because of the lack of presuit notice. We reverse. Section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes requires a medical malpractice claimant to notify defendants of claimant's intent to initiate litigation....

...No similar notice of intent was served on the blood bank. [2] It was not until June 18, 1996, over four years after plaintiffs had filed their lawsuit, that the blood bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on plaintiffs' noncompliance with section 766.106, the medical malpractice presuit requirements....

...at 1189 (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted). The blood bank argues that although the medical malpractice statute of limitations does not apply to actions against blood banks, plaintiffs nevertheless were bound to comply with the presuit requirements of chapter 766, including subsection 766.106(2)....

...ing under the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985 because they are not so defined under any of the chapter 766 definitions. To decide this question, our supreme court considered the definition of "health care providers." Although subsection 766.106(1)(a) defines a claim for medical malpractice, section 766.106 does not define a "health care provider." In fact, in NME Properties, Inc....

...Construing the Medical Malpractice Reform Act as requiring that presuit notice be given to a blood bank, as a condition precedent to maintaining an action arising from supplying contaminated blood, would be to engraft a requirement of presuit notice through section 766.106, with its extensive provisions for informal discovery and a 90day investigatory procedure for both plaintiffs and blood banks, even though the action does not involve treatment and care by the blood bank. The presuit notice can be sent only after plaintiff complies with the "reasonable investigation requirements of ss. 766.201-766.212." § 766.206(2); see also § 766.106(2)....

...he blood bank. In Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 589 So.2d 223 (Fla.1991), the defendant waited until trial to move to dismiss the plaintiff's failure to provide him with a presuit notice of intent to sue under section 768.57, which was renumbered in 1988 as section 766.106. See § 766.106, Fla.Stat....

...y the provisions of Chapter 766, as well as the statute of limitations found at § 95.11(4)(b). After, careful review of Florida law, we conclude that these questions are unanswered by controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida. Fla.Stat. § 766.106(l)(a) defines a “[cjlaim for medical malpractice” as “a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” In addition, § 766.202 defines a “claimant” as “any person who has a cause o...

...he two-year statute of limitations and their failure to provide a timely statutory presuit notice to HealthSpring. We reverse, concluding that (1) the Acostas’ claims against HealthSpring were not “claims for medical malpractice” as defined in section 766.106(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), and (2) even if the claims are characterized as a matter of law as claims for medical malpractice, the claims related back to the first amended complaint (which had a filing date within the applicable s...

...Defendants below appeal the trial court's order declining to hear their third motion for summary judgment. Each of the motions alleged, among other things, that the plaintiff in this medical malpractice action did not comply with the presuit notice requirements of section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650....

...Charles D. Bisogno in their medical malpractice suit. The trial judge granted Dr. Bisogno's motion for summary judgment based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. The quagmire in this case is created by alleged conflict between sections 766.106(3) and 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1991), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(d)(3)....

...[1] The effect of the notice was to start the presuit investigation phase. During this period of time, the law contemplates that the defendant and the defendant's insurer or self-insurer will conduct an investigation to determine liability and, if possible, to resolve the lawsuit short of litigation. Section 766.106(3)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (1991). Rights and obligations of the parties during this period of time are defined by statute. See § 766.106(3)(a)(d), Fla. Stat. (1991). The notice also tolls the statute of limitations for 90 *466 days as to all defendants. See § 766.106(4), Fla....

...The Masons filed their medical malpractice complaint on 27 June 1991. ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL At the hearing on Dr. Bisogno's motion for summary judgment, Dr. Bisogno's attorney argued that the period for filing the lawsuit expired on 24 June 1991. [3] Dr. Bisogno's attorney noted that section 766.106(3)(b) required he provide a response to the Masons' attorney at or before the end of the 90-day extended period. The lawyer argued that pursuant to section 766.106(4) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650, which the Florida Supreme Court passed to implement the two sections being discussed, the Masons had 60 days, or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever was greater, to file their lawsuit....

...Since the statute of limitations expired on the later date of 30 June 1991, their lawsuit was filed within the statute of limitations. The Masons' attorney also argued that there are two distinct methods to proceed under the presuit phase of Chapter 766. The first is the 90-day period under section 766.106(3)(b), and the other is the 90-day period under 766.106(4). He argued that they must be viewed and read separately and that the sections cannot be read together. Specifically, once the extension provision under section 766.106(4) is invoked by the parties, the provisions of 766.106(3)(b) do not, and can not, apply....

...The sole issue is whether sections of Chapter 766, sub judice, conflict. LAW The alleged conflict arises based upon two sections of Chapter 766 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650, the Medical Malpractice *467 Presuit Screening Rule. They are set out in pertinent part below. Section 766.106(3) reads: (b) At or before the end of the 90 days, the insurer or self-insurer shall provide the claimant with a response: 1....

...s attorney, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Failure of the prospective defendant or insurer or self-insurer to reply to the notice within 90 days after receipt shall be deemed a final rejection of the claim for purposes of this section. Section 766.106(4) reads: The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s....

...ailed, whichever is longer, after the earliest of the following: (C) Receipt by claimant of a written rejection of the claim. (D) The expiration of any extension of the 90-day presuit screening period stipulated to by the parties in accordance with [section 766.106(4)], Florida Statutes....

...Obviously, the supreme court can rewrite the rule to read that the latest, instead of the earliest, of several events will start the statute of limitations running, but this court cannot. See Boyd v. Becker, 603 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), quashed, Boyd, at 481. In conclusion, we hold that section 766.106(3) and (4) are to be read and applied together when there is an extension pursuant to section 766.106(4) and that a notice "rejecting the claim" and "terminating negotiations" are the same for the purpose of restarting the statute of limitations....

...Crenshaw, 573 So.2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Therefore, the time period actually expired on 25 June 1991, according to Dr. Bisogno's argument. Because 25 June 1991, was a weekday, and not a holiday, the statute of limitations was not extended. [4] But see, supra n. 3. [5] Section 766.106(3)(a), (c), Fla....

...ion 95.11(3)(a). While shortening the limitations period for medical malpractice claims, the legislature enacted provisions that toll or extend the limitations period. This case involves the interplay of three such provisions in sections 766.104 and 766.106, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Capps, 633 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1994). Section 766.104(2) allows a 90-day extension of the limitations period upon application to the clerk of court. (To avoid confusion, we will refer to this as the "purchased extension" because it is obtained simply by payment of a filing fee.) Section 766.106(3)(a) provides for a mandatory 90-day tolling of the limitations period after a notice of intent is mailed to a prospective defendant. And section 766.106(4) provides that upon notice that negotiations are terminated, [2] "a claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit." The interrelationship of...

...e month remaining in the regular limitations period. [4] Because there were fewer than 60 days remaining in the original limitations period, Coffaro argues that when she received the notices of termination she had 60 days in which to file suit under section 766.106(4), which requires suit to be filed within "60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater." As we understand the reverse argument, the healthcare providers argue that because Coffaro purchased the 90-day extension prior to sending the notices of intent, she had "extended" her limitations period by 90 days and necessarily had more than 60 days remaining when she received the notices of termination. If the 60 days provided in section 766.106(4) is a tolling period, there is no question that Coffaro is entitled to the 60 days in addition to the purchased extension because section 766.104(2) provides that the purchased 90-day extension is in addition to other tolling periods....

...n at any time before the statute of limitations has expired, and because the extension is in addition to other tolling periods, we conclude that the purchased extension under section 766.104(2) is not included when computing the time remaining under section 766.106(4) for filing suit....

...he following question to the Florida Supreme Court: IS A 90-DAY EXTENSION PURCHASED UNDER SECTION 766.104(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1995), INCLUDED IN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD WHEN CALCULATING WHETHER A PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL 60 DAYS UNDER SECTION 766.106(4) FOR FILING SUIT? Reversed and remanded for further proceedings; question certified....

...This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods. No court order is required for the extension to be effective. The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run. Section 766.106 provides in part: (3)(a) No suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice [of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice] is mailed to any prospective defendant.......

...der of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. [2] This occurs either when the 90-day tolling period expires without a response from the potential defendants, which is deemed a final rejection under section 766.106(3)(c), or when the claimant receives a notice of termination....

...constitutes a failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of chapter 766, Florida Statutes. Chapter 766 requires plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits to give notice to all prospective defendants of the intent to pursue litigation. See § 766.106(2), Fla....

defendants of the intent to pursue litigation. See § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). Certiorari review is indeed

...The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed appellant's complaint with prejudice. Appellant argues that he timely filed his complaint against appellees because he properly followed the medical negligence presuit process. He contends that section 766.106, Florida Statutes, tolled the one year limitation period for instituting his contribution action....

...ot file his complaint *380 until December 2, 1994. [1] Appellant argues that Walt Disney World Co. v. Memorial Hospital, 363 So.2d 598 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), applies to the presuit process in chapter 766, Florida Statutes. We disagree. The language in section 766.106, Florida Statutes, differs from section 768.44, Florida Statutes (1975), which was at issue in Walt Disney....

...Section 768.44 provided that "[a]ny person or his representative claiming damages by reason of injury, death, or monetary loss, on account of alleged malpractice ... shall submit a claim ..." Contribution claimants allege damages by reason of monetary loss on account of the malpractice of an alleged joint tortfeasor. Section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1993), more narrowly defines those claims subject to presuit screening procedures than did its predecessor, section 768.44, Florida Statutes (1975). "Claim for medical malpractice" means a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services. § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...Presuit investigation of medical negligence claims and defenses pursuant to this section and ss. 766.204-766.206 shall apply to all medical negligence, including dental negligence, claims and defenses.... § 766.203, Fla. Stat. We conclude that the plain language of section 766.106, Florida Statutes, does not encompass claims for contribution....

...Asif Mirza seeks a writ of certiorari quashing the trial court's order in a medical malpractice action. The order denied Dr. Mirza's motion for dismissal or summary judgment. Dr. Mirza argues that his motion should have been granted because respondents did not individually serve him with a notice of intent pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2004), and did not individually name him in their corroborating expert affidavit, filed pursuant to section 766.203(2), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...e defendant shall operate as notice to the person and any other prospective defendant who bears a legal relationship to the prospective defendant receiving the notice."). Therefore, by noticing ECHIS, plaintiffs met the presuit notice requirement of section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes, as to Dr....

...State, 436 So.2d 93, 95-96 (Fla.1983). NOTES [1] The statute requires the prospective plaintiff to serve the affidavit with his or her presuit notice. See § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). [1] When responding to initial requests for informal discovery pursuant to section 766.106 after the corroborating affidavit was filed, a pertinent part of Dr....

...physician group practice, Omni Healthcare, Inc. It is clear that what is alleged is a claim for medical malpractice. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss in the trial court based on Respondent’s failure to comply with the presuit requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...The allegations of the complaint, which must be taken as true, determine the facts. Id. "It is up to the court to decide from the allegations in the complaint whether the claim arises `out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.'" Id. (quoting § 766.106, Fla....

...that they did not need it. When our legislature intends to make a statutory provision a condition precedent, it explicitly says so and explains how and when. For example, in the notice before filing provision of our present medical malpractice law, section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1993), it is provided that after presuit investigation, and prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, a claimant must notify prospective defendants by certified mail, return receipt requested....

...(LifeSouth), raises several issues on appeal from a final judgment in favor of appellee, Kaynan Fitchner. We will address one which we find to be dispositive: Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss for appellee's failure to comply with the presuit notice requirements of section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes....

...e. The issue before us is one involving statutory interpretation. That issue is whether the Legislature intended that an action based on the alleged negligent screening of blood donors by a blood bank be subject to the presuit notice requirements of section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2003). Our review of the trial court's decision is de novo. Dep't of Children & Families v. P.S., 932 So.2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes, provides that, prior to filing a suit for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant....

...r, but the purpose of chapter 2003-416, as well as other amendments contained within this legislation. The Legislature changed the scope of chapter 766 from "medical malpractice" to "medical negligence," most notably in the amendments to subsections 766.106(1) and (2), Florida Statutes. 766.106....

...sor, should be treated as a professional.") (emphasis supplied). We, therefore, determine the trial court erred in failing to grant appellant's motion to dismiss for failure of the appellee to comply with the presuit notice requirements contained in section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes....

...We deny the motion for clarification, but we grant the motion for certification and reword the certification question proposed by appellee. We hereby certify the following question as being one of great public importance: DO THE PRESUIT NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 766.106(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY TO A BLOOD BANK THAT IS SUPPLYING BLOOD TO A PATIENT? BROWNING, C.J....

...The parties agree and recognize that the provisions of Florida Statutes, Chapter 766, governing medical malpractice claims shall apply to the parties and/or elaimant(s) in all respects except that at the conclusion of the pre-suit screening period and provided there is no mutual agreement to arbitrate under Florida Statutes, 766.106 or 766.207, the parties and/or claimant(s) shall resolve any claim through arbitration pursuant to this Agreement....

...The agreement at issue incorporates the statutory provisions with a section recognizing that “Florida Statutes, Chapter 766, governing medical malpractice claims shall apply to the parties” in all aspects except that if there is no mutual agreement to arbitrate under sections 766.106 or 766.207 at the conclusion of the pre-suit screening period, the parties will resolve any claim through the terms of the agreement....

...The agreement does not specify whether this provision applies to demands for arbitration under Florida Statutes. Therefore, patients subject to this agreement but seeking arbitration under the statutes would have to secure the “mutual agreement to arbitrate under Florida Statutes, 766.106 or 766.207” within this twenty-day window in order to escape the unfavorable terms....

...CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. .§ 766.207(2), Fla. Stat. (1999) ("Upon the completion of the presuit investigation with preliminary reasonable grounds for a medical negligence claim intact, the parties may elect to have damages determined by an arbitration panel"); § 766.106(3)(b), Fla....

...This issue, however, is one which must be addressed by our legislature. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing appellants' complaint. AFFIRMED. DOWNEY and GUNTHER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 768.57 has been renumbered and is now section 766.106, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...in allegations of ordinary negligence. We have certiorari jurisdiction and conclude that because the claim arises from the services and care Shands was giving to a patient in a locked psychiatric unit, the complaint alleges medical negligence under section 766.106(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...nial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, presents an issue of law.” Rhodin, 40 So.3d at 116 ; *330 Dirga v. Butler, 39 So.3d 388, 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (reviewing de novo whether defendants were entitled to presuit notice under chapter 766). Section 766.106(1)(a) defines a “ ‘[c]laim for medical negligence’ or ‘claim for medical malpractice’ [as] a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” The task for the courts is to “dec...

...e to Ms. Lawson for some two and a half months before she, “[a]s a direct and proximate cause of [Shands’] breach of its duty, ... impulsively eloped.” Despite the Estate’s disavowals of medical negligence, we agree with Shands because under § 766.106(l)(a), the harm alleged in the Complaint arose from Shands’ duty (and failure) to confine Ms....

...Because the breach arose from Shands’ provision, and ultimate failure, to keep Ms. Lawson confined within its locked unit, and was the service that Ms. Lawson’s condition allegedly required, we conclude that the Estate’s claim arises out of the medical care, treatment, and services provided to her for purposes of § 766.106(l)(a)....

comply with the spirit or law embodied by Florida Statute 766.106.... Specifically, these defendants claim

...equirements. Section 766.205, Florida Statutes (2001), provides: (1) Upon the completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s. 766.203, which investigation has resulted in the mailing of a notice of intent to initiate litigation in accordance with s. 766.106, corroborated by medical expert opinion that there exist reasonable grounds for a claim of negligent injury, each party shall provide to the other party reasonable access to information within its possession or control in order to facilitate evaluation of the claim. (2) Such access shall be provided without formal discovery, pursuant to s. 766.106, and failure to so provide shall be grounds for dismissal of any applicable claim or defense ultimately asserted. Section 766.106(3)(a) provides that no medical malpractice action may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice is mailed to any prospective defendant....

...rest and died on July 2, 1998. The Expiration Summary listed Dr. Campitelli as her physician. Nowhere does it list Dr. David Simon. Believing medical malpractice occurred during Virginia's care and treatment, Lee commenced pre-suit proceedings under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1998), by filing a notice of intent to initiate suit against various physicians associated with Virginia's care, including Dr....

...ed by the same person, Russell Galbut, have the same registered agent, and have the same registered principal place of business. The Respondent asserted that pre-suit notice pursuant to section 400.0233(2) of the nursing home statute is analogous to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes, the medical malpractice pre-suit notice provision, and therefore, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650, which specifies that medical malpractice pre-suit notice to any prospective defendant operates as notice to...

...reted the pre-suit notice requirements of chapter 400 of the Florida Statutes. We must, therefore, determine whether pre-suit notice to a prospective defendant pursuant to section 400.0233(2), the nursing home statute, should be treated similarly to section 766.106(2), the medical malpractice pre-suit notice statute, which according to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650, shall operate as notice to any other prospective defendant who bears a legal relationship to the prospective defendant receiving notice. The medical malpractice pre-suit notice requirement, found in section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2004), specifies that: [P]rior to filing a complaint for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence. § 766.106(2), Fla....

...t defendant and any other prospective defendant who bears a legal relationship to the prospective defendant receiving the notice. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650 states: (a) Scope of Rule. This rule applies only to the procedures prescribed by section 766.106, Florida Statutes, for presuit screening of claims for medical malpractice....

...and defenses and encouraging the early determination and prompt resolution of claims." Univ. of Miami v. Wilson, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D1682, ___ So.2d ___, 2006 WL 1687685 (Fla. 3d DCA June 21, 2006); see also Kukral, 679 So.2d at 280 (specifying that section 766.106(2) "was intended to address a legitimate legislative policy decision relating to medical malpractice and established a process intended to promote the settlement of meritorious claims at an early stage without the necessity of a full adversarial proceeding")....

...e-suit conditions in Fla. Stat. § 400.0233(2) . . . appears to be a desire for a reasonable investigation giving rise to a good-faith belief that grounds exist for the claim so as to avoid frivolous lawsuits. . . . "). Both sections 400.0233(2) and 766.106(2), Florida Statutes, are worded substantially the same....

...t shall notify each prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of an asserted violation of a resident's rights provided in s. 400.022 or deviation from the standard of care. § 400.0233(2), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). Section 766.106(2) states that: [P]rior to filing a complaint for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence. § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). Because both section 400.0233(2), the nursing home pre-suit notice provision, and section 766.106(2), the medical malpractice pre-suit notice provision, (1) are worded substantially the same; (2) have the same purpose and policy considerations, to allow pre-suit screening so as to avoid frivolous lawsuits and to promote pre-suit s...

...Section 627.4147(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2002), required the policies to include: a clause authorizing the insurer or self-insurer to determine, to make, and to conclude, without the permission of the insured, any offer of admission of liability and for arbitration pursuant to s. 766.106, settlement offer, or offer of judgment, if the offer is within the policy *1152 limits. It is against public policy for any insurance or self-insurance policy to contain a clause giving the insured the exclusive right to veto any offer for admission of liability and for arbitration made pursuant to s. 766.106, settlement offer, or offer of judgment, when such offer is within the policy limits....

...4th DCA 2007), this court explained: Rogers [, a medical doctor,] filed suit against his insurance company, claiming that it had failed to exercise good faith in its conduct of the presuit investigation and settlement. He alleged violations of both the presuit investigation procedure pursuant to section 766.106 and violation of the duty of good faith settlement in the best interests of the insured under section 627.4147....

...hospital nursing staff and staff doctors, most of the latter of whom are co- defendants alongside Dr. Nieves in this lawsuit. On April 25, 2011, Mr. Viera sent Dr. Nieves a notice of intent to initiate a medical malpractice action against him pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2011)....

...768.18 and 768.21 (1990), applicable to causes of action accruing after October 1, 1990, expand eligible survivor claimants in wrongful death actions by surviving parents and children, but are not applicable to claims for medical malpractice as defined by F.S. 766.106(1) (1989)....

...Fort Walton Beach Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Dingler, 697 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). By Florida’s presuit requirements, a potential plaintiff first must serve on a potential defendant notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence. § 766.106(2)(a), Fla....

...t. Rhodes' medical malpractice complaint alleged that Dr. Riggenbach was negligent *553 in performing this surgery, which resulted in the need for additional surgery and treatment, and ultimately caused permanent injury to Rhodes' wrist. Pursuant to section 766.106(4), Rhodes served Petitioners with a presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence....

...medical malpractice’ is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care.”); § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...a ‘provider of health care.’”); Joseph v. Univ. Behav. LLC, 71 So. 3d 913, 917 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (“The test for determining whether a defendant is 2 entitled to the benefit of the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106 is whether a defendant is liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1).” (internal citations omitted)); Univ....

...The Complaint alleges that while Fotea was at Mt. Sinai awaiting a CT scan prescribed by his chiropractor, he was approached by a lab tech for blood and urine samples. Fotea alleges that because the lab results indicated high levels of alcohol and illegal drugs, Mount Sinai Baker Acted Fotea. Section 766.106, Florida Statutes, requires that a plaintiff, claiming medical negligence or medical malpractice, give notice to prospective defendants of the intent to initiate litigation prior to filing suit. § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). This notice requirement then triggers preliminary discovery and investigation. § 766.106(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 766.106(1), Florida Statutes,' defines “medical negligence” and “medical malpractice” as a claim “arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(1), Fla....

...[2] Sanctions, as we use the term, do not include imposition of attorney's fees, which the Fourth District in Nolan v. Turner, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1468, 737 So.2d 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), correctly held were not permitted for failure to comply with section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...re or by the personal representative of the person who received the negligent medical care. The University alleges that this requirement was not met in the instant case *776 because Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon were not "claimants" pursuant to sections 766.106(2) and 766.202(1) of Florida's Medical Malpractice Act ("Act"), and had not been appointed as personal representatives at the time they served their notice....

...The question we must answer in this petition is whether, as a matter of law, a medical malpractice presuit notice is invalid when it is served by persons who were not personal representatives when the notice was served, but are subsequently appointed. The medical malpractice presuit notice requirement is found in section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides, in pertinent part: prior to filing a claim for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice....

...Salmon, the decedent's surviving daughters, noticed the University regarding their intent to pursue a wrongful death medical malpractice claim against it for the death of their mother, by sending the University a Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation, as required pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...4th DCA 1998); Fort Walton Beach Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Dingler, 697 So.2d 575, 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Chandler v. Novak, 596 So.2d 749, 750 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). The University argues that, because the legislative purpose of the Act is to promote presuit settlement, we must interpret section 766.106(2) to require that the notice of intent to initiate litigation be served by a person who had already been appointed as a personal representative because only a personal representative has the power to settle an action for wrongful death....

...The University argues that, because Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon were not personal representatives at the time they served the notice, the University could not settle the claim with them. Both the Florida Supreme Court and this court have held that when interpreting section 766.106(2) regarding presuit notice, we must not unduly restrict the access to the courts guaranteed by the Florida constitution in carrying out the legislative purpose of the Act....

...Kukral, 679 So.2d at 284; see also Patry, 633 So.2d at 13 ("[W]hen possible, the pre-suit notice and screening statute should be construed in a manner that favors access to courts."); Garay v. Colony Springs Med. Ctr., Inc., 731 So.2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)(declining to adopt a hyper-technical view of section 766.106, which would impermissibly infringe upon the constitutional right of access to the courts)....

...daughters apparently elected *781 to delay the performance of this most routine of probate procedures for reasons of their own, the majority nevertheless redeems them from any legal consequence of their decision on the ground that when interpreting section 766.106(2) ....

...We, therefore, deny the petition for writ of certiorari. Petition denied. WELLS and ROTHENBERG, JJ., concur. SHEPHERD, J., dissenting. Respectfully, I would grant the petition in this case and quash the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss. As the majority correctly states, section 766.106(2) of Florida's Medical Malpractice Act (the Act) requires: [P]rior to filing of a claim for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice. ง 766.106(2), Fla....

...s nothing in the Notice to suggest these individuals were at the time personal representatives of the estate of Ms. Salmon-Graham or seeking to become so. On February 6, 2004, after the pre-suit investigation period under the Act had passed, see ง 766.106(3)(a), Fla....

...faith belief there has been negligence. Id. *784 Once the claimant's investigation is complete, the Act requires the claimant serve all potential defendants with a Notice of Intent to initiate litigation corroborated by a medical expert opinion. ง 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. The defendants then have ninety days to conduct their own pre-suit investigation. ง 766.106(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). During this ninety-day period, the claimant may not file suit. ง 766.106(3)(a), Fla. Stat. When the defendants' evaluation is completed, they have four options: (1) reject the claim; (2) make an offer of settlement; (3) admit liability and submit to arbitration on damages; or (4) give no response. งง 766.106(3)(b), 766.203(3), Fla....

...ding a monetary cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice claims when a claimant seeks an early resolution and prompt payment through arbitration). [5] The pre-suit investigation period can be extended "upon stipulation of the parties." ง 766.106(4), Fla....

...investigation requirements of section 766.203(2), Florida Statutes (2021). Section 766.203(2) requires: Presuit investigation by claimant.--Prior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical negligence litigation pursuant to s. 766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) Any named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b...

...Riggenbach, an orthopedic surgeon, for medical negligence after he suffered permanent damage following wrist surgery. 267 So. 3d at 552-53. Instead of providing a written expert report from an orthopedic surgeon with his presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation under section 766.106(4), the plaintiff submitted a report from a board certified plastic surgeon and otolaryngologist....

...Petitioners assert irreparable harm by the trial court’s departure from the essential requirements of law in denying their motion to dismiss for Respondents’ failure to comply with the presuit requirements for medical malpractice actions contained within section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2015)....

...ver the parking bumper, at which point the Plaintiff was caused to trip and fall over the parking bumper causing severe and permanent injuries. Petitioners moved to dismiss, asserting Respondents’ failure to comply with the presuit requirements of section 766.106 applicable to medical malpractice actions....

...After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion without explaining its reasoning, resulting in this petition. Our review is de novo. Riverwalk at Sunrise Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Biscayne Painting Corp., 199 So.3d 348, 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Appellate Analysis Section 766.106 establishes the pre-suit notice requirements for complaints alleging claims for medical malpractice. Compliance with the statute is a condition precedent to filing the action, and failure to comply can be grounds for dismissal, Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla. 1996); Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg, 571 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1990). 3 Section 766.106(l)(a) defines a claim for medical negligence or medical malpractice as “a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” As we explained in Buck v....

...This case demonstrates the importance of pleading causes of action properly. . "Jane Doe" described in the complaint was subsequently-identified in the proceedings as Petitioner Julia Reyes. . In Lindberg , our supreme court interpreted section 768,57, Florida Statutes, which was renumbered in 1988 as section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...Thompson and Urology Associates of North Central Florida, on the basis that the statute of limitations had expired in this medical malpractice suit. We agree with the Porumbescus that the trial court failed to account for the ninety-day tolling period under section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods. § 766.104(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). The extension is to be tacked on to the end of the limitations period and does not run simultaneously with the separate ninety-day tolling period provided in section 766.106(4)....

...In a letter to the parties, the court stated "since Plaintiff filed a motion to extend the statute of limitations, the latest date that suit could be filed in this cause was March 15, 2000. Since this cause was filed after that date the statute of limitations bars this action." III. Section 766.106(4) The second extension, which was not accounted for by the trial court, comes from section 766.106(4), which creates a tolling period following a notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation. Section 766.106 requires such a notice before filing a claim, and creates a 90-day tolling period during which the defendants must investigate and respond with either a denial, an offer for settlement, or an admission of liability with an offer to arbitrate damages. See § 766.106(3) Fla. Stat. (1999). Section 766.106(4) provides: [D]uring the 90-day period, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants....

...led during any such extension. Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. § 766.106(4), Fla. Stat. (1999). The trial court's order granting summary judgment and its correspondence with the parties make no mention of section 766.106. According to the trial court's March 15, 2000 deadline, the complaint was filed nine days late (on March 24, 2000). By adding this additional 90-day period to the deadline from section 766.106(4), their complaint falls within the statute of limitations. IV. Conclusion We hold that the trial court erred by not providing the Porumbescus with the 90-day tolling period following their notice of intent under section 766.106(4) in addition to the automatic 90-day extension petitioned for under section 766.104(2)....

...We reverse the trial court’s dismissal order because the allegations in Simmons’s amended complaint do not establish, as a matter of law, that Simmons’s lawsuit against Hospital is a claim for medical malpractice that requires compliance with the notice provision of section 766.106 of the Florida Statutes. I....

...ing that, irrespective of how Simmons’s counts were labeled, Simmons’s claims were actually medical malpractice claims, and that dismissal, therefore, was required because Simmons did not provide Hospital with the pre-suit notice required by section 766.106(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes.2 Focusing on both the allegations of Simmons’s amended complaint and the relevant statutory language of Florida’s medical malpractice act, chapter 766 of the Florida Statutes (2013), Hospital argu...

...supervision and training – essentially asserted a “breach of the prevailing professional standard of care,” § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2013); and (ii) Simmons’s alleged damages arose “out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola, 635 So. 3d 945, 947 (Fla. 1994)). III. Analysis A negligence claim constitutes medical malpractice when the claim arises out of the “rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...there are more 3 The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim is two years, see § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013), while the statute of limitations for a negligence claim is four years. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). 4 See §766.106(2)(a), Fla....

...ervices, which would require the use of professional judgment or skill. Therefore, we do not characterize Simmons’s claims as ones for medical malpractice; and consequently, Simmons was not required to give Hospital pre-suit notice pursuant to section 766.106(2)(a). Reversed and remanded. 11 

...Brill’s notes from that initial visit state: [Hazen] had back surgery about five weeks ago. He is paralyzed from the waist down. He states that he is paralyzed from a myelogram. On 8 June 1995, Hazen served Kaplan with a notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation, see § 766.106(2), Fla....

...for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence ... Section 766.106(4) requires the notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation to be served within the limitations period set by section 95.11....

...Minor, 240 So.2d 301 (Fla.1970); City of St. Petersburg v. Houghton, 362 So.2d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). "This court further finds that the plaintiff's refusal to comply with the presuit discovery procedures warrants a dismissal of this action. See: Section 766.106(6)(7), Florida Statutes; Bartley v....

...In light of defendant's access to the evidence in the criminal case, the fact that the criminal charges may have arisen from involuntary actions, and plaintiff's due process right to bring his civil action, I would find it difficult to ever dismiss his claim, no matter how long the criminal case takes. NOTES [1] § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] §§ 766.106(6) and (7), Fla....

served within [the statute of limitations]”); section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (2013) (emphasis added);

...Those notices were received on January 13, 1997. The statute of limitations was then tolled ninety days from the date that the defendant received the notice of intent. See Boyd v. Becker, 627 So.2d 481, 483-484 (Fla.1993). Applying the holding of Hankey and the plain language of section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations clock stopped running as to "all potential defendants" for ninety days, or until April 13, 1997....

...Plaintiff Melissa Ann King appeals the trial court’s Order Dismissing defendants Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. and Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. d/b/a Baptist Children’s Hospital (collectively, Baptist Hospital), rendered final by the trial court’s order denying King’s motion for rehearing. We conclude that section 766.106, Florida Statute’s (2003), notice of intent to initiate litigation sent to Dr. William R. Thompson and Pediatric Surgical Group, PLLC was sufficient under the facts of this ease to impute notice to Baptist Hospital, and therefore reverse. In May 2008, King sent by certified mail two formal notices pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2003), informing Dr....

...d/b/a Baptist Children’s Hospital (collectively, Baptist Hospital) related to treatment she received at Baptist Hospital from Dr. Thompson. In her amended complaint, King alleged that she complied with all the conditions precedent to the filing of the action as required in section 766.106....

...l and the University of Miami, whereby the entities shared profit, losses, facilities, promotional and advertising benefits and insurance revenue. Baptist Hospital then moved to dismiss the amended complaint because it had not been directly served a section 766.106 let *42 ter of intent, arguing in part that there was no legal relationship between Pediatric Group and Baptist Hospital, thus pre-suit notice could not be imputed to Baptist Hospital pursuant to rule 1.650, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure....

...Moreover, she argued, the joint venture agreement discussed at the hearing— and upon which the court relied to make its ruling — conclusively showed a legal relationship between Dr. Thompson, the University of Miami and Baptist Hospital. The court denied the motion for rehearing. Section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2003) provides, in pertinent part: (2) Presuit notice.— (a) After completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s....

RAMIREZ, J. Margarita Toca appeals the denial of her petition to enforce arbitration. We affirm. On or about April 4, 2003, Toca initiated pre-suit procedure of her medical malpractice claim against appellee, Sonia Olivares, D.D.S., pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2002)....

...y accept the offer of voluntary binding arbitration within 30 days. However, in no event shall the defendant be required to respond to the request for arbitration sooner than 90 days after service of the notice of intent to initiate litigation under s. 766.106....

...al malpractice against multiple defendants, including Lawnwood and Appellee. Appellant alleged in his complaint that he complied with the pre-suit notice requirements of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes. 1  Section 766.106(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), provides in pertinent part: (a) After completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s. 766.203(2) and prior to filing a complaint for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify eac...

...ctive defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence. Notice to each prospective defendant must include, if available . . . the executed authorization form provided in s. 766.1065. Appellee moved to dismiss the complaint. In his motion, Appellee contended that, within the two-year statute of limitations period for medical malpractice suits set forth by section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, he had not been served with the pre-suit notice required by section 766.106(2)(a). Appellant responded he had served the pre-suit notice to Lawnwood and argued such service imputed notice to Appellee....

...he following in its place. A medical doctor sued his professional liability insurer for failing to exercise good faith in settling a claim against him. He claimed that his insurance company failed to undertake the necessary investigation pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes, and settled a claim which was completely defensible, causing him damages, including the insurance company’s subsequent refusal to renew his policy. The trial court dismissed the claim, finding that neither section 766.106 nor section 627.4147, upon which the doctor relied in making his claim, created a private cause of action against the insurer....

...Rogers, the appellant, purchased medical malpractice insurance coverage from appellee, Chicago Insurance Company (“Chicago”). In April 2002, the estate of a former patient served Dr. Rogers with a notice of intent to initiate litigation. Pursuant to section 766.106, Chicago had 90 days to conduct a presuit investigation of the claim....

...With time running out, it elected to settle the claim instead of defending. Rogers filed suit against his insurance company, claiming that it had failed to exercise good faith in its conduct of the presuit investigation and settlement. He alleged violations of both the presuit investigation procedure pursuant to section 766.106 and violation of the duty of good *282 faith settlement in the best interests of the insured under section 627.4147....

...Association, shall include: [[Image here]] (b)l .... a clause authorizing the insurer or self-insurer to determine, to make, and to conclude, without the permission of the insured, any offer of admission of liability and for arbitration pursuant to s. 766.106, settlement offer, or offer of judgment, if the offer is within the policy limits. It is against public policy for any insurance or self-insurance policy to contain a clause giving the insured the exclusive right to veto any offer for admission of liability and for arbitration made pursuant to s. 766.106, settlement offer, or offer of judgment, when such offer is within the policy limits....

...Murphy through medical negligence. Mr. Murphy has retained experts in the requisite specialties who will testify that that is so. As a condition precedent to pursuing a medical-negligence claim under Florida law, a plaintiff must comply with specific presuit requirements. See § 766.106, Fla. Stat. 1 One presuit requirement is this: the plaintiff must provide the defendant a presuit notice of the potential claim. Id. § 766.106(2). The presuit-notice requirement has long been in force and is plainly valid. Mr. Murphy does not contend otherwise. The statute now at issue, Florida Statutes § 766.1065, took effect on July 1, 2013....

...her things, allows the defendant — or the defendant’s attorney, insurer, or adjuster — to conduct ex parte interviews of the plaintiffs other healthcare providers, limited to matters pertinent to the potential medical-negligence claim. See id. § 766.1065(3)(E)....

...Murphy is entitled to a declaration that the proposed ex parte interviews will violate federal law, and Mr. Murphy is entitled to an injunction prohibiting the interviews. IT IS ORDERED: 1. It is declared that an authorization that a patient is required to provide under Florida Statutes § 766.1065 does not authorize a healthcare provider to disclose health information about the patient in an ex parte interview (that is, in an interview when the patient or the patient’s attorney is not present)....

...The basis for our ruling is that the record indisputably demonstrates the doctor falsely and materially represented in response to a question on the application that he had had no previous malpractice claims against him, although in fact he had previously received no less than three § 766.106(2) -notices of intent, which he had duly transmitted to his claims-made insurer....

...iring, training, and retention of Dr. Perez Ortiz. Prior to the filing of the complaint, Ms. Martinez served her notices of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice on Dr. Perez Ortiz and Perez Eye Center on July 27, 2017. See § 766.106(2)(a)....

...Assuming, arguendo, that this was the triggering date for statute of limitations purposes, Ms. Martinez had two years from that date, or until May 11, 2017, to serve her notices of intent to initiate litigation on Dr. Perez Ortiz and Perez Eye Center. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015); see also § 766.106(4). Prior to that time, Ms. Martinez obtained an automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to section 766.104(2), giving Ms. Martinez until August 8, 3 §§ 95.11(4)(b), 766.106(4), Fla....

...Perez Ortiz and Perez Eye Center argued 2017, to serve her notice of intent on Dr. Perez Ortiz and Perez Eye Center. Ms. Martinez served her notices of intent on Dr. Perez Ortiz and Perez Eye Center on July 27, 2017, triggering the ninety-day tolling of the statute of limitations under section 766.106(4)....

...The parties agreed to further extend the presuit investigation period on three separate occasions. Dr. Perez Ortiz and Perez Eye Center ultimately denied Ms. Martinez's claims on November 22, 2017. Accordingly, the statute of limitations was set to expire on January 22, 2018. See § 766.106(4) ("Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit.")....

...6 courts on the basis of technicalities." Rodriguez v. Nicolitz, 246 So. 3d 550, 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing Fort Walton Beach Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Dingler, 697 So. 2d 575, 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)). Pursuant to section 766.106(2)(a) a potential plaintiff must serve on any potential defendant a presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence (notice of intent) after the potential plaintiff completes a presuit investigation pursuant to section 766.203(2)....

...Appellant argues that the 180-day period after filing with the commission operates to *1152 toll the four year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3), so that he timely commenced this action. The above statute has a logical counterpart in sections 766.104 and 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989). Section 766.104(2) expressly authorizes an extension of the statute of limitations to allow reasonable investigation of an incipient medical malpractice claim by a simple filing with the clerk. Section 766.106(4) expressly provides for a tolling of the statute for the 90-day period after a notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation has been served....

...The compelled discovery in Grimshaw was a letter that the testifying expert witness had reviewed in preparing for his deposition. The letter was not discoverable because it had been generated “by the presuit screening process” and was exempt from normal discovery under that statute which is currently section 766.106(5), Florida Statutes (1991). The information sought by the defendant in this case is not necessarily protected by section 766.106(5) nor is it necessarily work product....

...er the trial court’s order. The trial court specifically prohibited inquiry into matters constituting any work product, which would include statements, discussions, written documents, or reports generated by the presuit screening process. See *925 § 766.106(5), Fla.Stat....

...the accidental death of the decedent. Appellee moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Appellant failed to comply with the pre-suit requirements of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes, which covers causes of action in medical negligence cases. Section 766.106 defines a “‘[c]laim for medical negligence’ or ‘claim for medical malpractice’ [as] a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...The Hospital now appeals. II. Analysis A. Medical malpractice The Hospital first argues that the trial court erred in failing to treat this case as a medical malpractice case subject to the provisions of chapter 766. We disagree. Section 766.106(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), defines a "[c]laim for medical negligence" or "claim for medical malpractice" as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." In addition, the medica...

...Section 768.21(8) provides that adult children cannot recover damages pursuant to section 768.21(3) “for lost parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury” when liability is premised on a claim for medical malpractice as defined in section 766.106(1)....

...Nonetheless, they claim the statute began to run on this date. As a result, Petitioners argue Dr. Cohen’s affidavit was served outside the two-year statute of limitations, which expired by Petitioners’ reckoning no later than June 17, 2019 (as tolled ninety days pursuant to section 766.106(4) and extended an additional ninety days by Ms. Machalek pursuant to section 766.104(2))....

...constitute “public policy” of the state. See Dinkins v. Dinkins, 120 So. 3d 601, 603 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). 10  (1) After the completion of presuit investigation by the parties pursuant to s. 766.203 and any discovery pursuant to s. 766.106, any party may file a motion in the circuit court requesting the court to determine whether the opposing party’s claim or denial rests on a reasonable basis. (2) If the court finds that the notice of intent to initia...

...requirements of ss. 766.201-766.212, including a review of the claim and a verified written medical expert opinion by an expert witness as defined in s. 766.202, or that the authorization accompanying the notice of intent required under s. 766.1065 is not completed in good faith by the claimant, the court shall dismiss the claim, and the person who mailed such notice of intent, whether the claimant or the claimant’s attorney, is personally liable for all attorney�...

...We further adopt form 1.977, which is patterned after Florida Small Claims Form 7.343. Rule 1.650(d)(3) is amended to implement the Court’s holding in Musculoskele-tal Institute Chartered v. Parham, 745 So.2d 946 (Fla.1999), that the tolling provisions of section 766.104(2) and section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1989), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(a), applicable to the statute of limitations, are equally applicable to the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...06(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). * The existing rule 1.650 was adopted by this Court to provide uniform procedures for implementing the medical malpractice presuit notice requirements of section 768.-57, Florida Statutes (Supp.1986) (renumbered as section 766.106; Florida Statutes (Supp.1988))....

...Subsequent to the adoption of rule 1.650(d)(2), the legislature amended section 768.57(3)(a) and reduced the notice requirement for bringing a medical malpractice action against a state agency from 180 days to 90 days. Ch. 88-173, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 766.106(3)(a), Fla.Stat....

litigation against the defendants. Pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes, the defendants had 90 days

...irst defense. 2. The date inserted in the instruction will ordinarily be two years before the date on which either the notice of intent was served or the petition to extend the statute of limitations was filed. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (4)(b); Fla. Stat. § 766.106 ; Fla....

...Counsel may show good faith by a written opinion of an expert "that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence." Id. After completing the pre-suit investigation and prior to filing a complaint for medical negligence, the plaintiff must notify the defendant of her intent to initiate litigation. § 766.106(2)....

...of limitations provided in section 95.11(4), the trial court dismissed the first amended complaint with prejudice. A claim for medical malpractice is a “claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(l)(a), Fla....

...Michael died on February 16, 1993, as a result of Dr. Franzen’s malpractice. The Moglers mailed a notice of intent to initiate a malpractice action to Dr. Franzen and his P.A. Dr. Franzen’s insurer responded and offered to admit liability under section 766.106(3)(b)3, Florida Statutes (1993), and to submit the issue of damages to voluntary binding arbitration under section 766.207, Florida Statutes (1993)....

768.57, Florida Statutes, was transferred to section 766.106, Florida Statutes, in 1988. See Allen v. Orlando

...768.18 and 768.21 (1990), applicable to causes of action accruing after October 1, 1990, expand eligible survivor claimants in wrongful death actions by surviving parents and children, but are not applicable to claims for medical malpractice as defined by F.S. 766.106(1) (1989). 2....

...d. ... Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (4)(b). Byrnes claims that she served Dr. Small with a medical malpractice Notice of Intent -within the seven-year limitations period and timely filed her Complaint within the tolling period provided under Florida Statutes § 766.106(4)....

...e is no dispute that the letter was served in December 2013. Accordingly, because December 2013 is more than seven years after October 2006, the claims against Dr. Small and MIC are time-barred even if there were fraud or concealment. See Fla. Stat. § 766.106 (4) (“The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s....

...Second, even if Byrnes had, in fact served the Notice of Intent on October 14, *1288 2013, unless there was a stipulation by the parties, the limitations period was tolled for a maximum of 90 days, after which she had 60 days to file suit. See Fla. Stat. § 766.106 (4)....

...ent for Sheriff Prummell. The claim against Corizon is more straightforward. This claim is one of medical malpractice. And, under Florida law, a plaintiff must provide pre-suit notice to defendants in medical mal- practice actions. Fla. Stat. § 766.106(2). Here, it is undisputed that Ireland’s Estate did not provide that pre-suit notice, but still Ire- land’s Estate attempts to argue that the claim sounds in ordinary negligence. We conclude that it does not. See id. § 766.106(1)(a) (noting that the pre-suit notice requirements apply to any claim “arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services”)....

...easonable grounds to believe that the defendant(s) was negligent and that negligence resulted in injury. § 766.203(2). After conducting this investigation, the plaintiff must then serve each defendant with a notice of intent to initiate litigation. § 766.106(2)(a)....

...the needles they were using were sterile.” Lakeland Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Allen, 944 So. 2d 541, 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“If the cause of an injury is effected by negligent medical care then, by definition, the complaint sounds in malpractice.”). § 766.106(1)(a)....

...Petitioners now petition this Court for a writ of certiorari. Chapter 766, Florida’s Medical Malpractice Act, sets out the procedure each claimant must comply with prior to filing a medical malpractice action, including presuit notice and screening. See § 766.104, 766.106, 766.201- .212, Fla....

...3d DCA 2022). One of the requirements is that plaintiff must conduct a reasonable investigation “to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.” § 766.104(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). In addition, section 766.106(2) requires a plaintiff to comply with presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation....

to medical malpractice claims as set out in section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1993), and Florida Rule

intent to initiate litigation required by section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes, and thereafter filed

purpose pursuant to the express provisions of section 766.106(5), Florida Statutes: No statement, discussion

PER CURIAM. Petitioners in this medical malpractice action seek a writ of certiorari to reverse an order of the Circuit Court determining that the presuit investigation conducted by defendants/appellees complied with the provisions of section 766.106(3), Florida Statutes....

...t’l Deaf Acad., LLC v. Townes, 242 So. 3d 303, 308 (Fla. 2018). A “‘[c]laim for medical negligence’ or ‘claim for medical malpractice’ means a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...Nat’l Deaf Acad., LLC, 242 So. 3d at 311–12. We have no difficulty or doubt in concluding that Plaintiff’s claims sound in medical negligence. The acts from which the claims arise relate to “the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(1)(a)....

...Before filing a medical malpractice claim, the plaintiff must conduct a reasonable investigation to determine whether there are grounds for suit. See § 766.104(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). If grounds exist, the plaintiff must then serve on potential defendants a notice of intent to initiate litigation. See §§ 766.106(2), (4), Fla. Stat. (2006). Serving the notice of intent to initiate litigation tolls, or suspends, the running of the statute of limitations for 90 days, or longer if the parties agree to extend the time. See §§ 766.106(3) & (4), Fla. Stat. (2006). During this 90-day period (which was not extended in the present case), prospective defendants are to conduct their own investigation, and may seek to negotiate a resolution of the claim. See § 766.106(3), Fla. Stat. (2006). “Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations ... the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit.” § 766.106(4), Fla....

...Patrick had purchased remained. (The whole of the original two-year period had expired.) Because the “remainder of the period of the statute of limitations” was less than 60 days, she had 60 days from November 1, 2006, in which to file her complaint. § 766.106(4), Fla....

...Patrick filed her complaint on January 17, 2007, seventy-eight days later. The trial court ruled her complaint was filed out of time, explaining that, once the tolling period ended, Ms. “Patrick had 37 days remaining on the statute of limitations and [section] 766.106(4) was activated.......

...Since 37 days remained on the limitations for filing a complaint, and because the days remaining were fewer than 60, Patrick had 60 days in which to file a complaint.” The trial court noted that the complaint was untimely (18 days late) even though the “operation of section 766.106(4) had effectively granted her an additional 23 days in which to file her complaint.” Relying principally on Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Coffaro, 829 So.2d 862 (Fla.2002), Ms. Patrick argues that she was entitled to the 60 days provided in section 766.106(4), plus the 37 days remaining on her purchased extension. But Coffaro does not support her position. There, Ms. Coffaro purchased a 90-day extension after the section 766.106(4) tolling period had already begun, and after events had dictated that the 60-day “grace period” applied....

...th left on the original two-year statute of limitations period. Because only one month remained and because the ninety-day purchased period from section 766.104(2) is not added to the month, she was entitled to the benefit of the sixty-day period of section 766.106(4)....

...Coffaro made the purchase, she knew that she was entitled to 60 days (after the tolling period ended) because, in her case, it was already clear that the “remainder of the period of the statute of limitations” was only one month, so that 60 days constituted the “greater” period. § 766.106(4), Fla....

...), not to another, shorter extension that would have added only some 60 days for an approximate total of 120 days (after the tolling period ended). In the present case, Ms. Patrick received not only the full 90-day extension she purchased but, under section 766.106(4), an additional 23 days as well....

...But Cortes only establishes that the purchased extension can extend the original two-year statute of limitations period for the purposes of filing a notice of intent to initiate litigation. The statute contemplates "either or,” not "both and." See § 766.106(4), Fla....

...(2006) ("60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater”). . The court held that, once a claimant files a notice of intent to litigate, "the two-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(b) is suspended (‘tolled’) for ninety days under section 766.106(4),” and that the purchased extension "does not run simultaneously with the separate ninety-day tolling period provided in section 766.106(4).” Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So.2d 93, 97-98 (Fla.2000). The court also opined that "any additional times added under section 766.106(4) if the notice of intent is filed by the claimant with less than sixty days remaining in the original statute of limitations, or under the automatic ninety-day extension pursuant to section 766.104(2), are actually statutorily granted additions to the initial two years allotted by the statute.” Id....

issues raised by appellees. The substance of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1993), was originally enacted

...As such, the court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law. Next, the University cites to Otto v. Rodriguez, 710 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), to argue that its failure to provide medical records did not waive all of Jones’s pre-suit requirements under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2023).2 The University is correct in that regard, yet, in Otto, the claimant provided no notice whatsoever....

...Here, the trial court found that the notice was sufficient given the limited information available,3 and concluded that Jones complied with the pre-suit notice 2 Chapter 766 contains several prerequisites to filing a medical malpractice action. See, e.g., § 766.104(1), Fla. Stat. (2023); § 766.106(2)(a), Fla....

...Boone had failed to attend the scheduled unsworn statement, and that respondents had failed to conduct a presuit investigation, as required by law. Accordingly, the Wolfords argued that section 766.206(8), Florida Statutes (1999), required the court to strike respondents’ answer, and section 766.106(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), justified dismissal of the claims and defenses....

...The Defendants first argument relies on two Florida decisions: GalenCare, Inc. v. Mosley, 59 So.3d 138 (Fla. 2d Dist.Ct.App.2011) and Sova Drugs, Inc. v. Barnes, 661 So.2d 393 (Fla. 5th Dist.Ct.App.1995). Both of these decisions concern whether Florida’s medical malpractice presuit notice requirements (see Fla. Stat. § 766.106 ) apply to pharmacies and pharmacists....

...Elisa Garay, plaintiff below, appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for defendant Colony Springs Medical Center in this medical malpractice action. We find that Garay’s notice to the attorney representing Colony Springs, within the limitations period, was adequate pre-suit notice under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1996)....

...Heath was an agent of Colony Springs, and in fact represented Colony Springs on this appeal, and timely service on him was proper. See, e.g., Woodard v. Florida State University, 618 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). To adopt Colony Springs’s hyper-technical view of section 766.106 in this case, we believe, would impermissibly infringe on the constitutional right to access to the courts....

with the pre-suit discovery provisions of section 766.106, et. seq., Florida Statutes. The attorney for

a medical malpractice claimant pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2000). Steinbronn was

...court order that denied their motion to dismiss. They argue the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint because the plaintiff failed to comply with the presuit requirements for bringing a medical malpractice action under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2017)....

...motion to dismiss, and remand the case to the trial court to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint without prejudice. The plaintiff may either amend the complaint to eliminate the medical malpractice allegations or comply with the presuit requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2017)....

intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1993), which they had

...In addition to defending the trial court's dismissal of the action because it was brought by an unauthorized attorney, appellee filed a cross-appeal claiming the court erred in not also dismissing the action because plaintiff failed to comply with the presuit requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...Courts must recognize the constitutional right of the legislature to enact statutes. The statutes in this case are not ambiguous. "Upon receipt by a prospective defendant of a notice of claim, the parties shall make discoverable information available without formal discovery." Section 766.106(6), Florida Statutes (emphasis added). "Such access [to information within a party's possession or control] shall be provided without formal discovery, pursuant to s. 766.106, and failure to so provide shall be grounds for dismissal of any applicable claim or defense ultimately asserted." Section 766.205(2), Florida Statutes (emphasis added)....

...ability to accurately assess the true expertise of the person giving the opinion and, consequently, to properly analyze the threat posed by the Plaintiffs' claims. In sum, since the Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the presuit requirements of §§ 766.106 and 766.203, Florida Statutes, their complaint must be dismissed pursuant to § 766.206(2)....

to comply with the notice requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1991). We regret the harshness

...On May 9, 2019, Brinson sent Dial 4 Care a records request, requesting a copy of his complete medical file, pursuant to section 766.204, Florida Statutes. The next day, on May 10, 2019, Brinson served a notice of intent to initiate litigation on Dial 4 Care, pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...ent after the notice of intent to initiate litigation, the request stated that it was being made pursuant to section 766.204, Florida Statutes. 2 The complaint alleged that Brinson had provided notices of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes; that the notices of intent had been served within two years of the date Brinson had knowledge there was a reasonable probability his injuries were caused by medical malpractice; and that the suit had been filed w...

...Garcia, 949 So.2d 366, 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)). LEGAL ANALYSIS The Legislature has set forth procedures with which each claimant must comply prior to filing medical malpractice suits. See, e.g., §§ 766.104, 766.106, 766.201–.212, Fla....

...o initiate litigation. There is a difference between records requested under section 766.204 for the plaintiff to conduct a presuit investigation and records requested in the notice of intent letter pursuant to the informal discovery provision of section 766.106....

...e of limitations has lapsed and whether Brinson is still able to timely provide Dial 4 Care with the affidavit. 7 of a claimant’s obligation to include an expert opinion appears in section 766.204(2), not section 766.106, and applies to a failure to provide medical records for the presuit investigation that precedes the filing of the notice of intent. Section 766.106(6) ....

...f intent to initiate litigation is sent. See § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. Indeed, the section providing for presuit notice letters states that such notice is to be sent to putative defendants “[a]fter completion of presuit investigation.” Id. at § 766.106(2)(a)....

affects the applicable statute of limitations. Section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1999), provides: The

FARMER, J. We affirm the trial court’s order in this medical malpractice action striking the pleadings and defenses of defendants for failure to participate in informal discovery as required by sections 766.106(6) and 766.205(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...We conclude that nothing in the applicable statutes precludes the use of interrogatories, reasonably limited in number and complexity, in informal discovery. We reject defendants’ contention that this kind of curtailed informal discovery is limited to unsworn statements under section 766.106(7)(a), the production of documents and things under section 766.106(7)(b), or physical and mental examinations under 766.106(7)(e)....

comply with pre-suit notice requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes. Petitioner asserts the notice

...Here, the estate asserts that the trial court erred by finding that Dr. Butler was entitled to presuit notice under chapter 766. According to chapter 766, only "prospective defendants" in medical malpractice actions are entitled to presuit notice. § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). As explained by the supreme court, "[s]ection 766.106(2) does not define the `prospective defendants' to whom notice must be given." Weinstock v....

...ound that the statute of limitations had expired and Appellants had not complied with the presuit medical malpractice notification requirements. For the reasons explained below, we reverse. 5  Section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2008), “imposes presuit requirements on a claim for medical negligence or malpractice.” Joseph v....

...Insofar as pertinent here, Abaunza moved to dismiss for Baptist’s failure to comply with section 766.104, Florida Statutes (1989). The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action with leave to refile after the expiration of ninety days. It appears that the trial court invoked section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989), as well as section 766.104....

...Memorial Hospital, 363 So.2d 598 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Where there has been a determination of liability on the professional negligence claim, an action for contribution is not properly deemed to be within the statutory definition of sections 766.104 and 766.106....

...Lucas appeal the amended final judgment entered by the trial court in their medical malpractice action. On September 14, 1993, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Sara Vizcay, M.D. and dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with the notice requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1991)....

received by the Department of Health under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1998 Supplement), confidential

...Barbara Ann Thomas-Robinson, as personal representative of the Estate of Leroy Lawrence, and Traci Cooper, as legal parent and guardian of Trevor Lawrence (collectively “Appellants”), appeal from an order dismissing a medical malpractice complaint for failure to comply with the presuit discovery requirements of Section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Scott’s insurer informed counsel for Appellants that the medical malpractice claim was denied. 2 On February 13, 2004, Appellants initiated suit. On August 25, 2005, Dr. Scott filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint arguing that Appellants failed to provide presuit discovery pursuant to Florida Statute 766.106(6)....

...In a written order, the trial court granted the motion, finding “that plaintiff failed to comply with presuit discovery.” There was no finding made by the trial court of prejudice to Defendant resulting from Plaintiffs failure. This appeal ensued. II. REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 766.106 Chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2005), “sets out a complex presuit investigation procedure that both the claimant and defendant must follow before a medical negligence claim may be brought in court.” Kukral v....

...The policy underlying the medical malpractice statutory scheme is to require the parties to engage in meaningful presuit investigation, discovery, and negotiations, thereby screening out frivolous lawsuits and defenses and encouraging the early determination and prompt resolution of claims. Id. at 284 . Section 766.106(3)(a) provides a defendant or the defendant’s insurer with a ninety-day presuit investigation period. During this ninety-day period, the claimant may not file suit. See § 766.106(3)(a). “Upon receipt by a prospective defendant of a notice of claim, the parties shall' make discoverable information available without formal discovery. Failure to do so is grounds for dismissal of claims or defenses ultimately asserted.” See § 766.106(6)(a). Additionally, section 766.106(7), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that “[f]ailure to cooperate on the part of any party during the presuit investigation may be grounds to strike any claim made, or defense raised, by such party in suit.” (emphasis added)....

...At or before the expiration of the ninety-day presuit investigation period, the defendant or the defendant’s insurer must provide the claimant with one of the following three options: (1) reject the claim; (2) make a settlement offer; or (3) admit liability and submit to arbitration on damages. See § 766.106(3)(b)....

...year statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence actions. See § 95.11(4), Fla. Stat. (2005). The motion further alleged that Stubbs’ medical negligence claim was barred because it had not been submitted to pre-suit screening. See § 766.106, Fla....

...The court reasoned that the section provides only for the striking of defendant’s “response” and interpreted the word “response” to refer to the written denial of the claim, not the defendant’s pleadings. Id. Notwithstanding section 766.206(3), section 766.106(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1999) provides that during the ninety-day period following the filing of the plaintiffs notice of intent, the defendants shall conduct a reasonable investigation into the claim: During the 90-day period, the p...

...d to the plaintiffs presuit notice of intent to sue, as well as *991 failed to file a corroborating written medical expert opinion. The court found, as a matter of fact, that defendants had not made a reasonable investigation as required by sections 766.106(3)(a) and 766.203(3), nor a good faith rejection of the malpractice claim against them. The third district affirmed. Noting that the undisputed evidence clearly demonstrated that the defendants did not make a good faith rejection of the malpractice claim against them and that they had unreasonably failed to comply with section 766.106(3)(a)(l)-(4), it held that the trial court was authorized under that section to strike the defendant’s pleadings and affirmative defenses. We believe Estevez is closer on point than Karr in this case. The Wellses’ motion to strike did not cite the statutory section that was being invoked. 2 Furthermore, the court’s inquiry during the hearing was directed to section 766.106(3)(a), and the order on appeal applied that section....

...specify the precise statutory provision under which she was moving, the plaintiff agreed at oral argument that she was relying only on section 766.206(3). Since Karr was argued solely under section 766.206(3) and this court was not asked to consider section 766.106(3)(a), we do not see our decision today as conflicting with Karr .

...Cortes, M.D., seeks a writ of certiorari to review a nonfinal order denying his motion for summary judgment on respondent’s medical malpractice complaint for failure to timely file a notice of intent to initiate litigation under the pre-suit notice requirements of section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes....

...Petitioner received the notice of intent to initiate litigation on December 13, 2001, well within the limitations period. A timely filed notice of intent to initiate litigation tolls the running of the statute of limitations period for ninety days. See §§ 766.106(3), (4), Fla....

...Upon the expiration of the ninety-day tolling period, or “[u]pon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the' statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit.” § 766.106(4), Fla....

...tes, a timely purchased extension adds ninety days to the end of the two-year limitations period, including any other tolling periods. The holding in Coffaro does not alter this result. Coffaro deals with the interplay between section 766.104(2) and section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes, in determining when a medical malpractice *636 complaint must be filed after a notice of intent is served. See Cojfaro, 829 So.2d at 864, 866 . Unlike the claimant in Cof-faro, respondent in this case filed for the purchased extension before serving the notice of intent. Accordingly, the 90-day tolling and the 60-day filing periods under section 766.106(4), discussed in Cojfa-ro, had not been triggered when respondent filed for the purchased extension....

...nd obligations under the plan by failing to authorize payment of benefits for a medically necessary surgery.” Well Care moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, arguing the six causes of action are claims for medical malpractice as defined in section 766.106(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), as they are predicated on and arise out of the alleged denial of medically necessary care and treatment, and the Solomons failed to serve presuit notice as required under sec *545 tion 766.106(2)....

...Well Care in providing medical care and treatment. They argue the trial court erred when it determined that the claims are subject to compliance with the presuit notice requirement set forth in chapter 766, and dismissed the complaint on that basis. Section 766.106 requires plaintiffs to notify health care providers of their intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation. See, e.g., J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola, 635 So.2d 945, 948-49 (Fla.1994); Patry v. Capps, 633 So.2d 9 (Fla.1994); Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835 (Fla.1993); Paulk v. Nat’l Med. Enters. Inc., 679 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Section 766.106(2), provides: After completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s....

...ertified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice. A “claim for medical malpractice” is defined as “a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(l)(a), Fla....

...nvoke the application of chapter 766. Thus, the trial court erred when it determined that the claims dealt with medical malpractice and dismissed the complaint on the basis that the Solomons failed to comply with the presuit notice requirement under section 766.106(2)....

...We concur with the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff-appellant’s motion to compel arbitration. As we view the matter, the result of the earlier declaratory judgment action was an order declaring defendant-appellee’s previous demand for arbitration under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1991), to be a nullity, and that order is now final....

WOLF, J. Appellant challenges the validity of certain 2013 amendments to the medical malpractice presuit notice sections of the Florida Statutes:' sections 766.106 and 766.1065....

...I.The Statutory Amendments The medical malpractice presuit notice statutes require a claimant to provide a potential defendant with notice prior to filing suit and implement a 90-day tolling period after service of the notice in order for the parties to investigate the claim presuit. § 766.106(3), Fla. Stat. (2013). Prior to the 2013 amendments, five methods of informal discovery were available to the parties when conducting this presuit informal investigation, including the taking of unsworn statements. § 766.106(6)(b)(l)-(5), Fla. Stat. (2012). However, the amendments added a new method of informal discovery for prospective defendants: interviews of treating health care providers. See Ch. 2013-108 § 3, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 766.106(b)(5), Fla. Stat. (2013)); Ch. 2013-108 § 4, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 766.1065(3), Fla. Stat. (2013)). These interviews are to be “consistent with the authorization for release of protected health information,” which must be signed by the claimant prior to the initiation of the medical malpractice lawsuit. § 766.106(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). The authorization itself explicitly provides permission for potential defendants to conduct ex parte interviews with the claimant’s health care providers. § 766.1065(3)(E), Fla....

...t notice that was served with the authorization “is deemed retroactively void from the date of issuance, and any tolling effect that the presuit notice may have had on any applicable statute-of-limitations period is retroactively rendered void.” § 766.1065(3)(G), Fla.- Stat. Thus, a claimant now cannot institute a medical malpractice lawsuit without authorizing ex parte interviews between the claimant’s health care providers and the potential defendant. § 766.1065(3), Fla....

...Persell, 390 So.2d 704, 706 (Fla.1980) (“This Court, as most jurisdictions, adopted discovery as part of our procedural rules to improve our system of justice.”). We reject this contention. As distinguished by the statute itself, the informal discovery process of medical malpractice cases differs from formal discovery. § 766.106(6)(a), Fla. Stat. Informal discovery occurs presuit and is a form of investigation which “is not discoverable or admissible in any civil action for any pmpose by the opposing party.” § 766.106(5), Fla....

...Rather, it appears that the supreme court intended only to codify the medical malpractice presuit statute. For example, the rule itself was created in response to the medical malpractice pre-suit notice statutes and explicitly states, “This rule applies only to the procedures prescribed by section 766.106, Florida Statutes, for presuit screening of claims for medical malpractice.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.650(a); see also In re Medical Malpractice Presuit Screening Rules — Civil Rules of Procedure, 536 So.2d 193, 193 (Fla.1988). The rule also appears to mirror section 766.106(6), Florida Statutes, as it was amended three months after its enactment to specify methods of informal discovery....

...ecause “[n]o justification exists for restricting putative plaintiffs’ rights or enhancing the discovery rights of putative defendants, their counsel, their insurers, or their potential consultants and wit *881 nesses in the manner that sections 766.106 and 766.1065 do.” As observed by appellee, there are two criteria that render a law general when it operates on the basis of a classification system....

...ncluding the recent amendments. Treating these plaintiffs and defendants differently than other tort claimants and defendants is justified by the purpose of protecting the public health by ensuring the availability of adequate medical care. Sections 766.106 and 766.1065 were originally enacted by the Legislature to combat the financial crisis in the medical liability insurance industry by encouraging early settlement and negotiation of claims....

...If the authorization form is served with the presuit notice of intent, there is no barrier to the courthouse doors for medical malpractice plaintiffs, nor are such plaintiffs’ substantive rights of recovery against health care providers modified in any way. In fact, the predecessor statute to section 766.106, which contains the present notice and screening requirements, has already been upheld as not violating the access to courts provision of the Florida Constitution....

...Kimes, 756 So.2d 1037, 1041-42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Before the statutory changes that appellant challenges here, claimants in appellant’s position already had to disclose and produce relevant medical records to the defense team during the presuit period. See § 766.106(2)(a), Fla....

...Samaritan Act; and section 768.136, Florida Statutes, "Liability for canned or perishable food distributed free of charge.” . We also note information not relevant to the potential lawsuit is not discoverable during the informal discovery process. § 766.1065(3)(C), Fla. Stat. Section 766.1065(3)(Q allows the claimant to list health care providers to whom the authorization for release of information does not apply because those providers possess health care information that “is not potentially relevant to the claim of personal injury or wrongful death that is the basis of the accompanying presuit notice.” § 766.1065(3)(C), Fla....

...l January 1998; however, her claim would have been extinguished by the statute of repose in May 1997. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). Nichols retained Preiser in early 1997, and in April 1997, he filed a notice of intent to sue as required by section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...negligence to a suit seeking relief under chapter 415 based on allegations of medical negligence. Chapter 766, Florida Statutes, provides the exclusive remedy for claims “arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...ARBITRATOR(S). .... 5. Pre-Request Procedures. Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, in connection with any claim for medical malpractice as defined in Florida Statutes Section 766.106, or any similar successor law, or any claim or Request involving medical negligence, the Parties shall comply with the presuit investigation and presuit notification requ...

all prospective defendants of the claims. See § 766.106, Fla. Stat. (2003). At times, it is often difficult

is impermissible in damages arbitration. See § 766.106(3)(b)3, Fla. Stat. (an offer to arbitrate means

mailing him notice of her intent to sue. See § 766.106(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). This notice included

...(UMC), and certain attending and resident physicians employed by the Board to provide obstetrical services at UMC appeal a summary final judgment in their consolidated declaratory judgment actions against appellees, two claimant families who filed notices of intent to initiate actions pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989), for neurological damages suffered by the infant claimants allegedly as the result of medical negligence during labor and delivery at UMC....

...patient’s admission and the other infant was vaginally delivered approximately 31 hours after the patient’s admission. The parties have stipulated that the notice required by section 766.316 was not given to either of these patients. Pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989), each claimant family filed a “Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation” for neurological damages allegedly caused by medical negligence....

...They contend that the trial court compelled arbitration under the incorrect statute. We agree and reverse. Estela Martell, as Personal Representative of George Martell. ("plaintiff"), filed a notice of intent to initiate a medical negligence claim against the defendants for the wrongful death of George Martell. See § 766.106(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). [1] The defendants sent a letter offering to admit *1104 liability and submit the damages issue to arbitration. See id. § 766.106(3)(b)3....

...To resolve this dispute, the plaintiff moved to compel arbitration. The trial court granted the plaintiffs motion and compelled arbitration without damages caps. This timely appeal follows. The plaintiff begins with the observation that the defendants' offer was made under subparagraph 766.106(3)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2004)....

...relationships that brought the CT scan to Dr. Grennan for review on February 19. All of the defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that the Youngs failed to provide notice of their intent to sue within the two years required by statute. See § 766.106, Fla....

....” . The Youngs’ original complaint named only Naples Community Hospital and Naples Radiologists, P.A., as defendants. However, the Youngs filed an amended complaint on October 9, 2008, adding Nighthawk Radiology and Dr. Grennan as defendants. . Section 766.106(2)(a) provides in part that "[a]fter completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s, 766.203(2) and prior to filing a complaint for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant by certified mail, return re...

...miscarriage of justice.” Haines City Cmty Dev. v. Higgs, 658 So. 2d 523, 528 (Fla. 1995). We find no such departure here. The pre-suit requirements of Chapter 766 apply to “a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

litigation by any of the means provided in section 766.106(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2022), as opposed

...We reverse the order dismissing the complaint and remand to the circuit court for appellant to have a chance to amend her complaint, so that she has an opportunity to demonstrate that the causes of action alleged fall outside of the presuit *660 screening requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2005)....

prior to filing suit, plaintiff, pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1991), sent defendants a

...Patient will be determined by submission to arbitration as provided by the Florida Arbitration Code, Chapter 682, Florida Statutes. (b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, no “claim for medical negligence” as defined in § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...and renders complaint void as to debtor). Likewise, Florida's medical malpractice law, which mandates the giving of a presuit notice to the defendant, expressly provides that "[n]o suit may be filed" during the 90-day presuit investigation period following the notice. § 766.106(3)(a), Fla....

...court departed from the essential requirements of law by determining that the allegations in Ms. Doe's complaint did not amount to medical negligence. Section 766.202(7) defines "medical negligence" as "medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract," and section 766.106(1)(a) defines a claim for medical malpractice as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." Thus, the "key inquiry" in determining if a claim is one for medical...

...Moisés Rub, seeks review of an order which permitted the discovery and use of an unsworn statement taken during the medical malpractice pre-suit screening process. We find that Dr. Rub’s statement made during the presuit screening process is privileged under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1991) and rule 1.650, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure....

...Petitioners contend that in order to be licensed as a hospital, the Hospital is required to have a pharmacy department. Petitioners argue that the Pharmacists in this case are a *141 necessary, indispensable part of the Hospital. The presuit notice requirement is set forth in section 766.106. “After completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s. 766.208(2) and prior to filing a complaint for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant ... of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence.” § 766.106(2)(a). “[T]he proper test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to notice under section 766.106(2) is whether the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1).” Weinstock v....

...5th DCA 1995) (holding that pharmacist was not included in definition of health care provider who would be entitled to presuit notice under chapter 766). Accordingly, pharmacists licensed under chapter 465 are not health care providers entitled to presuit notice under section 766.106(2)....

...Therefore, Goldman and Puentes do not support the argument that the Pharmacists were entitled to their own presuit notice. Petitioners contend that even if the Pharmacists (and HCA) are not health care providers under chapter 766, they are still entitled to presuit notice as “prospective defendant[s]” under section 766.106(2)(a) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(b)(1) by virtue of the fact that the Hospital was entitled to presuit notice....

...The Estate’s claim against the Hospital Petitioners next claim that the Hospital was entitled to presuit notice because it is a health care provider under chapter 766 and the claim against the Hospital arose out of the rendering of medical care or services. See § 766.106(l)(a) (“ ‘Claim for medical negligence’ or ‘claim for medical malpractice’ means a claim[] arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.”)....

...It is undisputed that the Hospital is a health care provider under the statute. But the Estate’s claim against the Hospital is not a claim for medical negligence or malpractice because it did not arise out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services by the Hospital. See § 766.106(l)(a)....

...4th DCA 2001) (setting forth the six elements for a claim of spoliation, also known as a claim for the negligent destruction of evidence). In addition, the Estate did not allege that the Hospital is liable under the *143 medical negligence standard, which is necessary to invoke the presuit notice requirement of section 766.106....

POLEN, J. Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari to quash an order denying their motion to dismiss respondent as a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action. They sought dismissal because respondent did not serve a notice of intent to sue pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...lpractice caused injury to Mr. Peralta. Mrs. Peral-ta was named as a plaintiff and sought consortium damages. Petitioner moved to dismiss Mrs. Peralta’s consortium claim, arguing that she had failed to comply with the presuit notice requirement of section 766.106(2)....

...The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, prompting this petition for certiorari. 1 *537 Recently, in Pavolini v. Bird, 769 So.2d 410, 413 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), the court held that a spouse and child of an injured claimant were not required to comply with the presuit notice provisions of section 766.106(2)....

...Thus we must first determine whether a person with a derivative claim for loss of consortium is a claimant under the Act who presents a claim for medical negligence. The pre-suit investigation statute provides that “[p]rior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to s. 766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) [a]ny named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the care and treatment of the claimant; and (b), [s]uch negligence resulted in injury to the claimant.” § 766.203(2)(a),(b), Fla....

...ng his motion for summary judgment. Mr. Wood moved for summary judgment in the circuit court on the ground that two of the respondents, Geneve A. Virgo and Radcliff O. Virgo (the Virgos), had failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of section 766.106(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006)....

“medical negligence” within the meaning of section 766.106(1)(a), Florida Statutes: In Silva

...plaint goes on to allege that Champion was fired from her job and suffered a loss of reputation as a result of the false statement. Cox moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Champion had failed to serve notice of her claim as required by section 766.106, Florida Statutes, and that she had failed to complete a presuit investigation as required by section 766.203....

...2017); Pierrot v. Osceola Mental Health, Inc., 106 So. 3d 491, 492 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)). “Medical negligence” or “medical malpractice” is defined as “a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...We grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the orders below. The petition for writ of certiorari arises out of a medical malpractice suit brought against Dr. Duchowny by the parents, as co-personal representatives, of their minor child's estate. Pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2007), the Boices served a notice of intent on the child's treating physician, Dr....

...screening process is necessary and this is more likely to occur if parties are assured confidentiality of information. For all of these reasons, the legislature distinguished between informal and formal discovery in a medical malpractice action, see § 766.106(6), Fla....

...d from the essential requirements of law in denying Miami Children's motions for protective order and to quash subpoena duces tecum. We therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the orders below. Certiorari granted. NOTES [1] See § 766.106, Fla....

PER CURIAM. A physician seeks review of an order denying his motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ medical malpractice complaint for failure to comply with the pre-suit requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes, et seq....

...The trial court granted the motion and entered a final order dismissing the case. The Broadways appealed. Id. The First District reversed, explaining: The test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to the benefit of the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes, is whether the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes....

...l dispute, to determine whether this case falls within the ambit of chapter 766. Petition granted. CASANUEVA and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur. . We stress that the facts described in this paragraph are based on the allegations of the complaint. . As used in section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2010), a " ‘[c]laim for medical negligence’ or 'claim for medical malpractice’ means a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(l)(a)....

...s versus notices to statutorily designated state agencies. It is true that claimants and defendants alike (even immune defendants) are subject to presuit investigation requirements. See § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (applying requirements to claimants); § 766.106(3) (applying them to defendants). And it is true that section 766.106(4) authorizes tolling of statutes of limitations for filing suit during such presuit investigations: The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s....

...any such extension. Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. § 766.106(4), Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis added). As is facially obvious, this section tolls deadlines for filing lawsuits, not for giving statutory notice to state agencies. These parties agreed to the extensions contemplated in section 766.106(4)—as to filing of a lawsuit....

...service of the complaint upon a defendant, the claimant shall provide a copy of the complaint to the Department of Health and, if the complaint involves a facility licensed under chapter 395, the Agency for Health Care Administration. § 766.106(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017). Unlike section 766.106, section 768.28 uniquely embodies and restricts the state’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions....

...ay of the incident. Petitioner Leon Medical Centers, LLC also operates a clinic that is unconnected to this medical incident. On July 14, 2022, Falcon and his wife, Elsa, served Leon Medical Centers, LLC with a notice of intent pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes....

...d/b/a Leon Medical Centers Health Plans, and Leon Health, Inc. as one entity, alleging they operate as “Leon.” 5  Leon Medical Center, LLC moved to dismiss alleging that Falcon failed to comply with section 766.106, Florida Statutes, and failed to plead a cause of action for vicarious liability....

...or considered by the trial court in reaching its determination. We therefore decline to pass on this question. Reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the plaintiffs complaint. SCHEB, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur. . Transferred to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.). . Transferred to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.). .Transferred to section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.)....

liability, Dr. Weare had faded to comply with section 766.106 and thus the offer to arbitrate was defective

...used in a statutory limitation[] context.” Id. at 97 (emphasis supplied) (looking to meaning of “toll” in the general limitations statute—section 95.051, Florida Statutes—and concluding the Legislature intended for the term “to have the same meaning in section 766.106(4)”); Hearndon, 767 So....

...We, therefore, reverse and remand this case for further proceedings and suggest to the trial court that sanctions against Mr. Lo-vell may be entirely appropriate in this case. Reversed and remanded. CASANUEVA, J., and DANAHY, PAUL W., (Senior) Judge, Concur. . Section 766.106(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), provides, in pertinent part: No suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice is mailed to any prospective defendant....

...Moliver”), Opal Hew, CRNA (“Hew”) and Drs. Ellis, Rojas, Ross & Debs, Inc., d/b/a Kendall Anesthesia Associates (“KAA”).1 We reverse, finding that Salazar’s pre-suit Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation served on those Defendants/Appellees was timely under Section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...presented in this appeal appears to be an issue of first impression in Florida. In order to understand the facts of this case, it is necessary to first examine the portions of the statutory provisions which are at the crux of the issue in this appeal: Florida Statutes Section 766.106 states: (2) PRESUIT NOTICE.— (a) After completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s....

...ged act of negligence who treated or evaluated the claimant, copies of all of the medical records relied upon by the expert in signing the affidavit, and the executed authorization form provided in s. 766.1065....

...mant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. (all emphasis added). Simply, the issue in this appeal is: does the Section 766.106(3)(a) 90-day tolling of the statute of limitations, effective upon receipt of a notice of intent to initiate litigation, toll the statute of limitations only as to the defendant receiving the notice, or does it also toll the statut...

...ly. However, if the 90-day tolling applied to other possible defendants, then Salazar’s 3 notices to the Appellees were timely. For the reasons stated below, we find that in this factual scenario, the Section 766.106(3)(a) 90-day tolling of the statute of limitations applied to the Appellees and, therefore, the Notices of Intent to Initiate Litigation sent to the Appellees were timely and summary judgment should not have been entered in their f...

...left of the extended statute of limitations, Salazar sent a Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation to the surgeon who performed the surgery and the hospital at which the surgery was performed.4 Those notices were received on October 22, 2009. Pursuant to subsection 766.106(3), Salazar could not file her medical malpractice action for ninety days after those notices were received. This is so because subsection 766.106(3)(a) states: “No suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice is mailed to any prospective defendant.” [e.s.]....

...Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93, 99-100 n.7 (Fla. 2000). The suit was filed against the surgeon and the hospital on March 23, 2010 consistent with agreements to extend the statute of limitations with those defendants. 5 in this appeal, Section 766.106(4), states that during this ninety day period “the statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants.” [e.s.]. Salazar did not send a Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation to Dr....

...Moliver, Hew and KAA claim that, as to them, the statute of limitations expired on November 20, 2009 and that Salazar’s notices were untimely and the action against them had to be dismissed. Salazar argues that by sending the Notices of Intent to Initiate Litigation to the surgeon and the hospital on October 21, 2009, Section 766.106(4) tolled the statute of limitations not only as to the surgeon and the hospital but also as to “all potential defendants” which would include the appellees and, therefore, the Notices to the appellees were timely. The gist of the Appellees’ argument to the trial court, as well as on appeal, is that subsection 766.106(2), requires that, after completion of the statutorily- required presuit investigation, a medical negligence claimant “shall notify each prospective defendant” (e.s.) of his or her intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence and that subsection 766.106(4) requires that “[t]he notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set for the in s....

...Intent to Initiate Litigation to the surgeon and to the hospital. Appellees concede that as a 6 result of that notice, the statute of limitations did not run as to the surgeon and the hospital because Section 766.106(3) tolled the statute of limitations for an additional 90 days. Appellees argue, however, that the 90-day tolling does not also apply to them because Salazar became aware shortly after the surgery that the Appellees participated in the surgery and they were therefore “prospective defendants” of Salazar’s claim. Appellees assert that, pursuant to Section 766.106(2)(a), the only way Salazar could toll the running of the statute of limitations as to them (as “prospective defendants”) was by serving a Notice of Intent to initiate Litigation on each of them prior to November 20, 2009. Appellees posit that once Salazar served them with a Notice of Intent, Section 766.106(4) would have tolled the statute of limitations for 90 days for Salazar to file her lawsuit against them. According to Appellees, Salazar’s failure to send Notices of Intent to them prior to November 20, 2009 defeated her claims against them....

...hether they received those notices or not). The October 22, 2009 date of the Notices of Intent to Initiate 7 Litigation sent to the surgeon and hospital is critical for the issues on appeal because subsection 766.106(4) states: SERVICE OF PRESUIT NOTICE AND TOLLING.— The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s....

...an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. (emphasis added). We acknowledge that subsections 766.106(4) and 766.106(2) use different terminology, one uses “prospective defendant” and one uses “potential defendant.” The use of the differing terms gives rise to the question of whether the terms are interchangeable or whether the Legislature intended them to have different meanings....

...After extensive review of the Florida Statutes and the history of Section 766.104 we are unable to conclude that the Florida Legislature intended the different terms to carry different meanings in the context of Chapter 766. Consequently, we hold that subsection 766.106(4) means what it says and that the statute of limitations on Salazar’s claims as to any defendant was tolled for a period of ninety days from October 22, 2009 and that Salazar’s notices to Appellees were timely as they were sen...

...2d at 96.6 A review of Chapter 766 reveals that subsection 766.202(5) defines “investigate” to mean “that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert.” By contrast, as above-quoted, subsection 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2009) states that after completion of the presuit investigation and prior to filing a complaint “a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant by certified mail” of their intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence.7 Further, section 766.106(6)(b)(3) states: Physical and mental examinations.—A prospective defendant may require an injured claimant to appear for examination by an appropriate health care provider....

...Unless otherwise impractical, a claimant is required to submit to only one examination on behalf of all potential defendants. The practicality of a single examination must be determined by the nature of the 6 The Court in Hankey also held that “toll” as used in subsection 766.106(4) means a suspension of the statute of limitations, stating: “In essence, the clock stops until the tolling period expires and then begins to run again.” 755 So....

...inst nursing homes and assisted living facilities respectively. Both those sections use the term “prospective defendant” throughout, including within the subsections which parallel the tolling of the statute of limitations set forth in section 766.106(4). Finally, the difference in the language in the two subsections has existed since the statute was first enacted in 1985, see Chapters 85-175, § 14 at 1200, Laws of Florida, and has continued to exist throughout the re-enactments of the statute....

...Nothing in the initial legislative history or any re-enactment indicates any intent for the terms to have a different meaning. See Wood v. Fraiser, 677 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“[W]e find it significant that since our judicial interpretation of the interplay between section 95.11(4) (b) and [] section 766.106(4) the legislature has continually reenacted these statutory provisions without any change in the language....

...Appellees’ argument that “[t]he purpose of the ninety-day tolling period is not to give a claimant an additional ninety days within which to pursue claims against another healthcare provider not yet served with a notice of intent. … [T]here is nothing in Florida Statutes Section 766.106 that provides that a plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of more than one ninety-day tolling period.” (Answer Brief at p. 19- 20).8 In fact, the only cases that have addressed the difference in language between subsections 766.106(2) and (4) have determined that the tolling applies to all defendants and that multiple tolling periods may exist....

...The court reasoned that in light of those notices, “[t]he statute of limitations was then tolled ninety days from the date that the defendants received the notice.” The court also concluded: “Applying the holding of Hankey and the plain language of section 766.106(4) Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations clock stopped running as to ‘all potential defendants’ for ninety days, or until April 13, 1997.” Id....

...would not expire until March 27, 2003. … Id. at 589. Thus, the Fifth District has twice concluded that notice of intent to sue received by one defendant tolls the statute of limitations as to all defendants for the ninety-day period set forth in section 766.106(4)....

...extending the statute as to the tenth defendant years after the statute applicable to the first noticed defendant. We acknowledge that such an unlikely scenario could exist under Chapter 766, but do not consider its improbable potentiality as a reason to read language into subsection 766.106(4) that does not exist....

...frivolous claims, but still provide access to the courts, we find that Salazar was not required to send notices of intent to initiate litigation to all practitioners at the same time and that she properly complied with all of the requirements of section 766.106. We further agree with Salazar that her Complaint against Appellees was timely filed in light of the ninety-day tolling period which arose upon Appellees’ receipt of her Notices of Intent. Those notices were received by Appellees on February 16, 2010. At that point, Salazar had three days remaining under the statute of limitations. Upon receipt of the notices by Appellees, under subsection 766.106(4), the statute of limitations was tolled as to Appellees until May 13, 2010....

...received, whichever is longer, after the earliest of the following: a. The expiration of 90 days after the date of receipt of the notice of intent to initiate litigation. (emphasis added). Subsection 766.106(4) also states: “Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file...

...Salazar’s Complaint was filed June 8, 2010, well within that time period.9 Reversed and remanded. 9 Salazar also argues that her agreement with the surgeon and the hospital to extend the statute of limitations, as is permitted under subsection 766.106(4), operated to extend the statute of limitations as to her claims against Appellees, but we need not address that argument in light of the timely filing of her claims under Rule 1.650. 17 

...lve disputes between physicians and patients in a more efficient manner provides in pertinent part: (3) Prior to issuing its response to claimant’s notice of intent to initiate litigation, during the time period for response authorized pursuant to s. 766.106, the defendant or the defendant’s insurer or self-insurer shall conduct an investigation to ascertain whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) The defendant was negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant....

...e parties in this case. • The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the order under review is quashed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Certiorari granted; order quashed. . Dr. Damus relies on section 766.106(3)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), for the proposition that no response rejecting the claim of medical negligence is required....

...best efforts of the emergency medical technicians the technologist summoned. He left a wife and two minor children. The very next day Dr. Samiian notified FPIC of a potential malpractice claim. On behalf of his widow, his children and the estate, pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2003), the personal representative served a notice of intent to initiate medical negligence litigation on April 13, 2005....

.... Settlement check is being requested. Plan to offer it prior to 7/14/05, end of presuit.” 1 As planned, FPIC delivered a check in the amount of policy limits to the personal representative’s attorney on July 11, 2005.2 1 Section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2003), provides in part: (3) PRESUIT INVESTIGATION BY PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANT.— (a) No suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice is mailed to any prospective defendant....

...The complaint contends instead that FPIC breached duties owed him and his professional association and acted in bad faith in making an offer to arbitrate which entailed admitting liability, without making the offer “contingent upon a limit of general damages.” § 766.106(3)(b)3., Fla....

..., medical care or services, . . . shall include” “a clause authorizing the insurer or self-insurer to determine, to make, and to conclude, without the permission of the insured, any offer of admission of liability and for arbitration pursuant to s. 766.106, settlement offer, or offer of judgment, if the offer is within the policy limits. It is against public policy for any insurance or self-insurance policy to contain a clause giving the insured the exclusive right to veto any offer for admission of liability and for arbitration made pursuant to s. 766.106, settlement offer, or offer of judgment, when such offer is within the policy limits.” (emphasis added))....

...Because we conclude that McManus's complaint was grounded in ordinary negligence, rather than medical negligence, we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint based on McManus's failure to comply with the presuit requirements set forth in section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2013). BACKGROUND McManus's complaint alleged that during an appointment for neurological testing on July 1, 2013, Dr....

...Upon receipt of that final, appealable order, this court was vested with jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(l). Turning to the merits, we acknowledge that compliance with the presuit screening and notice requirements set forth in section 766.106(2) is a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice action and that failure to comply is a reason to dismiss a medical malpractice complaint....

...Estate of Lawson, 175 So. 3d 327, 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (en banc)). A claim for medical malpractice or medical negligence has been defined by the legislature as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a); Nat'l Deaf Academy, LLC v. Townes, 242 So....

...ble). The trial court erred by concluding that McManus's claim was grounded in medical negligence and thus incorrectly determined that dismissal was warranted due to McManus's failure to abide by the presuit requirements set forth in section 766.106(2) within the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical negligence claims....

..., but the metastatic cancer in her bones has never gone into remission and is progressing. After properly filing for extensions of the statute of limitations and serving medical malpractice pre-suit notices as required under Florida Statute Section 766.106 (2010), Martin and her husband and son filed suit against Appellee in October 2012....

...Kevin Walker-White, Jr., appellants’ son, suffered a brachial plexus injury at birth. The Whites, on their own behalf and on behalf of their son, filed a request for arbitration against Gail Pezzullo-Burgs, M.D., Dafna Lebow, M.D., Jay Cohen, M.D., and West Broward OB/GYN Associates, P.A. (appellees) for damages under section 766.106 et seq., and sections 766.201-.212, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...We answer the question in the affirmative and grant certiorari relief. The hospital petitions for a writ of certiorari from an order denying its motion to dismiss. The hospital argues the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the presuit requirements of Florida’s medical malpractice statute, section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2019), requires dismissal....

agree with this construction of the statute. Section 766.106(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), creates a comprehensive

...1 On August 30, 1990, Boyd mailed a notice of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.104, which was apparently received by the doctor on September 3, 1990. This resulted in an additional automatic ninety day toll of the statute of limitations per section 766.106(4)....

...f Chapter 766 to the benefit of two successive ninety day periods of extension within which to file his action and an additional sixty days at the end of the second extension. At issue is the date that the final sixty day extension period began. LAW Section 766.106(4), states: (4) The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s....

...the claim, and triggered the final sixty day extension for Boyd to file a complaint. The parties differ, however, as to the basis for measuring the preceding ninety days. According to Boyd, the ninety day pre-suit period should be computed based on section 766.106(3)(c) which states: (c) The response shall be delivered to the claimant if not represented by counsel or to the claimant’s attorney, by certified mail, return receipt requested....

...The sixty day period, measured from December 3rd would end on February 1, 1991. Accordingly, Boyd’s filing on February 1, 1991 would have been timely. However, according to the doctor, the ninety day presuit period, should be measured based upon the provisions of section 766.106(3)(a), which provides in part: (3)(a) No suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice is mailed to any prospective defendant....

...Under these provisions the ninety day tolling of the limitations period occurs from the date the notice of intent was mailed. The only case cited which has discussed this issue is Barron v. Crenhaw, 573 So.2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). In that case, realizing the potential ambiguities between section 766.106(3)(a) (“mailed”), and (c) (“receipt”), the Fifth District stated: [T]hat the ninety-day period within which the response to a notice of claim is to be made under section 766.106 begins on the day after a notice of claim is received. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). This construction adopts 766.106(3)(c) as the trigger in which the ninety day clock begins. The logic of this view is predicated on the fact that section 766.106(3)(c) states specifically and explicitly that a non-response by defendant within ninety days of receipt of the notice of claim, constitutes a rejection by defendant....

...We affirm the trial court’s ruling because the allegations in the second amended complaint arise from Appellants’ disagreement and distress with Appellees’ medical decision not to resuscitate or offer life-saving measures to their son after an initial examination. § 766.106(1)(a), Fla....

...dical Malpractice Presuit Screening Rule). See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.140(b)(1). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. The Committee proposes to amend rule 1.650 to create consistency with the current version of section 766.106(6), Florida Statutes (2020), regarding informal discovery. The Committee and the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar unanimously approved the proposed amendments....

...The taking of unsworn statements of minors is subject to the provisions of rule 1.310(b)(8). The taking of unsworn statements is subject to the provisions of rule 1.310(d) and may be terminated for abuses. If abuses occur, the abuses shall be evidence of failure of that party to comply with the good faith requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes. (B)-(C) [NO CHANGE] (D) Written Questions....

...ice in the certificate of service. Failure of a party to comply with the above time limits shall not relieve that party of its obligation under the statute, but shall be evidence of failure of that party to comply with the good faith requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes. (E) Unsworn Statements of Treating Healthcare Providers....

...The taking of unsworn statements of a treating healthcare provider is subject to the provisions of rule 1.310(d) and may be terminated for abuses. If abuses occur, the abuses shall be evidence of failure of that party to comply with the good faith requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes. (3) [NO CHANGE] (d) [NO CHANGE] Committee Notes [NO CHANGE] -5- 

...g Home Act by failing to provide her with sufficient nutrition and fluids to prevent malnutrition and dehydration which resulted in her death. Health Care then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the pre-suit requirements under section 766.106 of the Malpractice Act....

...The trial court, however, denied the motion, citing NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So.2d 439, 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) as support. Health Care then filed an answer, raising the affirmative defense that appellant failed to exhaust the pre-suit requirements of section 766.106 predicated upon deficient medical care....

...After reviewing the motion, the trial court agreed with Health Care and entered final summary judgment in its favor. The court, therefore, dismissed the case without prejudice in order to allow appellant the opportunity to re-file the case under the Malpractice Act and to comply with the pre-suit requirements under section 766.106....

...ive tortfeasor—the agent or employee of the nursing home. Id. at 441. Thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court, in an unrelated case, agreed with the McCullough court that the proper test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to notice under section 766.106(2) is whether the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1)....

...Here, the nursing home statute creates a "right to receive adequate and appropriate health care," § 400.022(1)( l ), Fla. Stat. (1997), and creates a private right of action for deprivation of a nursing home resident's statutory rights. § 400.023(1), Fla. Stat. Although section 766.106 applies to suits involving general medical negligence, we conclude that the legislature, by enacting the 1993 amendments, clearly intended that the less comprehensive pre-suit requirements of section 400.023(4) should apply where the plaintiff alleges only that a nursing home violated a resident's right to adequate health care. *573 In this respect, we note that section 400.023(4) was enacted long after section 766.106 and we do not see how the two can be harmonized. As a general rule of statutory construction, a special statute controls over a general statute. See McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1994). Here, while section 766.106 applies to general medical negligence cases, section 400.023(4) specifically applies to suits involving a nursing home's failure to provide a resident with adequate health care. Because the legislative language of section 400.023(4) is unequivocal on the specific subject to which it speaks, it need not be "harmonized" with section 766.106, an inconsistent, general, and earlier-enacted statute. See McKendry, 641 So.2d at 46. Accordingly, we hold that appellant was not required to comply with section 766.106 where his only claim was under Chapter 400....

...vs. MYLES RUBIN SAMOTIN, M.D., et al., Respondents. April 21, 2022 PER CURIAM. In this case we consider the statutory presuit notice requirement that section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2018), imposes on a claimant who seeks to file a medical negligence suit....

...applicable limitations period, but the defendant did not receive the notice until after the period would have expired absent tolling. The certified conflict issue is whether the applicable limitations period for filing a complaint for medical negligence is tolled under section 766.106(4) upon the claimant’s mailing of the presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation, or only upon receipt of the notice by the prospective defendant....

...conflict cases of Zacker and Baxter to the extent they are consistent with this opinion. I Prior to commencing an action for medical negligence, a claimant is required to follow certain procedures under section 766.106....

...extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. (Emphasis added.) Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650 applies to the presuit procedures prescribed by section 766.106....

...Just one day before the expiration of the applicable limitations period, petitioner “served a notice of intent for -5- medical negligence, via certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to [respondents] pursuant to section 766.106(2)(a) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(b)(1).” Boyle, 313 So....

...ker and Baxter. Id. at 680. -7-  III In the certified conflict case of Zacker, the Fourth District held in relevant part that a claimant “satisfie[s] the requirements of section 766.106 when they mail[] the notice of intent to initiate litigation before the expiration of the statute of limitations.” Zacker, 609 So....

...applicable limitations period for filing a medical negligence complaint is tolled upon a claimant’s mailing of the statutorily required presuit notice or only upon receipt of the notice by the prospective defendant. This requires us to interpret section 766.106 and rule 1.650....

...Becker, 627 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1993). Because the relevant statutory language has remained unchanged since Boyd was decided, we begin our analysis with Boyd. In Boyd, the conflict issue was whether “the final sixty-day extension authorized in [section 766.106(4)]” began ninety days after the presuit notice was mailed or “ninety days after [the prospective defendant] received the notice.” 627 So. 2d at 483. After recognizing there was “no question” that the different 90-day periods referenced in section 766.106(3)(a) and section 766.106(3)(c) were “in direct conflict,” this Court ultimately—and - 10 - unanimously—held that “the conflict should be resolved in a manner that allows a claim to be considered on its merits.” Id. That meant “that the ninety-day period described in section 766.106(3) should be computed from the date the putative defendant receives the notice of intent to initiate litigation.” Id....

...receipt of the presuit notice, Boyd did not squarely address whether a claimant nevertheless triggers tolling upon mailing the notice. Boyd did, however, imply that was the case. See id. at 483 - 11 - (“Subsection (3)(a) of [section 766.106] prohibited Boyd from filing his lawsuit for a period of ninety days after mailing the notice. During this same ninety-day period, the running of the statute of limitations was tolled by subsection (4).” (emphasis added))....

...serve the notice to trigger tolling. See id. at 11 (“Under the statutory scheme, service of presuit notice tolls the statute of limitations during the ninety-day presuit screening period provided for in the statute.”); id. at 12 (citing what is now section 766.106(4) for the proposition that “timely service of presuit notice tolls the statute of limitations”)....

...that the prospective defendant receives and signs for the notice within the applicable limitations period. On the contrary, a claimant is merely required to “notify each prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation.” § 766.106(2)(a), Fla. Stat. And that notice must “be served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11.” § 766.106(4), Fla....

...There, this Court held that “the ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations purchased under section 766.104(2) is not added to what remains of the original statute of limitations but is added after the sixty-day extension period under section 766.106(4).” Id....

...Coffaro’s conclusion that the claims at issue were all timely filed, id. at 867. Indeed, because the presuit notices in Coffaro were all 2. The 90-day purchased extension under section 766.104(2) is not the same as “the 90-day period” in section 766.106(4). - 15 - mailed and received within the limitations period, but with “fewer than sixty days remain[ing] in [the] limitations period,” id....

...Rather, that language merely provides that, prior to receipt, a prospective defendant is not on notice. That premise, of course, is consistent with Boyd’s conclusion “that the ninety-day period - 16 - described in section 766.106(3) should be computed from the date the putative defendant receives the notice of intent to initiate litigation.” 627 So. 2d at 483-84. Lastly, Bove’s analysis is undermined by its erroneous suggestion that section 766.106(4) was amended post-Boyd to delete a reference to receipt of the presuit notice. See Bove, 196 So. 3d at 415 & n.6. No such amendment took place. In fact, from its original enactment in 1985—as former section 768.57(4)—section 766.106(4) has never, as Bove suggested, “refer[red] to notice of intent being received.” Id. at 415 n.6. Here, because respondents’ primary argument for approving the decision below is centered on Bove and Coffaro, we reject respondents’ argument....

...3d at 675 n.1 (concluding that the same “alternate” arguments respondents advance here were not even “properly before [the Second District]”). - 17 -  V We hold that under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2018), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650, it is the timely mailing of the presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation, not the receipt of the notice, that begins the tolling of the applicable limitations period for filing a complaint for medical negligence....

screening requirements of the Florida Statutes. See § 766.106, Fla. Stat. (2005). Concluding that the trial

...findings with respect to the claimant’s compliance with chapter 766’s presuit requirements constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law. See Dial 4 Care, Inc., 319 So. 3d at 114; PP Transition, LP, 232 So. 3d at 516; Herber, 984 So. 2d at 662. 2 See § 766.106(2)(a), Fla....

...3d DCA 1994) (same). 5 While we do not address the merits of this waiver issue, we note that the “failure to provide full and complete medical records under section 766.204, Florida Statutes . . . [does] not constitute a waiver of the required notice” of the intent to sue required by section 766.106(2)(a)....

....” Id. Finally, after obtaining the pre-suit corroboration required by section 766.203(2), “and prior to filing a complaint for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence.” § 766.106(2)(a), Fla....

...ing those admitted to emergency rooms. These types of issues arise out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services. Id. at 238–39. We concluded “that the complaint is one of ‘medical negligence’ under section 766.106(1)(a).” Id....

...right result, but for the wrong reasons” so long as “there is any basis which 3 would support the judgment in the record”). Specifically, Wexford Health claims Noble’s presuit notice was defective under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2021)....

...The taking of unsworn statements of minors is subject to the provisions of rule 1.310(b)(8). The taking of unsworn statements is subject to the provisions of rule 1.310(d) and may be terminated for abuses. If abuses occur, the abuses shall be evidence of failure of that party to comply with the good faith requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes. (B) - (C) [No Change] (3) [No Change] (d) [No Change] Committee Notes [No Change] RULE 1.730....

...e is not dispositive. The service of the notice of intent was a statutory prerequisite to filing suit,5 and it contained factual allegations relied on by the parties. Consequently, Mrs. Bove was bound by the 5 See § 766.106(2)(a), Fla....

...Bove argues that even if the statute of limitations expired on February 26, 2014, her complaint was timely filed because she not only served her first notice of intent on February 25, 2014, but also because she petitioned for extensions of the statute of limitations period. She relies on section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (2013), to argue that because she served her notice of intent on Physicians prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the limitations period was tolled. Section 766.106(4) provides that during the ninety days following service of a notice of intent, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants. However, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(b)(1), which deals with medical ma...

...that the notice is mailed—that is relevant for purposes of determining whether the statute of limitations has been tolled. Our interpretation of the rule is strengthened by -6- case law interpreting section 766.106 which has likewise focused on the receipt of notice....

...medical malpractice cases and explaining that "[f]or purposes of the statutory scheme, the date [that the defendants] received the notice of intent is the date used in computing statutory time requirements"); Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1993) (analyzing both sections 766.106(3) and 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1989), to conclude that although subsection (3) referred to a notice being mailed, the reference in subsection (4) to a notice being received meant that the ninety-day investigation period addressed in subsection (3)...

...Wang and Akins received the notice of intent even later. Because none of the appellees received the notice of intent until after the statute of limitations expired on February 26, 2014, the statute of 6 We acknowledge that the 2013 version of section 766.106(4) applicable in this case does not refer to notice of intent being received. Rather, it refers to notice of intent being served within the time limits of section 95.11. However, the change in the language used in section 766.106(4) does not persuade us that the legislature, in amending section 766.106, or the Florida Supreme Court, in drafting rule 1.650, intended for service of notice of intent to be perfected upon mailing, rather than upon receipt. Using the date of mailing would result in a shortening of the ninety-day investigation period afforded to defendants in medical malpractice actions. See § 766.106(3)(a). And there is no indication that such a result was intended. Rather, the continued requirement of service of the notice of intent through certified mail, return receipt requested, in section 766.106 in addition to the rule's reference to notice being received by a defendant convinces us that it is the date of receipt that begins the tolling period. -7- limitations expired, and Mrs....