Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Eaton of Podhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A., Miami, FL, for Respondents. SHAW, J. We have for review Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 739 So.2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), wherein the district court certified the following question: Does section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1993), prohibit the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to an action filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations? Morsani, 739 So.2d at 616....

...opped from raising the statute of limitations because the defendants had induced the plaintiffs to forbear suit on the Minnesota Twins transaction. The trial court granted summary judgment as to Count I as a matter of law. The trial court found that section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1993), which enumerates the eight specific circumstances that toll the statute of limitations, constitutes a legislatively mandated exclusive catalogue of grounds that can avoid the application of the statute of limi...

...supreme court in Fulton County Administrator v. Sullivan , *1074 22 Fla. L. Weekly S578 (Fla. Sept. 25, 1997). Because equitable estoppel was not included among the permissible grounds for avoiding the effect of the statute of limitations set out in section 95.051, the trial court held that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations....

...l be commenced as follows: . . . . (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.— . . . . ( o ) An action for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort.... § 95.11, Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 95.051 delineates an exclusive list of conditions that can "toll" the running of the statute of limitations: 95.051 When limitations tolled.— (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations ......

...In any event, the action must be begun within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action. . . . . (2) No disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section .... § 95.051, Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). *1076 The Court recently explained that use of the term "toll" in section 95.051 is synonymous with "suspend": The "tolling" language in section 90.051 has been routinely and consistently interpreted as suspending the running the statute of limitations time clock until the identified condition is settled....

...The trial court granted Major League Baseball's motion for summary judgment as to Count I, ruling that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The court concluded that because equitable estoppel was not one of the factors listed in section 95.051 as tolling the statute of limitations, the doctrine could not operate to bar Major League Baseball from asserting the statute of limitations defense. The district court reversed, holding that equitable estoppel does not "toll" the statute of limitations and thus is not covered by the exclusionary provisions of section 95.051....

...Unless a statute unequivocally states that it changes the common law, or is so repugnant to the common law that the two cannot coexist, the statute will not be held to have changed the common law. Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So.2d 914, 918 (Fla.1990). In the present case, not only does the plain language of section 95.051 not expressly change the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel, it does not mention or allude to that doctrine....

...s of the filing. The two concepts, i.e., the statute of limitations and equitable estoppel, thus work hand in hand to achieve a common goal, the prevention of injustice. Fourth, the overwhelming weight of legal authority supports the conclusion that section 95.051 does not trump the doctrine of equitable estoppel. This Court has recognized equitable estoppel as a bar to a statute of limitations defense both prior to passage of the tolling provision in section 95.051 [18] and after passage [19] and has recently limited the reach of the tolling proscription by distinguishing "tolling" from "accrual." [20] Florida's district courts have approved equitable estoppel as a bar to the statute of limitatio...

...v. Dinin, 734 So.2d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (which relied on the subsequently withdrawn decision in Sullivan ). [25] IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we answer the certified question in the negative and hold that the "tolling" proscription in section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1991), does not embrace the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel, for equitable estoppel is not a "tolling" doctrine....

...ion based on a claim of childhood sexual abuse accompanied by traumatic amnesia—keeping in mind that by our decision petitioner survives respondent's motion to dismiss."). [10] Statutory bases for tolling the statute of limitations are set forth in section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1991), and include inter alia the defendant's absence from the state, the defendant's use of a false name, concealment of the defendant, an adjudication of incompetency of the defendant, the payment of any part of an obligation, and the pendency of an arbitral proceeding....

...Gray, 48 So.2d 84 (Fla.1950); Steen v. Scott, 144 Fla. 702, 198 So. 489 (1940); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164, 192 So. 637 (1939); Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853, 7 So. 391 (1889); Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364 (1853); Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171 (1848). [14] § 95.051(2), Fla....

...5th DCA 1982) ("While continuing negotiations regarding settlement do not `toll' the running of a statute of limitation, such negotiations, if infected with an element of deception, may create an estoppel. This is true even subsequent to the 1975 enactment of subsection (2) of section 95.051 which states that `no disability of other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section.'" (footnote and citation omitted)); Cape Cave Corp....

...istence of all genuine issues of material fact." Milton v. Landers, 349 So.2d 722, 723 (Fla.4th DCA 1977). Petitioners contend that the district court incorrectly shifted to them the burden of proving the inapplicability of the tolling provisions of section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...in the term herein limited after his return to the state; and if after the cause of action shall have accrued he depart from the state, the time of his absence shall not be part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. Now codified as section 95.051(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977): 95.051 When limitations tolled....

...Lee, 678 So.2d 818, 821 (Fla.1996)("[A] cause of action cannot be said to have accrued, within the meaning of the statute of limitations, until an action may be brought."). The "tolling" of a limitation period would interrupt the running thereof subsequent to accrual. See § 95.051, Fla. Stat. (1987). To that end, the Legislature enumerated specific grounds for tolling limitation periods, but did not include delayed discovery due to lack of memory. See § 95.051(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). Furthermore, the tolling statute specifically precludes application of any tolling provision not specifically provided therein. See § 95.051(2), Fla....

...We find the statute constitutional. Section 95.11(3)(b) provides, in pertinent part: "Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:... (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS. — ... (b) An action relating to the determination of paternity." Section 95.051(1)(e) provides, "The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss....

...it was barred by the statute of limitations. The department filed a motion with the trial court to set aside the judgment or to grant a new trial. The trial court denied the petition for rehearing, held that the term "voluntary payments" as used in section 95.051(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1975), should be given its ordinary meaning, and upheld the constitutionality of section 95.11(3)(b)....

...to the birth of such child. In addition the court shall order the defendant to pay periodically for the support of such child such sums as shall be fixed by the court ... . [Emphasis added.] We believe the meaning of the term "voluntary payments" in section 95.051(1)(e) can best be determined in view of the legislative remedy envisioned by section 742.031....

...eterred from instituting suit while she is receiving the very benefits to which she would otherwise be entitled under the statute, the legislature has provided that she should not be disadvantaged by her failure to sue during this time. Accordingly, section 95.051(1)(e) tolls the running of the statute of limitations during the time the mother is receiving voluntary payments from the purported father....

...hen the statute is invoked. We conclude that in view of the restrictive monetary remedy in section 742.031, the legislature intended to include only monetary payments under the phrase "voluntary payments" when it enacted the limitations provision of section 95.051(1)(e). II We now turn to the constitutionality of section 95.051(1)(e), in the face of an attack alleging that it invidiously discriminates against illegitimates by circumscribing their rights to support in contravention of the state and federal constitutions....

...ery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ..... (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS. — ..... (b) An action relating to the determination of paternity. [2] Another issue presented to the trial court concerned whether "voluntary payments," as utilized in section 95.051(1)(e), include forms of support other than monetary payment....

...[4] OTHER STATUTES Another way of determining the Legislature's intent in using the word "tolled" in section 766.106(4), is by examining other uses of the word in similar contexts. The Second District also applied this rule in Sheffield. See Sheffield, 562 So.2d at 386. For example, section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1997), provides generally for the tolling of statutory limitations periods: (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss....

...ent); Glantzis v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 573 So.2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (preventing defendant from relying on the statute of limitations when defendant had accepted a demand for arbitration thereby suspending the statute of limitations under section 95.051(1)(g))....

...[49] Fla. Stat. § 95.031(1). [50] Additionally, Plaintiff argues that there are sufficient grounds to support the argument that the statute of limitations was tolled. The determination of whether there are valid reasons for tolling under Fla. Stat. § 95.051(1)(a) or for tolling of the statute of limitations under equitable principles is not appropriate on a motion to dismiss....

...The Court has held that this restriction constitutes a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose. [6] III. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL v. MORSANI This Court in Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071 (Fla.2001), addressed the question of whether the tolling proscription in section 95.051 applies to equitable estoppel. [7] There, Major League Baseball alleged that Morsani's tort claim was barred by the statute of limitations *1096 and that Morsani could not assert the doctrine of equitable estoppel because the doctrine was excluded by section 95.051. This Court disagreed, concluded that the doctrines of tolling and equitable estoppel "are as different as apples and oranges," and held that the tolling proscription in section 95.051 is inapplicable to equitable estoppel....

...In Florida, it is well settled that a time limitation provision "does not trump the doctrine of equitable estoppel." Morsani, 790 So.2d at 1078. In Morsani, this Court stated that it has recognized equitable estoppel as a bar to a statute of limitations defense both prior to the passage of the tolling provision in section 95.051 and after passage......

...on 768.28, Florida Statutes (1993); (2) this action should be allowed to proceed because of the allegations that during S.A.P.'s minority "there was no one acting on her behalf, no friend or guardian, who could have filed suit on her behalf; and (3) section 95.051(1)(h), Florida Statutes (1993), is not applicable to S.A.P.'s case....

...action, the answer is dictated by the following statute: No disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section, s. 95.091, the Florida Probate Code, or the Florida Guardianship Law. § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat (1993) (emphasis added). This statute is expressly very broad, applying to "any statute of limitations." Id. Because fraudulent concealment is not one of the exceptions listed in section 95.051(2), this provision alone requires that the certified question be answered in the negative....

...te the four-year limitation because of her allegations that no one was acting on her behalf during her minority. See S.A.P., 704 So.2d at 585. Again, the district court's decision on this issue must be quashed because it is in conflict with sections 95.051(2) and 768.28(12) and the long-standing precedent of this Court. First, section 95.051(2) specifically prohibits tolling for any statute of limitations except as specified, and the allegations here do not come within the specified exceptions....

...of limitations on personal actions in account of the minority of the claimant and none has existed since 1872." Id. at 323. The district court correctly recognized in its third holding that no such statute was passed until 1993, *1110 and therefore section 95.051(1)(h) has no applicability to S.A.P.'s case....

...1992) ("A statute of limitation begins to run upon the accrual of a cause of action.... On the other hand, a statute of repose, which is usually longer in length, runs from the date of a discrete act on the part of the defendant without regard to when the cause of action accrued.") [7] Section 95.051 sets forth an exclusive list of conditions that can "toll" the running of the statute of limitations; the section states that no other condition can toll the statute of limitations. The list does not mention equitable estoppel. See § 95.051, Fla....

...5th DCA 1982) ("While continuing negotiations regarding settlement do not `toll' the running of a statute of limitation, such negotiations, if infected with an element of deception, may create an estoppel. This is true even subsequent to the 1975 enactment of subsection (2) of section 95.051 which states that `no disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section.' " (footnote and citation omitted)); Cape Cave Corp....

...In the instant case, however, it has been alleged that S.A.P.’s records were confidential under Florida law and that, unlike N.G., no one, no natural parent, no adoptive parent, no guardian ad litem, and no next friend, was aware of HRS’s negligence in the supervision of S.A.P. Section 95.051(l)(h) Not Applicable Finally, we cannot agree with the trial court that, on the facts alleged in this complaint, section 95.051(l)(h), Florida Statutes (1993), mandates that S.AP....

...ed incapacity of the person entitled to sue during any period of time in which a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor or incapacitated person, or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue.... In section 95.051(l)(h), the legislature also established a seven-year period of repose for actions to which subparagraph (l)(h) applies by providing that: “In any event, the action must be begun within seven years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action.” The 1990 law which added subsection (1)(h) to section 95.051, however, expressly applies only “to causes of action accruing on or after the effective date.” Ch....

...Because it is not clear from the facts set forth on the face of this complaint that the alleged causes of action accrued after June 17, 1990, see D.B. v. CCH-GP, Inc., 664 So.2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the trial court erred in dismissing the instant action based upon the section 95.051(l)(h) statute of repose....

...In reaching that determination, the court reasoned: In chapter 95, Florida Statutes, the legislature has established certain statutes of limitations and has specifically enumerated the events that toll the running of such limitation periods. Permenter does not suggest that any of the tolling provisions in section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1991), pertain to this case and we find none that are applicable....

...In Permenter, the Second District explicitly rejected the reasoning in Frew and, *680 by extension, that in Smith also. 712 So.2d at 1179. Rather, by negative implication, the court directed its attention to a concept of "tolling" rather than when an action is "commenced" and, therefore, found section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1991), controlling....

...of Seminole County, 435 So.2d 804 (Fla.1983); see Kelley, 435 So.2d at 805 (citing this text with approval). TSE's argument that we should employ the continuous representation doctrine to toll the statute of limitations founders not only on our decision in Kelley but also on the text of section 95.051, Florida Statutes (2002), which restricts the circumstances under which statutes of limitations may be tolled. Section 95.051(1) contains a list of specific circumstances in which the running of the time under statutes of limitations (subject to the exception of certain statutes) is tolled. The existence of an ongoing attorney-client relationship is not on that list. (Nor is the existence of any other ongoing professional-client relationship.) Section 95.051(2) provides that "[n]o disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations" except as specifically authorized by statute....

...ovisions. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 746, 100 S.Ct. 1978, 1982, 64 L.Ed.2d 659 (1980) (in federal court action based on state law, tolling of the statute of limitations is based on state law). Florida's tolling statute, Fla.Stat. § 95.051 (West Supp.1994), enumerates the specific circumstances that toll the statute of limitations. Only those circumstances expressly provided by the statute will toll the statute of limitations. See Fla.Stat. § 95.051(2) ("No disability or other reason shall *358 toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section ..."); Webb v. Chambly, 584 So.2d 216, 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (Section 95.051 "limits tolling of statutes of limitations to the circumstances set out within"). A reading of section 95.051 readily reveals that the doctrine of adverse domination is not among those tolling circumstances recognized by Florida statute....

...in part, rev'd in part, 69 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1995), [5] this conclusion appears questionable. In Southeast Banking Corp., the court concluded that Florida law does not recognize the adverse domination theory for two reasons. First, the court reasoned that, because Florida's tolling statute, Section 95.051, Florida Statutes, enumerates the specific circumstances that toll a statute of limitations and because the tolling statute does not contain an adverse domination provision, there can be no tolling for adverse domination in Florida....

...her is the term used in other statutes of repose. For whatever reason, the legislature chose not to insert that legal term of art into the statutes. However, that does not mean those statutes lack the legal effect of statutes of repose. For example, section 95.051 is titled "[w]hen limitations tolled." Within the statute reside two separate statutes of repose, both reciting the same language: "In any event, the action must be begun within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action." § 95.051(1)(d),(h), Fla....

...nd based on the negligent retention policies of the church is barred by the statute of limitations. Section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes, limits an action for negligence to four years. This period is tolled until a minor plaintiff reaches majority. Section 95.051(1)(h)....

...medical malpractice); 95.11(4)(e) (an action founded upon a violation of chapter 517); and 95.11(4)(f) (an action for personal injury caused by contact or exposure to phenoxy herbicides), Florida Statutes (1987), and is not limited or controlled by section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1987) (when limitations tolled)....

...Thereupon, on May 1, 1989, appellants filed a petition to compel arbitration. From an order denying said petition on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired appellants perfected this appeal. Appellants contend that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to section 95.051(1)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...aim during a period when appellants had the option to arbitrate or litigate. State Auto contends that the claim is barred by the five-year statute of limitations provided in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), and that the tolling statute, section 95.051(1)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...sorting to the statute of limitations as a defense. Appellants' claim for injuries arising out of the automobile accident of April 2, 1984, was subject to the five-year statute of limitations set forth in 95.11(2)(b). However, the legislature passed section 95.051(1)(g) in 1986, which provides that the running of the time under any statute of limitations [except specific statutes not relevant here] is tolled by the pendency of any arbitrable proceeding pertaining to a dispute that is the subject of the action....

...Appellants do not contest that the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the accident. They simply contend that, having begun to run, the statute of limitations was tolled by the agreement to arbitrate, which occurred prior to expiration of the limitations period. Furthermore, section 95.051(1)(g) was passed several years after the decision in Kilbreath....

...We also disagree with Centimark's contention that, as a matter of law, any amendment would be futile based on the statute of limitations. We reach that conclusion because we cannot precisely tell when ABC's causes of actions accrued nor does Centimark take into account the provision of section 95.051(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1996), which tolls any statute of limitation during the pendency of any arbitral proceeding pertaining to a dispute that is the subject of the court action....

...ings. Dupont, 190 So.2d at 391 (citing 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 247). See also 35 Fla.Jur.2d, Limitations and Laches § 73 (1982). We conclude that in 1974 the legislature superseded the general rule adopted by prior case law by creating section 95.051 which provides for specific instances that toll the running of any statute of limitations. See Ch. 74-382, § 1, Laws of Fla. There is no provision for the tolling of any statute of limitation during the pendency of other legal proceedings which prevent a person from exercising a legal remedy, including bankruptcy proceedings. Cf. § 95.051(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1987) (pendency of arbitral proceeding pertaining to a dispute that is the subject of the action tolls any statute of limitations). Further, section 95.051(2) specifically provides that no disability or "other reason" shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specifically delineated. § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1981). Neither Williams nor Major Appliances, Inc., later cases which have adopted the above-cited general rule, discusses section 95.051(2)....

...(1) referring to "any suspension of such period" means those nonbankruptcy law tolling periods such as minority or incompetency of a plaintiff. Id. at 569. Such a suspension would also include any statutory tolling provisions, such as those found in section 95.051. However, as discussed above, section 95.051 does not provide for the tolling of the statute of limitations in this case....

...The parties have more certain knowledge of when claims will expire, and the potential claims period is not unduly extended because of the length — which may be great in complex cases — of the bankruptcy proceedings. 85 B.R. at 570. See also In re Baird, 63 B.R. 60 (W.D.Ky. 1986). Accordingly, we hold that under section 95.051 and 11 U.S.C....

...§ 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. The Legislature carved out the following exceptions to the accrual-date trigger: claims of fraud (§ 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat.)10 and products liability actions (§ 95.031(2)(b), Fla. Stat.); tolling exceptions provided in section 95.051(1)(a)-(i), Florida Statutes (2013); and “elsewhere in these statutes.” § 95.031, Fla....

...ction. Because earlier decisions of the court had apparently approved a common law fraudulent concealment avoidance of a limitations bar, the court explained why that particular judge-made rule was no longer available: *534 "we find that by enacting section 95.051 in 1975, the legislature specifically set forth the limited circumstances which will toll the statute of limitations....

...reverses the judgment against respondent." ___ So.2d at ___, 1997 WL 589312, at 2. The court then traced the use of the "fraudulent concealment" avoidance in several earlier cases, but ultimately explained: "However, in 1974, the legislature enacted section 95.051, Florida Statutes, see ch. 74-382, § 4, Laws of Fla., in which it enumerated several bases for tolling the statute of limitations, including defendant's use of a false name or concealment in Florida to avoid service of process. See § 95.051(1)(b)-(c), Fla....

...nt of the discovery of the plaintiff's injury in medical malpractice actions, there was no similar tolling provision for wrongful death causes of action. Compare § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1975), with § 95.11(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (1975). Moreover, in section 95.051(2), the legislature stated, `No disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section ... the Florida Probate Code, or the Florida Guardianship Law.' This exclusivity provision is applicable to this action. See § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1985). "Thus, the issue presented by the certified question is the continued viability of our court-made tolling provision for fraudulent concealment in the face of section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Huntington Nat'l Bank, 609 So.2d 1315 (Fla.1992). When construing statutes of limitations, generally courts will not write in exceptions when the legislature has refused to do so. Carey v. Beyer, 75 So.2d 217 (Fla.1954). "Given these rules of construction, we find the plain language of section 95.051 does not provide for the tolling of the statute of limitations in cases in which the tortfeasor fraudulently conceals his or her identity. The statute specifically precludes application of any tolling provision not specifically provided for by the legislature. See § 95.051(2), Fla....

...an we create by judicial fiat a reason, or reasons, for tolling the statute since the legislature dealt with such topic and thereby foreclosed judicial enlargement thereof.'); Swartzman v. Harlan, 535 So.2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (finding that under section 95.051(2), Florida Statutes (1987), the court was not able to create an exception to toll the statute of limitations not specifically enumerated by the legislature); In re Southeast Banking Corp., 855 F.Supp....

...For example, subsection (2) of section 95.031 expressly begins the limitations period in product liability and fraud cases from the time of discovery rather than the accrual of the cause of action. Section 95.11(4) begins the running of the statute for professional malpractice from the time of discovery. Finally, section 95.051 tolls the running of the statute in several explicit circumstances, but none of the enumerated circumstances include discovery in a case involving section 540.08....

...(1997) ("Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows ... (3) within four years ... (f) an action founded on a statutory liability ... (p) any action not specifically provided for in these statutes."). [4] § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1997) ("Except as provided in subsection (2) and in s. 95.051 and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues."). Section 95.051 provides when a limitations period may be tolled, but none of the allowable tolling provisions apply to this action....

...this opinion is written, more than 18 months have elapsed since it was first released. While the Sullivan opinion is thus not final, that lack of finality did not inhibit the supreme court itself from relying on it in Federal Insurance Company. [9] Section 95.051, Fla....

...od as provided by statute, it might apply no matter how unequivocally the applicable limitations period is expressed. Id. at 1079 (emphasis added). In Morsani, the trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of Major League Baseball holding that section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1993), [4] barred Morsani's claim. The second district reversed, holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel can operate to bar a statute of limitation defense. The second district certified to our supreme court as a question of great public importance whether section 95.051 prohibits the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to an action filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations....

...NOTES [1] § 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (1997). [2] § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). [3] § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). [4] "No disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitation except those specified in this section...." § 95.051(2), Fla....

...See id. at 1098 . The appellate court reversed, holding that there was no support for the proposition that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applies outside of the administrative context. See id. The *1207 legislative intent expressed in Section 95.051 lent further support to that conclusion, as 95.051(1) sets forth an exclusive list of eight circumstances in which the statute of limitations in tolled. See id. Absent from the list is the timely filing of a claim in the improper forum. See id. Furthermore 95.051(2) expressly precludes use of any tolling provision not listed....

...In the instant case, however, it has been alleged that S.A.P.'s records were confidential under Florida law and that, unlike N.G., no one, no natural parent, no adoptive parent, no guardian ad litem, and no next friend, was aware of HRS's negligence in the supervision of S.A.P. Section 95.051(1)(h) Not Applicable Finally, we cannot agree with the trial court that, on the facts alleged in this complaint, section 95.051(1)(h), Florida Statutes (1993), mandates that S.A.P....

...ed incapacity of the person entitled to sue during any period of time in which a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor or incapacitated person, or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue.... In section 95.051(1)(h), the legislature also established a seven-year period of repose for actions to which subparagraph (1)(h) applies by providing that: "In any event, the action must be begun within seven years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action." The 1990 law which added subsection (1)(h) to section 95.051, however, expressly applies only "to causes of action accruing on or after the effective date." Ch....

...Because it is not clear from the facts set forth on the face of this complaint that the alleged causes of action accrued after June 17, 1990, see D.B. v. CCH-GP, Inc., 664 So.2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the trial court erred in dismissing the instant action based upon the section 95.051(1)(h) statute of repose....

...erewith. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HARRIS, J., concurs. SHARP, W., J., concurs specially with opinion. *318 SHARP, W., J., concurring specially. It appears that the general rule in Florida, which we apply in this case, is that the tolling provisions of section 95.051 prevent the accrual of a cause of action, or the running of the Florida statute of limitations when any person, including a resident or a non-resident, is not present in this state. Section 95.051 provides: (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss....

...If the foreign judgment is no longer enforceable, then registration or a common law action on a judgment ought not to be available to breathe life into a moribund decree. Muka v. Horizon Financial Corp., 766 So.2d 239, 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). [1] § 95.051(a), Fla....

...Since Greene filed his complaint with the Commission on 16 June 1994, any claim for damages pre-dating 16 June 1993 is time-barred. Greene contends that the limitations period should be equitably tolled, but the only acts or circumstances that will toll a limitations period are those enumerated in section 95.051(2), see, Fulton County Administrator v....

...There is no authority in chapter 95 or in the Florida Civil Rights Act to suggest that this presuit procedure permits a rule regarding the statute of limitations that is different from any other statutory claim. Further, there is no statutory or case law authority for tolling the statute of limitations for these claims. See § 95.051(2), Fla....

...See Resp. at 36. The Florida tolling statute sets forth the limited circumstances under which the statute of limitations may be tolled. The statute explicitly precludes application of any tolling provision not specified by the legislature. See Fla. Stat. § 95.051....

...od is included. Mobil argues that the holding of McMillen v. Hamilton, supra , was superseded in 1974 by the passage of Section 95.031, Florida Statutes, which stated in part: [2] "95.031 Computation of time. — Except as provided in subsection (2), s. 95.051, and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues....

...The obvious purpose of Section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1974) was to make more precise the dates upon which various causes of action accrued. Since specific statutory circumstances under which limitations periods are tolled were being established in Section 95.051 as part of the same legislation, it was logical to include in Section 95.031 a statement that except as set forth in Section 95.051, the time within which an action shall be begun runs from the time the cause of action accrues....

...o file her claim no later than July 18, 2000. As her complaint was filed May 3, 2001, it is time barred by the statute of limitations. In the alternative, Plaintiff avers that the statute of limitations was tolled during the arbitration proceedings. Section 95.051(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that the statute of limitations is tolled by "[t]he pendency of any arbitral proceeding pertaining to a dispute that is the subject of the action "(emphasis added)....

...Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court has also held that "the party seeking to escape the statute of limitations must bear the burden of proving circumstances that *1124 would toll the statute." Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1979). Based upon the plain meaning of section 95.051(1)(g), there was no tolling of the statute of limitations unless the arbitration proceeding (a claimed violation of a collective bargaining agreement) pertained to the same dispute that is the subject of the current action (a claimed invasion of privacy and negligent investigation)....

...We conclude that the arbitrated employment dispute pertained only to the applicable collective bargaining agreement. It did not pertain to Plaintiff's claims of invasion of privacy and negligent investigation, which are the subjects of the current action. Therefore, section 95.051(1)(g) does not operate to toll the applicable statute of limitations, and Plaintiff's claims are time-barred....

...limitations is five years. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1990). The payment of any part of the principal or interest of any obligation or liability founded on a written instrument tolls the running of the time under any statute of limitations. See § 95.051(1)(f), Fla....

...However, the hospital's cause of action against Mrs. Lefor, which alleged that she was a guarantor in a written agreement, was not barred because the five year statute of limitation was tolled by the payments made to the hospital through June 1993. See § 95.051(1)(f)....

...The limitations period provided in section 95.11(2)(c) does not affect the life of the lien or extinguish the debt; it merely precludes an action to collect the debt after five years. Section 95.281(1)(b), conversely, establishes an ultimate date when the lien of the mortgage terminates and is no longer enforceable. Section 95.051, Florida Statutes (2002), sets forth the times when the limitations period under section 95.11 is tolled, but expressly excludes section 95.281....

...opped from raising the statute of limitations because the defendants had induced the plaintiffs to forbear suit on the Minnesota Twins transaction. The trial court granted summary judgment as to Count I as a matter of law. The trial court found that section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1993), [1] which enumerates *613 the eight specific circumstances that toll the statute of limitations, constitutes a legislatively mandated exclusive catalogue of grounds that can avoid the application of the statut...

...County Administrator v. Sullivan, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S578, ___ So.2d ___, 1997 WL 589312 (Fla. Sept. 25, 1997). Because equitable estoppel was not included among the permissible grounds for avoiding the effect of the statute of limitations set out in section 95.051, the trial court held that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations....

...Instead, the plaintiffs claim that the defendants are estopped to assert the bar of the expired statute. The defendants argue that Sullivan eliminates the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a defense to the statute of limitations. In Sullivan, the district court of appeal held that section 95.051 precludes the tolling of the statute of limitations due to fraudulent concealment....

...See id. Faced with an affirmative defense of a statute of limitations bar to the claim, the estate asserted that Sullivan's fraudulent concealment of his participation in the murder tolled the statutory limitation period. See id. Sullivan argued that section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1985), which enumerated several events that would toll the statute of limitations, precluded fraudulent concealment as a defense because fraudulent concealment was absent from the list. See id. at S579, ___ So.2d at ___. The supreme court agreed and reasoned that the legislative intent of section 95.051 sought to exclude all tolling exceptions except those listed in the statute....

...e legislature to consider an amendment to the statute to avoid such an unfair result. See id. In the instant case, the trial court found that Sullivan stands for the proposition that any defenses to the statute of limitations outside those listed in section 95.051 are not cognizable....

...McCulloch Oil Corp., 720 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir.1983); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1043, n. 7 (10th Cir.1980); Barton v. Peterson, 733 F.Supp. 1482, 1490-91 (N.D.Ga. 1990). The Fifth District Court of Appeal has expressly addressed the distinction as it applies to section 95.051. See City of Brooksville v. Hernando County, 424 *615 So.2d 846, 848 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). That court concluded that the two concepts are different and that section 95.051 has no bearing on the defense of equitable estoppel: While continuing negotiations regarding settlement do not "toll" the running of a statute of limitations, such negotiations, if infected with an element of deception, may create an estoppel.... This is true even subsequent to the 1975[sic] enactment of subsection (2) of section 95.051, which states that "no disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section...." Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, all of the Fifth District's sister courts have continued to recognize equitable estoppel as a defense to the statute of limitations without regard to section 95.051....

...stoppel defenses to the statute of limitations. The First District Court of Appeal dealt with a similar issue in Hearndon v. Graham, 710 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). In Hearndon, the court held that the defense of delayed discovery was precluded by section 95.051....

...Accordingly, we find that Sullivan can be distinguished as applying only to those defenses that toll the statute of limitations. However, because of the interpretation Hearndon has placed upon the holding in Sullivan, we certify the following question to the supreme court as a matter of great public importance: DOES SECTION 95.051, FLORIDA STATUTES (1993), PROHIBIT THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL TO AN ACTION FILED OUTSIDE OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS? The defendants argue that even if equitable estoppel survives Sullivan, this...

...Accordingly, we find that there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and reverse and remand for further proceedings on Count I of the plaintiffs' complaint. Reversed and remanded. PARKER, C.J., and BLUE and NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] That statute, which has remained unchanged since 1975, states: 95.051 When limitations tolled.— (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except §§ 95.281, 95.35, and 95.36 is tolled by: (a) Absence from the state of the person to be sued....

...PER CURIAM. The question on this appeal is how long does a debtor have to question an account stated. The debtor argues that it is the time provided in the Statute of Limitations, which period may be extended by payments made on account pursuant to Section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...(“Unjust enrichment is equitable in nature and cannot exist where payment has been made for the benefit conferred.”). c. Statute of Limitations The Receiver’s unjust enrichment claims are subject to a four year statute of limitations under Florida law. Fla. Stat. § 95.051 ....

...[3] Although not a basis for our opinion, we note that Florida "civil death" statute is a more severe deprivation of the right of access to courts than those invalidated by other courts in two respects. First, there is no provision to toll the applicable statutes of limitation while the right is suspended. Fla. Stat. § 95.051 (1983)....

...Hearndon held that the delayed discovery doctrine, when properly applied, operates to delay the accrual of a cause of action. 767 So.2d at 1184. "[A]ccrual pertains to the existence of a cause of action which then triggers the running of a statute of limitations[.]" Id. at 1185. The court observed that in section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1987), the legislature limited the circumstances when a cause of action might be tolled, or interrupted, after accrual....

...running of a statute of limitations, such negotiations, if infected with an element of deception, may create an estoppel. [2] North v. Culmer, 193 So.2d 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). This is true even subsequent to the 1975 enactment of subsection (2) of section 95.051, which states that "no disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section......

...Section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1996), covers "[a]n action founded on a statutory liability," which would apply to *1217 Doktorczyk's FDUTPA claim. The circuit court agreed that Doktorczyk's sole claim was a statutory cause of action, but held that the part payment tolling exception contained in section 95.051(1)(f) was applicable to this statutory claim because it was based on events that "occurred as part of the sales contract transaction." Section 95.051, entitled "[w]hen limitations tolled," provides in pertinent part: (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss....

...the RSIC, [Doktorczyk] purchased an unnecessary warranty which was never refunded. If, as [South Motors] correctly points out, the general statute of limitations in § 95.11(3)(f), Fla. Stat. (2004) applies, then, it logically follows that the part payment tolling exception of § 95.051(1)(f), Fla....

...Here, the RSIC, or "1996 finance agreement" as referred to in [Doktorczyk's] amended complaint, was the underlying basis for the deceit. Therefore, this Court finds that [Doktorczyk's] FDUPTA action was necessarily based on a "written instrument," i.e. the RSIC, and, consequently, the tolling provision of § 95.051(1)(f), Fla....

...nded complaint, however, was not the basis for the alleged deceit that he asserted in support of his FDUTPA action, and the payments tendered pursuant to the finance agreement thus did not operate to toll the statute of limitation period pursuant to section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...The circuit court's decision would effectively toll the running of the statute of limitation for all consumer transactions with extended payment plans for at least the life of the payments. This is a complete misapplication of the part-payment tolling provision in section 95.051(1)(f)....

...Weekly S578, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla.1997)(rehearing pending). In Sullivan, the court considered the following certified question: "Are statutes of limitations for civil actions tolled by the fraudulent concealment of the identity of the defendant." Id. [3] The Sullivan court ruled that, because section 95.051(2), Florida Statutes (1985) "specifically precludes application of any tolling provision not specially provided for by the legislature," id....

...on has accrued. This distinction, if it remains viable, is important here. If, rather than tolling the statute, the delayed discovery doctrine works to delay the accrual of the cause of action, then the legislative preclusion on tolling set forth in section 95.051(2) might not restrict judicial recognition of the doctrine and Sullivan might not compel affirmance in the instant case....

...the injured party sufficient to place him in ignorance of his right to a cause of action or to prevent him from discovering his injury. Id. at 39, (emphasis added). The rule in Sullivan seems broadly stated. Although Sullivan holds that section *92 95.051(2) precludes the judicial recognition of a "tolling provision" such as the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the Sullivan court explains that "[w]hen construing statutes of limitations, generally courts will not write in exceptions when the legislature has refused to do so." Sullivan, 22 Fla....

...defendant until that defendant is discovered. The legislature has enacted an all-inclusive tolling statute. Except for the reasons expressly provided by statute, "[n]o disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations." § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). Section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1993), provides circumstances that toll the statute of limitations, including concealment and use of a false name. See § 95.051(1)(b), (c), Fla....

...e for delay in being able to assert a cause of action. For example, the Legislature allows the tolling of the statute of limitations in certain circumstances when a party has a legal disability and is unable to assert his or her cause of action. See § 95.051, Fla....

...ht that are injured as a result of medical malpractice with additional time to file a claim. This proposition finds strong support in the staff analysis for House Bill 43 ("HB 43"), a companion bill to SB 454. [4] HB 43 contained a proposal to amend section 95.051, Florida Statutes to toll the statute of limitations and statute of repose for medical malpractice actions "brought on behalf of a minor child" until the child reached 5 years of age....

...Prior to 1974, there was no statutory enumeration of facts or circumstances which would toll the running of time under any statute of limitations although a number of such circumstances or facts had developed through case law. In 1974 the legislature enacted § 95.051, Fla....

...in subsection (2) that "[n]o disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section, s. 95.091, the Florida Probate Code, or the Florida Guardianship Law." In 1975 the legislature added § 95.051(1)(f) which provided that the running of time was tolled by "[t]he payment of any part of the principal or interest of any obligation or liability founded on a written instrument." This is the only subsection dealing specifically with written instruments and acts which would toll the running of time on written instruments. Under the provisions of § 95.051(1)(f), the only act which would toll the time for the running of the statute of limitations was the payment of any part of the principal or interest, since any contrary case law was superseded by § 95.051....

...applicable, and thus no tolling occurs, where the out-of-state (or concealed) Defendant is amenable to service of process. Friday v. Newman, 183 So.2d 25, 26 (2d D.C.A.Fla.1966); Roess v. Malsby Co., 69 Fla. 15, 67 So. 226 (1915); see also Fla.Stat. § 95.051 (1975)....

...But all statutes of limitations, which by their very nature destroy otherwise just causes merely because of the passage of time, are inherently harsh. Harsh results represent a trade-off which the Legislature has decided it is willing to make in exchange for the burying of stale claims. Even in the provisions of F.S. § 95.051, enacted after the events involved in this case, the Legislature has declined to exclude *1007 the situation before us from the effect of this decision; it certainly had not done so before....

...Thus, the action accrued in 1975 at the latest, and is therefore barred by any of the statutes of limitations listed above. Olavarrieta's response that the Board cannot invoke the time bars applicable "because the Third Party Defendant is in violation of F.S. 95.051(c) by not been [sic] registered as the person to be sued" is inaccurate and meritless....

...nt guardians. Id. at 1082-84 . Florida law tolls the statute of limitations for a minor's tort claim when the child lacks a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem who is not adverse *876 to the child and has not been adjudicated to be incapacitated. § 95.051(1)(h), Fla....

...ing, that guardian ad litem did not know of the factual basis for their claims against Adept and B.E.A.R.R. Id. The Second District held the guardian ad litem's lack of knowledge of the Twins' injury was irrelevant to the question of tolling because section 95.051(1)(h) does not allow for tolling on the basis that a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem is unaware of a minor's injury....

...damental error doctrine allows the Court to address this issue despite their failure to properly present it to the district court. As explained below, we conclude the Second District erred in determining the Twins' claims were not tolled pursuant to 95.051(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Johnson , 873 So.2d 1182 , 1185 (Fla. 2003). "The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing irrefutably that the nonmoving party cannot prevail." Bryson v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. , 75 So.3d 783 , 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). The application of section 95.051(1)(h) to this case is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo....

...dicated incapacity of the person entitled to sue during any period of time in which a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor or incapacitated person, or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue." § 95.051(1)(h), Fla....

...sence of any such representative "by next friend or by a guardian ad litem." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(b). By tolling the statute of limitations during any period in which a child lacks a person who has a duty to act in the best interests of that child, section 95.051(1)(h) protects children from the danger that their claims will be time-barred before they can be brought....

...had an interest adverse to the Twins. The parties do not dispute that the Mother, as the person who maltreated the Twins, had an interest adverse to the Twins with respect to the present case. Therefore, the first *878 requirement for tolling under section 95.051(1)(h) is satisfied: there was a period of time-from the time the Twins were first injured by the Mother's maltreatment until the present day-when the Twins lacked a parent whose interests were not adverse to their own with respect to their claims in this case....

...Guardian In order for statutory tolling to apply to a minor's claim, Florida law requires that there be a "period of time in which a ... guardian ... does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor ... or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue." § 95.051(1)(h), Fla....

...respect to the Twins and refers to the Grandparents as "custodians," not guardians; nor does it refer to the many substantive or procedural aspects of Florida guardianship law. We therefore conclude the Twins lacked a guardian within the meaning of section 95.051(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2006), until the Grandparents were appointed as their permanent guardians on April 13, 2007. II. Guardian Ad Litem A. Interpreting § 95.051(1)(h), Fla....

...(2006) The third and final element to statutory tolling of a child's claim requires that there be "a period of time in which a ... guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor ... or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue." § 95.051(1)(h), Fla....

...efer to other matters in which the guardian ad litem is not representing the child in question. Having identified the plain and obvious meaning of the term "guardian ad litem," we must now determine whether giving that meaning to the term as used in section 95.051(1)(h) would lead to a result which is unreasonable or contrary to the Legislature's intent....

...In providing for the tolling of children's causes of action, it is clear the Legislature intended to increase procedural protections for children in situations where a child's inability to sue would likely lead to harm. It is difficult to imagine what *880 other purpose section 95.051(1)(h) could possibly serve. Given the obvious meaning of the term "guardian ad litem" as a representative appointed for a particular legal proceeding, and given the Legislature's well-evidenced intention to provide broad protection for children, we cannot read section 95.051(1)(h) to prohibit tolling of a child's claim when that child is not represented by a guardian ad litem in the proceeding in which the claim to be tolled is being litigated, merely because the child happens to be represented by a guardian ad litem in a different proceeding. Such a result would be unreasonable and contrary to the clear intent of the Legislature. Instead, we conclude that "guardian ad litem" as used in section 95.051(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2006), means a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the child in the particular proceeding in which the claim to be tolled is brought. Applying this interpretation of section 95.051(1)(h) to the present case, we conclude the Twins lacked a "guardian ad litem" within the meaning of that statute....

...Although the Twins were represented by a guardian ad litem in the dependency proceeding from its inception until April 13, 2007, the Twins were never represented by a guardian ad litem in the case at bar. Therefore, the third requirement for statutory tolling under section 95.051(1)(h) is satisfied. B. Issue Preservation The Second District held section 95.051(1)(h) did not toll the Twins' claims because the Twins were represented by a guardian ad litem in the separate dependency proceeding. 217 So.3d at 1083. The Second District rejected the Twins' argument that the guardian ad litem did not know of the factual basis for the Twins' negligence claims, concluding that, based on the plain language of section 95.051(1)(h), the guardian ad litem's knowledge was irrelevant. Id. The Second District declined to address whether "the term 'guardian ad litem' in section 95.051(1)(h) means only a guardian ad litem legally authorized to file suit on the minor's behalf" because the Twins did not raise that argument on appeal....

...It is therefore possible, in very rare instances, to overcome certain procedural bars. In the present case, the district court declined to address whether the guardian ad litem's ability or inability to sue on the Twins' behalf had any effect *881 on the applicability of section 95.051(1)(h)....

...to rule on the merits of their argument. We conclude it is not necessary to reach this issue. Although the Twins did not raise this particular rationale for statutory tolling before the Second District, they nevertheless argued the applicability of section 95.051(1)(h), and the Second District ruled on the merits that section 95.051(1)(h) did not apply, in part because the Twins were represented by a guardian ad litem in the dependency proceeding....

...1982) ("[O]nce this Court has jurisdiction of a cause, it has jurisdiction to consider all issues appropriately raised in the appellate process ... when these other issues have been properly briefed and argued and are dispositive of the case."). Furthermore, as we have explained above, the phrase "guardian ad litem" in section 95.051(1)(h) refers only to a guardian ad litem appointed for the case in which the claim to be tolled is brought....

...e would require this Court to speculate about the powers of a hypothetical guardian ad litem who might have been appointed in this matter, but who was not in fact appointed, and about the effect those powers might have had upon our interpretation of section 95.051(1)(h)....

...Timeliness As explained above, there were periods of time where the Twins lacked either a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem, respectively, whose interests were not adverse to theirs and who had not been adjudicated as incapacitated to sue. Cf. § 95.051(1)(h), Fla....

...me during which those vacancies overlapped. It is clear from the record that the Twins lacked a qualifying parent at all times during the events to which this case relates. As we have explained, the Twins also lacked a guardian within the meaning of section 95.051(1)(h) until the Grandparents were appointed their permanent guardians on April 13, 2007. Additionally, the Twins were not represented by a guardian ad litem in these proceedings at any time. Accordingly, we hold the applicable statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to section 95.051(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2006), at all times prior to April 13, 2007, when the Grandparents were appointed as the Twins' permanent guardians....

...can have no actual effect."). The same is true with respect to the other issues raised on review. We therefore decline to address these issues. Conclusion We conclude the statute of limitations applicable to the Twins' claims was tolled pursuant to section 95.051(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2006), at all times prior to the Grandparents being appointed as the Twins' permanent guardians on April 13, 2007....

...to refer both to the individual guardian ad litem and the GALP. Adept later joined B.E.A.R.R.'s motion. 217 So.3d at 1076. 832 So.2d 708 (Fla. 2002). The version of the statute now in effect contains identical language in a different subsection. See § 95.051(1)(i), Fla. Stat. (2018). Adept and B.E.A.R.R. do not argue that the Twins' father-whose whereabouts are unknown-prevents section 95.051(1)(h) from tolling the Twins' claims....

...997), bars the enforcement of this debt because the default occurred more than five years before the suit was filed. He further argues that the statute of limitations was not tolled by partial payments made by Chamberlain. Appellees argue that under section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes, the statute of limitation was tolled by partial payments made by Chamberlain. Section 95.051(1)(f) provides: (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss....

...(f) The payment of any part of the principal or interest of any obligation or liability founded on a written instrument. (Emphasis added). In Chaplin v. Estate of Cooke, 432 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the court stated: In 1975 the legislature added § 95.051(1)(f) ... This is the only subsection dealing specifically with written instruments and acts which would toll the running of time on written instruments. Under the provisions of § 95.051(1)(f), the only act which would toll the time for the running of the statute of limitations was the payment of any part of the principal or interest, *1064 since any contrary case law was superseded by § 95.051....

...tations. [1] Appellants countered that their complaint was timely because the cost of SPCI was financed by Appellees and added to the mortgage loan, and, therefore, each mortgage payment served to toll the running of the statute of limitations under section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes. [2] The trial court granted Appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Appellants' complaint with prejudice, finding that section 95.051(1)(f) did not toll the running of the statute of limitations and that Appellants' claims were time-barred because the complaint was filed more than eight years after the most recent SPCI purchase in 1998. Appellants concede on appeal that their claims are time-barred unless tolled by section 95.051(1)(f). Appellees contend that this statute does not apply to Appellants' claims because it applies only to suits by creditors after the debtor ceases to make payments on a debt founded on a written instrument. Appellants counter that section 95.051(1)(f) refers to the tolling of "any statute of limitation" and that the plain language of the statute does not limit its application to actions founded on the written instrument on which the payments are being made or to suits by creditors. Appellants are correct that section 95.051(1)(f) must be given its plain meaning to the extent its language is clear and unambiguous....

...to an unreasonable or absurd result. Maddox v. State, 923 So.2d 442, 446 (Fla. 2006). Here, the "plain meaning" interpretation proffered by Appellants would lead to absurd results. First, if, as Appellants argue, making payments was sufficient under section 95.051(1)(f) to toll the statute of limitations for any cause of action, a debtor's tort claim (or any other type of claim) against a creditor could be tolled even if the action was unrelated to the written instrument on which the payments were being made. This is an absurd result. The only logical interpretation of section 95.051(1)(f) is that it tolls the statute of limitations for claims founded on the written instrument on which the payments are being made....

...Maddox, 923 So.2d at 448 (narrowly construing statute prohibiting traffic citations from being introduced "in any trial" to exclude citations only in proceedings involving use of a motor vehicle because the literal interpretation of the statute would lead to absurd results). Second, if, as Appellants argue, section 95.051(1)(f) applied to actions brought by debtors such as Appellants, the statute would essentially permit them to unilaterally extend the deadline for bringing an action by making their monthly mortgage payments. This interpretation is contrary to any of the other tolling provisions in section 95.051(1) which extend the time for filing an action based upon the acts of the other party, not the party bringing the action....

...Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 36 (Fla.1976), modified on other grounds by Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177 (Fla.1993). Additionally, to the extent that Appellants contend that Appellees' receipt of the monthly mortgage payments is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations under section 95.051(1)(f), Appellants are asking us to read words into the statute that are not there....

...of the principle or interest" (emphasis supplied); it does not say that the statute of limitations is tolled by "payment or receipt of any part of the principle or interest." Appellants have not cited, and we could not locate, any case interpreting section 95.051(1)(f) to apply to claims brought by a debtor or to claims related to, but not expressly founded on, the written instrument on which the payments are being made. Cf. Dudas v. Dade County, 385 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that section 95.051(1)(f) did not apply to debtor's action to recover overpayment on an account). To the contrary, the cases construing section 95.051(1)(f) hold that the statute merely codified the common law rule that partial payment of a debt tolls the statute of limitations for the creditor to bring an action on the debt. See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. McCartha, 920 So.2d 144 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (discussing the common law rule, the legislative history of section 95.051(1)(f), and cases applying the statute). Chaplin v. Cooke's Estate, 432 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), cited by the dissent, is not contrary authority. First, the issue in that case was whether a new promise to pay tolled the statute of limitations on an existing debt, not whether section 95.051(1)(f) applied to claims brought by debtors. Second, unlike this case, Chaplin involved a suit by a creditor to collect a debt. Third, although we recognized in *664 Chaplin that section 95.051 superseded any contrary case law (such as that which recognized tolling based upon a new promise to pay an existing debt), it does not follow that the statute was intended to expand the circumstances for tolling as argued by Appellants to include circumstances that had never been recognized in case law. Our conclusion that section 95.051(1)(f) does not apply to Appellants' claims is consistent with the Third District's decision in South Motor Company of Dade County v....

...anty which was included in the loan and spread out in installments during the loan period. 957 So.2d at 1216. The complaint was filed two years after the running of the four-year statute of limitations. The buyer argued that the tolling provision of section 95.051(1)(f) applied to him because he had been making payments on the loan....

...The county court granted summary judgment for the dealer because the sale of the warranty occurred more than four years before the filing of the complaint. The circuit court reversed on appeal, holding that the buyer's continued payments kept his claim alive under section 95.051(1)(f)....

...On this point, the court stated: The circuit court's decision would effectively toll the running of the statute of limitation for all consumer transactions with extended payment plans for at least the life of the payments. This is a complete misapplication of the part-payment tolling provision in section 95.051(1)(f)....

...Without the protection of the statute, a compassionate obligee that accepts sporadic part-payments from the obligor could risk jeopardizing its collection rights. Id. at 1218 (citations omitted). For these same reasons, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that section 95.051(1)(f) does not apply to Appellants' claims and that the claims are barred by the statute of limitations....

...toll the running of time under any statute of limitations although a number of such circumstances or facts had developed through case law." Chaplin v. Cooke's Estate, 432 So.2d 778, 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). In 1974, however, the legislature enacted section 95.051, Florida Statutes, which provided for a set of exceptions to the statute of limitations. "In 1975, the legislature added section 95.051(1)(f), which provided that the running of time *665 was tolled by `[t]he payment of any part of the principal or interest of any obligation or liability founded on a written instrument.'" Id. As we observed in Chaplin, "[t]his is the only subsection dealing specifically with written instruments and acts which would toll the running of time on written instruments. Under the provisions of § 95.051(1)(f), the only act which would toll the time for the running of the statute of limitations was the payment of any part of the principal or interest, since any contrary case law was superseded by § 95.051." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, although the common law may have limited tolling the statute of limitations with respect to claims brought by creditors, the cases giving rise to this concept were superseded by section 95.051(1)(f), which does not express any such limit....

...nd the SPCI policy incorporated in it. Thus, the statute applies and tolls the running of the statute of limitations. We should reverse the trial court's determination that the statute of limitations on Appellants' causes of action was not tolled by section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes, and reinstate the action for consideration on the merits....

...tions pursuant to section 95.11(3)(k). The breach of the duties of good faith and fair dealing is a claim arising from the parties' contractual relationship and, therefore, subject to a five-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(b). [2] Section 95.051(1)(f) provides: (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss....

...4th DCA 1991), review denied, 599 So.2d 1278 (Fla.1992); University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000 (Fla.1991). [2] Under Florida law, the running of the statute of limitation in a personal injury action is not tolled during a plaintiff's minority. Fla.Stat. § 95.051....

...Weekly S578, 1997 WL 589312 (Fla. Sept. 25, 1997) (absent an expression of the Legislature that fraudulent concealment may act to toll the statute of limitations, courts are constrained to hon- or the statutory bar except for those circumstances enumerated in § 95.051)....

...22, ex 17; T1 204-05; T2 62-63. [6] Florida no longer requires that the party claiming judicial estoppel was misled or changed its position based upon the other party's conduct. Grau v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 899 So.2d 396, 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). [7] § 95.051, Fla....

...competent evidence. The partial summary judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. NOTES [1] Our reversal is without prejudice to plaintiffs to show any matters which would avoid the limitations bar. See § 95.051, Fla....

...ch should be read to mean the State of Florida. The lender contended that the statute of limitations was governed by Florida law, and that the Florida statute of limitations was tolled until October 24, 2003, when the last late payment was made. See § 95.051(f), Fla....

...ng the conditions which would invoke a statutory tolling provision, is on the plaintiff). The tolling exception in section 440.19(2) is analogous to the statutory tolling exceptions to the statutes of limitations applicable to civil actions found in section 95.051. Having held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving tolling exceptions contained in section 95.051, we can think of no reason why we should not reach the same result with regard to the tolling exception found in section 440.19(2)....

...At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Daron admitted that the one-year statute of limitations for specific performance had run, but he argued that the doctrine of equitable estoppel precluded his father from asserting it as a defense to the claims of specific performance. Citing the tolling statute, section 95.051, Florida Statutes (2005), the trial court dismissed those claims with prejudice because equitable estoppel was not one of the statutorily authorized grounds for tolling a limitation period....

...And, Plaintiffs have cited no case in which the supreme court has applied the doctrine outside of administrative actions. Our decision not to expand Machules beyond the administrative law context is grounded primarily on the expression of legislative intent found in section 95.051, Florida Statutes (2001), and the deference our supreme court has given to that expressed intent. Section 95.051(1) enumerates eight circumstances under which the running of the time under any statute of limitations is tolled. [9] Absent from this list of eight circumstances is the timely filing of a claim in the wrong forum. Furthermore, section 95.051(2) expressly precludes the use of any tolling provision not listed: "No disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section, s....

...ion of an exception to or a tolling of the statute of limitations based upon the doctrine of delayed discovery. The First District had held that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the delayed discovery doctrine in light of the fact that in section 95.051(1) the legislature provided explicit tolling provisions that did not include delayed discovery due to lack of memory....

...Sullivan, 753 So.2d 549 (Fla.1999) (rehearing pending)," in which the supreme court considered whether statutes of limitations in civil actions are tolled by the fraudulent concealment of the identity of the defendant. Hearndon, 710 So.2d at 90. The First District noted that "[t]he Sullivan court ruled that, because section 95.051(2), Florida Statutes (1985) `specifically precludes application of any tolling provision not specially provided for by the legislature,' Florida courts cannot recognize a basis for tolling the statute of limitations not specifically established by the Legislature." Id....

...imitations. Id. at 1185. Based on the distinction between "accrual" and "tolling," the court held that the delayed discovery doctrine may only be applied to the accrual of a cause of action. Id. at 1186. In its discussion, the court observed that in section 95.051(1) the legislature enumerated specific grounds for tolling limitations periods but did not include delayed discovery due to lack of memory. Id. at 1185. The court also noted that section 95.051(2) specifically precludes application of any tolling provision not provided in subsection (1)....

...e of limitation. The Florida Statutes do not impede, however, the delay of the accrual of a cause of action. Id. at 1185 (footnote omitted). In Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1075 (Fla.2001), the supreme court once again addressed section 95.051 when the court was asked whether the statute prohibited application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to an action filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations. The court held that although section 95.051(1) "delineates an exclusive list of conditions that can `toll' the running of the statute of limitations," id....

...mmon law doctrine that "does not `toll' anything," id. at 1077. Implicit in the court's holding is the conclusion that in order for a doctrine to "toll" the statute of limitations, it must be included in the exclusive list of conditions set forth in section 95.051(1)....

...4th DCA 1993)(applying doctrine where there was confusion regarding hearing date); Stewart v. Dep't of Corr., 561 So.2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)(holding that trial court erred in failing to apply doctrine of equitable tolling to allow employee to appeal his dismissal). [9] Section 95.051(1) contains exceptions to these tolling provisions that are not relevant here....

...The limitations period is statutorily tolled in some circumstances, particularly the adjudicated incapacity of the plaintiff before the cause of action accrued and the minority of the plaintiff during any period of time in which a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem does not exist. Fla. Stat. § 95.051 (l)(d), (h) (2011)....

...Ryder Int’l Inc., 264 Fed.Appx. 878, 881 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11 (3)(k) (2011)). As demonstrated above, Lanaza has alleged sufficient facts making it plausible that the seven-year tolled statute of limitations applies to her under Fla. Stat. § 95.051 (l)(d), (h) (2011)....

...The applicable statute of limitations in Florida provides for a four-year limitations period. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(p) (2011); see also Sneed, 370 Fed.Appx. at 47 (stating same). As demonstrated above, Lanaza has alleged facts reasonably suggesting that this limitations period is tolled to seven years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.051 (l)(d), (h) (2011)....

...95.11(3)(k) & (3)(p)). Simonetti, in contrast, suggests the five-year period applicable to the foreclosure of certain mortgage liens ( id. § 95.281(1)(a)), or the five year period applicable to actions on a written instrument ( id. § 95.11((2)(b))—as tolled by id. § 95.051(1)(f)) (statute of limitations for action on written instrument is tolled by the "payment of any part of the principal or interest")....

...§ 95.11(2)(b). The terms of the first note provided for payment of monthly installments of $200, the last of which would be paid in November, 1981. The statute of limitations is tolled while payments are being made on an installment note. Fla.Stat. § 95.051(f)....

...Hillman, 906 So.2d 1094, 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“We are not persuaded that our supreme court would allow the doctrine [of equitable tolling] to be applied in civil action[s] such as the Plaintiffs’.”). These cases base their reasoning on Florida Statutes section 95.051, which provides that “[t]he running of the time under any statute of limitations,” save for three exceptions not relevant here, may only be tolled by one of nine distinct statutory reasons, none of which includes equitable tolling. Fla. Stat. § 95.051 (1). The statute then states that “[a] disability or other reason does not toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section [or other statutory provisions not relevant here].” Id. § 95.051(2)....

...The Court has held that this restriction constitutes a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose. 6 III. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL v. MORSANI This Court in Major League Baseball v. Morsani 790 So.2d 1071 (Fla.2001), addressed the question of whether the tolling proscription in section 95.051 applies to equitable estoppel. 7 There, Major League Baseball alleged that Morsani’s tort claim was barred by the statute of limitations *1096 and that Morsani could not assert the doctrine of equitable estoppel because the doctrine was excluded by section 95.051. This Court disagreed, concluded that the doctrines of tolling and equitable estoppel “are as different as apples and oranges,” and held that the tolling proscription in section 95.051 is inapplicable to equitable estoppel....

...Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415, 418 (Fla.1992) ("A statute of limitation begins to run upon the accrual of a cause of action.... On the other hand, a statute of repose, which is usually longer in length, runs from the date of a discrete act on the part of the defendant without regard to when the cause of action accrued.”) . Section 95.051 sets forth an exclusive list of conditions that can "toll” the running of the statute of limitations; the section states that no other condition can toll the statute of limitations. The list does not mention equitable estoppel. See § 95.051, Fla....

...5th DCA 1982) (“While *1098 continuing negotiations regarding settlement do not 'toll’ the running of a statute of limitation, such negotiations, if infected with an element of deception, may create an estoppel. This is true even subsequent to the 1975 enactment of subsection (2) of section 95.051 which states that 'no disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section.’ ” (footnote and citation omitted)); Cape Cave Corp....

...instrument. See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. It also filed a counterclaim, demanding payment for outstanding invoices. Southern replied, claiming that Farmhouse had made partial payments on its debt which tolled the statute of limitations pursuant to section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes. Farmhouse filed an offer of judgment a few months before trial....

...monies loaned, 2 without referencing any written instrument. Thus, a four-year statute of limitations applied. See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. Although Southern contended that the statute was tolled pursuant to section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes, by partial payments on the monies loaned to Farmhouse, that section applies only to partial payments on obligations “founded on a written instrument.” As Southern elected to frame its claim without referenc...

...[9] Plaintiffs do not argue, nor does the Court find, that the statute of limitations should be statutorily or equitably tolled in this instance. Florida law does not allow the tolling of statutes of limitation for any reasons other than those specifically enumerated in Fla. Stat. § 95.051. See Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179 (Fla.2000) (declining to create additional tolling exceptions to those listed in § 95.051, instead deferring to the legislative directive that there be no tolling exceptions other than those declared by the legislature), and Major League Baseball, supra (same). Section 95.051 does not provide for tolling in the instant wrongful death causes of action....

...That is to say, foreclosure of the mortgage is time barred by section 95.11(2)(c) and the enforceable life of the mortgage lien ended by operation of section 95.281 prior to the commencement of their action. We note that none of the tolling grounds contained in section 95.051 is involved in the present matter because of the express exception from that statute of section 95.281. Moreover, as was noted in Swartzman, section 95.051 does not include the pendency of a bankruptcy action as a ground tolling the limiting periods not excepted from that statute....

...Ramirez has not explained how his late filing was attributable to any of the six weather emergencies. He has not alleged that these hurricanes or storms in any way "temporarily impeded the ability of [his] attorneys ... in the performance of their duties and obligations with respect to" the timely filing of his lawsuit. Section 95.051, Florida Statutes (2006), enumerated eight different, specific grounds for tolling limitation periods....

...d or lulled into inaction, that he was in some extraordinary way prevented from asserting his rights, or that he mistakenly asserted his rights in the wrong forum"). In Ryan v. Lobo De Gonzalez, 841 So.2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the court held that section 95.051, did not abrogate the doctrine of equitable estoppel....

...the Florida Supreme Court the power to "adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts," not to modify statutes. Furthermore, we have the Florida Supreme Court itself in Hearndon specifically declaring that by enumerating eight grounds in section 95.051, the legislature has basically precluded application of any other tolling provisions that imaginative litigants may come up with....

...Therefore, Davids’ breach of contract action accrued when Davids ended the attorney-client relationship with Clark in November 2000, not when Davids filed his amended motion to enforce the charging lien in June 2008. Further, we fail to find any exception under section 95.051 that would toll the statute of limitations....

...This Court has held that a statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed and that, even where the Legislature acts in a particular area, the common law remains in effect in that area unless the statute specifically says otherwise.... In the present case, not only does the plain language of section 95.051 not expressly change the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel, it does not mention or allude to that doctrine." 790 So.2d at 1077-78....

...5th DCA 1982) ("While continuing negotiations regarding settlement do not `toll' the running of a statute of limitation, such negotiations, if infected with an element of deception, may create an estoppel. This is true even subsequent to the 1975 enactment of subsection (2) of section 95.051, which states that `no disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section.'" (footnote and citation omitted)); Cape Cave Corp....

...ase at the expiration of 20 years from rendition of that judgment. § 95.11(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); Marsh v. Patchett, 788 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Additionally, Taylor's absence from the jurisdiction did not toll the statute of limitations. See § 95.051(a), Fla....

...olls the statute of limitations. Section 95.11(4)(b) provides an extension where fraud or intentional concealment prevents the discovery of the injury, but it does not include a similar provision *943 for the failure to discover the negligent actor. Section 95.051(1), Florida Statutes (1998), provides when the running of the statute of limitations may be tolled....

...But all statutes of limitations, which by their very nature destroy otherwise just causes merely because of the passage of time, are inherently harsh. Harsh results represent a trade-off which the Legislature has decided it is willing to make in exchange for the burying of stale claims. Even in the provisions of F.S. s 95.051, enacted after the events involved in this case, the Legislature has declined to exclude the situation before us from the effect of this decision; it certainly had not done so before....

...the two-year statute of limitations did not toll the statute. Again, in Putnam Berkley Group, Inc. v. Dinin, 734 So.2d 532, 534 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), we held that fraudulent concealment of the identity of a wrongdoer did not toll the statute because section 95.051 did not contain such a provision, and section 95.051(2) specifically provides that "`No disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section....'" *944 The supreme court ameliorated the effect of this construction of the statute in Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071 (Fla.2001). While acknowledging that the reasons for tolling the statute set forth in section 95.051 were a legislatively mandated exclusive set of circumstances that would suspend the relevant statute of limitations, it found the principle of equitable estoppel could be used to prevent a defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a bar to suit....

...Starling’s assumption that the stay prohibited her from filing an amended complaint on the Starling Docket. Accordingly, the Court finds that “equitable tolling” saves Mrs. Starling’s claim. 23 The Eleventh Circuit has explained: *1234 Florida law does allow for tolling in certain instances, Fla. Stat. § 95.051 , but that list is exhaustive, id. § 95.051(2); Hearndon v....

...32.) They maintain that the Court should not have considered the “excuses” Mrs. Starling provided in her pleadings to explain why she filed her wrongful death action after the two-year statute of limitations passed because they are not found in the tolling scenarios listed in Florida Statutes Section 95.051....

...Life Ins. Co., No. 07-20336, 829 F.Supp.2d 1262 , 2011 WL 5223085 (S.D.Fla. Nov. 2, 2011) 2 ; HCA Health Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Hillman, 906 So.2d 1094 (Fla.2d Dist.Ct.App.2005); Machules v. Dep’t of Admin., 523 So.2d 1132 (Fla.1988); Fla. Stat. § 95.051 ).) Mrs....

...e Court lifted the stay on the nine activated cases. (Doc. No. 76, pp. 3-4.) Mrs. Starling also asserts that the Florida Supreme Court would allow equitable tolling in this instance, arguing that “subsequent to the Florida Legislature’s enacting Section 95.051 in 1974, the Florida Supreme Court and courts of appeal have repeatedly recognized the continuing availability of equitable tolling.” (Id....

...ict Court of Appeal reviewed the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179 (Fla.2000) and Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1075 (Fla.2001) and explained: The [Florida Supreme Court] held that although section 95.051(1) “delineates an exclusive list of conditions that can ‘toll’ the running of the statute of limitations,” ......

...law doctrine that “does not ‘toll’ anything,” ... implicit in the court’s holding is the conclusion that in order for a doctrine to “toll” the statute of limitations, it must be included in the exclusive list of conditions set forth in section 95.051(1)....

...ting directly to Machules). Further, the court listed “equitable tolling” separate and apart from “tolling,” for which it included an explanatory footnote stating the “statutory bases for tolling the statutes of limitation are set forth in section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1991).” 4 Id....

...end to limit the applicability of equitable tolling to administrative proceedings, but rather found the facts in that case warranted use of an equitable remedy to toll the statute of limitations, regardless of the legislative constraints outlined in Section 95.051....

...The distinction between "tolling” and "equitable tolling” was also recognized in the Eleventh Circuit’s Aruanno v. Martin County Sheriff, 343 Fed.Appx. 535 , 537 n. 2 (11th Cir.2009) decision, in which it noted: Florida law does allow for tolling in certain instances, Fla. Stat. § 95.051 , but that list is exhaustive, id. § 95.051(2); Hearndon v....

...Although this unpublished opinion is not binding, it is nonetheless persuasive authority indicating how the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted “equitable tolling” under Florida law. . Although the Machules decision does not expressly discuss the tolling provisions set forth in the Florida Statutes, Section 95.051 was in effect at the time the court issued its opinion, and therefore was equally applicable to that case....

...induces suppression of consciousness) to delay accrual. Moreover, there is no case law which limits the application of rule 1.210(b) to intentional torts. Second, the appellees argue that Drake is no longer good law, because the legislature amended section 95.051, Florida Statutes, in 1990, six years after Drake , to add the following regarding minors and statutes of limitations: (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss....

...ated to sue; except with respect to the statute of limitations for a claim for medical malpractice as provided in s. 95.11. In any event, the action must be begun within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action. § 95.051(l)(h), Fla....

...were adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue, Doe does not qualify under the statute for a tolling of the statute of limitations. We disagree with the appellees’ argument that Drake is no longer good law because the appellees’ argument regarding section 95.051(1), as applied to minors, misses the mark by failing to recognize that rules regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations are distinct from the rules regarding the accrual of a cause of action. As the first sentence of section 95.051(1) makes clear, the legislature is delineating a rule of tolling, not a rule of accrual of a cause of action. To the extent that the appellees argue the last sentence of section 95.051(l)(i) (formerly section 95.051(l)(h)) creates a statute of repose applicable to this case, we deem the argument to lack merit because after enacting the statute of repose provision in section 95.051(1)© in 1990, the legislature in 2010 enacted a revision to section 95.11 which provides for an unlimited time period for pursuing a *90 cause of action when a child under the age of sixteen is a victim of sexual battery....

...By enacting a provision establishing an unlimited time period for bring actions by victims of sexually battery at a time when they are younger than sixteen at the time of abuse, the legislature clearly did not intend for the statute of repose bar in section 95.051(l)(i) (or the tolling provisions) to apply....

...she reached age eighteen) and the statute of repose would not have extinguished the cause of action until 2011, her cause of action was still viable on July 1, 2010, when section 95.11(9) became effective. Thus, we conclude the statute of repose in section 95.051(l)(i) does not bar her action on our review limited to the four corners of the complaint....

...Glass is distinguishable from this case because section 95.11(3)(c), unlike section 95.11(4)(b), contains a specific statutory exception to the running of the limitation period. A specific statutory exception to the statute of limitation is analogous to the specific tolling provisions enumerated in section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1985), in the context of burden of proof. Thus, in accordance with the Glass analysis, a plaintiff seeking to avoid a statute of limitation through the tolling provisions of section 95.051 or a specific statutory exception would have the burden of pleading avoidance, and of proving facts relevant to the tolling of or the exception to the statute during the trial....

...ise its remedies: a collection suit, a repossession and non-judicial sale, a claim for deficiency, or otherwise. Park Finance also argues that the statute of limitations was tolled by "the sale of the collateral and resulting partial payment," under section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...tolling effect as if the note was still in force — that is, the partial payments would toll the statute for a period of one month. In response to the motion, Cadle argued that the five-year period set forth in section 95.11(2)(b) had been tolled by section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes: (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss....

..., meaning the statute had been tolled for a period of nine months, giving Cadle until September 13, 2004 to file suit. Because suit had not been filed until November 30, 2004, the court concluded the suit was untimely. Prior to the 1974 enactment of section 95.051, Florida Statutes, Florida law had long recognized that the statute of limitations on a pre-existing debt would be tolled through the date of any new promise to pay the debt, even if the promise was oral, as long as the promise was made prior to the expiration of the limitations period....

...315 (1920) (on rehearing) (explaining that new promise of payment revived the cause of action because it refuted *146 any presumption that the obligation has been paid or discharged.) This exception was apparently eliminated in 1974, when the legislature enacted section 95.051, which provided that the running of time under any statute of limitations was tolled by certain listed circumstances and further provided in subsection (2) that "[n]o disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section, s. 95.091, the Florida Probate Code, or the Florida Guardianship Law." See Ch. 74-382, § 4, Laws of Florida. Section 95.051(1)(f), the tolling provision involved in this case, was added by the legislature in 1975....

...It is not until the payee stops making payment that the creditor is placed on notice that the debtor is no longer willing or able to honor the underlying obligation. Consistent with this viewpoint, the cases that have considered this issue to date indicate that under section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes, the five-year statute of limitations applicable to actions founded on a written instrument, is "tolled" through the date of any partial payment....

...[1] Accordingly, this action, filed on November 30, 2004, was timely. REVERSED and REMANDED. LAWSON and MONACO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So.2d 93 (Fla.2000), which was relied on by the trial court in holding that this action was untimely, addressed the operation of section 95.051 in resolving the issue posed in that case and is not on point.

...rst begins to ran. Tolling doctrines apply after the cause of action has accrued and the limitations period has begun, and address whether the running of the limitations period should be stayed for some specific period of time. . Although Fla. Stat. § 95.051 lists the bases for tolling statutes of limitations in Florida, including the limitations period applicable to breach of fiduciary duty claims, at least one Florida court has held that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment still applies....

...8, 2013) (recognizing existence of fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine but finding that plaintiff did not properly allege all elements). The Florida Supreme Court previously held that the fraudulent concealment doctrine no longer existed, and that the only viable tolling doctrines were enumerated in Fla. Stat. § 95.051 ; however the court subsequently withdrew that opinion....

...hold that the doctrine does not apply. Cf. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071 (Fla.2001) (holding that defendants may be estopped from raising defense of statute of limitations even though equitable estoppel is not listed in Fla. Stat. § 95.051 )....

...The trial court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed. II. Normally, a claim for injuries based on another party’s negligent conduct must be filed within four years of the incident under the applicable statute of limitations. § 95.051, Fla....

tolls the five-year statute of limitations. Section ,95.051(2) limits statute of limitations tolling to

circumstances that toll a statute of limitations. See § 95.051, Fla. Stat. (2007).3 Nanlann agrees that

...We find the other issues raised by appellant to be without merit, and affirm as to all appel-lees. Additionally, we note that the appellees also contend that the statute of limitations was in any event not tolled by the temporary injunction because Florida Statute Section 95.051 provides, by its terms, the exclusive instances for tolling its running....

...arose when World Omni resorted to state judicial process to collect the tax." Accordingly, even under Cohen's timeline, his claim accrued when World Omni filed suit on January 4, 2000. 2. Tolling Does Not Apply Tolling of a limitations period is governed by state law. See Witchel, 2008 WL 1848359, at *2. Fl. Stat. § 95.051 sets forth eight situations sufficient to toll a limitations period, none of which are applicable here....

767 So. 2d at 1185 (emphasis added). Section 95.051(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2019), provides:

forebear filing suit. Id. at 1073. We held that section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1993), which delineates

...ions. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 746 , 100 S.Ct. 1978, 1982 , 64 L.Ed.2d 659 (1980) (in federal court action based on state law, tolling of the statute of limitations is based on state law). Florida’s tolling statute, Fla.Stat. § 95.051 (West Supp.1994), enumerates the specific circumstances that toll the statute of limitations....

...Only those circumstances expressly provided by the statute will toll the statute of limitations. See Fla.Stat. § 95.-051(2) (“No disability or other reason shall *358 toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section ... ”); Webb v. Chambly, 584 So.2d 216, 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (Section 95.051 “limits tolling of statutes of limitations to the circumstances set out -within”). A reading of section 95.051 readily reveals that the doctrine of adverse domination is not among those tolling circumstances recognized by Florida statute....

...the Florida Supreme Court the power to "adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts," not to modify statutes. Furthermore, we have the Florida Supreme Court itself in Hearndon specifically declaring that by enumerating eight grounds in section 95.051, the legislature has basically precluded application of any other tolling provisions that imaginative litigants may come up with....

...and the holdings in Nur-Ul-Islam Academy and Drake. See D.H. v. Adept Cmty. Servs., Inc., No. SC17-829, 2017 WL 4325848, at *1 (Fla. Sept. 29, 2017). AFFIRMED and CONFLICT CERTIFIED. 1 We note that even if we were to adopt Appellants' argument as to section 95.051(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2011), Appellants' negligence and respondeat superior claims were filed beyond the seven-year repose period provided for in the statute. Likewise, their alternative argument, based on section 95.11(9), Florida...

tolled the running of the statute of limitations. § 95.051(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993). Upon the husband’s return

limitation tolling provisions, set forth in section 95.051, do not allow for a toll of any statute of

rule has been effected by the enactment of section 95.051(l)(f), Florida Statutes (1975), see Wassil

suggest that any of the tolling provisions in section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1991), pertain to this case

...a judgment of a court of Minnesota. This being the case, the statute of limitations barred the suit unless the payments Mr. Quaintance made tolled the limitation period as the court found in its alternative ruling. The applicable tolling statute is section 95.051 which reads in part as follows: 95.051 When limitations tolled.— (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss....

...te and no cases from other jurisdictions which construe similar statutes. In a broad sense, a judgment can be said to be a written instrument upon which an obligation is founded, namely the obligation to pay the judgment. Yet, the use of language in section 95.051(l)(f) which so closely parallels the language contained in section 95.-ll(2)(b) suggests that the legislature intended to limit the instances in which part payment would toll the statute to those causes of action enumerated in section 95.-ll(2)(b). It would have been easy enough for the legislature to have made reference in section 95.051(l)(f) to a claim based upon a judgment had it wished....

...Black River Nat’l Bank, 187 U.S. 211 , 23 S.Ct. 52 , 47 L.Ed. 147 (1902)). Florida statutes of limitation are contained in § 95.11. See Fla.Stat. § 95.11. Tolling of Florida’s statutes of limitation is permitted in precise situations set out within Florida Statute § 95.051. See Fla.Stat. § 95.051....

...applying to them. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23; Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.220. The plain language of both Florida Rule 1.220 and Federal Rule 23, does not address the tolling of a statute of limitation based on the filing of a class action suit. See id. Florida Statute § 95.051 addresses the issue of tolling statutes of limitation, while federal judge-made law addresses the tolling of statutes of limitation upon the filing of a class action suit. See id. The Florida Supreme Court has recently addressed the issue of tolling statutes of limitation, under Florida Statute § 95.051. See Fulton County Administrator v. Sullivan, 22 Fla.L. Weekly S578, — So.2d - (Fla. September 25, 1997). The Florida Supreme Court stated that only in- limited situations, which are specifically enumerated by Florida Statute § 95.051, are statutes of limitation tolled....

...n of Rule 23 to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220 (Dkts. 48, 92). Plaintiff further states that if the federal court applied the federal interpretation of Rule 23 to Florida Rule 1.220 tolling is required (Dkts. 48, 92). However, Florida Statute § 95.051'sets out the limited situations where a statute of limitations is tolled....

...In the case at hand, Federal Rule 23 is not in direct conflict with Florida rules or laws. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23; Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.220. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220 is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See id. If Florida Rule *683 1.220 and Florida Statute § 95.051, which sets out the specific situations where Florida statutes of limitation are tolled, can exist simultaneously within Florida, so can federal rule 23 and Florida Statute § 95.051....

...Plaintiff must only have notice of the possible invasion of their legal rights. See Doe v. Cutter Biological, 813 F.Supp. 1547 (M.D.Fla.1993) aff'd 16 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir.1994). Florida law does not allow the tolling of statutes of limitation for any other reason than those specifically enumerated in Florida Statute § 95.051. See Fulton County Administrator v. Sullivan, 22 Fla.L. Weekly S578, - So.2d - (Fla. September 25, 1997). Florida Statute § 95.051 does not allow tolling, for the claims asserted in the-instant cause of action....

...be a legal certainty. See Bogorff, 583 So.2d at 1004 . Plaintiff must only have notice of the possible invasion of their legal rights. See Doe v. Cutter Biological, 813 F.Supp. 1547 (M.D.Fla.1993) aff'd 16 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir.1994). Florida Statute § 95.051 does not permit tolling of statutes of limitation for any reason, other than those specifically included in the statute. See Fla.Stat. § 95.051; Sullivan, 22 Fla.L. Weekly S578, — So.2d -. Plaintiffs claims are not tolled under Florida Statute § 95.051....

...But all statutes of limitations, which by their very nature destroy otherwise just causes merely because of the passage of time, are inherently harsh. Harsh results represent a trade-off which the Legislature has decided it is willing to make in exchange for the burying of stale claims. Even in the provisions of F.S. § 95.051, enacted after the events involved in this case, the Legislature has declined to ex- *1007 elude the situation before us from the effect of this decision; it certainly had not done so before....

...Not just that, “the word ‘toll’ has been consistently used by the Legislature and interpreted by the courts to mean ‘suspend’ when used in a statutory limitation[] context.” Id. at 97 (emphasis supplied) (looking to meaning of “toll” in the general limitations statute—section 95.051, Florida Statutes—and concluding the Legislature intended for the term “to have the same meaning in section 766.106(4)”); Hearndon, 767 So. 2d at 1184–85 (considering the meaning and application of “toll” as used in section 95.051). “Toll,” then, must carry the same meaning wherever it appears in a limitation statute, including its usage in section 440.19(2)....

...ide the statute of limitations for specific performance of the Undertaking. The question then becomes whether the limitations period should be tolled for Plaintiff. Florida law provides nine bases for tolling a statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.051 . The statutory tolling list is exhaustive, see Fla. Stat. § 95.051 (2); Major League Baseball v....

...tion on the note began to run; thus the complaint filed in 1998 was untimely. The *1022 trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Benfield contends the action on the promissory note was timely because of the tolling provision in section 95.051(l)(f), Florida Statutes (1991). The applicable portions of section 95.051(1) state: “The running of the time under any statute of limitations ......

...of the debt becoming due and payable upon default in 1991. Both sides have cited numerous cases in support of their respective positions on the issue before us. None of the cited cases answer the question we are required to resolve. We conclude that section 95.051(1)® is applicable and that partial payments tolled the limitations period. Section 95.051(1)® applies equally to promissory notes, with or without acceleration clauses....

...“shall not be extended by any other agreement, nonresidence, disability, part payment, operation of law, or any other method.”2 § 95.281(4), Fla. Stat. mortgage explicitly stated that the document “shall not be deemed a novation of the mortgage.” 2 We also note that section 95.051, which provides that a statute of limitations is tolled by the payment of any part of the principal or interest of any obligation or liability founded on a written instrument, explicitly excludes section 95.281. See § 95.051(1), Fla....

We also find insurmountable the language in section 95.051, Florida Statutes, which limits tolling of

...Four years is the applicable limitations period for the causes of action at issue. See § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). M.J.O. contends that the running of the statute of limitations was tolled by Heller’s misrepresentation of himself as Welt on September 19, 2003. Section 95.051(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), provides that the “running of the time under any statute of limitations ......

...ified himself in September, 2003, the statute of limitations was tolled only until December, 2003, when M.J.O. learned that the misrepresentation occurred. The phrase “that is unknown to the person entitled to sue” modifies the word “use” in section 95.051(l)(b)....

...Discovery of the imposter’s actual identity is not a material event under the statute. See Putnam Berkley Group, Inc. v. Dinin, 734 So.2d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (recognizing that a tortfeasor’s fraudulent concealment of his identity will not toll the statute of limitations under section 95.051)....

...However, the victim did not file her lawsuit until 1991, when she allegedly recovered her memory about the abuse. The Hearndon Court conceded that delayed discovery is not one of the statutorily authorized grounds for tolling a limitation period. 767 So.2d at 1185; see also § 95.051, Fla....

...appeals from an order denying its motion to dismiss the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. We affirm the summary judgment because the record reflects no genuine issue of material fact that the twins’ claims accrued more than four years before they filed suit, and the tolling for minors’ claims provided by section 95.051(l)(h) is inapplicable here....

...The question of tolling, in contrast, is concerned with determining whether, after a plaintiffs cause of action has accrued, an applicable statute suspends the running of the limitations period for a defined length of time. See Hearndon, 767 So.2d at 1185 ; see also § 95.051....

...ons. On the contrary, as discussed in part II.B, the legislature has specifically addressed that *1080 problem through a provision that tolls the running of the statute of limitations on the claims of unrepresented minors in specified circumstances. § 95.051(l)(h)....

...n accrued on April 11, 2006 or, alternatively, May 19, 2006—both more than four years before they filed suit—we now consider whether the statute of limitations was tolled at any point. The twins argue that the limitations period was tolled under section 95.051(l)(h) continuously from the time their claims accrued until the grandparents were appointed *1083 their permanent guardians in April 2007. If true, that would render their complaint timely, where the tolled -four-year period would not have run until April 2011, after the November 2010 complaint was filed. Section 95.051(l)(h) provides, in relevant part, that the limitations period is tolled by [t]he minority or previously adjudicated incapacity of the person entitled to sue during any period of time in which a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem do...

...litem was unaware of the twins’ injuries and therefore did not request services to address those needs. The twins’ argument concerning the guardian ad litem’s awareness of their injuries is, as a matter of statutory text, irrelevant to whether section 95.051(l)(h) applies....

...ns period. That is an editorial prerogative that belongs to a legislature performing a policymaking function and is denied to a court performing an interpretative one. See Hayes, 750 So.2d at 4 ; FINR II, 164 So.3d at 1264 . The twins’ reliance on section 95.051(l)(h) is therefore misplaced....

...esult. On the summary judgment record in the trial court, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the twins’ negligence causes of action against Adept and B.E.A.R.R. accrued, at the latest, on May 19, 2006. Nor does the tolling afforded by section 95.051(l)(h) apply here under the undisputed facts....

...nce of Adept and B.E.A.R.R. on or before April 11, 2006. In light of our analysis in the text, however, it is unnecessary for us to decide that question. . We acknowledge the argument raised by the concurrence that the term "guardian ad li-tem” in section 95.051(l)(h) means only a guardian ad litem legally authorized to file suit on the minor's behalf, Because that argument has not been raised by the twins in this appeal, we are unable to resolve it here....

...y obtain permit denials but take no further action for several years. Although the BUD process provides no specific limitations period, it cannot operate to revive an inverse condemnation claim that is otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. Section 95.051, Florida Statutes, enumerates eight specific grounds for tolling limitations periods....

FARMER, Judge. The issue in this case is whether section 95.051(1), Florida Statutes (1991), has the effect

...by the pendency of other legal proceedings”). On appeal, the School Board correctly concedes that the trial court’s reliance on DuPont was misplaced, 4 and that the 2006 litigation did not toll the statute of limitations for its 2010 claims. See § 95.051(2), Fla....

...of contract theory. See, e.g., Leahy v. Batmasian, 960 So.2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). However, Langley never raised this defense below.- . As concluded by the Second District, the rule in Dupont was superseded by the Legislature’s 1974 adoption of section 95.051, codifying the "specific instances that toll the running of any statute of limitations.” Swartzman v....