316.191 Racing on highways, street takeovers, and stunt driving.—
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Burnout” means a maneuver performed while operating a motor vehicle whereby the motor vehicle is kept stationary, or is in motion, while the wheels are spun, resulting in friction which causes the motor vehicle’s tires to heat up and emit smoke.
(b) “Conviction” means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld.
(c) “Coordinated street takeover” means 10 or more vehicles operated in an organized manner to effect a street takeover.
(d) “Doughnut” means a maneuver performed while operating a motor vehicle whereby the front or rear of the motor vehicle is rotated around the opposite set of wheels in a continuous motion which may cause a circular skid-mark pattern of rubber on the driving surface or the tires to heat up and emit smoke from friction, or both.
(e) “Drag race” means the operation of two or more motor vehicles from a point side by side at accelerating speeds in a competitive attempt to outdistance each other, or the operation of one or more motor vehicles over a common selected course, from the same point to the same point, for the purpose of comparing the relative speeds or power of acceleration of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles within a certain distance or time limit.
(f) “Drifting” means a maneuver performed while operating a motor vehicle whereby the motor vehicle is steered so that it makes a controlled skid sideways through a turn with the front wheels pointed in a direction opposite to that of the turn.
(g) “Motor vehicle” has the same meaning as in s. 316.003. The term “motor vehicle” also includes any motorcycle, autocycle, moped, all-terrain vehicle, off-road vehicle, or vehicle not licensed to operate on a highway or roadway.
(h) “Race” means the use of one or more motor vehicles in competition, arising from a challenge to demonstrate superiority of a motor vehicle or driver and the acceptance or competitive response to that challenge, either through a prior arrangement or in immediate response, in which the competitor attempts to outgain or outdistance another motor vehicle, to prevent another motor vehicle from passing, to arrive at a given destination ahead of another motor vehicle or motor vehicles, or to test the physical stamina or endurance of drivers over long-distance driving routes. A race may be prearranged or may occur through a competitive response to conduct on the part of one or more drivers which, under the totality of the circumstances, can reasonably be interpreted as a challenge to race.
(i) “Spectator” means any person who is knowingly present at and views a drag race or street takeover, when such presence is the result of an affirmative choice to attend or participate in the event. For purposes of determining whether or not an individual is a spectator, finders of fact shall consider the relationship between the motor vehicle operator and the individual, evidence of gambling or betting on the outcome of the event, filming or recording the event, or posting the event on social media, and any other factor that would tend to show knowing attendance or participation.
(j) “Street takeover” means the taking over of a portion of a highway, roadway, or parking lot by blocking or impeding the regular flow of traffic to perform a race, drag race, burnout, doughnut, drifting, wheelie, or other stunt driving.
(k) “Stunt driving” means to perform or engage in any burnouts, doughnuts, drifting, wheelies, or other dangerous motor vehicle activity on a highway, roadway, or parking lot as part of a street takeover.
(l) “Wheelie” means a maneuver performed while operating a motor vehicle whereby a motor vehicle is ridden for a distance with the front wheel or wheels raised off the ground.
(2) A person may not:
(a) Drive any motor vehicle in any street takeover, stunt driving, race, speed competition or contest, drag race or acceleration contest, test of physical endurance, or exhibition of speed or acceleration or for the purpose of making a speed record on any highway, roadway, or parking lot;
(b) In any manner participate in, coordinate through social media or otherwise, facilitate, or collect moneys at any location for any such race, drag race, street takeover, stunt driving, competition, contest, test, or exhibition;
(c) Knowingly ride as a passenger in any such race, drag race, street takeover, stunt driving, competition, contest, test, or exhibition;
(d) Purposefully cause the movement of traffic, including pedestrian traffic, to slow, stop, or be impeded in any way for any such race, drag race, street takeover, stunt driving, competition, contest, test, or exhibition;
(e) Operate a motor vehicle for the purpose of filming or recording the activities of participants in any such race, drag race, street takeover, stunt driving, competition, contest, test, or exhibition. This paragraph does not apply to bona fide members of the news media; or
(f) Operate a motor vehicle carrying any amount of fuel for the purposes of fueling a motor vehicle involved in any such race, drag race, street takeover, stunt driving, competition, contest, test, or exhibition.
(3)(a) Any person who violates subsection (2) commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Any person who violates subsection (2) shall pay a fine of not less than $500 and not more than $2,000, and the department shall revoke the driver license of a person so convicted for 1 year. A hearing may be requested pursuant to s. 322.271.
(b) Any person who commits a second violation of subsection (2) within 1 year after the date of a prior violation that resulted in a conviction for a violation of subsection (2) commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, and shall pay a fine of not less than $2,500 and not more than $4,000. The department shall also revoke the driver license of that person for 2 years. A hearing may be requested pursuant to s. 322.271.
(c) Any person who violates subsection (2) and, in the course of committing the offense, knowingly impedes, obstructs, or interferes with an authorized emergency vehicle as defined in s. 316.003(1) which is on call and responding to an emergency other than a violation of this section, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in paragraph (b).
(d) Any person who commits a second or subsequent violation of paragraph (c) commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. The department shall also revoke the driver license of that person for 4 years. A hearing may be requested pursuant to s. 322.271.
(e) Any person who commits a third or subsequent violation of subsection (2) within 5 years after the date of a prior violation that resulted in a conviction for a violation of subsection (2) commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, and shall pay a fine of not less than $3,500 and not more than $7,500. The department shall also revoke the driver license of that person for 4 years. A hearing may be requested pursuant to s. 322.271.
(f) Any person who violates paragraph (2)(a), paragraph (2)(d), paragraph (2)(e), or paragraph (2)(f) while engaged in a coordinated street takeover commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, and shall pay a fine of not less than $2,500 and not more than $4,000. Pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, the arresting law enforcement agency may move to seize any vehicle used in the violation of paragraph (d). The department shall also revoke the driver license of that person for 2 years. A hearing may be requested pursuant to s. 322.271.
(g) In any case charging a violation of subsection (2), the court shall be provided a copy of the driving record of the person charged and may obtain any records from any other source to determine if one or more prior convictions of the person for a violation of subsection (2) have occurred within a specified period before the charged offense.
(4)(a) A person may not be a spectator at any race, drag race, or street takeover prohibited under subsection (2).
(b) A person who violates paragraph (a) commits a noncriminal traffic infraction, punishable by a fine of $400.
(5) Whenever a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a person violated subsection (2), the officer may arrest and take such person into custody without a warrant. The court may enter an order of impoundment or immobilization as a condition of incarceration or probation. Within 7 business days after the date the court issues the order of impoundment or immobilization, the clerk of the court must send notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the registered owner of the motor vehicle, if the registered owner is a person other than the defendant, and to each person of record claiming a lien against the motor vehicle.
(a) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the impounding agency shall release a motor vehicle under the conditions provided in s. 316.193(6)(e), (f), (g), and (h), if the owner or agent presents a valid driver license at the time of pickup of the motor vehicle.
(b) All costs and fees for the impoundment or immobilization, including the cost of notification, must be paid by the owner of the motor vehicle or, if the motor vehicle is leased or rented, by the person leasing or renting the motor vehicle, unless the impoundment or immobilization order is dismissed. All provisions of s. 713.78 shall apply.
(c) Any motor vehicle used in violation of subsection (2) may be impounded for a period of 30 business days if a law enforcement officer has arrested and taken a person into custody pursuant to this subsection. If the arresting officer finds that the criteria of this paragraph are met, the officer may immediately impound the motor vehicle. The law enforcement officer shall notify the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles of any impoundment for violation of this subsection in accordance with procedures established by the department. Paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be applicable to such impoundment.
(6) Any motor vehicle used in violation of subsection (2) by any person within 5 years after the date of a prior conviction of that person for a violation under subsection (2) may be seized and forfeited as provided by the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. This subsection shall only be applicable if the owner of the motor vehicle is the person charged with violating subsection (2).
(7) This section does not apply to licensed or duly authorized racetracks, drag strips, or other designated areas set aside by proper authorities for such purposes.
...316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)1 28.1(a) causing property damage DUI ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was adopted in 1992 and amended in 1998 and 2009. 28.5(a) RACING ON A HIGHWAY § 316.191, Fla....
Cited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 828953
...Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Joshua R. Heller, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from Appellant's convictions for racing on a highway, in violation of section 316.191(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), and vehicular homicide, in violation of section 782.071(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....
...The convictions were entered below based upon Appellant's guilty plea. Appellant now argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to vehicular homicide. He claims this charge lacked a factual basis on the element of causation. Also, Appellant contends section 316.191 is facially unconstitutional as void for vagueness....
...the innocent party"). Given the foregoing, the charge of vehicular homicide had adequate factual support and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. III Regarding the facial validity of section 316.191, Appellant claims the statute should be found unconstitutionally vague *1071 pursuant to State v....
...esolved in favor of its validity. See State v. Brake, 796 So.2d 522, 527 (Fla.2001). However, any doubts raised in a vagueness challenge should be resolved in the citizen's favor and against the State. Id. Applying these principles, we conclude that section 316.191 can survive a facial challenge, contrary to the Fourth District's finding in Wells. Section 316.191, Florida Statutes (2005), states, in pertinent part: (1) As used in this section, the term: (b) "Drag race" means the operation of two or more motor vehicles from a point side by side at accelerating speeds in a competitive attempt to...
...rmine if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all its applications. See Travis v. State, 700 So.2d 104, 105-106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). In doing so, "the court must begin by applying the enactment to the facts of the case at hand." Id. at 106. Here, section 316.191 fairly proscribes Appellant's conduct....
...The obvious purpose of Appellant's conduct was to outdistance the other car and be the first to arrive at a given destination. This conduct, combined with the fact that Appellant refused to let the other vehicle pass, is encompassed by the definition of "racing" and, more importantly, is expressly prohibited by section 316.191(2)(a)(1). Thus, the statute is facially valid. This finding directly conflicts with the Fourth District's conclusion in Wells, *1072 where it determined section 316.191 to be unconstitutionally vague....
...The Fourth District found the statute's definition of "racing" as the "use of one or more vehicles in an attempt to outgain or outdistance another motor vehicle" included legal activities such as passing and accelerating from a stop. Id. at 839. It concluded that "[s]ection 316.191, by failing to include an element of competition in its out-of-the-ordinary definition of `race,' encompasse[d] an endless range of otherwise legal conduct ....
...When engaging in statutory interpretation, "related statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent whole." Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 829 So.2d 891, 898 (Fla. 2002); see also Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 199 (Fla.2007). Here, section 316.191(2)(a)(1) prohibits drivers from engaging in, among other things, "any race, speed competition or contest, [or] drag race or acceleration contest. " (emphasis added). Moreover, the legislature defined "drag race" as when two vehicles engage "in a competitive attempt to outdistance each other." § 316.191(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Reading these provisions together, the statute cannot be applied unless vehicles are "competing" with each other. Therefore, we decline to follow Wells and find section 316.191 facially constitutional. IV We affirm Appellant's convictions for racing on a highway and vehicular homicide. In so doing, we reject Appellant's claims that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was improperly denied and that section 316.191 is facially unconstitutional. We certify conflict with Wells, to the extent that it found section 316.191 facially invalid as void for vagueness....
Cited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 2609461
...L'Italien, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. James S. Benjamin and Peter T. Patanzo of Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Jamie Wells was charged with racing on highway under Florida Statutes section 316.191 (2005) and filed a motion to dismiss challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The trial court granted the motion and found section 316.191 unconstitutional on both vagueness and over-breadth grounds....
...e as a passenger in, or purposely cause the movement of traffic to slow or stop for, any such race, competition, contest, test, or exhibition, to-wit: the defendant was driving at a high rate of speed side by side with another vehicle, contrary to F.S. 316.191(2)(a). Wells filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Declare Fla. Stat. 316.191 Unconstitutional. In the motion, Wells contended that the racing on highway charge should be dismissed because section 316.191 was unconstitutional on three bases. First, Wells asserted that section 316.191 was void for vagueness, specifically alleging that the term "race" was constitutionally infirm based on its definition which included the vague terms "outgain and outdistance" that could encompass entirely lawful conduct. Second, Wells contended that section 316.191 was overbroad for encompassing constitutionally-protected conduct. Third, Wells claimed that the vagueness *837 and overbreadth of section 316.191 would result in arbitrary and capricious enforcement. The trial court held a hearing on Wells's motion to dismiss. Defense counsel contended that section 316.191 was unconstitutional as applied to Wells based on vagueness and overbreadth....
...I think it's overbroad, vague, and ambiguous; and, as written, anybody that accelerates from a light or to change lanes or to pass somebody could be violating the statute." Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting Wells's motion to dismiss on grounds of the unconstitutionality of section 316.191. The trial court wrote: On Thursday July 27, 2006, this Court heard argument from both the Defendant and the State of Florida regarding this Defense Motion to Dismiss and Declare Fla. Stat. § 316.191 unconstitutional. After hearing said motion and considering arguments from both sides this Court does find that the defendant does have standing to raise these challenges as Fla. Stat. § 316.191 is being applied to him; that, Fla. Stat. § 316.191 on its face and as applied is unconstitutionally vague and does not give a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct. Additionally, after hearing legal argument from both the State and the Defendant this Court finds that, Fla. Stat. § 316.191 is unconstitutionally overbroad and criminalizes otherwise innocent behavior that is constitutionally protected. This Court finds that this overbroad infirmity leads to arbitrary and capricious results in its application and enforcement by law enforcement. Therefore this Court finds Fla. Stat. § 316.191 unconstitutional facially and as applied to the defendant....
...beyond a reasonable doubt." Burch v. State, 558 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1990); see also Spanish River Resort Corp. v. Walker, 497 So.2d 1299, 1305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)(same). Keeping in mind these principles, we conclude that the trial court properly found section 316.191 to be unconstitutional both facially and as applied on vagueness grounds, but that the trial court erred *838 by finding section 316.191 unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds. Florida Statutes section 316.191 provides: (1) As used in this section, the term: (a) "Conviction" means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld....
...Any person who violates any provision of this paragraph shall pay a fine of not less than $500 and not more than $1,000, and the department shall revoke the driver license of a person so convicted for 1 year. A hearing may be requested pursuant to s. 322.271. We first address the trial court's finding that section 316.191 was vague....
...discriminatory enforcement." Habie v. Krischer, 642 So.2d 138, 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see also Se. Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 453 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 1984)(same). *839 We conclude that the trial court did not err by finding section 316.191 vague and declaring it unconstitutional both facially and as applied to Wells's case....
...ute vague because the "outgain and outdistance" term could encompass passing, accelerating from a stop, and countless other legal maneuvers (and illegal and otherwise proscribed maneuvers, such as speeding) which drivers employ in their daily lives. Section 316.191, by failing to include an element of competition in its out-of-the-ordinary definition of "race," encompasses an endless range of otherwise legal conduct (primarily based on the "outgain and outdistance" term), including passing and a...
...ly proscribed by the statute, as it is unclear whether he was attempting to "outgain or outdistance" the other driver (or undertake any other conduct indicative of racing as defined) or simply speeding. We next address the trial court's finding that section 316.191 was overbroad. The State is correct that overbreadth challenges are typically limited to statutes infringing on First Amendment rights (unlike section 316.191), see Se....
...Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205-1206 (9th Cir. 1999), and that driving is a privilege rather than a right, see State, Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Degrossi, 680 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). As such, the State's contention that the trial court erred by declaring section 316.191 unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds is well-taken because overbreadth is not implicated where a statute does not affect a fundamental constitutional right. Consequently, although the trial court properly found section 316.191 to be facially and appliedly unconstitutional as void for vagueness, this case should also be reversed and remanded in part for the trial court to strike the overbreadth findings (and the related arbitrary and capricious enforcement findings) from its order where it erred by finding section 316.191 unconstitutional as overbroad. In sum, because the trial court did not err by finding section 316.191 unconstitutional both facially and as applied on vagueness grounds, the trial court did not err by granting Wells's motion to dismiss the racing on highway count with which he *840 was charged. However, the trial court erred by finding section 316.191 unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds. As such, this case is affirmed as to vagueness and reversed and remanded as to overbreadth for the trial court to remove the overbreadth findings from its otherwise proper order finding section 316.191 unconstitutional both facially and as applied and dismissing the racing on highway charge against Wells....
. 28.5(a) RACING ON A HIGHWAY § 316.191(3)(a), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of
This Florida statute resource is curated by Graham W. Syfert, Esq., a Jacksonville, Florida personal injury and workers' compensation attorney. Attorney Syfert regularly works with Chapter 316 in the context of traffic and automobile accident law and represents clients throughout Northeast Florida. For legal consultation, call 904-383-7448.
